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ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



SPSIS-3

20 September 1945

SUBJECT: Security of Allied Ciphers

TO: Commanding General  
Signal Security Agency

1. One of the primary concerns of this office has been the integration of knowledge between the Intelligence Division and the Security Division in order that the know-how of practical cryptanalysis and its product could be applied to the cryptography of our own systems. You have asked what Signal Security Agency has produced similar to the British ZIP/SAC reports (Tab A), and it seems appropriate to give a summary of the whole subject at this time.

2. In September 1944, a memorandum was prepared by this office pointing out the need for furthering the integration between the two Divisions, and recommending that a permanent committee be formed for this purpose (Tab B). The paper was discussed at one of the first meetings of the Security Division conducted by Colonel Cook in the absence of Colonel Allsopp. C Branch (including Security Section), represented by Major Horton, agreed with the need for greater integration but felt that the proposed committee was not the answer. A Branch, represented by Major Sheetz, was wholeheartedly for the committee idea, while Major Rosen of F Branch thought that the Office of the Director of Communications Research should be the nucleus for such integration. No conclusions were reached and the paper was referred back to the Director of Communications Research who awaited Colonel Allsopp's return to pursue the matter further. No formal action was ever taken on the matter, but after the paper was referred to Colonel Allsopp a liaison officer for the Security Division was appointed to work on a full-time status with the Intelligence Division.

3. Frequent talks by this office with Colonel Allsopp, Major Martan, Major Prehn, and Captain Leshner, stressed the need for a more thorough evaluation of the C Series of the Bulletin. In November 1944, Lt. Ragland, under Major Prehn's direction, began preparing a short digest of these messages (Tab C).

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SPSIS-3 (20 September 1945)

4. In the latter part of 1944, this office learned of studies being undertaken by MIS on the evaluation of Japanese intelligence methods. In subsequent discussions with the MIS officer in charge of this unit, it became apparent that no comprehensive method was in force to insure that suitable action would be taken when communication security compromises were indicated. A written study of the above problem was undertaken by this office, and copies of Tab D were submitted to the Intelligence and Security Divisions for comment. A copy was also given to Major Spitzer of MIS for comment. This resulted in a conference between Colonel Collins, members of Security Division, this office, and Lt. Colonel Goodrich of MIS, and in the issuance by MIS of a directive, dated 3 March 1945, which vested primary responsibility in MIS for conducting research in connection with material obtained from Ultra sources relating to (1) compromises of cryptographic systems employed by U.S. or Allied Forces, and (2) indications of enemy traffic analysis of U.S. or Allied communications. (See Tab E). The Director of Communications Research was designated by the Commanding Officer, Signal Security Agency, as the Agency's representative to fulfill its part of the directive. Major Spitzer was designated by MIS to make the studies outlined in the directive. Eventually, a full-time representative from B-IV worked in Major Spitzer's section, and twelve scanners in B-I were set up to isolate Bulletin material for it.

5. In the meantime Security Division set up a section of its own in the Communication Security Branch as a result of the study referred to in Tab D. This section was to study all sources of cryptographic compromise including Ultra. It started the series of "I" reports (Tab F). Five copies of these reports were prepared and were distributed to the Chief, Security Division and staff, A Branch, Commanding General, and Director of Communications Research, MIS (Major Spitzer), and file. This represents Signal Security Agency's equivalent of the British report (Tab A). This report was never distributed to the theatres by the Security Division since it had no authority to disseminate Ultra information, although according to Colonel Hayes and Lt. Colonel Bickwit it would be extremely valuable to the theater Signal and SIS officers. Communication Security Branch felt that the theaters were doing all that could be done and that the material in the "I" reports would represent no new information for them.

6. Major Spitzer has been carrying out the responsibility of MIS in evaluating cryptanalytic and T/A successes of the Japanese, but has been handicapped in not having technical

~~TOP<sup>2</sup> SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPSIS-3 (20 September 1945)

technical knowledge of the subjects. Captain Maass of Security Division, and Lieutenants Barasch and Burcum of B-IV were able to give him considerable assistance. Two of the MIS reports are attached (Tabs G and H) as examples. Lt. Barasch actually wrote the one dealing with T/A (Tab H). These are distributed by MIS to the appropriate theater Special Security officers, and to interested recipients at Signal Security Agency.

8 Incls  
Tabs A thru H



MARK RHOADS  
Assistant Director of  
Communications Research

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