SECRET

APPENDIX

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. The classifying of information and material within the cryptologic field is an involved and complex problem Every document to be classified must be considered as being unique and one whose classification is dependent on factors existing within that document alone. The decision as to the proper classification of a document cannot arbitrarily be determined by referral to other documents or to specific rules and regulations. Each item of information or material must be adjudged solely on its own merits and classified according to its content There are, however, certain basic principles of classification which will be of assistance to individuals within the cryptologic field in the solution of their classification problems, and it is proposed to set forth these basic principles in this document

2. As a basis for classification, it is necessary that all personnel be thoroughly conversant with the security classifications established by Executive Order 10501: TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL. These security classifications can be stated as follows:

a. Top Secret: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification Top Secret shall be authorized. by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material which requires the highest degree of protection The Top Secret classification shall be applied only to that information or material the defense aspect of which is paramount and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation such as leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war. or the compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence operations, or scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense.

b. Secret: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation. such as by jeopardizing the international relations of the United States, endangering the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or compromising important military or defense plans, scientific or technological

SECRET

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS (Sect I2b Cont'd)

developments important to national defense, or information revealing important intelligence operations.

     c. Confidential: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification Confidential shall be authorized by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation.

     d. Confidential - Modified Handling Authorized: This does not constitute a separate and distinct classification category. Information must meet the requirements set down above for Confidential material. The addition of the notation "modified handling authorized' only permits modification of the storage and transmission procedures.

     official use only ?

     3. Within the cryptologic field we must provide even more safeguards for our activities than are provided for under the standard security classifications. Before any official cryptologic information is to be disseminated, it must be determined that the recipient has a need-to-know Information of an unclassified nature pertinent to the mission of a cryptologic activity should not be discussed with anyone except for official business purposes.

     4. Beyond the basic classifications established by Executive Order, it is recognized that there are special considerations which must be considered separately because of their inherently sensitive nature. These special considerations pertain to specific categories of communications intelligence (COMINT) and are identified by the assignment of a distinctive codeword. The classification of COMINT involves two distinct considerations: the security of the information and the sensitivity of the source from which the information was derived. Either or both considerations may affect the classification, dependent upon whether the information or the source is the more sensitive.

     5. Initially, COMINT material comes to this Agency as raw traffic which has been intercepted by field station activities throughout the world. This traffic is classified no lower than CONFIDENTIAL until such time as an analytical processing is begun. From the analysis of this raw traffic, we derive three types of intelligence.

     a. Cryptintelligence is that COMINT which results from cryptanalysis of the systems utilized by message originators to protect the traffic during its transmission. This includes speech and facsimile security systems.

     b. Traffic intelligence is that COMINT which results from traffic analysis of intercepted electrical communications. This includes COMINT produced by all means short of cryptanalysis of message texts.

     c. Intelligence derived from the analysis of plaintext traffic.

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS (Section I 6 Cont'd)

6. Information derived from these three analytical processes
(cryptanalysis, traffic analysis and plaintext analysis) is divided
into three security categories.

    a. Category III COMINT (Top Secret Codeword) is the most
sensitive category and contains information of the highest classification
whose source must be protected at all costs. In general, this will include
information derived from cryptanalysis (except for designated types of
COMINT) certain designated types of plaintext and special weather crypta-
nalysis and Traffic Analysis of certain high level systems as specified by
existing authorities. For additional items in this category. see Section
II.
                            (SECRET codeword)

    b. Category II COMINT is less sensitive than the preceding category
and is one whose material can by acceptance of a calculated risk be dissemi-
nated without over-riding concern for the security of the source. In general,
this will include traffic intelligence which has not been specifically placed
into other categories and cryptanalytic intelligence resulting from the
solution of certain low level codes and other security systems as specified
by existing authorities. For additional items in this Category, see Section
III.

    c. Category I COMINT (Non-Codeword) is subject to the least
restrictive regulations of the three categories and will include certain
types of low level COMINT as specified by existing authorities. Material in
this category will be classified no lower than CONFIDENTIAL without the
assignment of any codeword. Extreme care must be utilized in placing COMINT
in this category. (See paragraph 7, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL.)

7. In addition to these categories, there are certain other basic
statements that are acceptable as guide lines in determining classifications.

    a. COMINT will normally be considered as falling within Category
III except for such specific systems as have been mutually agreed upon by U.K.
and the U.S. to be in other categories. This list is available in PROD
(NSA-0621).

    b. Standing operating procedures, personnel reports, organizational
charts and instruction manuals governing respective COMINT organizations
will be classified according to the information contained therein; those
indicating operational capacity or success will be classified at least SECRET.
Classification problems which cannot be resolved by the originator will be
referred to NSA Classification Advisory Panel.

    c. In reference to type of cryptosystems, the terms "low grade",
"medium grade" and "high grade" are often used. Definitions of these cate-
gories are as follows:

SECRET Appendix to NSA Regulation
        Number 120 - dated

3

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS (Section I - 7c(1, Con''d,

> (1) low-grade, Pertains to a cryptosystem which
> offers only slight resistance to cryptanalysis;
> for example: (1) Playfair ciphers, (2) Single
> transposition, (3) Unenciphered one-part codes.

> (2) medium grade, Pertains to a cryptosystem which
> offers considerable resistance to cryptanalysis;
> for example: (1) Strip ciphers, (2) Polyphase
> transposition, (3) Unenciphered two-part codes.

> (3) high-grade, Pertains to a cryptosystem which
> offers a maximum of resistance to cryptanalysis:
> for example: (1) Complex cipher machines, (2) on-
> line systems, (3) Unknown two-part codes enciphered
> with an additive book.

8. a. It must be pointed out that, although the cryptanalytic techniques associated with a specific operational cryptosystem fall into Categories III, II or I, nevertheless a detailed description of the procedures and general principles underlying the solution of a type cryptosystem may be of lower classification or even unclassified, e.g., the solution of the basic Playfair system. Prior consideration applies also to principles and techniques involved in the attack on U.S. and NATO cryptosystems.

b. Likewise, although it must be pointed out that traffic analytic techniques and data associated with specific targets fall into Categories III, II or I, nevertheless a detailed description of the general principles and techniques involved in hypothetical traffic analysis may be of lower classification.

c. The classification of an item of cryptanalytic or cryptographic equipment is determined solely on its own merits, based on the extent to which protection of new principles and techniques must be afforded. The degree of classification does not necessarily concern only the field of cryptology (or cryptologic aspects) but also takes into account engineering sophistication.

9. As a means of further assistance to personnel the following classification guide lines have been established. Remember they are only general in nature and that the classification of any given item must be established solely or its own merits. In addition, an abbreviated classification table has been inclosed at the end of this document and is intended for reference purposes only. It may be detached and used separately. WARNING! In no instance may this table be used to solve classification problems Reference must always be made to the complete text of "Guide Lines for Security Classification."

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Section II - III)

SECTION II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD (CATEGORY III)

The following types of information are to be classified TOP SECRET Codeword:

1. Cryptanalytic intelligence and techniques derived from and state-ments of success attributable to a given Category III system.

2. Traffic intelligence based in whole or in part on the analysis or use of identifications and other data derived from Category III SNIT T. Such traffic intelligence might involve a high-grade encryption system or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading.

3. Intelligence which can be identified as resulting from the study

[ ]

4. Special Weather Intelligence, designated by a distinctive codeword.

5. Intelligence which can be identified as resulting from the [   ] since 1 September 1939, except as covered in paragraph 3, Section IV - TOP SECRET, paragraph 12, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL, and paragraph 12, Section VII - UNCLASSIFIED.

6. Traffic intelligence involving such combinations of cryptanalysis and traffic analysis whose value is so great that security or contents becomes the over-riding consideration.

7. COMINT based on traffic obtained from sources classified TOP SECRET.

8. UKUSA Cryptanalytic short titles of Category III cryptosystems.

SECTION III - SECRET CODEWORD (CATEGORY II)

The following types of information are to be classified SECRET Codeword:

1. Cryptanalytic intelligence and techniques derived from and state-ments of success attributable to a given Category II cryptosystem.

2. Traffic intelligence derived from the analysis of foreign com-munications after 2 September 1945.

3. Texta information.

4. Intelligence which can be identified as resulting from study of

[   ] except as noted in paragraph 5, Section II - TOP SECRET Codeword.

Appendix to NSA Regulation Number 120-   dated

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Section III - V)

    5. Traffic intelligence derived from radio fingerprinting (RFP) and
Morse operator analysis (MOA).

    6 UKUSA Cryptanalytic short titles of Category II and I cryptosystems.

SECTION IV - TOP SECRET

The following types of information are to be classified TOP SECRET:

    1. The detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a major component thereof.

    2. The existence of peacetime collaboration in COMINT matters between
U.S. agencies and other foreign governments, except for collaboration with
the U.K., Canada, or Australia, which will be classified SECRET.

    3. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of high-grade foreign
cryptosystems between 1 September 1939 and 2 September 1945, provided the
reference cannot lead to inferences as to the specific systems involved.
Such intelligence derived after 2 September 1945 belongs in Category III.
(See exceptions, paragraph 5, Section II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD and para-
graph 12, Section VII - UNCLASSIFIED.)

    4. Codewords (current and obsolete) applicable to Category III COMINT.

SECTION V - SECRET

The following types of information are to be classified SECRET:

    1 Intercept assignments (N.B. This does not include call signs,
frequencies or case notations which are classified CONFIDENTIAL).

    2. Intercept and DF plans and over-all operational effectiveness of
intercept and DF organizations as a whole.

    3 Details on traffic analysis as applied to enemy communications
during World War II.

    4. Disclosures of both the identity and details of the cryptanalysis
of low-grade enemy military cryptosystems during World War II.

    5. Existence of peacetime collaboration between the U.S. (NSA) with
the U.K (GCHQ), CANADA (CBNRC) or AUSTRALIA (DSB) in the COMINT field.

    6. Codewords (current and obsolete) applicable to Category II COMINT.

Appendix to NSA Regulation
                                                              Number 120-   dated

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Section VI)

SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL

The following types of information are to be classified CONFIDENTIAL:

1. Association of operational COMINT functions with specific activities and organizations by name (except as provided under paragraph 1, Section VII - UNCLASSIFIED).

2. General statements pertaining to the **operational** effectiveness of of individual intercept and D/F stations.

3. Intercepted raw traffic that shows no evidence of "processing" for COMINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements, elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of case number and/or an arbitrary trai-fic designator.

4. Intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e., target frequencies, call signs, "piped signals," other signal information, bearings and fixes), provided that no complex changing call sign systems are included.

5. The terms "United States Communications Intelligence Board" and "U. S. Communications Security Board" (abbreviations "USCIB" and "USCSB" and the abbreviations for their subcommittees are unclassified).

6. Plaintext tactical or operational traffic provided that no inter-pretations of complex changing call sign systems, enciphered map references, or results or advanced traffic analysis are included. This material shall include local procedural and local grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control and movement of front line units, early warning and exercise of tactical combat control of aircraft.

7. Intelligence derived from analysis of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing call sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local procedural codes used for brevity and plain-text interspersed with cover words is permissible.

8. COMINT concerning weather derived from the sources described in paragraphs 6 and 7, above.

9. COMINT derived from Naval tactical maneuvering codes and brevity codes.

10. Special cryptologic features of and magnitude of effort with computers.

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Section VI - VII)

11. Detailed references to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against specific military cryptosystems used by foreign powers between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939, and not used since.

12. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of the ⎢ ⎥ used by foreign powers between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939.

13. The extent of collaboration in CAN/UK/US COMSEC matters.

14. The extent of production of cryptomaterial for NATO use.

15. The fact that NSA is assigned specific ⎢ ⎥

16. Diagrams and descriptions of COMINT and COMSEC communication networks or related communication plans including cryptographic arrangements except where higher classification is justified by the listing of sensitive intercept stations.

17. Consolidated listings and records of cryptomaterials and crypto-holdings by short title.

18. The broad outlines of operational traffic analysis processes.

19. Relationship with CIA and other U.S. consumers in the field of COMINT.

SECTION VII - UNCLASSIFIED

The following types of information are Unclassified:

1. Association of NSA with cryptology, COMINT, COMSEC, or the service cryptologic agencies -- providing such association in no way adversely affects the missions of the agencies concerned.

2. Association of NSA with authors of technical papers on matters already in the public domain.

3. The terms NSA Field Activity Far East (NSAFE), NSA Field Activity Europe (NSAEUR), NSAAL, NSAUK, NSA-Field Unit 1 (FU/PAC) and NSA Field Unit 2 (FU/LANT).

4. Civil Service Job Titles and NSA "Qualification Standards Manual."

5. NSA's possession of or interest in computers or rapid analytical machinery, except as noted in paragraph 10 under Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL.

Appendix to NSA Regulation
Number 120-   dated

SECRET

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Section VII)

6. Specific components of equipment under research, if use of component is not revealed.

7. Report of inspection trip to uncleared company that is a prospective contractor, if no mention is made of actual applications of components.

8. Short titles, cover names, and code words. (See the following exceptions: Paragraph 4, Section III - TOP SECRET: paragraph 9, Section V - SECRET; paragraph 10, Section V - SECRET, and paragraph 17, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL).

9. Communications giving a person's security clearance.

10. Projects number and titles used in justification for purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified.

11. Detailed reference to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against World War I military cryptosystems.

12. References to intelligence derived from cryptosystems in which successful cryptanalysis has already been revealed by official U.S. action (e.g., the Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack).

13. Any reference to intelligence or cryptanalytic success against operational cryptosystems as disclosed by foreign publications appearing in the public domain. These references should be accompanied for the purpose of clarity by the source and be without further elaboration or amplification.

14. The fact that NSA produces and procures cryptomaterial including rotors, key lists, one-time tapes, one-time pads, codes, discs and other broad categories of keying materials, and employs special equipment to produce some of this material.

15. The fact that the U.S. collaborates with other NATO powers on COMSEC matters.

Incl.
Table

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REFERENCE TABLE

(Warning! In no instance may this table be used to solve classification problems. Reference must always be made to the complete text of "Guide Lines for Security Classification.")

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TOP SECRET CODEWORD

1. INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES AND SUCCESSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO CATEGORY III SYSTEMS.

2. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE BASED ON DATA DERIVED FROM CATEGORY III COMINT.

3. ▭ PLAINTEXT INCLUDING ALL RUSSIAN PLAINTEXT.

4. SPECIAL WEATHER INTELLIGENCE (SPECIAL CODEWORD).

5. CRYPTANALYSIS OF ▭ USED SINCE 1 SEPTEMBER 1959, EXCEPT[1].

6. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE WHERE SECURITY OF CONTENT IS THE DOMINANT CONSIDERATION.

7. COMINT BASED ON TOP SECRET SOURCES.

8. UKUSA CRYPTANALYTIC SHORT TITLES OF CATEGORY III SYSTEMS.

TOP SECRET

1. DETAILED MISSION OF A COMINT AGENCY OR MAJOR COMPONENT.

2. US COMINT PEACETIME COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, EXCEPT UK, CAN OR AUS CLASSIFIED SECRET.

3. INTELLIGENCE FROM CRYPTO SYSTEMS; 1 SEPTEMBER 1931 - 2 SEPTEMBER 1945 NOT REVEALING SPECIFIC SYSTEMS INVOLVED, EXCEPT[1].

4. CATEGORY III CODEWORDS (CURRENT AND OBSOLETE).

1. FOR EXCEPTIONS, SEE CITED PARAGRAPHS ON PAGE INDICATED.

SECRET CODEWORD

1. INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES AND SUCCESSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO CATEGORY II SYSTEMS.

2. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS AFTER 2 SEPTEMBER 1945.

3. TEXTA INFORMATION.

4. ▭ PLAINTEXT, EXCEPT[1].

5. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM REP AND MOA.

6. UKUSA CRYPTANALYTIC SHORT TITLES OF CATEGORY II AND I SYSTEMS.

SECRET

1. INTERCEPT ASSIGNMENTS, EXCEPT[1].

2. INTERCEPT D/F PLANS, EFFECTIVENESS AND ORGANIZATION.

3. DETAILS OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II.

4. DETAILS OF CRYPTANALYSIS OF LOW GRADE ENEMY MILITARY CRYPTOSYSTEMS DURING WORLD WAR II.

5. COMINT COLLABORATION BETWEEN US, UK, CAN, AND AUS.

6. CATEGORY II CODEWORDS (CURRENT AND OBSOLETE).

CONFIDENTIAL

1. COMINT FUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS BY NAME, EXCEPT[1].

2. GENERAL STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL INTERCEPT AND D/F STATIONS.

3. UNPROCESSED RAW TRAFFIC EXCEPT CASE NOTATIONS, FREQUENCIES, OR CALL SIGNS.

4. D/F MISSION ASSIGNMENTS.

5. USCIB AND USCSB WHEN WRITTEN OUT.

6. PLAINTEXT EXCEPT AS ASSIGNED TO CATEGORY II AND III.

7. UNENCIPHERED RADAR TRACKING AND VISUAL OPERATIONAL REPORTS.

8. WEATHER COMINT FROM 6 AND 7 ABOVE.

9. COMINT FROM NAVAL MANEUVERING AND BREVITY CODES.

10. FEATURES AND EXTENT OF USE OF COMPUTERS.

11. CRYPTANALYSIS OF MILITARY SYSTEMS, 11 NOVEMBER 1918 - 1 SEPTEMBER 1939 AND NOT USED SINCE.

12. CRYPTANALYSIS OF ▭ 11 NOVEMBER 1918 - 1 SEPTEMBER 1939.

13. CAN/UK/US COMSEC COLLABORATION.

14. EXTENT OF PRODUCTION OF CRYPTO MATERIAL ▭

16. COMINT AND COMSEC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS OR PLANS EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE INTERCEPT STATIONS.

17. CONSOLIDATED LISTINGS OF CRYPTO MATERIALS AND CRYPTO HOLDINGS BY SHORT TITLE.

18. BROAD OUTLINES OF OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC ANALYSIS PROCESSES.

19. COMINT RELATIONSHIP OF NSA WITH CIA AND OTHER US CONSUMERS IN THE FIELD.

UNCLASSIFIED

1. NON-SPECIFIC ASSOCIATION OF NSA WITH CRYPTOLOGY, COMINT, COMSEC OR SERVICE CRYPTOLOGIC AGENCIES.

2. ASSOCIATION OF NSA WITH AUTHORS OF TECHNICAL PAPERS ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

3. NAMES OF NSA FIELD UNITS.

4. CIVIL SERVICE JOB TITLES AND NSA "QUALIFICATION STANDARDS MANUAL."

5. NSA POSSESSION OF OR INTEREST IN COMPUTERS, EXCEPT[1].

6. NON-DESCRIPTIVE REFERENCES TO EQUIPMENT UNDER RESEARCH.

7. REPORTS OF INSPECTION TRIPS TO UNCLEARED PROSPECTIVE CONTRACTOR COMPANIES.

8. SHORT TITLES, COVER NAMES, AND CODEWORDS, EXCEPT[1].

9. COMMUNICATIONS GIVING A PERSONS SECURITY CLEARANCE.

10. NON-DESCRIPTIVE USE OF PROJECT TITLES AND NUMBER.

11. CRYPTANALYTIC SUCCESS AGAINST WORLD WAR I MILITARY CRYPTOSYSTEMS.

(12. CRYPT SUCCESSES IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
(13.

14. NSA PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT OF CRYPTO MATERIAL.

15. US COMSEC COLLABORATION WITH NATO.

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