

3 June 1954

MEMORANDUM

If this exhibit is to accompany the reply to General Erskins, I strongly recommend revision of Sections I and II as indicated below.

Section I is most unbecomingly phrased. It explicitly damns the previous administration (of AFSA) and deliberately puts the present Director (who is speaking in the first person) on the back. While the statements may be quite true, I feel that the contrasts between administrations should at worst be implied rather than pointed out, and at best should be inferred from the straight facts, with no implications.

Section II as currently written does not support the policy statements contained in subparagraph 3g of the draft letter. It could well be replaced by a simple list of the four charts C-1 through C-4.

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ENCLOSURE 1

EXTRACTS FROM
BROWNELL COMMITTEE REPORT

~~TOP SECRET~~

P. 111-113

"The Committee can advise without qualification that communications intelligence has been in the past, and still is, of vital importance to the Government. There was a tendency on the part of certain witnesses from the three Services to emphasize that its primary importance is 'military', and that the primary justification for our great COMINT effort should be to furnish the three Services with intelligence which is necessary in connection with the conduct of a war and in preparing to meet attack if a war starts. When one considers the fact that in the past most of the spectacular examples of its success have been directly connected with our military effort, this view is not surprising. On the other hand, there is no question in the Committee's mind that at this stage of our country's history communications intelligence is also of primary importance to the successful operations of certain of the civilian agencies, particularly the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These civilian agencies today play a vital part in the national security of the United States, and it is apparent to us that COMINT has an essential part in our entire effort to protect that security and not only in that large part of the effort which is the direct responsibility of the Military Services. This principle should govern our COMINT organization to a greater extent in the future than it has in the past.

"Information obtained through COMINT is of importance in a number of ways, but it is not too much of an oversimplification to divide its importance into two main categories. The first of these relates to the direct support of our military units in the field through communications intelligence pertaining to order-of-battle, movements of the enemy, enemy plans and intentions, and so forth. The second includes the longer-range military information, and intelligence relating to diplomatic, political, economic and scientific matters. While the two interlock, the former is unquestionably of primary importance to the Services and is indispensable to them. The latter is of importance to the Services and the civilian agencies alike. The two-fold characteristic of the finished product is the source of one of the difficulties in the organization of a central communications intelligence effort. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that, although it is possible to separate to the extent indicated the use of the finished product, it is not at all possible to segregate to an equal extent the functions of collecting and processing the material which is the source of the information. Some information in the first category can be obtained directly at a forward intercept station. Other such information, very probably of even greater importance, can be obtained only by compiling at AFSA itself all the bits and pieces derived from all COMINT sources, and by using the complicated cryptanalytic machinery located at AFSA. This is but one of the factors that leads us to the conclusion that COMINT is a national responsibility (as distinct from the responsibility of any particular Service, department or agency) and that as a consequence the activity must be so managed and organized as to exploit all available intelligence resources in the participating departments and agencies in order to obtain the optimum results for each and for the Government as a whole."

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCL 2

p. 125-126~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

"Below the directorate level, senior positions should be filled by individuals, whether officer or civilian, who have a career interest in the field of communications intelligence. We do not believe that these positions should be limited to civilians, because we are impressed by the testimony given by many witnesses as to the importance of familiarizing the Service organizations in the field with AFSA organization and operations by rotating officers from AFSA into field positions and then back again. Also, the long experience of several Navy officers is one of the great assets of the activity today. On the other hand, it would be a major mistake to limit the senior positions to officers, because it is of the greatest importance to encourage civilians to make careers in the COMINT field by clear demonstration that senior positions will be available to them if their talents merit promotions."

p. 129

" We are more concerned over the fact that the present top level control of AFSA is in a three-headed group, each member of which often has in mind the interests of his own Service, than by the fact that the group is military. Although it is our opinion that the 1949 experiment whereby AFSA was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be terminated, we would not adopt the plan urged on us by some witnesses that, following the British precedent, it should be placed directly under a civilian agency, such as the Central Intelligence Agency. We reach this conclusion not so much on the theory that the COMINT product is more important to the Services than to the civilian agencies as because (1) the Services are practically the sole collectors and transmitters of the raw intercepted material, and (2) the product is used to so important an extent in combat activities in time of war as to dictate the desirability of preserving lines of command through established defense channels. We have received no convincing evidence that it is necessary to put AFSA outside the Defense establishment in order to assure that the needs of civilian agencies are properly taken care of."

p. 138-139

"Greater civilianization, according to SCAG, is absolutely necessary in that branch of AFSA which is charged with the conduct of technical research. Many scientists and mathematicians in recent years have felt the appeal of the importance and mystery of the COMINT effort, only to draw away upon developing closer contact because they have felt it impossible or frustrating (whether rightly or wrongly makes little difference) to work within the military hierarchy."

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

PARAPHRASED EXTRACTS FROM A PAPER
by the HON. H. STRUVE HENSEL*

(Substitutions in the original article indicated by cancellation of original word(s),
underlining of word(s) substituted)

The fundamental principles, which must be identified and appreciated before any start can be made on the organization chart, are:

- (1) Civilian Military control may be of two kinds -- active or passive -- and each kind requires an entirely different type of organizational structure.
- (2) Military decisions cannot be separated from civilian decisions.

* * *

Under the passive concept, while civilians military officers do hold the highest positions and "influence," the military civilians really control. A few civilians officers at the top have the power to decide; they outrank all military-officers civilians and can, if they so desire, take command. But it is deemed irrelevant whether they actually do decide as long as the civilian military signature is the final word. Since these civilians military officers are more interested to know what has been decided than to have the data needed to make decisions, the fact that all the information they receive comes through a single military civilian channel makes no difference.

Such a system cannot work without a military civilian chief to sit in the center of the web -- immediately below the civilians military but above all the others. Through this single military-commander civilian head all information passes up and all orders pass down. The military civilian chief must and does "run" the department, agency. The civilian-Secretaries top military officers are thus more like a board of directors than top executives.

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On the other hand, the active concept is that, if they really wish to control, civilians the military must participate actively in the daily business of the department agency. They must have not only the power to decide but also

the ability to decide independently and intelligently -- that is, on the basis of thoroughly informed judgment. There is no place under this concept for a single military-commander civilian chief with power to "run" the department agency. The civilian-Secretary military Director does the "running," and any military civilian head is only one of several top advisers and consultants.

* * *

It is readily apparent why a choice must be made between these two concepts of civilian military control. They are miles apart in philosophy, principle, and implementation. They demand quite different types of personnel in the key positions. ... And just as civilian military control cannot be part active and part passive, organizations must follow one pattern or the other.

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... there still remains a forceful body of thought in favor of the passive concept. It is a workable approach -- or at least it has worked in the past. It offers an antidote for the weak-civilian-Secretary inexperienced military Director. It also offers some cure for the lack of continuity in office of the civilians military. It has considerable appeal to many in the career military civil service.

* * *

Not only is there much more to war the cryptologic business than any single specialist skill; it is also clear that all the necessary specialized knowledge and experience must be blended into a single decision by "generalists" rather than by "specialists." And the expressions of specialist opinion must flow to the generalists unimpeded by any military civilian or other specialist filters.

The favorite justification for having a specialist as top executive is the assumption that, unless he has a "personal wealth of military cryptologic experience" and "continuity of office," a person will not be capable of interpreting wartime COMINT situations or of making the proper decisions. Yet

commercial and industrial experience has indicated that it is far more satisfactory for the top executive to be a generalist.

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Men with a "personal wealth of military cryptologic experience" are in the main specialists. While there are exceptions, specialists do not normally develop into generalists. This comment is not pointed solely at military-men civilian cryptologic technicians. Accountants and lawyers are also specialists who as a rule make poor top executives, the exceptions being so few that they prove the rule. Furthermore, military-men civilian technicians are seldom developed for over-all executive direction; rather, promotion to top military-rank civil service grade often depends on proficiency in a well-defined special field.

There is such a professional as an "executive generalist." This type of man is far more effective in the top executive position than is the specialist because he not only develops the objective qualities of mind but also has more skill in weighing diverse factors and coming to a conclusion on the basis of the several specialist points of view. The generalist can and should be appointed to the top executive position. He will usually be found in civilian-life among military line officers.