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Commander Adams, P/P   13 December 1954

Mr. Friedman, Special Assistant

NSA Long-Range Estimate (NSAIRE)

1. Your paper reflects an excellent amount of work and clear thinking.

2. It might be well to include an additional Annex (or an addition to
Annex "E") which would take into consideration the fruits of commercial re-
search and development which may be pertinent and applicable to NSA's efforts.
(Such information can be obtained by direct contact with companies, or through
some of our Board and Panel members.) This has enough potential from a long
range and/or "mobilization base" viewpoint that it must be included in our
thinking, and should be clearly stated in our "long range estimates." The
item under Annex "E", "conducted by outside departments and agencies," is
not considered inclusive of knowledge of the state and potential of the art
in commercial outfits.

3. In reference to Inclosure 3, it might be effective to wind up
paragraph I 1c with the statement: "Therefore it can be said that the peak
of our national cryptologic effort may well have passed when general
hostilities commence."

4. Similarly, referring to paragraph I 2a ("THE COMINT EFFORT"), it
might be well to conclude: "The degree of success or failure of the effort
will be known only upon the commencement of hostilities."

5. Still referring to Inclosure 3, but now to Section II, attention is
invited to the fifth assumption. It is technically a bit inaccurate and is
not comprehensive, hence could be misleading.

6. The eleventh assumption could well be qualified with the statement
that it could be a serious mistake to postpone any phase or expansion of
the COMINT effort by reliance on a sudden expansion resulting from
hostilities. The optimum condition would be for the COMINT community to be
very close to wartime posture, capacity, and capability before the outbreak of
hostilities.

                                    WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
                                    Special Assistant

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