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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

26 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY USCIB COORDINATOR

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Involving

Forwarded herewith is a copy of a note sent by the Deputy Director, GCHQ, to Brigadier Tiltman who in turn forwarded it to this office inquiring whether any approach, similar to that discussed in the note, has been made to the [REDACTED]

This office does not have knowledge of any similar approach by the [REDACTED] but has sent a message to [REDACTED] via the SSO channel inquiring whether such an approach has been made and suggesting that, in the event of such an approach, Embassy personnel should avoid the subject if possible and should not take advantage of any subsequent offers of this sort.

A copy of the enclosed note has been forwarded to Mr. Douglass of CIA, inquiring whether CIA has knowledge of any similar approach to US officials [REDACTED]

ROBERT F. PACKARD
Chief, Technical Section
Special Projects Staff

Encl

Copy of undated note
(DGC/2197)

✓ cc: Chairman, USCIB Ad Hoc
Committee on [REDACTED]
Communications Security,
Mr. Friedman

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
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NOTE ON [] CRYPTANALYSIS



2. Sir Anthony Rumbold expressed interest in the telegrams but sought guidance from the Foreign Office on the line he should take were the [] to make a further approach. The Foreign Office advised him that the [] might well have in mind the object of leading up to a suggestion that the Foreign Office should reciprocate by showing similar material to the [] or even that there should be cooperation in cryptanalysis. This was a danger it was important to avoid, especially in view of the Anglo-U.S. proposals for an approach to the []. For these reasons, it was desirable that Sir Anthony Rumbold should as far as possible in future avoid both the subject and taking advantage of any further offers of this sort he might receive."

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