

USCIB: 12./17

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7 June 1955

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:Subject: Cryptographic Assistance for 

Reference: USCIB 12./15, 24 May 1955.

EO 3.3(h) (2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the reference the enclosed comments by the Department of State member are forwarded for consideration in connection with Item 1 of the Agenda for the 116th Meeting of USCIB.

  
H. D. JONES  
Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

## Enclosure

Dept. of State Memo  
dtd June 7, 1955.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1955

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Assistance to [redacted]

Reference is made to USCIB 12./15 of May 24, 1955.

The Department of State member of USCIB concurs in the recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the memorandum of May 3, 1955 from the Acting Director, NSA to USCSB to the extent that the US should not now provide cryptographic materials for use in [redacted] Army internal communications.

With regard to the comments of the Army member of USCSB, it seems premature at this time to conclude either that our interests with respect to the COMSEC of SEATO correspond to those with respect to NATO or that we should consider now the establishment of a Combined Working Group to study the COMSEC problems of SEATO.

In view of the foregoing it is suggested that, if feasible, the US respond to this [redacted] request by providing such rudimentary advice and reference to generally available cryptographic literature and materials as may enable the [redacted] to familiarize themselves with elementary prerequisites of good communications security prior to the inception of [redacted] communications or the development of SEATO COMSEC requirements and mechanisms. Such a course of action would be consistent with both (1) the present US policy to assist [redacted] wherever possible and (2) the policy of USCIB that the US should provide direct cryptographic assistance only in those cases where there is specific evidence that the security advantages to be gained by the US are attainable and outweigh the security [redacted] which might result.

FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE:

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

(Signed)  
T. Achilles Polyzoides  
Director, Special Projects Staff

Enclosure with USCIB 12./17 dtd 7 June 1955.