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CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

DATE 17 April 46

TO	FROM	TO	FROM
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chief, NSA	(10)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Ch, Security Div (80)
Exec O	(11)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	P & O Staff (81)
Control O	(15)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Ch, Materiel Br (82)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dir Comm Res	(14)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Ch, Protec Br (84)
Asst Ch (Staff)	(20)		Ch, Maint Br (85)
Ch, Pers Sec	(21)		Ch, Methods Br (83)
Ch, Org & Trg	(22)		Ch, Res & Dev Div (70)
Ch, Materiel	(24)		Tech Staff (71)
Ch, Plans & Oper	(23)		Ch, Ciph & Ciph Br (72)
Adjutant, NSA	(26)		Cn, Int Equip Br (75)
Ch, Fiscal Sec	(25)		Ch, Elec & Elec Br (74)
Ch, Sec Cont	(27)		Ch, Lab Serv Br (73)
Asst Ch (Oper)	(60)		Ch, C'logic Br (76)
Ch, Intel Div	(90)		Ch, Fer & Ing Br (61)
Ch, Int Cont Br	(94)		Ch, Supply Br (62)
Ch, Crypt Br	(93)		CO, Arlington H S (40)
Ch, Lab Br	(91)		2d Sig Serv Br (50)
Ch, I & D Br	(95)		
Ch, Machine Br (92)			
<input type="checkbox"/> As discussed	()		Information & file
<input type="checkbox"/> as requested	()		Recommendation
<input type="checkbox"/> Concurrence or comments	()		Signature if approved
<input type="checkbox"/> Information & forwarding	()		Your action by _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Information & return	()		Info upon which to base reply

In view of your explanation of new G-2 set up, & especially in view of stated functions of the Selection Group, I thought we might revive some interest in the attached paper.

WDGSS Form No. 96. (Rev. 9) - 6 Feb 46

Take up with ASA
Target Section of Collection Group

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-07-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

There is probably something to this but I would be reluctant to try to put anything out on this, for security reasons. I doubt very much if STANWIS would go for it. What do you think?

J

Dir Com Rep. We will never get improvement in State Dept Security if Attachés are going to be given responsibility. What happens in the many consulates, legations etc where no attachés are available? We must make the State Dept conscious of their grave responsibility for safeguarding their own communications.

I agree that better instruction of attachés on what material is of value to NSA would be helpful. Over a year ago I drafted a letter of instruction but it would not go for it.

11/5/54 2-man: p

TO

DATE

28 Feb 46

FROM

Chief, ASA (SS-10)

Executive O (SS-11)

Control O (SS-15)

Dir of Comm Research (SS-14) ✓

Asst Chief (Staff) (SS-20)

Chief, Pers Sec (SS-21)

Chief, Org & Tng Sec (SS-22)

Chief, Materiel Sec (SS-24)

Chief, Plans & Oper Sec (SS-23)

Adjutant (SS-26)

Chief, Fiscal Sec (SS-25)

Chief, Sec Cont Sec (SS-27)

✓ Asst Chief (Operations) (SS-60)

Chief, Intelligence Div (SS-90)

Asst Chief, Intel Div

Chief, Int Cont Br (SS-94)

Chief, Cryptanalytic Br (SS-93)

Chief, Lab Br (SS-91)

Chief, I & D Br (SS-95)

Chief, Machine Br (SS-92)

Chief, Security Div (SS-80)

Asst Chief, Sec Div

Plans & Oper Staff (SS-81)

Chief, Materiel Br (SS-82)

Chief, Protective Br (SS-84)

Chief, Maintenance Br (SS-85)

Chief, Methods Br (SS-83)

Chief, Res & Dev Div (SS-70)

Asst Chief/IC Operations

Technical Staff (SS-71)

Chief, Ciph & Ciph Br (SS-72)

Chief, Int Equip Br (SS-73)

Chief, Elec & Elec Br (SS-74)

Chief, Lab Serv Br (SS-75)

Chief, Cryptologic Br (SS-76)

Chief, Pers & Tng Br (SS-61)

Chief, Supply Br (SS-62)

CO, Arlington Hall Sta (SS-40)

2d Sig Serv Bn (SS-50)

As discussed

As requested

Comments and return

Information and file

Information and forwarding

Information and return

Recommendation

✓ See note on reverse

Signature if approved

Your action

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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By Authority of the
Commanding General

Initials Date

mk
21 February 1946

WDGSS-14

SUBJECT: Proposal for More Complete Liaison between Army,
Navy, and State Department

TO: Director of Communications Research

1. There are facilities now available which, with proper modifications and extensions, can be used to increase the efficiency of liaison between the Army, Navy, and the State Department which will result in the mutual benefit of all concerned.

2. The ASA has an interest in the security of State Department communications through its membership in the Cryptographic Security Board, consisting of members from the State Department, the Army, and the Navy. This board was appointed by the President as a result of recommendations made by a joint Army-Navy ad hoc Committee. As a result also of this joint survey, the State Department asked for and obtained the assistance of Army and Navy personnel to head up and operate its cryptographic section.

3. The ASA has an interest in State Department communications as a highly important source of collateral information, i.e. in the way of cribs. MIS has furnished some of this information in the past.

4. So far both of the ASA interests as outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 have been confined to the location of Washington alone. It is now proposed that these interests be extended to include U.S. embassies and ministries in the various foreign capitals by making use of the Military and Naval Attaches stationed thereat. These attaches would be assigned the additional function of Embassy Cryptographic Security Officer in the same manner as the present Army-Navy contingent now in the State Department. They would also be on the watch for likely cribs, a function which is not however handled by the above-mentioned contingent in Washington, but which might well be added,

5. To set such a plan into operation, provided the State Department approves, it would be necessary to provide

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a course of instruction of perhaps a month's duration at ASA and/or at NCA for new military and naval attaches before reporting for duty at the various foreign capitals. Not only could they be taught the general principles of cryptographic, physical, and transmission security, and crib intelligence, but also what to look for in other fields of collateral information such as books and pamphlets. In addition, they would be "cleared" so that special requests for cribs and publications could be intelligently handled in the various foreign capitals.

6. This whole program could well be set up and coordinated by STANCIB and STANCCIC, particularly so now that the State Department is represented on these committees. Representation is thus present for all phases of coordination, i.e. State Department, G-2, ONI, ASA, and Op-20-G. The State Department will benefit from additional communications security throughout the world and from the additional intelligence which it will receive via military and naval cryptanalytic and intelligence facilities. The Army and Navy intelligence centers will get more intelligence to integrate into the whole intelligence picture, and the cryptanalytic agencies of both services will be furnished highly valuable collateral information which will enable much quicker entry into foreign cryptographic systems.



MARK RHOADS
Assistant Director of
Communications Research

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