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File 80A

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



May 19, 1949.

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, SECURITY DIVISION,

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

Subject: Military Assistance Program.

Advance planning in connection with the military assistance program to be presented to Congress is being undertaken in the Department of State. Questions have arisen as to arrangements for telegraphic communications which depend upon cryptographic facilities available.

I have been requested to present the problem in preliminary form to interested officials and obtain guidance for the more detailed planning to come later. The attached paper contains most of the information presently available. Please let me know whether you agree with the recommendation or would like to discuss the problem at a meeting.

*LW Parke*  
L. W. Parke  
Captain, USN

Chief, Division of Cryptography

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE PROBLEM

To provide cryptographic facilities for the field representatives of agencies participating in the U. S. Military Assistance Program.

FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE

The Department of State, at the direction of the President, is coordinating the efforts of all Government agencies in shaping a unified, cohesive military aid program. Requests for military assistance may be expected from any "free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security." This paper deals only with cryptographic problems created by a military assistance program.

The Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air, and the Economic Cooperation Administration are expected to be participating agencies, with the broad responsibility and authority to administer the military assistance program delegated to the Secretary of State. At present cryptographic channels exist for the handling of messages between each of the participating agencies and its field representatives. These channels include systems held by diplomatic missions, attaches of these missions, and by military missions such as those in Greece and Turkey.

Existing cryptographic channels are primarily for communications within an agency and do not provide a common channel for messages of concern to all participating agencies.

DISCUSSION

Although it may be desirable for each participating agency to use its own cryptographic channels in connection with MAP traffic, there are some advantages to providing a joint system for this traffic. For example, in a large MAP installation the volume of traffic may necessitate additional tie-lines which could terminate in a separate MAP building. This would permit the operation of a joint communication center and code room. Also, traffic between agencies would not have to be reencrypted

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if a joint cryptographic system were provided.

It is assumed that the majority of the traffic will flow between departments of the Military Establishment and their field representatives, and will be of concern only to military personnel. For this reason and because the Military Establishment is better able to provide cryptographic material, any joint cryptographic system should be made available by the Army or Navy Department. It would also be desirable for one of these departments to administer the operation of coding facilities at locations where joint communication centers are installed.

✓ No estimates of traffic loads are available at this early stage in the planning.

CONCLUSION

In the first phase of the communication plan for the Military Assistance Program, participating agencies should use existing cryptographic facilities. The Department of State and the Economic Cooperation Administration will be able to use State cryptographic systems, and Army, Navy and Air Force Departments will be able to use their respective attache systems.

When it has been determined that joint cryptographic facilities are needed, the Army or Navy Department should provide a joint cryptographic system, distribute the necessary materials and prescribe the rules for its use.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the Army and Navy Departments agree upon a joint cryptographic system which can be used for the traffic resulting from a Military Assistance Program. The system chosen should be one which can be issued to the Department of State and its diplomatic missions.

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