

~~TOP SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605101st USCIB Meeting~~TOP SECRET~~

Item 4 COMINT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

2. On 29 December 1953 Director, GCHQ requested, on behalf of LSIB, approval of USCIB to an extension of the present SIGINT co-operation between the U.K. and [REDACTED]. LSIB proposed to supply [REDACTED] in addition to providing equipment. It was hoped that extension of the service would enable the U.K. to renew pressure on the [REDACTED] for more [REDACTED]. In fact, the possibility of [REDACTED] and the U.K. was suggested.

3. At the 100th Meeting of USCIB on 11 February 1954, the Director, NSA, in executive session, reviewed the background of U.S. COMINT relations with the [REDACTED] and distributed two papers:

- (1) The request of Director, GCHQ for an extension of the SIGINT arrangements with [REDACTED].
- (2) An Aide Memoire prepared by Director, NSA summarizing the history of U.S. COMINT arrangements with [REDACTED].

4. In the Aide Memoire, the Director, NSA, recommended that: (a) USCIB approve the LSIB request for an extension of the SIGINT arrangements with [REDACTED]; and (b) USCIB approve in principle the establishment of an official COMINT agreement between the U.S. and [REDACTED].

5. Director, NSA explained that he has given an interim reply to Director, GCHQ and proposed that the two papers be considered as an item of agenda for the next regular meeting of USCIB (the present meeting).

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

6. On 8 March, Director, NSA forwarded the LSIB request for USCIB consideration at this meeting, with a recommendation that the Board concur (USCIB 29.17/1). He stated that he would not forward USCIB's views until after he had heard from GCHQ on his [REDACTED].

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. The Agenda also includes the tentative Minutes of the Executive Session of the 100th Meeting. This Agency has already submitted certain modifications to these Minutes.

8. It has just been learned from EUSILO that the GCHQ response to our [redacted] has been complicated by a [redacted] approach to the RAF.

[redacted] The matter is further complicated, according to EUSILO, by the fact that GCHQ has had no reply from us on their [redacted]. It appears that a firm GCHQ reaction to our [redacted] will be delayed until USCIB's views on the [redacted] are received in London.

OGA

9. It has not been possible to determine unofficially the reaction of other Board members to the Director's recommendations (set forth in the Aide Memoire) with respect to obtaining USCIB approval in principle to a U.S. - [redacted] COMINT agreement. As a consequence, it is not feasible to recommend a course of action on this facet of the problem. It is doubtful that any decision will be reached at this meeting.

10. It is considered highly desirable, however, for the Board to consider the LSIB request (USCIB 29.17/1) on its own merits. The arrangement proposed by the British would be comparable to the service which we have proposed to furnish the [redacted] if London approves. It would seem to be in the best interests of the U.S. - U.K. effort to reach mutual agreement on an [redacted] as well as with [redacted]. Although it was planned not to forward USCIB's decision until after the British views on our [redacted] were received, such a course of action is no longer feasible. USCIB's decision (assuming it is favorable) will have to be transmitted to LSIB promptly in an effort to obtain favorable consideration for our [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION

11. It is recommended that the Board first consider the LSIB request on its own merits. After a decision has been reached on this item, it is recommended that the members be encouraged to express their views on the proposals for a U.S. - [redacted] COMINT agreement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUBJECT: 102nd Minutes of USCIB

1. Attached minutes of 102nd meeting of USCIB provide interesting reading.

2. On page 4, sub-paragraph c of Decision on [ ] matter, preparation of U.S. position papers was omitted. I queried the Executive Secretary regarding this; he checked the original Minute notes and confirms fact that preparation of position papers by Working Group was actually a part of the Decision, and the Minutes will be corrected accordingly.

a. In this connection, at the second meeting of the Working Group, the CIA member (Mr. Rowlett) objected to our proposal that Group prepare U.S. position papers, on the ground that "it would be premature, and that it exceeded the terms of reference of the Working Group." Other members supported CIA.

b. Since that time NSA forwarded to Executive Secretary for USCIB consideration, NSA draft of what we think should be the "Basis of U.S. Negotiations" and the "Terms of Reference for U.S. Delegation." These two papers will be on agenda for the next USCIB meeting.

c. I feel that you should make a strong effort to secure USCIB approval of these two papers. Unless USCIB does accept these papers, substantially as written, the Working Group will never be able to come up with U.S. position papers acceptable to NSA. (CIA has some outside support, and as long as he has, the Group will never come to agreement.)

d. If you desire to make this "all-out fight", (and it will be one) to gain USCIB approval of formal collaboration with [ ]

[ ] you should understand CIA position as submitted by Rowlett, and understood (unofficially) to be supported by State, Army and Navy (more strongly by latter two). CIA position is "that the Working Group should study in detail the COMINT capabilities of each country in turn, determining the material each can supply, determining uniqueness and absolute value, and then determine best way of obtaining it. Only then, if it appears to be best single alternative, should U.S. enter into U.S. collaboration."

3. On page 8 of Minutes the Chairman quotes you as the maker of the recommendation to turn down the British request on Circuit Mercury. Actually your sole recommendation was "USCIB should say Yes, or No - not Maybe". General Trudeau was the originator of the recommendation attributed to you; shall we initiate corrective action? (I do not believe it is sufficiently important to matter).

cc: V/DIR  
Senior Special Assistant  
P/P

D. M. AGNEW  
Captain, US Navy  
Deputy Chief of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~