

D R A F T

31 October 1951

SUBJ: Blankety-Blank

Reviewing action taken up to this date.

It was decided by this engineer that, in view of the extremely wide extent and broad ramifications of the operation under review, in the interests of avoiding confusion of thought, the project as a whole must be studied thoroughly as a first step on a purely organizational basis. To this end the contacting members of the staff were requested to prepare departmental flow charts, these to be subsequently embodied into an over-all organizational flow chart.

After appropriate discussion, it was decided that the flow charts would be made as simple as possible, first in the interests of security, and then in the interests of unobstructed and uncluttered basic thinking. Superimposed on each of the departmental or divisional flow charts, also on the over-all activity flow chart, would be annotations indicating:

- a. Yearly budget figure showing dollars required to finance current operations.
- b. Manpower authorized, and in being, to operate the activity.
- c. Floor space per divisional or major unit.

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Taking advantage of the Commanding Officer's invitation to look at all angles of the matter under review, serious question arose as to the wisdom of:

- a. Making any move at all.
- b. The possible alternative of a move into new quarters within commuting distance of the present activity.
- c. The presently projected move to the Middle West.

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It will be noted that in the foregoing discussion, little weight was given to the subject of military security, based on the philosophy that assuming that the Armed Forces could contemplate, with equanimity, the continued existence of the Pentagon, then this much smaller activity, involving about one-third of the people engaged at the Pentagon, could very well be included in the Washington picture.

Discussions with various people and benefiting by their tremendous background of knowledge and experience pertaining to the subject under review, a new evaluation regarding the projected move was obviously in order. The net of this discussion is depicted on attachments (B) and (C) with tentative factor evaluations dubbed in more as a basis of discussion than as figures submitted with any finality attached to them.

The opinion of the appropriate Officer regarding these tentative factor evaluations would be most helpful at this time.

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Conclusions as of this date.

a. The move to a new site in the interests of military security is necessary. This move obviously being predicated on the belief that existing defense measures cannot offer a sufficient degree of physical security to the Washington area.

b. The operations now spread between NEB and A can be sub-divided without a fatal loss of productive efficiency. This sub-division can envisage retention in Washington of a very carefully selected, efficiently operating nucleus, and the transfer of the rest of the activity to some point in the Central States.

c. Assuming that un-interrupted service must be maintained, then the logistics applicable to the move should be drawn up as a rigid operational order.

d. The next move, required of the engineer, is a review of the flow charts coupled with discussions with the appropriate staff members, in an endeavor to eliminate possible or probable duplications, and an endeavor to obtain more simplicity in the picture.

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The overriding problem of military physical security is obviously going to exert a major influence on all decisions, and it is judged to be essential at this time that a restatement be made of military security evaluations in respect to:

a. Continuance of operations at the present site for the contemplated two-year period.

b. The selection of a site for the residual 20% nucleus retained in the Washington area.

c. Evaluation of the projected site in the Middle West.

d. The degree of dispersal or concentration necessary to obtain physical security.

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It is perfectly obvious to the engineers that deep thought and clear logistical thinking has already been applied to the many aspects

of the problem ahead. Probably no one aspect of the overall problem is more important than that of housing.

It is recommended that this housing matter be dealt with in a generous frame of mind, and that the final housing plan be envisaged not in terms of, say, five years, but phased out in terms of ten, twenty and thirty years from now.

From the point of view of morale, operational efficiency, security, and career desirability, the housing question can and will exert a major influence. Because of the utterly vital importance of the activity being relocated, the usual policies pertaining to the housing of civilian and military employees are inadequate, and looking at the matter from the other extreme, the provision of a "cardboard city" with inadequate conveniences, muddy streets and location in a strange, and perhaps hostile, community could result in a drop in morale, which, in turn, could be fatal to the success and integrity of the project. In other words, the housing, both temporary and permanent, of the people involved in the move, should be regarded as just as important as the moving of the activities' extremely valuable machinery, and should be treated with the same care and discrimination. In the long run people are much more valuable than machinery as productive essentials.

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(B)

## MOVE - COMMUTING DISTANCE

ITEMS FOR	WEIGHT	ITEMS AGAINST	WEIGHT
1. Inadequacy of present Facilities	5	1. No decentralization	20
2. Administrative and Service Amalgamation	5	2. No basic improvement in Military security	80
3. Availability of Housing, Social and Educational Facilities in area.	10		100%
4. Good Labor Market	5		
5. Proximity of Contractor's Plants and Representatives	5		
6. Proximity of dependent Government Research Facilities	10		
7. Proximity to Cheltenham for Operational Testing	0		
8. Retention of trained personnel	10		

50%

## MOVE - FAR AWAY

ITEMS FOR	WEIGHT	ITEMS AGAINST	WEIGHT
1. Decentralization - Military Security	80	1. Lack of Housing, Social and Educational Facilities	5
2. Inadequacy of present facilities	5	2. Poor Labor Market	5
3. Administrative and Service Amalgamation	5	3. Remote from Contractor's Plants and Representatives	5
4. Adequate housing can be constructed	10	4. Remote from dependent Government Research Facilities	10
	100%	5. Remote from present Operational Testing Facility - Cheltenham (A new similar facility must be constructed at new site)	0
		6. Loss of trained personnel predicted by spot survey	10

35%