

~~TOP SECRET~~PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)~~APPROPRIATE TO THE
CONTAIN SENSITIVE MATERIAL~~

Comments on Trip Report by Professor Wilks

Mr. Friedman, S/ASST

TECHDIR/PROD

11 Jan 55

1. This report covers the highly controversial visit made by Dr. Wilks to GCHQ. There have been extremely informal reactions reaching PROD on a personal basis from GCHQ suggesting that Dr. Wilks' visit was not looked upon with favor at GCHQ, and that Dr. Wilks in his questioning innocently and accidentally got onto some extremely delicate ground.

2. This report reflects a strong undertone of disapproval for the present 70-90 organization, which is not a new concept but is interesting coming from NSASAB. He accurately portrays British feelings on the subject.

3. As to paragraph 8 on selection of personnel by tests, I personally cannot agree with him. This subject of testing has been investigated for years. The Navy in the last war had a large number of psychologists who were fascinated by the problem. The only test which we have seen in recent years in which we had any appreciable confidence was in the summer of three years ago when all our most promising junior mathematician applicants flunked polygraph and the least promising passed with flying colors. I cannot agree with the concept implied in this paragraph and in much of the past hiring of this Agency that people for T/A are essentially different from people for crypt and need not be as good. This is a blunder we are paying a terrific price to wipe out.

4. Paragraph 12 implies that there is no contact at present between the [] at GCHQ and 90, this is obviously absurd. Paragraph 13 on further AFSS representation is clearly policy but I am opposed. All Americans in GCHQ at Cheltenham must be under one command. The idea of special AFSS representation would create chaos. Possibly AFSS is not getting everything it should from the delegation at Cheltenham, but there is certainly adequate Air Force representation in the unit.

5. Paragraph 16 would have been the one paragraph in the paper in which I personally would want full details. After a recitation in which the number of sherries of the whole junket is given in detail, when Dr. Wilks gets to the meat he casually reports "As these problems are all rather technical, I shall not discuss them here." Where will he? The previous paragraph he apparently considers of more interest and concern to us.

6. As to his recommendation on [] coming over, we should be delighted, but the issue is larger. Because of shortages of funds, high cost of travel and dollar difficulties, very few GCHQ personnel come to NSA on visits. This is particularly conspicuous when we see the number of Americans, including Wilks, going the other way. This in itself is probably irritating to some British. It would clearly be to our advantage to greatly increase the visits of Britishers over here, of whom [] is a shining example, but the list is long. If the NSA Staff can diplomatically work out a program to accomplish this it would be worthwhile. One possibility would be to get them MATS transportation. By this we wouldn't embarrass them

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by directly handing them the cash. Something of this sort is highly desirable. We would much rather have here for a visit than Wilks at GCHQ and that is an understatement.

7. It is obvious that I personally consider Wilks' trip to have been an unfortunate junket which discovered no new information and created some ill will. It may be argued that this is offset by the show-in the arm to Wilks personally. This is in turn offset by the loss of morale by personnel on board.

F. A. RAVEN
 Acting Technical Director
 Production

Inclosure
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : S/ASST (Mr. Friedman)

DATE: 7 Jan 55

FROM : P/F

SUBJECT: Comment on Wilks' Trip Report to GCHQ

1. I am informed that comments on Professor Wilks' report were also solicited from Col. Marcy, Col. Herrelko, Dr. Kullback, and possibly others. No attempt was made, therefore, to staff this paper with other elements of the Agency.

2. The basic questions treated and suggestions and observations contained in the Wilks report may be reduced to the following general headings:

- a. Recruitment Procedures.
- b. Testing Methods for Selection of Personnel.
- c. Development and Presentation of Intelligence Indices.
- d. Rotation of Naval Personnel from the [redacted] to NSA.
- e. Liaison Between [redacted] and Analogous NSA Activities.
- f. Greater Liaison Between GCHQ and AFSS.
- g. Liaison Between GCHQ and NSA on Mathematical and Statistical Problems. ([redacted]-Leibler Relation).
- h. Greater Integration of the T/A and C/A Effort at GCHQ.

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3. Specific comments on these items follows:

a. Although Professor Wilks makes no comparison between the recruitment procedures followed by GCHQ and NSA, it seems apparent he is impressed by "the thoroughness of GCHQ's selection procedures - " (para 7). The success of this Agency in recruiting larger numbers of personnel and the excellent relations PERS has established with many colleges, despite occasional breaches of faith caused by governmental actions, seem to indicate that only in the engineering field is this Agency lacking.

It is recommended that PERS be given an opportunity to comment on this paragraph.

b. Paragraph 8 makes reference to a series of tests developed by GCHQ to improve personnel selections for C/A and T/A tasks. This Agency conducts a battery of tests to determine aptitudes in various fields, and uses an "employee utilization" group presumably to assure optimum exploitation of available talent. It is not known here how effective these tests may be, or how capably the EU group is administered.

It is recommended that PERS be given an opportunity to comment on this item.

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c. Professor Wilks was "very much impressed" by a graphical method for presenting intelligence as a function of time. This method is being developed by the [redacted]. Professor Wilks doesn't know if similar work is going on with respect to [redacted] but presumes that US Naval personnel in the Combined Party will bring back to NSA some of these ideas. He recommends that NSA personnel concerned with [redacted] be provided an opportunity to contact the [redacted], since the presentation problems are similar.

It is recommended that (a) SUSLO (L) and his staff be given an opportunity to comment on these observations. One of the functions of liaison would seem to be to assure the provision of information regarding new and valuable developments to home headquarters. (b) PERS be asked to comment on the possibility of rotating military personnel from liaison assignments overseas back to NSA Headquarters. One notable loss in this respect, it is rumored, will be the assignment of the incumbent SUSLO to a position not in Washington. This sort of thing has happened before, and the potential benefits to be derived from an officer's re-assignment to NSA HQS have not been realized. (c) DD/PROD be asked to comment on whether he has permitted or encouraged contacts between [redacted] and whether more can be done along this line.

d. Professor Wilks suggests, in paragraph 13, serious consideration of more contact between GCHQ and AFSS. It is assumed he refers to the COMINT field, rather than ELINT, because of his reference to the "similarity of outlook on the quantification problem between Mr. Millward of GCHQ and some of the Staff members of AFSS."

It is recommended that contacts between the COMINT agencies of the UK and US continue to be maintained through SUSLO staff. It may be advisable, however, to consider seriously the problem of more contact between AFSS and NSA. It is therefore further recommended that DD/PROD be asked to determine the advisability of stationing an NSA liaison office at Kelly AFB.

e. Professor Wilks considers it advisable (in para 16) to have [redacted] of GCHQ spend some time with Dr. Leibler's group at NSA. He does not suggest in what capacity. It is remembered that Dr. Leibler spent some time in London with GCHQ.

It is recommended that DD/R/D be asked to comment on the advisability of this suggestion, perhaps as a gesture of reciprocity.

f. In paragraphs 9 and 17, Professor Wilks seems impressed by the "focussing of T/A, C/A and other skills" and the "integration of T/A and C/A effort" at GCHQ, apparently to a larger degree than is practiced at NSA.

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The development of fusion practices at GCHQ is believed to antedate those at NSA. The extent to which this practice can be conducted at NSA under the present organization is debatable.

It is recommended that DD/PROD address himself to this point in an effort to determine whether more "focussing" or "integration" of skills is practicable and desirable, and whether a re-organization of PROD to accomplish this end would be necessary.

g. Finally, it is assumed that Professor Wilks' "technical" discussions with various individuals in GCHQ will be described in another report, and referred to appropriate technical people of this Agency for consideration.

John J. Davis
JOHN J. DAVIS
Colonel, Arty

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