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1. ^{AS-23}~~AS-14~~ AS-22 23Jan,1947 FM 30-15, Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service

1. The Intelligence Division, WDCS, is contemplating publishing in the near future a manual on Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service, and it is desirable that the Agency have a section in this manual devoted to such EKIS as it may perform.

2. The attached article has been prepared by WDGAS-90 and includes details of operation down to and including Divisions and Wings and is based on the assumption that Army Security Liaison Detachments are actually in use and assigned to Army, Corps, and Division levels and to comparable Air Force Headquarters. The activities of WDGAS-70 and WDGAS-80, with respect to this service, have been included, and the article has been coordinated with these two divisions.

3. Request comments and/or concurrence not later than 30 January 1947.

1 Incl
Section—, FM 30-15

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FM 30-15, ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SECTION --

CRYPTOMATERIAL

--. ORGANIZATION. - Each Army, Corps, and Division, as well as comparable Air Force headquarters, will have assigned to it an Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section. One of the duties of this section is to provide for the proper and rapid handling and exploitation of all captured enemy material pertaining to cryptography and cryptanalysis. In order to accomplish this function, each Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section will establish as one of its components at least one EEIS team consisting of two officers. One of these officers will be trained in the fundamentals of cryptography and cryptanalysis; the other officer will be a linguist, qualified to conduct interrogations in the operations area.

--. DUTIES. - It is the responsibility of the EEIS team of the Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section to make an immediate and thorough investigation and report concerning every captured enemy item having any apparent connection with cryptography or cryptanalysis. This investigation will include the following:

a. Prompt evaluation of the material; in some cases the information it affords may be of such great importance that its immediate exploitation may affect the success of current operations.

b. Determination of complete details regarding capture of the material; when, where, and by whom it was captured.

c. Where indicated, an investigation at the scene of the capture, to determine whether other items are available, whether further information may be deduced by a trained cryptologic officer, and whether enemy personnel are available for interrogation.

d. Interrogation of available enemy personnel having knowledge of the material. During the course of such interrogation the following must be determined:

- (1) The relationship of the prisoner to the captured item.
- (2) The nature of the captured item, its function, and the identity of the using organization.
- (3) Details of operation in the case of mechanical or electrical machines or devices.
- (4) Other specific questions, depending upon the nature of the material. The Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section will have available several different prepared lists of specific questions for use by EEIS teams. For example, the questioning of a prisoner who worked as a clerk in a message center would proceed along different lines from that of a prisoner who worked in a crypt-analytic section endeavoring to break our own cryptosystems.

(5) The EEIS team will submit a report, together with the captured material, as expeditiously as possible to the ^{G-2} Chief of the Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section of the next higher echelon.

→ RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDERS. - Commanders of areas down through Divisions, in which it is contemplated that EEIS teams will operate, will render necessary assistance to facilitate the accomplishment of the EEIS mission. Such assistance normally will include the issuance of passes, countersigned by the commander or his authorized representative, permitting the team unrestricted passage throughout the area, and access to all captured enemy cryptomaterial.

→ ASSISTANCE FROM G-2. - G-2 will inform the EEIS team regarding matters of probable interest, such as location of installations or personnel that should be investigated.

1. RESPONSIBILITIES OF CAPTURING ECHELON. - The capturing echelon has the direct responsibility for the immediate reporting to the Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section at the nearest Division or higher headquarters of all captured material, installations, and personnel having any apparent connection with cryptography or cryptanalysis. This will include practically all material in a captured message center.

a. Independent judgment must be exercised by the capturing echelon in the manner of making such a report; as indicated in paragraph -a, information regarding enemy cryptography or cryptanalysis may have a direct bearing on the success of current operations. For example, capture of current enemy codes or ciphers, or of plain-text messages, may make it possible for our own forces to obtain advance knowledge of details of the enemy plan of battle provided the material is made available immediately to the Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section for exploitation before the enemy has discovered his loss. In such a case, the capturing echelon should make a brief and direct report to the Army Security Agency Liaison ^{Det} Section at the nearest Division headquarters by the most expeditious means, presumably radio or wire, with use of a secure cryptosystem, if it is necessary to send by radio or wire. This report should be concise and clear, merely describing the captured material in brief terms, giving the exact location where it may be found, and the name of the organization having custody.

b. The brief report must be supplemented by a written report as soon as practicable. Written reports will include details surrounding the capture and all observed information regarding the use of the material.

c. Similar reports must be made when any evidence is discovered indicating enemy efforts or successes in breaking our own cryptosystems.