

NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TO:

FROM:

CHIEF DIVISION \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ EX. O. B-I \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ ADJT. B-II (1) *JK*  
 \_\_\_\_\_ PERS. O. B-III (2) \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ PROP. O. B-IV \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ TRAINING OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ CHIEF DIVISION   
 \_\_\_\_\_  EX. O. B-I \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ ADJT. B-II \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ PERS. O. B-III \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ PROP. O. B-IV \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ TRAINING OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_

*In turn*

COMMENTS AND RETURN  
 \_\_\_\_\_ INFORMATION AND RETURN  
 \_\_\_\_\_ INFORMATION AND FILE  
 \_\_\_\_\_ YOUR ACTION BY  
 \_\_\_\_\_ COORDINATE WITH

\_\_\_\_\_ AS REQUESTED  
 \_\_\_\_\_ SEE ME AT  
 \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNATURE  
 \_\_\_\_\_ GEN'L DIST.

11 Recommend a special unit to study all translations for security leads and follow same up. This would relieve the translators of the responsibility of decoding which are "c" Bulletins. *JK*

*Jul 3*

RESTRICTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET  
 TOP SECRET

REF ID: A4148554

~~TOP SECRET~~

22 January 1945

~~Secret~~  
By Authority of the  
Chief Signal Officer

Initials *FR* Date *27 Jan 45*

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM for Colonel Hayes

Subject: Communication Security Compromises

1. I do not believe that the Intelligence Division or Office of the Director of Communications Research is in a position, either with respect to personnel or availability of collateral information, to evaluate the security compromises which may show up in ultra material. All such information should be correlated with prisoner of war reports, reports of physical compromise, and security studies, in order to arrive at the proper evaluation of the compromise so that the necessary corrective action can be taken.

2. It appears that the Cryptographic Security Officer of the War Department already has certain powers vested in him, which, if properly expanded, would provide the necessary administrative and operational mechanism for effecting the aims of the attached paper. The proper expansion would possibly require the addition of personnel with specific qualifications for examining and evaluating the material from all sources pertaining to our own codes and ciphers. If done at SSA, it would certainly be a function of the Security Division, and not the other two offices mentioned.

3. At this time MIS has a large staff of personnel occupied in correlating and evaluating all types of information. No mention is made in the attached paper, now being undertaken by MIS on such material. It would appear that G-2, since it is charged with the evaluation and dissemination of information from Ultra sources, would be logically considered in the capacity proposed by the paper, and it is important to note that G-2 has the power to initiate corrective action much more rapidly than an operating agency such as SSA which in certain cases, would have to obtain approval of G-2. It is thought that consideration should be given toward having this function performed by G-2, since, within the frame-work of its organization, similar mechanisms have already been set up for other purposes. It is not inconceivable that some steps in this direction have already been taken by G-2.

4. Wherever the authority is vested, specialists will be required for proper functioning. It goes without saying, that such specialists should have instant and ready access to all sources of information bearing on the subject.

~~TOP SECRET~~

*FR*  
Frank B. Rowlett  
Lt. Colonel, Signal Corps.

*Handwritten mark*