

SRH- 309

Part 3

PACIFIC OCEAN

MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORTS

1945

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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COM-IRSTOANTASKFORPAC

13 May 1945

Dear Gil,

As you know, we had a couple of kamikaze boys come aboard the Bunker Hill on the 11th. In about 3 seconds our shack was full of dense black fumes, heat, and about 12 officers who were cut off from any other escape. There was a hell of a lot of confusion, and as the fumes were becoming overpowering there was real danger of suffocation. The port-hole was the only way out, and we took it, managing to land safely on a 40mm gun sponson about 12 feet below. Nichols (about the last man to get out) had a pretty narrow escape; if he had not luckily managed to get on his gas mask he would have been done for. Two officers who weren't able to squeeze into our shack in time were found dead in the passageway outside.

I'm happy to report that all RIU personnel ~~is~~ are OK, though somewhat shaken up. Our shack, however was a mess when I was finally able to get back. Water, heat and smoke fumes, plus all the tramping and scrambling had raised hell. The publications were nearly all ruined, but I managed to salvage the Operator's Manual, Freq. List, Grid chart, GZ handbook, plus my Rose-Innes and Kenkyusha dictionaries. Some of them are in poor shape, but all are useable. We were not able to get back into the shack until ~~232233~~ 1445 and had to be ready to leave the ship at 1530. As time was very limited - and also the amount of gear we could take with us * we brought aboard the Enterorise only 2 SX28 and 2 of the best mills. I am borrowing 2 other receivers from the ship and feel sure that we can operate sufficiently well with what we have.

The publications left aboard were bundled together and left in the shack together with the remainder of the materiel. I left one man aboard to take charge of the stuff and to burn the publications under the supervision of the Senior Staff officer remaining aboard the Bunker Hill. I am confident that there was not, and will not be any compromise of security. The materiel (magnetic recorder, RBK, RBC, SX28 etc will be put ashore at Ulithi along with other staff gear and will be under the surveillance of my man and the senior staff officer. I hope to be able to get it about the end of this month.

Incidentally, my room was flooded and filled with fumes, etc., and that whole compartment was cut off, so I have absolutely no personal gear with me. No I.D. card, money, orders or clothing. Even the stuff I have on is borrowed. I am hoping that much of my gear will be salvagable when the staff guys aboard are able to reach the room.

We found that the equipment we brought aboard here had to be worked on before it could be used, and the receivers especially seem to be little damaged. I strongly recommend, however that Beath bring 3 new mills and 2 SX28. (So much of the night air stuff is below 4000 kcs. that our RBC is not of much use.) As I said in my previous letter I am anxious to be relieved as soon as possible. I feel that McCain should start out, if at all possible, with a fresh unit. It seems to me that it would be to everyone's advantage since the extra time involved is so small. New publications and some new materiel will be needed in any case, and I suggest that Beath (or Burd) and at least 3 men be sent along too.

Dins

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(2)

When I was told during my last time at FRUPAC that I was eligible for duty in Washington in April, I turned it down so as to stay with Admiral Mitscher for this cruise. When an Officer or man is attached to a combat unit he expects, and braces himself, to take whatever comes along, be it good or bad. When I and my men reported to CTF58 we felt that way. We knew it might be rugged, but everyone else was taking a chance, so we would too.

When we were hit on the Bunker Hill, several Staff Officers and men were killed, as well as many ships company personnel. Well, the ship was of course unoperational, and so the Staff got off, their job was to keep on, even though the "lucky guys on the ship" (as we thought them) were going back to the States. The Staff, considerably reduced in number, left the Bunker Hill and boarded the Enterprise.

The Kamikazes had hit the flight deck of the Bunker Hill, opposite the island structure. The passage-way outside of the shack was filled with intense heat and fumes. (A Staff Officer was later found dead outside of our shack), Plaum, Nichols, McAleavey and I escaped through our port hole and dropped onto a 40MM sponson about 12 feet below.

Richards was caught below on the 3rd deck aft and had a hell of a time with the fumes down there. Leyden escaped from his quarters (near which the first plane hit) by climbing barefooted over a gun-mount and up the side of the ship to the flightdeck catwalk.

By the time we got aboard the Enterprise everyone on the Staff was pretty well worn out, but none more so than the R.I.U. Chief Richards did a splendid job of rescue work below decks where there were so many suffocation cases, and I was able, (once - I found a pair of shoes to replace the one's I had scraped off getting out of our porthole) to don a gasmask and enter fume filled rooms to get blankets and dry clothes for the wounded. Then we helped push damaged planes out of fire danger on the hanger deck. And then of course when we were able to get back into our shack we had to get our equipment for the Enterprise ready in a very short time.

Although I was exhausted I could not sleep that first night on the Enterprise. For one thing I was worried about the shack which is small, cramped inconvenient and in a very exposed position. Also everytime I closed my eyes I found myself reliving the experiences on the Bunker Hill. I must have climbed through the port at least five times in my sleep. I am sure the others felt much the same.

The next 2 days were spent in routine operation, improving the shack set-up, and arranging for suitable communications between us, Flag Plot and CIC. We were right off Kyushu and plenty nervous. When the bogeys began closing in during the early morning, Nichols, Layden, and I were in the shack, (I'd been up since 0245 as activity was considerable). Plaum and Richards were off watch. McAleavey had won the toss and remained on the Bunker Hill to burn publications and guard the material.

When the Enterprise 5 inches opened up our shack was shaken and the door blown open. The men (and I too) wanted to leave the exposed shack but I thought we should remain, on the off chance of picking up something useful at this late point, until the 40MM opened up. We donned our helmets and flash proof gear and waited, sweating it out. Then we heard the 40MM

FILE

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

1 June 1945.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

My Dear Captain Harper:

Our 280704 recommending relief for Sims and men was sent at the request of Admiral McCain and Admiral Baker, who feel that Sims and his original men are not in condition to perform their duties at maximum efficiency.

As you know, these men were obliged to abandon their shack on the BUNKER HILL through a "port" after the ship had been hit, and later had to get off of the ENTERPRISE after she was damaged.

From my own personal experience I have seen several of my operators deteriorate very rapidly after we were hit on the INDIANAPOLIS, and become practically worthless, in so far as work was concerned, after Rougeux was killed on the NEW MEXICO.

I feel that our regular plan for providing reliefs after a six month period is excellent, but the type of operations that we are engaged in at present will dictate deviation from time to time, as a result of damage sustained by ships in which RI units are operating, and combat fatigue of personnel concerned.


On the basis of the above information I hope you will consider relieving the unit in CTF-38 as soon as practicable. We will keep our requests for such irregular relief down to a minimum, but until such time as Jap air power is considerably more weakened than it is at present, we must anticipate emergency relief of personnel.

We have a splendid set-up on the Missouri, and hope that we can get in some pretty good licks before too long.

Can you give me the prospective date for setting up our station on OKINAWA, Captain? Leigh said that the plans called for a southern location which may entail a considerable delay in getting going. I hope that an effort is being made to change this location in that I feel an effective (the Army ain't got it) RI set up on OKINAWA has already become necessary.

With kindest personal regards to you, and all Hands.

Respectfully,


G. M. SLONIM.

Op-20-G-1/1nd

file
Jms
3-GT-P
29 December 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM

Subject: Pacific R.I. Afloat Teams.

1. Conference was held on 15 December 1944, to discuss Pacific R.I. Afloat Teams. Those attending the conference were:

Captain Wenger
Captain Carlson
Captain Harper
Comdr. Edgstrom

Comdr. Cross
Comdr. Williams
Comdr. Roeder
Lt. Comdr. Norris

2. After a general discussion, the following points were agreed upon:

- (a) In view of ComThird Fleet's very strong recommendation as to the value of R.I. afloat teams, it is necessary that Op-20-G ensure that the proper emphasis is given to this part of the Communication Intelligence Organization. It was pointed out that Captain Huckins, from Frupac, will arrive in Washington in mid January, and that, since he was closely associated with R.I. teams at Frupac, final arrangements will await discussions with him.
- (b) The activities of R.I. afloat teams may be considered in two categories, namely, interception of Japanese voice, and Japanese Morse transmissions. It was pointed out that the present activity of our R.I. afloat teams has been more or less confined to Morse transmissions. Although the British have reported obtaining intelligence from interception of voice air-ground communications from Japanese Army planes in the Burma Theatre, no such transmissions have been heard by our R.I. afloat teams. The point was made that we cannot be too much influenced by past experiences in this line, because the progress of the war in the Pacific is such that our forces are constantly nearing the Japanese Empire and main bases, and hence conditions may change.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Pacific R.I. Afloat Teams.

- (c) It was agreed that all necessary equipment for R.I. afloat teams should be supplied by Op-20-G. In this connection it was understood that a small, portable frequency meter is urgently needed by the afloat teams and G-3 agreed to obtain sufficient LM frequency meters to fill this need. It was pointed out that it is often necessary to transfer R.I. teams from one ship to another while at sea, and all equipment and boxes supplied these teams should be as small as possible, light, compact and non-inflammable.
- (d) The possibility of gaining additional information on Japanese circuits which are unheard by our present shore intercept stations, by having operators in E-29's or submarines, was discussed. Captain Harper made a note of such an idea and stated that he would investigate it upon his arrival at Frupac.
- (e) It was stated that experience in the Atlantic and Mediterranean had indicated that R.I. afloat teams were quite necessary on ships whose duty it was to jam the German guided missiles. Inasmuch as it is known that the Japanese have obtained prints and models of these missiles, our R.I. teams in the Pacific should be prepared to assist the jamming ships should the Japanese commence the use of such radio-controlled bombs.
- (f) With the advent of two afloat R.I. teams in the Seventh Fleet
- it was
- agreed that an over-all plan should be devised to coordinate the activities of all R.I. teams in the Pacific regardless of Fleet to which attached. The formation of such a plan will be discussed with Captain Hucksins.
- (g) It was considered that in order to place the proper emphasis on R.I. afloat teams it would probably be necessary to have an officer at Frupac whose primary duties are to see that information is exchanged between teams, that they are properly outfitted and looked after, and

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Subject: Pacific R.I. Afloat Teams.

that all such activities in the Pacific are coordinated.

- (h) It was agreed that Op-20-G would prepare a standard manual for Pacific R.I. Afloat teams and submit it to Frupac for comment before promulgation. GT-P will undertake this project.

3. Subsequent to the above conference the question of ciphers for R.I. afloat teams was raised. This is being handled by Comdr. Stokes and details will be promulgated at a later date.

J N Wenger
Captain, U.S. Navy
J. N. WENGER,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:

Op-20
Capt. Wenger
Capt. Carlson
Capt. Harper
Comdr. Engstrom
Comdr. Cross
Comdr. Williams ✓
Comdr. Roeder
Lt. Comdr. Norris

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MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE, 0900

16 JANUARY, 1945

Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat.

Present: Capt. Huckins (From FRUPAC)
Comdr. Goodwin (G-1)
Comdr. Cross (G-3)
Comdr. Roeder (G-10)
Comdr. Braun (G-10-A)
Comdr. Williams (GT-P)
Lt. Comdr. Norris (in absence of Comdr. Engstrom, G-4)
Lt. Burd (who has functioned in R.I. teams afloat
in Pacific)

Comdr. Goodwin set forth the purposes and scope of the conference.

Comdr. Cross described the steps being taken to provide standard equipment kits for R.I. teams afloat.

Lt. Comdr. Norris discussed the steps being taken to provide satisfactory lightweight voice recorders for R.I. teams afloat.

Comdr. Williams discussed the manual for R.I. teams afloat which is to be prepared by his section.

Capt. Huckins outlined the history of R.I. teams afloat and he and Lt. Burd furnished many items of information based on actual experience, and made recommendations accordingly.

Each point was generally discussed and the conferees came to agreement on all points. The following information was brought out:

In Connection with Scope, Function, Limitation

I 1. Countermeasures Units, under CINCPAC, are being trained for work in connection with jamming of "missile directing" transmissions and similar special uses of radio. This work is beyond the scope of the C.I. organization.

I 2. R.I. teams afloat can be of service to Countermeasures Units engaged in anti-missile work by providing tip-offs.

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TOP SECRET

Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat

I 3. It is desirable that R.I. units have continuous knowledge of (if not veto power over) any jamming activities contemplated by Countermeasures Units or other agencies.

I.4. Generally, no voice transmissions have been heard by our R.I. teams afloat, 1 Search has failed to reveal any transmissions but conventional Morse for tactical control of naval aircraft.

I 5. By restrictions imposed unavoidably by conditions on board ship, R.I. teams afloat are limited to the lowest levels of traffic analysis and decryption.

I 6. Teams must be considered as always working under radio silence. They can receive but not transmit. They are of no use to the R.I. organization, but only to the task force commanders whom they directly serve. Radar gives protection out to 20 miles. The teams give protection from 20 miles out to, perhaps, 150 miles.

In Connection with Equipment

I 7. The RBA-B-C series are undesirably heavy for team use but there are yet no lightweight substitutes which duplicate all of the coverage provided by this series, since the light RBM covers only up to 20 megs. Countermeasures is developing lightweight receivers for the band 20-100 megs, but this equipment is not yet in production.

I 8. The most important band is 4 to 10 megs. The lightweight RBM covers this band. A minimum of four receivers for this band is required by a team.

I 9. G-3 is planning to provide lightweight aluminum cases for teams' equipment kits (enough for 12 teams).

I 10. G-4 is procuring lightweight magnetic-wire voice recorders ("Brush Recorders") which provide one hour's recording time per spool.

I 11. Teams have found the SX 28 receiver useful (covers up to 25 megs.) but this receiver is technically obsolete and better equipment is available.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat

I 12. Teams must cover the entire frequency spectrum, at least to 70 megs.

I 13. Teams cannot depend on ships or any other activities for equipment. They must be completely self-contained in this respect. It would even be desirable for teams to provide their own antennas but practical considerations render this impracticable.

I 14. The portable RIP 5's have been found most unsatisfactory. Standard RIP 5's must be provided.

I 15. There is yet no portable VHF D/F equipment capable of quick and easy installation in small compass on shipboard, and therefore suitable for team use.

In Connection with Personnel

I 16. Existing FRUPAC teams are of two sizes; one officer and six men, and one officer and four men. Shipboard restrictions on numbers render it necessary that the one officer combine language qualifications with knowledge of traffic analysis, minor decrypting, and frequency assignment.

I 17. FRUPAC now has 5 teams at sea and is training 7 additional Boulder-trained language officers for this duty. 7th Fleet has 2 small teams (1 officer and 3 men) at sea.

In Connection with Communications

I 18. Certain elements of the JUSIT cipher are now being distributed. This cipher will provide channel from FRUPAC to teams at sea. When distribution is complete, Com 7th's teams should be served in this respect from FRUPAC vice FRUMEL.

I 19. FRUPAC is now limited (by operational authority) to about 2500 groups per day outgoing to teams. This volume is kept level by padding. Information sent to teams in principle is confined to call sign idents and a few values.

I 20. Transmission of processed intelligence from FRUPAC to teams is dangerous and undesirable, but TF commanders frequently ask team officers to evaluate intelligence received in ultra dispatches via channel 35-S. This renders it

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat

unavoidable that some intelligence background be transmitted to teams. This is best kept on the technical level.

In Connection with Standardization and Training

I 21. GT-P has been charged with preparing a manual for R.I. teams afloat.

I 22. It is desirable that there be assigned one officer who will organize, train, equip, and coordinate the activities of teams. FRUPAC is a better location for this officer than Guam, despite the latter place's proximity to the TF areas, because at Guam the coordinator would be out of touch with developments. FRUPAC can provide such an officer.

The conferees agreed on the following conclusions and recommendations:

R 1. Teams should, insofar as practicable, be embarked in the same ships as Countermeasures Units, for mutual benefit, and so that mutual interference can be avoided.

R 2. Standard equipment for an R.I. team will be -

1 RBA	3 Loud speakers
1 RBB	2 Clocks (24 hour)
1 RBC	6 Head sets
3 REM's	1 Selection of most essential spare parts
1 REK	1 Brush Recorder with supply of recording wire on spools
1 Compact electronic tool kit	
1 LM frequency meter	
6 Standard RIP 5's	

(The above to be assembled in lightweight aluminum cases) plus:
2 aluminum cases (large suitcase size) for documents.

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Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat

R 3. Antennas should be provided by ships, in compliance with appropriate advance directives from CINCPAC in each case. Teams can provide some contributory material and labor if FRUPAC is advised sufficiently in advance.

R 4. Standard personnel for R.I. teams will be as follows:

Large Flagship Teams

- 1 Language officer (interpreter) with knowledge of radio coverage and traffic analysis.
- 1 Chief Radioman with extensive experience as an intercept supervisor.
- 5 Radiomen.

Smaller R.I. Teams

- 1 Language officer, as nearly as possible qualified as for the larger teams.
- 1 Chief Radioman experienced as intercept supervisor.
- 3 Radiomen.

R 5. FRUPAC will assign an "R.I. team coordinator", an officer whose primary duty will be the organizing, training, and equipping of R.I. teams and coordination of their activities, and liaison with operations authorities in connection with assignment of teams to ships and their installation therein. When teams are at sea this officer will supervise information transmitted to them and will maintain closest liaison with CIC with a view to avoiding conflict or confusion between information on the technical level sent to teams and intelligence sent to TF commanders in channel 35-S.

R 6. The manual to be prepared by GT-P must be general in scope. It cannot set forth details of frequencies, call-signs, Japanese Fleet organization, etc., but must confine itself to team organization, function, equipment, liaison, communications, methods in general, etc. It should set forth the security standards which should be met in the operation of the teams and in the handling of their information.

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TOP SECRET

Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat

Action

By G-3

A 1. Prosecute the procurement of 12 R.I. team standard equipment kits. Have items sent to FRUPAC as available without waiting for complete assembly.

By G-4

A 2. Prosecute procurement of "Brush Recorders" for G-3's kits.

A 3. Keep informed of state of development of CM organization's lightweight receivers with a view to eventual replacement of the RBA-B-C-K series.

A 4. Keep informed of developments in field of VHF D/F equipment suitable for R.I. teams afloat.

BY GT-P

A 5. Proceed with compilation and production of the "R.I. Afloat Teams Manual" along lines indicated herein. Send tentative draft to FRUPAC for comment.

By FRUPAC

A 6. Assign and institute the activities of an "R.I. teams coordinator".

A 7. Prosecute the training of R.I. afloat teams' personnel as necessary.

By G-1

A 8. Institute inquiries as to FRUPAC's recommendations and CINCPAC's intentions with regard to FRUPAC communications

A 9. Initiate check on progress of arrangements for Seventh Fleet teams to receive FRUPAC's JUSITs in lieu of FRUMEL's

By G-5

A 10. Initiate request on the high command level (say COMINCH to CINCPAC) for clear statement as to just what intelligence or intelligence background may be sent via JUSIT to R.I. teams

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Subject: R.I. Teams Afloat

afloat. The point should be clearly made that, right or wrong, TF commanders do ask R.I. afloat officers to evaluate ultra items.

E. S. L. Goodwin,
Comdr., USN

Copy to: G
G-1
G-10
G-10-A
G-8
Capt. Huckins
G-3
G-4
G-5
Gt-P ✓
FRUPAC

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No. A16-3

Serial: 00044


14 MAR 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Commander FIRST Carrier Task Force, Pacific.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report Covering Period of Operations from
11 February Through 1 March.

1. Forwarded.

2. The services of this Radio Intelligence Unit were of great value in the TOKYO-IWO JIMA-OKINAWA operations, as in past operations. Much of the intelligence received duplicates that from other sources, but is received at once, when at optimum value. In addition, some intelligence of enemy air-borne and surface units is received exclusively from this source.


M. A. MITSCHER.

Copy to:
CinCPac
ComFIFTHfleet

Reports
L

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

4 MARCH 1945

FROM: LT. C.A. SIMS O-IN-C R.I.U. ATTACHED COMDR.
FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE.

VIA: COMDR. FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

TO: OFFICER IN CHARGE PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT.

SUBJECT: REPORT COVERING PERIOD OF OPERATIONS FROM
11 FEBRUARY THROUGH 1 MARCH.

THIS REPORT CONSISTS OF FIVE (5) PARTS.

1. OPERATIONAL DIARY.
2. MATERIEL.
3. PUBLICATIONS.
4. RADIO VOICE FREQUENCIES.
5. LOGS.

C.A. Sims

LT. C.A. SIMS O-IN-C

~~ULTRA SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

THE R.I. SHACK ABOARD U.S.S. BUNKERHILL WAS IN USE BY SHIPS COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT WHEN WE REPORTED ABOARD JAN. 28TH AT PEARL HARBOR. EVIDENTLY NO WORD HAD BEEN GIVEN THEM THAT A R.I.U. WOULD OCCUPY THESE QUARTERS. THE SHIPS COMPANY BEING VERY BUSH WITH WORK OF THEIR OWN AND ALTERATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE FLAG, THE R.I. SHACK WAS NOT SET UP UNTIL THE DAY WE SORTIED FROM ULITHI (FEB. 10TH) WHICH DID NOT GIVE US AS MUCH TIME AS WE HOPED FOR TO PREPARE FOR THE TOKYO STRIKE. MEN, EQUIPMENT, AND OPERATING AREA WERE NEW, AND THERE WAS NO TIME FOR DRESS REHEARSAL. IDEAL CONDITIONS WOULD ALLOW FOR AT LEAST A WEEK IN WHICH TO TEST OUT RECEIVERS, ANTENNAE, MILLS AND OPERATORS, AND TO GET ALL THE PUBLICATIONS IN SHAPE BEFORE UNDERTAKING ACTUAL TACTICAL OPERATION.

REPORTED ABOARD UPON OUR ARRIVAL AT ULITHI FOR DUTY WITH THE R.I.U. AND IS DEVOTING HIS FULL TIME TO R.I. MATTERS. HE HAS BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO ALL THE TECHNICAL AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATIONS AND IS ACTING AS ASSISTANT O-IN-C.

- 10/2 BEGAN OPERATIONS SHORTLY AFTER NOON. TWO MEN ON WATCH 8 ON AND 8 OFF. MAINLY SEARCH.
- 11/2 EMPHASIS TODAY ON PICKET BOAT AND YOKOSUKA DEFENSE AREA FREQUENCIES. COVERAGE 6490 AND 6705.
- 12/2 SAME AS PREVIOUS DAY. - COVERAGE 6490, 6315, AND 6705. CHECKING 8725, 9045, AND 7820. SEVERAL SUB SIGHTINGS PICKED UP BUT OUR _____ ALREADY OUT OF DATE. NOTED ON TOKYO BROADCAST THAT B.F. 31 COMDR. (MANILA) STILL SENDS TRAFFIC AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH MOBILE COMMUNICATION UNIT #11 AT MONTALCLAN. 6490 VERY ACTIVE WITH 8 POSITIONS RECEIVED FROM PICKET BOATS. MOST EASTERLY POSITION WAS 31-00N 142-00E WHICH IS 250 MILES WEST OF OUR PROPOSED TRACK. EVIDENTLY PICKET LINE BENDS NORTHWARD AT ABOUT 140 DEGREES EAST TO ROUGHLY PARALLEL JAPANESE COASTLINE. KISIKISI SEEMS TO BE "PLANE TYPE" WHILE KANA AND KANI ARE RESPECTIVELY NORTH AND EAST LATITUDE.
- 13/2 COVERAGE SAME - CHECKED ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES 9045, 3747 (YOKOSUKA AREA LOOKOUT STATIONS), AND 6744 (CHICHI-JIMA A.G. 903 DET.). AIRCRAFT HEARD LOUD AND CLEAR ON THIS LATTER FREQUENCY. PROBABLY SEARCH VP/F. THREE POSITIONS FROM PICKET BOATS. MOST EASTERLY AT 31-00N 139-00E. PICKET BOAT INEHETO SENDS SHORT SIGHTING REPORT. SAMASAMA INO FOLLOWED BY NUMERAL 3 OR 4. SINCE THESE ARE ADDRESSED TO HANNIGORI NEYOHU (ADDEE SUB REPORTS E. HONSHU) PRESUME SAMA AND INO MEAN SUBMARINE WITH NUMERAL

~~ULTRA-SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

- 13/2 PERHAPS SIGNIFYING CONDITION OR COURSE OR RELIABILITY OF CONTACT.
- 14/2 COVERAGE AS ABOVE. CHECKING IWO - MARCUS - ATSUKI FREQ. AS WE WILL BE ONLY 300 MILES FROM MARCUS AND IWO. HOWEVER NO ACTIVITY NOTED ON THIS CIRCUIT. FIVE PICKET BOAT POSITIONS NOTED, MOST EASTERLY BEING 31-05N 143-10E, OR ABOUT 160 MILES WEST OF OUR TRACK.
- 15/2 COVERAGE SAME AS ABOVE. AT 11:30 THIS MORNING 58.4 REPORTED SHOOTING DOWN A BETTY. ONLY AIR ACTIVITY NOTED BEFORE THIS WERE SOME SEARCH PLANES ON 8915 WORKING KISARATSU OR KANOYA. NO GRID WAS SEEN ON THIS OR OTHER AIR CIRCUITS, NOR DID ANY GRID APPEAR ON BROADCAST. ASSUME PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN BEFORE SENDING MESSAGE. ALSO STRAFED TODAY WAS A SMALL BOAT BUT NO SIGNS OF LIFE NOTED ABOARD BY PILOTS, AND NO SUSPICIOUS TRAFFIC ON 6490 OR 6705. NUMEROUS ALERTS DUE TO B-29 BUT WE DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SPOTTED. FIVE PICKET BOAT POSITIONS, NONE EAST OF 140 DEGREES EAST.
- 16/2 DAY OF TOKYO STRIKE. JAPS WERE CAUGHT OFF GUARD AGAIN. FIRST WARNING HERE SEEN ON YOKOSUKA BROADCAST FROM A PICKET BOAT AT 0606. FROM THEN ON THERE WERE CONSTANT SIGHTINGS FROM PICKETS, LOOKOUTS, AND AIR BASES. ATSUKI WORKED INTERCEPT PLANES ON 5890 BUT ORDERED THEM TO MAEBASHI UNTIL THE ATTACK WAS OVER. AIRGROUP 302 ALSO ORDERED HIS AIRBORNE PLANES TO MAEBASHI AT 0915 DESPITE THE FACT THAT SOME OF THEM ATTEMPTED TO FLEE AS FAR AS IWAKUNI. MANY SIGHTING AND ATTACK REPORTS WERE HEARD ON VOICE CIRCUITS (INFORMATION ON THESE VOICE FREQUENCIES IS ATTACHED). MOST ORDERS TO PLANES WERE FOR THEM TO LAND. AT 1700 AIRGROUP 302 TOLD SEVERAL OF HIS AIRCRAFT (SOME OF WHICH HAD LANDED AT MAEBASHI) TO LAND AT ATSUKI. ALTHOUGH AIR CIRCUITS WERE ACTIVE THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT AN ATTACK WAS FORMING.
- 17/2 PICTURE SAME AS PREVIOUS DAY. WEATHER VERY BAD AND RECEPTION TERRIBLE. TOKYO NOTED SENDING ROUTINE NUMERAL TRAFFIC. OUR ATTACKS BOTH YESTERDAY AND TODAY CAUSED THE EXPECTED AND USUAL AIR ALERTS, BUT WAS NOT REFLECTED AS CLEARLY AS EXPECTED ON THE MAJOR BROADCASTS. INTERCEPTOR PLANES AGAIN ORDERED TO MAEBASHI. WEATHER HALTED THE STRIKES AND IN AFTERNOON WE WITHDREW. THAT NIGHT WE RAN INTO SEVERAL PICKET BOATS AND SANK SAME. TWO OF THEM (7SARINO AND 3NITEA) SENT OUT PLAIN LANGUAGE REPORTS AT 180235 AND 172050.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

- 18/2 PICKET BOATS ACTIVE MOSTLY PLANE SIGHTINGS. AIRCRAFT UP ON 7045A WORKING KE0SI AND ALSO UP ON UNKNOWN FREQ., GRIDS FROM WHICH APPEAR ON TOKYO BROADCAST. MINIMUM OF FIVE GRIDS NOTED, SOME ON UNITS OF THE TASK FORCE. HOWEVER NO ACTIVITY ON ATTACK FREQUENCIES. LATER 58.1 FLASHED CQY ON 6685A WHICH WAS THE SEARCH FREQUENCY WE HAD NOT LOCATED.
- 19/2 COVERAGE 5337, 6685, CHECKING 9045, 8725, 6740, 5597, AND 6705. LANDINGS BEGIN ON IWO. MOST ACTIVE FREQUENCY 6685 ON WHICH 6 GRIDS WERE NOTED INDICATING A WIDE-SPREAD SEARCH. THAT EVENING MANY BOGIES WERE AROUND THE FORCE BUT ATTACKS WERE SPORADIC AND MEAGRE. THREE NIPS SHOT DOWN. WE HEARD NOTHING ALTHOUGH ALL FREQS CHECKED. (NOTE - IN NEXT DAYS ULTRA FROM CINCPAC NO MENTION WAS MADE OF ANY MESSAGE PICKED UP DURING THE ATTACK. MUST HAVE USED VHF WHICH WE COULD NOT FIND THOUGH SEARCHED BAND FROM 27 TO 142 MEGS.)
- 20/2 COVERAGE MAINLY AS ABOVE. GRIDS ON 6680, 5597, TWO ON 6680 IN LONG MESSAGE WHICH MENTIONED SARA(TOGA?). BEGAN TO GET A LITTLE SENSE
- 21/2 COVERAGE 6685, 5597, 7045, 8915, AND 8725. GOT TWO GRIDS DURING MORNING ON SEARCH FREQUENCY 6685. DURING AFTERNOON BOGIES APPEAR ON SCREEN AND BY 1630 THERE ARE DEFINATELY MANY NIP PLANES AROUND US. WE CHECK UP AND DOWN BAND WITH NO LUCK UNTIL ABOUT 1840 WHEN WE FIND ACTIVITY ON 7035 THAT SEEMS TO BE ATTACK GROUP. MUCH QRM BUT MUFFLED TOTO HEARD. LATER HEAR THAT SARATOGA TOOK THREE KAMIKAZES ABOARD. PLANES WERE WORKING KE7RI, SO FAR UNIDENTIFIED. THIS FREQUENCY MUST HAVE BEEN THE CHARLIE QUEEN YOLK 7045 WE RECEIVED TWO DAYS PRIOR FROM LT. COL. HOLCOMB.
- 22/2 TODAY AN ATTACK SEEMED DEVELOPING BUT DID NOT FINALLY TAKE PLACE. A0KI AND KE0SI (KANOYA AIR BASE) WERE UP ON 7035. EVIDENTLY A0KI IS IN BONINS AREA AS HE ASKED KANOYA WHAT TIME PLANES WOULD ARRIVE IN BATTLE AREA, AND ALSO SENT SEVERAL WX MESSAGES IN ANSWER TO A REQUEST FROM KANOYA.

C10

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

- 22/2 CONT. - PLANES WERE TO LEAVE KANOYA AT 1030 AND WE ACTUALLY REPORTED BY KANOYA AS HAVING DEPARTED AT AOKI BEGAN WORKING THE PLANES AROUND 1400 AND THESE AIRCRAFT SOUNDED LOUD AND CLEAR. AOKI THEN REPORTED TO KANOYA THAT "DEPARTURE TIME BLANK 1520" AND FROM THIS TIME ON PLANE SIGNALS BECAME WEAKER AND CIRCUIT SECURED. CONSIDERABLE SEARCH ACTIVITY ON 6685.
- 23/24/2 ROUTINE EXCEPT FOR APPARENT DRILL TRAFFIC BETWEEN F AND BASES ON 6998 MEASURED. GRIDS AND USED, LACK OF ANY TIE IN WITH OUR MOVEMENTS PLUS NON-APPEARANCE ON BROADCASTS LEADS TO BELIEF THAT THIS IS DRILL.
- 25/2 TODAY WE AGAIN STRIKE TOKYO. LAST NIGHT WE WERE SPOTTED AND REPORTED BY PICKET BOATS. FIRST REPORT FROM SUTENATA AT 242130 SAYING HE WAS BEING FIRED ON BY ENEMY VESSELS. 711U ALSO REPORTED US GIVING POSITION AS 31-20N 144-40E. AMPLIFYING REPORTS FOLLOWED AND WE REBROADCAST BY YOKOSUKA. HOWEVER, NO ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS ON AIR CW OR VOICE CIRCUIT AT 0717 8025 CAME UP WITH TWO PLANES WORKING AT SUKI REPORTING BEING OVER AND LANDING AT MAEBASHI. FROM THIS ON ACTIVITY FOLLOWED PROCEDURE OF PREVIOUS STRIKE, EVEN LESS OF AN UPSET IN GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS.
- 26-28/2 NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY.
- 1/3 COVERAGE 5512, 4830, 4915/9830, 5715, 6640, 6685, AND 9830. STRIKE MADE ON OKINAWA WITH USUAL SIGHTING REPORTS OF PLANES AND SURFACE VESSELS. UNPRECEDENTED VOLUME OF AIRCRAFT TRAFFIC ON 4180 AND 5512 AS WELL AS SASEBO BROADCAST.
- 2/3 FORCE RETIRING TO ULITHI.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

PUBLICATIONS AND DESPATCH CONTENT

OUR WAS OUT OF DATE BY THE TIME WE WERE READY FOR OPERATION. THIS CODE IS A CONVENIENT ONE TO HAVE, BUT IS NOT OF THE FIRST TACTICAL IMPORTANCE. SINCE ITS EFFECTIVE PERIOD IS NOT GREAT, IT WOULD BE BEST HANDLED BY SENDING VALUES BY DESPATCH.

THE OF GREAT USE, ESPECIALLY AS THE NUMBER OF VALUES RECOVERED INCREASES. HOWEVER, THE ENTERING OF THESE VALUES AND THE KEEPING OF THE BOOK UP TO DATE REQUIRES A GREAT DEAL OF TIME. TOO MANY JUSITS CONTAIN DELETION FOR VALUES ENTERED THE PREVIOUS DAY. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT A NEWLY RECOVERED VALUE BE ALLOWED TO MATURE AT FRUPAC FOR A DAY OR SO. THEN IF NOTHING HAS COME UP TO DISPROVE IT, IT CAN BE SENT OUT TO THE RIU AFLOAT.

ALL PUBLICATIONS CARRIED BY ME FOR DELIVERY TO OTHER R.I. OFFICERS WERE TURNED OVER TO THEM BEFORE WE DEPARTED ULITHI. RECEIPTS SIGNED BY THEM ARE BEING FORWARDED TO YOU.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

MATERIEL

RECEIVERS ALL IN GOOD SHAPE AND FUNCTIONING WELL. HOWEVER TWO OF THE RIP-5 WERE DEFECTIVE. (#897 AND 898) NUMBER 897 IS REPAIRABLE ABOARD SHIP BUT 898 NEEDS REPLACEMENT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY. ONE OF THE SX-28 SPEAKERS SENT TO US AT ULITHI ARRIVED DAMAGED AND UNUSEABLE. WE HAVE BORROWED ON TEMPORARILY BUT NEED TO REPLACE THE DAMAGED ONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WE WERE TOO RUSHED TO SET UP THE PANORAMIC ADAPTORS BEFORE THE EMPIRE STRIKES, BUT WILL INSTALL THEM WHILE AT ULITHI AND REPORT ON THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AFTER THE NEXT OPERATION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

RADIO VOICE FREQUENCIES

HEARD TOKYO AREA 16TH FEB.

4080 N/H
4400 YAMATO; ITO; TAIHOKU(?); KURUMA; SAKURA; TEKIWA;
ATASINO; MINATO.
4480 NAKAMURA; NAGATO.
4540 UMITOMI; NAKABA; MISIMURA/
4560 KANKA; NARABE; MATUTA; YAWAMOTO; ATAZI.
4580 KAKUTO; TATEYAMA.
4615 KANKA; ISIKAWA.
4660 KAMUKATA(,KAMIGATA).
4705 N/H
4780 NAKAJIMA; NAGATO.
4815 N/H

OFF IWO

4600 N/H.

OFF TOKYO 25TH FEB.

4325 N/H.
4400 HATATIRA; TEKIWA; MINATO.
4490 HAYABUSA; NAKAMURA; TAKASA.
4500 N/H.
4570 NAGATA; SAKURA; KANUTO; SENPO.
4825 KAMURA; NIKUNO.

OFF SE HONSHU 26TH FEB.

4575 MARU; SAN.
4590 N/H.
5040 TUBOKAWA; KAMASINO.
5320 TAKAIMA; KOSIMA; SIMOIMA (CALLED NOT HEARD)

OFF OKINWAW 1ST MARCH.

5180 * (VERY FAINT AND INDISTINCT)
5220 * TUBOTA; SUZUKA; NAKURIKU; ,TAKORINE.

* MAINLY 4 FIGURE TRAFFIC PASSED ORALLY. NO APPARENT
REFERENCE TO OUR ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD OF STRIKE.
THEREFORE ASSUMED TO BE OUTSIDE NANSEI-SHOTO AREA.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 COMMANDER FIRST CARRIER TASK FORCE

File No.

Serial:

RADIO VOICE FREQUENCY LOG.

FREQ.			TIME
4615	KANKA DE ISIKUWA	KAN HIKUSI	Ø653
	TANKA	...?? (VERY WEAK)	
466Ø	TAKOTAMI	REC CALLS	Ø7Ø8
	??	TEKI WA	Ø71Ø
	ATAMURA DE ??	TEKKI SAKURAMBO(?) - MISAKI	
		16KI	Ø716
4615	DE ??	TEKI HOOKOO	
458Ø	KAKUTO DE ??	YOKOSIBA NO JOOKUU	Ø72Ø
478Ø	?? DE TAKASI	NIGURA JOOKUU	
	KAKU DE ??	..KIKANJUU...TEKI WA	
	KAKU DE NAGATO	HOKUSINTYUU	
	?? DE TAKAJIMA	...2ØKI	
	TAKAJIMA DE NAGATO	NIGURA 14KI JOOKUU	
		(?) TOKORO JOOKUU NO KUUMEIBOO	
		O SIRASE	Ø745
454Ø	?? DE UMITOMI	TENKI GA YOKEREBA KIKAN SEYO	
	NAKABA DE ??	25GO NI ATSUMARE	
	MISIMURA DE ??	" " "	
449Ø	NAKAMURA DE MEIYOO	OOTA JOOKUU	Ø8Ø3
44ØØ	?? DE SAKURA	TEKI HENTAI 7KI...JOOKUU	
		SENKAITYUU TEKI KOODOØ....	
		HIKOOJOO JOOKUU NO TEKKI KANJOO	
487Ø	?? DE NAKAJIMA	KAMOTANJOO..HOKUSINCHUU	Ø84Ø
456Ø	YAWAMOTO DE MATUTA	REC L&C WAIT!	
	KAKU DE MATUTA	JOOHOO. (?) MAMONAKU YORI	
		TEKIHKOOCHUU NISI NI SUSUMU.	
	?? DE ATAJI	REC CALLS	Ø855
	NARABE DE MATUTA	TEKI HIKOOBUTAI....TEKI WA	
	YAWAMOTO DE MATUTA	KANBAKU..	
	KAMURA	NO HIKOOJOO BAKUGEKI TYUU NARI	Ø915
466Ø	???	HOPPOO TEKKI 16 SENKAICHUU	
44ØØ	VARØOUS A/C DE SAKURA	TAKAMURA HIKOOJOO NI TYAKURIKU	
		SEYO	
	ITO DE TAIHOO	TAIRIKU SEYO	
	ZENKI DE TAIHOO	" "	1ØØ9
KAMURA	KØMURA DE ??	TEKKI HIKOOJOO JOOKUU	
	KAKU DE ??	TEKI HENTAIHIKOOJOO JOOKUU	
448Ø	?? DE MURA	...7Ø ARI	1Ø55
44ØØ	FURUMO		
	TAKASA DE ATASINO	REC CALLS.	
	OKATA		
	KAKU DE ATASINO	TAIRIKU SEYO	
		HITATI HIKOOJOO NI TAIRIKU SEYO	
	ARITAKA DE TEKIWA	REC CALLS.	
	MANUKA		12Ø8
448Ø	?? DE ??	OOTA JOOKUU 5ØKI	
		OYAMA JOOKUU 52KI	
	KAKU DE NAGATO	16FUN OOTA JOOKUU SENKAITYUU	015
		17FIIN HOKODA NANPOO KAKO	

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

SERIAL

5 March 1945

From: Cinc Radio Intelligence Unit, Staff Commander Carrier Division Five.

To: Cinc U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Report, Forwarding of:

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of radio intelligence activity by this unit during "Detachment" operation. Forwarded under same cover is the radio log and traffic.

Robert A. Wilson Lt.(j.g.)USNR.
Cinc RI Unit Staff Comcardiv Five

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

CCD5/S67
SERIAL

SECRET

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Report of R.I. Unit
under command of
Lt(jg) R.A. WILSON
dated 4 March 1945.

From: Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT POINT ONE.
(Commander Carrier Division FIVE.)
To : Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.
Navy #128
Subject: Radio Intelligence Unit Report.

1. The subject report represents a summarization of the activities and reports rendered to this Command by Lt(jg) WILSON. The work of the unit and Lt(jg) WILSON was most satisfactory and commendable.

2. The reports submitted in almost every case were the basis for tactical decisions of great value by the Task Group Commander and the Task Group Commander is of the opinion that the unit is a most important and necessary adjunct to a Task Group Staff.


J. J. CLARK.

4 March 1945

Report of R.I. Unit

Commander Carrier Division Number Five

This report consists of this
cover page and pages 1-5
inclusive.

REPORT OF RI OPERATIONS FOR "DETACHMENT" OPERATION

Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi Atoll on 10 February, 1945 to prosecute the naval phase of the "Detachment" operation. RI operations up to D-3 day were concerned primarily with coverage of enemy search frequencies and research on enemy air circuits in an effort to ascertain the possible frequency or frequencies which might be employed tactically when enemy action against this Task Force was undertaken. This force was not sighted by the enemy during the approach to Tokyo.

16 February (D-3)

At 0600 an enemy plane was reported close aboard by radar plot. This plane was sighted by our pickets. No transmission was intercepted. At 0658 on 6850J an enemy plane reported that he had sighted "enemy surface units" on course 040 at a distance of 125 miles from an unidentified reference point. Flag plot was notified and the task group was alerted to possible presence of enemy plane in our vicinity. At 0702 Yokosuka Naval District was put in Condition Two. The task group was advised that the force had been sighted and to be prepared for an attack. 5890J produced messages from A.G. 302 directing airborne planes to go to Maebashi Air Base. This base is in T.G. 58.3 target area. That command was notified. A message from an enemy plane at 1013 on 4195J contained the grid position 34:57N-141:08E. This is not the position of this task group, but is definitely some portion of T.F. 58. On 5890J beginning at 0952 enemy planes reported that they were landing at Maebashi Air Base. 7035J produced grid position 23:57N--144:58E; believed possibly an enemy contact with the Iwojima bombardment group. On 5890J planes reported to Atsuki Air Base that they were departing Usa Air Base at 1450. This frequency also revealed these planes securing their transmitters prior to arrival at Atsuki shortly after 1700. Shortly after 1700 planes began moving up to Atsuki from Maebashi. CTF 58 was advised that we could not cover this field adequately on last strike due to heavy A.A. and recommended it to the attention of T.G. 58.5 for night attacks.

17 February (R-2)

5890J again revealed planes moving back to Maebashi from Atsuki A.B. At 1050 on 7952M an enemy plane reported that he had lost sight of the enemy and was making a forced landing at Hachijojima. At 1530 Yokosuka secured her air alert. All our strikes were aboard and we had begun to retire from the Tokyo area. During the evening planes were noted on 5890J moving from Atsuki from Maebashi. During retirement from the area the Task Force ran through the enemy picket lines. 6490J produced reports from these picket boats intermittently during the night. Based upon these reports, the T.G. was alerted to the presence of these boats and ordered to be on the lookout for them.

18 February (D-1)

The Task Force was enroute to Iwojima. At 0940 on 6685J an enemy plane originated a message containing the grid position-27:22N --140:08E. This was believed a contact with a portion of our force about 60 miles from this task group. The same grid was sent by another plane on this frequency under time group 0955. Our CAP was alerted and shot down a Wick at about this position. Again on 6685J the following grid position at 1100--29:42N:: 138:03E. The same frequency produced a grid position timed at 1250 at 27:23N--139:12E. At 1450 on 6685J a plane reported a possible element of T.F. 58 en route Guam:: position 17:47N--140:13E. At 1625 another plane made contact on the same frequency at 28:17N--139:38E. At 1630 and again at 1640 the following grid position on 6685J-6685J --26:57N - 139:08E. At 1705 on 7035J the grid position originated at 1625 appeared in a despatch from tentative Chichijima A.B. Possibly a night air attack is developing. At 1746 another grid on 6685J at 26:57N--139:03. This concluded a day of effective snooping by the enemy. These reports were passed immediately to Flag Plot. Gunnery and radar on alert throughout the day based upon these reports.

19 February (D day)

D-day with Task Group 58.1 fueling. A portion of the Task Force is striking Iwojima. At 0835 tentative Chichijima Air Base originated a despatch on 7035J containing two grids (1) 26:57N--139:08E (2) 27:37N--139:08E--both considered as contacts with elements of T.F. 58. 6685J produced a grid timed at 1123 in position 25:57N--147:23E (well away from the task force). At 1147 an enemy plane with a very strong signal reported on 6685J that he had sighted enemy carrier planes. At 1215 a second enemy plane reported that he was in contact with enemy carrier planes. At 1230 an enemy plane reported two grid positions on 6685J, both apparent contacts with T.F. 58 units off Iwojima. The positions 25:50N--140:16E and 25:50N--141:20E. At 1210 on the same frequency an enemy plane reported a grid contact at 23:17N--139:23E. The Task Group was alerted to the presence of low flying snoopers. At 1235 on 6685J a snooper reported grid position 25:50N--140:10E. This was a contact with T.G. 58.4 We set Condition 1 in the A.A. batteries. A plane on 6685J produced a grid report at 1244 --position 29:37N--149:48E (well away from the task force). This estimated to be search plane contact. No further grids noticed during the 19th.

20 February (D+1)

6685J continued the primary source of intelligence. At 0815 on 6740J a plane reported that he was turning back to base because of foul weather conditions. This may be the attack group mentioned in ULTRA despatch as possible scheduled to attack Iwojima Invasion forces today. Flag plot advised. At 1122 on 6685J an enemy plane reported contact with enemy carrier planes. The same plane sent a grid at 1130--position 26:17N--135:10E (still a good distance from the task force). At the same time on this frequency a second plane sent a grid at 24:10N--140:10E. This posit was close aboard and the group was alerted. Drill grids were noted on 6765J during afternoon. 6685J again produced grid at 1540 in position --23:50N--140:10E. This was a contact with another group. They were informed.

21 February (D/2)

At 0915 on 6685J a plane sent grid position 27:07N--146:28E. This was to the North and well East of the Force. At 0940 on the same frequency grid position 27:02N--147:58E--again at a great distance. Drill grids noted on 7102M. Plane activity estimated from signal strength to be remote from the Task Group. At 1655 on 7035J an enemy plane believed close aboard reported contact with Blue carrier planes. We then went to G.Q. and the CAP was searching for bogies. Again on 7035J at 1745 a grid from a plane --26:17N--141:38E. This is 25 miles east of our position. Another group is firing in that direction from us. (This probably was the attack on the Saratoga and Bismark Sea). Believe attack order may have been a series of dashes noted on 7035J at 1800.

22 February (D/3)

7035J was very active during the day, but little activity noted on 6685J. This group en route fueling area. No enemy contact with the force noted.

23 February (D/4)

Fueling. No enemy planes near force. Noted Grids on 7209M. Believe this to be drill.

24 February (D/5)

Approaching Tokyo for the second strike on that area. Air circuits were carefully copied but no grids on force noted and no loud signals intercepted. Activity on 7035J noted. May indicate mission by enemy, against Blue forces on Iwojima. At 2205 reported to Flag Plot that picket boats on 6490J were reporting contact with the force. Successive reports on this circuit were concerned with the course and composition of the Task Force. The group was alerted to be on watch for picket boats.

25 February (D/6)

The second strike on Tokyo during this operation was again launched in foul weather. The Task Group went to G.Q. at 0500. Radar picked up a bogie who orbited the disposition. No transmission intercepted. At 0700 planes were estimated on the basis of signal strength to be close to the group. Radar plot was advised and CAP alerted. The plane disappeared from the air shortly thereafter. Retirement from the area put the force again through the enemy picket lines. The first report from a picket boat was timed at 1855. Other picket boat reports were noted thereafter intermittently.

26 February (D/7)

At 0140 an enemy picket boat reported that the "enemy's course is south". 6685J, 7035J, 6640J copied together with a general search of enemy air frequencies as the Force retired from the Tokyo area and after withdrawal beyond the enemy picket boat lines. Drill grids noted. Flag Plot informed of air activity on 6640J. The appearance of the tactical signal T&TU on 7035J at 1739 led to a suspicion that an attack on Iwojima was developing. The above tactical signal was addressed by one plane to another. CTF 58 had advised the force earlier that a number of planes were airborne, some with loud signals. This led to a conjecture that a strike against Iwojima from the empire had passed comparatively close to the Task Force while en route to its target. Flag Plot so advised.

27 February (D/8)

Fueling. Enemy aircraft relatively inactive on 6685J and 7035J. No evidence of enemy mission against Iwojima intercepted. No planes noted in vicinity of force. Grids on drill circuits noted. Reported to Flag Plot that the situation was quiet.

28 February (D/9)

En route Okinawa. Strike and Photographic mission. 6685J, 7035J, 6640J, and the Sasebo Broadcast given attention during the day. B-29's noted over Kimeshima and Okinawa. B-29 passed close to force and showed bogie. - Situation quiet and so reported to Flag Plot.

1 March (D/10)

Strike and photographic mission in Nansei Shoto. Approach undetected. 4192J produced full air alert for Okinawa B.F. at 0655. 1st Blue planes reported over Okinawa at 0715. Hokoku Maru #3 Goo, and the Tsubane, CM, reported contact with Blue carrier planes. Flag Plot advised. Formosa placed under full air alert at 1017. Army air from Luzon apparently meeting its schedule in that area. During the afternoon 6640J became very active. Flag Plot so advised. On 6685J at 1639 an enemy plane with a very loud signal reported that he had sighted the enemy. At 1642 he originated a despatch containing the grid position 25:27N--129:43E. At 1650 he reported that he had sighted four carrier planes. At 1653 he originated a second despatch containing the grid position 25:47N--128:43E. The enemy base receipted for both messages. The ship meanwhile had this bandit on the radar screen, contact had been established by the CAP and then lost. Flag plot was advised and immediately after each interception. The last transmission from this plane was intercepted at 1701. The force was alerted due to the above contact. Okinawa secured its air alert at 1715. Sasebo B.C. released the 1st of the above despatches containing grids at 1722.

2 March (D/11)

En route Ulithi Atoll. No enemy air approached close to the force. Covering Sasebo B.C.

3 March (D/12)

Covering Sasebo B.C. Preparing reports, logs, traffic, etc., in anticipation of being relieved upon arrival at Ulithi Atoll.

4 March (D/13)

SECURED..

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Summary of Radio Intelligence Operations for
Period Beginning 9 March and Ending 30 April

This report consists
of twenty nine pages

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9 March 1945

Reported aboard USS HORNET at Ulithi to relieve Lt. Robt. Wilson as OinC of RIU attached to ComCarDiv 5 (RAdm J. J. Clark). Brought with me Dillon, R. K., RM1c, Camfield, J. G., RM2c and Carver, R. D., RM2c who were to relieve Mr. Wilson's crew. All hands squared away with snip and flag.

10 March 1945

Reported aboard USS INDIANAPOLIS with Wilson and CRM Garcia where officers and CRM of all RIU present were gathered for conference with Cmdr. Leigh. Common problems and policies of RI units were discussed. At that time it was confirmed that Lt. Wilson would stay on the HORNET for a week or ten days to break me in. Chief Radio Man L. H. Lee was to be transferred from Lt. Palmer's unit to serve under me.

11 March 1945

This day spent going over RI operations with Wilson. At 1945 this evening USS RANDOLPH in next berth was hit by Nip suicide plane with considerable damage to ship and personnel. Lt. Wilson set up a watch immediately, but we were unable to detect any evidence of the origination of this attack. (While in Ulithi anchorage only Col. Holcomb and Lt. Kluss kept an RI watch.

12 March 1945

Kept a watch up this day but results confirmed Wilson's claim that reception here is very poor due to tropical atmospheric and unfavorable position in relation to Orange transmitters. The Yokosuka, Snokozan, Palao, and Truk broadcast transmitters were the only stations receivable and we deduced no evidence of the source of the attack on Ulithi from them.

13 March 1945

This day gained CRM Lee and lost Lt. Wilson. Lee reported in early this morning. Wilson received unexpected orders making his relief effective immediately. He disembarked with his crew late in the afternoon. His departure necessitated a hasty and incomplete disposition of many matters concerning RI operations which we had planned to handle during the following three days. Kept a careful watch this day with no results.

14 March 1945

Task Force 58 sortied this day from Ulithi. Immediately put into effect a watch schedule giving maximum coverage during daylight hours. Chief Lee stood search watch from 0600 until 2300. The men stood a three section watch, each watch period being defined by mess call. During daylight hours there was always a regular watch and one scoop watch on deck. In effect this gave us three operators on the day watch, two during the evening and one during the midwatch. In practice GQ prevailed during the major portion of our hours off watch during the first two weeks, giving us three operators most of the time, since only one at a

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time could sack out in the shack.

Our basic coverage plan was to set up a broadcast -- Sasebo or Kanoya on the speaker; to keep two receivers guarding the most likely tactical circuits and one on search. We were unable immediately to determine which tactical circuits would be brought into action, but on the basis of the previous operation 6685 and 7035 were given special attention with constant search for air/ground activity on other known Kyushu-Nansei Shoto air/ground circuits.

By late on the 14th the receiving conditions already improved considerable and we began to pick up Empire air/ground circuits. Nothing but drill and a few local movements were noted.

15 March 1945

Considerable air/ground activity noted on 7035 and 6640 this day. The former indicating routine local movement. The latter circuit showed evidence of search training and grids were originated bearing the drill indicator KUN during the afternoon. Late evening watch saw reaction to B29 strikes in the Osaka area on the broadcast.

Oshima Defense Force circuit and picket boat circuit were copied occasionally. However it was decided that we could not afford to guard these circuits in view of the low volume of pertinent traffic, much of which was not readable here. Furthermore the occurrence of traffic originated on these circuits after a very short interval on both the NORU and MIKA broadcasts indicated sufficient coverage would be obtained from that source.

16 March 1945

The Kyushu air/ground circuit 7035 continued to supply the bulk of intercept, but this activity was purely local and on a small scale. The southern Kyushu air activity using 6640 was noted briefly sending drill traffic containing grids. Two messages originated by a plane heard on this circuit were broadcast by Sasebo several hours after originated. Unable to determine substance of this traffic. Also heard was AGrp 903 circuit 6740. A grid falling far to the east and north of us was given by a plane on this circuit during the afternoon. First Mobile Base Air Force circuit 6685/3342 made its first appearance this day and four planes were active on it between 1600 and 2000. Reports issued by these planes conformed to regular sighting report forms -- signals TETETE, UUU, KIKIKI were used and the indicators LISA, 2ROSA were used. Grids ranged from 35:50 131:50 to 25:02 132:13. None of these grids were broadcast and there was no evident reaction to them. It seems possible that these planes were engaged in search training along their own picket lines.

17 March 1945

Air/ground circuits were active during the morning with a total of 6 a/c using KKKK and MXXX calls appearing on 3342/6685 giving sighting reports and grids falling

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far to the north of our position, and using ISA, ROSA indicators. These indicators seem to be merely search flight serials. The planes starting out very early in the morning used ROSA and continued using it until their return to base after 0900; the planes which took up the search from then used ISA. This activity died down and was unheard after 0930.

Other air/ground Empire circuits were active but all traffic was either drill or involved in other areas than our own. No picket or radar reports with possible association with our force was noted, excepting possibly a report originating at Minami Daito at 1220 giving an unspecified target or objective (radar?) at 050° 270 miles. This was north of our position (25:50N 135:00E at 1200) but may have been our CAP.

At about 1030 three a/c using NKKW calls appeared on 6740 sending traffic with a kana suffix to the serials (e.g. NR1TO, NR3MO, NR6YO, NR1RU, etc). This was estimated to be 903 activity and dropped at 1050. This circuit was regularly checked and at 1414 an a/c appeared giving the grid 27:07 131:03 (146:03?). The content of this traffic was unread but it was assumed that the western position was intended. In any case the position was not on us. These planes appeared again at 1515 and gave two grids 26:30 136:30 and 28:57 135:40. These positions were getting close. Though these grids were not broadcast and did not have sighting indicators they looked like possible contacts, and we advised flag plot accordingly. The cat was out of the bag beyond all question by 2250. At 2325 we picked up 3342 just in time to catch a NR2 from plane ISAMA. Two minutes later Sasebo Broadcast put out his NR1 reporting sighting enemy surface units at 29:27 133:33. He followed up with his NR3 at 2330 giving position 30:12 133:53. Kanoya and Sasebo Broadcast these sightings in short order.

18 March 1945

First Mobile met our striking force with a dawn torpedo attack this day. Before 0200 he had at least nine KWN a/c up on his primary 3342. These planes were apparently out to track our forces and up to 0430 they originated a number of grids on units of TF58. Some of the planes sent under the indicators ISA, ROSA, etc., some under KIU27IRI. These kana groups seem to be target indicators as suggested by FRUPAC arbitrarily assigned to potential objectives. No consistency in the assignment has been noted in this and subsequent occurrences. The designator KIU numeral IRI has not been seen since.

Grids originated by these snoopers were broadcast almost immediately by Kanoya and Sasebo. At 0400 two new calls made their appearance. One of these was the coordinator plane (KKKN), the other the guide group (KKKN). Flight leader of the guide group gave the order to drop flares (TEKO) at 0418. This signal is for guiding illumination planes and torpedo planes into the target area not as target illumination. The spotting group leader at 0434 reported that he was being pursued. (Previously two of the search planes had indicated the same distress--TUSEU) Two groups of illumination planes using KKKW calls went into action (SEMA) at 0500. The time lapse between the dropping of the guide flares and the beginning of illumination indicates these planes had ample time to case their target before the attack planes arrived. There were apparently two attack leaders KATUM1 & 2 and four

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groups of attack planes (TEYOR01, MAMEM11, 3, 4, YANOMI2, MAKU05). One group reported its attack completed at 0505. Between 0515 and 0545 four of the attack plane calls reported torpedo attacks completed (RAYU). It is estimated that each of the attack plane calls represent the leader of a flight of three planes. The attack was not pushed home and though torpedoes were launched none found a target. This due to the forewarning, the intervention of CAP and the general difficulties of attaining the necessary coordination. (Recommend examination of CinCPAC CinCPOA translation and interrogation #19 item 10210 page 65 ff. for excellent exposition of Japanese torpedo attack doctrine including communications.)

About 0630 four search planes (NKMN) appeared and issued a heavy volume of sighting reports with grids. These planes used the ISA indicator with numeral prefix corresponding to the variable numeral in their call; thus 6REU3 used indicator 3ISA, 6REU4 used 4ISA, etc. Reports put out by these planes used the regular sequence of precedence indicators, TETETE on first sighting, UUU on amplification, and KIKIKI on weather reports. Grids originated by Kanoya's search planes appeared regularly on his broadcast within one or two minutes of time of origin. Grids were on several units of the task force including ourselves and our CAP engaged several planes during the morning -- shot down two between 0550 and 0730.

At 0752 activity was noted for the first time on 6050Kcs estimated*. The first traffic was an amplifying report (NR2) by a KNK a/c giving grid position 31:17 132:03 and using RISA KO. This is unknown frequency probably used by Nansei Shoto air activity. Two unsigned bases were heard working search planes KNK(N).

Beginning with Kure report of shipboard planes over Saeki AB at 0915 a steady stream of sighting reports was intercepted. Due to the continued imminence of enemy search planes we were unable to give much attention to the reaction to our strike.

Search continued throughout the day and numerous grids were given on our position by planes using 6685 and 6050. Planes on 6050 made suicide attacks on one of the other groups at 1300 at which time we heard for the first time the tactical signal NINIMI. This signal on this occasion and several times later was used as the attack signal for suicide planes. No more activity heard this day on 6050 except for return flight of leader of this attack.

* Our frequency meter broke down on the 15th and was not available for use during the remainder of the operation.

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Still looked for trouble on 7035J but frequent check revealed not significant activity. Also heard was carrier training freq. 7110.

During evening watch Kanoya's search planes continued very active using 3342 after 1800. Issued numerous sightings and seather reports on various units of our task force. Search planes still using NKKN calls.

On its first appearance about 8 February 6685 was being used by KKKN calls engaged in night torpedo attacks off southern Kyushu--estimated then to be army units training under 1KFGB. Reported to flag possibility of a torpedo attack as soon as the 3-kana-numeral calls appeared.

19 March 1945

Just before midnight 18 March two KKKN calls appeared on 3342 and one gave the signal: all units prepare to attack! (TUTUTU). This plane made a single appearance with traffic at 0017 and was seen no more. It is not known with what units he was engaging. A new group of KKKN search-tracking planes appeared and were up until 0300 but did no business. About 0200 they were joined by two other groups and a plane of one of these groups made contact with grids about 0340. One of these groups (NKIRU1, 2) had been heard on 7114M communicating with base call NEKO on 18 March. At 0313 a plane using same call (KKN) as used by one of the torpedo units on the previous day appeared with a contact report giving position in our vicinity but nothing further was heard of him. Grids came thick and fast throughout the morning many indicating approach close aboard our pickets.

At 0720 intercepted the signal: all units attack! (TOTOTO). Plane's call was unheard. This was probably the attack which resulted in disaster to CV FRANKLIN.

At 0935 received word from CTF of dive bombers in vicinity of TF. No indications here.

At 0950 CN call for base on 6050 called a plane announcing a full air alert. This call (KI4TI) identified by FRUPAC as AB Oroku (D).

At 1015 contact was made by a KKKN plane on Kanoya's primary. Numerous grids were reported by this and other planes which joined him. This developed into a dive bombing - suicide attack on 58.3. The first signal to attack (NININI) was intercepted at 1247, another at 1406. We were again preoccupied with keeping track of search units and possible attack groups, consequently only small evidence of reaction to our strikes in N. Kyushu - Shikoku area was noted. There was more evidence on the broadcast of reaction to the B29 strike on the Osaka area.

Only other activity of note this day was contact with a picket boat. At 1845 2NASASU reported enemy DDs, at 1900 he was being attacked by them, at 1717 unident ANA586 reported the position and composition of our task group. Our pickets were uncertain of the results, but it was not thought that the enemy was sunk. This was confirmed when 2NASASU originated traffic at 1510/20 saying he expected to arrive at Shimoda at 1700 and proceed to Yokohama the next day.

20 March 1945

Between midnight and 0600 three picket boats were heard. One was the same that made contacts the previous evening. Two others reported enemy EDs and BBs and one reported a fierce battle from which he escaped. Most of the positions given were to the extreme west margin of our group. Grid positions of this sighting were reported but only very fragmentary recoveries of the text were possible.

Picked up Kanoya's primary 6685 at 0915. Between then and 1300 a group of three planes tracked 58.2 (with the FRANKLIN) sending 11 grid positions on that group. One of these planes was engaged by CAP but apparently escaped and one by one dropped from circuit between 1130 and 1300. (Believe secondary circuit was not used.) Another group of three took up the good work appearing at 1315. Both of these groups worked an unsigned base thought to be Kanoya. At 1050 one plane called KASUI (not Fu-3). This call appeared the following days unchanged and is estimated to be Kanoya's base call when working combatant units of 1KFGB.

TG58.1 moving west to cover FRANKLIN retirement was spotted by planes tracking 58.2. At 1520 reported one of these planes had an extremely intense signal and was probably close aboard.* At 1548 somebody on this circuit passed a message NR5 to three KNK calls thought to be collective flight calls--though they may have been bases. Reported to flag possibility that attack units were being sent in from Kanoya. At 1602 one of Kanoya's tracking planes sent a sighting report with 58.2 position to two calls of the KNK type. Between 1630 and 1700 two groups of planes, using KNK calls mentioned above with numeral suffix, were heard giving attack signal (NININI). The attack was on 58.2. Two tracking planes last heard at 1620 being pursued (TUSEU).

Concurrently with the above activity an attack was carried out by planes operating on 6050Kcs. Beginning at 1245 seven KNKN calls appeared working an unidentified CN call base (TE6MO). Each of these calls was taken to represent the leader of a flight of two or three planes. One plane turned back at 1330. First traffic was passed at 1440 when one plane reported sighting enemy surface units. And at 1452 this plane gave the position of the sighting. Since it was close aboard TG58.1 was alerted. At 1450 sent CQY 6050 to all 5th Fleet RI units. At 1538 the signal to attack was given. From then until 1950 the base was heard calling his planes with no answer. One plane secured at the base at 1630 apparently all others were destroyed in the attack. Target was 58.2.

The fact that these planes were nearly two hours airborne before they sighted us at 29:37 135:28 is further evidence along with the Dog ident for Oroku AB on this circuit. Two hours is too long to have been from a base in Kyushu.

* Being aware of doctrine against estimation of a transmitter range on basis of signal strength I have yet found by experience that there is a fairly consistent and detectable indication of an opening and closing relationship to transmitter. When the indications were pronounced I have reported the conclusion of proximity or distance with reservation as to reliability.

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After 1700 Kanoya search planes were up again giving contact reports with grids falling on 58.2. Another group took up the tracking duty about 1930. It turned out that this was the beginning of the second torpedo attacks launched against this group. At 2122 the leader of the illumination and attack units was heard for the first time. At 2254 he asked for "homing" signals (HOTE4) from the tracking planes. Repeated this request at 2313 and 2320. The failure of the guide group to receive this request for bearings apparently resulted in arrival of the illumination group on the scene. At 2325 the base(?) told one of the tracking planes to drop flares. At 2330 heard for the first time a KKKKN call said he had completed his torpedo attack! Simultaneously another plane commanded: all units attack! (TOTOTO). It is apparent that the illumination plane failed. Of the five torpedo planes (or groups of planes) heard not one pressed home his attacks. Torpedoes were launched at extreme range. Two of the tracking unit at least survived the attack and were heard on the homeward route.

21 March 1945

The search was taken up by three planes about 0030 and between then and 0330 they sent in 12 contact reports with grids on 3342. These sightings were on various units of the TF including 58.1. Two planes were called back to base at 0230. The third made his last transmission a grid in the vicinity of our picket at 0330. Our CAP splashed a plane in this area at 0335.

This circuit became active again about 0800 and many grids on various units of TF58 and especially 58.2 were reported to Kanoya. At least one attack was mounted. One group (KNKN) first heard at 0940 made a contact at 1210 with 58.2 and at 1219 gave the signal: all units attack! This attack fell on 58.2. Three KNKN groups were involved.

The activity involving 58.2 was given immediate and repeated airing on MIKA and it appeared that 58.2 which at that time was between 58.1 and 58.3 all moving south, had been selected as the target. About 1100 three groups of planes appeared apparently not associated with the attack then developing on 58.2. At 1143 plane 4SIKUL relayed to NO3SIL a grid originated at 1100 by one of the tracking planes which had homed the attack which came off at 1220. The grid was on 58.2. At 1150 another of these tracking planes reported sighting a carrier force and gave our position -- we were bringing up the rear. Task group was alerted. At 1205 SA7SIL passed this report and position to NO3SIL. NO3SIL did not roger for this nor for the grid relayed to him at 1143.

At 1243 the unsigned base sent his NR15 containing grid 25:50 134:30 (58.2) to FU3WA, 7TAYU, RO4YO, TI2RI UKE NO3SIL*. Since 7TAYU had appeared with suffixes earlier in the morning we assumed that the other calls were collective a/c calls also. The fact that only one call was supposed to receipt for the message

* Looking at this afterwards it seems possible that the calls addressed here except NO3SIL were the fighter escort. None of these calls originated any traffic--which is consistent with their being fighter planes. If this is the case NO3SIL was probably leading them to a rendezvous with the bombers, communicating with them by VHF voice or by visual signals. After making rendezvous NO3SIL would become leader and communication control for the combined group.

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indicates radio silence had been imposed and we informed Flag Plot of the possibility that three or four attack groups were on their way out. At 1347 4SIKUL addressed a weather report to NO3SIL giving our position 26:07 134:23 -- no roger was heard. It now appeared that 4SIKUL was in the vanguard of the approaching attack as a tracking plane with NO3SIL directing the attack and handling communications. He was not heard by us to roger for the messages addressed to him, which was probably the result of strict communication silence. At 1425 base called SA7MOL, NESFUL, 4SIKUL UKE NO3SIL. This traffic contained no grid. Notified Flag Plot immediately that it was highly probable air attack was on the way down under radio silence and that it was probably well on its way. At 1513 plane 4SIKUL sent another contact message containing position of our task group. By this time however the attacking group bombers and fighters had been intercepted and practically annihilated to the north before penetrating our screen.*

This was the end of Kanoya's activities for 27 March. At 1454 he was heard on 6740 calling one of the search planes heard earlier on 6685. At 1700 he began working 4SIK02.** It is interesting to note that Kanoya used his CN call (TI4NI) several times this day on both 6685 and 6740.

TF58.1 retired south to fueling rendezvous and RI watch was reduced to one man, all hands seizing opportunity for much needed rest.

22 March 1945

Spent this day fueling and rearming. Receiving conditions notably weaker in area BEDBUG. Only circuit rendering any volume was 7035 and none of its traffic was tactical.. At 1445 copied the Nansei Shoto circuit 6115 intercepting a message originated by a plane and mentioning leaving Kanoya for Kikai Jima. On this same circuit at 1512 Minami Daito relayed to blank another message with reference to Kikai Jima. Noted much 5-numeral traffic originated by Nansei Shoto commands appearing on the broadcasts. No unusual associations were seen except Okinawa BF NR222003 addressed to unidents and a subforce call (NATUI).

Task group proceeded north during the night to the area east of Okinawa.

23 March 1945

Heard single KNKN plane working unident base I3NE at 0415 on 6640. Sent two messages concerning landing procedure. Base calls were heard on the AGrp 951 circuit (6430) also during early morning but no significant traffic.

* 18 BETTYS and 20 odd fighters were destroyed by 58.1's CAP. Pictures later during the engagement show that some of the BETTYS were carrying BAKA bombs.

** This is the first time we noted the use of a secondary circuit by Kanoya.

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Gave thorough coverage to Nansei Shoto base force and base to base air circuits this day, especially 6115, 5512, 4192 and 5305. Noted normal reactions to our air strikes throughout the Ryukyus with Okinawa BF, Oroku AB, Minami Daito, SEF #4 Cdr predominating. Generally speaking, from these BF and AB circuits we were unable to glean much intelligence except to log plane sightings and air alerts (Flag Plot was interested both these items). These circuits could be guarded only at expense of air/ground coverage which is our primary responsibility. Radar reports and specially urgent indications of distress to surface and shore units appeared quickly on both NORU and MIKA.

First Mobile primary became active in mid-morning. At 1115 Kanoya passed to his planes (5WOTA) a grid originated by a plane (5YUNU) unheard here but probably working on 6050E. This grid was on our radar picket. No contact was made with us by planes on this circuit until 1251 when a sighting report with our position was given by 5WOTAL. At 1305 a plane (call unheard) gave the command: all units attack! (TOTOTO). Our force had been alerted but no attack was forthcoming. At 1315 5WOTAL sent weather for our position. At 1331 having apparently orbited our position gave a grid slightly to the south east and gave weather for that position at 1340. At 1355 he was being chased. This was quite possibly the JILL reported splashed by our D CAP about that time. Two other planes of this group were heard working base as late as 1550. No other activity from Kanoya this day until 2335 when NKK a/c call originated his NRL on 3342 (msg unread here contains no grid). Another NKK plane was heard (S1). A grid originated by this latter plane at 2340 was broadcast by Kanoya at 2348. Position was between us and 58.3 which was under attack at that time.

The Nansei Shoto tactical circuit 6050E was active. At 1057 Oroku AB on 6115 sent to Ishigaki AB traffic originated at 1025 and 1030 by planes 2KIMI and 5YUNU respectively and these grids were both approximately on our radar picket. At 1120 we picked up 2KIMI on 6050 being worked by FUEMI (Oroku?). The plane itself was not heard until 1715. Between 1100 and 2100 FUEMI worked this plane and another a/c call OSATI. No traffic was passed, only signal strength signals. We estimated that these planes were probably kept in the air all day except for short intervals due to our bombing of the field at Okinawa. Plane 5YUNU was not heard but it seems likely that he was out of Oroku using 6050. His 1030 grid (on our radar picket) was put out by Oroku on 6115 at 1058 and by Kanoya on 6685 at 1115. 58.1's RAFCAP shot down a MYRT between 1030 and 1100 this morning.

24 March 1945

Activity was at a low level this day. Kanoya had several groups of search planes up. None of the grids given by these planes fell near our positions. One of these planes disappeared abruptly from the circuit after reporting he was being pursued at 0640. Our outbound strike splashed a single engine plane about this time. Many of the planes up on 6685 today shifted over to 6740 on the way back to the base.

Nansei Shoto tactical circuit came up at 0600 with probable Oroku (I2TA) working three NKK plane calls. One of these planes originated traffic at 0800 containing a grid for the approximate position of our minesweeping group. Nothing

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more of a tactical nature was noted.

At 1020 a NKK plane on 6650A (Formosa) originated a grid giving our position (msg unread). This grid was given an immediate airing on Sasebo, Kanoya, Tokyo, and Takao broadcasts. Sent a CY to other RI units. This same plane originated several other messages (no grids) but the circuit died out about noon.

Tried this day to detect evidence of transportation run though to be under-way from Kyushu to Amami Shima. Only possible association with such a movement was a message copied at 1206 from NORU in which J call JTJN gave his position as 29:28 129:40 at 1130. Our offensive search made no contact with any Jap surface units on the 24th.

went into effect this day on 6685 and 6650.

25 March 1945

First Air Fleet circuit 6650A was active this morning with two base calls appearing. This activity was in the vicinity of our fueling group but no attacks were made. One plane sent a grid on this group's position at 1025.

None of Kanoya's circuits were active. Air/ground activity of a local nature was noted on 3370E, 7035J and 6985J—all in the Kyushu area. In absence of air activity we were able to give good coverage to Okinawa BF, Oshima Def Force and SEF #4 circuits. Nothing was seen in traffic that appeared to be related to our strikes against shipping in the Amami Oshima area.

During the late afternoon planes were active again on 6650 and gave grids which indicated they had sighted a destroyer group which was enroute to join us for the move south to fueling rendezvous. No attack was made.

26 March 1945

Fueled again this day. On this and all other fueling occasions we noted a pronounced decrease in the amount of air circuits audible. A high noise level prevails in this area. On 26 March during the afternoon we experienced a two hour blackout (also noted by ship's radio).

Noted a group of search planes out of Kanoya on 3342 between 0000 and 0300. They made no contacts.

Reduced the coverage today to enable us to get some sleep. Guarded 6650 and Sasebo broadcast, checked Kanoya's primary. At least five planes were up out of Taiwan during the morning. They were probably search planes since though they originated many contact reports they apparently made no attacks on our forces. Between 0800 and 1130 they gave grids on the carrier forces east of Okinawa and two of them gave reports with grid positions less than 60 miles from our fueling group. Planes on this circuit do not always use TETETE, UUU, etc. on their sightings, they do not use sector indicators and often their grids are sent in an irregular form (e.g. MAUMAU3TU). From translation of some of this traffic it seems likely that our fueling group was sighted by one of these planes but task

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group reported no Bogies during the morning.

Kanoya's primary circuit 6685 was active during the late afternoon and evening. One search plane (NKKW) beginning at 1600 gave a series of contact reports, amplifications, and weather reports for each of two forces sighted west of Okinawa. Snooper plane took over about 1800 and reported on the same targets, until about 2000. At 2110 three 3-kana-numeral calls appeared. We informed Flag Plot of the possibility of an attack being made on the landing support forces west of Okinawa. This plane and two of the same group sent traffic between 2313 and 2326 which later translated revealed that they had attacked surface units sinking one cruiser (our units west of Okinawa were attacked at that time--cruiser not sunk).

Also up during the evening were three NKKW search planes out of Kanoya on 3342. Two of these gave sightings on carrier units east of Okinawa. Both of these Bogies reported they were being pursued just prior to midnight.

TG58.1 moved northward during the night.

27 March 1945

TG58.1 returned to area EAGLE this morning.

Between midnight and 0500 many planes were active on Kanoya's primary. Both search and attack type calls appeared. We reported several grids copied from these planes but none were in our vicinity. At 0423 an unidentified CW call base KE8NI called a plane MO8WE giving him a grid position. Between 0641 and 0702 our picket shot down two single engine Bogies--we saw no indication of this in traffic. Other planes on this circuit during the morning gave grids and amplifications west of Okinawa. No attacks were made. Planes working on 6685 went over onto secondary circuit 6740 going home. Two unident CW base calls were prominent on this circuit during the morning.

Air activity was nil for the remainder of this day.

28 March 1945

This day after a photo strike over Kikai Jima TG58.1 moved northward. Our mission was to intercept and destroy enemy surface units which were expected to sortie from Bungo Channel. Kept a careful check on the broadcast to catch the earliest reaction to our movement north. Also checked mobile frequencies and Sasebo local ship to shore for evidence of fleet movement. Our primary concern was however, the detection of any airborne counter measure.

Air activity on First Mobile's circuits continued at a low ebb. Cn 6650 (1st Air Fleet) unidentified base call MO7TE worked two a/c calls between 0800 and 0920 but there was no tactical traffic and circuit secured at 0920. This circuit was copied briefly at 1500 and NKK a/c call was heard giving a grid which fell in the Okinawa area--the circuit was dropped.

Kanoya had not been noted working any planes on his primary circuit 6685 today. From 1600 until 1800 three groups of planes using NKKW calls were engaged

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in training exercises on his secondary circuit 6740. Traffic was heavy using unassigned and Roman letter values of TA 77. The base did not sign his call. The planes used a single kana suffix with their serials. At 1640 this activity was interrupted by our strikes on southern Kyushu and the base using his charlie call MA 4 SI (Kanoya) warned them of the air alert. At 1842 he called them all back to base.

Our strike was launched at 1400 and was supposed to make the desired redevous with Japanese naval units off Miyazaki about 1630, one group of fighters making a diversionary sweep over Kanoya. First tip-off came at 1612 when Tanegashima reported sound of unidentified a/c headed north. Tsui Lookout Station made a radar report at 1641: unidentified target appearing suddenly, bearing 195 distance 65 miles. Kanoya went under full alert at 1706. At 1712 he reported 30 Grummans overhead. Weather prevented the torpedox-bomber force from hitting even its secondary target, Miyazaki.

The only other activity of interest was a message sent by probable Ibutsuki A-B. (MEI YO) to unident base on 5075. This message reported the arrival at Ibutsuki at 1900 of a plane which had survived an attack by a Grumman over Kagoshima Bay.

29 March 1945

TG 58.1 remained off southern Kyushu the night of the 28-29th and was joined by TG 58.3 in the morning. Continued an offensive search of the Kyushu-Shikoku littoral but found no mobile targets. The fighter-bomber strikes against Kyushu air bases was reflected in the morning's traffic. Many alerts and plane sighting reports were heard. We retired southward during the afternoon.

Air activity was kept down to nothing during the morning. There was no attempt to strike back at the carrier forces lying off Kyushu. An unsine base worked a single plane on 5075 briefly about 0700. At 0912 unident FU 0 YU sent traffic to KE 0 SI (Usa) on 7035 concerning night tactical training between the 10th and 15th of (April?).

Kanoya did manage to get two search planes out in the morning and one of the snoopers reported 58.3's position. The base relayed this information to other planes of the same group. Previously unheard calls appeared on the secondary circuit about 1400 and worked Kanoya (MU 6 TU). There landing was delayed by our raids on Kyushu and one of them made a forced landing at unidentified N 7 NE, possibly Omura where some of them were instructed to land. Between 2200 and mid-night at least 6 a/c probably all snoopers were up on 3342 and some of them made radar contacts with something they mistook for an enemy force lying south of Shikoku.

Received today a photostat of captured TA 77 complete. What a break.

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30 March 1945

Kanoya mounted a torpedo attack against the target located by radar by one of his search planes at 2310. At 0033 he told that plane the attack group was on the way. At 0015 attack group (TEYOR01) announced it would arrive at 0030. At 0051 the command to drop flares was given. At 0150 illuminating planes were ordered to change the color of the flares on account of the fog. Much confusion ensued with many grids given. The contacts made with 58.3 radar pickets and one of the snoopers was shot down by NCAP. No attacks were launched. Base tried repeatedly to vector his planes to the enemy's position but all contacts were false. Several planes complained of faulty radar gear. All in all Kanoya had had two groups of planes out after us that night including three groups of attack planes without making a real contact. These planes went back to base after 0500 using 6650E* as a secondary circuit. Due to poor weather conditions in the Kanoya area they went into Omura, Kumamoto and Miyazaki. The plane which dropped the flares at 0051 was a float plane out of Takuma--at 0711 he reported that due to the heavy fog he would land on the surface at Kawano Bay and taxi back to base (Takuma?). It is apparent from this and from other instances that the various flights working on 6685 and controlled by Kanoya's radio originate in widely scattered bases. It is not clear at which stages of the flights they enter and leave Kanoya's communication control. The plane mentioned above was working an unident base call KE7YU when he sent the traffic mentioned above.

Two groups of planes worked unident NASKA on 6740 during the afternoon but the nature of these flights is not clear. It did not seem to be drill traffic.

31 March 1945

Fueling this day. B29 strikes resulted in air alerts throughout the Inland Sea area and Kyushu during the morning.

At 0652 on 6640A AØRE (Kanoya?) working KN planes gave them weather for Miho AB indicating a flight from Kanoya to Miho.

At 0715 call KI working call H01 on 6740E addressed OI Air Base internally and gave him instructions regarding some observation (Kansoku) planes.

At 1025 unsigned base worked two NKKN a/c briefly on 7115E giving them landing instructions. This may be the same as 7110J later appearing as a secondary frequency for Kanoya.

Noted training exercises on 7035 during the afternoon.

Two groups of search planes were up on 6685 and 6740 during the afternoon but made no contacts. At 2350 KOR001 originated a radar contact with enemy surface force giving position 32:57 132:43 (?).

1 April 1945

Kanoya's primary was active from the beginning of this day with a KKKN type call appearing just before midnight. A KNKN call appeared at 0030 with one startling statement that he was attacking. No grids had appeared near any of our carrier groups. At 0045 a KNKN call reported he had torpedoed a transport thus

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fixing the locale of this attack to the west of Okinawa.

At 0131 KNKN sighted 58.1 and reported our position. At that time radar picked him up at 35 miles and NCAP shot him down at 0146 (BETTY).

At 0430 base call HA3SE (Kanoya?) called collective RORUMAtelling them that an enemy carrier force was in position 27:12 128:28 at 0000, and at 0436 he gave them a weather report from Oroku. This plane reported at 0616 that he had completed his attack and gone on to Ishigaki. He did not attack anyone in TF58.

Several pieces of traffic originated by planes unheard here were copied from the MIKA broadcast. This traffic included contact reports (no grids) and one tactical attack signal (TOTUTOTUTU). This traffic probably was originated on 3342.

From 0700 to 1000 heard a number of unident bases and planes using CN calls on 6540E. No tactical signals noted.

By noon Kanoya had five search planes and a possible attack group air borne. At 1330 Kanoya told the possible attack group that enemy carrier force was at 26:30 130:50 (58.3 35 miles east of us). Possible attack group turned out to be just another snooper. He originated a number of sighting reports on small craft lying off preferred beaches on Okinawa. Secondary circuit is still 6740. The unsigned base controlling 6740, assumed to be Kanoya ordered one of his search planes which reported motor trouble to go to Kisaratsu, indicating that this was a search line running eastward out of Kanoya.

At 1425 Kanoya sent Miyako Jima's 1300 weather to Tomitaka AB. At 1426 he sent a 51 group message to Tomitaka AB. This was probably an order concerning a flight southward--perhaps a shuttle bombing attack.

At 1605 the same snooper heard at 1330 popped up again being chased (TUSEU). He then sent a series of sighting reports on a group of carriers operating north-east of Okinawa. This was our TG's position but CIC had no bogies on the screen. He moved over on to 6740 about 1700 and went back to Kanoya.

At 2300 picked up KOR004 giving a sighting report. This plane and another of the same group thought they spotted an enemy force off Toizaki. It was a false start and Kanoya told them to get on with their scheduled search at 2345.

Noted also this day there were three KNKN a/c calls and two base type CN calls working on 6540E. At 0739 on of these a/c announced he had completed the attack--results unknown. The locale of this attack is unknown.

2 April 1945

The KOR00 planes continued southward running into an interception CAP north of Kikai where one of them reported being pursued. Between midnight and 0700 seven other flights of planes using KKKK calls were noted working out of Kanoya. They made many contacts during the night and mounted an attack against what they thought was a carrier force off Kikai (we had a shipping strike up there, but the carrier groups remain well to the south). Kanoya questioned the position given

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and the plane said the target was 210° 7 miles (!) off Kikai. Kanoya then at 0334 called three KKK base calls (army?) and told them to attack this target. Our NCAP went far afield and shot down a JILL and two GEORGES on our extreme northern permits before dawn.

Most of these planes returned to base on 6740 (3321). Weather conditions were bad at Kanoya and some of them went into Tsuiki, others to Shibushi. The KOROO planes used 6650E. Kanoya's call when working these planes on 6740 was OMARO.

It should be noted that after 1 April Kanoya (1DFGB) tactical circuit was used almost exclusively by KKKN a/c calls. These calls are thought to be army type calls each series appearing for three or four days consecutively. Kanoya's call when he uses one is a KKK call which changed every five days. This change in call system is possibly due to prominence of army air units under 1KFGB-- though almost surely the planes using these calls are not all army planes. When first heard about 8 February in training exercises 3-kana-numeral calls were used on 6685.

One group of search planes was up out of Kanoya during the afternoon. One of these reported sighting a cruiser in the approximate position of our picket--no bogie reported by CIC. He later made a report of a large number of landing craft lying off Naha. No other activity noted on this circuit today.

At 0900 on 6465E call KIL reported to blank that two shipboard attack planes (KANKOU2KI) had made a forced landing at Izumi AB.

During the afternoon the same plane (NKKN) which was sent to Kisaratsu on the preceding day again showed up in association with Kisaratsu. This activity was noted on 6740, Kanoya's secondary circuit. However this repeated association with Kisaratsu and the fact that all other calls on Kanoya's circuits were KKKN calls suggests that this may be an unrelated activity--possibly AGrp 903 which was prominent using 6740 before the first carrier strike on Tokyo.

Noted also during the morning (N)KKN a/c engaged in searching operations. The planes were working Tokushima AGrp (SAMUNE9). Whether this is same activity as previously associated by us with Kanoya on 7115E is not clear.

No tactical activity seen on 6540E.

3 April 1945

The day started off abruptly with a KKKN call out of Kanoya announcing at 0125 that he expected to arrive in battle zone at garbled time. We did not hear the search activity that must have preceded this attack. This same plane said he had found the enemy at 0235. We still didn't know where he was but his signals seemed to come from a great distance. At 0252 the leader of the attack groups gave the signal for all units to deploy for the attack (TUTUTU). Finally at 0322 he reached the scene and reported to base that the target was a formation of BB, CA and others giving a position west of Okinawa. At 0418 one of the attack groups reported that the attack was completed and one cruiser was destroyed. A total of six groups were seen on 3342 during this time and from 0600 to 0800 they were seen working the base on secondary 6740.

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Also participating in an attack during the early morning were aircraft working on 654OE. At 0637 Kanoya broadcast ME4TI2's NR0315 saying he had completed air attack blowing up and sinking a cruiser. This plane was seen working unsigned base on 654OE at 0715.

TG58.1 moved southward today relieving the British units which had been neutralizing bases in the Sakishima group.

During midmorning NKKN call planes were heard working unsigned base on 6580J. One of these planes sent in a search report giving the position 31:51 138:23.

Heard on 6740 but probably not related to Kanoya activity on that circuit were two planes (KNKN) working unsigned base.

At 1641 AB Koniya sent his 1600 weather to AB Tansui on 665QA. At 1839 Kanoya broadcast a message originated by a plane unheard by us. Message reported an enemy force in the approximate position of our fueling forces.

No other activity.

4 April 1945

TG58.1 refueled today. Air activity very light. Heard briefly during early morning two unident bases working three groups of planes on 1st Air Fleet tactical circuit. This traffic concerned point to point movements in Formosa. Only other activity noted was SI9YA working five NKKN a/c calls on 6740 during the afternoon. No traffic was passed.

5 April 1945

Back to Okinawa today. Air activity at low level. Drilling heard on 664QA, 654OE, and 6580E. There was internal reference to Kanoya AB in one of the messages transmitted on 664QA. Heard three groups of planes up on 6685-6740. These were NKKN calls. No traffic was originated on this circuit. Two groups of these planes worked unsigned base and were probably out of Kanoya. The third worked SI9YA (same call as on previous day) and was not out of Kanoya.

Single KKKN call appeared on Kanoya's primary just before midnight.

6 April 1945

First Mobile launched a pre-dawn torpedo attack against support units standing west of Okinawa. At 0215 a search plane reported Okinawa (?) weather. At 0244 the guide plane called three other flight leaders (illuminators & attackers). About 0300 each of these three answered probable ETA battle zone. A total of six attack groups were noted and thought the signals to illuminate and attack were not heard several units reported their attack completed after 0330 -- one reported he had hit a battleship. Some of these flight calls were later seen working Kanoya on 3370/6740.

At 0726 a fresh snoopers reported sighting something in approximate position of our radar picket. There were five search planes up at this time. At 0823 one of

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them reported 3 CVs. His signal was very strong and CIC reported a bogie. Two other search planes report our position between 0800 and 1000. CIC has bogies on the screen and RAPCAP has splashed a HAMP and a KATE. At 0904 one of the search planes sent his NRL using a cipher not understood here (MO.RO.HA.NI.I). This type of traffic has been noted several times since but no solution has been found for it. Positions of other TGs were also reported. At 1037 a new call came up and announced his expected time of arrival (no values held). At 1134 this plane made contact with 58.3 just north and east of us. A third flight appeared on this circuit at 1230. At 1250 another kana-period message was sent (MO.RO.I.HA.NI). Still more groups appeared. Between 1255 and 1330 ships of this TG shot down six enemy suicide-bombers. Snoopers continued to send grids during the afternoon mostly on our radar picket and on 58.3. Our DCAP shot down six more planes during the afternoon. All surviving units had moved over to 6740 by 1700.

Also seen on 6740 was a KKKN a/c not seen on 6685. This plane was up most of the afternoon sending 3 numeral traffic.

This was the end of air activity for the day.

7 April 1945

Kanoya had search planes up from 0030 this morning but no contact was made until 0811 when our position was reported (3CVs). Radar picket shot down a plane at 0815 but it wasn't this boy for he was still elaborating on his sighting at 0916. Three of Kanoya's planes reported they were being chased during the morning. Our CAP splashed several bogies before noon.

Our position was reported at 1255 by a fresh snoopers out of Kanoya. Between 1400 and 1500 six flights using KKKN calls appeared on 6580E. On preceding day planes on this circuit had been engaged in drill. At 1435 one of these flights reported being pursued by 7 carrier planes. This same plane escaped and at 1507 he reported: we are dropping bombs. CIC had a very large Bogie at this time and the CAP was enlarged. At 1515 base called another plane of this group asking a question not understood here (KATAKE"NI"). This signal has been heard since both in affirmative and interrogative form. At 1525 the signal to attack was given (NININI). Only two planes penetrated our screen and they were destroyed by gunfire at 1541 and 1543; one of them fell just a few yards short of crashing the San Jacinto. DCAP and RAPCAP got six others. Another task group was under attack at this same time. From 1550 until 1830 the base called these planes. Apparently only one survived -- he was heard securing his transmitter at 1628.

These attacks were made in coordination with the suicide sortie of the YAMATO and was undoubtedly intended to preoccupy our carrier force while the sea monster struck our landing and support units.

One of Kanoya's search planes used 3325E as a secondary circuit before dawn. It is not clear whether this is a harmonic of 6650 or of 6640 -- probably the latter

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8 April 1945

Fueled this day. No significant air-ground activity noted. Saw brisk reaction to B29 strike against Kyushu on MIKA broadcast.

9 April 1945

Supplying target CAP for Okinawa and Kikai again today. Tactical air traffic at very low level with no search planes out of Kanoya during the morning. From 0700 until noon unsign base tried without success to raise a single KNKN flight call.

First Air Fleet circuit 6650 was busy during the afternoon with at least three flights working Shinchiku. At least one of these arrived at Ishigaki at 1852. Noted also on another First Air Fleet circuit 5285 three flights of planes working Shinchiku and Takao. One of these planes at 1938 reported he had attacked a cruiser. This was over on the island. At 2000 Takao sent to two flights on this circuit weather for Taito and Taichu. They experienced much difficulty getting back to base due to the weather. Some stayed over at Shinchiku, others went on to Takao.

Received today photostat of captured

(TA79) currently in effect.

10 April 1945

Still operating off Okinawa. Tactical air activity nil for this day. The expected enemy effort apparently postponed on account of bad weather. At 0800 probable Ibutsuki AB (MIØ) on 6340 reported cloudy weather, solid overcast at 1000 meters, no wind.

During the afternoon Kanoya had two search flights up on 6685 but no contacts were reported. One of these flights flew on to Taiwan going into Shinchiku on 6650.

11 April 1945

Task group 58.1 fueled today. Receiving conditions were better than usual in fueling area. Noted six search planes up out of Kanoya from 0630 until 1200. These planes gave many contact reports on other carrier groups and on support units west of Okinawa. They worked Kanoya (KITEMA) using 6580J as secondary circuit on their return flights. One of them sent 3-numeral traffic on the secondary frequency. New groups of planes took up the tracking chore about 1300 and were shortly joined by two other groups who attacked the Okinawa radar picket seriously damaging two destroyers. The attack signals were not heard but at 1525 one of the search planes said he had seen friendly attack units, striking the enemy in that position. At 1545 this snoopers called his relief giving him the position of one our carrier groups. At 1632 the new search plane reported he had found the enemy carriers passing the position on to two other groups of planes. At 1700 there appeared three groups announcing that they would arrive in battle area at 1840. At 1722 probable base TOEKU called another base call KISOHI saying: Attack after 1900! At 1800 three groups reported expected time of arrival ranging from 1845 to 1905. At 1847 the attack leader ordered the illuminating planes to make preliminary illumination (presumably meaning to drop guide flares). After 1800 some of the attack units used 6685 some 3342

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The first order to attack was given at 1903, another at 1909. At 1911 one group reported its attack completed, another at 1915. At 1927 presumably at another target the order to drop flares was given and at 1930 another group reported its attack completed. At 2002 another command to attack was given. At 2018 one of the attack leaders reported he could see four "pillars of fire". At 2028 still another flight reported its attack completed. This torpedo attack like its predecessors failed to score a single hit. Survivors (very few were shot down) returned to base using 6580Kcs.

12 April 1945

In the first three hours of the day Kanoya had two groups of search planes up on his primary frequency. One of these was last seen at 0006 being pursued and is thought to be the MAVIS splashed by NCAP on our southern perimeter.

During this same period four groups of KKKN type calls appeared on the circuit. At 0041 unsign base warned these planes to be alert (CHUUISEYO) since there was an enemy striking force 35 miles, 110° from Kikai Jima. This looked like a warning to avoid this position and it was estimated that these planes were on a bombing or mining mission to Okinawa. Several of these flights reported their "duty completed" between 0200 and 0400 (they bombed the airfields and shipping at Okinawa). These attack units and the snoopers which worked out of Kanoya switched over to 3325E about 0400. At first we took this to be a harmonic of 1st Air Fleet's 6650 indicating that these planes had proceeded to Formosan bases rather than return to Kanoya. On this circuit they worked base call YARIME -- Kanoya's call was KITEMA on secondary 6580/3290. It was later apparent that 3325 was an harmonic of 6650E (previously measured at 6642-3321) and an alternate secondary circuit for LKFGB. First Air Fleet does not go down to 3325 at night.

After 0700 seven search planes came up on 6685. These snoopers were plagued with motor trouble (or cold feet?) and only one of them reported a contact -- this of landing and support units lying between Okinawa and Kerama. Later this same Nip reported flying boats in HA sector.

During the afternoon the enemy launched a suicide - dive bomber attack on our forces west of Okinawa.

A new group of at least 8 divisions came up on Kanoya's circuit about 1300. One of these planes turned back with motor trouble. No other traffic was originated by these planes until 1414; between that time and 1558 seven of these divisions made attacks on unspecified target in vicinity of 27:02 128:18. Only two of these planes seem to have survived the attack and at 1558 one reported blowing up a BB at 26:57 127:03. Another apparently eluded four carrier VF at 1527 and was still going strong at 1730.

At 1150 activity was first noted on an unfamiliar circuit. Three groups of KKKN calls came up indicating a southward flight. These planes were undoubtedly Kamikazes. Between 1200 and 1430 they kept up a constant chatter, obviously trying to keep up their courage, passing such remarks as: "We are hastening on to the battle zone", "Divine providence is with us", "We are full of confidence", "All planes heading straight south with high spirits", "Everything is favorable for the attack", "Just watch #2--he is a tough egg"(this from plane #2), "On to Okinawa under watchful eyes of the Gods", at 1420 they had "not yet seen any enemy fighters", and at

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ULTRA

1421 "We are upon the enemy". Between this time and 1430 these planes sent only long dashes (an attack signal) and were seen no more. Note this attack was simultaneous with that by planes on Kanoya's frequency.

Each of the approximately 20 calls which appeared is thought to represent a VAL or a BETTY having under its command a group of S/E planes; the leaders guide the small planes into the target area by visual contact. The command to attack is given by long dashes--which even pilots untrained in CW would be able to receive. Apparently the guide planes themselves do not attack until the S/Es have done their work. Some VALs and BETTYS functioning in this capacity are known to have launched buzz bomb from high angels while suicide planes were making their runs.

Nothing was seen by us in traffic of the planes which attacked us. (Formation shot down three S/E at 1530.) A single garbled grid originated by a plane on Kanoya's secondary circuit at 1305 gave three CVs at posit 26:40 129:40 (our position). Estimate single seater planes which attacked our group were not equipped with CW apparatus.

By 1830 it was apparent that a torpedo attack was going to take place. Four groups of KKKN calls were up on 3342. All of these calls were associated with the torpedo attack on the previous night. At 1850 a search plane reported carriers in our position so we were expecting the worst. At 1900 attack leaders announced time of arrival at scene of battle as 2000. As in last night's attack some of the attack units worked 6685, others 3342. The command to deploy for the attack came at 1922. At 1925 base called two collective calls telling them if they did not find the target to attack the enemy at Okinawa. At 1940 one of the groups on the day frequency gave the order to attack and at 1952 another reported his attack completed. Since no illuminating signals were used preceding this we estimate it was not a torpedo attack. At 2030 a grid was given for 58.4's position; at 2035 our position was reported. At 2048 the command to attack and to illuminate were given simultaneously (TOTOTO SEUHA). At this time flares were dropping all around us and it was like daylight. Our pickets were firing but no planes entered the formation. Between 2057 and 2105 more illumination signals were given -- and executed! But still no attack planes. Between 2100 and 2200 five planes reported they were being chased but but this by some other group as our CAP nor formation sighted a single plane during this attack although many flares were dropped inside the formation.

Even before this "attack" was over another group of search planes were on the job one of them sighted a carrier group at 25:52 130:03, this was 58.4 again.

13 April 1945

Kikusui 2 seems to be in its final phase. Between midnight and late afternoon four groups of search planes operated out of Kanoya. One of them made radar contacts with unidentified surface unit north of us about 0115. He was chased by two night fighters but "broke off the contact" and continued the search. Contact was made by another plane at 0303 and he too had VFN trouble. His companion drew ship's fire at 0339 and reported the positions (not us). One of the search planes reported at 0559 that he would arrive at Takuma at 0625; he was still on primary 3342. At 0916 a fresh snooper reported three carriers giving position of TG just south of us. At 0922 he was being chased. At 0929 he went down with a "Banzai".

At 0945 one of the search planes reported he had motor trouble and was making

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a forced landing in position 28:17 130:33. A division was sent out to look for him but nothing but a couple empty life rafts were found in the area.

Beginning at 1745 Kanoya worked one group of KKKN calls. At 1813 #3 of this group reported that he expected to arrive in battle area at 1920. This was rather embarrassing for no recent tracking activity had been heard. At 1927 he gave the command deploy for the attack. At 1930 #3 said it was impossible to attack and he was turning back fearful that he would have to make a forced landing. At 2045 #2 reported he had been prevented from carrying out his torpedo attack by enemy interceptors (this traffic had KOKOKO as precedence indicator).

Between 1800 and 2200 Schinchiku AB worked eight a/c calls on 6650 (1st Air Fleet). Only calls heard -- no traffic. It was probably aircraft which attempted to bomb the beach at Okinawa after dark on the 13th.

Between 1600 and 1800 noted a flight of probably eight planes from Tomitaka to Kanoya. These planes worked Kanoya (YULE) on 5285 (previously used by Taiwan bases and planes). Associations with Tomitaka were internal.

14 April 1945

A single search plane out of Kanoya sighted enemy surface force -- no position given -- at 0031. He was unheard after that and it is assumed that he met with disaster shortly after.

At 0806 a Kanoya snoopier reported that he was turning back with an oil leak. Another plane of this same group reported he had lost his belly tank (?) and was returning. This plane used _____ to encipher his grid position -- this would really be embarrassing if we did not hold the code. The base was unimpressed by this display of cold feet and told them to continue the search, and tipped him off to a possible target 80 miles 125° from Tokumo Shima. Another snoopier enciphered his grid position _____ at 0944.

During the morning noted a search activity on 1st Air Fleet's 6650. Plane 3NKO reported search operations completed at 0945. No contacts were reported.

On 6650E (6642?) two planes worked unident bases (WE7WE & Y07U). One of these planes said he was 50 miles off Maizuru at 1030.

During the afternoon 58.1 was subject to a fierce divebombing - suicide attack. At 1304 a plane out of Kyushu on the "suicide circuit" (7200) announced that he would arrive in the battle area at 1330. This was his first appearance. At 1306 another plane of this same call group gave his position about 110 miles northeast of us. These planes were probably the leaders of the many small planes which attacked our radar picket and formation between 1330 and 1430. Another of the lead planes gave the order prepare to attack at 1342. No other signals were given. At 1310 a BETTY was splashed over 58.3's picket, at 1315 our CAF splashed a BETTY over our eastern picket. At 1337 RANDOLPH CAP shot down a BETTY over 58.2's picket. At 1340 a JUDY and a ZEKE shot down by AA inside our formation. At this same time our radar picket was hit by three raids and splashed 19 S/E and 3 T/E by AA and RAPCAP. At 1400 58.3 RAPCAP and radar picket accounted for 3 more T/E and 15 S/E. At 1405 four more S/E

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were splashed by 58.3's DCAP. And to finish the show 58.4's DCAP splashed a BETTY at 1422.

The lack of advance tracking was notable in this attack. The raids were well underway before the first search plane reports were made. Kanoya at 1349 asked one of the attack leaders for the location of his target -- no answer. Shortly after this the base began to relay sighting reports from the come-late snoopers to the attack units but they were already destroyed or dispersed. The position of our TG and its composition was reported three times between 1400 and 1500.

What are estimated to be the many small planes participating in the attacks appeared on a Kyushu secondary circuit, the same used in similar attacks west of Okinawa on the 12th. Nine flight leaders appeared. It is not known how many planes were in each flight. Only the flight leaders were heard -- indicating that they were flying two-seater planes at least. The same flowery speeches about courage and confidence and providence were heard but on a lesser scale than on the 12th. It is probable that the single seat planes have a receiver by which they receive the signal to attack: a series of long dashes.

At 1920 an attack group out of Kanoya reported that he would arrive in the battle area at 2000. This plane made contact with our group at 26:52 130:38 by 2000. There were four groups up on 3342. At 2014 the signal to illuminate was given. Our task group is brightly illuminated but only our pickets have opened up. One group reported torpedo attacks completed at 2036 (RAYU) and at 2028 another group gave the order to make torpedo attack (RASEY). At 2032 the order to cease illumination (SEUYA) was heard. No enemy planes entered our screen but a loud explosion was heard close aboard which was thought to be either a spent torpedo or a buzz bomb. No bogies were splashed. The enemy planes shifted over to 3290 (6580) on their homeward trip.

15 April 1945

During early morning two groups of KKKN calls worked unsigned base on 3325. These planes were not heard up on the primary which indicates that this probably was not a tactical activity. No traffic was heard.

TG58.1 stood off Kikal today launching strikes against that base and Kanoya. Search activity was light with no contacts reported throughout the day. Between 0800 and 1100 Kanoya worked seven a/c (KKKN) on 6685 calling about every 15 minutes. The planes themselves were unheard. During the morning several groups of CN calls were drilling on 7200E. Previously when used as a suicide plane circuit KKKN calls were used.

At 1015 Kanoya worked a collective a/c call (3SIWI) on his secondary circuit 6580 calling planes and telling them to make a careful search for an enemy plane reported at 170 km bearing 120° from Kanoya. At 1035 he told two of these planes that there were no enemy planes over southern Kyushu.

Several groups of planes were engaged in drill on 6650E during the afternoon.

At 1500 Kanoya went under precautionary alert at the approach of our strike. At 1509 he dispersed the planes under his control broadcasting the order KUUTUKE!

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ULTRA

During the evening from 2100 to 2400 Kanoya worked two groups of 3-kana-numeral calls. No traffic was originated by base or plane until 2347 at which time one of the planes said that he expected to reach position 30-12 132-02 at 0220 (this far to the north of us). NCAP splashed a bogey over our picket at 2308 but we saw no evidence of this in traffic. Some of these planes shifted over to 3325 E after 2300.

16 April 1945

Before dawn torpedo planes out of Kyushu attacked 58.3. A few flares were dropped on the extreme edge of our formation but there was no attack. A number of search planes were active prior to 0600 but no contacts were reported.

At 0745 a fresh snooper out of Kanoya reported the position of our radar picket. Another reported our carriers and battleships at 0803. At 0810 he reported being chased by fighters but we didn't get him and later he issued several amplifying reports on his contact. A third plane of this same group sent a cryptic kana-period message at 0837 (MO,RO,HA,I.NI.). At 0853 plane #3 of the search group sent a report on the disposition of Blue shipping targets west of Okinawa. The base gave him our approximate position and instructed him to track us when he had finished his reconnaissance of Okinawa. At 0905 the base asked one of the snoopers for the targets bearing from Kikaijima. At 0919 #2 reported that he was low on fuel and at 0929 that he was being chased. At 0941 one of our pickets splashed a bogey.

Meanwhile the Kyushu Cadets were at it again, striking at surface units supporting the operation against Ieshima. At 0837 a plane on the "suicide circuit" (7200) sighted the target; at 0839 the command to attack was given (TO TO TO). This was followed by an unknown signal SETA SETA SETA and long dashes. Seven NKKN calls were heard engaging in this attack, each presumably leading a number of S/E. Two groups of attack planes working on 6685 attacked this same target at 0930. The carrier plane TCAP intercepted many raids over Kikai and Tokuno during the morning. At 0945 there was a raid on 58.1's radar picket in which 12 S/E were destroyed. We not see any indication of this raid in traffic.

About 1030 two groups of planes using KKKN calls with the same kana characters as had been used by torpedo planes in the most recent torpedo attacks appeared on 7200. It was assumed that these planes were also bound for Iejima. However, the signal that the target was sighted at 1150 and the signal to attack was so strong that we immediately advised flag plot that a suicide attack was probably close aboard -- CIC had a large bogey. Within two minutes of the signal to attack a single engine plane was destroyed by ships fire low on the water in the middle of our formation. DCAP intercepted 6 S/E and 2 T/E before they penetrated our screen.

Kanoya was under alert off and on all day as a result of further carrier plane strikes against southern Kyushu. Some of his planes returning to base on 6580 went into Usa air base.

During the evening three groups of NKKN a/c calls came up on 3600 kcs.

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ULTRA

Between 1915 and 2000 these planes carried out a torpedo attack against 58.3 to the north of us. At 1955 one of them reported that he had torpedoed a cruiser (rubbish!). In this message the grid position was encoded - - - - - . The survivors of this attack were told by the base at 2114 to go into Miyazaki.

Task group 58.1 moving southward to the fueling area escaped another torpedo attack which ~~xxx~~ came off between 2045 and 2115. This attack was made on one of the carrier groups east of Okinawa by planes which did their communicating on Kanoya's primary, 3342. This attack was followed by more snooping .

17 April 1945

This is fueling day again--what a relief! Retiring southward since sundown but not quite fast enough. At 0003 one of Kanoya's snoopers stumbled on us and reported that he was being fired on by a ship. At 0005 one of our pickets splashed a bogey (this was #4 for the Taussig in a little over 24 hours).

Noted search planes working on Kanoya's primary during the morning. Many contacts were reported.

At 1613 Kanoya sent over his broadcast the signal KUUTETU 1707. The meaning of the signal is not clear. On subsequent occasions it has been associated with air raids, usually appearing after the cancellation of the alert.

18 April 1945

Returned to station east of Okinawa. No activity noted during the early morning. At 0645 B-29s drove southern Kyushu under full air alert. Between 0700 and 0800 Shinchiku worked a single a/c call on 1st air fleet's 6650. At 0852 Kanoya canceled his full alert.

Activity on Kanoya's primary circuit today appeared very peculiar. Between 0900 and 2345 Kanoya (unsine) worked a total of 19 a/c calls. During this timethe base sent three messages. None of them were receipted for, and not a single one of the planes (?) transmitted any thing. This looks like deception.

During the afternoon Shinchiku was up again on 6650 working two a/c calls. Takao worked unident charlie calls on 5285. Beginning this day TA 79 is no longer in effect on major tactical circuits.

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19 April 1945

No tactical air activity heard today. At 2030 Kanoya again broadcast the signal KUUFETU.

20 April 1945

Still operating off Okinawa. Waiting for KIKUSUI 4 to break. Tactical air activity at a very low level again today. At 1235 a search plane (KKKN) reported something in a position north of us. Another plane of the same group gave a still more remote grid at 1245. Both of these planes transmitted their traffic almost simultaneously on 6842 and 6685. In order to do this they must have carried two transmitters and two operators---why? Kanoya's call ME TO SU was worked on both circuits. 6842 may be a new alternate primary for 1 KFGB.

Several groups of NKKN and KKKN calls appeared on 7200 but there was no indication that any of these planes were in contact with Blue forces.

Between 2100 and midnight ~~the~~ Blue shipping lying off Ieshima was subjected to a series of torpedo and suicide attacks by planes which used KKKN calls on Kanoya's secondary circuit 3370 (6740).

21 April 1945

At 0100 a group of three search planes were up on 3421 (6842) and at 0148 one of them reported our 0110 position. Our VFN chased this bogey but failed to catch him. The intervention of the night fighter probably is the reason for the delay in reporting the contact. At 0300 a single a/c call was seen on 3600 and at 0305 a group of three KKKN calls appeared on 3342. We informed the flag of the possibility that attack planes were under way. Nothing came of this, however. Kanoya kept snoopers up throughout the day on his new primary, 6842. During the afternoon one of them tracked a carrier group---not 58.1.

Briefly during the morning Kure Air Group (TO RO NO I) worked a single plane call on 6740.

From 1700 until 2000 Takao and a probable Shinchiku worked 12 a/c calls on 1st air fleet's 6650. These planes are thought to have participated in the night bombing attack on the Okinawa beachhead though no attack signals were heard. The planes on this circuit are characteristically loquacious and there is obviously no attempt to maintain radio silence such as is practiced by planes operating out of Kyushu.

Light units of 58.1 shelled Minami Daito Shima during the late after

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noon. He had a great deal of trouble getting his buddies on 6115 to roger for his high precedence reports of distress.

22 April 1945

Task Group 58.1 fueled again today. During the early morning noted a torpedo attack which Kanoya threw at Okinawa shipping between midnight and 0200.

At 0612 Kanoya dispersed his operational air craft (KUUTUKE) well in advance of his full alert. First monsters did not arrive over Toimizaki until 0728. Canceled his full alert at 0910 and called his planes back (NRE NRE NRE) at 0925. At 0935 he broadcast the signal KUUTETU (?).

At 1230 heard kana-numeral base working blank a/c on 6160 E. The plane was instructed to land at Kitagawa (posit unknown). Search planes out of Kanoya tracked carrier groups east of Okinawa during the afternoon. Between 1300 and 1900 heard unsine base working TO RA ϕ and NKKN plane on 4017, night frequency of 7110. This is a LKFG secondary frequency used during February for carrier plane training in the Kyushu area.

At 2050 picked up 6650 (1st air fleet) in time to catch a report from NKKN a/c that he had completed his bombing attack---hit one transport.

23 April 1945

No tactical activity noted today. Still waiting around Okinawa for KIKUSUI 4. Between weather and B29s they dont seem to be able to get it started.

24 April 1945

Activity very low today. Kanoya (ME TO SU) worked three KKKN calls during the morning, some on 6842 others on 6685. This latter frequency seems to be a secondary now. One of these planes went over to 5850 M and used army procedure. No contacts were reported today.

25 April 1945

Weather continues foul today and air activity remains at a low level. Kanoya had some snoopers up during the morning which reported weather in vicinity of our carrier units using both 6842 and 6685. During the afternoon he sent out another plane to survey the weather. This plane used 6850 when on his return leg. Weather data gleaned from these planes was fragmentary but enough was readable to tell that the weather was bad all the way up to Kyushu.

Between 1630 and 1730 Kanoya using his FU-3 call (NU RU TE) worked unident FU-3 (U KA KA) and two kana-numeral a/c calls. Traffic indicated a flight from unident to Kanoya. This on 6150 E.

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~~ULTRA~~

26 April 1945

Fueled again today. Kyushu was under alert from dawn 'till noon -- Kanoya called his planes back to their bases (NRENRENRE) at 1155. Enemy plane reports seldom gave the number, often referred to "the sound of planes" (BAYU) indicating that the area of low visibility still extends to Kyushu.

No tactical air traffic heard today. Briefly at 0900 AØRE (Kanoya?) worked a single NKKN a/c call on 6640A, no traffic. At 1030 Kanoya (YØ3WI) worked the unident CN call YU2SE on 7035, no traffic. At 1400 unident UNHL (not FU3) worked a/c (?) call TOYØØ telling him to return (KARE). At 1710 Koniya AB (KUWORU1) sent a weather report to Tansui AB (6715E).

27 April 1945

And back again to Okinawa. Beginning at midnight Kanoya had three search planes up. They reported no contacts during the search. By 0700 they were over on secondary 5850M going back to base. Kanoya dispersed his planes (KUUTUKE) at 0520! Went under precautionary alert at 0735 and full alert at 0745. At 0956 he told the returning search planes to go to Chiran AB (5850M). At 1010 he called one of them on 5850 and told him to come into Kanoya -- this in 3-numeral traffic. Again at 1016 in cipher he told another to land with caution since the western strip was damaged by bombs. At 1025 Kanoya cancelled its full alert.

From 1140 until 1240 three NKKN calls were engaged in drill communications on 7110E. At 1433 Kanoya said: KUUTETU (??). At 1745 noted NKKN a/c call working unident base on unidentified 6940E -- seemed to be a drill circuit. Heard unident base SI90 (believe erroneously identified as Yokohama AB -C- by RAGFOR) working single NKKN call during late afternoon--no traffic. Kanoya broadcast KUUTETU again at 2317.

At 2300 a flight of search planes appeared on Kanoya's primary, 3421.

Saw nothing of the bombing attack made on the beach tonight.

28 April 1945

Off for Ulithi today -- Kikusui #4 seems to be spending itself on the Okinawa shipping concentration. Between midnight and 0600 two groups of search planes were up but no contact reports were noted.

At 0720 Kanoya dispersed his planes and went under precautionary alert. At 0735 full alert.

At 0745 a Kanoya search made contact with a carrier force northeast of Okinawa. His report with grid appeared immediately on the broadcast. This plane was working on 5850M. At 0850 another plane of this search group sent MO.RO.HA.I.NI.0840 (??). It was his NRL and had an UUU as precedence indicator. Looks as though this is come way of reporting composition and disposition of a target. At 0903 blank plane sent MO.N.HA.KA.NI.

At 1128 Kanoya called back his scattered chickens. During midmorning noted Shinchiku and Takao working one another and probable a/c TE9MI on 1st Air Fleet's

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ULTRA

6650. Noted some of Kanoya planes working 5850 and some 6640A (6642M?) as a secondary -- on the latter they worked AØRE (Kanoya?).

At 1319 a snooper up on 6842 reported four carriers east of Okinawa. The message was broadcast instantly. He gave several amplifying reports on his sighting. Nothing more was heard on this circuit until 1630 when a new group of planes appeared. The base addressed them collectively with two long messages at 1741 and at 1814. The traffic could not be read -- it contained no plain form grids.

At 1820 and 1824 Kanoya broadcast two long messages originated by a plane which probably was up on 6650A (MIKAWO was the broadcast designator). The 2nd message contained a grid for position of shipping concentration west of Okinawa.

From 1815 until 2215 heard 16 flight calls in communication with Shinchiku and Takao on 1st Air Fleet's 6650. The volume of traffic was high as usual on this circuit, all unreadable. No actual signs of attack were noted on the circuit but it seems that these flights must have been involved in the 44 small raids which hit our shipping off Okinawa between 1800/28 and 0130/29.

29 April 1945

Sailing southward west of the Marianas today. Receiving conditions rapidly deteriorating. Kanoya's search planes made no contacts until 0818 at which time one of them reported three CVs giving a position east of Okinawa. At 0836 another search plane originated MO.RO.HA.NI.0835.

Activity on 6650 (1st Air Fleet) was much the same as on the previous night. The Kyushu CADETS were out again on 3600E(7200E). Reception was very poor on both these activities which were undoubtedly jointly responsible for another sleepless night for the ships east of Okinawa. Spent all this day writing up this report. It goes very slowly.

30 April 1945

Except for a brief period between midnight and dawn none of the Taiwas - Nansei Shoto - Kyushu air-ground circuits could be heard here.

Have set up a three-section watch, one operator on each watch. Securing the shack from 2300 'till 0600 (I) each night. Searching for signs of western Caroline air activity in view of ULTRA dope on Tan-3 operations. Our best bet probably is to catch them coming down from the Empire.

Coming south when we did we missed out on delivery of (TASØ). Probably hasn't long to run anyway.

Anchored in Ulithi lagoon at 1440.

Spent all this day on this report. Still about two days work. STANDARD mill very hard to find.

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ULTRA

The voluminous use of familiar radio procedure by the enemy, the recovery of some of his codes, and the excellent supply of high level ULTRA intelligence has made it possible for R. I. units afloat to produce an unusually high amount of intelligence of immediate tactical value during this operation.

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending March 17

(This report consists of three pages.)

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in ~~TOP SECRET~~ copy to the
NSA Technical Liaison on longer needed
5-41848 AV Copy 1

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13 March 1945

Relieved Lino Garcia, CRM. Radio equipment accounted for and found to be in satisfactory condition. A one-man watch is being maintained at anchor in Ulithi due to Kamikaze activity. Nothing of importance has been uncovered.

14 March 1945

Got underway from the fleet anchorage and sortied for ICEBERG operation. The three operators are being employed on a three section watch schedule with RinC supplementing during normal flying hours, ie 0600 to 2200 approx. It is planned to maintain the watch on this basis only until we enter the active combat area at which time the watch will be increased.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo Broadcast.
3319M	Unident Base & Planes, KN calls. Some drill t/c.
4122J	Bako BF, Takao.
5255J	Kanoya AB, Boonomisaki Lkt Sta, Tanegashima Lkt Sta.
5302J	Ooi Agrp, Suzuka Agrp, CU Kure, others.
5305J	Oshima Defense Force, Sasebo, Okinawa BF Cmdr, others.
6490J	Ominato CU, Hachiyo Jima AB, ComCruDiv 22, Pickets.
6550J	Agrp 901 dets, others.
7035J	Kanoya AB, Usa AB & Planes.
9045J	Bases & Planes.

15 March 1945

Cruising west of Marianas Islands. Considerable improvement is being noted in daytime reception. Air and surface activity appears normal, and numerous air and surface drill circuits are in evidence. Drill grids are being passed on 6640M along with some genuine traffic. Signal strength is good on these planes indicating that they are operating along our approaches to Kyushu. Will continue to watch this frequency closely. A flight of at least five planes was noted on 7035J between 1635 and 1750. An unidentified base HAORU has joined this net. The frequency designator K13 is tentatively linked with the night frequency (2980J). Nothing of import to our force has been noted.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcasts, alternately.
2980J	Kanoya AB, Usa AB, Unident (HAORU).
4192J	Oshima Defense Force, SEP #4, others.
6337M	Bases & Planes, K & KN calls.
6550J	Agrp 901 dets.
6640M	Base & Planes, KN calls. Some drill t/c.
7035J	Kanoya AB, Usa AB, Unident (HAORU).
9045J	AB's Takao, Koroku, Kanoya, others.

16 March 1945

Still proceeding northward. Reception continues to improve with only a short afternoon fadeout period noticed. Considerable air activity was noted although none was apparently related to our force. Numerous aircraft grids were intercepted on 6550A, 6685J, and 6740J, but all appear to be in connection with aircraft training exercises.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo Broadcast.
3342J	Planes only, drill, HEI calls.
4275A	Sasebo Defense Force.
5337J	Aggrp 901 Dets.
5512J	Sasebo-Oshima Defense Force.
5715J	Nansei Shoto area Bases & Planes.
6337M	Base & Planes, K & KN calls.
6460E	Base & Planes, KN calls.
6650A	Base & Planes, HEI calls, drill.
6685J	Base & Planes, HEI calls, drill.
6740J	Base & Planes, HEI calls, drill.
6930A	Hyakurigahara Aggrp.
7035J	Kyushu Bases & Planes.

17 March 1945

Moving into position for tomorrow's strike against Kanoya. In anticipation of the increased coverage necessary for this operation the watch was increased resulting in the following coverage:

0500-1800	3 oprs.
1800-2200	2 oprs.
2200-0500	1 opr.
G.Q.	3 oprs.

Numerous aircraft grids were received during the day, but nearly all of them plotted along the north-south picket boat line, possibly indicating search training exercises in spotting and reporting picket boats. Nevertheless a close watch was maintained on both day and night frequencies (6685/3342) which resulted in intercepting a grid on our own task group originated at 2250 by plane 1SAMA, and followed by a series of grids on various task groups of our force by both 1SAMA and 8NIE. These planes appear to work Kanoya AB. A close watch was kept on picket boat activities, but nothing developed.

Frequency Coverage

2980J	Kyushu Bases
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes
5305J	Sasebo-Oshima Defense Force
5715J	Bases & Planes
5955J	Shimonoseki Defense Division & Ships
6340J	Bases & Planes (prev. rptd as 6337M).
6490J	Picket Boats, bases.
6580J	Bases only
6650A	Base & Planes

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17 March 1945

Frequency Coverage (cont'd)

6685J	Kanōya AB & Planes
6740J	Base & Planes
7035J	Kyushu Bases & Planes
8725J	Bases & Planes
Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcasts, alternately.

Drill Circuits Logged

3980E	NKN Calls
5095E	N Calls
5715E	Various Call Types
6235E	KNKN Calls
6520E	KNK Calls
6580E	Various Call Types
6780E	KNKN Calls
6945E	KN Calls
7680E	KNW & KNK Calls
8065E	Calls not used
8215E	KN Calls

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending March 24

(This report consists of four pages)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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058

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18 March 1945

Intense search plane activity continues at the turn of the day with numerous aircraft grids and target weather reports being intercepted from planes in the immediate area. This was followed by the appearance of several new flights on the circuit (3342J). Shortly after 0400 the order was given to illuminate the target with flares, after which we underwent a two hour torpedo attack until sunrise. Apparently all plane-base communications during this attack were confined to 3342J. At 0600 the search planes of the attack force had shifted to 6685J where we intercepted grids on our new positions. At 0750 a new frequency (6050E) was uncovered and passed along by TBS to other task groups. This frequency is definitely associated with the current activities on 6685J, and is unique in that information received encoded on 6685J was passed from base to planes on 6050E in abbreviated plain language, the recipients apparently being attack planes. Day-light attacks ensued by planes using 6050E. Launched strikes against Kanoya AB.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
2980J	Kyushu Area Bases & Planes.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
6050E	Unident Base & Planes (attack).
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
7035J	Kyushu Area Bases & Planes.
7110J	Bases & Planes.
7820J	Bases only.

19 March 1945

Conducting strikes against Kure and Kanoya. Air activity continues at a reduced pace today and again centered around 6685/3342J. Numerous grids were received on our forces throughout the night followed by daylight bombing attacks on this and other task groups. Attacking planes transmitted on 6685J; however, since it was an uncoordinated daylight attack very little use of radio was necessary except for tracking information sent to Kanoya AB. One TOTO signal transmitted on 6685J set off the attack. Search activity was resumed after the attack, and numerous grids were received until 1500 at which time offensive air activity became completely nil. A flurry of activity was created on 6490J when units of the force were sighted by a picket boat (2SAMASU) during the evening.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
2980J	Kyushu Area Bases & Planes.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
3375E	Unident Base only, MEI call.
6050E	AB Koroku & Plane.
6115J	Miyako Jima AB, Koroku AB, Kanoya AB, & Plane.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
7035J	Kyushu Area Bases & Planes.

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20 March 1945

Retiring from strike positions and heading southward. Air activity very light until about 0900 at which time intense search plane activity was noted on 6685J. This continued throughout the morning with numerous sighting grids, disposition reports, and target weather messages intercepted on 6685J. Shortly before 1300 attack planes became active on 6050E, and within the next two hours had sighted our forces and began sending grids to the base (TEBMO) whom we identify as possibly Miyazaki AB on the basis of fragmentary information. From 1500 to 1800 various groups of the task force underwent an attack from these planes using both 6050E and 6685J as attack frequencies. After the attack 6050E became quiet and 3342J became active with tracking units producing numerous grids on our forces. This intense search was soon followed by a night torpedo attack on one of the other task groups. These torpedo attack units continued to use 3342J for plane-plane and plane-base communications.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
6050E	Miyazaki (?) AB & Planes (search & attack).
6490J	ComCruDiv 22, Ominato CU, Picket Boats.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
7035J	Kyushu Area Bases & Planes.

21 March 1945

Still cruising southward. Following last night's torpedo attack intense tracking activity continues at the turn of the day with 3342J and later 6685J producing numerous surface sightings, amplifications, and target weather reports. This was followed by small-scale attacks. At 1241 certain groups of planes on 6685J were instructed not to receipt for traffic and it became apparent that they were operating under radio silence. It later developed that a large-scale air attack force was enroute to the area (Betty's with buzz-bombs and fighter escort). They were intercepted however. Later remnants of the tracking units were heard on 6740J working Kanoya AB. Activity in the area became practically nil after this.

Frequency Coverage

3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
6050E	Unident Base only.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search)
Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.

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22 March 1945

Fueling task group today in preparation for tomorrow's strikes on Okinawa. Air activity in the area exceptionally light with no trace of any searches.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
7035J Kyushu Bases & Planes
6550J Agrp 901 Dets only.
6340A Bases & Planes.
5337J Agrp 901 Dets & Plane.

23 March 1945

Launched strikes against Okinawa Shima. From all circuit indications it came as a complete surprise. Air activity prior to the strike was negligible. Air alerts and plane sighting information was obtained from local defense force circuits. Within the first four hours of our strike our forces had been sighted by search planes, the first grids being received on 6115J from Koroku AB. Planes originating these sightings were immediately located on 6050E working Koroku AB and on 6685J working Kanoya AB. The original grids were followed by others intermittently throughout the morning & afternoon. Nothing developed of this search.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
4192J Nansei Shoto area Defense Force.
5305J " " " " "
5512J " " " " "
5337J Agrp 901 Dets & Plane.
6050E Koroku AB & Planes.
6115J AB's Sasebo, Ishigaki, Miyako Jima, others
6340A Nansei Shoto area Bases.
6650A Unident Base & Plane.
6685J Kanoya AB & Plane.

24 March 1945

Launched strikes against Okinawa again today. Search activity was somewhat lighter today; grids received on 6050E, 6650A, 6685J, and 6740J. This activity began shortly after midnight and continued until nearly noon. Nothing developed from this tracking.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3057J Nansei Shoto area Bases only.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
6050E Koroku AB & Planes (search).
6115J Nansei Shoto area Bases only.
6550J Agrp 901 Dets.

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24 March 1945

Frequency Coverage (cont'd)

6650A	Unident Base & Planes (search).
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
7035J	Kyushu Bases & Planes.

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT.POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending March 31

(This report consists of three pages)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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063

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25 March 1945

More strikes launched against Okinawa today. No air activity noted in the immediate area; however snoopers were active against task groups fueling to the south sending numerous grids to a Formosan base on 6650A. Air activity operating from Kanoya AB has been conspicuously nil.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3370E	Unident Base only, HEI calls.
4192J	Sasebo-Okinawa-Oshima Defense Force.
5337J	Agrp 901 Dets & Planes.
6115J	Nansei Shoto Area ABs only.
6650A	Formosa AB & Planes.
6985J	Kyushu area Planes.
7035J	Kyushu Bases & Planes.

26 March 1945

Fueling south of Okinawa today. Only light activity was noted on 3342J with one plane heard working Kanoya AB shortly after midnight this AM. Throughout the day a moderate amount of search plane activity was noted on 6650A working out of a Formosan Base. Kanoya AB was inactive on all his tactical air frequencies all day until about 1530 when a grid was received. Numerous planes were heard after this. Abnormal receiving conditions due to atmospheric disturbances rendered high frequency reception poor to impossible for several hours during the forenoon and afternoon period. Radio Central unable to copy either Guam or Pearl during this period.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes
6115J	Nansei Shoto Area ABs.
6550J	Agrp 901 Dets.
6650A	Formosa AB & Planes
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes

27 March 1945

Launching strikes in Kikai - Amami Jima area NE of Okinawa. Kanoya based search-attack planes moderately active throughout the morning, but unusually quiet during the afternoon and evening.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6115J	ABs Koroku, Minami Daito, Kanoya, Kikai Jima.
6650A	AB Shinchiku & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6740J	Kanoya AB, Unident AB (KESMI), & Planes.

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28 March 1945

Launching strikes against Kanoya AB and scouting for units of the Second Diversionary Attack Force. Guarded Sasebo and Kure ship-shore channels and 7910J in connection with the latter operation. However, nothing of note developed. Air activity was exceptionally light in the area with Kanoya AB conducting extensive air training exercises on 6740J throughout the day. Some activity was noted from search planes working out of Formosa on 6650A and snooping on the units south of this task group.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
4665J	Sasebo, Ships.
4682J	Midget-submarine Bases.
5075J	AB Iriomoto & Unident AB (Kagoshima Bay area).
5245E	Bases & Planes, K & KN Calls.
5337J	Agp 901 Dets & Planes.
6490J	Picket Boat activities.
6650A	Formosa area AB (MO7TE) & Planes.
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6850E	Unident AB (TX30) & Planes.
7035J	Kyushu ABs only.
8725J	Bases & Planes.

29 March 1945

Launched morning strikes for possible contact with Second Diversionary Attack Force. Guarded Sasebo Ship-Shore facilities again; nothing of note observed. Air activity in the area very light throughout the morning. Headed south for fueling rendezvous in the afternoon, during which considerable search activity was noted out of Kanoya using both 6685J and 6740J. This activity was in connection with TG58.3 remaining off Kanoya. The unidentified AB using 5075J and communicating with Iriomoto AB was associated by traffic with the Kagoshima Bay area.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
5075J	Iriomoto AB & Unident AB (Kagoshima Bay area).
6340J	Bases & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
7035J	Kyushu ABs only.
7700J	Various CDVs including CDV 14, CDV 46, CDV Kuga.

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30 March 1945

Spent the day at our fueling rendezvous. Air activity ran very heavy during the early morning hours in connection with night attacks on our forces off Kanoya. The remainder of the day was moderately active with several flights searching out of Kanoya and other bases. Night torpedo attack units continue to use 3342J along with search planes. Present employment of day frequencies appears to be 6685J for planes engaged in search or attack operations and 6740J for planes returning to base. This possibly is being done in an effort to ^{KEEP} nontactical traffic off the primary channel. Numerous HEI Base calls were active on 6650A, and several were noted using K08 calls along with HEI calls indiscriminately. From this it was noted that Tansui AB, Koniya AB, and Okinawa BF Cdr are among the stations employing this channel. Shortly after 1900 several of these stations shifted to a night frequency designated as KUYO55. We have not uncovered this frequency as yet.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
3785E Base & Planes, HEI calls.
6640A Base (AORE) & Planes.
6650A Tansui AB, Koniya AB, Okinawa BF Cdr. & others.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
6740J Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack).
6740E Bases & Planes, K & KN calls.
6860E Bases only, HEI calls.
7035J Kyushu ABs only.

31 March 1945

Launched more strikes on Okinawa. Air activity was abnormally light in the area with airborne planes handling very little traffic.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Sasebo & Kanoya AB Broadcast, alternately.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes.
4192J Sasebo-Oshima-Okinawa Defense Force stas.
5040E Bases & Planes, KN & K calls.
5075A Kushira AB, Kikai Jima AB, HEI calls.
5215E AB Kanoya & Unident, FU3 calls.
5305J Sasebo-Oshima-Okinawa Defense Force stas.
5430A Bases only, calls 103 & 101.
5512J Sasebo-Oshima-Okinawa Defense Force stas.
6115J Nansei Shoto-Kyushu area ABs.
6340J Bases & Planes, K & KN calls.
6640A Base (AORE) & Planes.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes.
6740J Kanoya AB & Planes.
6740E Bases & Planes, K & KN calls.
7035J Kyushu ABs & Planes.
6985J Sasebo Agrp & plane.
7115E or J Unsigned AB & Planes (search).

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending April 7.

(This report consists of three pages)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1 April 1945

Furnishing air support for Okinawa landings. Search and attack planes were active on 3342J in connection with night torpedo attacks being conducted against our landing forces from midnight to nearly 0600. Following these attacks activity of an undetermined nature was noted on 6540E. This activity continued for about two hours after which the planes landed. Kanoya AB and search planes were moderately active throughout the day on 6740J and 6685J. This activity continued in the evening on 3342J.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes, primary channel.
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes, secondary channel.
6540E	Base & Planes, KNKN plane calls.
7035J	Kyushu ABs & Planes.
6650A	ABs Tansui, Koniya, Okinawa BF & others, KOS & HEI calls.
6115J	Kyushu-Ryukyu area ABs.

2 April 1945

Continuing strikes and air support off Okinawa. Air activity was unusually heavy from midnight on through the morning, mostly confined to 3342J in connection with night attacks made on our forces nearer the beach. As has been noted in the past with activity on 6685-6740J, these units appeared to use 3370J during their return to base after the attacks. During the period just before and after the scheduled 0600 frequency shift Kanoya AB was noted keying both the day and the night frequencies (3370/6740J). A change in call types has been noted since the First on planes using the 3342/6685 and 3370/6740 channels. Nearly all search and attack planes are now using KKKN (not KOS), and Kanoya AB is using the call OMARO. Some search planes are continuing to use NKKN calls.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), primary.
3370J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), secondary.
6465E	Base & Planes, K & KN calls.
6540E	Base & Planes, HEI calls.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), primary.
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), secondary.
7035J	Kyushu ABs & Planes.
7115E	AB Kanoya (?) & Planes (search), HEI calls.
7115J	Tokushima Agrp & plane.

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3 April 1945

Launching strikes against Miyako Jima and Ishigaki today. Air activity continues heavy on 3342J in connection with attacks on Blue landing forces during the early hours. The plane activity noted since the 1st on 6540E was definitely established as being attack plane-base following this morning's attacks. So far the night frequency, if any, remains unrecovered.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes (attack).
6540E Unident AB & Planes (attack).
6650A ABs Takao, Shokozan, Shinchiku, Koniya,
others, & Planes.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes (search), primary.
6740J Kanoya AB & Planes (search), secondary.

4 April 1945

Rendezvoused for fueling today. Air activity was exceptionally light in the entire Formosa-Ryukyu-Kyushu area, and only routing recco flights were noted. Receiving conditions were abnormally poor during the late morning and early afternoon periods due to atmospheric disturbances.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
6115J Ryukyu-Kyushu Bases.
6550J Agrp 901 Dets.
6650A Formosa-Nansei Shoto Bases & Planes.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes, primary.
6740J Kanoya AB & Planes, secondary.

5 April 1945

Continuing Nansei Shoto strikes today. Air activity unusually light today except for routine flights. Numerous aircraft drill circuits were noted throughout the day and evening. The AB YA6FU associated the recently activated attack plane circuit 6540E with the Kyushu area in that he was noted handling traffic originated by Agrp Usa.

Frequency Coverage

4682J Midget Sub Bases only.
5285E Saishuutoo Seaplane Base, Ibusuki AB, other ABs.
6540E Kyushu area ABs only.
6540E Base & Planes, drill (separate ckt from above).
6580E Base & Planes, drill.
6640E Base & Planes, drill.
6650A Formosa-Nansei Shoto ABs.
6738E Base & Planes, drill.
6740J Kanoya AB & Planes.

069

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6 April 1945

Conducting more strikes over Okinawa area. Air activity was heavy throughout the early morning in connection with night torpedo attacks against Blue landing forces. Planes and Bases engaged in this operation used 3342J during the attack, and upon completion shifted to 3370J for the return trip. During the day this task group underwent heavy air attacks following a flurry of tracking plane activity on 6685J. As previously noted 6740J was used by returning planes. The latter channel was also used throughout the day by a flight of Army planes working Kanoya, handling 3 numeral type traffic and using strictly Army procedure.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), primary channel.
3370J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), secondary channel.
6540E	Kyushu Area Base & Planes.
6650A	Formosa Area AB & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), primary.
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), secondary.

7 April 1945

Launched attacks against Jap Second Fleet units in the East China Sea area today. Coverage of fleet tactical and ship-shore channels in connection with this operation was somewhat limited due to the fact that this and other task groups were under attack throughout the afternoon. However, nothing of import was noted when it was feasible to guard these surface channels. During the early morning a flight was heard working Kanoya AB on 3342J and later shifting to 3325E, the latter being possibly a new secondary channel. Air activity during the daylight attacks on the task force was predominant on 6580J, 6685J, and 6740J. The reactivation of 6580J is noteworthy. During the past few days intense training activity has been noted on this circuit, and today it developed into a first rate attack circuit. Several of the calls heard on 6580J during today's attack had previously been heard on the 2nd and 3rd on 6685J and 6740J. This would seem to indicate it as an alternate frequency for certain of these units.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast & Sasebo Broadcast, alternately.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), primary.
3325E	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), secondary.
6580J	Kyushu area (?) AB & Planes (attack).
6650A	Bases & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), primary.
6740J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & attack), secondary.
7035J	Kyushu ABs & Planes.

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending April 14

(This report consists of three pages)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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071

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8 April 1945

Spent the day at our fueling rendezvous. Air activity in the area generally light throughout the day with very few flights noted. Current search and attack frequencies inactive.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3057J Various Ryukyu-Kyushu ABs.
6545E Unsigned AB & Planes, KN calls, some drill traffic & some genuine traffic intercepted.
663EM Nagoya area AB & Plane.
9045J ABs Shinchiku, Kanoya, Shanghai, Takao & Planes.

9 April 1945

Resuming operations off Okinawa. Air activity abnormally light throughout the day with no indications of either search or attack activity. Even drill activity was light. A light flurry of activity was noted during the evening between between Formosan ABs and planes, confined to 6650A and 5285J.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB & Shokozan AB Broadcast, alternately.
3370E Unident AB only calling plane, HEI calls.
5285J ABs Takao, Shinchiku & Planes.
634CJ Bases & Planes.
6550J Agrp 901 Detachments.
6580J Kanoya AB & Planes.
6650A AB Shinchiku & Planes.
7035J Kyushu ABs.

10 April 1945

Continuing operations off Okinawa, anticipating Kikusui #2 attacks. This failed to materialize, and air activity in general was unusually light in the area with very few planes heard from.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3057J Ryukyu-Kyushu area ABs.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes.
6340J Bases & Planes, K & KN calls.
6550J Agrp 901 Detachments.
6650A Formosa area AB only.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes.
6720E Oshima Def Unit, Tansui AB.
7035J Kyushu area ABs.

072

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11 April 1945

Fueling task group today. Air activity throughout the day was heavy in connection with intense tracking of our task groups to the north. This activity was confined to 6685J for planes on the outward leg of their search line and 6580J for planes returning to base. Numerous sightings, disposition reports, and target weather reports were received on 6685J. Army planes were again noted operating with the tracking units on the secondary channel (6580J) and using Army prosigns. As before there was no distinction between Army and Navy call types. When tracking activity began to lag at around 1800 the night frequency (3342J) was employed by night torpedo attack units for the first phase of Kikusui #2. Upon completion of attacks these planes shifted to 3290J for the return trip.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3290J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), secondary.
3325E	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), secondary.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), primary.
6550J	Grp 901 Detachments.
6580J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking), secondary.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking), primary.

12 April 1945

Reentering the combat area at the turn of the day while night torpedo attacks continue. 3342J continues active as attack frequency. After the last attack was completed at about 0345 planes returning to base communicated on 3325E. Air activity continues throughout the day in connection with daylight attacks on our force, and was confined mainly to 6685J and 6580J. A heavy flurry of what appeared to be Kamikaze activity was intercepted on 7210E where numerous unofficial plain language messages were passed. This continued incessantly for about 2½ hours and was suddenly curtailed upon sighting surface units. Night torpedo attack units continued their activity throughout the evening on 3342J/6685J.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3290J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), secondary.
3325E	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), secondary.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), primary.
6580J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), secondary.
6650A	Formosa (?) area ABs & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), primary.
7210E	Kanoya AB & Planes (Kamikaze-guides ?).

13 April 1945

Still operating off Okinawa. Air activity continued on a moderate level in connection with searches in the area. A flurry of activity was noted on 6650A and 6685/3342J during the evening in connection with bombing and torpedo attacks against our landing units.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3325E	Kanoya AB & Planes, (tracking-attack), secondary.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (tracking-attack), primary.
5285J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6580J	Kanoya AB & Planes, secondary.
6650A	Shinchiku AB & Planes (bombers ?).
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), primary.
6650E	Kanoya AB & Planes, secondary. Believe this harmonically related to 3325E.

14 April 1945

Operating as before off Okinawa. 6685J and 7210E were both active in connection with daylight attacks on this and other task groups. The latter still appears to be used by guide planes of Kamikaze groups for plane-plane and plane-ground communications. Underwent night torpedo attacks during the evening, with tracking, illuminating, and attack groups continuing to employ 3342/6685J as primary (KOO) channels and 3290/6580J as (OTSU) secondary channels.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3290J	Kanoya AB & Planes, Otsu channel.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes, Koo channel.
3600E	Kanoya AB & Planes (night freq of 7210E).
5430J	ABs only, NNN calls.
6650A	Shinchiku AB & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes, Koo channel.

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending April 21

(This report consists of three pages)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

075

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

15 April 1945

Launching strikes against Kikai Jima and Kanoya. Air activity in the area has been confined to "snooper" and "heckler" flights. Aerial maneuvers were noted being conducted on 7200E (previously reported as 7210E). Kamikaze guide units have been using KKKN calls, some of which previously have been heard on 6685J. However, planes engaged in today's drill were using calls of the NKKN HEI type. Army planes again were noted on 6580J.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3325E	Kanoya AB & Planes, OTSU channel.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & heckler), KOO channel.
3430E	Base & Planes (area unknown).
3600E	Kanoya AB & Planes.
5285J	Unident AB & Planes.
6050E	Base & Planes, drilling.
6580J	Kanoya AB & Planes, OTSU channel.
6650A	AB Shinchiku, AB Koroku (?), & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes, KOO channel.
7035J	Kyushu Area AB & Planes.
7200E	Kanoya AB & Planes.

16 April 1945

Off Okinawa again. After a night of "heckler" activity, this and other task groups underwent air attacks throughout the day and evening. The recently activated 3600/7200E channel was used in connection with kamikaze and bombing attacks during the daytime and torpedo attacks during the early evening. 6685J/3342J were used by search and attack units throughout the day and by night torpedo attack units in the late evening, all of which shifted to communicate on an OTSU channel upon completion of their mission.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3290J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search-attack), OTSU channel.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search-attack), KOO channel.
3600E	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack).
5285J	Takao AB & Planes.
6580J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search-attack), OTSU channel.
6650A	Shinchiku AB & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search-attack), KOO channel.
7200E	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack).

076

~~TOP SECRET~~

17 April 1945

Fueling task group today. Air activity in the area was generally normal and very few flights other than routine searches were noted.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
6650A Shinchiku AB & Planes.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes (search).
7200E Kanoya AB & Planes.

18 April 1945

Operating off Okinawa again. Air activity remains very light in the area and no flights directly concerning our operations were noted. Although numerous planes were called on 6685J throughout the day, none were heard answering. Possibly this was an attempt at deception; previously this was noted on the 15th.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J Kanoya AB only.
5285J Takao AB & Planes.
6650A Shinchiku AB & Planes.
6685J Kanoya AB only.
7035J Kyushu area AB & Plane.

19 April 1945

Off southern Okinawa. Combat air activity in the area was almost non-existent throughout the day. 6685J was unheard. A very light flurry showed between 07-0800 on 6650A with a flight still using the same MFI calls used on the 18th.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
6650A Shinchiku AB & Planes.
7200E Kanoya AB & Planes.

20 April 1945

Still off Okinawa. Air activity in the area showed considerable increase today. A new plane-base circuit on 6642J was activated today as per FRUPAC's tipoff. This circuit produced two grids during the early afternoon. After obtaining a receipt on 6642J these planes immediately retransmitted the traffic on 6685J. This flurry represented the total activity on these two circuits. Shortly afterwards activity began on 7200E, possibly in connection with raids on Okinawa. 3370J was employed as a primary channel by attack planes during the evening. This is the first appearance since the 6th when it was replaced by 3290/6580J as OTSU channel for Kanoya based planes.

077

20 April 1945 (cont'd)

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3370J Unsigned AB & Planes (attack).
6290J Kanoya AB & Unidents, FU-3 calls.
6640A Base & Planes, KN calls.
6685J Kanoya AB & Planes.
6842J Kanoya AB & Planes.
7200E Unident AB (08E) & Planes.

21 April 1945

Operating in Okinawa - Minami Daito Shima areas. Kanoya-based search planes were active during the early morning on 3421J and during the early afternoon on 6842J producing grids on the task force on both frequencies. As has been noted in the past 3325E was used as an OTSU channel with the base only heard calling planes of the early morning search group. Planes of this group were heard on 3342J; possibly employed as an alternate OTSU channel. Considerable activity, possibly in connection with Okinawa raids, was noted during the evening involving flights from a Formosa AB and AB Ishigaki. Numerous urgent messages were intercepted from Minami Daito on 6115J in connection with our surface bombardment of the island.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3057J Minami Daito, other Ryukyu-Kyushu bases.
3325E Kanoya AB only, calling search planes.
3342J Kanoya AB & Planes (search) OTSU channel.
3370J Unsigned AB & Planes (attack)
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel.
3600E Kanoya AB & Planes.
3385E Kanoya AB, CinC Comb Fleet, Sentai 16, others.
5285J Takao AB & Planes.
6115J Minami Daito, other Ryukyu-Kyushu bases.
6340J Agrp 951 Detachments.
6580J Unident AB only, HEI calls.
6650A ABs Ishigaki, Takao, Shinchiku & Planes.
6685J Kanoya AB only, calling search planes.
6740J Kure Agrp & Plane.
6770E Kanoya AB, CinC Comb Fleet, Sentai 16, others.
6842J Kanoya AB & Planes (search), KOO channel.
7045E Unident AB (TA6FU) & Planes.

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Week Ending April 28

(This report consists of four pages)

079

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

22 April 1945

Refueling task group today. Air activity was at a moderate pace throughout the day. In connection with the night torpedo attacks on units to the north during the early morning hours 3421J was used as the KOO channel and 3325E as OTSU channel by the attack planes involved. Kanoya AB was heard calling some of these planes on 3342J before raising them on 3325E, further substantiating the belief that the former is an alternate OTSU channel. Search planes were active during the afternoon on 6842J, producing two grids and other traffic. During the late afternoon and evening 7200/3600E and 6650A showed activity, probably in connection with Okinawa raids.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3325E	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), OTSU channel.
3342J	Kanoya AB only, OTSU channel.
3421J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), KOO channel.
4017J	Unsigned AB & Planes.
3600E	Kanoya AB & Planes.
6160E	Unident AB only (Kitagawa area).
6290J	ABs Kanoya & Ibusuki, others, FU-3 calls.
6640E	Unsigned AB & Planes, KN calls.
6650E	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), OTSU channel.
6650A	Shinchiku AB, other ABs & Planes (attack).
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search-attack), OTSU channel.
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), KOO channel.
7200E	Kanoya AB & Planes.

23 April 1945

Off Okinawa again. Combat air activity in the area was exceptionally light and very few flights other than drill were noted. Kanoya tactical air circuits were very quiet.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3057J	Ryukyu-Kyushu area bases.
3342J	Single plane only.
3612J	Takao CU Broadcast (ZWA), previously non-current.
4017J	Unident AB & Planes, KKN, NKKN calls.
5280E	Base & Plane, KN, KKN calls, drilling.
6120E	Base & Planes, KKN calls, drilling.
6290J	ABs Kushira, Kanoya, Kagoshima.
6490J	ComOruDiv 22, Picket Boats.
6540E	Bases only, HEI calls.
6640A	Base & Planes, KN calls.
6740E	Base & Planes, KN calls.
6790E	Planes only, NKKN calls, drilling.
6855J	Base & Planes, K calls.
7885E	Unsigned AB only, calling NKKN plane.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

24 April 1945

Off Okinawa. Air activity continues light due to weather. A new frequency measuring 5850 was uncovered today involving Kanoya AB and planes of call types noted previously on 6842J, 6685J, etc. Army procedure was used by one of the planes, and several messages of the three-numeral Army type were intercepted from him. A light flurry of search plane activity was noted during the morning on 6842J by planes heard earlier on 5850M. Apparently this 5850M channel is currently being employed as a new OTSU frequency.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3342J	Kanoya AB & Planes.
5850M	Kanoya AB & Planes, KKKN, NKKN calls, OTSU channel.
6150E	Kanoya, Unident AB FU-3 call, and Planes KN calls.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes, alternate KOO channel (?).
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes, KOO channel.
7035J	Kyushu area AB & Planes, drilling.

25 April 1945

Off Okinawa. Air activity continues light except for several weather/search flights operating from Kanoya AB. 6842J continues to serve as KOO channel along with 6685J apparently as an alternate KOO channel. It was noted that sightings were transmitted first on 6842J, and then resent on 6685J. These planes later shifted to 5850M upon completion of mission, substantiating belief in its employment as an OTSU channel.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3375E	Unident AB only calling plane, HEI calls.
5850M	Kanoya AB & Planes, OTSU channel.
5980E	Agrp 903 Dets Kushimoto & Hamashima.
6115J	Ryukyu-Kyushu area bases.
6155E	Kanoya AB & Unident FU-3 & Planes, KN calls.
6650A	Formosa-Southern Ryukyu ABs & Planes.
6685J	Kanoya AB & Planes, alternate KOO channel.
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes, KOO channel.
7035J	Kyushu area AB & Planes, drilling.
7885E	Unsigned AB calling plane, NKKN call.

26 April 1945

Fueling task group today. Air activity in the area was exceptionally light today, and none but routine flights were in evidence. Kanoya AB tactical air circuits very quiet.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3057J Kanoya AB, Minami Daito AB, Koroku AB.
6650A Formosa area AB & Plane.
6715E AB Tansui & AB Koniya.
6940E Unident AB & Plane.
7035J Kanoya AB & Unident.

27 April 1945

Off Okinawa again. Air activity in the area continued throughout the day at a moderate level. 6842J and 5850M were again employed by Kanoya AB and planes as KOO and OTSU channels respectively. 5850M was also used by certain flights not showing on 6842J, one of which used Army procedure and passed three-numeral type traffic. Yokohama AB was heard working a flight during the afternoon on 6650A using HEI calls. During the evening an unidentified AB (MASUKE), possibly Kanoya AB, was noted working several planes on 3325E. At least one of these calls had figured previously in connection with torpedo attacks on the 22nd, and it appears that 3325E is still being employed as an OTSU channel for night use with 3421J as the KOO channel.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
3325E Kanoya (?) AB & Planes, OTSU channel.
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes, KOO channel.
5850M Kanoya AB & Planes, OTSU channel.
6640A Base & Planes, KN calls.
6650A Yokohama AB & Planes.
6842J Kanoya AB & Planes, KOO channel.
6940E Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls.
7035J Kanoya AB & Planes.
7110E Planes, drilling.

28 April 1945

Retiring from the Nansei Shoto area and heading for Ulithi. Considerable search activity was noted on 3421J at the turn of the day and several grids were intercepted on 3421J. Later in the morning several of these planes were observed working AØRE on 6640A. It is probable that this is harmonically related to the frequency previously mentioned in this report as 3325E, and the same channel previously reported on 22 April as 6650E. Activity remained at a moderate level throughout the day on 6842J. During the evening a heavy flurry involving numerous planes was in evidence working Formosan ABs on 6650A. This apparently was in connection with attacks on Blue units off Okinawa.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast.
(cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

28 April 1945 (cont'd)

Frequency Coverage

3421J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), KOO channel.
5850M	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), OTSU channel.
6640A	Unident AB (AØRE) & Planes (search), OTSU channel.
6650A	ABs Takao, Shinchiku & Planes (attack).
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), KOO channel.

Note:

Frequencies listed in the reports from this unit include those which were guarded in connection with various phases of the ICEBERG operations of TG58.1, and do not constitute a complete recapitulation of the search logs. Since this unit is not equipped with a frequency meter it was necessary to estimate many new and/or reactivated non-current frequencies.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

CCD5/P20-2(1)
SERIAL 00015

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

13 JUN 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
Radio Intelligence Unit
Summary Report for Period
1 May to 13 June 1945,
dated 13 June 1945.

From: Commander Task Group THIRTY-EIGHT POINT ONE.
(Commander Carrier Division FIVE).
To : Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet, Radio Unit.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Unit Summary report for Period 1 May to
13 June 1945.

1. Forwarded.
2. The work of the Radio Intelligence Unit under Lieutenant (jg) F. C. MILLER has been a substantial factor in the successful operations of this Command against the enemy. Desirable information has been available from this unit twenty-four hours a day and numerous decisions of the Task Group Commander have been made and based on considerations of material and information supplied by the unit.
3. It is understood that an additional officer is being sent to assist in the work of the current unit. The arrival of such officer will be welcomed as it is felt that the burden imposed on a single officer attached to this unit is too great considering the twenty-four hour feature of the unit.
4. The work of Lieutenant (jg) MILLER has been thoroughly appreciated by this Command and he has been recommended for a Bronze Star Medal for his meritorious conduct in operations of this Command.

J. J. Clark
J. J. CLARK.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

SERIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 June, 1945

From: Officer in charge of Radio Intelligence Unit attached to ComCarDiv Five
Via: Commander Carrier Division Five
To: Officer in Charge of U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit
Subj: Letter of transmittal.

Transmitting herewith :

- 1) Summary of Radio Intelligence Operations for the period 1 May to 13 June.
- 2) Flag endorsement of the work of this unit during the period 1 May to 13 June.

Respectfully,

Frank O Miller

Lt (jg) Frank O. Miller, USNR

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

SERIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 June, 1945

From: Officer in Charge of Radio Intelligence Unit attached ComCarDiv Five
Via: Commander Carrier division Five
To: Officer in Charge U.S. Navy Supplementary Radio Station, _____

Transmitting herewith a Summary of Radio Intelligence Operations for
the period 1 May To 13 June, 1945.

Respectfully.

Frank O Miller

Lt.(jg) Frank O. Miller, USNR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

SERIAL

13 June 1945

Subject: Radio Intelligence Unit Summary Report for Period 1 May to 13 June.

1. In general the period 1 May to 13 June in contrast with the period covered by preceding report was marked by a great reduction in the quantity and quality of enemy air operations against BLUE forces in the NANSEI SHOTO. This reduction is chiefly noticeable in relation to the fast carrier force, with the supporting forces off Okinawa sustaining the major weight of the enemy counter efforts. During this whole period, by our records, the only contacts made by enemy aircraft with the fast carrier task force were the attacks on TG58.3 on 11-12 May in area EAGLE, the attacks on 58.1 and 58.3 off Kyushu on 13-14 May, and snoopers contacts on 21, 23, 24, 25 May and 7 June, none of which contacts were exploited. An attempt was made to strike the carriers early on the 25th of May but failed chiefly because of bum dope reported by Jap snoopers late on 24 May.

This falling off of enemy air activity has been the result of many factors with unfavorable weather, the increased power of our shore based aircraft in the area and in the continuing attrition of the enemy's operational air strength being chiefly responsible.

The corresponding decrease in the volume of air-ground wireless communications on the part of the enemy has been further extended by the increased use of various single-man type planes which are for the most part undoubtedly unequipped with CW gear.

An additional characteristic of the period has been a rather pronounced change in the enemy's communication system. The change involves chiefly a noticeable increase in the number of currently active OTSU frequencies which are used both for routine operations, for secondary tactical operations and as OTSU channels for the major KOO circuit over which KANOYA has retained communication control. Whether intentionally or not, this has resulted in confusing the intercept picture, producing a kind of "communication Security" which we can only hope is causing the enemy as much trouble as he causes us. The chief affect is to make it more difficult for us to insure complete coverage of the tactical picture.

In general there has been a tendency to do less transmitting than was formerly the case on tactical circuits -- this does not apply to First Air Fleet's primary which remains very articulate.

2. Effectiveness of this unit. The above stated condition resulted in a corresponding decrease in the amount of positive intelligence this unit was able to supply to the task group command. Though as far as our information goes we did intercept and for the most part properly evaluate and report such Japanese air-ground radio activity as there was. (See however excerpt from our log for 14 May below - 6d.) Note that during the whole period of effectiveness of the code we were not in possession of a copy of the captured document. This was due to a series of unavoidable circumstances and not the fault of the distributing party.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

We continue to feel our inability to produce intelligence of any significance beyond the air-ground phase, and are concerned to know if other RI units have been able to derive useful information from base to base circuits and mobile-shore circuits.

We have been able to contribute useful items to the staff ACI and FDO from time to time not specifically related to the immediate tactical situation. The reciprocity from ACI has been very valuable and the current intelligence reports which he receives, especially translations of enemy documents and interrogations of prisoners have yielded much information regarding Japanese air communications and organization. Note: Please disregard my request for CIC weekly location report (reference my letter of 27 May 1945, paragraph 2). Adequate substitution is available.

Ultra, Pin-up, and FUTIZ dope from PEARL and RAGFOR has been of great value to us in directing our efforts and in providing a check against our coverage plan. We especially appreciate call idents and frequency dope. RAGFOR's daily summary by FUTIZ is an excellent service.

3. R. I. Reports. The release from responsibility for making a detailed report of our operation is much appreciated. The report was excessively burdensome to make up and the maintenance of proper records for it was an additional task for staff officers already are overwhelmed with "paper work".

Our policy for communicating pertinent intelligence to the staff remains as before. All tactical signals, grids, and any indications of approaching attack or search operations are reported immediately by phone or in person (we do not favor the squawk-box arrangement) to the Admiral, the Chief of Staff or the Staff Duty Officer. Periodic summaries of the air-ground situation, plane movements, weather reports, etc. are entered in the log in Flag Plot. Both CRM LEE and myself are on duty from early morning until late evening daily while in combat areas. I think it true to say that we obtained 100% coverage on pertinent air-ground activity, and with few exceptions properly evaluated and reported the intercepted traffic.

4. Personnel. The situation regarding personnel in this unit is generally good. The arrival of the fourth operator has made possible a much more satisfactory division of the watches. The radiomen have been plagued throughout this cruise by unsatisfactory sleeping arrangements, being much of the time barred from quarters by G. Q. and often forced to sleep with bomb assembling operations going on directly overhead. Have noted a tendency to disinterest and boredom since traffic volume has fallen off. The operators are aware of the amount of intelligence I am able to derive from traffic and are inclined not to copy traffic which they think I cannot read.

I do not doubt that personnel will produce adequately when once again we are in contact with enemy air power as we most surely will be. When that time comes I will much appreciate the assistance of the officer which has been assigned to work with me.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Our relation with the other staff personnel has been very satisfactory, at all times marked by cordiality, cooperativeness and an appreciation for the security restrictions under which we work. The Staff Secretary, the Staff ACI Officer, and staff materiel people have been particularly cooperative.

5. Materiel. The state of our materiel is unchanged. All articles are in good working order, with the exception of ear phone cords and diaphragms which will soon be critically depleted (reference my letter of 4 May 1945).

On 4 June received aboard on HORNET 1 RBA receiver with power unit, 1 SX28 receiver and 1 LM-15 frequency meter with power supply.

Top priority for us in materiel now are head sets and a standard mill.

6. (a) We have on several occasions found ourselves in disagreement with some of the dope put out by RAGFOR and have been unable to detect the reasons for our differences. An example of this has been the recent assignment of the ident KASANOHARA to the call 3KIRE on 5850J. We are almost positive that the call is KANOYA. The identity of the controlling station on this circuit seems important enough to justify settling the point. It seems to us that when such an important ident is made RAGFOR should state the basis of the ident. We suspect that RAGFOR has made the ident from internal references based on the place-name numbers list in TA-82 (captured). This list is in error from number 35 on with a general displacement forward two spaces and the insertion of one extraneous call. The lists in TA-79 and TA-81 are correct. Likewise we are unable to agree with RAGFOR's statements concerning suicide activities on 6650. It is our impression both from traffic and from OKINAWA action summaries that these are most always medium altitude bombing attacks and heckling missions. ~~It would be an improvement on their present summary reports if RAGFOR would make clear whenever their dope is derived from collateral traffic in systems we cannot handle.~~

(b) The air circuit picture as we see it is as follows:

Primary tactical (KOO)	6842/3421	controlled by KANOYA
Secondary " (OTSU)	5850/3320	
Secondary tactical	6740	All have been used by attack planes independently of 6842. 6685/3342 has been unheard since 24 May.
	7200	
	6685	
	6155	
Operational & Training	5850	These used primarily for drill and inter-empire plane movement. Have also been used as OTSU channels by planes attacking on 6842.
	6530	
	6580	
	6740	
	7035	
	7110	
	8045	

Note: There has been a growing tendency for search planes to restrict their use of 6842 making all but actual search reports on secondary (5850) both before and after making search reports.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(c) We have noted several times the appearance on secondary 5850 of single planes associated by call with planes concurrently engaged in search operations on 6842, but using army procedure and enciphering traffic in code. This activity is noted usually during the afternoon. The odd plane does not appear on the primary and is usually not heard until the search planes have come over to the secondary on their return trip. The function of this odd plane is not apparent. RAGFOR on 1 June suggests that his function is to relay transmissions made by search planes on the secondary channel. It does not seem likely that with CW emission on this frequency that a relay would not be necessary.

(d) Excerpts from log for 14 May: TG58.1 and TG58.3 were operating off the south eastern tip of KYUSHU this day and during the early predawn hours a half-hearted torpedo attack was launched against our group.

At 0225 KANOYA began working three fresh groups of plane calls. Since these calls were last seen suspiciously active at the time the BUNKER HILL was creamed we reported immediately the possibility that an attack was in the making. At 0250 HASOSU2 sent his NRL which we reported as probable estimated time of arrival in battle area (Note ULTRA from SLONIM who held TA-81 confirmed this). At 0256 another plane reported being chased. About 0300 two more groups of planes appeared. At 0315 one of the first planes out sent his NRL (TOO 0130) a surface unit sighting in posit 29:12 132:28 (58.3) to KUMERO, TESUTU, and KUKONI which were reported to flag plot as possible collective plane calls.

At 0325 a previously unheard plane reported being chased but Flag Plot had no dope on this. At 0330 NOHIHIL reported that he had sighted star shells of the contact party (SETEMI). Reported this and Staff Duty Officer said that there was some illumination far in the distance. At 0335 NOHIHIL said he had sighted the enemy -- this plane appeared to be in charge of the "attack". At 0353 MENOTO4 (he was being chased at 0256) said he had sighted the target (KOMOHA), then he said, "You are in too close, open!" (KITO) At 0353 the leader said "illuminate!" "prepare to attack!". At 0409 one of the attack planes reported the torpedo attack completed (Flag Plot confirmed that one of our pickets had just reported a near miss). The illumination during this attack fell well outside the screen and none of the attacking planes closed the formation. At 0414 an unsigned a/c reported being chased but NCAP had no tallyho. At 0424 our picket fired at a torpedo plane and at 0426 he splashed in flames outside the screen. This was the end of activity on 3421. Some of the planes which were engaged in the "attack" were seen working on secondary 3320 and 3290.

Between 0600 and 0800 TGs 58.1 and 58.3 were under heavy KAMIKAZE attack. The brunt of this attack fell on 58.3 and between 0614 and 0630. The ENTERPRISE flagship of CTF58 was rendered non operational by a suicide crash in her #1 elevator. 58.3 shot down 21 s/e planes in eleven raids by CAP and AA up to 0900. Two single engine planes were splashed by AA well inside our formation one while diving on the BENNINGTON. Our RAPCAP splashed seven more.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

During this attack the RI picture as far as this unit is concerned was confused and even from hindsight I cannot say that I understand just what was going on. The fact that most of the planes attacking were single-engine fighter planes indicates that CW communications were at a minimum.

At 0650 one of two search planes operating out of KANOYA opened up saying he was being chased and at 0702 gave a sighting report at 30:47 ; 132:23 (58.3). At this time we did not realize the scope of the attack which had been made on 58.3 during the preceding hour. At 0706 58.3 reported splashing one but it wasn't this boy for he kept on with amplifying reports.

At 0705 reported a First Mobile secondary (6580) as being active and using very tight communications. This circuit (3290) was used as secondary by some of the torpedo attack planes earlier in the morning and two of them were still up on it. At 0620 six KNKN calls appeared with very strong signals working unsine base and each other but sending no traffic (note: this was about the time the ENTERPRISE was hit). I concluded at first that their signal strength was due to our proximity to KYUSHU. By 0700 this continued communication silence began to look suspicious and we reported that this may be an offensive activity, though no tactical signals were heard. Two KKKN bases were working on this circuit all this while and though they did not communicate with the planes it seemed by 0830 that this was a flight between these two bases. When one of the planes broke silence at 0851 to report that he would arrive at base at 09-- we reported to Flag Plot that it was not a tactical activity and probably not associated with the attack made on us between 0700 and 0900. However at 0905 one of the planes said, "Expect to arrive in the battle area at 0910" (TATUYO 0910) and I warned Flag Plot that it was an attack after all. However the base and the other planes challenged this signal and the originating plane signed off 0915 (E"WO VA) -- either he had made a mistake in his signal or was a prize joker. Informed Flag Plot that it was a hoax. By 0830 attack on our force had ceased. By 1000 all planes on 6580 had secured. The question is, were they responsible for the attack on the ENTERPRISE. No other known tactical frequencies were active during the time of the attack; 7200, 6740, 6842, 6685, 5850 and even 6050 had been carefully checked.

(e) I am still in the dark concerning MIKA broadcast's oft repeated signals KUUTUKE and KUUTETU and would appreciate having the official interpretation. These signals are regularly used respectively preceding and following air alerts. The best I can make of KUUTUKE is "take to the air!" (cf. WARE KITU NITUKE), a signal to disperse. We have been unable to hear the frequencies indicated (KIE8 and UME33).

(f) On 25 May at 0917 MATSUYAMA told KANOYA (5850): "SHIRAGIKU planes will take off at 1000 using secret calls 7NAFUL (7NAFUL?) using an OTSU frequency". Unsine base worked 9 single kana a/c calls on 6740 beginning at 0945. This appeared to be an attack mission but was weathered out.

On 26 May MIYAZAKI told u/i on 7110 that after 0000/27 #7 battle calls would be used (SEMYOBI DASHIFUGU DAI7 SHU). This probably the same as 7NAFUL. On 28 May 1900-2018 base SU worked a/c calls. TIL-8 on secondary attack frequency 360

During the afternoon we noted a D/F net using 2-numeral station-reference points (22, 23, 13, 33 etc.) and giving stacked bearing and distance reports. This on 5993 Kcs measured.

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(g) On 26 May planes of a joint army-navy activity (7035) embracing units at MIYAZAKI, MIHO and other bases in western Empire engaged in a communications drill. Few planes were involved and no actual tactical maneuvers were indicated.

The drill was conducted by single planes. The planes apparently representing the spotting and tracking units and the base the attack leader. Two of the signals used in this drill may be of interest for their relation to future offensive operations by this or other Japanese units.

At one time the snooper sent the signal: "What is your expected time of arrival in the battle area? We will begin sending signals on 650 Kcs 30 minutes prior to that time." These are undoubtedly intended to be homing signals, leading the attack group to the target. Whether the frequency given (650 Kcs) is actually one that would be used is impossible to say. Our experience with torpedo attacks has been that time of arrival in the battle area is usually announced from 20 to 45 minutes before the attack. Whatever the type of attack plane the lead plane (the plane controlling cw communications) must be a multi-manned plane. There is usually one lead plane for each group of three to five attack planes. Always when the attack planes are single seaters and often when they are multi-placed, radio-telephone and visual signals will be used for communication within the group.

In the course of the drill the attack leader sent the signal. "40 minutes before our expected time of arrival in the battle area scatter window (deception paper) on a course of 60 degrees from the enemy." There is no provision in the code book for making the interval less than 40 minutes. In our experience the attacking unit usually volunteers its ETT and shortly thereafter requests RDF signals. We believe that the signal HOTE refers always to RDF emissions and not to radar signals.

(h) This unit has had no success with the interception of enemy radio-telephone transmissions. We have intercepted many times on 6685 Kcs and at skip distance on 34.10 Mcs where it jams Force Man what appears to be a fire spotter probably on Okinawa. On one occasion we picked up an unidentified type of Jap voice transmission on 5850 Kcs. Reception of the voice circuits is very poor -- none of our sets give high fidelity on voice reception though this may be chiefly the result of a faulty antenna arrangement. From collateral sources we understand that the maximum range of Japanese aviation radio-telephone is 30 miles and is used only between planes. It has happened that at any time enemy planes were within 30 miles of us we had neither time nor receivers to spare in searching out voice transmissions. With two officers at hand perhaps more can be done in this regard.

(i) If possible we would like to discontinue making two logs. The use of a carbon makes very awkward the rapid shift from log to copy which is necessary under the one mill system. The form of the logs has deteriorated.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank O. Miller

Lt (jg) Frank O Miller, USNR

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SERIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

8 June, 1945

From; O-in-C Radio Intelligence Unit, ComCarDiv Five
To: O-in-C U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit

Transmitting herewith the following :

- 1) Frequency Coverage and Analysis for Month of May, 1945. Report compiled by L. H. Lee, CRM in connection with radio intelligence activity aboard the USS HORNET.
- 2) Search Log covering the same period.

Respectfully,

Frank O Miller

Lt (jg) Frank O. Miller, USNR

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for the Month of May, 1945

(This report consists of ten pages)

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During the period from April 30 to May 8, 1945 this task group was at anchor at Ulithi. While there a search watch was maintained between 0600 and 2200 with the uncovering of possible Kamikaze activity in the area being the primary purpose of the watch. Frequency research was also carried out in connection with the current ICEBERG operation, but due to the limited period of receivability of signals from that area very little of value was accomplished.

9 May 1945

Task Group 58.1 sortied from Ulithi anchorage and proceeded toward Nansei Shoto. Receiving conditions continue very poor during daylight hours. However, during periods of good reception we bent our efforts to checking the currently used Formosa-Ryukyu-Kyushu area air circuits. No appreciable changes in the enemy's communications have been noted. For the present a three section watch is being employed with RinC supplementing during normal flying hours. Upon our arrival in the active combat area a scoop watch will further augment this coverage.

10 May 1945

Underway towards Nansei Shoto. Receiving conditions showed a marked improvement during morning and late afternoon hours, but the long forenoon and afternoon fadeout period continues to hamper search and intercept. Searching produced nothing of importance to the Task Group nor which failed to show in RAGFOR's summary of air activity.

11 May 1945

Continuing towards Nansei Shoto. Reception continues to improve with only a brief afternoon fade period noted. Nothing of note was uncovered other than activity mentioned in RAGFOR air activity summary.

12 May 1945

Fueling Task Group to southwest of Minami Daito Shima, and later conducting strikes over Okinawa. We are obtaining the usual excellent 24-hour reception in the area now. Air activity was generally light throughout the day on LKFGB tactical air circuits. During the afternoon and evening a heavy flurry of activity, the nature of which is undetermined, was noted on 6580 with two separate activities participating -- two unident FU-1 bases (one of them unsigned at times) working several KNKN planes, and an army AB (call TATIRA) in the Tachiarai area working KKK planes and handling considerable 3N army traffic. Another flurry was created on 6650 by planes and bases associated with the evening assaults against our beach and support units.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
5851M	Kanoya AB & planes (search & army), OTSU channel
6580J	Unident FU-1 ABs and planes, KNKN calls
6580M	Taichiarai area AB & planes (army), KKK calls

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ULTRA

Frequency Coverage (cont'd)

6650J	Shinchiku AB & other unident ABs & planes
6842J	Kanoya AB & planes (search), KOO channel
7035J	Kyushu area ABs and planes

13 May 1945

Launched strikes against air fields in the Kanoya area throughout the day. Radar stations were very active during these strikes on 5993M using NN calls, e.g. 18, 22, 23, 33. Plane sightings were received from Kanoya area lookout stations on 5955J. Within an hour after the first strikes were launched search planes became active on 6842 and continued tracking the force throughout the day and evening, employing 5851M as their OTSU channel. Grids were intercepted on both channels. During the early evening Formosa area bases and planes were very active on 6650 in connection with attacks on our forces near Okinawa.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
3421J	Kanoya AB & planes (search), KOO channel
5851M	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), OTSU channel
5955J	Kanoya area lookout stations
5993M	Kanoya area Radar stations
6650J	Shinchiku AB & Planes
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel
7035J	Kyushu area ABs & Planes

14 May 1945

Continuing strikes against southern Kyushu bases. Underwent aerial torpedo attacks during the early morning hours, and as usual the attack units employed 3421 for tactical communications. Following the attack a single tracking plane was heard on 3320J and attack units on 3290J working the unident AB MIKUTA7. Tracking of our force continued at a moderate level all day with planes using both 6842 and 5851 as KOO and OTSU channels respectively until about 1800. One army plane was also noted on 5851. 6580 was active during the day with many KNKN planes heard during the morning. During the late afternoon planes who previously had participated in the torpedo attack were active on this frequency working the unidentified ABs MIKUTA7 and SAMIKO5 during flights of an undetermined nature. Army 62nd fighter unit base also was heard on this frequency separate from the above activity.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
3290J	Unident FU-1 ABs & Planes (attack), OTSU channel
3320J	Kanoya AB & Plane (search), OTSU channel
3421J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), KOO channel
6525M	Unident AB (NILI) & Plane, KNKN call
6530M	Planes NKK calls, drilling
6580J	Unident FU-1 ABs & Planes, KNKN & KKKN calls

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ULTRA

Frequency Coverage (cont'd)

6580M	Army 62nd Fighter Unit Bases, KKK calls
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel.
5851M	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) OTSU channel.
7035J	Kyushu area ABs & Planes

15 May 1945

Fueling Task Group today. Air activity in the area centered around 6650 throughout the day and evening except for a lull between about 0900-1400. This appeared to be in connection with searches and attacks being conducted against Blue forces around Okinawa. Kyushu area air activities were generally quiet today. Activity on 6842/3421 confined to three search planes heard between about 1645 and 1700.

Frequency Coverage

6550J	Aggrp 901 Detachments
6650J	ABs Shinchiku, Takao, Ishigaki & Planes(search-attack)
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search)
Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast	

16 May 1945

Off Okinawa again. Air activity in the area showed mainly on 6842/3421 from noon throughout the remainder of the day; searches active from 1200 to 1600 and followed by night attack units from 1800 on concentrating on Blue forces nearer Okinawa. 5850A (previously reported as 5850M and 5851M) again was used as an OTSU channel by returning search planes.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast	
3421J	Kanoya AB & Planes (attack) KOO channel
5850A	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & NKKK flight) OTSU channel
6580J	Miyazaki & Unident FU-1 AB & Planes.
6650J	ABs Shinchiku, Takao & Planes
6766M	Kanoya, Miyazaki, other FU-1 ABs
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel
7035J	Kyushu ABs and Planes

17 May 1945

Off Okinawa. Air activity was predominant on 6650 throughout the early morning hours. Throughout the day 6842 remained quiet except for two search planes heard around 0700, after which activity was generally confined to 6580 and 7035 where flights of an undetermined nature were heard. During the evening 6650 and 3421 were both moderately active, apparently in connection with small-scale attacks on Okinawa.

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17 May 1945 (cont'd)

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes (attack)
6580J Miyazaki & unident FU-1 AB & Planes, KNKN calls
6530J AB Shinchiku (?) & unident, CN calls
6650J ABs Takao, Shinchiku & Planes.
6842J Kanoya AB & Planes (search)
7035J Kyushu area ABs & Planes

18 May 1945

Continuing air support off Okinawa. Air activity was maintained at a moderate level throughout the day and numerous flights, apparently of a routine nature, were in evidence in the area. However nothing of importance to our Task Group was uncovered and very little traffic resulted from this activity. Kanoya's primary tactical channel (6842/3421) was unheard during the daytime, showing late in the evening in connection with attacks against the support-landing forces nearer the beach. Simultaneously 3600 was activated, apparently also in connection with these attacks.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes, KKKN calls
3600J Unident AB (UKUNE) & Planes, KKKN calls
5850A Kanoya AB (TOKESO) & Unident AB (MEIRE) & Planes
6530J Kanoya AB & Planes, KNKN calls. NKK Planes later were noted drilling on this circuit.
6580J AB Miyazaki & unident FU-1 AB & Planes, KNKN calls
6580M Army ABs, KKK calls
6640J Kanoya AB & Planes, KN NKK NKK calls
6650J AB Shinchiku, other ABs & Planes, NKKN, KNKN calls
7035J Kyushu area ABs & Planes
7110J Unident AB (NERO2) & Planes, NKKN calls
8045J Unsigned AB & Planes, KNKN calls

19 May 1945

Off Okinawa. Air activity in the area continues at only a moderate level throughout the day. During the early morning activity predominated on 3421 with attack planes heard, later shifting to 6640J after sunrise. Later in the morning flights of an undetermined nature (planes using KNKN calls) were noted on 7035 separate from the usual RED, WHITE and YELLOW detachment activities. Search planes were active throughout the afternoon on 6842, later shifting to 5850. The evening remained quiet.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya AB Broadcast

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ULTRA

Frequency Coverage (cont'd)

3421J	Kanoya AB & Planes, KOO channel
5850A	Kanoya AB & Planes (search & others) OTSU channel
6530J	Unident AB (Y08KU) & Plane, KNKN call
6580M	Army ABs only KKK calls
6640J	Kanoya AB & Planes, OTSU channel
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel
6947M	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKK calls
7035J	Kyushu area ABs & Planes
7035M	Unsigned AB & Planes, KNKN calls
7110J	KKØ & Unsigned ABs & Planes, NKKN calls

20 May 1945

Fueling Task Group today. A heavy noise level of atmospheric origin hampered reception somewhat. In general air activity appeared to be on a reduced scale. Offensive searches in the operating area of TG58.3 were noted on 6842 during the afternoon. Few other operational flights were in evidence in the area.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
3320J	Unident AB (MISUKU) & Plane, KKKN call
3600J	Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search)
7035J	Kyushu area ABs & Planes

21 May 1945

Off Okinawa again. Air activity in the area continues light, atmospheric heavy. Sky Force search planes became active at the turn of the day on primary tactical channel (3421) sending grids and other operational traffic, later shifting to 3320 for the return trip. Both planes were unheard after 0600. Operational flights in the area appeared almost nonexistent throughout the day. 6842 was entirely unheard.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
3320J	Kanoya(?) AB & Planes (search) OTSU channel
3421J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel
6270J	ABs Tsuiki, Tokushima, and Unident ABs
6640J	Unident AB & Planes, NKK & KN calls
6650J	Shinchiku AB & Plane, NKK call
7035J	Kyushu area ABs
7225J	Unident KN calls, handling abbrev. pl. language t/c.

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22 May 1945

Off Okinawa. Air activity involving planes was almost non-existent in the area today. One flight of at least five planes proceeding to Kanoya (?) was heard on 5850A between 1545 and 1745. Weather and reception were both equally bad today. Guarded Sasebo-Oshima ship-shore facilities in connection with our strike against the scheduled Jap transport run. Nothing of note was uncovered however.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya & Sasebo Broadcast (alternately)
5850A	Kanoya AB & Miyazaki (?) AB & Planes, NKKN calls
6270J	Tokushima AB & Unident FU-1 AB.
7035J	Kyushu area ABs
7460J	Sasebo-Oshima Defense Force local.
8045J	Miyazaki & Miho (?) ABs

23 May 1945

Fueling Task Group today. Air activity was exceptionally light during the morning. Shortly after noon offensive searches were active on 6842 with planes reporting sightings in this rendezvous area. Upon completion of tracking they used 5850 for the return trip. A flight of NKKN planes was also noted on this channel. Numerous other flights were noted throughout the afternoon, probably in connection with Kikusui #7 staging operations.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya & Sasebo Broadcasts (alternately)
3320J	Unident (YUORO) & Planes, KKKN calls
5850A	Kanoya & Unident. (KONUMI) & Planes (search-others)
6580J	Miyazaki(?) AB & Planes, KKKN KNKN calls
6640J	Unsigned AB & NKK AB & Planes, NKKN calls
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel
7035J	Kanoya AB, Kisaratsu AB & Unident AB (YO4E) and Planes, KNKN calls. ABs used HEI KNK calls. All these in addition to usual Red, White, Yellow Dets using this frequency.

24 May 1945

Launched strikes against Kanoya, Miyazaki, and other southern Kyushu bases. Air activity in the Kyushu area remained at a moderate level throughout the day with numerous flights in evidence. Around 1000 search planes appeared on 5850 remaining in communication with an unsigned AB until arrival in our area about noon at which time they shifted to transmit sightings, grids, disposition reports, and target weather on 6842. This tracking activity continued for about three hours and upon completion the planes shifted to communicate on 5850 again for the return trip. Shortly after 2000 numerous flights were heard on 3421 preceding attacks that continued throughout the night.

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24 May 1945 (cont'd)

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast
3320J Unident AB (YUORO) & Planes, KKN & KNKN calls
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes (attack) KOO channel
5850J Kanoya AB & Matsuyama(?) AB & Planes (search-others),
NKKN, NKK, KKKN calls, OTSU channel
6030M Kyushu area radar & lkt stas, NN calls
6270J Kyushu area ABs FU-1 & HEI calls
6530J Planes only, NKK calls, drilling
6580J Miyazaki & Miho(?) ABs & Planes, KNKN calls
6640J Unident ABs, NKK calls
6650J Unident ABs and/or Planes, KNK calls
6842J Kanoya AB & Planes (search) KOO channel
7035J ABs Miho, Keijo, Miyazaki & Planes.
7110J Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls

25 May 1945

Withdrawing from Kanoya strike position toward Okinawa. At the turn of the day attack groups continue very active on 3421; most of the attacks being against amphibious forces and Okinawa-Ie Shimas. Upon completion of attacks some planes shifted to 4017 and others to 3320. After sunrise attack planes communicated 6842 as primary tactical channel, shifting to 6640 for their return to base. At about 0800 probable Kamikaze units activated 7200 using single kana calls and working an unsigned base. Most of these were forced to return to base due to unfavorable weather and engine trouble. Activity of a similar nature was uncovered also on 6740 which also failed to materialize due to foul weather. After these attempts only sporadic air activity was heard throughout the rest of the day.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast
3320J Unsigned AB & Planes, KNKN & KKKN calls, OTSU channel
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes(attack), KOO channel
4017J Miyazaki & unident ABs & planes, KKKN calls, OTSU channel
5850J Kanoya AB & Miyazaki AB(?) & Planes, KKKN calls OTSU
6580J Miyazaki & unident AB & Planes, KNKN calls
6640J Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN calls, OTSU channel
6740J Unsigned AB & Planes, K calls
6842J Kanoya AB & Planes, NKKN, KKKN calls, KOO channel
7110J Miyazaki AB & others & Planes, KKN calls
7200J Unsigned AB & Planes, K calls

26 May 1945

Off Okinawa. Air activity remained exceptionally light throughout the day with no offensive search or attack flights in evidence. LKFG primary tactical circuit (6842) was unheard while the secondary (5850) was activated by two planes working Kanoya and using army procedure, apparently on a routine flight. Other

26 May 1945 (cont'd)

flights were noted on secondary channels, but all appeared to be routine in nature.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast
4017J AB Miyazaki, others, KKØ calls
5850J Kanoya AB & Planes, KKKN calls
6580J Miyazaki & Miho ABs & Planes, KNKN calls
6640J Unsigned AB & Plane, KN call
" Unident AB (YUORO) & Planes KKKN calls
6650J Unident AB & Plane, KNK calls
6740J Unsigned AB & Plane, KKKN call
7035J ABs Miyazaki, Miho, Keijo & Planes, some drilling.
7110J AB Miyazaki, others & Planes, KKN calls

27 May 1945

Fueling Task Group today. Air activity continued very light throughout the day with only routine, or possibly staging flights in evidence. At 2000 Sky Air Force primary tactical circuit (3421) became active with numerous groups of attack, illumination, and tracking planes engaged in a night strike against Okinawa and the anchorage area. This activity continued through the remainder of the evening, producing much tactical traffic and signals in connection with these attacks.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes (attack)
6580J ABs Miyazaki & Miho & Planes, KNKN calls
7035J ABs Miyazaki, Miho, Keijo & Planes
7110J ABs Miyazaki, others & Planes

28 May 1945

Operating south of Okinawa. At the turn of the day activity on 3421 continues very active in connection with the night torpedo attacks being conducted against Blue units close in to Okinawa. During the day 7035 was very active with several flights in communication and passing a considerable volume of operational traffic. Numerous other flights were active on other secondary circuits, probably in connection with stages for forthcoming attacks. This continued until about 1800. Shortly before 2000 probable Kamikaze units were being called on 3600 and ordered to return due to adverse weather. Shortly after 2000 numerous probable attack units became active on 3421, but these also were ordered back to base. Later around midnight an unsigned base was heard calling one of these planes on 3290.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Kanoya Broadcast
3290J Unsigned AB & Planes (attack), OTSU channel
3421J Kanoya AB & Planes (attack), KOO channel
3600J Unident AB (SU) & Kamikazes(?), T11-7 calls

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Frequency Coverage (cont'd)

5850J	Kanoya AB & Plane (search), OTSU channel
6580J	Unsigned AB (Miyazaki?) & Planes, KNKN calls
6650J	Takao AB & Planes, KNK calls
6842J	Kanoya AB & Plane (search), KOO channel. Four kana plane call (NIWAANO) used. Last kana appears to be numeral-substitute.
7035J	ABs Miyazaki, Keijo, Miho & Planes
7035-45M	ABs Kanoya, Kushira, unidentified AB & Planes, KNKN calls
7110J	Miyazaki AB, others and Planes
8045J	ABs Kanoya(?), Miho & Plane

29 May 1945

South of Okinawa. Air activity remained at only a moderate level, probably due to the inclement weather around Kyushu. However, flights were noted from Formosan bases communicating on 6650 during the early morning from about 0100 and continuing throughout the remainder of the day. The mission of these flights during the early morning and daytime was undetermined and very little traffic was passed. In the evening around 2000 an attack signal (TOTOTO) was dropped and it became apparent that these flights were active against Okinawa.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
3290J	Unsigned AB & Plane, KKKN call
6580J	ABs Miyazaki & Miho & Planes, KNKN calls
6640J	ABs Hakata, Ibusuki, Koniya, KKK calls
6650J	ABs Takao, Shinchiku, others & Planes, calls NKK, NKKN, KNK, KNKN.
7035J	ABs Miyazaki, Miho, Keijo & Planes (drilling)
7110J	ABs Miyazaki, others & Planes

30 May 1945

Off Okinawa. Flights participating in Okinawa attack continue to be active on 6650 throughout the early morning hours until after sunrise. Formosan bases and planes were heard sporadically during the daytime but traffic volume was very light. Three search planes were heard on 6842 working Kanoya, later shifting to 5850 for the return flight. As before 4K calls were used, the last kana being a numeral substitute. An increase is observed in the number of Kyushu flights heard, but none appear to be offensive in purpose.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
5850J	Unsigned AB & Planes (search), KKKN calls, OTSU channel
6650J	Formosa area ABs & Planes, NKK(N) & KNK(N) calls
6842J	Kanoya AB & Planes (search), KKKN calls, KOO channel
7035J	ABs Miyazaki, Miho, Keijo & Planes
7110J	AB Miyazaki, others
8045J	ABs Miyazaki, Miho, Kanoya & Planes

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31 May 1945

Fueling Task Group today. Air activity was very light in the area today and no offensive flights were in evidence. 7035 and 7110 produced some operational orders, etc. Flights of an undetermined nature were heard communicating with AB Shinchiku on 6650 between 1730 and 1900. Sky Air Force's primary tactical circuit (6842/3421) remained quiet.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya Broadcast
6650J	AB Shinchiku, unidents & Planes
7035J	ABs Miyazaki, Miho, Keijo & Planes
7110J	ABs Miyazaki, unidents & planes

Submitted,

L. H. Lee, CRM

TASK GROUP FIFTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS HORNET, Flagship

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for Period June 1-10, 1945

(This report consists of 5 pages)

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1 June 1945

Launched fighter sweeps over TOKUNO and KIKAI JIMA. Offensive air activity continues at a low level in the KYUSHU area presumably because of the inclement weather. Planes in communication with TAKAO and SHINCHIKU were active at the turn of the day on 6650, continuing until around 0700, probably in connection with attacks conducted against BLUE forces around OKINAWA. During these flights the usual KNK calls and procedure were used. However, later at about 1700 when the frequency was reactivated by other flights a call system of KKKN planes (constant kana - variable numeral) and unsigned base calling procedure similar to 1KFGB's was employed by SHINCHIKU who occasionally signed NKIKE. TAKAO continued to use the old system of KNK plane and base calls. This activity continued for about 3½ hours with planes apparently again participating in attacks against the OKINAWA area. Activity on Sky Air Forces' primary tactical channels (6842-5850) was very light with only two search planes active during the morning from about 0700 to 1000. KONIYA AB and planes utilized the 6842 channel for flights during the evening from about 1720 to 1840 after which nothing of import was noted.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
5850J	KANOYA & MATSUYAMA ABs & Planes, NKKS calls, OTSU channel
6056M	Unsigned AB & Planes, KNK & KNKN calls
6650J	SHINCHIKU & TAKAO ABs & Planes, KKKN & KNK calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes (search), NKKS calls, KOO channel
6842M	KONIYA AB & Planes, KKKN calls
7035J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO, KEIJO ABs & Planes

2 June 1945

Off OKINAWA. Air activity continues light in the area due to the bad weather. 6842-5850 were activated during the afternoon by search planes out of KYUSHU. 6650 was only lightly active during the morning with four planes noted in communication with TAKAO AB during flights of an undetermined nature.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
5850J	KANOYA & MATSUYAMA ABs & Planes, NKKS, KKKN calls, OTSU
6650J	TAKAO AB & Planes, KNK calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
7035J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO, KEIJO ABs
7110J	MIYAZAKI AB, others
8045J	KANOYA & MIHO ABs

(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

3 June 1945

Off OKINAWA. Probable attack planes were active at the turn of the day on 3370, later noted turning back to base due to unfavorable weather. This activity shifted to 6740 after sunrise and continued until about 0700. Around 0800 search planes were noted on 6842. These planes sighted our carrier forces sending numerous sighting grids, disposition reports, target weather before withdrawing. As usual 5850J served as OTSU channel for search planes and other flights. Other flights were noted on 8045J, 6640J and 6530J during the day but appeared to be routine in nature. During the evening 6842 was employed by KONIYA & IBUSUKI ABs in communication with numerous planes from 1615 to 1950.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
3370J	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKS calls
5850J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS KKKN & KKKK calls, OTSU channel
6530J	Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN KNK calls
6640J	Unident AB & Planes, NKKN call
6740J	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKS calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
6842M	KONIYA & IBUSUKI ABs & Planes, NKKN calls
7035J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO & KEIJO ABs & Planes
8045J	KANOYA & MIHO(?) ABs & Planes, KKKN calls

4 June 1945

Fueling Task Group today. Air activity continued rather light today due to the weather. Search planes became in evidence on 5850 and 6842 shortly after 0700 apparently meeting with negative results. At about 1500 another plane on an apparently non-offensive mission was noted on 6842. Bases and planes were quite active on 7035, although activity appeared rather routine in nature. During the evening a flight of at least four planes, probably participating in OKINAWA attacks was in communication with SHINCHIKU AB and another unsigned base on 6650.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
5850J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, OTSU channel
6650J	SHINCHIKU AB & Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
7035J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO, KEIJO AB & Planes

5 June 1945

Passing through a typhoon to the southeast of MINAMI DAITO SHIMA today. Air activity was generally light throughout the day and nothing of direct import to the CTF was uncovered. During the evening attack planes, probably over OKINAWA, were heard on 6650 and 3421.

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
3421J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKN calls
6650J	FORMOSAN ABs & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls

107

(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

6 June 1945

Completed the fueling operations disrupted by the typhoon. Activity on 3421, which appears to be in connection with OKINAWA shipping attacks, continues at the turn of the day and later after 0400 shifted for return flight communications to 3320. Search planes and a single army plane activated 5850 shortly before 0700. Some grids were passed by the search units, but none appeared to be BLUE sightings. 3N traffic was passed between the army plane and base. The search planes subsequently appeared on 6842 where grid positions indicated they were operating near OKINAWA. Return to base was accomplished employing 5850. Planes and bases on 7035 were very active throughout the day dropping a considerable volume of traffic, presumably in connection with staging operations. Planes working out of FORMOSA and communicating on 6650 were active from about 1730 to 2245 in connection with evening attacks against OKINAWA.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: KANOYA Broadcast
3320J Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls, OTSU channel
3421J KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKN calls, KOO channel
5850J KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS KKKK calls, OTSU channel
6057M Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN calls, drilling
6650J FORMOSAN ABs & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
7035J MIHO, MIYAZAKI, KEIJO ABs & Planes
7110J KANOYA, MATSUYAMA ABs & Planes, K calls, some drill

7 June 1945

Off OKINAWA. Attack planes were active on 6650 during the early morning hours in connection with continued strikes against BLUE forces on OKINAWA. This channel was activated later in the day by search and other flights. 6842-5850 were employed by 1KFGB search planes throughout the day performing recce missions and reporting dispositions of BLUE shipping and other units around OKINAWA and target weather. Around 1745 attack planes operating from FORMOSA were active on 6650 continuing until about 2045. After about 2230 night attack units from KYUSHU employed 3421 during assaults around OKINAWA.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: KANOYA Broadcast
3421J KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKN calls
5850J KANOYA, MATSUYAMA ABs & Planes, NKKS calls, OTSU channel
6650J FORMOSAN ABs & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
6865M Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN call (no tfc)
7027M Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls
7035J MIYAZAKI, MIHO, KEIJO ABs & Plane
7110J KANOYA, MATSUYAMA ABs & Planes, KKKK & K calls

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

8 June 1945

Launched fighter sweeps over KANOYA and other So. KYUSHU area air bases. Night attack units operating out of KYUSHU continue active at the turn of the day employing 3421 as the primary tactical channel. Some of the planes shifted to 3290, others to 3320/6640 for the return to base which was accomplished by about 0630. 5972, 6530, 6580, and 7035 were active during the day, apparently with staging flights. Recce of the forces near OKINAWA was carried out by KYUSHU based planes during the day using 5850 and 6842. Attack planes in connection with evening assaults against OKINAWA area forces were active on 6650 in communication with FORMOSAN bases.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
3290J	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls, OTSU channel
3320J	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls, OTSU channel
3421J	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls, KOO channel
5850J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS & KKKK calls, OTSU channel
5972J	KONIYA & IBUSUKI ABs & Planes, NKKN calls
6530J	Unsigned AB & Planes, KKKN calls
6580J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO ABs & Planes, KKKN calls
6650J	FORMOSA area ABs & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
7035J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO, KEIJO ABs & Planes

9 June 1945

Fueling Task Group today. Night attack units over OKINAWA continue at the turn of the day using 3421 for passing sighting grids, target weather reports and other tactical traffic, and later shifting to 3320. Attack planes from FORMOSA were also over the target during the early morning hours employing 6650. This lasted until about 0800, after which search planes became active reporting BLUE surface unit sightings, dispositions and target weather on 6842, later shifting to 5850 for the return trip. During the evening 6650 and 3421 were again used by night attackers around OKINAWA.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	KANOYA Broadcast
3320J	Unsigned AB & Planes, NKKN calls, OTSU channel
3421J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKN calls, KOO CHANNEL
5125M	SEISHIN area army AB & Planes, KKK base call, KNK plane calls, handling ABC 3N type traffic.
5850J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, OTSU channel
6650J	FORMOSA ABs & Planes, KKKN calls
6842J	KANOYA AB & Planes, NKKS calls, KOO channel
7035J	MIYAZAKI, MIHO, KEIJO & Planes
8045J	MIHO AB & Planes, KKKN calls

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

On 10 June the Third Fleet and Carrier Task Force bombarded MINAMI DAITO and OKINO DAITO SHIMAs from the air and from the sea throughout the day, withdrawing to the south by night and heading for LEYTE GULF for replenishment and repairs, thus ending our participation in the ICEBERG operation. Anchored in SAN PEDRO BAY on 13 June and began making preparations to move the unit and equipment to the USS BENNINGTON (COMCARDIV3).

Submitted,

L. H. Lee, CRM

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

SERIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION FIVE

15 June 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge Radio Intelligence Unit, ComCarDiv Five

To: Officer-in-Charge U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit

Transmitting herewith the following:

1. Frequency Coverage and Analysis for Period June 1 to June 10.

This report was compiled by L. H. Lee, CRM in connection with radio intelligence activity aboard the USS HORNET.

Respectfully,

Frank O. Miller

Lt (jg) Frank O. Miller, USNR

TASK GROUP THIRTY EIGHT POINT ONE

USS BENNINGTON, Flagship.

RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT.

Report of Frequency Coverage and
Analysis for the period July 1 to
August 18, 1945.

(This report consists of 21 pages)

Submitted by

A. J. Cooper, CRM, USNR.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~USPFA~~

15 - 30 June 1945

CRM L.H. Lee was relieved on 15 June by CRM A.J. Cooper. On the 16th of June orders were received to move the unit from the U.S.S. Hornet to the U.S.S. Bennington. The move had been anticipated by CRM Lee, and was effected that day. As Lee had been provided transportation to Pearl on the Hornet, and she was not to leave until the 19th June, Lee was able to assist in planning the new R.I. radio room on the U.S.S. Bennington.

The installation was completed on the 28th of June. No priority was necessary as we were not to sortie until 1 June. Attached to this report is a sketch of the installation as it looks at the present time.

Diggins, S.S., RM2c, reported to this unit for duty on the 27th of June.

1 July 1945

Task force thirty eight sortied this date from San Pedro Harbor, Leyte Gulf, enroute Tokyo and Hokkaido. A one man watch was set immediately. When we approach enemy waters, the watch list will be as follows:

From G.C. in the A.M. until secured at night: CRM and two men. Remainder of the time: Two men.

2 July 1945

Task Group 38.1 cruising east of the Philippines having gunnery practice and training planes.

Coverage plan: We are monitoring Sasebo B/C. General air search includes the Yokohama/Marcus/Truk flight frequencies and tactical air frequencies.

3 July 1945

Task Group 38.1 still cruising east of Philippines having gunnery practice and training planes.

Coverage plane remains the same as on 2 July plus the Ominato ship/store frequency-6490J. Receiving conditions have been very poor. We have experienced much interference from electrical equipment connected with the gun turrets.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

4 July 1945

Cruising off the Marianas. Receiving conditions still very poor but have improved somewhat.

Frequency Coverage

7045J	Keijo A.B., Miho A.B., and Miyazaki A.B. and planes.
7011K	Unsine base and planes (KKKK)
7011M	Bases (NKK) and plane (KKKK). Not same as above.
5950J.	Bases (NKK) and planes (KKKK). Same as 7011K.
4022J	Unsine base and three planes.

5 July 1945

Task Group 38.1 still cruising to the northwest of the Marianas Islands. Reception getting good. We are experiencing a peculiar type of interference which appears to be coming from somewhere in the island structure. Radio 1 has been bothered with it for some time, and they do not seem to be able to trace it to its source. As it reaches a peak at 10000 kcs, we are not bothered with it to the extent of damaging our coverage.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo and Kanoya B/C.
5992J	Tateyama A.G. and planes.
6840J	U.I. Base (K) calling plane (KNN).
6840J	Oita A.B. and Miho A.B. working two planes.
7011K	Unsine Base and (KKKK) planes. Drill.
7011M	7KOKU, 9HANI. Separate from the above drill circuit.
7023M	TUAMU (U.I.) drilling planes (KNN).

6 July 1945

Cruising northwest of the Marianas. Reception good. Checking all known air frequencies including those sent out by HAGFOR. Continue to check the Yokosuka/Marcus/Iruk flight frequencies.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Frequency Coverage 6 July 1945

Monitored:	Sasebo B/C.
7011M	9HANI, 7KOKU and plane FIKATTEI.
7045J	Keijo, Miho, and Miyazaki to three planes.
8026J	U.I. Base (100) and plane (85) using plain language.
8435J	A.G. Kashima (KA0 and *NARAMA) working U.I. (KA2 and *SIMUMO). Kashima compromised the alternate calls.
8445M	U.I. KKN calls.

7 July 1945

Task Force 38 now north of the Marianas Islands. Reception good with much interference.

Frequency Coverage.

Monitored:	Sasebo B/C.
Monitored:	5295J UTU Sub B/C.
6100J	Checked.
6840J	Oita A.B. and Miho A.B. working one plane.
6830J	Takoa A.G. and Shinchiku A.B. working planes.
6745J	KKK Bases working planes.
7125J	KKK Bases working KKNW planes.

8 July 1945

Fueling this date. Reception excellent.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Sasebo B/C.
Monitored:	5295J UTU Sub B/C.
6032M	Bases working planes. (K,KN,KKK,KK).
6140M	Bases using KKN. Drop the Numeral to make KK calls.
6830J	Watsushima and Misawa A.B.
6745J	Ominato to patrol planes.
6070M	KKK base working five planes.
7125J	KKK base working planes.
6032M	Atsugi working fighter planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

9 July 1945

Enroute Tokyo. We reach our launching position at 0300 on the morning of the 10th. Signals very good.

Monitored:	Sasebo B/C and 5295J.
5088J	Unsiue Base drilling planes (WPKKN).
6136M	KK and KKN.
6148M	KNK and KNN.
6530J	Matsushima and Misawa working plane.
6530M	KKKN planes drilling.
6555J	KNKKN planes being drilled by SATEKO4.
6745J	Ominato A.B. and planes.

10 July 1945

Launched strikes against air fields in the Tokyo area. A complete surprise was effected. The first alarm came from ANU022 (Yokosuka Naval District Cinc) who declared a precautionary alert at 0505, and a full alert at 0522. These were intercepted first on 3375J.

An intensive search by three men failed to disclose any tactical air frequencies in this area. No enemy reaction to the strike was observed on the air frequencies. Two enemy planes were splashed by our CAP, and it was later disclosed that they had been using 6351M - an army air frequency.

Our forces over the enemy air fields reported light flak and no enemy air interception.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu Air Base B/C. "MIKO".
5942M	Army KKK.
6139M	EK, KKN Bases.
6351M	MAETU (U.I. Army Base) calling NEWMI (plane).
6530J	Matsushima and Misawa A.B. working three planes.
6745J	Ominato working ten search planes. N, NN, and NYN.
6925J	Atsuki A.B. working five planes. Secured at 0445.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

11 July 1945

Retiring from the Tokyo strike. No air activity heard except for Army air circuit on 6346M: RWORU (control) working MASUYU (plane) and YUNING (plane).

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
3320J/6640J	Search planes. NKK base.
4711M	Fone. Shimodate and Utsunomiya.
6650J	Shinshiku Air Base working plane TSOYUI.
6745J	Ominato and planes NN and N.N.
6630J	Misawa and Matsushima A.B. and plane.
7115J	Kanoya and Matsuyama.

12 July 1945

Fueling. Very little air activity noted. Unidentified army air stations using three kana calls on 6346M.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Ominato B/C.
3320J	Utsunomiya base and planes.
6346M	ROWOSI ROWOHA SAWOSI FURBESI. All U.I. army bases.
6630J	Matsushima and Misawa A.B.
6745J	Ominato working NN planes.
6955J	Hamamatsu A.B. and U.I. MOPURA.

13 July 1945

Attacks on N. Honshu and Hokkaido were called off because of bad weather.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Ominato B/C.
2011M	NKK and NNK.
6650J	Utsunomiya base drilling planes.
6657M	MMIIO and TIRBESI. Army.
6690J	Kasonohara (NKK) and Matsuyama (NKK) working army planes (NKK).
6636M	NKK.
7193M	U.I. Army air base (PAMIA) to FURBESI.
7771M	A.B. Kasunagaura and planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 July 1945

Launching fighter and bomber sweeps over Hokkaido and Northern Honshu. No air opposition was encountered. One enemy plane was splashed 85 miles from this task group. The reaction to the strike on air circuits was negligible.

New call on 6490J, MATI32, was identified as Comcrudiv 22. Two new series of calls were evident on 5986M. Calls do not fit IA3 call list.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Ominato B/G. 6490J.
4560M	U.I. Jap Fone.
5470J	Yokohama A.B. and planes.
6356M	Base (RIORI) giving homing bearings to MATOTO.
6530J	Matsushima, Kisaratsu, and Misawa.
6745J	Ominato A.B. calling planes MUFIMEI & 2.
6855J	Ominato A.B. and U.I. working planes.
7300M	U.I. Japanese fone stations.

15 July 1945

Launched fighter and bomber sweeps over Northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Many air raid alerts were received but no air activity was sighted that would indicate that there was any air opposition. Reports by the returning airmen confirmed this. Resistance was negligible.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Ominato B/C.
6007J	Single kana bases.
6139M	KKN bases. These bases drop off numeral suffix to make KF calls. Appears to be related to 7110J.
6364M	Base TANISU giving homing bearings to planes MIHAYO and MISUSI.
6455J	KKN and K bases.
6630M	Usine base drilling planes. Southern Empire.
6830J	Matsushima A.B. and Misawa A.B.
6855J	Usine base and KKN planes drilling.
6840J	KKN base and KKN plane.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

16 July 1945

Retiring from Hokkaido strike. Air activity light. Omin to A.B. working six planes on 6745J. No offensive activity noted however.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Ominato "NISA" B/C.
6530J	Matsushima & Misawa
6745J	Ominato A.B. & Planes. KKK, NN, NNW calls.

17 July 1945

Position: 37°N 143°13'E. Launched fighter sweeps over airfields of the Tokyo plains. Weather was very bad; so the bombing attacks were called off. No activity on the air/ground circuits was noted. Picket boat traffic on 6490j heavy. Our surface units shelled Hitachi. No reaction was noted.

Frequency Coverage

6050M	K, KN.
6408M	U.I. Jap fone.
6455J	Air bases in Tokyo area. KKN, KN.
6745J	Ominato A.B. & Planes.
6855M	U.I. KKK Base working planes. N, NN.
6955J	Hamamatsu A.B. & U.I. Base.
7322J	KN & KKN drilling.
5430M	U.I. KKK Army Air Bases.

18 July 1945

Position: 35° 35'N; 142° 42'. Early air attacks cancelled due to bad weather. First strike took off at 1130. At 1330 the bombing strike on the Nagato was launched. No air reaction to our strike was noted. In the morning, however, several air-borne planes were heard.

Frequency Coverage.

3382J/7765J	Takuma A.G. & planes.
4555M	U.I. Jap fone.
5470J	Yokohama A.B. & Planes.
6056M	KKK Army.
6555J	Unsine Base & planes; KKKK.
6640J	Miho, Oita, & Kanoya.
7010J	Kanoya; Oita & U.I. Base. Planes.
7125J	Atsuki, U.I. Base & Plane. KKKK.
7805M	Unsine Base & Plane. Drill.
8125J	Yokoshiba & Suzuka A.B.

19 July 1945

Retiring towards fueling area. 7200J up with three search planes working unsine base. one search plane sighted enemy planes in position: 33° 12' N; 139° 23' E. The plane then returned to its base.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C.
61404	KEN, KE. Associated 4017J/7110J
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama & U.I. & Plane.
7200J	Unsine Base & Search planes.
7322J	K, KEN, & N calls. Bases & Planes.

20 July 1945

Fueling. Search plane on 6955J using KKK reported submerged submarine in unrecovered position. Hamamatsu A.B. and U.I. Base working plane.

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C.
6745J	U.I. KKK working NNN (Ominato?).
6923M	Unsine base & NKKK planes. Drill.
6955J	Hamamatsu, U.I. & Army search plane.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita & planes.
7090J	Yokosuka A.G. & planes.

21 July 1945

Rearming. Air activity nil. Reception poor this date which probably accounts for lack of air circuits.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C:
6745J	U.I. & planes:
6855J	U.I. & planes. NN.
6955J	Hamamatsu, U.I.
8120M	KEN.

22 July 1945

Replenishing. Air activity this date very heavy. On 6842J, plane 3MOYUNO sighted unidentified Blue surface units in an unrecovered position. This traffic appeared on MIKA broadcast almost immediately. Three search planes were up on 7200J; their search was unproductive. On 7035J, two new bases appeared. They were KA & ML.

Freq

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	MIKO & MIKA B/C.
6842J	Unsine Base and search plane.
6955J	Hamamatsu A.B. & U.I. A.B.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita, U.I. & a/c.
7035J	Keijo, Miyazaka, Miho, U.I. & a/c.
7125J	Atsuki, U.I. KKKK Base & plane.
7200J	Unsine base and search planes.
7180M	KNK Army.
8125J	Suzuka & Yokoshiba A.B.
8884M	KKK drilling.

23 July 1945

Enroute Kure launching position. Air activity light. Nothing of importance sighted.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
6535M	KNK Army
6745J	Ominato A.B. & Planes.
6919M	Unsine Base and NKKK planes. Drill.
6930J	KN.
6950M	KKK Air drill circuit.
6955J	Hamamatsu A.B. & U.I. A.B.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita & Planes.
7035J	Keijo, Miyazaka, Miho, U.I. & Planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

24 July 1945

Position: 31°30'N; 135°00'E. Launched fighter sweeps over airfields in Kobe area. Launched bombing attacks on mobile units at Kure Naval Base. Our planes were jumped by 30 enemy planes after they had dropped their bombs. A Jill and a Francis were splashed by the other Task Groups, but were unheard by this unit.

Several search planes were heard on 5850J/6842J on what was evidently an unproductive search. At 1900 a contact came over the Kanoya B/C originated by plane 5NN1 at 1500. This plane was unheard on any frequency.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
5850J	Unsine base and search planes.
6150M	KKK. KKKK. Army Air Base & a/c.
6351A	Army A.B. & plane.
6640J	Oita, Miho.
6650J	Unsine base & plane.
6745J	Ominato A.B. & planes.
6842M	Yokosuka A.G. & planes. K, NK.
6955J	Hamamatsu A.B. & U.I. KKK.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita & planes.
7130M	Army KKK. KKK.

25 July 1945

Position: 32°00'N; 136°40'E. Off Shikoku. Launched fighter sweeps over Shikoku and Southern Honshu. Launched bomber attacks on the mobile units at Kure again. No opposition.

Search planes were active in the early morning operating on 5850J/6842J. Negative results were reported and the planes returned to the base at approximately 1000.

A second search was conducted on these frequencies in the late forenoon and early afternoon. At 1300 a plane gave what appeared to be a weather message with a grid, and then started back to the base.

A third search on these frequencies became evident when a plane was heard at 1600. Negative results again.

Search planes operating out of a base near Kisaratsu sighted our forces at 1457. Two of the search planes (MYRTS) sent sighting reports on the individual task groups and then headed back to their base. The third plane evidently retired to a distance and kept tracking the Blue forces while waiting to guide the attack group in.

The planes of the attack group were ordered by the base to attack the specific target as indicated by the guide plane in the following manner: -YUCOKAYUSOKA - followed by position grid. The guide plane was splashed at 1821. Plane KOK NE1 signaled the attack (tototohoho & tutututu) at 1936, sent a grid at 1947 and was unheard thereafter. Seven planes were splashed altogether.

25 July 1945

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
3421J	Unsine base & KKKN planes.
3320J	Oita, Miho & planes.
5850J	Unsine base & search planes.
6340J	K base & KN planes.
6640J	Oita, Miho & U.I.
6842J	Unsine base & search planes.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama & Oita.
7200J	Unsine base & search, attack planes.

26 July 1945

Search planes were active early in the morning on 3320J. Miho compromised his charlie call which is 8SARU. Bases and planes were active on 3290J, 3320J & 3421J. From all indications it appeared that an attack on Okinawa was in progress.

Search planes of A.G. 752 were up on 7200J working unsine base, possibly Kisaratsu. Plane TUESE3 spotted Blue surface forces at 1410, which might possibly have been a light bombardment group which was supposed to be operating to the north of T.F.38. The planes shifted to 5335J(KIE21) as a homing frequency.

Frequency Coverage

3290J	U.I. base & planes.
3320J	Miho, U.I. and search planes.
3421J	Unsine base & seven planes.
5335J	Secondary for 7200J.
6640J	Oita, Miho, & U.I.
6650J	Unsine base & planes.
6855J	U.I. KKK base & planes.
7197M	Sendai & Utsunoriya A.B. KKK KNK Army.
7200J	Unsine base & A.G.752 search planes.

27 July 1945

Fueling. Air activity light. Flights of planes were noted between Oita & Miho, Miho & Kanoya, Miho & Yamato.

Frequency Coverage

3320J	Oita, Miho, & Kanoya.
5895J	Unsine base & planes: KKK drill.
6055M	Unsine base & planes.
6640J	Oita, Miho, Kanoya, & Yamato. Planes.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita, & planes.

29 July 1945(Cont'd)

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
3320J	Oita, Miho & planes.
5850J	Kanoya & Matsuyama.
6340J	K, KN.
6580M	U.I. (ONATU) & planes; Drill.
6580J	Two U.I. NKK & planes.
6640J	Oita, Miho, Yamato & planes.
6855J	U.I. (EMMI) & N calls.

30 July 1945

Position: 33°10'N; 138°10'E. Off Nagoya. Launched fighter and bomber sweeps over airfields of the Nagoya-Kobe area. Resistance was nil.

No reaction was noted on the navy circuits to the strike; however an army plane (RIHAME) was heard at 1245 working Mito (MANITI) on 6351A. From the text of traffic sent in code (888), it was evident that the plane had already reported sighting Blue forces. The base kept asking: "Inform me of the enemy position". In code the plane first answered: "34°E". Later he said in plain language: "TEKINO ITI 114.260". (Enemy position bearing 114° at 260 kilometers from base). The base insisted that the bearing should be 214° which would be the reciprocal of the first information (34°). The plane landed at 1320.

At 1442 the following message was copied on the army B/C frequency 6345A: "There are 14 enemy carriers east of Hachichojima - beware". AT 1445, base MANITI sent the same message to plane ROHANO.

No attack materialized.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C.
3882J	Takuma & planes.
5430M	Army Air Bases.
5850J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita & planes.
5935J	Army A.B.
6300M	U.I. base & KN planes.
6345A	FUMETO, ROMOSI. To each other & KAKU.
6351A	MANITI (Mito), & army search plane.
6580J	Unsine base and KKKM planes.
6640J	Oita, Kanoya, & Miho.
6650J	A.B. Takao, U.I. & planes.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita, & planes.
3600J	Unsine base & KKN planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

28 July 1945

Position: 31°30'N; 135°26'E. Off Shikoku. Launched fighter sweeps over the Nogoya area. The primary targets for our bombers were the BB Ise and the CA Aoba at the Kure naval base.

Air opposition was negligible. Searches were conducted by planes on 5850J/6842J with negative results. First search in the morning by planes "NANEFU & 2 NANEMO. A second search was conducted in the afternoon by plane 8NIENO.

Planes of the 3rd Air Fleet conducted searches for the Blue fleet using 7200J as primary frequency. Two planes took part in the search. Plane HOKOH02 returned to the base early in the afternoon. At 1525, plane HOKOH01 sent a weather report and a grid and it was assumed that he was returning to the base also. He continued his search, however, and at 1709 sent "HIHIHI" (he had no time for the usual call up). AT the same time T.G.38.3 reported splashing a Jill. The base did not hear the "HIHIHI" as sent by the plane and continued to call him until 2000.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
3320J	Oita, Miho & Kanoya.
5850J	Unsine base and search planes.
5850J	Kanoya & Matsuyama. NKK ckt.
6155J	Iwakuni, U.I. & 17 planes.
6151M	KNK Army A.B. & KNKJ planes.
6640J	Oita, Miho, Kanoya & Yamato.
6650J	A.B. Takao & plane.
6842J	Unsine base & search planes.
6530J	Matsushima, Misawa & U.I.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama & Oita.
7200J	Base TOWEHE (U.I.) & search planes.

29 July 1945

Enroute Tokyo launch point from Kure strike. Air activity moderate.

Oita & Miho were heard working planes on 3320J shortly after midnight. Grids were sent by the planes at the end of their search lines. Plane 7RUEEJ sent a grid which placed him at the position of our launch on the 25th & 28th of July.

On 6580J an U.I. base was working five planes who sent the containing unbreakable grids. From the overall appearance of the operating procedure and traffic, it was believed to have been drill, although the usual signs denoting drill were absent. Two NKK bases were working a plane on the frequency indicating a possible flight this date between the bases.

31 July 1945

Retiring to the fueling area. Air activity very light. 7010 up with planes using KKKK calls working unsine base. No result from search.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
4017J	KK call.
6340J	K calls.
7010J	NKK, KKKK and unsine base.

1 August 1945

Rearming. Refueling. Air activity light. Reception poor. Note new Army frequency on 6125M. A change of calls took place on 7010J. Tentative idents are as follows: STUN Kanoya. 7TIM Matsuyama. 90A Oita.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
6125M	KEMAI (Control) & YOTUI, YOMAKU.
6950A	Takuma A.G. & planes. Drill.
7010J	Kanoya, Oita, & Matsuyama.
7090J	Yokosuka A.G. & planes.

2 AUGUST 1945

Strike on Basebo called off because of typhoon heading Northeast from the Kansen Shoto. Reception poor. Air activity light possibly due to poor signals.

Frequency Coverage

6340J	K base & planes.
6580J	Bases & planes.
6640J	Oita, Kisaratsu & planes.
6950a	Takuma & planes. Drill.

3 August 1945

Cruising northwest of Iwojima awaiting better weather and the passing of the typhoon. Receiving conditions poor.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kanoya B/C.
6340J	Oita, Kisaratsu & planes.
6950A	Takuma A.G. & planes.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama & Oita.

4 August 1945

Enroute launch position for Sasebo strike. Air activity moderate. 6650J up in the morning with search plane MIHARA who sighted Blue surface forces at 0927 in position 20°22'N, 126°28'E. The blue force consisted of battleships, cruisers and transports.

7010J was up with several planes working Matsuyama, Oita, and Keiho.

Frequency Coverage

3505J	Kanoya, Oita, and Matsuyama. (KMK)
3515J	Army A.B. & planes. (KMK)
6125M	U.I. Army A.B. (KMK)
6650J	Unsure base & search planes. (KMK)
6950A	Takuma A.G. & planes drilling.
7010J	Kanoya, Oita & Matsuyama. Planes.
6867M	Two U.I. (KMK) bases & planes. Drill.
7035J	Keijo, Miyazaki, Miho & planes.

5 August 1945

The strike on Sasebo cancelled so that the Army will have a cleared area when they drop their atomic bomb. Receiving conditions fair. Air activity moderate. On 6530J, Matsushima, Misawa and IHIU (Chitose) working a flight of planes. The operator believes that IHIU & ka2ka are one and the same. Misawa also drilling ten planes (probably Bettys). Collective call for the planes (KMK) was AØ.

Frequency Coverage

3505J	Matsuyama & Oita.
3515J	Army Air Bases & planes.
5342M	KMK calls. Believed to be army.
6125M	Army bases. KMK. Make 6125.
6345A	Army "KMK" B/C. Several KMK.
6530J	Misawa, Matsushima & Chitose(?). Plane
7010J	Matsushima, Oita, & Kanoya.

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 August 1945

Fueling. Receiving conditions fair. Air activity moderate. Unsine base drilling NK planes on 6530M. Misushima, Chitose, and Misawa working many planes on 6530J.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Misaratsu B/C.
3320J Oita, Matsuyama, Kanoya.
3514J Army Air bases.
6125M Army Air bases.
6530M Unsine base and NK planes drilling.
6530J Many planes working Misawa, Matsushima, Chitose.
6580M KKKK drilling.
6745J U.I. base and planes.
6930M U.I. base and NK.
7010J Matsuyama, Oita, Kanoya and planes.

7 August 1945

Enroute Northern Honshu. Air activity moderate. Receiving conditions good.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored: Misaratsu B/C,
3505J Matsuyama, Kanoya, Oita.
6530M Unsine base & NK planes drilling.
6530J Misawa, Matsushima, Chitose & planes. NKK, KKK.
6580M KKKK drilling.
6745J A.G. 903 Comdr. & planes. NNN.
6855J Two U.I. (KKK) base & KKKK planes.
7120A NK, KKK, KKK planes.

8 August 1945

Position: 40°13'N: 144°29'E. Strikes on Northern Honshu called off due to poor weather. Air activity moderate. Flights of planes were noted on 6530J between Misawa, Matsushima and Chitose. Comdr A.G. 903 and Ominato A.G. up on 6745J working N, NNN patrol planes. U.I. (TAHBSO) working KKKK planes. A.G. 903 also on 6855J working N, NK planes.

New army air frequency uncovered. RHHHTI (Mito?) heard working RHHHTI (plane) on 6545M. These two units heard previously on 6350J on the 30th May when RHHHTI sighted Blue striking force west of Hachijojima. There was no worthwhile activity on this frequency this date however.

8 August 1945 (Cont'd)

Two bandits were splashed by the CAP on this date were unheard by this unit.

Frequency Coverage.

Monitored:	Ominato B/C.
3505J	Matsuyama & Oita.
3515J	Army base & planes.
3705J	Army base & planes.
6155J	Unsine base & KN planes.
6530J	Matsushima, Misawa & planes.
6745J	Ominato, A.G.903 cmdr & Patplanes.
6855J	A.G.903 Cmdr., U.I & planes.

9 August 1945.

Position: 38°13'N. 144°07'E. Launched strikes at airfields on Northern Honshu.

Russia declares war on Japan this date.

At 1148 Unsine base (Kisaratsu) was heard calling plane SOO01 on 7200J. At 1158 the plane sent report sighting Blue surface forces and 1205 indicated sighting carriers and grid position which was approximately 100 miles south of TG 38.1. He sent his NR1 at 1225, NR2 at 1245 and was splashed at 1248 by our CAP. The plane was a MYRT.

At 1420, the attack planes were airborne and six planes were heard. At 1431 plane TUNAMAWA had motor trouble and said that he was returning to base. Plane TUNAMA2 made a forced landing in the water at 1505. At 1515 the U.S.S. Borie shot down two GRACES & was hit by a suicide plane. At 1541 plane TUNAMARA reported to the base that plane TUNAMARO had made a forced landing. This left him as the only remaining plane of the attack group. He sighted our forces at 1603, sent a weather at 1606 and was splashed by our CAP before he could repeat the weather message.

All was quiet until 1635 when another search plane appeared on 7200J using call SCS012. He made a sighting of our group at 1840 and returned to the base immediately. No further action resulted from this sighting.

A Kate appeared over our radar picket and splashed herself while trying to evade our RAPCAP. A ZEKE was splashed by the AA of 38.4. Both of these planes appeared early in the afternoon, but neither were heard by this unit.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C.
5335J	Unsine base, KKKK, KKK planes.
6067J	Misawa, Matsushima, K.
6530J	Misawa, Matsushima, Chitose. NKK.
6605J	Tateyama A.B. & KN pl ne.
6580J	Unsine base & NKKK plane.
7200J	Unsine base & search planes, attack Pl ne

10 August 1945

Position: 38°25'N. 143°05'E. Launched strikes against airfields in Northern Honshu. Results were very good. Neutralization raids were also carried out by the Navy & Army A.F. against airfields in the Kisaratsu area. No opposition was encountered and no air reaction was noted.

Unsine base and three planes were heard on 7200J sending deception traffic.

Japanese ask to surrender.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C:
5335J	Base & planes. KKK, KN:
5850M	Unsine base & K. plane.
6067J	Misawa, Matsushima & U.I.
6522M	Army Air bases using KKK.
6530J	Misawa, Matsushima, Chitose.
6545M	Army Air bases using KKK.
6745J	Ominato (AG903 Cmdr) calling Yok (Ag903).
6855J	A.B. Ominato & A.B. Bihoro & planes.
7200J	Unsine Base & planes.

11 August 1945

Fueling. Air activity light. Receiving conditions good. Unsine base and planes on 6580J.

Peace rumors persist. Japanese transmit communication to the Allies. The war still goes on.

Frequency Coverage.

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C. HITU B/C.
6067J	Matsushima; Misawa & U.I.
6530J	Matsushima, Misawa & Chitose.
6580J	Unsine base & planes:
6855J	U.I. & patrol planes. KKK. N.

12 August 1945.

Cruising to the east of Honshu to avoid bad storm. Reception good. Air activity light. New army circuit heard on 6662M.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C.
6530J	Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose.
6662M	Bases & planes. Army: Use
6855J	U.I. (KKK) & K planes.
6936M	NK. These appear to be bases only.

13 August 1945

Position: 36°30'N. 142°30'E. Off Tokyo. Launched strikes against airfields and industrial targets in the Tokyo area.

It is noteworthy that while the Japanese are talking of surrender, the Army and Navy Air Forces put up their first real opposition since we have been operating off Tokyo. It is believed that it might be "the last fling" before hostilities cease. Except for the planes heard on 7200J, no planes were heard on the air frequencies.

A MYRT was splashed by the Task Force at 0520. At 0758 a second plane was heard on 7200J reporting the position of Blue carriers. After sending a weather report, he retired to his base. At 1126, a NICK was splashed (unheard here). At 1135, two new calls appeared on 7200J, one of which reported that he was having motor trouble and was returning to base. Later it developed that four other planes were being called on this frequency and were not answering.

At 1309, a new search plane appeared on 7200J using call MOY003, and he sighted task forces at 1349. A message was sent to the attack planes at 1510 by the base for which the planes did not receipt.

at 1645 twenty four bandits were tallyho'ed by our C.A.P. and 11 were splashed. No further activity was heard on 7200J although bogies were reported by the radar pickets until 1930. CIC reported that one group of eight planes approached the edge of the task force, milled around for a few minutes and then retired.

Earlier in the day (1315), an army plane was heard on 6735M reporting six carriers, four battleships, eight cruisers, and five destroyers in position 33°36'N; 143°50'E, which was too far south for any of the units of the THIRD FLEET.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C.
5680J	Base & plane. K, KN.
6530J	Misawa, Chitose, & Matsuyama.
6735M	Army A.B. & plane. KKK.
6855J	U.I. KKK & KKAN planes.
6930M	U.I. NM.
7010J	Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama & planes.
7165M	Bases & planes. K, KN, KKK.
7252M	Army A.B.'s:
7200J	Unsigne base, search and attack planes.

14 August 1945

Fueling. Air activity light. Note much activity on A.G. 901 frequencies due to Russian activity in Korea.

Rumors still persist concerning peace, but the Japanese still very much at war.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Kisaratsu B/C. Tokyo HITU.
6530J	Misawa; Chitose, Matsushima.
7010J	Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama & planes.
7035J	KKK, KKNN, KN & K calls.
7200J	Unsine base & search planes.

15 August 1945

Position: 34°N. 142°E. Launched fighter sweeps over Tokyo area. The bomber strike carrying thirteen 2000# bombs from this ship alone was called back just before it reached the target. We immediately went on the defensive only. Peace was announced at 0800 by President Truman in Washington.

At 1150 an U.I. NK on 693GM told another unit: "According to the radio, all hands (should) gather together after 1200 to listen to the broadcast." Reference here is made to the peace proclamation by the Emperor at 1200. The broadcast was heard on many frequencies in the medium and high frequencies bands.

Several planes were splashed by our forces in the early afternoon. Presumably these planes had been ordered out by the commands prior to 1200.

Air activity: Four search planes were up at 0519 on 7200J. At 0536 plane YUMEW02 reported ten planes chasing him and gave a position close to this task group. Several grids were given by the other planes later in the morning, but they were not on this task group.

At 1040, a surface sighting report was copied from the B/C originated by a Formosa base plane.

Frequency Coverage

3705J	Army Air Base & planes:
6530J	Bases & planes. Misawa, Matsushima, & Chitose.
6640J	Oita, Kanoya, Mihō & planes.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita & planes.
7035J	U.I. KKK bases & planes.
7200J	Unsine base & search planes.
Monitored:	TOKIO HITU. Kisaratsu B/C.

16 August 1945

Fueling. Air activity this date light. Two search planes were up on 7200J in the morning. A sighting was made at 1205 by plane TUR001, and a weather message was sent at 1225. No offensive action was noted.

A much wider use of _____ code is noted on many army circuits and a partial swing to plain language was noted on some Navy circuits.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Tokyo HITU. Kisaratsu MIKO.
6625M	Army A.B.
6898M	Army.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita & planes.
7200J	Unsine base & planes.

17 August 1945

Cruising at Point Ready. Air activity moderate. Note several flights of planes, but no offensive searches. Two search planes were heard on 7200J, but nothing came of their searches.

Frequency Coverage

Monitored:	Tokyo HITU. Kisaratsu MIKO.
3515J	Unsine Base & planes. NEK & NKKN.
6530M	Unsine Base & planes. KKKN. Drill.
6530J	Misawa, Matsushima & Chitose. Planes.
6584M	Army A.B.
6640J	Miho & Oita & planes.
7035J	U.I. KKK base & KKKNN planes.
7120A	U.I. KKK base & NN planes.
7200J	Unsine Base & planes.

18 August 1945

Cruising at Point Ready. Air activity heavy. Many circuits up doing nothing much in particular.

Frequency Coverage.

Monitored:	Tokyo HITU. Kisaratsu MIKO:
6530J	Misawa, Matsushima Chitose.
6580J	Unsine Base & plane.
6584M	U.I. Army A. Bases:
6745J	U.I. Base & planes.
6640J	Oita, U.I. & planes.
6930M	U.I. NK.
7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama & Oita. Many Planes.
7035J	U.I. KKK bases & planes.

AS-2(2)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00065

22 FEB 1945

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To : Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for the Period 14 January to
19 February 1945, inclusive.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507 of
4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

(a) This unit is designated as HR unit for brevity purposes, and the letters "HR" appear on all copies of traffic intercepted.

(b) On 13 January three men, consisting of one Chief Radioman and two First Class Radiomen reported aboard the Fleet Flagship, the INDIANAPOLIS, with all equipment. The ship got underway for ULITHI on 14 January. The period from 14 January through 7 February was used for readying the operating room, partial watches for refresher purposes and obtaining remainder of personnel assigned to this unit.

(c) The flagship departed ULITHI on 8 February and arrived at SAIPAN on the 10th, sailing again on the 12th to join Task Force 58 for the TOKYO strikes. During this period 649ø and 67ø5 were assigned as primary coverage, plus general air search.

(d) The period 12 to 19 February inclusive, covers the period from SAIPAN to the TOKYO area, the two day strike there, retirement from the TOKYO area, and "D" day at IWO JIMA. Watch schedules were increased to three or four men as conditions warranted. En route to TOKYO area 67ø5 and 649ø were maintained as primary coverage plus search for air activities. Numerous sightings of BLUE aircraft were received on the picket boat frequency, 649ø, which usually gave the picket boat position in plain language. On the morning of 15 February our force passed through the picket line. Our submarines and destroyers had apparently eliminated picket boats in our area as no sightings on our force were seen. Once through this line 649ø was dropped and air search was made the primary assignment. While in the TOKYO area and during the two day strike, the only major air reaction noted was ATSUKI air base which was apparently directing fighters on 589ø.

T.F. Reports

A8-2(2) 00065

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

22 FEB 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

~~ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for the Period 14 January to
19 February 1945, inclusive.

Numerous other frequencies were active but revealed no indication of a projected attack on our forces or any indication that we were sighted. Several bogies were in our area, but were promptly eliminated by our CAP, and whether or not these planes were able to get their reports out is not known, as they were not heard by this unit.

(e) During the retirement period from TOKYO on the night of the 17th, while we were in the picket boat area, 6490 was active with sighting reports on our forces. These reports were given reruns on TOKYO #1. Several of these picket boats were sunk by our destroyer screen, but managed to get reports out, some in plain language. 6685 produced several grids on our forces the afternoon of the 18th which were given prompt rerun on TOKYO #1. Outstanding feature of these was the snooper who apparently retired well out of range before making reports to his base. However no attacks on our forces resulted even though we were apparently well sighted.

(f) "D" day, 19 February, this ship joined with other forces in pre-invasion bombardment of IWO JIMA. All known IWO JIMA circuits were covered for any indication of reports of landings, etc., but none were heard, possibly due to heavy interference from main and secondary batteries, plus extensive welding on ship due to repairing of damaged steam lines. In addition to above air search was maintained. 6685 produced several grids which were sightings on part of our carrier forces and fueling group. These were rerun on TOKYO #1 as before. 8025 yielded a good volume of aircraft traffic presumed to be ATSUKI air base to fighters, and fighters to base, taking action against B29's which were over TOKYO during this period.

2. Traffic and logs for this period have been forwarded to FRUPAC and should be studied for detailed data on frequencies and calls heard.

B. T. Holcomb, Jr.
B. T. HOLCOMB, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

AS-2(2)

COMMANDER, FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00057

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

28 FEB 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 26 February 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507 of
4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

20 February 1945

The flagship, Commander FIFTH Fleet (USS INDIANAPOLIS), continued to participate in the IWO JIMA support bombardment. Air search coverage and TOKYO No. 1 broadcast were primary assignments. 6685 produced grids on part of our forces on this date. The aircraft that made these reports was apparently out of KANOYA as the reports also showed on SASEBO broadcast with a rerun on TOKYO No. 1. Other air circuits revealed nothing of interest.

21 February 1945

Coverage continued as above, but air circuits revealed no indications of a contemplated attack or of planes in our vicinity. However, an attack was made by suicide planes during the early evening on our forces whose positions were reported yesterday. During the evening CHICHI JIMA was passing aircraft traffic, originated by plane calls, to air base KISARATSU on 5100. These calls were discovered on 7033M, later identified as 7035J. As our position was well known to the enemy as a result of the IWO JIMA landings and previous days grid reports, it is believed that this attack was made with strict radio silence and that the planes who survived made their reports to CHICHI JIMA on the return and possibly landed there. After a brief flurry the air activity on 5100 and 7035 ceased.

22 February 1945

Coverage continued the same. 7035 gave every indication during the morning that an attack was imminent, but it was apparently cancelled or our deductions were in error as activity ceased on this circuit without further developments. On 6705 the call KA 1 was heard working CHICHI JIMA communication unit. Transmitter characteristics and strength of signal lead us to believe this was IWO JIMA using an emergency rig and possibly located on KITA IWO JIMA. The flagship departed IWO JIMA on the evening of 22 February for rendezvous with Task Force 58.

Ref.

A8-2(2)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

28 FEB 1945

Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 26 February 1945.

23 February 1945

This morning the flagship joined Task Force 58 and fueling group. Air coverage revealed nothing of special interest, except that 7110 was quite active in the early afternoon with apparent drill. It was noted that calls and procedure were identical with the carrier-based drills formerly heard on 6535. Upon completion of fueling, our course was due north along Longitude 145. As we approached the picket boat line, 6490 was assigned full coverage as of 2000 this date.

24 February 1945

The estimated picket line was successfully passed during this morning with no reaction. However, 6490 was continued as full coverage. TOKYO No. 1 and TOKYO submarine broadcast was covered to eliminate any possibility of missing a sighting of our forces. This was in addition to air search which revealed considerable activity, but was of apparent routine and drill type, yielding nothing of immediate value. 6640M had a plane up with good signals, giving indications of search proceedings, but no report was heard from him and none appeared on either broadcast. 6988M was reported by the Radio Intelligence Unit, Commander Task Force 58 to be active with grids, but positions given and lack of reaction from the broadcasts, gave good indications that this circuit was being used for drill purposes. 6490 became active with sightings during the evening, the first position being reported at 2215. This was followed by a substantial amount of apparent amplifying reports. Although this traffic was given immediate and priority handling by OMINATO, there was a delay of one hour and 46 minutes before any of it appeared on TOKYO No. 1.

25 February 1945

Carrier strikes were carried out on TOKYO area today. YOKOSUKA area lookout stations gave first indications of alarm with radar contacts, and this area went into full alert at 0739. This was followed by numerous plane sighting reports, all received from 175J which was covered throughout the day along with TOKYO No. 1 and 17J. Continuous and diligent search of all known air frequencies failed to produce any indications of counter action, or that our position was known to the enemy. Due to inclement weather over target during the late afternoon, strikes were cancelled and Task Force 58 proceeded southwest for strike on the NAGOYA area in the morning. Upon leaving vicinity of TOKYO, 6490 was again picked up. At 1855 we were detected by a picket boat who got his report off to OMINATO, with no position given. He followed this immediately with other reports but could not obtain a receipt for them from OMINATO or ComCruDiv 22. This picket boat, along with a few others, were sunk by our destroyer screen before any further amplification of our position could be delivered.

AS-2/21
ComFIFTHFleet File

A8-2(2)

~~ULTRA~~
COMMANDER, FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

28 FEB 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 26 February 1945.

26 February 1945

During the early hours 6490 produced one more sighting on our forces with no position given. Although continued coverage was maintained on 6490 until 0900, no other contacts on our forces resulted. Due to foul weather we were unable to reach a suitable position in time to launch aircraft, so the NAGOYA strike was cancelled and Task Force 58 continued south. SASEBO and TOKYO broadcasts were covered this morning. As SASEBO produced more information of value to us, it is being covered in preference to TOKYO No. 1. Air circuit coverage revealed considerable drill with several grids showing they were no where near our forces. 6580, 6966 and 6637 were most active with this type of traffic. Other air circuits revealed nothing to indicate we were spotted or that a search was being conducted.

2. Traffic and logs for this period are hereby submitted for analysis and research.

Del'd to GT //
B. T. Holcome Jr
B. T. HOLCOMB, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

Copy to:

CNO (Op-20-G)
Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon)

AS-2(2)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: ~~00000~~ ⁰⁰⁰⁰⁷⁰

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To : Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Recommendations concerning technical aids furnished R.I. Units by FRUPAC.

- References:
- (a) CinCPac & CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507 of 4 February 1945.
 - (b) ComFIFTHFleet Ultra dispatch 312246 January 1945.
 - (c) FruPac Ultra dispatch 012222 February 1945.
 - (d) FruPac Ultra dispatch 231631 February 1945.
 - (e) ComFIFTHFleet Ultra dispatch 021141 March 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(c) of reference (a) the following recommendations are submitted:

GT-2

(a) OTSU FU-3. Continue sending additions and corrections to N-1 Book by daily broadcast. Discontinue sending additions and corrections to the 3-KANA basic call lists (sequence lists) by daily broadcast. As soon as a sequence period is completed, a new print to be made of that sequence, including all new additions and corrections, and mailed to all RI Units afloat. For example: when the period for FU-3 sequence 4 is completed and the enemy starts using sequence 5, a new print should be made of sequence 4 and mailed to insure its receipt before that sequence is used again.

(b) OTSU FU-2. No further material need be sent either by daily broadcast or mail.

(c) KOO FU-1. Continue to send additions and corrections by daily broadcast for the 1-A-1, 1-A-2, and 1-A-3 lists of this system. Up to date prints of these lists to be mailed about every fifteen days. These lists should be printed with as much space as possible being left between lines to provide space for pencil additions received in daily broadcasts. Difficulty is experienced finding space in which to make entries.

(d) KOO-8. Continue to send any additions and corrections for this system by daily broadcast.

*do not
a year
[unclear]*

(e) HEI (Charlie). Discontinue sending identities for this system by daily broadcast unless they can be received by units afloat during the current day for which effective. Circuits using these calls cannot be covered continuously due to insufficiency of operators thus making it impossible to follow through at midnight (minus nine). Current identities for these calls would be very valuable if they

A8-2(2)

Serial: ~~00000~~ 00070

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Recommendations concerning technical aids furnished R.I. Units by FRUPAC.

could be received during the day for which effective.

(f). _____ Continue to send additions and corrections by daily dispatch for the system currently in use. This code has proved of some value although much time and labor is required to make entries. A further trial period is considered necessary before a definite decision can be reached concerning the value of this code to the units afloat.

(g). _____ This code has not proved of much value as yet. Recommend frequent mailing of decodes.

(h). _____ This system has been very valuable. Continue to send additions and corrections by daily broadcast.

(i) Frequency information. Continue to send all possible information by daily broadcast. That received to date has been particularly helpful. Emphasis should continue to be placed on frequencies, particularly air, in the Empire-Nansei Shoto-Taiwan areas. New prints of the frequency books should be forwarded to each unit as soon as printed. This book is in constant use and soon becomes very worn and tattered.

G-D
2. The FIFTH Fleet Radio Intelligence Unit has been able to process and handle the material received to date. This has been made possible however, by using the chief radioman to assist the officer in charge in this clerical work. The chief radioman also acts as supervisor and normally only mans a receiving position when in action or when action is imminent. It is believed that the other units having a total of only four radiomen including the chief radioman, may have difficulty in properly handling the material received. A yeoman assigned to each unit would be a very helpful addition.

B. T. Holcomb, Jr.
B. T. HOLCOMB, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

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CNO (Op-20-G)

Rep.

A8-2(2)

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00078

7 MAR 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 5 March 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507 of
4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

27 February 1945

Task Force 58 made rendezvous with the fueling group this morning. Upon completion of fueling, the flagship (U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS) was detached from Task Force 58 and proceeded independently to IWO JIMA, arriving in the early evening. Search for active air circuits and SASEBO broadcast were primary assignments. Drill type traffic and procedure continue prominent from the Empire. Nothing of immediate interest was revealed from this day's coverage.

28 February 1945

This ship remained in the immediate vicinity of IWO JIMA throughout the day. Coverage assignments essentially the same as yesterday, except that the Air Search operator concentrated especially on the lower KYUSHU, NANSEI SHOTO, OKINAWA areas, for any indication that Task Force 58's position had been revealed. Results were negative. SASEBO broadcast contributed a good volume of plane sightings and air alerts, but these were due to the U.S. Army air attacks presumably operating from the PHILIPPINE area. Empire air circuits were either normal or continuing with their training program.

1 March 1945

Gunfire support of the IWO JIMA operations was furnished by the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS this date with call fire assignments. Air coverage showed a sharp increase in traffic volume, but revealed no information that was of immediate value. Due to the air strike by Task Force 58 in the OKINAWA area this date, SASEBO's broadcast was especially productive with plane sightings air alerts and many plain language reports. At 1637 a grid position was originated by the unidentified call (NI KI KE 5), and the position given was apparently on units of Task Force 58. This report made its first appearance on the SASEBO broadcast at 1723, a delay of 46 minutes. The call of the originator was never discovered working on any frequency. In view of the above it is considered possible that the snoop plane returned to its base and made a verbal report on his discovery, and that the call used as the originator of this report was that of the unidentified base. KANOYA air base came up with a broadcast

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COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
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 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00076

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 5 March 1945.

this date using the indicator MIKA. Due to the type of traffic this broadcast handles and after comparing it with traffic received from SASEBO it was felt that the latter reveals more information that will be of value to us. IWO JIMA continued to maintain communications with CHICHI JIMA and KISARATSU although considerable difficulty was experienced at various intervals.

2 March 1945

The U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS continued in the immediate vicinity of IWO JIMA. Coverage for this date remained essentially the same. Air circuits revealed nothing other than normal activities. SASEBO broadcast produced two grid reports that gave all indications of being a mild form of deception, or of very poor communications facilities. The first of these was originated at ~~020230~~ by the unidentified (U YA E 3) as his NR2. It showed on the broadcast within the hour. The second one, with date and time of ~~012010~~ made its first appearance on the broadcast at 1957 of this date, originated by the same unidentified call, as his NR1, with a total delay of 23 hours and 47 minutes. As this call did not fit any known garble table, and the fact that both reports appeared on the broadcast even after considerable delay, it is believed that neither of the above deductions could be correct.

3 March 1945

The U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS continued supporting the IWO JIMA operations with call fire bombardment. Coverage remained the same with 6685 producing one grid in the late morning. Although this report at first gave all indications of being a bonafide grid position on our forces, it is believed that a search was being conducted and, of the possibly two or three planes involved, one developed some sort of trouble and was forced to make a landing in the open sea, giving his position before he landed. Signal strength was good and a preliminary exchange of signals between planes before this position was given, and the fact that this report made no known appearance on any broadcast, lead to the above deduction. Otherwise nothing of immediate interest was revealed in coverage for this date.

4 March 1945

Call fire bombardment throughout the day and night continued to be furnished by the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS in support of the IWO JIMA operations. Coverage remained as before with negative results, with the exception of one apparently false grid on 5089M. This is possibly a continuance of some sort of deception or training program. Other than the one transmission to an un-

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COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00076

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~


Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 5 March 1945.

identified addressee on 5089M, it made no other appearance within the limits of this unit's coverage.

5 March 1945

The U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS remained in call fire bombardment status, supporting the IWO JIMA operations throughout the day. At 1600 this ship departed independently for GUAM. Coverage as before with very little activity noticed on air circuits. KANOKA air base broadcast and SASEBO broadcast produced three grid positions that looked legitimate. However, as positions given did not conform with any known locations of our forces it was believed that they possibly were reporting their own units, or it was a continuance of the deception program as previously mentioned. One of the units originating two of these reports was heard earlier in the morning on 7035.

2. Traffic and logs for this period are being forwarded for research and analysis.


B. T. HOLCOMB, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

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ComFIFTHFleet File

AS-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00086

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

13 MAR 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CinC RI Unit, FIFTH Fleet
Top Secret-Ultra Serial
00085 of 13 March 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during
DETACHMENT.

1. Forwarded.
2. As in previous operations, the services of the Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet, were of great value in the IWO JIMA operation and supporting strikes at TOKYO.



A. C. DAVIS,
Chief of Staff.

Rep.

A8-2(R.I.)

~~TOP SECRET~~
Serial: 00005

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

13 MAR 1945

TOP SECRET - ULTRA

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Via: Commander FIFTH Fleet.

Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during DETACHMENT.

Reference: (a) CinCPac and CinCPCA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a).

2. Commander FIFTH Fleet was in strategic command of the forces involved in the DETACHMENT operations. Commander FIRST Carrier Task Force, Pacific, was in tactical command of units making the TOKYO strikes. Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific, was in tactical command of the seizure and occupation of IWO JIMA.

3. The following is a resume of operations of the Radio Intelligence Unit embarked in the flagship, Commander FIFTH Fleet. Pertinent intercepts were handed personally to Commander FIFTH Fleet by the Officer in Charge of this unit. Minus nine (item) zone times are used in this report unless otherwise designated.

12-15 February 1945 (inclusive) - Enroute TOKYO area

Numerous reports were intercepted during this period from enemy picket boats generally disposed along the thirty degree North Latitude line. Most of these were sightings of search planes or of B-29's enroute to or from the Empire. In most cases a position was given, thus disclosing the location of the picket boat.

16 February 1945 - First Day of TOKYO Strike

0715 Beginning at 0644 radar contact reports were observed followed by a full alert being declared in the YOKOSUKA central district at 0710. This was a definite indication that the strike had achieved complete tactical surprise.

1000 ATSUKI air base ordered aircraft to proceed to MAEBASHI. Much activity heard on the ATSUKI air base fighter control circuit. Enemy air reactions seemed mainly defensive and no indication of air attacks being planned on our forces.

Many visual sighting reports of our aircraft over the TOKYO - YOKOSUKA were intercepted throughout the day.

Ref.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

13 MAR 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~
 TOP SECRET - ULTRA

Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during DETACHMENT.

17 February 1945 - Second Day of TOKYO Strike

Continued to receive numerous sighting reports of our aircraft over the TOKYO - YOKOSUKA area. No indication that our surface forces have been located or air attacks planned.

2300 A plain language message was intercepted from a picket boat stating that he was being shelled and was sinking. This enemy craft was sunk by one of our screening destroyers and did not get off an amplifying report or give a position.

18 February 1945 - Enroute IWO JIMA

1300 First of a series of grid positions were received on an enemy air search circuit. These positions checked very closely with the position of one of our carrier groups. A signal was sent to Commander Task Force 58 to insure that the Radio Intelligence Unit with Commander Task Force 58 was also intercepting these position reports.

19 February 1945 - D Day at IWO JIMA

1215 Enemy aircraft, probably KANOYA based, made a contact report giving a grid position indicating that the fueling group had been sighted. This plane reported a few minutes later that he had sighted carrier aircraft. One of the task groups of Task Force 58 was fueling at this time.

1245 Another enemy aircraft made two contact reports giving positions that were in the area in which our carriers were operating.

20 February 1945 - D plus 1 at IWO JIMA

1145 An enemy aircraft reported sighting our carrier aircraft at 1129. One minute later the same aircraft sent a grid position. This grid worked out to a position near which our carriers were operating. At 1140 one of our search aircraft reporting sighting a lone Betty within ten miles of this position on course 130. Traffic associations and the fact that the position was on the line KANOYA - IWO JIMA lead to the deduction that the Betty was a KANOYA based search plane.

1240 An enemy aircraft originated sighting report at 1131 which gave position of fueling group. Commander Task Force 51 was informed that a "snooper" was in the vicinity of the fueling group.

A8-2(R.I.)

00005
 TOP SECRET - ULTRA
 COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

13 MAR 1945

Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during DETACHMENT.

21 February 1945 - D plus 2 at IWO JIMA

No unusual traffic was intercepted today. There were, however, many weather reports originated in the BONINS which were transmitted on an air frequency during the morning and early afternoon. This was the only indication noted which was probably related to the suicide attacks made by enemy aircraft on our forces during the late afternoon and early evening.

22 February 1945 - D plus 3 at IWO JIMA

Much activity and several plain language messages were passed between two air bases probably in the Empire. The frequency was the same as that used yesterday in passing weather reports and it was thought for a time that another suicide attack might be planned. Such attacks failed to develop, however, possibly due to poor visibility in the IWO JIMA area in the late afternoon.

23 February 1945 - Enroute TOKYO area

Nothing of tactical interest intercepted this date.

24 February 1945 - Enroute TOKYO area

1230

The Radio Intelligence Unit with Task Force 58 intercepted two grid positions during the morning from enemy aircraft. One position was timed 0855 and the other at 0906. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (GUAM) also reported intercepting these grids. Only one of the grids could have possibly been a sighting report of our force, and it was not very close. Due to the fact that these grids did not appear on either the TOKYO broadcast or the submarine broadcast, and that there was no sign of an increase in operational type traffic that would certainly have appeared had our forces been sighted, it was firmly believed that we had not been discovered. An "Ultra" dispatch from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PEARL) originated at 240330 (Z) and received at 1600 confirmed this conclusion.

2245

A picket boat contact report originated at 2222 contained a grid which worked out to our approximate position. At 2243 this contact report was broadcast on his circuit by OMINATO. At 2400 it appeared on the TOKYO broadcast. The handling that this contact report received, in addition to the fact that the position reported was very close to that of our force was strong evidence that our force had been sighted and that the information was being passed to all interested parties. Commander Task Force 58 was informed of this sighting report at 2300.

A8-2(R.I.)

~~TOP SECRET~~ 000485
 COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

13 MAR 1945

Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during DETACHMENT.

25 February 1945 - TOKYO Strike

0745 The first evidence of enemy contact with our forces were a series of radar reports from unidentified stations in the general YOKOSUKA area, the first one being intercepted at 0720. At 0727 the first visual sighting report of our aircraft was intercepted. YOKOSUKA declared a full alert for the YOKOSUKA central district at 0739. Thus it appeared evident that the enemy was again surprised, in spite of the apparently legitimate sighting report of the previous night which received such wide attention. The only reaction to our strike was observed on the ATSUKI air base fighter control circuit. The enemy activity seemed defensive in nature, and nothing was seen to indicate an intended attack on our surface units.

1857 A picket boat reported contact with a surface unit at 1855. No grid was given but the report appeared on the OMINATO broadcast at 1937. No further transmission was heard from this vessel and shortly afterwards word was received from one of our screening destroyers that a picket boat had been sunk and another set afire.

2338 Another picket boat reported a surface force headed south. No position was included in the report. This vessel was also a victim of our destroyer screen as shortly after it made the above report it reported being shelled and was not heard from again.

26 February 1945 - Enroute IWO JIMA

1025 A signal was received from Commander Task Force 58 to the effect that sixteen planes were heard on 6580 kcs with strong signals. This frequency was checked and at 1107 a grid was intercepted that worked out to a position 140 miles away from our force. This grid did not appear on any broadcast, and judging from the types of calls and headings appearing on this circuit, it was thought to be a drill circuit.

1120 Intercepted report from unknown place that BLUE carriers were sighted bearing 180 distance 35 kilometers at 1015. The report was apparently erroneous and was thought to have been originated somewhere in the KURILES. An "Ultra" dispatch from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PEARL) 262014 (Z) and received at 270703 (I) tended to confirm this deduction.

27-28 February 1945 - Enroute IWO JIMA

Nothing of tactical interest intercepted.

Rep.

A8-2(R.I.) 00085

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

13 MAR 1945

Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during DETACHMENT.

1 March 1945 - At IWO JIMA (Task Force 58 Striking OKINAWA)

1000 OKINAWA declared a full alert at 0655. Many visual sightings of our aircraft shortly after the full alert was declared showed that tactical surprise was achieved.

1745 An enemy aircraft made a report at 1637 and gave a grid position that was about thirty miles northwest of Task Force 58's launching position.

2-4 March 1945 - At IWO JIMA

Nothing of tactical interest intercepted.

5 March 1945 - Left IWO JIMA enroute GUAM

B.T. Holcomb, Jr.
B.T. HOLCOMB, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

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A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00087

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

13 MAR 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week Ending 12 March 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac and CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

6 March 1945 - 12 March 1945 (inclusive)

During this period the flagship, Commander FIFTH Fleet (USS INDIANAPOLIS) was enroute from IWO JIMA to GUAM to ULITHI. Equipment was overhauled and repaired. SASEBO broadcast only was covered and nothing of a tactical nature that affected the flagship was intercepted.

B.T. Holcomb, Jr.
B.T. HOLCOMB, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

Copy to:
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Ref.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00094

22 MAR 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Fifth Fleet.
To : Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 19 March 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507 of
4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted.

13 March 1945

Commander Fifth Fleet Flagship (Indianapolis) anchored Ulithi. Covering Sasebo broadcast only and making preparations for the coming operation.

14 March 1945

Underway from Ulithi for air strikes on Kyushu. Air search, Sasebo and Kanoya broadcasts assigned as primary coverage. 6640M produced a brief flurry of air activity with several grid positions, which were considered to be of the drill type, as the positions given did not conform with known positions of any of our forces. 6490J was active in the evening with contact reports due to diversionary tactics by two of our destroyers. These reports were promptly handled by Tokio and Sasebo broadcasts.

The following Air frequencies were logged during the day:
5785M 6009M 8725J 9045J 8722J 8610A 8915J and 6550J.

15 March 1945

Continuing on northward course. Coverage assignments as before. Nothing of immediate value was received.

Routine air activity was noted on the following frequencies:
6550J 8725J 7790J 7035J 5215M 6858M 9045J 8915J 6115J 4340M
and 3915J.

NSA Technical Report when no better needs
5-41848AL copy

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial: 00084

COMMANDER, FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for the week ending 19 March 1945.

16 March 1945

Our position is southwest and west of Iwojima proceeding northwest. At least five planes were active on 6740J during the morning, sending grid positions which proved to be of the drill type. In the afternoon 6685J yielded a good volume of the same type of traffic. 3342J was especially prominent in the evening with planes and grid positions. These reports were promptly broadcast by Kanoya. Although positions given, and signal strength of the planes' transmitters indicated they were close to us, the method of handling this traffic indicated that an extensive communication drill was being conducted.

Other than the above mentioned circuits, Air activity showed on:
 5337J 3915J 6580J 9045J 5875M 6325A 8725J 8880M 7035J 6115J and
 6550J

17 March 1945

As we were well within range of search planes an additional operator was assigned to Air search. 6685J became active in the early morning producing numerous grid positions, which were given the same prompt handling by Kanoya as was the case last evening. However, positions given and the normal strength of the planes transmitters gave all indications that this was a continuance of the communication drill previously mentioned. 6740J carried a good volume of grid positions throughout the day, with a single kana character appearing after each message number suggesting a new means of indentifying drill traffic, which it apparently was. In the late evening, Bogeys were picked up on the radar screen, along with identified friendly planes. The Bogey originated his first report on our position at 2245, followed by several amplifying reports.

Other Air circuits active during the day were: 7035J 9045J 8725J
 5715J 6840J 6580J 6550J 4180J 8915J 6845M 4284M 5337J and 6640M.

18 March 1945

Our position and intentions were well known to the enemy by the time the first Kyushu strike was launched, as several snoopers made periodic reports on us throughout the night. 3342J, 6685J, 6050J and 6740J, which is closely associated with 6685J, were most prominent with information on our forces throughout the day. Kanoya broadcast gave immediate priority handling of these reports, which suggests that the previous mentioned communication drills were conducted, to prepare for just such an emergency. Sasebo broadcast also handled this information, but not as rapidly as did Kanoya.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial: 00894

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Subject Report of Operations for the week ending 19 March 1945.

The usual plane sightings, alerts and reports of engaging the enemy were received from both broadcasts. 6685J was not only used by the search planes reporting our positions, but was also used by the attacking aircraft as a tactical frequency.

Other circuits showing Air activity were: 6740J 7114M 6640M 6537M 7035J 7875J and 9045J.

19 March 1945

Although our forces were under constant surveillance by enemy "snoopers" during the night, the Kobe-Kure strike was launched on schedule. 3342J carried the grid positions on us while we were proceeding to the launching position. 6685J, 6740J and 6050J were all active with a large volume of information concerning our forces throughout the day. During the attacks on our forces today, 6685J was again used as a tactical frequency, while 6740J continues to be closely associated, as the same calls appeared on both circuits. As before Kanoya gave immediate distribution of all this information on his broadcast. A thirty to fortyfive minute interval was noted before the above information showed on Sasebos' broadcast.

In the late afternoon we began retiring southward, but progress was slow due to our remaining in the general vicinity of the stricken Franklin and her escorts.

In addition to the above mentioned circuits, Air activity was also noted on: 7114M 6640M 6573M and 7035J.

B.T. Holcomb, Jr.
B.T. HOLCOMB, JR.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

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COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial ~~000507~~

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

28 MAR 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Fifth Fleet.
To : Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 26 March 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret - Ultra Serial 000507 of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted.

26 March 1945

Commander Fifth Fleet in the Indianapolis, retiring from the Kobe-Kure area in company with Task Force 58. In addition to our regular coverage, 6490J was watched during the night with negative results. 3342/6685J, with 6740J closely associated, very active with grid positions on our forces plus a good volume of tactical information during the attacks that developed on our forces throughout the day and evening. Kanoya continued to give prompt delivery of this traffic on his broadcast.

Other circuits showing air activity were 6050A 6850J 7035J 6550J 5337J 8915J and 6115J.

21 March 1945

Search planes made periodic reports on our position during the night, using 3342J. 6685J continued these reports in the morning, and as before was used as the tactical frequency during the attacks on our forces. The last report concerning us was received at 1629 on 6685J, which was originated at 1600. As there was no evidence of further attacks, or that we were still being spotted, the watch list was reduced accordingly, in the evening.

Other circuits showing air activity were 6843M 6050A 8610A and 6115J.

22 March 1945

Fueled during the morning, then proceeded toward launching point for Okinawa carrier strike. Air search, Kanoya-Sasebo broadcasts and 6490J all negative concerning information of value to us. The latter was covered during the night only.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial 00095

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

28 MAR 1945

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 26 March 1945.

Air activity was noticeably light, with very few air borne planes and a complete lack of the previous extensive drill circuits.

Routine air activity was noticed on 7035J 8722J 8725J 8610A and 6685J.

23 March 1945

The Okinawa air strike was launched on schedule in spite of adverse weather conditions. Apparently the enemy had no forewarning of our intentions as this area was first alerted at 0620, which was after the first strike had reached their objectives. Air reaction was negative until the late morning when search planes from Kanoya, working on 6685J, contacted our destroyer screen, followed by several reports on the main body. During this period, 6050A showed several air borne planes and at 1334 the signal "All units attack" was received. The attacking force apparently failed to reach their targets, possibly due to interception by our Combat Air Patrol.

Air activity of a routine nature also showed on 6740J 8725J 9045J 6115J 6850J 7035J 5337J and 3342J.

24 March 1945

This ship joined the fast battleship group for bombardment of Okinawa's southern beaches. 6640M and 6685J both yielded position reports on the carrier group in the morning and the latter gave all indications that an attack was forthcoming, but none developed to our knowledge.

Other air circuits with routine activity were 7035J 6340A 6050A 8725J 8915J 6855J 7750M 6740J 8610A 7110J 5337J and 5715J.

25 March 1945

Proceeding to rendezvous with amphibious force in company with one cruiser and two destroyers. 6642M was active with air borne planes and grid positions on some of our other units. There was no evidence of any attacks. 6685J made several appearances with drill type traffic. As Task Force 58 continued active in the Nansei-Shoto area, Sasebo broadcast carried a good volume of plane sightings, alerts and engaging the enemy etc.

Other air circuits showing activity were 5337J 6583M 8725J 8915J 8722J 6115J and 6550J.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00095

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

28 MAR 1945


Subject: Report of Operation for Week ending 26 March 1945.

26 March 1945

Kerama Retto landings underway. We supplied minor bombardment support. 6653M yielded a good volume of grid positions on units of our forces during the morning while the afternoon was without incident. However in the evening enemy "snooper" had us well spotted which developed into a sizeable attack. As before 3342J carried the positions and the tactical information, plus several plain language reports during the attack.

Air activity was also noticed on 5337J 8915J 6340A 6115J 6550J 6740J and 7035J.

8120M had a little activity in the afternoon and early evening which was presumed to be midget submarines. This activity was mostly confined to exchanging signal strength.


B.T. HOLCOMB, JR.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

Copy to:

CNO (Op-20-G)
Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon) (2)

Ref

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00100

4 APR 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
 To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
 Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 2 April 1945.
 Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial
 000507 of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

27 March 1945

Commander FIFTH Fleet in INDIANAPOLIS operating off KERAMA RETTO in a bombardment status. Air activity from KYUSHU and FORMOSA produced a good volume of grid positions reports with 674ØJ, 665ØM, and 6685J most prominent. The current TA37 code book was delivered to us yesterday intact. Photostatic copies were made and delivered to Radio Intelligence Units of Commander Task Force 58, Commanders of Task Groups 58.1, 58.4, 58.5, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (ADV), Original was delivered to FRUPAC by Lieutenant Colonel Holcomb, U.S. Marine Corps.

28 March 1945

Bombarded OKINAWA defense positions during the day and retired to westward at night in company with Task Force 54. Two Vals attacked at dawn apparently maintaining radio silence. Considerable search activity out of FORMOSA which showed on 665ØM. KYUSHU air activity was negligible with 674ØJ the only frequency active. This proved to be drill. Translations of traffic received revealed enemy planes landing at TOKUNO SHIMA, and also confirmed the drill type traffic on 674ØJ. Our fleet was so informed, and neutralization of TOKUNO conducted by Task Group 58.1.

29 March 1945

Operating as before. KYUSHU air circuits active with good volume of grid positions and air traffic as a result of carrier strike in this area. 6685J and 674ØJ continue to carry the bulk of this information. Translations reveal radar contacts by planes. Base ordered plane that made contact at 221Ø to make further reports on enemy. This base reported that the attack force would arrive at battle area at ØØ31. Our forces were informed in spite of the fact that our forces were not in reported position, and attack would result in a "dry run". 665ØM was active with FORMOSA search planes. Traffic from this circuit revealed information that enemy planes were being staged through GIRAN and KARENKO during darkness for harassing missions against our forces in this area. Neutralization strikes requested from Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, which were carried out by the FIFTH Air Force.

AS-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER, FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

000111

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 2 April 1945.

30 March 1945

Operating off OKINAWA. Air activity from KYUSHU and FORMOSA showed on the usual frequencies, 665ØM, 674ØJ and 3342J. The KYUSHU activity gave evidence of an attack on units of Task Force 58. The attack occurred after midnight. 4Ø13M assumed to be a KYUSHU frequency was active in the evening with possible homing procedure.

31 March 1945

This ship was taken under attack and seriously damaged by a single Oscar that made suicide dive at Ø7ØØ. No warning of his presence was indicated, until he went into his attack. No damage to Radio Intelligence personnel or equipment. The usual FORMOSA-KYUSHU air circuits were active at intervals throughout the day and night.

1 April 1945

"Love" day OKINAWA. FIFTH Fleet flagship in KERAMA RETTO. Enemy reaction to landings below expectations. KYUSHU-FORMOSA air circuits, quite active, but indicated to be drill. However, bonafide grid positions on Task Force 58 appeared in the afternoon followed by orders from Base to maintain contact and units to attack enemy force bearing 21Ø degrees 7 miles from KIKAI JIMA, at Ø3ØØ. All holders of 35S were informed, even though it was anticipated that attack would be abortive, as plot showed no friendly forces off KIKAI JIMA on 1 April.

2 April 1945

At anchor KERAMA RETTO. Under attack during early hours of the morning. An hours warning was given to our forces from information received from Air Base and aircraft traffic relative to attacks 3342J, 6685J, 674ØJ and 665ØM continue to carry the air activity from KYUSHU and FORMOSA.

G. M. Slonim
 G. M. SLONIM,
 Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:

CNO (Op-20-G)
 Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon) (2)

AS-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000101

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

14 APR 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 9 April 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial
000507 of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

3 April 1945

Commander FIFTH Fleet flagship INDIANAPOLIS anchored in KERAMA RETTO. Considerable search activity from KYUSHU and FORMOSA showing on 6685J, 3342J and 665ØM with resultant attacks. A report of 2 BB's and 2 CV's in KERAMA RETTO was passed to three planes at 1715. Advance warning was given to our forces.

4 April 1945

Very little air activity today with no indications of searches being conducted. Bad weather possibly grounded enemy forces. 674ØJ and 665ØM appeared normal.

5 April 1945

Commander FIFTH Fleet shifted his flag to NEW MEXICO. A watch was maintained on the INDIANAPOLIS until a temporary watch was established on NEW MEXICO. By 16ØØ we were "set up" and operating normally, in newly built radio room. A vote of thanks to NEW MEXICO's material force for their excellent cooperation. To eliminate the possibility of equipment going astray in the confusion of such a shift it is suggested that all Radio Intelligence equipment be suitably labeled. The above is primarily a tip off to future new units. Air activity was very slow with evidence of limited search being conducted from KYUSHU. Bad weather continued to hamper the enemy's air operations.

6 April 1945

In company with Task Force 54 off NANSEI SHOTO. Air activity from KYUSHU became prominent in the early morning and continued throughout the day with resultant air attack in force during the afternoon. 3342J, 6685J carried this traffic, while 665ØM was also active in the morning with search activity.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER, FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

000101
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 9 April 1945.

6 April 1945 (continued)

In view of the above it seems the attacking forces came from FORMOSA as well as KYUSHU. 4013M gave further evidence of being a homing frequency for surviving planes.

7 April 1945

Operating off Western OKINAWA in company with Task Force 54. Air coverage revealed frequent sightings of Task Force 58 by KYUSHU planes working on 6685J. New frequency 6340M appeared with Kana numeral and single Kana calls. Nothing of value developed from this 6650M and 6740J appeared normal.

8 April 1945

Continued to operate with Task Force 54. Air activity slow. Weather reports prominent in today's traffic. No indications noted of impending attacks. Eight bogies were, however, splashed by Combat Air Patrol at sunset. 6740J only air frequency showing, but its volume was normal. Drill on 4013M, with one grid that was obviously drill.

Current editions of TA79 code book received this date, intact. Recovered from suicide plane which hit one of our DD's. Photostatic copies were made. Commander Task Force 58 was ordered to send plane to YONTAN Airfield for delivery of Task Force 58 Radio Intelligence Units' copies.

9 April 1945.

Operating as before with Task Force 54. Although air circuits were slow, translation revealed that enemy planes were landing at ISHIGAKI, possibly preparing for contemplated attack following day. All holders 35S were informed. 5288M made its first known appearance today. This was later identified as 5285 by FRUPAC.

G. M. Slonim
G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:

CNO (Op-20-G)
Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon) (2)

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial 000106

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

25 APR 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 23 April 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
dated 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

17 April 1945

The NEW MEXICO, FIFTH Fleet flagship, continued in support of OKINAWA operations during this period. KYUSHU air frequency 3342J active during the night with grid positions preceding attacks on carrier force and OKINAWA shipping in the morning. 7200M again showed with plain language while 6685J carried the tactical information. FORMOSA air circuit 6650J activated in the evening with resultant attack on Task Force 54. The current TA code was replaced by a new system this date except on a few FORMOSA circuits.

18 April 1945

Nothing significant on air circuits until late afternoon when FORMOSA frequency 6650J became active. Although very little traffic was passed the activity on this circuit gave strong evidence that an attack was pending. This attack was predicted well in advance of the attack. This is an outstanding example of capability of R.I. Units afloat.

19 April 1945

Air activity from KYUSHU and FORMOSA noticeably light. 7200M showed briefly in late afternoon indicating drill. One plane was repeatedly called on this circuit. Adverse weather perhaps curtailed the enemy's air operations.

20 April 1945

Nothing unusual developed until late afternoon when 6605J, 6844M and 7200M all became quite active. Possible drill on 7200M and search activity on the others, or perhaps this was part of a radio deception program. FORMOSA air circuit, 6650J showed in the evening. Attack later carried out by FORMOSA aircraft against forces in OKINAWA area. 3370M up with airborne planes at this time; this was possibly a low measurement for 3422, night frequency for 6844. Strong signals from these planes were heard suggesting this was the attack group that hit YONTAN airfield, although no evidence was seen to substantiate it as such.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial:000106

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

ULTRA

25 APR 1945

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 23 April 1945.

21 April 1945

FORMOSA and KYUSHU air circuits continued to show at intervals throughout the night. Bogies in this area at 0100 but no indication of their presence was noticed on the circuits. KANOYA alerted for approximately three hours during the morning as a result of neutralization strikes by the 21st Bomber Command. KYUSHU air circuits 6685J and 6844M up in the afternoon giving all indications of fairly extensive search. Several lengthy messages containing grid positions received. This traffic was given wide distribution. FORMOSA air 6650J again active in the evening, continuing through the night. Blue position on OKINAWA under attack by this group in late evening. No indications from KYUSHU that major attack contemplated.

22 April 1945

FORMOSA and KYUSHU landplanes called periodically through the night. One grid intercepted on 3422M, apparently a false position. Southern KYUSHU again alerted in early morning for a period of approximately three hours as the 21st Bomber Command continued their neutralization operations. KYUSHU air 6844J up in afternoon with two grid positions which looked good for our carrier group. 7200M also quite active at this time. This continued into the evening along with the usual KYUSHU and FORMOSA air circuits, leading up to a sizeable attack on our forces in the OKINAWA vicinity. However, few of the attacking planes were able to reach their objective. Many were effectively eliminated by our proficient CAP and Radar Pickets' gunfire. It was noticed on FORMOSA circuit 6650J, that single Kana numeral calls which had previously showed on 6640M conducting extensive training, were part of the attacking force. After 2100 no further air activity was noticed.

23 April 1945

Quiet throughout the night continuing so during the day. One grid from apparent airborne plane on 3422M during the mid-watch which was quite probably a report of his own position as nothing developed from this. 6650J showed briefly in the early evening and 4025A up with extensive drill at the same time.

2. This unit has experienced considerable interference from the ship's transmitters, making it difficult at times to copy even the strongest of signals. A temporary remedy was found by installing 600 Ohm resistors in the antenna, but this is not practical, as these resistors, being of a delicate structure have to be frequently replaced and the supply is not adequate to the demand.

AS-2(7)

ComFIFTH Fleet File
A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

000106

Serial:

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

25 APR 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 23 April 1945.

3. In view of the above it is recommended that future receivers for Commander FIFTH Fleet and Commander THIRD Fleet units be equipped with a permanent line filter of 1200 Ohms resistance. Whether or not this installation is desirable or necessary for carrier based units is not known, but the fact that both fleet commanders do considerable transmitting in the operating areas makes this installation most desirable.

↑
sent 16 line filters.
See FRUPAC
Serial Q 05165
of 16 May.

G.M. Slonim
G.M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:
CNO (Op-20-G)
Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon) (2)

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000109

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 16 April 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
dated 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

10 April 1945

During this period the NEW MEXICO, FIFTH Fleet flagship, operated off OKINAWA in company with Task Force 54.

Air circuit coverage revealed nothing of interest this date. No attacks occurred.

11 April 1945

KYUSHU air circuits were active throughout the day and evening. Vast majority of grid positions were originated by aircraft in actual contact with the carrier groups of Task Force 58. Several were messages of aircraft making weather reports "in vicinity of enemy"; two of the more active snoopers were definitely in the OKINAWA area.

Message was sent by enemy aircraft in afternoon stating that he would arrive in battle area at 1640. At 1545 a contact report on one of our carrier groups was passed to a collective air group by KANOYA AB. The above information was passed to all holders of 35S by Commander FIFTH Fleet as warning of enemy intent.

12 April 1945

KYUSHU air circuits 3342J and 3322M (3290J) continued to be active throughout the night and early morning. Many grid contacts were originated. MITUSI 5 (KANOYA a/c) originated a lengthy reconnaissance report on our forces present in the OKINAWA area and their dispositions at 0800(Item). This reconnaissance report was preceded by what appeared to be a short tactical report of 5 Kana, each separated by a period. Decode of reconnaissance report revealed that the Kana represented the various sectors of which plane had completed reconnaissance. 6685J continued in importance as KYUSHU (1st Mobile Base Air Force) tactical search and attack frequency. 7200M was used by the "Kamikaze" planes as a means of mutual strengthening of the "spiritual" prior to making the supreme sacrifice, and a considerable volume of plain

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial: 000109

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 16 April 1945.

12 April 1945 (Continued)

language traffic was intercepted on this frequency. Aircraft on this frequency "checked in" as they passed AMANI O SHIMA TOKUNO SHIMA and reported their flight time quite frequently. (Subsequent employment of the frequency has indicated that the Director of Naval Communications in TOKYO may have taken steps to prevent a recurrence). Attacks were resumed against our carrier groups in the evening. 3342/6685J were the tactical frequencies used, and 4017J was employed as "Hei" channel by aircraft returning to bases subsequent to attacks. Translations provided considerable information relative to intent, and contacts developed by search aircraft.

13 April 1945

Several planes from KYUSHU remained aloft during the night sending intermittent reports on 3342J. 6650J - 6267J and 6685J showed briefly during the morning. No indications of search activity or contemplated attack. At 1813 KYUSHU based plane on 6685J reported that he would arrive in battle area at 1920. All holders 35S notified. Attack group picked up enroute, however, the Combat Air Patrol intercepted them, and they never reached their targets.

14 April 1945

FORMOSA and KYUSHU air circuits were active all day with airborne planes yielding a good volume of grid positions. Message from SHINCHIKU Air Base intercepted, reporting no carriers, four heavy cruisers and 30 other ships at KERAMA RETTO, also about 150 other ships off OKINAWA. This was passed to an unidentified air base, and a good "tip off" that an attack was in the offing. Torpedo attack occurred on OKINAWA forces in late afternoon. At 1730 a plane reported that he had completed this attack and would land at MIYAKO JIMA about 2015. The above information was passed to Commander Task Unit 52.1.3 for action, and for information to all holders 35S. 7200M was quite active in afternoon with plain language. Had good reason to believe this was drill in anticipation of future use by Kamikaze groups, both Army and Navy planes were involved.

15 April 1945

Extensive search from KYUSHU in morning with results apparently negative. One plane reported that he had reached end of search vector and was returning to base. No enemy sighted. Afternoon was slow until Task Force 58 hit Southern KYUSHU. This area was alerted from 1455 until 1705. No immediate reaction to this strike was noticed on KYUSHU air circuits. 6650J, 6267J and 5285J all active for brief period in the early evening. Forces off OKINAWA underwent short attack, during this period, by planes believed to be based at SHINCHIKU and staged through MIYAKO JIMA. 3342J showed in the evening with airborne planes on apparent search missions for Task Force 58.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial 000109

28 APR 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 16 April 1945.

16 April 1945

KYUSHU air frequency, 3342J, continued to be active during the night and Task Force 58 reported having been under attack. 6685J carried the search and tactical information during the heavy air attacks in the morning, while 7200M again showed with plain language during the approach. Extensive search activity on 6685J continued in the afternoon. An enemy plane reported carrier force in position 23-42 N 125-38 E but could not determine number of carriers. This information was passed to Commander Task Force 57 as the above position checked for him. Task Force 58 again under attack in the evening. Plane on 3342J reported to base he would arrive battle area at 2040. This information sent to all holders 35S, and gave friendly forces approximately an hour's warning of impending attack.

2. HYNSON, Robert L., CRM(PA), USN, attached to this unit, has shown outstanding ability and devotion to the task at hand during periods when this flagship was under enemy attack throughout the present operation. It is felt that he is very definitely of officer calibre, and it is strongly recommended that he be made a warrant officer.

G. M. Slonim
G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:

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A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000115

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

4 MAY 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 30 April 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial
000507 of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

24 April 1945

FIFTH Fleet flagship, NEW MEXICO, continued to be employed as fire support unit in support of operations on OKINAWA. KYUSHU air circuit 6844 was active during the morning with single plane originating three grid contact reports; the reports were not rebroadcast by KANOYA, and no further activity was noted. 6650J, FORMOSAN air tactical circuit became active in the afternoon, and remained active during early portion of evening. The activity quite probably denoted search or ferry operations, as no enemy aircraft were encountered locally, nor in the vicinity of Task Group 52.1. 4017J was active with what appeared to be routine traffic between bases. 7200M was active for short period with single plane and airbase using army procedure, but no traffic was intercepted on the frequency.

25 April 1945

6844J, First Mobile Base Air Force's tactical frequency, became active in the morning with several grid positions, one of which appeared to be a bona-fide sighting of units of Task Force 58. The circuit continued to be active during the afternoon, but the volume of weather messages that were being originated by aircraft indicated that, if traffic could be construed as being an indication of offensive intent, operations would be a function of suitability of weather conditions. Since the activity eventually died out it was assumed that unfavorable weather conditions precluded carrying out initial phase of number 4 KIKUSUI operation. 7200M appeared again with Army procedure, but no traffic was intercepted. 6642M and 4025A were active during the evening watch with drill traffic.

26 April 1945

Forces in OKINAWA area alerted and under attack shortly after 0200. Only air activity noted at the time was 337LM, which is possibly a low measurement for 3382 kcs. An unidentified air base called five planes on this frequency,

AS-2(R.L.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000115

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 30 April 1945.

26 April 1945 (Continued)

only one of the planes originated any traffic. His signal strength was fair. Little activity was noted on any of the air frequencies during the remainder of the day. Large volume of contact traffic was sent as a result of the B-29 strike on KYUSHU airbases. Traffic indicated that bad weather was preventing the bombers from making visual attacks. Lack of air activity proved good indication that the scheduled KIKUSUI operations for the day had been delayed.

27 April 1945

3342J became active in early morning, a short message was sent by airbase to two planes. 6844J was up after daylight, and two planes were heard. No traffic was intercepted. Southern KYUSHU airbases were again bombed by B-29's, which produced the normal volume of contact traffic. No air activity during daylight hours. FORMOSA's 6650J became active during the evening. Attack on our forces in OKINAWA area was carried out, and anticipated in the light of the circuits' activity. Actually no traffic was intercepted on this circuit until "all unit Attack" signal was received, however, exchange of signal strength was frequent, and aircraft signal strength became progressively stronger while planes were approaching area.

28 April 1945

Considerable air activity on various KYUSHU tactical circuits prior to attacks on our forces. 3320M, 3422J and 3371M all being active. NISISO 1 was keying dual on 3320M and 3422J for a short period. Use of MASUKE (non-changing call) by base on 3371M and 3320 may indicate that these frequencies are being used by Army air units. 3371M believed to be 3382, and base that has been active on the circuit is KANOYA, HAKATA, or TSUMITAKA.

KANOYA area alerted by B-29's at 0600. Both KYUSHU and FORMOSAN air circuits were active subsequent to this time. Numerous grids intercepted, and indications of extensive search activity was noted. 6650J became very active in afternoon, search planes using this frequency made contact with units of Task Group 52.1. Warning of this contact was sent to Commander Task Group 52.1 and Commander Task Unit 52.1.3 by 35S message. Large scale attacks developed in the OKINAWA area in the late afternoon, and continued until midnight.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000115

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~ ULTRA

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 30 April 1945.

28 April 1945 (Continued)

A copy of TA80 was delivered to Commander FIFTH Fleet this date. Code was recovered from body of Jill pilot by DENSITY (AM218).

Effectiveness of smoke screen in transport area shown by intercepted message from plane stating that he had arrived in area, but since visibility was extremely poor, unable to carry out attack and he was returning to base. (Actually visibility was extremely good except in areas in which smoke was being generated).

29 April 1945

Single "boggie" alerted area 0200. Considerable search activity during morning. Task Force 58 was contacted. Considerable traffic giving grid position on units of Task Force 58 intercepted along with amplifying reports which contained composition and disposition of forces, courses and speeds. Translations passed to all holders 35S for information of units concerned.

Routine neutralization attacks on KYUSHU airfields by B-29's of 21st Bomber Command caused usual volume of tactical traffic.

Message received from KANOYA to search plane in contact with Task Force 58 "to make certain of his results as "Kamikaze" attack group was enroute to attack" was made subject of urgent 35S dispatch to Commander Task Force 58. Attacks on our forces off OKINAWA in evening did not produce a great volume of traffic, however, as usual a translation during the morning of a reconnaissance plane's report of dispositions of U.S. forces off OKINAWA was "tip off" that attacks would probably occur.

30 April 1945

B-29 attacks were carried out against KYUSHU bases from approximately 1000 (-9), the attacks produced the normal volume of contact traffic, with precautionary alerts at various bases from early morning.

KYUSHU based aircraft continued to be active during early morning, KANOYA ordered search plane to search area in vicinity of 27°30'N 129°50'E at 0305(-9). This was passed on to Task Force 58 as possible indication of further strike intent, however, plane was shot down at 0335 and no further activity developed.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000115

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 30 April 1945.

30 April 1945 (Continued)

Activity on 3422J was attributed to employment of aircraft to obtain weather information as all traffic intercepted dealt with weather conditions to southward of KYUSHU, and two planes reported that weather was getting worse,

6650J became active after sunset a single aircraft worked SHINCHIKU airbase, but neither plane nor base originated any traffic. Area was alerted at 2200(-9) by boggies on radar screen, TOTOTO received at 2245, and TERROR (CM) was hit shortly thereafter.

2. Attention is invited to the continued unsatisfactory nature of the FUTIZ and JUSIT systems as a means for Radio Intelligence Units to communicate with FRUPAC.

FIFTH Fleet's 281031, 280232, 280516 of April were not delivered to FRUPAC by Radio Wahiawa until 31 April, and not until ordered to do so by separate dispatch. The fact that key values of a captured current aircraft contact code were being sent in these dispatches is sufficient evidence in itself to indicate that a satisfactory system of communications between Radio Intelligence Units and FRUPAC must be established. The system must follow the pattern of established communications as Radio Intelligence Unit officers do not have sufficient leisure to supervise the CWO's in the handling of JUSIT and FUTIZ dispatches.

It is recommended:

(a) That FRUPAC be assigned a radio call to insure delivery of traffic to the activity.

(b) If FUTIZ system remains in effect, FRUPAC acknowledge all dispatches received from Radio Intelligence Units by OP JUSIT dispatch. (If this system is adopted a reasonable delay basis must be accepted prior to starting servicing by originator to prevent non-delivery).

(c) That units be ordered to parallel FUTIZ dispatches with a "See my # _____" in a normal channel dispatch. (This does not seem advisable in that it will overload our communication channels).

Copy to:
CNO (Op-20-G)
Flt Intel Off PacFlt (Advon), (2)

G. M. Slonim
G.M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

No
ok
He
unless no acknowledgment must remain

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00013

9 MAY 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 7 May 1945.

Reference: (a) CinCPac and CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial
000507 dated 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

1 May 1945

FIFTH Fleet flagship, NEW MEXICO, operating in the immediate vicinity of OKINAWA during this period, furnishing bombardment support to operations ashore.

KYUSHU and FORMOSA air circuits were quiet, except for brief appearances of FORMOSA's 6650J which yielded nothing of value. New 6950M was discovered about 1000(I) using aircraft procedure but this activity subsided by noon and gave all indications of drill. No traffic was received on this frequency.

2 May 1945

Air activity from KYUSHU and FORMOSA was non-existent, and there was neither indication of search activity nor impending attack. Considerable drill activity was noted within both areas.

3 May 1945

About 1000, FORMOSA's 6650J became active with indications of extensive reconnaissance. A lengthy report on friendly forces in the OKINAWA area was intercepted from one of these planes; the plane reported sighting 2 BB's, 3 CA's, about 10 DD's, over 60 large transports and 100 other vessels, plus 200 large and medium vessels in KERAMA RETTO.

The above information was passed to all holders of 35S. The reconnaissance was an excellent "tip off" of subsequent attack on forces in this area. The attack began at sunset and lasted until approximately 2030. FORMOSA's search and tactical frequency, 6650J, carried a good volume of tactical information during the engagement.

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 7 May 1945.

3 May 1945 (Continued)

The attacking group was composed of numerous units of the "Special Attack Force", (Kamikazes). Several instances of the use of the procedure signal E-WO "I am securing after this transmission", were noted just before these planes started their suicidal dives.

4 May 1945

Both FORMOSA's 6650J and KYUSHU's 3422J were up, and quite active at the beginning of the new day. Forces in this area were subjected to coordinated attacks from shortly after midnight until approximately 0500. FORMOSA based aircraft came in first, and as usual 6650J carried the tactical information. 3422J yielded valuable information during the approach of the KYUSHU based planes. Several messages were intercepted, which contained scheduled times of arrival in the battle area. Responsible commanders were informed by urgent despatch in 35S channel.

FORMOSA's 6650J, KYUSHU's 6844J and the new 6950M were all active with tactical signals and traffic during the attack on this area, which was resumed at approximately 0830 and lasted until about noon. Many plain language reports by planes of the Kamikaze group were intercepted on 6950.

Several grid positions, and departure reports of the "Giran Special Attack Force" were intercepted on 6650J in the late morning. First phase was reported to have taken off at 0950, second phase at 1010. At 1120 a report that the fourth phase had taken off was received. Positions given indicated attacks on Task Force 57 should be anticipated, consequently the above information was passed to Commander Task Force 57 for action, information to all holders 35S. There was no activity during the remainder of the day.

During this morning's air engagement, when our entire anti-aircraft battery was firing at a diving Kamikaze, the Marine Orderly delivered a Junit tape from FRUPAC, requesting an inventory of publications on hand. Several similar situations have occurred in the past, and it is hoped that in the future a more opportune time can be found to remind us of our clerical shortcomings, or machinery be set up to provide a yeoman.

5 May 1945

FORMOSA's 6650J became active shortly after midnight. Fifteen calls were heard, most of these were calls of airborne planes. This unusual activity during this time of night was good indication that air attacks were developing in this area. The attacks began about 0200 and lasted until nearly 0500. 5285J, another FORMOSA air circuit, was also up showing at least two airborne

Inform Comah. Inform that the Oin C Frigate has no critical over Kamikazes and hence cannot pick a time for delivery of certain messages. The Oin C would prefer not to have to remind him of his clerical shortcomings.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial:

~~TOP SECRET - UTR~~Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 7 May 1945.
 -----5 May 1945 (Continued)

planes. One signal "All Units Attack" was intercepted, plane had an especially strong signal. Almost immediately this ship vibrated quite violently as torpedo passed astern of ship.

6650J remained moderately active throughout the rest of the day and evening. Several grid positions were intercepted shortly after 0900, which indicated Task Force 57 had been sighted. This particular plane was repeating his message NR2 when his transmitter abruptly stopped. As he was never heard again he apparently ran afoul of the British CAP. The contact reports were passed to Commander Task Force 57 for action, information to all holders 35S.

At 2300 this area was once more alerted by the presence of bogies, but there was no activity on the air circuits at the time, except for 3320M on which frequency an unidentified base was calling several planes. The planes were never heard nor was any traffic intercepted.

6 May 1945

Area again alerted, and subjected to air attacks commencing around 0200 and lasting until nearly 0500. There was no advance indication on the air circuits of this attack. However, once in the target area, KYUSHU based planes on 3422J became most active with a large volume of tactical signals. Almost immediately after this engagement was completed, FORMOSA's 6650J became active showing 9 different plane calls. This was an apparent movement of aircraft to the staging base (possibly SHINCHIKU) for the subsequent attack on this area. These attacks began at 0900. Although no KYUSHU air frequencies were active at the time, it was suspected that a portion of the attacking force came from the KANOYA area.

FORMOSA's 6650J again showed signs of activity around 1600 and remained active until the close of day. Apparent snoopers alerted this area once more at 2000, but no indication of his presence seen on any of the circuits.

7 May 1945

FORMOSA's 6650J and KYUSHU's 3422J were moderately active at the turn of day, becoming most prominent around 0200 with tactical signals. Forces in our area were again subjected to a sustained attack lasting until approximately 0500. Air activity subsided on completion of the attack.

ComFIFTHFleet File
A8-2(R.I.)

100789
COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial:


~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

19 MAY 1945

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 7 May 1945.

7 May 1945 (Continued)

However, FORMOSA and KYUSHU's 6650J and 6844J became moderately active later in the morning. Traffic appeared to be routine. 7200M up around 0900 with apparent dummy traffic. Two "drill" grid positions were intercepted on the frequency, but the activity ceased at about 1000. Considerable drill traffic was noticed on 6640M in the afternoon. Remainder of day quiet. Adverse weather conditions probably curtailed any anticipated enemy air activity.



G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:

CNO (OP-20-G)
PacFlt IntelOff (2)

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

ComFIFTHFleet File

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
United States Pacific Fleet
Flagship of the Commander

Serial 000128

23 May 1945

~~TOP-SECRET ULTRA~~

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
OinC, R.I. Unit, FIFTH
Fleet Ltr. A8-2(R.I.)
Serial 000127, dated
22 May 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To : Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

1. Forwarded.
2. The FIFTH Fleet Radio Intelligence Unit has been of very great assistance to this command during the ICEBERG operation.
3. The recommendation included in paragraph 6 of basic letter is conservative. The enlisted strength should be increased to ten (10). The officer in charge should have a commissioned officer as assistant. Operations of the fleet are more extended than ever before. Closer and more continuous contact is maintained with the enemy. The Radio Intelligence Unit cannot operate at peak efficiency when fatigued as a result of personnel shortage.

R. A. SPRUANCE.

Copy to:
CNO (Op-20-G)
PacFlt IntelOff

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000127

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

22 MAY 1945

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Via: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
Subject: Report of Radio Intelligence Operations during ICEBERG.
Reference: (a) CinCPac and CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
dated 4 February 1945.

1. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a).
2. A compilation of reports made to Commander FIFTH Fleet as a result of information obtained from intercept activity would be entirely too voluminous to be handled in a report of this nature.
3. A considerable volume of pertinent tactical information was sent to Task Force and Task Group Commanders during this operation using Channel 35S.
4. There were very few instances noted during the entire operation of FIFTH Fleet forces being attacked by enemy aircraft without preliminary warning as a result of activity on enemy tactical air channels.
5. ROUGEUX, Walter Louis, RMlc(T), V-6, USNR, of FIFTH Fleet Radio Intelligence Unit was killed, and two men, HYNSON, Robert Lear, CRM(PA), USN, and SEELY, Robert Lee, RMlc(T), V-6, USNR, seriously injured, as a result of suicidal hit on Flagship on 12 May 1945.
6. Fatigue of operators during a protracted operation such as ICEBERG is a matter of concern, and it is felt that a minimum of nine operators should be assigned to the Fleet Radio Intelligence Unit, and no less than eight operators be assigned to Task Force Commander Units.
7. Technical material and publications were provided by FRUPAC and SUPRAD very expeditiously and proved very helpful in the proper functioning of unit.

G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:
CNO (Op-20-G)
PacFlt IntelOff

S67-1

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 100170

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 SEP 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Off. in Chg. RIU #8
A8-2(R.I.) serial 000166
dated 6 August 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To : Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.
1. Forwarded.

D. C. Ramsey
D. C. RAMSEY,
Chief of Staff.

Holcomb

NSA Technical Liaison Unit
S-41848 AV Copy 1

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial:

000156

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit No. 8.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Via: Commander FIFTH Fleet.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.

Reference: (a) CinCPac and CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507 dated 4 February 1945.

1. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a).

I. OPERATIONS

A. Summary of Intercepts

1. 17-20 August. Enroute to Manila from Guam.

Tactical air circuits were intercepted during this period but the only activity noted was probable drill on the FORMOSA tactical circuit. Other activity heard indicated a large scale movement of both Army and Navy planes from KOREA to JAPAN. Anti-sub patrols were flown by planes from Air Groups 901 and 903. One plain language message was intercepted on 18 August from CinC KWANTUNG Army ordering forces under his command to cease fire and turn over armament to Soviet forces.

2. 21-25 August. Anchored at Manila.

From 20 August the TOKYO #1 and SASEBO broadcasts received primary coverage while the tactical air circuits were checked frequently for activity. The Japanese planes carrying delegates to Manila had been instructed to use the call BATAAN were heard on 21 August using instead the call NIHO 1 (plane) and HONIØ (base - NIHO reversed), probably standing for NIHON (JAPAN). Plain language traffic intercepted on the broadcasts rapidly increased until by 24 August the major proportion of their traffic was in plain language. On 22 August Air Group 901 began sending its traffic in plain language and on 23 August fighter planes at MIHO and OITA sent plain language traffic. No tactical activity was heard during this period.

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000166

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.

On 23 August all Naval Radio stations were ordered to copy the TOKYO #1 broadcast and this station then began to circulate the Allied Supreme Commander's orders concerning the surrender. On that date the Minister of the Navy ordered all naval forces to turn in armament and take critical parts out of airplanes, guns, suicide boats and submarines.

By 24 August preparations to receive Allied occupation forces occupied a prominent place in the traffic. Deactivation of mines in GENKAI NADA and the SASEBO North West Sea Frontier was ordered. Arrangements were made to receive Allied forces in KYUSHU. Anti-aircraft warning nets were ordered to cease operations. Signs appeared of strains in the Japanese communications system as new frequencies were assigned and special communications personnel were rushed to different parts of JAPAN.

From 25 August on, Japanese air-ground activity ceased except for transport flights authorized by the Allied Supreme Commander. Tactical air circuits were still checked by this unit, however, although the TOKYO and SASEBO broadcasts were given primary coverage. On 25 August broadcast traffic began to increase very markedly. Reports began to come in from units which had disbanded and turned in their equipment. CinC 6th Fleet reported that submarines at KURE had put their armament and torpedoes ashore and requested similar reports at once from other submarines.

Many orders from the high command demanded immediate reports on progress in disarmament being made by lower echelons. These indicated a certain anxiety on the part of the high command concerning the progress of disarmament, and reluctance or inefficiency on the part of lower echelons in carrying out disarmament. Perhaps in an effort to speed this up, the Emperor asked for an orderly and swift demobilization without disturbances and ordered the men in the armed services to take up their civilian occupations as subjects loyal to the throne.

On 27 August the Minister of the Navy elaborated on the theme of the Imperial Mandate and asked men in the service to devote their energies to reconstruction in obedience to the Emperor's command. A message on the TOKYO broadcast asked for

A8-2(P.I.)

Serial:

000168

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.

an end to rivalry for power by the Army and Navy. YAMADA, former head of the Naval Academy, was made CinC 3rd Air Fleet and shortly afterwards ordered staff personnel from certain Air Flotillas and Air Groups under his command to arrange for turning in armament and sending in reports.

Most of the traffic, however, indicated that armament was being turned in and units were being disbanded in an orderly fashion. Surrender procedure was arranged for units from the MARSHALL ISLANDS to MANCHURIA. Famous suicide outfits joined in the scramble to locate trucks, interpreters, rations, etc. for the Allied occupation forces. Special care in the treatment of American prisoners and internees was ordered.

3. 28-30 August. Enroute to OKINAWA;
30-31 August. Anchored at BUCKNER BAY.

From 28 August circuits were intercepted which had traffic concerning Japanese preparations to surrender the KYUSHU and Western HONSHU area. Approximately 80 pages of plain text were now being copied each day. Special coverage was given to FORMOSA and other tactical air circuits without results.

All indications were that surrender arrangements were proceeding in fairly good order although on 29 August CinC 5th Air Fleet ordered stored armament protected from looting and commanded Peace Preservation Units, if necessary, to disregard the orders of junior officers in charge. On the same date CinC 3rd Air Fleet ordered interceptor lookout personnel withdrawn.

Coast Defense Vessels at KURE were readied for minesweeping beginning 28 August. CinC 7th Fleet tried to locate all sorts of vessels for use as minesweepers. The west entrance of KAGOSHIMA BAY was expected to be fairly well swept clear of mines by 2 September and the MOJI Sea Transport Department was requested to set up channel buoys.

The Chief of the KANOYA Liaison Party on 28 August reported progress in arrangements to receive Allied occupation forces. Orders were sent on 29 August to prepare for landing of Allied forces at TAKASU. The Commandant, SASEBO Naval District, on 29 August went so far as to collect blankets and American flags for use during the occupation. In a message intercepted on 30 August landing conditions at TAKASU and FURUE (piers, beaches, roads, storage, etc.) were described in detail.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial: 000138

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.

Roads in this area are being improved and the KANOYA airfield, which is being worked on night and day, is expected to be practically ready by 2 September.

The Army and Navy in the KYUSHU area (and throughout JAPAN) will be responsible for public order in their respective operational areas. Naval Peace Preservation Units in this area will wear armbands labelled "N.P." (for Naval Police). The Commandant, SASEBO Naval District, on 31 August, ordered compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the surrender agreement. The Vice Commandant will inspect preparations to receive the Allied occupation forces on 1 September.

B. Coverage

1. Numerous air activities were checked and heard. Among the outstanding were the following:

5337J Air Group 901 and detachments.
5485J Air Group 903. Anti-sub patrol of Tsugaru Straits.
6530J Air Group 706.
6640J Air Group 801. Fighter planes based at Miho and Oita on search Seaplane base. Movements, training, offensive searches and attacks.
6650J Formosa Tactical.
6885J Air Group Tsingtao.
7010J Kanoya, Oita #2 and Matsuyama. Movements and offensive searches.
7105J Air Group Koochi. (Kanoya, Koochi, Oita) Plane movements between bases.
7035J 7th Flying Regiment.
7200J Kyushu based suicide planes. 3rd Fleet search and attack frequency.
7875J Kanoya (MIKA) broadcast.
9045J Transport.

2. Following circuits were frequently checked but remained unheard:

3421/6842J Kyushu search and attack frequency. Principal tactical channel.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial:

009150

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.

3515J 6th Kokugun circuit. (7028A)
3705J 6th Kokugun circuit. Used in attack on Okinawa forces.
5850J Major tactical frequency. Army planes under Navy control.
5777J
9145J Takao (EWA) broadcast

3. The following special assignments were guarded:

8915J cw for peace planes enroute to Manila (Heard)
6970J Intra-voice for peace planes. (Unheard)

5520 Japanese ships were ordered to report via radio to the
6210 nearest Allied Radio Station. Frequencies assigned them
8280 were 500, 4325, 8470, 12705 and 16940. They reported
12420 they were unable to report on these frequencies and
requested permission to report in on the frequencies
listed (left hand column) which was granted, however,
nothing was heard by this unit.

II. MATERIAL

It was found necessary to make minor re-arrangements in the radio room. The following equipment had already been installed prior to our arrival:

3-REC's, 3-RBB's, 1-CFT, 2-Ultra high Halicrafters, 1-LM18 and 2-Panoramic adapters.

In the re-arrangement of the radio room, 2-REC's, 1-CFT, 1-LM18, 1-Ultra high Halicrafters and numerous small items were retained. Other receivers were removed to make room for the 4-SX28's which were installed.

Radio reception is generally excellent, however, at times bad interference is experienced from the ship's transmitters. Arrangements are now being made to move high-power leads aft in the hopes of eliminating this interference. No interference has been experienced thus far from Radar or its associated apparatus.

The radio room is located on the Signal Bridge, directly aft of Flag Plct. It is air conditioned and affords very comfortable operating conditions.

A6-2(R.I.)

Serial: 000163 COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 17 to 31 August, inclusive.

III. PERSONNEL


The following personnel comprise Unit Number Eight, and reported for duty aboard the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY, Flagship of Commander FIFTH Fleet, at GUAM on 16 August 1945:

Lieutenant Colonel Bankson T. HOLCOMB, Jr., USMC (4658),
Officer in Charge.

Lieutenant John ASHMEAD (236711), S(I), USNR,
Assistant Officer in Charge.

CHAMPAGNE, Paul E., #400-43-15, V-3, USNR, CRM(T).
COSSEY, Hanan M., #630-83-84, V-6, USNR, RMLc(T).
CARLSON, Holly L., #618-59-80, V-6, USNR, RMLc(T).
CROSS, Neal L., #562-61-88, V-6, USNR, RMLc(T).
HUFF, Charlie R., #644-04-98, V-3, USNR, RMLc(T).
HARRIS, Hugh S., #877-89-29, USN SV, RMLc(T).
STRUCKMAN, James C., #615-66-11, V-6, USNR, RMLc(T).
WINGER, Jack (n), #877-88-25, USN SV, RMLc(T).
BALLEW, Thomas L., #618-62-96, V-6, USNR, RMLc(T).
CURTIS, Clair W., #655-01-54, V-6, USNR, RMLc(T).

It is recommended that any personnel reporting in the future to units with the Fleet bring white and blue undress uniforms with them. The usual peacetime weekly Captain's inspections are beginning to be held again, and this unit has been embarrassed by lack of proper uniforms. Furthermore, the uniform for liberty has been undress whites! It appears that the Officer in Charge instructed the men of this unit only to take dungarees when they left PEARL for GUAM.


B. T. HOLCOMB, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

Copy to:
CinC, Supplementary Radio,
The Director of Naval Communications (OP-20-G)

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 00173

17 SEP 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit No. 8.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Via: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 1 to 10 September, inclusive.
Reference: (a) CinCPac and CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 0005507
dated 4 February 1945.

1. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a).

I. OPERATIONS

A. Summary of Intercepts

1. 1 to 10 September. Anchored at Buckner Bay, OKINAWA.

During this period reception was generally poor because of interference from static and from the ship's transmitters. After 3 September traffic intercepted in the Western HONSHU-KYUSHU area showed a steady decrease. On 5 September full coverage of TOKYO No. 1 Broadcast was discontinued to make possible a wider coverage of Western HONSHU-KYUSHU traffic.

The reception of Allied troops at KANOKA was followed closely from the arrival of the advance party on 3 September, until the first large scale landings on 5 September. Details of landing facilities at TAKASU and FURUE were intercepted by this unit and forwarded prior to the landings to U.S. forces concerned.

Plain language traffic intercepts made possible a continuous check on Japanese minesweeping activities during this period. On 2 September all minesweeping except that in KAGOSHIMA BAY and TOKYO BAY was stopped temporarily pending negotiations with the Japanese at TOKYO. On 5 September SASEBO Naval District was advised of future American minesweeping activities there, and, on 9 September charts of the SASEBO area were handed over to American minesweepers.

On 10 September, a rather large number of Japanese vessels at KURE were ordered to proceed to SASEBO starting on 12 September. Acting on the basis of this intercept, Commander FIFTH Fleet requested that this movement be delayed because of limited harbor facilities at SASEBO.

NSA Technical Director
No RPT desired when no letter needed
5-4/345 AV COPY .1

A2-2(R.I.)

Serial:

51173

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 1 to 10 September, inclusive.

On 6 September traffic intercepts revealed that an American fighter pilot had crashed in OMURA BAY. This information was passed on to interested authorities.

B. Coverage

Numerous circuits were checked and heard. Among the outstanding were the following:


4915J/9830J	SASEBO No. 2 Broadcast (NORU).
3855J/7710J	YAMATO, TOKYO, OITA and KANOYA. (YAMATO Broadcast NIA).
3867.5J/7735J	TOKYO, SASEBO, KURE, OMINATO, KANOYA, OSAKA and MAIZURU.
8350J	TOKYO No. 1 Broadcast (HITU).
4045J	OITA, KANOYA, TOKYO.
4192J	SASEBO Communication Unit.
4600J	SASEBO Defence Force Commander.
4665J	SASEBO, KURE, KANOYA.
4742.5J	TOKYO, YAMATO, OITA, SASEBO and KURE.
5955J	KURE Broadcast (ITO).
7260J	YAMATO, OMINATO, KISARATSU.
7460J	SASEBO, KANOYA, IZUMI and OSHIMA Defence Division.
7505J	TOKYO, SASEBO, KURE.

II. MATERIAL

Nothing to report other than continued interference from ship's transmitters. Continued communication was maintained with GUAM which necessitated the use of high power transmitters. Unfortunately the transmitting antennae were located forward and in close proximity to our receiving antennae. The ship's receivers were also interfered with.

III. PERSONNEL

Chief Radioman CHAMPAGNE was transferred to the U.S.S. NEW MEXICO for transportation to PEARL HARBOR and return to FRUPAC on 9 September. Radioman First Class Charlie R. Huff is acting as radioman in charge and as supervisor.


B.T. HOLCOMB, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

Copy to:

OinC, Supplementary Radio,
The Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial: 000175

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

5 OCT 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on
OinC, RI Unit No. 8
TOP SECRET ULTRA A8-2(R.I.)
Dated 4 October 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 11 to 30 September, inclusive.
1. Forwarded.

D. C. Ramsey
D. C. RAMSEY,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
OinC, Supplementary Radio,
Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).

Do NOT Destroy (return to the
NSA Technical Library when no longer needed)
S-41848 AVcopy 1

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

4 October 1945.

From: Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit No. 8.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Via: Commander FIFTH Fleet.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 11 to 30 September, inclusive.

Reference: (a) Cin CPac and CinCPOA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 0005507
dated 4 February 1945.

1. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a).

I. OPERATIONS

11 to 13 September	Anchored at BUCKNER BAY
13 September	Enroute to WAKANOURA
15 September	Anchored at WAKANOURA
16 September	Enroute to YOKOSUKA
17 to 30 September	Anchored at YOKOSUKA

During this period the TOKYO Naval Radio broadcast was given primary coverage, with secondary coverage of SASEBO, KURE, MAIZURU, OMINATO, and OSAKA. Special coverage was given to areas in which American forces were preparing to land or were actually landing. In all cases occupation operations went off smoothly or with only minor incidents.

During the early part of this period, before full liaison was established with Japanese forces concerned, detailed reports were submitted by this unit to Commander Fifth Fleet on the progress of demobilization and on minesweeping. These operations have proceeded without incident.

An increasing amount of traffic during this period has concerned repatriation operations, ship schedules, and fueling arrangements. The Japanese propose using the KATSURAGI and RYUHO as troop transports.

Typhoon reports, when of interest, have been passed on to the Fifth Fleet Staff Aerological Officer.

AS-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary, 11 to 30 September, inclusive.

II. MATERIAL

In view of the expected disbandment in the near future of this unit and the return of personnel and registered equipment (including RIP-5's) to FRUPAC, it is recommended that the four SX-28 receivers, unit speakers and spare parts, be invoiced to the Supply Officer, USS New Jersey. These receivers were obtained on memorandum receipt from FRUPAC on 1 August 1945. The serial numbers are as follows: HA-9100, HA-11366, HA-3739, and HA-168361.

III. PERSONNEL

Nothing to report.

B. T. Holcomb, Jr.
B. T. HOLCOMB, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps.

Copy to:

OinC, Supplementary Radio,
The Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial

24 January 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hancock

From; Radioman in Charge RIU, Attached Commander Second Carrier Task Force.
To; Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (GX)
Subject; Report of operations 30 December 1944 to 24 January 1945.
Enclosure (a) Subject report.
1. Forwarded

Very Respectfully

J.P. Zinger
J.P. Zinger CRM USN.

TOP SECRET

24 January 1945

This report consists of 9 pages.

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TOP SECRET

24 January 1945

PERSONNEL

E.B. Beath Lt (jg) OinC

J.P. Yinger CRM

B.R. Johnson RMLc

R.J. Jones RMLc

W.E. Vaughan RMLc

(Transferred to USS Solace 24 January 1945)

TOP SECRET

- 30 Dec Sortie Ulithi at 0915, -11 Sugar Day.
This force will prevent interference from enemy naval or air forces with the SoWesPac forces seizing objectives in Lingayen Bay, Luzon. By destroying enemy naval and air forces and shipping in the Ryukus Formosa, China Coast and Luzon Area prior Sugar Day.
- 31 Dec Position 136;00E, 14;52N. Coverage 8332J/5337J 5135J Manila B/C and search.
Air activity very heavy in the Southern Philippines area, with many planes being heard.
Received three grid type contacts reports and all were in about the same area, 124;23E, 14;42N. We are unable to explain just what these contacts were on, since to the best of our knowledge none of our forces were in that area.
From traffic received indications are that Convoy Routes Comdr #15 is aboard the Shiunan Maru. S.C. Div12 has his flag aboard Minesweeper #17, and C.D.V. Unit #11 Comdr is aboard C.D.V #1.
- 1 Jan Position 131;36E, 18;18N. Coverage 8332J/5337J, 6502J, 5135J, Manila B/C and search.
All air activity heard by this unit was on 5135J except a single plane heard on 5337J, but no traffic being received from him.
Indications are that special S.C. #74 patrols the west coast of Luzon to Formosa. As on the 31st of Dec. he sent that he sighted enemy planes off San Bernardino. Then on the 1st of Jan. he was heard working 1st Surescofor Comdr. on 8600J.
- 2 Jan Position 126;00E, 22;00N. Coverage 8780J, 8600J, 8332J/5337J, 5135J and search.
Refueling force. Upon completion this exercise this force will start high speed run for Formosa. Expect to strike there at dawn.
A picket boat sent a contact report at about 1315, giving position of 70 miles from this force. Several destroyers were despatched to that area in order to sink said boat, but were unable to locate it. This contact is believed to have been on B24 or B26's. Since they have been spotting ahead of this force for the past two days.
Also Takao guard district showed no alarm, and no search planes showed in this area.
- 3 Jan Position off Formosa. Coverage 8600J, 8332J/5337J, 5135J, 4390J Sasebo B/C and search.
Launched dawn strikes over Formosa, and again the enemy was taken by surprise.
First strike reported that they saw 15 transports in Takao, and 4 more coming from the north. These were attack and many sunk.
From traffic received on 8600J, this unit was able to give several positions of mobile units, and in turn they were attack and destroyed.
At about 1300 all planes were ordered back to their carriers, as the weather over the target was closing in, and visibility zero.

The many - 74

4 Jan

Position & Coverage same as 3rd.

Again launched dawn strikes over Formosa area.

Indications are that plane of A.G. Tookoo det. made an Radar contact on this force about 0130. Although this particular plane (LHESIMUI) was not heard by this unit on either 8332J or 5337J. Message received over Sasebo B/C with time as 0130, then the base added a new date and time group (040600). Perhaps this plane was out of communication with his base at the time he made contact on this force. We had a boggie on the screen at about the time this contact was originated. Night fighters were launched but were unable to contact enemy plane. Despit thick weather which cut down visibility both yesterday and today, carrier planes obtained fair results in strikes on shipping on Formosa and Okinawa Jima targets.

The two day attack brought the total cargo ships sunk to 26 and 35 ships were damaged.

At 1718 on 5135J, plane (MUKO) sent our position as 123;43E, 22;37N. This plane came from Formosa base, as about an hour after sending in contact, he asked the base whether he was having an air alert or not. Base replied in the negative. While this plane was in our area he showed on the radar screen and fighters were directed to his location but visibility was so poor they were unable to contact him.

5 Jan

Position 126;37E, 19;36N. Coverage 8600J, 8332J/5337J, 5135J, Manila B/C and search.

Withdrew from Formosa area, in order to refuel force and obtain plane replacements.

All air activity centered around the west coast of Luzon, where the 7th fleet is operating. AT 1307 received message on 5135J of sighting 64 transports 3 carriers and 8 battleships. These forces were under heavy air attack shortly after sundown.

6 Jan

Position off Northern Luzon. Coverage 8332J/5337J, 6502J/3250M, 7045J 5135J and Manila B/C.

Launched predawn attacks over Northern Luzon area air fields.

Although no boggie showed on the radar screen, and no planes were heard during the night by this unit. A contact grid type was received over the Manila B/C at 0947. Giving the position 122;48E, 18;27N, which was on this force.

At 1808 plane (MUMILL) sent the following message (TOTO.HO.TENNOHEKA HA"NSA" I). This makes the second time this unit has heard a KAMIKAZE just before he made his attack. Then at 1914 planes of squadron 5HAI sent they saw enemy units and were attacking. Indications are that they were attacking our units of the 7th fleet, who were just off Lingayen Bay. Another grid received at 1925 gave position as 120;13E, 16;02N. Also a sighting received at 1957 stated that 26 transports were 120 miles bearing 340 from his base.

- 7 Jan Position off Northern Luzon. Coverage 8332J/5337J, 7045J, 5135J Manila B/C.
 Launched predawn strikes over Northern Luzon area.
 Planes on 5135J were up much earlier than usual, and stayed up throughout the day. This is a result of new tactics on the part of this force. They blanket the air fields thus preventing any planes taking off or landing. Therefore the enemy must get his planes in the air before our attacking force arrives over his field.
 At 0219 received message originated by plane (1TISIL) on sighting 20 merchant ships, bearing 340 from his base, distant 150 miles. Possibly this base is Bacalod.
 At 0830 plane (9WAKA2) sent a contact grid type giving position as 119;43E, 16;42N. Believe this contact to be on units of the 7th fleet. As they are in Lingayen Bay bombarding the beach in preparation of the invasion on Sugar day. These units came under heavy air attack throughout the day. During the last two days 12 ships of the 7th fleet were hit by either KAMIKAZE, or bombs
- 8 Jan Position 126;00E, 20;00N. Coverage 8600J, 8332J/5337J 5135J Takao B/C.
 Retired to refuel force and obtain plane replacements.
 Air activity slackened off to quite an extent on 5135J. With only a few planes being heard. Plane (6ER01) came up on 5135J and at 1020 transmitted a grid giving the position 119;23E, 17;02N. This plane originated three separate messages within 15 minutes, and each one had a grid giving the same position.
 These messages were giving wide distribution, as Tokio, Takao and Manila broadcast them.
 From traffic received indications are the MAR TPN Comdr has his flag aboard C.D.V #25.
 It was also noted that on 5135J a base came up to work planes using a 3 kana call. This base is believed to be Takao A.B.
- 9 Jan Position 123;57E, 22;45N. Coverage 8600J, 7045A, 5135J Manila & Takao B/C.
 Launched strikes over Formosa area at dawn.
 Weather very unfavorable for flying. Visibility over target very poor. Few planes were encountered in the air, and only a small number seen on the ground. During the strike of 3 days ago most of the air fields had many planes parked on and around the fields.
 Air activity was almost nil, with only six planes being heard on 5135J when generally there are 20-30 during a 24 hour period.
 This force received orders to proceed through Luzon Straits into the China Sea, and attack targets in Indo China, China.

- 10 Jan Position 119;57E, 19;35N. Coverage 10170J/4492J, 8600J, 8332/5337J, Singapore B/C.
 Operation plan "GRATITUDE" now in effect. Which calls for strikes against Camranh Bay, Saigon, Hong Kong, Formosa. And engage any major surface units found.
 Air activity in this area is practically nil. It appears that the enemy does not run any searchers out of Saigon.
 Just before dawn our CAP splashed 1 Valg and 1 Judy. It is unlikely that these planes were on routine search, therefore they possibly not in direct communication with their base, and could not report they were being attack by "Blue" carrier planes. All indications point to the fact that this force has not been spotted up to date.
- 11 Jan Position 116;04E, 15;05N. Coverage 10170J/4492J, 7790J, 6325A Singapore B/C and search.
 Fueling all ships, and upon completion of this exercise will start high speed run on target, which happens to be Camranh Bay and areas. It was believed that a few heavy enemy units were based in Camranh Bay, so all the battleships and a few escorts were detached from the rest of the force to proceed within range of Camranh Bay to engage those units found. It was later discovered that the Bay was empty, of not only Orange naval units, but any type of ships.
 The only air activity for this area appeared on 7790J, with both planes and bases being heard. The traffic transmitted on this circuit was put on the Singapore B/C. Shortly after being sent on 7790J.
- 12 Jan Position 110;18E, 12;34N. Coverage 8395J/4150J 10170J/4492J, 5517J 6325A Singapore B/C.
 Launched dawn attacks over Saigon, Camranh Bay areas. Our forces were not detected until they were over the target, and then were fired on only when they made their attack. The enemy believe that the planes they were seeing were their own.
 AT 0826 C.DV. #43 sent that he was being attack by "Blue" carrier planes. Then at 1133 he transmitted that he was the last ship left afloat of their convoy, but he was sinking and was trying to beach the ship before it does sink. Some of the sightings received by this units stated that the Orange were being attack by B24's and P50's. Which was not true, what they saw were F6F's and TBF's and SB2C's.
- 13 Jan Position 114;10E, 14;15N. Coverage 10170J/4492J, 8600J, 8332J/5337J, 5135J 6325a, Takao B/C.
 Attempted to refuel force, but rough seas prevented us from doing so. Takao B/C first heard this date on 9135M/4573M. Later information received stated frequency as 9145J/5472J. Manila B/C unheard but (KEHITO6) up on his frequency broadcasting traffic with FUSI numbers.

- 14 Jan Position 118;10E, 21;25N. Coverage 9045A, 8600J, 8332J/5337J, 4492J, 5135J Takao B/C.
Continue to attempt to refuel force. Sea still rough which makes this exercise very difficult.
Air activity very light, until about 1537 when plane (6METO2) came up on 5135J and sent a grid. Giving position 116;33E, 17;27N. This is on our Task Force. Another plane (6METO1) also sent a grid at 1711 and this position possibly on our tankers 118;58E, 17;17N. Two other grids received from each plane later. These planes returned to their base about 1939, as at that time the plane requested his base to turn on searchlights. No attacks were experienced by this force.
- 15 Jan Position 117;58E, 21;42N. Coverage 8685J, 8600J, 5135J, Takao B/C and search.
Launched dawn strikes over Formosa, and fighter sweeps over Hong Kong, Canton Amoy areas.
On 5135J plane (9SAR01) transmitted an radar grid contact at 0929. Giving position 117;58E, 21;42N. That position was on this force. This plane came only close enough to this force for him to show very weak on the radar screen, and the people in CIC were in doubts as to just what this was. But this unit confirmed the fact that it was an boggie. After which the forces CAP were directed to the area, where the enemy plane was, but he escaped before our planes could contact him.
Another contact grid type received from plane (6MENEL1) at 0850. This plane transmitted sighting "Blue units" in 119;03E, 21;42N. All task groups were alerted and ship went into torpedo defense, anticipating a possible attack, which never developed. Plane (6MENEL1) returned to his base about 1340, while the other plane (9SAR01) is believed to have been shot down. His base called him for several hours without getting any response. Also the Task Force CAP reported that they shot down several large planes around the force during the afternoon.
- 16 Jan Position 114;00E, 21;00N. Coverage 8780J, 8600J, 5510J, 5135J and Takao B/C.
Launched predawn strikes over HongKong Canton Hainan.
Everything routine, no air activity noted in this area. Also very little air borne opposition encountered over target areas. However the ack ack was the most intense yet experienced in any operation to date.
5135J became active about 1730, with four bases and two planes being heard. Plane sent two short messages, and then returned to their bases. Circuit became inactive about 2145.

- 17 Jan Position 117;16E, 17;01N. Coverage 8332J/5337J, 5135J, Takao B/C. Refueling force and obtaining plane and pilot replacements. Air activity very light with 5135J, up occasionally with 1 or 2 planes being heard. Although these planes didn't come within range of this force, so no grids received, for the past couple of days.
- 18 Jan Position 118;28E, 19;13N. Coverage 8600J, 8332J/5337J, 5135J Takao B/C search. Weather still unfavorable for fueling, and air operation. This force only launching CAP's. Task Force now proceeding in a southerly direction hoping to find a lea somewhere along the coast of Luzon, where it would be possible to take on fuel. Indications are that this force will leave this area tomorrow, by passing through Surigao Straits. Unable to leave through the Luzon Straits at the present time as the Straits are very rough and are therefore dangerous to navigation.
- 19 Jan Position 117;50E, 14;28N. Coverage 5135J Takao B/C. Sea calmed down enough to make it possible for the force to continue fueling. Conditions routine as far as air circuits go. Planes and bases heard both on 9045J, 5135J. None of the planes heard were in this area. Task Force proceeding north again, and if weather permits will pass through the Luzon Straits tomorrow night and once again operate in the pacific ocean.
- 20 Jan Position 119;00E, 18;57N, Coverage 8722J, 8600J, 5135J Takao B/C and search. Everything normal until Task Force 38 started to pass through Balintang channel about 1800. We then came upon enemy planes on routine flight between Fromosa and Luzon bases. Of the fourteen or fifteen planes shot down by this force none of the planes were headed in the direction of this force. Instead they were flying on a straight course approximately 40 miles to the west of us. It is believed they didn't this task force was in this area until too late for them to muster any force to oppose us. Finally a single plane sent that he saw "Blue" planes and a little later transmitted two urgent messages. Which is believed to had our position. No attacks were experienced by this task group during the night.

- 21 Jan Position 122;50E, 22;30N. Coverage 8722J, 8600J, 5135J Takao B/C. Launched dawn strikes over southern Formosa, primary targets for this strike will be shipping. About dawn Orange planes began coming up on 5135J. Which is much earlier than usual. At 0812 plane transmitted a (TETETE) "Sighted enemy surface units". Then at 0832 same plane originated a grid contact giving the position 122;50E, 22;30N. Which was on this Task Force. During the morning several other planes were also heard on 5135J. But believe that most of them were splashed by our CAP. Several of the planes sent that they saw enemy air craft, and no other word was heard from them. Their bases called them for a few hours, with getting any response. At 1301 an enemy plane sent on 5135J (TOTOTO) he was attacking. In this engagement the Ticonderoga and Langley were hit by KAMIKAZE. And the Ticonderoga being put out of action. About 1330 a TBF landed on this ship's flight deck, and upon doing so started to taxi up the deck to park. Upon getting abreast of the island the pilot opened his bomb bay doors and a 500 pound bomb dropped to the deck and exploded. As a result of this explosion, this unit was put out of commission for several hours. Also R.J. Jones RMIC suffered a wound in the neck. Which necessitated his removal from the watch list, and given medical care. It is believed that he will be transferred to a hospital ship at the first opportunity.
- 22 Jan Position 128;30E, 25;00N, Coverage 5305J, 5135J, 4192J, Sasebo B/C. Launched dawn strikes over Okinawa. Shipping that escaped from Formosa being the objective. Also photos were taken of all the beaches. No air opposition was encountered over the target, although the flack was fairly heavy. The only air circuit heard by this unit was 6580J and 5135J, with the former believed to be drill. 5135J became quite active about 1700 with bases coming up first and later the planes. It is believed that two different squadrons of planes were out looking for this task group. But since no grids were sent on this Task Force today, the planes didn't know just where we were. And after looking around for a hour they started back to their base and secured from the circuit about 2100. Conditions normal after that. Task Force withdrawing to fueling area.
- 23 Jan Position 127;20N, 20;35N. Coverage 5135J, Sasebor B/C. Refueling Task Force. Upon completion of this exercise this ship plus New Jersey and Langley will depart for Ulithi.
- 24 Jan Position 133;03E, 15;42N. Coverage 5135J, Takao B/C.
- 25 Jan Arrive Ulithi. R.J. Jones RMIC transferred to USS Solace.

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24 January 1945

The following is a list of frequencies picked up by this unit that were not in our frequency book.

FREQ	HEARD	CALLED	DATE
2645M	B.F. Balikpapan Cdr B/C SAYO Indicator.	SATEKO4	1/45
3557M	C.U. 10 Singapore	SATEKO4	1/45
3628M	KKNN Calls (China Area)		1/45
3650M	KKN	WORK EACH OTHER	12/44
3931M	3K (Unident)	" " "	1/45
5100M	3K (Unidnet)	" " "	1/45
5135M	SATEKO4	B.F. 10 Det Lingga (OAWEL) Unidnet	1/45
5246M	KKN	WORK EACH OTHER	1/45
6131M	SP AB CALLS PLANES	" " "	1/45
6342M	KN KK	" " "	1/45
6594M	3K	KN	1/45
6708M	A.G. 953	PLANES	1/45
7865M	A.G. 901 DET TOOKOO A.G. 901 DET TAKAO	WORK EACH OTHER	1/45
11429M	NKN	KN	1/45

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~

7 July 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending,
7 July 1945, report of.

1. Task Force Thirtyeight Departed Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, 1 July 1945, for fueling areas prior to Strikes Tokyo. This Force fueled on 8 July 1945, in position 25:40 degrees North, and 149:40 degrees West.
2. The Radio reception for week ending 7 July 1945, was poor throughout the daylight hours and good during the night.
3. The following frequencies, in areas concerned, are listed as being on partial or full coverage for the week ending 7 July 1945.

1 July 1945.

3600J Air Bases and planes were logged, with no traffic being handled.

6010J Koochi Air Base and planes were logged, produced some traffic.

6490J Ominato C.U., ComCruDiv 22, and other unidents were logged, with not evidence of traffic being handled.

6650J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced not traffic.

7875J Kanoya Air Base (MIKA) was broadcasting aircraft sightings, alerts and other traffic.

8510J Ominato C.U. (NISA) was broadcasting greater
17020J volume of old traffic.

8915J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

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2 July 1945.

3600J Air Bases of Air Group 762 were logged.
6490J Ominato C.U., Picketboat Comdr. #4, Maru Seija #5, were logged.
6640J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801, were logged.
6650J Air Bases And planes were logged, with planes originating an attack signal "TOTOTO", at 0338.
7875J Kanoya Air Base(MIKA) was broadcasting alerts, aircraft sightings and other types of traffic.
8350J Tokyo C.U.(HITU) was broadcasting a large volume of old traffic.
8915J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

3 July 1945.

5972J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 634, were logged, produced traffic .
6115J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.
6490J Ominato C.U., ComCruDiv 22, Picketboats and Marus were logged.
6650J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.
7035J Sentoku Air Base and planes of 107th F.R., were logged, produced traffic.
7372M Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.
7875J Kanoya Air Base(MIKA) was broadcasting routine traffic.
8725J Air Bases and planes were logged, with the latter originating weather reports and bases on alerts.
9045J Air Bases and planes were logged, with the latter producing weather reports and the bases indicating alerts.

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5255J Fukuyama Air Base and Kaiyo CVE, were logged.
5972J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 634, were logged.
649ØJ ComCruDiv 22 and Picketboat Comdr., were logged.
664ØJ Air Bases of Air Group 8Ø1 were logged.
7Ø35J Sentoku Air Base and planes of 1Ø7th F.R.,
were logged, produced traffic.
7Ø45A Air Bases and planes were logged.
7875J Kanoya Air Base (MIKA) was broadcasting aircraft
sightings, alerts, sub sightings and ther traffic.
862ØJ Air Bases and planes were logged, with the latter
indicating flights from traffic analysis.
8725J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.
9Ø45J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

5 July 1945.

332ØJ Air Bases and planes of Air Group 8Ø1, were logged.
664ØJ
5255J Fukuyama Air Base, Kaiyo CVE and planes were logged.
5972J Air Bases were logged.
649ØJ ComCruDiv 22, Picketboats, Picketboat Comdr. #4,
were logged, produced, traffic.
665ØJ Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.
67Ø5J Unident, using KN calls, were logged, produced traffic.
674ØJ Air Bases and planes of Air Broup 9Ø3 were logged,
produced traffic.
7Ø35J Sentoku Air Bases and planes of 1Ø7th F.R., were logged.
7Ø45A Air Bases and planes were logged.

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5 July 1945.

7050J Air Bases were logged.
7087M Unidents, using 3KN calls, were logged.
8620J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic which indicated flights.
9045J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

6 July 1945.

3747J Osaka G. Div. and Osaka Sea. Fron. Def. Force were logged.
5100J Chichijima Air Base and Marcus G. Div., were logged.
5337J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 901, were logged.
5600J Yokosuka C.U. (KIMU) was broadcasting aircraft sightings, radar reports and weathers which also including weather requests.
5850J Air Bases of Air Group 171 were logged.
6115J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.
5972J Air Bases of Air Group 742 were logged, produced weather reports.
5985J Air Bases were logged.
6255J Chinkai (YURI) was broadcasting routine traffic.
6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706 were logged, produced weather reports.
6640J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801 were logged, produced drill traffic.
6650J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic which indicated instructions for attack.
7010J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 171, were logged.

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7035J Air Bases and planes of the 107th F. R.,
were logged, produced traffic.
7875J Kanoya Air Bases (MIKA) was broadcasting
routine traffic.
8620J Air Bases and planes were logged.
9045J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

7 July 1945.

5595J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 601,
were logged, produced traffic.
5600J Yokosuka C.U. (KIMU) was broadcasting routine traffic.
5916M Air Bases were logged, produced traffic.
5972J Air Bases were logged.
6345J Maizuru C.U. (FUSU) was broadcasting routine traffic.
6740J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 903 were logged,
with planes reported sighting aircraft.
6490J ComCruDiv 22, Picketboat Comdr. #4, were logged.
7035J Sentoku Air Base and planes of the 107th F.R.,
were logged, produced traffic.
7055M Kashima, Koowa, Tsingtao Air Groups were logged.
7970J Kisaratsu C.U. (MIKO) was broadcasting weather
reports and other types of traffic.
8620J Air Bases and planes were logged.

L. Garcia
L. Garcia, CRM, USN.

Copies to: Chief of Naval Operations (OP200G)
CinC Pac Advanced (fleet Intelligence Officer)
Supplementary Radio 926

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~

14 July 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending
14 July 1945, report of.

1. Upon completion of fueling, Task Force Thirtyeight, air strikes were conducted against enemy aircraft and strategic targets on the following dates and launching points.

(a) 10 July 1945, 34:00 North 142:35 East;
carried out strikes in TOKYO area.

(b) 13 July 1945, 40:30 North 144:35 East;
carried out strikes in Northern HONSHU and
HOKKAIDO areas.

(c) 14 July 1945, 41:30 North 145:30 East;
carried out strikes in Northern HONSHU
and HOKKAIDO areas.

2. Radio reception for week ending 14 July 1945, was fair during the day and good from sunset to sunrise.

3. The following frequencies, in areas concerned, are listed as being on partial or full coverage for the week ending 14 July 1945.

8 July 1945.

3421J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

5850J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171, were logged
produced traffic.

5985J Air Bases and planes were logged.

6040J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 938, were logged.

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8 July 1945.

6490J CruDiv 22, Comdr., Picketboats were logged, produced traffic.

6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706 and planes were logged.

6740J Ominato, Akkeshi Air Bases and planes of Air Group 903 were logged, produced traffic. One plane reported sightings on sub or oil slick.

7035J Air Bases and planes of the 107th F.R., were logged, produced traffic.

7200J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 601 were logged, produced traffic.

7970J Kisartsu C.U. (MIKO) was broadcasting routine traffic.

9 July 1945.

5850J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 171 were logged.

6147J Army Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic which was analysis from code.

6580J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 762 were logged, produced traffic.

6640J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 801 were logged, produced traffic.

6740J Ominato Air Bases and planes of Air Group 903 were logged, produced traffic.

7035J Sentoku Air Base and planes of the 107th F.R. were logged.

7970J Kisaratsu C.U. (MIKO) was broadcasting routine traffic.

8025J Atsuki Air Base and planes of Air Group 302 were logged, produced traffic which indicated flights.

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10 July 1945.

3722J Atsuki, Kanoya, and Takao Air Bases were logged.
3875J Yokosuka N. Dist. A.A. Def. Post Cmd., was logged.
3987J Yokosuka N. Dist. A.A. Def. Post Cmd., was logged.
5485J Akkeshi, Bihoro, Chitose, Tateyama Dets. of
Air Group 903 were logged.
6351M Army Air Bases and planes were logged, produced
traffic through the analysis of code.
One plane reported sighting on T.F.38 at 1334-9.
6490J Ominato C.U., CruDiv 22 Comdr., Picketboat #4
Comdr., were logged.
6740J Ominato, Yamada and planes of Air Group 903 were
logged, produced traffic.
7035J Sentoku Air Base and planes of the 107th F.R.
were logged.
6950M Army Air Bases and planes were logged, produced
traffic using the code.
7875J Kanoya Air Base (MIKA) was broadcasting routine traffic.
6580J Army Air Bases and planes were logged, produced
traffic
7970J Kisaratsu (MIKO) was broadcasting routine traffic.
8620J Suzuka, Hakata, Kanoya Air Bases and planes
were logged.
8725J Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

11 July 1945.

3320J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases and planes were logged,
with planes reporting negative results during search.
One plane reported being followed by enemy aircraft.
3421J Air Bases and planes were logged.

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14 July 1945.

11 July 1945.

649ØJ CruDiv 22 Comr., and Picketboat #4 comdr. were logged.

7182M Army Air Bases were logged, produced traffic

6303M Air Bases and planes using K, KN calls, were logged.

6056M Air Bases and planes using K, KN calls, were logged, produced traffic .

6351M Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic -

6395M Army Air Bases and planes were logged.

653ØJ Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 7Ø6 were logged, produced traffic.

665ØJ Air Bases and planes were logged.

658ØJ Army Air Bases were logged.

674ØJ Ominato, Akkeshi Air Bases and planes of Air Group 9Ø3 were logged.

739ØM Army Air Bases of the 1Ø7th F.C.S. were logged, produced traffic.

7875J Kanoya Air Base(MIKA) was broadcasting alerts and aircraft sightings.

851ØJ Ominato C.U.(NISA) was broadcasting greater volume of old traffic.

12 July 1945.

3320J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 8Ø1 were logged, produced traffic. Planes were reporting patrols west of Ishigaki.

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14 July 45.

12 July 1945.

4015J
5875J Ominato C.U., Ewakkanai Det., CDV65, Tsugaru Def. For., Air Group 903 Comdr., Ominato Air Base, Chitose Air Base, Nemuro Air Base, Noshiro Air Group, Yamada Air Base, Akkeshi Air Base, and all Air Group 903 Dets. were logged, produced traffic.

5342M Unidents using K, KN calls were logged.

5485J Akkeshi, Bihoro Air Bases and Air Group 903 Comdr. were logged.

5695J Ominato C.U., Iwakkanai Det., and Lookout Stations were logged.

6490J Ominato C.U., CruDiv 22 Comr., were logged.

6650J Air Bases and planes were logged.

6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903 were logged.

7765J Kasumigaura Air Base and planes were logged.

8510J Ominato C.U. (NISA) was broadcasting normal traffic.

13 July 1945.

3540M Unident. cover call(SATEKO4) logged as working Tokyo Bay Force.

4015J
5875J Ominato C.U., Wakkanai Det., Shimushu C.U., Chitose Air Base, Bihoro Air Base, Air Group 903 Comdr., were logged.

4790J Chitose Air Base, Bihoro Air Base #1 were logged.

5485J Akkeshi, Bihoro, and Air Group 903 Comdr. were logged.

6490J Ominato C.U., CruDiv 22 Comdr., were logged.

6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706 were logged, produced traffic with weather reports.

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14 July 45

14 July 1945.

- 4015J Ominato C.U., was logged, and produced traffic mostly, sightings on carrier based planes and alerts.
- 4255J Ominato C.U.(NISA) was broadcasting aircraft sightings alerts and radar reports.
- 5485J Ominato, Bihoro Air Groups were logged, produced traffic, of which were alerts and sightings on aircraft.
- 6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases and planes of Air Group 706 were logged, produced traffic. Planes reported sightings on aircraft and released weathers.
- 6490J Ominato C.U., CruDiv 22 Comdr., Picketboats were logged.
- 6740J Ominato Air Group, Noshiro Air Group and planes of Air Group 903 were logged.
- 6855J Ominato Air Bases and planes of Air group 903 were logged, produced traffic.

E. Garcia

E. Garcia, CRM, USN.

Copies to: Chief of Naval Operations (OP200G)
Cinc Pac Advanced (Fleet Intelligence Officer)
Supplementary Radio 926 (OinC)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~

21 July 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary For week ending
21 July 1945, report of.

1. Upon completion of fueling Task Force Thirtyeight, all preparations was being set forth for air strikes to be conducted against enemy aircraft and strategic targets; on the following dates and launching points.

(a) 17-18 July 1945, 36:40 North, 145:30 East; carried out strikes in Northern HONSHU and HOKKIADO areas.

2. Radio reception on Air Bases and planes indicated fair to good through out the period for week ending 21 July 1945.

3. The following frequencies for areas concerning the operations, are listed as being partial or on full coverage for the week ending 21 July 1945.

15 July 1945.

3832J Ominato C.U., Chitose Air Base #1, Ominato G. Dist., and Erimo, Nishinotoro Iakts. were logged, produced traffic, which consisted mostly of radar reports, and aircraft sightings.

4015J Ominato C.U., Yamada, Akkeshi Air Groups, all Dets. Air Group 903, Akkeshi Def. For., Shimushu C.U., Bihoro Air Base #1, were logged, and produced traffic consisted mostly of air alerts, aircraft sightings and others.

4255J/8510J Ominato C.U. (NISA) was broadcasting aircraft sightings and alerts.

4430J Kisaratsu Air Base, Meiji Air Group were logged, produced traffic.

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21 July 1945.

15 July 1945.

4897J Ominato C.U.(OMI) was broadcasting normal traffic.
6067J Matsushima Air Base and Sasebo Det, Air Group 951,
were logged, produced traffic.
6455J Yokosuka, Misawa-Air Groups were logged, produced
traffic.
6490J CruDiv 22 Comdr; PicketBoat#4 Comdr, and
other Pickets were logged.
6340J Sasebo Det., Air Group 951 and planes were logged.
6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose-A.B's., of Air Group
706 were logged.
6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903
were logged, produced traffic.
7010J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases and planes of Air
5850J Group 171 were logged, produced traffic. One of the
planes originated attack signal, "TOTOTO", at 1633-9.

16 July 1945.

4475J Maizuru, Miho Air Bases were logged.
6067J Matsushima Air Group and planes were logged,
produced traffic.
6365J Unident Air Bases were logged, produced traffic.
6455J Konike Air Group 722 and planes were logged,
produced traffic, Mostly concerned with the arrivals.
6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Groups 706 were
logged, produced traffic.
6640J Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801 were logged.
6740J Ominato Air Group 903 and planes were logged,
produced traffic.
6855J Ominato Air Group 903 were logged.

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21 July 1945.

16 July 1945.

- 7010J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 171 were logged, produced traffic.
- 7035J Miyazaki, Keijo, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 762 and planes were logged, produced traffic.
- 7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting aircraft alerts, sightings and other traffic.
- 7970J Kisaratsu A. B. (MIKO) was broadcasting aircraft sightings and alerts.

17 July 1945.

- 3875J Unident Lkts, were logged was producing radar reports and other traffic.
- 3952J Yokosuka C. U., Hachijojima G. Div., and Unident Lkts. were logged, produced traffic mostly on aircraft sightings, alerts and radars.
- 3985J Kisaratsu A. B. (MIKO) was broadcasting aircraft sightings, alerts, radars and other traffic.
7970J
- 5935J Hammatsu, and Taikyū Air Bases of the 107th F. R., were logged, produced traffic.
- 5985J Kanoya Air Bases was logged, produced traffic.
- 6455J Unident Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic. The planes were originating weathers and flight reports.
- 6490J Ominato C. U. was logged, produced traffic.
- 6640J Kanoya, Oita and Miho Air Bases of Air Group 801 were logged,
- 6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903 were logged,
- 6855J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903 were logged, produced traffic.

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21 July 1945.

17 July 1945.

- 7010J Matsuyama, Kanoya, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.
- 7035J Itami, Keijo, Miyazaki, Air Bases of Air Group 762 were logged, also produced traffic.
- 7970J Kisaratsu A.B. (MIKO) was broadcasting weathers, aircraft sightings, air alerts and other traffic.
- 8775A Unidents using KN calls were logged, also producing drills and aircraft grids.

18 July 1945.

- 2650J Yokosuka N. Dist. A.A. Def. Post Cmd. and Lkts were logged, also produced traffic, mostly radar reports on aircraft.
- 3875J Yokosuka N. Dist. A. A. Def. Post Cmd. and Lkts. were logged.
- 5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases of 107th F. R. were logged, also produced traffic of which was analyzed from the ABC-10 indicator.
- 5985J Kanoya, Oita, and Osaka Air Bases were logged.
- 6351A Army Air Acitivity were logged, also planes.
- 6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706 were logged.
- 6640J Air Bases and planes were logged, also produced traffic. Planes originating weather reports, including flights.
- 6855J Ominato Air Base. and planes of Air Group 903 were logged, also produced traffic. Planes reported aircraft sighting, giving position.
- 6955J Hamamatsu Air Base and planes were logged, also produced traffic.

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21 July 1945.

18 July 1945.

7010J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, also was producing traffic.

7970J Kisaratsu A. B. (MIKO) was broadcasting routine traffic.

8775A Unidentified Air Bases and planes using K, KN calls were logged, also was producing drill traffic and aircraft grids.

19 July 1945.

3915J Hachijojima G. Div. was logged, also produced traffic and air alerts.

6140M Unident Air Bases and planes in Kodama and Tokyo areas were logged, was producing traffic which consisted of flights and aviation weather grids.

6067J Matsushima Air Base and planes were logged, was producing traffic.

6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) was broadcasting precautionary alerts and other traffic.

5935J Kumagaya and Taikyu Air Bases of the 107th F. R. were logged, was producing traffic.

6455J Yokosuka Air Group and planes were logged, was producing traffic.

6480J Kanoya, and Miho Air Bases were logged, was producing traffic.

6490J CruDiv 22 Comdr, and Picketboats were logged.

6640J Kanoya, Miho air Bases of Air Group 801 were logged, was producing traffic.

7010J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, was producing traffic with planes originating weather and flight reports.

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21 July 1945.

19 July 1945.

- 7200J Kisaratus Air Base and planes of Air Group 601 were logged, was producing traffic with planes originating aviation weather grids and flight reports.
- 7200M Unident Army Air activity in Kodama area were logged, was producing traffic with planes reporting position over Kodama
- 7875J Kanoya Air Base (MIKA) was broadcasting routine traffic.
- 7970J Kisaratsu Air Base (MIKO) was broadcasting routine traffic.

20 July 1945.

- 3532J Maizuru C. U. was logged working SATEK04 a cover call.
- 3593M Suicide AtRon Comdr., Picketboat Unit #1 and other unidents were logged, was producing traffic.
- 3729M Assault Unit 12 Comdr., and other unidents were logged.
- 3987J Kure N. Dist., Yokosuka N. Dist. A. A. Def Unit were logged.
- 5850J Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases and planes of
7010J air group 171 were logged.
- 6067J Matsushima Air Group and planes were logged, was producing drill traffic.
- 6140M Unident Air Base and planes in Kodama area were logged, was producing traffic.
- 6550J Maizuru and Nanao Air Bases were logged, both in Air Group 901.
- 6630M Fujisawa Air Group was logged.
- 6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903 were logged, was producing traffic.

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21 July 1945.

20 July 1945.

6602J Hachijojima G. Div. and other Unidents were logged.
6855J Ominato Air Base and planes of air Air Group 903
were logged.
6927J Unident air bases of Air Group 601 were logged.
6955J Hamamatsu Air Base and planes were logged,
was producing traffic.
7322J Suzuka, Chitose, Hyakurigara Air Groups of Air
Group 601 were logged, was producing drill traffic.
8685J Yokohama, Atsuki, Oii Air Bases were logged, was
producing weather reports and other traffic.

21 July 1945.

3176M Army air activity in Tokyo area was logged,
produced traffic. Similar calls appear on 6351A.
5850J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of
7010J Air Group 171 were logged, produced traffic.
5985J Oita Air Base and unident air base were logged.
6067J Matsushima, Bihoro Air Bases were logged.
7035J Miyazaki, Miho, Sentoku, Itami Air Bases of Air Group
762 were logged, produced traffic.
6710A Suzuka #2 Air Base and other idents were logged,
produced weather reports and other despatches.
6955J Hamamatsu, Matsumoto Air Bases were logged.
7875J Kanoya Air Base (MIKA) was broadcasting aircraft
sightings, alerts, and radar despatches.

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21 July 1945.

21 July 1945.

797ØJ Kisaratsu Air Base (MIKO) was broadcasting air alerts,
 aircraft sightings and other despatches.

812ØJ Unidents using KKN calls assumed to be Midget Sub
 training activity were logged.

8125J Suzuka Air Base and Katori Air Base were logged.

67Ø5J Unident Lkts were logged.

L. Garcia

L. Garcia, CRM, USN.

Copies to:- Chief of Naval Operations (OP2ØG)
 CincPac Advanced (Fleet Intelligence Officer)
 OinC, Supplementary Radio 926

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~

28 July 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending
28 July 1945, report of.

1. Upon completion of fueling Task Force Thirtyeight, all preparations was being set forth for air strikes against enemy aircraft and strategic targets scheduled for the following dates and launching points.
 - (a) 24-25 July 1945; 31:30 north, 135:00 East, for carrying out strikes on KURE, MIHO, KOBE, MAIZURU and NAGOYA areas.
 - (b) 28 July 1945; 33:00 North, 138:30 East, for carrying out strikes on TOKYO, NAGOYA areas.
2. Radio reception on Air Bases and planes, in areas concerned, indicated fair to good throughout the period for week ending 28 July 1945.
3. The following frequencies, in areas concerning the operations, are listed as being partial or on full coverage during the week ending 28 July 1945.

22 July 1945.

3320J
6640J Unident Air Bases and planes were logged, produced traffic.

3729M Yokosuka N. Dist. A. A. Def Post Cmd., Hachijojima Lkt Sta were logged.

5850J
7010J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, produced traffic.

5470J Yokohama Air Base and planes of Air Group 901 were logged.

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28 July 1945.

22 July 1945.

5305J Kaniya, Ibusuka, and Takuma Air Bases were logged.
6351A Unident Army Air Bases and planes in Tokyo area
were logged, produced traffic with planes requesting
bearings.
7200J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 601
were logged.
6955J Hamamatsu, Matsumoto Air Bases and planes were logged.
7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts,
aircraft sightings and aviation grids.

23 July 1945.

3320J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801
6640J were logged.
3532J Unident unit using SATEKO4 as cover call logged
as working other unidents.
5485J Yokohama Air Base and planes were logged.
5850J Matsushima, Chitose and Miyazaki Air Base of Air
7010J Group 171 were logged, produced traffic.
5935J Hamamatsu and Kumagaya Air Bases of the 107th F. R.
were logged.
5955M Unident Air activity on voice presumably Kisaratsu
area.
6017M Oita, Matsushima Air Bases and other unidents
were logged.
6155J Iwakawa Air Base and planes of Air Group 131
were logged, with planes originating weather reports
and of arrivals.
6140M Aragawa Air Base and planes were logged, produced
traffic.
6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903
were logged.

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28 July 1945.

23 July 1945.

6695J Ominato C. U. working unidents were logged.
6930J Unident Air Bases and planes were logged.
Unident voice was also logged.
7035J Miyazaki, Keijo Air Bases and planes of Air Group
762 were logged.
7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts,
aircraft sightings and drill traffic.

24 July 1945.

3320J Miho, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 801 were logged,
6640J produced air alerts, weather requests, arrival and
departure reports.
3987J Kure N. D. A. A. Def. Comdr. was broadcasting air
alerts, aircraft sightings, radar reports.
4553M Unident voice, presumably air warning channel.
4865J Kure C. U. and unidents using 3KM calls were logged,
produced traffic.
4899M Unident voice was logged.
4915J Sasebo C. U. (NORU) was broadcasting aircraft weathers
and other traffic.
5305J Ibusuki, Omura, Koniya, Takuma and Ishigaki Det.
of Air Group 951 were logged.
5850J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171
7010J were logged, produced traffic.
5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya, and taikyu Air Bases of the
107th F. R. were logged, produced traffic.
5955J Kure C. U. (ITO) broadcasting routine traffic.
6140M Aragawa Air Base and planes were logged, also
produced traffic.
6130J Assault Unit 34 Comdr., Kawatana Unit 12 Comdr.
were logged, also produced traffic.

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28 July 1945.

24 July 1945.

6927J Hyakurigahara Air Group and other unidents were logged.

7035J Itami, Sentoku, Keijo, Miyazaki Air Bases and planes of Air Group 762 were logged.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings, grids and weather reports.

8125J Yokoshiba, Suzuka Air Bases of Air Group 131 were logged.

25 July 1945.

3320J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases and planes of Air
6640J Group 801 were logged, produced air alerts, aircraft sightings, aviation weathers and recalls for planes by the bases.

3987J Kure N. Dist. A. A. Def. Comdr, and other unidents were logged, produced aircraft sightings, radar reports and other traffic.

5850J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of
7010J Air Group 171 were logged, produced traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases of the 107th F. R. were logged.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base of Air Group 131 were logged.

6140M Aragawa Air Bases and planes were logged.

6340J Gunzan Air Base and planes were logged.

6661M Army Air activity were logged, produced traffic in which the indicator was used.

6842J Unident Air Bases and planes were logged, produced drill traffic.

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28 July 1945.

25 July 1945.

7200J Kisartsu Air Base and planes of air group 601 were logged, produced traffic. Planes were originating Carrier based plane sightings and in pursuit, carrier sightings, aircraft grid on Task Force 38 and aviation weathers.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings on B29's, PB2Y's, weather reports originated by Oita Air Bases and similar traffic as logged on 7200J.

26 July 1945.

3320J Oita, Miho Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801
6640J were logged, produced traffic. Planes originated aviation weathers, grids and reported flights.

3421J Unidents Air Bases and planes were logged, with planes originating aircraft grids. Same planes also were logged on 3290J.

3937J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting aircraft grids,
7875J weather reports and other traffic.

5335J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 601 were logged, produced traffic. Same planes also were logged on 7200J.

6150M Unident Army Air activity was logged also produced traffic.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base of Air Group 131 were logged.

6765J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases were logged, produced routine traffic.

6325J Kure, Saeki Air Group and planes were logged, produced traffic.

5850J Kanoya, Matsuyama Air Bases and planes of Air Group
7010J 171, were logged also produced traffic.

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28 July 1945.

26 July 1945.

7200J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 752 were logged, produced traffic. Planes were originating aircraft weathers, grids and surface sightings.

27 July 1945.

3320J Oita, Miho, Yamato Air Bases and planes of Air Group
6640J 801 were logged, also produced traffic. With planes originating aircraft weathers, grids and arrival reports.

3532J Unident cover call SATEKO4 working another unident were logged, also produced traffic.

5255J Oita Air Base and planes of Air Group 721, Kaiyo CVE, were logged, also produced traffic.

5600J Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) was broadcasting weathers, radars and other traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases and planes of the 107th F. R. were logged, also produced traffic.

5955J Kure C. U. (ITO) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other traffic.

6150M Unident Army Air activity were logged, also produced traffic.

6325J Kure Air Base, Saeki Air Group and planes were logged, also produced traffic.

6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases and planes of Air Group 706 were logged, also produced traffic.

6842J Yokosuka Air Group and planes were logged, also was producing drill traffic.

5850J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of air
7010J group 171 were logged, also produced traffic. Planes originated aircraft grids and weather reports.

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28 July 1945.

27 July 1945.

- 7210J Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases and planes were logged, also produced drill traffic.
- 6155J Iwakawa Air Base and planes of Air Group 131 were logged.
- 7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other routine traffic.

28 July 1945.

- 3320J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases and planes of Air Group
6640J 801 were logged, also produced traffic with the
bases originating air alerts.
- 3987J Kure N. Dist. A. A. Def. Comdr was logged, also
produced traffic, mostly of air alerts and radar
reports.
- 4865J Kure C. U. and Suicide Atron Comdr. were logged,
all produced traffic with Kure originating air alerts.
- 5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya Air Bases of the 107th F. R.
were logged, also produced traffic.
- 6155J Iwakawa Air Base and planes of Air Group 131 were
logged, also produced traffic. Planes were originating
aircraft sightings over Okinawa, evidently found the
mission very uneventful and returned to their bases.
- 6530J Army Air activity was logged, also produced traffic
- 6530J Matsushima, Misawa Air Bases and planes of Air
Group 706 were logged, also produced traffic. The
Planes originated Aircraft weathers.
- 7010J Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases of Air Group 171
were logged.

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28 July 1945.

28 July 1945.

- 7200J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 601 were logged, also produced traffic. The planes originated aviation weathers and grid reports. These planes apparently were on patrol mission evidently obtained negative results. Further reports indicated These same planes will never return to their base.
- 7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and grid reports and other routine traffic.
- 7970J Kisaratsu C. U. (MIK)) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft grids, surface sightings and other routine traffic.

L. Garcia
L. Garcia, CRM, USN.

Copies to:- Chief of Naval Operations (OP20G)
CinCPac Advanced (Fleet Intelligence Officer)
OinC, Supplementary Radio 926

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
'PACIFIC FLEET'

Serial SECRET

4 August 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending
4 August 1945.

1. Upon completion of fueling and replenishing Task Force Thirtyeight then made preparations to carry out strikes against enemy aircraft and strategic targets, on the following dates and from positions as indicated for launching aircraft.

- (a) 30 July 1945, 33:20 N., 137:41E.,
strikes against Nagoya, Tokyo areas and
surface bombardment on Hamamatsu.
- (b) 2 August 1945, 31:40N., 133:30E.,
strikes against Sasebo, Fuzan, N. Kyushu,
and Kure areas.

2. Radio reception as a result on air bases and planes, from areas concerning the primary mission of this Task Forces, indicated fair to good throughout the period for week ending 4 August 1945.

3. The following is the list of frequencies either given a partial or full coverage depended upon the valuation shown by the activity. Due to the limited personnel assigned only small percentage of air activity would be on continuous watch until such time deemed, then other frequencies were covered.

29 July 1945.

3320J 6640J	Kanoya, Oita, Miho air bases and planes of Air Group 801 were logged, also produced traffic.
3987J	Kure, C. U. (NONE) was broadcasting aircraft sightings and other routine traffic.
5850J 7010J	Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.

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4 August 1945.

29 July 1945.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases of the
107th F. R. were logged.

6125M Army air activity were logged, also produced
traffic
The analysis showed to be weather reports.

6150M Army air activity unident were logged, produced
traffic
also originated air alert.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base and planes of Air Group 131
were logged.

6325J Kure, Hakata, Saeki Air Groups were logged.

6530J Unident air bases and planes of Air Group
706 were logged, also produced traffic.

6480J Miho, Kanoya, Miyazaki Air Bases were logged.

6550J Miho, Maizuru, and other unident air bases
were logged.

7035J Miyazaki, Keijo, Air Bases of Air Group 762
were logged.

7115J Kasumigaura A. B. (HATI) was broadcasting air
alerts and other routine traffic.

7225J Oita, Kanoya Air Bases were logged.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts
and other traffic.

30 July 1945.

3290J Unident air bases and planes of Air Group 762
6580J were logged, produced traffic. The greater volume
consisted aviation weathers and aircraft grids.

3320J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 801
6640J were logged, produced traffic.

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4 August 1945.

30 July 1945.

3600J
7200J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes were logged.

3987J Kure N. D. A. Def. Cmd. Post was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings, radar reports and other routine traffic.

5337J Maizuru Air Bases and other idents of Air Group 901 were logged.

3290J
6580J Unident Air Bases and planes of Air Group 762 were logged, also produced traffic.

5600J Kisaratsu A. B. (KIMU) was broadcasting alerts and other traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Taikyu, Kumagaya Air Bases of the 107th F. R. were logged, also produced traffic regarding departures and arrivals of planes.

5955J Kure C. U. (ITO) was broadcasting air alerts, weather reports and other traffic.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base and unident of Air Group 131 were logged.

6325J Kure, Saeki Air Groups were logged, also produced traffic.

6340J Genzan Air Bases and planes were logged.

6351A Army Air Bases and planes were logged, with planes reporting position and producing other traffic.

6067M Yokosuka C.U. was logged as broadcasting air alerts and other traffic.

6585M Unident was logged as broadcasting weather reports in voice.

7010J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.

7200M Army Air Base and planes were logged, with the latter reporting sighting on aircraft.

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4 August 1945.

30 July 1945.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other traffic.

7970J Kisaratsu A. B. (MIKO) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other traffic.

31 July 1945.

3320J Kanoya, Miho, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 801
6640J were logged.

3987J Kure N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr. was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and radar reports.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya Air Bases and planes of the 107th F. R. were logged, also produced traffic.

6325J Kure Air Base and Saeki Air Group were logged.

6340J Chinkai Air Group, unidents and planes were logged, also produced traffic.

6155J Iwakawa and unident Air Base of Air Group 131 were logged, Planes also showed.

6351 A Unident Army Air Bases and planes in Tokyo area were logged, also produced traffic.

6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Group were logged, also produced traffic.

7010J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, and other routine traffic.

7970J Kisaratsu A. B. (MIKO) was broadcasting air alerts, weather requests and other routine traffic.

1 August 1945.

3320J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 801
6640J were logged.

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4 August 1945.

1 August 1945.

3921M Unident Army air bases and planes in Tokyo area were logged.

4215J Kanoya, Kisaratsu, Yamato Air Bases were logged, produced weather reports and other routine traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya Air Bases of the 107th F. R. were logged, also produced traffic.

6125M Nagasaki, Tsushima Army Air Bases and planes were logged, also produced traffic with planes originating negative search, weather reports.

6140M Unident Air Bases and planes in Kodama and Aragawa areas were logged, also produced traffic with planes reporting position over Tsushima.

6155J Iwakawa Air Bases and unident were logged.

7225J Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases were logged, all produced traffic.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting routine traffic.

8125J Suzuka, Yokoshiba Air Bases were logged, produced weather reports and other routine traffic.

2 August 1945.

3320J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases were logged, also produced traffic.

3440J Unident air bases and planes of Air Group 634 were logged, produced traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases of the 107th F. R. were logged.

3505J
7010J Kanoya, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.

6141M Aragawa Air Base and other unidents were logged.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base of Air Group 131 were logged.

6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) was broadcasting sub sighting, and other routine traffic.

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4 August 1945.

2 August 1945.

655ØJ Maizuru, Nanao, Miho, Genzan, Air Bases of Air Group 9Ø1 were logged, also produced traffic.

674ØJ Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 9Ø3 were logged.

6842J Unident Air Bases and planes were logged.

6845M Surface Escort Fleet #1, CinC (UNIO) was broadcasting routine traffic.

7Ø35J Keijo, Itami Air Bases and planes of Air Group 762 were logged, also produced traffic.

8125J Suzuka, Yokoshiba Air Bases of Air Group 131 were logged.

8443M Unidents using KKN calls were logged.

1Ø2ØØJ Yokosuka, Chichijima Comm. Units and Marcus G. Div. were logged, also produced traffic.

3 August 1945.

332ØJ Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group
664ØJ 8Ø1 were logged, also produced traffic.

3382J Unident air bases were logged.

35Ø5J Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases and planes
7Ø1ØJ of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya Air Bases of the 1Ø7th F. R.
were logged, produced traffic.

5972J Unident Air Bases of Air Group 634 were logged.

614ØM Yokosuka, Tokyo Comm. Units were logged.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base and unident were logged.

7685M Unident (NIA) was broadcasting routine traffic.

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4 August 1945.

4 August 1945.

3145J	Kanoya Air Base was logged.
332ØJ 664ØJ	Kanoya, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 8Ø1 were logged.
35Ø5J 7Ø1ØJ	Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.
3875J	Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr. was broadcasting sub sightings and other routine traffic.
613ØJ	Unident air base of Air Group 9Ø1 were logged.
615ØM	Unident Army air bases and planes were logged, also produced traffic.
6155J	Iwakawa Air Base and unident of Air Group 131 were logged.
6325J	Saeki Air Group 951 and other unidents were logged.
585ØJ 7Ø1ØJ	Kanoya, Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 were logged, also produced traffic.
588ØJ	Matsuyama Air Base, Maizuru, Ominato Comm. Units were logged.
5935J	Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases of the 1Ø7th F. R. were logged.
5985J	Oita Air Base and other unidents were logged.
6365J	Ominato, Yokosuka comm. Units and unidents were logged.
6437M	Kure, Osaka Com. Units were logged, also was produced traffic.
649ØJ	CruDiv 22 Comdr, Picketboats were logged, also produced traffic.

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4 August 1945.

4 August 1945.

6765J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases were logged, also produced weather reports.

6842J Unident air bases and planes were logged, was producing drill traffic.

7035J Keijo, Itami Air Base and planes of Air Group 762, were logged.

7050J Oii, Kowaa, Mineyama, Okazaki Air Groups were logged.

7225J Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases were logged,

7675J Subron 11 Comdr. and subs of subron 11 were logged.

7685J Yamato A. G. (NIA) was broadcasting air alerts, and other routine traffic.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, and other routine traffic.

L. Garcia
L. Garcia CRM, USN.
Rinc RIUA#2

Copies to:- Chief of Naval Operations. (OP20)
CincPac Advanced (Fleet Intelligence Officer)
Supplementary Radio 926

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial

~~SECRET~~

11 August 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary For week Ending
11 August 1945, report of.

1. Upon completion of fueling and replenishing all ships in Task Force Thirtyeight, then preparations for strikes in Northern Honshu areas began. The launching point was set for on 9 August 1945 in latitude 38:20 North, and 143:20 East.

2. Radio receiving conditions on air bases and planes, from areas concerning the operations, indicated fair and good throughout the period for this week.

3. Due to the limited personnel assigned for this duty afloat, only a small percentage of air channels could be covered as there are great number listed. Therefore, only those channel which was found invaluable would be placed on primary coverage.

4. The following is the list of frequencies logged for week ending 11 August 1945.

5 August 1945.

3320J 6640J	Miho, Oita Air bases of Air Group 801 produced weather reports and other traffic.
3842J 7685J	Yamato A. G. (NIA) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and radar reports.
3505J 7010J	Kanoya, Matsuyama Air Bases of Air Group 171 and planes produced traffic.
4275M	Unident army air activity produced traffic
5935J	Hamamatsu, Kumagaya Air Bases of the 107th F. R. produced traffic.

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11 August 1945.

5 August 1945.

6150M Unident army air bases and planes produced traffic.

6903M Unident air bases and planes produced traffic, with bases originating air alerts.

7035J Itami, Sentoku, Keijo Air Bases and planes of Air Group 762 produced traffic with planes originating weather reports.

7675J SubRon 11 Comdr, and subs produced traffic.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) was broadcasting air alerts, and other routine traffic.

8006M Unident air bases and planes produced traffic.

8125J Yokoshiba, Suzuka Air Bases of Air Group 131.

6 August 1945.

3705J Kumamoto Air Base and planes of the 60th F. R. produced traffic with planes originating reports departures, arrivals and bombing mission over Okinawa.

6350J
52 Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Base and planes of Air Group 706 produced traffic with planes originating aviation weathers and grid reports.

3320J
6640J Miho, Oita, Kanoya Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801 produced traffic with planes originating aviation weathers, aircraft sightings and grid reports.

4737J Tsukuba West Air Base and planes of the 62th F. R. produced traffic with planes originating aviation weathers, departure and arrival reports.

3842J
7685J Yamato A. G. (NLA) was broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other traffic.

6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 901 produced traffic.

3505J
7010J Kanoya, Oita, Matsuyama- A. G. 171 produced traffic.

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11 August 1945.

6 August 1945.

7035J Itami Air Base, unident air bases and planes of Air Group 762 produced traffic.

7385M Unident Army air activity of the 97th F. R. was producing traffic.

7875J Kanoya A. B. (MIKA) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and aviation weather reports.

7992M Unident (NATU) broadcasting greater volume of old traffic.

9075M Owada C. U. (N) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings, radar and d/f traffic.

7 August 1945.

3705J Kumamoto Air Base and planes of the 60 F. R. produced traffic with planes originating aviation weather reports and results on the bombing mission over Okinawa.

3995M Unident (NATU) broadcasting air alerts and
7993M other routine traffic.

6067J Matsushima, Bihoro, Yokosuka Air Groups.

4737J Tsukuba Air Base and planes of the 62 F. R., produced traffic.

6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) broadcasting alerts and other traffic.

6490J Ominato C. U., Crudiv 22 Comdr produced traffic.

6530J Matsushima, Misawa Air Bases and planes of Air Group 706 produced drill traffic.

6740J Ominato Air Base and planes of Air Group 903 produced traffic.

6855J Unident air bases and planes of Air Group 903 produced traffic.

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11 August 1945.

7 August 1945.

7675J SubRon 11 Comdr and subs produced traffic.
7685J Yamato A. G. (NIA) broadcasting routine traffic.
851ØJ Ominato C. U. (NISA) broadcasting aviation
weathers and aircraft grid reports.

8 August 1945.

4Ø15J Ominato, Shimushu Comm. Units produced traffic.
5875J Oii Air Group producing air alerts, aircraft
sightings and other traffic.
5337J Maizuru, Omura, Miho Air Bases and planes of
Air Group 9Ø1.
6Ø67J Matsushima, Bihoro Air Bases produced traffic.
649ØJ Ominato C. U., CruDiv 22 Comdr. and picketboats
produced traffic.
653ØJ Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air
Group 7Ø6 produced traffic, with planes originating
aviation weathers, departures, arrival reports
and drill traffic.
674ØJ Ominato, Noshiro Air Bases and planes of Air
Group 9Ø3 produced traffic.
6855J Unident Air Bases and planes of Air Group 9Ø3
produced traffic.
6843M Surface Escort Fleet 1, Cinc (UMO) broadcasting
routine traffic.
7Ø1ØJ Matsuyama, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air
Group 171.
7385J Unident army air bases and planes of the 1Ø7th
F. C. S. produced traffic with planes originating
arrival and departure reports.

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11 August 1945.

8 August 1945.

851ØJ

Ominato C. U. (NISA) broadcasting sub sighting, air alerts and other routine traffic.

9 August 1945.

36ØØJ
72ØØJ

Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 752 produced traffic, with planes originating aircraft sightings, surface sightings, grids and also the attack signal "TUTUTU" was employed by suicide planes. At the time this signal was executed one of the destroyers of this task force reported hit by a suicide plane. Prior to releasing the attack signal the plane originated signal, "HOTA", giving a tentative meaning - Pickets (destroyers) sighted.

3176M

Unident Army air activity in Tokyo area.

3842J
7685J

Yamato A. G. (NIA) broadcasting surface sightings and other routine traffic.

3875J

Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Cmd. broadcasting air alerts and radar reports.

4Ø15J
5875J

Ominato C. U., Wakkanai Det., Maizuru C.U. produced traffic.

5595J

Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 6Ø1.

56ØØJ

Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings, surface sightings and other routine traffic.

4255J
851ØJ

Ominato C. U. (NISA) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other routine traffic.

6Ø67J

Matsushima Air Group and Bihoro Air Bases.

6325J

Chitose Air Bases.

6345J

Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) broadcasting high precedence aircraft traffic.

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~~SECRET~~

11 August 1945.

9 August 1945.

653ØJ Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 7Ø6 produced traffic.
664ØJ Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 8Ø1.
6685M Ominato C. U. (FUKA) broadcasting air alerts and worked others with routine traffic.
6855J Unident air bases and planes of Air Group 9Ø3 produced traffic.
6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Groups and planes produced traffic.

1Ø August 1945.

3575M Ominato, Tokyo Com. Units.
3875J Unident Lkt. Sta. broadcasting aircraft sighting, and great volume of radar reports.
4Ø15J Ominato, Shimushu Com. Units, Øi Air Group,
5875J Iwakkanai Det., produced traffic.
5283M Otaru Air Base, Air Group 9Ø3 Comdr., produced traffic.
56ØØJ Yokosuka C. U. (KIU) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other traffic.
5955J Kure C. U. (ITO) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and other routine traffic.
6351A Unident Army air activity in Tokyo area produced traffic.
6Ø67J Matsushima, Bihoro Air Groups produced traffic.
653ØJ Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 7Ø6.
6685J Ominato C. U. broadcasting air alerts and other routine traffic.
6742M Ominato, Misaratsu Com. Units.

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11 August 1945.

10 August 1945.

6855J Unident air bases and planes of Air Group 903, produced traffic, including air alerts.

6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Groups produced traffic.

7010J Matsuyama, Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 produced traffic.

7120J Unident air bases and plane of Air Group 171 produced traffic.

7115J Kasumigaura A. G. (HATTI) broadcasting aircraft sightings and other routine traffic.

7200J Kisaratsu Air Bases and planes of Air Group 752 produced traffic with planes originating weather reports.

7390M Unident Army air bases and planes of the 107th F. R. produced traffic with planes originating aviation weathers, departure and arrival reports.

7970J Kisaratsu A. G. (MIKO) broadcasting air alerts, and other routine traffic.

7325J Tokyo Radio released Domei news, that Japan has accepted peace terms as in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. This is the very first indication that Japan has agreed, was broadcast 2000-9. Commander Second Carrier Task Force was immediately informed of the above news.

11 August 1945.

3577M Ominato, Tokyo Com. Units produced traffic.

3960J Chitose, Bihoro, Akkeshi Air Bases.

5600J Yokosuka C. U. (MIKU) broadcasting air alerts, radar reports and army traffic.

5820M Unident air bases using 3M calls produced traffic

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616-104

11 August 1945.

11 August 1945.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base of Air Group 131.
6155M Yokosuka, Tokyo Com. Units. produced greater volume of weather reports.
6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706 produced traffic.
6490J Ominato C. U., and picketboats produced traffic.
6685M Ominato C. U., working unidents and broadcasting air alerts.
6845 J Yokosuka C. U. and unidents.
7010J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group 171 produced traffic.
7200J Unident air bases and planes produced traffic.
7760J Maizuru Air Base working All Dets of Air Group 901.

L. Garcia
L. Garcia, CEM, USN.
Rinc #2 RIUA

Copies to:- Chief of Naval Operations (OP20G)
CinC Pac Advanced (Fleet Intelligence Officer)
CinC Supplementary Radio 926

A 8-2(3)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~

18 August 1945.

From: RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.
To: OinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending
18 August 1945, report of.

1. The strikes against enemy aircraft and strategic target in the central and northern Honshu areas for this week, on 13 and 15 August 1945. The launching point was carried out in latitude 35:57 North, 142:23 East. Although the strike plans on 15 August 1945, was recalled in accordance with instructions received from Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet.

2. Radio receiving conditions on air bases and planes, in areas concerning the primary mission of this Task Force, indicated fair and good throughout this period.

3. Due to the limited personnel assigned, only a small percentage of enemy air channels could be observed at one time. Therefore, only those channels which was found more valuable than others was given a primary coverage.

4. The following is the list of frequencies which were logged for week ending 18 August 1945, also additional remarks concerning the speech from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

12 August 1945.

- 332øJ Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air group 8ø1 produced traffic.
- 3382J Oita, Miho Air Bases.
- 3615M Kanoya, Miho Air Bases.
- 3557J Kasumigaura A. G. (HATI) broadcasting routine traffic.
- 4137J Maizuru, Omura Air Bases of Air Group 9ø1 produced traffic.

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~~010101~~

18 August 1945.

12 August 1945.

5600J Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) broadcasting air alerts, aircraft sightings and radar reports.

5595J Unident air base and planes produced drill traffic.

5840J Chitose Weather Sta. producing weather reports.

5875J Ominato C. U., Air Group 903 Comdr., produced traffic.

5935J Hamamatsu, Kumagaya Air Bases of the 107th F. R. produced traffic.

6145M Tokyo, Yokosuka Com. Units produced mostly weather reports.

6155J Unident Air Bases of Air Group 131 was producing traffic.

6150M Unident Army air activity was producing traffic

6490J Ominato C. U., CruDiv 22 Comdr., and picketboats was producing traffic. With Ominato on air alerts.

6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706 produced traffic, mostly of air alerts, aircraft grids and weather reports.

6685M Ominato C. U. broadcasting routine traffic.

7010J Kanoya, Miho, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 171 produced traffic.

13 August 1945.

3505J Matsuyama, Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group
7010J 171 were producing weather reports and other traffic.

3875J Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr. broadcasting air alerts, radar reports and other traffic.

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18 August 1945.

13 August 1945.

5335J
7200J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 601 produced traffic, with planes originating aircraft sightings on surface units and planes of this force. Also aviation grids and weather reports was coming the planes.

5836M Unident voice channel was broadcasting air warnings.

5595M Unident voice presume to be Kisaratsu Air Base or planes. Partial contents recognized through the interference from Yokosuka broadcast.

5600J Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) broadcasting air alerts, sub sightings, radar reports and other traffic.

6070M Yokosuka C. U., Assault Units 11-12 Comdrs., produced traffic.

6104M Yokosuka C. U., Assault Units 11-12 Comdrs., producing air alerts and other traffic.

6155J Iwakawa Air Base and planes of Air Group 131 produced traffic.

6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706.

6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Groups produced traffic.

7090J Yokosuka Air Base and planes.

7120M Unident airbase and planes producing traffic.

8038M Yokoshiba, Suzuka Air Bases and planes of Air Group 131.

14 August 1945.

2650J Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr, and unidents.

3875J Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr., working unidents

5335M Yokosuka C. U., unidents producing traffic.

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18 August 1945.

14 August 1945.

5337J Nanao Air Base and plane of Air Group 901.
5595J Unident air base and plane.
5600J Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) broadcasting air alerts,
aircraft sightings and other traffic.
5679M Unident air base and planes in Tokyo area was
producing traffic and air alerts.
5680J Unident using K and KN calls.
5972M Unidents Using 3KN calls, also produced traffic.
6150M Unidents Army air activity was producing traffic
6275J San Riku Force Comdr., Def. Force East Frontier
comdr.
6530J Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases and planes
of Air Group 706. Planes were originating
weather reports.
6736M Unident Army air activity producing traffic
6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Groups produced traffic.
7010J Unident Air Base and planes of Air Group 171
produced traffic.
7225J Kanoya, Miho, Oita, Matsuyama Air Bases.

15 August 1945.

2650J Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr., was producing
air alerts and other traffic.
3505J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases of Air Group 171.
5335J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 752
7200J produced traffic. Planes were originating aircraft
sightings, weather reports and other traffic.
5337J Komatsu, Maizuru Air Bases and planes of Air
group 901.

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18 August 1945.

15 August 1945.

5385M Yokosuka N. Dist. A. Def. Comdr., produced air alerts and other traffic.

5595J Unident air base and planes of Air Group 601.

5600J Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) broadcasting air alerts, radar reports.

5935J Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Base of the 107th F. R. produced traffic.

6030M His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, was recorded on the Magnetic wire recorder, regarding the terms set forth in the Potsdam Declaration.

6479M Unidents using 3KN calls.

6640J Unidents using KN calls.

6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Groups.

8530J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) broadcasting high precedence traffic.

15880J Tokyo Radio Domei broadcasting His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan speech was paralleled on 6030M in voice. The Emperor's speech will be on pages 6 and 7 in full.

16 August 1945.

3320J Miho, Oita Air bases of Air Group 801.

3505J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and planes of Air Group
7010J 171 produced traffic.

3952J Yokosuka C. U. and unidents produced traffic.

5680J Unidents using K and KN calls, produced traffic.

5935J Kumagaya, Taikyu Air Bases of the 107th F. R.

6627M Unident Army air activity produced traffic

6927J Suzuka, Hyakurigahara Air Groups and other unidents

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15 August 1945.

Transcription of address made by:

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

1. Symphonic Music, commenced at 1200 -9.
2. Announcer: "His gracious Majesty Emperor of Japan is about to speak. All people in the Empire respectfully stand while National Anthem is played."
3. National Anthem of Japan.
4. Emperor speaks: "To our good and loyal subjects; after pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered our government to communicate to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and wellbeing of our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors, and which we lay close to heart.
Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to ensure Japan's selfpreservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone - the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants of the state and the devoted service of our onehundred million people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of world have all turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

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15 August 1945.

Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects; or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors. This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the powers.

Cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the empire towards the emancipation of East Asia. The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains our heart night and day. The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers, and of those who have lost their home and livelihood, are the objects of our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great."

"We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that we have resolved to pace the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable. Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the imperial state, we are always with ye, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, of any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world."

"Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the inmate glory of the imperial state and keep pace with the progress of the world."

5. The National Anthem of Japan.

6. Announcer: "That concludes the address of His Gracious Majesty."

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18 August 1945.

16 August 1945.

7200J Kisaratsu Air Base and planes of Air Group 752 produced traffic. Planes originated sightings on surface units, aircraft and grids.

7210J Unidents using 3KN calls.

7225J Kanoya, Matsuyama Air Bases.

17 August 1945.

3842J Unidents using 3KN calls.

5335J Unident airbases and planes of Air Group 752.

4722M Misawa Air Base, Tokyo C. U.

5725M Unidents using 3KN calls.

5820M Unidents using 3KN calls.

5935J Kumagaya Taikyu Air Bases.

6627M Unidents using 3K calls.

8025J Atsuki Air Base and planes of Air Group 302 produced traffic which indicated flight to Ominato Air Base.

18 August 1945.

3782J Shinchiku A. B. (TAWO) idling, no traffic.

3842J Yamato A. B. (NIA) idling, no traffic.

3955M Tokyo C. U. (NATU) idling, no traffic.

5255J Unidents using K and KN calls.

5517M Suicide Atron 4 Comdr., and unidents.

5680J Unidents using K, KN calls and planes, no traffic.

6325J Kure Air Base and Saeki Air Group produced traffic.

6640J Oita, Miho Air Bases and planes of Air Group 801 produced traffic.

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18 August 1945.

18 August 1945.

6907M Unidents using 3KN calls, no traffic.
7010J Unident air base and planes of Air Group 171.
7119M Unident air base and planes was producing
traffic.
7210J Unident 3KN calls.
7260J Kisaratsu, Matsushima, Yamato, Meiji Air
Bases produced traffic.
7322J Suzuki, Itami, Hyakurigahara, Miyazaki Air
Groups and planes produced traffic.
7345J Unident using 3KN calls.
7685J Yamato A. B. (NIA) broadcasting air alerts
and other traffic.

L. Garcia
L. Garcia, CRM, USN.
Rinc #2 RIUA

Copies to:-

Chief of Naval Operations (OP2/C)
CinCPac Advanced (fleet Intelligence Officer)
Oinc Supplementary Radio 926

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

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~~SECRET~~

25 August 1945.

From: RinC, Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To: OinC, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending
25 August 1945, report of.

1. Task Force Thirtyeight patrolled and carried out fueling operations approximately two hundred miles east of Tokyo Area. Therefore, the primary mission of the Intelligence Unit was to uncover any air activity that may indicate an attack against Task Force Thirtyeight or any other units of the Blue forces.

2. Air activity showed a considerable drop in operations as compared to previous reports. Although the radio receiving conditions on air bases, planes and other activities indicated fair and good for week ending, 25 August 1945.

3. The following are a list of frequencies as logged on either primary or secondary coverages for week ending, 25 August 1945.

19 August 1945.

3320J/ 6640J	Oita, Miho Air Bases of Air Group 801.
3505J	Kanoya, Oita Airbases of Air Group 171.
5898M	Usa, Oita Air Bases, produced traffic.
6067J	Matsushima Air Base.
6530J	Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases of Air Group 706, produced traffic.
6630J	Fujisawa, Tsushima Def. Force.
6902M	Matsushima Air Base.

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25 August 1945.

19 August 1945.

7035J Itami, Kanoya Air bases.
8025J Atsuki Air Base and planes, produced traffic .
8915J Atsuki Air Base and planes which carried the
Imissionaries on surrender flight to Ie Jima
Air Base.

20 August 1945.

3320J Oita Air Base of Air Group 801.
3452M Kanoya, Matsuyama Air Bases and Koochi Air Group,
produced weather reports and other traffic.
3760J Osaka C. U., Kushimoto A.B., Def. Unit 11 Comdr.,
Yokosuka Det.
6067J Unident using K calls, was producing weather
reports.
6627J Unident Air Bases and planes of Air Group 601,
was producing traffic.
7035J Itami, Keijo Air Bases and planes of Air
Group 762, with planes producing departure and
arrival reports.
7050J Yamato, Oi Air Bases, Mineyama, Koo Wa #2,
Okazaki #3 Air Groups.
7115J Kasumigaura A. G. (HATI) was broadcasting
routine traffic.
7125J Unident air bases and planes was producing traffic.
7260J Yamato, Suzuka Air Bases.
8510J Ominato C. U. (MISA) was broadcasting a cancelled
air alert and other routine traffic.
8350J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting high
precedence traffic.
9045J Unident air bases and planes.

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25 August 1945.

21 August 1945.

332ØJ/
664ØJ Oita, Miho, Yamato Air Bases and planes of
Air Group 8Ø1.

3747J Yokosuka N. D. Anti Aircraft Def. Comdr.,
Torishima Ikt.

5Ø75J Usa, Kannonji Air Bases, producing weather
reports and other traffic.

5972M Suicide Atron 2 and 1Ø Comdr.

6365J Kasumigaura Air Group and Chitose Air Base #1.

653ØJ Matsushima, Misawa, Chitose Air Bases and planes
of Air Group 7Ø6.

665ØJ Maizuru, Miho, Nanao Air Bases of Air Group 9Ø1.

6765J Kanoya, Oita Air Bases and Genkai Seaplane Base.

7Ø1ØM Unidents using K calls.

7Ø35J Unidents air bases and planes.

7125J Unidents using K, KKM and KKK calls.

7193M Unidents using KKM calls, producing plain language
traffic.

835ØJ Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting mostly plain
language traffic.

22 August 1945.

5817J Koo Wa #1 Air Group, Air Group 2Ø Comb. Comdr.,
Mineyama Air Base.

5875J Ominato C. U., Oi Air Base, and unident using
the cover call SATMO4, CDV 215.

6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.

6365J Matsushima, Yamato Air Bases and Kasumigaura
Air Group.

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25 August 1945.

22 August 1945.

6490J Ominato C. U. running tests, no traffic.
6530J Matsushima, Chitose Air Bases and planes of
Air Group 706.
6640J Unidents using 3MN calls.
6927J Hyakurigahara Air Group and unidents.
7032M Hyakurigahara Air Group and unidents.
7201M Fleet 7 CinC, Fleet Escort #1-Cinc, Harutsuki DD,
Sakito CDV, and ODB in CD Unit 31.
8350J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.

23 August 1945.

4175J/
8350J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.
4492J Singapore C. U., Sama G. Div. 16, Takao Cu.,
Fleet China 2, CinC were producing traffic.
6067J Unidents using KIN calls, produced traffic.
5337J Maizuru, Miho, Nanao, Komatsu Air Bases were
producing plain language traffic.
6345J Maizuru C. U. (JUSU) was broadcasting traffic.
6530J Matsushima, Chitose Air Bases and planes of
Air Group 706, with latter reporting progress
of the flight.

24 August 1945.

4175J/
8350J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.
5875M Mei Air Group and Air Group 20 Comb. Comdr.
6365J Matsushima, Kasunigaura Air Bases producing mostly
weather requests.

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25 August 1945.

24 August 1945.

653ØJ Matsushima Air Base and planes of Air Group
7Ø6, also producing traffic.

72ØIM Fleet Escort 1 CinC, Fleet 7 CinC, were producing
traffic.

6712M Ominato C. U., and Nemuro Det-Ominato C. U.

726ØJ Kisaratsu and Yamato Air Bases.

25 August 1945.

3875J Yokosuka Unit Comdr., Yokosuka H. D. Anti Aircraft
Def. Comdr., Hachijojima G. Div., and unident
lkts., were producing traffic .

4175J/
835ØJ Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.

5356M Yokosuka C. U. and other unidents.

51ØØJ Yokosuka, Chichijima Comm. Units and Marcus G.
Div. were producing weather reports and other
traffic.

56ØØJ Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) was broadcasting routine
traffic .

3Ø5ØM Unident lkts using KIMU calls.

5955J Kure C. U. (ITO) broadcast idling.

6Ø7ØM Yokosuka C. U. and unidents.

6365J Kasumigaura Air Group, Kooriyama, and Matsushima
Air Bases.

655ØJ Maizuru, Miho Air Bases.

663ØM Unidents using IM calls.

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25 August 1945.

25 August 1945.

6695J Ominato C. U. (FUMA) broadcast, Otaru RHO,
Alckeshi Det. Ominato C. U., Div. 104 Comdr.,
were producing traffic.

6705M Ominato C. U. and Muroran R. N. O.

7177M Unident using K calls, were producing traffic.

7685J Yamato A. G. (NIA) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.

7710J Maizuru and Chinkai Comm. Units.

L. Garcia
L. Garcia, Com(T), USN
Rinc, #2 R.U.I.A.

Copies to:- Chief of Naval Operations(OP20G).
CinC Pac Advanced (fleet Intelligence Officer).
CinC Supplementary Radio Station (Navy Radio 926).

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SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
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~~SECRET~~

1 September 1945.

From:- RinC, Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander, Second Carrier Task Force.

To:- CinC, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject:- Radio Intelligence Summary For week
ending, 1 September 1945, report of.

1. Task Force Thirtyeight continues to carry out patrols and fueling operations in vicinity of Tokyo area. Therefore, the primary mission of this radio intelligence unit was to uncover any air activity on frequencies that may indicate an attack against the Blue Forces.

2. Air activity continues to show a decrease in operations of any importance. Only flights in the Empire was noticed which indicated instruction were being carried out as set forth by the Allied Commander. Although the radio receiving conditions existing on air bases, planes and other activity indicated fair and good for week ending, 1 September 1945.

3. The following are a list of frequencies as logged on either primary or secondary coverages for week ending, 1 September 1945.

26 August 1945.

3842J	Yamato A. B. (NIA) broadcast, idling.
3875J	Yokosuka N. D. Anti-Aircraft Def. Comdr., Torishima Ikt., produced plain language traffic.
3887J	Maizuru C. U., Maizuru Def. Force Unit Nanao.
3952J	Yokosuka C. U., Hachijojima G. Div.
4ø 17M	Atsuki, Yokosuka C. U., producing plain language traffic.
4175J/ 835øJ	Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain language and 4M traffic.

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1 September 1945.

26 August 1945.

5075J Ominato C. U. and Chitose Air Base #1.
5135M Maizuru C. U., Def. Force Maizuru Unit and
Fushiki R. N. O.
5201M Ominato C. U., and Chitose Air Base #1.
5875J Maizuru C. U., and Wakkanai Det. Ominato C. U.
6550J Maizuru and Chinkai Air Bases.
6630M Unidents using 3KN calls.
6640J Unidents using KN calls, was producing plain
language traffic.
6855J Chitose, Misawa and Bihoro Air Bases were
producing weather reports and other traffic.
6870J Maizuru and Kure Comm. Units.
7260J Suzuka, Yamato, Oi, Maizuru and Meiji Air Bases.
7115J Kasumigaura A. B. (HATI) was broadcasting plain
language traffic.
7737M Tokyo, Osaka and Kure Comm. Units.
8405M Sasebo and Tokyo Comm. Units.
8510J Ominato C. U. (MISA) broadcast, idling.
9410J Ominato and Tokyo Comm. Units.
10200J Yokosuka C. U. and Hachijojima G. Div.

27 August 1945.

3672M Yokosuka C. U. and unidents were producing
traffic.
3757M Osaka C. U., Komatsu Jima Air Group, Def. Unit
Kii Comdr.

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1 September 1945.

27 August 1945.

3875J Yokosuka, Chinkai Comm. Units, Yokosuka Lkt.,
Hachijojima G. Div.

3952J Yokosuka C. U., producing traffic.

4017M Atsuki and Yokosuka Comm. Units produced plain
language traffic.

4352M Unidents using KENN calls.

4648M Sasebo C. U., Nagasaki R. N. O., Fleet 7 CinC.

4715J/
8350J Tokyo C. U., (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language despatches.

6227M Tokyo and Maizuru Comm. Units.

6245M Tokyo and Osaka Comm. Units.

6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) broadcast, idling.

6365J Matsushima, Kasumigaura Air Bases and Chitose
#1 Air Base produced plain language despatches.

6630M Unidents using KN calls.

6695J Ominato C. U., Div. 104 Comdr., Otaru R. N. O.,
produced plain language despatches.

7117M Unidents using K calls, were producing aircraft
type despatches.

7260J Yamato, Meiji, Matsushima, Oi, and Fujieda Air
Bases were producing plain language despatches.

7352M Tsingtao, Shanghai Air Bases and planes.

7710J Chinkai, Maizuru Comm. Units and Fleet 7 CinC.

8405M Sasebo, Maizuru and Chinkai Comm. Units.

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1 September 1945.

28 August 1945.

3661J	Yokosuka, Osaka Comm. Units and other unidents were producing traffic.
3975J	Osaka C. U. and unidents were producing plain language despatches.
4010M	Yokosuka and Atsuki Comm. Units. were producing plain language despatches.
4665J	Sasebo C. U. and Fleet 7 Cinc., were producing plain language despatches.
4715M/ 8350J	Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain language despatches.
4748M	Tokyo C. U., idling.
5528M	Assault Unit 17 Comdr., and unidents.
5600J	Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) was broadcasting traffic.
5817J	Koo Wa #1, Mie Air Groups and Air Group 20 Comb. Comdr.
5955J	Kure C. U. (ITO) was broadcasting plain language despatches.
6240M	Maizuru and Tokyo Comm. Units.
6345J	Maizuru C. U. (FUGU) was broadcasting plain language despatches.
6365J	Kasumigaura Air Group, Matsushima, Kooriyama Air Bases were producing traffic.
6687M	Kasumigaura Air Group, Matsushima, Kooriyama Air Bases.
6695J	Omimoto C. U. and Muroran R. N. C.
6630M	Unidents using KM calls were producing traffic.

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1 September 1945.

28 August 1945.

6855J Chitose Air Base and unident producing weather reports.

6875M Sasebo, and Kure Comm. Units.

7115J Kasumigaura A. B. (HATI) broadcast, idling.

7164M Ominato and Tokyo Comm. Units were producing traffic.

7260J Yamato, Matsushima and Oi Air Bases were producing traffic.

3842J/
7685J Yamato A. B. (NIA) was broadcasting plain language despatches.

7995M Tokyo C. U. (MUTU) broadcasting traffic.

9830J Sasebo C. U. (NORU) broadcast, idling.

29 August 1945.

3875J Hachijojima G. Div., Yokosuka N. D. Anti Aircraft Def. Comdr were producing plain language despatches.

4715M/
6262M/
8350J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) broadcasting plain language and coded despatches.

6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUSU) was broadcasting plain language despatches.

5817J Air Group 20 Comb. Comdr., Kooriyama Air Base, Tanoura and Atsuki Air Groups, Air Group 20 Comb.

6365J Kasumigaura Air Group, Kooriyama Air Base, Kooriyama #1 Air Group, and Chitose #1 Air Base.

6892M Ominato and Tokyo Comm. Units.

7115J Kasumigaura A. B. (HATI) was broadcasting weather reports and plain language despatches.

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1 September 1945.

29 August 1945.

7117M Unidents using K calls, were producing aircraft type despatches.
7685J Yamato A. B. (NIA) was broadcasting plain language despatches.

30 August 1945.

3617J Takao C. U., idling.
4010M Atsuki and Tokyo Comm. Units.
4715M/
6077M Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain language despatches of which most of them were originated by Bupers. Chief.
4790J Chitose Air Base #1, Bihoro #2 Air Base and Hyootsu #1 Air Base were producing plain language despatches.
5600J Yokosuka C. U. (KIMU) was broadcasting plain language despatches which were originated by Bupers Chief.
5817J Air Group 20 Comb. Comdr., Mineyama Air Base, Koowa #1 Air Base were producing plain language despatches.
6255J Chinkai C. U. (YURI) broadcast, idling.
6365J Kasunigaura Air Group, Chitose Air Base #1, and Matsushima Air Base were producing plain language despatches.
6550J Maizuru Air Base and unidents using M calls, were producing plain language despatches.
6695J Murooran R. N. O., Div. 104 Comdr., Onizato C. U., Nemuo Det.
7115J Kasunigaura A. B. (KMTI) was broadcasting plain language despatches and weather reports.

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30 August 1945.

7117M Unidents using K calls.
7260J Meiji and Yamato Air Bases.
7353M Tsingtao and Shanghai Air Bases.

31 August 1945.

3630J/
7260J Yamato, Fujieda, Suzuka, and Meiji Air Bases
were producing weather reports and 5N despatches.
4010M Atsuki, Tokyo Comm. Units were producing plain
language despatches.
4015J Ominato C. U., Wakkanai Det.
4665J Sasebo C. U. and Def. Force Sasebo, Nagasaki
R. N. O., produced 5N despatches.
— 4715M Yamato and Fujieda Air Bases.
4715M/
8350J Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language despatches.
4790J Ominato C. U. and Chitose Air Base #1.
5295J CinC 6 Fleet calling I-401, no results indicated.
5817J Yokosuka C. U., Air Group 20 Comb. Comdr., Air
Group 20, Mineyama Air Base and Suicide Atron #4
Comdr., were producing plain language despatches.
5600J Yokosuka C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting weather
reports and other despatches.
— 5860M Ominato C. U. and Wakkanai Det.
6345J Maizuru C. U. (FUBU) broadcast, idling.
6236M Maizuru, Tokyo Comm. Units and Suzuka Air Base.
6705M Ominato C. U. and Div. 104 Comdr.

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1 September 1945.

31 August 1945.

6365J Kasumigaura Air Group, Matsushima Air Base
were producing weather reports and other traffic.
7115J Kasumigaura A. G. (HATI) broadcasting plain
language despatches.
7117M Unidents using K calls.
7752M Ominato and Tokyo Comm. Units producing traffic.

1 September 1945.

3617J Takao C. U. (EMA) broadcast, idling.
4ø1øM Atsuki and Tokyo Radio.
4715M Tokyo C. U. (HITU) was broadcasting plain
language despatches.
479øJ Chitose #1, Bihoro Air Bases were producing
traffic.
4865J Kure Cu, Moji R. N. O., Oita Air Base, And
Suicide Atron 2 Comdr.
5ø7øJ Ominato C. U., Chitose #1 Air Base, Def. Unit
Akkeshi.
5817J Koowa #1 Air Group, Air Group 2ø Comb. Comdr.,
Air Group-2ø Comb., Air Group Mie.
6345J Maizuru C. U. (JUSU) was broadcasting traffic.
6365J Bihoro #1, Chitose #1, Kooriyama Air Bases.
6ø95J Ominato C. U. (JUKA) Broadcasting plain language
despatches, Muroran R. N. O., Div. 1ø4 Comdr.

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SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
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Serial ~~TOP SECRET MERRY~~

6 September 1945.

From: Officer-in-charge R.I. Unit attached
Comdr. SECOND Carrier Task Force Pacific.

To: Officer-in-charge U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Shipboard R.I., lessons learned and improve-
ment in techniques possible.

Reference: FRUPAC Letter dated 8 August 1945.

1. Now that the war with Japan is successfully concluded, it might be well to consider in the light of the experience gained during the past two years, what lessons learned should help in providing the best in shipboard RI techniques in the future, with a view to making available adequate provision for RI Units aboard Flagships, even though Units are not aboard, and also making available new and better equipment as it becomes available.

2. It is assumed that as long as there is a Fleet the policy of having RI facilities available to that Fleet Commander will be continued. As technical improvement on ships are developed and changes are made in intra and inter-ship communications, care should be taken to insure that provisions for RI are maintained and new developments suitable for RI are investigated and incorporated if needed.

3. The types of information that shipboard RIU's have given can roughly be divided into two classes:

- (A) That derived from processing and reading enemy codes, and ;
- (B) That derived from activity on circuits, mainly aircraft, as interpreted by the traffic picture aided by such collateral information on calls and frequencies as is available.

It is felt there is need of improvement in the facilities available to fully exploit type (B) information. Type (A) service can only be improved by producing more comprehensive tools for exploitation. That is a matter of higher policy which cannot be considered here.

4. As Carrier warfare has developed and changed during the course of the war the demands on shipboard RI were changed somewhat, though the basic service and type of information available was limited by tools available and changed

NSA Technical Liaison when no letter needed
S-41848-AV Copy 1

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but little. The latest demand was for more wide and rapid distribution of information within the force. Those who needed the information could best get it direct, and in spite of directives permitting RI to give type (B) information to CIC direct, facilities were not available to do so.

5. With the advent of suicide plane attacks by the Japanese, certain changes in Carrier tactics operating against large land areas were indicated. Destroyers were sent out some 40 or 50 miles from the Task Group to act as early warning radar pickets. They were equipped with CIC facilities and a fighter director, and were continually covered with a CAP. To provide these Destroyers with information on enemy search planes in the area, and guide planes in attack groups was very important since it has been proved good reconnaissance information and a reliable and flying guide plane is a prerequisite to suicide attacks. These Destroyers were in a position to direct CAP to shootdowns of enemy snoopers before contact with the Fleet. To facilitate distribution of information on these planes, the term "POLKAT" was added to CIC terminology, and was used to indicate enemy planes known to be in the area by Radio Intelligence. Frequencies encoded in "SHACKLE" code were given for the benefit of other RIU's in the force by the originating unit if it was indicated. This was a step in the right direction, but it was still necessary to work through Flag Plct by ordinary telephone; and delivery of information, in times when speed meant everything, was difficult.

6. Tracking of search and attack guide planes by RDF is another shipboard possibility that should be exploited. Also it would enable bases of operations of planes to be readily determined.

7. As the Fast Carrier Task Force is currently operated, the Force Fighter Director is in constant VHF communication with all ships in the Force. He can rapidly disseminate any urgent tactical information to those who should know. Also a VHF circuit for use by Task Group Commanders only is available. Because of this it is felt increasing the number of units does not increase the potential or output of RIU's. Each Unit duplicates the work of the other, and information is interchanged between the commands with nothing gained, unless one Unit, for some reason or other, is not at the time covering the active circuit. It is felt by incorporating in the Force and Fleet Flagships one enlarged Unit, much will be gained.

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This would multiply coverage and opportunity for exploitation. Increasing the number of Units has not done this, but has merely increased the number of men doing the same job. The increase in manpower with the Fleet has not increased the output. If manpower and equipment with the Fleet were centralized in Fleet Commander's and Task Force Commander's Flagships, information could then be given to Fleet and Force Commanders for rapid dissemination. Tactical, not too Secret, information could be given all who should know immediately through CIC and the Force Fighter-Director.

8. In view of the above, it is recommended that future considerations envisage the following:

- a) Careful planning and study to insure the Flagships of the Fleet are equipped with the current best in RI equipment, or that it is available to be readily installed if needed.
- b) Better intra-ship communications need to be provided. CIC and Communication officers, Staff, CTF38, recommend a 3-way sound-powered phone linking CIC, Flag-Plot, and Radio Intelligence.
- c) Research and study be given to perfecting RDF afloat.
- d) Not more than two enlarged units be employed with each Fleet.


9. It is to be hoped that what was learned about shipboard RI work in the Pacific during World War II is not forgotten, and the above lessons be considered in planning Units of the future. It must be stressed that if it is intended to use Radio Intelligence aboard ship in Naval Wars of the future, (if the atomic bomb makes them possible) keeping abreast of current developments in ships, and insuring a properly laid out and installed compartment for RI use, incorporating the latest in gear and techniques, is essential for proper and efficient operation.

10. A diagram of what is considered an adequate installation is enclosed in the original copy only. The compartment equipped is compartment B-105L, allotted to RI on the U.S.S. Shangri-la (CV38).

Copy to:
CINCPAC (OPS/CI)
CINCPAC STAFF
CIC Desk, ENUPAC

CB Beath
R. B. Beath, Lt., USNR
CINCPAC RI Unit #2.

266




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To be used as the
existing needs dictate.

SCALE: 1" = 1'
TOP VIEW

PROPOSED R.I. INSTALLATION FOR U.S.S. SHANGRI-LA (CV38) (TYPE 'B' UNIT)

J.L. BARKER RM4, USN.
5 SEPTEMBER 1945



SCALE: 1" = 1'
~ SIDE VIEW ~

PROPOSED R.I. INSTALLATION FOR U.S.S. SHANGRI-LA (CV38)

J. L. BARKER RM2
5 SEPTEMBER 1945

18-3(3)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SECOND CARRIER TASK FORCE,
PACIFIC FLEET

Serial ~~SECRET~~

8 September 1945.

From: Rinc Radio Intelligence Unit attached
Comdr. SECOND Carrier Task Force Pacific.

To: Officer-in-charge U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Summary for week ending
8 September 1945, report of.

1. Task Force 38 continued patrol of Tokyo area, at an average distance of approximately one-hundred miles, while carrying out fuelling and replenishing operations. The primary mission of the Radio Intelligence Unit being to guard all circuits possible, in anticipation of any possible treachery on the part of the Japanese while our forces were landing at Yokosuka. Task Force 38, on 2 September 1945 (V-J day), was well within sight of land, patrolling the entrance to Sagami Bay.

2. Air activity for the period was absolutely nil, with radio receiving conditions indicated fair to good. The greater volume of traffic copied was in plain language, and was translated as being routine reports, etc.

3. The following is a list of frequencies as logged on either primary or secondary coverage for week ending 8 September 1945.

2 September 1945.

36305	Suzuka, Yamato Air Bases.
38135	Unidents using III calls, produced traffic.
38701	Tokyo, Mure, Sasebo, and Maizuru Comm. Units.
42555	Oninato C.U. (HISU) idled most of day.
46655	Sasebo C.U., 7th Fleet SINC.
47150/ 39701	Tokyo C.U. (HISU) produced plain language traffic.
47405	Tokyo C.U., Yamato Air Base.
48655	Mure C.U., Unident located #2 Comdr., Unident using III call.
55175	Nagasakiura A.S., Yokosuka C.U.

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5875J Ominato C.U., Def. Unit Akkeshi, Wakkanai Det.
Ominato C.U., Shinkin Maru; Aux. Shirosaki.

5815J A.G. 20 Cong. Comdr; A.G. Noowa #1.

5600J Yokosuka C.U. (NITU) B/C, idling.

6345J Maizuru C.U. (FUSU) B/C, 4 Numerals, F/L traffic.

6365J Masumigaura A.G., Matsushima A.B., Mooriyawa A.B.

3-September 1945.

3866M Osaka, Tokyo C.U.'s.

4005M Atsuki, Tokyo Radio.

4665J Basebo C.U., Tomitaka, Oshima Def. Unit Comdr.,
Fleet 7 CinC, produced plain language traffic.

4715M/
8350J Tokyo C.U. (NITU) B/C, plain language traffic.

4790J Chitose #1, Bihoro #1 - A.B.'s, Unident IIRN,
producing plain language traffic.

5355M Yokosuka Lkts., Yokosuka C.U., Hachijojima GDIV.,
Torishima Lkt.

5517J Hachijojima GDiv., Yokosuka C.U., North San
Riku Comdr., Suicide Attron #4 - GDiv.

5600J Yokosuka C.U. (NITU) B/C, idling.

5840J Ominato C.U., Wakkanai Det., Ominato C.U.

6345J Maizuru C.U. (FUSU) B/C, idling.

6365J Masumigaura A.G., Chitose #1 A.B., F/L traffic.

6695J Nemuro Det., Ominato C.U.; Div 104 Comdr.

7260J Yanato, Suzuka, Heiji A.B.'s, Unident 3M, F/L t/c.

7752M Ominato, Tokyo C.U.'s, plain language traffic.

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4 September 1945.

376ØJ	Osaka C.U., Assault Unit #22 - Comdr.
3975J	Kure A/A Def. Comdr., Kure A/A Def. Net.
4Ø15J	Maizuru C.U., Fushiki RNO.
4Ø29M	Atsuki, Tokyo Radio.
4715M/ 835ØJ	Tokyo C.U. (HITU) B/C, plain language traffic.
4665J	Flt. 7 CinC, Oshima Def. Unit Comdr., Sasebo C.U., Tomitaka Radio.
479ØJ	Chitose #1, Bihoro #1,2 A.B.'s, P/L traffic.
4865J	Kure C.U., Unidents using KEM calls.
4995M	Patrol Force #1, Unidents.
5517J	Yokosuka C.U., Suicide Attron #4 Comdr., Hachijojima GDiv, For. North San Riku Comdr., produced plain language traffic.
56ØØJ	Yokosuka C.U. (KIMU) B/C weathers, P/L traffic.
5673M	Shimonosaki, Moji Def. Unit Comdr., Unident.
5817J	Kooriyama #1 A.B., A.G. 2Ø Comb. Comdr.
5875J	Ominato C.U., Wakkanai Det.
6134M	Unidents, using KEM calls.
6345J	Maizuru C.U. (TUBU) B/C, plain language traffic.
6365J	Kasunigaura A.B., Matsushima A.B., Chitose #1 A.B., Kooriyama A.B., weathers, P/L traffic.
6625J	Truk C.U., other unidents using K007 calls, produced plain language traffic.
6695J	Ominato (JUKA) B/C, plain language traffic.
7737M	Sasebo C.U., Tokyo C.U.

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5 September 1945.

3959M/
7994M Tokyo (MUTU) B/C, plain language traffic.

4630J Tokyo C.U. (FUTU) B/C, plain language traffic.

4665J Fleet 7 CinC, Flt Esc 1 CinC, Nagasaki RMO,
Moji Def. Unit Comdr., Sasebo C.U., Chitose A.B.#1.

5070J Ominato C.U., Chitose A.B.#1.

5355M Unidents, using KEMMI calls.

5517J Yokosuka C.U., Kasunigaura A.G., For. North
San Riku Comdr.

5817J A.G. 20 Comb. Comdr., Mineyama A.B., Kooriyama
#1 A.B., Koowa A.B.

5840J Ominato C.U., Unidents using KEMMI calls.

5955J Kure C.U. (ITO) B/C, plain language traffic.

6395M Shanghai Hrbr affairs Dept., Unidents using
KW calls, plain language traffic.

6695J Ominato (FUKA), Div104 Comdr., G. Dist. Ominato,
all RMO, plain language traffic.

7260J Yamato A.G., Matsushima A.B., Fujieda A.B.,
producing plain language traffic.

7670J Flt. China CinC, B.F. Yangtze Comdr., B.F. Tsingtao
Comdr., plain language traffic.

7710J Tokyo C.U., Sasebo C.U.'s, Maizuru C.U.,
plain language traffic copied.

7737M Sasebo, Tokyo, C.U.'s, plain language traffic.

6 September 1945.

3630J/
7260J Yamato, Meiji, Matsushima, Fujieda, Suzuka,
Oita, Air Bases.

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3867M	Tokyo, Osaka C.U.'s, Nohara A.B., Yamato, Kasumigaura A.G.'s, weathers, P/L traffic.
3875J	Osaka, Tokyo C.U.'s, P/L traffic.
3959M	Tokyo C.U. (MUTU), idling.
4015J	Maizuru C.U., Niigata RMO, Flt 7 CinC, Fltesc 1 CinC.
4665J	Flt 7 CinC, RMO Nagasaki, Flt Esc 1 Cinc, P/L tfc.
4790M	Unidents using 3MN calls.
4790J	Chitose, Bihoro A.B.'s, Bihoro #1 A.B.
4865J	Kure C.U., Unident KEMN calls, P/L traffic.
4995M	Surface Def. For. Comdr., Pat. For. #2, SEF Yangtze Comdr.
5100J	Yokosuka, Chichijima C.U.'s, GDiv. Hachijoojima.
5245J	Chinkai Def. Comdr. Okinoshima Def. Station.
5295J	Kure (UTU) B/C, plain language traffic.
5347M	Suzuka, Igauenon A.B.'s.
5355M	Yokosuka C.U., Yokosuka area lkt.
5485J	Yamata A.B., A.G. 903 Comdr., P/L traffic.
5517J	Kasumigaura A.B., Yokosuka C.U., Asslt Unit 12 Comdr., GDiv Hachijoojima.
5717M	Flt 7 CinC, Joji Def. Unit Comdr.
6345J	Maizuru C.U. (FUSU), idling.
6365J	Kasumigaura A.G., Matsushima, Mouriama A.B., producing plain language traffic.
6895J	Ominato C.U., GDist Ominato, all RMO's.
7464M	Sasabe C.U., Kashi-DD, plain language traffic.

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Serial
7512M Tokyo C.U., Kanoya RDO, Oita A.B.
7685J Yamato A.G. (NLA) B/C, plain language traffic.
7710J Sasebo, Tokyo C.U.'s, Yamato A.B., P/L traffic.
7859M Tokyo, Shanghai C.U.'s.

7 September 1945.

3866M Tokyo, Sasebo, Mure, Maizuru C.U.'s.
3987M Tokyo C.U. (MUTU) B/c, idling.
4665J Sasebo C.U., Unident using KIMM calls.
6345J Maizuru C.U. (JUSU) B/C, idling.
6365J Masumigaura A.G., Kooriyama, Matsushima A.B.'s,
weather and plain language traffic.
7260J Yamato, Meiji, Fujiida A.B.'s, plain language
traffic was copied.

8 September 1945.

3760A C.U. Osaka, unident KKK.
4186M Sasebo C.U., A.B. Kanoya, Oshima Def. Unit
Comdr., plain language traffic.
5346M A.B. 2 Suzuka, A.B. Igaueno.
5517M C.U. Yokosuka calling unident.
5817J A.G. Mie, A.G. 20 Comb. Comdr., A.B. Mineyama
5848M C.U. Ominato, unident ~~MIEM~~, produced plain
language traffic.
6077M Tokyo C.U. (MITU) B/C, plain language traffic.
6365J Masumigaura, Matsushima A.G.'s, weather and plain
language traffic was received.
6699M C.U. Ominato, unident ~~MIEM~~, plain language traffic.


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7205M Fleet 7 CinC, FleEsc 1 CinC.
7260J A.B.'s Yamata, Matsushima, Suzuka, Meiji,
producing plain language traffic.
7513M Oita A.B., Tokyo C.U., producing plain language
traffic.
7670J Flt. China area CinC, SEF Yangtze Comdr.
7710J C.U. Maizuru, Sasebo, and Kure.
7993M C.U. Tokyo (MITU), idling.

4. The watch aboard the U.S.S. Shangri-la (CV38)
was secured at 2010 (-9 time), upon receipt of Junit bearing
date-time-group 071000, and ordering all Mobile RIU's to re-
turn to FRUPAC, and RIU Officers to Com U.S. forces at Yoko-
suka.

Respectfully submitted,


L. J. Garcia, CSI.
RinC, R.I. Unit Number 2.

Copy to:

Chief of Naval Operations (OP20G)
CinCPAC Advanced (Fleet Intelligence Officer)
CinC SUPRAD, Navy #926.

FILE

AS-2(R.I.)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

Serial 00011

12 June 1945.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, THIRD Fleet.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 2 June 1945.

Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret - Ultra Serial 000507 of
4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted.

27 May 1945.

THIRD Fleet Flagship MISSOURI at anchor HAGUSHI Beach, OKINAWA. At about 1400 flagship got underway, and fired main battery bombardment mission against enemy positions on OKINAWA and proceeded to join up with TF-58.

3421J and 3370M became active in early evening with airborne aircraft. NIRAH11 reported prospective time of arrival in battle area as 2223 I. It was assumed that attacks would occur against Naval units in OKINAWA perimeter, rather than against TF-58, as no indication of enemy having established contact with fast carriers had been received. At 2320 NKOWA1 reported sinking a CA in position 26°22'N, 127°33'E. 6950J and 7035J were active with movements of aircraft in MIYAZAKI sector. 6340J and 6640J were also active during the evening.

28 May 1945.

ComTHIRDFleet relieved ComFIFTHFleet at midnight, and fleet flagship joined up with TF-38. At 0050 MAKAU2 claimed sinking a DD in position 26°22'N, 127°38'E. Very little activity during day subsequent to early morning attacks, as bad weather prevailed. FORMOSAN 6650J was active in late afternoon, but planes reported turning around as a result of bad weather. List of frequencies heard during the day: 3320J, 3370M, 3421J, 6470J, 6550J, 6640J, 6650J, 6840J, 6842J, 7035J, 7110J, 7200J.

29 May 1945.

Poor weather again curtailed tactical activity. 6650J heard in late afternoon with one plane that reconnoitered LINGAYEN area. 3320M, 6640J, 7035J were heard, but did not carry any tactical traffic. 7110J, 6855J were used as drill frequencies.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00011

12 June 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week Ending 2 June 1945.

30 May 1945.

FORMOSAN 6650J became active in early morning, and at 0236 W07TU sent a TOTOTO, "All units attack." Early search conducted by KYUSEU planes, using 6842J in an effort to contact TF-38. Negative search reports received from these planes, giving positions 27°N, 131°E and 25°40'N, 128°40'E as end of search sectors between 0800 and 0900.

Reconnaissance of LINGAYEN area was again conducted by FORMOSAN based plane using 6650J.

Two planes heard on 6842J conducting late afternoon search, but no traffic was intercepted.

Movement of aircraft using 7035J within Empire was observed. 3750E was heard with drill traffic. Other frequencies heard during day were 6530J, 6875E, 7175J, 7765J.

31 May 1945.

Weather caused postponement of KIKUSUI #9 operation. Plane YUSIENO was active on 6842J between 1700 and 1730. This plane was very probably a weather plane sent out to locate the "front" to the southward of KYUSHU.

Movements of aircraft from MIHO to MIYAZAKI were noted on 6580 at 1740 and 1750.

Four planes were heard on FORMOSA 6650J in late afternoon, but no evidence of attack was obtained. Activity may have represented movement of FORMOSAN planes into SAKISHIMA GUNTO air base.

Considerable volume of engine trouble and forced landing traffic was intercepted on 6155J, 6740J and 8035J.

1 June 1945.

MISSOURI and other units of TG-38.4 fueled today. TG-38.1 remained in support of force in OKINAWA area.

Seven planes were active on 6650J between midnight and 0700.

Evidence of bad weather in KYUSHU was obtained on both 7035J and 6842J.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00011

12 June 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week Ending 2 June 1945.

1 June 1945 (continued).

6650J was up in early evening. Plane reported weather between GIRAN and KUME SHIMA at 1845. TATOMI3 reported completion of bombing attack at 1943.

KONIYA AB was up on 6842J using call K000. At 1736 he reported weather unfavorable in his area and ordered four planes to return. Collateral indicated an attack by four PAULS staging through KONIYA had been scheduled.

2 June 1945.

TG-38.4 conducted a long range fighter sweep of southern KYUSEU fields this morning. KANOYA set precautionary alert at 0743, and full alert at 0800. A heavy volume of "Grumman" sighting report was intercepted. Full and precautionary alerts were secured at 1035 and 1135 respectively.

Unfavorable weather conditions hampered enemy's operation of aircraft during afternoon. Search for Striking Force by KYUSHU-based aircraft ran into bad weather.

Considerable volume of weather traffic received on 7035J, and also a report to the effect that our attack had destroyed three planes at MIYAZAKI.

2. Information is requested as to what positive action is being taken to supply RI units with RIP 5's when requested.

This unit's RIP 5's are not in sufficiently good condition to be transferred to TG-38.3 unit.

3. To insure receipt of RAGFOR tactical frequency information in sufficient time to be of value to RI units, Urgent precedence must be used for Flash messages, as Operational Priority precedence is entirely too slow. The Flash reports are invaluable to units, and use of the higher precedence is believed to be entirely justifiable.

4. SX-28 receivers continues to be the best search receiver for RI unit work. The RBB and RBC are excellent receivers for fixed frequency coverage, but the RI unit loses flexibility by having the sets in place of SX-28's.

*Smoking 10/12
to 10/12/45*

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00011

12 June 1945.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week Ending 2 June 1945.

Recent damage to carriers, and RI unit shifting at sea required as a result of this damage has again demonstrated the necessity for light-weight equipment that can be easily installed.

5. It is requested that one RBG be sent to the MISSOURI in order to test the set under actual operating conditions.

6. In anticipation of large increase in RI units in the fleet during the next six months, it is recommended that RI unit personnel be granted leave upon the completion of normal tours, and then be returned to a pool at either GUAM or OKINAWA for further assignment to RI units afloat.

G. M. Slonim

G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:

CNO (Op-20-G)
Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon) (2)

*Approved
S. J. ...
FRAPAC 197*

A8-2(R.I.)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

Serial 00015

20 July 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, THIRD Fleet.
 To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
 Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.
 Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret - Ultra Serial 000507 of
 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted.

1 July 1945.

MISSOURI underway at 0700 today from SAN PEDRO BAY, LEYTE anchorage. Today's coverage: KANOYA (MIKA) broadcast, 6650J (FORMOSAN tactical). 7185J (KASUMIGAURA Air Group frequency) also was heard.

2 July 1945.

0700 position was 13°05'N, 129°15'E. Set two-man watch. One position makes complete coverage of KANOYA (MIKA) broadcast. ONE BAKER identifications usually arrive via JUSIT between 1400-1600 ITEM; before that time we usually can identify KANOYA and MIYAKOJIMA by means of stereotyped headings of weather messages. Air freqs active today were 3320J, 5850M, 6570E (KKKN), 6650J, 6842J, 7017M (KKKK), 7035J.

3 July 1945.

0715 posit was 14°35'N, 132°58'E. Have joined TG-38.4. Complete coverage of KANOYA broadcast. Two picket boat frequencies (4593E and 6490J) heard today, using new code. Air freqs heard today were 6650J, 7012M (ETIRUHI and ETIRUWA sent drill grids), 7015E (KKK base working planes), 7035J (three bases with calls U, SU and TU), 7050J (calls 1TE, 1TO and 1SI heard. Air Group Kooshi?), 9045J, 3165J (calls N and SOL working each other) and 7017E (7KOKU and 9HANI using "RA" procedure).

4 July 1945.

1810 posit was 18°00'N, 137°13'E. Possibility that plane 5NN1 sending grid (TOO 1913) may have been in our sector and hence within 100 miles of TG-38.4. Bogey was on screen at the time, but probably was friendly plane with IFF not functioning properly. Message was a weather report.

Sloven File

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00015

20 July 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.

4 July 1945 continued.

Full coverage of KANOYA broadcast. Other frequencies heard were 3421J, 6490J (picket boats), 6650J, 9045J, and 7505J (used by major Empire Comm Units) and 7019M (probably same activity as that heard on 7012M yesterday).

5 July 1945.

Posit at 2000 was 20°44'N, 140°49'E. No contacts on this force today. After covering OMURA's reactions to B-24 strike on KANOYA broadcast, switched to TOKYO broadcast. Air frequencies heard today were: 4017J (one plane up), 6530J (permanent call KAYKA working two planes on Air Group 706 freq), 5972M (unident base working KONIYA), 6580J (2 planes up), 6640J (two planes airborne between OITA and MIHO), 6550J, 8725J; other frequencies covered during day were 6490J (picket boats), 7505J and 7065J.

6 July 1945.

Posit at 0910 was 21°58'N, 143°02'E. No contacts on this force today. Our primary coverage is TOKYO #1 (HITU) broadcast and KISARATSU (MIKO) broadcast. Air frequencies heard today were 6550J (three Air Group 901 bases), 6270J (base SASIØ working five KN planes), 6650J, 7035J, 8025A (ATSUKI working three KNK planes), 8614M (unident TAYANAS working four KN planes), 8725J. Other freqs covered were 6490J (picket boat) and 5100J (MARCUS).

7 July 1945.

Our 0800 posit today was 23°26'N, 146°35'E. Still with TG-38.4 getting ready to refuel then launch first strike on the 10th. Still have two-man watch, will initiate three-man watch tomorrow. Our primary coverage today was TOKYO #1 (HITU) broadcast and the KISARATSU (MIKO) broadcast. 6490J, the picket boat frequency, also was covered. Air freqs heard today were: 5255J, 5972J, 6042M, 6067J, 6270J, 6550J, 6555M, 6580E, 6640J, 6650J, 7035J, 7050J, 7110J, 7720M, 8435J, 8915J and 9045J. No information relative to this force intercepted on air frequencies.

8 July 1945.

Refueled in position 25°20'N, 149°14'E. Many grids were sent throughout the day, but only one, probably in the HOKKAIDO area, was bona fide. Several practice grids were sent over the KANOYA (MIKA) broadcast. Air frequencies heard today were: 3421J, 4017J, 5255A, 6050E, 6470J, 6530J, 6680J, 7035J, 7050J, 8025J and 8435J.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00015

20 July 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.

9 July 1945.

Running on to launching position for TOKYO strike tomorrow morning. Posit at 1500 was 30°13'N, 146°15'E. Covered radar circuits, but no contacts on us were intercepted. No evidence that TF-38 has been spotted. HACHIJOJIMA, MARCUS, and YOKOSUKA area were under full and precautionary alerts throughout the day. 8725J, ordinarily a Trans-Empire transport frequency, today controlled the alerting for the OSAKA district. Cities alerted on 8725 kcs were KYOTO, OSAKA, NARA, HYOOGO, WAKAYAMA, KOCHI, TOKUSHIMA, FUKUI and GIFU.

Primary coverage was TOKYO #1 (HITU) broadcast and KISARATSU (MIKO) broadcast. Picket boat frequency 6490J also was heard. Air freqs heard today were: 4017J, 6130M, 6530J, 6580J, 6740E, 7035J, 7050J and 7110J.

10 July 1945.

TF-38 launched strikes against TOKYO, first launch at 0400 today. MISSOURI's posit at that time was 33°53'N, 142°40'E. There were no contacts of BLUE carrier planes until 0511, when YOKOSUKA assumed precautionary alert. At 0511 the Kantoo Sea Frontier had a full alert, and YOKOSUKA the same at 0517. Radar lookout station circuits were carefully watched, and gave no forewarning of the TOKYO-bound planes. TF-38 did not withdraw from launching area until 1500 today, and shortly after noon a JILL and a FRANCES were splashed while snooping. Either or both of these may have been Army planes NEKUMI and ROWONI which spotted TF-38 and reported same to Base MAETU on 6351 kcs in Army 888 code. No other contacts were heard today. Air Group 903 was up from 0415 to 0506 and from 1332 to 1710, with bases YAMADA, OMINATO, AKKESHI, NOSHIRO, and several other unidentified working NN and NNN search planes. In addition to the TOKYO and KISARATSU broadcasts and the picket boat frequency, the following air frequencies were heard today: 3882M, 5337J, 5960E, 6140M, 6340J, 6371M, 6530J, 6960E, 7035J, 7050J, and 8435J.

11 July 1945.

Today Task Force 38 retired to northeast. Tomorrow we will refuel, then launch strikes HOKKAIDO and northern HONSHU on the 13th. No contacts on our forces were intercepted. A KKK plane on 6351M was searching for us this morning, but did not spot us; he sent 888 readable traffic to his base. OMINATO and TOKYO #1 broadcasts were covered. Air frequencies heard today were: 3881M, 6067J, 6140M, 6312E, 6351M, 6530J, 6550J, 6740J, 6855J, 6955M, 7320E, 9045J.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00015

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~ 20 July 1945.

TOP SECRET - ULTRA

Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.

12 July 1945.

TF-38 today headed north for tomorrow's scheduled strike on northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO. There were no contacts on this force. Our coverage for the day was: OMINATO broadcast, 6490J, 6067J, 6740J, 6855J, 3682M, 6509M, and 6455J.

13 July 1945.

Strike scheduled today for HOKKAIDO was postponed because of bad weather. No contact made on TF-38 by Nip planes. Little activity on Northern HONSHU-HOKKAIDO air freqs today. Pertinent air circuits heard today were: 6067J, 6454M, 6530J and 6740J.

14 July 1945.

TF-38 planes struck North HONSHU and HOKKAIDO early this morning, while TU-34.8.1 shelled the KAMAISHI Steel Works at noon. The strike achieved complete surprise. The first alerting was a precautionary alert of the OMINATO area at 0440, shortly before our planes were over the target. A full alert was ordered for the same area at 0445. Numerous visual contacts of BLUE carrier planes were reported by lookout stations ERIMO, SHIRIYASAKI and SHIRAKAMI. On the picket boat frequency, 6490 kcs, the UNSAN B MARU originated a high priority message at 0515 sent to the Tsugaru Defense Force Comdr. At 0537, Air Group 903 Comdr. ordered search planes to return to base. As for messages pertaining to the KAMAISHI bombardment, four planes were reported over KAMAISHI at 1135, while at 1213 Air Base YAMADA, which is located only 11 miles from KAMAISHI, sent a high priority, SATEKO4 message which doubtless told of the bombardment.

No contact by Jap search planes was heard. Frequencies active today were 3682M, 6067J, 6340J, 6351J, 6454M, 6530J, 6740J and 6855J.

15 July 1945.

For the second consecutive day TF-38 launched carrier strikes on Northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO and BB's MISSOURI, IOWA and WISCONSIN bombarded the steel works at MURORAN, commencing at 0933. The TSUGARU area went under full alert at 0452, just before BLUE planes arrived. Several messages were TSURAd to Air Group 903 All Detachments, but there was no ensuing search activity heard. Frequency coverage today was same as yesterdays. OMINATO worked three planes on 6740J. No planes on other local circuits. The 1-A-2 call KATI 36 was compromised at ANA6

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00015

20 July 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.

15 July 1945 continued.

(CRU DIV 22 Comdr.).

TF-38 withdrew from HOKKAIDO area this evening (after rendezvousing with the above-mentioned BBs) and will refuel tomorrow.

16 July 1945.

Today TF-38 refueled in preparation for tomorrow's activities. Very little activity heard today. Drill was heard on Navy KYUSHU circuits 6530E, and 7322M. A KKK base was sending traffic on 3880E kcs, possibly Air Group TAKUMA. On 7090J, planes 3NO and 3RI, possibly from OITA, sent TOTOTOs (all units attack) at 0840 and 0933 respectively. Considerable ABC-10 888 breakable traffic was sent on 6534M; base KIKAYO was in communication with at least three KKK planes who sent messages such as "Am making long, low-level flight", "Our morale is increasingly higher", "In air over IKUNO, no enemy a/c sighted", "Patrolling in clouds at 1000 meters. Nothing spotted" and "Ganbaru" (a Jap "fight-team-fight" phrase). IKUNO is in the NAGOYA area and the enemy aircraft being searched for might well have been the MUSTANGS which hit the NAGOYA area today.

17 July 1945.

Today TF-38 carried out carrier-plane strike and bombardment of the TOKYO area. No contact on us by Jap planes while early morning carrier strikes were being launched. As usual, Nip reactions were belated. The YOKOSUKA area went under precautionary and full alerts at 0510 and 0522. The Kantoo Sea Frontier full-alerted at 0522 and the San Riku Sea Frontier at 0532.

The bombardment of HITACHI commenced at 2333. One Jap radar station was jammed by our forces when it had a beam on us. We kept close tab on the Point Inuboo Lookout Station, but the only radar reports occurring were contacts on planes. The bombardment was carried out in rainy weather which accounted for the lack of Nip air activity.

Only traffic relevant to today's activity appeared on an Army circuit, 5935M, reporting that the British fleet had commenced operations against HONSHU. At 1647 Air Group 903 search planes (6740 kcs) were warned that "5 enemy aircraft are heading your way." Other Navy frequencies active today were 6454M, 7322J (drill), 6940M (drill) and 6980E. Army air frequencies heard were 6534M, 5935M and 6850E.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00015

20 July 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.

18 July 1945.

Stormy weather curtailed today's carrier strikes on the TOKYO area but our planes did sweep over the KANTOO area shortly after noon. HACHIJOJIMA, KANTOO and YOKOSUKA alerts appeared accordingly. Late in the afternoon our force had some visual bogeys, and one of them may well have been Army plane UROKU which at 1744 reported itself as "over the target" on 6351 kcs, the same frequency on which we were spotted on June 10. This plane landed half an hour later but inasmuch as we were only 100 miles off CHIBA peninsula at the time, the plane could easily have returned to base in 30 minutes. No further air reaction, either patrol or attack, was noted. Only other information of potential interest appeared on Army circuit 5935M where readable traffic revealed planes airborne between HAMAMATSU and KUMAGAYA, probably transports.

19 July 1945.

Today TF-38 withdrew to its refueling rendezvous, scheduled to arrive there (approximately 31°N, 152°E) at 0400 tomorrow. No air activity today. 1 Balloon shot down.

2. During present operations against Empire positions, enemy's lack of reaction has made the RI units chief function one of providing negative information.

3. Intercepted radar traffic is of value to bombardment groups, and an effort should be made to identify calls used on such frequencies as 3635 and 3875 and fix positions by HF/DF. 61

4. FRUPAC serial Z-4514 of 2 July relative to outfitting RI units aboard MIDWAY and F. D. ROOSEVELT should be corrected:

2 RBK receivers are not necessary for RI unit use.

R The RBBs and RBCs should only be installed if it is impossible to get SX-28s, as these receivers are definitely not desirable for RI Unit use.

These ships will very probably be Fleet or Force Flagships and should be outfitted on the basis of at least a type "B" unit being assigned. At least 6 SX-28 (or equivalent) positions should be provided for.

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00015

20 July 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~


Subject: Report of operations for period 1 July to 19 July 1945.

5. Army traffic is becoming progressively more important to RI Units. Every effort should be made to pass whatever information that is available on Japanese Army frequencies, systems and calls to units in JUSIT despatches.

6. No urgent flash reports were received from RAGFOR on 6351 kcs activity. It is requested that active tactical air frequencies whether Army or Navy continue to be made subject of urgent JUSIT despatches.

7. RI Units should receive copies of each time system is reprinted.

8. It appears that voice intercepts may become more important in future operation in Empire waters. Prospective O-in-Cs of units should be given as much training as possible in voice while at station "Able".



G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S.N.

Copy to:

CNO (Op-20-G)

Flt IntelOff PacFlt (Advon) (2)

FILE

A8-2(R.I.)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

Serial 00018

3 August 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, THIRD Fleet.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Period 22 July to 2 August 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPAC & POA Top Secret - Ultra Serial 000507 of
4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted.

22 July 1945.

Task Force 38 is fueling in position well to south of the Empire. No contacts made on this force today as we are beyond patrol radius of Nip search planes. Air activity slight. One Air Group 801 plane airborne between MIHO and OITA, using 7010J kcs. 6853M kcs, an Army air circuit, is used by search-and-attack planes operating from KOREAN base KEIJOO and CHINKAI. Other air frequencies active today were 8125J, and 6351M (Army).

23 July 1945.

Having refueled, TF-38 is now steaming to launching position for tomorrow's strikes on the KURE and KOBE areas. This evening KYUSHU air base IWAKAWA was working SU and SE numeral planes of the FUYOO Air Force; at 2027 plane SU1 was ordered in plain language to "Attack from the South". The other planes are ordered to return to base. We have bogey at this time, but it proves to be a friendly plane. We conclude that FUYOO planes are OKINAWA bound, especially since their signal strength is weaker than their base's.

Among the air frequencies active today was 6325E, on which base SU was working planes E11 and E12. Plain language message associate this air activity with EHIME KEN (Western SHIKOKU) and YAMAGUCHI KEN and TOKUYAMA (Western HONSHU). Other frequencies heard were 5935M (Army), 6067J, 6853M (Army), 6918M, 6930M (drill), 7010J and 7035J.

24 July 1945.

At 0445 today TF-38 launched first strike against KURE, KOBE and SHIKOKU targets. We achieved complete tactical surprise, and the first precautionary alert for the Western Inland Sea was not received until 0532. The KURE area originated a precautionary alert at 0547, and two minutes later ordered a full alert. At 0610 TAKUMA reported "ten small enemy a/c overhead". At 0710 KANOYA (7KOKU) warned OITA (9SOWA) that "Sixteen small enemy a/c are heading northeast over ASHIZURI POINT". At 0740 TAKUMA reported "engaging enemy a/c".

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00018

3 August 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Period 22 July to 2 August 1945.

At 0930 two snoopers, JILLs, were splashed. At this time we had an S-5 plane up on 6140 kcs sending bona fide (JITSU) traffic. Another possibility was plane 3MOYUNO which was conducting KYUSHU search. But both planes were heard later and no grids were sent. First grid is originated by plane 5NN1 at 1505 and contains sighting indicator (TETETE). At 1721 an Army plane (FU2TU7) on 6150M kcs with a very loud signal strength was ordered to "Attack according to plan". Ships went to general quarters on basis of this, and shortly thereafter, a DINAH was splashed by our CAP. Plane FU2TU7 no longer heard. Another Army plane (SUSAMI), on 6755 kcs, reported to his base (FUYAN) at 1910, that it has "carried out OpOrd #3, but failed to find enemy". At 2000 the Air Group TAKUMA frequency (3882E kcs) had one plane airborne. No further air activity for remainder of evening.

Air frequencies active today were: 3421J, 5558M, 5850M, 5935E (Army), 6150M, 6050M, 6340J, 6351M (Army), 6550J, 6595M (Army), 6640J, 6755E (Army), 6845A, 6661M (Army), 6842J, 7010J, 7782M.

25 July 1945.

Strong evidence that KYUSEU search plane 7RUNE3 (on 3421 kcs) was searching for TF-33 from about midnight, since our radar showed bogey whose movements indicated a search plane advancing to a point approximately 100 miles from us then retiring along the same course in the direction of KYUSEU. But this plane sent no sighting grids, and therefore apparently failed to spot us.

For the second consecutive day we sent our carrier planes over KURE and KOBE. KURE ordered a precautionary alert at 0440, but the full alert was not received until 0944. We learned later that bad weather had held up our attacks on KURE for five hours, which explains the time lag between alerts. The usual stream of alerts ensued at MATSUYAMA, TOKUYAMA and the Western INLAND SEA area. At 0825 Army circuit 6661M reported "1000 carrier planes over TOKAI area. No invading planes in KANTOO area." At 1434 the same circuit told of the P-51 strikes on NAGANO.

In mid-afternoon seven planes with S-5 transmissions were heard on 7200M, a circuit said to be the 3rd Air Fleet search-and-attack frequency. At 1743 one of these planes, YAREME3, sent a grid position on TF-33. Very likely he was shot down, as his base called him until 1900 with no success. At 1900 our radar picked up many bogeys coming in from the northeast (KISARATSU?) and two snoopers were splashed by one of our DD pickets. One of them probably was plane KOKANE1 (7200 kcs) who sent a TUTUTU at 1937 after having ordered "All units attack!" at 1927. KOKANE1 was last heard at 1948 and KOKANE3 at 1949.

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Serial 00018

3 August 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Period 22 July to 2 August 1945.

6150M, the Army circuit which figured so prominently yesterday, was again active today, but was chiefly associated with NIIGATA, an air base on the JAPAN SEA. Army circuit 3600M kcs had traffic which links it with offensive search based at MIYAKO in Northern HONSHU. Other air frequencies heard today were: 3882E, 5030M (Army), 5850J, 5935M (Army), 6146M, 6150M (Army), 6340J, 6351M (Army), 6520E (Army), 6661M (Army), 6842J, 6845A, 6917M and 7200J.

26 July 1945.

Air Group 801 planes searching from OITA were heard on 3320 kcs early today, but no contact was made on TF-38, which retired beyond striking range of SHIKOKU and KURE. Search planes reappeared on 7200 kcs today, and one of them sent a grid, which later appeared on the KANOYA (MIKA) broadcast, and on 7010 kcs (FUYOO Air Force frequency). No tactical aftermath, however. Air frequencies heard today were 3320J, 3421J, 5335J, 6150M (Army), 6351M (Army), 6473M, 6527M (Army), 6595M (Army), 6661E (Army), 6640J, 6740J, 6850E (Army), 6955M (Army), 7105A, 7035J and 7200J.

27 July 1945.

Very little tactical air activity and no contacts on us today. One plane, NAYARA, was airborne on Army circuit 6351M this morning; Air Group 801 had planes up on 6640 kcs in the afternoon. Other frequencies heard today were 5337J, 5850J, 6140J, 6145M (Army), 6530J (drill), 6534M (Army), 6550J, 6850M (Army), 6750E (Army), 6864M and 6955M (Army; HAMAMATSU).

28 July 1945.

At 0445 TF-38 launched strikes against KURE and KYUSHU from position 31.30N - 135E. Prior to this time 6155 kcs was active with planes of the FUYOO Air Force. At 0334 plane KE4 sent an attack signal. We have no bogeys and since the Nip planes are making forced landings at KANOYA and KUSHIRA we conclude that they have run into OKINAWA based Blue a/c over KYUSHU. At 0420 one of our DD pickets fired at a bogey and we intercepted on 6155 kcs a plain language message concerning an attack on a "submarine" by plane SE3. Possibility exists that SE3 is one of the FUYOO ZEKES scheduled to search our area at about this time, and may have mistaken the picket for a sub.

We launched our first strike at 0445. KURE precautionary alert intercepted at 0549 and full alert at 0606. Throughout the morning we received numerous contacts, not only on TF-38 planes, but also B-24s and P-38s hitting Southern KYUSHU, and MUSTANGS raiding the TOKYO area. Army air base on

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Serial 00018

3 August 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Period 22 July to 2 August 1945.

6150M kcs sent several pertinent messages today, one of them (from tentative KUMAGAYA to NIIGATA) concerning the sighting of an enemy patrol plane near IOSHIMA south of the KII Peninsula. From this came the deduction that "the enemy striking force has completed its replenishment and will conduct another strike soon. Assume precautionary alert from early morning today the 28th". Later, at 1007, the same originator reported "enemy surface striking force located at 32N - 137E at 0715 today". Apparently this circuit (6150M) is an extensive Army warning net, for at 1010 KUMAGAYA (?) referred to the P-51 raid on TOKYO, saying "100 planes raided IBARAKI, coming in via BOSO POINT." and at 1048 reported P-51 attacks on KASHIMA and KASUMIGAURA.

At 1329 a grid position originated by plane 2NANEFU was intercepted on the KANOYA broadcast. The posit was approximately 31.30N - 132E and not near us. This plane was heard on 5850J kcs a homing frequency. The plane's signal strength was weak. KURE and TOKUYAMA canceled their precautionary alerts at 1510, but resumed full alert status at 1525. Planes RUMATU and NAYARA were airborne using Army circuit 6150M, with S-5 transmissions; however, activity did not concern our forces.

Air frequencies heard today were, 3320J, 3441M, 5337J, 5850J, 5935A (Army), 6145M (Army), 6150A (Army), 6155J, 6351M (Army), 6530J, 6548M (Army), 6580E (Army), 6608M (drill), 6640J, 6650J, 6853M (Army), 6888M, 7010J, 7035J, 7105A, 7200J.

29 July 1945.

TU-34.8.1 bombarded HAMAMATSU commencing at 2300. Air Group 801 search planes working OITA sent grids, which later appeared on the KANOYA broadcast, none of the posits were near our force, and no bogeys appeared on our radar screen. At 1004 KUMAKA (probably KUMAGAYA) on 6150M kcs reported that "Position of enemy striking force at 1630 on the 28th was 31.18N - 133.18E". This information, like much of the other information appearing on this circuit, was erroneous.

As TU-34.8.1 advanced to within bombardment range of HAMAMATSU, we kept close check on the lookout stations and air bases in the vicinity, but no contacts or tactical air activity was noted.

Frequencies heard today were: 3320J, 1J, 4275M, (Army), 6130M (Army), 6150A (Army), 6351M (Army), 6365E, 6527M (Army), 6620E, 6640J, 6845A, 6919M (drill) and 7391M (Army).

30 July 1945.

TF-38 carrier planes took off at 0430 for TOKYO strikes. YOKOSUKA ordered a precautionary alert at 0549, and a full alert at 0553. TATFYAMA reported

A8-2(R.I.)

Serial 00018

3 August 1945.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Period 22 July to 2 August 1945.

enemy a/c overhead at 0530. Army frequency 6351M kcs had plane RIHAME, airborne in TOKYO area. This plane was warned of carrier planes over CHIBA Peninsula. At 1445 another plane on the same circuit was warned of carrier planes dive-bombing HACHIJOJIMA. Following reports concerning raids at SHIZUOKA and MITO were intercepted and at 1625 the plane reported that he was landing at UTSUNOMIYA. In the late afternoon we heard planes on 7200J kcs, and at 1845 TF-37 splashed a DINAH snoop. No evidence linking these two events appeared. YOKOSUKA secured from full and precautionary alerts at 2104 and 2109 respectively. Later in the evening two Army planes, on circuit compromised as 6695J while attempting to land, sent frantic plain language requests for directions, flares and bonfires. At 2315 DesRon 25 carried out an anti-shipping and bombardment mission in SURUGA WAN but aside from YOKOSUKA full alert at 2333 no reaction was noted, TF-33 retired southward to fueling rendezvous (28N - 138E).

Frequencies heard today were: 3290J, 3600J, 3922M (Army), 5935J (Army), 6060M, 6130M (Army), 6351M (Army), 6450M (Army), 6525E (Army), 6530J, 6537M (Army), 6550J, 6580M (Army), 6661E (Army), 6695M (Army), 6740J, 6853J (Army), 7035J, 7200J, and 7391M (Army).

31 July 1945.

Little air activity today. 6351M kcs, an Army circuit, had one plane airborne over YOKOSHIBA (CHIBA Peninsula). Plane NONTU was searching on Army circuit 6450M kcs. Other air frequencies heard today were: 3320J, 3515M (Army), 3922M (Army), 5935J (Army), 6844M (Army), 6351M (Army), 6450E (Army), 6525E (Army), 6530J, 6550J, 6530J, 6640J, 6650J, 6695J (Army), 6740J, 7010J and 7035J.

1 August 1945.

As a result of a typhoon, air activity practically nil. Air frequencies heard today were: 5995J, 6078M (drill, Army?), 6140M, 6150A (KXK and KXKN calls), 6150M (Army), 6640J, 6695J (Army), 6852M (Army), 6865J, 6885J, 7010J, 7015E, 7035J and 7200J.

Respectfully,

G. M. Slonim
G. M. SLONIM,
Commander, U.S.N.

Copy to:

CNO (OP-20-G).
FltIntelOf, PacFlt, (2).

291

Route

File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISER DIVISION ONE

Flagship of the Commander

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 June 1945

From: Radio Intelligence Officer, ComNorPac
To: OinC, Fleet Radio Units
Subject: R. I. Activity, Northern Pacific,
2-12 June, 1945

1. Preliminary: On 2 June ComNorPac R. I. Unit reported to Commander, Task Force 92, aboard the Richmond, and left Adak the following morning. A four-section watch was established in Radio III, until the Task Force sortied from Attu on 7 June, 1445 (W); at that time equipment was set up in the Admiral's Cabin and a two-section watch was begun.

2. Mission of the Task Force: Sweep for Japanese shipping in the Okhotsk and/or the area east of the Kuriles, and bombardment of Matsuwa. The initial bombardment, scheduled for 9 June, was postponed because of information that a convoy was expected within our section of operations. A sweep was conducted off Matsuwa in the Pacific; two operational despatches from C. D. V. #49, escort of the convoy, were intercepted, and a sizeable file of operational traffic sent by unidentified ships was collected; but the enemy convoy was not discovered.

Bombardment of installations on Matsuwa was made on 10 June. Immediately following this, the Task Force made a feint of withdrawal toward Attu, but shortly returned under cover of darkness, entering the Okhotsk by way of Mushiru Strait, and conducting a shipping sweep in the Matsuwa Area, without results. On 11 June Matsuwa was again bombarded, and the Task Force returned to Attu. R. I. operations continued until we were safely beyond the range of enemy aircraft.

3. Summary of R. I. Activity: Japanese radio traffic indicates that Task Force 92 was undetected during the sweep of 9-10 June; Bombardment #1 on 10 June was a complete surprise. It is indicated, moreover, that the Okhotsk sweep of 11 June was likewise undetected, and Bombardment #2 on 11 June culminated as a further surprise. On both

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occasions Matsuwa radio was idle until attack actually began.

Enemy radar was trained on the Task Force for some minutes during both approaches to the target, but radar reports flashed out to the Warning Circuit were few and late.

Matsuwa's pattern of reaction to bombardment was evident upon comparison of traffic resulting from Bombardment #1 and Bombardment #2. It is this:

- a. Draft a message as soon as firing begins. (Delay in broadcasting necessitated by drafting-time, or for other reasons).
- b. Draft another message as soon as firing ceases. (Delay for same reasons).
- c. After a lapse of about thirty minutes, send out report of enemy's withdrawal, perhaps estimating his course.

A comparison of traffic resulting from the two bombardments can be made from the following logs:

Bombardment # 1

<u>TOO</u>	<u>TOI</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addee</u>	<u>Prob. Subj.</u>
102350 (W)	11 0033	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Under naval bombardment
11020	0042	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Bombardment ceased
110055	0105	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Amplifying report

Bombardment # 2

112345 (W)	112355	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Naval bomb.
120005	120027	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Bomb. ceased
0044	0105	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Amplifying

4. Conclusion: The comparative apathy of Japanese radio in the Kuriles reflects the unwariness of the area, and suggests that Task Force 92 should be able to move with more audacity than has heretofore been deemed feasible.

Respectfully submitted, 293
Stephen L. Mooney
Stephen L. Mooney

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISER DIVISION ONE

Flagship of the Commander

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

27 June 1945

From: OinC, R. I. Unit, ComNorPacFor.
To : OinC, Fleet Radio Units
Subject: ComNorPac R. I. Unit, Operations,
June 22-27 (I) - (All times Item,
unless otherwise indicated)

1. PRELIMINARY: Task Force 92, after completion of operations in the Kuriles-Okhotsk Area in early June, stood in at Attu until 22 June. ComNorPac R. I. Unit remained aboard the Richmond, operating on a four-section watch until the 22nd, when the Task Force sortied again for the Okhotsk, and the R. I. Unit set up a two-section watch.

2. MISSION: Two-day shipping sweep in the Northern Okhotsk, to be followed by simultaneous bombardments of Kurabu Zaki and Suribachi (Paramushiro). This plan, however, was modified on 24 June because of ComNorPac's message: "Evidence that ships left Kashiwabara today going south." The Task Force immediately separated into two groups, the Trenton and two destroyers patrolling off Shasukotan in the Pacific, the Richmond with the rest of the force patrolling inside the Okhotsk off Shasukotan and southward. The two Task Groups arranged to rendezvous outside the Kuriles chain at 26-0400, and to complete operations with the bombardment originally scheduled. The bombardment was subsequently canceled altogether.

3. WEATHER: Low overcasts, fog, storm in Okhotsk, 22-27 June.

4. ACTION: Since no contacts with enemy shipping developed during the patrol of either Task Group, the Richmond and her ships prepared to rejoin the Trenton early on the 26th as scheduled.

At 26-0045, as the Richmond group was approaching Shasukotan Strait bearing east, flashing light signals from Japanese ships were spotted, and soon afterward five surface targets were picked up by radar. These targets were immediately attacked.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

5. RESULTS:

Sunk: 1 2,000-ton AK
1 SC
1 large tug

Probably sunk: 1 vessel, tonnage
undetermined

Damaged: 1 small vessel (perhaps
sank later)

6. R. I. ACTIVITY DURING ATTACK: There was no indication from Japanese naval communications that Task Force 92 was detected during the patrol period, or preceding attack on the five enemy ships. Flashing-light signals, copied by a ship's signalman, show, however, that the enemy had detected us first; these are reproduced below, as copied:

(a):	-.-- .-	KE I	Alert signal
(b):	..--..... (plus two characters missed)	TO" I ? TO" TA ? TO" YO ?	
(c):-	RATA ? HETI ?	??
(d):	-...- -...-	SARU	Withdraw?
(e):	----	KO	Attack signal?
(f):	Series of Ø's	(Probably KO repeated)	
(g):	(Probably HE repeated?)	
(h): -...-	27Ø	Richmond's bearing from Jap'se ships

All of these were repeated numerous times; signal (a) was definitely flashed first, but the signalman was not sure of the order of the others. Bearing 27Ø has been established as correct, the one certain indication that they detected us first.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

occasions Matsuwa radio was idle until attack actually began.

Enemy radar was trained on the Task Force for some minutes during both approaches to the target, but radar reports flashed out to the Warning Circuit were few and late.

Matsuwa's pattern of reaction to bombardment was evident upon comparison of traffic resulting from Bombardment #1 and Bombardment #2. It is this:

- a. Draft a message as soon as firing begins. (Delay in broadcasting necessitated by drafting-time, or for other reasons).
- b. Draft another message as soon as firing ceases. (Delay for same reasons).
- c. After a lapse of about thirty minutes, send out report of enemy's withdrawal, perhaps estimating his course.

A comparison of traffic resulting from the two bombardments can be made from the following logs:

Bombardment # 1

<u>TOO</u>	<u>TOI</u>	<u>Originator</u>	<u>Addee</u>	<u>Prob. Subj.</u>
102350 (W)	11 0033	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Under naval bombardment
11020	0042	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Bombardment ceased
110055	0105	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Amplifying report

Bombardment # 2

112345 (W)	112355	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Naval bomb.
120005	120027	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Bomb. ceased
0044	0105	A. B. Matsuwa	Warn. Ckt.	Amplifying

4. Conclusion: The comparative apathy of Japanese radio in the Kuriles reflects the unwariness of the area, and suggests that Task Force 92 should be able to move with more audacity than has heretofore been deemed feasible.

Respectfully submitted, 293
Stephen L. Mooney
Stephen L. Mooney

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISER DIVISION ONE

Flagship of the Commander

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

27 June 1945

From: OinC, R. I. Unit, ComNorPacFor.
To : OinC, Fleet Radio Units
Subject: ComNorPac R. I. Unit, Operations,
June 22-27 (I) - (All times Item,
unless otherwise indicated)

1. PRELIMINARY: Task Force 92, after completion of operations in the Kuriles-Okhotsk Area in early June, stood in at Attu until 22 June. ComNorPac R. I. Unit remained aboard the Richmond, operating on a four-section watch until the 22nd, when the Task Force sortied again for the Okhotsk, and the R. I. Unit set up a two-section watch.

2. MISSION: Two-day shipping sweep in the Northern Okhotsk, to be followed by simultaneous bombardments of Kurabu Zaki and Suribachi (Paramushiro). This plan, however, was modified on 24 June because of ComNorPac's message: "Evidence that ships left Kashiwabara today going south." The Task Force immediately separated into two groups, the Trenton and two destroyers patrolling off Shasukotan in the Pacific, the Richmond with the rest of the force patrolling inside the Okhotsk off Shasukotan and southward. The two Task Groups arranged to rendezvous outside the Kuriles chain at 26-0400, and to complete operations with the bombardment originally scheduled. The bombardment was subsequently canceled altogether.

3. WEATHER: Low overcasts, fog, storm in Okhotsk, 22-27 June.

4. ACTION: Since no contacts with enemy shipping developed during the patrol of either Task Group, the Richmond and her ships prepared to rejoin the Trenton early on the 26th as scheduled.

At 26-0045, as the Richmond group was approaching Shasukotan Strait bearing east, flashing light signals from Japanese ships were spotted, and soon afterward five surface targets were picked up by radar. These targets were immediately attacked.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

5. RESULTS:

Sunk: 1 2,000-ton AK
1 SC
1 large tug

Probably sunk: 1 vessel, tonnage
undetermined

Damaged: 1 small vessel (perhaps
sank later)

6. R. I. ACTIVITY DURING ATTACK: There was no indication from Japanese naval communications that Task Force 92 was detected during the patrol period, or preceding attack on the five enemy ships. Flashing-light signals, copied by a ship's signalman, show, however, that the enemy had detected us first; these are reproduced below, as copied:

- | | | | |
|------|--|----------------------------|---|
| (a): | -- -- .- | KE I | Alert signal |
| (b): | ..--..... (plus
two characters
missed) | TO"I ?
TO"TA?
TO"YO? | |
| (c): |- | RATA?
HETI? | ?? |
| (d): | -.-. -.-. | SARU | Withdraw? |
| (e): | ---- | KO | Attack signal? |
| (f): | Series of Ø's | (Probably KO repeated) | |
| (g): | | (Probably HE repeated?) | |
| (h): | | 27Ø | Richmond's bearing
from Jap'se ships |

All of these were repeated numerous times; signal (a) was definitely flashed first, but the signalman was not sure of the order of the others. Bearing 27Ø has been established as correct, the one certain indication that they detected us first.

Ship frequencies (covering LF and HF) were guarded during the attack, and following, but no traffic was intercepted, except for one fragment on 5055J, ineptly keyed and left suddenly unfinished midway in the heading; it was addressed to Base Force Kuriles, Commander, and the "TI" (action adee) was repeated four times. This appears to have the characteristics of a ship in distress at the moment before annihilation.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

7. OTHER R. I. ACTIVITY: Beginning with a message timed 241315, originated by A. B. Paramushiro Area (tentative Suribachi), addressed to A. B. #1 Shimushu, a two-day stream of aviation traffic. and aviation weather was exchanged between the two bases. This represented a persistent attempt by Paramushiro to find suitable weather for flying planes to Shimushu. In view of the urgency of the traffic involved, it is suggested that planes are to be shifted to the Kataoka Area to replace losses suffered from recent Blue air strikes.

8. TENTATIVE IDENTIS: The following tentative Ko-Fu 1 identis were made:

§ NO RU MI: A. B. #1 Shimushu
NA KI 891: A. B. Paramushiro (Suribachi?)
TO NA 603: A. B. Paramushiro (Suribachi?)
TO NA 721: A. B. Matsuwa

9. CONCLUSION: The R. I. Unit has been aboard the Richmond throughout May and June, except for a week at the end of May, spent at Adak. A new team of four radiomen is selected from Station AX each time we return to Adak; there have been two teams so far, one for May, another for June. It is necessary to instruct them in shipboard routines and in intercept procedures best suited for the Task Force. It seems inevitable that one or two operators will be regularly seasick because they are not mentally adjusted to operating at sea, a problem that will undoubtedly be encountered with each new team. By keeping the operators not affected by seasickness on watch during critical periods, in addition to their regular watches, the hazard of inefficient copying is largely eliminated.

It now appears that T. F. 92 will conduct frequent shipping patrols and sweeps in the Okhotsk throughout the summer and fall, extending operations as far south as Shimushiro. Since I relieved Lt. Robinson on 17 April (W), the R. I. Unit has participated in the following operations:

1. May 13-20 (W) Patrol in Okhotsk and bombardment of Suribachi
2. June 2-12 (W) Patrol in Okhotsk and two bombardments of Matsuwa
3. June 21-26 (W) Patrol in Okhotsk and attack on Jap'se ships

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~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Relations with personnel of the Richmond are smooth and pleasant; this, with the fact that Admiral Brown has implicit faith in radio intelligence, makes the work rewarding, and compensates for inadequate quarters and frequently crowded operating space.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen L. Mooney

Stephen L. Mooney

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISER DIVISION ONE

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Flagship of the Commander

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

22 July 1945

From : OinC, ComNorPac R. I. Unit
To : OinC; Fleet Radio Units
Subject: ComNorPac R. I. Unit Operations,
14-23 July 1945 (All Times Item)

1. Preliminary: Task Force 92 sortied from Attu on 14 July to make a shipping sweep inside and outside the Kuriles Chain, to extend roughly as far south as Northern Uruppu, and to be terminated by a bombardment of installations at Suribachi Wan, Paramushiro, if feasible.

2. Shipping Sweep (14-19 July): During the approach of the Task Force to the Kuriles, and while the sweep was conducted inside and outside the chain, there was no indication of detection by the enemy. The shipping sweep revealed no targets.

3. Enemy Aircraft (20 July): Some hours after an advance warning by the R. I. Unit, the Task Force was sighted by an enemy plane inside the Okhotsk south of Matsuwa, while we were conducting a daylight sweep. The plane shortly retired without attacking. The Task Force immediately set course for the Pacific; weather messages sent from Matsuwa to Shimushu indicated that more planes were likely to follow from the Shimushu Area. As the Task Force was passing through Mushiru Strait, five enemy planes were sighted, and the Anderson opened fire on them. They ultimately withdrew.

Reports believed to have been originated by these planes were re-broadcast by Shimushu. The planes were not heard transmitting, although a constant search by two operators was maintained for a considerable time.

The Task Force proceeded east without further delay, but, once in the Pacific, doubled back toward the Kuriles to be at Paramushiro for a bombardment of Suribachi late on the 22nd.

4. Bombardment: The approach of the Task force to the target was apparently unsuspected, the first

Morgan file

TOP-SECRET-ULTRA

TOP-SECRET-ULTRA

reaction from Paramushiro being an operational message drafted five minutes after firing commenced. Targets were the canneries and the airstrip. Firing continued for twenty minutes. No enemy retaliation followed.

5. Conclusion: At present, Kuriles aircraft frequencies appear to be largely a matter of mystery. Very little certain information is available at Station AK. Nevertheless, as soon as practicable, AK traffic for the 20th will be examined for aircraft transmissions, to determine what frequencies were used. The following messages, are those believed to have been aircraft reports:

(29 1238 - 5055J
20 1330 -
20 1425 - 8915

// Any data on Kuriles air frequencies which FRUPAC may be able to supply will be much appreciated. |

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen L. Mooney

Stephen L. Mooney

File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISER DIVISION ONE

Flagship of the Commander

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 August 1945

From : OinC, ComNorPac R. I. Unit
To : OinC, Fleet Radio Units
Subject: ComNorPac R. I. Unit Operations, 1-13 August (All times Item)

1. ComNorPac R. I. Unit, aboard the USS Richmond, intercepted Japanese Naval communications during the period 1-13 August. On 9 August the Task Force sortied from Attu for a shipping sweep of the Kuriles Area, to be followed by simultaneous bombardments of Kurabu Zaki, Suribachi, and Matsuwa by three Task Groups.
2. During the shipping sweep, shortly before bombardment time, eleven trawlers and a sub chaser were discovered off Paramushiro and were destroyed. Bombardments followed immediately, as scheduled.
3. There was no indication that the Task Force was sighted during the shipping sweep, and it was not until midway through the encounter with Japanese small craft that Paramushiro was alerted to the presence of Blue Naval forces.
4. The return trip to Attu was quiet except for the appearance of Paramushiro-based planes which came out in daylight several hours after the bombardments. These were followed by others, as predicted by the R. I. Unit, but they did not appear on the radar screen; Japanese airborne radar, however, was picked by the the RCM Unit, corroborating the information supplied by radio intelligence.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen F. Mooney
Stephen L. Mooney

GM
9/10

AP-213

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 September 1945

From : R. I. Officer, ComNorPacFor
To : OinC, Fleet Radio Units
Subject: NorPac R. I. Situation

1. Lt. (jg) Edward H. Hobbs reported to ComNorPac at Adak on 22 August 1945. Soon after his arrival, ComNorPac stated that two complete R. I. Units would be required for the occupation of Northern Japan; arrangements were therefore made for an R. I. Unit to go with ComCruDiv 1 on the RICHMOND, and another with ComNorPac on the PANAMINT. With the permission of Op-20-G twelve operators for the two units were transferred to NorPac from Station AX.

2. When ComCruDiv 1 was ordered to return to the States, the RICHMOND unit was transferred to the PANAMINT and absorbed into the unit already aboard.

3. ComNorPac is awaiting instructions from Op-20-G concerning the disposition of eleven radio-men and one Chief Radioman of the R. I. Unit, and other instructions from FruPac concerning the two R. I. Officers now assigned to ComNorPac.

4. There is nothing of significance to report concerning R. I. work in the occupation of Northern Japan. Most of the traffic has been in plain language; a few messages have contributed creatively to ComNorPac intelligence. The tactical job seems to be finished in this area.

5. Publications received from FruPac will be returned by officer messenger.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen L. Mooney

Stephen L. Mooney

FB2-2

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 September 1945

From: Cinc RIU #7, Com Car Div 2.

To: Cinc Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific,

Subject: Daily summary of activity covering the period from the activation of this unit to its termination; from 19 August 1945 to 8 September 1945.

1. The following is a day by day log of the operation of this unit #7.
2. Logs and traffic have been sent under separate cover to Lt. Commander R. Seeks at Station Able.
3. Upon termination of this activity gear has been sent as per instructions (Frupac 051929) to Guam. Enclosure duplicate of detailed list of disposal of gear.
4. Enclosure of a "when last heard" frequency file, should this be of interest and assistance to either Ragfor or Frupac.

Respectfully,

Lt. (W) A. N. Vardac, USN
~~Cinc~~ RIU #7

*Whose
signature
is
this*

Three copies of Daily Report
Three copies of "when last heard" file.
One Copies of Disposal of Equipment and Pubs

Technical I.
5-41 S4S N COPY FOR
1

302

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

AUGUST 1945

19/1430-21/0300

Reported to Flag aboard Ticonderoga (CV-14) late afternoon of 18 August 1945. Spent our first night getting set up and testing equipment. Began operation 19/1430. Five receivers operative. Activity on possible tactical frequencies was absent. Consequently work here has developed along three lines, viz. (1) Guard of broadcast frequencies for any tip-off of reverse in policy prior to final signing of surrender. (2) Continuous search for snoopers or recalcitrant suiciders "hopped" in defiance of Emperors's surrender orders. and (3) Observation of base-base frequencies for any indication of movements which might suggest an organized offensive action. Results in these three directions, although showing evidence of some airborne activity in Southern Empire, have been negative.

21/0800-22/0900

Continuing along three point method begun in first day's operation. Actual frequencies heard included 7105J, 6363M, 6140J, 7035J, 6082J, 6345J, 5485J, 6260M, 9045J, 6490J, 6450J, 7135J, 6765J, 6927J, 7045J, 6702M, 6641M, 6550J, 6097M, 7799M, 5560M, 5336M, 7118M, 5973M, 5632J, 3952J, 4475J, 6287M, 3865J, 5337J, 6079M. Message in Army gave some indication that preparations being made for carrying out surrender. This circuit showed what appeared to be a lookout for occupation convoys. One plane of 98 FR airborne. AG 903 Commander and Bases appeared throughout the day as well as AG 901. AG 901 showed one plane up at midnight, but soon disappeared. Lookouts Circuits maintaining contact inter-station-purely academic. Seems to be some repeat transmissions of back administrative traffic clearing up old logs on the base-base AG circuits. Results, then, in the three chosen directions were again negative. Hope this keeps up. No tip-off in broadcasts that it should not.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

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22/0800 - 23/0800

Activity continues along lines suggested above. Broadcasts on the military freq's, now broadcasting in plain language, defining surrender methods. Unidentified unit of AG903 reported sighting four enemy planes and receiving attack at 44-46N:141-12E. His report came at 1336 addressed to Commander AG 903. At 1410 NOSHIRO AB reported to same commander departure of plane. This plane apparently flew to YAMADA across northern HONSHU but gave no indication of search or tactical flight. Orange radio growing ever less active.

23/0800 - 24/0800

Results along lines of search outlined above again negative. Continue of surrender broadcasts and necessary instructions. Some evidence that orange has begun mine-sweeping of sea of GELKAI and area NW of SASEBO. AG 706 showed at least five aircraft aloft. Apparently attempt to concentrate at MATSUSHIMA which was impeded by fog. Despite this last minute activity prior to grounding deadline no patrols or tactical missions were observed. A lull in orange air radio impends.

24/0800 - 25/0800

Gained access for the first time today to the dope from Bob Seaks and company. Much help, particularly for background, which to date, has cost us much search time. No search or tactical activity noted prior to 1800 and no airborne activity at all noted after 1800. Orange air radio gently dropping off to sleep amidst much plain language honorific.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

25/0300 - 25/0800

Broadcast and rebroadcast of surrender instructions mostly in plain language and usually quite uninteresting. One typhoon warning. No air-borne activity of any kind noted.

26/0800 - 27/0800

Nothing to report. No air-ground no nothing. Tried some sub freqs as well as sub surrender freqs. Nothing doing. Missed Bob Seaks dope yesterday. Making a general check on all freqs and compiling a "when last heard" file just in case anybody might be interested.

27/0800 - 28/0800

No air-ground activity noted during this period. This area of activity is now at a complete standstill with an occasional weather report filtering in. I suppose you, too, intercepted the urgent request for locations of bulk coal or charcoal by Tokyo Comm. Unit. broadcast to all other CU's. Can't think of another thing to say. Our dial work continues apace with our three section watch just in case something should come up and for the sake of the notions of activity. CAP has a neru cruising within two miles of homeland but he seems as quiet as a little blonde mouse at bay. Northern air bases, CEITOSE, OMIHATO, MATSUSHIMA requested av. weather of KASUMIGAURA for 28/0500-1000. Wonder what they can be thinking of. Will follow up. Wayne Tetric: in gales of glee over promotion to first class. Congrats.

28/0800 - 29/0800

Air-ground activity at a standstill. Maintaining thorough search on air and base-base possible activity as well as check on sub and sub surrender freqs. Nothing noted. Hope it stays this way.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
 CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

29/0800 - 30/0800

Continuing our 24 hour search for any possible air activity during these initial days of occupation. Absolutely nothing airborne by our register. Also checking special assault unit fregs for the possibility of any recalcitrant suicide boaters or such. Possibility that nearby Kyushu coast, once swarming with suicide boat units might flower a few cherry blossoms.

After trying unsuccessfully to put through a transmission date-timed 29/1352, the Commander CHINKAI Def. Force finally got through to CDV #100a despatch stressing the urgency of "terminating armament at sea". He kept sending this message during the afternoon until finally CDV #100, who apparently had been keeping a strict radio silence, replied at 2206: "Would like to be informed as to the manner and the method of the boat business referred to in your ambiguous 29/1300 despatch." Commander CHINKAI Def. Force transmitted his original 1352 despatch again at this time stressing the urgency of "terminating armament at sea". At that time a reply from CDV #100 came in uncopyable. At 30/0205 CDV #100 reported a position in response to query from CHINKAI. Again this was uncopyable. The ship was last heard at 30/0403. Com CarDiv 2 originated despatch to Com Third Fleet for action that a CDV #100 was cruising apparently armed and unaware of surrender requirements in vicinity of CHINKAI.

30/0800 - 31/0800

Jap air circuits complete blackout. Had a "yufu -yufu" from I-401 to CINC 6 Fleet at 1450 and 1452. Nothing further. Nothing on CDV #100.

31/0800 - 1/0800

In the face of the recalcitrant flick-flick on Bichelberger's Atsugi run and the obstreperous suicide craft of Hongkong we continue our 24 hour vigilance. Jap air seems to be toing the mark. We have absolutely nothing to report.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

1/0300 - 2/0300

Even the plain language traffic traffic is on the ebb. We continue our guard and trust the last pre-peace moments will be unmarked by treason in the Jap ranks. Nothing airborne noted during the last twenty-four hours, neither transport, ferry nor snoop.

2/0300 - 3/0300

Nothing doing.

3/0300 - 4/0300

Nothing doing. Nips put out a typhoon warning which we copied, recorded and reported. It agreed with our own reports save as to the possible direction of advance of the present typhoon. Japs had it as possibly NE, while we had it N to NW. Their direction would put us in general line of its advance.

4/0300 - 5/0300

Nothing doing. Going up to TOKYO and still going through the motions.

5/0300 - 6/0300

Sailed into TOKYO BAY couple hours ago at day break. FUJIYAMA impressive. Cannot say as much for the shattered small bay island installations. Keeping up a summary check for airborne activity with nothing doing.

6/0300 - 7/0300

Anchored off YOKOSUKA, carrying on routine activity with nothing to report except the glee of the boys over the possibility of returning to Pearl.

7/0300 - 8/0300

Maintaining skeleton watch. Went aboard SCUTH DAKOTA, visited with COMMANDER SLONIM. He is about to originate action dispatch terminating activities of RIU. His shack has been secured and men off to PEARL. Returned to TICON, crated gear, assembled registered pubs, burned Ragfor stuff, prepared OMI and made final prep for disbanding outfit, sending gear of to GUAMI, the men to PEARL and me on the BEACH. Secured shack at 1200 on 8 September 1945.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

G. N. Vardac, Lt. (jg) USNR
CINC RIU #7

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

RIU 70 FREQUENCY REPORT 19 AUG 1945/1400 - 5 SEPT 1945/1400

I. Frequencies Heard and when last heard prior to
Sept 5 1945/1400.

<u>FREQ</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>
100J	260626
2773M	260052
3012M	250630
3032M	250103
3065J	252304
3256M	250225
3660J	021953
3712M	032220
3725J	040125
3730J (M)	040110
3557J (HATI) B/C	020001
3759M	250647
3855J	250345
3927.5J	272037
3931.5M	040040
3952J	252210
4010M	272212
4015J	041757
4017J	250655
4028M	040715
4185J	032525
4186M	290215
4192J	050300
4335J (UMO) B/C	031845
4330M	051515
4377J	311655
4393M	291805
4325J	050024
4353M	282204
4475J	240805
4593J	250140
4600J	290830
4630J (FUTU) B/C	031645
4640M	310855
4665J	051856
4712M	292118
4715M	271030
4748M	290352
4721M (J)	242250
4750J	041837
4835J	031800
4915J (HOMU) B/C	030740

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
 CARRIER DIVISION TWO

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FREQUENCIES LAST HEARD (CONTINUED).

<u>FREQ</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>
4985J	310329
4987J	241934
5043M	022045
5100J	043040
5225J	022141
5245M	280807
5271M	042221
5295J (UTU) B/C	020400
5325J	241003
5337J	240816
5337.5J	010850
5348M	311010
5345M	300815
5355M	271935
5365A	271655
5393M	032103
5411M	040539
5485J	260415
5517J	041655
5514M	281955
5551M	231455
5587.5M	040455
5600M	281700
5673M	032045
5675M	231959
5700J (OTA) B/C	311043
5715M (UMO) B/C	041510
5716M	290843
5730M (UTU) B/C	040110
5791M	251630
5812M	011635
5817J	301015
5820M	301937 (031314)
5823M	250810
5712J	261310
5720M	281432
5735M	271713
5907M	311130
5943M	251023
5969M	292215
6082J	241631
6122M	311715
6125M	011400
6136M	041707

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
 CARRIER DIVISION TWO

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FREQUENCIES LAST HEARD (CONTINUED).

<u>FREQ</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>
6130M	231435
6140J	041032
6245M	301715
6255J (URI) B/C	251114
6345J (FUSU) B/C	041615
6363J (301500)	240355
6400M	301540
6500M	281603
6505M	290745
6550J	250900
6634M	251105
6650J	241115
6875J	241708
6885J	260736
7115J	251440
7117M	260701
7165J	240945
7170M	251410
7175J	040940
7210J	251507
7235J	250950
7260J	311535
7332.5J (DELETE FROM THIS LIST)	
7371.5M	020850
7375J	021410
7402M	311131
7440M	281145
7460J	250945
7402J	010900
7575J (HOWI) B/C	040401
7675J	041255
7685J (NIA) B/C	020845
7710J	020910
7735M	041510
7795M	021300
7990J	031330
7995M	291336
8550J (HITU) B/C	050300
8400M	311330
8510J (NISA) B/C	010923
8570J	301130
8743J	041111
9045J	040313
9205J (SIO) B/C	010350
9605M	011450
10200J	301217
13375M (S)	281055

FB2-2

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

II. FREQUENCIES HEARD AFTER 19 AUG. 1945/1400.

<u>FREQ</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>
2678J	UNHEARD
3053J	"
3617J	"
3290J	"
3421J	"
3617J	(DELETE THIS FREQ FROM LIST)
3440J	"
3852J	"
4725J	"
5180J	"
5470J	"
5840J	"
5850J	"
5890J	"
5985J	"
5912J	"
5972J	"
5340J	"
6155J	"
6267J	"
6320J	"
6530J	"
6640J	"
6705J	"
6490J	"
6747J	"
6842J	"
6390J	"
6340J	"
6325J	"
6580J	"
6885J	"
6995J	"
6708J	"
6765J	"
6980J	"
6930J	"
6355J	"
7010J	"
7050J	"
7110J	"
7035J	"
7035J	"
7105J	"
7185J	"
7352J	"
7222J	"

FB2-2

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWO

Serial

II. FREQUENCIES UNRECORDED AFTER 19 AUG. 1945/1400.

<u>FREQ</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>
7805J	UNRECORDED
8915J	"
8470J	"
8725J	"

SUBMITTED BY
S. W. Johnson
S. W. JOHNSON, CHIEF, RING,
RIU 78

TENTATIVE

13 February 1945

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
To: Assistant Director on Naval Communications, (Op-20-G).
Subj: R.I. Teams Afloat.
Ref : (a) Op-20-G Serial 590320 of 25 January 1945.
(b) Op-20-G Serial 593920 of 6 February 1945.

1. Receipt of references (a) and (b) is acknowledged.
2. The proposed measures and facilities for R.I. Teams in reference (a) are appreciated. The indicated action prescribed for FRUPAC in reference (a) has been taken. A coordinator of R.I. Teams has been detailed and training of personnel is progressing.
3. Reference (b) requested an expression of policy as to the type and extent of intelligence forwarded to the R.I. teams afloat by FRUPAC. In reply, it is believed that no real problem in this respect arises. CINCPAC or CINCPAC staff has complete and continuous control of the volume of messages, the type and extent of intelligence, and in general all phases of the intelligence information forwarded to the forces afloat both from Guam and Pearl Harbor. Generally speaking, the information forwarded to Task Force R.I. Units by FRUPAC without reference to CINCPAC is confined to the technical level while all intelligence conveyed to the Forces afloat is screened and forwarded by CINCPAC.

J. S. Harper

Yes
yes
GM

Has subject this tentative letter been handled.

JAH. 313

12 March 1945

Memo: GXT

Subj: Recommendations Concerning RIU's.

1. It is recommended that every effort be made to forward all technical info obtained at Station "Able" that will be of value to Task Force Units as expeditiously as possible by means of JUSIT. Hit calls and results of search should be given "special treatment".
2. If yeomen or specialists are available for RIU's, units should be so informed, and requests submitted based on space available aboard various ships.
3. Printed material which is sent to TF units should be well spaced to allow entry of necessary pencil corrections.
4. A system of rotating indicators for JUSIT should be devised in order to facilitate originating of JUSIT despatches by units afloat.

Respectfully,



G. M. SLONIM
Comdr., USN.

File General

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

TOP SECRET ULTRA

22 May 1945

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer-in-Charge, R. I. Unit, Task Force 51.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-20-G).
Subject: Weekly Reports, forwarding of.
Enclosure: (A) Report of Operations for week ending 8 May 1945.
(B) Report of Operations for week ending 15 May 1945.
1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.

A. L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

314A

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Serial: 0001

22 May 1945

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 51.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 8 May 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

This unit reported for duty aboard the USS ELDORADO on 29 April and began operating 2 May. Its mission while at Okinawa will be to produce information about enemy activity directed against the immediate area. Activity directed elsewhere will be of interest only for the potential effect it may be deemed to have on local conditions.

As a general coverage program, two receivers have been placed on continuous guard over 6842J and 6650J, the principal frequencies used in action against this area. A third is set on the Kanoya broadcast, which, because of its catch-all nature often discloses the presence of air activity on unsuspected frequencies, while the fourth is used, when there are enough operators on hand, for general search, although naturally the first two positions also engage in search when the main circuits are inactive. This arrangement, accommodated to existing conditions, has been found the most effective, with our necessarily limited facilities, for covering air activity concerned with this area.

A day-to-day log follows:

2 May 1945

Air activity light on account of poor weather conditions. KKKN planes were heard on 6947J for a short period, but only one despatch, a time-of-departure message, was sent. Weather reports constituted the bulk of traffic, with Oroku one of the principal transmitters on 5255J.

3 May 1945

No air activity observed on Formosa or Kyushu tactical circuits between 0000-0800. A.E. Oroku was noted on 7700M calling the Special Lookout Station on the southern tip of

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~ (

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 8 May 1945.

3 May 1945(continued)

Okinawa, but communication was not established. Shinchiku was in communication with 7 planes in the late afternoon but no action resulted.

4 May 1945

Planes and bases appeared on both 3421J and 6650J at 0200 but Okinawa forces were already alerted and the attack in progress. The times involved make it look as if the arrival of the Kyushu planes was timed to coincide with the completion of activity by the Formosa planes. Then the Kyushu planes were succeeded in the same way by a second wave from Formosa.

Daylight activity on 6650J was concentrated on the Blue striking force south of Miyako Jima.

5 May 1945

Ten to twelve planes worked by Shinchiku and Takao appeared on 6650J at 0056. The "All units attack" order was given by various planes at 0306, 0324, 0342, and 0407, indicating that Formosa-based units may be expected on the scene within 2 to 2½ hours of their first appearance on the air, which is judged to be very shortly after take-off. Three planes appeared on 6842J after 0200, later shifting to the fundamental 3421J, but activity on both frequencies was light.

6 May 1945

3421J became active at 0108 with 4 planes up and stayed alive till 0530. We were alerted at 0215, and it is likely, if previous patterns are to be trusted, that whether they transmitted or not, the planes had been aloft since midnight. Base and planes apparently shifted frequencies on the hour, for they would be heard for a time on 3421, then on 6842, then on 3431 again. It was not merely a case of hearing the harmonic at the same time as the fundamental, since when 6842 was heard, 3421 was silent.

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 8 May 1945.

6 May 1945 (continued)

Fifth Base Air Force frequency 6650J became active at 1421 and remained so throughout the evening. The attack signal was heard at 1930, but apparently Blue forces elsewhere were the objects of the attack as Okinawa did not undergo an alert, and then only a brief one, till 2030.

There were indications that [REDACTED] became effective this date.

7 May 1945

Seven planes using calls of several types — KNKN, KKK, NKK, NKK(N) — came up on 6650J at 0037. Our alert was at 0210 and the planes climaxed their attacks between 0340 and 0420, following each one with a new abbreviated signal HA"SI, which is interpreted as "Bombin completed" (HA"KUKI"KI SIURYOO). — Two bases and one plane were noted on 5140J from 0235 to 0447 but are not believed to have been related to the morning attack.

8 May 1945

All tactical air frequencies remained inactive throughout the day, undoubtedly because of the prevailing bad weather.

A.L. RAEMOVITZ,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt (2)
OP-20-G
SupRad,
OinC, R.I. Unit 5th Flt.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Serial: 0002

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 51.
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 15 May 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

9 May 1945

Two waves of 7 planes each came up on 6650j beginning at 1634. The first used KNK calls exclusively, the second both KNKN and NKKN. Climax of the attack came about 1850 when 3 planes transmitted the "All units attack" signal. Major KYUSHU frequencies were quiet all day.

10 May 1945

First Mobile Base Air Force frequency 3421J was heard at 0035 contacting two groups of planes, but each group used a separate frequency (3320 J or 6842J) to respond. The planes appeared on the radar screen about two hours later, as expected. At 0235 Formosa also sent 3 or 4 planes down which arrived about 0420.

Two bases were heard on 5140J discussing the readability of army type plane calls LUNCNE and YUPARE on circuit KUYC 45 (6580J). The latter was indeed heard on that frequency using army procedure and navy code in communication with a base believed to be MIKAI JMA, as well as with one of the two bases first heard on 5140J. Plane US FE 2, heard on 5140J during the attack on OKINAWA, appeared on 3320J at 0116.

11 May 1945

Ten planes came up on 3421J shortly after midnight, and about 7 to 8 on 6650J at 0055. We were alerted at 0106, but the first "All units attack" signal was heard at 0330. -- Three planes active on 3421J in the early morning hours were heard on 3320J at 0612. Grids and attack signals passed at various times between 0314 and 0523 indicated that a Blue striking force to the east of OKINAWA was under assault at the same time as the island. Activity against it was continued until well into the morning.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Serial:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 15 May 1945

12 May 1945

Formosa frequency 6650J was active all day but by 1715 5 hitherto unobserved KWK planes were noted aloft and the usual warning was passed to Air Support and Staff Duty Officer. The planes eluded radar and came in at 1920, one of them diving into the NEW MEXICO. This unit was ordered to take over guard of circuits for FIFTH Fleet during temporary disablement of the R.I. unit attached thereto.

13 May 1945

KYUSHU activity was concerned entirely with tracking the carrier force. However at 0122, plane KO 2 TE, whose take-off had been announced on 6650J for 0130, was heard on that circuit along with 6 other planes, which climaxed their attack on the OKINAWA area about 0330. --Beginning at 1419 a total of 26 planes came up on 6650J. Their arrival was anticipated and very few got beyond the outer pickets.

14 May 1945

Five planes were spotted on 6650J at 0030, arrived within radar visibility about 0230, and gave attack signals from 0245 to 0304.

From 1653 to 2212 two bases on 6650J were heard inquiring each other's signal strength on KUYO 55, a frequency known to be between 6685 and 6740 kc. Search disclosed bases Tansui and Koniya, using Koo-8 calls on 6715M, to be the bases probably involved.

Bases E and IWA and possible plane NAKIKO 4 were heard working one another on 6155M.

On 3320J two army type calls, MISUKU and RENALC, communicated with planes ROTUC 1, 2 and LESIKA 2, respectively, from 0259 to 0439. The latter was ordered by an unsigned base to return to TAKUMA.

The principal KYUSHU circuit was occupied most of the day with the carrier task force.

15 May 1945

After a report from a scout plane up during the afternoon,

314F

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Serial:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 15 May 1945.

15 May 1945 (continued)

15 planes worked by 4 bases including SHINCHIKU and TAKAO appeared on 6650J, most of them shortly after 1700. Low-flying planes were immediately ordered on patrol near KUME and KERAMA RETTO. Nine of the raiders were shot down, none penetrated, and no GQ was necessary.

Three planes were up on 6842J in the afternoon tracking Blue surface forces around 26:12 N, 125:38 E.

A.I. RABINOVITZ,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt
Op-20-G
SupRad,
OinC, R.I. Unit 5th Flt

314G

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

67492

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

26 May 1945

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 51.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G).

Subject: Weekly report, forwarding of.

Enclosure: (a) Report of Operations for Week ending 22 May 1945.

1. Copy of enclosure (a) is forwarded herewith.

A. L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

314H

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Serial: 0003

26 May 1945

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 51.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 22 May 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top-Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

16 May 1945

Seven planes using KNK calls appeared on 6650J after 0027, and again in the evening 6 planes using KNK, NKKN, and KNKN were heard on the same frequency. Both raids were anticipated.

Eight planes using KKKN calls were discovered on a new frequency, 5848M, being worked by calls MEIRE and TOKESO. Two of the planes, MESUKI 1 and MESUKI 2, were heard on 6842J, suggesting that 5848M has been added as an alternate frequency. These two planes were not keying dual and were the only planes up on 6842J between 0750 and 1323. Five planes were on 3421J from 2243 on, with indications of surface sightings.

17 May 1945

Five planes were up on 6650J between 0016 and 0935, and 3 on 3421J just after midnight. Activity on both circuits was light.

Secured watches at 0935 for transfer to USS ANCON.

18 May 1945

Planes ROTUO 1 and 2 worked by KK call MISUKU on 3320, also by call I00 on 6640 later in the day. New frequency 5848M heard with two NKKN planes, as well as the KKK calls heard on the 16th. Eight planes heard on 3421J during and after night attack. --There was evidence that _____ was in effect.

19 May 1945

Circuits fairly quiet all day because of bad flying weather.

20 May 1945

Activity light on account of bad weather. Base MISUKU passed

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

314 T

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Serial: 0003

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 22 May 1945

20 May 1945 (continued)

KONIYA weather to plane ROTUO 1 on 3320 and both calls were later heard on 6740. --Search planes were up on 6842 in the evening.

21 May 1945

Another rainy day and activity very slow. There were search planes on 3421J and one was heard in the afternoon on 6650J worked by SHINCHIKU.

22 May 1945

Air activity practically nil. For the third straight day
hecklers approached the area without communicating on known
circuits, suggesting one of three possibilities: --absence of
transmitters, maximum observance of radio silence, or use of
phone circuits, perhaps a combination of the last two.

A. L. RABINOVITZ,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt
Op-20-G
SupRad,
OinC, RI Unit 5th Flt.

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~


2 June 1945

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

From: Officer in Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To : Officer in Charge, Supplementary Radio Station,

Enclosures: (A) Report of Operations for week ending 29 May 1945.
(B) Log of Operations for week ending 22 May 1945.

1. One copy of enclosure (A) and (B) forwarded herewith.


A. L. RABINOVITZ,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

Serial: 0004

2 JUN 1945

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 29 May 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

23 May 1945

Search planes tracking task force units heard on 6842J in the afternoon. Otherwise no noteworthy activity until 2318 when submarine type calls were picked up on 2980M. Parties involved were mostly concealed or unidentifiable but one despatch from Air Base Koniya to a WE-WE address went to Okinawa Base Force Cdr. for information.

24 May 1945

Four search planes reported carrier sightings on 6342 in the afternoon. --Movement of White Chrysanthemum trainers to or from Matsuyama observed on 5850M.

Twenty-six attack planes picked up on 3421J beginning at 2042. Most were involved in the attack on Okinawa that followed around midnight, but at least ten, including the earliest, had search duty and others were diverted to the scene of carrier sightings as soon as such reports were received.

25 May 1945

Thirteen planes noted on 6842J shortly after 0800, including four using calls I, YA, RI, and KO instead of the usual KKMM. Many turned back because of bad weather but an "All units attack" signal was heard from plane RI.

Seven suicide planes using single-kana calls were up on 7200J after 0800. Two claimed the need to make a forced landing, drawing an indignant charge of trickery from one of the remaining five.

Serial: 0004

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 29 May 1945

25 May 1945 (continued)

6155J was active in the first three hours of the morning with thirteen KN search planes. Nearly all their traffic was transmitted by Fu-1 call HOSAKO 1. --5850M was up with the same calls used by search planes on 6842 on 24 May. --Six single-kana plane calls were heard on 6740 about 1055.

26 May 1945

Flights of twin-engine bombers from Miyazaki to a rear base were observed on 6580J. --Army plane and base on 7200J used KKK calls. As in similar procedure observed once before, the second kana in such army-used calls is apparently always the same. --KKN planes on 6640J were worked by KKK base calls, which occasionally changed, on the same transmitter, to HA 00 and I 00.

27 May 1945

Base calls SA, I, and TU heard on 6329M. SA sent the other two a long weather forecast and a report of the securing of a western Inland Sea alert.

An army base on 6849 mentioned both 6849 kc. and 6050 kc. in service communications. Four KKK calls of the army type heard 26 May were then discovered using 6050 kc.

3421 J became active at 2005 with the first wave of planes of KINUSUI 8 operation. Three gave ET's at the scene of action. Others came up at 2131 and 2347 to make a total of nineteen. The action itself all took place after midnight.

28 May 1945

Reports of coming into sight of Blue surface craft started arriving at 2337. Thereafter there were several announcements from various planes of dropping of flares and completion of torpedo bombing. Hits on cruisers and a destroyer were claimed by four planes at different grid localities. --Five of the planes used 7035J for homing and one or two identical messages were intercepted on both 3421 and 7035. Others used 6580J and 3320J for homing purposes.

Serial: 0004

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 29 May 1945.

28 May 1945 (continued)

6530J was used by four ENKN planes of Air Group 706 which reported bombing completed a few minutes after 0200.

Two KKN planes heard on 6740J were engaged in torpedo bombing at Kerama Retto.

Three KKN planes were picked up on 6947J at 0321. Their activity could not be determined but it was presumably also related to the attack on Okinawa.

Miyazaki, together with a rear base, either Miho or Yonago, was engaged during the day in directing forward (ZENSHIN) and rear (HITAI) movements of planes between the two bases on 7110J. --On 6530J a Chiran-based army plane heard once before on the same frequency (10 May) was picked up in contact with Kanoya and tentative Kikai Jima. --Search planes on 5850M used KKKK calls, the last kana a numeral substitute.

29 May 1945

Three planes proceeding to Tainan were heard in the early morning on 6650J. In the afternoon a fourth attempted offensive search over the Manila Bay area. --Calls HA ØØ, I ØØ, and KO ØØ used by float planes on 6640/3320 seem fairly definitely to be seaplane bases Hakata, Ibusuki, and Koniya.

Seven planes were noted airborne on 6650J shortly after 2343, announcing their arrival for 0200. All but one, who did not roger for the order belaying the attack, returned because of bad weather. The lone straggler sent an "All units attack" signal at 0236, showing up on the radar screen at the same time.

2. Miscellaneous observations:

(a) Two leaves of notepaper recovered from a crashed plane mention frequencies 7035, 7200, 6320, 12640 (harmonic), the latter used by attack planes, and 316 kc. The phrase "Homing frequency 2 hours after departure" was also observed.

(b) The Japanese version of Aldis (ORIJISU) was discovered in the above-mentioned document as well as in two messages

Serial: 0004

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 29 May 1945.

intercepted on 5550M on 24 May. That Japanese planes and bases use an Aldis signalling device was confirmed by a captured airman, who claimed it was used by trainers only. Aldis lamp signalling between planes is not uncommon. However, in view of the number of suicide planes that have come down without transmitters, perhaps its use may be expected to increase.

(c) Plane calls on 7110J are names of trees (KATU, pine; TAKE, bamboo; UME, plum), just as those on 7035J are those of colors.

(d) The numbers (33) and (34) in the place name system have apparently been assigned to the rear bases prominent in the SAN HIRU-HITAI plane movements. The former is possibly Miho.

A.L. RABINOVITS,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt (2)
Op-20-G
SupRad
CinC, RI Unit, 3rd Flt

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

~~TOP SECRET (ULTRA)~~


11 June 1945.

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer in Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer in Charge, Supplementary Radio Station,

Enclosures: (A) Report of Operations for Week Ending 5 June 1945.
(B) Log of Operations for Week Ending 29 May 1945.

1. One copy of enclosure (A) and one copy of enclosure (B) are forwarded herewith.


A. L. RABINOVITZ,
Lieut.(jg) USNR.

Serial: 0005

11 JUN 1945

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 5 June 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

30 May 1945

No noteworthy activity except for two float plane flights to Koniya on 6640J.

31 May 1945

Seven KNKN planes advanced to Miyazaki from rear base using 6580 kc. -- 6650J used by NKK and KNKN planes on search over Manila area.

1 June 1945

Six KNK planes and three planes using a new KKN call system, apparently effective this date, up on 6650 in the early morning but forced back because of the weather. -- In the evening they tried again but were met at the anticipated time.

Two planes, 3 HISENO and 3 HISERA, using another new type of call --NKKS (S for numeral substitute) --were on a search-attack mission on 5850J and were in contact with Kanoya, Miyazaki, and Matsuyama. Bases used NKK calls.

Koniya ordered the return of four float planes which had set out in the late afternoon, probably for the Okinawa area. This activity was on 6842J.

2 June 1945

Planes with 3HISE(S) calls controlled by base 3 KIRE again up snooping on both 5850 and 6842. Calls of both base and planes are apparently non-changing.

Four planes up on 6650 at 0525 but secured at 0630. They were in contact with Takao and tentative Shinchiku and might have been survivors of the raid of the evening before making
the

Serial: 0005

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 5 June 1945

2 June 1945 (continued)

the last leg of their homeward trip to the former base.

Base 4 KIRU worked three NKKN planes on 6842 after 2315.

3 June 1945

Two NKKS planes used 3370J for a morning attack on Okinawa.

Search planes using \emptyset SETE (S) calls again on 5850 and 6842 in the morning, one of them reporting Blue carriers at 26:37 N, 129:28 E. --Army KKKK plane call also up on 5850.

Unit secured at 1130 and transferred to USS AUBURN.

Base 4 KIRU again observed working \emptyset SUTU-numeral planes on 6842. Latter calls are likewise non-changing.

4 June 1945

Three NKKN planes on their way to Kyushu in the first hour of the morning reported (5317 E) landing at Hachijojima to await securing of Kyushu alert.

One NKKS snoopers was up on 6842 in the afternoon but his activity was cut short by bad weather near Takara Gunto.

Four planes up on 6650J at 1810 or earlier transmitted attack signals at 1929, 1942, and 1946. They were not observed in the immediate vicinity, although one radar picket near Tori Shima reported a single bogey opening at about 2000. --Failure of code to break indicates is in effect.

5 June 1945

Unsigned base on 6842 ordered NKKS snoopers to scout western Tokuno, repeating the order apparently (both messages were NR 1) a few minutes later

Five planes up on 6650J after 1701 arrived late because of the bad weather, climaxing their attacks between 1945 and 2000.

Ten planes started out after 1950 on 3421J but about an hour later seven were heard on homing frequencies 7035 and

Serial: C005

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of operations for Week ending 5 June 1945

5 June 1945 (continued)

3290. None showed up at Okinawa, presumably having been forced back by the foul weather.

Five KKEN planes were engaged on 6580J in flights between Miho and Miyazaki during the late afternoon and evening.

Use of TA 84 confirmed in despatches on 7110J and 7035J. TA 83 will be skipped. ||

R.J. Bruchs, RM 2/c, reported aboard for duty.

A.L. RABINOVITZ,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: FltIntelOff PacFlt (2)
Op-20-G
SupRad
CinC, RI Unit, 3rd Flt

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET (ULTRA)~~ SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

15 June 1945.

From: Officer in Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31. ✓
To: Officer in Charge, Supplementary Radio Station,

Enclosures: (A) Report of Operations for Week Ending 12
June 1945.
(B) Log of Operations for Week Ending 5 June 1945.

1. One copy of Enclosure (A) and Enclosure (B) are enclosed herewith.

A. L. Rabinovitz
A. L. RABINOVITZ
Lt.(jg) USNR.

WSH

15 JUN 1945

Serial: 0006

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 12 June 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

6 June 1945

Activity on 3421, 5850, and 6155 was routine, but 6650, which showed one snooper in the afternoon, came up with six planes shortly before 1800. Four gave a signal, probably signifying securing, one hour after take-off but the remainder proceeded to the Okinawa area as anticipated.

7 June 1945

At 0040 four planes with calls changed since midnight but bearing the same numeral suffixes as the four which had secured on the evening of the 6th, came up on 6650, reaching the Okinawa area as expected. --Later in the day the entire process was repeated from the beginning: A group of four planes came up at 1705 and proceeded to Okinawa. Forty-five minutes after their departure a second group came up but one hour after take-off sent a daily-changing nigoti signal obviously meaning "Am securing" since they were not heard thereafter. The first group reached Okinawa in three hours; the second group was merely making a forward movement, probably to Shinhiku or Giran, to stage for a morning attack, and both probably departed from Takao. Hence the three-hour trip for the first group, and a one-hour one for the second. This may be the pattern of a SAKURA operation.

An afternoon snooper on 6842J spotted a Blue surface force and also transmitted weather to his base, probably giving the green light for the scheduled KIKUSUI operation. Beginning at 2225, thirteen planes were heard on 3421J. They came down in two waves, with several in the earlier one-giving indications of being on carrier search-duty while the Okinawa attackers remained "on call" in case the bigger game should be sighted. The same tactic was observed in the attack of 27-28 May. Planes homed on 3320 and 6580 kc.

Serial: 0006

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 12 June 1945.

8 June 1945

At the expected time, about 0120, four planes were up on 6650 with the midnight change in call but the same numeral suffixes as those which had made the forward movement earlier in the evening. Their arrival within two hours from their forward base was duly anticipated. --In the evening the process started all over again: --six planes in the first group, arriving in the Okinawa area three hours after take-off; five planes in the second group, departing 45 minutes later and landing one hour after take-off.

At 1957 plans calls like those seen in the 7 June attack were heard on 3421, and two hours later one plane on homing frequency 7035J sent a message of the "Attack completed, results unknown" pattern, but none of the planes seems to have put in an appearance in the vicinity of Okinawa. Others of the group were observed homing on 3290J.

R.T. Young, RM 2/o, reported aboard for duty.

9 June 1945

Precisely as yesterday, the forward based planes came up on 6650J at 0115 for their morning sortie against Okinawa. That they were the same planes that had advanced six hours earlier for staging was revealed by a call compromise committed by an operator who started to send his 8 June call but checked himself on realization of his error. As usual, the numeral suffixes remained unchanged over the previous evening. --At 1629 four more planes came up, taking the usual three hours to arrive. The advance group this time consisted of only two planes. They secured an hour after take-off, according to pattern, but failed to take off again the following morning.

One plane, or group of planes, carried out an attack around 0300 using 3370 kc.

Routine search activity took place on 6342 and 6155.

10 June 1945

Four planes were picked up on 3421 after 0130. One

Serial: 0006

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 12 June 1945

10 June 1945 (continued)

of them had been heard momentarily on 6640J before midnight. Messages intercepted after 0130 indicate that they must have taken off for an attack between 2300 and 2330, but there was no external evidence that they were concerned with the Okinawa area.

Routine activity was heard on 6155, 6580, and 7110. On 5850 a plane sent messages in (army) code to base 3 KIRE, tentatively identified as Kasanohara.

11 June 1945

Nothing to report beyond the usual snoop activity on 6842 and 3421, and the usual forward-rear movements involving bases Miho, Miyazaki, and Kanoya on 6580 and 8045.

12 June 1945

No activity during the entire day despite weather conditions which were not distinctly unfavorable.

Note: It has been observed in recent attacks on this area that whenever the planes consist only of VALS, no radio activity is discernible despite the most intensive search. It is possible that transmitters have been stripped from all VALS and installed in newer model planes.

A.L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt (2)
Op-20-G
SupRad
OinC, RI Unit 3rd Flt

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

~~TOP SECRET (ULTRA)~~

21 June 1945.

From: Officer in Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer in Charge, Supplementary Radio Station,

Enclosures: (A) Report of Operations for Week Ending 19
June 1945.
Witnessed by G.D. (B) Log of Operations for Week Ending 12 June
1945.

1. One copy of Enclosure (A) and one copy of
Enclosure (B) are forwarded herewith.

A. L. Rabinovitz
A. L. RABINOVITZ,
Lieut.(jg) USNR.

Serial: 0007

21 JUN 1945

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 19 June 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

13 June 1945

No activity.

14 June 1945

The familiar attack pattern observed last week on the Formosa tactical frequency 6650J was resumed, two planes with single-digit call suffixes coming directly to Okinawa from Takao, six others with two-digit suffixes making a forward flight to Shinchiku. At 2010 an "Attack completed" report was originated by a plane of the first group but he was unobserved in the vicinity.

15 June 1945

The six planes which made the advance flight the evening before did not come up on 6650J after 0100 as expected but instead waited for daylight and returned to Takao. --However in the evening they advanced to Shinchiku again, simultaneously with the group of four single-suffix planes which took off for the direct flight to Okinawa. The latter arrived as anticipated, transmitted attack signals from 1948 to 2002.

16 June 1945

At 0116, usual take-off time for the morning end of the operation, five of the six advance planes, with calls changed but numeral suffixes the same, took off from their northern staging base. One was forced to return early but the others reached here as anticipated at 0320. An attack signal came from one at 0328, but from a second not until 0420, indicating the attackers may have flown around seeking out priority targets.

Serial: 0007

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 19 June 1945.

16 June 1945 (continued)

Two of the four failed to return to their base. --In the evening the process was repeated: four direct flights up after 1741, two advance flights up shortly afterward and landing an hour later. Planes of the first group sent attack signals at 2015 and 2045 respectively. As once or twice before, no bogeys were detected on the radar screen, but the destroyer TWIGG later reported an attack about 2030 by a low-flying plane, and finally at 2059 a single bogey was seen opening to the west. The relations between these times and those sent by the planes is inescapable. It appears that on the few evening occasions when Formosa-based planes have been observed by radio but not by radar their theatre of action has nevertheless been the Okinawa area. As a result, our forces will hereafter be warned to be on the lookout for low-flying planes when word is given by this unit that they may be expected.

Aircraft activity between an unsigned base and five to seven KKKN planes was picked up on 3881M.

17 June 1945

The expected Shinchiku-staged planes, with of course new calls, came up on 6650 an hour earlier than usual, at 0004. One of the bases compromised the call by using the old one and was quickly reminded by a second base of the change. Just two minutes after showing up on the radar screen, one of the two planes sent an attack signal (0254) which was released on the TAWO broadcast a few moments later. He returned home safely at 0611, but the fate of his companion remained uncertain throughout the operation.

A single snoopers was up in the morning from 0705 to about 1321 on 6650J.

At 1750 four planes due to carry out the evening portion of the regular attack pattern were heard on 6650. Three were forced to turn back (one being picked up on homing frequency 6267J) but the fourth sent his attack signal at 2058, just three hours from the time he was first heard and only a few minutes after appearing on the radar screen. Two minutes later six bombs exploded off our starboard side. His attack was reported completed at 2120.

Serial: 0007

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 19 June 1945.

17 June 1945 (continued)

Instead of coming up simultaneously with the first group, this night the two-numeral suffix planes came up at 2213, and instead of landing at Shinchiku, proceeded directly to the Okinawa area. One returned at 0100, but the other, showing on the radar screen at 0125 after his three-hour flight from Takao, sent his attack signal at 0156, his report at 0200, and his ETA at the base at 0435.

Five ~~KKN~~ planes were again heard on 3381M about 2100.

Calls KIRE, KINO (evidently kana plus numeral substitute), and FU (for KIFU ?) were picked up briefly on 6586M. Regular 6580J calls were also heard on this frequency, so that it may actually be the one involved, but the nature of the traffic is unknown.

Three planes worked by Koniya and SA $\phi\phi$ (Sasebo ?) on 5972M.

18 June 1945

A snooper on 6650 was up from 0627 to 1130, then again from 1458 to 1635. Both in the morning and afternoon he spotted Blue surface forces containing carriers and sent weather reports on the vicinity. He appeared briefly on the radar screen but was too high and distant to be chased.

At 1800 three planes of the single suffix variety came up on 6650. One was forced to return, another to land, but the third sent his attack signal at 2035 and his completion report at 2050. Unseen locally by radar, this plane possibly tried to attack the vessels spotted earlier by the day snooper, or more likely just dropped his bombs and went back.

The double-suffix planes came up at 2228, for the second night changing calls at midnight while still aloft, contrary to the usual practice. One was forced to return before midnight.

19 June 1945

The other proceeded to the Okinawa area. A spectacular ^{wow!} example of coordination between R.I. and Air Support was afforded when radar, warned of the possible approach of a plane from the west, picked him up as far out as 145 miles. Contact was then maintained continuously while night fighters were

Serial: 0007

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 19 June 1945.

19 June 1945 (continued)

directed to the target. At 0105 the plane transmitted the attack signal, but at 0121, when one of our night fighters caught up with him 30 miles out and shot him up, he sent confused and frantically repeated "JIBAKU SU" ("Am making suicide bombing attack") signals and then was heard no more. This was probably sent for the edification of the base for there was nothing around to bomb. The plane was identified as a BETTY. --The question whether each call heard on this frequency represents a single plane or a leader in command of one or two others was raised again when radar immediately spotted a second BETTY, also later shot down. It is likely that either may be the case, and that it is impossible to determine which condition prevails during any given flight.

Two snoopers worked by Shinchiku were up during the afternoon sending weather and sighting reports.

At 1749 the usual single-digit suffix calls were heard. Both planes aloft were ordered back to the base however because of foul weather at 2000, and the same cause apparently stymied the morning end of the regular operation for no planes were observed on the circuit for the rest of the night or morning.

6842J became active for the first time since 11 June with a single snooper who sent weather grids from 1635 to 1715.

Army calls HASUO, NANESI, and TANENI on 6850 kc. were heard discussing relative (clearness of communications) on 6850 and 5000 kes. *Signal strength*

KK calls associated with joint army-navy activity on 7110J were heard using 6137M to send army 4-numeral traffic.

Suggested

(11-20 June) values:

I RA (3)
KI NO (3)
KO YU (3)
SE MI (3)
A YA YU
KI HE NE
KU RE YA

TINKOO FURYOO NO TAME
KITOO NI TUKU
KICHAKU YOTEI JIKOKU
KOOGEKI SHUURYOO
22 or 23
ØØ
HIKILAESE

Serial: C007

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week Ending 19 June 1945.

TA TE O 10-50
TU MI TA 18
TU ME NE 30-50

Suggested values:

KE KE MI KU	3-8
MA MA KU YA	03
NE NE NO SA	22
NE NE MI TU	SIKAI
NE NO WA HE	(NO) YOTEI
NO FU FU SU	23
NO YO E MU	SIN
FU YO KA YA	(49), i.e. SHINCHIKU
HO RA NU KA	50 or 55
YO KE RU NI	WARE HIKIKAESU
HI MU (3)	KITOO NI TUKU
MA MU (3)	CHAKU NO YOTEI
ME YA (3)	KICHAKU YOTEI JIKOKU (SIRASE)
MI YO (3)	WARE KOSHOO
MU RO (3)	KOGEKI SHUURYOO
NO TE (3)	KOOKA FUMEI
WI KI (3)	KITOO NI TUKU

A.L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt (2)
Op-20-G
SupRad,
CinC, RI Unit 3rd Flt

70718

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

29 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G).

Subject: Weekly Report, forwarding of.

Enclosure: (A) Report of Operations for Week ending
26 June 1945..

1. Copy of enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

A. L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

333A

Serial: 0008

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

29 June 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit, Task Force 31.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 26 June 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac & POA Top Secret-Ultra Serial 000507
of 4 February 1945.

1. In accordance with paragraph 8(b) of reference (a) the following report is submitted:

20 June 1945

The only tactical frequency active during the day was 6650J (Formosa) on which three planes appeared at 1804. Two turned back but the third sent an attack signal at 2025. At this time the radar screen showed no bogeys, but an ASP pilot reported a plane flying very low over the water at 252 degrees from our position. The plane finally appeared on our screen, opening, at 2040, at which time his "Attack completed" report was originated.

21 June 1945

Two snoopers with calls ending in a numeral substitute sent northern Nansei weather reports in the morning and afternoon. The second was picked up returning on 5850, with the numeral substitute changed to straight numeral.

Advance movements from Miho to Miyazaki by several flights of planes were noted on 6580 in the late afternoon.

Eighteen plane calls heard beginning 2238 on 3421J, the major Sky Air Force tactical channel which had been virtually silent since 11 June, were an indication that KIKUSUI 10 was under way. Several gave ETA's on the scene of action ranging from 0005 to 0025. A second wave must have departed about 2330 for a group of planes transmitted completion reports about 0140. The first wave homed on 3290/6580, the later one on 3320 as well as 7035.

On 6650J three snoopers were active in daylight-to-dusk shifts sending weather for the Sakishima-Kerama area. In the evening two planes came up at 1756. One apparently turned back but an "Attack completed" report came from the second about three hours later. Accumulated evidence indicates that many of the twilight attackers from Formosa, unobserved by radar on the way in but occasionally picked up on the way out, fly in very low to escape radar detection, drop their bombs

Serial: 0008

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 26 June 1945.

21 June 1945 (continued)

in some innocuous place short of the Okinawa perimeter, then swing north and out again toward the base, reporting success of the attack.

Three float planes picked up in the early morning on 5972M returning to their base (possibly Ushine) came up again at 2256, their messages receiving circulation on the Kanoya broadcast.

Lieut. (jg) H.B. Bradford reported aboard for duty.

22 June 1945

Three planes on Air Group 706 frequency 6530J appeared several minutes after midnight worked by unidentified base EHANE and sent attack completion reports at 0200 and 0225. The target of this air group in past KIKUSUI operations has been the airfields on Okinawa.

Two planes alternated in snoop duty on 6650 during the morning and afternoon. --In the evening a group of five planes took to the air about 1758, a second group of three at 1828. Two of the first group sent attack signals at 2002 and 2032, the others having turned back, but again they passed unobserved by radar. A plane of the later wave sent an attack signal at 2158, his presence well confirmed by radar.

Six torpedo bombers using calls of the night before were picked up on 3421J at 2210 and carried out attacks about 2250-2300. All except one were later heard homing, as on the 21st, on 7035J.

Plane 3 MUTOFU worked Kanoya on 5850 and sent ABC-10 (army) messages with an apparently new indicator, 851. Later 3 MUTONO was heard on the same frequency sending traffic

Air frequency 6947 was up with a concealed originator calling SU-plus-numeral calls and using non-aircraft procedure.

New base calls replacing the old A, KA, and SA were heard on 7035. Calls are now SU, TU, and U; or WOKE, SESA, and TUU with Ø suffix for base and numeral suffix for planes.

23 June 1945

The first of two planes heard on 6650J at 1748 turned back,

Serial: 0008

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 26 June 1945.

23 June 1945 (continued)

but the other sent an attack signal (2024) and a completion report (2045), as usual without being observed by radar or likely targets in the area. This behavior was in keeping with that noted in twilight sorties during the past week:-- probable low-altitude approach, dropping of bombs, turning for home, followed by a report to the base.

Later in the night on the same frequency KAKIU 31 was picked up at 2237, KAKIU 12 at 2324, and both changed calls but not numerals at midnight. Allowing for the usual two-and-three-quarter hour interval between time first heard and time of appearance on the radar screen, the first was expected at 0120. He was picked up at 0115, very far out, and tracked in. At 0128 when his position was near that of the picket DD Ingersoll, he sent the signal "See what appears to enemy destroyer" and several minutes later the attack signal. The Ingersoll later reported hearing bomb explosions in its vicinity at 0130. Shortly thereafter the plane was splashed. It was a SALLY. --The second plane then appeared as anticipated, at 0234. His attack signal came at 0245 when the screen showed him over Ie Shima. At the identical time Ie Shima reported having a plane under A-A fire. He escaped however, returning home about 0620. Three bases including, as usual, Shinchiku were involved.

24 June 1945

A Single snoopers was up from dawn till 0900 on 6650J, then, after a rest, again from 1450 to 1650.

In the evening one plane (the one which escaped on the 23rd) made an advance or rear flight, probably between Takao and Shinchiku. --At 1841 a second plane appeared on the circuit. Allowing the regular two-and-three-quarter hour interval, it was expected at 2125, showed up at 2125, and was shot down many miles out at 2142 by waiting night fighters before it could get in close enough to warrant sending an attack signal. It was a BETTY.

25 June 1945

A snoopers from Kyushu turned up in the early morning on 6842J, homed on 5850J. --A Formosa-based snoopers was up on 6650J from 0448 to 0935.

6580J showed five planes making forward movements from

Serial: 0008

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 26 June 1945.

25 June 1945 (continued)

Miho to Miyazaki from 1616 on, suggesting possibility of night attacks from Kyushu.

Two planes were airborne on 6650 at 1807. One turned back because of bad weather, the second later following suit. Voice transmission, incomprehensible because of QRM, also up here about 1830.

Two planes up on 3421J at 2012 gave indications of a possible attack but the circuit suddenly turned silent and remained so until 2227. Ten planes with calls 6 WAFU-numeral, 4 YAYU-numeral, and 5 SEWO-numeral were then heard, 5 SEWO 1 sending grids from 0125 to 0240 in the neighborhood of 28 N, 133 E. This and companion calls were probably Air Group TAKUMA planes on an offensive search mission. None of the other planes sent attack signals or definite action reports. Their calls were familiar, having been observed in actions on 5, 6, 7, and 8 June, when they even used the same frequencies -- 4 YAYU planes on 3290; 6 WAFU planes on 3320 -- for homing. The bulk of the attack was carried out by light float planes of the RUFÉ and PETE type, which, like fighters, probably do not use medium frequency transmitters and were therefore not heard.

On Air Group 706 frequency 6530J four planes came up between 2130 and 2220, but except for one which turned back, were not heard after that hour.

26 June 1945

Secondary frequency 6640J was heard used for the first time for rear base-advance base plane movements. Three planes using HEI Fu-4 calls were heard in contact with OTSU Fu-1 calls for Kanoya, Oita, and Miho. The flight also seems to have followed that course.

A. L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: Flt IntelOff PacFlt (2)
Op-20-G
SupRad,
OinC, RI Unit 3rd Flt.

5462

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

11 SEP 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit 6, SEVENTH Fleet.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Supplementary Radio Station

Subject: Weekly Report, forwarding of.

Enclosure:(A)Report of Operations for Week ending 10 Sept.1945.

1. Copy of Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

A.L. Rabinovitz
A.L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

333 F

AE-2(3)

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

11 SEP 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit 6, SEVENTH Fleet.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of Operations for Week ending 10 Sept. 1945.

1. This unit reported aboard the U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT on 3 September and commenced operations on 8 September after suitable accommodations had been provided.

2. Since regular Japanese air-ground communications ceased on 24 August, the only traffic intercepted has been of a routine administrative nature over principal broadcast circuits, which are more thoroughly covered by Frupac and summarized in its daily despatches to fleet units. Thus the function of the mobile RI unit, which was primarily tactical and local, has ceased to exist. In accordance with Frupac despatch 051929, when the unit is released, all equipment and registered publications will be forwarded to Station Able, and personnel will report to Frupac. All unregistered publications will be destroyed by burning.

3. In conformance with instructions in a recent despatch, the appended table lists service data for personnel of R.I. Unit 6.

A.L. Rabinowitz
A.L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

SERVICE DATA FOR PERSONNEL OF R.I. UNIT# 6.

11 SEP 1945

NAME	AGE (nearest birthday)	MONTHS IN SERVICE	MONTHS OVERSEAS	POINTS (including overseas credit)	DESIRES RELEASE FROM SERVICE
A.L. RABINOVITZ, Lt (JG) USNR	29	33	14	44 1/2	Yes
H.B. BRADFORD, Lt (JG) USNR	24	39	5	32 3/4	Yes
J.W. DEININGER, CRM USN	28	114	17	73	USN
L.A. FATE, RM1c USNR	23	39	9	43 1/4	Yes
T.A. BLAI, RM1c USNR	23	45	10	36 1/2	Yes
H.D. GILLION, RM1c USNR	22	34	24	34	Yes
R.J. YOUNG, RM2c USNR	22	27	16	28 1/2	Yes
R.J. BRUCHS, RM2c USNR	22	32	16	31	Yes

~~TOP SECRET~~

OCT 9 11 45

5545

1 October 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I. Unit 6.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Supplementary Radio Station,

Subject: Equipment and Registered Publications --
forwarding of.

Enclosure: (a) USS ROCKY MOUNT (AGC3) Bill of Lading
#100-45
(b) RPS 1 Transfer Reports

1. In accordance with Frupac despatch 051929
(September), the following items of material and reg-
istered publications have been forwarded to Station ABLE:

(a) Materiel

- ✓ 4 RCF Receivers (#63, 127, 164, 422)
- ✓ 1 RBK Receiver (#182)
- ✓ 1 LM Frequency Meter (#2826--Power unit #761)
- ✓ 1 Wire Recorder (#524)
- ✓ 1 Box auxiliary parts (including one speaker,
one clock #28745E, five
headphone sets, spare tubes)
- ✓ 1 Repair Kit

(b) Registered Publications (sent via Officer Messenger
Mail)

5 RIP-5's (#1660, 1661, 1662, 1663, 1664)
CSP 2613 B (#22)

2. Acknowledgment is requested for receipt of
the registered publications using copy of Enclosure (b).

A. L. Rabinovitz
A.L. RABINOVITZ
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Copy to: FRUPAC

334 B

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

24 September 1945

MEMORANDUM for: Captain Harper

1. I think it advisable to bring you up to date on our situation here as I see it at the present time. As you know, my unit is the only naval intercept unit now functioning in the Empire. The Army may have intercept units here, but I have so far been unable to find anything out about them. I have contacted Captain Smith-Hutton who is Chief of Staff for Rear Admiral Ballentine (the latter is CinCPac Liaison Officer on the Supreme Commander's staff). He informed me that so far there has been no censorship of Japanese naval or military communications. That is, SCAP is not given a copy of any Japanese transmission by the Japanese. Of course, as you know, practically all of the Japanese naval traffic is in plain language. I am intercepting a great deal of it, and Commander FIFTH Fleet considers the information derived from this traffic of importance to him. I submit a daily summary to him of the traffic intercepted, and any message of unusual interest is translated completely. I believe that in about a month's time, when the Empire is entirely occupied, the need for this unit will cease. At least, the Admiral has indicated this to me.

2. There are also some matters concerning my personnel situation that I would like to bring to your attention. Three of my men, including my acting chief, HUFF, need only two or three points before they are eligible for discharge. I have already sent you a report covering the point situation of my unit. In view of the somewhat indefinite future of this unit I think that plans should be initiated by FEUPAC to provide reliefs for these high-pointers. I think a good way to handle the situation would be for you to originate a dispatch to Commander FIFTH Fleet stating that it would be desirable to send reliefs for these men if this unit is not to be disbanded in the near future, and ask for a probable date that this disbandment might take place. My assistant, Lieutenant Ashmead, is doing an excellent job. He has only 44 points and so is not eligible for discharge for some months yet. As for myself, of course I want to get home as soon as possible. Since September 1939 I have spent only ten months in the continental United States and I hope that you will be able to prevent my being assigned any duty that will keep me here in the Empire indefinitely. By that I mean I am willing to stay with the FIFTH Fleet as long as Admiral Spruance stays. However, when he leaves, I intend to make every effort to leave with him.

3. Lieutenant Burd came aboard to see me yesterday. As you know, he, Beath, and Van Campen were put ashore with the other language officers of the THIRD Fleet units when those units were disbanded some time ago. Beath and Van Campen are both eligible for discharge, both having 55 points. Burd has 46 points. All three have been in the Navy since September 1941 and have been in the Pacific since the summer of 1942. Burd and Beath have both had a lot of combat service and Burd has only been home for four months, and Beath

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Memorandum for Captain Harper

24 September 1945

has only had two months in the United States, since arriving in the Pacific in 1942. Although Van Campen has been mostly on duty with FRUPAC and JICPOA at Pearl, he has not been back to the United States at all. These three officers are all specialists in "communication Japanese" and are not especially fitted as general translators or interpreters. In fairness to these officers I strongly recommend that you request CinCPac to make an exception in the case of these officers and that they be allowed to return to the United States at an early date. Burd informs me that the other language officers ashore here have generally little service, and have spent most of the war either in Jicpoa or in Washington.

Very respectfully,

B. T. HOLCOMB, JR.,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Officer in Charge.

In reply address:
OinC, United States Naval
Supplementary Radio Station
Navy Number 928, c/o F. P. O.
San Francisco, California

A6-4(1)/wml
Serial 00001507

UNITED STATES NAVAL
SUPPLEMENTARY RADIO STATION

5 January 1946

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

TOP SECRET ULTRA

From: Officer-in-Charge.
To : Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit,
Navy No. 128.

Subj: RAGFOR Material - Forwarding of.

Encl: (A) Miscellaneous RAGFOR Material.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded, to you for disposal.

W. G. Inman

W. G. INMAN
Acting

84492

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
RADIO UNIT
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
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FIRST ENDORSEMENT to ltr.
A6-4(1)/wml Serial 00001507
dated 5 January 1946.

From: Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Naval Supplementary Radio Activities,
Pacific.
To: Assistant Chief of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).
Subject: RAGFOR Material - Forwarding of.
Enclosures: (A) RIU Afloat Reports.
(B) RIU Afloat Intercept Logs.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded.

Holtwick
J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr.,
Captain, U. S. Navy