

104TH USCIB Meeting

Item 1


APPROVAL OF FINAL MINUTES
OF THE 102ND MEETING

1. Changes submitted by NSA have been incorporated in the final version of the minutes of the 102nd USCIB Meeting.
2. Recommend approval of these minutes.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-01-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

~~TOP SECRET~~104th USCIB MeetingPL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)~~TOP SECRET~~

Item 2

BACKGROUND

1. At its 103rd Meeting on 14 May USCIB agreed not to accept the basic report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee (USCIB 29.18/2). Instead, it was agreed to appoint a reconstituted committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Frank Raven. This committee was to consider proposed agenda items "a" through "d" and, if agreement was reached on these items, to proceed with consideration of items "e" and "f." Recommendations to USCIB were to be submitted for consideration at the 11 June meeting with a view to having approved position papers available for exchange with UK authorities by 15 June 1954.

2. It was further agreed that member organizations concerned would submit to USCIB on 11 June the names of their conference delegates and technical advisers, keeping the number as limited as possible (USCIB 29.18/5).

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

3. The papers for agenda items (a) through (e) have been written by the Working Committee chaired by Mr. Raven. These papers have been circulated as USCIB 29.18/7 and 29.18/8. All members of the Working Committee are in agreement on these papers. It is important to note here that the wording of these papers has been carefully worked out and agreed by all members in concert. We recommend that the Director not take exception to any of the phraseology in these papers.

4. Item (f) of the paper on will support the objectives of the Director, NSA, but will leave until later the question of agreement on the actual mechanism of technical collaboration. Item (f) of the paper Item (f) recommends against further expansion at this time, but provides for approval in principle of the supply of technical information by Director, NSA, if, in the future, he considers this necessary or desirable. All members of the Working Committee are in agreement on these papers.

5. If the question of liaison requirements comes up, the Director's position should be based on the necessity for close technical relations with The votes of members who support NSA will be contingent upon the view that the Director must have working liaison personnel in A question which might be asked is: "How soon after the agreement is ratified do you contemplate establishing these technical liaison people It is vital to NSA's position that the Director's reply be: "Immediately."

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6. Agreement having been reached among the members of the Working Committee, it is expected that the papers as submitted will receive the unanimous approval of UECIB.

7. CIA may argue that, if NSCID #9 governs, the Director, NSA, should be responsible for conducting the technical collaboration, whereas, if NSCID #5 governs, then the CIA must control it. If CIA goes on record as stating that NSCID #5 governs in this matter, it will prove to the other members that CIA considers that certain COMINT activities are outside the control of UECIB. They are unlikely to get even a single supporting vote in UECIB on this thesis, which a number of members have indicated an eagerness to resolve for all time.

8. If CIA should state that they will not put up the money for the collaboration if NSA runs the show, we recommend that the Director accept this news calmly and observe that he will arrange to budget for it himself, and that he presumes an adjustment can be made between the NSA and CIA budgets.

10. The whole case rests on the thesis that - if COMINT collaboration [redacted] is a technical operation, then only a technical Agency can do it and NSA is the one government agency established for such technical COMINT operations.

11. We must avoid accusing CIA of running [redacted] badly in the past. If CIA attacks NSA operations, it will win no votes thereby. The important thing is to avoid a wrangle. We can afford to admit that there is perhaps some merit in their charges, if made, adding however that the reverse is probably also true and, in any case, it is all in the past. We can point out that we are now starting a new arrangement and urge that it be established on a solid basis.

RECOMMENDATION

12. It is recommended that the Director support the recommendations of the Working Committee [redacted]

13. It is further recommended that the Director be prepared to nominate the delegates and advisors who will represent NSA at the forthcoming conference.

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
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Item 3



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BACKGROUND



3. Subject to these deletions, the Board agreed that the proposal would be considered by vote sheet and that each member, prior to voting, would check with his own sources on the subject of legality and such other aspects of the proposed transactions as are felt to warrant consideration.

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

4. This item has again been placed on the meeting agenda at the request of CIA. CIA, in their vote sheet reply, indicated that further discussion was required. Vote sheet replies by CIA, NSA, and Navy are included in paper circulated by the Executive Secretary (USCIB 29.14/16).

5. It has been learned from a reasonably good source that CIA will state at the meeting that they are generally opposed to the proposal because of its political implications. Further, they don't like dealing



It is understood, however, that CIA will be prepared to cast a favorable vote, if a majority of the Board favors such action.

6. Navy has approved the proposal subject to a determination of the legality of the transaction. The Navy JAG has rendered an informal opinion that such a sale is legal, provided that the equipment is transferred to SECDEF, who can in turn utilize CIA as the delivery agent. However, Navy JAG points out that any final decision regarding transfer or disposal of military property rests with its Office of Legal Counsel.

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7. It is understood that other members will report orally their views on the legality of the transaction but it is not known just what those views will be.

8. On its vote sheet, NSA stated that both of the procedures suggested for selling the machines are considered to be legal. However, NSA stated that the more appropriate procedure would be to transfer the machines to CIA from military stocks on hand; CIA could then sell them and reimburse the Army or Navy supply source.

RECOMMENDATION~~TOP SECRET~~