

18 April 1952

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] Participation in U.S./U.K. Collaboration on COMINT Matters

1. Pursuant to the decision of USCIB at its 75th meeting on 24 March 1952, the Deputy Coordinator [redacted] for the purpose of making an informal explanation [redacted] concerning the results of the BRUSA conference held in London in January 1952.

2. The Deputy Coordinator called upon [redacted] on the afternoon of 10 April 1952. The contents of USCIB 14/208, a summary of agreements reached in London, were explained to the latter. After this presentation, [redacted] stated that, in his opinion, there did not appear to be much in the agreements of direct concern [redacted]. He inquired if it would be necessary [redacted]. The view was expressed that this would probably not be necessary as the arrangements were regarded as coming within the scope of the BRUSA Agreement and the provisions affected were virtually the same in [redacted]. The new arrangements might, therefore, be considered merely as agreed interpretations. In response to a question as to the manner in which [redacted] might desire official notification, [redacted] indicated that he considered a resume' of the type presented would be sufficient for purposes of [redacted]. It was agreed that such a resume' would be prepared and forwarded as soon as practicable.

3. Following the above presentation, the Deputy Coordinator informed [redacted] that the U.S. had entered into certain arrangements with foreign agencies or individuals for the purpose of obtaining raw material in return for cash and/or equipment. None of these arrangements was specifically identified. [redacted] was also informed, in general terms, of the recent agreement [redacted] for the exchange of raw traffic, but the means whereby this agreement was established were not indicated. It was agreed that this information would also be submitted in memorandum form along with the aforementioned resume'. Prior to this notification concerning [redacted] information was received by the Coordinator to the effect that the Director, [redacted] was taking similar action.

4. In addition to the foregoing, the question of relations between the Senior U. S. Liaison Officer and [redacted] was discussed. [redacted] he felt that the proper channel for handling policy matters was through himself.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

18 April 1952


SUBJECT: [redacted] Participation in U.S./U.K. Collaboration on COMINT  
Matters

5. At a subsequent conference, [redacted] raised the question of [redacted] in U.S.-British conferences. The Deputy Coordinator stated that, in view of the respective contributions and interests of the three nations in the total COMINT effort, it was hardly reasonable to expect them to sit down as equal partners in discussions of the various problems that arise. It was pointed out, moreover, that the considerations which led to the [redacted] were essentially [redacted] ones and that U.S. [redacted] was actually on a [redacted]

[redacted] For these reasons, it appeared proper to make no definite decision for or against [redacted] as a general rule, but instead to decide on the basis of the interests actually involved in each conference. [redacted] appeared to accept this point of view and did not press the matter further. He stated, however, that [redacted] was anxious to play a useful part and would welcome U.S. guidance to that end.

6. Question also arose as to the matter of procuring COMINT studies prepared by the U.S. intelligence agencies. It was pointed out, as had previously been done, that these studies were under control of the agencies preparing them and that AFSA could supply only those that had been released by the producers. Requests for additional material would have to be made to the latter through the proper channels.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

  
J. N. WENGER  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Deputy USCIB Coordinator.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

6. Category "C" COMINT is defined as those results appertaining to the analysis of enciphered weather messages.

7. Category "D" COMINT is Communication Intelligence of such low degree of sensitivity of source that its compromise would have a minimum effect upon other aspects of the overall COMINT effort and which, to be useful, must be disseminated operationally to substantial numbers of indoctrinated personnel, cleared for the classification appertaining to its content. Operational dissemination, as used herein, includes dissemination to combat units in the field and to other recipients having the "need to know".

a. Unless otherwise specifically agreed by the USCIB Coordinator and the Director, GCHQ, Category "D" COMINT shall be strictly limited to: (1) those results pertaining to traffic analysis (including Direction Finding) of specified target nations wherein no analysis of complex procedural systems is involved, and (2) those results appertaining to the analysis of unencrypted messages (including those transmitted by voice) and of cryptosystems of a low order of cryptosecurity.

#### INDOCTRINATION

8. Except in categories of persons and in individual cases agreed upon from time to time by USCIB and LSIB, all personnel to be assigned to Communication Intelligence duties or indoctrinated as recipients of Communication Intelligence shall be the subject of special security inquiries. To ensure that such inquiries are similar in character, each party shall

-4-

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

forward all regulations governing the same to the other for information.

a. It is recognized that the standards of such special security inquiries may differ depending on whether the individual in question will have access

(1) To Category "D" COMINT and/or Category "C" COMINT, only; or

(2) Additionally, to Category "A" COMINT and/or Category "B" COMINT

and that such differences will be commensurate with the difference in the sensitivity of the materials included in such categories.

b. The principle of indoctrination is based on the "need to know", which means that each person will be indoctrinated only for such portion of Communication Intelligence (which may be any one or more classes of COMINT) as he requires in order to perform his assigned mission. The indoctrinations for the various classes of COMINT will differ in accordance with the "need to know".

c. Above all it is imperative that unauthorized persons be prevented from ascertaining, (1) the scope of the COMINT effort, (2) the degree of success obtained in general, and (3) the specific types of communications which can be read. It is only by a strict application of the principle of the "need to know" to COMINT indoctrination, as well as to its dissemination, that it will be possible to minimize the risk of compromise inherent in the indoctrination of substantial numbers of individuals.

d. A person who has been indoctrinated for one or more of the

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

less sensitive classes of COMINT may be indoctrinated for one or more of the more sensitive classes thereof only after such individual has been the subject of the special security inquiries applicable to the more sensitive material.

e. In time of war or emergency, or in areas agreed upon from time to time by USCIB and LSIB as subject to Emergency Regulations, or otherwise as agreed by USCIB and LSIB:

(1) Exceptional occasions may arise where it is considered essential for an individual to take up his duties before the special security inquiries can be completed. In such case, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority of such senior officers or officials as are designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that special security inquiries are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.

(2) It may be considered essential to employ, solely for intercepting or translating raw traffic in connection with the production of Category "D" COMINT, persons as to whom the prescribed special security inquiries are impossible or impracticable. In such cases as are approved by USCIB and LSIB, the persons concerned may be specially indoctrinated for such limited purposes, and not otherwise, after such special security inquiries as may be practicable have been made.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ -SECURITY INFORMATION-

9. USCIB and LSIB shall maintain complete lists of persons currently indoctrinated for Category "A" and Category "B" COMINT under their respective Governments, specifying in each instance the one or more classes of COMINT for which the person concerned has been indoctrinated.

a. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's COMINT agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by his parent agency or Board, and be properly indoctrinated, and such access or knowledge shall at all times be limited strictly to the particular one or more classes of COMINT for which the person concerned has been indoctrinated, with the approval of his parent agency or Board.

b. USCIB and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters, and Commands receiving Category "A" and Category "B" COMINT, or either of them, or any one or more classes thereof, indicating the approximate number of indoctrinated persons qualified to receive each class.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMINT SECURITY

10. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and peace cannot be overestimated; conservation of the source is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the production, exploitation, and dissemination of COMINT, and as well of all related or resultant information, be strictly controlled and appropriately limited. The provisions of these regulations shall apply to any intelligence which, in whole or in part, includes items which can be traced solely to COMINT sources.

-7-  
~~TOP SECRET~~ -SECURITY INFORMATION-