

SRH-317

PACIFIC OCEAN

MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORTS

1943

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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of documents in this
Special Research History
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Security Group Command

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COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

~~SECRET~~

22 April, 1943

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer-in-Charge, Combat Intelligence Unit,
FOURTEENTH Naval District.
To : Commander Task Force FIFTEEN.
Subject: Appreciation of Valuable Report from Radio
Intelligence Unit.
Reference: (a) Report of Task Force 16 (now 15) Radio
Intelligence Unit covering period 16 Oct.,
1942 to 28 March, 1943.

1. Reference (a) was received recently in this office.
2. The Officer-in-Charge considers this report to be an excellent presentation of the subject matter and desires to express his appreciation for the cooperation received from the Commander Task Force which has made possible the good work accomplished. The information contained in the subject report has served a very useful purpose.
3. Reports have been received recently of Ensign Sims' endeavors to solve enemy grid systems by the use of direction finder bearings from Noumea and Mid Pacific Net Stations forwarded from Pearl Harbor. It is suggested that the radio intelligence facilities at Guadalcanal including the direction finder be jointly used by Task Force FIFTEEN in a manner which is satisfactory to Commander Third Fleet.

W. B. GOGGINS

cc: Comdr. Third Fleet

A-50

Gen

af

SECRET

NOTES ON DETACHED
RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS

May 27, 1943

I. Practicability of ship-borne units

- A. There is only one function that can be performed by a carrier borne RIU which cannot be better performed by land based units. Namely their function as a warning and reporting agent on the fighter-direction of such enemy carriers as are within the very close range necessary for the reception of such low frequency transmission. These circumstances occur normally only during actual engagements.

For example, on Oct. 26, 1941, considerable traffic of this nature was intercepted by the RIU aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise. However due to the time necessary for compilation, translation and evaluation of these messages (under extremely adverse conditions for reception) the information contained in them did not reach the proper officers in time to be of immediate strategic value during the engagement, and was therefore of use only as material for later research. Thus even this one function in which the carrier borne RIU is superior loses much of its importance.

Furthermore, should the Japs tighten up on the use of plain language transmission, and radio communication in general during engagements (and there are already indications of this) there would be no single argument in favor of ship borne RIUs.

- B. Of vital interest to every task force commander at sea is information as to whether his unit has been spotted by enemy recon planes. This officer feels that CTF 15 considered the securing of such information to be the primary function of the RIU aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise. Although this information was given by the RIU to CTF 15, others of our own forces which were known to have been spotted could not be informed by the Enterprise RIU due to the strict maintenance of radio silence when at sea. A good example what this may mean is furnished by the case of the Chicago sinking.

On January 29 at 0940 (love) a Jap reconnaissance plane made contact with TF 18 which was proceeding on a mission to Guadalcanal. The same plane kept this force under observation until 1515 (love) during which time it sent three more position reports. The last of the above reports was addressed to another Jap plane which then proceeded to relieve the first plane and take over the snooping until 1720 (love). The Enterprise RIU felt that this continued shadowing might presage an attack on TF 18 but

being at sea was unable to send a warning. CTF 18 himself seemed unaware that he was being shadowed, and it seems definitely established that whatever information may have been picked up by units other than the Enterprise RIU, this information did not reach CTF 18. At 2215 (love) a plain language transmission "all attack together" was sent by a Jap plane and at 2230 another plane sent "Still making torpedo attack, one warship appears to be sinking". The following day the damaged Chicago was again attacked, and sunk.

- C. From a technical standpoint SBRIUs are handicapped by:
1. Inability to make use of high frequency RDF.
 2. Relatively poor reception conditions due to the many interferences aboard ship.
 3. Limited facilities and space available for equipment and personnel.
 4. In general, not enough personnel and equipment can be placed aboard ship to make a first class RIU and anything less does not seem advisable.

There have been instances where a failure at Comsopac to correctly evaluate Radio Intelligence information has been costly to our forces. This is due to the fact that there is no one at Comsopac who thoroughly understands the nature of RI operations. The present Sopac unit is at Guadalcanal where it has almost no connection with Comsopac staff, and due to the absence of a trained RI officer at Comsopac this present unit is not being utilized properly.

The need seems to be for a completely staffed and equipped landbased RIU to operate in the Sopac area under the control of ICPQA. Such a unit, operated correctly, could be invaluable to the main unit at Cincpac and to our own surface forces. One of the primary functions of such an organization would be to keep all surface forces at sea informed of the location of Jap plane contact reports. In addition it would act as a full-fledged auxiliary to the main RIU, keeping watch on local Nip circuits, utilizing RDF as an aid in making identifications and undertaking special research on such Jap frequencies as assigned by ICPQA.

C.A. SIMS

USS ENTERPRISE

SECRET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

The following is a report of the activities of the RADIO INTERCEPT UNIT aboard the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, in TASK FORCE 15, for the period of March 28 to May 7, 1943, inclusive.

C-16 *May 30th 1943*

Frank J. Weiland

Frank J. Weiland, CRM USN

Info
GAP

GX
Sanger

GQ
GR *has copy already*

File

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U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

This report consists of the following sections:

1. OPERATIONS

- (a) Comment
- (b) Security
- (c) Room
- (d) Equipment
- (e) Receiving Conditions

2. COMMUNICATION DATA

- (a) Chronology
- (b) Frequencies
- (c) Frequency Indicators
- (d) Communication Signals

3. DIRECTION FINDER DATA

- (a) Comment
- (b) Equipment
- (c) Operation
- (d) Interference
- (e) Purpose of Employment

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

I OPERATIONS

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

I. OPERATIONS

(a)

COMMENT

Transportation from Pearl to Espiritu Santo, being the location of the ENTERPRISE, was completed in one month.

The various observations are herewith outlined and commented upon so as to present as factual a picture as possible, the general conditions under which the R.I.U. functions.

(b)

SECURITY

Under the arrangement made for this unit aboard the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, security was lacking to a great degree. The operating position, analysis and research desk, all being in a compartment in, but set apart from the ship's transmitter room; with the exception of one receiver, used for secondary assignments and research purposes, was under the eye of all who entered the "TR".

The transmitter personnel, fortunately for this unit, altho being aware of our activities, did not, to the best of our knowledge, divulge to others, our activities.

(c)

ROOM

The compartment constituting our working space, is approximately six by eight feet (working space - four by five). Installed therein, are the following: Three receivers, complete with power supplies, one of which belonged to and was used by this unit; TBS transmitter and power supply; gear locker (for ship's equipment) and other miscellanea.

Besides the above listed, all shelves etc., were employed by the ship's transmitter gang, as a "catch-all", which although not significant in itself, meant that there were numerous interruptions necessitated by the traffic caused on account of such.

Therefore, concentration, freedom of movement and the necessary space for the proper performance of duties, was hindered to a great degree by the above mentioned conditions.

It is understood that R.I. units have withstood such conditions in the past, but it is highly recommended by the language officer, as well as the unit's personnel, that if the organization is to be a permanent function aboard task force carriers, that adequate facilities be arranged so that the highest degree of efficiency may be obtained from the unit.

SECRET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

I OPERATIONS (Contd)

(d)

EQUIPMENT

The equipment on hand consisted of two SX-28 receivers of our own, plus an additional borrowed receiver of the same type, installed in the Flag Plot. The RAK-RAI models were also obtainable, although the low frequency receiver was in an unsatisfactory operating condition the majority of the time.

It is recommended that future task force crews be furnished three SX-28 type receivers (with the essential tube replacements) and one airplane type frequency meter.

The model ID4 frequency meter was available for our use, but was not always accessible due to congestion of the transmitter room.

Three RIP-5 and one portable typewriter.
(e)

RECEIVING CONDITIONS

Receiving conditions at sea are greatly improved over the reception encountered while in the harbor (Espiritu Santo). Local circuits tend to block out signals a great deal.

008

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

II COMMUNICATION DATA

SECRET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

II COMMUNICATION DATA

(a)

Chronology
29 March

Kiaba Island appeared frequently as originator and as addressee.

A number of four-kana reports by planes (rebroadcast of air frequency traffic) was received on 9980J.

"R" Area Deffor. and New Georgia Deffor. appeared frequently in traffic today, as did Guadal Opr. Force.

Ship at anchor in Espiritu Santo.

30 March

Routine.

31 March

D/F at Espiritu Santo manned by one operator for purpose of guarding air frequencies, mainly 8845J. Bearings desired on Japanese patrol planes sending position grids.

Out of numerous air contact reports received one originated by TIMINO (unidentified), reported 24 fighter type planes heading north-northwest.

1 April

D/F manned. Bearing of 294 degrees on plane 4YUY03 sending grid position TUNELTAME.

New Georgia Deffor., Rekata Garrison and Kavieng appeared frequently as addressees as well as originators. Guadal Opr. Force mentioned a few times.

At 1750 (-9) SubChaser #18 was attacked by or sighted seven planes. At 1815 S.C. #18 sent a 4 kana code, possibly giving further information of the planes' activities.

2 April

Main activity in Solomons appears to be centered around the New Georgia group, and on New Guinea at Finschafen and Lae.

Bearing of 286.7 degrees received on plane 4YUY01 sending grid position of N HE 1 NE LE.

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

Chronology

3 April

Outstanding was the increase in volume of 4 kana traffic. Such usually denoting increased activity in areas concerned.

The "Advanced Exp. Force" (SOTI3) appeared frequently and was associated with calls identified as being "associated with the Advanced Exp. Force".

Radar reports continue almost daily from Buin area.

D/F manned. Two bearings received. One of 292 degrees on plane sending grid position of E NI 4 TE. The other of 312 degrees on plane grid position of SO RO. 3 TU ME.

4 April

Buin and Lorengau reported planes during the day.

Bearing of 017 degrees obtained on plane sending grid position of YO E 3 SU SA.

5 April

Kolombangara Air base appeared frequently throughout the day's traffic, associated with the 6th and 8th Fleets, as well as a number of unidentified activities.

D/F manned. Bearing of 320-degrees received on plane sending grid position of NO HE 4 E SE.

6 April

Third Fleet (carrier fleet) and CarDiv 2 appeared in today's traffic. Guadal Oprn., AirFlot 26, New Georgia DefFor., Munda Air base and Base For #3 were the outstanding activities during the day.

7 April

Task Force 15 underway on an undisclosed mission, heading northward.

Activity in the Bismark and Solomons areas appeared to be increasing. Possibility of reenforcements to those areas.

8 April

Routing of today's traffic strengthens yesterday's assumption that it is highly probable that a movement between the Bismark area and Solomons is intended.

SECRET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

Chronology

9 April

It is apparent that some sort of action is taking place at or in the vicinity of Wewak (on New Guinea). DesRon Three associated with above.

Rabaul's nite frequency (4990J) very faulty.

Ship (and rest of task force) approaching Guadal Canal. The enemy has not been encountered on this run, so far and from all indications, they have not sighted us.

10 April

Finschafen and BaseForce #8 appeared frequently, indicating some activity between the two. —

There are indications of the possibility of a convoy movement between Truk and Saipan. The Second Escort Force and the Fourth Construction and Repair Units were also among the addressees. The latter indicating supplies and manpower.

11 April

Returned to Espiritu Santo. Enemy not engaged.

A call identified as 6th Fleet (Sub Flt) was heard broadcasting traffic to KIRAL (All Subs., S.E. area Force ?) on 6653M Kcs.

The highlight in today's traffic was the triple appearance of the Third Fleet, mentioned along with the 6th Flt and an Air Flot. All despatches were short 4 kana type.

Radar reports continue daily from Kavieng, on New Ireland and other Lookout Stations in the Solomons area.

12 April

A Japanese reconnaissance plane reported sighting 55 bombers and 80 fighters at various locations.

Throughout the morning Jap patrol planes were very active, sending a number of three-kana and other short code despatches. All were re-broadcast by Rabaul.

13 April

Underway for gunnery. Return to anchorage in the late afternoon.

Routine.

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

Chronology

14 April

During the morning, considerable aircraft activity showed on 8730Kcs. It is evident from traffic summary that two Japanese Patrol squadrons contacted and engaged some of our forces. Various directives were sent out by the Squadron Commanders (ØSENO and 2YAN). No information as to where this action took place is yet at hand.

Few plain language despatches were received.

15 April

It is noted that the bulk of the traffic was made up of extra long five-numeral coded despatches.

Effective this date, a new system for indicating time, date and part numbers was put into use.

Breakdown as follows:

- 1st group: 1st two nrs. .. date
 2nd two nrs. .. hour of origination.
- 2nd group: 1st two nrs. .. minutes of origination.
 2nd two nrs. .. part indicators.

The Carrier Fleet mentioned in today's traffic.

16 April

As evidenced by traffic summary, there are indications of a convoy, size unknown, believed to be bound for Rabaul, or vicinity, from Truk. It is believed that the cargo will be aircraft or aircraft supplies.

Rabaul worked a unit, identified as being associated with Air Transports, and this same unit appeared in messages dealing with the above paragraph. Along with this, the 9C2nd Air Group was mentioned. Possibly this Air Group moving down to Rabaul vicinity?

A despatch was received, originated by the Comdr. of Yokosuka #7 Special Operations Force, which indicates the possibility of reinforcements being put into the S.W.P. area.

After receiving a directive from the squadron leader, a Japanese patrol plane replied that "he could not see the target, altho visibility was 40 kilometers and weather was clear, that he was returning to the base".

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

Chronology

17 April

It appears, through traffic analysis, that Japanese air power in the Southwest Pacific area is being increased. To what extent, as yet cannot be determined. On 16 April all indications pointed to the possibility of a number of seaplanes (or air group) enroute to Rabaul or vicinity. Possibly being shipped by plane carriers.

Considerable traffic between Air arsenals in the Empire and Bases with Rabaul in particular, throw more weight to this assumption.

ComDesDiv 31, appeared in traffic, being associated with an Escort unit. DesDiv 8 was mentioned twice.

18 April

CinC Third Fleet (or Air Base Force - alternate identification) appeared in today's traffic, as did an activity identified as being associated with Air arsenals, Third Fleet.

19 April

A despatch, originated by an unidentified activity, was addressed to the following:

All Comdrs. (Officers...?)
All Communication Unit Comdrs.
All Air Corps Commanders
All Air Base Force Comdrs.

Traffic between S.W.P area activities and the Air arsenals in the Empire continuing.

20 April

Air Group 902, Nr. 2 Special Base Force at Wewak and 2nd Sea Escort Forces active. Operations in Wewak area?

21 April

It is apparent that a convoy movement out of Truk for the New Guinea area is likely.

Wewak Base Force Nr 2 continues to show activity above normal.

22 April

The Nr. 1 Escort Force appeared frequently, as did a number of hospital ships. Returning to the Empire for hospitalization of wounded?

23 April

Air Group 902 continues to be prominent.

014

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

Chronology

23 April (Contd)

Rabaul Radio employed automatics on his broadcast to Guadal Operations Force. This evidently a test run as same was secured shortly, returning to manual sending.

24 April

Japanese patrol plane - 2KEU1, sent position grid, first received in twelve days, U HE 4 E ME. D/F not manned.

25 April

Comdr. 8th Army, 1st Special Base Force (RXZ DefFor.. Solomons area) and the 8th Base Force appeared active.

Air Group 755, last reported in the Marshalls, presumably at Tarao, appeared in traffic. This is possibly one of the new (or to be) air groups in the S.W.P. area.

Position grid HE SO 2 KI ME received. No bearings.

26 April

A Jap patrol plane 2NKAL, sent grid position of YA WA 4 E ME (167.25E - 03.15S ?) at 1005. Probably a contact with one of our search planes.

According to [redacted] address (HARUSIMAKITI) it appears that either a group of planes or the Comdr from Guam is at Truk.

27 April

A despatch originated by "Army Air Base, Rabaul" places members of same at "WA" (Unidentified location) and in association with Chief of Staff, 8th Flt.

Convoy movements between Empire and Mandates and between the latter and the S.W.P. area likely.

28 April

4YUHA6 (Japanese Patrol plane) sent a position report of A MA 4 RE SA, at 1100. The 5 to 20 degree indicator RE does not fit the present table. This character may be in error or possibly may be a further sub-division of minutes, giving a more exact location.

S.W.P. area Army commands and activities have been appearing frequently of late. Locations mainly concerned are Munda, Bouganville and Kolombangara.

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

Chronology

29 April

At 0915 a Nipponese patrol plane 2NKAL, sent a 4-kana despatch containing grid position of U HO 4 TE ME (tentative location of 163.55E 13.15S).

During the forenoon the U.S. Destroyer "Preble" underwent a bombing attack at 163.40E 11.10S. The above despatch probably deals with this action.

The Comdr. of the 66th Infantry Reg. was mentioned as being with the New Georgia DefFor.

DesDiv 8 and 22 were mentioned in connection with Base Force One (...in New Georgia area ?) as was a Third Fleet activity. The Headquarters of the HEKI Attack Force also concerned with the above activities. Troop movement in the New Georgia area very likely.

Several Radar reports, which in each, reported bearings and distances of a number of "objects", originated by TUSINA (...in Central Solomons...a new Lookout Station..?)

30 April

Solomons area activities, mainly Kolombangara, New Georgia DefFor and Base Force 1 (all closely associated) have been very active the past few days. The Comdr. of the 7th Combined Special Force was mentioned in connection with Base Force One.

Position Grid YATU2KIME (tentative location..167.40E - 07.05S. The same plane originated another position grid at 1020 - NC TU 1 SA ME, placing sighted object at 157.05E and 07.10S. There is possibility of error in grid table or an error in the longitudinal equivalent when sent by the plane.

1 May

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE underway for States, via Pearl, less Comdr. Task Force 15 and staff.

R.I.U. remaining aboard as per instructions and continuing with regular activities.

Daily despatches not filled in with identifications, except three-kana calls, as JUSITS no longer received. We are continuing coverage of Rabaul UTU while in this area. Also search watch set, guarding air frequencies and other "possibilities".

The 6th and 12th AirCorps were mentioned _____ as was the Comdr of the OKI Force, Nr 6251.

Position grid SC4KESA (158.55E - 12.15S ... tentative)

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

~~SECRET~~

Chronology

2 May

Routine. Rabaul UTU and search watch coverage. Japanese patrol plane 8YATI4 sent grid position LUFU2NIME. The same explanation is intended for this "off" "5 minute" designator as was given on 28 April

3 May

Routine. Rabaul UTU and search watch coverage.

4 May

There is a possibility that the "5 minute" designator of the position grid may be further subdivided than had originally thought. So far there have been three instances where the character following the numeral in the grid position has not agreed with the usual procedure.

5 May

Reception of Rabaul Radio broadcast becoming poor. Up Truk's broadcast to Guadal Operations Force (17980A). This latter frequency becoming poor in quality later in the day. Tokyo broadcast (16700J-8350J) now guarded.

6 May

Out of Southern Area, dropped Rabaul and Truk (an attempt was made to copy them) and set watch on Tokyo's Nr. 1 UTU.

Continue search. Remainder routine.

7 May

Routine. Search for air frequency activity and other possibilities.

At 1400 (-9) secured coverage of Tokyo's Nr. 1 UTU. Continued search until well after possibility of being sighted, by any means (aircraft or otherwise) had past.

To arrive in Pearl Saturday, May 9th.

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

II COMMUNICATION DATA
(Contd)

(b)

Frequencies

Regular research was carried on, as conditions would permit. The unit was handicapped by the fact that the latest TASK FORCE MANUAL failed to reach the unit, thereby depriving us of the latest information regarding frequencies and other pertinent data.

The following lists of frequencies are submitted, bearing in mind that some may be "old" or duplicated information. However, no record of such being at hand their actual status was not known.

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

April 1943

Secret

Frequencies

4332	M	Manilla and Philippines Force (?).
4500	A	Truk #2 UTU (Night freq.).
4692	M	Truk and Jaluit using service calls.
4702	M	
5090	M	Maru and other unidents (3 kana calls). May be Ambon or Davao and ships.
5130	M	No calls heard. Tfc sent included unidents at Truk and Yokosuka.
5455	M	Oshima Deffor to Marus.
5505	M	Rabaul (weather stn?) and Marus. Included Tenkai Maru #2.
5667	M	1 kana numeral calls, may be D/F ckt. One call identified as being in Marianas.
6646	M	Sixth Fleet to South East Subfor.
6653	M	
6929	A	Air base #57 and planes.
7570	M	Soerabaya to SouthWest Area Fleet. (Kehoto)
7586	M	
7588	M	

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

April 1943.

Frequencies.

Secret.

7943	M	
7944	M	Service and plane calls. Drill.
8990	A	Truk #2 UTU (Day freq.).
9279	M	Sixth Fleet to South East Area Subfor. (UTU). (Day freq. ? - See 6646 M).
9743	M	Service and plane calls. Drill.
13976	M	Jerk to secret call. (Unident. may be Jaluit).

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

II COMMUNICATION DATA

(Contd)

(c) —

Frequency Indicators

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

April 30, 1943.

~~Secret.~~

Frequency Indicators.

HI710 4706J.

Flagship Air Div.25.
Flagship Air Div.21.
Flagship 11th Air Flt.(At times)
Shortland Land Plane Base.
Lae Landplane Base.
Surumi Air Base.
Ships Operating with above.
(This Indicator Is In Question)

T0-
25th Air Div. -
Base.
5th Air Att-
ack Force.

SE941 8880A.

Rabaul Radio.
Lae Communication Station.
Surumi Communication Base.
Shortland Communication Base,
Buna Communication Base.
Buin Communication Base.
Plus a few Marus.

TAHI764- 8610A.

Air Stations And Planes.

TAN800- 4225J.

Rabaul Radio.
Kavieng Communication Station.
Buin Communication Station.
New Georgia Deffor.
Sea Plane Tender Div. 11.

TU106- 4500A.

Truk #2 UTU to Guadalcanal
Operations Force.(Nite)

TU406- 8990A.

Truk #2 UTU to Guadalcanal
Operations Force.(Day)

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

II COMMUNICATION DATA

(Contd)

(d)

Communication Signals

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

April 1943.

Secret.

Nigori Signals.

E"SO-

Send corrections on portions
indicated on NR _____.

Special
Nigori signals.

KO"EA-

I have WX. for you.

Kana Signals.

WEHA-

When followed by a question
mark means- "Will you retune
your transmitter?"
(This used on Air Craft Cirt)

~~SECRET~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

III DIRECTION FINDER DATA

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

III DIRECTION FINDER DATA

(a)

COMMENT

The Direction Finder at Espiritu Santo, recently installed by COMAIRSOPAC, was available for use by this unit as occasion demanded.

The D/F is situated about one and one half miles from the landing. The distance between the central area of activities of COMAIRSOPAC and the d/f is approximately one half mile. Transportation between this area and the d/f is accomplished mainly by pedestrianism. Other methods being impossible at times, due to the heavy rainfall and lack of roads.

(b)

EQUIPMENT

The D/F receiver and associated equipment is of the DAB model. Power requirements are furnished by the d/f's own auxiliary Koehler System.

(c)

OPERATION

After a short operators' familiarization period, bearings obtained by this model were rated high in their accuracy. However, all operators found this receptor (which constitutes two receivers in one) low in efficiency when employed in search operations. The main points of criticism being directed against the tuning arrangements, which were mechanically inadequate due to lack of smoothness of operation and vernier control. Secondly, against the resultant audio signal obtained after the necessary adjustments had been made, putting the receivers in the required condition, necessary for maximum d/f operation.

(d)

INTERFERENCE

Trouble of this nature was experienced frequently due to the numerous RADAR systems employed in the vicinity - also other local induction noises.

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

III DIRECTION FINDER DATA

(Contd)

(e)

PURPOSE OF EMPLOYMENT

The DAB equipment was employed, in conjunction with our Pacific DF net, to obtain fixes on Japanese patrol planes. A comparison of such fixes obtained to be made with positions given in intercepted plane contact reports for the purpose of establishing the longitudinal and latitudinal equivalents of the grid characters, used in these reports.

Up to the present time, no absolute fixes were made. However, all bearings obtained here at Espiritu Santo, were highly valuable in the above calculation.

It is here brought out that the possession of this grid is the main vertebra of the backbone of the shipboard R.I.U. in the manner that in receiving grid positions, we can readily tell whether we or other units have been spotted. And this is the information we are after.

~~SECRET~~

July 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER HUCKINS:

Subject: Report on General Activity of Radio Intelligence Unit attached to ComNorPacFor.

Enclosure: (Subject Report

1. Arrangements are being made to have bearings on Northern Units furnished by cable from the Direction Finder Station at Amchitka. This arrangement is the best at present possible, but does not provide for flashing by this unit of the targets desired.

The only solution to this problem is permission to set up a transmitter on the Flash Circuit. I request this possibility be given consideration, and would like to be advised of your decision.

2. In view of the fact MAYNARD G. ALBERTSON 268 28 51 Rm 1c U.S.N. has fulfilled the requirement as to term of service, I recommend consideration be given to an advancement of his rating.

Respectfully,

Ernest B. Beath
Ernest B. Beath

Ensign, U.S.N.R.

Ensign Beath WMB
JAH

Cerr

(A-163)

SECRET
20 July 1943

A general report on activities of the Radio Intelligence Unit attached to Task Force Sixteen follows in two parts.

- I OPERATIONS
- II MATERIAL

A-163

I OPERATIONS

1. Receiving Conditions.

During the month prior to July 12, the day we moved to our new operating building, receiving conditions were slightly below normal on all frequencies. On the lower bands, 2000-4000 kilocycles, and particularly on 2480, weak signals and a high static level reduced the grade of traffic copied to fair in most cases. However, after our move to the new location using our new antennas, there has been such a marked improvement in signal strength on all frequencies, it is difficult to determine yet whether atmospheric conditions have improved. There is still a great deal of static on the 2000-4000 kilocycle band.

It is felt that most of our unsatisfactory receiving conditions have been due to the poor antenna set-up we were using before July 12. Besides being poorly located, they were of insufficient height as well as being improperly installed in regard to direction. Our new antenna system is designed to alleviate this condition. (Antennas are fully covered in part II of this report).

Our 8030 kilocycle doublet has greatly improved reception on this frequency. With the exception of Kiska, all stations on this frequency have been copyable twenty four hours a day using this antenna. Kiska apparently uses either two transmitters or two antennas (or both) on this frequency. While using one arrangement, his signal strength will be 3 to 0 both day and night. When he shifts to his other transmitter or antenna, his signal strength raises to 5 plus - much louder than any other station on this frequency. It is possible that one antenna is beamed, although, when he is weak here, he is also weak at Tokyo and Ominato and Foromushiro has to relay his traffic.

Twenty four hour coverage could be obtained on Ominato's broadcast were it not for interference caused by WAFG (Army?), a powerful station that uses 8510 Kcs(?) to work WKE. When he is not actually sending traffic, he is idling at high speed making it impossible to copy traffic on this frequency. 6377M is usually copyable from about 1900 to 1200 (William).

The ~~ten~~ KW generator which is being installed today was originally intended to be used as an auxiliary power supply, but in order to further minimize local interference caused by electric razors, saws, local buzzer systems etc, we have decided to try using this as our main power supply. The main power supply will be available for emergencies.

Since we have only used our new antennas eight days, it is difficult to report accurately on reception. After we have checked conditions over a longer period of time, a complete report will be forwarded on this subject.

SECRET

I OPERATIONS (Cont)

2. Coverage

The bulk of our traffic is received on the following frequencies. Of these, only 8030 is covered continuously. The Ominato broadcast is covered fairly continuously when it can be copied, which is about sixty percent of the time.

8030J	Covered continuously
8510M(A?)	Ominato broadcast. Covered when heard
6377M	" " " " "
4255M(A?)	" " " " "
7275A	Covered when active.
6690A	Covered when up.
6490A	Covered when up.
**262M	Covered when up.
248M	Covered when up.

** This frequency has, for several months, been called 405M. We were told this was 405 Kcs. upon arrival and until we obtained a frequency meter we had no way of checking. The indicator for this frequency (262.2M) is (13).

The following frequencies are checked frequently and some traffic has been obtained on them.

8915J	Checked frequently.
7735A	Covered when up.
8105A	Covered when up.
6325A	Checked frequently.
4880A	" "
2480A(J?)	Covered when up.

All Air Frequencies are covered continuously when active and might concern Hi-North.

8105A has not been heard since Jap planes unsuccessfully attempted attacks at Attu, shortly after our invasion of that island. This frequency has been watched very closely since that time.

Below is a complete list of all "measured" frequencies heard to date. Some of them probably are averaged frequencies which are not listed in our compilation. In order to maintain identity of frequencies, it is suggested that we be sent an up-to-date list of all Hi-North Average and "J" frequencies as used by your office.

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Activity</u>	
11300E	RATATO to RAYKE	(Old Calls)
7190M	RI I O - I KOFU - ROKAWO	(Old Calls)
7175M	One Kana calls; SI, FU, O, I	
6842M	TEØ - FOI Also one Kana calls.	
6800E	SUMUSE - YORIRU - SITUA	(Old Calls)
6696M (6690A?)	Ominato Broadcast to Fifth Fleet using FAMI numbers.	
6688M	Two Kana Numeral and Numeral two kana-planes.	
6626M	Ominato Broadcast to Fifth Fleet using FAMI numbers.	
6621M	Two Kana numeral and three Kana calls (Unident)	

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS CONT.

Frequency Cont.

Activity

165 E	Dual with Tokyo BC
180 E	Yokosuka to ?
2740 M	KANO to A SI
2878 M	A ME to MI NO
3610-20 M	Attu-Kiska-"FO" Calls
3620 M	Numeral-two kana Calls (Drill)
3773 M	Two-kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
3885 M	Two-kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
3972 M	Two-kana-Numeral Calls
4181 M	Ominato to Three-kana-Numeral
4389 M	Empire Air Stations
4660 E	" " " & Two-kana-Numeral Calls
4726 M	# One Surface Escort Force-Others
4849 M	MI SA SI to Takao
5656 M	HA SO to MO HI
5757 M	Two-kana-Numeral Call & Planes
5782 M	Two-kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
5921 M	Two-kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
5992 M	GuardDiv 81 - Iwojima AirBase - Marus - Others
6002 M	Chichijima Air - Others
6022 M	AMAGISAN MARU to Truk
6044 M	Saipan to Various
6050 M	"FO" Calls
6130 M	Chichijima Airgroup - Airgroup 253
6243 M	Yokosuka to Two-kana-Numeral & Three-kana
6303 M	Two-kana-Numeral & Three-kana Calls
6310 E	MU HA WA & Two-Kana Calls
6396 M	MO NI TO CQ
6448-59 M	HA SA NO to E RI FU - SU KE U
6456 M	Matsuwa
6462 M	TA YU SI to SE TA YO
6468 M	Horomushiro to Various
6486 M	Two-kana Calls
6491 M	SI - TO - I (One Kana)
6503 M	Two-Numeral Calls
6531-44 M	Empire Air Stations
6593 M	Three-kana Call to Ominato
6569 M	Three-kana to Two-kana-Numeral Calls
6637 M	Kana-Numeral Calls
6640 M	Three-kana & Kana-Numeral Calls
6645 M	AirCraft Calls (Drill)
6662 M	Empire Air Stations and DefenseFor Units
6665 M	Wakkanai to SI TU KO
6709 M	Two-kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
6720 E	TE KA KE to I ME RA - Yokosuka
6792-6802M	Okinawa Deffor
6920 M	MA WA NE to Two-Kana-Numeral Calls
6932 M	57th AirBase and Planes
7020 M	I HA RO to Two-Kana-Numeral Call
7047 M	Planes - Two-Kana-Numeral Calls
7120 M	Tokyo to Horomushiro
7685 M	11th AirFlt Calls-Others (Drill)
7691 M	Two-Kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
7741 M	Empire Air Stations
7748 M	MO SU (Takao)
7792 M	Chichijima to "All Vessels"
7816M	Two-Kana-Numeral Calls
7839 M	Two-Kana-Numeral Calls (Drill)
8078 M	Plane to MI NO KO
8214 M	Kure Air- Planes - Shima Deffor F/S
8792 M	Imieji - Wake - Ruotto - Planes - Others
8828 M	Planes and MO A N
8839 M	MU SE A

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS CONT.

<u>Frequency Cont.</u>	<u>Activity</u>
9351 M	KE MI FU to MA SI KE
9967 M	Tokyo to TU N SU
10892 M	Two-Kana-Numeral Calls & Yokosuka Air Station
13476 M	One-Kana & Kana-Numeral Calls
14183 M	Planes

The following frequencies, most of which do not necessarily concern the Ei-North area, have been heard and logged from time to time. It may be interesting to note the range of a certain few.

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Activity</u>
17 A	Tokyo Sub Broadcast
125 A	Dual with #1 Tokyo Broadcast
3812 J	Empire and Ei-North Area D/F Circuits
3815A-5910A	Empire AirBases-CV's
3835 A	CinC China - Idzumo
4650 A	Fachijojima Det. Force
4700 A	KI KU KU to X051 - Soshu Gunboat Unit Base
5935 J	Sub Frequency - BC
6010 A	Sub Frequency
6040 J	EI WA N - E02 (Air Freq)
6260 A	Air Frequency
6265 A	Yokosuka Deffor (Different circuit nw)
6235 J	Sasebo to Marus
6385 A	Empire Air Stations (Also Sub Freq)
6400 J	(Mentioned on 2480J)
6495 A	Bako Deffor
6645 A	BC - Units
6705 J	Yokosuka to Units
6750 A	Ominato Air - Planes - Yamada Base
6850 A	Planes - Bases
6910 A	Hongkong BaseFor
6995 A	Jerk to Jaluit - Sub Freq
7110 J	Planes - Bases
7590 J	Soerabaya & Base 25
7635 J	CV's - Planes
7670 A	Idzumo - Tsingtao - Others
7975 J	Kure to Marus - Various
8220 J	Ominato Utu (NC)
8550 A	Marshalls Air Circuit - Various
10110 A	Ominato to Horomushiro- Kiska
10650 A	Dual with 8030j (Seldom used)
10750 J	Saipan to DD in DesDiv 61
11050 A	Major Air Stations
11450 A	Yokosuka-Saipan-Chichijima-Marcus
12550 J	Empire Air Stations

PAGES 034-036

NOT RELEASABLE

~~SECRET~~

II Materiel

1. Receivers

The unit is now using five receivers as described below:

- A. One (1) Halli-crafter's model SX28 in good working condition. This is by far our best receiver. It is used for all searching and aircraft frequency coverage and various other high North coverage.
- B. One (1) RCA model RAZ low frequency receiver, range 15 to 600 kcs., with preselector. This receiver performs well for a five tube regenerative set and is used for all low frequency coverage. During the day, 248m can be heard strength 2-5 with good copy. At night 262m is heard strength 1-4. The weaker signals are uncopyable due to a high noise level varying from strength 3-5.
- C. One (1) National model RAS in fair working condition. This receiver is used for 8030J and 4015J coverage and performs very well. It needs some work done to bring the operation up to peak.
- D. Two (2) National, model NC-200 receivers. One of these is in fair working condition and is used to cover the Ominato broadcast. The other is very poor condition and is used as a standby receiver.

Remarks:

Experience has shown that the NC-200 Receiver is generally unsatisfactory for this kind of work and does not compare with the SX28. We believe that our coverage could be improved if SX28 receivers were used in place of the NC-200s. All maintenance and repair work on our equipment has been done by our operators.

2. Antennas

At our new location we have three poles averaging seventy feet above ground. The antenna system was designed ~~to fit the requirements for~~ to fit the requirements for best reception as follows:

- A. One (1) doublet cut to 8030 kcs, directed to Kiska and Foromushiro.
- B. One (1) "long wire" 400 feet long, used on the SX28 for search and general coverage.
- C. One "long wire" 350 feet long, used on the RAZ low frequency receiver.
- D. One "long wire" 150 feet long used on the Nc-200 covering Ominato's broadcast.

3. Emergency power

Separately housed we have a gasoline powered Kohler 10 KVA 115 volt-60 cycle, 3 phase generator with switching facilities for quick changeover from remote to local power. This machine is solely for our use and is of ample capacity to handle our full load.

From:

GA

To: *GQ. Info ~~Handwritten~~

GB or GA (Personnel)

1. Personnel, please advise do you take care of advancements.

See paragraph 2.

JAH.

Please return to me with any advice for Ems Beath.

*Surg. that "TEK" wd be suitable. 1 met. See att. description. Handwritten

Following is an extract from Bureau of Ships "Radio and Sound Bulletin No. 9" (dated Jan. 1, 1943):

NEW MODEL TCK SERIES TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT

A new transmitting equipment is now being issued to the service in which some distinctly new features have been incorporated. The most outstanding of these is the single dial control of all major tuning adjustments. By virtue of this new feature the time required for tuning and frequency checking operations is kept to a minimum.

This new equipment is designed for both ship and shore applications. It provides a nominal power output of 400 and 100 watts on A1 and A3 emission, respectively, and covers a frequency range of 2,000 to 18,100 kc.

Basically, the equipment consists of a master oscillator stage employing a type 837 vacuum tube, an intermediate power amplifier stage employing a type 837 vacuum tube and a power amplifier stage employing two type 813 vacuum tubes in parallel.

For A3 emission, grid modulation of the power amplifier is accomplished by the use of a two-stage speech amplifier employing a type 6SK7 first speech amplifier and a type 6SQ7 second speech amplifier and modulator.

Construction is of the sub-assembly type. The transmitter frame is constructed of chrome-moly steel aircraft tubing welded to form an extremely strong, yet lightweight, structure. The size of this equipment is such that it may be passed, without disassembly, through a door 20 inches wide by 38 inches high with 10-inch radius at the corners. It is also capable of passage through a hatch 25 by 20 inches under the same conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the general appearance and construction of the transmitter unit.

In order to provide for conditions of extreme shock or vibration, four rubber shock absorbers are fastened to the bottom of the transmitter unit. In addition, two rubber shock absorbers are mounted on the back corners near the top of the transmitter unit to provide stabilization, thus preventing excessive sway of the unit.

The power supply for this equipment consists of a motor generator set capable of supplying all the necessary voltages for operation of the transmitter and associated equipment. Motor generator equipment for operation from 220/440/3/60 A.C. or 115 or 230 volts D. C. is available. The use of rectifier power equipment for A. C. applications is contemplated in future equipments.

Standard control circuits are employed which permit operation with the Navy type 23211 or 23172 radiotelephone units.

The master oscillator is designed to provide continuous frequency coverage over the frequency range of 2,000 to 18,100 kc. by the use of six bands. Continuity of the frequency range is insured by an overlap of 1 percent between bands. A single control is employed to vary the frequency of the master oscillator and simultaneously tune the intermediate and power

NEW MODEL TCK SERIES TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT

amplifier circuits. Tuning and adjustment of coupling in the antenna circuit is done in a conventional manner with separate controls. A band change switch is employed to select the operating band desired. A suitable dial calibrated directly in frequency is provided for each band.

The single dial control for tuning the master oscillator, intermediate amplifier, and power amplifier is obtained by a gang-operated four unit condenser so arranged vertically in the transmitter units that each tuning condenser is located in its respective compartment. The arrangement of the gang condenser assembly is illustrated in figure 2. The main tuning control knob drives through to a worm and worm gear to the gang condenser assembly. Indication of frequency is accomplished by means of positive geared Veeder counters coupled to the tuning condensers.

A stop mechanism is provided to prevent damage to the capacitors and mechanisms at the ends of rotor travel. The stop mechanism exerts a braking action which is applied before the main end stop is reached. This slows down the control before reaching the positive end and serves as a warning that the operator is beyond the band limit.

Special precautions have been taken in the design of the uni-control and dial mechanism to reduce and hold the backlash to a minimum by employing split gears wherever necessary. Precision ball bearings have been used throughout the uni-control mechanism, including counters and capacitors, to insure free running and long life.

A crystal frequency indicator, incorporated in the transmitter unit, is employed as a means of obtaining a series of check points, every 100 kc., for resetting the calibration of the frequency indicating dials for a high degree of accuracy. This consists of a crystal oscillator and multivibrator which generates marker frequencies throughout the range of the transmitter. The output of the multivibrator is coupled to the grid of a detector tube; the transmitter signal is also introduced to this grid by means of a pick-up coil located in the master oscillator plate circuit. The output of the detector is then amplified and delivered to a phone jack located on the front panel of the transmitter.

Checking the accuracy of the directly calibrated dials is accomplished by setting the dial at a marker frequency point nearest the desired frequency of transmission. The crystal frequency indicator is then turned on and a beat note with the marker frequency is heard. By means of a small trimmer condenser incorporated in the master oscillator stage the transmitter frequency is brought to zero beat. The dial calibration is then accurate to within 0.02 percent of the desired absolute frequency under average temperature conditions.

Two trimming capacitors, controlled by knobs on the front panel, are provided to trim the intermediate and power amplifier stages. The range of these trimmers is sufficient to resonate their respective stages but

NEW MODEL TCK SERIES TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT

not large enough to allow the selection of an adjacent harmonic frequency.

The antenna tuning equipment is designed to feed a wide variety of antennas and in general will work satisfactorily into all antennas encountered in shipboard installations.

Operation of the transmitter as a whole is on a par with that obtained from other standard Navy transmitting equipment of comparable power output and frequency range. The increased flexibility resulting from uni-control of the dial mechanism has been accomplished with no apparent sacrifice of any other operational feature of transmitting equipment of this type and, in general, is considered to be a definite advancement in the constructional design of Navy transmitting equipment.

~~SECRET~~

August 19, 1943

General Instructions for O-in-C Task Force RI Units

1. You are going aboard a new vessel under new surroundings with a definite mission which is to obtain the maximum amount of enemy intelligence from the analysis of intercepted enemy radio. The mission and the conditions aboard ship are not always compatible. Quarters, operating restrictions, seagoing security measures, space limitations, and other factors are not what they are ashore. Realize these necessary handicaps and accept with appreciation any assistance rendered aboard ship to improve radio reception and working conditions.

2. The RI Unit is loaned to the Task Force Commander to make any use of it that he desires. The Admiral commanding the Task Force is your "boss" and any instructions herein or hereafter given you are given you under the assumption that the Task Force Commander approves them. The Commanding Officer of the vessel to which you are attached is charged with the administration, smooth operation of all activities aboard, the quartering, the messing, and the discipline of all personnel aboard the vessel. The Admiral and his staff are exempted from certain phases of shipboard routine. For the analysis of your own operations you are concerned only with the Admiral and staff but for all other matters, the ship's personnel generally are involved. Efforts will be made prior to departure from port to have one staff officer advised of your requirements and act as liaison officer. However, minor and urgent requests for material or advice need not necessarily pass through the one staff officer particularly if this officer happens to be busy or asleep.

3. As soon as practicable after reporting aboard, obtain a copy of the ship's roster and learn the names of the staff officers and the Senior Ship's officers. Also, while getting ready for sea, learn the principal deck terminology and parts of the ship. Pay strict attention to Admiral's, Captain's and other senior officers quarters boundaries and acquaint the radioman in the RI Unit with the desirable means of access between their quarters and working space.

General Instructions for O-in-C Task Force RI Units
(Continued)

4. The successful mission of the RI Unit depends more than anything else on the good reception of radio signals by the unit. You should have the best possible antennas and interference-free space aboard ship but you will probably accept the best available reception after vital ships communications are provided for. This must result in a compromise in one way or another. Prior to departure from port, hold extensive tests of interception and make the best possible adjustments to suit the conditions. Shipboard reception is not comparable to shore reception particularly of enemy stations that take steps to insure your non-reception of signals. Your requirements for antennas and receivers should be based on:

- 1 receiver watch on Low and Medium frequencies
(30 to 3,000 kcs)
- 2-3 receiver watches on High frequencies
(3,000 to 30,000 kcs) (particularly 4 to 8 megacycles)
- 1 receiver watch on Very High frequency
(30,000 to 60,000 kcs)

The accurate and expedient identification of enemy circuits requires ready access to a frequency meter aboard ship. Provision for continuous (preferred) or occasional but rapid measurements must be made prior to commencing intercept operations. All your receivers should be calibrated accurately after they are set up.

5. There are two general methods of attacking the intercept problem in the Task Force Unit. One involves exclusive service to the immediate situation without regard to the careful recording for file or future operations of the intercept data. In other words, grasping the immediate tactical data from traffic or active circuits with little concern for the strategical situation or future similar operations. The second method involves the rapid shifting from one channel to another with the interception of each and every despatch heard on each channel found active. The best practicable method is believed to be as follows:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

General Instructions for O-in-C Task Force RI Units
(Continued)

- (a) Immediately upon leaving port concentrate on interception of all active receivable circuits in the general area to which you are headed plus the enemy areas enroute. Become familiar with types of traffic, calls, times of operation, and other RI data attending these circuits. Do not copy Main Broadcasts.
- (b) Enroute to areas and prior to probable contact, study active circuits in particular areas and make out priority frequency lists. As contact day approaches, commence regular automatic coverage procedure noting in log with times all frequencies checked followed by statement "Routine t/c" or "Unheard". Also learn to shift rapidly to Rabaul, Truk, or Tokyo Broadcasts depending on which area you are headed for.
- (c) At the beginning of each Tokyo day, record and learn the frequent precedence indicators to facilitate the identification of urgent indicators on the day of contact.
- (d) Prior to probable contact date, put all operators and receiving equipment including loud speakers on watch for one "action" run in order to smooth out procedure.
- (e) On probable contact date, never have less than two operators and all receiving equipment in continuous operation with careful attention paid to checking all possible area channels at short intervals (logging results in each case).
- (f) Immediately upon contact (by radio intelligence), go to Condition 1 and concentrate on the active circuits affected by the enemy contact. Continue checking probable active frequencies for activity as some of the affected uncovered circuits appear to resume normal routine. Keep the objective enemy station main channels, particularly the air channels under constant observation and continuously search for activity on the ultra high receiver. As a general rule, do not resort to falling back on the main broadcasts (Tokyo, Truk, Rabaul, Ominato) unless all possible area channels are inactive. The enemy contacts will undoubtedly appear on the main broadcasts but the mass of unrelated traffic that requires analysis prior to arriving at contacts and related urgent messages are generally too much for a small unit.

Value of UTU depends mainly upon amount of calls that can be identified.

~~SECRET~~

General Instructions for O-in-C Task Force RI Units
(Continued)

6. Regarding Security, there are two points to keep in mind. Avoid any air of mystery regarding your duties, but caution the men to refrain from discussing the nature of their work with unauthorized personnel. You are particularly cautioned to insure that the secret documents entrusted to you will be kept in a secure place except when actually in use and that positive steps are taken to destroy all secret documents in the event of casualty which would prevent their safe return to this office.

7. Remember that the personnel in your unit are also new to the ship (probably unfamiliar with shipboard routine) and require a certain amount of advice and instruction. Attend to their comfort and do everything within reason to promote the highest possible operating efficiency. As a general rule, shorter watches at more frequent intervals are more conducive to efficiency but the optimum enemy radio reception periods plus the shipboard schedule will probably affect the watch list. The success of your operations will depend in a large measure on the detailed preparations made prior to contact date and the correct interpretation of intercepts as reported by you to the Admiral or staff officer. It is suggested that you weigh carefully all available indications received prior to making each report but do not hesitate to make reports promptly and when occurring regardless of frequency depending on the wishes of the Task Force Commander.

Make two copies of all intercepts.

U.S.S. YORKTOWN

SECRET

SOME POINTS ABOUT THE MARCUS ISLAND

RAID.

(TF 15 R.I.U. SEPT 1) 1943

The raid by U.S. carrier planes on Marcus Island on September 1 (Tokyo Time) came as a complete surprise to the Japanese. There are three reasons for this:

1. Maintenance of strict radio silence (except on ultra high frequency TBS, which was kept at a minimum) gave the Nips no chance of D/F-ing our units.
2. A study of latest available search plane sectors and picket boat locations enabled the selection of a route which allowed our forces to reach the launching point and return to operations base without being spotted.
3. The radar on Marcus Island, which should have warned the Nips of the approaching planes, was either not in operation or failed to give satisfactory results. Probably the assumption that it had been secured for the night is correct.

That the Japanese had no suspicion of the coming attack was evident from a study of the behaviour of the Marcus Island radio as well as the Yokosuka and ChiChijima radios.

Sims Report

(2)

U.S.S. YORKTOWN ~~SECRET~~

At 0020 Marcus says AUNO "Securing" and shuts down until 0303 when he comes back on the air and asks Yokosuka U"KA, "Have you had any ~~tra~~^{traffic} for me since I shut down?"

Marcus, Yokosuka and Chichijima then work each other with usual routine traffic on the regular 5725J KCS channel,

At 0336 our first bombs drop and at 0340 Marcus, using service call EE8, originates an urgent message in 4 kana operational code. The encoding takes several minutes and he gets it on the air at 0347. It says "Enemy bombers raiding us". Another message with same time of origin is encoded and sent out at 0358. It mentions something about "6 blank type bombers attacking".

After sending these two messages about the attack, and trying unsuccessfully at 0548 to get Yokosuka's attention in order to send more urgent traffic, Marcus then left the air for nearly an hour and a half. The most probable explanation is that the raid caught him before he could move to a bomb-proof transmitter room and, having sent warning of the attack, and then not being given a chance to send further traffic, he now decides to move to the shelter.

At any rate he shows up again at 0705 on the day frequency 11450KCS. A thorough search was made in the meantime for any other frequencies Marcus might use, but none was heard.

(3)

U. S. S. YORKTOWN

SECRET

Substantiation of this is seen in the fact that Yokosuka and Chichijima kept the 5725/11450J circuit clear for Marcus, and set up other channels on which to clear their own traffic. Marcus kept in operation until 1148 at which time he went suddenly off the air during a transmission. He was evidently hit by our last wave of bombers and his equipment badly damaged, because he was unheard until 1349 and it was obvious that he was using a makeshift transmitter.

(4)

U.S.S. YORKTOWN ~~SECRET~~

It is interesting to note that although Marcus was being bombed, and the need for speed was uppermost, time was taken to encode these messages before transmitting them. This may have seemed to the Jap in charge to have been the proper thing to do, but actually it was foolish for two reasons.

1. The messages, being in code form, did not receive the immediate circuit-wide attention that would have been given a plain language despatch mentioning the attack. In other words the messages were delayed at both ends by having to be encoded and decoded, and, being in code, their great importance was not immediately recognized by the radio operators who handled them at Chichijima and Yokosuka.

2. From the cryptanalysis standpoint the Jap was foolish to send a short urgent code message at a time when its content would be so obvious to the enemy. In other words, whether or not we had the code, the message could obviously—(considering the timing) only be about the raid, and must therefore necessarily contain words such as "Air Raid", "Enemy Planes", "Bombing" etc. Thus, the Jap who coded this message was also responsible for the partial compromise of an important code.

C.A. Sims, Ens. U.S.N.R.

048 c-86

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FREQUENCIES, Marshall-Gilbert Islands

While in the vicinity of the Gilbert Islands from the period 23 August to 23 September, 1943, a thorough search and study was made of all local circuits used in the Marshall-Gilbert Islands, as well as all air frequencies used.

Following are all local circuits (Circuits other than Kwajalein/Tokyo, Mandate Circuit, etc.) and is thought ~~to~~ the normal and complete Inter-island communication system:

- 3800 - 24 Hour frequency - Used by Kwajalein to and from weather stations in the Marshall Islands including Kusaie and Eniwetok. This is the only communication channel of the smaller and less important islands.
- 3945 Nite - 7890 Day - Kwajalein/Wake/Jaluit/Nauru. This is primarily their Eastern DF Net although some regular traffic is handled. Jaluit weather is always sent over this circuit.
- 3990 - 24 Hour frequency - Used by Rucotto Air Base and Kwajalein.
- 4275 Nite - 6115 or 8550 Day - or
5110 24 Hour frequency - Used by Eastern Air Force air bases. A type frequency indicator peculiar to this circuit is used. (1TUKE) is used for 4275 KCs and (5TUKE) is used for 5110 KCs.
- 4300 Nite - 8600 Day - Used by Kwajalein, Gilbert Island bases (Tarawa, Makin, Ocean and Nauru) and Maru boats.
- 4380 Nite - 7300 Day - Used by Kwajalein, Marshall Island bases (including Wake, Eniwetok and Kusaie) and Maru boats. Also used by these Marshall Island bases to units in their respective Guard Divisions.
- 5790 - 24 Hour frequency - Used by Tarawa to 3 small units in the Gilbert Islands using calls HIKESU, H01 and H02. HIKESU is thought to be one of the southernmost in the group either Arorai or Tamana, H01 between Tarawa and Makin probably Apiang, and H02 one of the central islands. *Over responsibility of...*

Note on MARUS: It was noted that Marus approaching or leaving the Marshall Islands would use 4300/8600 until actually within the Marshalls when they would shift to 4380/7300 and continue working Kwajalein. When a Maru goes to one of the bases other than Kwajalien the local base (or guard division) becomes responsible for his communications. By watching these frequencies tabs can be kept on all Marus in this vicinity.

~~SECRET~~

FREQUENCIES (Contd)

- ✓ 5720 Nite - 8725 Day - Used by land based planes and bases (Ruotto, Wake, Taroa, Mille, Tarawa and Nauru). Was also used by Taroa and planes for communication drills. Secondary to 7120.
- ✓ 6115 Nite - 8305 Day - Used by long range flying boats and seaplane bases (Imieji and Makin). Secondary to 6845/8845.
- ✓ 6260 - 24 Hour frequency - Used by 3 unidentified stations using Charley calls and infrequently by Tarawa using regular two kana numeral call. The "C" calls appearing on this frequency have never appeared on another circuit and traffic handled is usually quite old. This leads to the belief that they are small secondary bases on the same atols as the regular air bases.
- ✓ 7120 - 24 Hour frequency - Used the same as 5720/8725 but seems to be the primary frequency.
- ✓ 6845 Nite - 8845 Day - Primary frequency for long range flying boats and seaplane bases for entire 11th Air Fleet. Marshall/Gilbert stations known to be on this frequency are Imieji, Makin and 22nd air flot.
- ✓ 9420 Day - Used as a drill frequency by Taroa air base and planes. Could be used to replace either 7120 or 5720/8725.

It was noted that each patrol plane, flying boat and bomber, has two transmitters in operation at all times paralleling each other. Contacts are usually sent on the primary frequency but may be sent on the secondary frequency if the operator feels it is getting through better and in one instance was sent on both, one transmission immediately following the other.

J. H. JOHNSON

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1943

Comments on Report of Yorktown RI Unit
(Operations - Marcus Aug.-Sept. 1943)

1. Generally an excellent report. However, for information future O-in-C's, all such reports should be signed by and submitted by the O-in-C with list of personnel included.
2. Limitations aboard ship. Each report from Task Force RIU's invariably starts out with an unfavorable report of conditions aboard ship affecting reception, operating conditions, and getting started. Most of this trouble can be remedied despite crowded conditions afloat by arranging well in advance of departure date for reception of the unit. Two weeks advance knowledge of the name of ship and contacting the "right people" at least a week in advance of departure is recommended. The Admiral should be contacted first and depending on conditions a complete written list of material, space, and operating requirements should be given the ship's officers. It is noted that three days were spent in fitting up and equipping the former battle dressing station aboard the Yorktown for service as radio shack.
3. Future equipment for RIU. The recommendation for a small, compact, and portable frequency meter to accompany material sent from Wahiawa is concurred in. Will material officer (GQ) please obtain? However, it is believed that any frequency meter taken aboard must be occasionally checked against the best standard aboard ship. No comment on adequacy of receiving equipment or portable RIP 5's is included in report. Assumed that 3 SX-28 receivers plus ultra high was adequate and that the radio operators continue to prefer the standard RIP 5 to portable type.
4. Operations. The total and presently considered adequate allowance of four operators per RIU is a small number of operators to cover all enemy stations and circuits connected with current operations of the Task Force, plus all possible air striking force channels and all enemy patrol channels to be encountered by Task Force.

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Because of this fact, the coverage of the Truk broadcast between 25 August and the termination of Task Force operations in enemy area is believed to have been a very unwise move. If a main broadcast was to be copied, the Tokyo UTSU would have been preferable. Neither would provide the Task Force Commander with vital information such as that contained on likely enemy air strike channels activated by an actual flight of planes headed for U. S. Task Force. It is noted throughout the report that coverage of vital channels was unnecessarily restricted due to coverage of Truk broadcast. At 1510/2 September, report states "Now discontinue close coverage of 5725/11450 and concentrate on the air frequencies so as to be warned if any one spots us". This was 24 hours after all attacks by Task Force were completed. The small number of operators can provide maximum protection of Task Force only by constant checking of air frequencies and searching for new active channels. There is always a possibility of enemy fleet units seeking out our Task Force and attacking with no immediate reflection on main shore broadcasts (Tokyo, Truk, etc).

5. U.S. Fleet security. It is noted that Task Force was somewhere well past Midway when Ford Island radio on 6390E was heard strength 5 to Motor Whale Boat No.1. This incident will be referred to CINCPAC Security.
6. Aircraft abbreviated calls. It was reported that Marcus Air on 8705 with planes employ a contracted call. Instead of using the complete call 8 HIMI 1, the call HI 1 is used. This may explain some of the confusion in our aircraft call analysis.
7. New enemy frequencies. Several frequencies listed in report are being checked. It is noted no new frequencies were listed below 3933 kcs (m). Since SX-28 receiver does not go below 550 kcs and there may be several advantages in being able to cover the low band, the provision of a low band receiver is being considered.

JAH
T. A. Huckins
(Comdr. USN)

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~~SECRET~~

TF 15

REPORT

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING LIST

G W

GQ W

G1 B

GF W

GT W

GR ED

CIC WJH. - I suggest that
attention of Fleet Security Office be called to fact
that the Task Force Radio Security officers
to have been alleged to be particularly
to commit in excellent way a which states
what was handled by flying into land

[Handwritten signature]

~~SECRET~~

20 Aug - 6 Sept 1943

Contained herein is the report of the R. I. Unit attached to Task Force 15, USS Yorktown (CV10). The report is made up of five sections.

1. Preamble
2. Chronology
3. Miscellaneous
4. Nigori Signals
5. Frequencies

Submitted by:

- E. J. Forrest CRM USN
- J. K. Engen RM 1/C USN
- S. L. Gregory RM 1/C USN
- J. P. Wilder RM 1/C USN

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PREAMBLE

The R. I. unit for duty with Task Force 15 reported aboard the USS Yorktown (CV10) at Fox 10, Ford Island on 20 August 1943.

The unit was assigned a small compartment on the gallery deck that had previously been a battle dressing station. There were no facilities for setting up equipment of any kind. Thus, from 20 August until late afternoon 23 August was spent in fitting up and equipping the compartment for service.

Antennae lead ins were cut through the outboard bulkhead and connections made to ships antennae system. As there were no means of ventilation an exhaust blower and fan were installed but the compartment remained very hot due to presence of "up takes" next to inboard bulkhead. Metalsmiths made and installed operating positions and chart table. It was necessary to put in several power outlets and a telephone was installed. The work in general was hampered by the necessary use of cutting torches and electric welding in the installations.

Although the specialists involved in this work were under heavy pressure and in constant demand elsewhere the spirit of co-operation was very good and is truly appreciated by this unit.

While this work was under way the members of the unit were employed in supervision of the work in the compartment and in procuring supplies and equipment to work with.

SECRET

Preamble. Cont.

It was necessary to borrow equipment from other activities on the ship. A clock was thus obtained from the navigator and a frequency meter from the air-craft radio shop.

In reference to this meter, it is recommended that one similiar to it be obtained and included as standard equipment for R. I. units on task forces. The one in mention is small, compact and portable. It is a type CRR-74028 and is a unit of model LM-13 radio equipment. This is manufactured for the Navy Department, BuShips by the Bendix Radio Corporation.

The meter has a self contained power pack, covers a range from 125 KC to 20000 Kc, and is very accurate.

~~SECRET~~

CHRONOLOGY

All times and dates -9.

24 August 1943

Checked all receivers while in Pearl Harbor, conditions poor and antennae set up not the best but all equipment in working order.

0300 Commenced search watch to check a few frequencies but frequent interruptions by men finishing up odds and ends of work made it necessary to secure and cover our gear.

1400 Work is now quite completed here and the watch is started again. As our objective is to be Marcus Island all his frequencies are checked, by elimination and knowledge of frequencies it is apparent that the only frequencies employed by Marcus at the present time are as follows.

5725J-11450J Shore to Shore and his main frequency. 8705A as his air frequency. 7335A as a D/F frequency. Also as Yokosuka Deffor takes in the Marcus area it is considered advisable to cover 6315A and 6705J to some extent.

Signals this day were fair to poor and little activity was encountered.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

25 August 1943.

Continue coverage of 5725/11450J as the main frequency for Marcus. Also cover 6315A intermittently for Yokosuka Deffor activity.

0300 Set up Truk Nr.1 UTU and set 24 hour watch upon it as it embraces all of the locality we are interested in, One other operator at search position to watch for any frequencies of interest and cover 5725/11450J when it is going.

1236 Ceased to log any more UTU numbers as wasted time and paper, continue however to copy his traffic.

Conditions were generally poor this day.

The bulk of the traffic received today was from the southern areas and concerned fleets and bases there. The traffic concerning Yokosuka, Chichijima, Tenian and some Marcus D/F ranked a poor second.

26 August 1943.

Conditions remain fair to poor for Marcus, Chichijima, Yokosuka frequency and Yokosuka Deffor.

2006 Yokosuka sends Chichijima a service (MUSI) saying: "No. frequency (USE2) not good for communication". Then tells him he is strength five on 5725J and to go ahead without benefit of "Rogers". This other frequency (USE2) is unknown and unheard here.

On evening watch commenced two section watch, two men to a section, eight on and eight off. It was felt necessary by all hands to stand this type of watch in order to cover

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

26 August 1943, Cont.

the frequencies we are interested in plus the UTU,

The bulk of the traffic received today concerns the southern areas and traffic addressed to various sectors of intelligence.

27 August 1943.

Truk UTU with little traffic in the early morning hours. The coverage of 5735/11450J is as nearly constant as conditions permit. Operators becoming familiar with style of operators at Chichijima, Yokosuka and Marcus and with the types of traffic and headings employed. We are able to identify most addressees shortly after change of calls. The stability of the signals on these frequencies is generally poor.

Air frequencies checked but little activity is found. Signs of air activity appear on UTU but it is all well south and we are unable to hear frequencies involved.

Received A"KA. TII5. CMDR. yokosuka sea defense force.

A"KA.HOYUYO. Yokosuka air detachment at Marcus.

It would seem from this last A"KA that Marcus air has been strengthened by a Yokosuka detachment.

6315A and 6705J (Yokosuka Deffor and Yokosuka to ships) were covered intermittently.

No second kana conversions were received for this day. Traffic concerning the southern area continues to be outstanding with Yokosuka Navdist, and air traffic second.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

28 August 1943.

As we are now well past Midway Island signals in the north and the Empire are steadily improving. 5725/11450J are good most of the time. 6315A varies from fair to good depending on the position of the units.

0012 Marcus tells Yokosuka that due to power circumstance he will be unable to transmit until 0300 but for Yokosuka to go ahead each transmission twice.

0100 Marcus up again to say he had no traffic and secured.

0130 Ominato using the Call SEHE was heard calling CQ on 6695J.

0144 Ford Island Radio to Motor Whale Boat NR.1 was heard on 6390E strength five. If we can hear this frequency at this distance then so can the Jap. We had no time to check this further but it may be of interest.

0317 Marcus on the air again (5725J) and resumes operations.

Air Group 902 at Truk was heard on 9085J but no traffic was received here.

1000 Yokosuka asks Chichijima if he can relay to S.C. 42, there was no reply to this.

Marcus Air, using a service call, was heard on 8705A to planes. On this frequency it is found that in call ups, exchange of signal strength etc. the planes use a kana numeral call made up of the first kana and last numeral of their regular call. IE. SHIMI1 breaks to HI1.

Bulk of traffic today concerned Yokosuka Navdist, Deffor and units, souther area fallen off.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

29 August 1943.

Search for other Marcus Frequencies continues. Truk UTU discloses no especial activity. Wake frequencies were well checked, signals were good but no activity.

0129 Chichjima informs Yokosuka that he cannot relay to SC NR.42 (Per request of 1000 the 28th)

Station (NEE6) associated in traffic with Yokosuka was heard to work planes on 8915J.

The main frequencies covered are as follows: 5725/11450J, 6315A, 8705A, 7120J and 8725J.

Marcus working planes on 8705A, traffic routine and the signals good, a total of six planes were heard.

Most of the traffic received today emanated from the south and dealt with Base Forces, 8th Fleet and Escort units. Yokosuka Deffor units ranked next with Yokosuka and the 4th Fleet appearing together in a few. Traffic to intelligence addressees has dropped off somewhat in past few days.

30 August 1943.

S still closely guarding 5725/11450J, 6315A and air frequencies to determine if there is any indication that we are or will be spotted. Ultra high frequencies were checked from time to time with negative results.

Marcus, Yokosuka Air, Chichijima Air and planes working on 8705A. Plane call working all these was SEKETO10 whereas only Marcus worked regular type plane calls.

0817 On 8705A the plane SEKETO10 sent signal, TERA TERA. The meaning of this is "Something of the enemy is seen".

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

30 August 1943, Cont.

However, as no enlargement on this was sent it is assumed that TERA has another meaning which we do not know of.

Air base Yokosuka heard working plane and Chinkai Comm. Unit on 9135J. Chinkai and Yokosuka Air with good signals but plane was unheard.

Supposed enemy submarines are reported in this vicinity so search was made for NARAE or strong signals with no results. If there were subs about no transmissions were made. Nothing appears in traffic or on UTU to indicate a contact has been made with us.

Main body of traffic continues to come from the south and little from the north except concerning Yokosuka and that area and some air and weather traffic.

31 August 1943.

Continuing what looks like a vain search for additional Marcus frequencies as he has not been heard on other than 5725/11450J, 7335A and 8705A.

5735/11450J, 6315A, 8705A covered very closely. Some of the planes on 8705A had strong signals but there is no evidence of their seeing us. Marcus planes on 8705A were unheard from between 1000 to 1330, it is possible that they returned to base and then went out again on afternoon patrol.

1535 Two unidentified three kana calls heard on 7116M, one sounded like plane, one message received. This circuit was up again only to secure at 1606.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

31 August 1943, Cont.

10890 has been up several times but most of the traffic is weather and planes and bases appear to be in the Empire.

Keep checking ultra high frequencies and checked the low frequencies from 38kc to 600kc but with no results.

2400 At this time we can safely say that, as yet, we are not spotted and Marcus Island is within two hundred miles,

Traffic volume continues to center in the south with some from the Yokosuka area and the Hi North.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

1 September 1943 .

- 0000 TRUK UTU changes to RIMI numbers and uses NARAE as collective call.
- 0005 Operator sitting on 5725J very, very closely, all is normal.
- 0020 Marcus says A"NO and secures. Turns in ?
- 0032 Find Saipan, Truk, Rabauk, Palao, Kwajelein on 3975M, this a new circuit for 5180.
- 0200 (Our first five planes takeoff for raid on Marcus)
- 0230 6315A sending all old traffic, no evidence of any excitement. The same conditions exist all over the band.
- 0303 Marcus asks Yokosuka U"KA. "Have you had any traffic for me since I shut down at 0134? (It looks like he's been asleep)

Now Chichijima, Yokosuka and Marcus back in the swing with usual traffic and exchange of signals.

- 0330 Marcus and the rest just as normal, no indication of contact. (Our planes must be nearly on top of him).

A most thorough search has been made for other frequencies Marcus might use but none were heard.

- 0340 Marcus now originates two messages in an urgent operational code, precedence KOFU but changes this to SARO. (Some degree of KIN)

0347 First message received here. This one states he is under attack by bombers.

- 0358 Second message received here. Says in effect, "Sixtype bombers are raiding.

CHRONOLOGY

~~SECRET~~

1 September 1943, Cont.

Chichijima and Yokosuka do not realize what is afoot as no HIIHI or other contact signal was sent, they go ahead with routine traffic, don't pay too much attention to Marcus.

0402 Marcus finally manages to get a "Roger" from Chichijima for traffic sent at 0347 and 0358.

All other frequencies are as normal.

0459 Yokosuka tells Chichijima to set up (FU2) (114JC). They are attempting to clear unnecessary traffic from 5725J.

0503 Yokosuka (NAR03) heard working Marcus (EE8) on 8705A

0512 Marcus changes the precedence indicator of his Nrs.010340 to (ETE), this could be KIN NIKA.

0546 First Marcus traffic appears on the Truk broadcast.

0548 Marcus tried to get Chichijima and Yokosuka's attention for some time as he has KIN traffic but they do not hear him or won't stop transmitting long enough to let him be heard. Marcus is unheard again on 5725J.

0553 Chichijima alludes to (YOTE 1) and Yokosuka to (FU2). It seems possible that they have different indicators for the same frequency (114 JC),

Yokosuka and Chichijima continue to work on 5725J and to call Marcus intermittently with no results.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

1 September 1943, Cont.

0557 On 6115J heard (?) tell plane to shift to (TAHI725) this either 7110J or 7120J.

0600 Picked up 7120J but very little activity there and and nothing concerning us.

0605 8125J was heard but planes were too weak to be in a vicinity that would interest us.

Other air frequencies were checked with negative results.

0630 Yokosuka calls Chichijima and Marcus telling them to shift to (RI 15) (11450J).

0705 Marcus up with traffic on 11450J to Chichijima and Yokosuka and sends four more KIN, operator is very nervous and it reacts in his operating.

0828 Chichijima tells Yokosuka that he is now transmitting on (FU12). Search made for this frequency.

0852 Find Chichijima working Yokosuka on 8480M (FU12 ?). Yokosuka claims to have been on this frequency since 0700 but unheard by us and apparently unheard by Chichijima.

0930 Much talk on 11450J between Chichijima and Yokosuka about (FU12).

A few messages to Marcus from Chichijima and from Yokosuka.

1042 Marcus out of communication with both, signal reports to him had been getting lower and lower.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

1 September 1943, Cont.

- 1116 Marcus in again and sends two, time of origins at 011105 and 011107.
- 1146 Received here.
- 1148 Marcus transmitter is now out.
- 1349 Marcus again on air but too weak and is off the frequency. The transmitter does not sound the same but too weak to get characteristic of it, unheard after this.
- 1620 Air base Yokosuka is heard working a plane on 8705A. Yokosuka has traffic for Marcus on 11450J and broadcasts it as he cannot hear Marcus.
- 1743 Yokosuka tells Marcus and Chichijima to shift to 5725J at 1800.
- 1816 Marcus heard on 5725J working Yokosuka and Chichijima.
- At about this time T F 15 Starts return trip to our base.
- 2114 Yokosuka tells Chichijima to make V's on (FULL) and we search for it .
- 2202 Chichijima now calling Yokosuka on 4228M and tries to work him with no results. This probably is (FULL).
- 2219 Marcus now up and heard strength two to three on 5725J. His transmitter is definitely not his usual one and from the characteristics of it we feel it is a MARU type job and may be an emergency transmitter or one taken from the AO that our planes strafed on the way in to Marcus.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

1 September 1943, Cont.

Traffic for this day included the usual run of southern activity but as most of our attention was centered on Marcus, Chichijima and Yokosuka area a great deal of traffic was received from there.

It is interesting to note that Marcus originated traffic contained very few service calls but mostly three kana, these were for action of Yokosuka C of S and for the information of Yokosuka Deffor, Combined Fleet, Fifth Fleet, Eleventh Air, Twelfth Air, Yokosuka Air and to Chichijima. Marcus put out numerous four kana messages during the day.

REMARKS

At no time was Marcus heard to mention setting up another frequency but the 5725/1145 OJ circuit was kept clear for him by Yokosuka and Chichijima setting up other frequencies to clear their traffic to each other on.

It is our firm conviction that no warning of the approach of this task force was given by enemy plane, ship (surface or submarine) or radar and further that the Marcus operator was asleep from 0134 to 0303. It has been reported to us that our planes met and strafed an A0 near Marcus but it got off no warning.

September the first was a long day for all hands in this unit. Between covering necessary and probable frequencies and long "GQ'S" no sleep was possible for 24 hours.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

2 September 1943

Continue close coverage of 5725/11450J until plane frequencies are up.

0100 Chichijima working Yokosuka on 4228M. Believe this to be the night frequency for 8040M and to be represented by the frequency indicators (FULL) for Chichijima and by (YOTEL) for Yokosuka.

Marcus is unreadable in the morning hours.

Keep check on 6705J, 6315A to see if any word goes out about this force.

0522 Marcus readable at this time, he appears to have but one transmitter and is chary of shifting it.

Yokosuka Air, Chichijima Air, Marcus (Using his three kana call) and planes heard on 8705A working back and forth. Planes SEKET01, 2 and 8 are only ones heard.

1000 Alternate between 8705A and 11450J where Yokosuka is broadcasting traffic to Marcus, it is apparent that he has difficulty hearing Marcus also.

1510 Now discontinue close coverage of the 5725/11450J circuit and concentrate on the air frequencies so as to be warned if any one spots us.

1544 Heard Truk and Maru boats working on 8600M, the signals are good but interference was very high.

Yokosuka Air heard on 8915J working Hi North Air, nothing unusual occurred here.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

2 September 1943, Cont.

Empire Air and planes on 9390J but not concern us.

8825J was heard but very little activity.

Sixth Fleet to submarines found going on 7173.9M

believe this to be Ex 7280J.

2400 No indications of any sort were found that we are being trailed or have been spotted. Apparently our "get-away" will be as secure as the approach was.

Traffic for this day still showed much for Yokosuka area, to offices Deffor and air units. Most of the rest of traffic was from the south.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

3 September 1943.

As we are now underway for Oahu and our course brings us within seven hundred miles of Wake much attention is being given to Wake Air, local and Maru frequencies. Continue to cover 5725/11450J at intervals.

0358 Yokosuka heard on 7112M making V's but the transmitter does not sound like any type he has used previously. This sounds more like Marcus emergency job than any other, no one was called and no traffic was sent.

Yokosuka Air, Chichijima Air, Marcus and one plane were heard on 8705A. Marcus signal strong and transmitter is the same used on 5725/11450J.

0644 Four planes and base were heard on 7120J. The planes signals were good but no indication was given that they were in our vicinity.

Wakes local and Maru frequencies were checked but little activity was noted. No high precedence traffic. Some frequencies checked were: 6115J, 4275A, 6655A, 7300A, 8600J, 4380 and 3800A.

Buin, Rabaul, Lae and Wewak were found working on 12000M and 6000J as day and night frequencies. 6000J was previously used by Rabaul.

This has been a very quiet day as far as activity on the circuits goes, it is believed that Marcus requested a search be made for us but if so it hasn't neared us yet.

Traffic was back to normal today with most concerning the southern areas. Yokosuka and area had little.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

4 September 1943.

Continue coverage of air and Wake frequencies and search all bands for local activity.

On 8705A heard Marcus to three planes and believe these were flown in to give him some air support as all his own planes were destroyed during the raid. Marcus is still using emergency transmitter and continues the use of three kana call on this circuit.

Base and plane heard on 7120J but no special activity was noted.

1700 At this time secured steady search watch and just leave one man on Truk broadcast to note how traffic is going. Air frequencies are still checked intermittently but we are well out of Wakes search area by now.

5 September 1943.

No indication is received from the broadcast or from air frequencies that there is a search for us or that anything special is brewing.

0700 Secured search at this time, letting Truk BC run through the day.

Traffic today was mostly of NARAE origin pertaining to various southern areas. Base Force Seven at Lae figured as good second with traffic to SoEast Area Fleet,. Fourth Fleet showed either as information or action addressee in a lot of traffic.

CHRONOLOGY

~~SECRET~~

6 September 1943.

1215 Nothing unusual or affecting this Task Force was found anywhere. All watches secured at this time. VA.

What traffic that was copied today showed that intelligence addressees are very prominent, some traffic originated by NARAE and going to Combined Fleet and other Fleets.

The succeeding days spent aboard the USS Yorktown were spent in catching up on paper work, checking traffic and logs and preparing reports. It was impossible to do any of this while the watch schedule was in effect.

SECRET

MISCELLANEOUS

The following characteristics and habits peculiar to the Marcus Island Communication Unit are passed on for whatever value they may have.

Marcus, Yokosuka, Chichijima shore to shore circuit.

On the frequencies of 5725J - 11450J it is noted that Marcus sends out his weather traffic at every hour except at 0100 and 0200. After his 0000 weather is cleared he secures (A"NO) and tells Yokosuka and Chichijima that if they have any traffic for him between that time and 0300 that they broadcast to him repeating it all twice. This procedure held true to form even the morning of the attack and is another good indication that the task force was not expected. His standard traffic is sent at any time other than the hours mentioned above. His D/F traffic is sent either immediately before or immediately after mid-night.

Marcus Air Base to planes.

Constant coverage of this frequency, 8705A, revealed the following: Marcus when calling planes and the planes in answering him used cut calls except when they had traffic for each other. In that circumstance the full calls were used. Marcus never used his call, which was a service call and changed each day, except when he had traffic for planes. Due to these characteristics it was a simple matter to identify Marcus each day.

074

~~SECRET~~

NIGORI SIGNALS

This is the revision or correction
of a few Nigori signals noted on 5725/11450J,

A"SE "Verify and repeat" of, "Encoding
of your NR _____, is incorrect."

U"KA "Have you had any traffic for me
since (I shut down at) 0230 ?"

Note this signal does not always
require the use of time since the station was
last worked.

~~SECRET~~

NEW FREQUENCIES

Aug.

8/25/43.

82 76M.

Two kana call (SUSO) using International "Q" Signals.

no
MX plus J = JMX = Trunk Radio

8/28/43.

5460M.

Soerabaya to Vessels(?). Soerabaya was broadcasting all traffic here.

5618M.

Empire air stations.

Kisaratsu air.

Sakata air.

Others unidentified.

6660M.

Manila WX. Station to unidentified 3 kana call . Manila also broadcasting long type WX. here.

8828M.

Air Circuit.(Drill)

Base.

Planes.

8877M.

Air Circuit.(Drill)

Base.

Planes.

(P.2)

NEW FREQUENCIES
CONT.

~~SECRET~~

7668M.

Air Circuit.

Ominato Air.

Kurlies Air.

Planes.

8/30/43.

5296M.

Air Circuit.

Air station northern Empire.

Plane.

6145M.

WX. Circuit.

Matsuwa Wx. station

Unidentified 3 kana call.

6313M.

Drill Circuit (?)

Single call, controls -6345M-

6345M.

Drill Circuit (?)

Single kana calls

Unidentified.

6642M.

Drill

Single kana calls.

(P.3)

NEW FREQUENCIES
CONT.

~~SECRET~~

8712M.

Drill Circuit.

Planes.

Base.

8/31/43.

7116M.

Northern Circuit. (?)

3 kana calls - Unidentified.

-Sept.-

9/1/43.

3933M.

(Orange CKT ?)

Letter numeral Letter calls and
the use of International "Q" Sigs
were noted in use here.

3975M.
(Nite)

Mandate Circuit.

This was previously 5180J,.

11929M.
(Day)

Mandate Circuit.

This was previously 10360A.

4075M.
(Nite)

High North Circuit.

This was previously 4015J.

8146M.
(Day)

High North Circuit.

This was previously 8030J.

078

(P.4)

NEW FREQUENCIES
CONT,

SECRET.

4228M.
(Nite)

Overload Circuit.

Yokosuka Radio. (FU1P)

Chichijima Radio.

8480M.
(Day)

Overload Circuit.

Yokosuka Radio. (FU12)

Chichijima Radio.

4490M.

Takao Rdo.

Singapore Rdo.

Soerabaya Rdo.

7191M.

Drill Circuit (?)

Kana Numeral call

14382M.

Drill Circuit (?)

Harmonic of the above frequency

(7191M)

8208M.

Drill Circuit.

Base .

Planes.

8480M.

Maru Freq. (?)

Using 2 kana call and gng to 4 kana.

079

(P.5)

NEW FREQUENCIES
CONT.

~~SECRET~~

9/2/43.

7173M
(Nite)

Submarine Broadcast .

6th. Fleet to Subs.

This was previously 7280J.

14326M.
(Day)

Submarine Broadcast.

6th. Fleet to Subs.

This was previously 14560J.

7174M.

Yokosuka Radio, besting to
collective call.

Unidentified 3 kana calls.

7785M.

Southern Frequency.

Truk Radio to Soerabaya and
Rabaul Radio.

8420M.

Drill Circuit (?)

Unidentified kana numeral and
2 kana numeral calls.

(P.6)

NEW FREQUENCIES
CONT.

~~SECRET~~

8600M.

Maru to Shore Circuit.

Truk Radio to Marus.

Marus To Truk Radio.

4769M.

D/F Circuit (?)

Unidentified 2 kana numeral
calls. A couple of these calls
appeared in D/F tfc. on this day.

4945M.

Rabaul Broadcast.

Rabaul Radio to All Southern
Areas.

This was previously 4990J.

9/3/43.

7112M.

Yokosuka Radio to (?).

6000M (?)
6000J (?)
(Nite)

Solomons-New Guinea Circuit.

Rabaul Radio.

Buin Radio.

Wewak Radio.

Lae Radio.

Note the frequency 6000J. was once
used by Rabaul some time ago, it is
possible this is the same thing.

(P.7)

NEW FREQUENCIES
CONT.

~~SECRET~~

12000M.
(Day)

Solomons-New Guinea Circuit.

Rabaul Radio.

Buin Radio.

Wewak Radio.

Lae Radio.

This ties in with 6000M as the
nite frequency.

6653M.

Drill Circuit.

Unidentified single kana calls.

6120M.

WX. Circuit.

Ominato Radio.

Shikotan Wx. Station.

9/4/43.

17990E.

Orange Circuit (?)

FZQ3 TO JAR...

Report on the activities of the Task Force
RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT aboard the U.S.S.
PRINCETON from August 23 to September 23.

1943

PART I GENERAL REMARKS
PART II CHRONOLOGY
PART III FREQUENCIES

Submitted by

William W. Burt

Ensign, USNR

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Z-6 083

27 September 1943

I - GENERAL REMARKS

Most of the subjects which could be covered here have been thoroughly rehashed by other Task Force RI unit reports and by subsequent discussions. -The following remarks are therefore limited to a recapitulation of the more important subjects.

It is considered that the general operation of the unit was satisfactory. It was unfortunate that there was so little time to collect material before leaving and it would have been very helpful to have had a few days to do research. Ordinarily it would be even more important to have three or four days prior to leaving to set up the equipment aboard ship. In our case we were fortunate in getting two extra days due to a change in sailing date. The installation of clocks, electric fans, desks, etc., makes it necessary to interrupt work and secure for several hours. Also, the ships officers are not at all happy at having to take on extra work just at the worst time, namely when the ship is about to sail. All equipment, including such things as paper and pencils, should be taken along. Endless time is wasted on obtaining such things from the ship. Little trouble with frequency calibration was experienced but it would be very helpful to have a portable frequency calibrator.

The subject of information contained in JUSITs has been pretty well covered but the two outstanding objections seem to be the sending of Horomushiro weather in O.P.'s, which caused a very much overworked staff communication officer to get up to break them several times a night for no reason at all, and the lack of a daily general RADIO INTELLIGENCE summary. An RI unit working in a limited area soon gets out of touch with the general picture. CINPAC summaries do not give the information from the same viewpoint as an RI summary would. The question of sending weather traffic operational priority may be impossible to solve but it is thought that some solution could be worked out for sending a daily summary without too much difficulty. As a suggestion, it might replace idents which are of no use to the RI unit at sea at that time. These would be idents with no possible connection with that area and idents in lists which will not be in use until after

I - GENERAL REMARKS (continued)

unit has returned. Such information as the time airplane search reports were made each day by the major bases was very helpful in confirming the belief that there were no night searches in this area.

It is felt that the main usefulness of a shipboard RI unit is in its ability to give the Task Force Commander accurate, up-to-the-minute information on plane movements. Much of this information cannot be obtained by radio receivers more than a few hundred miles from the area of operations. Relative signal strength of planes and bases was very useful in locating search planes. Some frequencies, which operators stated were lost at Wahiawa for an hour or so at the evening and morning frequency shifts, can be received continuously. After a few days of working in the Baker area the operators obtained much of their information from recognition of enemy operators and transmitters. Many idents, both Baker and Charlie calls, were obtained only by this familiarity of the operators. Since all Japanese activities in this operation were defensive it is difficult to make a good appraisal of the usefulness of the RI unit to the Admiral but from the fact that all defensive movements such as searches, requests for more planes and plane movements to the area concerned were reported to him as definite information before such information was received from CINCPAC, the ship's patrol, or by Radar, it may be assumed that any offensive measures taken by the Japs would also have been detected early enough to have been of much value.

2 - CHRONOLOGY

Pearl to Baker Island - August 23 to August 30.

Continuous coverage began the day after leaving Pearl, August 26. All frequencies known to be used in this area were studied and continual searches were carried out. Circuits were studied from a research point of view rather than for the purpose of picking up all traffic on each frequency. The call lists for this period had not been used since Baker six was in effect so idents were few and they were especially poor for this area, most calls being identified "Marshalls Air Base". This made identification of Charlie calls very difficult so that throughout this period we were doubtful as to which bases were working planes. 8845 gave a lot of trouble at this time as we were not sure that it was used in the Marshalls-Gilberts area. There was also considerable question in the operators' minds about 6260 and they seemed to think at first that it was being used for deception. Later developments made the use of this frequency much clearer, however. The Truk UTU was not covered during this period as we were not in an area where contact was likely. After the task force arrived off Baker it was found sufficient to use the UTU only to check on the importance of despatches originated by planes or bases. At other times if it was felt necessary to listen to the UTU the loud speaker was turned on and one of the search operators would take down traffic when "?MI" or "break" was sent. In this way no time was wasted and nothing was missed.

Period during which Carrier Force
covered operations on Baker -
August 31 to September 15.

During this period our main job was to contact search planes operating between the Gilberts and Baker. During these two weeks the operators became thoroughly familiar with all frequencies in the Marshalls-Gilberts area. The conclusion was reached that there were no night searches anywhere in this area. All planes heard at night were obviously en route from one base to another. Information on the Gilbert Island searches was pretty good but the previous overestimation of the number of planes in this area caused considerable doubt in our minds for some time as to whether we were picking up all planes carrying out searches.

One cause of unnecessary confusion was the lack of information on contacts of our Canton and Funafuti planes with Jap patrol planes. Information received on such contacts was usually incomplete as to type of plane, what happened at contact, and was always a couple of days late.

It should be mentioned here that the last despatch received was that from Marcus, which described in detail our September 1 raid on that island. If the small plane code (3 kana code) were available it would prove of extreme value as it has almost entirely superceded plain language for plane reports and contacts.

During this period three of Makin's patrol bombers (Emilys) were shot down by a plane from our carrier. The first, on September 1, was not keeping in contact with the base at time of search and had no time to send out a warning when our plane attacked it. It was not called by the base until four hours later. The second plane, shot down on September 4, was not heard until he sent "HI HI HI" on contact. This was unheard by base which didn't call him until five hours later. Both planes were called on 8305 and 8845. Bases then began to ask all air bases on 8845, including Truk, if they had heard the plane.

During the next few days the importance of the Solomons operations probably prevented any extra attention being paid to this area. The only planes contacted besides those from Makin were the three to six planes which worked Marshalls bases on 6260. No Makin plane was heard on September 6 and traffic between Makin and Mille indicated that one or more planes were being sent down as replacements. When the Makin search plane came up again on September 7, and from then as long as we were in the area, contact between plane and base was made every half hour by sending "dits".

On September 8 the third Emily was shot down. She sent a short contact message but it did not appear on the UTU and seemed to be too garbled for stations to pick up as they asked each other for it and all stations said they had not received it.

During this period there was little other activity aside from transportation in the Marshalls-Gilberts area and the loss of three Emilys did not evoke much response.

It is considered very peculiar that no plane was sent straight out to make a reconnaissance of Baker and Howland during the following few weeks.

Charlie calls drilled planes in Marshalls on 8725 and 9420 during this period using the prefix "TIYA". This was interrupted by "JITSU" or "TIYA MATE" whenever an authentic despatch was sent. The nigori kana numeral calls appearing on 6260 were continually compromised by bases when they sent the full numeral kana kana numeral call by mistake.

Period from rendezvous with Lexington
until return to Pearl.

Traffic analysis was made much easier during this period as the call lists had been used twice before and only second kana were being converted. This made it possible to identify almost all Charlie calls by the second day they were used.

The approach to Tarawa produced no change in traffic and although the Makin's patrol plane was heard every day, it did not contact our force.

In spite of warnings from Cincpac that major fleet units might be encountered in the area of operations and other rather ominous suggestions as to what might happen, there was nothing to indicate any condition of alertness on the part of the enemy. Plane searches did not increase and on one circuit (6260 Kcs) less planes than usual were worked. The principal danger was a night attack by torpedo planes from Taroa and this was considered very unlikely unless the carrier force was first located by search planes.

The part of the RI unit in the Tarawa raid consisted mainly of reporting the events as they occurred.

The army struck first on Tarawa at 2059 on September 18 (-9 time). Previous to this HIKESU, probably a lookout of one of the southernmost Gilberts, had reported "Enemy planes headed north." Subsequently Nauru was hit by the Army. The Navy carried out five strikes between 0335, when the first planes took off, and 1126, when the last planes landed. Delayed action bombs were dropped to go off as late as 2400 on September 19 so that the field could not be used until carriers were out of the danger zone. Somewhere between 0500 and 0600 planes working Taroa started south. From then on it seemed apparent that the enemy did

not know from which direction we had come. They may have assumed that the Navy had struck Nauru since the Army's attack was at night when they couldn't distinguish plane types very well. This is also indicated by the fact that most of the search planes sent south by Tarawa searched in the triangle between Tarawa, Nauru and Imieji. As far as we could judge there were only two planes east of Tarawa, both of which we shot down. Both were picked up with land signal strength before being contacted by our planes or by Radar.

No ultra high frequency was observed to be in use at this or any other time. We could pick up our own planes but not the enemy's. It is also doubted that search planes on offensive missions can make use of ultra-high frequencies due to the limited distance they carry. The use is probably limited to carriers working planes and bases directing fighters if the enemy does use it at all.

It may be useful to note here the inefficiencies of the Jap communication system in this area. Our operators continually expressed their contempt for the enemy operators and of the enemy operating technique. There were many examples of this. Operators frequently balled up the whole works by insisting on getting a low precedence message through when someone else had a contact to report. They often failed to get a message which was repeated three or four times, although our operators received it with no difficulty at all. It was a common practice to break out with "KIN" and then encode it the usual way as soon as other stations took notice.

From the time of the first strike on, practically no plain language was sent. As far as is known Tarawa didn't even send "KUHA" or "HIHIHI" when the Navy planes first hit her. The alarm was undoubtedly included in one of the four kana messages that she sent continuously after the Army bombing at 2059.

From 1730 to 0045 on September 19 - 20 Mille and Tarawa kept asking each other if the other could hear the following planes: 5 SO Ø, 7 NOKI, 7 NKE, 1KUKI and 1 KUKI 1. They were on 5705. None of the planes was contacted and neither station answered the "KAN?" of the other station. This looks very much like deception.

The last significant contact was a "HIHIHI" from Tarawa at 0820 on September 20. This was undoubtedly the Army photo-reconnaissance plane from Funafuti or Nanomea.

The RI unit was secured after leaving the danger zone, partly because the RI at Pearl could cover anything we could from that time on, but mainly because the operators needed a rest after almost three weeks of hard work and very little sleep. Two operators were on practically continuously and for long periods all four were busy. It would be impossible to compliment highly enough the technical ability and personal interest in their work of these four men.

September 26, 1943

3 - MARSHALLS-GILBERTS FREQUENCIES

The following frequencies are those studied by the Tarawa Task Force RI unit from August 23 to September 23, 1943. Comments are made where the use of the frequency differs from those listed in the frequency tables.

4275A - Has been brought back into use. Equivalent of 6115 and 8550, one of these being used as day frequency. Japs seemed confused themselves as to which one to use.

4295E - Used by Air Bases at Koepang and Tanimbar. Not listed in frequency table and was picked up when searching.

5110E - Eastern Air Force 24 hour frequency. Recently moved from 4275/6115. All Marshalls-Gilberts air bases three kana calls appear on it.

5610E - Marcus Communication Unit (NORUYA) worked unident RIHEWE on this.

5705E - This was first noticed September 19. Same calls are used as on 7120J. They may have shifted 5720 to this. It was checked very carefully and operators were sure that it was not 5720.

5720/8725J - Used by all Marshalls-Gilberts land bases planes and bases. Charlie calls drilled planes on this circuit using TIYA as drill indicator. This was interrupted by JITSU when authentic traffic was sent. This is a secondary circuit to 7120 but aside from the fact that it is used often for drilling it is identical. Only land based planes seem to use it.

5780-5E - (This may be the same as 5790M.) Used by Tarawa (KENOME) and the following three units: HIKESU, HO-1, and HO-2. HIKESU must be Arorai as he reported "planes headed north" one hour and fifty minutes before the Army strike on Tarawa. HO-2 sent a HIHIHI when one of our planes was making a reconnaissance of Apamama so must be a lookout on that island. It is a 24 hour frequency and was not observed to be in use anywhere else.

6115J/8305J and 6845/8845J - These are dual circuits in the Marshalls-Gilberts. 8845J is used by entire Eleventh Air Fleet; Air Flots, air bases and planes, especially when enemy contact is made. The search planes sent toward Baker from Makin used 8305J and 8845J alternately but immediately jumped to 8845 when contact was made if the plane happened to be on the 8305. Bases also called missing planes on 8845. It may be useful to note that planes and bases in the Gilberts started keeping contact with each other by just sending "dits" on the half hour on 8305 after three of Makin's Emilys had been shot down.

6260J - 24 hour frequency. Used by all Marshalls-Gilberts Air Bases using Charlie calls, also by Tarawa using Baker two kana numeral call. Bases work each other and planes. The latter are called by their numeral kana kana numeral calls and also by nigori kana numeral calls. The latter were compromised as abbreviations of the former. This is the commonest air frequency in this area. Tarawa, Makin, Taroa, Wotje, Imieji and Ruotto were identified on this circuit. From 3 to 6 planes were up on this frequency every day.

7120J - Used by air bases in Marshalls and patrol bombers. Alternate of 5720/8725J but is more important.

8825J - Unident Charlie call NTI-3 (8/26) called plane on this frequency.

8915J - Not used in this area during this period. (Kwajalein and Imieji are listed as using it.)

9420J - Same as 5720/8725J but only used by Taroa Air Base and planes.

Following do not differ in use from frequency table and are only added for purpose of reviewing all frequencies in this area.

3800 - 24 hour frequency. Used by Kwajalein to and from WX stations in Marshalls Islands, including Kusaie and Eniwetok. This is the only communication channel of the smaller and less important islands.

3860E/9770J - Tarawa // Truk // Kwajalein.

3945A/7890A - Kwajalein, Wake, Jaluit and Nauru. This is primarily the Eastern D/F net frequency but some regular traffic is handled. Jaluit weather is always sent over this circuit.

3990 - 24 hour frequency. Used by Ruotto Air Base and Kwajalein.

4300J/8600J - Used by Kwajalein and all Gilberts bases and Marus.

4380J/7300A - Used by Kwajalein and other Marshalls Islands bases (including Wake, Eniwetok and Kusaie) and Marus. Also used by Guard Division units in this area.

4497J/8995J/17990J - Truk UTU.

5047J/10095J/15142J - Kwajalein UTU. Has become important since Tarawa raid.

7300A - Kwajalein to Marshalls Defense Force, Marus, Picket Boats. Taroa, Mille and Wake also use it.

NOTE on Marus:

Marus approaching or leaving Marshalls use 4300/8600 until actually entering Marshalls then shift to 4380/7300 and continue working Kwajalein. When a Maru goes to one of the bases other than Kwajalein the local base or guard division becomes responsible for his communications. By watching these frequencies tabs can be kept on all Marus in this vicinity.

~~SECRET~~

REPORT OF RIU ABOARD USS ESSEX (CV9) TF14
28 Sept. - 11 Oct. 1943

The RIU was given the old Air Office, which is in a convenient place on this type ship. No work had been done toward making a radio receiving room out of it. Ships company men were standing by to fix it up as desired and their cooperation was fully appreciated by this unit.

Four receivers were installed. (3 sx-28's 1 RBK). Coaxial leadins were used. Believe this cut down the usual shipboard interference a good deal as very little was noticed throughout the trip. Installation of all equipment required 2½ days and watch was not started until evening of third day aboard.

Suggest that if possible the place for the RIU be set up prior to the units going aboard. This being a short trip, we should have been operating as soon as the ship got underway. In addition since the use of a frequency meter was forbidden when more than two days out from Pearl Harbor, not much time was available for checking receivers. This work should be done if possible on first and second days on all frequencies likely to be used.

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~~SECRET~~

PERSONNEL

Ens. C. A. Sims, OinC.

Gramblin, S.E., CRM(AA)

Stewart, A.D., Rmlc

Brinkhoff, A.G., Rm2c

Rice, P.E., Rra2c

Wake Is. Raid - Oct. '43

1 October

- 1330 Set watch on Truk broadcast.
1530 Set up search watch. Wake frequencies checked.

Plane activity from solomons area was very high. Numerous planes up and Truk rebroadcast many urgent operational and contacts. Addressees included AG938, Airflots 25 & 26, Buin #1 Base Force and 11th Air. Concealed originator and tactical calls were also seen sending urgent traffic. One nip plane mentions dropping flares. The picture may not be complete because only traffic on Truk broadcast is available but indications suggest contact between our surface ^{forces} and/or planes with similar Jap units.

Chihaya, Hakazaki, Shiganoura Marus and two unidentified Marus indicated possibly in convoy enroute Marshalls area.

#8 Mikage Maru in Empire area.

Suma Maru near Truk

Gokoku Maru (HIAME) has made or will make trip between Sasebo and Truk. Probably from Sasebo to Truk.

Plane flight from Yokosuka via Tenian and Truk to Rabaul indicated.

If idents are good DD Fuyo (MESI9) last shown in S.W. Area addressed Guard Div. 62 at Mille(KUMI5) indicating movement to this area. Inclusion of Escort Unit #4 (TERUTU) and Sasebo CofS(YUYA7) tend to bear out this indication

2 October

0400-0600 Closed down while telephone was being installed.

2226 DD in Surface Escort 2 (URUI) heard calling Truk on 4292J. No traffic sent.

An arrival report from Eniwetok action Mille, Truk airbase #101, info. 4th fleet and Airflot 22, and a second message from Eniwetok to Mille requesting weather reports from 0100 to 0400 on the 2nd, indicates plane flight from Truk to Mille via Eniwetok. Probably these are the 9 replacement planes for Airgroup 755 mentioned yesterday.

Wake very inactive, a few weather reports on 4275a being only traffic noted.

3 October

0126 Received A"KA sent to Chichijima by Yokosuka (UR01) ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ . No confirmation here but probably should be for 2 Oct. (Baker list 32)

0506 7120J up but due to poor signals it was dropped at 0553.

1504 Guard Div. 61 at Wake (TOTINI) was picked up on 6655A. Heard calling MITINA (Unid.) and H04. Up on each hour afterwards also calling H01, H03, H05 until 1800 sked. Not heard after that.

2013 Received A"KA sent to Guard Div. 16 from #2 Ch. Flt. (TAOMI)

~~SECRET~~

3 October Cont..

Wake sends weather at 0100, 0300, and 0600 to Flt 4, Airflot 22, ROSU7 (Unidentified) and Taroa Airbase. This could possibly mean planes are expected at Wake, (perhaps from Taroa). At 032330 Wake (TASU2) sends a five numeral short message to ISU6 (Unidentified). This could be a plane arrival report. At 1327 Imieji Airbase (NEU3) sends a 5 numeral to ISU6 (Unidentified).

4 October

0230

Activity on 455M picked up by ships operator. this unit asked to check it and a NARAE was heard calling FUWISE (Deffor. unit Yokosuka). NARAE's signal strength 3 FUWISE barely audible. Our receivers not low enough to cover this frequency so it was dropped as soon as call FUWISE was checked on.

1504

TOTINI (Ident. as Guard Div. 61-Wake) heard going to three kana calls. this on 6655a.

1703

Up again going to H02, H03, H04 and three three kana calls.

1803

Up again to same ones with traffic.

098

~~SECRET~~

4 October Cont.

Weather reports in good numbers were noted from nearly all Marshall bases, but of special interest was a series of four on-the-hour weather reports from Wake to Taroa between 0600-0900. This nearly always means a plane flight, in this case, from Taroa to Wake. Taroa is the base for Air Group 755 (VB/M) where Wake's bombers flew on Sept. 20th. Now that AG755 seems to have received replacements he may have returned Wake's bombers.

Although strict watch was kept on air circuits no planes or bases working planes were heard. Thus if the flight took place radio silence was maintained. A report from Wake at 1415 may be arrival report.

A plane reports (at 0920) something in 10s-162e.

Plane 4AMU5 reported contact at 040520 in 170-55E 02-05N, probably a blue submarine.

DD Asanagi (unit of 2nd surface Escort Force) changed communication zones from Truk to Kwajalein.

TOTINI (previously identified as guard div 61 at Wake) sends one at 1727 in merchant ship cipher to addressees who suggest possible convoy enroute from Truk area.

099

~~SECRET~~

5 October

0513 7120J up and active most of the day.

1501 TOTINI up working same units as before. Considering frequency, time, signal strength, distance and units worked, it leaves doubt as to this being Wake.

1555 On 3998M (as reported by Nashville) rec'd msg. NR 0515 1500. Callup for this message was NARAE DE NARAE. Probably Ruotto Air Base and Kwajalien working on 3990A. Both had good notes and strong signals.

Plane traffic evidently from solomons area again appeared prominently on Truk's broadcast suggesting further activity between Jap and U.S. units in this area.

Rabaul weather station sends one at 051145 action to all air bases S.E. Area (SENI6), AG938 (MEHIØ), AG958 (TAHI4), 8th Flt. (YORUØ), 3rd Flt. (KUNI9) plus unident. (SEYA5). The association of 3rd Fleet with these solomons area calls is interesting and suggests that either surface units or more planes of 3rd Fleet may be headed for the Rabaul area.

Plane 6IRO1 at 1430 says "Sight enemy submarine bearing 175 from M, Distance 20 miles". MOMOMO [M] 175.MA2C
Location of M unknown.

100

SECRET

5 October Cont..

We expected to be picked up by Wake search planes today but by sheer luck were not sighted. About 0820 radar plot reported a "bogey" (unidentified plane) about 50 miles north of us on an easterly course. At 0845 plane 3TERO4 sent grid YUYUYUHEHEHE3SUFU to Wake (ØKORO). This worked out to a position about 70 miles behind (~~or~~ east) of us and was the approximate position where a quantity of fuel oil from one of the auxiliary carriers had been released, causing a good sized slick. Radar showed that the plane had turned south when about 75 miles east of us and had then headed southwest.

A check on this grid report showed that it caused no undue excitement and was not seen on Truk broadcast.

This bit of luck enabled us to completely surprise the Japs at Wake the following morning.

Marshalls weather for ~~the day~~^{the 5th} was the most active of all the days noted. Routings and hourly schedules showed indications of plane shifts from Truk to Taroa and Taroa to Ruotto and/or Wake.

SECRET

6 October (Dog Day)

Truk broadcast had been maintained for the following reasons:

1. To give the unit, as far as possible, an idea of what of importance was taking place in other traffic areas.

2. As a check to ensure no message of possible importance might be missed if not picked up by search operators. As a matter of fact on two occasions despatches were missed by search operators, which were of importance to this unit, but were received on Truk's broadcast.

3. To check on the importance of a despatch. For instance, the fact that the grid position sent by Wake's search plane on the 5th was not seen on the Truk broadcast confirmed our belief that the task force had not been sighted.

However the broadcast was dropped today in order to get maximum coverage on Wake and air frequencies.

) 0000-0300

Traffic was light this morning with weather traffic lower than normal for this period.

Our planes, taking off from a point approximately 100 miles north of Wake reached their target about 0245.

102

~~SECRET~~

6 October Cont..

The first warning seems to have come out on 6640E in a simple substitution type cipher from single kana call (N) to numeral calls 3,4,5,6,7 and 9. (N) sent a message originated at 0250 to 7,9,3 and 4. These numeral calls are evidently Wake picket boats and (N) the control station. This first message was probably a warning to these boats to be alert for enemy vessels, in response to a warning ^{assumed to have been} received on another frequency by (N) from a picket boat. (Our first plane strike reported sighting a Nip PC 20 miles north of Wake). This message was not seen on any other circuit, and the first general warning was seen at 0310 when Wake Guard Div 65 (SUHEKU) sent one on 4385a which was originated by Wake (UKI3) at 0244. At 0250 Wake had begun checking signal strength with Kwajalein each minute, and asked him to wait for traffic. Evidently the message was being encoded or drafted during this time.

0315

Wake WX station (RIATI) sends a 0300 weather report to truk WX (KISUMI). Sending WX at a time like this may indicate a reinforcement flight or perhaps is the result of a scheduled flight due to arrive this morning.

6 October cont..

FOLLOWING IS LOG OF TRAFFIC OF INTEREST.

TOR	FROM (ORIG)	ADDRESSEES	TIME OF ORIG.	FREQ.
0323	Wake	BF6 Info. Flt4, A.S.Kwaj., AF22	0320	4385a
0335	Wake	BF6 Info. Flt4, A.S.Kwaj., AF22	0320	2
0345	"	" " " "	0340	"
0352	"	" " " "	0349	2
0410	8FURA	2RETA6		6260J
0418	1NUME	6MOO		7120J
0451	Wake	BF6 Info. Flt 4, A.S.Kwaj., AF22	0450	4385A
0552	Ruotto	Taroa, Wake and Nauru Air Bases	0535	4275A
0605	Taroa	11th Air, AF22, Truk WX	0600	4275A
0619	Eniwetok	Ruotto Air Base	NONE	7300A
0637	Wake	AF22 info. Unid.(HIRE8), Taroa	0513	8550A
0707	Wake	AF22 Info. " "	0508	"
0714	Taroa	Wake, Unid.(SATE7) Info: Unid. (NOTE2)	0600	"
0714	Wake	BF6 Info: A.S.Kwaj., Flt 4, AF22	0550	15142J
0719	"	" " " "	0503	"
0722	"	Ruotto	0524	8550A
0729	Taroa A.B.	????	0725	"
0734	Wake	AF22 Info: Taroa	??03	"
0736	A ¹¹ Ruotto	Tarawa Info: Taroa Air Base	0706	"
0737	Concealed	(SIFU1)(SAFU9)(YUMU9) R.I., BF6, AF22		
		INFO: BF3-, A.B.Taroa, Flt.2, Wake, (AMU2)	0643	15142J
0743	Wake	Kwajalein	0712	7300A
0813	Ruotto	Taroa Info: Wake, Nauru	0535	8550A

Looks like possible operations order to send Taroa VBM to Wake

6 October cont..

0743	Tarora	Wake		0705	8550A
0753	Wake	BF6	Info: A.S. Kwaj., Flt 4, AF22	0745	7300A
0755	Wake	"	" " " "	0748	"
0804	Wake	AG755	Info: Flt 4, Assoc. flt S.E.Area AF22	0654	8550A
0817	Tarora	At Ruotto	Info: Wake	0520	"
0818	Wake(2RIKI)	Unid.	9NERE	0800	7120J
0819	Mille	Wake, AF22	Info: Tarawa Air Base	0600	8550A
0837	Wake	AF22	Info: AG755, Flt 4	0503	8550A
0845	Tarora	5MIH01		NR6	0842 7120J
0857	"	5 MIH02		NR1	0840 "
0900	"	"		NR7	0854 "
0915	9TIH02	RE*XMTED	to 5MIH02 by Tarora	NR2	0850 "
0925	9TIH02	5MIH01	" " " "	NR3	0900 "
0927	"	"	to A.S. Kwaj. by Kwaj.	NR1	0840 7300A
0930	"	"	" " " "	NR3	0900 "
0934	"	"	to 5MIH01 by Ruotto	NR4	0910 7120J
0940	Wake	TARora	re-xmts to tarawa	0503	8550A
0943	Wake	BF6	Info: Flt 4, AF22, A.S. Kwaj.	0934	7300A
0948	At Mille	Ruotto		0934	8550A
0953	Flt 2	BF6		0931	7300A
1003	Wake	BF6	Info: A.S.Kwaj. Flt 4 AF22	0934	7300A
1016	AF22	Mille	Info: Wake	0905	8550A
1041	9TIH02	Tarora		NR5	1035 6115J
1045	Wake	BF6	Info: AF22, Flt 4, A. S. Kwaj.	1016	7300A
1051	Wake	"	" " " "	1049	"

SECRET

6 October cont..

1100	5MIH01	Taroa	NR3	1055	6115J
1105	Taroa	5MIH01	NR9	1101	7120J
		These planes and Taroa must be interested in something further south. Perhaps a sub.			
1117	Wake	BF6 Info: AF22, Flt. 4, A.S. Kwaj.		1100	7300A
1131	Taroa	9NERE5	NR8	1100	7120J
1139	9TIH01	Taroa	NR6	1130	6115J
1140	AF22	Unid.(WITEØ) Info: Wake		0905	7300A
1145	Taroa	5MIH01	NR10	1132	7120J
1145	Ruotto	Wake		1100	7300A
1149	Ruotto	5MIH01	NR1	1130	6115J
1150	BF6	????		0855	7300A
1200	Taroa	5MIH01	NR10	1132	6115J
1204	Taroa	Ruotto, 5MIH01	NR11	1140	6115J
1204	Wake	BF6 Info: AG755, AF22, flt 4, A.S. Kwaj.		1016	8550A
1207	Ruotto	Tarawa, Nauru		1140	8550A
1215	5MIH01	Text of msg. KUSIKUSIKUSI		1215	6115J
1220	5NENU	8MAKE6	NR1	1200	6115J
1222	Wake	BF6 Info: AF22, Flt 4, A.S. Kwaj.		1150	7300A
1233	Flt 2	BF6 Info: Flt Comg., Flt 3, Flt 4		????	7300A
1251	9REN1	RE-xmtd by 7YARO to MOHETIL	NR1	1220	7120J
1303	RUSU8	YURE6 RE-xmtd to Wake for Info:		1242	7300A
1306	At Ruotto	YURE " " " " "		1241	7300A
1333	Wake	AF22, ISSF Coll.		1210	7300A
1342	5MIH01	Ruotto, Taroa	NR4	1310	6115J
1400	"	Ruotto, Taroa	NR5	1345	6115J
1410	"	" " " " "	NR6	1407	6115J

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~~SECRET~~

6 October cont..

Rest of traffic for the day consisted mostly of rebroadcasts of previous messages and several long operational messages from Wake, with the total volume for the area remaining high.

Planes of the 9TIHO and 5MIHO group have been very active on 6115J and 7120J working Taroa Air Base (1NUME) and Ruotto Air Base (8NEMU). Their signals were not very strong, they did not work Wake, and no Jap planes appeared over the ships of this particular task group, so it was assumed that these planes were not in contact with our forces. However, later reports from our units showed that several groups of Jap planes, evidently newly arrived from either Taroa or Ruotto, had engaged planes of our bombardment and screening forces just off Wake. Although several of these Japs were shot down no instance of plain language transmissions were noted.

SECRET

7 October

Our forces struck Wake again at about 0320.

Just before they struck a short 4 kana despatch was sent by Ruotto at 0315 to Taroa, Mille, Nauru and Tarawa in either aircraft or D/F code. This dispatch may have no connection with the Wake attack but considering the time of origin it could very well be a D/F or plane report of our ships or planes.

The first warning from Wake was picked up on 4275A at 0346. HI HI HI from YOHEKU (Wake air base) who, in his excitement compromised charlie call 2RIKI as also being Wake air base.

A message originated at 0324 by Wake and sent action Base Force 6, Information 4th Fleet, Air Flot 22 and All ships Kwajalein area, was intercepted at 0334.

From this time on the traffic picture was similar to the previous day although slightly less in volume. This was probably due to the condition of Wake's transmitters. Although never completely bombed off the air he seemed to have been considerably damaged and was reduced to two transmitters on the 7th. Neither of them were very good, the one generally on 4275A being so poor as to often be hardly copiable.

0800

Airflot 22 (SIHI9) sent one to FUNI7 (Uniden.

(15)

108

SECRET

7 October cont..

but possibly Airbase Collective) less Wake Airbase (KAYAL). Text was Roman letters M H M. This message was seen on other stations and is probably the signal for condition red in the area.

Searches were sent out for us from both Taroa and Ruotto. Planes heard were from the 5MIHO, 9ROFU, 4WIHA and ØWITA groups, the activity beginning at 0655 with 1NUME (Taroa) working 5MIHO3.

Among the more active planes was ØWITA14 who sent three short ones to Ruotta at 1235, 1250 and 1300. At 1324 he sent "MATE KO Ø ?" and was heard no more. At 1411 one of our planes reported shooting down a twin engine snoopers 20 miles north of the force, after a short chase. Another snoopers was shot down a few hours later. It seems unusual that neither of these planes sent the customary HI HI HI when attacked. Furthermore they did not send a grid position. Whether they were attempting radio security to an extreme degree, or were just new men too excited when chased by an enemy plane to send a message is not known. In any case they don't seem to have reported our position to their base.

~~SECRET~~

7 october cont..

It is also interesting to note that the search planes worked Taroa or Ruotto rather than Wake using either 6115J or 7120J indiscriminately. Wake as has been mentioned had only two transmitters working, one of which was almost constantly on 4385A/7300A. The other was used mostly on 4275A/8550A and so he had nothing with which to work 6115J/7120J. He very seldom swithed his second transmitter over to these frequencies, and consequently the search planes, using these frequencies, worked past Wake to the more distant bases. This fact tended to mislead the unit at first into thinking the planes were further away than they actually were, and it was only when we received reports of Jap planes in the vicinity that we realized the situation. Had a grid position been sent we would immediately have seen what was going on. FUTURE RIU MEN TAKE NOTE!

8-9-10 * -

~~SECRET~~

8 October

4385A/7300A and 4275A/8550A covered alternately.
7120J-6115J slow most of day with few planes
being heard or worked.

YOKEYU (Wake Air Base) on 4275A seemed to
have a good deal of transmitter trouble.

9 October

4275A/8550A and air frequencies main coverage
for the day.

10-11 October

Routine search watch. No special coverage.
Secured watch on 11th, making preparations
for leaving the ship.

NEW FREQUENCIES

455M NARAE to FUWISE (Deffor. unit Yokosuka).
3720E 2kn calls - too weak to get dope on.
4270E 2kn calls - drill traffic.
4340E 2kn calls.
5040E 2kn calls - drill traffic.
5050E 2kn calls.
6625E Base and Plane - drill traffic.
6640E N (Wake)(?) to 1 numeral calls.
6690E Base (5SUYU) to plane (3 Oct.)
6685J(?)

Frequency Comments.

6115J/7120J These frequencies were not keyed simultaneously but were used in such a manner that there was very little difference. Planes were called on both frequencies by Ruotto and Taroa and could answer on either freq. This was done when several planes were in the air, otherwise 7120J was used almost exclusively. 8725J, 9420J were not heard by this unit.

6655A There is doubt as to just what this frequency embraces. TOTINI Commented on previously in this report, is very unsteady and appears to come up in a different spot at each schedule. His average would probably be close to 6655.

SECRET

FREQUENCY COMMENTS** CONT..

6040E

This could possibly be Wakes 6655A or 6625JC
1 kana call (N) used on here working 1 numeral calls
up until ^{shortly after} the time of the first attack on Wake. Not
heard after that so it is presumed to be a Wake
frequency. Traffic transmitted by (N) appeared to
be a simple substitution cipher. This makes it logical
to assume that it is a Picket Boat frequency as a
Picket Boat would hardly carry any secure codes.
Messages received were on the 6th originated at
0250 and 0322.

8600J/4300J

Wake was not heard on this frequency but would not
say for sure that he was not up on it. Due to other
coverage a close check could not be made on it.

6260J

This was covered for a while the first day of attack.
Only Marshalls air frequency that was active at the
time. Mainly administrative traffic was transmitted
and signals were poor so it was dropped for other
coverage.

8550A/4275A

Good frequency for Marshall area weathers that tie
in with plane flights. Pretty near a dead give-way
on prospective flights from one island to another.

7300A/4385A

This proved to be outstanding frequency for Wake's
"Hot Dope", and administrative traffic.

113

Tentative Identifications

All calls converted to basic list.

List 30 - used 4 Oct.

- RIME5 - Fleet 4
- SANO3 - Air unit Taroa
- SOME8 - Fleet 11th Air
- KOME8 - Air Base Wake

List 20 - used 5 Oct.

- SAHA5 - Air Base Mille
- RIRI8 - Air Base Wake

List 21 † used 6 October

- HITI8 - Fleet 4
- KEKA3 - Air Group 755 (?)
- MIHI4 - Air Base Wake

List 22 - used 7 Oct.

- TASA2 - Air Base Mille
- WOTA4 - Unit at Taroa
- MOHAØ - Air Base Wake

List 18 - used 8 Oct.

- TURA9 † Air Base Wake

NOTE:: Call TOTINI on 6655A (?) should be checked by the D/F net for a good fix.

SECRET

COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS

The Officer in Charge and the men of this unit feel that a low frequency receiver might have proved of value on this trip.

On the morning of the first strike our planes reported a picket boat 20 miles north of Wake. This vessel undoubtedly reported the planes to Wake, for a few moments later Wake picket boat control (N) sent a warning cipher message to patrol boats 7, 9, 3 and 4. This message and others from (N) to the single numeral calls were seen on 6640E but the report from the picket boat that made the first sighting, and subsequent reports (if any) from other picket boats were not seen. This led to the belief that these patrol craft may, when near each other or their base, use low frequency transmissions which we were unable to pick up.

The ship's radio picked up on the 4th a transmission on 455M which when investigated by one of our operators proved to be a NARAE calling Defense Force Unit Yokosuka (FUWISE). Due to the inconvenience and lack of security involved in using a ship's receiver we dropped this frequency after checking the identities. If we had a low frequency receiver as part of our equipment a great deal of research might be accomplished and, in case

115

~~SECRET~~

COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS CONT..

of a night sighting by picket boat, we might get valuable information which otherwise we would receive too late, or not at all.

It is strongly recommended that a suitable low frequency receiver be included as standard equipment for all shipboard RIU's. It would necessarily be smaller and more compact than the RBA/RBB type. Perhaps Hallicrafters have a model.

Suggest also that metal boxes for receivers and typewriters be manufactured. This very near a necessity due to the strictness aboard ship in regards to keeping all burnable materials at a minimum. Difficulty experienced in finding suitable storage place for the type now being used. Due to the weight of the receivers sturdy handles should be attached to ease the strain of handling on steep ladders.

SECRET

T A A S K F O R C E

1 4

R E P O R T

30 Sept. - 11 Oct. 1943
Slonim Report
Wake

Do NOT Destroy Return to the
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~~SECRET~~

CONTAINED HEREIN IS THE
REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE R I UNIT ATTACHED
TO USS LEXINGTON (CV16)
FOR DUTY WITH TASK FORCE
FOURTEEN.

SUBMITTED BY:

E. J. FORREST CRM (AA) USN.

J. P. WILDER RM 1/C USN.

J. K. ENGEN RM 1/C USN.

S. L. GREGORY RM 1/C USNR.

SECRET

THE R I UNIT REPORTED ABOARD THE USS LEXINGTON,
(CV 16), AT NOON TWENTY EIGHT SEPTEMBER 1943,
FOR DUTY WITH TASK FORCE FOURTEEN.

THE COMPARTMENT ASSIGNED THIS UNIT TO WORK IN
WAS ON THE GALLERY DECK JUST FORWARD OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE. THIS COMPARTMENT WAS NOT
READY FOR USE AND WHILE SOMETHING HAD BEEN DONE
A LOT REMAINED TO BE COMPLETED. THE SAME SPIRIT
OF COOPERATION FOUND ON OTHER SHIPS PREVAILED
HERE AND ALL POSSIBLE WAS DONE TO EXPEDITE THE
FITTING OUT OF THE COMPARTMENT. RECEIVER TABLES
AND OPERATING POSITIONS WERE CONSTRUCTED AND
INSTALLED AND AN ANTENNAE SYSTEM WAS FED IN TO
THE COMPARTMENT FROM RADIO ONE.

BECAUSE THE MEN WORKED DAY AND NIGHT ALL WAS
IN READINESS FOR US THE EVENING OF TWENTY NINE
SEPTEMBER AND AT THAT TIME A WATCH WAS COMMENCED.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

ALL TIMES MINUS 9

30 SEPTEMBER 43

1400

WORK OF REFITTING COMPARTMENT FOR USE BY THIS UNIT BEING COMPLETED A TWO MAN WATCH WAS COMMENCED HERE.

A FREQUENCY PLAN FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST WAKE ISLAND WAS LAID OUT AS FOLLOWS:

6655A WAKE AND MARUS (PICKET BOATS)

8550J WAKE, RUOTTO, TAROA AND OTHER AIR BASES IN THE
4275A MARSHALLS AREA.

7300A WAKE, KWAJALEIN, MARUS AND OTHERS IN MARSHALLS
4385A DEFFOR AND AREA.

7890A WAKE, KWAJALEIN, RUOTTO AND OTHERS. D/F OPERATIONS.
3945A

8600J WAKE GUARD DIV. 65, KWAJALEIN, MARSHALLS BASES AND
4300J MARUS. THIS NOT CONSIDERED OF PRIME IMPORTANCE.

5110M WAKE, RUOTTO, TAROA AND OTHER AIR BASES IN THE
MARSHALLS AREA. THIS IS ALTERNATE OR OVERLOAD
FREQUENCY FOR THE 8550J-4275A SERIES.

6115J ALSO AN ALTERNATE FOR THE 8550J-4275A SERIES AND
IS A POSSIBLE AIR FREQUENCY AS IT WAS HEARD AT
STATION "H" BEING EMPLOYED THUS.

7120J AIR FREQUENCY FOR WAKE, RUOTTO, TAROA AND PLANES.
8725J AS ALTERNATE FREQUENCY.

6115J AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATE AIR FREQUENCY.

1 TRUK RIMI BROADCAST FOR ANY UNUSUAL TRAFFIC THAT
WOULD AFFECT THE AREA UNDER STUDY.

1400

STARTED OFF COVERING TRUK RIMI BROADCAST AND ONE SEARCH
MAN EMPLOYED IN GENERAL COVERAGE OF FREQUENCIES LAID OUT
ABOVE.

AS WE ARE CLOSE TO OAHU 8550J DOES NOT COME IN WELL, THE
SIGNAL AVERAGE POOR.

1605

SHIFT TO NIGHT FREQ OF 4275A. SIGNALS STILL POOR HERE
WITH WAKE ABOUT "SI".

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

30 SEPTEMBER 43, CONT.

- 2036 3975M, CIRCUIT GOING HERE USING SERVICE CALLS WHICH DO NOT FIT THE CONVERSION TABLE, THEY SECURED BEFORE MUCH INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED.
- 2157 4336M, THIS IS YOKOSUKA DEFFOR FREQUENCY USING SERVICE CALLS.
4300J, KWAJALEIN WORKING VARIOUS BASES AND MARUS. TO WAKE WITH TRAFFIC.
6115J, THIS WAS PICKED UP JUST IN TIME TO HEAR THEM SECURE UNTIL 2400.
- 2330 5685A, PICKED THIS UP TO OBTAIN NEW SERVICE CALLS.
WAKE'S MARU FREQUENCY WAS UNHEARD AS WAS ANY AIR FREQUENCY OF THAT AREA. SIGNALS IN GENERAL WERE POOR. TRUK'S RIMI FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY TRAFFIC OF INTEREST TO THIS UNIT.

1 OCTOBER 43.

- 4385A, COVERED BUT CONDITIONS REMAIN POOR, PART OF THIS IS DUE TO LOCAL CONDITIONS AND IN PARTICULAR FROM RADIATIONS FROM RADAR EQUIPMENT.
- 0300 6655A, UP AT THIS TIME WITH WAKE (N) CALLING (3), NO ANSWER WAS HEARD AND NO TRAFFIC SENT.
- 0328 6655A, SECURED.
- 0523 7300A, WAKE TO KWAJALEIN WITH TRAFFIC (WEATHER) SECURED.
- 0523 8550J, STILL POOR AND COPY DIFFICULT.
- 1000 CONSTANT SEARCH FOR AIR ACTIVITY HAS MET WITH NO RESULTS. MARSHALLS AREA QUIET.
- 1027 16145M, JUN UP CALLING EOC4. USED SIGNALS KAN0 YONTE" AS AS. THIS WAS UNHEARD AGAIN.
- 1340 8761M, A PLANE (1ER11) HEARD FOR MOMENT BUT NO FURTHER TRANSMISSIONS WERE MADE.
8600J, THESE TWO BEING COVERED ALTERNATELY FOR A TIME.
7300A
7348M (7300) A UNIT OF BASEFOR #6 (TOO1) CALLING GUARD DIV RUOTTO. HIS SIGNAL WAS VERY STRONG BUT COMMUNICATION WAS HAMPERED BY HIS BEING OFF FREQUENCY SO MUCH. SIGNALS ON 7300A WERE ALL GOOD AT THIS TIME.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

1 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 1632 8550J, THIS FREQUENCY NOW COMING IN BETTER WITH ALL SIGNALS IMPROVING.
- 1700 6660M, GUARD DIV 61 (TOTINI) CALLING THREE KANA CALLS ASSOCIATED WITH TRUK AND MARSHALLS AREA AND THE CALLS HO 1 THROUGH 4. SIGNAL STRENGTH WAS GOOD.
- 1710 TO 1755 A "BOGY" IS REPORTED ON THE SCREEN AS BEING FIFTEEN MILES ASTERN OF US. A SEARCH WAS MADE HER FOR LOCAL TRANSMISSIONS WITH NO RESULT. I BELIEVE THIS "BOGY" TURNED OUT TO BE ONE OF OUR OWN PLANES.
- 1806 6040J, FIND NUMERAL KANA KANA CALLS BEING USED HERE, PERHAPS ARE NEW "CHARLIE" CALLS FOR AIR BASES.
- 1918 5047J, KWAJAKEIN HEARD USING "NARAE" AS CALL. HE WAS OBSERVED EARLIER IN THE DAY USING THE SAME CALL ON 15142J.
- CONTINUED SEARCH FOR AIR FREQUENCIES AFFECTING THIS AREA HAS MET WITH NO SUCCESS. WAKE OR HIS PICKET BOATS ARE UNHEARD AGAIN.
- 2010 5615A, MARCUS ISLAND IS HEARD WORKING SAKATA AIR BASE.
- 2030 6843M, (SUNOME) (ASSOCIATED OPERATIONS SOUTHEAST AREA) HEARD GOING TO (SUNOME 1), THIS WAS ALSO HEARD ON THE 30TH OF SEPTEMBER.
- 2100 5755J, PLANES AND BASES WORKING HERE WITH THE TRAFFIC LATER APPEARING ON THE TRUK RIMI, SIGNALS ARE FAIR TO POOR.
- 2330 5685A, STAND BY HERE FOR CALL CHANGE.
- WAKE WAS INACTIVE ON ALL CIRCUITS TODAY, HIS AIR BASE WAS UNHEARD AND AFTER 0328 NO MORE WAS HEARD ON 6655A. TRUKS RIMI TRAFFIC FAILED TO SHOW ANYTHING USEFUL TO US.

2 OCTOBER 1943.

- 0012 4275A, ALL NORMAL HERE WITH VERY LITTLE TRAFFIC RUNNING. A CONSTANT CHECK OF 6655A ON THE HOUR AND HALF HOUR IS BEING MADE.
- 0143 4340M, YOKOSUKA'S DEFFOR UNITS OPERATING HERE AGAIN.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

2 OCTOBER 43.
CONT,

Ø155 3945A, WAKE AND KWAJALEIN HERE WITH THE NORMAL AMOUNT OF D/F TRAFFIC.

Ø5ØØ WAKE OR MARUS FAIL TO SHOW ON 6655A. NO AIR ACTIVITY ENCOUNTERED. SIGNALS POOR AT THIS TIME ON MARSHALLS FREQUENCIES.

Ø6Ø5 TO Ø62Ø 6655A, WAKE (N) CALLING (4), NO TRAFFIC SENT AND NO REPLY WAS HEARD. SIGNALS WERE SO POOR AS TO BE UNREADABLE.

942ØJ, BASE AND SEVERAL PLANES APPEAR HERE WITH QUITE A BIT OF TRAFFIC WHICH IS BELIEVED TO BE DRILL. THE CALL, HOWEVER, ARE CONSIDERED TO BE GOOD CALLS AND TO ORIGINATE IN THE MARSHALLS AREA.

Ø952 855ØJ, WAKE HEARD HERE BUT HIS SIGNALS ARE POOR, THE OTHER BASES COME IN FAIR.

RECEPTION IS VERY DIFFICULT WITH A MAJOR PORTION OF THE LOCAL INDUCTION ORIGINATING IN RADAR EQUIPMENT. AS THE RECEIVING ANTENNAE IS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE RADAR GEAR THE INDUCTION IS NEARLY CONSTANT. BY THE USE OF TRANSMITTING ANTENNAE PIPED THROUGH FROM RADIO ONE AND THREE WE ARE ABLE TO REDUCE NOISE LEVEL AND IMPROVE ALL SIGNALS TO SOME EXTENT.

1235 712ØJ, PLANE AND BASE APPEAR HERE, THE BASE IS ONE THAT WAS HEARD PREVIOUSLY ON 942ØJ. THIS MAKES IT A POSSIBILITY THAT 712ØJ'S UNITS WILL APPEAR ON 942ØJ.

1318 942ØJ, BASES TO PLANE FOR SHORT TIME.

1447 TO 1534 942ØJ, BASES AND PLANES WORKING.

18Ø5 6628M, (TONOYU) (ASSOCIATED WITH EMPIRE AIR) CALLING HO 1. AT THIS TIME (TOTINI) IS CALLING HO 1 THROUGH 4 ON 6648M. THE TWO MAY BE ASSOCIATED. *? [Signature] No*

1824 5755J, BASE TO TWO PLANES.

1843 5835J, PLANE TO BASE. THIS IS A SOUTHERN FREQUENCY AND SIGNALS ARE POOR.

1856 684ØJ, THE PLANE HEARD ON 5835J IS ALSO HEARD HERE TO CALL BASE.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

2 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

THE FREQUENCIES OF 8550J, 7300A, 4275A AND 4385A WERE COVERED OFF AND ON THIS DAY. OPERATORS LINING UP THE FREQUENCIES TO SEE WHAT THE FLOW AND DIRECTION OF THE TRAFFIC IS DURING NORMALCY. THE AIR FREQUENCIES OF THE AREA CONCERNED WERE NOT VERY ACTIVE. IT IS THOUGHT THAT WAKE IS NOT CONDUCTING A PLANE SEARCH AS HIS AIR BASE HAS NOT BEEN HEARD TO OUR KNOWLEDGE.

ON THE EVENING WATCH OF THIS DAY A NEW WATCH SYSTEM WAS INAUGERATED TO GIVE MORE COMPLETE COVERAGE OF AIR AND BASE FREQUENCIES DURING THE DAYLIGHT AND EVENING HOURS. THE RADIOMAN IN CHARGE BEING ON FROM EIGHT A.M. TO MIDNIGHT (LOCAL TIME) WITH TWO OPERATORS IN THE DAY TIME AND WITH ONE IN THE EVENING, THE MID WATCH BEING STOOD BY ONE MAN ALONE.

3 OCTOBER 43.

- 0016 4275A, THIS COMING THROUGH VERY WELL NOW WITH USUAL MORNING TRAFFIC, WAKE APPEARED WITH HIS WEATHER.
- 0332
TO
0350 6260J, BASE TO BASE AND BASE TO PLANE.
- 4385A, AND 4300A, COVERED OCCASIONALLY BUT TRAFFIC VOLUME IS LIGHT.
- 0408 5755J, BASE TO PLANE, TRANSMISSIONS SHORT AND WENT DOWN IN SHORT TIME.
- 6840J, WAS HEARD BUT SIGNALS TOO POOR FOR COPY.
- 0415 6655A, WAKE CALLING (2) WITH S3 SIGNAL. (2) WAS NOT HEARD HERE. WAKE SOMETIMES MAKES " " " BETWEEN THE STATION CALLED AND THE CALLING STATION BESIDES USING " DE ".
- 0525 7120J, A PLANE UP HERE WORKING A BASE, SIGNAL S 1 TO 0 AND NOT UP FOR LONG.
- 0539 8705A, HEARD MARCUS AIR GOING TO YOKOSUKA AIR WITH WEATHER TRAFFIC, SIGNALS THIS FREQUENCY ARE GOOD.
- 0619 6655A, WAKE CALLING (3). VERY WEAK SIGNAL AND NO MORE WAS HEARD.
- 0656 6655A, WAKE AGAIN HEARD MAKE A SHORT CALL.
- 9420J, PLANES AND BASES HERE AGAIN. ONE OF THE PLANE GROUP HERE HAD APPEARED ON 7120J (7 SA KI 1)

CHRONOLOGY

~~SECRET~~

3 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 0631 TO 1116 8915J, AT INTERVALS DURING THESE HOURS THIS FREQUENCY WAS COPIED AS AIR BASES IN THE MARSHALLS GROUP KEPT SHOWING UP. PLANES WERE WORKED BUT WERE OF THE CALL TYPE CLASSIFIED AS TRANSPORT PLANES OR FERRY PLANES.
- 1645 7125M, HA 1 TO HA 2, NO TRAFFIC AND SECURE TO 2000.
- 1655 CHECKING LOW FREQUENCIES. SEVERAL ENCOUNTERED ON SWEEP ACROSS BANDS BUT NONE THAT HAVE EFFECT ON US. A LIST OF THOSE HEARD IS INCLUDED WITH THE MEASURED FREQUENCY LIST.
- 1700 6650M, GUARD DIV 61 (TOTINI) TI HO 1 THROUGH 4, NO TRAFFIC AND SECURED.
- 2005 7125M, HA 1 TO HA 2 AGAIN. GIVES KAN 0 NO TRAFFIC AND SECURED UNTIL 0730.

BESIDES THE CONSTANT SEARCH FOR AIR AND NEW TRAFFIC FREQUENCIES ONE MAN WAS ON THE 8550J-4275A AND 7300A 4385A SERIES FOR TRAFFIC. TRUK RIMI CONTINUES TO BE COVERED WITH NO TRAFFIC APPEARING THAT HAS AFFECT ON THIS TASK.

4 OCTOBER 43.

- 0215 456 E, WHILE CHECKING LOW FREQUENCIES FOUND (NARAE) GOING TO (FUWISE) WHO IS IDENTIFIED AS A UNIT OF THE YOKOSUKA DEFFOR. BELEIVE STATION USING (NARAE) IS YOKOSUKA AS HE OFTEN USES THIS TYPE CALL ON 6315A.
- 0330 6655A, WAKE TO COLLECTIVE CALL (0) NO TRAFFIC AND SECURED
- 0525 8705A, YOKOSUKA AND CHICHIJIMA AIRBASES USING THREE KANA CALLS AND AIRGROUP CHICHIJIMA USING SERVICE CALLS TO SERVICE CALLS.
- 0615 7120J, BASES AND ONE PLANE, SOME BASE TRAFFIC RECEIVED.
- 0650 9420J, BASE AND PLANES WITH TRAFFIC. IT IS BELEIVED THAT THIS TRAFFIC IS GOOD TRAFFIC AS NO PRECEDENCE INDICATOR IS USED AS WAS THE CASE WHEN TRAFFIC SENT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE DRILL.
- 0730 SHIPS MAIN RADIO REPORTS STEADY CARRIER WAVES ON 12700E AND 4800E. CHECKED ACCORDINGLY BUT FOUND NOTHING OF INTEREST TO US. (*no transmissions!*)
- 0852 8915J, RUOTTO AND TAROA AIR BASES WERE HEARD TO WORK TRANSPORT TYPE PLANES HERE, WAKE DID NOT SHOW.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

4 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 1258 8623M, (TA 1) AND (KANI) WORKING EACH OTHER, TRAFFIC WAS DRILL AND SIGNALS VERY POOR.
- 1310 6648M, GUARD DIV 61 TO (HO 4), NO TRAFFIC AND SECURE.
- 1330 7120J, BASE TO PLANE AND BASES TO BASES UP FROM TIME
1458 TO TIME WITH SHORT TRANSMISSIONS.
1507
- 1609 7110J, A PLANE WAS CALLED HERE AT THESE TIMES BY A
1611 BASE (?) WHOSE CALL DID NOT APPEAR. NO TRAFFIC WAS
1752 SENT.
- 1653 7125M, HA 1 TO HA2; NO TRAFFIC AND SECURED
- 1703 * 6648M, GUARD DIV 61 TO HO-4, 2, 3. KITIYU, MITINA,
1810 NEHERI AND SENDS A FEW MESSAGES.
- 1709 5755J, BASE TO PLANE UP HERE FOR A SHORT TIME.
- 1722 7035J, A BASE WAS HEARD TO WORK A PLANE BUT WENT
DOWN SOON AND WAS UNHEARD AGAIN.
- 1913 6040J, BASES TO BASES, NO PLANES HEARD HERE.
- 1928 6403M, SERVICE CALLS USED HERE, NO TRAFFIC WAS SENT
BUT BELIEVE THIS TO BE A DRILL CIRCUIT AS ONE OF THE
STATIONS WAS HEARD WORKING DRILL ON 5750E.
- 1930 6840J, SERVICE CALLS HEARD, NO TRAFFIC SENT AND THE
CIRCUIT SECURED UNTIL 0500.
- 2025 3825J, (NARAE) TO COMSUBFOR WITH TE SE, NO MORE
WAS HEARD FROM THE "JERK" AFTER THIS.
- 2028 3817J, SERVICE CALLS USED, THESE STATIONS HAD SOME
TRAFFIC BUT DID NOT SEND IT AND MADE A SCHEDULE FOR
2230. SECURED NOW. SIGNALS WERE POOR.
- 2124 3817J, UP AGAIN AND TWO MESSAGES RECEIVED HERE, AGAIN
MAKE A SCHEDULE FOR 2230 AND SECURE.
- 2230 3817J, RECEIVED ONE MORE HERE. A SCHEDULE MADE FOR
0530 AND THE CIRCUIT SECURED.

6655A WAS UNHEARD AFTER 0330 ALTHOUGH A CLOSE CHECK WAS MADE. THE ONLY SUBMARINE HEARD WAS WEAK AND THE AIRCRAFT COPIED COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS LOCAL. CONTINUED COPY OF 8550J-4275A, 7300A-4385A. THE LOW FREQUENCIES WERE CHECKED FROM TIME TO TIME. TRUK'S RIMI CONTINUES TO RUN NORMAL.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

5 OCTOBER 43.

- 0513 6655A, WAKE CALLS (6) AND SAYS MUFU. SAYS, MUFU MUSI. KATU. (6) WAS HEARD TO ROGER FOR THIS BUT HIS SIGNAL WAS VERY WEAK. THE POWER USED BY THE PICKET BOATS SEEMS TO BE EXTREMELY LOW.
- 0555 7120J, TRANSMITTERS HEARD TUNING UP HERE. A BASE
0642 AND PLANE WERE HEARD THE PLANE BEING S 1 HERE.
- 0659 6655A, WAKE TO (6) AND TELLS HIM HE IS OFF FREQUENCY.
0715 WAKE AGAIN TO (6) BUT SECURES AFTER HE IS UNABLE TO RAISE (6).
- 0705 6260J, ONE BASE HERE GOING TO PLANES.
- 0800 6655A, WAKE ONCE MORE TO (6) AND SENDS SIGNAL KA"TU
0810 KA"TU DE FURUKAWA. AGAIN. KA"TU.NI?. THEN SENDS MUSI.KA"TU. DE (OR HO HE) FURUKAWA. THEN, KA"TUNIU?
- 0825 8610J, AIR BASE 57 AT TENIAN HEARD WORKING TRANSPORT TYPE PLANE CALL.
- 0842 7120J, PLANES AND BASES UP HERE WORKING BACK AND
TO FORTH. BASE (OKORO) TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS WAKE
1316 AND BASE (OKIHA) TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS RUOTTO.
- 0904 4275A, THE IDENTIFICATIONS ON 7120J LOOK GOOD AS RUOTTO ASKS WAKE IF HE RECEIVED A PLANES NUMBER ONE AND HAD ASKED THE SAME THING ON 7120J USING THE "CHARLIE" CALLS.
- 1020 ~~346JC. FURTHER CORRABATION OF THESE IDENTIFICATIONS
436JC. IS OBTAINED FROM THESE LOW FREQUENCIES AS (OKORO) IS FOUND USING HOMING BEACON ON 346JC AND (OKASA) (THIS TAROA) USING 436JC AS A HOMING BEACON. INFORMATION ON THESE FREQUENCIES WAS OBTAINED FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.~~
- 1707 6650M, GUARD DIV 61 TO HO CALLS, ONE MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED AND CIRCUIT SECURED UNTIL 1900.
- 1707 4289M, OMINATO WITH TRAFFIC TO (NARAE). THIS RIDES OVER 4275A AND CAUSES INTERFERENCE WITH SOME OF THE STATIONS THERE.
- 1730 "BOGY" REPORTED ON THE SCREEN. A CHECK BEING MADE ALL AIR FREQUENCIES BUT NOTHING HEARD.
- 1842 6642M, (TONOYU) TO HO 1 AND (KIYUTI) ALSO (MENAME) TO A 5. THIS CIRCUIT WAS HEARD AGAIN AT 2110.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

5 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 2155 500A, (HOSE) HEARD WITH TRAFFIC TO (CQ) BUT
SECURED WITHIN A FEW MOMENTS.
- 2205 5750J, AMOY RADIO (METITO) WORKING (HO 2).

COVERAGE OF THE 8550J-4275A, 7300A-4385A SERIES
CONTINUES. IT WAS NOTED TODAY THAT THE AIR BASES DID
NOT SHIFT UP TO 8550J BUT OPERATED UPON 4275A FROM
0000 TO 2400.

THIS WAS THE FIRST DAY THAT WAKE HAS BEEN FOUND ON
7120J.

6655A WAS COMING IN A BIT BETTER BUT THE USE OF LOW
POWER BY WAKE'S PICKET BOATS MAKES COPY OF THEM VERY
DOUBTFUL.

IN SEARCHING UP AND DOWN THE DIFFERENT BANDS IT HAS
BEEN NOTED THAT THE NUMBER OF DRILL CIRCUITS SEEM TO
BE INCREASING.

FROM TRUK'S RIMI TRAFFIC AND FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE
IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THIS FORCE HAS BEEN SIGHTED
OR THAT OUR PRESENCE IS EVEN SUSPECTED.

ON THE EVENING WATCH OF THIS DAY A THREE MAN
CONTINUOUS WATCH WAS STARTED SO AS TO BE READY FOR ANY
EVENTUALITY. TWO MEN EMPLOYED ON 4275A-4385A AND IN
CHECKING TRUK'S RIMI BROADCAST THE CONTINUOUS COVERAGE
OF WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE NOW. ONE MAN IN CONSTANT
SEARCH OF AIR FREQUENCIES AND TO CHECK WAKES 6655A.

6 OCTOBER 43.

TO ANOTHER SHEET.

6 OCTOBER 43.

CHRONOLOGY

~~SECRET~~

- 6/137 6655A, WAKE (N) CALLING (3) AND (4), THESE UNHEARD.
- 0150 OUR FIRST PLANES LEAVE FOR STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND.
- 0237 6655A, WAKE SENDS MESSAGE TO (3) AND (4), FIRST PART OF TEXT "ENEMY".
- 0238 6655A, WAKE CALLING (3) AND (4) SAYING HE HAS TRAFFIC, THE OPERATOR SEEMS A LITTLE BEFUDDLED.
- 0249 6655A, (2) CALLING WAKE BUT DOES NOT FINISH. STILL USING VERY LOW POWER.
- 0250 6655A, WAKE CALLING (7) AND (9) .
- 0251 6655A, (9) CALLS WAKE AND SAYS " SIYU SIYU KAN ? YUFU " (SIYU BELEIVED TO MEAN "UNDER ATTACK") WAKE TELLS (9) TO GO AHEAD BUT (9) SAYS MUFU VA AND IS HEARD NO MORE. WE BELEIVE THAT (9) WAS SUNK ABOUT THIS TIME. ?
- 0255 6655A, WAKE SENDS MESSAGE TO (7) AND (9), TEXT STARTS OFF "ENEMY".
- 0258 6655A, WAKE CALLING (6) BUT BREAKS OFF.
- 0317 6655A, (4) GOES TO WAKE WITH TRAFFIC. (5) TO WAKE WITH SIGNAL SITU (MAY BE GARBEE FOR SIYU AS OPERATOR WAS VERY POOR AND EXCITED) . (2), (3) AND (4) UP TO WAKE. WAKE GOES WITH TRAFFIC. WAKE TRIES TO WORK (4) AND WHILE DOING SO (4) SAID " VA " AND WAS HEARD NO MORE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT HE ALSO WAS SUNK.
- 0339 6655A, (3) SENDS A SUB CONTACT(?) TO WAKE WHICH WAKE REPEATS BACK FOR VERIFICATION.
- 0425 6655A, WAKE CALLS COLLECTIVE CALL (0) AND SENDS TRAFFIC, THEN CALLS NUMBERS (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9) FOR ROGERS. SOME OF THE UNITS ARE HEARD GOING BACK TO HIM WITH ROGER.
- 0448 6655A, WAKE ASKS (2) IF HE CAN SEE (9).
WAKE AND UNITS SENDING TRAFFIC BACK AND FORTH NOW.
- 0630 FLURRY BETWEEN WAKE AND UNITS SEEMS TO HAVE SUBSIDED.
- 0852 6655A, WAKE TO (2, 4, 5 AND 6) HEARD SIGNALS ANSWER BUT THEY WERE TOO WEAK TO DISTINGUISH.
- 0920 6655A, WAKE RECEIVED TRAFFIC FROM A UNIT THAT WAS NOT HEARD HERE. WAKE CALLS COLLECTIVE (0) SAYS TOKI AND SENDS TIME TICK.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

6 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- Ø941 6655A, (5) TO WAKE WITH TRAFFIC, RECEIVED ONE FROM (5).
- Ø254 4385A, WAKES TRANSMITTER GIVING TROUBLE NOW, NOTE
TO CHANGING FROM GOOD TO POOR AND BACK AGAIN. THIS
Ø3Ø3 FREQUENCY HAS BEEN CLOSELY WATCHED SINCE ZERO HOURS
AND THIS IS FIRST INDICATION OF TROUBLE.
- Ø254 4385A, WAKE CALLING KWAJALEIN OVER AND OVER MAKING
TO. PRECEDENCE INDICATOR MASU TO INDICATE URGENT TRAFFIC.
Ø324 WAKE SUCCEEDS IN GETTING NRØ6Ø244 TO KWAJALEIN, THIS IS
MESSAGE TELLING OF ATTACK. (2) ALSO SENDS NRØ6Ø32Ø WHICH
PROBABLY ENLARGES UPON FIRST MESSAGE.
- Ø337 4385A, KWAJALEIN BROADCASTS WAKES TRAFFIC TO MARSHALLS
AREA.
- Ø328 4275A, WAKE HAS BEEN CALLED REPEATEDLY BY TAROA AND
RUOTTO WITH NO RESPONSE, THESE BASES ARE APPARENTLY NOT
INFORMED OF CONDITIONS AT WAKE AS YET. IT SEEMS THAT
THE TRANSMITTER WAKE USES ON THIS FREQUENCY IS NOT IN
COMMISSION.
- Ø344 4275A, RUOTTO NOW BROADCASTS WAKES NRØ6Ø244 TO COLLECTIVE
CALL FOR MARSHALLS AIR BASES.
- Ø352 4275A, RUOTTO IS BROADCASTING WAKES TRAFFIC.
Ø4Ø5
- WAKES TRAFFIC IS NOW APPEARING ON 4275A, ON 73ØØA AND
ON TRUK RIMI BROADCAST.
- Ø555 4275A, WAKES TRANSMITTER FOR THIS FREQUENCY IS STILL
OUT AS HE HAS NOT ANSWERED UP TO MANY CALLS.
- Ø622 73ØØA, MUCH WAKE TRAFFIC IS APPEARING HERE. WAKE USING
THIS FREQUENCY AS OUTLET IN PLACE OF 855ØJ-4275A SERIES
DUE TO TRANSMITTER FAILURE.
- Ø848 73ØØA, KWAJALEIN CALLS COLLECTIVE AND SAYS (I"KA) " I
AM ABOUT TO TRANSMIT AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE".
- Ø927 73ØØA, KWAJALEIN BROADCASTS THREE MESSAGES ORIGINATED
BY THE PLANE (9TIHØ2). BELEIVE THIS IS WHAT WAS MEANT
BY SIGNAL AT Ø848.
- Ø643 855ØJ, WAKE GOING HERE NOW BUT IS HAVING TRANSMITTER
TROUBLE, THE KEYING IS ERRATIC BUT FINALLY GOT IT IN
OPERATION.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

6 OCTOBER 43, CONT,

- 1608 8550J, RUOTTO AND TAROA CONTINUE TO CALL WAKE WITH NO
1714 SUCCESS. WAKE HAS APPEARED ON THIS FREQUENCY OFF AND
ON ALL DAY BUT HIS TRANSMITTER TROUBLE STILL EXISTS SO
IS APT TO BE OUT OF COMMISSION AT ANY TIME.
- 0612 6115J, PLANES AND BASES WERE HEARD FOR SHORT TIME HERE
TO BUT NO TRAFFIC RECEIVED.
0617
- 0353 7120J, BASE TO BASE WORKING HERE WITH TRAFFIC.
- 0803 7120J, WAKE APPEARS WORKING OTHER BASES AND SEND TRAFFIC
CONSIDERED TO BE ABOUT THE RAIDS. HIS SIGNAL IS VERY
GOOD.
- 0845 7120J, TAROA TO ONE PLANE, PLANE HEARD MAKE ROGER.
- 0903 7120J, BASES NOW GOING WITH TRAFFIC TO PLANES.
- 0925 7120J, BASES AND PLANES HERE BUT UNABLE TO GET THEM
DUE TO HEAVY LOCAL INDUCTION. (WE NO LONGER HAVE
TRANSMITTING ANTENNAE AS THEY ARE IN USE BY SHIPS
RADIO)
- 1024 7120J, PLANE TO PLANE WITH THE WARNING (KE KE KE)
ACTIVITY IS INCREASING HERE WITH PLANES AND BASES UP.
- 1500 7120J; ACTIVITY STILL HIGH.
- 1519 7120J, WAKE (2 RIKI) SENDS. HIIHIIHI.
- 1520 7120J, WAKE AGAIN TRANSMITS. HIIHIIHI.
- 1651 7120J, WAKE SECURES FOR A TIME (A"NO).
- 1730 7120J, WAKE HEARD AGAIN WITH TRAFFIC BUT IS WEAK NOW
AND IMPROVES LITTLE WITH HIS NOTE CONTINUING POOR. IT
SEEMS THAT THE BOMBING AND SHELLING HAS HAD SOME
EFFECT ON HIS EQUIPMENT.
- 1950 7120J, STILL RUNNING WITH OCCASIONAL TRAFFIC.
- 2120 7120J, WAKES TRANSMITTER IS VERY BAD NOW AND DOES NOT
SOUND LIKE THE ORIGINAL. OPERATOR IN A BAD WAY TOO AS
HE IS MAKING MANY ERRORS.
- 2135 7120J, WAKE NOW GOING ON PART ONE OF A THREE PART
TO MESSAGE TO RUOTTO AND TAROA. OPERATOR STEADIED DOWN
2400 BY THE TIME HE REACHED THE SECOND PART. STILL GOING
WITH THIS AT MIDNIGHT.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

6 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

2040 A GENERAL SEARCH WAS MADE AT THIS TIME FOR THE PLANES WHOSE TRAFFIC WAS SHOWING ON TRUK RIMI. THESE WERE NOT FOUND AND IT IS THOUGHT THAT THEY ARE IN THE SOUTHERN AREA.

0300 AT THIS TIME WAKES LOW FREQUENCY HOMING BEACON 346JC * WENT OFF THE AIR AND WAS NOT HEARD AGAIN.

TO MAKE EASIER READING AND AVOID CONFUSION THIS DAYS CHRONOLOGY WAS MADE BY FREQUENCY.

COVERAGE OF 6655A GAVE US THE FIRST INDICATION THAT WAKE WAS HIT. BY VIRTUE OF TRANSMITTER TROUBLE ON THE 8550J-4275A SERIES THE SECOND INDICATION AND BULK OF EARLY TRAFFIC APPEARED ON THE 7300A-4385A SERIES. THE AIR FREQUENCY OF 7120J PRODUCED SOME GOOD TRAFFIC ALSO. TRUK'S RIMI WAS COVERED WHEN POSSIBLE TO GET THE OVER-ALL PICTURE BUT IT WAS NOT PRACTICAL TO COVER THIS ALL THE TIME AND SACRIFICE OTHER CIRCUITS.

7 OCTOBER 43.

0000 • 7120J, WAKE STILL GOING WITH LONG MESSAGE. TRANSMITTER STILL GIVING TROUBLE AS IT DOES NOT KEY ALL THE TIME.

0105 7120J, WAKE UNREADABLE NOW DUE TO TRANSMITTER.

0152 7120J, WAKE IS BACK UP AGAIN AND CALLING RUOTTO AND TAROA. RUOTTO HAD ATTEMPTED TO RAISE WAKE EARLIER WITH NO SUCCESS.

0221 7120J, JUST FEW VEES HEARD NOW.

0240 7120J, NO ACTION HERE ALTHOUGH OUR PLANES SHOULD BE OVER THE TARGET AREA.

A CHECK WAS KEPT ON 7120J, 6655A AND LOW FREQUENCY AT THIS TIME.

0330 7120J, RUOTTO TO ANOTHER BASE WITH TRAFFIC.

0410 7120J, RUOTTO CALLING WAKE WITH NO RESULT.

TO
0425

0608 7120J, TAROA AND ANOTHER AIR BASE WORKING HERE.

0621 7120J, ONE PLANE WORKING TAROA.

0653 7120J, PLANE ASKS TAROA IF HE HAS ANY AVIATION WEATHER FOR HIM.

CHRONOLOGY

~~SECRET~~

7 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 0700 7120J, PLANES AND BASES WORKING NOW WITH SOME TRAFFIC.
- 0740 7120J, NO ACTIVITY.
TO
0859
- 0900 7120J, BASES TO BASES AND ONE PLANE WITH TRAFFIC. RUOTTO MENTIONS (TAH1711) IN A SERVICE, ALL THIS TRANSMISSION WAS NOT RECEIVED HERE. THE INDICATOR COULD MEAN 5720J OR 5110M. CHECKED FOR THESE BUT NO RESULTS AS YET.
- 0943 7120J, A NEW PLANE CALL APPEARS HERE (4WIHA2) AND WORKS BASE. SOME BASE TO BASE TRAFFIC. A PLANE HERE IS UNABLE TO RAISE RUOTTO SO TAROA IS RELAYING TO AND FROM PLANE.
- 1011 7120J, RUOTTO AGAIN ATTEMPTS TO RAISE WAKE BUT GIVES IT UP.
- 1115 AIR ACTIVITY SUBSIDES.
- 1151 7120J, A "BOGY" IS REPORTED NEARBY; STANDING BY THIS TO FREQUENCY FOR A CONTACT REPORT.
1200 THE "BOGY" REPORTED SHOT DOWN, NO TRANSMISSION MADE BY THIS PLANE THAT WAS HEARD HERE.
- 1302 7120J, SIGNALS HEARD HERE BUT ARE TOO WEAK FOR COPY.
- 1325 AT THIS TIME BASES AND PLANES THAT APPEARED ON 7120J ARE SHOWING UP ON 6115J. ANOTHER OPERATOR PUT ON THAT AND 7120J CONTINUES TO BE WATCHED.
- 1432 7120J, IN ACTION AGAIN .
- 1444 7120J, RUOTTO AND TAROA HERE WORKING DIFFERENT PLANE GROUPS THAN APPEAR ON 6115J, WAKE HAS BEEN UNHEARD ON EITHER FREQUENCY AS YET.
- 1544 7120J, ONE OF 6115J PLANES APPEARS ON HERE SO IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE FREQUENCIES ARE INTERCHANGEABLE. BASES AND PLANES GOING HERE NOW.
- 1652 7120J, RUOTTO AGAIN TRIES TO RAISE WAKE.
- 1702 7120J, RUOTTO SENDS TRAFFIC TO WAKE THAT WAS ORIGINATED BY A PLANE. NO ROGER IS HEARD.
- 1707 7120J, TAROA TELLS A PLANE THAT HE HAS TRAFFIC OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE FOR HIM. (YUFU TA). TAROA SENDS HIS NR 4 TO THE PLANE.

CHRONOLOGY

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- 1756 7120J, PLANE ASKING RUOTTO FOR AVIATION WEATHER.
- 1801 7120J, RUOTTO SENDS AVIATION WEATHER TO PLANE.
- 1820 7120J, PLANE (9ROFU3) SENDS SIGNAL. SI"KO TO RUOTTO. MEANS HE HAS TROUBLE (COMMUNICATIONS ?)
- 1840 7120J, RUOTTO CALLS FOUR PLANE GROUP COMMANDERS AND SENDS TRAFFIC. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS IS A GENERAL RECALL FOR PLANES.
- 1900 7120J, TRAFFIC HERE STILL GOING STRONG.
- 1930 7120J, PLANE SIGNALS HAVE DROPPED HERE AND HAVE INCREASED AT THEIR BASES. (PER KAN REPORTS) IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE PLANES WERE RETURNING TO BASE.
- 2144 7120J, NO MORE HEARD HERE.
TO
2315
- 1325 6115J, NOW FIND 7120J BASES WORKING PLANE HERE, THE 6118M PLANES ARE OF NEW GROUP.
- 1351 6115J, ACTIVITY GOOD HERE, RUOTTO AND PLANES.
- 1548 6115J, A PLANE (9REN1) IS TRYING TO RAISE WAKE AIR BASE AND SENDS HIS TRAFFIC WITHOUT WAITING FOR A GO AHEAD. THE TRAFFIC IS PLAIN LANGUAGE AND ASKS WHAT FREQUENCY TO USE IN HOMING TO WAKE. TAROA COMES UP AND ROGERS FOR THIS TRAFFIC .
- 1608 6115J, RUOTTO TELLS PLANE THAT WAKE HAS RECEIVED HIS NR2 (PLAIN LANGUAGE).
- 1614 6115J, PLANE SENDS ANOTHER PLAIN LANGUAGE MESSAGE TO WAKE FOR WHICH RUOTTO AND TAROA ROGER.
- 1623 6115J, RUOTTO SENDS A MESSAGE TO THE PLANE FROM WAKE, THIS BELEIVED TO BE IN ANSWER TO NR2 FROM PLANE. IT IS ALSO BELEIVED THAT RUOTTO IS RELAYING TRAFFIC TO WAKE ON 5110M.
- 1630 6115J; STILL BUSY WITH PLANES AND BASES.
- 1706 6115J, LAST HEARD.
- 1810 6115J, STILL UNHEARD, BELEIVE CIRCUIT SECURED.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

7 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 0935 5110M, FIND TAROA, RUOTTO AND REST OF AIR BASES WORKING HERE WITH EXCEPTION OF WAKE. THIS COULD BE (TAHI711).
- 1811 5110M, RUOTTO TO TAROA WITH TRAFFIC, RUOTTO TO ALL AIR BASES. ALL BASES SEEM TO BE HERE EXCEPT WAKE.
2100 THE ACTIVITY IS LIGHT HERE AS IT IS ON ALL THE REST OF THE MARSHALLS FREQUENCIES.
- 0135 4385A, CHECK HERE FOR WAKE, TRANSMITTER HERE IS ALL RIGHT AND HAS S 5 SIGNAL. CIRCUIT NORMAL.
- 0227 4385A, ALL NORMAL HERE, WAKE WORKING KWAJALEIN.
- 05011 4385A, ALL HANDS SHIFT UP TO DAY FREQUENCY OF 7300A.
- 0510 7300A, WAKE IS VERY GOOD HERE, CIRCUIT RUNNING NORMAL.
- 0857 7300A, WAKE TRANSMITTER NOW GIVING SOME TROUBLE, SEEMS TO BE AN OVERLOAD OF POWER RESULTING IN BLOCKING. HIS TRAFFIC WAS GOTTEN OFF AFTER SOME DIFFICULTY.
- 1046 7300A, WAKE TRYING TO WORK KWAJALEIN BUT NOT MAKING MUCH HEADWAY SO GETS RUOTTO GUARD DIV TO RELAY FOR HIM.
- 1150 7300A, RUOTTO GUARD DIV. AGAIN RELAYING TO KWAJALEIN FOR WAKE.
- 0000 4275A, BEING COVERED HERE. QUITE A BIT OF TRAFFIC IS FLOWING AND WAKE HEARD HERE WITH NO STRAIN. TRANSMITTER IS NORMAL.
- 0327 4275A, WAKE (YOKEYU) CALLS MARSHALLS COLLECTIVE AND SENDS, HIIHIIHI DE 2 RIKI.
- 0328 4275A, RUOTTO CALLS MARSHALLS COLLECTIVE AND REPEATS THIS.
- 0339 4275A, WAKE CALLS COLLECTIVE AND SENDS, HIIHIIHI DE YOKEYU.
- 0343 4275A, WAKE SENDING TRAFFIC TO RUOTTO AND TAROA. THIS WAS THE LAST HEARD OF WAKE ON THIS SERIES.
- 2317 4275A, RUOTTO TRYING TO RAISE WAKE HERE WITH NO SUCCESS.
- 2341 4275A, WAKE WAS HEARD S 1 TO 0 IN ANSWER TO RUOTTO, TOO POOR TO BE POSITIVE OF TRANSMISSION.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

7 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

MARSHALLS AIR BASES THIS DAY USED 5110M FOR AN OVERLOAD CIRCUIT IN CONJUNCTION WITH 4275A-8550J. WAKE WAS OFF THE AIR ON 4275A-8550J FOR SOME TIME BUT WAS ON 7300A-4385A SERIES MOST OF THE DAY. TODAY WAS THE FIRST TIME WE COULD BE SURE THAT 6115J WAS USED FOR AN OVERLOAD OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH 7120J, THIS WAS HEARD THE SIXTH BUT NOT LONG ENOUGH TO PROVE ANYTHING. 6655A FAILED TO SHOW THIS DAY AND IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE POSSIBLE THAT WAKE HAD SENT HIS PICKET BOATS TO SOME OTHER ISLAND TO PROTECT THEM. AN AIR SEARCH WAS MADE FOR US BY PLANES, PROBABLY FROM RUOTTO OR TAROA, RUOTTO SEEMED TO BE IN CONTROL ON THE AIR CIRCUITS. A COUPLE OF THESE PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN BY OUR UNITS AND IT IS THOUGHT THAT ONLY ONE WAS NEAR ENOUGH AT ANY TIME TO SPOT THE TASK FORCE, THIS ONE WAS SHOT DOWN BEFORE HE GOT ANY TRANSMISSION OFF. AS FAR AS IS KNOWN HERE ONLY ONE PLANE ATTEMPTED TO GO TO WAKE ON THE EVENING OF THIS DAY AND FROM REPORTS WAKES AIR FIELD WAS IN SUCH CONDITION THAT A LANDING PLANE WOULD BE WASHED OUT.

8 OCTOBER 43.

- 0000 4275A, CONDITIONS POOR HERE WITH WAKES SIGNAL STRENGTH DOWN TO S 1 .
- 0031 4385A, WAKE GOING HERE WITH A FAIR SIGNAL BUT KEYING IS BAD.
- 0220 3990A, KWAJALEIN WORKING RUOTTO AND USING NARAE FOR CALL.
- 0340 4385A, WAKE NOW MUFU , TRAFFIC HAS SUBSIDED.
- 0408 4385A, WAKE AGAIN TO KWAJALEIN WITH TRAFFIC, SENDS ABOUT FOUR.
- NO AIR OR SUBMARINE ACTIVITY FOUND AT THIS TIME.
- 0445 7120J. TRANSMITTER TUNING UP HERE.
- 0458 7120J, PLANE AND TAROA AIR BASE WORKING, RUOTTO ALSO SHOWS UP HERE BUT WAKE IS NOT HEARD.
- 0522
TO
0625 7120J, INACTIVE.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

8 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 0625 7120J, UP OCCASIONALLY WITH LITTLE ACTION.
ON
- 0800 MARSHALLS AND WAKE FREQUENCIES NOT ACTIVE.
- 0805 7945J, PLANE AND BASE WORKING HERE, THIS IS THOUGHT
TO BE A NORTHERN CIRCUIT, SIGNAL STRENGTH INDICATES
SOME DISTANCE.
- 0819 7120J, RUOTTO CALLING WAKE WITH NO RESULT.
- 0850 7120J, RUOTTO STILL CALL WAKE BUT UNRAISE HIM.
TO
0917
- 1014 7120J, PLANE WORKING RUOTTO BUT IS VERY WEAK HERE
RUOTTO HOWEVER, GIVES HIM KAN 5.
- 1049 5110M, MARSHALLS AIR BASES WORKING HERE INSTEAD OF
8550J.
- 1127 6260J, BASE AND PLANE WORKING, THE BASE HERE IS WEAK
AND THE PLANE HAS BETTER SIGNAL.
- 1150 6843M, KWAJALBIT, PONAPE AND PLANE WORKING HERE FOR
SHORT TIME. WJALUIT CALLED ONE SERVICE CALL WHICH WAS
NOT HEARD HERE.
- 1230 7120J, RUOTTO AND PLANE WERE UP HERE FOR FEW MINUTES.
- 1313 7120J, BASE UP FROM TIME TO TIME, NO TRAFFIC.
TO
1347
- 1445 7863M, TWO KANA CALL TO SERVICE CALL (II 1 DE KANI)
1458 MUCH CALLING HERE BUT SERVICE CALL WAS UNRAISED.
- 1508 7120J, BASE AND PLANE WITH POOR SIGNALS.
- 1512 7120J, BASES AND PLANES, ALL SIGNALS POOR AND A BBC
FREQUENCY RIDES OVER THIS CAUSING HEAVY INTERFERENCE.
- 1609 7120J, RUOTTO AND TAROA AIR BASES TO PLANE WHICH THEY
DO NOT SUCCEED IN RAISING.
- 1703 7120J, RUOTTO TRIES TO RAISE A PLANE HERE WITH NO LUCK.
1718
- 1730 2836E, CHECKING THIS FREQUENCY FOR STRONG SIGNAL HEARD
BY RADIO ONE.
- 1750 2836E, A CARRIER WAVE WAS ONLY SIGNAL HEARD AND THIS
WAS TOO WEAK TO BE OF INTEREST TO US.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

8 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

- 1917 6403M, DRILL CIRCUIT USING SERVICE CALLS, OPERATORS ON
HERE VERY FAST AND SNAPPY.
- 1930 6260J, BASES AND BASES WORKING. A SCHEDULE WAS MADE FOR
2030 AND THE CIRCUIT SECURED.
- 2030 6260J, THIS CIRCUIT WAS UNHEARD THIS FREQUENCY OR ANY
OTHER.

ON THIS DAY WE DROPPED THE THREE MAN WATCH SCHEDULE
AND RETURNED TO A TWO MAN WATCH WITH ONE MAN ON TRUK
RIMI AND ONE SEARCH MAN FOR AIR AND SUB ACTIVITY.
NOTHING WAS HEARD THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED IN OUR
VICINITY OR OF CONCERN TO US AT THIS TIME.

9 OCTOBER 43.

MID WATCH: ONE MAN TO WATCH COMSUBFOR UTU WHEN UP, TO
CHECK ON SUBMARINES AND COVER TRUK RIMI.

DAY WATCH: ONE MAN ON TRUK RIMI AND ONE SEARCH MAN TO
CHECK AIR AND SUBMARINE FREQUENCIES.

EVE WATCH: ONE MAN ON TRUK RIMI AND ONE SEARCH MAN TO
CHECK AIR, SUBMARINE AND MARSHALLS FREQUENCIES FOR
ACTIVITY.

RESULTS OF THIS DAYS EFFORTS WERE ZERO. NOTHING THAT
OCCURED COULD BE CONSTRUED AS APPLYING TO THIS FORCE.
SEARCH WATCH WAS SECURED AT 1800.

10 OCTOBER 43.

MID WATCH: ONE MAN WATCH TO COVER COMSUBFOR UTU WHEN
IT HAS TRAFFIC AND TO COVER TRUK RIMI ALTERNATELY.

DAY WATCH: COVERED TRUK RIMI WITH OCCASIONAL CHECK
FOR AIR ACTIVITY.

EVE WATCH: COVERED TRUK UTU.

RESULTS AGAIN ZERO.

11 OCTOBER 43.

ALL WATCHES THIS DAY COVERED THE TRUK RIMI, NOTHING
HAS APPEARED THAT HAS ANY BEARING ON THIS TASK FORCE.

CHRONOLOGY

SECRET

11 OCTOBER 43, CONT.

1800

AS WE ARE WITHIN A FEW HOURS RUN OF PEARL HARBOR AT THIS TIME ALL WATCHES HAVE BEEN SECURED. TRUK'S BROADCAST FAILED TO PRODUCE ANYTHING CONCERNING US THIS DAY.

FOR THE BENEFIT OF FUTURE TASK FORCE UNITS IT IS REPEATED THAT ON THIS TYPE OF CARRIER THE RECEIVING ANTENNAES ARE APT TO PICK UP A GREAT DEAL OF LOCAL INDUCTION FROM THE RADAR EQUIPMENT. IT WAS FOUND BY TRIAL THAT THE TRANSMITTING ANTENNAES ARE A GOOD DEAL BETTER FROM THE STANDPOINT OF NOISE AND OF SIGNAL. THIS, OF COURSE, IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF NO TRANSMITTING IS TO BE DONE BY THE SHIP.

OBSERVATION ON WAKE

SECRET

RADIO BY FREQUENCY.

346 JC

THIS IS WAKES HOMING FREQUENCY FOR PLANES AND WAS FIRST PICKED UP THE EVENING OF 5 OCTOBER, MINUS 9. THE PROCEDURE ON THIS FREQUENCY IS AS FOLLOWS: WAKE SENDS HIS "CHARLIE" CALL THEN MAKE LONG DASHES FOR FIVE MINUTES MAKE HIS CALL AGAIN AND LONG DASHES FOR FIVE MORE MINUTES. AT THE END OF THIS TEN MINUTE PERIOD HE WOULD MAKE HIS CALL AGAIN AND SHUT DOWN FOR TEN MINUTES. THIS CONTINUED UNTIL ALL HIS PLANES WERE IN.

436 J
4275A

Taroa AB HOMING FREQ

MARSHALLS AIR BASE FREQUENCY CONTROLLED BY RUOTTO AIR BASE. ON THIS WAKE WOULD SEND OUT HIS REGULAR WEATHER AND AVIATION WEATHER. AT MIDNIGHT WAKE SENT WEATHER AND THEN SECURED TILL 0300, USUALLY. WAKES WEATHER WOULD GENERALLY COME OUT AT THREE HOUR INTERVALS. WAKE WOULD ALSO SEND HIS PLANE SEARCH REPORTS TO RUOTTO AFTER HIS PLANES HAD COME IN.

4385A

THIS IS KWAJALEINS FREQUENCY TO ALL MARSHALLS AREA AND MARUS. WAKE NORMALLY USED THIS TO SEND AVIATION WEATHER ON BUT AFTER THE RAID HE USED TO CLEAR HIS OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC AS HIS TRANSMITTER FOR THE 4275A-8550J SERIES WAS NOT IN COMMISSION. ALL OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC SENT KWAJALEIN BY WAKE WAS REBROADCAST TO ALL MARSHALLS AREA BY KWAJALEIN.

5110M

THIS IS A MARSHALLS AIR BASE FREQUENCY AND WAS USED AS AN OVERLOAD CIRCUIT BY THESE BASES ON THE SEVENTH OF OCTOBER AND IN PLACE OF 8550J ON THE EIGHTH. IT IS BELEIVED THAT WAKE DID NOT HAVE A TRANSMITTER TO PUT UP ON HERE AFTER THE RAID AS HE DID NOT APPEAR.

6115J

THIS IS ALSO A MARSHALLS AIR BASE FREQUENCY AND WAS USED INSTEAD OF 8550J NOT LONG AGO. AT THIS TIME HOWEVER, IT WAS USED BY TAROA, RUOTTO AND OTHER AIR BASES IN THE MARSHALLS TO WORK PLANES AND BY PLANES TO THE BASES. THIS WAS HEARD THE SIXTH FOR JUST A SHORT TIME BUT ON THE SEVENTH WAS USED INDEPENDANT OF AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH 7120J. WAKE WAS NOT HEARD ON HERE BUT BELEIVE THIS ONLY BECAUSE OF HIS SHORTAGE OF TRANSMITTERS IN COMMISSION.

6655A

WAKES FREQUENCY TO AND FROM HIS PICKET BOATS. A STANDING SCHEDULE OF 0300 WAS OBSERVED HERE BY HIM BUT IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR HIM TO BE AS LATE AS 0330. IT IS APPARENT THOUGH THAT A GUARD MUST BE KEPT ON THIS FREQUENCY BY THE PICKET BOATS BECAUSE WAKE WOULD BE CALLING THEM WHENEVER THERE WAS ANY TRAFFIC. IN THE CALL UPS WAKE WOULD MAKE RA OR " " " BETWEEN STATION CALLED AND STATION CALLING OR BETWEEN STATION CALLED AND THE DE .

OBSERVATIONS ON WAKE

SECRET

CONT.

6655A

AT TIMES THE DE WOULD BE LEFT OUT ENTIRELY BUT THIS TYPE OF PROCEDURE COULD HARDLY BE CALLED ABBREVIATED. BEFORE THE ATTACK, ON HIS 0300 SKED, WAKE WOULD CALL ONE OR TWO OF THE PICKET BOATS SO IT IS ASSUMED THAT THESE WERE DUTY BOATS AND HAD THE RADIO GUARD.

THE PICKET BOATS USED EXTREMELY LOW POWER AT ALL TIMES AND EVEN WHEN ATTACKED DID NOT RAISE THEIR POWER SO IT IS A MATTER OF SMALL WONDER THAT THEY ARE SELDOM HEARD AT STATION "H".

IT IS BELIEVED THAT NUMBERS (5) AND (9) WERE SUNK BY OUR PLANES. IT IS ALSO CONSIDERED POSSIBLE THAT WAKE SENT THE REST TO SOME OTHER ISLAND FOR PROTECTION AS THEY WERE UNHEARD THE SECOND DAY OF ATTACK.

7120J

THIS IS THE REGULAR MARSHALLS AREA AIR FREQUENCY AND IS THE ONE WAKE APPEARED ON. THIS AND 6115J ARE THE ONLY AIR FREQUENCIES THAT WAKE WAS CALLED ON. WAKE AND HIS PLANES AS WELL AS RUOTTO, TAROA OTHER BASES, AND PLANES APPEARED HERE THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND SEVENTH.

7300A

(SEE NIGHT FREQUENCY 4385A)

8550J

(SEE NIGHT FREQUENCY 4275A)

8725J

THIS WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A WAKE AIR FREQUENCY ALTERNATE FOR 7120J BUT WAS UNHEARD BY THIS UNIT, APPARENTLY 7120J AND 6115J PROVED SATISFACTORY AT ALL TIMES.

THIS UNIT CONSIDERS WAKE RADIO TO BE EITHER THE BEST CONCEALED OR BEST PROTECTED EQUIPMENT SO FAR ENCOUNTERED. CONSIDERING THE HEAVY BOMBING, STRAFING AND SHELLING THAT WAKE TOOK IT IS REMARKABLE THAT THEY KEPT TRANSMITTERS ON THE AIR MOST OF THE TIME AND GOT THE TRAFFIC OFF SO SWIFTLY.

FREQUENCIESSECRET

81 M		TOKYO TO ALL SHIPS AND STATIONS, HAS A SCHEDULE AT 2300.
93 E	3RD	TOKYO TO D/F YOKOSUKA.
112 E	3RD	CHICHIJIMA TO UNIDENTIFIED THREE KANA CALL.
170 E	3RD	KOGASHIMA AIR BASE. HAS 2300 SCHEDULE.
175 E	3RD	2 KANA CALL (HOSE) TO (CQ). HAS A SCHEDULE FOR 2300.
248 E	3RD	SERVICE CALLS, CONDITIONS WERE TOO POOR FOR IDENTIFICATIONS.
445 E	3RD	NO CALL, STATION GOING WITH "MAM" TYPE BROADCAST.
456 E	4TH	NA RA E TO THREE KANA CALL (FUWISE), A YOKOSUKA DEFFOR UNIT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT STATION USING "JERK" CALL IS YOKOSUKA.
500 A		TWO KANA CALL (HOSE) TO (CQ).
3975M		SERVICE CALLS THAT DO NOT FIT CONVERSION TABLES. THIS CIRCUIT SECURED BEFORE MUCH INFORMATION COULD BE GAINED.
4289M	5TH	OMINATO TO SUBMARINES.
4336M	30TH	SERVICE CALLS IDENTIFIED AS BEING UNITS IN YOKOSUKA DEFFOR.
4340M	2ND	
4335M	2ND	
4405M	2ND	DRILL CIRCUIT USING SERVICE CALLS.
5110M	7TH	RUOTTO, TAROA AND OTHER MARSHALLS AIR BASES.
5112M	8TH	
5113M		DRILL CIRCUIT EMPLOYING SERVICE CALLS.
6086M		SERVICE CALLS WITH DRILL TRAFFIC.
6403M	4TH 8TH	SERVICE CALLS WITH DRILL TRAFFIC, OPERATORS ON THIS CIRCUIT ARE VERY GOOD INDEED.
6628M	2ND	CALL ASSOCIATED WITH AIR EMPIRE (TONOYU) TO KANA NUMERAL CALL (HO 1)
6635E	1ST	(FREQUENCY METER OUT) TWO KANA CALL TO THREE KANA AND NUMERAL TWO KANA CALL.

FREQUENCIES, CONT.

~~SECRET~~

6642M 5TH THREE KANA CALL (TONOYU) TO KANA NUMERAL CALL (HO 1). THREE KANA CALL (MENAME) TO KANA NUMERAL CALL (A 5). THIS WAS PREVIOUSLY HEARD ON 6628M THE SECOND.

6660M 1ST
6648M 2ND
6650M 3RD
6648M 4TH
5TH GUARD DIV. 61 (TOTINI) CALLING THREE KANA CALLS ASSOCIATED WITH TRUK AND THE MARSHALLS AND KANA NUMERAL CALLS (HO 1 THRU 4).

6843M 30TH
1ST THREE KANA CALL (SUNOME) (ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATIONS SOUTHEAST AREA) TO THREE KANA NUMERAL CALL (SUNOME 1).

6843M 8TH PONAPE AND JALUIT USING THREE KANA CALLS. JALUIT TO SERVICE CALL. ONE PLANE WORKING PONAPE AND JALUIT.

6945M 4TH DRILL CIRCUIT USING SERVICE CALLS.

7125M 3RD
4TH KANA NUMERAL CALL TO KANA NUMERAL CALL. (HA 1 TO HA 2)

7863M TWO KANA CALL TO SERVICE CALL, TRIED TO RAISE HIM BUT NO RESPONSE.

8623M 4TH KANA NUMERAL (TA 1) AND TWO KANA CALL (KANI) WORKING HERE WITH DRILL TRAFFIC, SIGNALS WERE POOR.

8761M 1ST ONE PLANE HEARD HERE. NO FURTHER TRANSMISSION.

THERE WERE MANY MORE DRILL CIRCUITS HEARD IN SWEEPING OVER THE BANDS BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE TIME ENOUGH TO MEASURE THEM AND GET INFORMATION ON THEM.

SPECIAL SIGNALS

SIYU BEING ATTACKED. THIS IS ABBREVIATION.

SITU UNDER ATTACK. THIS WAS THOUGHT TO BE A GARBLE FOR SIYU.

RECOMENDATIONS

SECRET

IT IS RECOMENDED THAT A RIP 5 BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE RIP 5 - 1 A. THE PORTABLE IS PRACTICAL ON SLOW CIRCUITS BUT WHEN AN OPERATOR IS RUSHED MISTAKES ARE BOUND TO OCCUR DUE TO THE DIFFERENCES IN THE KEY BOARDS. A FOURTH RIP 5 WOULD HAVE BEEN OF GREAT VALUE ON THIS TASK.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMENDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL TWO MEN BE SENT WITH AN R 1 UNIT FOR DUTY ON TASK FORCES. IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THESE MEN BE FIRST CLASS MEN OR SEARCH OPERATORS AS THEY COULD BE EMPLOYED IN COVERING WHATEVER BROADCAST OR POINT TO POINT CIRCUIT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DICTATE. THIS WOULD RELIEVE THE STRAIN OF HAVING SEARCH MEN COVER BROADCASTS WHEN THEY COULD BE BETTER EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE. WITH SUCH AN ADDITION IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO LEAVE THE BROADCAST UNGUARDED AT TIMES AS IS NOW THE CASE.

AS THE RBK ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY RECEIVER IS OF SMALL USE UNLESS PLANES ARE OPERATING OVERHEAD OR CLOSE BY IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE SPACE IT TAKES COULD BE BETTER UTILIZED BY ANOTHER SX 28 RECEIVER. AN ADDITIONAL SX 28 RECEIVER WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE WHEN COVERING NUMEROUS FREQUENCIES WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF OPERATORS.

IT IS RECOMENDED THAT A MODEL LM-13 FREQUENCY METER BE AQURED AND CARRIED AS ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT. WE WERE ABLE TO BORROW ONE ON THIS OCCASION BUT MAY NOT ALWAYS BE ABLE TO DO SO AS SOME AIR DEPARTMENTS DO NOT HAVE SPARES.

IN THE MATTER OF PUBLICATIONS AND REFERENCE MANUALS CARRIED IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THEY BE BOUND IN SOME HEAVY, DURABLE MATERIAL THAT WILL WITHSTAND THE CONSTANT HANDLING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11 October 1943

Memorandum for Commander T. A. Huckins:

Subject: Radio Intelligenc Activities, report of

Enclosure: Subject report.

1. Experience has shown that in the instances when the enemy has been most active in the Northern Pacific area, immediately available Radio Direction Finder facilities could have been used to good advantage.

During the months of June and early July, after the introduction of 7735 Kcs as a submarine frequency, there were ample indications of submarine activity and it was often possible by traffic analysis to foresee their intentions to run into Kiska. In the not few instances when submarine transmitters were active, good fixes could have been obtained.

Although the enemy air force has not been extremely active in this area to date, in the instances in which they did operate, fixes from Hypo through regular crypto channels were received too late to be of tactical value.

The present system of using the 4005 Kcs series for speedy delivery of fixes from Pearlharbor Communication Intelligence, and the flashing of targets desired should greatly increase the effectiveness of the Unit.

In the light of this experience, it is considered, if practicable, whenever and wherever possible, similar Direction Finder facilities should be made available to shore based detached units charged with the responsibility of furnishing material of tactical value to the local Command.

2. A recommendation has been submitted and endorsed by the Chief of Staff ComNorPac recommending approval, for the advancement in rating to Chief Radioman for R. A. Rundle RMLc and Albertson G. RMLc.

Routing - Letter & Report

- 1 - G *AND* 8 GR *EW*
 - 2 - GF *Q*
 - 3 - GF (freq) *ZZ*
 - 4 - GT *and*
 - 5 - GQ *W*
 - 6 - GA *Clay*
 - 7 - GY *A*
- Return to GX*
- JAH.*

Respectfully,

EB Beath

E. B. Beath

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~~SECRET~~

5 October 1943

A report on activities of the Radio Intelligence Unit attached to Task Force Sixteen from July 21, 1943 to October 1, 1943 follows in two parts.

I OPERATIONS
II MATERIEL

~~SECRET~~

5 October 1943

I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage. List of frequencies heard between July 21-Oct 1 .

- 75A - Yokosuka to Various -
- 82J - Yokosuka D/F Control to D/F Stations
- 201M - Chinkai Comm Unit to Jerk
- 248M - Kiska to NorFor SubFor
- 264J - Horomushiro, Ominato, other Kurile Stations, Units
- 294M - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 315M - Ruotto Airbase to Imieji Airbase
- 354M - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 400M - Wakkanai to Patcraft, various units
- 420M - Okinawa Deffor to Deffor Units
- 451M - MU73 to Two-Kana Num Call & E MI HO
- 454M - Wakkanai to Units
- 465M - Okujiri Radio, Kimikawa Maru to C/S Kure, Deffor Units
- 500M - Two-Kana Calls, JCS (Mentioned 425KC), JTK to RU RI N (Mentioned 131KC)
- 2480J - Horomushiro, Fifth Flt Units & Marus
- 2540M - Kure to Hongkong B.F. Unit & HI NA O (2545J-TIU151?)
- 3600M - Two-Kana-Num Calls (Drill Ckt)
- 3606M - KI WE RI & YU HO TA (Army?)
- 3612M - Two-Kana-Num Calls (Drill Ckt)
- 3612M - HO0 & HO3 (Inter-Kiska Ckt?) (NC)
- 3621M - Num-Two-Kana Calls
- 3680A - Comm Unit Kolombongara to Airbase Munda

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage (Cont)

- 3896M - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 3812J - D/F Ckt
- 3817J - Air Sta's, Air Groups, Units
- 4015J - Tokyo, Ominato, Horomushiro, Kiska, Occasional Units (NC)
- 4052M - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 4075M - Tokyo, Ominato, Horomushiro
- 4255A - Ominato BC
- 4315M - WI SE to HO E HA NA
- 4370A - D/F Ckt
- 4380A - GuardDiv 63 to GuardDiv at Ruotto
- 4377-81M- Empire Air Sta's - Kuriles Air Sta's
- 4395A - Empire AirBases, Kurile AirBases
- 4465A - Horomushiro BC, Units
- 4485M - Empire Air Sta's, Kuriles Air Sta's, Others
- 4490M - Takao to Saigon, Manila
- 4494M - Tateyama Air, Yokohama Air, AirAtkFor22, Others
- 4625J - Chinkai, Units
- 4650A - Empire D/F Sta's
- 4845A - Bako to Takao
- 4862M - Three-Kana Calls, Units Chinkai Area (MEHETO-KAMUFU-MAFIYA
NAKEN-KIHETE-MAKEC)
- 4880A - Okujiri Radio to various Units (Marus & Patcraft)
- 4890A - Two-Kana Calls
- 4926M - TE NO HO to HO NA YO
- 5002M - Num-Two-Kana Calls (Bases & Planes)
- 5040A - Kii Channel Deffor and Units

Kane Def Com 2tr

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I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage (Cont)

- 5448M - Two-Kana-Num Calls (Drill Ckt)
- 5455A - Kuriles Deffor, Horo AirBase, other AirSta's, Units
- 5364M - WI SE to HO E HA NA (See 4315M)
- 5445A - Oshima Deffor, Units
- 5621M - TE SO to JOU
- 5623M - Sakata AirBase to NO RU YU & KI WI TU *Spec m.S#19*
- 5825M - B.F. Penang to TE O-FU (5832J?)
- 5965A - Singapore to Tokyo
- 6003M - S.L.F.6 Kure, AirBase Rabaul, YO NO KA, WAL
- 6010A - Kwajalein to Subs
- 6039M - Two-Kana-Num Calls (6040J Air Freq?)
Spec m.S#107
- 6111M - KU NO NO to NE A-U & AirBase Batavia
- 6113M - TO NA NE , AirBase Imieji
- 6117M - Ruotto AirBase to Collective Eastern AirFor
- 6120M - Ominato, #5 Wx Unit to Kuriles Wx Sta's
- 6184M - WO NO SU to SI KO YO (Army?)
- 6235J - Sasebo Radio, Marus, Others
- 6265A - Yokosuka Radio, Yokosuka Deffor Units, Others
- 6275M - Two-Kana-Num Calls, Various (6270J?)
- 6325A - Yokosuka to Yokosuka Deffor, many others
- 6365A - Ominato BC
- 6385A - Empire AirBases and Planes
- 6391M - Kure Comm Unit (TU NA) to CQ
- 6403M - Two-Num Calls

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage (Cont)

- 6418M - Horomushiro to Matsuwa (Freq varied greatly)
- 6415J - Buin, many others
- 6445-64M- Chinkai Lookout Sta to Units, Planes
- 6445J - Hankow Deffor Units to Shanghai
- 6447M - Two-Num Calls
- 6447M - Horomushiro, Kuriles Deffor
- 6449-58M- Yokosuka AirBase, Empire Deffor, Planes, others
- 6455M - Num-Two-Kana Calls
- 6468M - HI YU WA to Sasebo Comm Unit
- 6490J - Ominato, Horomushiro, Crudiv 22, many other units
- 6534M - *new army 1 Nov*
MI SU RE to Wakkanai
- 6535A - Chitose AirBase, other Empire AirSta's
- 6638M - *Kosushiro*
ME A I (Hankow Deffor Units)
- 6663M - Empire AirBase and Planes
- 6664M - GuardDiv 61 to H03 & H04
- 6685J - Bases and Planes
- 6692M - MO ME YO to SU MI RE (Pbly Army)
- 6695J - Ominato to various Units
- 6705J - Yokosuka to ships, marus, various
- 6715M - Vessel to SBF Chichijima, others (6705J)
- 6725M - One-Kana Calls
- 6737M - Empire Deffor Units, SE MA YO
- 6750A - Ominato AirBase, Otaru Base, Planes, A O RE
- 6795A - Okinawa Deffor Units

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage (Cont)

- 6830A - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 6845J - 11th AirFlt, AirBases, Planes
- 7035J - 11th AirFlt, many others
- 7051M - Bases and Planes
- 7080M - Bases and Planes
- 7101M - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 7110J - Two-Kana-Num Calls and Planes
- 7169M - Sixth Flt to Jerk (Old 7280?)
- 7175A - One-Kana Calls (SI - Control Sta)
- 7275A - Horomushiro BC, Kuriles Deffor, Units
- 7280J - Jaluit Sub BC (NC)
- 7290A - Palao Comm Unit to Ulithi WX Sta
- 7335A - D/F Ckt. Chichijima, Horo, Marcus, etc.
- 7345J - Empire AirBase to Planes
- 7367M - TE MU YO to I NO NO
- 7424M - WA KI TE to YO KI SI
- 7625M - AirBase (Unident) to Lkujiri Radio
- 7635J - Two-Kana Calls - Carriers etc.
- 7641M - TU U to NI SI
- 7667M - Ominato Air, Planes, A O RE
- 7688M - Two-Kana-Num Calls (Drill Ckt)
- 7696M - WO SA to MAXX
- 7727M - AirBase or Group to FU A TO
- 7733M - RU SO O to TE SA MI (Pbly Army)

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage (Cont)

- 7734M - Kana-Num-Kana Calls
- 7735A - Ominato, Kiska, Subs, Units (NC)
- 7745A - Chitose Air, Kasumigaura Air, Matsushima Air, Planes, Other
- 7745M - Two-Kana-Num Calls
- 7760J - TU WI to M A M
- 7778M - SubChaserDiv 60 to Soerabaya & Rabaul Comm Units
- 7794M - Rabaul and Soerabaya
- 7818-25M - AirGroup 752, Yokosuka AirBase, Kagoshima Air, Saho Comm.
09.501
- 7877M - FU MU N to Planes
- 7898M - Nansei Shoto AirBase, Plane
- 7933M - Unident AirBase to Yokosuka AirBase
- 7945M - Bases and Planes - One-Kana & Kana-Num Calls
- 7968M - RU YU HI to TSUNESHIMA MARU
- 7975J - Kure Radio to Marus
- 8024M - Truk Comm Unit to Tarawa
- 8030J - Tokyo, Ominato, Horomushiro, Kiska occasional Units (NC)
- 8032M - 6991 to SI SA RE
- 8036M - Two-Kana-Num Call to Planes (Num-Two-Kana-Num)
- 8040M - SU NO ME to Num-Three-Kana-Num Calls (Planes)
- 8105J - Horomushiro Air, Planes / FU SE NU & KI SO TE Called.
- 8150M - Tokyo, Ominato, Horomushiro
- 8225J - Oshima Deffor, Nansei Island Deffor, others
- 8230M - Tateyama AirSta to Empire AirSta
- 8242M - U MU NA to E O NO, Planes

09 Plans Habutu - 9.

~~SECRET~~

I OPERATIONS

1. Coverage (Cont)

- 8350J - Tokyo BC
- 8444M - SU NO ME to Plane
- 8450J - Rabaul, others
- 8456M - TO RA to RE MI
- 8478M - TE WI to MAYY
- 8510A - Ominato BC
- 8740A - D/F Ckt
- 8760A - Horo AirBase, Akkeshi Wx Sta, Matsuwa (NC)
Horo AirBase, Yokohama AirBase, Chitose AirBase (Current)
- 8825J - Bases and Planes (Various types of Calls)
- 8844M - YU SA MA to Two-Kana-Num Call (8845J?)
- 8876M - One-Kana Calls (Drill Ckt)
- 8894M - Empire Air Calls, to Two-Kana-Num Calls, Moji Tpn Sect
- 8915J - General Air Frequency
- 9085J - Planes, Airgroup 902 Truk, Airgroup 902 Guam Detach, Wake Garrison, BF5 Saipan, many others.
- 9462M - Escort Vessel to Kagoshima AirBase
- 10650A - Tokyo, Ominato, Horo, Kiska (Keyed with 8030J) (NC)
- 10750J - TE TE 1 to M A M G
- 11050A - Kasumigaura AirSta, Tateyama AirBase, Formosa AirSta, Chitose Air, others.
- 11450A - Chichijima, Marcus, Saipan, Yokosuka
- 12730M - Ominato BC
- 13405M - Yokosuka to Marus
Resder, 5 Sub Po 59
- 14364M - Yokosuka to HO YU HI & I NA MI
- 15520A - Takao to Tokyo
- 17830A - General Air Freq - Bases and Planes (Double 8915J)

I OPERATIONS (Cont'd)

2. Frequencies and Reception.

(1) Low Frequencies.

On frequencies up to 500 kilocycles, signals are usually copyable from approximately 2300 to 0600 (W), with 264J copyable until about 0800. A later model receiver than RAZ-1 would insure better coverage on these frequencies.

RBA very good for these times

(2) 2000 - 4000 Kcs.

For the past four to six weeks, increasingly heavy static has made reception very poor on these bands. Prior to 28 August, when it was being used regularly, 2480J was usually copyable from about 2200 to 0400. The few times it has been up since then, reception was very poor.

(3) 4000 - 6000 Kcs.

Reception generally good. The most regularly used circuits (4483M, 4880A, 5055J) are usually up and copyable at about 2000. Signals on these bands are usually faded out at 1000, but under very good conditions they can be heard until 1300-1400. Local transmitters cause considerable interference on both the night and day frequencies of the Tokyo-Ominato-Horomushiro circuit. The Ominato broadcast can usually be copied on 6375A during the hours of darkness, but when it is necessary to copy it on 4255A, considerable interference is caused by WKFG, a local Army station.

(4) 6000 - 8000 Kcs.

Reception good. Recently there has been very little activity on the unit and air frequencies during the day, but are usually copyable when up. The Ominato broadcast is sometimes copyable for 24 hours a day on 6375A, but usually fades out between 1400-1600 daily. Daytime reception is hampered considerably by local interference, such as buzzers, power saws, razors, etc.

(5) 8000-12000 Kcs.

Reception good on 8000 band. Considerable interference on 8150M by local Navy transmitters and minor interference by NFG. The Ominato broadcast is always S4-5 on 8510A during the day but is intermittently blocked out by WKFG. No Hi-North frequencies heard in the 9000 Kcs. band. The Ominato broadcast on 12730M is usually S2-3 with reception generally poor due to high noise level and line interference.

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II MATERIEL

1. Receivers.

Receivers now being used by this unit are as follows:

1. Hallicrafter's Model SX-28
1. National Model RAS-3
2. National Model NC200
1. RCA Model RAZ-low frequency

The SX-28 receiver has proved to be the best receiver and is the most used.

2. Frequency Measurement.

1. Type IM-11 frequency meter.

This meter is entirely adequate for our purposes and performs satisfactorily.

3. Antennas.

The antenna system which was described in our report of July 20, 1943 has improved reception considerably over the old set-up. They have held up very well under extremely windy weather.

We have been using the doublet, which was cut for 8030 kilocycles, on 8150 with no noticeable drop in signal strength of any of the stations on this frequency.

4. Emergency Power.

One 10 KVA, 115 Volt, 60 Cycle, 3 phase gasoline powered generator is immediately available and has been used many times when local power failed. Most of our interference is radiated so that using our own generator does not solve the problem of electric razors, saws and other electrical machinery causing trouble.

5. Transmitting equipment.

We now have available a Model TEK transmitter - Output 500 Watts on A-1 emission - for use on the 4005 Kcs series to communicate with the High Frequency D/F Net Control Station. When ICFOA Serial Z2459 is placed in effect, this station will go on the air using the call NUD.

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Traffic Intelligence Report
U.S. Raid on Wake
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The following report will be divided into two sections. The first part will include a chronological record of events; the events being despatches by originating times in the majority of cases. The second section will embody in a summarial way the radio intelligence impressions, the communication discipline, and some generalizations based on assumptions as well as facts.

For all practical purposes, there are three different radio stations on Wake Island, one for the Air Base, one for most of the other activities including Comdr. 65th Guard Force and Wake Comm Unit, and a third station (radio call) used exclusively for direction finder traffic. The three calls are:

- (AB) Wake Air Base - YOKEYU, MIU-1 (MIHI-4)
- (CU) Wake Comm Unit - SUHEKU, UKI-3 (URU-7)
- (DF) Wake DF Station - YURE-6 (YUI-2)

Actually, the evidence supports two stations, Air Base and one other main station where separate frequency and call assigned for DF.

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-0200	Wake AB	Air Group 755 (Taroa) (KETE-0 - KEKA-3)	Routine 0200 weather report sent by Wake AB at 0216 last word from Wake prior to raid.
6-0240	Wake DF	Blank	This direction finder despatch may or may not have been the first suspicion on Wake's part of impending attack depending on possible use of radio by Task Force.
6-0244	Wake CU	Base Force 6 (Info) 4th Fleet Air Flot 22 All Stations Marshalls	Very short urgent (may have been radar report).

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Traffic Intelligence Report
U.S. Raid on Wake
 (continued)

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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-0250	Wake Patrol Comdr? (Special Call N)	Wake Patrol? (Call -??)	Short special patrol system for Local Defense or Patrol.
6-0307	Wake (Garbled call)	Kwajalein CU	Short (2 four-kana groups) DF system. Sent on DF circuit by Wake (3945 kos).
6-0311	Wake CU	Kwajalein CU	HIHIHI (enemy aircraft sighted). This also sent on 3945 kos (DF channel).
6-0320	Wake CU	Same as at 6-0244	Short urgent
6-0322	Wake CU (Call N)	Patrol Boats? (4 call)	Special type warning despatch (W24).
6-0328	Wake CU (Call N)	Patrol (Calls 2,4,6,7)	Special type warning despatch (W24).
6-0338	Wake CU (Call N)	Patrol (3 HE)	Special type warning despatch (W24).
6-0340	Wake CU	Same as 6-0244	Short urgent
6-0349	Wake CU	Same as 6-0244	Short urgent
6-0350	Com 4th Fleet (NARAE)	Inner So. Seas Force (Info) Comb.Flt. (SEYA5) 3rd Flt. NGS 5th Flt. or 12th A.F. (WAN16)	First Reflected Despatch, COMDR I.S.S.F. alerting Marshalls and Gilberts. First observed Kwa- jalein Broadcast 0425. Yokosuka gave to Marcus-Chichi at 0727. Ominato and Truk also broadcast at 0655 and 0433 respectively.

Traffic Intelligence Report
U.S. Raid on Wake
 (continued)

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-0400	Com 4th Fleet? (NARAE)	Combined Fleet Info A.F.22 A.F.25 or 26 11th A.F. #2 SoExFor(C) Air Group 956(C)	This appears to be a request for aircraft reinforcements made by Comdr 4th Fleet on Combined Fleet.
6-0405	Comdr 6th Base Force (NNE2)	<u>All Stations Marshalls.</u> Info Comb. Fleet 3rd Fleet 4th Fleet	This should be same to 6th Base Force from COMDR as COM 4th Fleet to his command at 6-0350 above. This system is held by all small and unimportant stations.
6-0418	TAROA Air Base? (LNUME)	Aircraft (6M00)	<u>First aircraft activity.</u> <u>On 7120 kcs.</u>
6-0420	Com AirFlot 22? (SATE7)	AirFlot 22? Info 3rd Fleet 4th Fleet 11th A.F.?	Probable Operation Order to all Air Bases and Groups in Marshalls-Gilberts. Urgent.
6-0450	Wake CU	Sameas at 6-0244 (except KAMUS-KANIS substitute for TEWIU)	Very short urgent
6-0503	Wake AB	<u>Air Flot 22</u> Info Comb Fleet 4th Fleet Air Group 755	Short urgent in . Note this is first sign of activity from Air Base Wake unless 6-0418 entry pertains to Wake. This despatch was not observed until 0723 transmitted by Kwajalein on regular broadcast.

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Traffic Intelligence Report
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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-0508	Wake AB	<u>Air Flot 22</u> <u>Info 4th Fleet</u> A.G. 755	Believed same as next above Wake Air Base transmitted this at 0708.
6-0520	Air Group 755 (KETE0)	<u>Air Base Ruotto</u> <u>Info AirBase Wake</u>	Very short despatch. May be plane departure Taroa to Ruotto (and Wake eventu- ally).
6-0524	Wake Air Base	Air Flot 22	Very short (4 groups) urgent (Aircraft code). Despite Wake CU clearing traffic to Kwajalein at 0533, this despatch was seen being transmitted by Wake AB at 0722 presumably on first transmission.
6-0540	Wake DF	<u>Comm. Unit Kwajalein</u>	Short direction finder bearing report. Transmitted promptly at 0553. Our Task Force probably radio active. SUHEKU sent this on 4380 in- stead of on 3945 (DF freq.).
6-0544	Wake CU	Kwajalein	Sends procedure signal "Have remedied source of power trouble." Unheard here since 0316 but not necessarily off air that period.

Traffic Intelligence Report
U.S. Raid on Wake
 (continued)

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-ø55ø	Wake CU	Same as at 6-ø244	The first long despatch (67 groups). Hass all the earmarks of preliminary action (damage) report for base facilities exempting Air Base.
6-ø61ø	Wake CU	Same as 6-ø244	Short urgent Good communication out of Wake CU at this time.
6-ø654	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 Air Group 755 Info Comb. Fleet 4th Fleet	Long despatch. Appears to be report of action (damage) as far as <u>aircraft</u> and <u>air base</u> are concerned.
6-ø7ø5	Air Group 755	Wake Air Base	Short Departure report of planes Taroa for Wake (probably).
6-ø74ø	Wake CU	Same as 6-ø244	Short
6-ø745	Wake CU	Same as 6-ø244	Medium
6-ø748	Wake CU	Same as 6-ø244	Very short
6-ø747	Taroa Air Base? (1NUME)	Aircraft?	Short transmission Received rather wide distribution. May have been sight contact our forces?!

Traffic Intelligence Report
U.S. Raid on Wake
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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-0825	Air Group 755	Ruotto AB Info Wake AB Nauru AB	Medium length Involves movement aircraft between Nauru and Wake via Taroa and/or Ruotto.
6-0840 0850 0900 1035	Plane (9TIH02)	<u>Contact Report</u>	This plane originated 5 despatches between 0840 and 1035 (1 not intercepted). Probably enemy sight contact apparent from wide distribution.
6-0905	Air Flot 22	Mille AB Info Wake AB	Medium length Probably ordering planes Mille to Wake.
6-0934	Mille AB	Ruotto AB	Wake not addressed. Perhaps no planes will be sent to Wake.
6-0934	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Additional report of damage?
6-0939	(Concealed) <u>Comdr. 4th Flt.</u>	Air Group 755 Air Flot 22 Wake AB Info Combined Fleet Base Force 6 Wake CU	Medium length. Probably an operation order for plane operations at Wake. Reinforcements.
6-0945 1000 1053	Plane (5MIH01) (from Taroa?)	To contact report address	Contact or search progress report. This plane received from Taroa. AB a contact report originated by 9TIH02 at 0930. See later entries of 5MIH01. Contacts in

Traffic Intelligence ReportU.S. Raid on Wake

(continued)

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-1016	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading (except goes back to TEWIU for KAMU-8)	Medium length damage? report
6-1049	Wake CU	"	Short report
6-1100	Taroa AB (1-NUME)	Plane 9-NERE-5	On 7120 kcs. Short urgent
6-1100	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Medium damage report

Aircraft Analysis Separately.

Traffic Intelligence Report
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 (continued)

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-1150	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Medium report of damage.
6-1210	Wake AB	I.S.S.F. (Collective) Air Flot 22 (TUSI-5)	Medium report of damage to Air Base.
6-1330	Wake AB (garble call)	Air Flot 22 Air Group 755	Very short (3 groups) This seen only once-at 1528 going from 7-YARO to 8-NEMU and 1-NUME on 7120 kos.
6-1400	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 Comdr. Air Group 755 Comdr. Info Comdr. 4th Fleet Eastern Air Force	Very long (W-420) report probably damage summary and request for air support.
6-1412	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 Comdr. Air Group 755 Comdr. Info Combined Fleet I.S.S.F. (Collective) I.S.S.F. Comdr.	Medium length damage report
6-1515	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Short damage report
6-1515	Wake AB (2-RIKI)	Broadcasted	HIHIHI - Enemy planes in sight. Note that this sent by 2-RIKI on 7120 kos. for benefit of friendly planes and bases. Friendly planes must be in vicinity probably enroute Wake.
6-1520	Marshalls DF	DF Net	Kwajalein became very active with flashes. Wake omitted so assumed Wake DF out.

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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-1520	Wake AB	Navy Minister Combined Fleet (CinC) Ruotto AB (AF 22) Info 11th Air Fleet I.S.S.F. Comdr. I.S.S.F. Collective	Medium length Note Navy Minister addressed. This despatch was intercepted 13 times at Station H. First seen at 1551 on 7120 sent by 7-YARO.
6-1550	Wake AB (garbled call)	Base Force 6 Air Group 755 Comdr.	Only observed once going from YOYURO to SANARU on 7300A. Notice mixing of Air and regular surface command calls.
6-1600	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Long two parter
6-1605	Wake AB	Ruotto AB	This was seen going over 7120 kos. to Ruotto using Aircraft "C" calls. No sign of Wake on normal air base channel.
6-1700	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 (garbled) Air Group 755	Medium length Probably latest available data on location enemy Task Force!
6-1730	Wake CU (garbled)	Air Flot 22 (collective) Info 4th Fleet Combined Fleet	Some doubt about this one. Ruotto broadcasting at 1744 - 14 minutes after originating time. Originator maybe Ruotto.
6-1801	Wake CU	Base Force 6 Info Air Flot 22	Short Wake (SUHEKU) sent this to Kwajalein at 1825.
6-1920	Wake DF	Kwajalein CU	Direction finder at Wake may have resumed normal operation.

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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
6-1951	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 Air Group 755 Info 4th Flt. Comdr.	Very long (3 parts) report on enemy and damage.
6-2020	Wake DF	Unidentified call (NIKI-0 - NIRU-3)	Direction finder system again. Addressee probably a DF Net call.
<p>End of 6th October. Beginning of 7th. Some of apparent reflected traffic on 6th omitted from above summary. Wake Air Base transmitter using call 2-RIKI continues activity through the night.</p>			
7-0130	Comdr. Air Flot 22	Unident TAHI-3 (TAA-2)	This despatch (long two parts) was broadcast many times. It indicates early preparations for search or that Comdr. Air Flot 22 maybe at Wake reports true situation.
7-0324	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Short 4 group urgent almost identical with 060450 despatch. Wake receiving attack 2nd day?
7-0503	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Medium report of damage after first wave of attacking planes? However since DF Control Yokosuka received this despatch, it may include report of enemy radio activity.
7-0540	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Very short (3 groups)

Traffic Intelligence Report
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 (continued)

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
7-ø623	Wake AB	-----	Station H reports Ruotto Air Base unable raise Wake on 855ø.
7-ø742	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 Air Group 755 Air Base Taroa Info Comdr. IS.S.F. Unident ROYA-4 (ROTA-4)	Medium Unident ROYA-4 is conspicuous. Probably Air Group or Section in Marshalls-Gilberts area.
7-ø745	Comdr. AF 22	ROYA-4 (ROTA-4) Info Combined Fleet 4th Fleet 3rd Fleet Wake CU	
7-ø82ø	Comdr. AF 22	Wake AB Info Combined Fleet 4th Fleet	Long
7-ø845	Gilberts Command? (ESI-3 - ERI-2)	4th Fleet Info NGS Flt. Commands (2nd & 3rd) S.E. Area Fleet Wake CU	Long two parter from unidentified command. Low precedence. Not distributed widely.
7-ø849	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Short
7-ø93ø	Wake CU	Stereotyped heading	Very long report of conditions at Wake.
7-ø95ø	Wake AB	Air Flot 22 Info Marshalls AB? Marshalls AG?	Medium The 2 info addressees FU08 and ROTA4 (basic) may be at Eniwetok and under A.F. 22.

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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addressed to</u>	<u>Remarks-Type Despatch</u>
7-0957	Wake CU	Stereo heading	Long report.
7-1114	Wake CU	Stereo heading except basic TITA3 unident substituted for AF22.	Medium
7-1225	Aircraft activity increased about this time. Ruotto Air Base, Wake Air Base, Taroa Air Base and planes (ØWITAL call series) most active with some reports apparently enemy sightings.		
7-1234	Plane ØWITAl1 originated his #1 report. <u>This appears to be an enemy sighting.</u>		
7-1237	Ruotto AB	Wake AB <u>4TH FLEET</u> Info 3rd Fleet <u>Comb Fleet</u>	Short Departure report (preliminary)?
7-1240	Ruotto Air <u>Arsenal</u> (TITA3 basic)	Tokyo BUAIR Info Yoko A.A. Yoko AB Comb Fleet 11th A.F. Taroa A.A. Tateyama AB	Medium priority. Report of enemy planes. Sighting or captured!
7-1247	Ruotto AB	Wake AB	Medium May be actual departure report AF22 planes for Wake area.
7-1308	Wotje AB (RITA3)	<u>Air Flot 22</u> <u>TAROA AB</u>	Short Wotje called upon to furnish planes or assist in Wake operations.

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7-1340	<u>Ruotto AB</u>	<u>Taroa AB</u> <u>Wotje CU</u>	Short Departure of planes Ruotto for Wotje and Taroa slightly indicate enemy Task Force to eastward!!
7-1410	Wake CU	Stereo heading.	Short
7-1440	<u>Ruotto Air Arsenal</u>	<u>Wake AB</u>	Medium
7-1455	<u>Ruotto AB</u>	<u>Mille AB</u>	Short Not high priority and not necessarily connected Wake operations.
7-1520	<u>Ruotto AB</u>	Wake AB	Medium
7-1630	Unident (HETA4 basic)	<u>Wake AB</u> <u>Wake CU</u>	Long aircraft code HETA4 may be in Gilberts.
7-1710	Wake CU	Base Force 6 4th Fleet <u>Comb Fleet</u> <u>Navy Minister</u> Info Tokyo Mil Stores	Medium Report of damages to supplies and Base instal- lations!
7-2010	Wake AB	Air Group 755 Taroa-AB Unident HETA4 Info Comdr 4th Flt.	Long Wake reports on aircraft from Taroa and HETA4?!
7-2045	Wake CU	6th Base Force(only)	Medium Kwajalein promptly sent it info to 4th Fleet and A.F. 22 Comdrs.
7-2321	Concealed (May be 4th Fleet)	Comb Fleet Imp. HDQTRS. Wake CU FUNA1 (basic) MUM01 (basic)	Long 2 part message Looks like summary of Wake attack from Comdr 4th Fleet.

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A survey of the foregoing traffic yields the following intelligence information from a traffic viewpoint. Prior to going into statistics and drawing conclusions, it is considered desirable to point out the fact that the entire analysis is based on intercepted signals from one station. When our operator reports Wake Radio is unheard, it may be attributed to atmospheric, weak or inefficient transmissions at Wake, or battle damage. If our operator *hears Ruotto call* hears no response, we cannot assume any definite status at Wake but if after several attempts to contact Wake by Ruotto and Tarca are followed by those stations broadcasting all traffic to Wake, we then assume that Wake's transmitter is not on the air.

There are believed to be two radio stations on Wake physically separated and operated by different personnel. One is probably on one island and the second station on a different island. Air Base is presumed to be on different island than the main communication station handling Guard Division 65, Communication Unit, and other activities (Weather, Army, Construction, DF).

If U.S. Task Force 14 did employ radio in getting the first attack wave off and directed to Wake, then the Wake DF bearing report timed 0240/6th October might have provided the first warning. Without the help of other DF station bearings, one bearing from Wake would have meant little but an alert operator may have noted loud signals or unusual direction and given the alarm. However, just four minutes later at 0244, Wake definitely got the alarm and sent an urgent to the "right people". We are discussing the Wake Comm. Unit as Wake Air Base after sending routine weather at 0200 prior to the raid did not originate any despatches until after 0500. Since Wake (GU) sent three despatches between 0244 and 0311 when Wake operator broke out with the familiar HI HI HI (meaning enemy planes sighted), it is assumed that Wake is equipped with Radar, that Radar provided 27 minutes warning, and that radars are not under the jurisdiction of the Air Base. It is interesting to note that only six minutes after first Wake urgent report to the outside and ten minutes after the questionable DF bearing report, Wake got out a despatch to his patrol in special system. Judging from past conditions, particularly at Marcus, I would judge the Japs on Wake were either well aware of an impending attack or were excellently drilled in command communications. No operators' breaks were noticed, despatches during the early period were handled properly as far as Wake was concerned. Except for the one urgent

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U.S. Raid on Wake
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abbreviated signal (HI HI HI) at the very beginning, all despatches throughout the Wake raid were in code or cipher and in view of the lack of servicing type despatch, they were all properly encrypted, both contents and calls.

One hour and six minutes after the first Wake enemy report, Commander Fourth Fleet, presently in Kwajalein, issued his first directive with respect to the enemy attack. The despatch appeared first on the air at 0425 making a total elapsed time since Wake first report of one hour forty one minutes. Allowing for decryption time after receipt of 4th Fleet despatch, it is assumed that some one officer in each Marshalls-Gilberts command or base knew of the Wake raid approximately two hours or less after first warning or commencement of the raid. In this connection, it is believed that Japanese communications facilitate recognition of emergencies and degrees of emergency perhaps better than our own. The selection of the crypto system itself and a particular precedence sign for each type of emergency facilitate instant recognition whereas the precedence sign in our traffic is a means of pushing thru a heavy normal traffic which each originator believes is relatively less important traffic.

The 0350 despatch was originated by Comdr 4th Fleet (Inner South Seas Force) as usual in concealed type and was addressed for action to

Inner South Seas Force (Collective - assumed to include all ships and stations in the Marshalls-Gilberts-Carolines-Marianas-Palao area, info to

Commander Combined Fleet
Commander Third Fleet
Commander Fifth or 12th Air Fleet (WANIG)
Naval General Staff.

The assumed times of reception by following addressees give a rough idea of reflected emergencies for future guidance:

Traffic Intelligence Report
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(continued)

<u>Radio Transmission</u>	<u>Stations and Commands</u>	<u>Elapsed time (0244)</u>
Kwajalein Broadcast (0425)	Gilbert-Marshalls Stations and Bases.	1 hour 41 minutes
Truk Broadcast (0433)	All Major Commanders of Combined Fleet in Mandated area, All Carolines-Marianas Stations and Bases.	1 hour 49 minutes
Ominato Broadcast (0655)	Major Comdrs in HOKKAIDO-Kuriles, Ships and Stations in North east to Hawaii.	4 hours 11 minutes
Yokosuka Radio (0727)	Transmitted specifically to <u>Marcus</u> and <u>BONINS</u> .	4 hours 43 minutes

The crypto system used in 4th Fleet message was five numeral so that the smaller units and stations not holding this system would have to get it from the next senior officer holding same. To take care of this in the vital "enemy operations" area, Comdr 6th Base Force issued a directive at 0405 just ten minutes following above 4th Fleet despatch. This 6th Base Force despatch was addressed to Collective for All Stations in Marshalls (and presumably Gilberts) info to Comdrs Combined, Third, and Fourth Fleets.

It will be noted that the First and Second Fleets were not addressed. This is considered normal and serves to confirm their location in area outside of Marshalls-Gilberts. They would be advised in turn by Combined Fleet Comdr. If outside of Truk area where all three happened to be during the raid, the Combined Fleet Staff officer might have directed a special relay via Truk Broadcast specifically to 1st and/or 2nd Fleet calls.

Following receipt of Wake Raid report and dissemination to 4th Fleet and 6th Base Force commands, some commander (believed to 4th Fleet again in a NARAE) addressed the following commands in another five numeral high precedence despatch timed 0400/6th:

Action to	Combined Fleet
Info to	AirFlot 22 11th Air Fleet AirFlot 25 or 26 Air Group 956 (C) #2 SoExFor

This has several indications of being a request for aircraft reinforcements by 4th Fleet from the Combined Fleet. Since the logical replacement air groups are under 11th Air Fleet in the Rabaul area or enroute there, this Commander is given info together with two or three somewhat "shady" idents. This despatch is interesting in two points. The speed with which 4th Fleet Commander reacted to the Wake raid report in a slight way indicates the 4th Fleet had probably negotiated previously with same commands for more aircraft for his Marshalls-Gilberts area. Additionally, it confirms the supremacy of surface over air commands in that CinC 4th Fleet is directly in charge of air operations in Mandates with 11th Air Fleet the former superior of 22nd Air Flot in charge in Southeast Area.

A study of our intercepts and exchanges of procedure signals between Wake and Marshalls stations leads to conflicting reports on the communication casualties experienced at Wake. Assuming three main communication channels which are normally active continuously throughout the day, the picture develops into the following:

<u>AIR BASE CHANNEL</u> (4275, 8550, 5110)	<u>WAKE C.U. CHANNEL</u> (4370, 7300)	<u>DF CHANNEL</u> (3945, 7890)
6th-0600 Aux. power. Poor Communication. 2 hrs. delay 05-07 on 1 despatch. Irregular or poor comm. until 1330/7th when Wake reported in good shape.	6th-(0342-0542) Out of commission. 6th(1447-1800) Poor Communication. Thereafter good.	6th-(00-0400) Active 6th & 7th-Inactive after 0400.

In the early part of the raid on the 6th, both Wake Air Base and Wake Comm Unit stations obviously experienced damage. Main power source probably was damaged and there is evidence that auxiliary transmitters were employed. However, except for an occasional despatch, as for example Air Base 6-0508 was actually transmitted by Air Base at 6-0708, Wake radio facilities provided fair to good service with evidence of some battle damage and use of auxiliary power and equipment. Wake activities originated the following despatches between 0244 and 2400 on the 6th and from 0000 to 2045 on 7th:

	6th	7th
WAKE COMM. UNIT	<u>26</u>	<u>10</u>
WAKE AIR BASE	15	4
WAKE DIRECTION FINDER	4	-

Not included in above are estimated 10-15 operational aircraft despatches between Wake and aircraft with other air bases. Several Wake despatches were relayed to destination by Ruotto and possibly other stations or aircraft. Notably absent since the first hour of the raid on the 6th are Wake weather reports. This points to the destruction of weather instruments or the Weather Observatory at Wake. Wake Air Base and Wake aircraft may have received an early and damaging effect at the beginning of the attack since Wake Air Base did not originate a despatch until 0503 and this was first observed here at 0723 being broadcasted by Kwajalein Radio. Aircraft radio calls did not appear active until almost 0800 when Air Group 755 from Taroa appeared to have been enroute to Wake area.

In analyzing the Japanese aircraft operations, there are many gaps in the picture. Outstanding was the appearance of only one principal Air Group or base (at Taroa) involved on the first day. This one Air Group is believed to be the 755th despite several identified calls for 552nd Air Group. It is believed that all planes at Wake prior to attack belonged to 755th Air Group and that Comdr. and staff this group were at Taroa. Whether the planes sent out from Taroa to area were also from 755th cannot be proved. From the relatively large number of aircraft call series used on both the 6th and 7th, it is certain that more than one air group was involved. One notable point in the Wake operations is the use on the 6th by the Japanese of only one aircraft frequency (7120 kcs). There were a few transmissions on 6115 on the 6th and a great many on the 7th. In previous raid on Tarawa, at least two and sometimes three air frequencies were active at the same time. Perhaps

to accommodate Wake Air Base and provide one air channel in which all planes and bases connected with vital operations could be contacted, the 7120 kcs channel was adopted on the first day. On the second day, Ruotto Air Base and a new Air Group using 6115 kcs took a prominent part. Assuming Wake planes were out of the picture at an early time on the 6th and our idents are correct, the air picture boils down to the following:

- (a) Taroa Air Base with Air Group 755, Wake Air Base, and about ten planes from Taroa were most active in the Wake operations. Call series indicated several sections of Air Group 755 were involved and perhaps other Air Groups but the actual number of different plane calls connected with Wake was not over a dozen.
- (b) The wide distribution given some of above plane's despatches indicated sight contact with our force on the 6th.
- (c) Ruotto Air Base and probably additional Air Group using ØWITA call series played most important role on second day. Taroa, Mille, Wotje and Wake Air Bases were also connected with operations. Ruotto and Air Group employed 6115 kcs.
- (d) Estimated 15 - 20 planes took active part in second day's operation.

For future guidance, it is noted that Kwajalein Radio broadcasts on regular broadcast channel all important or vital communications occurring in Eastern Area. Truk Radio apparently covers this broadcast strictly and repeats most important despatches as a matter of routine. Tokyo Radio no longer repeats all important messages. In the future, Kwajalein broadcast coverage by our Task Force Units will serve a more useful purpose than coverage of Truk Broadcast provided our operations are in the general Marshalls-Gilberts area.

Stereotyped headings seem to be a vital necessity to the majority of Japanese communication stations. Out of 26 despatches originated by Wake Communication Unit on 6 October, 18 were addressed For action -- Comdr. 6th Base Force (Immediate superior in command)

For infor -- Comdr. 4th Fleet
Comdr. AIR FLOT 22
Collective All Stations in 6th
Comm. Zone (or Marshalls-Gilberts)

The Wake Air Base Despatches did not follow as consistent a pattern but were generally addressed to Comdr. Air Flot 22, Comdr. Air Group 755, Comdr. 4th Fleet

and Combined Fleet.

This report already excessive in length does not cover a great many points considered important purely from a traffic intelligence standpoint. Only Wake traffic and immediate or obviously reflected traffic is catalogued in the summary above. While it must be admitted that call identifications (after three months repetition) just at the period of Wake raid were perhaps superior to any other period of offensive U. S. operations, the complete and continuous coverage of all Wake and Marshalls frequencies together with the fact that we did manage to intercept many original or first transmissions and follow them down to the main broadcasts made it possible to see the picture fairly well. A most important factor that can conceivably assist our analysis to the highest degree is the checking of one side of the picture against the other as soon after occurrence as possible. This can best be accomplished by a steady flow of available information from our own forces to match the enemy signals as they come in. Short of this, an intensive study of each operation immediately following receipt of chronology reports from own forces will greatly assist.

PAGE (1) OF

FOLLOWING REPORT

NOT IN FILE

Nov. 43

~~SECRET~~

PERSONNEL

<u>Burd, W.W.</u>	LT.(jg)	USNR
Gramblin, S. E.	CRM(PA)	USN
Price, R. A.	Rm1c	USN
Forgy, J. P.	Rm2c	USN
Rice, P. E.	Rm2c	USNR

Gilbert's Occupations
Nov '43

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SECRET

This report is divided into the following sections:

1. Preliminary remarks.
2. Daily log and summary.
3. Frequencies.
4. Call identifications.

SECRET

1. Preliminary Remarks.

SECRET

The main purpose of this introduction is to express a few ideas on possible improvements in the efficiency and usefulness of future RI units. Some of these suggestions are not new but it is felt that there is a serious necessity for making certain changes and improvements.

The first of these has to do with the RI setup aboard ship. If the present policy of sending RI units to sea frequently for short periods is to be continued some attempt should be made to have permanent RI rooms installed aboard all likely ships. ^{This has been done. Not at date of writing. Dub!} These could be used as auxiliary radio rooms when there is no RIU aboard. If this plan were to be carried out the RI rooms should be set up by some one with sufficient knowledge of what is needed. A room has been set up aboard the Enterprise which is fine in all details except two. It is too small for four men to copy traffic at one time, which is necessary at certain times, and it was built next to a radar motor which causes considerable interference and prevents talking in a normal tone of voice. ^{Other bad features is location from safety standpoint and interference}

The JUSIT problem has been much improved as far as ^{from filov} this unit is concerned. The only improvement suggested is ^{during take offs & landing} that the daily conversion list number be sent out in the morning of the day it is used. ^{Agree, but generally speaking RIU should be able to finish list OK.} The present policy is to wait until most of the conversions have been made before the list number is sent out.

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This may seem like a minor detail but it often prevents recovery of daily identifications until the following day, when they are of little use.

The biggest problem in need of discussion is that of preliminary research and coordination before the RI unit goes to sea. The necessity for security of course prevents what would be ideal, an outline of the entire operation, but it is felt that the officer to be in charge should have a better idea of what is going to come off than he has at present. In Galvanic it was found that practically every one involved knew more about the operation than the RI officer. *RI officer should contact staff Intelligence officer as soon as aboard & borrow Op plan - paying particular attention to Intelligence & Comm annexes* Two newspaper men aboard the Enterprise had been given a complete outline of galvanic by CTF54 before leaving Pearl. If at least a general idea could be given to the RI units prior to the operation much better work could be done, especially along the line of research. Before the present operation a very fine summary of the Marshall's communication system was written up by the Oinc of Intercept Operations at FRUPAC. It was the intention of the above officer that the three RI units aboard ships should coordinate their efforts so that without sacrificing any of the security of the Task Units they could make an attempt to get a complete picture of the Marshall-Gilbert communication system. This was impossible to carry out.

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~~SECRET~~

There was no conference before the three RI units left and the only oral discussion was a statement by Comdr. Huckins to Lt. Comdr. Slonim and myself that as he understood the operation, Lt. (jg) Sims would be with the TF to the south of the Gilberts, Lt. Comdr. Slonim would be with the attacking TF, and I would be with the TF between Mille and Makin. Under this assumption the frequency coverage assignments or suggestions were made. It turned out that he was badly misinformed as to which force each RIU would be with and thus made it impossible for the suggested coverage to be carried out.

The radio equipment carried by this unit seems to be enough for a unit of this size if a portable frequency meter be added. Frequency calibration was very troublesome due to the lack of a small, portable frequency meter. *Borrow one from Air Group on ship.*

The following section of this report is written with the intention of recording the important facts rather than analyzing the whole communication picture resulting from galvanic. Since the purpose of a shipboard RIU is primarily to give the CTF information which will help his immediate offensive and defensive operations primary consideration must be given to air circuit coverage. This prevents very much coverage of circuits which will furnish a good general picture at the time when that information is appearing on

~~SECRET~~

the air. For this reason it is considered that any analysis of communications for this operation by the RIU would be incomplete and probably incorrect. A good analysis can probably be made from the traffic of the three RIU's together. This RIU has covered almost continuously the Marshalls-Gilberts air base circuit of 4275A/8550J, partly because this was considered to be the best frequency to cover continuously and partly because it was hoped that the other RIU's would cover some other frequency and thus offer material for research. This is probably the worst frequency to cover if a general picture is desired, so that various other frequencies such as the Marshalls-Gilberts circuit 3770E/8600J, the Marshalls-Gilberts minor bases, Guard Divs. and Maru circuit 4380A/7300, the Kwajalein and Truk broadcasts, and others were covered for short periods when certain information was desired. A further difficulty which caused much trouble during the operation, and which would prevent accurate analysis by this unit alone, is the lack of knowledge of movements and attacks by and on our various task units and ships. This was due to the fact that the RIU was operating under a Task Group Commander, who did not have all the knowledge of movements and attacks which a Task Force Commander would have.

~~SECRET~~

NOTE: This RIU was originally assigned to CTG 50.2 aboard the USS Enterprise. On November 27th CTG 50.2 was called back to Pearl Harbor and due to the difficulty of transferring the RIU at sea it was ordered to remain aboard for the post-galvanic attack on Kwajalein, or to be shifted to the Flagship of CTG 50.3, the USS Essex, if the Commander so ordered. Two days later the RIU was ordered to procede to the Essex, in three TBF's, by CTG 50.3. Two of the planes arrived safely aboard the Essex but the third containing Gramblin CRM, Forgy Rmlc and Rice Rm2c, plus two RIP's two loudspeakers and one SX-28 made a bad take-off and crashed in the sea. The three men, all uninjured, were then picked up by a destroyer and sent aboard the Essex on the following day. All the equipment aboard the plane was lost.

Interception was discontinued on Nov. 28th and begun again late in the day on Dec. 2nd. The RIU secured for this operation on Dec. 6th.

~~SECRET~~

2. DAILY LOG AND SUMMARIES

SECRET

NOVEMBER 12

Inteception as usual held up several days by interruptions of various sorts and finally begun on the 12th. First few days spent in trying to find out more about some of the Marshalls area frequencies of which the use is not yet well understood.

942ØJ observed in use by Ruotto charlie call drilling planes. The same call worked planes on 712ØJ and messages were all prefixed "drill".

NOVEMBER 13

Little air traffic, bases not working planes. Both Taroa and Mille worked Eniwetok and traffic had to be relayed by Ruotto. This relaying by Ruotto seems necessary most of the time.

Indications of planes Leaving Marshalls. Mille requests Eniwetok WX and is associated with Rabaul, Kavieng and 11th Air.

A considerable amount of transportation noted into and within the Marshalls-Gilberts.

SECRET

NOVEMBER 14

Requests for WX in and out of Tarawa indicate an attack on Funafuti or Nanoméa.

Call conversion almost impossible due to the fact that the first kana is converted and the second kana conversions are not sent out in the JUSIT. Instead, the date of the list to which they convert is sent and since we have no old conversion tables this doesn't help us. Practically, however, WX traffic on 4275A gives us all the important local calls.

Mille has been very prominent for the last few days, probably due to the staging of planes there for the Ellis Islands attack.

Taroa sent a HIHIHI which was picked up at 0859 on 8600J. Caused little excitement.

Mille again asks for Eniwetok WX.

Tarawa now has four lookouts. H03 has been added to HIKESU, H01 and H02.

NOVEMBER 15

Mille again requests Eniwetok WX. Otherwise WX traffic is below normal.

Lots of traffic noted going from MINOSO to SAWIRO (Addees of SS D/F reports). Ruotto is sending it to all M-G bases.

(12)

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SECRET

NOVEMBER 15 Cont.

CinCPac sends information that Army raided Mille and Tarawa yesterday. No indications of this beyond the HIIHI from Taroa (probably saw a photo plane) and some _____ messages. _____ decode is too incomplete to be of any use. If a good decode could be worked up before an operation it would be of tremendous value.

At 1233 and 1248 Mille sends plane sighting reports. From then on much activity is noted. Whole M-G area is being alerted,

7300A seems to have become more important than 8600J now but 4275A/8550J is obviously the important frequency in this area for every thing but information on ships movements and logistics.

Ruotto and Taroa still noted working a few planes every day on 9420J; all messages seem to be drill.

Indications that Air Group 552 or part of it is going to Kavieng.

NOVEMBER 16

Eniwetok heard on 4275A/8550J for first time. TETIHI (Tarawa A.B.) hasn't come up on 4275A/8550J since secured on the fourteenth. Still up on 8600J. May indicate withdrawal of aircraft to central Marshalls

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 16 Cont.

bases.

Imieji sends HHHHI at 1142 on 8550J. Then sent by Charlie call on 8305J. Followed by hot messages for several hours. Call-ups are very stereotyped. Typical heading is- Action Base Force 6, 4th Fleet. Information Marshalls area Defense Force, Gilberts area Defense Force. ^{Call}

At 1530 Mille sent aircraft sighting report. Traffic heavy, all Marus in area, especially in Gilberts, are addressed. Alerting of Guard Division and Marus indicates submarine sighting.

Request of certain information received from Sims by visual. Impossible to answer. Exchange of information by RI units on different ships is very difficult. Just is the worst code possible for this. Every message must be received letter perfect in order to decode it. Due to amount of traffic being exchanged between the two ships an answer was never sent.

NOVEMBER 17

Operational traffic started again today with sightings of our photo-recce planes by Imieji and Ruotto. Traffic all resent on 8305J, 7300A, 8550J and Kwajalein UTU. Would be possible to cover Kwajalein UTU alone

SECRET

NOVEMBER 17 Cont.

if we had call conversions. Once an air raid is made and the fact noted from a plain language report or high volume of little information can be obtained from traffic. Operational traffic, all addressed to a very few addressees completely floods all circuits for several hours.

Taroa asks Tarawa for WX for 1100 to 1400, indicating a strike at the Ellice islands.

NOVEMBER 18

Imieji, Mille and Taroa send plane sighting reports today. Mille sights "4 large planes" at 1215 and Taroa sights "8 large planes" at 1330. Not a great deal of reaction.

Lots of shifting of planes seems to be going on these days. Locations of Air Groups within Marshalls very difficult to ascertain as there are few idents for air units.

NOVEMBER 19

Scheduled raids on Nauru and Tarawa today. Nauru report recognized immediately but no reaction from Tarawa. Tarawa hasn't been up on 4275A since the 14th.

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 19 Cont.

A close check for ^{new} night frequency of 8600J has not been made at this time. (Later discovered to be 3770E). Tarawa still up on 5770A communicating with her lookouts.

Cincpac reports Wotje raided yesterday. We saw no indications of this raid.

Plane contacts sent by Imieji, Mille and Nauru. Several grids sent.

Things really picking up today. Tarawa is back up on the air base frequency. Ruotto asks Taroa and Mille for WX. At least 16 planes are up, all on 6115J. Many grids are being sent. TG 54.4 reports it is under attack. Essex later reported snoopers but no attack. Things pretty hot until 2200 when routine traffic again being sent.

Lack of knowledge of locations and operations of other task groups and ships makes it impossible to get a good picture of what is happening. Even grids sent by planes mean nothing in an area as confined as this. The sighting of a plane from a near position may be one of our task group planes or another task group or land based planes.

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 20

Covering 4275A, 8305J, 6115J and one man on search for our Makin strike and Yorktown's Mille strike.

From 0150 to 1430 plane contacts and grids were sent constantly by Imieji, Tarawa, Mille, Makin and planes.

TG south of Tarawa spotted and most of the planes seem to be working it over. Planes are working Tarawa on 6115J. Lack of any conversions or the list numbers, even on day of strike, prevents getting a lot of information from traffic. On this same day several dummy messages were sent in the JUSIT.

Makin went off the air when hit. Came back up with a new transmitter on 8600, sending messages originated at 0445. Mille also out for several hours after reporting first contact.

Most of plane contacts of our forces are to the south of us, although our planes have shot down one Jap plane.

Necessary frequency coverage is pretty clear by this time. 6115J is the only air frequency which needs to be covered. 4275A is necessary and 8600J must be covered for Makin which isn't on 4275. Searching for other frequencies is still being carried on, however.

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NOVEMBER 20 Cont.

So far no abnormal traffic associations have been noted. Airflot 22, 11th Air, 4th Flt and Basefor 6 are the main addressees.

Ruotto is asking for Mille, Nauru and Tarawa WX. Large numbers of planes in air, all working Ruotto Air Base directly. Large amount of abbreviated plain language and many grids sent. Very difficult to interpret as no way of finding out locations of own forces.

NOVEMBER 21

(Dog day - Nov. 20, West Long. Time)

Tarawa up at 0011 with short urgent. Still has transmitters going on 4275A and 3770E. At 0200 calls Kwajalein and Truk on 3892J.

Ruotto getting WX from Taroa, Mille and Nauru. Associations show that Air Group 552 is either back in Marshalls or that it never left.

Makin up on auxiliary transmitter at 0402, Transmitting a message originated at 0305 which is the time of our strike.

Planes spotting several task groups and many grids are being sent. Looks like we are the only force not yet spotted by planes. All planes seem to work Ruotto direct.

NOVEMBER 21 Cont.

Ruotto then resends the traffic to the outlying bases from which the planes are actually operating.

Makin last heard at 0420. Landing was made at 0530. Discontinuing watch on 8600J from now on.

Flood of operational traffic prevents much of a general picture. Comdr. 4th Flt. is back in truck. Eniwetok is sending her traffic action to 3rd Flt., indicating 3rd Flt. planes entering Marshalls.

Activity quieted down by 1600, although HHHHI's sent by planes now and then throughout the day.

The USS Independence was hit at 1700 (-9). This could not be tied up with any special plane message. At 2100 there was an 80 word message from Nauru. This may indicate that it was a Nauru plane that made the attack or may be just a summary of Nauru's plane's activity. In one despatch Nauru is associated with 3rd Flt. so 3rd Flt. planes may be operating out of Ruotto and basing at Nauru, (and also at Mille and Taroa).

There were many grids and abbreviated plain language messages sent. One group "TOTOTOTO" definitely means "All units (or planes) attack".

Planes came from Taroa but as it was late afternoon attack completed they spent night at Nauru, leaving at about 0400 (-9) the next morning.

This group (TO--) not sent at this Indef hit!!! (19)

This is one message which tied in perfectly

SECRET

NOVEMBER 22

First plane up at 0100 working Ruotto. Another sends grid shortly after. Same position as that of TF 52, a little to the south of us.

Tarawa backkup on 8600J for about an hour, then secured again.

Activity is way down. Nauru field seem to be temporarily knocked out as no longer associated with air traffic.

Large amount of WX being exchanged by Ruotto and Taroa, some by Mille. Indications that Taroa is to be the main stageing base for further attacks on us.

Nothing seems to be coming out of Tarawa and Makin. Air circuits down after 0900 with the exception of plane sighting reports by Mille, Ebon lookout and Nauru. No planes up at all in evening. Circuits abnormally quiet all day.

TOTITI (BB Nagato) up on 5775E but no traffic sent.

On 5770A Tarawa's lookouts sent several badly garbled plain language messages. Seem to be in answer to questions about enemy activity, probably coming from Ruotto. One says something like "Enemy seems to have made a landing", another says something about "Enemy surface forces _____".

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(20)

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 23

Taroa asks Mille for WX from 0100 on. First planes up at 0150 on 6115J. This is the only important air frequency in this area now.

CinCPAC reports 40 zeros to attack Tarawa at 0600 but Mille was hit twice in early morning by TF50.1 so attack probably broken up. A few planes up but little traffic sent.

Planes up working Ponape on 6840J. Flurry of traffic and two plain language messages sent. One says "Second plane unit attack". The other says "Rest of planes attack". Looks like an attack on a U.S. sub. Both Air Group 952 and Air Group 902 worked planes on this frequency. Air Group 902 was also heard on 8915J.

Traffic even lower than yesterday. Imieji caused a flurry when hit by Army bombers but little else was seen.

NOVEMBER 24

Jap sub rammed and sunk by one of our destroyers. Definite indications of plane flights from Truk to Eniwetok to Ruotto to Taroa to Mille. Requests for WX very helpful in giving information of plane movements. Seem very reliable and tell to the hour when flights are

SECRET

NOVEMBER 24 Cont.

to be made.

On Truk UTU at 0717 a message in plain language from a Bougainville lookout reported "5 DD, 6 miles to E, course 270."

Lack of air activity on 6115J caused fear that plane frequency had been changed. Large part of today's traffic was WX on route described above. Later frequency found not to have changed so planes involved must have been keeping silent.

U.S. planes are causing much interference on 4275A, but not on 8550J.

Peculiar that there have been no large scale attacks for the last few days. The reason may be that the Japs fear a major offensive attack is to be carried out on the Marshalls and their activities are toward getting prepared for that.

Both Imieji and Mille again reported plane sightings in morning.

Amount of activity on the air circuit does not seem to be a good indication of the strength of an attack. Some days no traffic is noted at all until attacks begin, on other days there is a tremendous volume, much of it coming from spotting planes and being resent.

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 25

Taroa up asking Mille and Imieji for WX.

Radar plotted formation of planes coming south and heading toward Tarawa at 0000 (We are just north of Makin). No radio contact with them made. Bases were up on 6115J working each other but not working planes. No plane traffic appeared on 4275A either.

Low frequency receiver just discovered to be out of adjustment. May be reason no low frequencies yet heard.

About 0900 planes come up and shortly after the excitement really starts. All planes again working Ruotto direct. Messages being resent by Ruotto on 4275A and 8600J. Grids pouring out and most of them in area just south of Makin. Another group of grids S.W. of Tarawa.

Ruotto using Charlie call (9EKA) is up on both 7120J and 6115J and is working different planes on each.

At 1330 things quiet again but Mille still sending WX to Taroa and Ruotto, so probably ^{planes} more coming.

Couple of close misses with subs. Periscope sighted four miles off.

D/F traffic picking up. Being sent to Mille. Probably due to excessive use of transmitters by our

214

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 25 Cont.

task groups.

Call conversions now arriving a day and a half late.

More planes up in evening. Different calls from earlier ones. Several grids sent within 50 miles of us and boogies appearing frequently on radar screen. After searching a few hours they were relieved by a new group of planes, all of whose messages started with "Number one." One plane flew directly over ship at about 500 feet but didn't see us. Another lucky day.

A total of eighteen grid positions was sent today, all located in the immediate vicinity of Makin and Tarawa.

NOVEMBER 26.

Hourly WX still being sent from Mille and Imieji to Ruotto. Continues all day.

Two grids sent at 0915, on each side of us about 30 miles off. One widely circulated. Traffic otherwise mostly WX.

A sub D/F report in Marshalls TURA' ed to Nauru for Maikaze, Nowake and Usio indicating their presence in this general area.

Base sending dashes on 6115J but no traffic sent until 1615, this day, then planes are so near us that

215

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 26 Cont.

they block out 6115J and messages have to be picked up on 7300A. (Not being repeated on 8550J tonight).

Radar reports 12 planes dead astern. Flares being dropped. Operators don't sound excited so probably haven't spotted us. One BB has just shot down a couple of planes. Several torpedo wakes seen but no hits. A SS picked up on radar screen about eight miles off.

Planes begin to send type of traffic usually sent to bases before securing at about 1800 and shortly afterwards all go off the air.

About eight grids sent today between 0915 and 1500 all within 40 miles of us. Procedure seems to be for search planes to locate unit to be attacked during day. Location sent by grid and subsequent description of movements. Attack planes then take off from bases in time to arrive just after carrier fighters are landed.

NOVEMBER 27

Japs having lots of trouble with their communications this morning.

Radio officer reports that Japs jammed our airplane channel of 4295kcs. last night. Copied our traffic and resent it about one letter behind us.

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~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 27 CONT.

No contacts before 1225 today. WX traffic still heavy but everything else quiet up to this point. After 1225 a large number of contacts and grids originated by planes. Bases are now sending 6115J traffic out to planes on same channel. Seems to be sent to the plane group leader. (No final numeral on plane call).

Tonights attack began as usual, just after carrier planes landed. Much bigger attack than any seen so far. Radar screen covered with boogies. Relatively little traffic is being sent. "TETETE" (Enemy !), "TOTOTO" (All units attack) were sent. One plain language message sent saying "Enemy is _____ing"?

Enterprise sent up three night fighters which seemed to disorganize their attack. Planes were shot down by both the night fighters and the destroyer screen.

None of air traffic being repeated on 4275A again tonight. Still being resent on 7300, however.

First group of planes asked Mille for WX and now silent. Another group up sending messages numbered "1". Second group never got very near to us and may have attacked TF 50.1, which also was under attack tonight.

Between 2100 and the end of the day Mille sends several messages to Ruotto. Probably reports of attacks.

217

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 28

Day beginning as usual with lots of WX traffic and little else. Large amount of operational messages has more or less excluded from circuits any administrative traffic from Marshalls.

About 1000 spotting planes using same calls as one of yesterday's groups are up. Grids within 30 miles sent and one plane sends "MUMUMU" (Carrier). Boogie on radar shortly after. Planes following usual spotting procedure but few grids being sent. No attack tonight so must have found someone else. Same type traffic sent as in attack upon us.

Indications are that air groups in Marshalls do not have individual frequencies. Air group calls, also, seldom appear. Probably all under the immediate command of Comdr. Airflot 22, who gives direct orders to plane units regardless of what group they belong to.

The Flag left the Enterprise at sea today so all important communication channels and the JUSIT are no longer aboard.

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 29

Planes up as usual at about 1000. Grids sent from then on until 1235. Enterprise out of possible contact area since yesterday. Indications of a battle going on during the evening but unit had to be secured in order to get equipment ready to transfer if so ordered.

NOVEMBER 30 - December 1

No interception due delayed transfer by plane from Enterprise to Essex and crashing of one plane. Three men in crashed plane brought aboard Essex on Dec. 2 after spending night aboard destroyer (Russel) which picked them up.

Only three receivers and the four RIP's , plus publications and two speakers could be transferréd, so one SX-32, one RBK and one RBA left aboard the Enterprise. Two RIP's, two speakers and one SX-28 lost with the plane.

NOTE: Personal gear of Gramblin, CRM and Forgy, Rm2c lost on this plane.

DECEMBER 2

Review of ULTRA and high command traffic files aboard the Essex shows that little has been missed in the three days interception discontinued.

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~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 2 Cont.

Lack of two RIP's will be a bad handicap during the Kwajalein attack. Loss partly made up by good news that first kana no longer being converted.

No indications of fleet strength in Kwajalein Atoll from traffic. Interception only for a few hours in evening so little of interest picked up. Operators in bad need of a good rest before the attack.

Essex RI room has only one antenna leadin, so would be difficult to use low frequency receiver if we had it.

DECEMBER 3

4275A uncopyable at 0500 due to interference.

3990A is frequency used between Air Base of Air Flot 22 at Ruotto and Comm. Unit 6 on Kwajalein Island, so would be a good frequency to cover on the day of attack. All traffic on 8550J and 8600J should appear on it. However, having only two RIP's will probably not cover it.

Lots of trouble with reception today. Operators are very poor, especially Ruotto operators. Our operators can hardly read their messages.

Wotje is still spending most of her time relaying Taroa's traffic to Ruotto.

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SECRET

DECEMBER 3 Cont.

Weather Maru's traffic does not seem to be resent on 4275A/8550J any more. Has to be picked up on 7300A. Have had a lot of trouble with them recently and only one boat picked up.

Eniwetok noticed using an air base call (YOHEA) for the first time.

Planes are up on both 6115J and 7120J. 6115J is still by far the most important of the two but one plane will send a message on one of them and then switch to the other to send the next message. A few contacts sent but we have not been spotted yet. We are skirting the Marshalls in a semicircle, about 300 miles to the east, and will come in toward Kwajalein from the N.E. December 5 (-9 time) has been set as "Dog day."

4275A/8550J seems to be carrying all the hot dope again. Probably due to the fact that less operational traffic is being sent now. Traffic headings show good line-ups and give general picture of reorganization and strengthening of Marshalls bases.

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 4

Planes up but none in our area. Looks like Japs have decided we are not going to invade Marshalls at present and are concentrating their energies in attacks on units in the Gilberts area. Only contact was when Mille reported "Ten large planes" at 1010.

A plane from Air Group 753 (MENATE4) is in Marshalls-Carolines area. This group last located in the N.E.I. area.

Operators at all bases extremely poor today. Have trouble getting each others messages.

Traffic is back to normal and a large part of it is again administrative. Planes up around 1800 and despatch from Funafuti says Tarawa being attacked.

Amazing that we haven't been spotted today. Our only worry now is that we might be contacted by a picket boat on the run in tonight. Covering 7300A so we will know if we are spotted.

DECEMBER 5

(Dog Day- December 4, West Long. Time.)

Nothing but back traffic on 4275A since 0000. Shifting to 4380A until our planes hit Ruotto at 0445 (-9 time), so will know if they are spotted by picket boats on way in.

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 5 Cont.

Kwajalein UTU on speaker. Same planes that were heard last night are up working Ruotto but don't sound close.

0455-Planes due to strike within ten minutes and old traffic still being sent.

0500-Kwajalein UTU sends "Fifty small planes". Attack complete surprise. Dropped 4380A and switched back to 4275A.

Amount of operational traffic quite limited. Kwajalein transmitter (SANARU) seems to have been knocked out. (Came up again in evening).

Large number of planes up, being worked by Ruotto on 6115J and 7120J. Grids sent by planes are relayed by Ruotto to Wotje. Planes coming out in small groups, many HIIHI's being sent. Snoopers being shot down by both task groups.

Mille, Nauru and Ocean all report plane sightings.

More and more planes coming up. After one group has been up a few hours it returns to the base and another replaces it. Several grids have been sent, all pretty close to us.

Real attack starts at dusk and continues until two o'clock the next morning. For the first time grids were seen being sent at night.

223

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 5 Cont.

Well coordinated attacks seemed to be directed by one plane each time. Due to long time these directing planes were in the air they are believed to be float planes. Several plain language and abbreviated language messages were sent. One of these "I am going to start dropping flares," followed a few minutes later by "TEKOTEKOTEKO" (Drop flares) was sent by 7KINI1, the plane that had been most prominent all day. This preceded one of the biggest attacks. At least forty planes were in the air. Many planes were shot down. Torpedo runs were made on both task groups up until two o'clock but the only casualty was to the U.S.S. Lexington which took a torpedo in the stern. The Japs did not seem to know they had hit her.

DECEMBER 6

Last plane heard from last night's attack was at 0042. A few planes up in morning but none out our way. Probably patrolling area to guard against another attack by us. At noon we are over 400 miles away and out of danger of attack. Many planes up in afternoon. Only coverage on 6115J and 4275A/8550J on speaker.

SECRET

DECEMBER 6 Cont.

Every one has been up with little sleep for two days and we are well out of danger area so secured at 2000.

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3. FREQUENCIES

3770E/8600J Night frequency 3770E replaced 4300J in early November, all bases in Marshalls-Gilberts have appeared on this, not only those listed in frequency list. All urgent traffic appearing on Kwajalein broadcast seems to be sent out on this also.

3892J Only heard once when Tarawa called Kwajalein and Truk on the day of the attack, 11/21. Tarawa was also using 4275A and 3770E at the same time.

4275A/8550J No changes in use noted. Following air bases now use it.

Taroa	-	SAWIKI
Wake	-	YOKEYU
Nauru	-	MEHEU
Wotje	-	RURUNE
Eniwetok	-	YOHEA
Mille	-	TUHESO
Imieji	-	TOWIRU
Ruotto	-	NONANE

Usually repeats all important traffic sent in Marshalls, but is not reliable as several times when a high volume of operational messages was

~~SECRET~~

being originated on 6115J none of it appeared on this.

Not exclusively a land air base circuit as there is no air field at Imieji.

There was bad interference on this by some U.S. stations using calls AR1, H661B and H661J.

- 4735J Overload circuit for 4275A/8550J.
- 5110A Not heard at any time.
- 5720J Not heard at any time.
- 5770A Used by Tarawa and her lookout stations, HIKESU, H01, H02 and H03, prior to the occupation of Tarawa.
- 5775E On 11/22 TOTITI (BB Nagato) was heard working unidents MA5 and WA5. No traffic was exchanged.

SECRET

6115J

Major air circuit in Marshalls. Used by all bases and all planes engaged in offensive operations. If at one time Air Groups had individual frequencies it appears that they do not have them now. All planes in Marshalls, of whatever administrative unit they belong to, seem to work Ruotto when flying on combat operations, and to use this frequency. This is used between air bases using Charlie calls, (Only OTSU calls appear on 4275A/8550J) between bases and planes, and between planes themselves.

6260J

Not an operational circuit. Used at present only by air bases at Imieji, Kwajalein (and by Makin before occupation). Little traffic sent on it although during operations traffic on 6115J was sometimes repeated on it.

6840J

Used principally by the two patrol plane groups, 902 and 952, in the Marshalls and Carolines. What looked like a SS or U.S. plane contact was sent to Ponape by a plane using this frequency and no drill traffic has been seen on it. Both 3K and 2KN calls are used and the same calls appear on 8915J.

SECRET

7120J

Use not clear but definitely secondary to 6115J at present. Traffic from bases to planes often repeated on this. The same plane has been seen to send messages on both this and 6115J within a few minutes of each other. Usually observed when high volume of traffic on 6115J when important messages are repeated on it. On Nov. 21, Nauru called Ruotto on this when he couldn't reach him on 4275A.

8305J

According to operators, Makin and Imieji started holding schedules on this about Oct. 20. They were still doing so when Makin was occupied. The only other use observed was when 8MUE (Imieji Air Base) called planes on it on 11/20.

8915J

Same calls appear on this as on 6840J. Ruotto, Air Group 902 and Air Group 952 are the main users of this frequency.

9420J

Seen in use by Taroa and Ruotto air bases using Charlie calls, working planes. All traffic seen was prefixed "drill".

LOW FREQUENCIES

Research on low frequencies was not done aboard the Essex as the low frequency receiver could not be brought over from the Enterprise.

436

Observed on Nov. 26th at 1745 sending dashes and NAMU (in kana) or RT (in international). Thereafter dashes heard, but no call, whenever listened to.

471E

Ruotto uses this as a homing frequency. Both service and Charlie calls used. Call sent every half minute and dashes sent in between. Observed many times, usually in late afternoon. Not up continuously.

ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCIES

None heard at any time. Ultra high frequency ^{receiver} not taken over to Essex when RIU moved.

Extensive use of 6115J between planes makes it look as though planes do not use ultra high frequencies for inter-plane communication. Distances of course prevent bases from working planes on them.

~~SECRET~~

4. CALL IDENTIFICATIONS

LIST HEI CALLS

3-c-9 NOV. 10-15

3TUHA	Kwajalein SPB ✓	C
6SOSO	Mille SPB Makin(e)	C
7KESU	Ruotto AB	B
7SUTE	Mille AB	A
8TURU	Jaluit SPB	C
1TURO	Mille AB	C
4KESA	Makin SPB	C
CTURU		

3-C-10 NOV. 16-20

8MU E	Imieji AB	A
6WARE	Taroa AB	B
7WITU	Kwajalein SPB	B
7NEYA	Mille AB	C
1MUMU	Makin SPB	C
4FUYU	Mille AB	C
4HITI	Nauru AB	C
7RAKU	Wotje AB	C

3-C-11 NOV. 21-25

8 o o	Makin	SPB	C
ØKEHA	Mille	AB	D
6KUNA	Mille	AB	A
1 UNI	Collective		A
7TARI	Taroa or Mille		
8NIME	Kwajalein	SPB	C
6KINI	Mille	AB	C
3SE E	Kwajalein	SPB	C

3-C-12 NOV. 26-30

9NUKE	Ruotto	AB	B
6KU U	On 626ØJ		
5RUSO	Collective		C
5YOMU	Mille	AB	A
3HASA	Taroa	AB	C
5YO E	Taroa	AB	C
7WAHA	Collective		C

3-C-13 DEC. 1-5

4KO O	Taroa AB	B
2KONE	Ruotto AB	A
5 AKO	Kwajalein SPB	B
1 UNI	Collective (Doesn't seem to change)	A
7 ETO	Wotje AB	B
8TITU	Nauru AB	B
4METE	Collective	C
4SUNO	Wake AB	C

3-C-14 DEC. 6-10

9WAKI	Ruotto AB	A
5MI E	Taroa AB	B

NOTE: Calls are considered to be collective if they do not originate traffic and if different ~~and if different~~ planes receipt for messages to that call.

LIST OTSU CALLS

Most of our identifications were made without benefit of list numbers or conversion tables which usually came a day late so most of our identifications are actually already in the printed call lists. Therefore, only those calls which were later checked and found not to be in the lists are given here.

CALLS ARE NOT CONVERTED TO BASIC LISTS.

LIST 1 - NOV. 13

ME U 1	Mille AB	B
RUMU 2	Taroa AB	C
HIRE 2	Ruotto AB	B
HO U 6	Eniwetok AB	B
NONE 4	Airflot 22	D

LIST 27 - NOV. 14

RIME Ø	Taroa AB	B
MIHO 8	Imieji AB or AG	C
KI E 8	At Taroa	C
MIHO 8	Imieji AB (Delete AG8Ø2)	B

LIST 31 = NOV. 15

AMA 5	Eniwetok AB	B
REMA 9	MAKIN AB	B
N MA 2	Nauru AB	B

~~SECRET~~

LIST 29 * NOV. 16

HIHO 9	Adm. Offs. of all Flt. Comdrs. (A*KA)	A
ORO 3	Imieji AB	C
HANO 6	Taroa AB	B
TUHO 3	Base Force 3	B
SEME 5	At Kwajalein	B
SUKE 9	Eniwetok	B
SOSE 5	AIRFLOT 22	D
ASE 3	Base Force 6	B
I E 9	ISSF Collective	C
MEHO 2	Airflot 22 or Flt 4	
E E 7	Base Force 6 or Flt 4	
SEHO 7	Mille AB	C

LIST 26 - NOV. 17

TAMO 7	Taroa AB	B
WA A 2	A.G. 902	C
TETA 5	Eniwetok AB	B
WOTA 7	At Ruotto	C
MOMA 5	ISSF Collective	B

LIST 30 - NOV. 18

HOSU 1	Imieji AB	C
NOTA 0	Nauru AB	C
KERE 3	ISSAF	D
MUFU 8	MILLE AB	B
YUYO 0	Tarawa AB	B
MORE 8	At Eniwetok	C

LIST 28 - NOV. 19

RA I 1	Makin SPB	B
RATI 1	Jaluit SPB	B
KOYA 8	ISSAF Collective	C
MENE 9	Kwajalein SPB	B
KESI 6	At Kwajalein	B
HITI 8	Imieji	B
SONI 7	ISSAF or Airflot 22	C
SAHI 7	Taroa AB	B

LIST 25 - NOV. 20

RIMU 4	Nauru AB	B
YOYO 8	Imieji AB	B
RATE 8	Gilberts area Def. For.	C
SERE 7	ISSAF Collective	B
HOFU 4	Basefor 3 - Makin Det.	B
TE U 5	Eniwetok AB	B
TATE 4	At Taroa	

~~SECRET~~

LIST 32 - NOV. 21

TIYA 9	Eastern Force	C
UMI 2	Eniwetok AB	C
YUNI 3	Flt 4	B
NUTI 6	Flt Comb	D
YANI 4	At Mille	

List 11 - NOV. 22

SI E 2	Eniwetok AB	B
NOSE 4	At Imieji	
RESE 2	Airflot 22	B
SU E 5	Airflot 22 (Raise to B)	B
SUNO 4	Airflot 22 (Delete Ruotto AB)	B

LIST 15 - NOV. 23

TUMO 4	At Kwajalein	
OHA 8	At Mille	
NANA 4	Taroa AB	C
ESA 3	At Ruotto	
WETA 1	At Imieji	

LIST 14 - NOV. 24

REMI 1	Nauru AB	B
NOHI 7	Imieji AB	B

~~SECRET~~

LIST 13 - NOV. 25

KEHO 4	Eniwetok AB	B
HIHO 1	Ruotto AB (Delete Mille AB)	B

LIST 14 - NOV. 26

SU A 4	Eniwetok AB	C
KUNA 9	At Ruotto	
SA O 4	Ruotto AB	C

LIST 16 - NOV. 27

None checked against list.

LIST 17 - NOV. 28

NONE Checked against list.

LIST 18 - DEC. 3

MIME 0	Eniwetok AB or CU	B
MEKI 2	Eniwetok AB	C
REME 5	At Nauru	
HOSE 0	Wake COMM UNIT (Delete Kwajalein CU)	B
TEME 3	Wotje AB	B

SECRET

LIST 23 - DEC. 4

YARU 3	Airflot 22 or Ruotto AB	B
FUTI 3	At Wotje	B
ROKA 7	Eniwetok AB	B
SOKA 1	Ruotto AB	B

LIST 17 - DEC. 5

ITA 1	Wotje AB	B
WOMO 2	Taroa AB	B
N HA 3	Wotje AB	B

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THIS REPORT PREPARED BY
PERSONNEL OF R.I. UNIT
ATTACHED TO U.S.S. YORKTOWN
6 NOVEMBER TO 9 DECEMBER
1943, LT.(JG) C.A. SIMS
OFFICER IN CHARGE.

Gilbert's Occupation

NSA Technical Report 12 When no longer needed
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TASK FORCE FIFTY

U.S.S. YORKTOWN

Lt. (jg) C.A. Sims, USNR and the following men reported on board the U.S.S. YORKTOWN 1300, 6 November 1943; Beltz, W.J. CRM USN; Brinkhoff, A.G. RM2C USNR; Hooten, E.H. RM2C USN; Chamberlin, R.L. RM2C USN.

All equipment was stowed in the Chief Of Staff's cabin while painting and necessary installations were made in compartment 111 to accomodate the unit. This included completion of an air-conditioning unit installation, without which efficient work would have been impossible owing to the heat caused due to the location of the compartment next to the stack exhaust.

Ships company painted overhead and bulkheads and the R.I.U. painted the deck.

Installation of equipment was completed on 9 November 1943 Hawaiian date.

Reception was exceptionally good due to two antennae installed by ships force. Each antenna is approximately 200 feet long, one running from the island aft, the other from the island forward.

The permanent installation of a model RBA receiver gave the unit the use of the following equipment; 4 model SX-28 Hallicrafters; 1 model RBK; 1 model RBA receivers.

All receivers performed very satisfactorily, gunfire failing to throw the SX-28 and RBK receivers off frequency.

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On both "Dog" days, the unit experienced casualties. 21 November, (-9), water from the island head backed up into the Air-conditioning drain causing a flooded deck and waster matter in the compartment. This was quickly cleand up and ships force co-operated wholeheartedly in opening up the drains which had been closed for condition "Able".

5 December, the air-conditioning fan motor burned up causing heavy fumes in the compartment which necessitated the temporary suspending of operations and removal of personnel. Once again with the prompt help of ships company the unit was soon in operation. One operator had remained on 6115J throughout the disturbance and copied (with pencil since mills were covered) a grid report of contact with this force.

FREQUENCIES COVERED

1. Air Frequencies. (Bases and planes)
 - (a) 6115J
 - (b) 7120J
 - (c) 8725J
 - (d) 6580J
 - (e) 6260J
 - (f) 9420J
 - (g) 8525M (New frequency)
 - (h) 5720J
 - (i) 8305J
 - (j) 6840J
 - (k) 474J

2. Air Base Frequencies.
 - (a) 4275A/8550J
 - (b) 4735M (New frequency) ✓

3. Communication Units. (Gilberts Defense Force)
 - (a) 3767M/4300J/8600J
 - (b) 9770J/3860A

4. Weather and Lookout Stations.
 - (a) 5770A
 - (b) 3800J

5. Ship-Shore (Marshalls Defense Force)
 - (a) 4380A/7300A

6. Direction Finder.
 - (a) 3945J/7890J.

7. Fleet Frequencies.
 - (a) 7910A

8. Broadcasts.
 - (a) 4497J/8995J/17790J
 - (b) 5047.5J/10095J/15142.5J

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~~SECRET~~

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

474J

This frequency used for homing planes returning to Ruotto after the attack on this force 5 December.

3767M/4300J/8600J

3767M has replaced 4300J as a night frequency.
4300J was heard only once. This shift probably due to fact 4300J was interfering with 4275A.

3800J

The following stations were logged:

Kwajalein Communication Unit.

Brown Lookout

Utirik Lookout

Ebon Lookout

Kusaie Lookout

Rongelap Lookout

Mejit Lookout

RO 114 (RUANA) ———

POKAAKKU Lookout Station.

Utirik Weather Station

Ujae Weather Station

Rongelap Weather Station

Kusaie Weather Station

Blank Division 14 Commander

Wotje Weather Station.

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FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

3800J(cont)

This is a 24 hour frequency. As far as we could determine these stations do not use 9730C. Schedules are usually on the even hours for the weather stations. Lookouts apparently do not maintain any set schedules. No traffic was received from RO 114. Kwajalein delivered traffic to him on 3800J.

3860A/9770J

Nothing unusual observed on this circuit.

3945J/7890J

Normal D/F traffic handled with the circuit used as a traffic channel when other circuits are loaded.

4275A/8550J

Prior to 1 December and the capture of Makin and Tarawa, the following bases were logged:

Ruotto

Makin

Tarawa

Nauru

Eniwetok (ROWIWE)

Taroa

Imieji

Mille

Wake

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

4275A/8550J(cont)

On 1 December the following stations were logged:

Ruotto

Nauru

Wotje (RURUNE) (First Appearance) *(Air Base 90)*

Eniwetok (YOHEA) " " *(Air Base 78)*

Taroa

Imieji

Mille

Wake

On 6 December OE9 appeared for a short time.

4497J/8995J/17990J

Truk broadcast.

4735M

This new frequency was heard but once on 21 November used by the following airbases.

Nauru

Imieji

Taroa

Ruotto

Considerable interference is experienced on 4275A at night by Navy circuit using call AR1. 4735M is a clear channel frequency. It is quite possible this frequency may become more prominent.

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SECRET

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

5047.5J/10095J/15142.5J

Kwajalein broadcast.

5720J

On 15 November, bases were heard working. It is suspected planes were also up on this frequency but were unheard by this unit.

5770A

While this circuit was on the air, the following stations were heard working:

Tarawa

Apamama

H01

H02

H03

When the attack on Tarawa began, the lookouts burned their codes and considerable plain language was copied.

6115J

This is the primary air circuit in the Marshalls-Gilberts area. It is used for both tactical and search purposes. With one exception, all grids received were transmitted on this frequency. Reception is good between Ruotto and all bases throughout the day. At no time during the present operations did a poor operator appear on the control (Ruotto) station.

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FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

~~SECRET~~

6115J(cont)

During combat operations, Ruotto assumed command. All directives were given by the control and planes addressed their traffic to control, at times including other bases as either action or information addressees.

Upon completion of operations, planes split up into groups, each group working the base he apparently was returning to. This was later verified by one of our Submarines sighting planes landing at Mille airfield after planes had been heard requesting D/F bearings from Mille.

Planes operating on 6115J also transmit and receive on 7120J but never simultaneously. All traffic of any importance is always repeated by the control on both frequencies.

6260J

Used by Imieji, Kwajalein Seaplane base and planes. At times, both bases use this frequency to clear traffic.

6580J

This circuit used for ferry flight between Truk and Eniwetok. No Marshall bases were heard working on 6580J, 8ISO (probably CarDiv 1) being the only base heard.

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FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

6840J

This circuit was used on 20 November by Ruotto
airbase, 22nd Airflot and planes.

7120J

This is a secondary channel used in conjunction with
6115J during combat operations and used separately
during search patrols of a routine nature. Ruotto
is also control on this frequency. One grid was
received on 7120J.

7910A

At 0745 5 December, unidentified NIRI9 called
Truk (YOHEMI) and sent one four kana nigori msg
050550 addressed to Fleet 4 and fleet SoEast All
Major comm. for action, information to Deffor
Marshalls, unidentified SIMA2, 22nd Airflot, and
NavGenStaff, first section. In view of the fact that
Cruisers were known to be present at Kwajalein and that
the frequency used was 7910A (a fleet unit frequency)
it is suggested that NIRI9 may be a cruiser relaying
traffic to Truk from Kwajalein, whose communication
unit was knocked out.

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FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

8305J

On 19 November three unidentified Air Bases were heard. 4OWI 6KIO 1SUSE. Makin and Imieji were heard using three kana calls (SUANU and TOWIRU) working three kana nigori type traffic. Bases and planes used this frequency on 18 November. This frequency was quite prominent during the operations in September 1943 and seems to have lost its importance as an operations frequency at least during the present operations.

8525M

Taroa (SAWIKI) was heard working one plane on 14 November. This was the only time 8525M was heard.

8725J

Used by Wotje to work planes apparently attached to Air Group 531. No other base was heard on this frequency while this unit covered it. The necessity of maintaining a continuous watch on 6115J, 7120J and 4275A/8550J, plus Kwajalein broadcast and a search on very high frequency for voice made it very difficult to obtain very much data on this circuit. This frequency may take on added importance as operations continue in the Marshalls-Gilberts area. Planes used #3K# calls -(#ROKEFU#) which are listed as unassigned calls of Air Group 531.

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~~SECRET~~

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS (cont)

9420J

This circuit was heard only once and at that time only drill traffic was being handled.

POSSIBLE CODE COMPROMISES

On 13 November on 8550J Taroa Airbase (SAWIKI) originated message 131410 and cancelled it upon completion of transmission - 1436. At 1505 he originated another message 131440 with the same word count and same addressees. This apparently same message in another cipher.

On 30 November, 9NUKE originated a four kana nigori type message on 6115J carrying time of origin 1329 and delivered to 7SEH11 and 2MUH01 (nr2). At 1508 4MAN1 told 9NUKE he did not hold the code for 9NUKE message 1329. At 1523 9NUKE sent another message (nr3) with same time of origin but in three kana code. This looks very much like a code compromise.

NEW FREQUENCY OUTSIDE MARSHALL-GILBERT AREA

3730M

The following stations were heard:

Kasajima

Patrol force Nansei.

1 Unidentified call. (3 kana) (EKENE)

SECRET

SECRET

NOTES OF INTEREST

At 1500/21 Nov. on 6115J plane 2KUWAL sent a TOTOTOTO which was the signal to begin the attack on T.G.50.3 during which the Independence was hit. Immediately following this, 9 new calls appeared indicating Radio silence had been observed prior to the attack.

Circuit discipline practically disappeared on 4275A/8550J after the first strike was made by out forces. Ruotto tried to put some order on the circuit, but due to stations being off frequency and each station trying to clear traffic at the same time, the situation was impossible. The appearance of Eniwetok and Wotje on this circuit further overloaded the traffic flow, even though Makin and Tarawa no longer appeared. Nauru has but one good transmitter which is generally used on the air frequencies. Eniwetok is apparently without a good transmitter on any circuit heard. Wotje's transmitter is faulty. Ruotto, Imieji and Taroa are the only three on the circuit with good transmitting equipment.

A positive ident on Ruotto's Charlie call can easily be made by listening for his crystal howl. Each time before Ruotto transmits, he apparently touches the key and the transmitter starts automatically as his crystal can be heard radiating very clearly. It is quite likely his crystal can be heard at 254
This condition is especially true on 6115J.

LR

NOTES OF INTEREST (cont)

During the early phases of the present operations the appearance of a certain excellent operator on Ruotto (8550J) was generally a good indication that the period to follow was considered to be an important one by the Japs. Thus, before a period of activity instigated by the enemy, or during the hours before dawn when an attack by our own force seemed most likely, this operator was noted on watch.

Later, it was noted all good operators including this operator, were placed on air circuits.

On the evening of the fifth (prior to the attack on this force, north of Kwajalein) one of the first indications that the Japs were planning an important air strike move was the appearance of this operator on 6115J.

Discipline on the air circuits during the attack was excellent.

~~SECRET~~

100-93

Route attached 2 reports from TASK FORCE
units to:

180730

GT Jaw

Have not completed, please
write back to me after GI runs

GF 1 Reed 11/16/43/P

GI to

CIC WMA

GR VEP MP

GI _____

Please expedite and return to G-X

G-W

J. H. H. H.

These are the best T.F. reports I have seen - Jaw

Excellent reports

Edy

Task Force RIU (USS Indianapolis)
(Nov 6 - Dec 12) 1943

Info: GF 1 LP
GT Jaw
G W/S

GR* Q
G 1 Q

Return to GX. Please expedite
Jg Huckins

WAS SENT TO AND RETURNED FROM "GR" WITH SMS
REPORTS WHICH "GR" INITIALED. NOT INITIATING
EVIDENTLY AN OVERSIGHT. JHP

255B

Do NOT Destroy Return to the
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Enclosed herein is the report of the activities of the Fleet Radio Unit attached to COMCENTPACFOR for duty on the USS Indianapolis (CA35) from 11/6/43 to 12/12/43.

Submitted by:

FORREST	E.J.	CRM	USN
WILDER	J.P.	RM1c	USN
GREGORY	S.L.	RM1c	USNR
GRIER	A.J.	RM2c	USNR

*Slonim's report
on Gilbert's occupation
operation*

~~SECRET~~

The Fleet Radio Unit composed of the previously named men reported aboard the USS Indianapolis 6 November 1943 for duty with ComCentPacFor.

The compartment assigned this unit for use was not in readiness and was not completed until late afternoon of 10 November, at which time we were underway.

All times minus 9.

~~SECRET~~

11 November 1943.

Final work on compartment was completed in the late afternoon of this day.

At 1020, after comparison of Truk, Rabaul and Kwajalein broadcasts, a one man watch was set on Kwajalein broadcast. Until the late evening another man was employed checking Gilberts air and base frequencies.

At 1615 on 7160A IMUNU, identified as Submarine 1184 was heard to call ROMUNA, identified as Maru Chikushi, No traffic was sent and no more heard from this unit. A check was kept on ComSubFor broadcast during the evening and mid but it was not active.

Sasebo on 6235J was heard to work TAKESU, identified as the DD Satuki, this considered as good indication that this vessel is in Sasebo's communication zone.

Conditions this day were poor with much atmospheric QRM.

12 November 1943.

Commenced a two man watch this day with one man on Kwajalein broadcast and one man on general search. The Marshalls-Gilberts air base frequencies of 8550/4275J had poor to fair signals. 8600J was uncopiable. On the mid a new night frequency for this circuit was found to be 3767M and stations usually found on 4300J were all here. In general, signals in the Marshalls-Gilberts area were poor and traffic volume light.

Some tentative idents of Charlie calls were made from the air frequencies but few air frequencies were heard. Tarawa and look-out stations on 5770A not heard till 1852 and very poor then.

~~SECRET~~

13 November 1943.

The early part of the day found Kwajalein broadcast inactive and this continued until 0830 when it steadied down and ran with traffic.

6260j was heard in the early morning with fair signals and some traffic but faded out at 0500. 7120J was heard but noise level proved to be too high for copy.

A four kana call was heard working JOF on 8280J and traffic of a commercial type was received.

Conditions in the afternoon were very poor and copy from 8600j and 8550J was intermittent, no air frequencies were heard and a low frequency search produced nothing except Soerabaya broadcast to NARAE on 20.70M.

Some air frequencies were heard on the evening watch but were not busy. 6245E was up with bases and planes and this traffic appeared on Truk broadcast, it is thought that this is old 6246M.

Tarawa, Appamama and unidentified lookout station appeared on 5770A at 1507 but secured till 2100. The balance of the day found little activity on any circuit, the frequencies of 7300A, 8600J, 8550J and their night frequencies were covered when the activity warranted it. Kwajalein broadcast running slow. Signals for the evening and mid watches were fair.

14 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

A low frequency search in early part of day revealed nothing for our area, some empire and Yokosuka area activity was heard on 73J and 93E. At 0325 a station (YUMISI) was heard with KAKU type weather broadcast on 3765E.

Imieji and four planes were heard using drill procedure on 9420J but shut down at 0729 and were unheard again. 6260J was heard with some traffic and 6845J was heard but was unreadable, two planes and two bases were heard on 7120J but they seemed to have no traffic and were not heard after 0640.

At 0856 Taroa originated HIHIHI and later high precedence traffic appeared on 8550J and the Kwajalein broadcast.

This morning Kwajalein shifted directly to 15142J from 5047J and did not use 10095J.

From 1453 to 1700 8600J was busy with Tarawa originated traffic which was repeated on there at once by Kwajalein and appeared on the Truk and Kwajalein broadcasts within a short time. We are beginning to experience considerable interference from US Navy station on 8590 and from SurEscFor broadcast which is very strong in this area.

Kwajalein and Tarawa use 9770J for same traffic that appears on 8600J. On 8600J Kwajalein calls all hands telling them to shift to (KE101) which seems to be 3767M as these stations appear there in a short time, this may replace 4300J or be an alternate as 4300J was unheard. The Kwajalein broadcast running steadily but had to be dropped for Truk broadcast at 1945 due to bad echo. 4275J inactive at this time and QRM is heavy.

~~SECRET~~

14 November 1943.
Cont.-

At 2030 the Kwajalein broadcast was readable again and is picked up. The Marshalls-Gilberts frequencies and air frequencies are not active and there seems to be but little traffic, broadcast going with some second transmissions. Conditions for this day were fair.

15 November 1943.

Kwajalein broadcast inactive in morning hours. Air frequencies were not very busy with the exception of 6260J which was active for a short time. One plane of the transport type heard on 7120J, this frequency was up at intervals. Marshalls-Gilberts area put out a fair amount of traffic in the morning.

At 1108 Tarawa originates a message that he is being bombed but no further details of this appear. At 1215 the broadcast was dropped to cover 8550J. At 1313 Mille puts out HIHIHI and uses his service call as well as his secret call. At this time 8600J and 8550J are busy.

At 1323 Ruotto was heard to use his service call on 8550J to work Mille. At 1344 Mille puts out service message that his transmitter was out of order and he was unheard from 1327 until this time. Activity at Mille causes quite a flow of traffic to appear on 8550J and 8600J this is four kana and other high precedence traffic.

At 1533 Eniwetok was heard for the first time on 8550J, for this trip, and the signal was poor. At 1637 units formerly heard on 8390A were heard back on 8300J.

5770A was heard this day, but no traffic was received and signals here continue to be very poor, it is evident that only low power is used on this frequency.

~~SECRET~~

15 November 1943.

Cont.-

At 1700 8600J units again shift to 3767M and use the indicator (KE101). A low frequency search made at this time was fruitless. Ruotto and Mille air bases were heard to work on 5720J but were not busy nor up for long.

At 1800 the traffic volume and circuit activity has dropped off with some signals fading. Truk broadcast picked up at this time. The remainder of the day found little activity with the broadcasts running low on traffic.

16 November 1943.

At 0311 5770A was heard but was uncopyable here. 6260J appeared with three planes and bases, new "Charlie" calls in use today. With the exception of transmitters tuning on 7120J this was the only air frequency heard.

8550J is now covered most of the time when conditions permit, there is much asking for and sending of weather traffic here.

At 1145 on 8550J Imieji originates HIIHI and follows this with some amplifying traffic. There is still no air activity other than 6260J.

At 1441 on 8600J Tarawa goes with high precedence traffic and it is beleived that he is being attacked. Kwajalein re-broadcasts this traffic here and on his broadcast. Traffic originated by Tarawa also appears on 6260J from Kwajalein Sea Plane Base. ()

At 1459 on 8590E Air Group 732 (JWIKA) and one plane showed, one message was received from the plane.

At 1625 on 8600J^{MAKIN} commences to scream that he has high precedence traffic.

16 November 1943.
Cont.-

For the remainder of this report a chronological form will be used to make easier reading.

1630 8600J Makin sends high precedence traffic, considered to indicate that he is under attack. Due to QRM Makin has some difficulty raising Kwajalein and Tarawa and the same trouble is experienced here.

1644 8600J Makin again with hi precedence traffic to collective Gilberts.

1652 8600J HIIHIHI originated by (OR03) shows here but due to QRM we are unable to get originators three kana call.

1700 3767M This frequency is busy with Makin traffic.

1930 The Kwajalein broadcast and 3767M are still busy with good traffic.

1938 6260J The base (7WIRU) tells base (7ROTO) A "TU.HIIHIHI .(OR03). The meaning of this is thought to be, " Did you hear.....?" or, " Have you heardsince.....?"

2000 6260J Secures until 0300 and shuts down.

Circuits at this time are not very active and atmospherics are heavy.

2153 All hands are practically out of communication due to atmospherics.

17 November 1943.

0245 6845J Four planes and three bases are found here. The base (ORUSI) puts out KUHA at this time. This activity is beleived to be too far south for us, signals are poor to fair.

0410 3767M Tarawa puts out some high precedence four Kana traffic and amplifying traffic which later appears on Kwajalein.

17 November 1943.

Cont.-

0544 6260J This frequency become busy with much call and answer but little traffic, four planes were heard. It is not considered probable that this frequency will prove to be of great value during this operation.

0630 6260J continues to be busy. 8600J with some action and the Kwajalein broadcast is running steadily.

0706 7120J This frequency heard but activity is light.

0720 8550J Imieji originates HIIHI.

0724 8550J Imieji again with HIIHI, now twenty planes, also puts out some traffic which appears on Kwajalein broadcast.

0806 8550J Ruotto originates HIIHI at 0800. The rest of the bases have hard time believing this and ask many checks on the originator. Kwajalein broadcast is reproducing most traffic that appears here.

0830 Circuits are normal again. The air frequencies are not busy and poor signals prevail part due to high noise.

1205 BC Plane originates HIIHI at 1200, this plane one heard on 7120J.

1208 7120J Same plane now with grid contact and HIIHI. O"MU6VE, this last may be garble but if not its meaning is not known.

1310 7120J Continues with traffic, the Marshalls-Gilberts air bases circuits are inactive.

1731 5770A Three " HO " calls work Tarawa with " HO3 " being new to this circuit.

The latter part of this day was slow, the low frequencies were checked over with no result. No air activity.

18 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0340 High precedence traffic originated by (MERE2) appears on Kwajalein broadcast, on 4275J and 3767M.

Base and plane were heard on 5775A for a short time, signals were fair and some traffic received here.

0711 8550J Imieji gives plane sighting report.

7120J Was heard earlier in day but had no traffic.

1047 9770J Tarawa going here with high precedence traffic.

What was considered to be an image of 9770J was found on 8845E.

1105 Traffic originated by Tarawa shows first on 9770J then the Kwajalein broadcast then on 8600J and 8550J.

7120J Appears intermittently so far.

1219 7300A Mille originates HIHIHI and had put one out at 1215. This appears on broadcast also. 7300A active at this time whereas 8600J and 8550J are not.

6260J Is up intermittently with traffic but it is usual for this traffic to have appeared some hours earlier on the other circuits.

1430 8550J Taroa originates HIHIHI.W08. and follows this up with traffic.

1447 5720J Air bases are heard working here but it is beleived these are southern stations using the Gilberts frequency.

Continue to check low frequencies but with little result, the receiver in use (RAK6) does not seem very sensitive.

1600 Marshalls-Gilberts area activity has diminished.

Very heavy interference is present on 8550J/4275J.

2200 All frequências are quiet at present. 5770A was not heard this day.

~~SECRET~~

19 November 1943.

Close attention devoted to Marshalls-Gilberts frequencies.

0234 3 767M Nauru originate KAKAKA (CV type planes). Other frequencies at this time are not busy and Tarawa seems calm.

0255 3860A Tarawa with KIN traffic.

3767M This frequency becomes hot with Tarawa and Nauru originating four Kana KIN traffic.

0255 5770A Lookout stations here are calling Tarawa but his transmitter seems to be out.

3860A Tarawa going with high precedence traffic at this time, operator is very nervous. Tarawa was last heard here at 03 \pm 2 and has been called many times since.

0321 4275J Nauru on here with KIN traffic.

0329 3767M Tarawa busy on here. At 0415 Tarawa's transmitter drops out while keying and doesn't show again until 0440.

0352 5770A This continues to be busy with lookout station going with traffic some of which is contact. Tarawa is unheard here from 0308 to 0412 and then is just audible.

0420 5770A This is busier than ever. HO 1 is the only one in communication with Tarawa. Apamama gives up and secures till 0600. Other stations here trying very hard to raise Tarawa. HO 1 and HO 2 going with traffic.

6260J Is repeating traffic from other circuits.

0420 4275J Nauru broadcasting his high precedence traffic.

0459 5770A Tarawa shows on here with a fair signal and raises all hands, receiving KAN5 all around. He sends and receives some traffic, other units signals have decreased.

0527 5770A HO 2 with service message. HA"YU 0522VE. Means (??).

19 November 1943.
Cont.-

0531 7120J Planes and bases up here, planes with some grid traffic. 6260J is also busy at this time.

8600J and 4275J going full blast.

0642 6260J Base (7ROMO) originates HIIHI.

0700 4275J Imieji puts out HIIHI.

0736 6260J Base (7WITU) puts out HIIHI from Mille.

0754 8550J Na uru with another HIIHI. Traffic here is heavy now.

0758 7120J Ruotto tells plane to shift to 8915J(K013) and works him there continuing to work on 7120J also.

1100 All circuits concerned are going with traffic. 7120J remains up and 6260J is copied when heard. 8600J and Truk broadcast seem to run neck and neck with traffic now.

1240 Grid traffic is appearing on 8550J and Truk broadcast. Calls to fit this traffic are not found as yet.

1421 6115J This appears to be the hot air frequency at the present time, calls here fit grid traffic copied on 8550J and Truk broadcast. Planes going at this time with contact traffic.

8305J This frequency also heard but the base was not able to raise plane there and showed up on 6115J in short time.

1456 6115J P lane originates HIIHISEKI. This frequency becomes very busy.

1415 8305J Imieji again tries to raise a plane here with no success, works Makin air base and secures at 1532 until 0300.

1530 8550J This is quieter now. 6115J still going strong with occasional grid traffic appearing.

SECRET

19 November 1943.
Cont.-

1730 6115J Still active with some plane signals dropping.

8600J Inactive.

8550J Traffic volume dropping off.

2000 6115J This is now too weak for copy in most cases.

2200 All activity slight. Air frequencies are inactive
with the exception of occasional flurry on 6115J. Broadcasts at
this time are slacking off.

~~SECRET~~

20 November 1943.

0230 4275J Grid traffic continues to appear here at intervals.

0247 6115J Bases and planes going now with grid traffic prominent.
6260J With light activity.
A low frequency search at this time reveals nothing.

0308 4275J Imieji originates HIIHII.

0330 3767M Kwajalein rebroadcasts HIIHII from Mille. Tarawa busy here and on 4275J with traffic at this time.

0400 Marshalls-Gilberts air frequencies other than 6115J fail to appear.

0500 6115J Still going strong at this time.

0530 8600J Kwajalein now very busy and sending much traffic originated by Tarawa. Operator here ceased logging received traffic as time did not permit it.

0635 6115J Plane (1YAR03) with HITAHITA.
0640 8550J Tarawa is busy with traffic but his transmitter is poor here and all have trouble receiving him.

0650 6115J Plane (1YAR03) again with HITAHITA. His signal is very strong.

0653 6115J Same plane with grid traffic, we believe that this grid position is ours. This plane believed to be shot down shortly after this.
Tarawa is still putting out considerable traffic but his transmitter is poor on all frequencies and is often unreadable to us.

0715 8550J Mille originates HIIHII6K0 and sends amplifying traffic.

0830 8550J Continues with high precedence traffic from Tarawa.

20 November 1945.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

0355 8550J Mille originates HIIHIK09.

0900 Mille again with HIIHIK018. Both of these appear on
8600J also.

8600J Very busy at this time with Kwajakein and Tarawa
swapping traffic and Makin with high precedence traffic to Kwajalein
and collective Gilberts.

1000 6115J Continues busy with traffic a good percentage of which
is grid traffic.

1100 All circuits are going full blast. Kwajalein^{*} broadcast
is duping important traffic from other circuits.

1236 6115J A plane asked to be homed on (HI720) which is listed
as 474J, na search for this was unproductive.

1300 All circuits have quieted down to some extent now.

1345 8600J Tarawa and Makin again putting out high precedence
traffic. Tarawa is also going on 8550J.

1410 8600J Tarawa, Makin, Ocean Is. and Nauru are now putting
out much traffic which Kwajalein^{is} repeating.

1500 6115J Continues to be very active, there are many planes on
this frequency now.

1648 8305J There are a couple of planes and bases working here
1708 but frequency is not active enough to be desired now.

Kwajalein broadcast is not very active at present.

1800 BC Received HIIHIH originated by Imieji air base at 1751,
this was also picked up on 3767M.

Circuits are running slower now but still have a good
amount of traffic.

2135 5770A Tarawa calls HO2 and Apamama, no traffic received and
other stations unheard. Secures until 0000.

20 November 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

2135 6115J Is slow at this time and little more is heard for the rest of this day.

Kwajalein broadcast was given only what coverage as there was time for until late evening as most of his traffic was a duplication of traffic received on other circuits.

As the logs of this operation will show there is a great deal of local interference encountered and much of it comes from this ships transmitters. This has prevented good copy in many cases and made some copy impossible in others.

It appears that the air frequencies of 6115J and 7120J are the only ones in constant use for this area. 8305J has been used but seems to be an alternate or stand by frequency.

Circuit activity was intense today and the traffic volume very good.

21 November 1943.

0116 5770A Lookout stations HO 1 and HO 2 state that they will transmit at the beginning of each hour.

6115J Up for a short time only.

0145 5770A This circuit going again with HO 2 doing most of the transmitting. Several HIIHI and other contact traffic appear from the various lookout stations.

0200 4275J Tarawa going strong with traffic again.

3767M Tarawa putting out traffic on the double and is not waiting for Rogers. Kwajalein repeating this traffic to collective Gilberts.

0225 5770A This frequency still very busy with contact traffic, some plain language traffic also shows here.

0300 3767M These frequencies very busy with Tarawa traffic and
8550J
Tarawa is sending steadily.

0307 We commence bombardment.

0320 5770A HO 2 Reports burning codes and traffic thereafter is plain language.

0326 Port whip antennae is carried away by vibration or concussion, shifting to other antennae.

0400 5770A Apamama and HO calls with traffic to Tarawa, some signals are poor but all are busy.

4275J Tarawa unheard here from 0358 to 0417, all hands are calling him madly. Reception here difficult at present due to very noisy antennae.

0446 5770A Tarawa up calling HO calls, Apamama and Sasebo Special Landing Force (KURUSE), this last station was unheard here.

6115J Very active with bases and planes, considerable grid and other traffic here.

21 November 1943.

Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

0446 Our intermittent firing is causing a great deal of antennae noise.

0500 3767M Shifted to day frequency of 8600J but no activity appears until 0524.

Our planes and ships are using a frequency very close to 8600J for target spotting and cause heavy interference.

0600 5770A Continues to be busy.
8600J

0605 6115J This frequency is active again. A plane appears with
HIHIHI

0650 6115J The same plane with HITA and grid traffic, his signal is very strong,.

0659 5770A HO 3 Reports burning codes and secret documents.

0753 5770A Apamama says he has transmitter trouble and secures until 0900.

0800 Kwajalein runs with much traffic on 8600J and 9770J but Tarawa is unheard.

0802 6115J A plane (3TINE3) with HIHIHI, signal is very strong.

0845 8600J Tarawa is heard to finish a message.

0852 8600J Tarawa goes again but transmitter fails once more.

0903 5770A Apamama is heard calling Tarawa but that is all, his frequency is a little off at this time.

0949 5770A Apamama is tuning transmitter to frequency. HO 2 and HO 3 with traffic for Tarawa but he is not heard.

1000 7120J Planes and bases both these frequencies with traffic.
6115J

1200 8600J, 8550J, 7300A, 9770J, 5770A and air frequencies are all going strong, Tarawa is unheard any frequency and Makin is also unheard.

21 November 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1234 8550J Mille originates HIIHI.K0100, Ruotto repeats this for all hands.

1328 8600J Tarawa is up with traffic but transmitter again fails at 1338.

1335 6115J A plane originates HIIHI.

1356 8600J Tarawa on air again and finishes his traffic. Tarawa does not show on 8550J.

1500 7120J These frequencies kept covered and are up with traffic
6115J intermittently.

The rest of this day was comparatively quiet with some action from time to time on the 8600J/3767M and 8550J/4275J series. 7120J and 6115J continued active until the late evening.

Local transmitter interference again makes it very difficult to copy our most important frequencies. A faulty antennae system seems to be responsible for this.

Traffic and circuit activity were again heavy on this day.

22 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0116 4570E Call for Tarawa (KENOME) was heard on here calling Nauru and Kwajalein. Operator says that it did not sound like Tarawa transmitter and it is possible that the frequency is an image.

0133 6115J Planes and bases are active here and some grid type traffic is appearing.

0158 Our 40 MM guns now start up.

0159 6115J A plane (7TARI1) Sends TOTOTO (Attack).
Local interference is heavy at present.

0204 3767M Nauru and Kwajalein call Tarawa with no result.

0219 5770A Lookout stations all call each other. HO 2 with some traffic to Tarawa. HO 3 Secures until 0400. HO 2 Secures after some traffic output. Tarawa was unheard.

0222 6115J Plane (7TAKO3) with TOTOTO. Other planes and bases are up here but not very active.

0240 Our 40MM and 5 inch guns taking off now.

0300 4275J Units are going here with usual weather traffic.
Ruotto and Nauru try to raise Tarawa but are unsuccessful.

0330 4275J These frequencies quiet at present.
3767M

0430 6115J Again with some action.

0601 8600J Tarawa on here but a little high in frequency, he is not in communication with other units.

0646 8550J Some good traffic is appearing now.

0730 8550J Nauru originate HIHIHI.WO6. This is repeated by Ruotton on here and also shows on 8600J. Nauru later follows this up with high precedence traffic.

0743 8600J Tarawa is still calling Kwajalein, gets no answer.

0821 8550J Nauru again with HIHIHI and pertinent traffic.

22 November 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

0900 8600J Tarawa finally gets in communication and gets out a lot of traffic.

8550J Very busy at this time.

0950 6115J Activity here fair and traffic volume fair.

Kwajalein broadcast running with dupes of Tarawa's 8600J traffic.

1133 6580J Air base "Charlie" calls here, one identified as being attached to Cardiv 1.

1230 8550J Mille with HHHHI and traffic to follow it up.

8600J Tarawa calling Kwajalein again, activity here has dropped off.

1240 8550J Ruotto originates HHHHI.

1400 Air activity now very slight.

1400 8550J Ruotto and Mille go with high precedence traffic.

1720 ComSubFor broadcast set on speaker and operator stand by for breaks in his traffic in order to know when subs are operating.

Activity in general has diminished to low level.

1828 6260J Bases on here with traffic but most of this is dupe of 8600J and 8550J traffic received some time previous.

Air circuits are unheard for the rest of this day.

No submarines are picked up.

Kwajalein broadcast running slow and with old traffic.

23 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0000 4275J All routine here at present, noise level is very high.
0100 Low frequency searches made with no results, there seems to be very little low frequency activity this operation or it may be that receiver is not sensitive enough.
0153 6115J Planes and bases with some traffic.
0300 6115J This goes intermittently but is frequently broken up by interference of a local nature. Traffic from this circuit shows on Kwajalein broadcast in a very short time.
0315 4275J Ruotto rebroadcasts HIHIHI originated by Mille who is unheard at this time.
0327 6115J Ruotto sends another HIHIHI from (6KUNA) which is Mille air base.
0420 4275J Nauru inquires of Ruotto and Mille how they receive him on 6115J but gets no answer to this.
0427 7120J Shows at this time with bases operating. Interference makes copy nearly impossible.
0507 4275J Taroa now goes with high precedence traffic.
0554 8600J Nauru with high precedence traffic which appears on Kwajalein broadcast in a short time.
0600 8600J Kwajalein attempts to raise Tarawa with no result.
0700 4275J Imieji now puts out a lot of traffic here.
0730 4275J Imieji and Mille with considerable traffic.
0800 8600J Kwajalein is still attempting to raise Tarawa.
0809 8600J Kwajalein broadcasts HIHIHI originated by Mille.
0810 We bombard again.
0812 8550J Mille is now heard and goes with traffic. This frequency now becomes busy, considerable from Mille.

23 November 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1058 7120J This frequency active intermittently but all signals
To
1146 are poor.

1115 8550J Silent with the exception of Ruotto trying to raise
To
1146 other bases.

1300 8550J Traffic here at good volume still with all bases
active.

2000 8550J Now weather traffic predominates although some other
traffic shows from time to time.

Very little activity from air or other frequencies in
the latter part of this day.

24 November 1943.

Cont.-

SECRET

0000 4275J This with usual weather traffic.

0209 6115J This shows for a few minutes, one plane with a very good signal to Ruotto. Other air activity is not found.

0400 4275J With usual weather traffic and requests for weather.

0430 6260J A unit here with HIIHI but operator is unable to determine who it is due to terrific interference from ships transmitter. At this time a HIIHI shows on 4275J from Mille air base.

0511 5275J Mille originates HIIHI at 0508 but this is not backed up with traffic on this frequency nor on 7300A .

0609 8915J Unit identified as being in Cardiv 1, (8ISO) is heard to work planes here and Ruotto, service call for this unit found to be (SUKA5) from traffic handled. Ruotto also worked AF22 and unidentified service call with weather for 0500 and 0600.

0630 6845J This frequency up with planes and bases but is thought to be too far south to be of interest, activity is light.

0747 8600J Ocean Is. is heard to call Tarawa and it is evident that he has not been enlightened.

At this time 8550J, 8600J, 7300A and the Kwajalein broadcast are running light.

0818 8550J Ruotto asks Wake if the "Break in" system is used on (HI721) which is 341JC, this was checked for but unheard.

0844 8550J Wake asks Ruotto if he shall assign an operator to 7120J and Ruotto instructs him to do so, this was checked on but was not heard. Both 7120J and 6115J are inactive.

0952 8550J Imieji originates HIIHI at 0944 and follows this with amplifying traffic.

24 November 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

8550J Mille and Brown Is. have been difficult for all hands to receive and Nauru is not much better. Ruotto has been acting as relay between Mille and Taroa much of the time.

1021 8915J Ruotto and AF22 are heard working here as well as Ruotto to 3rd Fleet planes, planes of AG 752 also heard here.

1230 8260J This frequency covered for a while and signals are fair while we are in this area but no real power seems to be used.

1600 Air frequencies remain inactive, a constant air and tactical frequency search is maintained with no success.

1735 6385J NARAE up with traffic and good signal. Sub frequency is kept under surveillance. As these Fleet Radio Units are not equipped with HFDF and little of the position of NARAE can be determined by signal strength it doesn't appear practical to cover submarine frequencies.

2015 6385J Another NARAE heard here with a good signal but copy is impossible due to ships transmitter going at same time.

2040 Same NARAE is heard again and is clear of interference.

2325 2917M This circuit was heard but atmospherics were very bad so little was gained here.

Air activity for this day was very light and all circuits were not exceptionally active. Kwajalein broadcast ran intermittently with traffic.

Local interference was again extremely heavy.

25 November 1943
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1640 6385A NARAE with traffic, has good signal.
1725 6115J A plane requests dashes for D/F bearing from Ruotto.
At this time the plane signals are weakening.
1837 4275J Imieji originates HIIHI at 1830, this is repeated
by Ruotto.

Mille air base has been unreadable or unheard for
most of the day.

2000 6115J There continues to be fair activity here but signals
are dropping, some planes securing and others asking for weather in
preparation to go in.

2044 6115J Ruotto puts out message to collective call for planes
that is thought to be a recall.

2100 4275J This circuit has been very slow with the bulk of the
traffic being weather.

2105 6385A NARAE here with traffic.

2200 6115J Mostly bases on here now with traffic, this circuit
was last heard at 2235.

2335 6385A NARAE with traffic to ComSubFor, his signal good but
QRM very heavy.

26 November 1943

~~SECRET~~

0000 4275J Some routine traffic here but bulk is weather.
0500 4275J Conditions about the same. Mille is either very weak or unheard at all.
0730 No air frequencies have appeared.
0830 7120J Up for short time, no action.
0909 6115J Planes and bases here with traffic.
0928 Plane (6ROMO47) with HIIHI.
1100 Action here is spasmodic.
8550J Nearly all weather traffic, no excitement. Some duplicates of 7120J and 6115J traffic appears.
1407 6115J Plane with HIIHI.
1430 Another plane with HIIHI. Activity is now good here.
1600 6115J There continues to be considerable activity here with planes and bases going.
1730 4275J Ruotto tells Mille and Taroa to make V's for D/F bearings, (this for a plane).
1815 4275J Some aircraft traffic originated on 6115J appears.
1857 4275J Ruotto again tells Taroa to make V's for bearing.
1900 6115J Circuit still running strong, average plane signal is S3 and some ask for weather.
2100 6115J Circuit now dropping off, signals are weak and there is little traffic.

Major activity of this day was on 6115J whereas other circuits were nearly normal. The Kwajalein broadcast ran with more numeral traffic than formerly.

27 November 1943,

SECRET

0000 4275J This frequency is a madhouse at present due to the presence of northern air bases on here as well as usual Marshalls-Gilberts bases. These stations which are identified as being in the north are so close to 4275J as to cause heavy interference and confuse operators of both circuits.

0300 4275J This has gradually straightened out and is in near normal shape, most of traffic is weather.

0437 7120J Planes and bases spend some time getting in favorable communication but not much activity ensues.

0530 4275J Eastern air bases shift to 8550J and use indicator (HITU23) for that frequency. Tarawa is unheard either one.

0614 7120J One plane secures.

0632 Another secures.

0649 6115J Planes and bases with traffic.

0758 One plane secures on here.

0800 8550J Mille is unheard on here and is S Ø to most bases on the circuit, traffic to and from Mille is relayed by Taroa.

1000 8550J Mille is finally heard here but is very weak, the circuit is not busy and little other than routine and weather traffic appears.

1037 7120J Ruotto tries on both these frequencies to raise some
6115J planes but is not successful.

1120 7120J This is used for a while but traffic volume is low.

1200 7120J Both of these in use and are fairly busy.
6115J

1224 6115J Grid traffic is appearing now.

1245 6115J Planes using KIN and SAKI to prefix traffic here,
grid and other priority traffic showing here and frequency is red hot.

27 November 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1300 8550J There are many requests for weather and much of this traffic is sent.

1347 6115J This is so active now that operator is not able to log all of it but concentrates on traffic. Plane signals are strong and grids are appearing thick and fast.

1427 6115J Plane puts out HIIHI KASE (Enemy carrier based fighter planes).

1555 6115J A plane thought to be AttFor leader puts out a NR3 -- SIMOSIMOSIMO"1550, this is given wide distribution and the bases make certain that all hands get it. It is believed that this is the same as TOTOTO.

1630 8550J This circuit has been runnin about normal and now shifts down to 4275J using indicator (HITU023).

1700 6115J Is still going strong.

1728 6115J Plane asks Mille for aviation weather.

1741 6115J Plane to Mille with MEMEME (Unidentified planes).

1803 6115J A plane (ØYUHO1) sends .YO.HOIHOI(3HORO6) to Mille and then tells originator that Mille has rogered for it.

1815 6115J Mille with traffic to (3HORO6).

1900 6115J Some planes are getting weaker now.

2000 6115J Frequency still up and going, signals dropping .

2053 6115J Ruotto homing a plane.
to
2120

2220 6115J This was last time this frequency was heard today.

Other than air activity there was little out of the ordinary on the circuits this day. Kwajalein was very quick to repeat plane traffic. Local interference remains very heavy.

28 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0000 4275J Normal routine this morning with all hands going with weather. Heavy and frequent interference makes copy difficult.

0300 4275J Mille continues to be the missing link and has to be relayed to and for, usual weather routine on circuit.

In the early hours no air is found and the broadcast reflects no good traffic. 5770A has been unheard for some days now. Search for lookout stations reported still operating is fruitless.

0611 8550J Ruotto calls collective and instructs them (TOKA) that it is not necessary to obtain permission before transmitting.

0730 No air circuits as yet. Kwajalein broadcast is going with 27th traffic.

0825 8550J Ruotto rebroadcasts HIIHII from Mille.

0856 6115J Planes and bases appear on here, little action yet.

0954 6115J A plane with HIIHII and makes quite a mess of it.

0955 Another plane with HIIHII. At this time the circuits becomes busier and grid traffic shows up.

1130 8550J Imieji asks Ruotto how he hears plane (MEHEKO, an AG801 plane) and Ruotto gives S5 and says he has received traffic from the plane. It is believed that this plane is from 8915J.

1230 6115J Activity continues to be good here with several grids showing and plane signals good.

1300 8550J This circuit is about normal. Mille's transmitter remains very poor and has some characteristics of a Maru type.

1405 6115J Ruotto informs a plane (6ROM043) that he is not heard on (HI720) 474JC, a check of low frequency failed to find any action on this frequency.

28 November 1943.

-Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1430 Very heavy static at this time, probably from rain
and covers from 2000 to 6500 kcs.

1450 No air heard.

1451 6115J Heard again, bases and planes with good amount of
traffic, grids still showing up.

1545 6115J A plane (5MOSI1) and thought to be AttFor leader puts
out TOTOTOTO.

1600 8550J All is normal with this circuit.

1730 6115J Continues to roll along and is fairly busy.

 7120J Is heard at this time but interference from USN on
7035 prevents copy.

1740 4275J Some plane traffic from 6115J appears here. For the
rest of this day this circuit runs about normal with weather and
routine traffic.

1950 Static is very severe again and air circuits are not
heard.

2000 6115J Still in operation but signals are very much weaker,
this frequency is unheard after 2155.

29 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

The morning hours are quiet with routine traffic on the circuits and no air activity found.

0543 7120J A plane heard working Ruotto, this plane secures and says I"FU (I am ceasing communications).

0800 8550J Routine here with the usual amount of weather traffic.

1022 6115J Planes and bases up now with high precedence traffic, this circuit remains active for some time.

1254 8550J Eastern air bases with considerable traffic.

1500 6115J A plane puts out HIIHIIHI and the activity here goes on the double again with planes prefixing traffic KIN and SAKI.

8550J Still with a good amount of traffic.

1600 6115J A plane (7NURA1) thought to be AttFor leader becomes very excited now and puts out plain language traffic. At 1616 another plane goes with HIIHII on here.

1711 6115J Plane tells control base that he wishes to be homed, activity here is waning but there are still planes and bases calling and working.

1800 4275J Copy from this frequency is impossible to obtain due to the USN local interference.

1954 6115J Action about done here and frequency dies out.

30 November 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0009 4275J All is normal here with aviation weather traffic.
4280E This is Empire or Northernair base frequency that causes considerable interference to 4275J at times.

0325 6115J Base and plane here with poor signals, some copy is received.

0528 7120J Base and planes calling but little traffic appears.
8915J Eastern air bases heard here frequently with traffic the most of which is weather.

0615 7300A Tuned in on this in time to hear NARAE finish a message to Kwajalein, no more is heard from NARAE.

0744 6260J This frequency heard but has no traffic.

0800 7120J Planes on here with grid and high precedence traffic and much call and answer.

1005 7120J A little traffic continues to show here but most of action is call and answer.

1200 7120J Planes and bases are still calling but activity is not heavy.

1410 8550J A good volume of traffic is received here and this continues until 1540 at which time the shift to night frequency is made.

1600 All air frequencies are quiet at present.

1640 6385A A NARAE is heard in block seven of a 219 group numeral message, the signal is very good.

2245J Kwajalein broadcast slow and running second time transmissions.

Not much action was found after 1600 on any frequency although 4275J had traffic intermittently.

1 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0159 4275J A new air base call appears here (RWRUNE) which is Air Base 90 and may be at Wotje.

0310 4275J There has been no traffic delivered to this time due to bad receiving conditions but stations get underway with weather traffic now.

0600 6115J This going with traffic now some of which are grids.

0900 8550J Imieji tells Air Base 90 to secure operators on 8305J until further notice. Imieji adds that he is also securing on 8550J until 1200 which seems to startle Ruotto but he finally Rogers. Mille is only heard occasionally on this frequency as his transmitter remains poor.

1012 8550J Taroa goes with HIIHI.W010.

1304 7300A Kwajalein rebroadcasts a HIIHI from Ebon Lookout.

1530 6115J A plane reports a sub sighting (SESESESE).

1613 8550J The new air base call here (YOHEA) is identified as being Air Base 78 .

1619 6115J This frequency is very poor at this time and copy is difficult. Other air frequencies remain quiet.

1720 6115J Better signals here and a fair amount of traffic flows.

1804 6115J A plane requests homing aid. Activity this frequency is about over at this time.

The traffic volume this day was fair but much traffic was lost through the usual local interference, there has been many times that good dope was lost in this manner.

2 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0406 6115J Going at this time with a small amount of traffic.

A plane informs Ruotto that he is shifting but does not give any frequency indicator, this plane was not heard on any other frequency although some activity was heard on 7120J.

0603 7120J Bases and planes here getting in communication and some traffic is eventually delivered.

0947 6115J Quite a bit of grid and regular plane traffic is received on here at present.

1151 8550J Some action here with a good volume of traffic besides the usual weather.

1321 7120J A plane secures here, there is not much traffic going but a great deal of calling.

1450 Receiving conditions at this time are very poor.

1656 7120J Three planes secure now.

1800 No air activity has been heard since 1656. Circuits for the remainder of the day are inactive.

3 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0414 7120J Bases and planes calling but little traffic is being delivered.

0451 7120J One base secures here but gives no reason for it. At this time both 7120J and 6115J are in use by the same planes and bases.

0818 6115J This frequency with a small amount of traffic.

0920 6115J A plane reports HIIHISE at this time.

1120 7120J Both still in use and Ruotto calls on both at this
6115J time, little action here .

1314 7120J A plane on here says E"E VA and secures. This is supposed to mean that "Exercise is concluded" but it is beleived that this is incorrect.

1448 7120J Traffic being sent here but again it is not possible to copy it through our local interference.

1733 6260J Traffic here is numeral traffic and several hours old.

2015 3800J Units just calling here, this is one of the few times that this frequency has been heard on this operation.

4 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0358 3800J One unit sends weather message and secures.

0413 6260J Up but not active.

0415 3767M Kwajalein and Ocean Is. calling and not making much headway, this is the usual case between these units and is partly due to Ocean Is. being off frequency many times.

0626 All confidential and secret publications and devices secured and covered up until 0810 during which time shipfitters were working on ventilation system. A listening watch is maintained on 7120J and 6115J during this period.

0842 6115J Units are heard here but no traffic is delivered.

0910 6115J A plane sends out grid on a plane he has sighted.

1015 8550J Mille with report of sighting ten planes. A good volume of traffic appears on this circuit at present.

1200 7120J Have been heard intermittently but seem to have no
6115J traffic nor unusual action. Communications for this day have been poor to fair so far.

1303 8550J Mille with HHHHI.

1748 7120J Bases and planes calling but not much traffic. (There are thirty Nip planes overhead and attacking the island but they don't seem to be transmitting.)

1842 7120J A plane asks for weahter from Ruotto and that Ruotto send dashes for D/F bearings, plane wishes to go home.

2140 7120J/6115J Fade out at this time. These and other air frequencies have not been active this day.

5 December 1943

~~SECRET~~

0025 3800J Heard but has no traffic.

0156 4275J This frequency with a good volume of traffic from all hands.

0337 3990A Ruotto and Kwaj with traffic, both sign NARAE.

0342 7120J A plane is heard here but QRM is very bad and not much is obtained from this frequency.

0510 4275J Ruotto with HIIHI reporting fifty small planes.

0511 7120J A plane makes O"HI but does not give any indicator.

0527 6115J Ruotto is heard trying to get a Roger for traffic from the plane mentioned above but the plane is not heard on any frequency.

0611 6260J Air base, (5AKO) which is possibly Kwajalein Sea Plane Base, with HIIHI.

0622 8550J Air Base 90 with quite a few high precedence messages.

0803 6115J Bases and planes with traffic now.

0812 8550J Nauru with HIIHI.

0850 8550J Mille reports sighting seven planes.

0853 8550J Mille now reports 15 planes sighted.

0919 8550J Mille again reports sighting planes.

0940 7120J Some call and answer but no action here.

1012 7910A Truk and Kwajalein working here. It is possible that this was made necessary by heavy air raids at Kwajalein.

1031 8550J Air Base 90 reports sighting small planes but does not give the number.

1130 7120J Goes with a little traffic.

8550J Busy with considerable amount of traffic.

5 December 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1250 8550J Imieji with HIIHII.
1255 8550J Nauru with HIIHII.
1350 8550J Imieji with HIIHII.
1503 6115J A small amount of traffic appears here.
7120J Has no traffic at this time.
1531
To 6115J Bases and planes with considerable traffic.
1725
1819
To 6115J Planes have large volume of traffic and often two
2000 or three are transmitting at the same time, this
gradually subsides.
2315 7120J Some traffic here but planes are beginning to secure
at this time.
2347 6115J Ruotto sends a plane his bearing and the quality of
it in message form, activity diminishing here.

6 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0005 6115J/7120J Bases seem to be using both these to raise planes on, signals here are still weak.
0120 6115J This is unheard now.
7120J Plane on here and secures, signal very poor.
0125 4275J This circuit is running about normal.
0234 3767M Truk and Kwajalein working here which is something new. Truk asking for repeats on broadcast traffic and Rogers for some.

The air frequencies this morning are erratic and not very active.

0445 4275J Mille sends some plane traffic here and Taroa goes with traffic, things look up a little.
0800 8550J Circuit normal now.
0952 Air traffic and action amounts to little until this time. 7120J Is going now with some traffic, planes have weak signals. This activity dies out by 1100.
1138 8600J Beleive that Kwajalein is working Rabaul on here, did not hear Rabaul called but from the method of working, sound of transmitter and identifications in traffic it seems a possibility.
1202 8550J Mille with HHHHI.
1300 7120J Activity picks up somewhat here but traffic not heavy.
6115J Also with some action.
1325 8550J Mille with HHHHI.
1355 8550J Mille goes with good traffic but this is not received here due to poor signal and interference. Some plane traffic shows on this frequency now.

6 December 1943.
Cont.-

~~SECRET~~

1445 No air frequencies are heard now.

1600 8550J Quite a bit of traffic is missed at this time due to ships transmitter going most of the time.

1633 8550J Imieji asked Brown Is. when his next time of transmission was, Brown said to secure until 1800. Believe they may be referring to 8305J or other frequency as they appear on here soon.

1800 4275J Ruotto operator is exceptionally poor for that base and manages to foul all hands up.

1907 GQ. It seems we have bogies. Nothing comes of this.

2000 6115J/7120J These frequencies are up off and on but action is to
2200 negligible.

2100 4275J This circuit considerably slower than usual and general conditions remain poor.

This day did not seem of great value in either traffic or dope revealed on circuits. Air frequencies were inactive most of the time and unsatisfactory when up. Some traffic received from Truk and Kwajalein broadcasts from time to time.

7 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

4275J This frequency was very quiet in early hours of this day.

0422 7120J This is the first air activity that has showed today, no traffic as yet but much calling.

0550 7120J Traffic appearing now but interference from 7035(USN) is very frequent. It is necessary to get the bulk of 7120J traffic from Kwajalein broadcast as copy is near impossible on 7120J.

0936 No air action on either 6115J or 7120J.
To
1200

0930 8550J Everything is normal to this point.

0945 8550J Mille with HIIHI and some amplifying traffic.

1200 7120J There is some action here and a small amount of traffic.

1400 8550J Normal routine. Ruotto operator is having a hard time keeping circuit control and little discipline is noted;

1415 Mille puts out HIIHI which is repeated by Ruotto.

1430 7120J/6115J Both go with some traffic, very often traffic is duplicated on these frequencies when both are in use.

1458 8550J Ruotto operator now changed and conditions are better.

1530 All air inactive.

1602 8550J Mille with HIIHI originated at 1545.

1735 6115J A plane with HIIHI and some action shows here for a time.

1840 7120J/6115J Both going at this time.

2000 This sees the end of air activity for this day.

2000 4275J Some traffic other than weather appears at times but the weather is still the bulk of it, conditions normal here.

8 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0005 Flag Plot reports suspicious plane. A search if made for plane transmissions with no result, all air frequencies quiet.

Kwajalein broadcast and other circuits running at normal or below.

0321 4275J Taroa with HIIHIHII originated at 0312, he makes sure that all bases get this but it takes twenty minutes.

0425 4275J Mille with HIIHIHII originated at 0415.

0446 At this time coverage of 8550J/4275J series is dropped and a steady coverage of Truk broadcast started with air frequencies being checked also.

0425 7120J Planes and bases with some traffic, action light.

0454 One plane securing.

0534 Another plane secures.

0541 Plane to plane said KAN ? ARE32? (ARE32? ARE32?).

The meaning of this, unless ARE32 is plane call which is doubted, is not clear.

0642 6115J A plane with HIIHIHII.

0652 6115J Base and planes are using cut procedure to stay in communication.

0703 6115J Base (ØNOKA) compromises his call and signs with three kana call as well, this is Mille.

0900 Air frequencies are quiet at present.

1300 Air frequencies remain quiet with occasional calls and swapping of signal strengths. This condition holds true for the rest of the day.

9 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0320 4275J Coverage of 8550J/4275J series started once again, Nauru having put out HHHIHI.

0331 4275J Brown Is. with HHHIHIKABA"KIKAHA"KIKAHA"KIO300VE
Nauru with high precedence traffic now.

0357 Nauru with KIN traffic.

0400 Air Base 78 attempts to go with traffic but Ruotto instructs him to wait as Nauru has HHHIHI.

0406 Nauru duplicates some KIN traffic and it is the last time he is heard for some hours. All hands try to raise Nauru with no result.

0658 8600J Nauru was heard here for few moments but secured.

0705
To 7120J Bases and planes up from time to time but not active.
0840

1036 7120J Now goes again.

1119 7120J/6115J Both these go now but traffic is light.

1100 8550J Nauru is heard working here.
Traffic was picked up from 7300A and 8600J from time to time and a good part was originated by Nauru.

1110 8600J Nauru with traffic here, his transmitter is mushy but he is still in communication.

1400 Air frequencies up from time to time but planes and bases mainly keeping in communication, use cut procedure.

1630 6115J Some traffic now appearing.

1900 6115J Still up but traffic volume is small.

2030 Air activity dies out. Secure logging these and one operator maintaining watch on Truk broadcast with check for air.

10 December 1943.

~~SECRET~~

0300 Air frequencies are nil and little of any interesting activity is found.

0540 8600J Truk and Kwajalein are heard working on here and it seems probable that this frequency is used in place of, or in conjunction with, 9770J.

0730 All air frequencies are either inactive or so weak as to be useless to us. Search watch secured. One man watch kept on Truk broadcast.

11 December 1943.

Watch on Truk broadcast was maintained until 2400 this day and at that time all watches were secured. Ship due in Pearl Harbor in the morning.

12 December 1943.

This day spent in checking logs and gathering material for this report as no time was available for this during operations due to long hours on watch and lack of sleep for all hands.

13 December 1943.

Shoved off from USS Indianapolis with personal gear and RIP 5's leaving receivers and other operating gear locked in the shack. Confidential and secret publications were also taken ashore.

The inclusion of a suitable, small, frequency meter of the portable aircraft type is still urged as experience shows that such equipment is difficult to obtain aboard some ships. On this occasion we were unable to borrow anything of this type excepting a type LN Oscillator which proved to be of no value because of its inaccuracy, several attempts were made to use this or to have it lined up.

A few spare parts for typewriters would be of value as on this operation one was out of commission due to a broken key guide and broken space bar.

Some sort of a clock is desirable as that also happened to be something that was impossible to obtain.

The model RAK-6 low frequency receiver proved to be of small value, it is believed that this type of receiver is not sensitive enough for the purpose. A model RBA has been used on previous ships and proved quite satisfactory both in sensitivity and calibration.

An extra pair of headphones would be desirable under certain circumstances.

It is urgently requested that more operators be assigned to these task force units in order to adequately cover vital frequencies and still keep the operating efficiency of all hands at a good level. Additional men would not have to be first class operators and could be used on point to point and broadcast frequencies.

NUMBER OF HOURS PER DAY PER MAN
FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER.

	FORREST (HOURS)	WILDER (HOURS)	GREGORY (HOURS)	GRIER (HOURS)
1.	12	10	12	15
2.	15	12	12	9
3.	12	15	12	9
4.	10	14	15	14
5.	13	19	19	15
6.	18	13	11	15
7.	12	15	12	8
8.	5	7	11	11
9.	9	17	10	14
10.	12	8	10	7
11.	15	13	10	7

119

(NOTE - ALL TIMES HERE ARE -9)

109

133

113

134



NUMBER OF HOURS PER DAY PER MAN
FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER.

	FORREST (HOURS)	WILDER (HOURS)	GREGORY (HOURS)	GRIER (HOURS)
12.	16	16	16	14
13.	11	17	11	8
14.	8	13	15	11
15.	11	11	16	13
16.	15	10	11	10
17.	11	16	11	13
18.	11	14	15	11
19.	17	16	16	14
20.	17	11	12	17
21.	18	24	20	20
22.	20	13	13	15
23.	17	13	15	15
24.	17	15	17	15
25.	19	19	12	15
26.	13	9	15	15
27.	19	11	10	6
28.	13	14	11	15
29.	12	12	15	13
30.	15	15	16	12

(NOTE- ALL TIMES ARE -9)