

SRH- 320

VARIOUS REPORTS ON
JAPANESE GRAND FLEET MANEUVERS
1927 - 1929

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12356
by Director, NSM/Chief, CSS

MAS Date: 2008

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Special Research History
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*Return to
Stratla*

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U.S.S. PITTSBURGH, Flagship.

A8-2 (3)
(CF-702)

16-(he)

~~SECRET~~

Shanghai, China,
9 December, 1927.

From: The Commander in Chief.
To : The Director of Naval Intelligence.

SUBJECT: ORANGE Maneuvers, Information concerning.

1. Forwarded.
2. Comment is requested.

/s/ MARK L BRISTOL.

(One (1) copy and intercepted
radio communications inclosed
for Director of Communica-
tions.)

U. S. S. PITTSBURGH

EMZ:LH

~~SECRET~~

Shanghai, China,
28 November, 1927.

From: Lieutenant Commander Ellis M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

SUBJECT: ORANGE Maneuvers, Information desired by the Commander
in Chief.

1. There is forwarded herewith a complete analysis and report on the information received during subject maneuvers, and other pertinent facts of interest, together with conclusions and recommendations deemed necessary.

- - - - - /s/ ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS * * * -

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. PITTSBURGH

Shanghai, China,
28 November, 1937.

THE ORANGE MANEUVERS AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION OBTAINED.

1. During the period of contemplated ORANGE Maneuvers, in which it was understood that the first ten days, October 10-20, would be devoted to individual Fleet tactical maneuvers, and the last ten days, October 20-30, to a war problem, with one of the fleets as the attacking fleet, the radio activities were covered in the following manner:

1st. Phase.

From October 11-13, the U.S.S. CINCINNATI cruised in the area off the southern end of Korea, preparing for and holding full power trials, during which time two operators qualified in ORANGE code were on board. On the night of October 11, shortly after leaving Shanghai, both tactical signals and general traffic were heard. The distance from this area of activities was at least four hundred miles, and signals were of the same high strength that they were throughout all maneuvers, indicating that no restrictions are put on the amount of power used. Interspersed with tactical signals and general traffic in five codes, were reports of enemy submarines in plain language. These reports covered submarines in the Inland Sea, and indicate one of the scenes of activity. Throughout the traffic, tactical calls were used, and of these about sixty were recorded. By means of the addresses in the messages, it will be possible to identify the majority of these.

An attempt was made to obtain compass bearings of all ships and stations, but the result was unsatisfactory due to the lack of development of personnel and materiel and will be covered later.

2nd. Phase.

On October 19, the U.S.S. MARBLEHEAD left Shanghai for Nagasaki where she remained until 26 October, then departing for Kobe, via the Inland Sea where she arrived on 27 October. On 2 November, she proceeded through the Inland Sea for rendezvous off Shanghai.

On this trip, four operators qualified in ORANGE code and the Chief Radioman in charge of them on their usual station, were taken by me for interception work. The MARBLEHEAD's equipment and personnel were placed at my disposal, except one receiver used to guard the 315 KCS traffic. This was later eliminated while in ORANGE waters and the guard was kept on high frequency.

Upon leaving Shanghai and throughout the trip until the conclusion of maneuvers, the qualified operators were kept on two receivers, one for waves up to 2400 meters, and the other for waves above 2400 meters. They were required to stand watch and watch for twelve hours during the day and at night one receiver was manned. The ship's force were used for a continuous watch on the high frequency, the radio compass, and the 315 KCS traffic.

It was found that the ship's operators were of no use whatever either on the radio compass or for identifying incoming traffic, for without a knowledge of the ORANGE code and procedure, they could not identify and record the call signs. It was then necessary to use a qualified operator on the radio compass as much as he could be spared from copying traffic which was heavy and continuous. With a qualified operator it was comparatively easy to identify calls and obtain good bearings with the radio compass, but it was found, when several bearings were taken on known shore stations and plotted, that an error of as much as ten degrees was introduced, on account of the variation of the wave length of the sending station from that wave length for which the compass was calibrated. It is believed that this error can be eliminated by obtaining a calibration curve for every thousand meters wave length.

It will be noted that the traffic of this Phase is divided into three sections: (1) that copied by the intermediate and high wave receiver from the day after the departure from Shanghai until the day after the maneuvers, October 10-26; (2) traffic by low wave receiver and radio compass for the same period; (3) traffic from after maneuvers until contact with ORANGE stations was lost, October 27 to November 3. In the first section, which contains over one hundred pages of traffic, will be found the most valuable data, including all codes and the majority of the tactical call signs used. Section two contains additional call signs not obtained in Section one, and also shows some of those calls on which compass bearings were taken, Section three is valuable in that it shows the length of time and extent that tactical calls were used after the conclusion of the maneuvers, and also contains a considerable number of tactical calls not heard during the maneuvers.

On each page of the above traffic will be found such comment and notations as was thought necessary to emphasize and clarify the record, and at the same time the unimportant plain language messages were translated in part to assist in elimination during collation.

In connection with the unimportant plain language traffic, it is desired to invite attention to the fact that the kind of incoming traffic is unknown to the operator, which made it necessary for me to spend as much time as possible in the Radio

room and compass house, watching the traffic as it was being copied, and advising the operator when he was receiving useless plain text messages or commercial traffic. This would make it highly advisable to have a language expert present in order to eliminate useless work in future operations.

2. In addition to the general discussion above, it is believed desirable to invite attention to the following comments on general ORANGE procedure:

Tactical calls appear to be allocated alphabetically and numerically according to types. Addresses, which always precede the body of the message, appear to be parts of the names of the ships or stations to which addressed, and this will afford an easy method of identifying the tactical calls. Additional syllables in addresses indicate various departments, as: KA, Commanding Officer, CHI, Commandant. Appended to the record of traffic are complete lists of calls heard during both Phases.

The traffic of the first Phase indicate that before the maneuvers, the ships worked in groups for tuning and that the majority of the tuning of the red fleet was done on IN. A plain language message stated that the Flagship was the only one who had a wave meter, therefore IN is assumed to be the Flagship. This was later corroborated by the work of IN with units.

There were many instances of unit commanders making calls to units and in some cases these acknowledged individually.

In code, all letters are usually repeated once, depending upon audibility. Even then reception in some cases seemed to be generally poor, necessitating repeats as many as four times. Sending is rapid and fairly good, but we are able to copy everything without difficulty, in many cases where their operators had to call for repeats.

There is much conversation between operators and calls are not answered readily, which indicates that the operators fail to keep on the proper frequencies, or that calibration is poor. In calling, the operators seem to use that as an opportunity for practicing sending, as they send calls an unusual length of time. There seems to be much unnecessary calling to find out if there is any traffic, and this occurred even during the maneuvers. It will be noted that AU and others run through a whole list of tactical calls to tell them there is no traffic. There were several cases of stations calling and signing off with tactical calls and when no answer was received, the same stations then shifted to international calls and sig-

natures which identify both tactical calls.

It was found that the greatest distance tacticals were picked up was about four hundred miles, which occurred during the first phase, when some of the ships were believed to be still at Kure.

The range of wave lengths used throughout was comparatively small, almost everything being sent by ships on 2000 to 3000 meters, and by shore stations on 6000 to 9000 meters, each sending within its own range.

Just prior to or during the preliminary maneuvers, the ships spent much time trying to tune at 2800 meters on IN.

All transmission was on Continuous Wave, and it was only seldom that spark set was heard.

No high frequency was used during the maneuvers, and a close watch was kept for this over a wide area of the low waves. Three ORANGE stations using High Frequency were heard, but the messages were purely commercial.

Attention is invited to the large group of International calls made by certain stations. Their part in the maneuvers could not be determined, but there is undoubtedly some connection which can be worked out after tactical calls are identified.

In all cases where code was used for what appears to be position reports, it is noted that the number of words used is twenty-eight (28), which will probably reveal a block system of reporting positions.

It is believed that all codes used during the maneuvers were copied and further that sufficient traffic was received in these to effect the breaking of them.

There appeared no attempt whatever to maintain Radio Silence, and, on the other hand, there was a tremendous amount of traffic at all times, in many cases causing interference on their predetermined wave length, but it was evident that this was not an attempt at interference.

A track of our own ships during both Phases has been kept, together with a complete record of all compass bearings taken, but on account of error introduced as explained above, it is not believed that these records will be of much use in identifying the call signs of ships, and should be kept for comparison with future work. However, a copy will be made and forwarded for what information they might give.

Plain text messages indicate that during the maneuvers, two airplanes were sent out, one from the MUTSU and one from the NAGATO, both with destination Yokosuka. All vessels were instructed to keep a close lookout for them. Other traffic sent out reported the loss of the dirigible and the death of Princess Fushimi, but there was no general press sent during the maneuvers.

The maneuvers were concluded on 25 October, a few days earlier than expected. The order for the suspension of the maneuvers was sent in plain language, as was orders for vessels to proceed to home yards in order to clean up and prepare for the Fleet Review, which indicates that there was sufficient time to bring about the fine appearance which the ships presented at the review. In a conversation with Admiral Nomura, he stated that extremely heavy weather was experienced during the last half of the maneuvers, and was particularly hard on the destroyers and submarines. This probably accounts for the shortening of the maneuvers by two or three days.

3. While the Fleet was Hokohama an unusual opportunity was afforded for close observation of the outside of all ships present, and the following features, which will undoubtedly be covered by the Naval Attache', were noted:

All vessels still use large bird cage aerials, the cruisers using four for main antennae, and battleships two. Auxiliary aerials are both forward and aft on cruisers, and forward on battleships.

There were practically no insulators used on stays. In a few cases single insulators were used on topmasts.

Only a few ships have radio compasses, and those visible consisted of small open coils on top of a special deck house about six feet high.

All ships presented a fine appearance. Some of the older battleships have completed modernization.

On all battleships the range finders are not within the turrets, but on top of the roof at the rear, in a special low housing, with operator standing inside turret. These were usually located on turrets number two and three.

The large ships have four to six anti-aircraft guns, cruisers have two to four, and in addition have on the stern what is believed to be an anti-aircraft machine gun, all of which were kept elevated about fifty degrees. The breech of the gun is about eight feet from the deck, and is too high for a depth charge gun, which it resembles.

Only a few of the cruisers carry airplane launching gear -- all old type, with a runway pivoted on one side lacing with another runway on top of a turret. There were no catapults, which makes it necessary for the plane to take off with its own speed.

Only one plane was seen in the whole fleet, that aboard one of the cruisers.

None of the battleships appeared to have space for plane stowage.

Some cruisers have stowage space for one plane on a stand forward, but no launching gear.

The new airplane carrier AKAGI was of special interest, and a simple sketch is appended. No planes were visible. The entire upper works are inclosed by irregular metal sheeting, except at the stem, where there was space and booms for hoisting planes aboard, and overhead railway cranes are fitted for handling the planes. The flying deck extends about four-fifths of the length of the ship, with no obstruction whatever on this deck. No arresting gear was visible. Along the edges of this deck there appear to be on each side about seven compressed air tanks distributed throughout its length, probably for arresting. A second deck or platform, the full width of the ship and heavily supported, extends from the forward end of the flying deck to half the remaining distance to the bow. Its height is about halfway between the main deck and the flying deck. No gear whatever was on this deck. The third deck, which is probably for catapult work, extends all the way to the bow. Wide doors fitted on the forward end of the superstructure, which stops at the forward end of the flying deck, opens the whole forward end of this superstructure, affording a take-off, possibly from far back into the superstructure. The elevators to the flying deck were not visible. Guns visible were three 8" in each side aft and two A.A. Guns forward. There were no gun ports in the superstructure or elsewhere. The only lighting through the sides of the superstructure were two rows of small port holes. The smoke pipes protruded from the starboard side near the forward end of the flying deck and ended well below it. The after pipe, about eight feet in diameter, turned up; the forward pipe, about twenty feet long and eight feet wide, turned down. Neither aerials nor radio compass were visible.

The new submarines I (pronounced E) type, carried two five-inch guns placed halfway between the conning tower and bow and stern respectively. The conning tower, while quite large, did not seem to be sufficiently large for an airplane stowage. Much labor seems to have been spent on the fish tail

type of stern. Periscopes were large and substantial, as were the aerials and fittings for same.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE ATTITUDE
OF THE JAPANESE TOWARDS US.

4. During the past year I have had occasion to observe the attitude of Japanese officers during official calls and various contacts made, and have noticed a marked change during that period. In September, 1926, in Tokyo, with both officials and civilians whom I had known intimately before, there was a cold politeness, which I attributed to the immigration bill. In December, 1926, in Manila, on the occasion of the visit of the Midshipmen's Practice Squadron, both the Consular officials and the Naval officers were highly indifferent, a tremendous contrast to the same conditions three years before. Of course, the 1926 Squadron entered Manila just two days after the death of the Emperor, but even this would not cause them to forget a shade of politeness. In Shanghai during the first five months of 1927 the same attitude prevailed on all occasions of contact, but in June, 1927, the attitude seemed to fall away, invitations were forthcoming, and a desire for intership visits was expressed. This change was so marked that I was forced to look for a motive. In Tokyo, in October, 1927, the same change was noted, and the whole atmosphere seemed much freer than the previous year. At the Navy Department, Admiral Nomora, the Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, stated that he was extremely glad that the MARBLEHEAD had visited his country and hoped that more would follow. He said his Government is extremely anxious to return the extreme hospitality extending to their training squadron in America. When asked, he stated that foreign ships would be invited to the Coronation in November, 1927, at which time they would hold another Fleet Review.

The business of foreign concerns in Japan is decreasing, and some of the business men feel that the day of the Foreign business man in Japan is ended, that is, the importers whose agencies are being taken over by Japanese firms. Some concerns are either selling out, or are incorporating with Japanese. One method of freezing out is the system of discrediting a concern with the Japanese People, to which there is no recourse and which at the same time is extremely effective.

PATROLS. It appears that the Japanese authorities do not desire to have patrols landed from Foreign Men of war. However, it is evident that a policy on this subject has not yet been determined, and disseminated by the Home Office. The Naval Attache' requested a decision on the subject from the Home Office, and their reply was that no patrol was necessary, as the police could handle anything

that might come up. But before this information could be transmitted to the Commanding Officer of the MARBLEHEAD, he made the same request to the Chief of Police at Kobe, and was informed that the patrol could be landed, but without clubs, the uniform being belts, leggings, and arm bands.

PILOTS, Inland Sea. It was found that a pilot was most desirable through the Inland Sea, on account of the congestion of traffic, and swift currents at several "hairpin" turns throughout the trip.

CONCLUSIONS.

That this trip has been highly successful, both in the tremendous amount of code material obtained, and in the information obtained with which future operations can be made more successful.

That the efficiency of ORANGE radio is at a stage comparable to that in our service some years ago, when the supervision and control of operators was still out of hand.

That it is possible to copy all ORANGE traffic as well as, or better than they do themselves.

That the well-known policy of directing operations from Tokyo, and the resulting lack of indoctrination among subordinates, will make radio silence impossible, as was demonstrated in the recent maneuvers.

That the systems of codes, tactical calls, and addresses used throughout, will not allow for radical changes without seriously retarding and disrupting their communications.

That with proper radio compass calibration and specially qualified operators to man them, it will be possible to track their vessels at great distances.

That no attempt at interference was made during the maneuvers.

That no high frequency was used during the maneuvers.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

That an attempt be made to cover all future maneuvers with one or more ships and shore stations. To facilitate this the Naval Attache', Tokyo, might keep the Commander in Chief informed of prospective maneuvers.

That in order to provide sufficient qualified personnel for the future, some incentive for learning the ORANGE code should be provided, either in the form of extra compensation, as in the case of Gun Captains, Gun Pointers, Mess Cooks, or coxswains of boats, or offering periodic advancement of those remaining on the duty, irrespective of complement of station to which attached. The necessity for periodic advancement or monetary reward is necessary, because the man specializes, and endangers his future general work by serving in this work.

That the radio officers of all vessels on this Station be required to offer, oversee, and carry out the instruction of those operators who wish to qualify.

That the Fleet Flagship prepare and send out to vessels on the Station necessary copies of the code and forms of procedure.

That all vessels fitted with Radio Compass be required to calibrate on wave lengths of every thousand meters, preferably at the Naval Station, Cavite, and that such calibration be made under conditions as would exist at the time of interception work, that is, all receiving antennae closed.

That, in view of the fact that the operator is not familiar with the content of the incoming traffic, someone qualified in the language be present to assist in directing the work, and, if possible, one who is familiar with cryptanalysis.

~~SECRET~~

October 30, 1927.
1240

On this day, the occasion of the termination of the Grand Maneuvers, the following Imperial Rescript is herewith announced. It is to be transmitted to all forces under the Command of those addressed.

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

It has pleased me to supervise the Grand Maneuvers in person from the beginning. The close application of all has been noticed. The hoped for objective has been attained. It has pleased me immensely to see the ardent manner in which our fleet has simulated wartime conditions. The military spirit is superb. The students under training, the secretaries, and the military men, each and every one has performed his duty magnificently.

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From **W** Date **Nov. 23**, 19**27** Serial No. **332** File No. **910-400**
 Source of information **Ship movements reports, statements issued from Navy Department, press.**
 Subject **Japan** **Navy - Operations** **Maneuvers.**
(Nation reported on.) (Index title as per index sheet.) (Subtitle.)

Reference

BRIEF.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Grand Maneuvers - Oct. 11 to 24, 1927.

S-41.852

The grand maneuvers were held between the dates of October 11 and October 24, 1927, inclusive. The maneuvers were divided into the first period from October 11th to October 19th, and the second period from October 20th to October 24th. The Blue Force (defending) comprised the combined first and second active fleets, and the Red Force (attacking) comprised the third fleet which was specially organized for the maneuvers.

The first period was devoted to joint exercises between the Army and Navy; to test the local defenses of naval ports and important centres; and to separate tactical exercises of the Blue and Red Forces. The second period was devoted to a major fleet operation with the Blue and Red fleets opposing each other.

The conduct of the maneuvers was planned to cover particularly the following points:-

- (1) Mobilization of shore establishments in conjunction with the fleet mobilization.
 - (2) Major operations of the fleet in scouting, screening and day and night actions with aircraft and submarines.
 - (3) Test of the defenses of Sasebo, Kure and Yokosuka, especially against airplane and gas attack.
 - (4) The operation of the advanced bases at O-mami-shima and the Bonin Islands
 - (5) The establishment of temporary air bases at Tomeye in the Goto Islands, at Saiki and Oita.
 - (6) The usefulness of the new aviation station located on the island of Hachijo-jima.
 - (7) Mining and mine-sweeping.
 - (8) Operation of the new aircraft carrier Akagi.
 - (9) Operation in the fleet of the new cruisers of the Furutaka and Aoba classes and new fleet submarines.
 - (10) Communications, especially between surface vessels, and aircraft and submarines.
 - (11) Call of reserve officers to active duty.
- (Total of 3 flag officers and 36 other officers).

Statement of Chief Empire

Admiral Suzuki, Chief of the Naval General Staff, who acted as chief umpire on board the Mutsu, made the following statement to the press on October 10th, just prior to the opening of the maneuvers:-

"The present grand maneuvers differ from former ones in two respects. First, the Red or attacking fleet in this case is superior to the Blue or defending fleet, and secondly the time and place of the fleet actions is not

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(Commence new series each January first.) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index.)

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Sheet No. 2.

"specified in advance as heretofore but will develop in the course of the maneuvers. In the grand maneuvers of 1924 the fleet action took place south of the Bonin Islands, and likewise in this case it will take place somewhere in the Pacific.

"The Red fleet will approach from the direction of the South Sea Islands and will attempt by radio and airplanes to locate the Blue fleet. The Blue fleet will base on the western part of Honshu and will attempt to ascertain the formation, course and speed of the Blue fleet. The most important features of the present maneuvers is the tactics employed by each fleet in searching for the others position."

Composition of Forces

Blue Fleet

Commander-in-Chief - Admiral H. Kato - Flagship-Nagato

First Fleet-Flagship-Nagato-Commander in Chief, Admiral H. Kato.

1st division - Nagato (flag-Admiral Kato), Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga.

3rd " - Kinu (flag-Rear-Admiral T. Tachino), Abukuma, Kuma.

First destroyer squadron:- Tatsuta (flagship-Rear-Admiral J. Takahashi).

25th division:- Houshi, Hashi, Take, Kaya.

26th " :- Toga, Kaki, Nire, Kuri.

27th " :- Hishi, Sumire.

28th " :- Yomogi, Tado, Hasu.

First submarine squadron:- Yura (flagship-Rear Admiral S. Yuchi), Jingei, tender.

24th division:- Ro-68, 63, 64.

26th " :- Ro-62, 60, 61.

27th " :- Ro-67, 65, 66.

Second Fleet:- flagship, Kongo - Vice Admiral Y. Yoshikawa.

4th division:- Kongo (flag-Vice Admiral Yoshikawa), Hiyei.

5th " :- Koko (flag-Vice Admiral J. Kiyokawa), Furutaka, Naka.

Second destroyer squadron:- Yubari (flag-Rear Admiral S. Yasumi)

5th division:- Nos. 3, 6, 7, 9.

29th " :- Nos. 17, 11, 13, 15.

30th " :- Nos. 21, 19, 23, 25.

22nd " :- Nos. 28, 27, 29, 30.

Second submarine squadron:- Chogei (flag-Rear Admiral K. Shichida) also tender

7th division:- I-2, 3.

17th " :- I-52, 51.

18th " :- I-55, 53.

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Sheet No. 3.

Air force:-

- Hosho (carrier)
- Notoro (aircraft tender)
- Mamiya (with 2 Hiro planes)
- Dirigible N-3.

Auxiliaries:-

- Shiriyu (oiler)
- Tsurumi (oiler)

Mine force

- 6th mine sweeper division:- Uranami, Ayanami, Kikuzuki, Isonami, Minazuki, Nagatsuki.
- Steamship Kikusui Maru (commandeered) (544 tons)
- " Bisan Maru " (337 tons)
- Mine layer - Katsuriki.

Attached:-

- Karasaki (submarine tender)
- 3rd destroyer division:- Nadakaze, Shiokaze, Yakaze, Shimakaze.
- Katsura, Kayede (destroyers).

Forces at O-mami-Oshima

- Wakamiya (aircraft tender)
- Konabashi (submarine tender, no submarines)
- 17th destroyer division:- Enoki, Nara, Yamakaze, Umikaze.

Red Fleet

Commander-in-Chief - Vice Admiral E. Yamamoto - Flagship, Yamashiro.

Third Fleet-Flagship-Yamashiro-Commander in Chief Vice Admiral E. Yamamoto.

- 2nd division:- Yamashiro (flag-Admiral Yamamoto), Fuso.
- 6th " :- Hirato (flag-Rear Admiral N. Ominato), Oi.
- 7th " :- Kinukasa (flag-Rear Admiral Suetsugu), Aoba.
- 8th " :- Natori (flag-Rear Admiral M. Ando), Nagara, Sendai.

Third destroyer squadron:- (Tama-flag-Rear Admiral R. Takahashi).

- 13th division:- Nos. 4, 2, 6, 8.
- 15th " :- Fuji, Hagi, Susuki, Tsuta.
- 18th " :- Tokitsukaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Amatsukaze.
- Special " :- Nos. 32, 31, 34.

Fourth destroyer squadron:- (Isuzu-flag).

- 1st division:- Nohaze, Numakaze, Numikaze, No. 1
- 2nd " :- Yakaze, Okikaze, Minekaze, Sawakaze.
- 4th " :- Hokaze, Hakaze, Akikaze, Tachikaze.
- 9th " :- Kuwa, Maki, Keyaki, Tsubaki.

Third submarine squadron:- (Kitagami-flag).

- 15th division:- Ro-15, 14, 16.
- 22nd " :- Ro-25, 23, 24.
- 25th " :- Ro-29, 30, 31, 32.

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Sheet No. 4.

Fourth submarine squadron:- (Kiso-Flagship).

- 5th division:- Ro-57, 58, 59.
- 14th " :- Ro-26, 27, 28.
- 16th " :- Ro-19, 17, 18.

Air force:-

Akagi (aircraft carrier).

Auxiliaries:-

- Hayatomo (oiler)
- Sunosaki (oiler)
- Muroto (collier)

Mine force:-

1st mine sweeper division:- Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.

Attached:-

Otomari (ice-breaker), based on Yokosuka.

Submarines based on Yokosuka:-

5th division:- Ro-20, 21, 22.

First Period - October 11th to 19th incl.

Maneuvers ordered started Oct. 11th at 0800 by signal from Admiral Suzuki in Mutsu. All navy yards and stations placed on mobilization status.

First fleet (blue) at Tokuyama.

Second fleet (blue) at Tokuyama.

Third fleet (red) at Ariake Bay.

Temporary air bases established at Oita (near Beppu), at Saiki and at Tomezaki in the Goto Islands.

Yokosuka Area - First Period - Oct. 11th to 19th incl.

October 11th, 12th and 13th - 5th submarine division and 3rd destroyer division operated at Tateyama near entrance to Tokyo Bay.

Live mines were planted at the entrance of Yokosuka harbor.

Oct. 14th -

Night air attack on Yokosuka.

Attacking force - 15 planes from Kasumigaura.
Dirigible N-3.

Defending force - 30 planes from Oppama, anti-aircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries.

Operations- started 1800, naval station and town of Yokosuka were darkened. Searchlights used. Planes dropped flares and simulated a bomb and gas attack. Defending forces used gas masks. Operations ended at 2200.

Oct. 17th -

An attempt to mine entrance to Tokyo Bay.

Attacking force - 3rd destroyer division; mine layers Enoshima, Ninoshima, Kurozaki; planes from Oppama.

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Sheet No. 5.

Oct. 17 - continued:-

Defending force - 5th submarine division, plus planes from Oppama and Otomari (an ice-breaker, simulating large cruiser).

Operations - No details known.

Oct. 18:-

Day air attack on Yokosuka.

Attacking forces - Planes from Oppama

Defending forces - Planes from Oppama, anti-aircraft batteries of ships and shore stations.

Operations - Started at 1400. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack. Special preparations were made to counter-act gas. Operations ended at 1510

Kure Area - First period - Oct. 11th to 19th.

Oct. 11:-

(1) Oil tanks and coal depot camouflaged. City placed under martial law. Anti-submarine nets laid.

(2) At 0800 a mine force under Rear Admiral Tachi consisting of 6th mine sweeper division, plus Bisan Maru and Kikusui Maru left for operations in the Bungo Channel.

Planes from Hiro left to establish temporary base at Saiki.

Oct. 12:-

Vice Admiral Taniguchi (Commander in Chief of Kure area) left to inspect the defenses of Tokuyama.

Oct. 14:-

(1) Day air attack on Kure.

Attacking forces:- 6 planes from Saiki.

Defending forces:- Anti-aircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries.

Operations:- Started at 0910. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack from altitude of 2000 meters. Gas masks used. Fire fighting and hospital forces exercised. Bombs assumed to have hit railroad station, reservoir, radio station in town of Yakuyama, back of Kure, and oil tanks at Hitonose and Akitsuki. Ended at 0940.

(2) Night mine sweeping operation against Kure combined with submarine attack.

Attacking forces:- (Rear Admiral Tachi) 6th mine sweeper division; mine layers Washizaki, Kurokami, Bisan Maru, Kikusui Maru; submarine tender Karasaki; one division of submarines.

Defending forces:- Local defenses.

Operations:- Started about 1800. Ended 2100.

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Sheet No. 6.

Kure Area - First Period - Oct. 11 to 19th, continued

Oct. 15:-

- (1) Naval hospital exercise at receiving 160 injured from incoming vessel.
- (2) Night air attack on Kure.
- Attacking forces - 6 planes from Saiki.
- Defending forces - Anti-aircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries.
- Operations - started 1830. Naval station and town of Kure darkened. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack operation. Ended 2030.

Oct. 16-17:-

- Mine force described above under Oct. 11th (2), moved to Bungo Channel and operating with air forces from Saiki and Oita, mined the Bungo Channel.

Oct. 18-19:-

- Battalions from Kure naval barracks embarked and carried out a landing near Higata, west of Hiro.

Sasebo Area - First Period - Oct. 11 to 19.

Oct. 12:-

- Night operations of naval forces against Sasebo, in conjunction with a land attack following an assumed landing.
- Attacking forces - detachment from Red fleet at Ariake Bay and one battalion from Sasebo naval barracks.
- Defending forces - local defense forces, including shore batteries.
- Operations - started at 1900, ended about midnight.

Oct. 13:-

- (1) Day air attack on Sasebo.
- Attacking forces - seaplanes from temporary air base in Goto Islands.
- Defending forces - Anti-aircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries on Mount Tajima.
- Operations - started at 0900. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack, ended at 1030.
- (2) Similar air attack was carried out on the night of Oct. 13. Naval station and town of Sasebo were darkened. Planes used flares. Shore defenses searchlights. Defense was especially organized to counteract effect of gas attack.

Oct. 14:-

- Battalions from Sasebo naval barracks were exercised in heavy marching order and field maneuvers.

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Sasebo area -- first period - Oct. 11th to 19th - continued.

Oct. 15:-

(1) Two battalions were embarked and made a landing at Matsubara in Omura Bay. Planes from Goto Islands covered the landing which was opposed by one battalion from Sasebo.

(2) Night air attack of Oct. 13th repeated, starting at 1920

Oct. 16:-

Battalions which had landed at Matsubara attacked Omura with 4 planes from Goto Islands. Operations started at 0530.

Oct. 17:-

At 1250 day air attack and at 2100 night air attack by planes from Goto Islands.

Oct. 18:-

(1) At 0640 day air attack by planes from Goto Islands, opposed by planes from Omura. Attack ended at 0712.

(2) The training ship Shikishima entered port theoretically damaged and emergency dry docking carried out.

Oct. 19:-

Day air attack of Oct. 18th repeated. First period closed at 0900.

Joint Army-Navy Maneuvers at Shikoku - First period
Oct. 11 to 13th

The area of operations for this manœuvre covered the northern coast of the Island of Shikoku between Takuma and Matsuyama, and the contiguous waters of the Inland Sea. A convoy of troops embarked at Takuma and proceeded westward under escort through the Inland Sea. A landing was effected at Matsuyama, opposed by troops of the 11th Army Division.

Attacking forces (green)

- Tatsuta (flag first destroyer squadron)
- 25th destroyer division
- 26th " "
- Yura (flag first submarine squadron)
- 24th submarine division
- Notoro - airplane tender
- Mamiya - temporary airplane tender
- Tsurumi
- Bizan Maru (chartered steamer)
- Kikusui Maru " "
- Motor lighters for landing troops
- Detachment of troops from 11th Army division.

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Sheet No. 8.

Defending forces (black)

- 28th destroyer division
- 27th " "
- Jingei (submarine tender)
- 26th submarine division
- Planes from Saiki
- Land forces from 11th Army division
 - 3 battalions mountain artillery
 - 1 " engineers
 - 1 cavalry squadron
 - 1 radio company.

Operations

Oct. 11:-

Started 0800. Black land forces were concentrated near Matsuyama. Of the Black forces afloat, the Jingei and 26th submarine division were at Mitsugahama, the 27th destroyer division was at Kamekawa and the 28th destroyer division at Asaki-wan. The Green naval forces concentrated in Awa-shima. Green troops were embarked at Takuma.

Oct. 12:-

Green convoy got under way, destination Gunchu, near Matsuyama. Convoy was attacked by submarines in Kurushima-Channel.

Oct. 13:-

0120 convoy was attacked by Black destroyers and aircraft. The landing was made under smoke screen between 0230 and daylight of the 13th at Gunchu.

The manoeuvre was officially ended at 0740. The operations were witnessed by Admiral Suzuki, Chief of Naval General Staff and General Uyehara, Member of the Military Council.

Operations of Blue Fleet - 1st period, Oct. 11. to 19.

At the opening of the manoeuvre, Oct. 11, the first and second fleets (Blue) were concentrated at Tokuyama.

Oct. 11 to 13:-

The first destroyer squadron and first submarine squadron with the aircraft tender Notoro and special service vessels were operating in the joint Army-Navy manoeuvres off Shikoku. The Hoshu was at Tokuyama making practice flights and air reconnaissance. The second submarine squadron was operating in the Sea of Izo and the Bungo Channel.

Oct. 14:-

Blue fleet left Tokuyama and proceeded through the Bungo Channel for tactical exercises.

Oct. 15:-

First destroyer squadron made a night attack on

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Oct. 16 to 18:-

Tactical exercises.

Oct. 19:-

Blue fleet returned to Tokuyama.

Operations of Red Fleet - 1st period, Oct. 11 to 19.

At the opening of the manœuvres, Oct. 11th, the third fleet (Red) was concentrated at Ariake Bay.

Oct. 12:-

Detachment of Red fleet participated in attack on Sasebo.

Oct. 13:-

Red fleet left Ariake Bay for tactical exercises.

Oct. 14:-

Exercised in night torpedo attack.

Oct. 15:-

Returned to Ariake Bay.

Oct. 16:-

At 0430 Red destroyers and submarines operating with 15 planes from the Akagi made an attack on the Red fleet at anchor in Ariake Bay. Operations ended at 0700

Oct. 17-18:-

At Ariake Bay fueling.

Oct. 19:-

Red fleet left Ariake Bay in following order to take up position to the south for manœuvres of second period:-

0600 - 4th submarine squadron with Muroto and Sunosaki (ollers).

0945 - 3rd destroyer squadron.

1800 - Main body of Red fleet, with remaining cruisers, destroyers, submarines and special service ships.

Forces at O-mami-Oshima - first and second periods - Oct. 11 to 24.

During the first and second periods (Oct. 11 to 24), the following vessels were operating at O-mami-Oshima, based on Konia:-

- 17th destroyer division
- Mine layers - Katsuriki
- Submarine tender - Komabashi
- Aircraft tender - Wakemiya

During both periods these vessels carried out exercises in mine laying, mine sweeping and air reconnaissance.

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sheet No. 10

Casualties.

- Oct. 12th - Submarine Ro-62, coming to surface touched another submarine. Periscope damaged.
- " 15th - Destroyer Yomogi stripped a turbine and returned to Kure.
- " 16th - Plane from Akagi had forced landing at sea. Plane and both pilots lost.
- " 18th - During air attack on Sasebo plane No. 131 from Omura had forced landing in sea due to engine trouble. No fatalities.
- " 23rd - Dirigible H-3 completely wrecked and burned in heavy gale.
- " 23rd - Plane No. 78 operating from Hachijojima made forced landing at sea. Plane lost, pilots rescued.

Second period - Oct. 20-24 incl.

The manœuvre of the second period (Oct. 20-24) which was participated in by the entire Blue and Red fleets is believed to have been based upon two assumptions as follows:-

First Assumption. War exists between the United States (Red) and Japan (Blue). The U.S. Asiatic Fleet has retired to Manila Bay (represented by Yokosuka) and is blockaded there by Blue forces (Japanese). Blue land forces have invested Manila but it is still held by Red.

The Red fleet (United States) with troop convoy and train has seized a base "A" in the South Sea Islands and is proceeding to the relief of Manila (Yokosuka).

Second Assumption. War exists between the United States (Red) and Japan (Blue). The U.S. Asiatic Fleet retired to Manila where it was destroyed or captured. A Blue (Japanese) expeditionary force has occupied Manila.

The Red fleet (United States) has established a base at "B" in the South Sea Islands or in the southern islands of the Philippines and will attempt to bring the Blue main fleet to a decisive engagement before attempting operations to retake Manila.

Blue (Japanese) Estimate of the Situation - First Assumption.

MISSION. To prevent relief of Manila by Red fleet (United States).

CONTRIBUTING MISSIONS.

- (1) To maintain blockade of Manila.
- (2) To ascertain strength and disposition of enemy main fleet.
- (3) To destroy enemy convoy and reduce capital ship superiority by submarine, destroyer and air attacks.

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Sheet No. 11.

ENEMY FORCES (RED)

Strength - See Red organization sheet No. 3.

Disposition - Red Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay. Red main body plus convoy at base "A", preparatory to proceeding toward Manila.

Probable Intentions - In spite of superiority in capital ships, destroyer and air forces, Red on account of troop convoy will avoid, if possible, a fleet engagement until after arrival off Manila.

OUR FORCES (BLUE)

Strength - See Blue organization sheet No. 2.

Disposition - Blockading force off Manila. Blue main fleet at "X" (probably Bonin Islands).

Courses of Action Open -

- (1) To undertake destroyer, submarine and air raids on Red main body and convoy, avoiding a main fleet action.
- (2) To undertake destroyer, submarine and air raids on Red main body and convoy, bringing Red fleet to a decisive engagement after reducing Red superiority in capital ships.

Decision - Red will be hampered by transports and train. Blue will be in the most favorable position to deliver attacks by light forces. Unless Red fleet is brought to action, they will reach Manila, drive off our blockading forces and our main mission of preventing the relief of Manila will fail. Therefore Blue forces will:-

- (1) Maintain blockade of Red forces in Manila.
- (2) Scouting force ascertain movement of enemy main body and convoy from base "A".
- (3) Main body proceed to latitude _____ longitude _____.
- (4) Submarine force proceed to latitude _____ longitude _____.
- (5) Air forces proceed to latitude _____ longitude _____.
- (6) After location of enemy fleet, deliver day and night submarine, destroyer and air attacks on main body and convoy.
- (7) Bring enemy main fleet to action after reducing superiority in capital ships.

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Sheet No. 12.

Blue (Japanese) Estimate of the Situation - Second Assumption.

MISSION. To bring Red main fleet to a decisive engagement under conditions favorable to Blue, after reducing Red superiority in capital ships by day and night attacks by light forces.

CONTRIBUTING MISSIONS

- (1) To ascertain enemy strength and disposition preparatory to attack by main fleet.
- (2) To reduce enemy superiority in capital ships by destroyer, submarine and air attacks.

ENEMY FORCES (RED)

Strength - See Red organization sheet No. 3.
Disposition - Red fleet has seized a base at "B" (in South Sea Islands or in the southern islands of the Philippines). Red main fleet has left "B", proceeding northward. Red Asiatic fleet has been destroyed or captured at Manila.
Probable Intentions - Red main fleet (United States) will attempt to bring Blue (Japanese) main fleet to a decisive engagement as soon as possible.

OUR FORCES (BLUE)

Strength - See Blue organization sheet No. 2.
Disposition - Manila is held by our expeditionary forces plus armored cruiser division, destroyer squadron, submarine squadron, air forces. Blue main fleet at "X" (probably Bonin Islands).

Courses of Action Open to Us -

- (1) Undertake offensive operations against Red main fleet.
- (2) Operate on interior lines and fall back toward main islands of Japan in case of advance of Red fleet to the northward.

Decision - By falling back before Red advance, Red will be getting further from their base, and Blue nearer their bases in the Japanese islands. There will be continued opportunity for reduction of Red capital ship superiority by attack of Blue light forces. The decision therefore is:-

- (1) Forces holding Manila be prepared for attacks by Red light forces.
- (2) Scouting force ascertain movement of enemy main body from base "B".
- (3) Main body proceed to latitude _____, longitude _____ (between Bonin Islands and Ryuchu Islands).
- (4) Submarine forces proceed to lat. _____ long. _____
- (5) Air forces proceed to lat. _____ long. _____

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Sheet No. 13.

- (6) After location of enemy main body deliver day and night destroyer, submarine and air attacks.
- (7) Bring enemy main fleet to action after reducing superiority in capital ships.

OPERATIONS - October 20-24 (see attached chart)

Oct. 20-21 - Red fleet left Ariake Bay at 1800 Oct. 19th, and proceeded to its initial position. Assuming that:-

- (1) Red was in initial position at 0600 Oct. 22 (zero hour was at 0800 Oct. 22)
- (2) And that Red fleet speed proceeding to initial position was 12 knots.

Then Red covered 720 miles in going from Ariake Bay to its initial position. The circle C-1 is struck from Ariake Bay as a center with a radius of 720 miles. Red was therefore somewhere on C-1 when the manœuvre started at 0800 - Oct. 22.

The Blue fleet left Toknyama Oct. 20 and stood out to sea through the Bungo Channel. Blue probably established a scouting line from the end of Kyushu, scouting bearing east, distance about 400 miles. Planes from Omura, Sasebo, Saiki and Oita could cover the western end of this scouting line and planes from Hachijojima the eastern end.

Blue mine forces mined the Bungo Channel and the straits of Shimonosaki, Haruto and Tomagashima (entrance to the Inland Sea).

Oct. 22 - Zero hour 0800 - manœuvre started by order of the Emperor in the Mutsu. Both forces started scouting and screening operations with cruisers, destroyers, submarines and aircraft. Very heavy weather. Dirigible N-3 lost.

Oct. 23 - First contact at 1800. Both forces attempted night attacks by destroyers, submarines and aircraft on main bodies.

Oct. 24 - The fleet action started at 0600 and at 0745 the manœuvre was officially ended by signal from the Mutsu.

Upon completion of the manœuvres the Blue fleet proceeded to Yokosuka with the Emperor on board Mutsu and arrived there at 1400 - Oct. 25. Assuming:-

- (1) That the Blue fleet left position of the close of the manœuvres at 1000 - Oct. 24, then it steamed for 28 hours to Yokosuka.
- (2) That fleet speed was 12 knots (weather was heavy) then the fleet covered 28 times 12 or 336 miles going from scene of final fleet action to Yokosuka. The circle C-2 on which fleet action

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therefore occurred is struck from Yokosuka as a centre with radius of 336 miles.

The fleet action started at daylight 0600 - Oct. 24. Red had therefore steamed 46 hours from its initial position. Assuming that Red fleet made good 12 knots per hour, their advance from initial position to point of fleet action was 552 miles. Press reports stated that the fleet action took place about 200 miles south of the Kii Peninsula. Assuming this to be approximately correct, then the initial position of Red is deduced to have been about latitude 20-50 N., longitude 137-30 E on circle C-1 and the fleet action took place about latitude 30-25 N., longitude 136-35 E. on circle C-2. The distance between these two positions is 552 miles.

Analysis of the Maneuvres.

The current naval budget carried an appropriation of \$5,000,000 for the conduct of these maneuvres. Consequently no expense was spared in the mobilization of forces ashore and afloat and in the exercise at such emergency drills as quick dry docking of ships, protection of civilian population against gas attacks and receiving of large numbers of wounded in naval hospitals. As is characteristic with the Japanese, it was evident that the plans for the maneuvres were worked out in the most minute detail.

Thorough provisions to meet a local attack on their naval bases and large industrial centres was shown in the operations during the first period of the maneuvres. Their peace time organization, unlike ours, provides a considerable active defense force, especially of destroyers and submarines based permanently on their naval bases. These units are not a part of the active fleets.

The fear of air attack, especially with gas, was evidenced by extent of the operations of planes against Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo during the first period, and the elaborate preparations practised to nullify, as far as possible, the effect of gas.

As in previous grand maneuvres the extent of the actual operations of the opposing fleets against each other was very limited, extending actually over a period of 48 hours from 0800 of Oct. 22 to 0800 of Oct. 24. There has been no evidence either in present or past maneuvres that they have exercised in scouting operations over large areas with the subsequent difficulties in concentration of forces for attack. They inevitably in their maneuvres have planned ahead of time exactly when and where each phase of the operation will occur. In spite of the statement of

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Sheet No. 15.

Admiral Suzuki (Chief of the General Staff) before the manoeuvres, that this procedure for the first time would not be followed, the limited time involved and limited area of operations during the fleet manoeuvres of the second period, indicated that no extensive scouting operations were involved.

An analysis of the manoeuvres of this and past years, indicates that except for a probable expedition against the Philippines, the basic Japanese fleet strategy in case of a war with the United States, is for the main fleet to operate on closely drawn interior lines to accomplish the following objects:—

- (1) Maintain absolute integrity of line of communications with Asiatic continent.
- (2) Force any major fleet action to take place in close proximity to Japan proper with consequent benefit of bases close by, and assistance of air forces based on shore.
- (3) In addition to protect with light forces as far as possible the line of communications to the Dutch East Indies to insure a supply of oil

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U.S.S. MEMPHIS

SHANGHAI, CHINA.

OCTOBER 17, 1928.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE USE OF ORANGE OPERATORS ON
SIMILAR WORK.

HAVE OPERATORS IN TRAINING THE ENTIRE YEAR COPYING
JAPANESE CODE. CONSTANT PRACTICE IS NECESSARY TO COPY HIGH
SPEEDS.

COMPASS OPERATORS NEED LESS EXPERIENCE TO RECOGNIZE
STATIONS, BUT CONSIDERABLE RADIO COMPASS PRACTICE.

AT LEAST THREE OPERATORS ARE DESIRABLE FOR COPYING
CODE AND A LIKE NUMBER TO TAKE BEARINGS. RADIO COMPASS SHOULD
BE CALIBRATED ON 140 KCS.

AN OFFICER SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SUPERVISE WORK
WITH SOME KNOWLEDGE OF JAPANESE AND THE WORK BEING DONE.

ESPECIAL CHARTS TO PLOT THE ROUGH WORK ON WOULD
ASSIST.

SEVERAL REGULAR OPERATORS ON EACH SHIPS COULD BE
TAUGHT ENOUGH JAPANESE CALLS TO BE OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE AND
MORE THAN ONE SHIP COULD TAKE BEARINGS.

OPERATORS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE SHIPS AS FAR IN
ADVANCE OF THE VISIT TO JAPAN AS PRACTICABLE IN ORDER TO
FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SETS AND COMPASSES TO BE USED.

TACHE'S REPORT

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Source of information Japanese press.

Subject Japan Navv - Operations Maneuvers
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Japanese Minor Naval Maneuvers, 1928
(October 8 - 12, 1928)

Objective

The principal objects of the maneuver are for the study of tactics in connection new aircraft squadron and new submarines (I type; large submarines), both offensive and defensive.

Composition of forces

Blue Fleet (attacking)

- Commander in Chief, Admiral H. Kato; Nagato, flagship
- 1st division - Nagato (flag-Admiral Kato) Mutsu, Fuso, Hyuga 4 BB
- 3rd division - Maka (flag-Rear Admiral N. Uminato), Abukuma, Jintsu 5 CL
- 7th division - Isuzu (flag-Rear Admiral Y. Shima), Kiso, Tama 3 CL
- 1st destroyer squadron; Rear Admiral I. Okamoto, flagship, Tenryu (CL) 16 DD
- 13th division - Wakatake, Kuretake, Senaye, Sawarabi
- 15th " - Fuji, Hagi, Susuki, Tsuta
- 18th " - Fuyo, Asagao, Yugao, Karukaya
- 26th " - Toga, Kaki, Hiro, Kuri.
- 3rd destroyer squadron; Rear Admiral T. Kono, flagship, Kinu (CL) 16 DD
- 12th division - Shinonome, Usugumo, Shirakumo, Isonami.
- 17th " - Umikaze, Yamakaze, Hara, Enoki.
- 18th " - Hamakaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze, Isokaze.
- 25th " - Washi, Take, Momi, Kaya.
- 1st submarine squadron; Rear Admiral S. Yuchi, Jingo, tender 6 SS
- 24th division - Ro-68, 63, 64
- 27th " - Ro-66, 65, 67
- 3rd submarine squadron; Captain S. Omoto, Tokiwa, tender 9 SS
- 4th division - Ro-56, 54, 55
- 14th " - Ro-27, 26, 28
- 16th " - Ro-18, 17, 19
- Aircraft squadron - Akagi, Hoshio, Ume (D.), Kusunoki (D)

Mine force

6th mine sweeper division + Nos. 10, 11, 12, 8, 7, 9.

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Operations

The operations were carried out in the sea area south of Honshu, from Kyushu to Tokyo Bay. Prior to beginning the maneuvers the fleets assembled as follows. The Blue Fleet in Saiki Fleet; the Red Fleet and assisting forces in Yokosuka.

The assumption was that the Blue Fleet (attacking fleet) was enroute from a distant point in the Pacific by way of the South Sea Islands to attack (raid) the south coast of Honshu in vicinity of Tokyo Bay. To make this demonstration, at the beginning of the maneuver the Blue Fleet proceeded well to southward toward the Bonins from its base at Saiki Bay.

The defending forces (Red Fleet) established an advanced air base at Hachijo-jima, assembled aircraft from different stations, provided for fixed net and mobile defenses against submarines, established anti-aircraft batteries and searchlights, organized the coast for protection against fire and gas attack, and for darkening the defensive areas. Surface, submarine and air patrols were established.

As the maneuver developed, the losses resulting from contact of the light forces (air and submarine) apparently became so great (or else the stated objective of the maneuver being accomplished by these contacts and resulting actions) that the maneuver was suddenly discontinued by order of Admiral Suzuki before the fleet main bodies became engaged.

Casualties

- Oct. 11 - Destroyer Shimakaze collided with the Yukaze. Both destroyers returned to Yokosuka under their own power for repairs.
- Oct. - Deck plane from Omura Naval Air Station while enroute to Yokosuka developed engine trouble near Kure and crashed. Plane demolished, pilot escaped injury.
- Oct. - Seaplane from Sasebo enroute to Yokosuka fell into the sea near Awaji-shima. Occupants rescued.
- Oct. 12 - Seaplane attached to the Red Fleet made a forced landing. Men were rescued.
- Oct. - F-5 hydroplane made a forced landing near Zatsu-ura. Occupants of plane rescued.

Comment

The following extract from the Tokyo Nichinichi dated October 16, 1928, is quoted, as it contains quite an accurate account of the maneuvers:-

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"To go into detail, as soon as the maneuver entered the second period, the Nagato was attacked off the southern coast of Shikoku by a large type submarine belonging to the Red Fleet, and the battleship was declared totally disabled. In the same way and about the same time submarines of the Blue Fleet were operating off the entrance of Tokyo Bay.

"Concerning air operations, 15 deck planes launched from a carrier of the Blue Fleet appeared early on the morning of the 12th over Izu Islands. They disappeared for a while but again appeared over Yokosuka naval district at 1 p.m. and threatened the Red Forces. Also 15 planes from the carrier Akagi attacked the Red Fleet and destroyed the 5th division composed of four 7100 ton cruisers. The Akagi was also attacked and disabled.

"While it is too soon to declare the uselessness of battleships, it is a fact that even a powerful fleet is often powerless in the face of an attack by aircraft. When we consider that air forces of the Blue Fleet appeared over Yokosuka in spite of our anti-aircraft preparations it is apparent that an air attack on our capital is not a difficult task for an enemy to undertake. In the not distant future the era of battleships may change to the era of aircraft."

On the completion of the minor naval maneuvers the high ranking officers of the Japanese Navy held a critique at the Yokosuka Naval Station.

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From WS Date Sept. 10 1929 Serial No. 151 File No. 910-400
(Commence new series each January first.) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index.)

Source of information Japanese Press.
Subject Japan Navy - Operations Maneuvers.
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet.) (Subtitle)

References:


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Fall Maneuvers of the Japanese Navy.

According to the Japanese press, the fall maneuvers of the Japanese Navy will be held from October 21 to 31, 1929, in Japan Sea Area from Maidzuru to Tsushima Straits.

The maneuver will be divided into three periods; the first period will be devoted to individual exercises; the second period to joint maneuvers with the Army, 5th division (Hiroshima) and 12th division (Kokura); the third period to a major fleet operation with the red and blue fleets opposing each other.

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523

2023-797

WARIDEP/3/JEN/7

G-2 Report.

Japan (Military)

6610

Subject: Combined Army-Navy Coast Defense
Maneuvers.

REC'D JUN 10 1929

File
EM

Mention has been made in previous reports of a combined Army-Navy maneuver to be held this autumn, on the coast of the Japan Sea. It is reported that the seat of this maneuver is Maizuru and will be participated in by the 6th Division and the 1st Naval Squadron. It is reported also that the railway gun which recently arrived from France will be sent to Maizuru to participate in this maneuver.

This combined Army-Navy and Railway Department maneuver is believed to be of considerable importance and careful plans are being made for it by the departments concerned.

C. Burnett
Lieut. Colonel, Cavalry,
Military Attache.

0161

HA/Tokyo

Report No. 3994

16 May 1929

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From W Date Oct. 9, 1929 Serial No. 103 File No. 910-700
(Commence new series each January first.) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index.)

Source of information Official

Subject Japan Navy - Operations Movements.
(Nation reported on.) (Index title as per index sheet.) (Subtitle.)

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**Analysis of Ship Movements of the Japanese Navy.
(Month of September 1929)**

There follows hereafter a table, giving an analysis of the activities of the Japanese Navy for the month of September, 1929. The Japanese Navy Department issues a daily report giving the position of all ships of the Navy at 10 a.m. of that date. The daily changes of position for every vessel in the Navy, thus indicated, plus an empirical allowance for known periods of maneuvering, form the basis of the figures in the following table.

Class of Vessel	No. of vessels of class	No. of vessels in an active status	No. of vessels underway during month	Average No. of days underway	Average mileage per vessel underway
Battleships	6	6	3	6	927
Battle cruisers	4	2	2	6	1163
Armored cruisers	7	4	3	13	3297
1st and 2nd line light cruisers	29	21	21	5	760
Destroyers	105	95	63	5	762
Submarines	61	44	30	5	525
Gunboats	12	12	10	6	577
Submarine tenders	4	3	3	5	710
Airplane carriers & aircraft tenders	5	4	3	7	1003
Mine layers	4	3	3	4	320
Mine sweepers	12	12	6	4	360
Oilers	12	7	7	17	3445
Colliers	4	3	3	8	1573
Miscellaneous	9	6	6	10	1406

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Sheet No. 2.

Japanese Naval Activities - September.

During the first three days of September the first fleet moved from Otaru to Hakodate, and the second fleet moved from Ominato to Aomori. In the early morning of the 4th both fleets moved from their respective anchorages and effecting a junction at the Pacific entrance of Tsugaru Strait, proceeded out into the Pacific bound for Yokosuka, where the ships arrived on the 7th. Fleet cruising formations were practical enroute and the entrance to Yokosuka was made in the form of an attack on that port.

From the 7th to 21st both fleets remained at Yokosuka giving leave and liberty to the crews. On the latter date, the second fleet sailed for Mikawa Bay carrying out tactical exercises enroute where they arrived on the 24th, sailing on the 28th for Wakanoura (approach to Kobe) where exercises in effecting a landing in force were carried out during the night of the 29th and early morning of the 30th.

The first fleet sailed from Yokosuka on the 20th, and after spending one day at Yokohama proceeded to Shimizu, from which port they sailed on the night of the 30th bound for Ise Bay. Tactical exercises were carried out enroute.

The fleet aircraft squadron sailed from Yokosuka on the 21st and after taking part in the extensive air maneuver (see report No. 167, 910-100 of 4 Oct. 1929) again sailed from Yokosuka, on the 25th joining the first fleet at Shimizu on the 26th, thereafter moving with the first fleet.

In addition to the maneuvers in which Yokosuka Naval Station took a part, Ominato, Kure, Sasobo and Maidzuru naval stations all conducted independent exercises during the month. The maneuvers conducted by Kure were particularly extensive; being an exercise in the defense of the Bungo Channel, and later of the inner approaches to Kure against attack by surface craft or submarines, by the use of local defense craft alone, principally mine layers and submarines. Both day and night exercises as outlined above were conducted, the following vessels taking part; Myoko, Oi, Tenryu, Karasaki, Shirotaka, Katsuriki, 18th destroyer division, 4th, 11th, 14th and 17th submarine divisions and the 6th mine sweeper division.

The destroyers Murakumo and Mochizuki, which were in collision in early July, completed repair at Kure, the former joining her division at Mikawa Bay on the 24th while the latter joined up on the 29th off Wakanoura. The gunboat Ataka completed her annual overhaul at Sasobo, sailing on the 9th, joining the first foreign service squadron at Shanghai on the 11th.

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Sheet No. 5.

During the exercises off Wakanoura on the night of the 29th the submarine I-54 was in collision with the submarine tender Chogei. The bow of the submarine was badly damaged but she was able to proceed to Wakanoura where after some repairs she was able to proceed slowly under her own power for Kuro. The damage to the Chogei was practically negligible.

Of the seven tankers in an active status, all continued active during the month; two returning with oil from Oha, one being enroute home from San Pedro, one being at San Pedro, and one being enroute home from Tarakan.

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Subject Japan Navy - Operations Aviation
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10/18/20
(T. H. S.)
Japanese Navy Air Manuever.
Original
under
...

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The most extensive air manuever yet held by the Japanese Navy was scheduled to start on September 21st, but due to unfavorable weather conditions was postponed until the 23rd. In preparation for the manuever the air forces of the Yokosuka air station was augmented by three reconnaissance, type 15 landplanes and six pursuit, type 10 landplanes from Omura; four reconnaissance, type 14 seaplanes and two F type 1925 patrol planes and eight reconnaissance type 14 seaplanes from Kasumigaura. The Omura and Sasebo planes took off from their respective stations about 7 a.m. Sept. 19th, the Omura pursuit planes stopping at Hiroshima for fuel while all the Sasebo planes stopped at Fukae (near Kobo) and after refueling proceeded to Yokosuka. One of the F type planes was delayed at Fukae but proceeded to Yokosuka later. The three type 14 land reconnaissance planes from Omura made a non-stop flight to Yokosuka. All planes including those from Kasumigaura had arrived at Yokosuka air station by 5 p.m. Sept. 19th. The distance by air from Omura and Sasebo to Yokosuka is approximately 500 miles and the time consumed until all planes had arrived at Yokosuka about 10 hours.

Assumptions and Objective.

The manuever was based on the following assumptions:-

1. A powerful enemy striking force has seized the Bonin Islands as an advanced base, is then advancing northward with the object of delivering a strong air attack on Yokosuka and the Tokyo-Yokohama industrial district.
2. The Japanese air force, concentrated at Yokosuka and using Hachio-jima as an advanced base has been entrusted with the mission of preventing the enemy aircraft from getting home their attacks, and destroying the enemy air force by destroying the attacking carriers.

The manuever itself was divided into two separate and distinct manuevers (a) a daylight attack and (b) a night attack both based on the above assumptions.

Composition of Forces.

Attacking force - Rear Admiral S. Takahashi, commanding.
 Akagi, Hoshio, Hotoke, 4th destroyer division (Hokaze, Akikaze, Tachikaze, Hokaze).

Planes carried on carriers of attacking force composed attacking force.

Type 10 pursuit plane -	16
Type 15 reconnaissance plane -	32
Total planes	48

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Sheet No. 2.

Composition of Forces, continued

Defense Forces - Rear Admiral Konoe.

7th destroyer division (Sakaki, Sugi, Kashiwa, Matsu), anti-aircraft shore batteries, shore defense corps and all planes based on Yokosuka air station, as follows:-

Type 10 pursuit (landplanes)	14
Type 13 torpedo and bombing (landplanes)	11
Type 14 reconnaissance (seaplanes)	20
Type 15 F patrol planes (flying boats)	6
Total	51

Supreme director (chief umpire) Vice Admiral Yamamoto (Commander in chief, Yokosuka Naval Station).

Upon receipt of the signal to start the maneuver at 1 p.m. Sept. 23rd, the defense forces promptly sent up several squadrons of planes for patrolling the defensive area. At about 2.50 p.m. however, enemy forces of 12 light bombing planes guarded by pursuit planes were discovered close to Yokosuka, and these planes flying at an altitude of 500 meters succeeded in dropping bombs and doing minor damage to the air station and naval station at Yokosuka before they were driven off by the 14 pursuit planes of the defense forces. About 4 p.m. a defense reconnaissance plane reported by wireless sighting the carriers Akagi and Hoshō off the Seven Islands of Izu. Upon receipt of this report a strong bombing squadron immediately took the air at Yokosuka and was able to deliver an attack on the carriers with such effect that both ships were declared sunk. Shortly afterwards the Hōtoro was discovered off the Izu peninsula and was soon sunk by bombs. At 11.40 p.m. this phase of the maneuver was declared finished.

All forces were now declared to be intact as at the start of the maneuver, and at 2 a.m. Sept. 24th the signal to start the second phase of the maneuver was given. Upon receipt of the signal the defense forces immediately organized an air patrol extending 60 miles to seaward from Yokosuka. In spite of this patrol however, three of the enemy light bombers were, under cover of darkness, enabled to deliver an attack on Yokosuka air station before being finally driven off. Just at dawn a squadron of 9 enemy planes were discovered over the Boso peninsula heading for Tokyo, the defense planes immediately gave battle. While this battle was in progress another squadron of 9 enemy planes, flying very high, appeared over Yokosuka and succeeded in dropping bombs with considerable effect before being chased off. At 7 a.m. the order to end the maneuver was given.

From the above it would appear that the daylight attack was completely unsuccessful and that the defense forces fully attained all their objectives in preventing any serious attack and in finally destroying all enemy aircraft carriers. In the night

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From 7 Date Febr. 19, 1930 Serial No. 22 File No. 910-700
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Source of information Compilation of official data.

Subject Japan Navy - Operations Movements.
(Nation reported on.) (Index title as per index sheet.) (Subtitle.)

Reference

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Activities of Japanese Navy - Dec. 1, 1928 to Nov. 30, 1929.

There is submitted herewith an analysis of the movements of the Japanese Navy and the employment of the main forces of the Japanese Navy during the operating year 1929 (December 1, 1928 to November 30, 1929).

This report contains:-

- (1) A short summary of special points stressed in the operations of the naval establishment.
- (2) A month by month summary of operations.
- (3) An analytical table of operations showing the type of operation and the total amount of time spent in each operation, including amount of time underway, in port, and in overhaul.
- (4) A list of 32 vessels which did not move during the operating year.
- (5) A list of 78 vessels which steamed a total of 1,000 miles or less.
- (6) State of readiness for war of Japanese naval vessels indicated by (4) and (5) above.
- (7) Summary of movements of oil tankers and conclusions as to probable maximum number of voyages possible per tanker per year to the North Saghalien oil fields.
- (8) List of naval vessels commissioned during the period of this report.
- (9) List of naval vessels under construction on Nov. 30, 1929.
- (10) Total mileage steamed by each vessel or unit of the combined fleet.
- (11) A tabular analysis of the average annual mileage and time underway of the average ship of each class of vessel.

FACTORS STRESSED IN OPERATIONS.

(1) Great stress laid on aircraft operations both with the fleet and from shore bases. The fleet maneuvers in April and October both stressed aircraft. The maneuvers of each naval station stressed aircraft. The flights to Saipan and Keelung were tests of aircraft operations covering the Mandate Islands and Formosa.

(2) Radio communication, particularly radio silence and plotting the position of ships by radio compass bearings.

(3) Use of submarines operating independently against an attacking fleet and tests of ability of I class submarines to be self supporting when operating from detached island bases as in the Loo Choo and Mandate Islands.

(4) Curtailed activities of vessels other than those of the combined fleet, particularly after the advent of the new "Economy Government" in July.

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FACTORS STRESSED IN OPERATIONS, continued

(5) Both maneuvers were stopped short of completion on account of bad weather - both maneuvers were in the Japan Sea area however.

(6) Continuation of the comparatively high accident rate. In every month that any considerable operating was done one or more serious or near serious accidents occurred, principally collisions. The Japanese press attributes this high accident rate to the fact that Japanese naval maneuvers and exercises more nearly approach actual war conditions than is the case with other navies. A more logical explanation would seem to be that this high accident rate is due to the marked lack of sea experience of Japanese commanding officers as compared with their United States and British contemporaries.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONSDecember 1928

From 1st to 10th practically all vessels of the Japanese Navy were assembled off Yokohama where they were reviewed by the Emperor on the 4th. Shortly after the review the various vessels dispersed to their home ports and the fleet organization for the operating year 1929, including changes in command and shifts of personnel, was placed in effect. The 10th to 31st was spent as a holiday and overhaul period.

January 1929

Home ports, leave, liberty, overhaul. The light cruiser Kitagami made a cruise to Bangkok, Siam and was at Singapore at the end of the month.

February 1929

1st to 25th - home ports, leave, liberty, overhaul. 26th to 28th - individual ships and units of the Combined Fleet underway to and at fleet rendezvous off Mitajiri. By the 28th the Combined Fleet had assembled at Mitajiri and completed its organization. The light cruiser Kitagami made a cruise around Sumatra and was at Batavia at the end of the month.

March 1929

From 1st to 4th the Combined Fleet remained at anchor at Mitajiri. On the 5th the various units dispersed to various bases in the Inland Sea where they were engaged in elementary gunnery and torpedo exercises and conducted these practices until the 26th. By 27th the First Fleet was assembled at Saiki and the Second Fleet at Kure on the 28th; both fleets sailed on their cruises to North China ports. The Japanese Naval landing forces along the Yangtse River and the ships of the First Foreign Service Squadron were reenforced upon the outbreak of fresh troubles along the Yangtse valley.

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Sheet No. 3.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, continued

April 1929

On the 1st the Fleet Aircraft Squadrons were organized and joined the fleet at Dairen on the 8th. The two Fleets cruising as separate tactical units continued their cruise to North China ports. From 19th to 22nd the two fleets engaged in a war game featuring the use of aircraft, but the war problem was interrupted by bad weather and both fleets arrived at Sasebo on 22nd. On the 24th the units of the two fleets started dispersing to their home ports where most of the vessels had arrived by the 26th. During this month a *Communication* maneuver and a minor maneuver by the Yokosuka Naval District was held.

May 1929

1st to 31st liberty, leave, overhaul. The ships and some of the men which reenforced the First Foreign Service Squadron in March were withdrawn from Chinese waters and returned to Japan. A military aircraft flight was made from Yokosuka to Saipan and return and two submarines made independent cruises along the Loo Choo Islands to Keelung and return.

June 1929

This month saw the commencement of the second period of fleet training, both fleets being assembled by June 3rd and carrying out individual fleet tactical exercises and conducting advanced battle practices. 300 men were withdrawn from the naval landing forces ashore at points along the Yangtse River valley.

July 1929

During the first week in July all vessels of the fleet assembled at Saiki Bay and under the tactical command of the Commander in Chief of the First Fleet sailed from Saiki Bay on a cruise south around the island of Kyushu arriving at Yuya Bay on the 24th where fleet gunnery exercises were conducted till the 31st. Tactical exercises were conducted enroute.

August 1929

During this month the Combined Fleet continued to act as a tactical unit carrying out tactical exercises as the fleet moved north along the Japan Sea coast to Hakodate and Otaru where the fleet arrived at the end of the month.

September 1929

During the first week of this month the Combined Fleet moved south from the Hakodate area and arrived at Yokosuka on the 7th. From the 7th to 20th all vessels remained at Yokosuka fueling, loading supplies and granting leave and liberty to the crews. On the 21st the fleet separated, the First Fleet going to Ise Bay and the Second Fleet to Wakanoura from where they operated for the remainder of the month. During this month every naval station except Bako and Chinkai hold independent maneuvers.

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Sheet No. 4.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, continued

October, 1929

From 1st to 9th the two fleets continued operating as in September and on 10th the units dispersed to their home ports and were assigned to organizations for the coming fleet maneuvers. On 21st the opposing fleets assembled and completed their organization; 21st to 24th being spent in individual training, the maneuvers taking place from 25th to 28th. Bad weather again adversely effected the maneuver which was terminated principally on that account. All ships assembled at Maidzuru by the end of the month. The 24th destroyer division (Homo, Yanagi, Kashi, Hinoki) was withdrawn from Chinese waters.

November 1929

Home ports, leave, liverty, overhaul.

OPERATIONS

(A)	<u>Days</u>
(1) Vessels composing first and second fleets dispersed to their home ports, inactive, overhaul, rest, etc. Very few and very short movements of individual ships	Total 148
 (B)	
(1) First and Second Fleets assembled as such but their various units assembled separately engaged in training for gun, torpedo and mine exercises	16
(2) As above, unit tactical training at sea	16
(3) As above, in port, inactive, fueling, visits to ports during coronation	9
Total (B).....	41
 (C)	
(1) First and Second fleets assembled but separately engaged in gun, torpedo and mining exercises	10
(2) As above, unit tactical training at sea	23
(3) As above, in port, inactive, fueling, visits to foreign ports	40
Total (C).....	73
 (D)	
(1) Combined fleet assembled, engaged in gun and aerial bombing exercises	12
(2) As above, tactical training at sea	36
(3) As above, in port, inactive, fueling, repairs, etc.	55
Total (D).....	103

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OPERATIONS, continued

Recapitulation (1)

Navy Yard overhaul	148
Individual training	32
Individual ships in port	9
1st and 2nd fleets underway	33
1st and 2nd fleets in port	40
Combined Fleet underway	48
Combined Fleet in port	55
Total	<u>365</u>

Recapitulation (2)

Navy Yard overhaul	148
Individual training	16
In port, liberty, fueling, visits to foreign ports	104
Target practice	38
Tactical exercises	59
Total	<u>365</u>

SUMMARY OF FLEET

The above analysis shows that during the year the first and second fleets were assembled as separate units for 73 days, the fleets being underway for 33 days of this time.

The two fleets were combined and operated as one tactical unit for 103 days, 48 days of this time being spent underway.

Fleet tactical exercises consumed 59 days and fleet gunnery exercises 22 days.

SHIPS WHICH DID NOT MOVE DURING OPERATING YEAR - 32 VESSELS

<u>Battleship</u>	<u>Aircraft tender</u>	<u>Submarines</u>
Iso	Wakamiya	Ro-1 Ro-20
<u>Battlecruiser</u>	<u>Mine layers</u>	2 21
Kirishima	Aso	3 22
<u>Armored cruisers</u>	<u>Tankers</u>	4 23
Adzuma	Erizo	5 24
Misshin	Iro	11
<u>Light cruisers</u>	Shiretoko	12
Chikama	Shiriyu	13
Yubari	Tsurugizaki	14
<u>Training ships</u>	<u>Target towing ship</u>	15
Fuji	Settsu	16
Shikishima		

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Sheet No. 6.

Vessels with a total annual mileage of less than 1000 miles or which were underway for only a very short period during only one month of the operating year.

<u>Battleships</u>	: <u>Aircraft carrier</u>	: <u>Destroyers</u>	
Ise, Fuso	: Kaga	: Enoki	Asanagi
<u>Battlecruisers</u>	: <u>Mine layers</u>	: Koshiwa	Fumizuki
Kirishima	: Aso	: Kawakaze	Harukaze
Kongo	: <u>Tankers</u>	: Kiku	Hatakaze
<u>Armored cruisers</u>	: Erimo	: Kusunoki	Hayate
Adzuma	: Iro	: Minekaze	Kisaragi
Nisshin	: Shiretoko	: Okikaze	Matsukaze
<u>Light cruisers</u>	: Shiriya	: Sawakaze	Minazuki
Abukuma	: Tsurugizaki	: Tanikaze	Nagatsuki
Chikuma	: <u>Submarine tender</u>	: Ume	Oite
Hirato	: Komabashi	: Umikaze	Satsuki
Kuma	: <u>Target towing ship</u>	: Yakaze	Uzuki
Naka	: Settsu	: Yamakaze	Yayoi
Sendai	: <u>Submarines</u>	: Asakaze	Yunagi
Yubari	: Ro-1	Ro-12	Ro-13
<u>Training ships</u>	: 2	13	19
Fuji	: 3	14	20
Shikishima	: 4	15	21
<u>Aircraft tender</u>	: 5	16	22
Wakamiya	: 11	17	23
			52
			68
			57
			58
			59
			63

A consideration of the above list gives a fairly accurate picture of the actual operating status of ships of the Japanese Navy. It shows that of the 275 vessels of all classes listed in this report, 197 were actively operated throughout the year. An indication of the readiness for war and the rapidity of mobilization is the fact that only 32 vessels are listed as not having moved. A consideration of the above factors leads inevitably to the conclusion that so far as personnel and upkeep are concerned, practically every ship of the Japanese Navy is maintained in a state of immediate readiness for war.

MOVEMENT OF TANKERS

Seven tankers were kept in active operation during the year; eleven round trips each being made to the oil fields of Borneo, California and Northern Saghalien. A further consideration of the individual movements of the tankers leads to the conclusion that about three round trips per tanker to Oha is about the maximum possible in view of the short operating season and with the present loading facilities. It should be further noted that this maximum is not possible if any of the tankers are to be operated to other oil fields and on other duties as is indicated by the fact that during the period of this report five tankers each made two round trips and one tanker made one round trip to Oha.

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NEW VESSELS PLACED IN COMMISSION

<u>Light cruisers</u>	<u>Mine layer</u>	<u>Submarines</u>
Myoko	Shirataka	I-56
Ashigara	<u>Destroyers</u>	I-61
Haguro	Hatsuyuki	
<u>Gunboats</u>	Miyuki	
Atani	Murakumo	
	Uranami	

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION NOVEMBER 30, 1929.

<u>Light cruisers</u>	<u>Destroyers</u>	<u>Submarines</u>
Takao	%Ayanami	%I-4
Atago	%Shikinami	I-5
Chokai	%Asagiri	%I-57
Maya	Yugiri	%I-59
<u>Mine layer</u>	Amagiri	%I-60
%Itsukushima	Sagiri	%I-62
<u>Gunboat</u>		%I-64
%Futami		I-66
		I-67

% - Indicates ship has been launched.

The following table gives the total mileage steamed by vessels of the Combined Fleet during the operating year 1929.

<u>Battleships</u>		<u>Cruisers</u>		
Yamashiro	12,521	Aoba	13,237	Yura 13,397
Hyuga	12,091	Furutaka	13,387	
Mutsu	12,656	*Jintsu	12,995	
<u>Battlecruisers</u>		Kako	13,387	
Haruna	12,315	*Kinu	13,339	
Hiyei	12,947	Kinukasa	13,237	
		Nagara	13,862	
		Natori	11,942	

* - Indicates destroyer squadron flagships.

<u>Destroyers</u>			
11th division	- 4 boats	45,479	(Hatsuyuki and Miyuki did not join up until April and July)
12th "	- 4 boats	43,782	(Murakumo out of commission most of year)
13th "	- 4 boats	62,074	
15th "	- 4 boats	57,715	
16th "	- 4 boats	61,414	
23rd "	- 4 boats	48,646	(Mochizuki laid up 2 1/2 mos. due to collision)
27th "	- 4 boats	43,636	
4th "	- 3 boats	56,310	(part of aircraft squadron. Organized in April).

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Sheet No. 8.

TOTAL MILEAGE STEAMED BY VESSELS OF COMBINED FLEET, continued

Submarines

7th division - 2 boats	21,012	(1-3, third boat of this division operated for only 2 months, total mileage of only 2,955)
13th "	- 3 boats	30,103
19th "	- 2 boats	18,522
26th "	- 3 boats	35,433
27th "	- 3 boats	35,433

Submarine tenders

Chogel	9,559
Jingel	9,447

Aircraft carriers and tenders (did not join fleet until Apr. 1)

Akagi	11,982
Hosho	12,067
Notoro	10,414

Supply ship

Mamiya	9,424
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Fleet tankers (In addition to their fleet duties each of these vessels made several trips abroad for oil)

Naruto	15,593
Tsurumi	23,362

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Inven- tions	Oil	Commander in Chief			Commander		Attaché at	State	Justice	Inter.	Com.	Laber	Ship Board	Return to Room No.				
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Class of vessel	No. ves-	No. of ves-	No. of ves-	Average number of vessels in an operating status during year	Total No. of vessels	Total mileage of vessels
Battleships	6	6	5	4	75	10195
Battlecruisers	4	2	3	2	80	12631
Armored cruisers	7	4	5	3	108	23036
Light cruisers	30	22	23	17	72	12051
Destroyers	105	95	105	58	72	11953
Submarines	61	44	45	25	70	9016
Gunboats	12	12	12	8	51	5875
Submarine tenders	4	3	4	3	60	8258
Airplane carriers						
Aircraft tenders	5	4	4	3	79	11500
Mine layers	4	3	3	2	54	6322
Mine sweepers	12	12	12	6	43	5776
Oilers	12	7	7	7	167	35017
Colliers	4	3	4	3	122	22330
Miscellaneous	9	6	6	4	116	12227

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Sheet No. 2:

COMPOSITION OF FORCES, continued
BLUE FORCE, continued

Aircraft Squadrons - Akagi, flag (Capt. I. Yamamoto) (3 AV)
 Akagi, Hoshio, Noto
 4th destroyer division - Tachikaze, Hokaze, Hakaze, Akikaze (4 DD)

BLUE FORCE at Fukuoka

CONVOY AND ESCORT (at Fukuoka)

3rd division - Yura (flag - Rear Adm. H. Fujita) (3 CL)
 Natori, Nagara

1st DESTROYER SQUADRON - Jintsu, flag (Rear Adm. H. Ichimura) (1 CL)

15th Dest. Div. - Wakatake, Kuretake, Sonaye, Sawarabi
 15th " " - Hagi, Tsuta, Fuji, Susuki
 16th " " - Yugao, Fuyō, Karukaya, Asageo
 27th " " - Ashi, Hishi, Sumire (15 DD)

Line layers - Tokina, Shirataka 2 MI

1st Minesweeper division - Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 6 MS

In addition to the above the following ships were attached to the Blue Force:-

- 3 Tankers - Sata, Naruto, Tsurumi.
- 1 Collier - Seito.
- 1 Supply ship - Mamiya.
- 5 Small transports.

BLUE ARMY - Lieut. General Kanayama, Commanding.
 12th Army Division (Infantry) to embark at Fukuoka.

RED FORCE - afloat at Maidzuru; Commander in Chief

Vice Admiral R. Nakamura (Nagato, flagship).
 6th division (temporary) - Nagato (flag - Vice Adm. Nakamura) Nachi, Ashigara, Haguro 1 BB
 7th division - Isuzu (flag), Tama, Oi 3 CL
 3 CL

3rd DESTROYER SQUADRON - Tenryu (flag) 1 CL

18th Dest. Div. - Hamakaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze, Isokaze.
 3rd " " - Madakaze, Yukaze, Shiokaze, Shimakaze
 21st " " - Kiri, Sakura, Tachibana, Kaba 12 DD

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Sheet No. 3.

COMPOSITION OF FORCES, continued

RED FORCE, continued

- 3rd SUBMARINE SQUADRON - Karasaki (flag)
- 4th submarine division - Ro-56, 55, 54
- 14th " " - Ro-27, 26, 28
- 11th " " - Ro-53, 51
- 17th " " - I-52, I-51
- 25th " " - Ro-30, Ro-29, Ro-32
- 9th " " - I-24, I-23, I-22, I-21 17 SS

In addition to the above the following ships were attached to the Red Force:-

2 destroyers - Katsura, Kayede.

Aviation Force - Two squadrons seaplanes based at Lake Shinji.

RED ARMY - Lieut. General Kawada, Commanding.
 5th Army Division (Infantry); Field artillery units of Shimonoseki Defense area; Yokkaichi Air Regiment.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS

BLUE OBJECT - to safely escort and insure the effective landing of a powerful Army along the north coast of Japan and insure the subsequent maintenance of that Army.

BLUE PLAN - in order to attain the above objective the following plan was evolved:-

- (1) Blockade of Red Base Maidzuru by submarines to prevent egress of Red Fleet until after Blue Army had effected a landing and consolidated its shore positions.
- (2) Prior to landing of Blue Army to destroy by aircraft the Red air bases to give Blue certain air supremacy.
- (5) Air raids over Red base Maidzuru as a feint to give impression that Maidzuru was the object of attack.
- (4) After successful landing of Blue Army, the powerful Blue Fleet to search out and destroy or closely blockade the Red Fleet.

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Sheet No. 4.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS, continued.

RED OBJECT - prevent the effective landing of the Blue Army.

RED PLAN -

- (1) To carry on a campaign of attrition against the Blue convoy and fleet, especially the troop transports by means of submarines and night destroyer attacks.
- (2) To prepare defenses at all likely landing places along the coast.
- (3) By careful radio tracking determine as far in advance as possible the particular point on the coast which is Blue's immediate objective.
- (4) To carefully conserve all sea and air forces until Blue is engaged in the operations of landing troops, then deliver a combined air and sea attack against the Blue forces depending on the Red Army to slow up Blue's landing sufficiently for this purpose.

OPERATIONS

Under the general plan, the maneuver was roughly divided into three periods, namely (1) Oct. 21-23, individual practice; Oct. 24-27, joint maneuver with the Army; (3) Oct. 28-31, general fleet action and critique.

On Oct. 21st the main force of the Blue Fleet was assembled at the Blue base, Chinkai; the Blue escort and convoy were assembled at Fukuoka. The Red main force was assembled at Maidzuru, and the Red Army started concentrating.

During the first period Red was energetically engaged in establishing radio compass stations along the coast, establishing a seaplane base at Lake Shinji, and an Army air base at Tottori, meanwhile engaging in drills designed as defense against air attacks in which gas is used and in various drills designed to protect the civil population and important centers against air raids.

The Blue forces remained quiet during the first period, except that during the afternoon and night of Oct. 23rd the Blue Army embarked at Fukuoka. During the embarkation great activity was shown by the Blue escort, which evidently expected an attack, in anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense preparations; the anticipated Red attack did not materialize however, and the embarkation of the Blue Army was completed on schedule and without incident. Early on the morning of Oct. 24th, the Blue convoy and escort put to sea, proceeding out of Hakata Bay through a swept channel cleared by the first mine sweeper division. On the night of Oct. 23rd

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OPERATIONS, continued

the Kinu and the Second Destroyer Squadron, less the 12th division (Blue) sailed from Chinkai about the same time that Red forces consisting of the destroyers Katsura and Kayede and the submarine tender Karasaki with the entire Third Submarine Squadron sailed from Maidzuru. On the early morning of the 24th Blue forces consisting of the 5th division, the First and Second Submarine squadrons with the tenders Jingei and Chogei, the Aircraft Squadrons sailed from Chinkai. The remainder of the Red light forces consisting of the 7th division and the Tenryu with the Third Destroyer Squadron also put to sea on the morning of the 24th.

About 3 p.m. on the 24th Red submarines located and made contact with the Blue convoy to the southwest of Okai Islands and a sharp fight ensued in which the Red forces were finally driven off but only after one Blue troop transport had been badly damaged. On the afternoon of the 24th Blue Aircraft scouts appeared over Maidzuru, Tottori, Miho Bay and other points along the coast but were eventually driven off by Red air forces.

Under cover of darkness during the night of the 24th, the Blue aircraft carriers had approached close to the coast off Tottori and on the early morning of the 25th, in spite of high wind and rain were able to launch their planes in two simultaneous air attacks, the principal air attack in which about 40 Blue planes took part was directed against the Red army air base at Tottori and the Red Navy air base at Shinji Lake. This attack was delivered with such effect that the Red Army air base at Tottori was entirely destroyed, together with the Red Army planes, while the Red Navy base at Shinji Lake was badly damaged. While this air attack was in progress 8 Blue bombers delivered a gas and bomb attack on the Red base at Maidzuru; little damage was done however. As a result of these operations by Blue aircraft air supremacy was definitely assured to Blue.

On the early morning of the 25th the Blue 4th division sailed from Chinkai. The Red Admiral who was apparently well informed of Blue movements by his radio compass stations then attempted to get to sea with his main force, the 6th division, only to find that Blue submarines had him bottled up in Maidzuru and he had to recall some of his light forces to clear away this menace before he was finally able to get to sea, late on the afternoon of the 25th.

During this period the Red Army was busily engaged in defense preparations against the expected Blue landing. Army headquarters were established at the city of Matsuye and the forces were busily engaged in establishing look-out stations along the coast, preparing defense earthworks adjacent to all likely

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Sheet No. 6.

OPERATIONS, continued

landing beaches, while the approaches to those beaches were mined by small mine laying craft from Maidzuru. Barbed wire entanglements were also erected along these beaches and field artillery emplacements prepared in positions to command the landing areas. In carrying out these operations however, the Red Army was considerably hampered by Blue air raids and Blue aircraft observation.

About midnight of the 25th, the Blue main body and convoy approached the coast off Miho Bay and commenced mine sweeping operations with a view to effecting a landing. The Blue Force was undiscovered by Red until the early morning of the 26th when both sides opened fire; the Blue heavy ships gradually moving in shore covering the operations of their mine sweepers and light craft. There was a strong northeast wind accompanied by rain and a heavy sea making air craft operations impossible by either side. At 0800 Blue attempted to land troops but this was found impossible due to the heavy seas. The Blue ships remained in position however, and maintained a heavy fire on the Red shore positions until at 1140 the maneuver was ordered suspended. At 1500 the wind having veered to the northwest the seas in Miho Bay moderated and the maneuver was resumed and Blue was considered to have effected a landing in force on the beach under cover of a smoke screen. Actually however, it was so rough that only a small force of infantry was actually landed on the beach, the remainder of the Blue Army landing at the port of Sakai. At 1600 the order to end the maneuver was issued.

Upon completion of the maneuver the Red forces returned to Maidzuru while the Blue Force, including the 1st division which sailed from Chinkai on the 26th assembled off Oki Islands and then proceeded to Maidzuru where they arrived on the afternoon of the 27th.

CASUALTIES

- Oct. 20th - Type 14 seaplane on its way to Kudza Bay from Matsuye, due to heavy rain, lost its way and landed off Fukui Province. Due to rough sea plane was destroyed, but crew (1 officer and 2 men) were rescued.
- Oct. 24th - Reconnaissance seaplane belonging to Furutaka made forced landing at sea. The plane, undamaged, was recovered. Crew safe.
- Oct. 25th - During battle over Maidzuru a type 14 reconnaissance plane crashed in Kudza Bay. pontoons badly damaged; crew escaped injury.
- Oct. 25th - Type 14 reconnaissance plane based on Lake Shinji made forced landing on a farm; plane demolished; crew uninjured.
- Oct. 25th - Type 15 reconnaissance seaplane while flying over sea off Hinosaki fell in flames. Remnants of plane found; the crew (one officer and one man) missing.

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COMMENT

From the above it would appear that Blue attained all its objectives but was prevented from effecting an actual landing on the beach at Miho Bay by weather conditions. The following points are of especial interest:-

(1) By clever use of air force and submarines the Blue main force and convoy were given almost entire freedom of action.

(2) The Blue first division did not sail from Chinkai until daylight of the 26th and hence was never actually engaged.

(3) The Blue plan worked perfectly but seemed incapable of change to meet unforeseen conditions - Blue had planned to land at Miho Bay and when unforeseen weather conditions made such a landing impossible either lacked the initiative or ability to alter his plan so as to effect a landing at some other point; Kizuki for instance which would be protected from the prevailing north to northeast wind.

(4) - (3) above may be partly explained by the fact that the Blue Commander in Chief, Admiral Taniguchi was not present at the actual scene of operations and that in the absence of his senior the Blue active Commander, Vice Admiral Osumi, either lacked the initiative to change or feared to assume the responsibility involved in altering the plan of his senior.

(5) The planned third period of the maneuver did not take place.

J. V. Ogans

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