

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

DISPOSITION FORM~~SECRET~~**SECRET**

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

Fourth Meeting of NSA Classification Advisory Panel - 12 February 1954

TO

Members of NSA Classification Advisory Panel

FROM

AG

DATE

16 Feb. 54

COMMENT NO. 1

Geo. E. Campbell, 60235/cmj

1. The fourth meeting of the NSA Classification Advisory Panel was called to order by Col. Geo. E. Campbell, Adjutant General, at 1300, 12 February 1954, in Room 19-232. The following were present:

Col. Geo. E. Campbell	AG
Mr. D. D. Groskary	C/SEC
Dr. A. Sinkov	PROD
Mr. F. E. Densmore	PROD
Maj. W. R. Carson	P/P
Maj. W. T. Connor	SEC
Mr. L. D. Callimahos	TNG

2. It was agreed that the attached proposed guide lines for use by originators in determining the classification of materials, on which review continued at this meeting, would be revised again and presented for further review at the next meeting to be held at 0830, Thursday, 18 February, in Room 19232.

3. The meeting adjourned at 1530.

4. Declassified when inclosure is removed.



GEO. E. CAMPBELL
Colonel, AGC

Incl:
a/s

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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SECTION I - GENERAL

Incl

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
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SECTION II - *TOP SECRET CODEWORD

**1. A cryptanalytic process which is indicative of specific success on a particular foreign system.

2. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading. Exceptions would be listed separately.

3. Intelligence derived from the study of



since 1 September 1939, except as covered in

paragraphs _____ and _____.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SECTION III - TOP SECRET

1. The detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a major component thereof.

2. The existence of peace-time collaboration in COMINT matters between U.S. agencies and other foreign governments, except the UK.

3. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of high-grade foreign cryptosystems during World War II, provided the reference cannot lead to

* This section to be referred to Security Committee of USCIB.
** This paragraph is unnecessary if the paper is to serve as the over-all guide.

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SECTION III - TOP SECRET (CONTINUED)

inferences as to the specific systems involved. (See exceptions, paragraph 5, Top Secret Codeword, and paragraph 15, Unclassified.)

4. Codewords applicable to Special Intelligence and Special Weather Intelligence.

5. Disclosures of both the identity and details of the cryptanalysis of low-grade enemy military cryptosystems during and after World War II.

6. Material involving sensitive collection procedures or the revelation of success against unusual or sensitive transmission procedures and devices.

SECTION IV - SECRET CODEWORD

1. Traffic Intelligence derived from the analysis of foreign communications after 2 September 1945.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2. Texta information.

3. Intelligence derived from study of

[Redacted]

except as noted in

paragraphs 4, Top Secret Codeword, and 6, Top Secret.

SECTION V - SECRET

1. Intercept assignments.

2. Intercept and D/F plans and over-all operational effectiveness of intercept and D/F organization as a whole.

3. General reference to the fact of cryptanalytic success against low-grade enemy military crypto-systems during World War II and the Korean conflict, without any detailed description of the cryptanalytic methods used.

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SECTION V - SECRET (CONTINUED)

4. Details of traffic analysis as applied to enemy communications during World War II.
5. Description of equipment peculiar to intercept stations.
6. Detailed listing and location of US Service operated intercept stations.
7. Existence of peacetime collaboration between the US and UK (GCHQ) in the COMINT field.
8. All personnel reports for the entire Agency, civilian or military, which indicate authorized or actual strength by organizational element, short title or symbol, or by function.
9. Codeword applicable to Traffic Intelligence.
10. Information relating to an entire system of cryptologic (R/D) equipment.
11. Cryptanalytic short titles.

SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL

1. Association of operational COMINT functions with specific activities and organizations by name (except as provided under Unclassified below).
2. Individual intercept and D/F station products and statements of operational effectiveness.
3. Intercepted raw traffic that shows no evidence of "processing" for COMINT purposes. Processing does not include case notations, frequencies, or call signs.

SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL (CONTINUED)

4. Intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e., target frequencies, call-signs, "piped signals," other signal information, bearings and fixes), provided that no complex changing call-sign systems are included.

5. Administrative records of security investigations.

6. The terms "United States Communication Intelligence Board" and "U.S. Communication Security Board" (abbreviations "USCIB" and "USCSB" are unclassified).

7. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems, enciphered map references, or results of advanced traffic analysis are included. This material shall include local procedural and local grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control and movement of front line units, early warning and exercise of tactical combat control of aircraft.

8. Intelligence derived from analysis of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local procedural codes used for brevity and plain text interspersed with cover words is permissible.

9. Special Intelligence from Naval tactical maneuvering codes and brevity codes.

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SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL (CONTINUED)

10. COMINT concerning weather derived from the sources described in paragraphs 7 and 8 above.

11. Special cryptologic features of and magnitude of effort with computers.

12. Detailed references to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against specific military cryptosystems used by foreign powers between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939.

13. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of the [redacted] [redacted] between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939.

14. The fact that NSA produces cryptographic keying materials including rotors, key lists, one-time tapes, one-time pads, codes, discs and other broad categories of keying materials, and employs ^{special} cryptographic key generating equipment to produce ^{some of} this material.

15. The extent of collaboration in CAN/UK/US COMSEC matters.

16. The extent of production of cryptomaterial [redacted]

17. The fact that NSA is assigned [redacted]

[redacted]

18. Diagrams and descriptions of COMINT and COMSEC communication networks or related communication plans including cryptographic arrangements except where higher classification is justified by the listing of sensitive intercept stations.

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SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL (CONTINUED)

19. Consolidated listings and records of cryptomaterials and crypto holdings by short title.

20. The broad outlines of Operational Traffic Analysis processes.

SECTION VII - UNCLASSIFIED

Association of NSA with cryptology

1. Non-specific or hypothetical references to Communication Intelligence or Communication Security without any association of that function with specific activities and organizations other than the National Security Agency as a whole and service cryptologic agencies as a whole, and association of NSA with the latter.

2. Elementary principles of traffic analysis, military cryptanalysis and cryptography, in production of instructional material and language training material used at NSA School.

*3. Identification with NSA of NSA authors of technical papers on matters already in the public domain.

4. The terms NSA Field Activity Far East (NSAFE), NSA Field Activity Europe (NSAEUR), NSAAL and NSAUK.

5. Civil Service Job Titles and NSA "Classification Standards Manual".

6. Existence of and individual employee's interest in computers, except as noted under Confidential.

7. Specific components of equipment under research, if use of component is not revealed. (R/D)

* Decision requested by Colonel Wyman on this point.

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SECTION VII - UNCLASSIFIED (CONTINUED)

8. Report of inspection trip to uncleared company that is a prospective contractor, if no mention is made of actual applications of components.

9. Association of NSA with ^{cryptology} cryptography, CONSEC, Friedman, Hagelin, Hebern, keys, rotors, etc.

10. Short titles (R/D) ^{and covert news}

11. Communications giving a person's security clearance as "cryptologic", "cryptographic", ^{and degree of information.}

12. Projects number and titles used in justification for purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified.

13. The terms NSA-FWPU (LANT) and NSA-FWPU (PAC).

14. Detailed reference to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against World War I military cryptosystems.

15. References to intelligence derived from cryptosystems in which successful cryptanalysis has already been revealed by official U.S. action (e.g., the Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack).

16. Any reference to intelligence or cryptanalytic success against operational cryptosystems as disclosed by foreign publications appearing in the public domain. These references must be accompanied by the source and be without further elaboration or applications.

17. The fact that NSA procures and produces ~~crypte equipments and spare parts.~~

18. Accounting reports and correspondence referring to only one or a few isolated items by short title.

* Requires elaboration.

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SECTION VII - UNCLASSIFIED (CONTINUED)

19. ~~Cover names assigned to various sources of traffic, when used out of context.~~

20. NSA's possession of or interest in computers or rapid analytical machinery, *except as noted in*

21. The fact that the US collaborates with *other NATO powers* ~~UK and Canada~~ on COMSEC matters.