

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	
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			INFORMATION
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REMARKS			
<p>Re: "A Plan for AFSA Field Activities Overseas" and "Global COMINT Planning" papers -</p> <p>I have examined them and my only comment is - it'll be interesting to learn the Service comments thereon</p> <p>I like how papers would like to sit in on their discussion</p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE		DATE	
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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-03-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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## Global COMINT Planning

Captain Bangar  
Colonel Hetherington  
Captain Dyer  
Mr. Friedman

Lt. Colonel Horton

25 July 1951  
Mr. Griffin/471/iev

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. Your comments are requested on the attached papers which the undersigned proposes to present to the Working Group of the AFSAC Ad Hoc Committee on Global COMINT Planning.

2. It is proposed that these papers will form a tab to the report of the Working Group. Copies of other tabs to the report are not available at this time. Essentially they present plans for [redacted] and wartime [redacted]. They will include:

a. A study of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in [redacted]

b. A plan for U.S. Global COMINT structure in wartime based on existing structure.


c. A plan for [redacted] collaboration in wartime, based on existing structure.

d. Recommendations regarding [redacted] in wartime, based on existing structure.

e. Plans and recommendations as in b, c, and d above, including (1) currently authorized expansion, (2) planned wartime mobilization expansion.

3. The papers attached hereto are "additions" in the sense that AFSA overseas installations have not been included in the tabs mentioned in paragraph 2 above. These papers are based essentially on the plan contained in Enclosure "C" to the draft study on AFSA Overseas installations which has previously been circulated within AFSA. Appendix 4 to the attached Tab B, Part I, is a chart now in preparation.

4. It is anticipated that revised versions of the attached papers will be submitted to the Working Group about 1 August. Your comments and suggestions would therefore be appreciated by 30 July.



RUSSELL M. HORTON  
Lt. Colonel, Signal Corps  
Acting Chief,  
Plans, Organization, and Policy Division

Enclosures - 2

1. Draft Tab B, Part I
2. Draft Tab B, Part II

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TAB E PART I

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AFSA-12/r11  
23 July 1951A PLAN FOR U.S. GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE IN WARTIME,  
BASED ON ADDITION CONSIDERED TO BE TO U.S. ADVANTAGE

## PURPOSE

1. To describe an adequate wartime U.S. COMINT structure.

## SCOPE

2. This structure includes the COMINT organizations of the Armed Forces.

## RESPONSIBILITIES

3. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have assigned COMINT responsibilities as follows:
  - a. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are responsible for:
    - (1) Providing fixed intercept installations as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such installations are manned and administered by the Service providing them, but are operationally directed by AFSA.
    - (2) Providing mobile intercept facilities required by their respective Services. Such installations are manned, administered, and operationally controlled by the individual Service, but may be used to perform special missions for AFSA as requested by the Director thereof.
    - (3) Processing as needed for intercept control and for combat intelligence. Exploitation by each Service applies only to material of operational interest to that Service, and should not entail undesirable duplication of AFSA processing.

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(4) Research and development as required for authorized intercept and processing.

b. AFSA is responsible for all other COMINT activities in the Department of Defense. Some of these activities are listed in the Appendix to JCS 2010 and the Enclosures to JCS 2010/6. They include responsibility for formulating and, after approval, implementing plans, policies, and doctrine relating to COMINT for the Armed Forces, and performing such other functions as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct, including:

- (1) Operational direction of fixed intercept installation manned and administered by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- (2) Production of COMINT in accordance with approved plans and policies and conduct of all operations necessary to the production of such intelligence except those listed in subparagraph a above.
- (3) Coordination within the Department of Defense of individual Service cryptologic activities and those of AFSA.
- (4) Provision of technical support to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in their conduct of COMINT activities.
- (5) Collaboration with foreign COMINT agencies in accordance with United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) policies, and provision of the USCIB Coordinator and Executive Agent, together with such assisting personnel as may be required.

4. The activities utilized separately by AFSA and the Services to fulfill these responsibilities are shown in AFSAC: 63/36, with explanatory flow charts and other data. The presentation includes all

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existing and currently authorized pre-mobilization activities, but only those planned wartime activities which are incorporated in approved mobilization plans.

## ASSUMPTIONS

5. That the U.S. wartime global COMINT structure will be based upon the activities described in AFSAC: 63/36.
6. That COMINT responsibilities in wartime will be as indicated in paragraphs 3a and 3b above.
7. That in wartime there will be continued agreement "in principle that there should be full integration of the overall communications intelligence effort to maintain maximum coverage, minimum duplication, and complete availability of end-products to the Services."<sup>1</sup>

## DISCUSSION

8. The activities listed in AFSAC: 63/36 provide an adequate basis for development of a wartime global COMINT structure.
9. These activities are not adequate to permit fulfillment of all the responsibilities referred to in paragraphs 3a and 3b above. Details of these inadequacies are shown in Appendix 1.
10. AFSAC: 63/36 does not indicate adequate provision for integration of the COMINT effort mentioned in paragraph 3c above. Details of the requirements for integration and coordination are shown in Appendix 2.

<sup>1</sup> An inter-Service agreement stated prior to the formation of AFSA, as cited in a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Enclosure to JCS 2010/1)

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11. An adequate plan for the wartime U.S. global COMINT structure would include all of the activities listed in AFSA 63/36, and would in addition include AFSA Field Activities in major areas of operations where more than one U.S. Service is engaged. The mission of AFSA Field Activities is outlined in Appendix 3.

12. Appendix 4 shows graphically the U.S. global COMINT structure envisioned.

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## APPENDIX I

## FULFILLMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

## INADEQUACIES OF AFSAC: 63/36

1. The COMINT activities described in AFSAC: 63/36 are inadequate to permit fulfillment of assigned responsibilities. This inadequacy is occasioned by the failure to provide for AFSA activities outside the continental United States. Specific responsibilities which cannot be fulfilled are outlined below:

## INTERCEPT AND PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES

2. Army, Navy, and Air Force intercept and processing responsibilities cannot be adequately fulfilled unless Service units have timely access to AFSA, which is their principal source of information regarding targets and of other types of technical support.

3. AFSA intercept and processing responsibilities cannot be adequately fulfilled if all AFSA units are too remote from their sources of traffic and pertinent collateral information.

## TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES

4. AFSA cannot fulfill its responsibility for providing technical support to the Services and for coordinating COMINT activities without on-the-spot participation and investigation and without shortened lines of communications.

## CONDITIONING FACTS

5. These considerations are based upon two facts:

a. Basic COMINT resources consist of experience, technical and collateral information (current and historical), and special equipment. These resources, which formerly were distributed among the individual

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Services, now belong collectively to all the Services, are centralized in AFSA, and do not exist in appreciable quantities outside AFSA. An important wartime product of these resources is technical support to Service units processing combat COMINT. They must be used to maximum advantage to supply this technical support.

b. Adequate rapid communications will not be available in wartime to carry raw traffic to the continental U.S. in the quantities in which AFSA will require it.

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## APPENDIX 2

## INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION

## INADEQUACIES OF AFSAC: 63/36

1. The data presented in AFSAC 63/36 do not provide for wartime implementation of the agreed principle of integration "to maintain maximum coverage, minimum duplication, and complete availability of end-products to the Services."

## CONDITIONING FACTS

2. This agreed principle is conditioned by the following facts:

a. Technically, COMINT is not effectively divisible along Service, national, or geographical lines.

b. Service intelligence interests and control requirements are such that complete integration is not feasible.

c. For each specific problem, the best possible compromise must be found between technical demands for integration on the one hand and Service requirements on the other.

## MAXIMUM COVERAGE AND MINIMUM DUPLICATION

3. Wartime integration, particularly under field conditions, is severely limited by the fact cited in paragraph 2b above. "Maximum Coverage" and "minimum duplication" are attained rather by coordination than by integration.

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4. Coordination may take the following forms:

- a. Sharing of intercept and D/F assignments
- b. Joint operation of D/F nets
- c. Exchange of raw traffic
- d. Exchange of technical information
- e. Exchange, loan, or pooling of personnel and specialized equipment
- f. Other exchange, sharing, or pooling of effort as required by the local situation.

5. The degree of coordination governs the amount of coverage obtained and the amount of duplication eliminated.

6. AFSAC 63/36 lists isolated exchanges of traffic and information which have taken place, subject in each case to approval of higher Service authority, but does not show any further coordination or depict any structure for effecting overall coordination. An adequate plan for a U.S. global COMINT structure must provide:

a. General agreement among the Services upon implementation of coordination.

b. In each major theater of operations where the forces of more than one U.S. Service are engaged:

(1) A single pool of information on the operations and targets of all COMINT units in that area;

(2) Machinery for insuring necessary collaboration on intercept and processing missions; exchange, loan,

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and pooling of talent, equipment, and information on missions of common interest; elimination of undesirable duplication; and all practicable comparison of end-product prior to release.

c. Direct communications among the major areas of operations, for the exchange of technical information and end-product.

7. AFSAC 63/36 suggests no machinery for insuring complete availability of the end-product as required to all the Services, nor for technical comparison of the end-products of the various units. No provision is made for joint COMINT support of U.S. Unified Commanders or of supreme international commanders. An adequate plan for a U.S. global COMINT structure must provide:

a. Maximum possible technical comparison and collaboration among all Services in preparation of the end-product.

b. Complete exchange of end-product at technical and intelligence levels.

c. Joint COMINT support of U.S. Unified Commanders and of Supreme Commanders at integrated headquarters.

8. AFSA is a completely unified and integrated organization with components from all three Services.

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APPENDIX 3

AFSA FIELD ACTIVITIES

The mission of an AFSA Field Activity will be to:

1. Coordinate the operations of Service COMINT activities in the area; coordinate these activities with those of AFSA; and, coordinate these activities with the COMINT activities of any foreign power in the area with whom COMINT collaboration is authorized by the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Provide technical support, including specialized training and personnel, to Service COMINT activities in the area.
3. Conduct field solution and exploitation, within its capabilities and as directed by the Director, AFSA, on material obtained from intercept in the area of its location, whenever it is determined by joint agreement that such solution and exploitation is beyond the capabilities of individual Service units in the area and that such solution and exploitation can be most effectively and efficiently accomplished in the AFSA Field Activity.
4. Conduct cryptologic interrogation of prisoners of war or other foreign personnel, and conduct the integrated collection and examination of captured cryptologic documents and equipment, in the area.
5. Support any Unified Commander in the area as required by him, and provide COMINT information which it produces to authorized recipients in integrated, Unified, and individual Service commands in the area.

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A Global Plan for [ ] COMINT Collaboration in Wartime  
Based on Additions Considered to be to U.S. Advantage

1. Collaboration Implementation in the Field. In order to implement and coordinate [ ] collaboration in the field it is proposed that a USCIB Coordinator Field Representative (USCIB COFREP) be designated, subject to USCIB approval, within the area of, or within the forces attached to, each Unified and major Service command, normally as follows (see Appendix 4 to TAB E, Part 1):

a. In areas where no AFSA Field Activity is operating;

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>COFREP</u>
Type 1 and 2 Command	G.O. of the ASA Unit (Senior)
Type 3 and 4 Command	Senior OIC of the COMSOPACTS
Type 5 and 6 Command	G.O. of the USAFSS Unit (Senior)

b. In all other areas;

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>COFREP</u>
All Types of Commands	Officer-in-Charge, AFSA Field Activity.

2. Authority and Responsibility of the USCIB COFREP. USCIB will delegate authority and responsibility to the COFREPs as follows:

a. To coordinate, arrange, and authorize, within the limits to be prescribed in an agreement between [ ] and USCIB, such collaboration between the U.S. military COMINT activities supporting the forces of the Unified or major Service command concerned and the appropriate [ ] COMINT activities.

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b. To terminate such collaboration when mutually desired, but only with the concurrence of the heads of cryptologic agencies concerned or when directed by USCIB.

c. To report to the USCIB Coordinator the initiation of all collaboration so arranged and authorized, and termination thereof.

d. To coordinate arrangements for the entry and visit of  COMINT representatives into the area of the command, subject to the approval of the USCIB Coordinator and the commander; or for the visit of U.S. COMINT representatives to  COMINT Units where applicable.

Note 1. It is recognized that collaboration between an U.S. Service COMINT Unit and a COMINT unit of a different  Service (e.g., U.S. Navy - ) will be desirable under certain circumstances and will be authorized when mutually desired.

Note 2. Inter-theater U.S.- collaboration may be desirable, especially as regards the exchange of selected raw traffic. The USCIB COFREPS of the theaters concerned may coordinate and arrange such inter-theater collaboration; the COFREP initiating the arrangements reporting to USCIB Coordinator.

3. USCIB COFREP Limits of Action. The USCIB COFREP shall be limited in his action, except with explicit prior approval by USCIB in each instance, to arranging and authorizing collaboration between U.S. and  COMINT units as set forth below:

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a. While it is not intended that each instance of assistance be necessarily reciprocated in kind, it shall be a guiding principle that some benefit be reasonably expected to accrue to the giving nation.

b. All exchanges of COMINT results and technical information shall be consistent with existing intelligence dissemination policies and confined to those levels of information to which the COMINT units concerned are otherwise restricted. Where exchanges are to be carried on between units limited to different levels, the exchange will be limited to the lower level. No exchanges will be initiated without prior approval of the USCIB Coordinator in each instance if they adversely affect exchanges with activities outside the area over which the USCIB COFREP has jurisdiction. Subject to the above, exchange is authorized as follows:

(1) D/F bearings and fixes

(2) Technical information

(3) Decrypts, traffic analysis reports and other COMINT results.

c. Exchange of raw traffic, not otherwise restricted, in support of processing for intercept control or for production of combat intelligence, is authorized.

d. Interworking of D/F nets is authorized.

e. Interchange of intercept coverage control of facilities available in excess of own current requirements is authorized.

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f. Sharing of intercept and processing assignments is authorized.

g. Exchange of planning information relating to future COMINT operations and capabilities is authorized.

h. Provision of COMINT results to SSOs or equivalent of opposite nationality, in consonance with existing dissemination policies is authorized.

i. [ ] Service Standardization agreements concluded in consonance with [ ] Agreement(s) shall govern.

j. Exchange of personnel for liaison or training will be carried on between [ ] COMINT Units as mutually desired. Such exchange will be limited to personnel actually attached to the units concerned, except where USCIB and [ ] agree to the establishment of specific liaison billets.

k. Collateral information shall be exchanged or furnished to opposite parties only in accordance with the current [ ] Agreement. Access to information by exchanged personnel shall be restricted accordingly.

l. The security provisions of the current [ ] Agreement shall govern in all collaboration authorized.

m. Collaboration between U.S. Naval Communication Supplementary Detachments afloat and equivalent [ ] detachments, will be limited to the exchange of personnel for training purposes.

4. Collaboration between Service COMINT Units and [ ] Collaboration between any Service COMINT activity in the field and [ ]

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[ ] may be arranged by the Chief of the cryptologic agency of the appropriate Service through USCIB channels.

5. Communications for Field Collaboration. Within capabilities of the Services concerned, electrical communications may be established as necessary to further the collaboration in the field. Cryptosystems for combined use will be provided as appropriate. Existing or special courier or mail channels should be utilized where practicable.

6. Collaboration at AFSA, [ ] and Service Cryptologic Headquarters Level. U.S. [ ] COMINT collaboration at the AFSA, [ ] and Service cryptologic headquarters level is authorized and the method of implementation delineated by the present [ ] Agreement. The provisions of the present [ ] Agreement for collaboration at this level are considered satisfactory.

7. Collaboration with [ ] The provisions for collaboration set forth in this plan do not apply to the cryptologic activities of the several [ ] except as expressly provided for elsewhere by the [ ] Agreement. It is contemplated that a separate similar agreement will be concluded with [ ] and that cases involving the other [ ] will be considered by USCIB when the need for collaboration arises.

Note. [ ] Agreement, Appendix J (1948), refers to the [ ] [ ] the agreements that exist between [ ] those [ ] and the contemplated [ ] USCIB actions toward collaborating with those [ ] as well as restrictions on such collaboration.

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Appendix F - paragraph 9 states:

[ ] will be the channel through which all COMINT items produced by the other [ ] agencies (except [ ] will be forwarded to the U.S. Agencies and through which the same materials produced by the U.S. Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to other [ ] recipients (except [ ] ."

8. Combined U.S. [ ] COMINT Units. The combining of U.S. Service COMINT Units and [ ] COMINT Units may be desirable in certain cases and undesirable in others. If circumstances indicate the desirability of combined units they will be subject to [ ] agreement in each instance, with appropriate provisions for mission, task assignment, technical support, and administrative responsibility.

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