

~~SECRET~~

USCIB: 9.3/16

~~COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

3 December 1954

~~SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.

References: (a) USCIB 5/453 of 3 July 1953.  
 (b) USCIB 5/455 of 15 July 1953.  
 (c) USCIB 9.3/7 of 27 July 1954.  
 (d) USCIB 9.3/8 of 18 October 1954.  
 (e) USCIB 9.3/11 of 4 November 1954.  
 (f) USCIB 9.3/15 of 2 December 1954.

1. The enclosure is circulated for consideration in connection with item 2 of the Agenda for the 110th Meeting of USCIB to be held at 1430 on Friday, 10 December 1954.

2. Attention is invited to the references. It will be remembered that the present Master Requirements List was approved by USCIB on 3 July 1953 (see reference (a)) and forwarded directly to the Director, NSA with the concurrence of the Executive Agent for the production of COMINT (see reference (b)) as a new approach to the problem of the COMINT response to intelligence requirements. It was to be reviewed in six months in the light of a report from the Director, NSA as to his ability to respond to the List and its subsequent implementing, detailed information requirements. The six-months review period proved to be too optimistic owing to the time required to prepare the Information Requirements and the broad scope of report desired. However, the report was finally distributed under cover of reference (c) on 27 July 1954. It was placed before USCIBEC by the Executive Secretary. USCIBEC referred it for study to the USCIB Intelligence Committee, which submitted to USCIBEC the comment and questions contained in reference (d). Meanwhile reference (e) was submitted by the Director, NSA in order to bring about improvement in the manner by which consumer requirements have been levied on his Agency. Reference (f) merely summarizes the views of USCIBEC with regard to reference (d).

3. A brief word about the present system of handling requirements levied by the Board on the National Security Agency may be of assistance. Recommendations as to form and substance of requirements are formulated by the USCIB Intelligence Committee on the basis of national intelligence objectives without regard to whether such requirements can be met from COMINT sources. (Previously the ability of the COMINT source to produce had been an important factor in levying requirements). These requirements are compiled into what is

USCIB: 9.3/16

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

USCIB: 9.3/16


~~COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

3 December 1954

~~SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.  
-----

known as the Master Requirements List (MRL). This List is submitted to USCIBEC and then to USCIB for approval. The approved version is then reproduced by the NSA and distributed by the Executive Secretary who provides 250 copies to the Director, NSA. A second list, called the Information Requirements List, is then prepared by the INTCOM. This list refers, in order, back to each requirement listed in the MRL and is supposed to state in detail the types of information which might be expected from the various COMINT sources and which it is desired be produced and distributed by NSA in accordance with the priority assigned to the pertinent MRL listing. The information requirements, if unan-  
imously agreed by the INTCOM, are forwarded directly to the Executive Secretary who in turn forwards them directly to the Director, NSA with concurrent distribution to the members of USCIBEC any one of whom may then raise an objection. Information requirements are not submitted to USCIB for review unless an objection that cannot be solved in USCIBEC is raised. Until receipt of reference (e), no lack of unanimity in the Intelligence Committee has been reported nor have any objections been raised in USCIBEC to any information or Master Requirement.

4. THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ENCLOSURE CONTAIN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

  
RUFUS L. TAYLOR  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure  
a/s

USCIB: 9.3/16

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

2 December 1954

## MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Master Requirements List

1. I have read with interest USCIB 9.3/11, which contains the views of the Director, NSA, on the USCIB Master Requirements List, and I agree wholeheartedly with his observations.

2. During our year of experience with the existing MRL and its Informational Supplements, certain deficiencies which require correction have become apparent. I have set forth in Paragraphs 3 through 10 below, the essential ingredients which I believe any adequate mechanism must include.

3. Basic guidance for the U. S. COMINT effort should originate with a statement of the objectives of that effort. These COMINT objectives should be consistent with and, in fact, must be derived from the over-all national intelligence objectives. They must be defined in the light of COMINT realities and the capabilities of other intelligence sources and activities. The U.S. COMINT effort should be directed primarily to those tasks for which it has a unique capability and should not be asked to pursue presently unproductive tasks exclusively, to produce information of marginal value, or to duplicate unnecessarily information available through less critical sources.

4. These COMINT objectives must dictate the basic allocation of U.S. resources against foreign COMINT problems and govern the output of the effort so allocated, while at the same time making provision for technical preparations to meet future requirements.

5. Basic guidance of this nature must be authoritative and therefore should go from a superior qualified to formulate it to a subordinate responsible for implementing it. Accordingly, basic guidance must originate at a point no lower than USCIB itself and be addressed to the Director, NSA.

6. Such guidance must be clear, succinct, and understandable and require a minimum of non-technical interpretation by NSA. It must establish priorities which are as nearly absolute as possible so that there can be no question as to the required allocation of COMINT resources or the product desired.

7. At the same time, provision must be made for flexibility in adjusting the guidance to meet current intelligence and technical developments as they arise. This will require that necessary provision also be made at a working level for achieving mutual understanding of intelligence and technical developments.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

8. It must be clearly recognized that USCIB guidance amounts to operational orders which NSA must obey. While those providing the guidance will be concerned with the results rather than the details of the implementation, they should be fully advised by NSA as to the capabilities and limitations of U. S. COMINT resources and be advised of the effect of requirements on technical operations.


9. In addition, NSA should prepare a clear and understandable annual progress report to USCIB concerning conformity with, and fulfillment of, the guidance received; the basic allocation of COMINT resources; and an estimate of the additional resources required to enhance fulfillment of the COMINT objectives.

10. After study of this annual report, USCIB must advise the National Executive Agent as to what resources it considers should be made available for COMINT production in the coming year.

11. As a constructive step toward establishment of a mechanism including the ingredients which I consider essential, the attached paper which describes a mechanism including these essentials has been prepared within the Department of Defense.

12. I recommend that USCIB endorse the above essentials and forward them to USCIBEC for its guidance with instructions to prepare the necessary detailed papers for Board approval, and that the enclosure be forwarded to USCIBEC for use as a point of departure in preparing its recommendations.

For



G. B. ERSKINE  
General, USMC (Ret)  
Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense  
(Special Operations)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

2 December 1954

NATIONAL COMINT REQUIREMENTS STRUCTURE

## 1. PRIORITIES RESPONSIBILITY OF USCIB

Intelligence activities of the government do not work for themselves. They must operate to acquire information to support the objectives and policy of the government. Intelligence authorities are therefore responsible to operate in the light of expressed national policy, to shift their targets as national policy changes and to apply intelligently each of their resources along lines which capitalize on unique capabilities and avoid needless duplication of effort.

In this light, the responsibility of USCIB is to provide guidance in the understanding that it does not "determine" needs but rather intelligently applies and interprets them in terms of COMINT. It does not "generate" requirements but "tailors" them to COMINT realities. Understanding of this principle is essential. It is only in this way that we are assured that COMINT activities will always be guided in accordance with the goals of national authority and in proper relationship to the activities of other intelligence sources.

USCIB's job is therefore to examine the most recent expression of national intelligence objectives based upon current national policy (this would be DCID 4/3, now being coordinated with all IAC agencies and due for publication within a month or so) and modify it on the basis of two yardsticks:

a. COMINT should not be asked to pursue unattainable targets only. Complete allocation of COMINT effort to tasks which do not now produce anything of current value and give every indication of continued frustration after tremendous expenditure would be disastrous. A reasonable balance must be struck between targets offering relatively quick, if not easy, results and those which do not. This must never mean that targets will not be attacked because they are difficult, but that USCIB weighs alternatives and "allocates" objectives in terms of COMINT realities and capabilities. The Director, NSA's periodic report to the Board indicating his performance toward satisfying objectives and his ability to do so in the future, assumes particular significance in this light and would form the basis for deciding which intelligence targets it would be unrealistic to assign to COMINT. It would also provide the most effective means of determining whether increases in personnel or facilities were necessary.

b. COMINT effort should be directed against targets for which it has a unique or the best capability as compared to other intelligence sources. This implies the ability to compare the several sources of intelligence. There is a legal basis for this comparison in the IAC which is concerned with all sources except COMINT. USCIB as a corporate body has no competence to evaluate COMINT resources in the light of all others, but can and must do so through its members who,

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

as individuals, provide the tie-in with the rest of the intelligence community. For example, COMINT might be asked to pursue certain targets in East Germany because a covert capability had recently declined or, COMINT would not be asked to supply data from an area on which it had a capability because attache or diplomatic contacts were providing adequate reporting. In contrast to the first yardstick, for this aspect NSA would be given no production requirement.

Basic USCIB guidance would be found in two documents:

COMINT Objectives List

This would be a modified IAC priority objectives list. It would be shorter than the present USCIB Master Requirements List (under 50 items running to some five pages) and would be differently arranged so that, for instance, everything on Communist China does not fall below priorities on anything in the USSR. The list would be broken down into three major categories covering highest priority, high priority, and priority items with objectives for any area sprinkled throughout the three categories depending upon the importance of the item to national security needs. The language of the objectives would be as specific as possible for a document of this type, to insure its accurate application within NSA. It would not, however, employ technical COMINT terminology, thus becoming outdated rapidly. Items would be listed in as nearly absolute priority as possible, to insure that basic priority determinations which must be made, are made by USCIB rather than NSA. Entries such as the following would be used:



The COMINT Objectives List should be designed to remain valid as long as possible, excluding items of the temporary high priority or crash type. The primary purpose of the Objectives List would be to determine the allocation of resources to problems by NSA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

The setting of COMINT objectives is of such importance that it must be viewed as an essentially non-delegable responsibility of the Board members. The COMINT objectives list must be approved by USCIB itself. This is feasible in that USCIB is not required to produce a new document but rather to delete and re-arrange items in an existing IAC paper. It is also essential that this job be done by the Board itself in that it can be done only in the knowledge of the capabilities of non-COMINT sources of intelligence. USCIB would set the priority order of the objectives within the major breakdowns. Subordinate bodies of USCIB such as the Intelligence Committee frequently have as their representatives members from the COMINT rather than intelligence community who are not necessarily equipped to make recommendations concerning the status of all intelligence sources in their departments.

#### Detailed Requirements List

This would be the KEI of the COMINT business based upon the Intelligence targets which USCIB had decided to pursue. Contrasted to the present encyclopedic COMINT information requirements, it would run to some 15-20 pages and attempt to describe in intelligence terms the types of information needed to satisfy the stated objectives. For example,



This Detailed Requirements List would be developed through close consultation by representatives of the other USCIB agencies and NSA so that it would represent the best expression of users' needs and producers' capabilities. Information known to be within the technical capability of NSA to produce, but not required on a continuing basis because of its relative priority or its availability from other sources, should be listed in a low priority or in a non-desired supplement. As opposed to the Objectives List, which determines allocation of resources to problems, the Requirements List would determine the continuing production of NSA.

Both of these documents should be approved by USCIB as a package so that they are clearly consistent with one another, with the intent of the Board, and useable by the Director, NSA.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

## 2. NSA IMPLEMENTING COMINT PLAN

Up to this point the COMINT Objectives List would be established exclusively by users and the Detailed Requirements List cooperatively produced by users and producers. Now that USCIB had declared itself on COMINT priorities, the producers must do what they alone can do--transform them into collection and processing directives. Once the Board had stated what was wanted, NSA would decide how to use its facilities. It would be NSA's responsibility to produce an Implementing COMINT Plan, assigning U. S. COMINT cover by nationality, service and case number and allocating traffic analysts, cryptanalysts, linguists and reporting officers by target. This plan would be modified only as COMINT requirements are modified or significant technical changes occur. Such a plan must also accommodate certain tasks which might not be expressly stated in the requirements list but on which, for technical purposes or continuity insurance, an effort must be maintained. It must be recognized, for instance, that while current output on Guatemala may not be necessary, the ability to produce useful information in an emergency should exist. Also that a study of certain foreign communications practices may be desirable although there is no immediate need for or prospect of end-product.

Such a plan, once approved, would set the pattern for NSA COMINT operations, providing a sound basis on which training, communications, logistics, personnel, R/D and other activities could be planned. It would provide a basis for NSA requests for additional personnel or facilities to accomplish certain tasks, or for NSA informing the Board that certain objectives could not be satisfied.

## 3. CURRENT REQUIREMENTS

The requirements structure described thus far is designed to provide for an authoritative source of requirements expressed in understandable terms and within mutually agreed limits, stating what is required and leaving to the producer the decision as to how resources will be used to provide the immediate and long-term answers. But it does not provide for current flexibility.

An effective COMINT requirements structure must recognize that no list is totally adequate, that situations and therefore requirements change, that technical developments likewise change and have an impact on answers to requirements and ultimately on the requirements and objectives themselves. It is obvious that a current requirements mechanism must be established that is (a) authoritative and (b) rapid.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~Consumer Panels

Consumer Panels should be established--set up by or for each of the COMINT consumer agencies--to insure that there is a real understanding within NSA of the needs and plans of the Agency concerned in terms of COMINT requirements, and a similar understanding of COMINT capabilities and limitations in terms of that Agency's needs. Panels should be staffed by persons authorized to represent the intelligence needs of their department or agency, and NSA representatives responsible for their fulfillment.

Panels would meet monthly or more often as required, and would discuss current COMINT requirements (as at present, requirements desks would handle spot requirements passed through normal liaison channels). It would be essential to effective operation of these panels that participants discuss in necessary detail the factors underlying intelligence needs and technical capabilities and limitations. Conclusions reached by these panels, which would not be identically set up or run, would be promptly circulated to other panels and to a senior committee so that conflicts would be avoided.

The consumer panels would be the basic element of an effective requirements structure. It is here that the dynamic problem of requirements and technical successes would be handled initially, by face-to-face discussions among well informed persons.

Multi-Lateral Resolution of Conflicts


A senior panel or committee would be necessary to perform the functions of (a) initiating necessary alterations to established priorities to avoid or reconcile conflicts, and (b) initiating any necessary priorities revisions in reaction to significant intelligence or COMINT technical developments. This group would insure the necessary flexibility to adjust to changing situation.

1. CONTINUING IMPLEMENTATION BY NSA

Based upon the approved Master COMINT Implementing Plan, discussions within the consumer panels, and senior committee actions, continuing refinements and modifications to collection and processing directives would be necessary. To accomplish this, NSA probably would need to establish a COMINT Technical Implementation Committee. This group would receive the results of each consumer panel and senior committee meeting. In the light of the Implementing Plan, the panel discussions, committee actions, and information provided by the production units, it would initiate necessary adjustments. These would be effected through integrated collection and processing directives. Holders of the basic implementing plan would receive these "amendments" to the plan so that training, logistics, personnel, R/D and communications planning would continue relevant to current and future needs.

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED NATIONAL COMINT REQUIREMENTS STRUCTURE



~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

Chart B

## CURRENT PRIORITIES STRUCTURE

## PROPOSED PRIORITIES STRUCTURE

## Master Requirements List

1. Prepared by Intelligence Cmte.
2. Soviet - Non-Soviet breakdown.
3. Ten pages.
4. Not selective.
5. Ineffective.

## Information Requirements

6. Not considered by USCIB.
7. Sections written in Collection Terms.
8. Over 400 pages.
9. Cannot effectively be applied by NSA.

## NSA Requirements Office

10. Exclusive requirements channel; limited authority to make Agency decisions.

## Consumer Liaison

11. Exclusive Liaison channel; limited authority to make Agency decisions.
12. COMINT considerations only.
13. No meeting of counterparts.

## COMINT Objectives List

1. Prepared by USCIB from National prototype.
2. Breakdown by priority importance, regardless of country.
3. Five pages.
4. Tailored to COMINT.
5. Determines allocation of Production Resources.

## Detailed Requirements List

6. Approved by USCIB.
7. Written in intelligence terms.
8. Twenty pages.
9. Definitive priorities govern continuing COMINT output.

## NSA Requirements Office

10. Limited requirements channel; limited authority to make Agency decisions.

## Consumer Liaison

11. Liaison channel; limited authority to make Agency decisions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~Chart B  
continued

## CURRENT PRIORITIES STRUCTURE

## PROPOSED PRIORITIES STRUCTURE

Consumer/NSA Panels

12. Speak with authority for their agencies.
13. Total intelligence and technical considerations.
14. Face-to-face meeting of counterparts.

Senior Committee

15. Multilateral concern with all requirements laid on NSA.
16. Resolve Panel conflicts.
17. Initiate requirement adjustments required by technical and intelligence developments.

General Priorities Committee  
Processing Priorities Committee  
Intercept Priorities Committee

14. Consumers engaged in technical operations.
15. Separate consideration of intercept and processing priorities.

Report on Implementation

16. No adequate report made or possible in direct relation to MRL.

COMINT Performance &amp; Resources

17. No informed appraisal of performance & determination of required COMINT resources readily possible outside of NSA.

NSA COMINT Implementation Plan

-----  
NSA Technical Implementation Cmte.

18. NSA personnel in technical operations.
19. Integrated view of intercept and processing problems.

Report on Implementation

20. Comprehensive Annual Report by NSA.

COMINT Performance &amp; Resources

21. Informed USCIB annual review of COMINT performance & determination of required COMINT resources.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~110th USCIB Meeting

Item 2

USCIB MASTER REQUIREMENTS LISTBACKGROUND

1. The present Master Requirements List (MRL) was approved by USCIB on 3 July 1953 and forwarded directly to the Director, NSA, with the concurrence of the Executive Agent for the production of COMINT, as a new approach to the problem of COMINT response to intelligence requirements. The Director was requested to advise USCIB concerning the extent to which U.S. COMINT resources could be applied effectively to fulfill these requirements in the order listed. (USCIB 5/453 and 5/455).

2. The first report by the Director on this subject was circulated on 27 July 1954 as USCIB 9.3/7. It was placed before USCIBEC for initial consideration. USCIBEC referred it to the Intelligence Committee for study and recommendations.

3. INTCOM, with the NSA member not voting, reported to USCIBEC that the report while containing data on the current status of exploitation, did not provide the type of information that is required for an adequate understanding of the present and potential capabilities of U.S. resources to satisfy U.S. COMINT requirements (USCIB 9.3/8). Vote sheet replies indicated that NSA desired to have the entire matter considered by USCIB, while CIA recommended that USCIBEC consider the question of periodic reports by the Director, NSA, and the material which such reports should contain (USCIB 9.4/15).

4. USCIB 9.3/11 of 4 November 1954 circulated a memorandum in which the Director, NSA, set forth his views on the MRL. These three points were stressed:

a. The MRL does not appear to reflect current national security needs;

b. Many items of the MRL are phrased in such general terms that guidance is actually dissipated; and

c. The Information Requirements supplementary to the Master List are so drawn as to make proper action difficult.

This memorandum was placed on the agenda for the 109th meeting on 12 November but deferred until the December meeting at the request of the OSD member.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## Item 2 (Cont'd)

CURRENT CONSIDERATION:

5. USCIB 9.3/16 of 3 December 1954 circulates a memorandum by the OSD member in which he states his wholehearted agreement with the views of the Director, NSA on the MRL. The memorandum recognizes certain deficiencies in the present MRL and sets forth the essential ingredients which the OSD member believes should be included in any adequate requirements mechanism. They are as follows:

a. Basic guidance for the U.S. COMINT effort should originate with a statement of the objectives of that effort. These COMINT objectives should be consistent with and, in fact, must be derived from the over-all national intelligence objectives.

b. These COMINT objectives must dictate the basic allocation of U.S. resources against foreign COMINT problems and govern the output of the effort so allocated.

c. Basic guidance must originate at a point no lower than USCIB itself and be addressed to the Director, NSA.

d. Such guidance must be clear, succinct, and understandable and require a minimum of non-technical interpretation by NSA.

e. Provision must be made for flexibility in adjusting the guidance to meet current intelligence and technical developments as they arise.

f. It must be clearly recognized that USCIB guidance amounts to operational orders which NSA must obey.

g. NSA should prepare a clear and understandable annual progress report to USCIB concerning conformity with, and fulfillment of, the guidance received; the basic allocation of COMINT resources; and an estimate of the additional resources required to enhance fulfillment of the COMINT objectives.

h. After study of this annual report, USCIB must advise the National Executive Agent as to what resources it considers should be made available for COMINT production in the coming year.

6. As a constructive step toward establishment of such a mechanism as outlined in para. 5 above, the OSD member's memorandum incloses a paper entitled "National COMINT Requirements Structure". The paper is divided into several sections which are discussed below.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

## Item 2(Cont'd)

7. Priorities Responsibility of USCIB - The responsibility of USCIB is to provide guidance in the understanding that it does not "determine" needs but rather intelligently applies and interprets them in terms of COMINT. It does not "generate" requirements but "tailors" them to COMINT realities. Its job, therefore, is to examine the most recent expression of national intelligence objectives based upon current national policy and modify it on the basis of two yardsticks:

a. COMINT should not be asked to pursue unattainable targets only. A reasonable balance must be struck between targets offering relatively quick, if not easy, results and those which do not.

b. COMINT effort should be directed against targets for which it has a unique or the best capability as compared to other intelligence sources. This implies the ability to compare the several sources of intelligence.

8. Basic USCIB guidance would be found in two documents:

a. COMINT Objectives List - This would be a modified IAC priority objectives list. It would be shorter than the present MRI, and would be arranged differently. It would be broken down into three major categories covering highest priority, high priority and priority items, with objectives for any area sprinkled throughout the three categories depending upon the importance of the item to national security needs. The primary purpose of the list would be to determine the allocation of resources to problems by NSA and it should be designed to remain valid as long as possible. The COMINT objectives list must be approved by USCIB itself, in that the setting of these objectives must be viewed as an essentially non-delegatable responsibility of the Board members.

b. Detailed Requirements List - This would be the REI of the COMINT business based upon the intelligence targets which USCIB has decided to pursue. It would be shorter than the present Information Requirements and would attempt to describe in intelligence terms the types of information needed to satisfy the stated objectives. This list would be developed through close consultation by representatives of the other USCIB agencies and NSA so that it would represent the best expression of the users' needs and producers' capabilities.

9. Both the COMINT Objectives List and the Detailed Requirements List should be approved by USCIB as a package so that they are clearly consistent with one another, with the intent of the Board, and useable by the Director, NSA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## Item 2 (Cont'd)

10. NSA Implementing COMINT Plan - Once USCIB had stated what was wanted, NSA would decide how to use its facilities. NSA would be responsible for producing an Implementing COMINT Plan, assigning US COMINT cover by nationality, service and case number and allocating traffic analysts, cryptanalysts, linguists and reporting officers by target. Such a plan, once approved, would set the pattern for NSA COMINT operations, providing a sound basis on which training, communications, logistics, personnel, R/D and other activities could be planned. It would provide a basis for NSA requests for additional personnel or facilities to accomplish certain tasks, or for NSA informing the Board that certain objectives could not be satisfied.

11. Current Requirements - To provide for current flexibility, a current requirements mechanism must be established that is authoritative and rapid. To accomplish this, consumer panels should be established to insure that there is a real understanding within NSA of the needs and plans of the agency concerned in terms of COMINT requirements. These panels would be the basic element of an effective requirements structure. It is here that the dynamic problem of requirements and technical successes would be handled initially, by face-to-face discussions among well informed persons. A senior panel or committee would be necessary to (a) initiate necessary alterations to established priorities to avoid or reconcile conflicts, and (b) initiate any necessary priorities revisions in reaction to significant intelligence or COMINT technical developments.

12. Continuing Implementation by NSA - Based upon the approved Master COMINT Implementing Plan, discussions within the consumer panels, and senior committee actions, continuing refinements and modifications to collection and processing directive would be necessary. To accomplish this, NSA probably would need to establish a COMINT Technical Implementation Committee. This group would receive the results of each consumer panel and senior committee meeting. Necessary adjustments would be initiated and would be effected through integrated collection and processing directives.

13. The OSD member recommends that USCIB endorse the essential ingredients which he considers necessary for any adequate COMINT requirements mechanism and forward them to USCIBEC for its guidance with instructions to prepare the necessary detailed papers for Board approval. In addition, he recommends that the inclosed draft in a National COMINT Requirements Structure be forwarded to USCIBEC to be used as a point of departure in preparing its recommendations. The thought here is that USCIBEC should prepare for Board approval a paper setting forth its recommendations for an effective National COMINT Requirements Mechanism to replace the present MRL.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Item 2 (Cont'd)

14. It is to be noted that the OSD memorandum with its inclosure was circulated to the Service Secretaries and the JCS prior to its submission to USCIB. Replies were generally non-committal, recommending that the matter could best be discussed in USCIB. There have been hints, however, that questions will be raised as to the degree of authority of the Consumer Panels.

15. It is hoped that the members of USCIB will indorse the "essential ingredients" laid down by the OSD member. It is believed likely that they will accept the first two sections of his proposed "National COMINT Requirements Structure", viz. Priorities Responsibilities of USCIB and the NSA Implementing COMINT Plan. The third and fourth sections dealing with Current Requirements and Continuing Implementation by NSA are likely to bring forth considerable discussion, especially in connection with the Consumer Panels.

RECOMMENDATION

16. It is recommended that the NSA member endorse the OSD member's proposal for a National COMINT Requirements mechanism to replace the present MRL.