

Commander Adams, P/P

13 December 1954

Mr. Friedman, Special Assistant

NSA Long-Range Estimate (NSALEN)

1. Your paper reflects an excellent amount of work and clear thinking.

2. It might be well to include an additional Annex (or an addition to Annex "E") which would take into consideration the fruits of commercial research and development which may be pertinent and applicable to NSA's efforts. (Such information can be obtained by direct contact with companies, or through some of our Board and Panel members.) This has enough potential from a long range and/or "mobilization base" viewpoint that it must be included in our thinking, and should be clearly stated in our "long range estimates." The item under Annex "E", "conducted by outside departments and agencies," is not considered inclusive of knowledge of the state and potential of the art in commercial outfits.

3. In reference to Inclosure 3, it might be effective to wind up paragraph I 1c with the statement: "Therefore it can be said that the peak of our national cryptologic effort may well have passed when general hostilities commence."

4. Similarly, referring to paragraph I 2a ("THE COMINT EFFORT"), it might be well to conclude: "The degree of success or failure of the effort will be known only upon the commencement of hostilities."

5. Still referring to Inclosure 3, but now to Section II, attention is invited to the fifth assumption. It is technically a bit inaccurate and is not comprehensive, hence could be misleading.

6. The eleventh assumption could well be qualified with the statement that it could be a serious mistake to postpone any phase or expansion of the COMINT effort by reliance on a sudden expansion resulting from hostilities. The optimum condition would be for the COMINT community to be very close to wartime posture, capacity, and capability before the outbreak of hostilities.

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