

SRH- 314

PACIFIC OCEAN

MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORTS

1944

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12356
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

7RS Date: 23 August '84

Declassification review
of documents in this
Special Research History
has been coordinated
with personnel of the
United States Naval
Security Group Command

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February 11, 1944

DESCRIPTION OF TASK FORCE RADIO
INTELLIGENCE UNITS

1. Personnel. 1 officer translator who has had some experience in traffic analysis plus four radiomen (kana operators), one of whom is generally a Chief Radioman and an experienced Kana traffic supervisor.

2. Material. As many receivers as ship can accommodate in small restricted space assigned to the Unit within the personnel operating limitations of the Unit. Generally, the following material is taken aboard or is used aboard by each unit:

- 4 Receivers covering 2 to 18 (or 30) megacycle band
- 1 Receiver covering low frequency band below 2 mcs.
- 1 Receiver covering ultra high frequency band
- 4 Special kana typewriters
- 1 Frequency meter
- Loud Speaker, etc.

Due to lack of suitable portable gear, the unit generally borrows the low frequency receiver and frequency meter from the vessel concerned.

3. Documents. The officer translator takes with him the following documents:

- Complete Call Lists
- Frequency Lists
- Address Ciphers and Conversion Tables
- Organization Lists of Japanese Navy
- Codes in current use
- U. S. Cipher only held by Intelligence Center and Units.

4. Communications between Intelligence Center and Units. This is a one way proposition until such time as radio silence is broken and reports are received from the Unit. A regular steady daily volume of outgoing traffic from Center to Units is maintained (so many despatches in Special cipher are placed on the NPM broadcast). This number does not vary - if no bonafide traffic, then, padded messages are sent. In these despatches, the Center attempts to include the current call conversion tables, all confirmed or goodidents (this is somewhat changed due to recent acquisition), and currently recovered new code values

Jalwin GX
Jak

SEM

(this will require a change also due to recent acquisition), data on enemy vessels idents) that have been located by DF and broadcast to the "Fleet", and "hot" data on newly discovered frequencies.

5. Instructions and Responsibility of Units.

The Task Force Units are virtually "loaned" to the forces afloat for any duty which the Task Force Commanders may prescribe. Written guiding instructions and summarial area notes are given the Units by the Center but the O-in-C of each Unit may and does direct the frequency coverage of his operators.

6. Operation of Units. The Unit of one officer (superintending the coverage) and four kana operators attempts to cover the entire radio spectrum for urgent or operational enemy radio signals. The Unit knows fairly well what enemy channels the Center is copying and the limitations involved. Theoretically, the output of the Center's enemy radio traffic is interpreted and data derived is forwarded via Special Cipher under appropriate precedence to the Unit. In reality, the best that the Unit can do is to cover the known air circuits in the area visited and at least one area or command channel in the area visited in an effort to keep a finger on the "pulse" of the enemy and discover any unusual reaction such as would be occasioned by discovery of our own forces in the campaign. (Units are all on flagships of these forces.)

7. Handicaps of Units. Except for one flagship permanently set up for a Unit, the vessels to which Units are assigned are generally so assigned a few days prior to departure. Consequently, not very good radio reception is made possible, quarters and operating space are crowded, transmitting antennas are used in some cases for reception, and a new group of personnel has to become acquainted and accommodated in makeshift arrangements. Certain coding personnel attached to Unit flagship have to be detailed to handle Special cipher messages from Center to Unit, and so forth.

8. Advantages and Disadvantages of Units. There is a belief that Units may receive via reception aboard ship of enemy signals information of the proximity of enemy forces to the Task Force in sufficient time to warn the Task Force Commanders of the enemy's presence. This requires the coverage of the right frequency. However, it is true that, whether the Unit is actually covering the right enemy channel or not, certain

associated information obtained aboard the Task Force Unit vessel coupled together with the latest information from the Center will give the Unit valuable trends in a minimum of time.

The greatest hazard in the operation of Task Force Units is the exposure in enemy waters of highly skilled personnel and invaluable ultra documents, the capture of which by the enemy would only result in disaster to the entire Allied radio intelligence service.

The disadvantages in the operation of Units afloat can be well imagined. Our forces, even when close to the enemy, receive very little enemy traffic not copyable at the Center. This is due to poor reception aboard ship in improvised conditions and the demand to spread the operations of four kana operators over the entire radio spectrum. In campaigns of long duration, the Units aboard ship undergo severe fatigue under unfavorable operating conditions. There is a distinct disadvantage in radio silence not only between the Units and the Center but between the Units themselves. Summing up the disadvantages against the advantages, there appears to be a serious doubt as to the advisability of continuing these Units afloat.

The above represents the picture under past normal conditions. The recent acquisition of certain valuable information affords the Task Force Commander a means of obtaining better information with fewer difficulties but the hazards and operating conditions attending the Units afloat are still very real.

*Prepared and delivered
2 copies this for Belconnan
& Eastern Fleet Colombo.
JAH*

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February 20, 1944

Instructions for Dissemination of Information to Task Force HI Units

1. All information sent to Task Force Units will continue to be enciphered in the JUSIT crypto system and addressed to Z2M but a change in radio transmission data has taken place. Beginning at 1430 Monday 21 February (Local time), which is ~~0000~~ - 22 February GCT, a special HAIKU broadcast at the following times will handle all JUSITS not specifically designated as urgent or operational priority:

0300	GCT	1730	Local
0300	"	2330	Local
1400	"	0430	"
2300	"	1330	"

Other than the elapsed time between the release of JUSITs and the next regular schedule, it is believed that delivery of this type message will be speeded. In other words, our routine and priority JUSITs will never be delayed beyond the scheduled times above. Take note of the long blank period between ~~0430~~ and 1330 local.

2. Normally all ident despatches and those of the same relative importance will be sent Priority and go out over the Haiku Special broadcast. All personnel in the call section preparing JUSIT despatches and GX Watch Officers will consider the above schedule when assigning precedence with a certain allowance for encryption and land line handling times.

3. Urgent and operational priority JUSIT despatches will not go on above HAIKU scheduled broadcast but will go out on the primary FOX broadcast as expeditiously as the current traffic load (in urgent-operational priority category) permits. It is expected that we may receive instructions later as to the proper designation required to use HAIKU broadcast or primary FOX schedule. Conversion tables will be sent Q-P in cases where despatch must be delayed more than two hours for HAIKU schedule.

Gen.

4. JUSIT Despatches containing idents, conversion tables, and other call data will always be carefully checked and initialed by the senior GT officer present before release by the GX Watch Officer. Normally, all urgent and operational-priority JUSITS will be released by the GX Duty Officer and will contain only technical Traffic Intelligence data. For the benefit of GX Watch Officers, the current practice in following up DF fixes in vital areas by JUSITS is considered insufficient and incorrect. The current locations of Carrier Task Forces can only be estimated by FRUPAC personnel. If a DF fix in vital area is released for transmission by NFM, the CIC Watch Officer should advise CINCPAC of identity and any other pertinent information of station located by DF so that the high command may advise the All Task Force Commanders and not necessarily only Carrier Task Force Commanders.

T. A. HUCKINS

Distribution:

G GTI GF GO CIC
G1 GC GF1.

Feb. 18, 1944

Memorandum for Admiral Ginder:

The following plain language transmission was intercepted at 1252 February 17, zone plus 12 time. Brown Air Base was calling Jaluit Comm Unit on the frequency recently used by all Marshalls Air Bases.

Even in our favorable position signal strength was poor and the transmitter unsteady, so characters were missed and garbled. There is no indication Jaluit received the message.

TEKI HA BLANK N KAH HOKAYARU JOKOREHITITUUSINRENRAKUWOYAMUTEI
KOKUNOBANZAIWOINORU

Translation:

"Because of the enemy blanks, I am ceasing communication. I pray for the long life of the Empire".

The blanks possibly concern fires started by Naval Gunfire.

Respectfully Submitted,

E. B. Beath

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REPORT OF RIU ABOARD USS ESSEX (CV9)

{ From 16 January to 5 March 1944. }

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Submitted by OinC.

W. W. Burd, Lt.(jg) USNR

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Personnel,

W. W. Burd, Lt. (JG) USNR, OinC.

E. J. Forrest, CRM, USN, RinC.

J. M. Redman, CRM, USN.

P. E. Rice, RM2c USNR.

A. J. Grier, RRM2c USNR.

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Contents.

1. Occupation of Marshalls.
2. Truk strike.
3. Marianas strike.
4. Frequencies.
5. Idents. (Under separate cover).

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Occupation of the Marshalls.

(16 January to 12 February.)

The following report is intended as a resume of the activities of this RIU rather than as a detailed account of all traffic received and its interpretation. A notebook log has been kept of all details and can be referred to for specific information on any point.

The plan of the operation, (Flintlock), was to capture the Marshalls by occupying Kwajalein and Majuro atolls. The various task groups and units were to enter the general area by many routes and the first offensive action was to take place on D-2 day (30 Jan.) when all the important islands were to be hit by carrier based planes. On D-1 day Eniwetok was to be hit and on D day landing operations were to start on Kwajalein.

The above plan made our first task, to know if and when we were discovered, fairly simple. We could only be discovered by aircraft, picket boats or submarines. The latter we ignored as a shipboard RIU can gain little useful information by copying sub circuits. Picket boats were a minor danger as they are usually located too close to the target to do the enemy much good. Aircraft were our main worry. However, the number of searches seemed to be considerably below those previously carried out. Aircraft radio transmissions seemed to be on a much more limited scale than previously and all security tricks, such as use of cut calls and keeping in contact by "dits" alone were used.

The frequencies for this area were so well understood that they offered no trouble after a few recent changes were noted. (See under Frequencies.) Since there was little chance of missing an important

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contact in this area, whatever frequencies were covered, much searching was carried out.

No contact was made by the Japs with any of our surface units prior to the first strike. All the bases were continually on the alert, Roi in particular sent many air raid warnings without any obvious reasons, but as has happened before on every operation in this area, the attack was a complete surprise.

The general picture was very quiet and little information of either research or operational importance was obtained. Probably little was going on in this area aside from consolidation of defenses. The limited number of call idents prevented very deep research into what traffic was copied. The Truk local zone circuit, 4292J/8585J, furnished interesting information however. On 20 January the DD Hayanami, the DD Nowaki and the DD Maikaze were heard in direct communication with Truk. Subsequently most of the other combatant ships in the Carolines were located by a watch on this circuit.

Several times during the approach to Roi sub contacts were made and on one occasion 6390J was kept on a speaker to see if the subs would come up with frantic warnings. Nothing appeared however. Normally, it is useless to attempt to get information from submarine broadcasts but in this instance if a sub had come up with a loud signal it would have been a fairly definated indication that we had been sighted.

Several grids were copied during Flintlock but all appeared to be contacts with US subs. — — were not being read so no definate interpretation could be made as to what was seen.

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Limited retransmission showed that surface vessels had not been sighted.

Army bombing raids also caused some flow of operational traffic every day.

On D-2 day, 1 February, the first strikes took place, simultaneously on all the airfields in the Marshalls except Eniwetok. The attack was a complete surprise, the first KUHA (Air Raid) coming just a minute or so before our planes were over Roi. From then on for the next few days contacts and operational traffic poured out of all Marshalls stations. The entire air power in this area was knocked out on the first day of attack, however, and all the despatches seemed to be nothing but damage reports. Roi radio station was blown up and this resulted in great confusion in the communication system. One station after the other tried to control the major frequencies with Wake finally winning out in most cases, temporarily. Later Truk took over 9770J and 8550J and Wake seemed to control 7450M.

As usual, practically all operational traffic sent had stereotyped headings and these remained the same, without Second or Third Fleet calls appearing at any time to indicate that the command of defensive or offensive operations had changed. The Japs seemed to be resigned to losing this part of the Pacific.

Evacuation of important personnel was subsequently carried out by several bases. Very little information could be obtained on this as: was not being read by us. No evacuating planes were heard to transmit when they were within the Marshalls.

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The ULTRA's furnished practically all information of this sort. In this case, as in all others, ULTRA information and the way it is handled showed a tremendous improvement over previous times and showed that there was an understanding of what was important information to task force commanders. It is assumed that this was due to the fact that the originators of the information understood the tactical situation.

Roi was last heard on 31 January and Kwajalein on 1 February. All air frequencies heard after D day were Carolines frequencies. These were very active and the Japs seemed to be keeping a pretty close watch on the areas surrounding Truk. Sub RO-39 was continually associated with Taroa but was having trouble due to our DD activity.

After the occupation of Kwajalein and Roi Atolls the Marshalls air frequencies were no longer used and considerable time was spent on research of Carolines-Marianas frequencies. The use of frequencies in these areas was not clear but 7970J appeared to be the operational frequency for all planes in this area. One curious feature which has been noticed more and more in recent operations is the observation of as much radio-silence as possible by planes while flying in areas where enemy units are known to be. There was no indication of imminent air or other offensive action by the enemy in our area at this time. The unoccupied bases continued to originate four Kana traffic but all associations were limited to the same idents as previous to our occupation. Commander Air Flot 24 remained the senior officer in the Marshalls and Commander

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Fourth Fleet remained in charge of operations.

On February fifth this task group entered Majuro. During the next week or so very little intelligence material was obtained. Very little seemed to be going on, especially on the air circuits. Wake originated a large amount of D/F traffic during this period which may have been on our pilots who, as usual, spent their spare time while flying in describing local events in plain English, often on high frequency circuits.

On 10 February Commander, Fourth Fleet was addressed at Eniwetok. This was also noticed by Sims who deduced it from different data. He returned to Truk at a later date where he was next located. Base Force 6 had moved to Wake by this time also. It was not possible to get good local coverage at this period as most attention was given to getting information for the coming strike on Truk.

We received captured _____ and call lists just prior to leaving Majuro for Truk. After their receipt most information was obtained from translated messages rather than from traffic intelligence. The captured OTU 7 call lists were of practically no value during the remainder of this operation due to lack of conversions during the day the list was in effect. This also applies to the period right up to the Tenian-Saipan strike when the conversion table began to arrive early in the day.

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Truk Strike.
(13 February to 18 February.)

The carrier strike on Truk was set for 17 February. This was D-1 day, D day being the beginning of the occupation of Eniwetok. It had previously been discovered that there were quite a few large combatant vessels in Truk but a fairly continuous coverage of 4292J/8585J showed that most of these were no longer in the area. This frequency was very useful but showed only which combatant vessels were in the whole Carolines area and not whether they were at or near Truk. The total number of ships, especially of DD, on this frequency was very impressive but it was obvious that few of them were actually at Truk and the lack of heavy ships or carriers was disappointing.

On 15 February, or D-3 day, a Betty was shot down before it could get off a message. It was using 7970J but due to lack of Charlie call idents the base it was working was not known. It was probably Truk, however.

On D-2 day a message was intercepted on 8585J warning that further carrier strikes were going to be carried out in the eastern Marshalls. This probably meant they had concluded that we were about to take Eniwetok or Ponape. This was not followed by any great increase in air reconnaissance.

The night before the Truk strike was quiet except for considerable sub hunting activity to the northwest of Truk. The strike was again a surprise. Few planes were found in the air over the target. Snoopers were around us all day and several were shot down. In the evening we were attacked and the USS Intrepid took one torpedo.

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Throughout this period there were many requests for weather or to set a watch of such and such a frequency by Truk, Tenian, Empire air bases and so on but it was found that these were not very helpful in indicating what was actually going to happen. A wide enough picture could not be obtained to judge the relative value of this sort of information. Principal reliance had to be placed on the Truk broadcast and 7970J. The latter is the operation frequency to be watched now and the Truk broadcast continues to be the most reliable source of information for the central Pacific.

On 18 February, or D day, the number of intended strikes against Truk was lessened due to the loss of the Intrepid for offensive purposes. Continued bombing of Truk prevented air attacks on us during the day and we were not spotted in the night although there were search planes up most of the night.

On 19 February this task group was ordered to hit the Marianas so the Marshalls and Truk area frequencies were dropped and we started to do research on Marianas air frequencies.

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Marianas Strike.

(18 February to 25 February)

Dog day was set for February twenty second (West longitude date).

On 20 February we were sighted by a plane which sent our position , 160-10E, 10-30N at 0155 (minus 9 time) . One plane was shot down by a night fighter. Planes were around until middle of day but none attacked, these worked both Truk and Tenian.

February twenty first was quiet and the day was spent in research on all known air frequencies used the area between Truk and the Empire. There was some activity on 9315M which is A B Katori's frequency. Commander First Air Fleet was either at or due to go to Tenian and this is undoubtedly the reason this frequency was used in the Marianas. The frequencies of 9190J, 9420J, 6215M and 7970J were all in use but we ended up by covering continuously only 7970J as this was the ~~only~~^{major} operational frequency. There does not seem to be any air base frequency comparable to the Marshalls' 4275J/8550J in this area but 5375J/10750J is Base Force 5's equivalent of Base Force 4's 4292J/8585J. This furnished some useful information but could not be relied upon so the Truk broadcast was also covered. Several other frequencies were also covered intermittently but due to continual GQ's, night attacks and the long period we had been operating in the combat zone the four operators were too exhausted to keep up a steady coverage of many frequencies.

On 22 February, D-1 day, we were contacted at 1030. The plane was picked up on the Radar at just about the time it was heard to send a long message with "KII!" precedence. There was some doubt as

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to whether the base received the message as communications were especially poor this day and it was never "Rogered" for. There was no doubt that he had seen us however. At 1425 the message reporting our location came out over all circuits including 7970J. The plane had probably not gotten its message off and had had to wait until landing back at Tenian to give his report.

At 1900 the enemy planes started arriving. Our course and distance from Tenian were sent repeatedly. We were under attack until about two oclock the next morning but no ships were hit. Over ten planes were shot down. Again little traffic was sent and almost no plain language. The Japs seem to be using Radar to some extent now.

On 23 February, after about two hours rest, our position was again reported by a plane and werwere attacked at daylight by torpedo planes and fighters acting as dive bombers. There were estimated to be about thirty planes in all over half of which were shot down, many within the DD screen. This attack lasted about two hours. Our strikes on Tenian and Saipan had been launched in the meantime. Due to the likelihood of further attacks on our forces we withdrew in the late afternoon, we were not located again this day and few planes seemed to be searching for us. Many requests for aviation weather were sent by Truk to Tenian and Tenian reported that her airfield was serviceable, so the lack of more attacks on the day we attacked and the following night was curious. This may probably be explained by the message from Tenian reported by Fru-Pac that they were almost out of aviation gasoline.

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We were again contacted in 24 February and one of the two planes was shot down. At 1217 Saipan originated a message instructing Truk's fighters to attack us at dusk. This was another of the many cases where lack of aircraft, aviation gasoline or pilots seemed to be the only logical reason for our not being attacked. At Tenian, although they had had almost twenty four hours notice of our intended attack many bombers were still lined up on the airstrip when our planes arrived overhead.

After the Marianas strike this task group returned to Majuro and from there to Pearl Harbor. After our strike on the Marianas, in which the one operation frequency seemed to be 7970J, various other air frequencies began to be used by the aircraft operating in that area. These were, 9190J, 6215M and 9315M. The Japs may be trying to pick a frequency with less interference than 7970J for their main air circuit in this area. At one time Base Force 5's local frequency 5375J was also used as an air frequency by Tenian and planes.

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Frequencies.

387M Used for homing planes in Truk area 2/18/44.

3767J/
7530M Marshalls Guard Divisions. Guard Divisions at Taroa, Wake, Jaluit, Mille and Wotje still heard plus Lookout stations at Enibun, Pokaakku and Kusaie.
(7530M is day frequency which replaced 7450M which had replaced 7300J and 8600J).

3800J Lookout Stations in the eastern Carolines, C.U. Truk, L.O. Mortlock, Enderby, Olol, Kusaie, Ponape C.U. and Pingelap.

3860A/
9770J Major frequencies in the Marshalls after occupation of Roi and Kwajalein. Used as clearing frequency by Wake for traffic received on other frequencies. Truk is control but Wake sends most of the traffic.
Stations now appearing here are:
C.U. Nauru
C.U. Ocean
C.U. Det. 1-ISSF (TIYOWA)
C.U. Jaluit
C.U. Ponape
G.D. 65 Wake
C.U. Truk

3955A/
7912M Kaimana to Ambon.

4065A/
8145M Comm Units Truk, Saipan, Rabaul and Palao.
(8145M is ex 11940A)

4130A/
8260J Comm Unit Truk and Carolines Lookout Stations.
(After Kwajalein occupation this not current)

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4243M Truk broadcast traffic to the.....(JVAA).

4275J/
8550J Marshalls Air Base frequency. Still used by AB's remaining in the Marshalls.

4292J/
8585J Truk local zone frequency. Ships intending to enter or depart from Truk work on this, usually using three Kana calls. Ships may be as far away as Palao when heard on this however. Truk broadcasts MAM schedules and broadcasts to ships in his area.

4420M Drill circuit. Service calls used which do not fit the garble table used.

4735A Same use as 4275J/8550J, was used infrequently and is not current.

5375J Saipan Base Force 5 local frequency. The equivalent of Truk's 4292J/8585J. Works Guard Divisions, Look-outs and ships on here. This was used by Tenian (50WI) and planes during Tenian strike.

6025M/
12058M Air Base Truk and Tenian, Tenian to unident call (ROSIRI) and Guard Division 54-Rota worked here.

6040J Solomons air bases and planes, Charlie calls used.

6215M Air Base Truk and AB's Tenian and possibly Ponape and planes. May develop into operation frequency for that area.

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- 6280J Planes using KN calls working KK calls, believed to be in Empire area. Drill circuit.
- 6580J CarDiv One frequency. Both drill and good traffic appeared here, Charlie calls used, no idents.
- 6625J This was not current for a time after the Marshalls occupation. Truk and Mortlock continued to appear however. After some time lapse the stations that appear on 3800J now use this and it appears that 8260J calls also showed here.
- 6840J Air Groups 902 and 952, Truk and Ponape use this. Not an operational frequency.
- 6850J Solomons area bases worked planes.
- 6945J Truk local circuit. Comm Unit Truk and marus and other vessels. Truk broadcasts MAM schedules and to vessels in his area, this often dual with 8585J on broadcasts which start on the hour.
- 7035E Plane drill circuit.
- 7302M
(1295A) Air Bases Kavieng, Buin, CinC 11th Air Fleet and Shirataka heard here.
- 7970J Major operational frequency for planes and bases, Truk, Tenian and one other unident Charlie call were heard. Comparable to old 6115J in the Marshalls. (This was entered as 7945J in our logs).

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- 8105M Rabaul to NARAE with UTU numbers.
- 8320M Bases and planes, beleived in Empire area.
- 8620J Ponape has called Comm Unit Truk on this. Listed as used in NEI area by air bases, planes and AG 753. This air group moved into central Pacific now and may have brought this frequency along.
- 9085J Air Groups 902 and 952 and Fourth Fleet transport planes use this. Comm Unit Ponape and unident Charliedcalls (6METE, 3HAMI, etc) heard.
- 9190J Used by bases and planes heard on 7970J but appears to be an alternate or standby frequency.
- 9420J Planes and base with drill traffic only were noted during these operations. AB Tenian (50WI) and planes heard with drill traffic.
- 9465M Planes with drill traffic. Planes seemed to cut their calls by dropping first numeral, thus INOMI4 would be sent as NOMI4.

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USS Yorktown
March 4, 1944.

Dear Comdr. Huckins,

Enclosed please find a summary of activity of Unit 4 during FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE operations.

It would be much appreciated if practicable personal mail for the radiomen as well as myself be forwarded in any further shipments of office material.

On March 2nd Admiral Ginder and his staff shifted flag from the USS Saratoga to the USS Yorktown.

Respectfully,

EB Beath
E.B. Beath

Info Captain *[Signature]*

G1 *[Signature]*

action GJ *[Signature]*

J.H.

File
J.H.

I note that Beath parries his instructions

Ripsey
[Signature]

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REPORT ON MARSHALLS COMMUNICATIONS BY RIU
ATTACHED TO CTG 58.4

This unit aboard USS Saratoga (CV3)
Jan. 15 to Mar. 3, 1944. (West Long. time)

Time used in this report is Minus Nine
unless stated otherwise.

This report consists of twelve (12) pages.

Submitted by

E.B. Beath
Lt. (jg) E.B. Beath USNR.

~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~

~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~ ~~IC~~

PERSONNEL

Lt. (Jg) E.B. Beath OinC

Gramblin, S.E. CRM

Otto, W.B. CRM

Price, R.A. Rmlc

Forgy, J. P. Rmlc

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The two tasks undertaken by this force have been:

1. Air strikes on Wotje, Taroa And Eniwetok as a Task Group in the FLINTLOCK operation (Dog Day Feb. 1).
2. Pre-landing bombing and strafing, followed by actual covering of troop landing on Eniwetok Atoll in the CATCHPOLE operation (Dog Day Feb. 18).

In the initial approach on the Marshalls Islands this force evidently took the enemy by surprise, and although there is a slight possibility the force was spotted Jan. 30, no attacks were experienced. Since FLINTLOCK we have been operating under ^{LARGELY} American controlled skies and in U. S. controlled waters.

Beginning Jan. 30 with the coordinated strikes of the Four Carrier Task Groups on all the major enemy bases in the Marshalls, the enemy experienced a deterioration in his communications which culminated in Kwajalein, the control, going off the air. Various individual stations were unheard for periods of time after the strikes, and most all were not transmitting for some time or another on Jan. 31.

On the 1st of Feb. With the obvious disappearance of Kwajalein and Ruotto from the air, the following changes in circuit routing were noted:

On 8550J Imieji (YURATI) took control, and on 7450M Guard Div. 62 Jaluit (SIHOSU) took control.

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This procedure continued on the 2nd of Feb. in a more or less confused state, but on the 3rd and 4th Truk took control of both circuits, with all the stations normally up in commission (barring Ruoetto & Kwaj.). Truk is believed to have retained control until the end of the first week in February when conditions became fairly stabilized and 8550J was discontinued as a Marshalls Air Base frequency (Only Wake, Jaluit, Brown and Truk thereafter). 7450M was retained as the only circuit tying together the left-over Japanese Islands. Truk remained in control of 8550J after the Air Bases were dropped but Wake assumed control of 7450M, Truk after the emergency no longer appeared on this circuit.

The Lookout Frequency 3800J continues to be used as before with Guard Div. 62, Jaluit (SIHOSU) Controlling in the Marshalls area and Truk controlling in the Carolines. Most of the stations on this freq. are unidentified. On three occasions planes from this Task Group attacked installations on islands believed to have stations on 3800J (Rongelap & Utirik on Feb. 3, Ujae Feb. 13 and Bikini Feb. 24), but no evidence of the attacks were noted.

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CHRONOLOGY OF FLINTLOCK OPERATION

Jan. 27th

Run from Pearl completed and refueled during most of day in vicinity
177-25 W 13-12 N.

Covered: 7450M/3767J 8550J/4275J

Planes were up on 6115J. 7120J not heard.

Jan. 28th

Position 27/1200 Local day : 177-30 W 11-25N

Covered: Same as 27th.

No plane activity noted.

Jan. 29th

Position 28/1200 Local day : 176-25 E 11-12 N

Covered: 7450M/3767J 8550J/4275J 7120J 6115J Search.

Jan. 30th

D -2 Day. Launched first strike at Dawn!! (Wotje our target)

Covered: Same as 29th

Found an air circuit (6291M) that was evidently search frequency in
this area. This is probably 6290J (TAHI744) as mention of that indicator
had been made on 8550J. Planes on this freq. worked (ØNOTU) and grids
sent were in the general area of this Task Group.

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Jan. 30th Cont.

Planes were heard also on 6115J and 7120J. Truk using three kana call (KOSEMO) appeared on 6115J and 8550J.

Jan 31st

D -1 Day. Strikes against both Wotje and Taroa.

Covered: Same as 30th.

On 3767J / 7450M series Kwajalein-off the air at 0740. Wake controlled the circuit (what control there was). Marshalls traffic relayed to Truk by Wake on same frequency if need arose. Kwajalein back up at 1539, but Wake still appeared in charge. Some traffic was relayed by Wake to Truk on 8260J . Ruotto last heard at 0558.

Planes were heard working only on 7395M, with no indications as to the area of their operation. Marshalls planes out for good.

Feb. 1st (D Day)

Strikes against Wotje and Taroa.

Coverage remained the same.

Heard on 8550J/4275J were Wotje, Nauru, Imieji, Brown, Taroa, Truk and Wake. Imieji controls now and relays to Truk.

Feb. 2nd

On 8550J/4275J Heard were Mille, Taroa, Imieji, Truk, Wotje, Brown, Nauru and Wake.

On 7450M/3767J Heard were Wotje, Jaluit, Truk, Wake, Taroa, Mille,

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2nd Feb. Cont.

and three unidents. Kwajalein up at 0357 and sent two messages before he was out for good at 0432. Jaluit controls.

3rd Feb.

Truk took control on 8550J and 7450M. All usual stations up with the exception of Kwajalein and Ruotto.

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CATCHPOLE OPERATION (DOG DAY FEB. 13)

The capture of Kwajalein, and the destruction of all Japanese aircraft at other Marshalls bases, combined with the effective denying of these air bases to replacement planes, appears to have forced the Japanese to fall back on Truk as a base for air and surface operation even in this area. As a result Marshalls air circuits became history by Feb. 3, 1944. 6115J, 6291M and 7120J were extinct and dropped from our coverage. The Truk air frequency of 7970J was substituted instead.

Since the object of this force in the Catchpole operation was Eniwetok, 8550J/4275J continued to be covered. Truk broadcast was covered and 7450/3767 was dropped.

The area of operation for this task group after Flintlock and up to the present has been Kwajalein-Eniwetok area.

Feb. 16th

Covering 8550J/4275J Truk bdcst. and Search.

Evidence in despatch East Carolines Area alerted for invasion of blue striking force.

Feb. 17th

Coverage same as 16th.

Brown Air Base up on 8550J sending only reports of our raids.

Initial contacts in abbreviated plain language sent on all five strikes, and a summary sent in evening. No evidence of

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Feb. 17 Cont.

suspicion of invasion. Some army code originated by A.G. 952 Brown Detachment (WIFUME) traffic cleared through Jaluit who relays to Truk. Brown Air Base (SUWIKI) transmitter is weak and unstable. Only one of his contacts noted on Truk bdcst., although five were sent.

Sporadic sightings of units and reports of shellings from Wotje, Taroa, Mille and Jaluit as usual. —

Feb. 18

Brown Det. A.G. 952 (WIFUME) up on 8550J first at 0727 with a plain language message calling Jaluit for delivery to Truk. "Enemy is in the lagoon in large force evidently intends to land. Request aid."

This despatch was encoded _____ by Jaluit and relayed to Truk who put it on his broadcast.

This was followed by several 4 numeral messages.

At 0952 Air Base Brown (SUWIKI) called Jaluit (SIHOSU) and in plain language transmitted the following :

"Because of enemy blank am suspending communications.
I pray for the long life of the Empire" (TEKIHA**--NKAN
HOKAYAKU)KORENITETUUSINRENRAKUWOYAMUTEIKOKUNOBANZAIWO
INORU)

Text was repeated twice , but transmitter was so weak that even in our favorable position ~~in the near vicinity~~ some characters were missed and garbled. There is no evidence Jaluit received the despatch.

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The following is a list of frequencies with units heard or called. These frequencies were not listed in the frequency list. Due to the lack of identifications at this time the identities are left blank.

FREQUENCY	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	REMARKS
3850 M	ATENI KITOHI TAWATU WIMISU	FUNANO	5 Feb.	Rabaul area
4262 M	RUNO 8 NIFUKA	YAHO 5	24 Jan.	
4269 M	NARAE	MIRO 6 MUNIYO	4 FEB.	
5996 M	KOSEMO	HIYOYO ROSIRI KETINO	22 Feb. "	
6224 M	1 EYO	Planes	12 FEB.	Apparently drill or exercise circuit
6291 M	ø NOTU	Planes	30 Jan.	This probably TAHI744 (6290 JC) Marshalls air freq. (Air Flot 24 7)
6511 M	KOROSA IKE 1	8 OYO 1 8 DYO 2 8 OYO 5 8 OYO 6	4 Feb.	Probably drill.
7000 M	TERETI	NSU 1	5 Feb.	Probably drill as NSU 1 doesn't fit garble.
7135 M	MI SI 12	FU 22 SI 32	23 16 Feb.	SI 12 had typical plane xmtr. note.

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FREQUENCY	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	REMARKS
7366 M	NIRAKU RI ITE		4 Feb.	
7395 M	7 NOYA	Planes	31 Jan.	Little traffic but appeared to be group comdr. to planes rather than base to planes. Possibly TAHI 340 (7395J).
7538 M			15 Feb.	Replaced 7450M. This probably 7535 mentioned by Truk. Unable make definite reference due to logs having been sent back.
7920 M	IURATI	NEKI 9 METIHO	31 Jan.	Possible image of 8305
7970 M	2 UMO 1 EYO	Planes	13 Feb.	Position grid on 14th received on Truk bdcst. originated by plane on this frequency. Position was North of Wake and East of Marcus. Later confirmed as 7970J Truk air freq.
8320 M	ø TUKA 2 TOI	Planes	11 Feb.	
8696 M	SOEME	KETINU	12 Feb.	

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FREQUENCY	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	REMARKS
5403 M	???	SU7	23 Feb.	Xmtd. msg # 230905 22 Several Lkt. Sta. Rabaul area as Info. Addees.
5375 M	5 OWI	4 TUMU 3	23 Feb.	
7696M	REENU	SOFUTO	24 Feb.	No traffic
8140 M	WIMISU KOSEMO NOMIKE TEWIWA		23 Feb.	Replacement of 12200 A
8258 M	KENASO NUSANI	SUEO	25 Feb.	
8570 M	5 OWI 2IE8 2IE4 2IE3	2IE6	25 Feb.	Only msg xmtd was prefixed - SI" TU
8616 M	NUMOKI	NASAKE	24 Feb.	No traffic
9180 M	KOSEMO	NARAE	24 Feb.	1 Msg Xmtd. NR 240800

April 8, 1944

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REPORT OF RIU ATTACHED TO CTG 58.3

This unit aboard USS Yorktown (CV10)
Mar. 3 to April ____ (West Long. time)
Previously aboard USS Saratoga.

Time used in this report is minus nine
unless stated otherwise.

This report consists of twelve (12) pages.

Submitted by

Lt.(JG) E.B. Beath USNR.

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PERSONNEL

Lt. (jg) E.B. Beath OinC

Gramblin, S.E. CRM

Otto, W.B. CRM

Price, R.A. Rmlc

Forgy, J.P. Rmlc

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SUMMARY OF DESECRATE OPERATION
(KING DAY MARCH 30)

The task of this group in the DESECRATE operation was to attack and destroy enemy shipping and installations in PALAU harbor, and destroy enemy aircraft and installations at PELELIU Airbase, and on KING plus one day to attack and destroy enemy aircraft and installations at MEREYON (Woleai) Airbase.

Although grid positions were used on certain occasions by some planes, the general tendency of enemy aircraft to give the position of a contact on our forces by encoded bearing and distance from a base or known point, made certain recognition of enemy contact of our forces more difficult.

Even during attack operations enemy planes continued to us largely encoded communications. Little use of plain language or tactical signals in our possession was noted. Attacks were seemingly poorly coordinated and runs usually made by single planes. After initial contact was made little significance in communications was ascertained which would tie together plane transmissions and subsequent movements. Termination of attacks was followed by a request for bearings from bases.

Cut procedure was used by planes that were headed for our area. RA and 1 Kana were transmitted at frequent intervals by either base or plane. Apparently each plane or group comdr was assigned a 1 kana character before leaving the base. This appeared to be used only for maintaining contact with each other as regular calls were used when traffic was transmitted.

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As nearly as was possible complete coverage of all air circuits in this area was obtained. Truk broadcast was covered only when its help was needed in determining the urgency or importance of particular operational traffic. As often as practicable searching was done.

March 28

Coverage: At various times. 919~~Ø~~J-858~~Ø~~M-814~~Ø~~M-797~~Ø~~J-6417M-6215J-176M Search.

A contact grid from plane 2 HAFU 58 working ~~Ø~~ FUMO on 858~~Ø~~M gave position 145-43E ~~ØØ~~-18S at 1~~ØØ~~5. This position was some sixty miles South-West of our position at that time. A further position from the same plane at ~~Ø~~93~~Ø~~ was too distant to be assumed as contact of this force. No attacks were experienced that night.

March 29

Coverage: At various times. 919~~Ø~~J-863~~Ø~~M-814~~Ø~~M-797~~Ø~~J-7945J-7~~Ø~~7~~Ø~~M-6417M-6215J-6115J- Search.

Several grids received making definite location of this force obvious. Attacking planes that evening heard on 6215 J. First concrete indication of attack was TETETETE (Enemy Surface Force) by plane at 1733. Ship went to General Quarters at 1740. The plane originating above contact believed shot down at 181~~Ø~~. At 2~~Ø~~3~~Ø~~ planes requested bearings from FELELIU. A.B. Davao appeared on ~~the~~ circuit.

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March 30
(KING DAY)

Coverage : Same as 29th

Palau air alerted 0600 to 1630.

Planes up on all air frequencies. Collateral information indicated dawn attack was planned on blue forces, but it failed to materialize. Planes that were up in early morning seemed confused in their purpose, some asking for bearings, some asking in plain language shall we return, (Ware Kare?) and asking of PELELIU if the base was all clear yet, (KUKA?). Disconcertion among the planes seemed to be headed by a high precedence despatch originated by MEREYON (0FUMO) at 0815 and subsequently delivered to all planes.

Evening attack was initiated at 1734 when plane transmitted KIN. Ship went to General Quarters at 1750. Attack was terminated by request for bearings from PELELIU.

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The following is a list of frequencies picked up by this unit that were not listed in the frequency book in our possession. Data on the use of some of the frequencies will be listed separately. The stations as listed in the HEARD and CALLED columns are as of the date when first heard. On some of the frequencies other stations have accrued since but are not listed.

FREQ.	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	ROUGH LOG REFERENCE (WHERE AVAILABLE)
151 M	YOSONU (C.U. Ominato)	OROSO (Maru Kaihoo)	26 Mar. 44	473
175 M	HOMASU (C.U. Yokosuka)	TEREPI (A.B. Katori)	6 Mar. 44	***
1		WARE2 * A.G. Suzuka TUYO6 - A.B. Kisaratsu MAKI4 - A.G. Kasumigaura NEKI6 - A.G. Tateyama TATE4 - A.G. OI		
176 M	NOMIKE - C.U. 3-Palao	TURETE - Fumitsuki (DD) MIMUKI * picket Boat #31 ROTIWI - Shigure (DD) NINONA - Shiranuhi (DD) YOSIYO - subchaser #37 EMOIA - Subchaser #38 YATURE - Subchaser #34	7 Mar. 44 9 Mar. 9 Mar. 9 Mar. 9 Mar. 9 Mar.	***
183.3 M	HIYORI - Toyohashi A.B.	KOROSU - A.B. Tsuiki MORIRO - A.G. 502	12 Mar. 44	***
187.3 M	SAMAMO - C.U. 5 Saipan TEWIWA - Spec. B.F.P. 5 Cdr.	WIMORU - Ikazuchi (DD) SENKA - Shimukaze (DD) URI 1 * S.G. Div. 21 Cdr.	7 Mar. 44	***
192.8 M	HOMASU - C.U. Yokosuka	HAFUSO - A.G. Kasumigaura TAYAMI - A.G. Tateyama	5 Apr. 44	624 625
223.6 M	YOSIKO * Garble	KIREME - A.G. Saeki	12 Mar. 44	***
250 M	KOSEMO - C.U. 4 * Truk	NARAE - Jerk	25 Mar. 44	***
380 B	TEREPI - A.B. Katori	HAFUSO - A.G. Kasumigaura	6 Mar. 44	***

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FREQ.	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	ROUGH LOG REF. (Where Available)
2546 M	MAKEMA - Rabaul # 2 A.B.	SOMUTU - FLT. 11th Air CinC	12 Mar. 44	***
2620 M	YURERA - Buka #1 A.B. SOMUTU - Flt 11th Air CinC MAKEMA - Rab.#2 A.B. Vanakanau KOSEMI - Buin #2 A.B. ERESI - G.D.89 - Namatami TAWATU - A.G. 938	HISUKI - Rabaul #3 A.B. Tobera SETOKI - Kavieng A.B. YOWITA - Buin # 1 A.B. YOREYU - Samo A.B.	9 Mar. 44	***
2680 M	HOYUTI - G.D.81 - Rabaul	KU 4 - I 7 - Credner Isl. L.O.S. HE 7 - MA 7 -	11 Mar. 44	***
2693 M	MI - Unident	TO 7 - Furusaki L.O.S.	11 Mar. 44	***
2879 M	ATANI - C.U. 1 - Buin SMUKU - Unident SREMA - Unident	6 MEHI 1 - Unident	9 Mar. 44	***
3990 M 9	HOMIKI - C.U. Palao SOWANE - Subchaser 60 WATURE - Subchaser 34 ROTONO - A.B. Peleliu	NARAE - KINIWI - All S&S #3 C.Z. WISUMI - Subchaser 35	30 Mar. 44	514
4292 M 4300 M	MIRE 9 - A.B. 65 - Mereyon KIYO 7 - A.B. Peleliu MO U 3 - C.U. 4 - Truk KU U 9 - A.B. 57 - Tenian	IYO 4 - G.D. 54 - Oniyajima	29 Mar. 44	510
4588 M	HO - Unident.	TI 5 - Alexander L.O.S. TI 6 - Unident. HO 3 - " HO 6 - " HO 1 - "	16 Mar. 44	***
4663 M 4657J	HOSI 3 - G.D.54 - Oniyajima TAYA 6 - M.S. Div. 15 Comdr. YUYA 5 - A.B. Katori NAI 4 - A.B. 57 - Tenian NIYA 5 - Comdesron 3		25 Mar. 44	***
4714 M	OKI 5 - Unident. KIYO 7 - A.B. Peleliu	TARE 4 - UNIDENT	29 Mar. 44	510

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FREQ.	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	ROUGH LOG REFER. (Where Available)
4792 M	NISESA - Maiko Gunboat MI Ø - Unident.	FU 3 - Unident.	26 Mar. 44	476
4900 M	HE 7 - Unident. NA 7 - " TO 7 - Furusaki L.S.S. KISESA - S.B.F. Hollandia	HOYUTI - G.D.81 Rabaul HO 1 - Unident.	26 Mar. 44	476
5240 M	MI Ø - Unident. HA 2 - Poporang Isl. LOS HA Ø - Unident. MOTERE - Kure N.D. #7 SLP	SU Ø - Unident.	24 Mar. 44	456
5430 M	AHA 9 - A.B. Harushima HE A 5 - A.B. Peleliu HORI 2 - C.U. 5 Saipan KEHA 6 - G.D. 54 - Miyajima MAMA 5 - A.B. 65 - Meroyon NUNA 9 - A.B. 57 - Tenian		19 Mar. 44	***
5488 M	KUSOTI - Newak	TUKIYU - Kairiru S.P.B. KISESA - Spec. B.F. Hollandia MA 2 - Unident.	12 Mar. 44	***
5508 M	SAMAMO - C.U.5 - Saipan	FU AHI - TOKYO	3 Apr. 44	609
5715 M	5 RASA 7 - Plane	5RASURIS - A.G. Sasebo (Planes)	23 Mar. 44	***
5850 M	TUKIYU - Kairiru S.P.B.		13 Mar. 44	***
5952 M	MIYAEO - Shimonoseki DEF. Div.	KEHOWA - Maru Miyo KAMU U - Shimonoseki Deffor.	15 Mar. 44	***
6216 M	4RUHI - Tenian A.B. 2NEHA1 - 2SEROS - 2REWA3 - 4MUT11 -	2RETU1 - 5MUT11 - 1RUHI1 - 1RUHI2 - 2NEHA1 -	9 Mar. 44	***
6335M	IHOSU - Coast Def. Div. XX Call	TENINA - Tatamiyama HX Sta.	4 Apr. 44	619
6417 M	NCMIKE - Palau AYAMA - S.C. #36	MASOYO - Maru Kihoo 1 YAWANO - Maru Seiei 2 RUMAKI - Maru Ataka SCHAKI - Tokobei L.O.S. NUWARE - Arukoron L.O.S.	11 Mar. 44	***

SECRET

FREQ.	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	ROUGH LOG REF. (When available)
6463 M	UTATO - Maru -XX Call MUSUME - Maru Chooan K	FURUMI - Unassigned MOKOI - Takao Guard Dist. Force	27 Mar. 44	436
6520 M	MENARE - Ataku (PC) KATUSO - Maru Kooho		25 Mar. 44	460-461
6556 M	MUKA 2 - DesDiv Comdr.	N KORI - Yamato (BB)	25 Mar. 44	461
6576 M	WIMISI - A.B. Komatsushima	SONUNI - Comb. Air	2 APR. 44	597
6604 M	TU U 1 - Unfit Garble	KE I 1 - G.D. 3 - E.I. For.	9 Mar. 44	***
6832 M	ROYATO - G.D. 18 -Manokwari HI AYA - Kau S.B.F. 26 Comdr.		8 Mar. 44	***
7070 M	NOIJIKE - Palao C.U. U E O - Ulithi WX SOTUTO - Sorol WX ROTONO - A.B. Peleliu		29 Mar. 44	493
7191 M	SA 1 - Unident KI 2 - " KI 3 - "		25 Mar. 44	462
7288 M	MAKEMA - Rabaul #2 A.B. YOWITA - Buin #1 A.B. ERESI - G.D. 89 -Namatami	YOREYU - A.B. Samo HISUKI - Rabaul #3 A.B. EROTO - # 211 Const. Bat. Ch. XX Call	8 Mar. 44	***
7354 M	WOKE - UNFIT GARBLE 4 TITI -	4 YOYO - 5 YOYO - (DRILL CIR.) 6 YOYO -	9 Mar. 44	***
7707 M	SEYA U - A.G. 958 TAWATU - A.G. 938 ATENI - C.U. 1 WIMISU - C.U. 8 KITOHI - C.U. Buka	KAMAMI - A.G. 938 4 Base Det. FUNANO - A.G. 938 2 Base Det. UMINU - A.G. 938 8 Base Det.	25 Mar. 44 24	453
7790 M	ANIKI - A.G. Singapore	YAYOSO - A.B. Labuan	24 Mar. 44	453
7927 M	RATIHO - A.B. Kisaratsu MARIMI - A.G. Yokosuka " 1 (Planes) " 6 -	MARIMI 3 - A.G. Yokosuka (Planes) " 2	10 Mar. 44	***

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FREQ.	HEARD	CALLED	DATE	ROUGH LOG REF. (when available)
7940 M	TERUKA - A.G. 934 MOOKI - A.B. Daru KERONE - Flt. Soex 3 - XX Call	HUREO - A.B. Manckwari	30 Mar. 44	525
7950 M	WATURE - S.C. #34	HURI9 - C.U. 24 WOTA6 - Kau S.B.F. 26 Comdr.	30 Mar. 44	525
7984 M	ØNEWA - Caroline A.B. ØRAKE - ØMIFU -		9 Mar. 44	384-385
8320 M	H O WI - A.G. 901 NUMUYUL - Unassigned SUMEY08 - "	U RARI - Unassigned SASUSO - "	9 Mar. 44	***
8574 M	ØROHI - A.B. Harushima ØREHU - A.B. 57 Ø FUMO - A.B. 65 WAE5 - A.G. 952 Det. FURA7 - A.B. Harushima	Planes	26 Mar. 44	469-472
8630 M	MIRE9 - A.B. 65 KIY07 - A.B. Peleliu KUU 9 - A.B. 57	HURE7 - A.B. Harushima	29 Mar. 44	492
8721 M	FUTO9 - A.B. Katori TAKEØ - Unident RARA2 - A.B. Shinchiku NIRO8 - Unident	HOTO5 - 1st Air Flt.-All A.B.	26 Mar. 44	474-475
9153 M	FURA7 - A.B. Harushima I E 7 - A.B. Peleliu WAE 5 - A.G. 952 Det.	TOSE6 - A.B. 57 SESE9 - Unident	26 Mar. 44	477
9201 M	U RU5 - A.B. 57 NIKAØ - A.B. 65 NUTI6 - Unident (Control)	TAMIØ - G.Div. 54 IYA6 - A.B. Peleliu ANI8 - B.F. 5 Comdr.	16 Mar. 44	***
9902 M	HOKAKA - C.U. 4	SUIMO - C.U.6 Det. 3	21 Mar. 44	***
10705 M	SASA3 - Unident	HURI4 - Air Flot. 23 Comdr.	30 Mar. 44	525

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FREQUENCY COMMENTS

- 175 M Yokosuka C.U. work Empire A.b. And A.G. Traffic heavy when heard and fairly good routing showing unit locations was noted.
- 176 M Palao local. First heard on 7 Mar. and intermittently thereafter until 29 Mar., the day our forces purpose becamee obvious to the enemy. Not heard after that, assumed units withdrawn.
- 187.3M Saipan local. First heard on 7 Mar. and still in use. Will be good frequency to watch when headed that way again.
- 250 M Truk Local. Used as broadcast, but not connected with RIM Bdst.
- 2620 M/
7288 M This takes in all air base activity in the Rabaul-Solomons-Kavieng area.
- 4065 A/
8140 M This frequency lost some of its routing value when Saipan started broadcast. At present only Palao is on this circuit without a Bdst as possible outlet for traffic.
- 4300 M/
8330 M This could well be compared with the old 8550 J Marshalls frequency as an important Air Base frequency. Takes in all major Air Bases in Marianas Carolines. As yet there is little circuit discipline and considerable confusion. A reasonable explanation for that is the fact that A.B. Harushima is supposed to control the circuit but A.B. 57 - Tenian handles most of the traffic.
- 4657 J/
9315 a This appears to be an Empire to Marianas Air Base frequency, with Fleet units engaged in Plane Guard appearing on it when planes are being ferried to or from the empire.
- 6115 J Out of use when Orange Air activity in Marshalls ceased. Has been used at various intervals since then for drill or training exercises. Approximately the 25th of Mar. it was again used as Base & Plane circuit.
- 6215 J Major Air frequency used by Search & Attack units. Used in conjunction with 7945 J.
- 6417 M Palao local. Used in conjunction with 176 M.

SECRET

- 6556 M Possibly a Fleet frequency. Could stand checking.
- 7945 J Base & Plans Frequency used with 6215 J. Believe planes searching or spotting used this and also planes on the way to attack.
- 7970 J Believe this not used South of Carolines chain. Probably used in connection with 9190 J for Searches in Marianas-Carolines sector North of the Carolines.
- 8574M This is probably Truk Southern search frequency.

~~Printed to~~

G AM

G 1 (Q)

GR (R)

GQ ~~WST~~

GXA 1 ~~WST~~

2 JHM

3 QRE

4 WST

GQ - see recommendation last page.

ok JAH

File in GX
JAH

Submitted April 28, 1944

~~SECRET~~

SLONIM Report

FREQUENCIES COVERED DURING THE PALAO RAID

3980J/7082J - PALAO COMM UNIT
PALAO AIR BASE (PELELIU)
SOROL WEATHER STATION
PATROL BOAT 36
#3 KYOO KAI MARU
MURO MARU
SUBCHASER 60

5775A TENIAN AIR BASE
GUAM AIR BASE
ATTACK PLANES

6115J TRUK COMM UNIT
TRUK AIR BASE
SHORT RANGE PLANES

6215J TENIAN AIR BASE
PALAO AIR BASE (PELELIU)
GUAM AIR BASE
4WIRU (UNIDENT)
SEARCH AND ATTACK PLANES

6415J PALAO COMM UNIT
#43 GUARD DIVISION KOIGURU BATTERY
#43 GUARD DIVISION ARUMONOGUI BATTERY
TOKOBE LOOKOUT STATION
#3 SHOOWA MARU
#5 SHOOWA MARU
#1 KIHOO MARU
IBARUKI MARU
HACHIGEN MARU
SUBCHASERS 22, 26, 27, 32 AND 52.

AIR GROUP 32
AIR GROUP 954, CEBU DET.

7945J PALAO AIR BASE (PELELIU)
SEARCH PLANES
(PALAO COMM UNIT OR CINC COMBINED FLEET STOOD
INTERCEPT WATCH)

AIR GROUP SETTSU
AIR GROUP 553

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~~SECRET~~

FREQUENCIES (CONT'D)

7970J - TRUK AIR BASE
PONAPE COMM UNIT
6RUTO (UNIDENT)
FOURTH FLEET TRANSPORT PLANES

8575A TRUK AIR BASE
TENIAN AIR BASE
WOLEAI AIR BASE
GUAM AIR BASE
MORTLOCK AIR BASE
PLANES

9180J TRUK AIR BASE
WOLEAI AIR BASE
GUAM AIR BASE
MORTLOCK AIR BASE
PLANES

~~SECRET~~

REPORT ON PALAO RAID

24 MARCH

- 0520 EBON LOOKOUT STATION REPORTS SIGHTING ENEMY FORCES CONSISTING OF 1 CRUISER, 3 DESTROYERS AND 1 TRANSPORT BEARING 270.
- 0635 EBON SENDS PLAIN LANGUAGE DISPATCH "ENEMY APPEARS TO BE MAKING PREPARATIONS TO LAND".
- 0701 EBON LAST HEARD ON CIRCUIT.

25 MARCH

- 1100 701527 (TRUK SEARCH PLANE) APPARANTLY CONTACTED SOMETHING AS HE SENT A TOTAL OF 7 MESSAGES. THE LAST ORIGINATED AT 1545.

27 MARCH

- 1658 6RUTO (UNIDENT) SENDS MESSAGE TO TRUK "COURSE 240 DEGREES". TRUK RELAYED THIS MESSAGE TO PLANE 2HAN02.

28 MARCH

- 0930 2HAFU54 (WOLEAI SEARCH PLANE) SENDS GRID POSITION 138 38EAST, 00 22 NORTH.
- 0947 2HAFU54 SIGHTED ENEMY PLANE (HI HI HI KA).
- 1005 2HAFU58 (WOLEAI SEARCH PLANE) SENDS GRID POSITION 144 30 EAST, 00 55 NORTH.
- 1416 WOLEAI SENDS MESSAGE IN KANA WITH TIME OF ORIGIN AS 0930. THIS LOOKS LIKE INFORMATION FROM 2HAFU54 SENT UPON HIS ARRIVAL BACK AT THE BASE.
- 2340 WOLEAI REPORTS ENEMY PLANES AND THAT HE IS SECURING HIS RADIO.

~~SECRET~~

29 MARCH

- 0932 2HAFU537 (WOLEAI SEARCH PLANE) SIGHTED ENEMY PLANES.
- 0945 2HAFU537 SENDS NR1 MESSAGE.
- 1045 1SOKE35 (PALAO SEARCH PLANE) SENDS GRID POSITION,
138 33 EAST, 02 32 NORTH.
- 1108 SUBCHASER #10 SIGHTED TEN CONSOLIDATED LARGE BOMBING
PLANES (TRUK STRIKE?).
- 1109 PALAO BRINGS UP TRANSMITTER ON 6215 KCS AND PLANES HEARD
TUNING (8HOTO1, 8HOTO7, 8HOTO9). APPARANTLY THEY WERE
IN READINESS FOR TAKE-OFF AND AWAITING CONTACT.
- 1130 2HAFU537 SENDS GRID POSITION, 141 18 EAST, 02 47 NORTH.
- 1157 1SOKE35 SENDS ANOTHER GRID, 138 50 EAST, 02 30 NORTH.
- 1503 8HOTO9 SIGHTS ENEMY PLANE.
- 1655 4 NEW PLANE GROUPS BEGIN TO APPEAR ON PALAO CIRCUITS
(1MEMI1-5, 4NUNI1, 9RASI1, 3YAY01-2)
- 1738 1MEMI1 SIGHTS ENEMY FORCES (TE TE TE).
- 1929 3YAH01 RETURNING TO PALAO, ASKING FOR BEARINGS.
- 1938 8HOTO1 SIGHTS ENEMY FORCES.
- 1944 8HOTO9 SIGHTS ENEMY FORCES.
- 2005 COM BASE FORCE 30 SENDS MESSAGE PREFIXED -KIU TO #43 GUARD
DIVISION ARUMONOGUI BATTERY.
- 2051 3YAH01 BEARING 091 DEGREES FROM PALAO.
- 2057 3YAH01 BEARING 068 DEGREES FROM PALAO.
- 2100 HAKKO MARU SENDS -KIU TO COM BASE FORCE 30.
- 2133 NEW PLANES (3YUTO1, 6YOFU1-5) APPEAR WORKING PALAO.
- 2320 TENIAN AIR BASE NOW WORKING 0HISU1 (SPECIAL SEARCH PLANE?).

053

~~SECRET~~

30 MARCH

0001 TENIAN WORKING TWO PLANE GROUPS, PRE-DAWN ATTACK?
(8BONI1-3-4-7-8, 0HISU1-2-3-4)

0500 THREE NEW PLANE GROUPS APPEAR, PROBABLY SPECIAL SEARCH
PLANES (0HITI1, 7RORA2, 2HARE2)

0552 9RASI1 SENDS PLANE SIGHTING REPORT.

0600 AIR BASE PELELIU SENDS KUHA.

0601 PALAO COMM UNIT TELLS TOKYO TO WAIT AND GOES OFF
THE AIR ON ALL CIRCUITS.

0650 0HISU1 CALLING WOLEAI PROBABLY WANTS TO LAND THERE.

0723 9RASI2 TELLS GUAM "ARRIVED".

0750 8HONI4 ASKS WOLEAI FOR BEARINGS.

1114 LANGGOER LOOKOUT STATION SENDS HI HI HI.

1122 MESSAGE FROM 0HISU1 TO 8HONI:4RIMOKANARAHA".SIRA.

1338 NEW PLANE GROUPS APPEAR-- FOR TWILIGHT ATTACK?
(0MIMI1, 4NUME1-2, 0HARA1-2-3-4-5-6)

1435 TWO NEW PLANE GROUPS (3HORI1-2, 6MOKA1-2)

1730 9RASI2 AND 3 APPEAR CALLING PALAO, RETURNING TO LAND?

1740 PALAO SENDS KUKA. ✓

1740 MESSAGE FROM 0MIMI1 TO 4NUME1 AND 2; WARE.TATUYO
1845.N300.

1815 0MIMI1 TO 4NUME1: TEKORE.

1826 0MIMI1 TO 4NUME2: TEKORE.

1833 TO TO TO FROM 0MIMI1: ✓

1844 0MIMI1 TO 4NUME1: TEKORE.

1854 0MIMI1 TO 4NUME1: TO TO TO.

2010 0HARA5 WANTS BEARINGS FROM PALAO.

2050 0HARA3 WANTS BEARINGS FROM PALAO.

2137 0HARA2 AND 6 WORKING PALAO, ARE PREPARING TO LAND? 054

~~SECRET~~

31 MARCH

0525 TWO PLANE GROUPS UP WORKING TENIAN (3HORI1-2,
0HARA3-5-7)

0600 TWO NEW PLANE GROUPS WORKING TENIAN (4NUME1, 6MOKA1)

0620 PALAO SENDS KUHA.

0800 8 OF TENIANS REGULAR SEARCH PLANES (1YONO) HAVE SHOWN
UP ON CIRCUIT. BY SIGNAL STRENGTH ALL OF THESE SEEM
TO BE IN THE DIRECTION OF PALAO.

0817 9RAS11 AND 3 UP WORKING PALAO.

1004 0HARA7 RETURNING TO TENIAN, ASKS FOR BEARINGS.

1017 1YON017 SENDS TE TE TE.

1024 1YON017 SENDS HI HI HI.

1040 0MIMI1 (COMMANDER OF ATTACK FORCE ON 30TH) APPEARS
ON CIRCUIT.

1115 9RAS13 ASKING FOR BEARINGS FROM TENIAN.

1352 TWO NEW PLANE GROUPS APPEAR (8HONI1-7, 0KEK01-2)

1727 2WII5 SENDS TE TE TE.

1739 NEW ATTACK GROUP APPEARS ON CIRCUIT (0NEWI1-2-3-4-5-6)

2243 2WII5 RETURNING TO ~~XXX~~ TENIAN, ASKS FOR BEARINGS.

2257 5MATA2 AND 7HA01 APPEAR ON CIRCUIT FOR FIRST TIME.

2315 0NEWI1 RETURNING TO TENIAN, ASKS FOR BEARINGS.

~~SECRET~~

1 APRIL

0001 2WII1 SHOWS UP ON CIRCUIT, TO RELEIVE 2WII5?
0054 0NEWI3 SECURING TO LAND (TENIAN).
0058 7HA01 RETURNING TO TENIAN, ASKS FOR BEARINGS.
0133 WOLEAI SENDS HI HI HI. -
0330 8HONI1 MADE FORCED LANDING (IN THE SEA).
0428 5MATA2 LOST, TENIAN FURNISHING BEARINGS.
0548 5MATA2 MADE FORCED LANDING (IN THE SEA).
0553 WOLEAI SENDS HI HI HI. —
0555 WOLEAI SECURING HIS RADIO.
0649 TWO NEW PLANE GROUPS. 7A01-2 FROM TENIAN, 0KAH01
FROM GUAM.
0929 TWO NEW PLANE GROUPS (6TAMI1 AND 5OKA2).
0955 GUAM AIR BASE SENDS KUHA, BUT THEN SAID TO CANCEL KUHA.
1015 SEARCH PLANES AGAIN OPERATING OUT OF PALAO
(1SOTI8-14-18-26).
1134 TWO NEW PLANE GROUPS APPEAR, 3SIYU1 FROM TENIAN
AND 8KUMU1 FROM GUAM.
1604 NEW PLANE GROUP UP TO PALAO (5KOTI1-2).
1623 5UTE1 CALLING TENIAN AND PALAO.
1645 0ESI3 UP TO TENIAN.
1945 9AWI26 (TENIAN SEARCH PLANE) SENDS MESSAGE PREFIXED KIN.
2127 5UTE1 LANDED AT PALAO.

~~SECRET~~

2 APRIL

- 0359 SEARCH PLANES FROM TENIAN UP WORKING.
- 0428 0KEWAS UP, LOOKS LIKE A SPECIAL SEARCH FROM GUAM.
- 1050 9AWI32 (TENIAN SEARCH PLANE) SENDS MESSAGE PREFIXED
KIN BUT THIS COULD HAVE ONLY BEEN DRILL AS HE LATER
SENT TWO MESSAGES PREFIXED SI"TU.
- 1600 TWO NEW GROUPS APPEAR ON CIRCUIT (2IYU1, 0HARA2).
- 1700 8SUNU1 AND 5UTE1 UP WORKING PALAO.
- 2130 5UTE1 ARRIVED AT TENIAN.

~~SECRET~~

NOTES ON SEARCH PLANES

SEARCH PLANES CAN USUALLY BE HEARD TESTING THEIR TRANSMITTERS FROM ONE-HALF TO ONE HOUR AFTER THEY HAVE TAKEN OFF. THIS MAY BE ANYTHING FROM ONE DOT TO A MINUTE OR SO OF TUNING, DEPENDING ON THE OPERATOR. THE MAJOR ADVANTAGE TO A TASK FORCE IN HEARING THIS IS THAT YOU ARE NOW CERTAIN THAT THIS IS A FREQUENCY THE PLANES WILL USE THAT DAY. ALSO, A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THEIR TIME OF TAKE-OFF AND A POOR ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF PLANES UP CAN BE MADE.

ORANGE NAVY SEARCH PLANES ORDINARILY OPERATE ON TWO FREQUENCIES. ONE OF THESE IS USUALLY OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE AND THE OTHER RARELY USED, BUT NEVERTHELESS BOTH THE PLANES AND BASES HAVE A RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER SET UP ON THIS SECONDARY FREQUENCY AND MAY BEGIN TO USE IT AT ANY TIME. IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT EVEN WHEN THEY ARE GETTING THROUGH AND HANDLING TRAFFIC THE OPERATOR MIGHT SHIFT TO THE OTHER FREQUENCY FOR HIS NEXT MESSAGE. INSTANCES OF THIS SORT CAN ONLY MEAN THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DECEIVE AN INTERCEPT OPERATOR.

SINCE LOSING SO MANY SEARCH PLANES WITH NO WORD BACK TO THE BASE, IN DANGER AREAS, NOTABLY TENIAN, TRUK AND PALAO, THE PLANES KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE BASE AT HALF-HOUR OR HOURLY INTERVALS. THIS IS USUALLY DONE BY THE PLANE MAKING TWO DOTS (") FOLLOWED BY ONE KANA CHARACTER ASSIGNED TO THE PLANE FOR THAT DAY IF HE DOES NOT HEAR THE BASE AND THREE DOTS (RA) FOLLOWED BY THE ONE KANA CHARACTER IF HE DOES HEAR THE BASE. THE BASE UPON HEARING THIS ANSWERS IN THE SAME MANNER, RA FOLLOWED BY THE ONE KANA CALL OF THE PLANE. IF THE BASE WANTS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT A PLANE IS RECEIVING HIM, HE FOLLOWS THIS SAME PROCEDURE, TWO OR THREE DOTS AND THE ONE KANA CHARACTER OF THE PLANE, THIS TIME WITH THE PLANE ANSWERING. OFTEN WHEN ONE OPERATOR IS NOT ON HIS TOES FOR SOME REASON AND DOES NOT ANSWER FOR A FEW MINUTES THE COMPLETE CALL FOLLOWED BY KAN? IS MADE IN THE REGULAR MANNER.

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL COMMENTS

DESECRATE WAS AN EXTREMELY INTERESTING OPERATION FROM AN R.I. STANDPOINT. AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY WAS HEAVY ON BOTH "RUN IN" AND RETIREMENT, CONSEQUENTLY A QUITE COMPLETE PICTURE OF ORANGE SEARCH AND ATTACK MISSIONS WAS OBTAINED FROM INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACKS WAS CLEARLY DEFINED SUBSEQUENT TO RECEIPT OF SEARCH PLANE REPORTS OF HAVING MADE CONTACT WITH BLUE STRIKING FORCE. NORMALLY A #1 MESSAGE SENT BLIND BY GUAM, PALAU, OR WOLEAI TO THREE COLLECTIVE CHARLIE CALLS WAS INDICATION THAT ATTACK GROUP WAS AIRBORNE. THE THREE COLLECTIVE CALLS WERE CONTACT, ILLUMINATION, AND ATTACK GROUPS. NORMALLY TRAFFIC HAD BEEN RECEIVED PRIOR TO THIS TIME FROM PLANES OF CONTACT GROUP.

FOR EXAMPLE 2NENU (PALAU) SENDING #1 OR 31 ETC TO 6SASI, 4RINU, 2SOTI AT 1608 (-9) WOULD BE AN INDICATION ATTACK GROUP 2SOTI WAS ENROUTE, NORMALLY THIS GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF FROM 8 TO 10 BETTYS. 6SASI1 AND (OR) 6SASI2 (CONTACT PLANES) HAD SENT TRAFFIC THAT INDICATED THAT HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH OUR FORCE PRIOR TO THIS TIME, THESE PLANES HAD MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH THE ILLUMINATION GROUP (4RINU0 AND 4RINU1). IT WAS NOTED ON THE NIGHT OF 31 MARCH THAT ATTACK COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT AGAINST OUR FORCES IN THAT CONTACT PLANES WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT IN SPITE OF VIGOROUS EFFORT TO DO SAME.

P.O.W. STATED THAT SENIOR PILOT OF AN ATTACK MISSION IS IN THE ATTACK GROUP AND COORDINATES THE ATTACK, BUT IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT CONTACT PLANE, CONTROLLED THE ILLUMINATION GROUP, AND ORDERED THE ATTACKS WITH HIS TOTOTO TRANSMISSIONS.

THE DESECRATE OPERATION WAS THE FIRST STRIKE WITH A "DOG" DAY THAT DID NOT COINCIDE WITH A CHARLIE CALL CHANGE BY THE JAPS. CHARLIE CALLS WERE WELL IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO "RUN IN". THIS PROVED TO BE INVALUABLE IN GETTING THE DAILY AIR PICTURE, AND SHOWED THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE AND TIMELY IDENTIFICATION OF CHARLIE CALLS. APROPOS IT IS FELT THAT AN EXCELLENT JOB HAS BEEN DONE ON CHARLIE CALL IDENTIFICATION RECENTLY, THE IDENTS RECEIVED BY THE RIU'S DURING THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION WERE ESPECIALLY GOOD, IT IS HOPED THAT CONTINUED SUCCESS WITH THE CHARLIE CALL IDENTIFICATION CAN BE ANTICIPATED.

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND INTERPRET JAP ARMY RADIO TRAFFIC (AIR) BY TASK FORCES IS BECOMING PROGRESSIVELY MORE IMPORTANT. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE RIU'S WITH INFORMATION RELATIVE TO FREQUENCIES EMPLOYED, AND ANY ABBREVIATED PROCEDURE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

We should have more data on Army air ty

2. MACHINERY SHOULD BE SET UP TO PERMIT ALL SHORE INTERCEPT UNITS TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO FORCES AFLOAT. VIZ, FREQUENCY DATA, PERTINENT AIR OR SUB TRAFFIC, ETC.

No.

3. IF POSSIBLE, SX-28 RECEIVERS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO T.F.'S WITH NO SUBSTITUTES AS THIS RECEIVER SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ALL OPERATORS IN THAT IT IS THE ONLY RECEIVER THAT IS SATISFACTORY FOR BOTH NORMAL FREQUENCY COVERAGE AND SEARCH OTHER THAN THE LOW AND ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY SETS.

Yes

4. DURING PERIODS IN WHICH FLEET IS AT ANCHOR IN MAJURO, UNITS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED BY AO OF ANY UNUSUAL AIR OR SUBMARINE ACTIVITY OBSERVED BY "JUSIT", EITHER URGENT OR OPERATIONAL PRIORITY AS DEEMED NECESSARY, WITH PARTICULARS AS TO CALLS OF UNITS INVOLVED AND FREQUENCIES.

No

?

5. A DEFINITE POLICY FOR TRAINING OFFICERS AND MEN FOR R.I.U. WORK SHOULD BE GIVEN CONSIDERATION AT PRESENT, IN THE LIGHT OF PROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS AND INCREASING NUMBER OF FORCES THAT WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE FUTURE.

??

??

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

G. M. Slonim

G. M. SLONIM

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 1944

NEW FREQUENCIES

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|--|--|---------|
| 1. | 175J | Palao to Ships | | 4-18-44 |
| 2. | 950M | Air Base Truk to Air Base Guam
2ROKA to 4YONI | | 4-30-44 |
| 3. | 2130M | Truk RIMI Broadcast
This freq. used when regular
RIMI freqs. were bombed out. | | 4-30-44 |
| 4. | 2670M | Guard Unit 81 to KN calls | | 4-17-44 |
| 5. | 3982M | Rashin Broadcast to NARAE | | 4-15-44 |
| 6. | 4527M - HITU | 96-9056M-HITU96
Air Base Sorong
Air Base 329 Kendari
Base Det. AirFlot 23
Air Base 325 Koepang
Air Base 332 Balikpapan
Air Base Ranguru
Air Base Davao
Air Base Wakde
Guard Division 18
Air Base NABIRE
Air Base Blank (BABO?)
This circuit is usually spread out
over approximately 20 Kcs and is
difficult to copy, especially at
night when interference is bad. | RUNAKA
NASARU
SOMOHO
MUTAYA
NU URE
U E A
REE HI
MUTAFU
MATEMO
ATUSO
REMESU | 4-20-44 |
| 7. | 4895M | Guard Div 81
A7
SE7
TO7 | HOYOTI | 4-20-44 |
| 8. | 5537M | Palao
Air Base Peleliu | 4-17-44 | 4-17-44 |
| 9. | 5614M-16843M | C.U. Rabaul.
C.U. 21
C.U. Saipan | | 4-20-44 |
| 10. | 5807M | Davao Wx Station
Manila
Legaspi (31 G.D. Det.)
Cebu Wx.
Others (time did not permit full investigation). | | 4-16-44 |

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Rep.

11.	5838M	Special Base Force Comdr Biak Det. G.D. 18 Special Base Force Guard Div 18 WAKATAKA CM Seriu Det. G.D. 18 Sorong Det. G.D. 18 Kana Numeral call	HIAYA MATEMO TUKEE (xx call) ROYATO NKAU HOROH KIKOHI HO2	4-17-44
12.	5845M	Special Base Force 26 To Guard Div 18 (This may be same as 5838M heard while broadcasting to G.D. 18.)	HIAYA	4-20-44
13.	6910M	Tenian Air Base Planes		4-44
14.	7370A - HITU429	2 KN calls Planes Biak Det. G.D. 18		4-20-44
15.	7370M	Special Base Force 22 Comdr (WAYUNI) Special Base Force (xx call)(AIKI) May be others on this frequency.		4-20-44
16.	9045M	N2K calls Planes Believed to be Chichijima & Saipan	4-20-44	4-20-44

Notes on NEW GUINEA AREA

A clear picture of Japanese radio communications in the NEW GUINEA Area could not be determined due to the numerous air circuits requiring attention and the limited number of personnel available.

As may be expected reception in this area is very good from all points of the Jap Communication net. Many Army circuits were heard.

4527M/9056M (HITU096-HITU96) proved to be very helpful in following the movements of Air Groups into and throughout the NEW GUINEA Area. WAKDE Island was heard only intermittently probably due to our Air strikes.

Since this unit was with forces engaged in intercepting hostile aircraft, special attention was given to Air circuits plus the 4527M/9056M circuit. Even this mission could not be efficiently handled due to lack of personnel. At one time five separate air circuits were active simultaneously.

With the exception of new frequencies uncovered, it is felt this unit cannot add very much to what is already known in the NEW GUINEA Area.

7370A was the only air circuit uncovered in this area.

Notes - Second Strike on TRUK

TRUK brought up what sounded like an aircraft transmitter on 2130M after his RIMI series had been disrupted. Several numbers (RIMI) were sent on this frequency.

The appearance of MARSHALL-GILBERT traffic on SAIPAN's TIME broadcast suggests SAIPAN was directed or voluntarily took the guard for TRUK. This may be a hint that SAIPAN's TIME was originated to handle just such an emergency or to take over in the event TRUK broadcast is permanently knocked out.

SATAWAN was heard on 8565J broadcasting traffic to NARAE in aircraft code suggesting he had burned his other codes. TRUK later rebroadcast part of this traffic on his RIMI.

6115J is TRUK's primary search and tactical frequency when operations are in progress from one of his own bases only. When operations include aircraft and bases from other points in the MARIANAS or CAROLINES, 8575A appears to be the primary tactical and search freq with 9180J being used as a secondary. Usually TRUK also uses 6115J for reconnaissance.

It was noted the following Air frequencies were used during all operations in the CAROLINES and MARIANAS:-

6115J
6215J
6910M
7945J
7970J
8575A
9180J
950M (TRUK and GUAM - may be others)

7970J has not been used lately and it is believed 8575A will replace this frequency as a primary circuit. It may also be worth while to check on all the old MARSHALLS-GILBERTS Air frequencies. They may have been transferred to the SAIPAN Area along with others.

Notes - General

It is requested we be kept informed of new air frequencies and local frequencies as they are uncovered. During operations, the unit is too busy to search and may therefore miss out on important traffic through no fault of its own.

Watch 4303M/8624M for compromises on Charlie calls used by PALAO, WOLEAI, TENIAN, SAIPAN, GUAM and HARUSHIMA. This circuit can usually be depended-upon to give us a few compromises every time Charlie calls change which is very nice of them.

Notes - Personal

Will appreciate anything that can be done to get our mail to us.

Also after four or five near misses, we all feel we are not allergic to Japanese Bombs!

BELTZ, CRM
COLTEEN, CRM
GREGORY, RMLc
CHAMBERLIN, RMLc

Info

G-1

(N)

GB

N

GD

has copy

F

HEF

GT

J

GXA

John USA
Walt PR

Last page contains
complaint about mail.
This is CRM Report of
Task Force Unit (SIMS's).

JAH

~~SECRET~~

GX



May 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM COMMANDER HOWETH

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Report RIU attached CTF 58.1 (Rear Admiral Clark ComCarDiv 13
aboard U.S.S. Hornet).

Enclosure: Subject Report.

1. No frequencies not already recovered were discovered during the operation, so the usual frequency section of report is omitted.
2. Report is given as chronology of radio activity as intercepted with cause of enemy reactions and friendly operations wherever they are known and will help to complete the picture.
3. This report consists of eight (8) pages.

Respectfully,
E.B. Beath
E.B. Beath

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~~SECRET~~

Personnel

Beath, E. B. Lt.(jg) O-in-C

Gramblin, S. E. CRM

Otto, W.B. CRM

Price, R.A. RMIC

Forgy, J.P. RMIC

~~SECRET~~

Chronology of enemy air activity as determined by RIU attached to ComCarDiv 13 (Rear Admiral Clark) during Desecrate 2 and rest Desecrate operations (April 16- April 30) including Hollandia Support operations and strikes on Truk. Times employed are minus 9 throughout.

April 13

Sortied from Majuro.

April 16

1035 Grid from enemy plane giving position 159-23 E 00-18 S. Our Position 161-33 E 01-00 N.

Contact considered not to be this group but probably our oilers(TG 50.17) who should have been in position of contact at time.

April 17

0428 First plane up, probably from Truk.

0600 12 planes up, also probably from Truk. Believed to be searching.

1237 Enemy pilot reported to base he was in contact with blue plane(s).

1252 Pilot amplified report as 1 large plane, probably SoPac search.

April 18

0400-1800 Many search planes heard throughout day but no indication of positive results.

2240 Continued very heavy distribution of plane traffic to major Command Units indicates Japs know of presence of blue Units in their waters. Possible some of our surface Units sighted this afternoon though no grids received. Encoded positions makes reliance on grids for determination of contact unwise.

~~SECRET~~

April 19

- 0600 Many planes searching.
- 1305 2 planes signal strength 5X5. Must be near.
- 1308 1 plane reports sighting blue carrier planes (plane^(BETTY) was sighted visually 12 miles off Starboard bow. No radar contact.)
- 1315 A lone Betty splashed by USS Princeton planes in sight of formation.
- 1316 2 planes still 5X5. One working Truk and Wolei^a, one Palao.
- 1318 Dispatch originated by one of above planes being given wide distribution.
- Probably effected contact.
- 1811 2 Emilys ? (3 kana numeral calls) landed at Manokwari, probably from Palao.

April 20

- 0613 3 planes up. Signal strength 3.
- 0835 17 enemy planes in air. Believe 12 search, and balance normally flying Guam to Woleai-Palao.
- 0900 Manokwari sending aviation weather to Babo.
- 1010 Betty shot down 10 miles from formation by USS Cowpens Anti-snoop VF.
- No traffic sent by plane.
- 1020 Jap plane using 3 kana call working Manokwari. Likely Mavis or Emily search.

April 21

Launched successive air strikes on Wakde, Sarmi and Sawar. No significant enemy air traffic noted.

April 22

- Launched successive air strikes on Wakde, Sarmi and Sawar airdromes.
- 1020 Hornet returning strike bomber shot down 1 Betty 40 miles from Wakde.
- No reaction from plane noted.

~~SECRET~~

April 22 Cont.

SIGNAL

- 1055 Enemy search plane sighted "Enemy planes" strength 3. Woleai under attack. Planes sighted by Jap probably Army attack group.
- 1135 Enemy search plane report sighting enemy planes. Probably returning blue Woleai attack group.
- 1407 Orange birdman gave following contact position 142-10 E 01-10 N. Our position 141-45 E 01-35 N.
- 1600 Indications Japs ferrying planes Guam to Palao.

April 23

- 1030 1 of 2 strength 5 Jap planes reports sighting carrier planes.
- 1045 1 Betty shot down by Hornet CAF. 1 injured Jap warrant officer survivor picked up and brought to Hornet.
- 1046 2 planes still near with strong signal.
- 1106 Planes appear to be returning. No longer transmitting urgent traffic. Obvious we were spotted.

April 24

- 0925 Plane reports carriers in formation with 1 BB, 5 CA and number of DD heading west, speed 16 knots. Message #3 from the plane.
- 1000 Planes still near, judging by signal strength.
- 1005 Betty shot down by Hornet anti-snoop VF, sent position 140-48 E 00-28 S before being shot down. Base either Palao or Davao. Point of shooting 140-27 E 00-42 S.

Recovered code books TA 27 and TA 28 which was immediately photographed, original sent to CTF 58.

- 1512 From unidentified base, probably Babo to plane group "attack left at 1500".

SECRET

April 24 Cont.

- 1615 1 plane ordered by base to search to northeast of enemy.
- 1728 From plane to base and other planes "weather in vicinity of enemy - visibility 20 miles . Slight mist."
- 1826 Plane reported saw enemy plane. We had friendly on radar near Bogey.
- 1840 Plane reports ETA at scene of battle 1908.
- 1855 1 plane to another "cannot see the enemy".
- 1935 Plane to base "Missed objective - discontinuing attack - returning to base."
- 1758-1900 3 raids reported by Radar. None closing within gunfire range of this group.

April 25

- 0900 Enemy plane reported contact with blue carrier force of unknown composition.
- 1000 Same plane reports being tailed by 6 carrier fighters.
- 1040 Search Betty shot down by Cowpens 33 miles from task group center. 4 survivors picked up by USS Bradford, with charts and other data delivered to CTF 58.

April 26

- 0845 Orange birdman contacted blue land based plane 149-53 E 03-52 N.
- 0850 Jap plane gave position 1 carrier based plane distance 280 miles bearing 192 degrees from base (probably Truk). Plane was heading north, altitude 300 meters. Transmission weak and not thought to be close aboard.
- 0900 Orange plane reports blue carrier based plane, no position given.

April 26 & 27

Refueling off Seeadler Harbor.

April 28

Continue operating off Seeadler Harbor.

SECRET

April 28 Cont.

- 0945 Plane reports seeing 1 enemy flying boat. Heading north, bearing from base(probably Truk) 168 degrees, distance 206 miles. "I am continuing search."
1020 Plane reports "Am returning to base. Left motor is bad. Distance covered 415 miles."

April 29

Proceeding in northerly direction enroute Truk.

- 1050 Plane above gave contact originated at 1030 of enemy striking force composed of carriers and 3 cruisers. Bearing 203 degrees from base, distance 460 miles.
1055 Same plane reported another contact including 2 carriers bearing 265 degrees 430 miles from Truk(Our bearing 205 degrees 402 miles.)
1105 Plane reported previous contact to be on course 310 speed 18(Our course 025 speed 10)
1115 Plane gave weather report in vicinity of enemy.
1130 Plane gave another weather report enroute to base,
1153 Another plane up with loud signal.
1140 Above plane sent contact originated at 1140 with 1 B25 410 miles 163 degrees from Truk. Heading 170 degrees, alt. 2,000 meters.

April 30.

Launched strikes against Truk.

- 0400 Orange birdman sent 2 unguents on sighting this force. Base hasn't acknowledged yet.
0410 Plane reports planes taking off carrier decks.
0415 Air alert at Truk.
0440 Nip reports he is to continue to shadow us.

~~SECRET~~

April 30 Cont.

- 0625 1 patrol plane reports he is turning back because of weather. Another reports cannot find enemy due to weather.
- 0710 Truk air base(believed Param) to planes "Enemy is attacking from 260 degrees . Be careful when you land."
- 0740 Contact with 8 ships including 2 carriers by birdman in position 151-58 E 0542 N. Our position was 151-46 E 06-32 N but USS Mobile sighted a Jap plane over horizon at that time.
- 0700-0753 Bogies on radar screen. Most of the TG in rain squall and attack did not develop on this group.

April 31

- 0740 Contact by plane on Blue force 170 degrees, 80 miles from Truk.
- 0800 151-18 E 06-27 N -- Position of Blue force.
- 0815 151-18 E 06-47 N -- Position of Blue force.
- 1020 1 orange plane made forced landing.
- 1950 Planes up on 6115J. Aloft since 1900. Probably search or attack mission.
- No dispatches yet.
- 2035 Plane(group comdr) sent signal "All units attack."
- 2036 Plane reports "We attacked with torpedo. Results unobserved."
- 2045 "Torpedo attack finished, am returning".
- 2140 Plane reports "Expect to arrive back at base at 2150."
- 1915-2005 Several Bogies on screen. No attacks developed. Other group object of attack.

23 May 1944

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GX WATCH OFFICERS
(Relative to Releasing Despatches to Task Forces)

1. The subject of reporting enemy intelligence information either directly or indirectly from FRUPAC to United States Forces operating in the forward area is considered so important and fraught with possible misunderstanding as to require explicit and detailed instructions.

2. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet is the one officer in the Pacific charged with the responsibility of directing, controlling, and rendering all decisions relative to the operations of the Pacific Forces, particularly the Central Pacific Task Forces. After CENTPAC Forces depart from port, together with the CENTPAC Commander-in-Chief, for operations against the enemy, the control of the flow of enemy intelligence to the CENTPAC forces must be carefully exercised by CINCPAC. This control requires most careful judgment because of two factors: (1) The Task Forces may be separated, and (2) radio silence will not permit any opportunities on the part of the Task Forces to clear up probable misunderstandings. It is very obvious, then, that the one responsible officer, CINCPAC or his representative, should pass on all enemy intelligence which has a bearing on the area of operations or the forces themselves.

3. Communication Facilities and Provisions for Task Forces. As far as we in FRUPAC are concerned, there are three principle crypto-channels available for secret or ultra information by means of which our interpretations and analyzes may reach the Task Forces. They are:

- (a) High Command Channel--Normally not used by FRUPAC --only by CINCPAC. It is this system that normally carries ultra secret (DI) or top secret (TI) enemy intelligence from CINCPAC to all Task Force Commanders.
- (b) FRUPAC JUSIT Channel. This system is held by only four (4) officers in the Operating Task Forces who will be expected to be on board three aircraft carrier flagships and one CENTPAC Flagship. CINCPAC does not originate despatches in this system. Notice the limited distribution in

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

JUSIT as compared to the high command channel. Only the CinC's of Radio Intelligence Units (four in number) receive the JUSIT. Only Radio Intelligence Technical Information is sent in this channel.

(c) Radio Direction Finder Fix Reporting System.

This system is used, as indicated by name, to advise all ships (including merchant vessels) in the Pacific of the enemy ship locations as determined by radio direction finder bearings. CINCPAC does not originate in this system. Only FRUPAC.

It will be noted that the three principle systems of forwarding enemy intelligence to the Task Forces are widely different in type, subject matter, and distribution. Also it is to be noted that COMB and TUNA are not received by the Task Forces and at the present date, considering the remote locations of West Coast and Australia from the probable areas of operation, it is believed we should not particularly strive to advise COMB (other than CINCPAC) and TUNA addressees of enemy intelligence in the operating area except in the routine daily summaries.

4. By agreement, FRUPAC is authorized and directed to release, encrypt, and send out enemy fixes (DF). By agreement also, FRUPAC is authorized to release enemy intelligence information of a technical nature in JUSIT to the Task Force Radio Intelligence Units on board four flagships. The interpretation of the word technical is important. Examples of authorized subject matter for JUSIT system are:

- (a) "KWAJALEIN reports aircraft on 5600 kcs using abbreviated procedure x unheard here x cannot confirm area of activity."
- (b) "FIX reported at _____ Zebra was in direct communication with SAIPAN on 2690 kcs."
- (c) "PALAO appears to have taken over SAIPAN regular broadcast and guard x unable here to uncover SAIPAN emergency channel to PALAO."

~~TOP SECRET~~ ULTRA

While it is difficult to estimate all types of suitable and useful technical information which should be properly forwarded via JUSIT, the criterion is that the information imparted in this channel must be such as to require a TI analyst to understand and utilize it and that the information imparted could not have been utilized properly via the high command channel. In order to clarify this last sentence, here are some examples of border-line cases which require the high command channel:

- (a) "FIX reported at _____ (Z) believed to be the BB NAGATO" (all hands received the fix and all Task Force Commanders should have the identity if available. This can only be judged by CINCPAC, however, so JUSIT is out of the question).
- (b) "DAVAO has resumed normal communications x one transmitter appears to be on emergency power" (this despatch follows a heavy strike on DAVAO).

Here is a border-line case or two requiring JUSIT:

- (a) "CinC 1st Air Fleet directed all stations on 5950 circuit to shift to circuit TIHA51 at 1130 x latter channel believed to be Air Flot 23 regular 4700 kcs."
- (b) "FIX reported at _____ (Z) a possible RFP match for TRUK Air Base Charlie call reported recently on 4650 kcs."

5. Releasing DF Fix Reports to Pacific Fleet.

The following rule will normally apply regardless of the area of U. S. Task Forces operations.

- (a) Report all fixes (surface, subs or aircraft) to the east (right hand) of the following line - Up 120° East to 20° North, East on 20°N to 150°E, up 150° to Arctic unless the fix is known to represent the normal operating area of vessel and no U. S. Task Forces are believed to be in vicinity
- (b) Report all fixes of enemy submarines regardless of the area of the fix.

Whenever U. S. Task Forces are operating in the forward area, it is expected that Captain Goggins will advise the GX Duty Officers of the enemy objective and approximate routes and dates, at which time, any necessary special provisions for reporting enemy fixes (DF) will be promulgated to the GX and GF Watch Officers. GX Duty Officers normally get this information in CIC before going on watch.

6. The responsibility of obtaining the most accurate and timely enemy intelligence extends down to the last man in the organization. The team doesn't function without each man doing his job. However, the selection and delivery of intelligence to the Task Forces requires the exercise of careful consideration and good judgment on the part of the GX Watch Officer. It will be normal practice to have all despatches that are addressed to Task Forces in JUSIT released by the GX Duty Officer unless simple idents and call conversions are involved. In the temporary absence of the GX Duty Officer, the GX Watch Officer may release despatches containing technical information but, in so doing, will accept full responsibility. If the case is the least bit doubtful, it should be referred to the GX Duty Officer regardless of the time of day or night. The expeditious and accurate delivery of intelligence to the Task Forces by GX via CIC and CINCPAC requires that each party in the chain of delivery maintain the same interpretation. In order to insure that reports are accurate, the GX Watch Officer will, with the help of the Yeoman, maintain a complete log of reports given to CIC by telephone. It will be standard practice to report all items of intelligence to CIC by telephone as they occur with the understanding that CIC will forward to CINCPAC.

T. A. HUCKINS

Approved:

W. B. GOGGINS
Captain, U.S. Navy

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION THIRTEEN

CCDL13/s67
Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 June 1944.

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit attached
to Commander Carrier Division THIRTEEN (CTG 58.1).
To: Officer in Charge, GX, Fleet Radio Unit, U.S. Pacific
Fleet.
Subject: Report of FORAGER Operation to 27 June 1944.
Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
1. Forwarded.

E. B. BEATH,
Lieutenant (jg), I-V(S), USNR.

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TOP SECRET

27 June, 1944

Report of RIU attached to CTG 58.1 (Rear Admiral J. J. Clark)

This unit aboard the U.S.S. Hornet (CV12), April 11th to date.
It was previously aboard the U.S.S. Yorktown 3 March to 11 April,
and aboard the U.S.S. Saratoga 15 January to 3 March, 1944.

Time used in this report is (-9) unless otherwise stated.

This report consist of 13 pages.

Submitted by:

Lt. (jg) E. B. Beath.

PERSONNEL

E. B. Beath Lt. (jg), O in C

Otto, W. B. CRM

Price, R. A. Rmlc

Rorgy, J. P. Rmlc

Huston, H. H. Rm2c

TOP SECRET

6 June. Sortied from Majuro at 1045. (-11 zone time, E longitude date)

Coverage: 8572 J, Saipan Broadcast, Search.

Normal search activity was noted by Saipan seaplanes on (8572 J). No contacts or sighting reports of fleet units were copied. The usual sightings of "blue" search planes and reports of strikes in the Marshalls-Carolines area were noted on the Saipan Broadcast. Nothing sent on the Broadcast appeared to apply directly to the "blue" surface forces commencing the FORAGER operation.

7 June. 0800 position, 167-04 E, 07-30 N. (-11 zone time)

Coverage: Saipan Broadcast, 8572 J, 6910 A, 9180 J.
Search and copy intermittently 8137 J, 5925 A / 11850 A, 8610 J

Saipan seaplanes were active on (8572 J). There was evidence that at least one plane (6MAKU2) stayed up all night searching. This plane was first heard at 2036 on 6 June, up all night and last heard at 0451 on 7 June, when he asked Saipan seaplane base (6RIWA) for bearings. Harushima search was up on (6910 A) and Guam on (9180 J).

8 June. 1600 (-11) position, 161-45 E, 12-25 N.

Coverage: Saipan Broadcast, 8572 J, 9180 J, 6910 A.
Search and copy intermittently 8332 J, 4305 A / 8610 J,
5925 A / 11850 A

The three main air circuits were up with good signal strength. Traffic was copied from each, some of which appeared on the Saipan Broadcast. The TASK FORCE had not yet entered the Truk search area.

9 June. 0800 (-10) position, 159 E, 15 N.

Coverage: Saipan Broadcast, 8572 J, 6910 A, 9180 J.
Search and copy intermittently 5375 J, 4728 M, 9035 A,
7970 J.

All Marianas-Carolines search frequencies heard with good signal strength. Aircraft traffic was quite heavy with many messages being re-transmitted on the Saipan Broadcast. Particularly noteworthy were a number of (KIM) messages sent by (5HOYAL) on 6910 A and readdressed to C in C, FLEET FIRST AIR.

(cont)

TOP SECRET

9 June continued.

This surge of air activity was interpreted as an indication of intensive search for the blue force and an indication that the enemy knew the force had sortied from Majuro. (Note: It was learned later, that Jap planes had been over Majuro on the 9th of June.)

10 June. 0800 (-10) position, 155-16 E, 14-15 N.

Coverage: Saipan Broadcast, 8572 J, 6910 A, 9180 J, searched various, 5925 A, 5375 J, 4727 H.

Aircraft traffic was fairly even throughout the day with no unusual activity noted. Signals on (6910 A) were very strong and it was feared those aircraft would spot us. No grids or contact reports were noted.

11 June. 0800 (-10) position, 149-29 E, 13 09 N

Coverage Saipan Broadcast, 8572 J, 6910 A, 9180 J, searched and copied various, 7044 M, 6144 M, 6115 J, 9035 A.

At 0730, a "HELEN" was shot down by our fighters, but no alert was sent. At 0808, a sighting report on a BLUE plane was originated by a TENIAN plane and copied on the Saipan Broadcast. Several (KIN) messages were originated by AIR BASE GUAM and appeared on the Saipan Broadcast, indication of a possible alarm over the plane sighting. During the morning our TASK GROUP evidently crossed the route of transport seaplanes flying between TRUK and the MARIANAS. Several were shot down, one near enough to the formation to enable a destroyer to pick up two prisoners, three large bags of official documents, and one (TA 34) aircraft codebook. (NOTE: The official mail contained reports from BASE FORCE ONE, SIXTH ARMY DIVISION, and other data from SOLOMONS AREA commands. The two prisoners were ARMY evacuees from BUIN. (TA 34) was found to be still used by MARCUS and search planes, also by some ~~other~~ air activity.)

Strikes were launched. At 1305, on 9035 A, an air raid alert originated by SAIPAN SEAPLANE BASE was copied from IWOJIMA AIR BASE. (KUHA. KUHA. KUHA 1248 (3 EWI)) . At 1326, AIR BASE TENIAN sent an alert on 6910 A, and GUAM AIR BASE at 1338 on 9180 J. There followed great activity and much confusion on the plane circuits. At 1640, both TENIAN and GUAM originated cancel air raid warning messages.

TOP SECRET

12-13 June. Position; Guam immediate area.

Coverage: Saipan / Truk broadcast, 9180 J, 6910 A, 5575 J, searched various, 6115 J and 6333 N.

The strikes against GUAM and ROTA continued. Air activity was good, with many high precedence messages and plane sightings (HI HI KA) being sent. There was no indications of a sighting or attack on the BLUE FORCE. The Saipan Broadcast was up and down, the TRUK broadcast was copied instead.

14 June. 0800 (-10) position, 147-39 E, 16-35 N.

Coverage: Truk / Tokyo broadcast, 6920 M, 8332 J, 6910 A, 5095 / 10190 A, Search.

TG 58.1 ceased strikes on GUAM and ROTA and headed for the BONINS to attack CHICHIJIMA and IWOJIMA. AIR BASE MARCUS was heard working search planes on (6920 M). Some BONINS air activity noted on (8332 J). Much traffic was copied on the base circuit (5095 A / 10190A), but there were no indications of any alarm.

15 June. position, Bonins area.

MARCUS planes on (6920 M) were noted searching in MARIANAS area, sending sighting reports with bearings from TENIAN. These aircraft were thought to be large seaplanes (MAVIS or EMILY). At approximately 1330 the strikes against IWOJIMA and CHICHIJIMA were launched. At 1345, air base 52, IWOJIMA, originated an air raid alert which was sent to CHICHIJIMA. There was some delay and CHICHIJIMA sent his own air raid warning before he receipted for that from IWOJIMA. CHICHIJIMA also sent a preliminary air raid warning to the base force detachment at HAHAJIMA. Secure was sent by IWOJIMA at 1710. There was nothing sent on the TOKYO broadcast concerning the attacks. Signals were very good and the base circuit (3840 J) was copied at any time of the day with S5 strength.

TOP SECRET

16 June. 0800 (-10), 141-40 E, 22-55 N.

Coverage: Tokyo / Palao / Truk Broadcasts, 3840 J, 7835 J, search.

At approximately 1200 a strike was launched against IWOJIMA. At 1250, IWOJIMA originated a full air raid alert (HI HI HI, KASEKI KAHAKI, 50 KUHA KUHA KUHA 1250). At 1255, the OGASAWARA FORCE commander originated an air raid alert and cancelled it at 1435.

At 0509, on 7835 J, AIR BASE TENIAN (GRESE) re-transmitted an attack message originated by a plane (TO TO TO 0425 (SYOTA2)). This was interpreted as an attack on another TASK GROUP in the MARIANAS area and later was verified as such.

17 June. 1300 (-10) position, 140-48 E, 19-12 N.

Coverage: Same as on 16 June.

GUAM and TENIAN were active on (7835 J) and several plane sighting reports were sent. At 1647, (9ROTUL) sent a grid message to GUAM, followed immediately by the attack signal (TO TO TO). At least four other planes not heard before sent the attack signal. There followed a silence of about five minutes on the circuit broken by (9ROTUL) who sent an emergency landing signal (FU FU FU). All attacking aircraft then sent messages to GUAM (SYOHA), (ONOMAL) sent a grid. Since both grids sent were far from our position it was believed that the attacks were against the surface units in the SAIPAN area. (It was later verified that some LSTs and tankers had been attacked and one KATE had been shot down.)

18 June. 1000 (-10) position, 143-08 E, 15-18 N.

Coverage: Truk broadcast, 7635 J, 6580 J, 7835 J, 7225 A, search.

At 0810, 6580 J was first heard but was not active until approximately 1300. Signals were loud and the unusual procedure coupled with the cautious manner in which the bases refused to sign, was suspected of being CARRIER ACTIVITY. Grid positions were sent by search planes on (7835 J) but since the positions were not on BLUE units, it was thought possible that such positions were on submarines in the vicinity of the enemy's carriers. Grids were sent on (6580 J) indicating positions of BLUE TASK GROUPS.

(cont)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

18 June continued.

Some traffic sent by carrier planes carried a special prefix (-17I), (-15I) and so on. For example, plane (4NEH017) sent a message prefixed (-17I), while plane (1FUSE15) sent traffic prefixed (-15I). The special meaning of this was not known, but it was an identifying mark of carrier aircraft traffic, though all carrier plane traffic did not have it.

19 June. 0800 (-10) position, 143-30 E, 14-40 N.

Coverage: Truk broadcast, 7910 A, 6580 J, 7835 J, search.
Intermittent coverage of 7110 J, 7585 M, 7395 J, 6879 M,
6195 J.

At 0600, 6580 J was up and many grids were sent. Some were on the BLUE positions and some in positions thought to be in the vicinity of the enemy's forces. Several of these grids appeared on the Truk broadcast. Enemy aircraft were very active and over fifty messages had been received up till approximately 1000, when TF58 was attacked by the enemy's carrier planes. Most of these planes were intercepted before they could get close to BLUE carriers, and were shot down. At 1043, plane (4NUT01) sent the attack signal, (TO TO TO). At 1048, CARDIV 3 COMDR (SOPU4), came up on (6580 J), sent a (KI N) to CINC FLT FIRST MOBILE, and was not heard again on this frequency. Planes asked for bearings and seemed to be confused. Some were being engaged in aerial combat and others were making forced landings. Fleet frequency (7915 J) was up at 1809, with CINC FLT FIRST MOBILE sending to all heavy units. The carrier ZUIKAKU and other unidentified units were heard. At times, TWO KANA calls were used. On 7110 J, planes asked for bearings. One plane (8RAH1), using plain language, named the CHIYODA in connection with his request for bearings. The carriers used regular CHARLIE CALLS when working planes, but seldom signed, causing some uncertainty at times in the identity of the transmitting station. It is believed that the enemy planes were supposed to attack the BLUE forces from HIS carriers and then fly to GUAM, hence the confusion in bearings between the carriers and AIR BASE GUAM.

Most of the enemy planes were shot down fifty to seventy five miles from the BLUE force. This might possibly account for the RIU not being able to hear any VHF radiotelephone. All frequencies were searched. Carrier plane activity was heard on 6580 J, 7110 J, 7395 J, 6195 J, and 6879 M. CW only was heard.

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 June. 0800 (-10) position, 14-05 E, 13-10 N.

Coverage: Same as 19 June.

At 0418, (6580 J) was up with planes sending position grids thought to be on subs in the vicinity of the enemy or on his forces. At 1151, (5WARI6) on 7835 J, sent a contact on a large surface force (TA TA TA) and immediately thereafter a sighting report on a BLUE plane (HI HI KA). This plane (BETTY) was shot down at 1153. The enemy's carriers were active on (7910 J). At approximately 1500, the enemy surface forces were sighted in position (135-25 E, 15-02 N), course 270 degrees, speed 20 knots. BLUE position was then (138-51 E, 14-15 N), the enemy bearing 281 degrees at 200 miles. BLUE planes were launched to attack the enemy. At 1615, a grid position was sent, spotting the BLUE TF very closely. At 1731, an enemy carrier plane (0 HI) sent a plane sighting report on the BLUE strike, (HI HI KA). This was followed by a message from (0HAHIL) who sent (HI HI KA.HO) at 1735. At 1740, on 7910 J, the CHITOSE originated and sent a plane sighting report to CINC FLT. FIRST MOBILE (HI HI KA.50.1740). Many messages and various warnings were sent by (0HAHIL) who though signing a plane call, seemed to be a carrier. By 2200 there was very little activity on (6580 J). Carrier activity was not heard on any other frequency. The CHITOSE, CHIYODA, ZUIKAKU, MOGAMI, MYOOKOO, CINC FLT FIRST MOBILE were all heard or called on (7915 J / 3955 J).

21 June. 0800 (-10) position, 136-47 E, 15-33 N.

Coverage: 7910 J, 6580 J, 6260 J, 7835 J, search.

The enemy was in position (132-03 E, 17-30 N, distance 360 miles). Traffic was sent on 7910 J, HIS air circuits were quiet, with a few planes up. Two grid positions, both in HIS vicinity were sent. Pursuit of the enemy was broken off.

22 June. 0800 (-10) position, 137-30 E, 15-15 N.

Coverage: 7835 J, 7910 J, 6580 J, search various.

TG58.1 fueled and headed for ENIWETOK via PAGAN to attack and destroy enemy aircraft and facilities as we pass by. No alarms noted from PAGAN. No great air activity was heard.

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TOP SECRET

23 June, 1500 (-10) position, 144-40 E, 17-05 N.

Coverage: 7585 M, 7910 J, 7835 J, search.

At 1022 and 1307, search aircraft from IWOJIMA (5TIYA), sighted BLUE planes and sent reports (HI HI HI). At approximately 1615, BLUE fighters intercepted and shot down two (LETTYS) and four (ZEKES). No contacts or "screams" were heard from any of them. Later, air base PELELIU (3U TU) and air base IWOJIMA (5TIYA) both called aircraft which did not answer.

24 June, 0800 (-10) position, 143-39 E, 22-18 N.

Coverage: 3840 J, 7835 J, 7588M, search.

At approximately 0500 a strike was launched against IWOJIMA. At 0717, air base IWOJIMA originated an air raid warning on 3840 J. Base force CHICHIJIMA also originated a (KUHA) at 0725. At 0829, plane (01 RI3) sent a sighting report on TG58.1 by bearing and distance from IWOJIMA. At 0830, a grid position was sent by the plane (01 RI2) spotting us very definitely. Many (SAKI) and (KIN) messages followed and at 0925, another grid position on the TASK GROUP. These grid positions were re-transmitted on (7835 J) by air base TENIAN (7 UTA). Various plane sighting reports were sent on (7588 M) and enemy planes were shot down all around the group. It is not known why the distress calls and battle contact messages of these aircraft were not heard. All frequencies from 95kc. to 14.3 mc. were searched, but nothing heard. It is thought probable that VHF is used and is either above the range of our receiver, (27.8 to 14.3 mc.), or that it cannot be heard unless within very close range. At 1955 many BOLLIES were up and the TG went to general quarters. Signals on (7585 M) were very loud and there were several groups or "raids" in the vicinity of the TG. Evidently the enemy planes could not find the BLUE because they did not attack. During the raid, air base 52 (IWOJIMA) was heard on 319kc. estimated, sending his call (TOWANA) during a ten second period, followed by a ten second dash. This seemed to be his homing frequency.

TOP SECRET

25 June. 0800 (-11) position, 150-30 E, 18-30 N.

Coverage: 6115 J, 7585 M, 7835 J, 6260 J, search.

Enroute to ENIWETOK. Air circuits were up and some traffic copied. Various plane sightings and air raid alerts as usual. No activity of any great importance was noted. IWOJIMA air activity much quieter since TG58.1 no longer in that vicinity.

26 June.

Coverage: Same as that on 25 June.

Activity as on 25 June. Two contact attack messages (TO TO TO), were copied from enemy planes on (7835 J). It was believed that these attacks were against surface units in the SAIPAN area.

27 June.

Arrive ENIWETOK.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The frequencies listed below are not identified in the current frequency list or supplement. The identities are as of the day first heard.

<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>IDENTITY</u>	<u>DATE</u>
350 E	Plane (3WAR01) homing	6/19/44
356 E	A.B. (TURI O) homing	6/24/44
454 (J)	Marcus air base homing, recovered from dispatch. Plane to base, "Transmit on a frequency of 454 kcs."	6/24/44
381 E	A.B.--xx call(TURI O) to A.G. Yokosuka, (NAMOHA).	6/24/44
462 E	SBF Chichijima (MONASI) to Maru Fumi, (MIKIKI)	6/24/44
423 E	Kii defense div.(RUORA) of Osaka guard div.--sea frontier(KAMIYO).	6/24/44
1518 M	GD Omiyajima (TAFUTA) to Maru katsuragisan using 3 kana calls	6/12/44
1808 M	Oshima defense div. to Sasebo Naval District--xx call-3 kana.	6/12/44
2112 M	Truk RIMI broadcast	6/11/44
2676 M	BF26 Kau, SBF28, CU24, BF23, CU25, 2k-N calls.	6/20/44
3000 M	Air base 1 Davao, Air base 2, Davao, 1 unident, 2K-N calls.	6/12/44
4360 M	Wake Det. CU6-Det.3 to C.U.5	6/8/44
4710 M	Truk Atoll interisland, K-N calls	4/30/44
5378 M	Unidentified base and planes, N-K-K, N-K-K-N calls.	6/9/44
5500 M	C.U. Palao to carrier, xx call 3K, (AMIWO)	4/24/44
5836 M	BF26 Comdr. A.B. Daru, G.B.18, G.D.18-Sorong Det., 3K calls.	4/24/44
6333 M	A.B. Marianas, planes. N-K-K, N-K-K-N	6/12/44
6592 M	N-K-K calls	6/22/44
6879 M	Carrier planes and carrier, used in battle of "East Philippines"	6/19/44
6930 M	A.B. 57, Air bases Marianas, planes. N-K-K, N-K-K-N calls.	6/11/44
7044 M	A.B.57, Air bases Marianas, N-K-K, N-K-K-N calls	6/11/44
7065 M	Base and plane, N-K-K, N-K-K-N calls	6/17/44
7140 M	Base and planes, N-K-K, N-K-K-N calls	6/21/44
7205 M	Comm. force comdr. to C. U. 4-det.2 3 K calls	4/16/44
7527 M	Palao Broadcast, "IRA"	6/10/44
8372 M	A.B. (5KERI) unident, planes, N-KK, N-K-K-N calls.	6/15/44

089

TOP SECRET

MATERIEL

This unit has 2 HALLICRAFTER model SX28 receivers, 1 HALLICRAFTER model SX32, 1 HALLICRAFTER model RBK and 1 HALLICRAFTER HQL20 (Navy model RBG) as original equipment. A type RBL, low frequency receiver has been borrowed from the ship. The receivers have been checked over and are performing satisfactorily now, but it is expected that with two more months of continuous operation, replacements or expert attention will be required. Antennas are the same as those used by the ships radio and are generally satisfactory. The RIP-5 machines are all still usable but are badly in need of expert adjustment. As much as could be done to repair them has been done.

FFS 1/16/44

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~.

28 September 1944

Memorandum for Officer-in-Charge GX.

1. Enclosed is a list of measured frequencies heard by the Radio Intelligence Unit attached to Commander Second Carrier Task Force August 29 - September 28.
2. It is assumed most of these frequencies are already known and information is submitted largely as matter of form.
3. Lack of tools has handicapped traffic and crypto-analysis during this period. No report on these activities is enclosed.

*File this with
Task Force Reports.
JAH*

Respectfully Submitted

E. B. Beath Lt(jg) USNR

E. B. Beath

NSA Technical Liaison
 5-41845AV Copy
 In Reply, please refer to this file
 when no longer needed

SEPT. 28, 1944

THIS IS A LIST OF FREQUENCIES THAT WERE HEARD BY THIS UNIT THAT WERE NOT LISTED IN OUR FREQUENCY BOOK:

FREQUENCY	HEARD	CALLED	DATE
(84603) → 8460M	MANILA (TO WI HI I) DAVAO (KO SA U I)	DAVAO MANILA	9 / 44
→ 6117M	UNIDENTS (MI NO / SU KE)	(SU KE / MI NO)	9 / 44
6050M	BALIKAPAPAN BASE FORCE 22 UNIDENT (MI FU WE YO)		9 / 44
7372M	BASE FORCE #26 (WO HA HE 6)	XXXXX (WE 0 N)	9 / 44
6679M	MANILA (BC) (O YU ME YO)	GENERAL CALL	X 9 / 44
6867M	UNIDENTS WO NE HI 6 HI HA A FU RI MI RE YO NE TO WE 3 MA N TE 3		9 / 44
7313M	UNIDENTS (MI NO / MI I)	(MI NO / MI I)	9 / 44
6503M	PHILIPPINE AREA AIR BASES (K K N CALLS)		9 / 44
(64625) → 6470M	MANILA (SA NU SE 7) LKT STA PULPAN (KA RA 40-9) RE KI SO 7 (LEGASPI) UNIDENTIFIED AIR BASE CEBU ? (KU WA YO 7)	(ALL WORK MANILA)	9 / 44
5792M	POSI LKT STA HALMAHERA LKT STA BASE FORCE #26 KAU WAJAMILI LKT STA MESA LKT STA MOROTAI UNIDENTS (LEKA NI 2 / FU RE TA 1 / I WO WO FU)	(ALL WORK B.F. 26 KAU)	9 / 44
→ 5440M	MANILA SAMA	SAMA MANILA	9 / 44

FREQUENCY	HEARD	CALLED	DATE
6252M	UNIDENTIFIED AIR BASE (NU RU TO 4) PLANE (I KE SA E I)		9 / 44
6707M	UNIDENTS (K K N CALLS)		9 / 44
7047M	PHILIPPINE AREA AIR BASES PLANES SPECIAL AIR BASE CALLS		9 / 44
3844M	UNIDENTS (KU I A I / TE KI YO 6)		9 / 44
4045M	TOKYO TAKAO 2nd AIR FLEET CINC	(WORK EACH OTHER)	9 / 44
5337M	MANILA (LOCAL) (NA SE / BC)	(WORKING ALL SHIPS IN (MANILA AREA)	9 / 44
7948M	MANILA DAVAO CEBU GUARD DIV. 33 UNIDENT(WO SA MI KO)	(WORK EACH OTHER)	9 / 44
7623M	UNIDENTS (SA YO / SA FU)		9 / 44
8800M	UNIDENTS (K K N CALLS)		9 / 44
4309M	NORTH CELEBES FORCE COMDR. UNIDENTS(RI NO MO 3/ NE WI NU FU)		9 / 44
5037M	UNIDENTS (NE 8 / A2)		9 / 44
5415M	UNIDENTS (HI YO SU I / KA KO KA HI / KA KE O FU)		9 / 44
5428M	AIR BASE NAHA AIR BASE SHINCHIKU		9 / 44
4618M	WX. UNIT 3 DETACHMENT MANILA	RU TE FU 5	9 / 44
6531M	AIR BASE DAVAO	AIR GROUP 955	9 / 44
8610M	SPECIAL AIR BASE CALLS		9 / 44

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

11/44

Info GT
GXT *III*

John

From: Oinc, FRUPAC Unit, Staff Comcardiv One.

To: Oinc, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit

Subject: Operations of FRUPAC Unit, Report of.

Enclosures: (a) Report of operations of Frupac Unit attached to Staff of Comcardiv One.
(b) Radio Logs and traffic.

1. Enclosures (a) and (b) are herewith forwarded.

Respectfully submitted

Robert A. Wilson LT.(i.g.)
Oinc, FRUPAC Unit, Staff Comcardiv 1.

Rep

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IN REPLY
REFER TO:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FROM: OinC FRUPAC Unit, Staff Comcardiv One. 11/44

To: OinC U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Operations of FRUPAC Unit, Report of.

1. The period covered by this report is from 16 November to 26 January. During this period the objective was a continuing attrition of the Japanese Air, Naval, and Merchant Marine forces as well as the destruction of land installations. This attrition was projected to weaken the Japanese military organization in the Philippine Islands and the approaches thereto in support of the developing land offensive by army forces in the Philippines.
2. This RI unit made its contribution again almost entirely during the approach, assault, and retirement phases of the actual operations. Our efforts at these periods were concentrated upon ascertaining the time at which the enemy detected the presence and position of the Blue forces, the time at which Orange counter-measures were ordered and, when possible, the detection of enemy planes approaching the Blue forces through interception of aircraft traffic and, more particularly, of tactical aircraft signals. The assault upon enemy objectives was made from a position relatively close to them. This fact, plus the familiar tricks of atmospheric, made "signal strength" very thin evidence upon which to base judgments that enemy planes were approaching the disposition.
3. This unit, has, in nearly every case, intercepted the despatches which carried grid positions locating this force. The Manila Broadcast proved a very useful source of intelligence until it faded from the traffic picture. Grids usually appeared on it within a short time after their origin. The despatch ordering Orange counter-measures usually appeared on the Broadcast shortly thereafter, and could usually be detected. At this point coverage of the Broadcast lost its importance and coverage of air frequencies- in particular 5135J in the Philippines Area- became the subject of concentration for this unit.
4. The discovery of the tactical air frequencies employed in a given area presents difficulties to the small RI units with the Fleet, particularly in the initial strikes on that area. The evidence which identifies a frequency as one employed tactically appears only briefly on the air and only during tactical situations. For this reason

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Subject: Operations of FRUPAC Unit, Report of. (continued)

the tactical air frequency employed by the enemy in a new theatre of operations can easily be missed for a considerable period of time. The Major value of The RI unit to the Command at this stage in Radio Intelligence derives from the intelligence gained from these tactical air frequencies. I strongly urge that evidence gained at _____, Makalapa, and _____ with reference to tactical air frequencies be sent to the Fleet RI units as soon as possible. In the "Gratitude" operation in the South China Sea and particularly in the strike against Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques we had no information on tactical air frequencies. Since it occasioned no vigorous enemy air reaction I presume that such information is not now available at Frupac. The point I wish to make is that in these initial operations against an area we are operating somewhat blindly. It may well be that the Empire is one of the agenda for carrier operations. In that event it will be vital for us to know at the earliest possible moment the tactical air frequencies and, if possible, the units employing them. It may well be, that we will discover them for ourselves, but, in any event, any help which FRUPAC can send us in this regard will be extremely welcome.

5. In my opinion there is room for doubt as to the practicability of the small RI unit of one officer and four men when the Empire becomes the target of carrier operations. The consolidation of all personnel into a smaller number of much larger units will, in my opinion, come nearer to meeting the complex problem of frequency coverage in empire waters. Carrier strikes against the Empire will, of necessity, be launched from positions well within range of many enemy air bases. Unless it develops that one or two frequencies become the tactical air channels for the empire area, the RI units as now constituted will not be adequate to meet the problem.

GR

6. William F. Miller Rm2/c has been advanced to Rm1/c, such advancement to become effective on 1 February, 1945. *OK*

GS

7. This unit has been ordered to report to Comcardiv #5 for duty. Please alter mailing addresses accordingly.

Haddock →

Dose *WJ*

Respectfully submitted,

Robert A. Wilson LT (A-9)
Oinc, Frupac Unit, Comcardiv #1.

FB2-1/367/dp

18 November 1944.

From: Officer-in-Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Commander
Carrier Division ONE.
To : Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Report.
Enclosure: (A) Radio Intelligence Report.
(B) Radio Logs and Traffic.

1. Submitted herewith is the report of the Radio
Intelligence Unit attached to the Staff of Commander Carrier
Division ONE.

—
Respectfully submitted,

R. A. Wilson

R.A. WILSON,
Lieut(jg), USNR.

REPORT OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT
STAFF, COMCARDIV ONE

THIS REPORT CONSIST OF THIS COVER PAGE AND
PAGES 1-6 inclusive

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORT

This unit was assigned to Commander Carrier Division Number One and reported aboard the Flagship on 28 August (East longitude), the day prior to sortie upon the operation termed, Stalemate II, ~~Stalemate I~~ ~~having been the first carrier-based strike on Palau.~~

The Koo 7 call list was abandoned by the enemy shortly after setting up operations, leaving the Unit embarrassingly little with which to work. Little of intelligence value could be accomplished by the Unit during the approach phase of the strike against Palau. Coverage of Palau circuits indicated that we were undetected, and the surprise achieved by the airforce in the first strike bore this out.

Little of intelligence value was achieved by this Unit during the strikes against the Philippines prior to D-day in the Stalemate II operation. No grids were copied and the absence of call identities made impossible any sound conclusions regarding enemy reactions.

|| The recent operations leading to the landing in the Central Philippines were termed King II, King I having been the U.S. Army operation against Morotai. This Unit has been of somewhat more use during this operation, although there is ample room for serious doubts as to the future usefulness of R.I. Units afloat. As offensive operations proceed out of the area which was charged as , primarily, the responsibility of the Japanese Navy and moves into an area where the Japanese Army assumes great importance, the lack of training in army radio procedures becomes a limiting factor in the work of the R.I. Unit afloat. During the King II operation many grids were copied, often indicating enemy air contact with the task force. On the whole the work of the R.I. Unit during this operation has been little more than an auxiliary aircraft warning system. The activation of the Japanese Fleet tactical frequency was noted during the morning of 24 October, but prior to that time the Japanese Fleet had been well-reported by blue aircraft and submarines and was already under air attack by the carrier-based airforce.

|| Little analysis of traffic has been possible due to the call-identity situation. Recent advices indicate that this may continue for some time to be the case. In any event I believe that the Pacific War will progress to a point at which the little remaining justification for the existence of R.I. Units afloat will have been dissipated. This point does not seem far distant.

Respectfully submitted,

R. A. Wilson LT. (j.g.) USNR
R.A. Wilson Lt. (j.g.) USNR

Roy

FREQUENCY REPORT

New frequencies for the month of September, 1944

KCS	CALL	IDENTS
4510 M		Makassar Broadcast (NEKI)
5723 M	KOSAUI ROFUMOØ WOMIMO7 KEIRO7	Davao Comm Unit Palao Comm Unit
6175M	WARIWEØ YAYAIYO YUKUNA1 WEMAMO7 WEEKUFU	Yokosuka Comm Unit Miyakishima Lkt. Oshima Lkt.
6379 M	ENENO2 NEKEMO8	G.D. 46, Yap Palao C.U.-blank Det.
6385 M	UEU4 ROFUMOØ	B.F. 30-Palao Palao Comm Unit
794Ø M	TOWIHII KOSAUI YOREKAYO	Manila Comm Unit Davao Comm Unit G.D. 33- Tawi Tawi
8137 M	SEREHO2 TATOKA Ø	Shimushu Comm Unit Ominato Comm Unit
8488 M	TOWIHII KOSAUI	Manila Comm Unit Davao Comm Unit
9728 M	TOWIHII KOSAUI	Manila Comm Unit Davao Comm Unit
9764 M	KUWAYO7 KOSAUI TOWIHII	G.D. 36- Cebu Davao comm Unit Manila Comm Unit

New frequencies for the month of October, 1944

KCS	CALL	IDENT
3743 M	WOWINFU KATASI4	Yokosuka Comm Unit--Hatsugoe Det. All ships-stations Sasebo Comm Zone
3755 M	KKN	
376ø M	WOWINFU NNI6	Yokosuka C.U. --Hatsugoe Det.
423ø M	TOWIHII KOSAU1 HIOFU6 MURUKOFU	Manila C.U. Davao C.U. Bacolod Air Base Cebu
4745 M	TOWIHII MIKEHI2 KAHENO5 KUUWI3	Manila C.U. Cinc 2 Air fleet Takao C.U. Kanoya Air Base
5ø4ø M	KN	
5ø6ø M	KKN	
5174 M	HINAWAI KEYUHO6 WEHAHO3 KONISEMI KKN KNKN	Shinchiku Air Base Takao Air Group Tainan Air Group Special A/B A/C calls
5934 M	NKKN	Special A/B A/C calls
6115 M	AWON2 OWEROI NUAFUI WONEHIMI	ni STA A.B. Okinawa Ambon C.U. 607 "0"
692ø	ROFUWO5 YUWCSI8	Patrol Unit Eastern Ocean-5th Fleet
7ø35 M	KKN	
718ø M	KCSAU1	Davao C.U. B/C (TAU)
724ø M	KCSAU1	Davao C.U. B/C/ (TAU)
7478 M	IMWEI KNKN	Yokosuka Air Group Special A/B A/C calls
785ø M	TAFUSEHI MIYUTE7	

New frequencies for October, 1944

KCS	CALL	IDENT
846ø		Same as 423ø M
1ø17ø M	KKN	
25ø5ø M	SUNISA9	Tokyo B/C
29866 M	SUNISA9 WITANAø	Tokyo C.U. Shanghai special landing force.
3499ø M	OKUO8 SUNISA9	Singapore C.U. Tokyo C.U.

New frequencies during period 1 Nov.--15 November

KCS	CALL	IDENT
3251 M	KKN	Cinc 1st Air Fleet
3623 M	KURUS14 WAEKO5	
446ø M	KKN	
4684 M	KKN	
579ø M	KKN	A.B. #333, Comairflot 23
6515 M	KAHENO5 MERUKEø	Takao G.U.
6575 M	KKN	A.G. 453
729ø M	KKN	Kisaratsu A.B., Ominato G.D. Cinc, Kasumigaura Air group, Navy Minister
7799 M	RUMARI4 TCWIHII	Philippines Force Manila C.U.
1ø175 M	AFUHE2 WARIWEø UCø1	

CALLS (ORIGINATING AND ADDRESSED) DURING PERIOD 24-27 October on 791ø KCS.

24th
 TAWE4
 SONO7
 SIRO6
 KOR01
 WEW07
 SON7
 KOYU2
 TUMU9

25th
 RIHE
 NNO
 RAMO
 ISI
 TOMI
 YUWA
 NUTE
 KEHO
 NERE
 HANE
 NEMI
 NISO
 KIA

ENE6
 SAMI5
 INU7
 SIRE2
 KENE6
 KAN2
 KOMO9
 IRO3
 KOWO5
 SEMA1
 KON9
 TIFU6
 URI5
 TUTO5
 TIRI1
 KIWA9
 SEMO3
 KAREø

26th
 RAMO
 NERE
 NUTE
 IHA6
 KEWE3

27th
 SONI3
 RITOø
 EMO7

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

3 December, 1944

From: KNOTTS, Stanley Richard, CRM.
To : Officer in charge, Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Via : Comdr. G. M. Slonim

SUBJECT: Intercept Activities For Month Ending 31 October, 1944, of The
FRUPAC Unit Assigned For Duty With Comdr. Third Fleet, Report of.

1. The personnel of this unit is as follows:

Comdr. G. M. Slonim, Officer in Charge

KNOTTS, S. R., CRM
ESCH, G. P. RMLc
SCHAEFFER, C. H., RMLc
KNEHLAND, C. E., RMLc
McCAULEY, H. M., RM2c
BARKER, J. L., RM2c

2. This report will be divided into three sections as follows:

- I CHRONOLOGY
- II FREQUENCIES
- III OPERATING SIGNALS

Stanley Richard Knotts
Signed: Stanley Richard Knotts, CRM

G. M. Slonim
Approved: G. M. Slonim, Comdr., USN

Enclosure "A" to FRUPAC's serial Z-3722 dated 13 Dec. 1944

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I CHRONOLOGY

1. Becoming more familiar with Army circuits, procedure and types of traffic, more time is now being devoted to army air circuits. As time goes on, these circuits are yielding more information.
 2. Japanese Army air frequencies and procedure signals will be listed separately, but no attempt will be made to give a separate daily coverage report.
- Oct. 1st Activity was very light and only seven frequencies were heard, including 7045J, 8609M, 8705J, 9045J, 5835M, 7990J and 8572J. The only activity of importance to us was on 7045J. It will be noted that 8572J has been brought up again, but so far the stations on this circuit have been drilling. Local coverage was derived from the Manila broadcast. The K08 call KOROM05 was tentatively identified as a Canton Area activity, through plane sighting reports.
- Oct. 2nd A greater quantity of air frequencies were heard this date, twelve in all, but the activity on each was light. Those frequencies heard were 9045J, 8609M, 7045J, 6740J, 6580J, 8044M, 8572J, 6130J, 7095J, 6535J, and 6840M. One position grid was received from the carrier frequency 6580J, but the grid would not fit and the circuit was obviously drilling. Bases and Planes on 8572J continued to drill also. On 8044M a plane was heard working and exchanging signal strength with a Jerk (SATEK04). In addition to the Orange Naval frequencies covered, traffic was copied from Army bases and planes on 6620M, 6850M and 7150M. The KK call NOKO is tentatively identified as Air Base Oita.
- Oct. 3rd Air frequencies heard were numerous, but the actual activity on the individual frequencies was limited. Those frequencies heard were 6535J, 9045J, 5835M, 8609M, 7045J, 7153M, 8705J, 7435M, 5935J and 6929M. The majority of these frequencies were drilling. The Army air frequencies 7150M and 6850M were also copied. Continue coverage of the Manila broadcast.
- Oct. 4th Due to extremely adverse weather conditions (typhoon here), air activity was poor with largely bases heard on those frequencies copied. The air frequencies covered were 7990J, 8305A, 7045J, 6535J, 9045J, 8705J, 5715J and 8630J. In addition, the Army air frequencies 6850M, 7150M and 7304J were copied. Many weather requests were received and the weather net on 6160M was observed to be quite active.
- Oct. 5th Air activity continued light, possibly due to adverse weather conditions, reflected by numerous weather requests on the air frequencies. Eight Naval air frequencies were heard, including 9045J, 7045J, 8572J, 8609M, 8680A, 6535J, 7990J and 6580J, but there was not much doing on any of these. Army air circuits

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I CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

- Oct. 5th (continued) heard were 7150M, 6850M and 7304J. One Army plane on 7304J was apparently lost and was requesting both weather and bearings from the base. Four hours later the base was heard giving him landing instructions in plain language. The K08 call YUTEMIMI is tentatively identified as Guardiv 44 at Woleai.
- Oct. 6th Phillipines area air circuits were busy throughout the day, with major stress on 7045J. Those frequencies heard were 7045J, 5835M, 8609M, 9045J, 8305A, 7140A and 7153M. Two air bases on 7045J entered into a prolonged and heated argument over a call identification, in which numerous BAKA's were hurled with great abandon and some plain language used. Army air coverage was on 7150M, 6850M and 7304J, with good activity on these. The Manila broadcast was copied for local coverage.
- Oct. 7th Naval air activity was very light with only four frequencies copied, including 6920J, 8609M, 8705J and 7045J, the latter being the most active. Better results were obtained from Army air circuits, although traffic received from these was light. The Army air circuits covered were 5835M, 6035M, 6850M, 7150M and 7304J. A number of weather requests were sent, reflecting the adverse weather conditions prevailing.
- Oct. 8th Twelve Naval air and four Army air frequencies were copied, with fair activity on most. The Naval air frequencies covered were 8705J, 7158M, 6580J, 7990J, 6535J, 5715J, 8315M, 8332J, 7095J, 7045J, 8305A and 8609M. Principal attention was given to the last five mentioned, as they were in the area desired. The Army air frequencies copied were 7304J, 6850M, 7150M and 6620M. Local frequencies in the Naha area were covered, in anticipation of our strike in that area and to discover whether we had been sighted by any small craft. On this date Manila was heard broadcasting NASE numbers on 2662M. Air base Oita definitely compromised his KK call NOKO on 6535J.
- Oct. 9th Seventeen Naval and six Army air frequencies were heard this date. The Naval air frequencies included 7870J, 7110J, 7990J, 8630J, 7580M, 8705J, 8572J, 5715J, 6440M, 7835J, 7045J, 6115J, 8609M, 6740J, 8332J, 5835M and 8305A. The last eight frequencies mentioned were given primary coverage as representative of the area desired. 6115J has been inactive for some time and when last heard was used by Air Base Harushima. However, these signals were quite strong and obviously in the Naha area - send: much contact traffic which was apparently drill, since positions given were not good. Army air frequencies covered were 6035M, 6620M, 7304J, 6850M, 7150M and 3905M.

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~~SECRET~~

I CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

- Oct. 10th Air activity continued heavy with thirteen Naval and five Army air frequencies copied. The Naval air frequencies included 4007M, 6285M, 8705J, 9045J, 6740J, 7095J, 8609M, 8305A, 8332J, 6115J and 7045J. Of these, principal attention was given to 7095J, 8609M, and 7045J, as representative of the area desired. The Army air frequencies copied were 3160M, 6055M, 6850M, 7150M and 7304J. 4007M is a new frequency with Air Group 953 as the control. The indicator TATA2 may be used for this frequency as Air Group 953 told his planes on 7095J to set watch on TATA2 and then came up on 4007M. What appeared to be a new ComSubRon 11 frequency was heard on 7673M, using single kana calls with SI being the control and calling many units. The traffic and contacts would tend to place SI at Naha or in that area. ~~Our planes sank or damaged a number of subs in our strikes, which would account for this flurry of activity.~~ *Emg.*
- Oct. 11th Air activity remains heavy with seventeen Naval and four Army air frequencies heard. The Naval air frequencies included 7835J, 8305A, 8332J, 6865M, 6535J, 9045J, 7045J, 8609M, 8705J, 5835M, 8320J, 6740J, 5875M, 7875J, 7140A, 7990J and 7095J. Of these frequencies, principal attention was given to 7835J, 8305A, 7045J, 5835M, 6740J and 7095J as giving the best picture of the situation. The Army air frequencies copied were 6850M, 7150M, 7304J and 6620M. The most notable feature in the days coverage was the number of weather requests.
- Oct. 12th Air activity was extremely heavy this date, with seventeen Naval and five Army air frequencies up, most of which were quite active. The Naval air frequencies copied were 5337J, 3057M, 6115J, 7835J, 8332J, 8609M, 5835M, 7045J, 7045M, 8705J, 5935J, 6084M, 8305A, 7095J, 8572J, 9045J and 5165J, with most attention devoted to the first eight mentioned. Planes of Air Group 901, TOKO detachment on 5337J sighted our force at 0255 and started sending grids. At 1555 we picked up 6115J sending many grids and contacts. This frequency had previously been used for drill but at this time the grids were good and the signals so loud that it was obvious they were not drilling. This frequency was used by the planes for the subsequent sea/air battle. At 2300 they brought up 3057M as night frequency for 6115J. On 7310M Air Base Kanoya referred to 6115J as (ISA 10). Air Group Toyohashi, Air Group Naha and others were also working on 6115J using K08 calls, but it was not believed that any connection existed between the circuits. An Army plane on 7150M sent an aircraft warning signal followed by TETETETE. On 5337J TOKO detachment of Air Group 901 compromised his secret call HE0.

I CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

- Oct. 13th Covered twelve Naval and two Army air circuits this date. The Naval air circuits included 6115J, 3057M, 5337J, 8332J, 6580J, 6740J, 7835J, 8609M, 8705J, 7115M, 7045J and 7095J, while the Army circuits covered were 7150M and 7304J. Most of our attention was devoted to 6115J, 3057M, 5337J, 7835J, and 7095J, as being of primary interest. Activity on 6115J/3057M from the 12th continued on with diminishing intensity, until 0400 this date. Then at 1545 those frequencies again became active for continued attacks on our forces, until 2100. 7835J was apparently used as a secondary frequency and one plane on that channel sighted enemy ships 142 miles from Takao on a bearing of 080 degrees, at 1500. Coverage was started on CINC 2nd Air Fleet frequency 7310M, in lieu of the broadcast.
- Oct. 14th On this date copied fourteen Naval and two Army air frequencies. The Naval air frequencies were 5337J, 3057M, 6115J, 7045J, 5935J, 8609M, 8305A, 8705J, 5570M, 8630J, 6740J, 7835J, 5835M and 7095J, while the Army air frequencies copied were 7150M, and 7304J. Principal coverage was on 5337J, 3057M, 6115J, 8305A, 5570M and 7835J. 5570M is a new Phillipines area air frequency. 6115J opened up at 1655 and the attack signal was received at 1840. Coverage was maintained on 7310M instead of the Manila broadcast.
- Oct. 15th Seventeen Naval and three Army air frequencies were heard, with the Naval air including 3057M, 6115J, 7045J, 6740J, 6580J, 9045J, 8609M, 8705J, 8305A, 5835M, 5570M, 7990J, 9080J, 7865M, 7113M, 2980M, 8315M and 7835J, while the Army frequencies were 6850M, 7150M and 7304J. Principal attention was given to 3057M, 6115J, 7045J and 7835J. Activity on 3057M/6115J carried over from the 14th continued until 0300 and thereafter was unheard. Then 7835J took over the burden of the activity. Continued coverage of 7310M in lieu of broadcast.
- Oct. 16th Air activity hit a new high this date, with twenty Naval and three Army air frequencies heard. However, quite a few of these frequencies were drilling. Those frequencies heard were 5337J, 5715J, 7045J, 7038M, 8305A, 8609M, 6740J, 6995M, 6115J, 3057M, 9080J, 7990J, 7835J, 8572J, 9045J, 5935J, 6082M, 8630J, 6928M and 8705J. Of these, principal attention was given to 3057M, 6115J, 8609M, 6995M, 7835J and 8630J, as being most representative of the area desired. The Army air frequencies were 6454M, 7304J, and 7150M. 3057M/6115J came up at 1030 and were active for the attack on our forces at 2300. Planes appeared at widely separated intervals on 6995M, sending grids which were repeated both by the Manila broadcast and by CINC 2nd Air Fleet on 7310M. CINC 2nd Air Fleet referred to its night frequency 3654M as (A091). Resumed partial copy of the Manila broadcast in order to be certain of having the proper air coverage.

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I CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

- Oct. 17th Air activity started falling off, with only twelve Naval and three Army air frequencies heard. The Naval air frequencies included 6115J, 7030M, 7990J, 8305A, 7045J, 5835M, 8705J, 9045J, 6740J, 6920J, 9080J and 7835J. The Army air frequencies were 7304J, 7150M and 6850M. 6115J was relatively inactive and 7835J carried the burden of the activity. One plane on 7835J sighted enemy ships at 0820 bearing 088 degrees from Manila at 140 miles. Other air frequencies watched closely were 8305A, and 7045J. Resumed full time copy of the Manila broadcast this date.
- Oct. 18th Air activity continued to fall off with only eight Naval and two Army air frequencies heard. The Naval air frequencies were 8305A, 5935J, 6995M, 6740J, 5337J, 7835J, 7045J and 8609M, with primary attention given to the last three mentioned. The Army air frequencies heard were 6850M and 7150M. Continued coverage of the Manila broadcast and also partial coverage of the CINC 2nd Air Fleet frequency 7310M. Quite a few requests for aviation weather were noted.
- Oct. 19th Air coverage was lower than usual this date, due to concentration on a few more important frequencies. Very little attention is being given to Army air frequencies at this time, as they have shown no evidence of participating in attacks. Those air frequencies covered included 6740J, 7875J, 6250J, 6995M, 8305A, 9045J, 5337J, 7045J, 8609M and 7835J, with primary attention given to the last three mentioned. Planes on 7835J sighted our ships at 0810.
- Oct. 20th Only six air frequencies were covered this date, including 5337J, 7835J, 7045J, 6740J, 6995M and 8305A. Of these, most time was put in copying 7045J and 7835J. Some copy was made of Army air circuits on 6850M and 7150M, and several Phillipines local circuits were covered in addition to the broadcast.
- Oct. 21st Seven air frequencies were copied this date, including 8305A, 7045J, 8609M, 7835J, 8705J, 7990J and 9045J, devoting most time to the first four mentioned which were of the most interest. One Army air circuit on 6620M was copied for a while. Planes on 7835J again sighted our ships at 0930. Continue coverage of local circuits.
- Oct. 22nd Air activity increased somewhat, with nine frequencies heard, but several of these were drilling. Those frequencies heard were 8305A, 7045J, 7013M, 7835J, 8620M, 5337J, 6865M, 7095J, and 9045J, with 8305A, 7045J and 7835J receiving the closest coverage. 8620M is a new measurement of 8609M. Some copy was also made of the Army air circuits on 6850M, 7150M and 7304J. On 6462J a Phillipines lookout station sent a short service message as follows: I"NA (5895) - confirming this as a Japanese frequency.

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I CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

- Oct. 23rd Activity on the air frequencies started building up again, with fourteen frequencies heard, including 7045J, 8305A, 8105J, 6740J, 8620M, 8572J, 7030M, 6920J, 8332J, 7835J, 5337J, 8725J, 6865M and 8880A. However, quite a few of these frequencies were drill. Primary attention was devoted to the frequencies in our area, namely 7045J, 8305A, 8620M and 7835J. The unit TORONOI (still unidentified) and planes on 7045J made reference to the indicator (KUREØ22) and (KUREØ42), neither of which were identified here. Davao was heard broadcasting TAU numbers on 7218M.
- Oct. 24th Air frequencies were very active this date and practically all of the thirteen frequencies heard were sending good traffic. Those frequencies heard were 5337J, 5770M, 8620M, 8320J, 6920J, 7045J, 6865M, 5135M, 7218M, 5715J, 7835J, 8305A and 9045J. The major frequency used by the enemy for today's attack was 5135M, but five others, namely 5570M, 6865M, 6920J, 7218M and 7835J were tied in with 5135M, having the same bases. These secondary frequencies were used largely by snooper planes for reporting sightings. The actual attack was started about 1730. A plane on 7218M sighted our forces at 0150 and sent a grid, but we splashed him before the base was able to receive it. Again at 0320 a plane using the same frequency spotted us and sent another grid, but met the same fate as his predecessor. However, at 0540 a plane working on 5570M had better luck and managed to get his through. Later sightings were reported by planes on 6920J at 0752 and on 6865M at 0855, as well as many on 5135M. In addition to these air frequencies and the Manila broadcast, this group also covered 3955J/7910J in view of possible fleet action. A number of units were heard operating on those frequencies. Unidentified stations were up using voice on 5135M, saying something that sounded like "Kaku kochirawa shinkō", repeating each word several times.
- Oct. 25th Only ten air frequencies were heard this date, but probably all of these were sending good traffic rather than drilling. Those frequencies heard included 5135M, 5570M, 8620M, 6865M, 7218M, 8725J, 7095J, 7870J, 8305A and 7990J. Most careful attention was given to the first five mentioned, as the important data was derived from these. It is believed that 6865M is actually the carrier frequency 6865J. 3955J/7910J were also closely watched for fleet units.
- Oct. 26th Only five air frequencies were heard, but at least four of these were quite active and were copied throughout the day. These frequencies were 8705J, 5135M, 7045J, 5570M and 7212M. 5135M was the more active and received the most attention. 3955J/7910J were still watched closely for fleet units.
- Oct. 27th The pressure was not so heavy this date and while ten air freqs. were heard, only three of these were operational. Those freqs. heard were 7045J, 8332J, 7212M, 5570M, 7095J, 8705J, 8620M,

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I CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

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- Oct. 27th (continued) 9045J, 5135M and 7212M, the latter three being operational. Activity on 3955J/7910J died off.
- Oct. 28th Air activity was normal today, with seven frequencies heard, including 7218M, 5135M, 5570M, 8705J, 8305A, 7045J and 7095J. Of these, 5135M, 5570M and 7045J received primary attention. The Maru Kinkai was up on 8291M using the commercial call JDUZ and calling JOR. This may be a high measurement of 8280J.
- Oct. 29th Air activity continues normal, with seven air frequencies heard including 5135M, 5570M, 7045J, 8305A, 8620M, 8705J and 7865M. The first three mentioned received primary attention as they yielded the information desired.
- Oct. 30th There was considerable activity on 5135M arising out of enemy attacks on our forces at Leyte, as well as on our fueling task forces. Many grids and contacts were received. Besides 5135M, copy was also made on 7045J, 8305A, 8620M, 5570M and 8332J, all being in the area desired. Some attention was given to Army air frequencies and 6850M was copied for a short time, but no operational frequencies were heard.
- Oct. 31st Eleven air frequencies were heard today, but only four of these were regarded of any importance to us. Those frequencies heard were 8620M, 6740J, 8725J, 9045J, 8705J, 7865M, 5337J, 8305A, 5135M, 5570M and 7045J, of which the latter four were considered most important. In addition, some coverage was given to Army air circuits on 7150M, 7050M and 6850M. Local coverage was obtained from the Manila broadcast.

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II FREQUENCIES

1. Orange Naval Frequencies.

(a) These include frequencies found since the last report was compiled and while they will probably duplicate the findings of other stations, they are submitted for whatever they may be worth.

- 2417M ✓ Singapore Comm. Unit to A.B. Kuching and All S-S C. U. 1ø zone.
- 2574M KKN calls - Drill.
- 2662M ✓ Manila broadcasting NASE numbers to collective call.
- 2980M Drill air freq. KKN calls - Use both Army and Navy procedure.
- 3050M ✓ Base Force 22 Balikpapan and unidents.
- 3065M Air Base Oita and Air Base Kagoshima.
- 3164M ✓ Air Base Kanoya, Air Group Oita, Air Group Omura, Air Base Katori and Air Base Kagoshima
- 4097M Air Group 953, Air Group 381 and others. (Indicator: TATA2)?
- 3639M ✓ Unident. 3 kana calls - unfit KO7 list - Naval traffic & procedure
- 3690M KEN drill in Phillipines area.
- 3725M ✓ CINC 2nd Air Fleet broadcast to B.A.F.#6 (see also 7440M).
- 4345M Single kana calls (perhaps Army).
- 4603M KK calls - unidentified.
- 4675M ✓ Miyakishimo lookout station and others.
- 5135M ✓ Phillipines area bases and planes. Special Air Base Calls.
- 5570M Phillipines area bases and planes. Special Air Base Calls.
- 5799M Unident. KKN calls - Phillipines area.
- 5831M Karenko Air Base working Sangalla B.F. 21 and others.
- 5895J ✓ (by compromise) Phillipines lookouts.
- 5913M KKN calls in Phillipines area (maybe hi for 5895J).
- 6000M KK and KN calls

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II FREQUENCIES (CONTINUED)

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- 6040M ✓ Base Force 23 Radio station to Guard Div. 4 and collective.
- 6065M ✓ Takao EWA broadcast.
- 6084M Drill air freq. KN, KKN and KNN calls.
- 6285M Unident. Bases and planes. Spec. A B calls.
- 6342M ✓ Air Group Omura to B.A.F. #6 (indicator - A93)?
- 6440M Drill Air freq. Spec. A. B. Calls - planes.
- 6739M K and KN calls.
- 6862M Air Base 52 Iwojima to unidents.
- 6841M ✓ K and KN calls.
- 6975M Ship to shore (Maru Banshu #51 heard).
- 6995M ✓ Bases and planes. Spec. A B calls in Formosa area. Also Air Group Sasebo and planes.
- 7038M Unident. KKN and KN calls - drill air freq.
- 7115M ✓ Unident. KKN calls. Send air type traffic. Drill.
- 7212M ✓ Davao TAU broadcast.
- 7218M ✓ Bases and planes in Phillipines/Formosa area - Spec. A B calls.
- 7440M ✓ CINC 2nd Air Fleet ATU broadcast to B.A.F.#6 (see also 3725M).
- 7673M ✓ Single kana calls. Believe this is ComSubron 11 frequency.
- 7910M ✓ ^{MUNOSE} YUSE weather broadcast. (Apparently at Manila).
- 8291M ✓ Maru Kinkai to JOR, using commercial call JDUZ.
- 8615M ✓ Ident. as Ship or command in the China Sea Area. One answering frequency for 7838M. Uses both Army and Navy procedure and traffic
- 8620M ✓ KKN call sending UTU numbers to Sub Chaser #17.
- 8635M Unidet. KKN and KNN calls. Control running automatics. Same outfit is on 9210A.
- 8860M KK calls, unident.
- 9745M Three numeral calls, no idents.

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II FREQUENCIES (Continued)

2. Japanese Army frequencies recovered during the period:
- 2280M In Phillipines/Formosa area - not certain is air freq.
 - 6454M Bases and planes in the Formosa area.
 - 6620M Bases and planes in the Phillipines area.
Bases and planes in the Malaya/Indo-China area.
 - 7050M ✓ Bases and planes in the Empire area.

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III OPERATING SIGNALS

1. There follows a list of Orange Naval signals recovered during the period, with classification:

IKO" (IGO) Since or After (B) (Good Jap word).
KAKUHO I have (Do you have?) (Used with grids and in connection with the dropping of flares). (D)
KI"ME Have you been able to contact _____. (D)
KOSEU Damaged. Equipment faulty. (C)
WAMU Am being intercepted by enemy planes. (D)
KA^oHO Inform _____ that I am calling him. (D)
KA^oNI Are you in communication with _____. (D)
SI^oMI Does _____'s message concern me? (D)
SU^oRI I am not in contact with _____. (C)

2. There follows a list of Japanese Army signals recovered during the period, with classification:

TO"RA Unidentified (enemy). (D)
MA (Repeated) Warning signals. (D)
TAME Your bearing will be encoded. (D)/(C)
TOKE All clear. (D)