

SRH-309

Part 2

PACIFIC OCEAN

MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORTS

1945

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~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

USS ENTERPRISE (CV6)

January 25, 1945

From: CinC Radio Intelligence Unit, ComCarDiv Seven
To: CinC Fleet Radio Unit Pacific
Subject: Report of RI operations for period from December 24, 1944
to January 24, 1945.

1. This report compiled by T. E. Gilmore, Jr., CRM RinC consists of data extracted from the daily logs and the daily written reports to the Admiral compiled by the CinC of the unit.

2. The Radio Intelligence Unit of ComCarDiv Seven consists of the following personnel:

T. E. Gilmore, Jr., CRM USNR
L. H. Lee, CRM USNR
H. E. Fritz, RM2c USN
W. S. Buster, RM2c USNR

Respectfully submitted,



Lt (jg) R. B. Palmer, USNR

U.S.S. Enterprise CV(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

25 January, 1945

December 24, 1944

Reported to Admiral Montgomery(ComCarDiv 3) aboard the U. S. S. Yorktown at 2100. At anchor Ulithi Atoll.

December 25, 1944

Began unpacking equipment. The set-up of the Radio Room as we found was inadequate for our needs. New operating table was planned and specification made. Work request put through for construction of same. Rest of the day taken up with the unpacking of equipment.

December 26, 1944

Continued installing and unpacking of equipment.

December 27, 1944

table
New operating not/completed yet and has slowed us up. Cannot do anything else until it is installed. However we have the RBA and REG in operation.

December 28, 1944

Admiral Montgomery injured himself while coming aboard and was transferred to the U. S. S. Solace for hospitalization. Admiral Radford(ComCarDiv 6) is to relieve Admiral Montgomery. We have heard rumors to the affect that Lt.(jg) Kluss will come over here with his men. We are standing by to go over to the U. S. S. Ticonderoga, but continue to get the Radio Room ready.

December, 29, 1944

Received orders to report aboard the U. S. S. Ticonderoga this morning. All equipment to be left aboard but Registered Publications go with us.

Reported aboard the U. S. S. Ticonderoga at 1200. Lt.(jg) Kluss and his men standing by to go over to the U. S. S. Yorktown.

Radio Room aboard is in partial completion. Very nice arrangement and should prove to be excellent for our operations. Six separate antenna's will be at our disposal when completed.

December 30, 1944

Underway from Ulithi at 0700. Destination is a point approximately 75 Miles off the SouthEast Coast of Formosa.

No Admiral aboard, so this will more or less be a "Dummy Run" for us. We are unable to receive FRUPAC despatches because of this. However, Lt.(jg) Palmer has decided to give the Captain limited information.

Received information that we will eventually be transferred to the U. S. S. Enterprise for duty. Regular watches started at 1130. Two section (2 men each) watches will be regular routine until things get too "hot".

002

December 31, 1944

In full operation. Covering Manila Broadcast. 5135J active with Eases and planes up. Apparently a new frequency was uncovered on 3948M, with Eases and planes active. Area of operation seems to be in the Luzon - Formosa Area. Grids were received from 5135J and 3948M, positions given were on Elue Forces in Central Philippine's. 9045J, 5337J, and 8332J were also active. Manila Broadcast was covered.

January 1, 1945

Call change became effective today. Activity still centered in the Central Philippine's Area. Manila Broadcast was poor today so we covered both Takao and CinC First Air Fleet Broadcasts. Active frequency's covered were 5135J, 3948M, 5337J, 6740J, 8332J, and 9045J.

January 2, 1945

CinC First Air Fleet Broadcast covered throughout the day. Covered 5135J, 3935M(3948M), 5337J, 5715J, 7045J, and 9045J. Several Grids received from 5135J, but all were on Elue Forces in the Central Philippine's.

January 3, 1945

Strike was launched against Formosa and lower portion of Nansei Shota this morning. We slipped in without being seen.

Unable to hear Takao Broadcast so we covered the Sasebo Broadcast. Covered 5337J, 5715J, 7045J, 8332J, and 9045J. Two planes were heard on 6594M and were apparently engaged in a search operation. The two planes were in communication with each other and their signal strength was very strong. Nothing was sighted by them and they were last heard at 1130.

January 4, 1945

Second strike launched against Formosa and southern Nansei Shota this morning.

At 2305 on the 3rd, Air Base Toko was heard to call plane 9HESIMUI on 5715J. However no contact was made. Air Base Toko and 9HESIMUI were heard calling each other on 3935M at 0040, but communication was not established, even though they called each other until 0506. Air Base Toko then attempted to establish communication with 9HESIMUI on 5337J and 8332J. Communication was finally established between the two at 0547 on 8332J and 9HESIMUI cleared 5 messages to Air Base Toko, including one grid giving the position of our force, however the grid was originated at 0130 and at that particular time CIC aboard had picked up a Bogey on the Radar. A poor copy was made on the transmissions of 9HESIMUI on 8332J, due to his very weak signal, but a solid copy was made on the grid when Air Base Toko relayed the message to Sasebo. ten minutes later. The grid subsequently appeared on Sasebo and other major Broadcasts.

Other frequency's heard were 3057J/6115J, 4315J, 44COA, and 7045J. Sasebo Broadcast was covered the whole day. Takao Broadcast unheard.

5 January, 1945

At 0117 this unit was ordered by despatch from Commander 3rd Fleet to be ready for transfer to ComCarDiv 7 aboard the U. S. S. Enterprise by 0600. Men and equipment were ready at specified time but were not transferred until 0900. Transportation to the U. S. S. Enterprise was furnished by a DD. Breeches Buoy was the method of transfer from ship to ship. Came aboard the U. S. S. Enterprise at 1230. Began setting up equipment as soon as possible and were ready for operation at 2200. Ships of the Task Force were fueling during this day.

6 January, 1945

Underway for strike against Luzon Island.

Due to the fact that all the men of this unit had gone without sleep for a considerable length of time, caused by our transfer, watches were not started until 0300.

The most important development today was the sighting of our Task Force by plane SU4NOL at 0509. The position given by the plane was 1827N-12248E, our approximate position at the time. The message was first received at 0750 on 5715J, S11YO passing it to Air Base Tansui. This message (NR1) and the amplifying reports NR2(0530), NR3(0545), and NR4(0600) were given wide distribution over the Major Broadcasts. SU4NOL was not actually heard until 2043 on 3935M.

At 1904 on 5135J a message was intercepted from a plane saying he sighted enemy and was attacking ending with, "Hail to the Emperor, Banzai". Apparently the plane was attempting a suicide attack on Blue Forces in the Central Philippine's.

Frequency's Heard

3935M-Air Bases and Planes
5715J-Air Group 955, Air Base Tansui, Air Base Bako.
5135J-Bases and Planes Philippine's. Very active.
5337J-Air Group 901 and Detachments.
Manila Broadcast.

7 January, 1945

Strike launched against Luzon today. No great reaction seen. One grid was received from 5135J originated by plane 9WAKA5 at 1455. Position given placed sighting at 0210N-13450E, approximately 180 miles North West of Biak - NJ Island. Several other grids were originated by this plane all giving the same position. We were not sighted. 021

Frequency's Heard

5135J-Bases and Planes Philipinnes.
5337J-Air Group 901 Detachments First Escort Fleet CinC.
5715J-Air Bases and Planes.
6740J-Bases and Planes.
7045A-Air Base Bako, Air Group 953 Toko Det., and Planes of Air Group 953.
8332J-Air Group 901 Detachments.
8305J- Bases and Planes.
9045J-Air Bases and Planes
Manila Broadcast.

8 January, 1945

Fueling today, after retiring from Luzon Area during the night. No important developments. Several grids received from 5135J, but all of them were on Blue Forces off Biak Island.-- NC

Lookout Station San Fernando at 2255/7th sighted Blue Forces Southwest from him at a distance of 40 miles. At 2350/7th he again reported a large force moving east.

Frequency's Heard

3935M-Air Group 901-Toko Det.
Air Group 901-Takao Det.
CinC First Escort Fleet.
Unident 3Kana Calls.

Manila Broadcast.

5135J--Planes and Bases

5337J--Air Group 901 Detachments.
Air Base Tansui.
Air Base Bako.
Air Group 953 and Planes.
First Escort Fleet CinC.

6115J--Air Base Kanoya
Air Base Oroku

6920M--Special Air Base Calls.

7045J--Air Base Tansui
Air Group 953
Air Base Bako
Air Group 901 Dets.

9045J--Air Group Station Takao.
Air Base Kanoya.
Air Base Oroku.
Planes of Air Group 1022.
Air Base Suzuka.

8305J--Special Air Base Calls.

9 January, 1945

Strike launched against Formosa and Southern Nansei Shota this morning. As far as we were able to determine the attack came as a complete surprise. Plane 7HESIMJI operating out of Toko was apparently looking for our Task Force but had no luck.

Grids on Blue Forces off Biak Island were again received from 5135J.-- NC
Checking Fleet Frequency's closely but no activity heard.

Frequency's Heard

3740J--Ushima DefFor.

3935A--Planes and Bases

005

Frequencies Heard (cont'd)

4400A-Takao & Luzon Sts Force	5096M-Air Bases Unknown area
5337J-Dets Agrp 901 & Agrp 953	7045A-Dets of Agrp 953
Planes of Agrp 901	8305M-Bases & Planes
Special AB Calls	8332J-Agrps 901 & 953 Dets &
Takao Broadcast.	Planes of Agrp 901

10 January, 1945

Went through Bashi Channel and into South China Sea. Activity quiet today. Plane was shot down over Task Group during early morning, but did not have time to get off a message or signal. No report seen on Blue Forces sighted near Lingayen Gulf yesterday. Seems rather odd as the Nips usually raise quite a howl when any landings are coming off. Blue planes very active over Luzon again today. Orange activity on all Formosa and Philippine circuits very light.

Frequencies Heard

3935A-Planes & Bases (bases using new Otsu Fu3 calls)
5337J-8332J-Agrp 901 Dets.
4400A-Takao GDist Forces
5135J-Airbases & Planes FI Area
6330J-BF 11 Saigon & BF Camrahn Det at Kinon
5804M-CU 31 (Manila) & unident calls: KEHITO6 HETTYO9
7960J-Manila, Legaspi, and Lkt Stations
7212M-Planes & Bases (FI Area ?)
7322M-Agrp Kasumigauru & Planes
7045A-Agrps 953 & 954 - Spec AB Calls (FI Area) & Planes
9045J-Agrp Takao, other bases, and Planes.
Manila & Sasebo Broadcasts (at different times)

11 January, 1945

Received information about our next strike in the Saigon area scheduled for tomorrow. No sightings today but Nips apparently realize we are at loose in the South China Sea, and Java Sea Areas shipping as well as South China Sea shipping has been alerted. This might be due to Blue submarine activity but possibility is doubtful. Singapore was hit with 100 planes. Air traffic was very light. Still nothing more seen of our landings in Luzon near Lingayen on Nips radio circuits.

Frequencies Heard (cont'd)

Same as on 10th except:

7790J-Air Bases & planes, Malay, Singapore, Penang Areas

5510J-Hongkong Local

Singapore Broadcast

January 12, 1945

Strike on French Indo-China launched this morning. Caught them by surprise again. Saigon, Camrahn Bay, Ft. St. Jacques were hit very hard. No air opposition was indicated so far as we were able to determine. Shipping was hit very hard.

Frequencies Heard

6330J-BF 11 Saigon Cmdr
 BF 11 Det. Camrahn
 BF Camrahn, Det. Kinon
 Transport #149 (believed sunk)
 Fr. Indo-China Hq Br Cmdr.
 CDV #27
 Maru Shoowa #5 or #1.
 5337J/8332J-Agrp 901 Dets
 Surescor #1 Cmdr
 Agrp 953 & planes

6225J-KN & KK calls (Empire?)
 7690A-KN & hKN Drill Ckt
 7925J-Agrp 934, Air Base Seo
 4850M-RNO Thailand
 Bansyu Maru #3
 7243M-KK Calls
 5727M-BF 21 Surabaya wrkng
 - KN KKN & Sp SC #104
 5510J-BF Hongkong Area Cmdr
 and unident

January 13, 1945

Operational traffic between Saigon, Sama, Takao, Toko, Laoag, Manila, and Cavite on 5337J/8332J was unusually heavy today. The volume of base to plane traffic was high and repeated requests for weather between Takao and Saigon indicated definite plane activity between these bases. It seems definite that the Nips are aroused because of our presence in the South China Sea. A new frequency of 6535M involving Agrp 901 Toko Det, who seems to be control, working other 901 Dets at Takao, Sama, Bako, Tansui, and Agrp 953. There is no doubt of a large scale search for our Task Force.

Frequencies Heard

3562M-SATEKU4 wrkng Singapore
 5337J-Planes & Bases Agrp 901
 and 953. Also CinG 1st
 Escort Fleet
 6330J-BF 11 St Jacques Det
 BF 11 Camrahn Det
 BF 11 Saigon Cmdr
 BF Camrahn Det Kinon
 Fr. Indo-China Br Hq Cdr

6532M-AB Seaplane huerto Frinassa
 Agrp 955.
 6535M-Agrp 901 Det Toko working 901
 Dets at Takao, Sama, Bako,
 Tansui, and Agrp 953.
 6565A-GDiv Hoihow Cmdr & unident KN
 calls reporting plane sighting
 7790J-Malayan area bases & planes
 9130M-Takao EWA Broadcast, new freq
 probably day of 4570M found
 previously.

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14 January, 1945

We were sighted today at 1520 by a plane (6METO1) operating on 5135J. The position was given at 17:17N 118:58E. There were two other planes engaged in a coordinated search with 6METO1. One of these, 6METO2, sighted us at 1530 giving a position of 17:27N 116:33E. The other, 6METO3, apparently failed to sight the force. Judging from the distance between the two sightings the two planes were operating approximately 180 miles apart.

Operational traffic between the Philippines, Formosa, Hainan, and Saigon continued heavy again today. From traffic it appears that Formosa is or is becoming the major air center for attacks on our forces in the Philippines.

Frequencies Heard

3583M-Agrp 903 Chichijima Det Unidentified SATOSA9	6532M-Agrp 955 AB Seaplane huerto Princesa
3935A-Unidents AUO and HIYOSE	6594M-Unidents SANABI & KA4, possibly same freq prev. reported as 6565A.
5135J-Bases & Planes FI and Formosa areas	7045A-AB Tansui, Tansui plane unit, Agrp 953.
5337J-Agrp 901 & 953 Dets and Planes, CinC 1st Esc Fleet	
6330J-BF Saigon, BF11 Camranh Det.	

15 January, 1945

Strike against Formosa launched this morning. We were sighted again today at 0850 by plane 6MENEL, and at 0910 by plane 9SAR01; both sightings received on 5135J and positions given as 21:42N 119:03E; and 21:42N 117:53E respectively. 6MENEL was called by his base from 0936 on, but was unheard from. Apparently he was shot down by one of our own planes (I hope!). From an A"KA it was definitely proved that some bases on 5135J are in Formosa, and that it was Air Base Tainan who worked both 6MENEL and 9SAR01.

Formosa reacted rather mildly to the strike today. The usual plane sighting reports and air alerts were received. What seems puzzling is the absence of any sort of attack against us. They have known for two days where we are.

Frequencies Heard

5135J-Air Base Tainan & Planes Unidentified bases	5517J-CU 10 Singapore to SATEKO4
5337J-Agrp 901 Dets & Planes 1st Esc Flt CinC	Takao Broadcast

16 January, 1945

Strike against Hongkong area launched this morning. Attack was again a complete surprise as far as we could determine. Hongkong gave up counting attacking planes at 0945 and announced, "Innumerable planes - we are engaging." Air opposition was practically non-existent as far as we could determine.

Operational traffic between Philippine, French Indo-China, and Formosa air bases continues fairly heavy.

C08

Frequencies Heard

5135J-Spec AB calls, Formosa & Philippine Bases, no planes heard.

5337J/8332J-Agrp 901 Dets Formosa, Philippines, South China, and French Indo-China areas, planes

17 January, 1945

Fueling ship today. Nothing of interest occurred as far as we were concerned. Close check kept on fleet frequencies, but nothing heard. New Manila broadcast was checked but very poor reception. Formosa was hit by Army planes.

Frequencies Heard

3562M-Singapore & SATEKO4.

5135J-Planes & Bases Philippines, Formosa area. Search planes quiet.

5337J-Agrp 901 dets French Indo-China, South China, Okinawa, Formosa, Pescadores, Philippines areas. CinC 1st Esc Flt. Planes quiet.

5510J-Hongkong area base force cdr, and BF units.

6535M-AB Seaplane Puerto Princesa, Agrp 955.

6541M-Agrp 901 Dets, Toko, Saigon, Manila, Takao, CinC 1st Esc Fleet. Apparently alt or overload ckt of 5337/8332. Tentative freq designator is E1122 by deduction.

9045J-Bases & Planes. Activity light.

18 January, 1945

Fueling ship again today. There is good evidence of a search being regularly conducted in the Bashi Channel area. Planes apparently based between Toko and Manila. Plane activity was again light.

Frequencies Heard

5135J-Planes & Bases Formosa & Philippines areas

5337J/8332J-Various Agrp 901 Dets, planes, 1st Esc Flt CinC

6542M-Agrp 901 Dets Saigon, Toko

5840J-Manila Rdo, Legaspi Gdiv 35

5996M-NA3 & A2 unidents.

7224M N9 or SOTON9

8460J-Manila Rdo & KEHITO6 Takao & Sasebo Broadcasts

19 January, 1945

Nothing of interest occurred today. Weather is so foul that it seems reasonable to believe that this is cause of light plane activity. New FUJI Broadcast on 8885A was covered during periods when it was copyable.

Frequencies Heard

5337J-Agrp 901 & Dets.

5135J-Planes & Bases Formosa & Philippines area

3935A-Empire Air Bases

6541M-Agrp 901 Dets

20 January, 1945

Air activity was very heavy today. 5135J active with planes engaged in search for our Task Force. One of our own planes shot down a Nip (2REK01) who was last heard at 0921. Flag Flot reported one plane shot down at 0950. 2REK01 was called by bases SO3KU and ~~ME4ME~~ until 1556, but was never again contacted or heard. Two other Nip planes E5N1 and E5N2 contacted our patrols at 1655, but managed to get away. At 1913 plane SO6KE2 sighted our patrol planes. He was last heard at 2028, no evidence to show that he was destroyed. There was no indication to show that our Task Force was actually sighted, and it is likely that only our patrol planes were contacted. The enemy knows approximately where we are ~~are~~.

Plane activity on 5337J was very heavy today. More planes on this circuit than have been observed in the past.

We are to go through the Bashii Channel during early morning of the 21st.

Frequencies Heard

5135J-Planes & Bases in Formosa

5337J-Agrp 901 Dets.

Takao & Sasebo Broadcast. Sasebo reception better in this area.

21 January, 1945

Froceeded through Balintang Channel instead of Bashii Channel during early morning and proceeded to a point approximately 90 miles off SW coast of Formosa where strikes were launched at approximately 0700. Part of the Task Group (night fighters) sent out strikes around 0100 and probably hit the Okayama area as this area was under alert from 0210 to 0300.

Plane OHAAH1 sighted us at 0809 giving position as 22:30N 122:50E, our exact position at the time. Plane SA8HI1 originated what was apparently a garbled grid at 1245 giving our position as 29:42N 122:58E, a little high for our task force. SA8HI1 came up again at 1253 and announced that he was "Attacking". His sending was very poor, and he seemed to be under a nervous strain. From later information we discovered that the USS TICONDEROGA was hit at approximately the time SA8HI1 announced he was attacking. So there is a possibility this was the plane. SA8HI1 was never heard after this, altho his base continued to call him for some time.

Part of our Task Force was under intermittent attack throughout the day.

Frequencies Heard

5135J-Planes & Bases Formosa
7835J-Empire bases & planes

5337J-Agrp 901 Dets.
Sasebo Broadcast

22 January, 1945

The strike launched against Nansei Shoto this morning produced a very mild reaction on the air. Kuchinoerabu Shima radar station reported contacts at 0525 and 0620. Ishigaki reported 6 carrier planes at 0838. Kune Shima reported shipboard type planes at 0910 and 0918, and a radar contact at 1218.

The airbase-plane activity was very heavy on 5135J in the Formosa area. Air Base Shokoazan and Air Base Tainan worked a considerable number of planes. An unidentified base was noted to have worked at least 5 planes. Close liason was observed between these bases in that one base would work a plane for awhile, at which time another would take over. This would tend to strengthen our belief that the major portion of the enemy air strength in the Philippine-Formosa area is operating from Formosan bases. Since CinC 1st Air Fleet is believed to be at Shokoazan Air Base, there is a possibility that all air activity in Formosa is controlled from this base.

Army planes again hit Formosa today. Tainan, Takao, Taito, Okayama, Karenko, and Bako were all under air raid alerts at various times.

Frequencies Heard

4915J-9830J-Sasebo Broadcast	5337J-Air Group 901 Dets & Flanes
5135J-Flanes & Bases (Formosa area)	6125M-Flanes & Bases (Area unknown)
5178M-Flanes & Bases (Drill Ckt)	7936M-N-KKK-N calls with drill traffic (KUN)
5227M-KK & KN calls	
5335M-Flanes & Bases (Area unknown)	

23 January, 1945

Retired from the Nansei Shoto area and are refueling today. Air activity continues heavy on 5135J, with planes heard working out of Tainan, Takao, Taito, and Shokoazan, and another unidentified base. Three separate flights came up at 0300 and seemed to establish roving patrols over the Formosa area. This is the third day we have noticed this type of activity. Planes were very active from 0300 to 0800, and again from 1600 until 2400, after which it continued quiet.

A very amusing incident occurred on 5135J today. Plane 03T11 working out of Shokoazan Air Base (SI7NU) reported at 2158 that he expected to land at 2300. However at 2255 Air Base Shokoazan went into an air raid alert and informed the plane that he was under an alerted condition. The plane was therefore unable to land at 2300, and at 2313 he asked Air Base Shokoazan if he could try an emergency landing, adding that he was out of gas. At 2314 the plane stated that he was going to make an emergency landing. At 2321 the base requested the plane's bearing from base, to which the plane replied. The plane was up for the last time at 2328, at which time we were unable to copy him due to heavy interference. Shokoazan Air Base continued calling him until 0522 on the 24th, and it is assumed that the plane crashed shortly after his last transmission at 2328.

Frequencies Heard

5135J-AB Shokoazan	(A"KA Ident)
AB Tainan	(A"KA Ident)
AB Taito	(A"KA Ident)
Agrp Takao	(Compromise with KEYUHO6)

011

Frequencies Heard (Cont'd)

5337J-Agrp 901 Dets & Planes	7563M-2KN to SATEKOH
8332J-Agrp 901 Dets & Planes	5257M-KK Calls
6545J-Agrp 901 Dets & Planes	4665J-Sasebo Local
7960J-Manila, Davao & BF 33 Cmdr Cebu	3730J-Sasebo, BF Okinawa Cmdr,
7965M-K & KN	DefDiv Oshima
7360M-FU-3 Unidents	Sasebo and Takao BC at intervals.

24 January, 1945

Underway for Fleet Anchorage at Ulithi Atoll. Air activity in the Formosa area has eased up somewhat, but there was still evidence of continued patrolling by planes. Air Bases Tainan and Shokoan again worked the majority of planes.

Drill circuits in the Empire were quite active today, and might well indicate extensive training for defense of the southern approaches to the Empire.

Frequencies Heard

5135J-AB Tainan	7960J-Manila Rdo
AB Shokoan	BF 33 Cmdr Cebu
Unidentified Bases	C. U. 31-Baguio Det.
Planes	RITAKA9
5430M-KKN Calls (Probably Drill)	6462J-CU31 Manila
5337J/8332J-Agrp 901 Dets & Planes	OSOSII
6540J-Agrp 901 Dets.	Sasebo Broadcast

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore Jr.
T. E. Gilmore Jr. CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS ENTERPRISE (CV6)

25 January, 1945


From: Lt (jg) R. B. Palmer, CinC RI Unit, ComCarDiv 7

To: CinC Fleet Radio Unit Pacific

Subject: Method of disseminating RI information and general discussion of RI problems aboard for period from December 24, 1944 to January 24, 1945.

1. This report does not attempt to duplicate the technical report submitted by CRM T. E. Gilmore. Instead it includes a discussion of how RI material is handled and what value the information was to ComCarDiv 7. Several recommendations arising from the past operation are respectfully submitted for general discussion.

Respectfully submitted



Robert B. Palmer, Lt (jg) USNR
CinC RIU ComCarDiv Seven

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USS ENTERPRISE (CV6)

25 January, 1945

Radio Intelligence at sea aboard Flagships naturally has definite limitations. For the most part we cannot and do not attempt to duplicate the FRUPAC Summary which is sent out to the fleet daily. Since we can not perform a competent analysis of traffic because of our limited operating facilities, we limit our coverage in such a way that we are concerned only with tactical information which is of immediate and vital importance to the Admiral and his staff. Although much of the information appears later in the FRUPAC Summary, it no longer has any important bearing on the tactical situation at this time. Information which falls into this category is the sighting of Blue forces by "Snoopers", the organized attack on Blue forces by planes, and the information concerning flights into the immediate operating area of our Task Force. All of this information plus certain incidental information (such as when our planes reached the target, when the target was alerted, what convoy shipping appeared to be in the area, and what Air Bases seem to be operating the bulk of the operational aircraft) has an immediate tactical value which can prove to be invaluable to the Task Group.

In the operation which has just been completed the following information was found to have been of particular value to the Task Group:

1. On January 4, 1945 plane 9HESLUI sighted the Task Force at 2305, but was not able to make contact with his base until 0506 the following day. This gave our ships and planes enough time to get in close enough to stage an attack which was a complete surprise.
2. There were several times when we had occasion to pick up planes which sighted us but which had not appeared on the Radar screen.
3. One case of RI information which proved to be of some value to ComCarDiv Seven was as follows: Since we are a Night Carrier, our mission is to send out night heckler strikes over active operational bases. The Admiral asked us where on the basis of RI information the heckler flight should be sent. A study of the logs bore out the fact that on 5135J, Tainan Air Base had been working most of the planes heard. The flights were sent to Southern Formosa and our planes over Tainan that night caught quite a number of NIP planes landing at the approximate times we had noted from the logs they had landed on previous nights.
4. In the strike against Saigon several ships gave away their positions, and this information was of definite value to attacking pilots.

To summarize the information which we feel RI can supply to the Admiral:

1. RI can generally inform the Admiral when his Task Group has been sighted.
2. RI can pick up planes at times when the Radar does not see them. (This factor varies with the efficiency of Radar personnel aboard.)
3. RI can give the Admiral a fair idea as to when coordinated attacks by planes can be expected.
4. RI can give the Admiral "on-the-spot" information as to where activity of enemy air operations is centered.

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5. RI can let the Admiral know whether his attacks have come as a surprise or whether the enemy has been alerted ahead of time.

Since we are interested for the most part in operational aircraft our operating procedure was to search until the major tactical air frequency of the immediate area was discovered. At the same time a check was kept on the Broadcast which handled the important operational traffic of the immediate area. This was done in order to assure the fact that we did not miss any important traffic which might concern us. The operator assigned to the broadcast set the broadcast up on the loudspeaker and copied only the more important traffic i.e. sightings, grids, and high precedence traffic. In the meantime he searched for new air frequencies of the area. The second operator searched for the tactical air frequency and after this frequency was found kept a steady watch on it. A two-man watch was kept at all times except during General Quarters when a three-man watch was set up with the third man searching. As can be seen from this coverage plan, search was the most important activity.

The information was given to me and was telephoned by me to the Admiral or to the Chief of Staff if the Admiral so directed. A written report analyzing the day's activity and repeating all important information relayed verbally during the day was given to the Admiral at about 0230. (I found that writing such a report was very helpful not only because it crystallized the day's traffic and made me re-analyze the logs and the traffic quite carefully, but also because it gave me a day-to-day summary with made up a handy reference log.)

Information was given out only to the Admiral and the Chief of Staff. Only that information that the Admiral designated be distributed to other sources, i.e. operations officer, was released to these sources.

Recommendations

It is suggested that all radio gear and equipment be carefully calibrated and thoroughly checked before being sent out with RI units afloat. In our particular case the receivers were in a poor state of repair and practically all of them had to be serviced at one time or other. Boxes for shipment of gear should be small and the gear should be carefully packed. The packing of our equipment was excellent, but one or two of the boxes were a little large for easy handling. This information might be of some interest to future RI officers travelling by air.

Future units should make a clock as standard equipment. We wish to thank Commander Holtwick for securing us this piece of necessary equipment which is almost impossible to obtain aboard ship. The frequency meter was also excellent, and the size is perfect for easy handling. The RBG could easily be replaced by another SX-28 since the latter is by far the best receiver for ship based units.

The information received from 35-Sail has been quite helpful in spite of the fact that most of FU-3 idents did not concern us even after they were obsolete. However this will probably not be the case in the forthcoming operation. If repetition is sent out on some of the calls, our unit would appreciate repetition of the Comm. Unit calls which were sent out during the period when we were on the USS TICONDEROGA. At that time we were not authorized to receive 35-Sail, consequently we must have missed a good number of these identifications.

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USS ENTERPRISE (CV6)

25 January, 1945

I would like to thank Captain Huckins and Commander Dennis in particular, and the rest of FRUPAC in general for their help and cooperation.

~~ULTRA SECRET~~
~~ULTRA SECRET~~

27 February 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit(ComCarDiv7).
TO: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Technical Report of RI Operations from 10th to 17th of
February, 1945 inclusive, compiled by T. E. Gilmore CMM (PA)
USNR.

1. This report consists of six(6) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

cc: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet.
File.

~~TOP SECRET~~
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~~ULTRA SECRET~~ 27 February, 1945
U. S. S. Enterprise CV(6)
~~ULTRA SECRET~~

Operations Report Covering Period 10 to 17
February, 1945

On 10th of February, 24 hour, two section, two man watch was again put into affect. This type of watch standing will be normal unless the situation deems it necessary to use three men on at one time. Frequency Coverage was directed towards Empire Air Activity and the Picket Boat Activity. The Ominato Broadcast and the Operational Frequency of 6490J were observed very closely, however the receiving conditions in and around Ulithi Atoll are very bad so a very poor amount of information was uncovered.

Frequencies Heard

9045J
7875J

Air Base Kanoya and Air Base Shinchiku.
FU-3 Unident Calls to NKNK(Hei-Call). Base sent 1 KIN message to plane YULKAL. Interference from NPM/NPN circuit made it almost impossible for reception.

7960J
7842M

Davao Radio and Baguio Detachment of Comm. Unit 31.
Japanese Airways Circuit. Shoonan Airport and Yokohama Airport. (New Frequency-No previous information)

7690A
7672M

KKN to KN (Drill Circuit)
KN Calls. (Drill Circuit). (New Frequency-No previous information)

6490J
5337J

ComCruDiv22, Comm. Unit Ominato and Patrol Boats.
Air Base #30-Bako, Toko Detachment Air Group 901, and Hongkong Detachment of Air Group 901.

3747J

Yokosuka Area AA Defense Stations.

February 11, 1945

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Activity pertinent to our forthcoming operations continued light. Receiving conditions remain poor. Only light reaction to our Submarine attacks against the Picket Boats was noted. Ominato Broadcast on continuous coverage.

Frequencies Heard

9045J
8915J
7790J
8725J
6705J
6490J

Bases and Planes. Special Air Base Calls.
Bases and Planes. Special Air Base Calls.
Bases and Planes Singapore Area. Special Air Base Calls.
Bases and Planes. Special Air Base Calls.
Yokosuka Radio and Ships.
ComCruDiv22, Comm. Unit Ominato, Comm. Unit Shimushu, and Picket Boats.

6550J

Shinchiku Air Base, Toko Detachment Air Group 901, and Air Group 931.

5300M
5305J
5390J

Unident FU-3 Calls. (New Frequency-No previous information)
Okinawa Area Base Force Cmdr., and Air Base Sasebo.

Air Base Seletar to Air Base Kotoraja, Eatuphat Seaplanes, and Air Base Billian.

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U. S. S. Enterprise CV(6)

27 February, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

5240A K Calls-Unident.
5100J Yokosuka Radio, Comm. Unit Chichijima, and Marcus Radio.
4450M Unident KOO-8 Call to Unident 1A3 Calls.
4880J Comm. Unit Ominato, Base Force Kuriles Area Cmdr., and Maru Hakuho.
3875A Yokosuka AA Defense Control, Yokosuka Radio, Cmaezaki Lookout Stn.,
Katsuura Lookout Stn., and Nunora Defense Guard Post.
3747J Yokosuka Radio, Yokosuka AA Defense Control(Same Station),
Yokosuka Area Air Attack Defense Station.
3575A Air Group 903, Chichijima Detachment, Ominato Detachment, and
Kushimoto Detachment.

12 February, 1945

Receiving conditions much better today, undoubtedly due to our more north-
erly position. Bases and Planes active on 6740J. We believe this frequency bears
close watching. Bases and Planes also heard on 7031M, which also might turn out
to be a good frequency for us to cover. Picket Boats quite active on 6490J and
some very good information as to positions was obtained. Drill Circuit Activity
in the Empire was quite prominent. Ominato Broadcast steady coverage with the
Sasebo Broadcast covered at times. Ominato Broadcast is good coverage for Picket
Boat Activity and Air Attack reports from Yokosuka Area, Bonins-Volcanoe Islands,
and Marcus Island, while Sasebo Broadcast gives us good information on the situ-
ation in Taiwan, Nansei Shota, and Kyushu. Kisaratsu Broadcast on 7970J/3985J
checked, but unheard.

Frequencies Heard

8915J Bases and Planes(Hei-Calls) and Unident FU-3 Calls.
8910M KN Calls. (Drill Circuit)
8725J Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
8436M Planes(Hei Calls) This could possibly be 8435J. The calls on this
Circuit and on 6740J were similar. On 6740J the call HA5KE70 was
heard, while on 8436M the Base, ØHA5KE was working 3HA5KE, 2HA5KE83,
and 2HA5KE82. The numeral inserted at the front of the call being
the difference. Drill traffic was handled.
8415J KNK TO KN.(Drill Circuit)
7937M NKK Call to Unident AY011 and AY052. In view of the fact that all
of the AYO calls in 1A3 are assigned to Air Group 903, there is a
distinct possibility that this is an Air Group 903 Frequency.
7525M Plane(Hei-Call) and Unident. Drill Circuit. This could be 7525J
7031M Planes and Bases.
6998M Unident FU-3 Calls.
6843M Ibusuki Air Base to KN Calls.
6740J Bases and Planes.(Hei-Calls)
6705J Comm. Unit Yokosuka and Comm. Unit Chichijima.
6625J Comm. Unit Truk to Unident. (Using KOO-7 Calls)
6490J Comm. Unit Ominato, ComDrudiv 22, Comm. Unit Shimushu, and Picket
Boats.
4779M Bases. (Hei-Calls) Drill Circuit.

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U. S. S. Enterprise CV(6) 27 February, 1945

(Operation's Report Cont'd)

3575A Air Group 903, Chichijima Detachment, and Hachiojima Detachment.

February 13, 1945

Picket Boats remained active on 6490J, sighting planes and disclosing several positions. Air Circuits only moderately active, producing nothing of note for our Task Force. Air traffic received on 5256M was given distribution over Ominato Broadcast. Ominato Broadcast continuous coverage.

Frequencies Heard

9045J	Bases and Planes. Special Air Base Calls.
7054M	Tokushima Air Group and Planes.
7032M	Bases and Planes. Not changing calls. (7031M on 12th)
7000M	Unident FU-3 Calls.
6929M	Unidents YOØ and SAWOYO.
6740J	Bases and Planes. Yokosuka-Bonins Area.
6705J	Comm. Unit Yokosuka and Comm. Unit Chichijima.
6490J	Comm. Units Ominato, Shimushu, ComCruDiv22, and Picket Boats.
5495M	Air Group 903 and Detachments. (Same as 3575A)
5436M	K Calls, no traffic.
5337J	Air Group 901 and Detachments.
5257M	KN Calls, no traffic. Also KK Calls.
5256M	Bases and Planes. (Hei-Calls)
5135J	Air Bases only.
5100J	Comm. Units Yokosuka and Chichijima.
4450J	Unident LA3 Calls.
3902M	Unident FU-3 Calls.
3875A	Yokosuka Area AA Defense Stations and Lookout Station.
3610A	KKN Calls. (Drill Circuit)
3575A	Air Group 903 and Detachments.
3466.5M	Unident LA2 Calls. (Drill Circuit)

February 14, 1945

Picket Boat Activity very heavy, through compromise on their sighting reports we were able to spot the positions on many of them. This information is of great value to the Task Force at present time as we expect to pass through the area covered by the Picket Boats tomorrow. Steady coverage kept on 6490J, 6740J very active, and Base Call SU5YO heard on both 6740J and 8436M thereby positively establishing this frequency as 8435J. Activity on 8725J and 9045J heavier than usual, possibly indicating large plane movements in the Empire and Taiwan Area's. Air Group Hyakurihara was heard on 6928M. This was last reported at E-44 and measured 6933kcs at that time. Ominato Broadcast continuous coverage.

Frequencies Heard

9045J	Bases and Planes.
8725J	Air Base Atsuki, Air Base Kanoya, unident Bases and Planes(Hei-Calls) Unident Bases.(FU-3 Calls)
8724M	Unident KKN Calls.

(Page 3 of 6)

020

27 February, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

7033M Bases and Planes. Non-Changing Calls. (7031M/12th, 7032M/13th)
 8435J Bases and Planes. Base call SU5Y0 also appeared on 6740J.
 8430M Kland KN Calls. (Drill Circuit)
 6740J Bases and Planes. Yokosuka-Bonins Area.
 6739M KKKNN to KKKNN . (Drill Circuit)
 K to KN. (Drill Circuit)
 6550J Air Group 901-Toko Detachment.
 6490J Comm. Units Ominato and Shimushu, ComCruDiv22, and Picket Boats.
 5495M Air Group 903 and Detachments. (5495M on 13th)
 5100J Comm. Units Yokosuka and Chichijima.
 6928M Air Group Hyakurihara to his planes. (6933M 8-44)
 3875A Yokosuka Radio, Yokosuka AA Defense Control, and Nonura Defense Guard Post.

February 15, 1945

Picket Boat Activity very high, and many positions were compromised. Task Force made it through without being sighted. Plane Activity exceptionally low. Ominato Broadcast continuous coverage.

Frequencies Heard

8915J Bases and Planes. (Hei-Calls)
 8415J KN Calls. (Drill Circuit)
 8725J Air Base Suzuka(FU-3) and Bases(Hei-Calls)
 8366M Unident SIYOMI to SATEK04.
 7675A Subron 11.
 7050A Kocchi Air Group and Planes.
 7034M Bases and Planes. Non-Changing Calls.(7033M/14th)
 6940M KKM Calls, unident.
 6928M Air Group Hyakurihara.
 6740J Bases and Planes.(Hei-Calls)
 6705J Yokosuka Radio and Ships.
 6638M NK Calls. (Drill)
 6490J Comm. Units Ominato, Shimushu, ComCruDiv22, and Picket Boats.
 6315J MTB 13 to Unident.
 5305J Air Base Ibusuki, Air Base Sasebo, and Air Base Kanoya.
 5240A K Calls.
 5728M Unidents WI502, WI71, WI52 and TO.(Possible 5715J)
 5050M Unident FU-3 Calls.
 4783M Air Bases (Hei-Calls) (Drill)
 4826M Air Bases (Hei-Calls) (Drill)
 4575M Air Bases(Hei-Calls) (Drill)
 4462M Air Bases (Hei-Calls) (Drill). This same as 4575M.
 4446M Air Bases (Hei-Calls) (Drill)
 3575A Air Group 903 and Detachments.

27, February, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

(Operations Report Cont'd)

16 February, 1945

Strike launched against the Tokyo Area today. Tokyo (HITU) Broadcast covered. Covered Yokosuka Lookout Stations on 3747J and 3875A until our planes had been sighted. Message received from Tokyo Broadcast originated by plane KU7MI2 at 0600. Search was conducted for this circuit but unheard. A "grid" originated by plane NISITA6 at 0800 was also received from Tokyo Broadcast, giving position 2942N-13558E. None of our Task Force was in that position so it is believed that it was either a garbled "grid" or that particular plane was seeing things. A search was made for the circuit, but again was not uncovered. At 1000 a Base/Plane circuit was uncovered on 7045M and at 1014 a plane(WALTIL) originated a "grid" which was on our Task Force in position 34:57N-141:23E. Other sightings were received from this frequency but were apparently on our Forces bombarding Iwojima. On the whole, the air reaction to today's strike was mild. 7045M being the only frequency that really concerned us.

Frequencies Heard

9045J	Bases(Hei-Calls)
8725J	Air Base Atsuki, Air Base Suzuka, Planes, and Bases(Hei-Calls)
7952M	Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
7045M	Bases and Planes(Hei-Calls-Grids received)
6855J	K and KN Calls.
6854M	Bases and to Planes.(NA7KU also heard on 7045M)
6741M	Unident Bases-FU-3 Calls.
6638M	K and KNK.
6641M	FU-3 Calls to KNK.
6585M	KN calls.
6490J	Comm. Unit Ominato.
6315J	Yokosuka Defense Force.
6023M	KN to KN .
6660M	KNK to KK.
5890J	Air Group 302, Air Base Atsuki, and Fighter Planes. Very active during the "Strike" but due to heavy interference from Shipboard voice circuit we were unable to get much off this circuit.
5715J	K Calls heard.
5255M	Bases to Planes(Hei-Calls). NA5KO also on 6740J
5093M	Unident FU-3 Calls. (Drill)
3903M	KNK Calls. (Drill)
3875A	Yokosuka Air Defense, Hachiojima Lookout Station, Yokosuka Radio (KOO-s), and other unidentified Lookout Station in Yokosuka Area. This circuit now using LA3 Calls except for Yokosuka Radio(MARINEØ) Many Radar and actual sighting reports received from this circuit. Same as 3875A. Also using LA3 calls. Many Radar messages received.
3747J	Air Group 903 and Detachments. Now using LA3 Calls.
3575A	KNK to KNK.
2943M	Bases and Planes.(Hei-Calls)
6740J	

~~TOP SECRET~~

U. S. S. Enterprise CV(b)

27 February, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

17 February, 1945

Air Activity relatively light in view of the present situation. No organized attack was launched against the Task Force. Three planes were fairly close to us around 1600 to 1630, on 7333M, but were probably not attack planes or search planes. Through position obtained by our unit, Picket Boat 3NITEA was eliminated by our Destroyer Screen at approximately 2050. The Picket Boat originated a "plain language" message stating that he was "Dying for the Emperor-Banzai, etc!" Ominato Broadcast again on steady coverage. This Broadcast is much better than Tokyo and puts out the same important traffic plus the aircraft sighting from the Bonins etc. The Kisaratsu Broadcast has not been heard for sometime, it was thought before this operation began that this would be a good coverage, but apparently this circuit has been discontinued.

Frequencies Heard

8725J	Bases and Planes.
8480J	Yokosuka Radio to SATEK04.
8028M	Air Group 903 Detachment to Air Group 903.
8915J	Bases and Planes. Matsuyama Air Base (K008)
7260M	Unident FU-3.
7333M	Unident Aircraft using KKN Calls.
7039M	Bases and Planes. Same as 7045/16th.
7035M	KN TO KN.
6855J	K and KN -Bases and Planes.
6785M	KN Calls. (Drill)
6740J	Bases and Planes.
6490J	Comm. Unit Ominato, ComCruDiv22 and Picket Boats.
5255J	KK to KK Calls.
5599M	KNK to NK Calls.
3575A	Air Group 903 and Detachments.
4171M	Bases.(Same as non-changing calls on 7035M)
3747J	Yokosuka Area Lookout Stations.
3321M	Base and Planes. KKKN Calls.(Probable Drill)

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR (RinC)

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SEVEN

Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Commander Carrier Division SEVEN.
To : Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Subject: Report of Operations of Radio Intelligence Unit from 10
February, 1945 to 10 March, 1945.
Reference: (a) CinCPac Top Secret Ultra, serial 0005507 (undated).

1. Forwarded.

2. The unit attached to this command has provided me with information of great value in so far as Air Operations and dispositions of aircraft are concerned. While the information received is perhaps not as specific as that which might be derived from a larger organization with extensive facilities, it is timely and continuous—attributes which cannot be over-rated. Largely through this service, most of the enemy air attacks with which this Task Group has been concerned have been anticipated, not to mention valuable warning of possible snoopers.

N. B. Gardner
N. B. GARDNER.

File

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

11 March, 1945

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit(ComCarDiv7).
TO: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Report of Operations from February 10, 1945 to February 23, 1945.

1. This report endeavors to list only the information which was of value to ComCarDiv 7. No attempt has been made to cover the whole Radio Intelligence picture, since this has been already been done by the regular weekly reports submitted by CRM Gilmore.
2. This report consists of four(4) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. E. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

cc: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet.
File.

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ULTRA

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

8 March, 1945

~~ULTRA SECRET~~
~~ULTRA SECRET~~

Since the report of CRM Gilmore covers the technical aspect of the Radio Intelligence picture, I will limit myself to giving a brief daily list of only the most important developments in the communication picture as it affects this Task Group and our Admiral. I shall also include several copies of the daily reports I give the Admiral, so that it can be seen just what form this report takes and just how the information is disseminated.

February 10, 1945

Picket Boat positions and their general spacing along the 30-31 Degree Parallels of Latitude important information for the Admiral. This will increase in importance as we get into this Area, since at that time FRUPAC'S positions will come in too late to be of value.

February 11, 1945

Nothing important except that the Submarine Wolf Packs do not seem to have gotten rid of any of the Picket Boats.

February 12, 1945

More Picket Boat positions.

February 13, 1945

Possible "Snoopers" today out of Chichijima. Signal strength of one of the planes quite loud, but no sightings were received.

February 14, 1945

I made a summary of all Picket Boat data today and plotted in their positions.

February 15, 1945

We are able to tell the Admiral we had made the run in today, without being sighted.

February 16, 1945

Strike a complete surprise. Main force sighted, but we do not operate in front line area's until night, so the sighting does not concern us directly. Again the negative evidence obtained by RI that no attacks are airborne has been valuable.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV-6) 8 March, 1945
ULTRA SECRET

February 17, 1945

Attacks today quite successful. We picked up 3 planes before CIC had them on their screen. It is of great value to CIC to know whether a plane is actually a "Bogey" or one of our own planes with poor IPF. As a result RI and CIC can often "Splash" * planes which might otherwise have gotten away because it had not been determined far enough ahead of time that they were actually enemy planes.

February 18, 1945

We were the first Task Group to go back through the Picket Boat lines and the Picket Boat positions were of some help. Two Pickets were destroyed and 3NITEA sent our her exact position about 2 hours before we came upon him. We also picked up two "Snoopers" who sent out our position quite accurately. CIC did not get either of them on the screen.

February 19, 1945

Picked up "Snooper" again today, one ^{of} whom sent out our position. Neither appeared on the Radar screen. In all these instances we were sure the planes were in our immediate area, both from the signal strength and also from the pertinent fact that they had sent out our position. Had we had any sort of medium High Frequency D/F equipment, we could have sent planes out on a bearing and probably could have "Splashed" the "Snooper".

February 20, 1945

We picked up another "Snooper" today and through definite liason with CIC we were able to identify him as a "Bogey" as soon as he appeared on the screen. All the information is relayed to the ships in the Task Group and helps to alert CIC throughout the Area. The "Snooper" (4NAN) mentioned the Saratoga.

From an analysis of the positions sent out by the "Snooper" planes on 6684M, we were able to draw up a chart of these plane searches for the Admiral. This gave him a good idea of how thoroughly certain areas were covered.

Two planes which had 3-5 signals when they secured, were heard on 7035J. I told the Admiral that it looked very much as though planes were still being staged into Chichijima

February 21, 1945

Attacks by the Japs were staged into Iwojima today at about 1600 and the "Night Hecklers" were up until 2100. The attacks were definitely concerned with hitting our forces at Iwojima. The Saratoga, which was lying right off Iwojima, was hit by four suicide planes. We noticeed NKKN calls up on 7035J at the time and it seems quite possible these were the attack planes. Since, as we later found out, ~~the~~ the planes do not transmit until after they are returning to their base, Radio Intelligence could do little to warn the Task Force of the attack at this time. However we did pick up the culprits at the time the "Hecklers" were over our force dropping "windows" (Anti-Radar Device). The information gained at this time helped us in later raids.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) 1748 March 1945
~~TOP SECRET~~

February 22, 1945

Planes were being staged somewhere, using 7035J. The flights only took a little more than a half and hour and I estimated that they were going from Kisaratsu to Hachiojima.

February 23, 1945

Code groups pretty well establish the fact that the plane attacks of the 21st have very close associations with Chichijima. From a study of the logs it is impossible to determine whether the planes put into Chichijima before the attacks or after. The first assumption seems the better of the two.

We are no longer Task Group 58.5 but have been detached from Task Force 58 and have been assigned to the Iwojima Area to take over the duties of the U. S. S. Saratoga. We are now part of Task Force 51 and are supplying both night and day air coverage. Consequently we are the only RI unit in this immediate area and any important information that we uncover will be sent to CTF52.

I feel that our insistence upon the fact that Chichijima is still used as an operational field has started to pay off, since repeated attacks are being launched against it daily. We certainly can't take all the credit for this, but I am sure we can take some of it. We have been able to tell by checking the circuits used by the attack planes and also from the traffic appearing on this circuit just about when there is a raid coming this way.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNA
Officer in Charge

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~~ULTRA~~

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

11 March, 1945

~~ULTRA SECRET~~

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit (ComCarDiv7).
TO: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Carbon copies of three(3) daily reports submitted to ComCarDiv 7.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

17 February, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
Radio Intelligence Summary

~~TOP SECRET~~
(All Times -9)

Today's raids produced very little resistance on the part of the Nips. Plane traffic was relatively light and absolutely no organized attacks were staged as far as we can tell. The first contact on our planes was again picked up by the Hachiojima Radar at 0557. Radar contacts streamed in after this and by 2019 a radar station in the Yokosuka Area had sent out 104 messages. Yokosuka went under a full alert at 0724 and at 0845 reported 70 planes coming in over Irosaki. At 0905 Yokosuka secured his alert and at 0914 he sighted 78 small planes headed NW from Nojima Saki and went into a full alert at 0927. A third alert came at 1205. One of our rescue Submarines was sighted by a Lookout Station in the Yokosuka Area 15 miles out bearing 60 degrees at 1410.

It is interesting to note that our Night Fighters were picked up last night by a Lookout Station somewhere in the Hachiojima Area at 0000. At 0008 this station reported that he was being attacked and stated bombs had been dropped.

At 1607 we picked up three planes working each other, with their signal strength becoming louder as they approached the force. This was reported to CIC and a few minutes later CIC saw three bogeys on the screen going due North. At 1612 one plane said he expected to arrive at 1632. These planes probably came up from the Iwojima Area and stopped off at Hachiojima. At 1624 a plane reported that he had landed. At 1728 he was up again indicating that he was probably on his way to Honshu. No sighting report was received from these planes, and it seemed quite evident that they had no idea of attacking.

This evening as we were retiring a Picket Boat radio call 3NITEA came up at 1658 and reported planes. He gave his position away as 31:05N-141:27E .

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ULTRA

17 February, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

This was right on our course. At 1715 he reported planes, and at 2030 he reported Ship units. At 2050 he sent out the following dramatic message, quote, "We are under Naval gunfire. All hands are bound in the defense of their country, though smeared with blood. Ten-Thousand Years to the Emperor!". This was later re-broadcast and received wide distribution. There is no doubt about the fact that the enemy knows just where we were at the time of this transmission. The fact that we had been sighted was strengthened by a message from a Picket Boat in the position 31:10N-141:00E. This Picket Boat reported a large enemy force with 1 Carrier headed North. (This might well confuse the Nips again tomorrow)

Several other Pickets were heard but only one gave away his position at 2240 at 31:00N-134:55E(9:15EKI), too far away to concern us. This Picket sighted planes headed North. The other Pickets heard were: OYUKUTI(Position on the 14th 31:10N-142:55E), LR.YOLE(Position 14th 29:30-136:50E), 4HOKEE, 5KIHLSE, and 5TOHATO.

HahaJima and IwoJima took a thorough pasting today, with the first alert intercepted at 1500 and the last all clear at 2143. MachiJima had a full alert at 2111 with the all clear at 2240. Yokosuka had another alert at 2030 with the all clear at 2158. Evidently B-29's were over the target after we left.

Respectfully submitted,

n. B. Palmer RI Officer.

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~~ULTRA~~

Radio Intelligence Summary

February 18, 1945

Note: All times mentioned are -9.
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

The most important development today was the snooping of our force by at least two planes who followed us from about 1200 until at least 2000 (2100 ship's time). The planes might still be in the air at the present time, but the frequency has faded so badly that it seems very doubtful they will be able to send out a new position until early morning. I imagine CIC has not been able to track this plane with any degree of accuracy because he seems to stay out of Radar range. The first grid was sent out by plane NIKIKE1 at 1250 and was rebroadcast from Tokyo at 1434. The position given was 27:20N 139:00E. Our position at the time was approximately at this point. At 1415 this plane sent out the weather in our area, and at 1420 he sent several messages to another plane NIKIKE4, who evidently was relieving him. At 1630 NIKIKE4 took over the job of snooping and sent out the position 26:57N 139:08E. Our position at about the time was 26:51N 139:04E. At 1640 he sent out information about the weather in our vicinity. At 1746 he sighted two forces and sent out two grids, 26:57N 139:28E and 26:37N 139:03E. This was also put out on the Tokyo broadcast at 1746. This plane was last heard at 2000 (2100 ship's time) and may still be in the area.

There is some indication that a plane sighted the landing force at 1450 although the grid is badly encoded. There were two indications of attacks on the force at Iwojima with one coming at 0702 and the other at 1646. In the first instance the plane said "Banzai", but later changed his mind about a crash dive since at 0802 he asked his base (in the Bonins Area?) whether there were enemy planes over the field, and after he received "Negative", he probably landed. In the second instance there are no indications of a Kamikaze attack.

Plane activity in the Empire was rather light. Atsuki Air Base worked

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U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)
two groups of planes and there are good indications that Kanoya moved planes to the Honshu area early in the day.

The picket boats were quite busy last night, and they sent out repeated sightings of our forces. Of these pickets three definitely sighted us. Two of these were undoubtedly destroyed. This is in addition to the picket (3NITEA) who sent out last night's dramatic message. The first of these pickets (5KIHISE) sighted forces at 0150, the second (1NESUSA) at 0200, and the third (7SAKINO) sighted the force at 0223. The one who sighted us at 0223 sang his swan song at 0232 with the following pathetic message, "We have decided to attack and die honorably". All these reports were sent to the Honshu area and received wide circulation. For this reason the Nips should have had no difficulty in plotting in our course last night and today.

Several other pickets not in our area sighted planes and compromised their positions. These are as follows:

TIME	RADIO CALL	POSITION
0039	5TIYUSE	29:00N 136:25E
1224	6SDMETI	31:20N 135:00E

Four other pickets were heard but did not give their positions. These were 3NONISE, 4HOKII, 5TOHATO, and 8AFUNE. One of these boats was equipped with Radar.

Iwojima and Hahajima took their usual pounding. Last night at 0241 Hahajima had a large plane overhead. Iwojima had a full alert at 0247 with the all-clear at 0255. The second alert at Hahajima was at 0325 with Iwojima following suit at 0332. During the day Iwojima reported alerts at 1110 with the all-clear at 1206 (heavy bombing reported) and again at 1447. Marcus Island also received a little attention at 1111 with the all-clear at 1140. Yokosuka was alerted at 0230, following the warnings issued by picket boats

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Radio Intelligence Summary

February 18, 1945

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U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

that enemy planes were headed for the Empire last night.

Respectfully submitted,

Lt (jg) R. B. Palmer,
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

Radio Intelligence Summary

February 19, 1945

We have been snooped. SLS. ENYERDREE (planes working out of a Kyushu base, probably Kanoya. At 0738 the first plane appeared and six others were heard between 0758 and 0929. The eighth and ninth planes were heard shortly after 1300. The planes maintained excellent circuit discipline and did not send any superfluous traffic at all. At 1051 3 of the planes had a good strong signal and at 1126 one of them (7HIMI) sent out a garbled grid, announcing at the same time he had sighted a large plane. This plane then sent out at 1130 a message originated at 1123 giving a grid position 25:57N 147:23E. Although this position looks as though the plane had made a mistake in longitude, another one of these planes (4KOKU) sent out a grid position at 1245 which read 29:37N 149:43. Just what the two planes sighted is an interesting point. No grids are sent out unless surface units are sighted, but I just don't know what surface units were this far east, unless replenishment units are in the area.

At 1147 plane 9RUU said he sighted enemy carrier planes, while another plane who was operating close to him also sighted carrier planes at 1214. Both of these planes had a very loud signal and seemed to be in our general area. At 1222 9KUU said the enemy was north of him and at 1230 he sent out the grid position 25:50N 140:10E, the position of 58.1 north of Iwojima. At 1235 he sent out the position 25:55N 141:30E. This plane grew much louder after this, and at 1315 he sent out the position 23:30N 140:10E, our position at this time.

The second plane 5ITE sent out a grid at 1210 reading 23:17N 139:23E, our approximate position at this time. Neither one of these planes appeared on the Radar screen, but since their signals were S5 and their position definitely pinpointed our force there is absolutely no doubt in our minds that they hovered just outside of the force.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Radio Intelligence Summary

February 19, 1945

Page 2.

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

At 1405 9RUU completed a long day by sighting a submarine. The other 5 planes were heard on the circuit but they did not sight anything of importance. At 1415 4KOKU secured and at 1514 7MITO followed suit. All the signals grew weaker after 1400 and it is assumed the planes have returned to their bases in Kyushu. From the fact that the planes came over a distance of over 600 miles and also from the fact that they were up over 9 hours it is assumed they were large type Jap reconaissance planes of the ~~type~~^{B-29} type. From collateral evidence sent out by FRUPAC it is known reconaissance had been ordered and it seems more than likely that the 9 planes were sent out on a wide-spread search to pin-point all activity in the Bonins area. The 5 planes who did not report sightings undoubtedly were in sectors which carried them to the east and to the west of the Bonins area.

Thirty B29's were over Nagoya today at 1435 and the Atsuki fighters were up to meet them. Empire air was fairly active but there were no indications of any mass movements to any area.

Respectfully submitted,

Lt(jg) R. B. Palmer,
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~ULTRA SECRET~~
1 March, 1945
~~ULTRA SECRET~~

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit (ComCarDiv7).
TO: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Technical Report of RI Operations from 18th to 24th of
February, 1945 inclusive, compiled by T. E. Gilmore CRM (FA)
USNR.
1. This report consists of five(5) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

cc: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet.
File.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) 1 March, 1945

Operations Report Covering Period 18 to 24
February, 1945 Inclusive

18, February, 1945

Watches were returned to normal today, after using three men on at a time, since 15th. New "Search Plane" activity uncovered on 6684M. First indications of this activity was on Ominato Broadcast, when a "Grid" was received originated by plane NIKIKEL at 1250. Circuit was picked up at 1422. All "Grids" received on this circuit were on units of our Task Force. Circuit was active until 2045. Activity on 7035M was good today. One "Grid" on our forces around Iwojima was received, and the, "All units Attack" signal was also received. There seems to be two different activities on this frequency. One involving the non-changing calls KEØSI and KE2A, and the other and most important using "Hei" and NNK call. The latter activity is used for "Searches" and "Attack", and is apparently based out of the Empire. 5290A was active during the early morning. Plane A5SE2 announced that he was "Attacking" at 0739 after already saying he was going to make a "Banzai" attack at 0702. Plane apparently changed his mind about "Dying for the Emperor", and was last heard at 0846 on his way back to his base. Another night frequency of 7035M(KEØSI-KE2A) was found on 2979M. Planes and Bases were up on a new frequency of 5255M. Bases were heard on 6580J, first time this circuit has been heard. Picket Boat activity was very heavy during the early morning hours, due to our passage through their lines. Several of them were permanently put out of action by our Destroyers.

Frequencies Heard

8725J	Planes and Bases. (Empire)
7050A	KN Calls.
7035M	Search Planes KKN Calls. Non-changing calls(KEØSI-KE2A)
6740J	Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
6705J	Yokosuka, Chichijima, and Iwojima.
6684M	Search Planes KKN Calls.
6580J	Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
6490J	Comm. Unit Ominato, ComCruDiv22, and Picket Boats.
6115J	Air Base Oroku calling Plane.
5890A	Air Base Atsuki and Planes.
5290A	Bases and Plane.
5255M	Bases and Planes.
5135J	Bases and Planes.
6108M	KN and KKN Unident.
4677M	Calls H01, H05, and H06.
2979M	Nite frequency of 7035M(KEØSI-KE2A)

19 February, 1945

Search frequency found on 6684M yesterday, became active again today at 0752 and remained active until 1713. Eight different planes were up, and numerous "Grids" were received, all on our Task Force which was re-fueling in the Iwojima Area.

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U.S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

1, March, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

The Planes were using NKK calls today in place of the KKKM of yesterday. Plane activity was again up on 7035M today, but no "Grids" were sent, although there is a possibility that an attack was made, probably against pur ships supporting the Iwojima landings.

Frequencies Heard

7116M	Air Group Tokushima and Planes.
7033M	KEØSI and KE2A and Planes (NKK Calls). Previous measurement 7035/18.
7035M	Planes and Bases. Planes use KKM-Base never signs call.
7003M	Unident FU-3 Calls.
6740J	Air Bases(Hei-Calls), working planes. Air Group 903(AY015) working his Detachments.
6684M	Search Planes and Base(SA3MI)
5886M	Base to Plane. (Hei-Calls)
5255J	Air Group OI to Unident. (FU-3 Calls)
5305J	Air Base Ibusuki and Air Base Kanoya.
5135J	Base to Plane. (Hei-Call)
5492M	Air Group 903 and Detachments. Previous measurements, 5495/13 and 5493/14.
5890J	Air Base Atsuki, Air Group 302, and Planes.
4587M	Bases. (Hei-Calls) Possible Drill.
3320M	KKKM Calls and Bases.
2980M	KEØSI and KE2A. Previous measurement 2979/18. Tokyo (HITU) and Ominato Broadcasts covered.

20 February, 1945

Search Planes were again active and three "Grid" positions were released. All on our Task Force. Frequency used was again 6684M. Average frequency was made on air activity on and around 7035Kcs, we now call it 7035A. This frequency was very active today, and there were some indications of plane flights from Empire Bases to possibly Chichijima and then make an attack on our Task Force. Two planes were up on 6740J and put out "Grids" in the Saipan Area. Probably on supply forces enroute to Iwojima. Three men on watch during late afternoon and evening watch.

Frequencies Heard

8725J	Empire Air Activity, Planes and Bases.
7658M	KKM Unident to ComCruDiv22.
7035A	KEØSI, KE2A, and Planes using NKK Calls. Bases and Planes.(Hei-Calls)
6900M	Air Group Ohtsu to Air Group Ohtsu Planes.
6740J	Bases and Planes. (Hei-Calls)
6634M	Search Planes and Base.
5594M	Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
5244M	Garbled KOC-8 to Air Base Kanoya.

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U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

1 March, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

5135J Air Bases. (Formosa Area)
3998M Unident LA2 Calls. Believe this to be Lookout Station in Kure Area.
3875A Yokosuka Air Defense Circuit.
3575A Air Group 903 and Detachments.
3321M KNK to KN.
3240M Air Group Miyazaki, Air Base Kanoya, and Unidentified FU-3 Calls,
Broadcasting traffic to Collective Call KOSIO.
Tokyo Broadcast (HITU) covered.

21 February, 1945

Search Planes again active on 6634M, with two "Grids" received, both of which were something to the East of Chichijima. Attack against our forces on Iwojima and against our supporting Naval ships occurred late this afternoon. Enemy planes apparently used 7035M, but gave no indication they were attack planes until they were enroute back to their Base, at which time traffic was received from them. 6580J was heard with planes very active. First known appearance of planes on this circuit in sometime.

Frequencies Heard

8749M KNKN Calls to Unident.
8725J Empire Air Bases and Planes.
7035A Planes working Base (KE7RI)
Planes and Bases (KEØSI-AØKE)
This frequency Averaged as of this date.
7002M Air Group Coi to Unident FU-3.
6641M KNK to KN.
6580J Bases and Planes. Base UØFU also on 8725J and TULU on 6684M.
6684M Search Planes and Base. (TULU)
5821M Unident FU-3 Calls.
5594M Bases and Planes also KAØKA.
5399M LA2 calls. Same activity as on 3998M/20.
3747J Yokosuka AA Defense and Lookout Stations.
3430M LA3 Calls. (Drill)
3321M KKKK Calls. This appears to be an Air Circuit.
Ominato Broadcast.

22 February, 1945

Air activity exceptionally light. Probably due to bad weather in the area. Some search activity was noted on 6580J, which resulted in two grid positions on Blue Forces, probably reinforcements to the south of us. These grids however, did not appear on any of the Broadcasts. Plane flights up on 7035J for a short period working KEØSI. Other area air frequencies very quiet with few aircraft heard.

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U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

1 March, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

Frequencies Heard

7035J Bases and Planes. (This frequency 7035J per FRUPAC)
6705J Yokosuka and Chichijima.
6684M Base and Planes.
6641M Bases and Planes. (KN Calls)
6636M Base only. (MA2/I)
6580J Base and Planes.
3747J Yokosuka NavDist AA Defense Stations.
2980J Nite of 7035J
Ominato Broadcast.

23 February, 1945

Air activity still continuing light. Attack Planes up on 7035J again and will probably hit our forces in and around Iwojima sometime during the morning of 24th. Same calls active as were heard on the 21st. Search frequency of 6684M inactive for first time since the 18th. From information derived from the traffic received on 6684M it seems quite likely that these planes base out of Kanoya or Miyazaki.

Frequencies Heard

8725J Bases and Planes in Empire.
8086M SATEKO4 testing and sending V's. Up for about an hour.
7333M Special plane calls(KKN). First heard on the 17th.
7100M KN Calls. (Drill)
7035J Special AirBase Calls and Planes.
Base and Planes. (Attack)
6855J K to KN Calls.
6740J Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
6710A Air Base Suzuka to Planes.
5495M Air Group 903 and Detachments.
5095M Air Group Coo, Air Group Suzuka and Unident FU-3 Call.
5100J Chichijima, Marcus, and Yokosuka.
4725J First Escort Fleet CinC, CDV24, Kashima CL, Moji RMO-Radio Stn.
3905M Air Base Kisaratsu and Unidentified FU-3 Calls.(3915J ?)
3835J CinC China Fleet and Base Force Yangtze Area Cmdr.
3321M KN Calls. (Drill)
2980J Special Air Base Calls.
Ominato Broadcast covered.

24 February, 1945

Attack carried out by Planes against our forces on Iwojima, using 7035J as operating frequency. It is now apparent that these planes do not indicate in any way that they are attacking, until after the attack is over and they report to their base that the attack has been completed and they are returning. Only thing we can do in the future is to notify the proper authorities when the planes are first heard, and in this way give them some advance notice of an attack. 041

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

1 March, 1945

(Operation Report Cont'd)

It should be noted here, that our Task Group on the 23rd was relieved of all duties from Task Force 58 and assigned to Task Force 52, furnishing air support to our forces on Iwojima and conducting strikes against enemy installations on Chichijima and Hahajima.

Our Carrier Task Force which is enroute for an attack on the Tokyo Area was sighted by a Picket Boat at 2115 in position 13:20N-144:40E. There seems to be an increase in high precedence traffic addressed to Empire Air Commands, indicating a good possibility they are being fully alerted for tomorrows strikes.

Frequencies Heard

10200J	Chichijima, Yokosuka, Marcus, and Air Base Kisaratsu.
9400M	NK Calls. (Drill)
7870J	Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Subic (Seaplane), and others.
7333M	Planes and Bases, KKKN Calls. Both Drill and good traffic.
7035J	Base and Planes. (Attack)
	Special Air Bases and Planes.
6997M	H01 and H02.
6740J	Bases and Special Air Base calls.
6684M	Base and Planes. (Search)
6580J	Bases and Planes.
6490J	Comm. Unit Ominato and Picket Boats.
5831M	Air Group Ooi. (Drill)
5094M	Air Base Suzuka, Air Base Tokushima, Air Base Koochi, and unident FU-3 Calls. Conducting drills with numerous grids being handled. This measured 5095 on the 23rd.
3915J	Air Base Kisaratsu, Air Base Meiji, and other unident FU-3 Calls.
3875A	Yokosuka AA Defense Stations.
3575A	Air Group 903 and Detachments.
3747J	Yokosuka AA Defense Stations.
4776M	Bases, special calls.

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore Jr.
T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SEVEN

Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Commander Carrier Division SEVEN.
To : Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Subject: Report of Operations of Radio Intelligence Unit of Commander
Carrier Division Seven, 15 to 24 March, 1945.

1. Forwarded.
2. The examples set forth in the basic letter illustrates the tactical value of the services rendered by this unit.

N. B. Gardner
N. B. GARDNER

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SEVEN

Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

28, March 1945

From: OinC Radio Intelligence Unit, ComCarDiv 7

To: OinC Fleet Radio Unit Pacific

Subject: Report of operations from March 15th to March 24th when we returned to Ulithi for repairs to battle damage. I am also including with this daily report a general discussion of the attacks made on us on the 13th, 20th, and 21st. This discussion was compiled for the Admiral so that future attacks could be evaluated immediately from past experience.

2. I am including raid plots of CIC made on the 17th and 21st of March.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SEVEN

Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

23, March 1945

I shall make up a general resume of each day's most important events. In the case of the attack days of the 18th, 20th, and 21st I shall include the Radio Intelligence Unit Summary I compiled for the Admiral for these days. These in addition to the general summary should present a fairly clear picture of just what happened. The notes on the CIC raid plots I think are self explanatory.

15, March 1945

Nothing of much importance today. Air activity low. Ficket boats concerned with B-29's. Only one compromised his position.

16, March 1945

A great deal of air traffic up with practically all of it drill. Too many improbable grid positions were received. I reported this to the Admiral as a possible battle problem. Ficket boats were hit by subs today. If the planes continue to drill in the areas where the grids fell they will undoubtedly sight us.

17, March 1945

Covered in Radio Intelligence Summary.

18, March 1945

This day is covered in the Radio Intelligence Summary. However it might be of interest to know that in the attacks on the 18th we were able to give the Admiral advance notice of the attack on us both because of signal strength and because of the numerous grid positions in our area. The plane which hit us

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SEVEN

Serial

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(2)

28, March 1945

with a bomb did not send out the tactical signal to attack although we were able to forewarn the task group on the Ø755 attack. We were all pretty well shaken up but managed to keep operating.

19, March 1945

Covered in Radio Intelligence Summary. None of the planes concerned us intimately but we were able to give CIC so many positions on the snoopers and bombers that the Fighter Director Officer was able to vector his planes accordingly. (The information was passed to CIC through the proper channels.)

20, March 1945

Covered in Radio Intelligence Summary. We were smoked out of the shack and badly scared but still operating.

21, March 1945

Covered in Radio Intelligence Summary.

22, 23, 24, March 1945

We are now on our way back to Ulithi to repair battle damage. There is no unusual activity which is of any concern to us.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SEVEN


Serial

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

26, March 1945


1. Although CIC is not told the source of the information I have included these raid plots so that FRUMAC can have some tangible evidence as to how our information ties in with theirs. When the Admiral hands on the grid positions to CIC, CIC immediately plots them in on their board and watches for planes in that area. As can readily be seen from the plots, in several cases RI was able to establish a plane to be definitely bogey and in the case of RO2HAL was actually able to tell from what sector he would attack.

2. It is unfortunate that security does not permit this information to be given to the Fighter Director at the very time it occurs because this might often lead him to change his fighter dispositions.




THIS WAS
THE FIRST GROUP
OF SNOOPERS
ISAMA
8NIE

FIRST GRID
SENT OUT AT
0257 002245



ISAMA NOT
HEARD AFTER
THIS TIME

048



THE

The plane shot down by AA at about 1230 was ROZNA 1. At 1216 this plane gave out the position 26:32N-136:23E. The fact that we were able to pick this plane up as bogey immediately alerted the whole task group. We were able to tell the Admiral the attacks in general were on their way at 0930. However in this specific instance we were able to pick up the attack signal of this particular plane in time to really help out.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) 11 March, 1945
~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit(ComCarDiv7).
TO: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Report of Operations from February 24, 1945 to March 16, 1945.

1. This report endeavors to list only the information that was of value to ComCarDiv 7. No attempt has been made to cover the whole Radio Intelligence picture, since this has already been done in the regular weekly reports submitted by CREM Gilmore.
2. This report consists of three(3) pages.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert B Palmer
R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

cc: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet
File.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

11 March, 1945
~~ULTRA SECRET~~

The period from February 24th to March 10th will be handled as a separate operation, because during this period, this RI Unit operated in the Iwojima Area exclusively. As in the previous report I shall take each day and list only the important contributions we were able to make toward the operation. Technical data on frequencies can be found in CRM Gilmore's weekly reports. The information in this report has been gathered from my daily written report to the Admiral.

February 24, 1945

A raid went into Iwojima tonight at about 2000. No transmissions were heard on 7035J until after the planes were on their way back. It appears from the short interval between the time the planes attack and the time they say they intend to land, that they are refueling at Chichijima. The radio procedure between this and the one on the 21st is strikingly similar. We can't honestly say we were able to pick up the planes until they came back from the target. However, if they are actually putting into Chichijima, as we now quite definitely believe, they can be wiped out when they land. It is interesting to note that a "Helen" attempted to land at Chichijima at about this time and was shot down by one of our "Intruders". We are keeping the Admiral informed ^{ON TIME} Jap reaction to the second Tokyo raid, although it has no definite tactical bearing on our activity.

February 25, 1945

Nothing important except that Chichijima is sending weather to Air Base Kisaratsu. This however, looks fairly normal and does not presage an attack. My report to the Admiral covered the Empire raids for the most part since the activity down here is slow.

February 26, 1945

Numerous grid sighting on 6580J, but none of them appeared on the Broadcast. None of them concern us directly and the assumption is that they are probably drill. Our value down here lies in the fact that we are able to report that we haven't been sighted and that we aren't under imminent danger of an attack-in short the old cliché of negative evidence. We are keeping an eye on Empire operations since they may very well concern us at anytime.

February 27, 1945

More drill. A probable "Snooper" was close to our force, to judge from his signal strength. His signal strength was still S4 when he landed. It maybe he landed at Chichijima although this is still conjecture.

February 28, 1945

Nothing important to our force.

051

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

~~ULTRA SECRET~~
11 March, 1945
~~ULTRA SECRET~~

March 1, 1945

Another attack on Iwojima came down in the early morning about 0300. A new frequency, ie 5595M, was used, but we didn't pick up the planes until 0618. ~~However~~ If the planes have followed the usual procedure they didn't communicate until the raid was over. However the NRI message of the plane was originated at 0230 although the base did not receive it until 0707.

At 1808 the same type of call (NKKN) appeared on 7035J and we predicted a raid was on its way. However the planes were not heard and after two hours the base stopped calling the Planes. A FRUPAC despatch came through saying that an attack was imminent. Nothing came of the whole affair and it is believed that the Japs cancelled their plans but forgot to notify the base that there was no longer any need to call the planes.

March 2, 1945

Nothing of importance which affects the Task Group. Reported Okinawa reaction to the Admiral. The usual air-raid alerts from Chichijima and Hahajima were heard. By watching these alerts and their subsequent all clears it is possible to determine just when the Japs have time to recuperate and get their field at Chichijima back into operation. We have been hitting these fields when the Army doesn't interfere.

March 3, 1945

Chichijima and Hahajima were strangely quiet today. Evidently they are not longer bothering the Empire with their routine alerts. Grids were received on the Blue Forces at Okinawa.

March 4, 1945

Very little plane activity anywhere, probably due to bad weather. Picket Boats have been set up around the Nansei Shoto Area. No alerts from Chichijima or Hahajima.

March 5, 1945

Planes are probably being staged into Hachiojima (ident questionable) today, from about 0800 to 1000. These planes are airborne for about 30 to 40 minutes, and it has been noted that raids against Iwojima usually follow this air activity on 7035J. Blue Task Force sighted again today.

March 6, 1945

Nothing doing, although we spent a fruitless mid-watch waiting for the attack foretold by FRUPAC. Nips must have changed their minds, because we didn't hear at thing. Here again negative evidence had some value.

TOP SECRET

ULTRA

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11 March, 1945

March 7, 1945

Another good frequency(6684A), turned to drill. Two messages sent in Aircraft Operational Code on the 6th at 1747 and 1841 were intercepted on the Tokyo Broadcast (HITU). Although the messages went from Air Base Iwojima and addressed for action to Air Base Kisaratsu, Air Base Hachiojima, and Comm. Unit Chichijima, we were not able to break out enough values to determine just what was sent. Evidently planes were to, or are to, land at sometime, at some Island(probably Chichijima).

March 8, 1945

Iwojima still on the air and at least one long action report went to Air Base Kisaratsu at 2038. A suspicious flight was up on 7035J which might concern us, although the lack of identities prevents any sort of prediction which would be of value.

March 9, 1945

Two bombers in last night at 0330(Item), the exact time FRUPAC said they would arrive. We didn't hear a thing either before or after the raid. This raid caused absolutely no damage, and definitely seemed to be concerned with Iwojima proper and not with the support forces. It is quite possible the planes used a new frequency, but we feel fairly confident that they did not communicate.

March 10, 1945

We have left Iwojima and are on the way back to the "Sweat Box". I shall secure the watches as soon as we get below Saipan, since we have ~~two~~ only three men left and they are badly in need of rest.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

053

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ULTRA

~~ULTRA SECRET~~
11 March, 1945

Reccommendations

1. This unit had the misfortune to lose the services of RM2/c Winston Buster on March 5th, when he was operated on for Appendicitis. This, of course, seriously impaired the units efficiency and forced the other watch standers to double up. Due to the fact that we have been forced to maintain a two section watch for over a period of a month, the men have received very little rest. Were we to have one extra man, the watch schedule could be eased considerably without affecting the necessary frequency coverage and an emergency such as the one mentioned above could be met without any serious effect on the units efficiency.

Operations have gotten to the point where they now extend over periods of one to two months, whereas the operations of a year ago extended over a period of two to three weeks. The short stay at Ulithi can hardly be termed a rest for the men. Consequently the extended watches of this type tend to argue for the addition of an extra operator to the units afloat.

2. We lament the fact that the "Jusits" have fallen off appreciably in the last week or so. No "Peter" values have been received and the frequency data has been extremely sketchy. The Oboe values have been very helpful to me and I certainly hope the policy of sending out Operation Aircraft Code values has not been discontinued. It would be of great value to us if FRUPAC would send out the frequencies on which attacks were staged, if by any chance we should have missed such a frequency. The inclusion of the frequency in the following day's "Jusits", would prevent our missing it a second time and would reassure us if the planes in the attack had actually maintained radio silence.

3. The sequence list which we received did not include sequence 4.

4. I have made several references in my reports to the value a medium high frequency D/F would have for an RI Unit.

There are many instances when we are able to determine when "Snoopers" are in the immediate vicinity. These planes very rarely appear on the "Radar Screen". If it were possible for us to give the Fighter Director a bearing on these planes, our Fighters could extend their searches in this direction and quite possibly "Splash" the "Snooper". This is particularly true of night "Snoopers" or night attacks when our planes depend for the most part on Radar contacts on the attack planes. If we could D/F a group of planes two or three hundred miles away, the CAP could be there to meet it when it came in. A D/F would also place some of the calls for us. This was exceptionally true in the case of Iwojima operations when the base calling very rarely signed his call.

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. Falmer
R. E. Falmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~
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~~ULTRA SECRET~~
5 March, 1945

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit(ComCarDiv7).
TO: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Technical Report of RI Operations from 25th February, 1945
to 3 March, 1945 inclusive, compiled by T. E. Gilmore CDM(PA)
USNR.
1. This report consists of .5 pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. E. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

cc: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet.
File.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) 5 March, 1945

Operations Report Covering the Period
25 February, 1945 to 3 March, 1945 inclusive.

25 February, 1945

Still operating Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity very light. Air Base Iwojima up on 3642J/7285J using call assigned to Coast Defense Vessel #59. Very small reaction to Blue Carrier Strike from the Tokyo Area.

Frequencies Heard

8480J Comm. Unit Yokosuka to SATEKO4.
7675A Comsubron 11 and units.
7035J Special Air Base Calls and Planes.
6855J K to KN.
6852M Maizura Naval District Call to LA3 Calls assigned to Maizura Naval District.
6705J Comm. Unit Chichijima to SATEKO4.
SURRESC #3 Cmdr. to unident LA3 Call.
6740J Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
5135J Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
3875A Yokosuka Air Defense Circuit.
3742J/7285J Air Base Iwojima, Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Atsuki, and Comm. Unit Chichijima.
3575A Air Group 903 and Detachments.
3241M Air Base Kanoya and Unident FU3 Calls.
2955J Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Takao, Air Base Atsuki, and Air Base Oroku. Tokyo Broadcast (HITU) Covered.

26 February, 1945

Still in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity increased noticeably in the Area in and around the Empire, nothing of concern to our Force noted however. Numerous sightings were received on 6580J giving grid positions on what appeared to be our Tanker Force NE of Chichijima, and also the Carrier Force operation to the SE of Tokyo. Ten grids were received all told, and as near as we could tell they were not rebroadcast, a fact which might indicate they were not genuine, but Drill. Other plane/base circuits were active also, but nothing to indicate of attacks on Carrier Task Forces operating off Tokyo.

Frequencies heard

8590A KN and KK Calls.
7955M Bases only. (Hei-Calls)
7705M KN Calls. (Drill)
7333M Bases and Planes, KK. Calls. (Drill)
7162M Base to KN Call.
7119M KK and KKN Calls.

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5 March, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

7035J Planes and Bases, special Air Base Calls.
6684M Planes. KKKN Calls.
6580J Bases and Planes. (Hei-Calls)
6508M Air Group 931 and unident FU3 Calls.
6740J Bases and Planes. Bases use Hei Calls-Planes use KKKN Calls.
6638M Bases only. (Hei Calls)
5595M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
5494M Bases only. (Hei Calls)
5337J Air Group 901-Toko Detachment and Plane.
5255M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
5240A KN and K Calls.
3875A Yokosuka Area Air Defense Circuit.
3747J Yokosuka Area Air Defense Circuit.
3643M Unident FU3 Calls except for KOTOSA listed as KCV HITAKA(Sunk), passing Drill traffic.
3642J Air Base Iwojima, Air Base Kisaratsu, and Comm. Unit Chichijima
3575A Air Group 903 and Detachments.
3783M Comm. Units Iwojima, Chichijima, and Mahajima. Might be low for 3840J but seems unlikely.
Ominato Broadcast Covered.

27 February, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity remains good. We are suspicious of the activity on 6580J, and it is our belief that it is being used for Drill. Search Planes up on 6684M again today.

Frequencies Heard

7285J Air Base Kisaratsu.
7090J KN to KN.
7035J Bases only. (Spec. Calls)
6740J Bases only. (Hei Calls)
6580J Bases and Planes. Planes using NKN Calls as well as KKKN. Believe this to be Drill Circuit now.
6578M Unident FU3 call to KN Calls.
5595M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
5343M Bases only. (Hei Calls) Air Base Yokohama compromised his Hei Call with his FU3 Call.
5337J Toko Detachment of Air Group 901, Tansui Detachment of Air Group 901, and Plane of Air Group 901.
5247M Air Base Shokozan to Unident KCOS Call. (5245A?)
5240A Air Group Kasumigaura and Air Group Matsushima. (FU3)
5255M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
5094M Air Group Suzuka and Unident FU3. (Drill)
3875A Yokosuka Radio, Hachiojima Lookout Station, Yokosuka Air Defense Command Post.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ 5 March, 1945
~~TOP SECRET~~
(Operations Report Cont'd)

3747J Yokosuka Air Defense Command Post to Hachiojima Lookout Station.
3321A Bases and Planes. (KKKN Calls)

28 February, 1945

Still in Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air activity very light in our Area and nothing of real importance noted. 6580J continues to produce what appears to be Drill grids, without the usual EN or KUN indicators. Numerous other drill circuits noted.

Frequencies Heard

- 8626M Bases and Plane. (Hei and FU3 Calls). Air Group Oita and Oita Detachment of Yokosuka Air Group. Probably 8630J.
- 7035J Bases and Planes.
- 6843M Planes. (Hei Calls)
- 6786M Bases only. (Drill)
- 6580J Planes. (Hei Calls) Probably drill.
- 5595M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
- 5346M Bases, including Air Base Atsuki. (Hei Call) Air Base Atsuki used his FU3 call also. This circuit is apparently between Air Base Yokohama and Air Base Atsuki.
- 5375J Comm. Unit Chichijima Local.
- 5248M Air Base Shokozan. (5247M on 27th)
- 5232M Bases. (Drill)
- 5077M Planes and Bases. (Hei Calls)
- 3875A Yokosuka AA Defense Stations..
- 3747J " " " "
- 3740M Tokyo calling Sasebo.
- 3860J Wake Island Detachment of Comm Unit 6 calling Comm. Unit Truk. (KC07)
- 3642J Comm. Unit Chichijima and Air Base Kisaratsu.
- 3321M KM Calls.

1 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Island Area. Search planes active on 6684M today, and they spotted our Carrier Task Force off Minami Daito Shima. 5593M was used by Aircraft conducting night attacks on our positions on Iwojima. Another attack during the late afternoon and early evening, planes using 7035J again, but apparently raid did not come off. Base called planes for several hours but did not make contact.

Frequencies Heard

- 7035J Base to Planes. (attack group)
Special Air Base Calls and Planes.
- 6684M Base and Search Planes. (Two Grids received)
- 6681M Bases only. (hei calls)
- 6705J SURFSC #3 Cndr using LA3 Call AFU16 to unident LA3.
- 5593M Bases to Planes (Night Attack Group) The same base call (KE7LI) has always worked these attack planes on this frequency and on 7035J.

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5 March, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

5344M Air Base Atsuki and Air Base Yokohama. (Hei Calls)
5254M Base to Planes. (Hei Calls) 5255M/27th.
6740J Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
5337J Air Group 901 Takao Detachment to Plane.
5135J Bases only. (Hei Calls)
3939M Unident Broadcast using prefix or indicator MIKA.
3160M Air Base Oita(FU3) to Unident FU3.
Ominato Broadcast covered.

2 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity in all areas light, and no search activity noted. Air drill circuits continue very active. Nothing of concern to our particular Task Group was uncovered. Air Base Kanoya using his K008 call was heard on 7874M broadcasting traffic to SATEKO4 and using indicator MIKA. This is the day frequency of the unident broadcast we heard on 3939M yesterday.

Frequencies Heard

7874M Air Base Kanoya Broadcast. (MIKA)
7035J Special Air Base Calls and Planes.
6800M KNN Calls. (Drill)
6798M Unident FU3 Calls.
6740J Planes using KKKK Calls.
6694M Unidents H01 and H02.
6684A Base heard only. This frequency averaged as of this date.
6620M KN Calls. (Drill)
6550J Air Group 901 Detachments.
6490J ComCruDiv22, Ominato, and Picket Boats.
6110M KKKC Calls. (Drill)
5715J K and KN Calls. Planes and Bases.
5245A Chinkai Defense Force.
5240A Unident FU3 Calls.
5225J Shanghai and Sasebo.
4723M Air Base Kisaratsu and Unident.
4781M Bases only. (Drill using Hei Calls)
4665J Sasebo Local.
3875A Yokosuka Area AA Defense Stations.
3758M Bases only. (Drill using Hei Calls)
Ominato Broadcast covered.

3 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity somewhat better today. Drill circuits still continue active in the Empire. Search Planes on 6684A were also up on 6740J at the same time. Grids received from the former and operational traffic received from the latter. There is a possibility that 6740J is used for inter-plane circuit.

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5 March, 1945

(Operations Report Cont'd)

Frequencies Heard

8915J	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
8725J	Bases and Planes. (Hei and NKKI-KKN Calls)
8438M	Unident FU3 Calls.
7790M	Planes of Air Group 901 and KK Calls.
7751M	Bases only. (Hei Calls)
7323M	KN Calls. Sent Drill Grids.
7035J	Special Air Base Calls and Planes.
6854M	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6740J	Planes NKK Calls. Also some activity on 6684A. Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6684A	Base and Planes. (Search Activity-Grid Received)
6639M	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6855J	K Calls.
6125J	Air Base Misawa.
5517J	Oshima DefFor Unit.
4686M	Unidents H01 and H02.
3960M	Bases only. (Hei Calls) Drill.
2976M	Bases only. (Hei Calls-Drill)
5255M	Bases only. (Hei Calls)
3575A	Air Group 903 and Detachments. Ominato Broadcast covered.

Due to our RBA Receiver being inoperative we have been unable to cover the Low Frequency Spectrum. After doing all we could to operate^{it} correctly we turned it over to the Ships Radio Material Shop. They were able to get slightly better reception but it is still useless as far as we are concerned. If and when we ever get in Port again where we can spend some time with it, we will attempt to get it operating properly.

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore
T. E. Gilmore CMM(PA) USNR.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

~~ULTRA SECRET~~
11 March, 1945

FROM: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit(ComCarDiv7).
TC: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
SUBJECT: Technical Report of RI Operations from 4th to 10th of
March, 1945 inclusive, compiled by T. E. Gilmore CRM (FA)
USNR.

1. This report consists of four(4) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer, Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge

RP
cc: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet.
File.

061

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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

11 March, 1945

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Technical Report from 4 March, 1945
to 10 March, 1945 inclusive.

4 March, 1945

Still in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity light in all Area's, probably due to weather conditions. No search activity up. A few routine flights were noted. Picket Boat sightings numerous following a "Surfaced Submarine" reported at 0804 by Picket Boat 4NUSASU. No picket boat positions were disclosed in their reports. Considerable drill activity continuing in the Empire.

Frequencies Heard

7875M Air Base Kanoya Broadcast. (MIKA)
7352M Single Kana Calls. TI, TA, and I.
7333M KN Calls. (Drill)
7225M Unidents KO and K03.
7118M Air Base Tokushima to Air Group Tokushima Planes.
7035J Planes and Bases.
6740J Bases only, calling planes. (Hei Calls)
6738M Special Air Base and Plane Calls. (Drill)
6640M Special KN Calls. Drill grids received.
6735M Single Kana Calls, RE and SA.
5725J Kyushu and Nansei Shoto Area Search Planes and Bases.
3915J Unident FU3 Calls.
3747J Yokosuka Area Lookout Station and AA Defense Stations.
3575A Air Group 903 and Detachments.

5 March, 1945

The loss of the services of Euster, W. S. RM2/c, due to an Appendectomy, has caused us to inaugurate ^{A NEW} watch standing system. One man goes on at 0800 and stays on until 2000. Another man goes on at 1000 and stays on until 2200. The other man goes on at 2200 and stays until the next morning at 0800. This gives us two men on during the time when reception and activity are the best. Watches are not rotated under this system.

Search planes active on 7035J and 6684A, with several grids being received, none on us, however. The grid received from plane LKIKU on 7035J is our first indication that these planes have been or are now engaged in search activity. Grids were re-broadcast by Air Base Kanoya on his MIKA Broadcast. Drill activity continues in the Empire. Our Task Group is still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area.

Frequencies Heard

8433M Unident FU3 Calls.
7875M Air Base Kanoya Broadcast. (MIKA)
7480A Unident FU3 Calls.

11 March, 1945

(Technical Report Cont'd)

7429M K and KN Calls. (Drill)
7035J Special Air Base and Plane Calls. (Grid received)
6948M KN Calls. (Drill)
6838M Air Base Ibusuki working H01.
6743M H01 and H02.
6740J Base and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6689M KN Calls. (Drill)
6577M Air Group Himeji and Air Group Himeji Planes.
6684A Bases and Planes. Grid received. This frequency Averaged as of this date.
6640A AØRE and KN Plane Calls. This frequency Averaged as of this date. AØRE and SAMUNE9 (Tokushima Air Group) might be one and the same.
6640M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls) Was 6639M on the 3rd.
6342M K and KN Calls.
5715J Kyushu and Nansei Shoto Area Bases and Search Planes.
3965M Bases only. (Hei Calls) Sending Drill traffic. Measured 3960 on the 3rd.
3167J Unident FU3 Calls.
3057J Air Base Kanoya.
Ominato Broadcast Covered.

6 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity very light. Drill circuits continue active in the Empire. Intensive search made for possible attack frequency during the early morning, but nothing uncovered and no attack came off.

Frequencies Heard

7705M Base and Planes. (Hei Calls.) Drill.
7035J Special Air Base Calls and Planes.
6771M Bases only. (Hei Calls)
6689M K and KN Calls. (Sending both Drill and JITU traffic)
6853M Air Base Ibusuki, Single Kana Call, and Planes using Hei Calls.
This measured 6838 on the 5th.
6637M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls) Measured 6640 on the 5th.
5725J Kyushu and Nansei Shoto Area Bases and Planes.
4732M Unident FU3 Calls.
3915J Unident FU3 Calls.
3782J Air Base Takao (Shokozen) RCKU Broadcast.
4131M Air Group 901-Toko Detachment, Air Group 901-Sama Detachment. First known appearance of this circuit.
3575A Air Group 903 and Detachments.
2983.5M Bases only. (Hei Calls) Drill circuit.
2980J Same as 7035J
Ominato Broadcast Covered.

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~~ULTRA SECRET~~
11 March, 1945

(Technical Report Cont'd)

7 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Air Activity moderate. Night frequency found on the activity on 6684A, on 334M. Several grids received from these two frequencies, but as none of them appeared on any of the Broadcasts were are inclined to believe that this circuit is also being used for drill purposes. Iwojima Air Base heard on 3642J working Air Base Kisaratsu, and Comm. Unit Chichijima. This circuit is using KOC8 calls now.

Frequencies Heard

8200M	KN Calls. (Drill)
7035J	Special Air Base and Plane Calls.
6740J	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6684A	Bases and Planes. (Drill)
6625M	Unident Base to Plane. (Hei Call)
5715J	Kyushu and Nansei Shoto Area Bases and Planes.
4404.5M	Bases only. (Hei Calls) Drill.
4131M	Air Group 901-Toko Detachment, Air Base 30-Bako, and Air Group 901-Tansui Detachment. Measured same on the 6th.
3966M	Bases only. (Hei Calls) Drill. Measured 3964 on the 5th.
3779.5M	Bases only. (Hei Calls)
3764.5M	Bases only. (Hei Calls) Also KKN and KN Calls. All Drill.
334M	Same as 6684A. Grids received.
2980J	Same as 7035J.

Ominato Broadcast Covered.

8 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Drill activity continues heavy in the Empire. 6684A was active with planes originating, what we believe are drill grids. Today was first time we have heard planes using NKKK and KKKK type calls on this frequency. 6580J was very active sending JITU traffic along with the regular drill traffic. 5595A was active, with four planes and one Base up. Could be possible that another attack is on the way. Iwojima Air Base up on 3642J working Air Base Kisaratsu.

Frequencies Heard

7705M	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls) Drill traffic.
7035J	Special Air Bases and Plane calls.
6787M	FU3 and 1A1 Calls.
6740J	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6705J	Comm. Unit Yokosuka working Transport #16.
6684A	Base and Planes (Hei Calls) Probably Drill.
6580J	Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls) Drill and JITU traffic.
6225M	Base and Planes. (Hei Calls) Drill.
5715J	Kyushu and Nansei Shoto Area Bases and Planes.
5595A	Base and Planes. (Hei Calls)
3964.4M	Bases only. (Hei Calls) Drill. 3966M/7th.

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11 March, 1945

(Technical Report Cont'd)

3642J Air Base Iwojima and Air Base Kisaratsu.
5334M NK Calls.
Now covering the Tokyo HITU Broadcast. Cminato not putting out much good
dope anymore.

9 March, 1945

Still operating in the Bonins-Volcano Islands Area. Drill activity continous heavy in the Empire. Air Group 901 Detachments have all changed there special calls. Now using NK calls with the numeral being 0, in all cases. Air Group 901-Toko Detachment (EX-HE0) now used call of 0TE. Attack planes over Iwojima around 0330, but we were unable to find them on any frequencies.

Frequencies Heard

7035J/035J Special Air Bases and Plane calls.
6740J Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6711M FU3 to 143 Call.
6638A Base and Planes. (Hei Call) This frequency Averaged of this date.
6580J Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls) Drill traffic.
6550J Air Group 901 Detachments using new calls.
6224M Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls) Drill traffic. Measured 6225 on the 8th.
5715M KNN Calls. Drill traffic.
5595A Base and Planes. (Hei Calls)
5337J Air Group 901 Detachments. Using new calls.
3642J Air Base Kisaratsu, Comm. Unit Chichijima. Air Base Iwojima called but un-
heard.
3501M Unident FU3 Calls.
2980J Same as 7035J
Tokyo HITU Broadcast covered.

10 March, 1945

Departed Iwojima this day, enroute to Ulithi Atoll. Drill activity continues in the Empire. Other air activity very light.

Frequencies Heard

7700J Fleet Escort #1 CinC and Unident FU3.
7035J Special Air Bases and Plane Calls.
6740J Bases and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6638A Base and Planes. (Hei Calls)
6642M KN Calls. Drill traffic.
6225M Base and Planes. (Hei Calls) Drill traffic. Measured 6224 on 9th.
3320.5m KN Calls. Drill traffic.
Tokyo HITU Broadcast covered.

Respectfully submitted,
T. E. Gilmore
T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

22 March, 1945

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit, ComCarDiv 7.
To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific
Subject: Operations Report for the period from 14 March to 20 March, 1945,
submitted by T. E. Gilmore CRM (FA) USNR.

1. This report consists of six (6) pages.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer Lt., (jg) USNR
Officer in Charge.

CC: Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, Fifth Fleet.
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22 March, 1945

Operations Report for the Week
14, March, 1945 to 20 March, 1945
inclusive.

14, March, 1945

Underway from Ulithi Anchorage at 0700. On the 13th we received Plaum, H. T. RM2/c and Clinkenbeard, D. E. RM2/c as replacements for Buster, W. S. RM2/C and Lee, L. H. CRM. Buster still on light duty only and Lee transferred to COMCARDIV 5. A two-man two-section watch in effect.

Receiving conditions poor to fair, as is the case around this area. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast put on speaker watch. Believe this Broadcast will suit our purpose for this operation.

Frequencies Heard

7841M Yokohama Air Port and Shoonan Air Port.
4583M KKN Calls. (Drill)
4371M KKN Calls. (Unident activity)
4240J Yokosuka Radio to SATEKO4.
3915J Air Base Kisaratsu and other Air Bases.
3875A Yokosuka Defense Command Post and Unit in Tokyo Bay Force.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

15 March, 1945

Air Activity very light. Receiving conditions very bad. Close check kept on Search Plane frequencies and on Picket Boats.

Frequencies Heard

7035J Air Base Kanoya and Air Base Usa. (Non-changing KKN calls)
6705J Yokosuka Radio and SEF #3 Commander.
6684A Search Plane, heard only once and very weak.
6659M KK Calls. (Believe this to be Army Act.,)
6625J Rota and Truk.
6490J Comm. Unit Cminato, ComCruDiv 22, and Picket Boats.
5802M KN Calls. (Unident Activity)
5100J Yokosuka Radio and Marcus Island.
4206M Air Group Oi, Air Group Kasumigaura and Air Group Hakata.
4309M Air Group Suzuka, Air Group Koochi, and Air Group Tokushima. (Drill circuit sending grids)
3993M Bases only. (Hei Calls)
2980J Same as 7035J.
2975M Bases only. (Hei Calls-Drill t/c)

Operation Report Cont'd.

16 March, 1945

Air Activity extremely heavy on 6684A/3342M, with a total of 9 different planes producing 19 grid position. These grid positions were all in approximately the same area (25 to 28 degrees North Latitude-131 to 135 degrees East Longitude). It is hard to determine whether these were genuine or drill. They were definitely not on Task Force 58, but the fact remains that Air Base Kanoya was rebroadcasting this traffic. Viewing it another way-none of this traffic was heard on any of the other Broadcasts suggesting that this activity was a large scale drill exercise.

Close check kept on 6490J for possible Picket Boat Positions.

Frequencies Heard

8435A Air Group Kasumigaura, Air Group Hakata, and Air Group Ci. (4206M/15th probable night frequency of this)
7952M Base and Planes. (Drill)
8725J Bases and Planes.
7120M KK Calls. (Unident activity)
7035J Air Base Kanoya and Air Base Usa. (Non-changing calls)
6855J Bases only. (Hei Calls)
6930M Air Group Hyakurihara to his Planes.
6740J Bases only. (Hei Calls)
6705J Yokosuka Radio.
6640M Bases to planes. (Hei Calls)
6561M Air Group 931 to Air Base Shuuzan.
6550J Air Group 901 Detachments.
6684A/3342M Bases and Planes. (Many grids)
6490J Comm. Unit Cminato, ComCruDiv 22, Unident ANAØ42, Picket Boat Division 4, Patrol Vessel (ANIKAKE).
4130M Air Group 901 Detachments.
5302J Air Group Suzuka and Air Group Koochi.
3915J Air Base Kisaratsu and Unident Bases.
3875A N. D. Yokosuka Air Defense Command Post and unident ANCØ56.
3575A Air Group 903, Hachiojima Detachment Air Group 903. (Air Group 903 now using FU-3 Call)
3553.5M KKN Calls. (Drill)
533.8M KMK Calls. (Drill)
434J Yokosuka Defense Force.
208J Comm. Unit Sasebo.
110E KK Calls. (D/F Circuit)
67J Sasebo Broadcast. (NORU)
331.9m Sasebo Air Base to SUSCE8
Kanoya Air Base Broadcast.

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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

22 March, 1945

Operation Report Cont'd

17 March, 1945

Air Activity was highlighted by the sighting of our Force by plane LSAMA at 2245 on 3342M. Air activity of the same nature as on the 16th continued on 6684A/3342M up until the time plane LSAMA actually sighted us. We still believe that the activity on this circuit up to the time of the sighting was drill as far as the traffic goes, but that the planes were also on the lookout for our force. Eight planes were up and six grid positions including the one by plane LSAMA. ~~Grids~~. The grids were in the same general area as on the 16th. The grid position originated by LSAMA was 29:47N-133:33E. Air activity on 6740J was very heavy. Seven planes were up and 13 grid positions received. These grids were in the area bounded by 26 to 29:57N by 130-138E. Believe this circuit was drill, and the same type of activity that is on 6684A/3342M

Euster, W. S. RM2/c put on day watches only. This gives us three men during the daylight hours and two each during the evening and mid watches.

Frequencies Heard

7956M	Base only. (Hei Call-Drill) Measured 7952/16th.
7697M	KN Calls. (Drill)
7120M	KK Calls. Aircraft type traffic received.
7035J	Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Usa, Unident HAØRU and Planes.
6840M	Base and Planes. (Hei Calls-Drill)
6740J	Planes. (Drill Grids)
6705J	Yokosuka Radio and SATEKØ4.
6684A	Base and Planes. (Grids received, Drill and authentic)
6550J	Air Group 901-Toko Detachment, Kieta Garrison Unit, and Unident Detachments of Air Group 901.
6490J	Comm. Unit Cminato, ComCruDiv 22, SATEKØ4, Maru Kihoo #1, AMAØ42, and Patrol Vessel (AMIKAKE).
5715J	Bases and Planes Kyushi-Nansei Shoto Area.
5337J	Air Group 901-Toko Detachment and Plane of Air Group 901-Toko Detachment.
5305J	Croku Detachment of Air Group 951.
5240M	Unident FU-3 Calls.
420J	Sasebo Defense Force. Kanoya Air Base Broadcast.

18 March, 1945

Air Activity was extremely heavy. 6684A/3342M and 6740J and new night frequency 3366M were used by both search and attack planes. Thirtythree planes were heard on the 3342M series, with 30 grid positions received. Eight planes were heard on the 3366M series, with no grid positions received.

This Task Group was under attack by an enemy plane at 0740, when a Divebomber dove on this ship dropped a 660 pound bomb which struck our forward elevator a glancing blow, skidded down the flight deck and struck the forward part of the island

Operation Report Cont'd

structure. Our luck was with us however, as the tail section of the bomb, which contains the fuse and booster charge broke off from the main portion of the bomb and exploded causing minor damage. The rest of the bomb continued down the flight deck and came to rest near the middle of number 2 elevator, from where it was rolled over the fan-tail by the more stout hearted of the crew. We consider ourselves most fortunate, because if the bomb had stayed intact and exploded by the island structure this unit would probably have been wiped out, as we are located about 15 feet forward and on the gallery deck from the spot where the tail section of the bomb exploded. We had no indication that a plane was making an attack, although we did know that planes were in our vicinity, and the ship was properly alerted. This particular pilot just pulled a fast one on the whole Task Group.

At 0755 plane WC5HAL on 6684A announced that he was attacking, signal was of the loudest so we knew he was coming in on this Task Group. Proper authorities were immediately notified and the plane was shot down by the combined guns of the Task Group. Again, this ship was the particular target. Enemy planes were around us all day with sporadic attacks being made.

Some traffic received from the Kanoya Broadcast was originated by planes we did not have up. Search was made but this circuit was not heard, a fact which worried us considerably.

Frequencies Heard

7035J	Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Usa and Planes.
6855J	Bases only. (Hei Calls)
6740J	Bases and Planes.
6684A	Bases and Planes.
6490J	ComCruDiv 22 and Comm. Unit Gminato.
6115J	Air Base Croku and Minami Daito Shima Air Base.
6050M	Bases only. (Repeating Grid positions)
3366M	Same as 6740J
3342M	Same as 6684A

Both Kanoya and Tokyo Broadcast were covered at different times. During the early morning and late afternoon both the Kanoya and Sasebo Broadcast would fade to such an extent that we had to use Tokyo Broadcast.

19 March, 1945

Air Activity continued heavy up until around 1600, when it abruptly dropped off. The operational frequencies of 6684A/3342M and 6740J/3366M continued to be used by enemy aircraft. The 3342M series produced 27 grid positions with 18 different aircraft heard, while the 3366M series produced 3 grid positions with 10 different aircraft heard. Plane E7RA4 sighted 4 Carriers around 1400. We received this message from the Kanoya Broadcast. Apparently there is another operational frequency being used, as several messages have been copied from the Broadcast originated by planes which were not active on either the 3342M series or the 3366M series. This frequency is probably not very active as the amount of traffic rebroadcasted is very small. We just have not been fortunate enough to run across it, although we have been checking very carefully.

~~TOP SECRET~~
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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

22 March, 1945

Operations Report Cont'd

Plane 2RCSA was heard on 3341M (Nife Frequency of 6638A), also active on 3342M series.

Frequencies Heard

7820J Air Base Atsuki and Plane.
7310M NK and NKN. (Drill)
6740J Bases and Planes.
6684A Bases and Planes. (Air Base Kanoya identified)
7035J Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Usa and planes.
6055M Bases only. (Hei Calls) Air Base Suzuka probable ident. This measured 6050/18th.
3366M Same as 6740J
3342M Same as 6684A.
2980J Same as 7035J
The call WALKI and A3MI70, A3MI14, A3MI05, and A3MI03, which appeared on 3366M and 6740J are believed to be drill.

Kanoya Broadcast, Sasebo Broadcast, and Tokyo Broadcast were all covered at different times.

20 March, 1945

Air Activity continued heavy throughout the day. The 3342J series produced 28 grid positions, with 17 different planes heard. The 3366M series produced no grid positions, but 5 planes were heard.

This Task Group was under attack by approximately 20 enemy aircraft around 1615. Several hours prior to this we had began to get indications that an attack was in the offing. Proper authorities were notified and the Ship was in a alerted condition. In spite of this, seven enemy planes penetrated our screen, and between 1620 and 1625 four of these planes attacked this Ship. Four bombs were dropped which were all near-misses, but one was close enough to start a fire in the two 40MM Gunmounts almost directly over our operating room. Several planes caught fire also, and as a result of the combined fires of the planes and the gunmounts, the ready ammunition both 40MM and 50 Caliber began exploding directly over us, and smoke from the fires began pour-in along with the salt water and Foamite from the fire fighting equipment. A very fast decision was made and all hands abandon'd the operating room "on the double". We were not able to get back into the operating room until 1610. It was in terrible condition, although the fire did not penetrate into it. The salt-water and Foamite had been liberally sprayed over everything, but by some miracle had not damaged the equipment, so we were able to start watches again at 1615. One antenna was blown away but this did not hinder operation seriously. Telephone communication to Flag Plot was out, and this caused great difficulty in passing along information. Although all-hands were thoroughly scared we were able to get back on the job again.

It became apparent around 2125 that another attack group was on the way, when "Snooper" 1AYC1 began sending grid positions to "Attack Plane" NC/TFL. At 2258 NC

22 March, 1945

Operation Report Cont'd

NOCTEL began asking for bearings from LAYO1. At 2327 LAYO1 announced that he was going to drop flares. Flares were dropped shortly after this. At 2331 NOCTEL gave the signal for all planes to attack. Torpedo's are believed to have been dropped. Attack group penetrated slightly into our Screening Force then turned sharply away. No damage was inflicted by the enemy. LAYO1 announced at 2341 that he was dropping flares again, but no more attack planes came in. We believe this attack was a complete failure on the part of the enemy. This unit was able to furnish complete details of this attack from the first indications until the planes attacked, to the proper authorities.

Frequencies Heard

7035J	Air Base Kanoya and Air Base Usa.
7120M	KK Calls.
6855J	Bases only.
6740J	Bases and Planes.
6685J	Bases and Planes.
6550J	Air Group 901-Toko Detachment.
6547M	Bases and Planes
6490J	ComCruDiv22, Comm. Unit Ominato, and Patrol Boats.
6341M	Same activity as on 5715J
3366M	Same as 6740J.
3342J	Same as 6685J.

Kanoya Broadcast, Sasebo Broadcast, and Tokyo Broadcast at different times.

On the morning of the 19, March, this Task Group (58.5) was detached from Task Group 58.4 with which we had been operating ~~with~~ since we left Ulithi, and took over command of Task Group 58.2, temporarily, while the Commander of Task Group 58.2 was transferring from his Flag Ship (U.S.S. Franklin) to the U.S.S. Hancock. On the 20th command of Task Group 58.2 was transferred from this Ship to the U.S.S. Hancock, and we reverted to Task Group 58.5 again although operating under Task Group 58.2. As a result of our Task Group Commander operating under another Task Group Commander, who was without an Radio Intelligence Unit, the information that we obtained was not utilized to its fullest. This is a situation that very rarely occurs and hope it does not occur in the future.

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CWO USNR

~~TOP SECRET~~
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USS ENTERPRISE(CV6)

15 April, 1945


From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
ComCarDiv Seven.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.


Subject: Operations report for the period from 21 March
to 5 April, 1945. Submitted by T. E. Gilmore
CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of three(3) pages.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer in Charge.

cc: OinC Fifth Fleet RI Units.
File.



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

15 April, 1945

Operations Report from 21 March, 1945 to
4 April, 1945, inclusive.

21 March, 1945

The whole Task Force is retiring from the Kyushu Area today. Air activity continued heavy until 1700, at which time it died down considerably. This Task Group was again under attack. At 1219 plane RO2NA1 gave the signal for attack and shortly after, he was shot down by ships AA fire after penetrating well into our formation. The plane was a type Francis. There were three planes involved in this attack. Two were shot down by our CAP (Combat Air Patrol), and the other as mentioned. An interesting thing was noticed on 6740J, when plane I9KA1 secured at 1424 his signal was extremely loud. As Minami Daito Shima was the nearest possible landing field to us at the time, it seemed quite probable that the plane mentioned landed there. A Japanese voice circuit was also heard on 6740J, sounding very much like a military circuit. ^{As}Mr. Palmer, ~~was~~ extremely busy at the time, and ^{as}the circuit was only up for a short period of time, no positive identification could be made.

On the 3342J series, 26 planes were heard and 29 grid positions were received. On the 3360M/6740J series, 6 planes were heard, no grid positions were received.

Frequencies Heard

6740J	Bases and Planes Kyushu Area.	Search and Attack.
6685J	Bases and Planes Kyushu Area.	Search and Attack.
6490J	Comm. Unit Cminato.	
3342J	Night frequency for 6685J.	
3360M	Night frequency for 6740J.	
	Kanoya Air Base Broadcast.	

22 March, 1945

Air Activity died down considerably. No aircraft were heard on the Search and Attack frequencies, although the Bases were up passing traffic. Watches were eased, as we are now underway to Ulithi for repairs to Battle Damage.

15 April, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

Operation Report
(Cont'd)

22 March, 1945

Frequencies Heard

9045J Bases and Planes. Formosa and Kyushu.
8725J Bases and Planes. Empire.
8630J Bases and Planes. Empire.
7035J Bases and Planes. Kyushu Area. Air Base Kanoya (KEØSI)
6685J Kyushu Area Air Bases.
6550J Air Group 901 Detachments.
6490J Comm. Unit Ominato.
3342J Night frequency for 6685J.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

23 March, 1945

Underway for Ulithi. Air activity continues quiet, although a new frequency was found on 6649M. No identification as to area location of this activity, but from signal strength of the Base it is probably located in the southern Nansai Shoto or in Formosa. Nothing else of importance was noted.

Frequencies Heard

6740J Base and Plane. Search activity.
6649M Base working planes. New frequency.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

24 March, 1945

Arrived Ulithi. Operational frequency of 3342J/6685J showed briefly, but reception was generally poor. Grids on our main force enroute to attack Okinawa were received. New air frequency of 6649M showed briefly, with bases only being heard. Reception is always poor in this locality.

Sullivan, R. E. RM2/c reported aboard this date.

Frequencies Heard

6685J Bases and Planes. Search and Attack.
6649M Bases only.
3342 J Night for 6685J

15 April, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
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Operation Report
(Cont'd)

25 March to 5 April, 1945

Watches were eased on the 25th of March. One man put on day watches only, to check air circuits and watch Broadcast to determine any change in the Radio Intelligence picture. Reception is foud here at Ulithi, even Tokyo Broadcast (HITU) is difficult to copy at times. Due to Battle Damage repairs in and around the operating room, watch standing was reduced to a minimum for security sake. All registered publications were removed to a secure stowage. One man was kept around "shack" at all times, while repairs were being made. After the shipfitters were through in our area, the "shack" was given a thorough "Field Day" and decks and bulkheads were painted. Antenna's were repaired and we were ready for operation by sailing day on the 5th of April.

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR

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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) 15 April, 1945


From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
CmCarDiv Seven.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Operations Report for the period from 5 April
to 11 April, 1945, inclusive. Submitted by
T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of five(5) pages.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer Lt.(jg) USNR

cc: CinC RI Units, Fifth Fleet
File

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15 April, 1945

Weekly Report Covering the Period
5 April to 11 April, 1945, inclusive.

5 April, 1945

Sortied from Ulithi at 1000 (-10 Zone), enroute for the Okinawa Area. New Air circuit picked up on 6531M. Bases and planes heard, but unable to identify activity as to area. Circuit was first heard at 1751 and activity faded out at 1920.

Frequencies Heard

9045J Empire Air Bases.
8725J Empire Air Bases.
8975J Escort Fleet #1-Takao Detachment, First Escort Fleet Cmdr.
8480J Surface Escort Unit #3 Cmdr to Comm. Unit Yokosuka.
8430J Air Group Cii, Air Group Hakata, and Air Group Kasumigaura.
6550J Air Group 901 Detachments.
6531M Bases and Planes. New activity-unidentified.
5332M Unidentified KCC-8 Calls.
Sasebo Broadcast.

6 April, 1945

Air activity increased considerably. The 3342J/6685J series was active and a large number of grids received from Search Planes on this circuit. FRUPAC reported frequency of 5075M was heard on 5071M with planes using NKK Calls.

Frequencies Heard

7870J Planes and unsigned Bases. Planes used KN Calls.
6740J Planes and Bases. Kyushu Area.
6685J Planes and Bases. Search and Attack.
6490J ComCruDiv 22.
6269M Planes working Bases, and vice versa. This maybe FRUPAC reported frequency of 6267M.
5337J Takao Detachment Air GROUP 901.

(page 1 of 5)

078

15 April, 1945

Weekly Report Cont'd.

6 April, 1945

5305J Seaplane Base Sao Guntoo.
5071M Bases and Planes.
5210A Air Base Kanoya and other FU3 Calls.
4205M Air Group Oi, Air Group Hakata, and Air Group
Kasumigaura. (Probably night frequency of 8430J)
Sasebo and Kanoya Broadcasts.

7 April, 1945

Air activity continued fairly heavy on 3342J/6685J, with numerous grids on Blue Forces in the Nansei Shoto Areas. 6740J was also active carrying same activity. Air Base Shinchiku, and Air Base Takao and one other unidentified base were up on 5289M, working planes. The planes were using KNK calls and were easily identified as planes. Activity seemed to be in the movement of aircraft from the Takao Area to the Shinchiku Area. This circuit is probably previously reported FRIMPAC frequency of 5285KCS. Check was made on possible frequencies used by Japanese Naval Units, but results were negative. Base Force Okinawa Cmdr, was heard on 7460J sending traffic to unident FU-3 Calls. From N-1 placements, one of the calls was probably Second Diversionary Attack Force Cmdr.

Frequencies Heard

9045J Bases and Planes. Empire.
7460J Base Force Okinawa Cmdr to Unident FU3 Calls.
Cmdr. #4 Escort Fleet.
6740J Bases and Planes. Search.
6685J Bases and Planes. Search and Attack.
6550J CinC First Suesco Fleet, Toko Detachment-Air Group 901.
Shanghai Detachment of Air Group 901.
6501M Unident LA3 Calls.
5289M Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao and Planes.
4137J CinC First Suresco Fleet, Toko and Shanghai Detachments of
Air Group 901.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

8 April, 1945

Air activity was extremely light. Only one plane was heard on 6685J/3342J series. This plane was later called by Base on 6740J.

15 April, 1945

April 8, 1945 Cont'd.

Frequencies Heard

9100M CDV #3 to CDV#14 and Kashima CLT.
9045J Bases and Planes-Empire.
8725J Bases and Planes-Empire.
7845A Yokohama Airport.
7700J Kashima CLT.
7035 J Air Base Kanoya and unidentified KNK Call.
6740J Base and Plane.
6685J Base and Plane. (Also on 6740J)
6640M KN Calls. Drill.
6340J Bases and Planes. K and KN Calls.
6115J Air Base Oroku, and Air Base Kanoya.
6010J Air Group Koochi and Planes.
5289M Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, and planes.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

9 April, 1945

Air activity increased slightly. 6650J(6649M) showed with positive ident, Air Base Shinchiku and other unident Base. Two planes were heard although three others were called by both planes and the Bases. This latter activity occurred from 1706 to 2000. Previously to this a single plane had been active from 0827 to 1125. No grids or any indications of attacks being carried out were noted. At 1908, 5289M came up with Air Base Takao calling a plane. Air Base Shinchiku was heard later, at 2053. There were three groups of planes active and it seemed apparent that they were on a flight from Takao to Shinchiku. This activity died down after 2357.

Frequencies Heard

8800A Bases and Planes. Drill Circuit.
8183M KKN and FU-3 Calls. Drill Circuit.
7035J Air Base Kanoya and unident Base.
6720M Okinawa Special Base Force Cmdr., Air Base Tansui, and Oshima Deffor Unit.
6712M FU-3 Calls. Drill Circuit.
6656M Same as 6720M.
6650J Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, Unident Base and Planes.
6550J Air Group 901 Toko and Shanghai Detachments.
6340J K and KN Calls.
5289M Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, Unident Base and Planes.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

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15 April, 1945

Weekly Report Cont'd.

10 April, 1945

Air activity was very light throughout the day. The 3342J/6685J series was active for a short period, with three planes being heard. No sighting occurred. A Base (probably Shinchiku) was calling two planes on 6650J but failed to establish communications with them. Planes were unheard.

In accordance with FRUPAC Secret despatch 082353, Fritz, H. F. RM2/c USN, was detached this date. No relief was required.

Frequencies Heard

9045 J	Bases and Planes.
7692M	KN Calls. Drill Circuit.
7460J	Special Base Force Okinawa Cmdr., #4 Suresco Cmdr.
7334M	Unident Base calling KE1NO.
7220M	Air Base Atsuki to unident FM3 Call.
7035J	Air Base Kanoya (KEØST) and FUØYU (Unident)
6685J	Base and Planes.
6650J	Air Base Shinchiku calling planes.
6740J	Unident Bases.
6550J	Air Group 901-Toko Detachment.
6340J	KN Calls.
5305J	Air Base Sasebo, Air Base Lungwha, Chinkai Air Base, Seaplane Base Sad Gunto.
5255J	Air Base Tanegashima, Air Base Croku, and Air Base Kanoya.
4137J	CinC First Escort Fleet and Air Group 901 Detachments.
3342J	Same as 6685J.
	Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

11 April, 1945

Air activity increased considerably today. The 3342J/6685J series being used by search and attack planes from Kyushu Bases. Snoopers were active throughout the day, and kept us under close observation. Activity died down around 1145 but became active again at 1340 when plane YAYAH1 announced that Fighters were on his tail. At 1400 "Bogeys" were reported⁴⁷ CTC, as closing fast on our force. Our guns opened up at 1404 and at 1409 a suicide job crashed into our port quarter at the water line. The concussion from this hit shook us up considerably, to say the least. One of our SX-28 receivers was shaken from its shelf and fell in the lap of Plaum, H. T. RM2/c, who quickly placed it back and tried to continue operating, but under difficulties. One RIP 5 was damaged as a result of this. One antenna was out, but beyond that everything came through alright.

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15 April, 1945

11 April, 1945 Cont'd.

Considerable amount of loose gear was thrown on the deck, adding to the confusion.

The enemy kept up the attacks and scored several near misses. One in particular, at 1459, shook us up severely. This suicide plane dove across our flight deck hit one of our planes a glancing blow and crashed into the sea close to our starboard bow. This caused a fire in the plane on our flight deck, but was brought under control very shortly. During this whole attack there was no indication from the enemy, except for the presence of snoopers, that an attack was being launched. Voice circuits were checked ~~on~~ on the RBK, but results were negative. The snoopers YAVAH1 and 2 were undoubtedly the guide planes.

At 1516 plane YAYAH2 sent a grid position to plane NKURE1. At 1544 the same plane called the whole group (NKURE) and repeated the same grid position. From this it was quite apparent that another attack was on the way. At 1625 plane NKURE1 sighted three carriers. It appeared very certain now that an attack was coming in probably around sunset. Several new groups of planes came up around 1800, and at 1903 plane KATEMI3 sighted one of our Task Groups lying to the north of us. At 1918, plane MARORI4 announced he was going to attack, as did KATEMI3. Three Betty's were shot down at this time by planes from this ship.

3342J became active at 1857, but 6685J still continued active.

It was noted that plane MARORI4 was keying dual on both 3342J and 6685J.

The group of planes using the call NIYURA with numerals were the snoopers during this night attack. Flares were dropped around our forces, and attacks were made, but this Task Group came through these night attacks in good shape. It was very hard on our nerves, however.

The conduct of the operators on watch during the day and night attacks was commendable. They stuck to their jobs even though their nerves were very much on edge.

The damage to another RIP 5 leaves us with only two machines in operation. Repairs will be attempted at the first opportunity.

Frequencies Heard

6685J	Bases and Planes. Search and Attack
6340J	KN Calls. Air Group 951 Activity
6226M	Unidentified Bases.
5337J	Planes and Bases of Air Group 901.
4137J	Shanghai Detachment of Air Group 901.
3342J	Same as 6685J.
	Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore
T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR

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17 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Today's activity was high lighted by the sighting of the Task Force at 2245. Plane (13AMA) working Air Base Kanoya on the regular search frequency which produced yesterday's battle problem grids, came up and sent out the double positions of 29:47N-133:33E and 29:22N-133:33E. The signal strength of the planes transmitter was extremely loud, in fact the oscillator of the planes transmitter could be heard quite distinctly. This is always an indication that the plane is very close. ^{Up to} Bogeys had appeared on the radar screen previous to this transmission, but since this was his number 1 message, we are sure he had not sent out anything previous to this time. The information was put out on the Kanoya Broadcast at 2313. The same plane sent out his number 2 message, originated at 2300, at 2321 and ^{it} was put on the Kanoya Broadcast at 2326. The message gave the condition of the weather over us. At 2330 the number 3 message was sent, containing another grid position at 30:12N-133:53E. A second plane with a weak signal came up at 2336 and sent his number 1 message with the grid position of 28:47N-134:18E.

It is interesting to note that the same frequency had been active this morning at 0542 and had sent out grid positions which came out in the positions 27:30N-132:50E and 27:10N-132:10E. At 0610 a plane sent out the position 26:57N-133:18E. Our position at the time was 25:19N-135:53.6E. Although both of these grids appeared on the Kanoya Broadcast, as well as the subsequent grids, they were not on the Blue Carrier Task Force. I am led to believe the activity was a continuation of the Battle Problem or drill activity mentioned in yesterday's report. At least five planes were active.

083

At 1025 another drill circuit was picked up and at least 3 planes were up sending grids to each other. Since none of these grids actually concerned us and since the planes insisted on sending the grids to each other, we felt this was definitely drill. However, since the grids all fall in the general area between 25 to 27N and 132 to

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17 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)


135E, we watched the frequency carefully. At 1548 one of these planes (2KIN04) had a very loud signal and his oscillator could be heard. However, nothing came of all this traffic and I feel safe in saying that we passed right through the area covered by these planes, without being observed. This circuit died down at 1548.

Air Activity on the other circuits was fairly high with drill traffic holding the prominent position on most circuits. Air Base's Kanoya and Usa were in communication again, but no planes were heard.

Two Picket Boats had a flurry of activity from 0150 to 0302. One of these, (7TOUKA) gave his position at 0150 as 30:50N-137:30E. The other Picket Boat, (1MIDUT gave his position at 0209 as 30:50N-137:30E. Both of these Picket Boats sighted flights of planes and both of thier positions seem to be good, but too far to cause us any concern.

At 0110 and 0136, Sasebo Defense Force Commander sent a message to the Mopping Up Units at Sasebo, concerning Submarine activity in the Empire Area. This undoubtedly dealt with yesterdays submarine activity.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. PALMER,
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~TOP SECRET~~
18 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
ACTIVITY UNTIL 1800

Needless to say we had a busy day. The two circuits being used for drill exercise's yesterday, were the ones used today for "Attack" and "Search", both of which were loaded with traffic. From the first grid which appeared at 2245/17 until this evening at 1905, we heard at least 30 planes. A conservative estimate would put at least 60 planes up in this area—all of them actively concerned with the Blue Forces in the area, and most of them passing within very close range of this Task Group. The activity was divided into fairly definite sections, with snoppers up until dawn, followed by the single bomber attacks at 0745. Snoppers continued to be active until approximately 0930, a short lull then occurred with traffic fairly light until 1500, when another group of snoppers came up en force and kept the Task Force busy until 1900.

Three things seemed quite apparent from today's traffic. In the first place several urgent messages sent to First Mobile Base Air Force by its Commander at Kanoya at 0202, 0215, and 0217 seemed to indicate at the time that retaliation measures were being planned. Secondly there were absolutely no indications that any planes were being moved out of Kyushu into Honshu. Thirdly, snooping on an unprecedented scale was carried out throughout the day so this very close contact was kept with Blue Forces at all times.

Of the attacking planes we heard, one (J05H11) with an extremely loud signal, said he was going to attack at 0755. About 2 minutes later he came in on our Task Group and was splashed.

I shall list the snoppers in a time table method by call. All of the grids received wide distribution on the Broadcast.

18 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
2245/17	1SAMA	29:47-133:33 29:22-133:33
2330/17	1SAMA	30:12-133:53

From 0055 to 0103 planes 4HIKI, 6RCUL, 6RCU2, 3WIMI, 3WEME, 4JONE, 2TOHA, 6OSI, and 4TERE came up and got under way to snoop Blue Forces. All of these planes were night reconnaissance planes, since they were not up during the daylight hours and several of them are up again tonight.

0245	6OSI	30:22-134:28
0320	3WIMI	30:12-133:53
0325	6ROU	30:52-133:48
0340	6ROU	31:42-133:08

At 0455 four planes with different type calls appeared and sent out several messages, which appeared on the Kanoya Broadcast. They were KATUMA1, KATUMA2, TEYORO2, and FUOUL.

0610	6REU3	30:22-133:18
0620	6REU4	31:22-133:38
0625	6REU4	31:17-133:23
0630	6REU3	30:02-133:08
0649	6REU1	28:47-132:18
0650	6REU3	30:22-133:18
0650	6REU1	30:37-133:03
0810	6REU3	30:32-133:28
0820	6REU3	31:02-133:13

Activity was down after this until 1500.

1510	ØNAME2	31:12-133:18
1555	Unident	31:12-133:18
1700	ØNAME4	32:22-132:28

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18 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
1715	ØNAME4	31:37-134:03
1800	ØNAME4	31:37-134:03

This last plane can pretty well be plotted in, showing the area he was covering. There were actually 4 planes in this last group and at 1517 ØNAME2 and at 1525 ØNAME1 said that they were being chased by enemy planes. At 1644 an unident plane in the group said that 4 planes were after him and ^{at} 1647 ØNAME4 said the same thing. At 1840 this plane was quite possibly shot down because he attempted twice to send a message but never finished.

Practically all of these planes came from Kanoya although some plane activity was noted at Oita and slight activity between Usa and Kanoya.

Alerts and reactions to the Blue Strikes were of course numerous and, as is to be expected, most of the planes were reported first by the Tanega Shima Radar Station. Planes were divebombing the Tanega Shima Air Base at 1084 and 6 Grumanns were over Usa at 1200. Saeki had planes overhead at 1257 and Sasebo and Omura had a full alert at 1403. Kanoya of course was being hit throughout the day.

B29's seem to have hit Yokosuka at 1313, although Onima reported 15 small planes at 1323.

Respectfully submitted,

RBOal
A. B. Palmer,
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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19, March 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
Activity from 1800 March 18 to March 20 0100.

From 1800 until 2130 on the 18th plane activity died down. However at 2130 the first one of the night search plane group was called by his base (probably Kanoya), Soon after that six other search planes were called by the base (6ROU, 6ROU2, 6ROU3, 6ROU5, TEYORO2, 4HIKI, and 7KASE). The first grid was received at 2213 and had been originated at 2200. The position was 3132N-13403E. The plane was picked up a few minutes later by CIC in this position.

This group of planes was quite active until about 2400, then another group (2ROSA) seemed to take over the snooping until approximately 0400. This search group was then relieved by a third group (9WARE) which took over the duty until about 0600 when the day snoopers (17AI) arrived on the scene. The day snoopers were quite active until 1300 when activity died down until 1500. At 1500 another group (8TEMA1) came up until approximately 1900.

After 1900 activity died down completely and no plane was heard until this morning.

The bombers were in close communication with the search planes. The first signal to attack was heard at 0723 but the signal was quite weak. From collateral evidence this was probably the plane which attacked the Franklin. Other bombers were heard at 0539, 0715, 0836, 0901, 0924, 1021, and 1239. (We are assuming that a certain type call on the circuit (KNKN) is a bomber since the plane yesterday which attacked us used this type of call while the snoopers use a (NKKN) call. None of these bombers came into our immediate area.

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19, March 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

I shall list the grids in a time table chart.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
2200	6ROU2	31:32-134:03
2206	6ROU5	30:42-132:23
2250	6ROU2	Sends weather to base.
2300	6ROU3 (This plane was 55 miles from us)	30:60-133:20
2320	6ROU3	30:52-132:13
2330	6ROU2 (This plane said he had fighters on his tail at 2330)	30:42-133:28
2344	6ROU2	31:12-133:53
0010	2ROSA3	31:00-133:20
0025	2ROSA3	Sends weather to base.
0116	2ROSA4	Says planes are on his tail.
0116	2ROSA4	31:12-135:13
0135	2ROSA3	30:42-134:23
0135	2ROSA4	Sends weather to base.
0305	2ROSA3	Sends weather to base.
0316	9WARE4	31:30-133:10
0340	2ROSA4	30:52-135:53
0342	9WARE4	31:47-133:13
0355	9WARE4	32:27-133:23
0423	9WARE4	SIGHTS Planes.
0450	9WARE1	31:40-133:00
0455	9WARE1	31:12-133:13

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~~ULTRA~~

19 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
0520	9WAREL	32:27-133:28
0522	MOSNE2 (Bomber)	31:17-133:23
0615	1WAI1	31:22-133:28
0624	1WAI2	31:22-133:28
0630	1WAI6	32:27-133:28
0640	1WAI6	32:07-134:03
0645	1WAI2	31:22-133:28
0718	1WAI6	Sighted 4 CV'S, 2 BB'S, 5 CA'S, 10 DD'S-Course 350.
0728	1WAI4	31:32-134:03
0704	1WAI6	32:07-134:03
0816	1WAI4	31:17-135:43
0820	1WAI2	31:22-133:58
At 0845 and 0855 two bombers sent out two short messages.		
0857	1WAI3	32:22-133:28
0915	1WAI1	33:57-134:18
At 0925 snoopers (1WAI6) communicates with (1WAI1 and 1WAI2), first occurrence of snoopers being in communication.		
0925	1WAI1	Says he is going back to Kanoya.
1015	1WAI3	32:37-134:03
1030	1WAI3	32:22-134:18
1124	WI3NI2 (Bomber)	32:02-134:03
1245	I3SII (Bomber)	31:42-134:33
1412	E7PA4 (Bomber)	Sighted carriers, possible attack here.

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19 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)


<u>TIME</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
1435	STEMAL	32:12-135:43
1444	STEMAL	Sends weather to base.
2332	6ROU2	31:12-133:53

It can readily be seen that many of these planes could be plotted in by their grid positions on our forces. By telling CIC the position, the number of planes and the type of plane we are able to help them to pick out the bogies from the friendlies and in several cases we are able to say we helped splash a plane.

Kanoya of course was under numerous alerts and the planes often asked him before they came in whether he was under an alert or not.

A picket boat (LYOSATU) gave away his position at 1307 as 30:23N 136:37E. An unident Maru sent out his position at 0430 as 34:26N 135:07.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

20 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Today was high lighted by two attacks on our force—one rather successful and one seemingly unsuccessful attempt. From a Radio Intelligence standpoint the day was quite a successful one, since in both instances we were able to pass the word as to just what was impending and generally just when it was going to happen and from where it was coming. I shall take the ~~EVENTS~~ ^{EVENTS} in chronological order and show just ^{how} they affected the general picture.

Phase 1. Day Attack

1. 0900. At least 3 snoopers came up on the air and at 0946 (8NEFUL) sighted the Task Force. Plane 8NEFU3 followed suit at 0948.
2. 0950. Plane 8NEFUL sent out a grid position 31:42N-134:58E(TCO 0945). Our position at the time was approximately 31:40E-134:13E.
3. 0952. 8NEFUL reported the grid and announced our fighters were on his tail. They did not affect him greatly since he was back on the air again at 1010.
4. At 1000 8NEFU2 sent out ~~sent out~~ a grid position 31:52N-134:18E(TCO 0945). We were approximately in this position.
5. 8NEFU3 originated a position 31:37N-134:18E at 0950 which was received at 1004.
6. 1010. 8NEFUL sent out a grid position 29:12N-134:18E (TCO 0954). Our position at 1000 was 31:39N-134:12E.
7. 1021. 8NEFU3 sent out a grid 30:57N-134:18E plus weather information.
8. 1023. A plane which we believe was 8NEFU2 came up and announced he had fighters on his tail. The plane was splashed.
9. 1032. 8NEFU3 sends out grid position of 31:17N-134:48E.(TCO 1005).
10. 1035. 8NEFUL repeats grid 29:12N-134:18E (TCO 0947).
11. 1037. 8NEFU3 has fighters on his tail but he finally shakes them off and comes up later.
12. 1105. 8NEFUL sends out out grid position of 31:52N-134:3E (TCO 1032). Our position 31:25N-134:20E.

20 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

13. 8NEFUL repeats same grid at 1110.
14. 1147. 8NEFUL again repeats the grid. This is a good indication an attack will come on the Task Groups in the area.
15. At 1135 the Base sent a message to 8NEFUL which seemed to indicate that Bombers had left, or were leaving the base and were on the way to attack.

These snoopers seemed to have secured after this and 3 new snoopers took their places. They were ØSCKEL, ØSCKE2, and ØSCKE3.
1412. Grid position 28:52N-132:53E received.
1453. Grid position received from ØSCKE2. (TCO 1450). Our position at the time was 30:36N-134:36E.
1457. Grid position received from ØSCKEL of 30:37N-134:23E. (TCO 1455)
1545. Grid position received from ØSCKE3 of 30:27N-135:43E. (TCO 1545) Our position at 1530 was 30:25.5N-134:42.3E.
1555. ØSCKE3 sent out a grid position of 30:27N-134:53E. (TCO 1540) This position pretty well pin points us for the Bombers.
1606. The Base sends out the position on our Task Group to two bomber groups. This definitely indicates an attack on us is quite imminent.
1608. ØSCKE3 again gives out a position plus the weather.
1618. ØSCKE2 has our fighters on his tail.
1620. ØSCKE3 ~~still~~ has fighters on his tail.
1628. We are attacked by Bombers and receive near-misses.

It may be just a coincidence but it looked as though the two snoopers were intentionally leading the CAP away so that the Bombers could enter the screen unopposed.

We were forced to abandon our operating room after the overhead caught fire. However we resumed operation at 1616.

The rest of this report concerns Phase 2 or the night attack.

Phase 2. Night Attack.

2026. First indication that snoopers are again in our immediate area.

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20 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

2119. Sncoper LAY01 sends out a grid position of 29:07N-134:08E. (TOO 2112) Cur position at the time was 28:57.2N-134:48E.
2128. Base calls the bomber group (NOCTEL). This is the first indication that we have Bombers on the way.
2134. LAY04 send out grid position of 29:22N-135:03E. (TOO 2117)
2140. LAY02 sends out grid position of 27:12N-134:18E. (TOO 2130) Cur position at 2145 was 28:45-134:50E.
2145. The Bomber Group tells the snooper LAY01 that they will arrive at 2300.
2156. LAY02 sends out grid position of 27:12N-138:18E. (TOO 2155)
2200. LAY02 sends out grid postion of 29:47N-133:58E. (TOO 2140)
2219. LAY01 sends out ~~same grid~~ same grid position as LAY02.
2222. LAY01 sends out grid position of 29:37N-134:18E. (TOO 2130)
2239. LAY02 sends out grid position of 30:32N-132:48E. (TOO 2230)
2253. The Bomber asks LAY02 for a bearing.
2310. LAY02 sends grid position of 30:32N-134:03E. It would seem that the Bomber is being vectored into this area.
2315. LAY03 sends out grid position of 29:52N-132:48E.
2321. The Bomber again asks for a bearing from LAY01.
2326. LAY01, obviously the coordinator of the attacks, announces that he is going to drop flares. Flares were dropped about five minutes later.
2331. The bomber group leader (NOCTEL) gives the signal for all planes to attack. DIC reports ~~the~~ group of planes came in after this was reported but swerved after a short run in. It is possible they dropped torpedos.
2341. LAY01 again announces he is going to drop flares. Flares were dropped about five minutes later.
2356. LAY01 sends out a grid position of 30:37N-135:23E.

Things grew relatively quiet after this, although a new group of snoopers came up after this (0042) and continued to send out positions until 0415, when all the activity died down.

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20 March, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

The grid positions receive shortly after mid-night on the 21st were as follows:

0055 - 30:32N-134:48E.

0227 - 30:02N-133:38E


0137 - 28:40N-134:00E.

0315 - 29:52N-130:38E

0200 - 28:32N-133:08E.

0401 - 28:40N-134:00E

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

21, March 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The most important part in today's activity was concerned with the Wip search and attack operation against the Blue task force. The second one of these attacks concerned us intimately and we were able to track it all the way in. At least thirteen bomber calls were heard on the circuit and if we consider this to mean there were at least three planes in each group, at least forty planes were involved in the attack. The procedure followed was practically the same as that used in previous attacks. I shall list the events in chronological order since I feel this shows us the general procedure a little more clearly. The first sign that there were planes on the way was noticed at 0751 when the first bomber (RIAMUL) was called by the base probably Kanoya. Immediately thereafter three other bombers were called. At the same time several snoopers sent out their call on the circuit indicating the usual procedure for the search attack was being followed.

The first grid position was sent at 0858 by a snooper who had not been heard before (630311). The grid position was wrongly encoded but the corrected grid was later sent out by the same plane at 26:57-134:38. Our position at the time was 26:38-136:33.

- 0930 The bomber YOSEL who later attacked a group north of us was heard with a weak signal. The snoopers up now are 630313, 630311, 7TAYU1, 7TAYU2, and 7TAYU3.
- 0933 630311 sends out second grid (TOO 0915). Position given was 26:52N-134:28E. This is still north of us.
- 0938 The base asks the snooper how many Carriers he has sighted.
- 0943 Bomber YOSEL heard again, with a louder signal. 630311 has repeated the grid 26:52N-134:28E three different times. This group will probably get the attack.
- 1017 Two snoopers work each other.
- 1021 Bomber ROZIAL sends out grid 26:57N-135:58E. This generally indicates an attack will be made on this group in the near future.
- 1022 Base sends out grid to the Bomber Groups and snooper groups. The position is 26:57N-134:38E.

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21, March 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

1024 Snoopers 630SI3 sends out a grid(TOO 1020) is position 25:47N-134:13E. Our position at the time was 26:14N-136:30E.

1033 Bomber RC2NAL has a Fighter on his tail.

1034 Snoopers 7TAYU2 asks for a bearing.

1044 Bomber YC6NEL comes in for an attack.

1055 Bomber LEE1AL has engine trouble and says he is going to make a forced landing.

1110 New Bomber NO3S11 in contact with snoopers 4SIKUL.

1116 630SI3 sends out grid position of 25:32N-134:13E.

1132 630SI3 follows this with the weather.(TOO 1110)

1136 New Bomber I9KAL sends grid position 29:02N-135:53E.

1136 Two Bombers, NO3S11 and SA7M01 are in communication with each other, and with snoopers 4SIKUL. This looks like trouble.

1150 7TAYU1 has a fighter on his tail.

1151 630SI2 sees the enemy, which from his signal strength must be us.

1156 630SI2 with a S-5 signal sends a grid(TOO 1155) 26:42N-135:38E.

1158 4SIKUL calls bomber NO3S11.

1159 Bombers are in communication and SA7M01 repeats the grid 26:42N-135:38E.

1215 RO2NAL and SA7M01 are in communication.

1217 RO2NAL sends out grid position 26:32N-136:28E.

1220 RO2M1 gives the signal to attack and comes in. This plane, a Francis, was shot down 200 yards from the Enterprise. We could hear him come all the way in by the sound of the guns.

1224 630SI3 sends 4SIKUL2 and NO3S11 the grid position 25:32N-134:13E. This looks like the Franklin's position.

1243 NO3S11 send grid position 25:50N-134:20E.

1347 4SIKUL sends out grid position 26:07N-134:23E.

1321 Bombers SA7M01 and NO3S11 are working each other.

1442 4SIKUL gets in contact with NO3S11 and sends grid position 25:12N-134:23E to him at 1510. After this the bombers and the snoopers seemed to be on their way back to their bases, since all important activity ceased after 1700. Kancya came up at 1858 and called 630SI2 but never made contact. No other activity of tactical importance was noted after this time.

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. Palmer
R. E. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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24, March 1945

General Discussion of the Attack on
the 18, 20, and 21.

Since the attacks of the last few days have been the first instance of any type of coordinated Nip attack in recent months, I thought it might help to analyze them from a Radio Intelligence standpoint so that any future attacks along this line can be evaluated by the recipient of the information.

It must be remembered that there is no set communication pattern for any of these attacks which the Japs definitely feel they must follow. However certain characteristic patterns have been maintained in all of the attacks we have received and it is these patterns with which I shall concern myself.

The attacks can be divided into day and night attacks with the day attacks requiring the least amount of communication. For this reason the day attack is the hardest to foretell with any degree of accuracy. Radio Intelligence can generally predict one is on the way but it can not always predict the exact hour or minute of the attack. However by analyzing the general pattern of these attacks we can generally determine when the crucial moments in the development of an attack have been reached. Consequently I shall take up the characteristic pattern of the day attacks of the 18, 20, and 21 and I will try to show just when the attacks can be expected. In the three days' attacks the procedure was for the most part identical although the attack on the 21 brought out the procedure a little more clearly than that of the 18 and the 20.

DAY PROCEDURE

1. The snoopers came out from their base first and can be heard maintaining close contact with the base.
2. The bombers start off shortly afterward and also maintain close contact with the base.

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24, March 1945

3. The snoopers come in and find us and immediately send back a position to the base. The snoopers then stay close on our heels sending back frequent contact reports.

4. The snoopers get in touch with the bombers and send out a position. The procedure varies since the base may send out the position to the bombers. This is undoubtedly done so that the bombers will be sure to get our position regardless of whether or not the snoopers are still there to conduct the attack.

5. The snoopers start to call the bombers and establish close contact with them.

6. The bomber comes in and sights us and sends out our position.

7. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes later the bomber gives the signal to attack.

8. The bombers come in, generally reaching the center of the screen about 10 to 15 minutes after the signal to attack.

There is some indication that on the 13th the snoopers intentionally went in and picked up the CAP. Both snoopers at that time announced they had fighters on their tail. By leading the CAP a merry chase in opposite directions they left a wide path for the bombers in the middle.

In all cases the snoopers seem to be the coordinators of the attack. On the 21 this was quite obvious since in one case the snoopers vectored in the bombers with a bearing, then gave the signal to form for attack. This was followed by the bomber's signal that he was going in for an attack.

NIGHT PROCEDURE

Night attacks demand much more coordination and for this reason the coordinator of the attack is the most important man on the scene. This is again the snoopers who send the position of the force.

The night attack of the 2 ϕ follows the following procedure.

1. The snoopers sent out a position at 2119.
2. The bomber gets in touch with the snoopers at 2145 and told him he expected to arrive over the target at 23 ϕ .
3. The snoopers repeats the latest grid position at 2222.
4. The bomber asks for a bearing at 2258.
5. The snoopers repeated the grid position at 231 ϕ .
6. The snoopers says he is dropping flares at 2326.
7. The bomber says he is attacking at 2331.
8. The snoopers drops flares again at 2341.

In the case of night attacks it is believed that the elimination of the snoopers even after they have given out our position might well create so much confusion in the coordination of the attack that the attacks would generally be unsuccessful. This is not necessarily so in the case of a day attack since we have found that the bombers generally drive through and carry out the attack quite successfully without any necessary coordination from the snoopers outside of the initial grid position.

The crucial moment in the day and also the night attack is the time when the snoopers and the bomber start calling each other. After this has happened if the bomber sends out a grid position of his own it is practically a dead give away he is coming in for an attack in that area.

In the case of the attack on the 18th the bomber and snoopers never actually set up communication with each other. However it is believed this was so only because our position had been sent out repeatedly during the day and no actual vectoring of bombers was needed. In short if numerous positions have

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24, March 1945

been sent out by snoopers and if bombers are heard on the circuit it can generally be assumed the attack will occur on the Task Group whose position has been repeatedly sent out. The exact minute of the attacks can only be determined if the bombers show their hand by giving the signal to attack.

However in the case of long range attacks when snoopers and bombers start out at about the same time the procedure noticed in the last few days will generally be used.

Night attacks generally follow the night procedure mentioned above.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
17, May 1948

SECRET

From: Cinc R. I. Unit Commander Carrier Division Seven.

To: Cinc Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Report of operations from 5 April to 14 April.
I am including in this report the activity which occurred before this unit moved to ComCar Div. One. Since we were detached quite unexpectedly it was impossible to get Admiral Gardiner's endorsement for this nine day period. Most of the report is covered in the daily intelligence summary written for the Admiral. The period from 25 March to 5 April was spent in port while battle damage was being repaired.

~~SECRET~~

17 April 1945

April 5, 1945

Sortied from Ulithi. Poor reception and little apparent activity.

April 6, 1945

The activity covered in the daily summary still did not concern us intimately since we are still on our way to the battle area. However the daily report covers the activity fairly completely.

April 7, 1945

No sightings on our Task Group although reconnaissance activity was high. Covered in daily summary.

April 8, 1945

No activity of importance.

April 9, 1945

No activity of importance. The code groups helped cut immensely today since from the few groups received by JCSIT we were able to identify Ishigaki as the base to which planes were being staged from Shinchiku.

April 10, 1945

No activity of importance.

April 11, 1945

Covered in daily summary.

April 12, 1945

Covered in daily summary.

April 13, 1945

Covered in daily summary.

April 14, 1945

Moved to Essex and spent the entire day on a destroyer.

~~SECRET~~
17, May 1948

Miscellaneous Comments

I did not take the Jusic code with me when I left the Enterprise because I had been led to believe that it was a standard issue for flags. However we have not missed any of the Jusic's except the Jusic's of the 14th, the day we moved to ComCarDiv. One.

As a self styled authority on moving from carrier to carrier I heartily recommend light mobile radio gear packed in some sort of metal container. The metal container is almost imperative in the case of the receivers since destroyer crews show little regard for anything marked fragile. I also recommend that the men on RI units be given a short course in the repair and maintenance of the RIFB since we can not have ship's personnel overhaul this necessary part of our equipment without compromising the whole set up. Chief Gilmore has done an admirable job with the damaged RIFB we have but it required a good deal of extra time and ingenuity on his part.

The frequency information now received over the Jusic Channel has improved immensely especially since we have received the short frequency summary for the day from RAGFOR.

I want to apologize for the fact that our reports have not come in a little more regularly but we have had a fairly rugged time between battle damage, moving and local interference from the code machines.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
17 May 1946

Miscellaneous Comments
(Cont'd)

I sent in recommendations from Admiral Gardiner concerning the advancement in rate of Horace E. Fritz and Winston S. Buster from RM2/c to RM1/c. Have these recommendations been received and is it possible to find out what action has been taken?

I was unable to let FRUPAC know where I was when I was transferred to ComCarDiv. One because of conditions of radio silence and because Admiral Sherman told me it was the duty of Admiral Mitscher's communicator to inform FRUPAC of my new assignment.

The RIIS's with this unit all need an overhaul and it is recommended that the officer who relieves this unit bring along a RIIS to take the place of RIIS No. 524 which was damaged when we were hit on the enterprise.

Respectively admitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer

R. I. Officer ComCarDiv. One

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5, April 1945

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ULTRA

Radio Intelligence Summary

Traffic today was still sporadic for us since we are still in too southerly a latitude for good reception of Empire air circuits. Ishigaki which has been highlighted in the last few days as a staging base sighted 20 ship based planes at 0940, 4 more planes overhead at 1510 and 31 planes at 1545. Evidently the British were in on this attack and on today's strikes against Formosa. Takao had a full alert at 1410.

Blue planes were also busy with Minami Daito Shima under attack at 1610. Okinawerabu Shima and Kume Shima sent out action reports at 1105 and 1453 respectively.

Several requests for weather were intercepted and in one of them weather was sent to Air Bases Kanoya, Atsuki and Ishigaki indicating the Nip Kyushu and Formosa based air strikes are still ^{IMMINENT} imminent.

Orange shipping was under attack by Blue subs in the Kyushu area. An unident maru sent out its position at 1057 at 33:54N-130:53E. At 1210 this same maru was in the position 33:59N-130:53E.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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RADIO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 6 April, 1945

Air traffic rocketed today with at least 3 groups of snoopers keeping very close check on Blue Forces in and around Nansai Shoto. The snoopers relieved each other approximately every 4 hours with a new group taking up where the old group left off. There were no definite signals to attack on the circuit but this by no means indicates that no attacks were staged since the Blue Forces were so thoroughly snooped that there was no real reason for bomber groups to communicate. The snoopers seemed to be Army Planes (Probably 7th and 98th Air Regiments) for the most part using Navy procedure. The main group came from Kanoya but a separate group with different calls and on a different circuit seemed to come from Formosa, probably Shinchiku.

The first group was up previous to 0730 with the first grid being sent out at 0824. This group consisted of at least 5 planes (ONIIA1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) and was quite active until approximately 1045. I shall list the grid positions which were sent out of this group chronologically.

<u>CALL</u>	<u>TIME OF ORIGINATION</u>	<u>TIME OF RECEIPT</u>	<u>POSITION GRID</u>
ONIIA3	0715	0715	27:02-129:43
ONIIA3		0824	Sights 4 CV's in 27:02-129:43
ONIIA1		0825	Sights 3 CV's.
ONIIA1	0821	0825	25:02-129:43
ONIIA2	0820	0837	27:27-129:33
ONIIA3	0830	0839	26:52-129:48
ONIIA3	0830	0850	Repeats same grid and adds weather information.

Some plane had 3 fighters on his tail at 0900. Although the plane did not sign his call it was probably ONIIA 4, since he is not heard from hereafter.

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RADIO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(Cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET~~
6 April, 1945

<u>CALL</u>	<u>TIME OF ORIGATION</u>	<u>TIME OF RECEIPT</u>	<u>POSITION GRID</u>
ONIYA3	0840	0904	Repeats same grid.

Repetition generally signifies an attack will probably be made here.

ONIYA5		0900	Sights CV's and BB's
ONIYA2	0910	0910	25:02-125:18
ONIYA2	0908	0941	24:37-130:03

The base has been sending short messages to the planes during this period telling them about the arrival time of the Bombers.

ON IYA1	0935	0950	25:02-129:43
ONIYA2	1015	1021	24:37-130:03
ONIYA5	0930	1009	26:10-127:50
ONIYA5	1015	1034	29:20-127:40

From all these positions it is clear that ONIYA3 was mostly concerned with 4 Carriers in the position 27:02-129:43; ONIYA1 with 3 Carriers in the position 25:02-129:43; ONIYA3 with the Blue Forces in the position 26:52-129:48. ONIYA5 and ONIYA2 sighted two other groups.

At 1040 a new group came up and RONM01, 2, and 3 took over. Up until 1237 plane RONM01 sent out ~~reports~~ at least three times the position of Blue Forces in the position 27:22-130:18 and 27:22-130:13. Later at 1435 the plane sent out a general resume of the positions of four Blue Forces in the positions 26:12-129:13, 27:22-129:08, 26:22-129:03, and 27:22-129:48. RONM02 sent out the position 25:07-129:18 at 1335. At 1459 this plane gave his relief the position 26:40-129:40.

The relief FUE11, 2, and 3 came up after this time and continued sending out positions until 1724. After 1724 activity died down. The plane FUE11 was concerned with at least two Blue Forces. The first one he snooped from 1505 until 1525 in the position 27:02-129:53 and the second group at 1528 was in the position 27:32-130:33.

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RADIO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(Cont'd)

6 April, 1945

At 1608 one of these groups was in the position 27:22-129:53 and another in the position 27:12-129:53. At 1724 the plane sent out its last grid message giving the position 26:60-129:40, obviously the position of a third force.

The British Task Force near Formosa was sighted by planes from Formosa in the position 23:22-123:03 at 0820. As has been mentioned before, no attacks were noted.

Kikajima, Kuchinoebaru, and other Nansei Shoto bases received Blue air strikes today while Osaka and Kure received strikes last night.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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Radio Intelligence Summary - 7 April, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

At least two and possibly three separate groups of snoopers were up today and numerous grid position on Task Force 58 were received. As far as we can determine no grid position was sent out on our force although we came quite close to being detected several times. A group of at least five planes was up ~~for~~ ^{from} about 0400 until approximately 0600. These planes which were undoubtedly Kanoya based might well have been snoopers although no grid positions were received during this time. Shortly after 0700 a new group came up on the circuit and this group using the same call as yesterday's early snooper group consisted of at least four planes also Kanoya based.

Since it was quite possible to plot in the course of most of these planes I shall list each plane's position chronologically so that the course can be followed. The first plane to come with a position was ONIYA3.

<u>PLANE CALL</u>	<u>TIME OF ORIGINATION</u>	<u>TIME OF RECEIPT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
ONIYA3	0814	0814	26:57N-129:43E This plane sighted 3 CV in this posn.
ONIYA3	0828	0841	26:57N-129:48E
ONIYA3		0855	25:22-129:03E This posn was re- peated several times and was included in several amplified re- ports at 0855 and 0900.
ONIYA3	0900	0911	25:02N-128:43E
ONIYA3	0920	0920	26:12N-128:43E Plane started back north. This report was amplified at 0930 0940, and 0935.
ONIYA4	0845	0822	27:27N-128:18N. This plane operating farther to the north and his search sector can be followed by his sighting.

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Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

17 April, 1945

<u>PLANE CALL</u>	<u>TIME OF ORIGINATION</u>	<u>TIME OF RECEIPT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
ONIIYA4	0928	0934	25:42N-127:18E At 1103 the plane said he expected to land in the immediate future. It is interesting to note he might well have landed in the Nansei Shoto Area instead of returning to Kanoya.

ONIIYA2 sighted 4 Carriers at 0923 in the position 24:52N-129:08E. ONIIYA1 sent out the position 24:47N-129:08E at 1020 and sent it while he had Fighters on his tail. At 1120 he also said he expected to land soon.

The next group of snoopers came up at about 1018 and the first plane of this group RONMO1 sent out his first grid at 1026 giving the position 26:12N-128:43E and 26:57N-129:43E. At 1200 he sighted 3 Carriers in position 26:42N-129:33E.

RONMO2 sighted 2 Carriers at 1258 in position 26:52N-130:28E. At 1300 this plane originated the position 26:37N-131:08E and at 1321 the position 27:12N-130:48E. This plane had Fighters on his tail at 1400 and was chased until 1541 when no more was heard from him. The Base called this plane until 1856 without making contact or getting any response. The time of the last transmission fairly well coincides with the "Splashing" of the Francis.

Air activity after this was down until 2035 when Shinchiku came up on the air calling 3 plane groups which seemed to be coming up from Takao. One of these plane groups got lost and had to ask for a bearing. At 2256 he got a bearing of 126 from some Formosa Base. This movement of substantial plane groups to Shinchiku falls in with one the Ultra's which stated that planes had been ordered to move northward in Formosa. These planes might well be staged out of Shinchiku against Okinawa tomorrow if the weather permits.

Respectfully submitted,
R. B. Palmer 111
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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Radio Intelligence Summary 8 April, 1945

Air activity was just about non-existent today. Not a single grid position on Blue Forces in the Nansei Shoto Area was received and as far as we can determine there were no snoopers in the area. No large scale tactical movement was noted. Only one plane, KIYOU1 appeared on the Kanoya snoopers circuit. This plane sent out a short message (TOO 1545) which seemed to indicate he had left Kanoya. However nothing more was heard from him thereafter.

At 0700 Air Base Oroku(Naha) sent out weather to Air Bases Kanoya, Takao, and Shinchiku, but since no planes were up during the day the scheduled flights must have been cancelled.

Kanoya was under Blue Air Attacks at 1030 and Miyako Jima had carrier planes overhead at 1114.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
Radio Intelligence Summary 9 April, 1945

Traffic during the day was again practically non-existent. However at 1706 a Formosa frequency came up and it became quite evident that planes were being staged from Shinchiku to a base which was later identified by signal strength and by a code group plus a little of the "Jesus Factor" to be Ishigaki. One group, KE6WI was up until about 1850 when he said he expected to land at Ishigaki. The plane group was heard to communicate with one other group during the flight so it seems quite logical to believe that at least two groups landed at this time. At 1927 another group of planes WE2E came up. This group left Takao and headed for Shinchiku since later Takao and Shinchiku were working the flight. Another group SE0YA came up shortly thereafter (1939) and a third group KE5MO was up at 2046 working Takao. Weather information was passed to these groups quite frequently by Shinchiku and it is interesting to note that at 1825 the one plane group WE2E complained of the bad weather. It looks very much as though these planes continued to Ishigaki since they were still in the air at 2400 and it is assumed that they certainly would have returned to Takao or Shinchiku previous to this time if the weather had been too bad to navigate. I think the long duration of the flight does prove a good deal of difficulty was met in the weather and the repeated weather messages seem to bear out this assumption. It seems safe to estimate that approximately 20 planes took part in these flights and that they might well be poised for an attack early tomorrow morning if the weather permits. If the snoopers come up tomorrow it should be a fair indication attacks are planned.

One snoopers was up this morning at 1004, from Formosa but due to bad weather he saw nothing and seemed to have returned by 1125.

Respectfully submitted,
R. B. Palmer, RI Officer.

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Radio Intelligence Summary 10-April, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

Air traffic today hit a new low with only two fairly important air messages received. Both were from Kanoya based planes and both announced that searches were negative due to bad weather. Two planes were up at 1855 and 1913 and both of them had quite loud signals. However nothing developed later and it is assumed that these planes returned to their base. Formosa activity was down and none of the planes were heard although a Formosa base was up at 1400 calling at least two planes. It is interesting to note that Ishigaki Air Base sent reports of Blue Strikes against him to Kanoya Air Base, Miyako Jima Air Base, and Takao Air Base. This quite definitely shows where most of the planes from Formosa are sent before they strike Okinawa and it also appears that Kanoya based planes might land here after an Okinawa strike. Ishigaki incidentally was hit at 0558 probably by British Task Forces. Sasebo Air Base sent weather to Chinkai Air Base at 0700 indicating planes are still being staged into Southern Kyushu.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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11, April 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity took a terrific jump over previous days. The activity on the search attack frequency was divided into 3 parts with snooper activity from 0836 to 1200, an attack by Kamikazes from 1340-1501 and continual snooping followed by night attacks from 1500 on. Since we were fortunate enough to have the aircraft code a close study of all activity can be made. For this reason I shall list the activity in its chronological order so that the activity can be followed a little more readily.

PHASE 1 Snooper activity 0836-1200

At 0836 it became evident that snoopers were on their way down toward TF58. Although 6 snoopers took part in the search only one, MITUSI2, actually sighted blue forces. The other snoopers did not sight anything in their various sectors and after they had given out the weather in their ~~various~~ sectors they returned to their base. The sequence of events is as follows:

0929 MITUSI2 sights enemy.

0936 " 3 carriers 27:17N-129:53E.

This information and subsequent information concerning blue forces was put out on the Kanoya Broadcast.

0930 MITUSI2 elaborates on report and says he sees 10 other ships in addition to the carriers, speed 20 knots.

0943 MITUSI3 has fighters on his tail.

0956 MITUSI2 has fighters on his tail but he evades them nicely and keeps up the good work.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

11, April 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

In the mean time MITUSI1 is reporting the weather in his area and MITUSI5 reports he can not see any enemy in the Okinawa area because of bad weather.

1011 MITUSI2 gives out weather in vicinity of enemy and keeps repeating the position 27:17N-129:53E.

1016 MITUSI6 gives it all up as a bad job and returns without sighting the enemy in his sector.

1019-1028 MITUSI2 sends out enemy disposition, fighter cover and other pertinent information.

1050 Already on his way back, MITUSI2 says the weather is not suitable for a dive bombing attack but that a torpedo attack would be more suitable preferably from the N.E.

1120 MITUSI6 decides to take over snooping and at 1115 he sighted enemy at 27:07N-131:13E.

1200 All activity has died down.

PHASE 2

Two snooper coordinators came up on the circuit at 1340 (YAYAH1,2). At 1340 one of them, YAYAH1 has fighters on his tail. At 1400 CIC reported that bogeys were closing rapidly on our force. At 1404 the guns opened up and at 1409 we received a hit from a Kamikaze on our port quarter. We rolled around in the shack like a pair of dice in a dice box but no serious damage was inflicted on any of the personnel. At 1442 YAYAH2 sighted 2 carriers in the position 27:42N-130:23E and at 1459 we received a very near miss from a Kamikaze who crashed into the starboard yardarm. We swayed around again and one RIF5 took a beating. At least 4 near misses were received during the afternoon and

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

11, April 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

at 1526 YAYAH2 sent out a message (TCC 1455) in which he stated that one ship was covered with black smoke. The action after this in chronological order is as follows:

- 1516 YAYAH2 passes the grid 27:42N-130:25E to a new plane NKURE1.
- 1532 YAYAH1 the other snooper did not sight enemy and gives out weather in position 24:37N-123:23E.
- 1544 YAYAH2 passes on position of enemy to a new group NNUKE consisting of at least 5 planes. This group was the group which carried out the night torpedo attacks and this was the first time we realized they were on their way.
- 1547 YAYAH1 has fighters on his tail. Very loud signal.
- 1624 NKURE1 appears on the scene. This is the plane who had been vectored to the area at 1516.
- 1625 NKURE1 sights the enemy 3 carriers.
- 1635 NKURE1 sends posit of enemy to NNUKE1, the leader of the night attack group and to MIYUR1.
- 1645 NKURE1 sends out weather and position 27:52N-130:08E.
- 1707 NNUKE3 reports he will arrive over the target at 1840.
- 1721 A new attack group (KISCHI) is told to attack after 1900.
- 1758 Another attack group (KATEM13) will arrive over the target at 1900. This makes 3 attack groups all arriving at approximately 1900 or about 20 planes in all.
- 1843 New groups heard with very weak signal (MARCRI).
- 1858 KATEM13 has fighters on his tail.
- 1902 KATEM13 has fighters on tail at position 27:52N-130:08E.
- 1903 KATEM13 attacks.
- 1913 MARCRI4 completed torpedo attack.

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~~ULTRA~~

11 April 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~
Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

- 1920 MARCRI4 has fighters on his tail.
- 1924 MIYURA1 (first appearance) has radar contact 27:57N-130:28E.
- 1925 KATEMI3 asks KATEMI1 when he is going to drop flares.
- 1925 MIYURA5 announces torpedo attack completed in position 27:37N-130:28E.
- 1934 MIYURA1 drops flares.
- 1935 KATEMI3 has completed torpedo attack.
- 1955 New plane YUNCTUL appears and calls MARCRI group.
- 2004 YUNCTUL sights enemy 27:37N-130:28E.

Three new groups are called ie MITENA, TAYORE, FUMOTU but since these groups carried on most of their activity in the next day their activity will be included in the report of the 12th.

Respectfully submitted,

R B Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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Radio Intelligence Summary

Activity on the 12th stayed at a very high level. There was night heckler activity from midnight until 0700. No attacks were noted and it appears the planes who participated in this stage of the day's activity were merely maintaining close contact with blue forces. From 0700 to 1200 day snoopers carried out a complete reconnaissance of the Ckinawa area and of TF58 and it was this group who vectored in the main attack group consisting of over 100 planes. The main attack was carried out against Ckinawa shipping and produced a large number of contact reports between 1411 and 1530. This was followed by a night attack on TF58 from 2050 until 2200.

NIGHT HECKLER ACTIVITY

At least 16 planes took part in the night heckling activity. 6 groups were involved with from 2 to 4 planes in each group (NCTUTU, NITENA, URCSI, URIKU, TAYARE, FUNONU). The most important activity listed chronologically is as follows:

0002 NCTUTU2 has fighters on his tail 25:07N-130:53E.
0043 Base tells NITENA, TAYARE, URIKU, URCSI that the enemy task force is 110 35' from Kikaijima 50 miles.
0110 NITENA2 has completed his mission and is returning.
0131 NITENA1 has sighted enemy 20:12N-123:03E. and was under heavy AA fire.
0144 NITENA1 has completed his mission.
0148 NITENA1 vectors NITENA, TAYARE, URIKU, URCSI to position 23:12N-123:03E.
0154 FUNONU2 and 4 appear on the scene.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Radio Intelligence Summary
(CCINT'D)

0209 URIKU2 has fighters on his tail 27:17N-127:53E.
0223 URIKU1 has completed his mission.
0235 URIKU2 returns.
0305 TAYARE3 appears and has radar contact 25:52N-130:18E.
0302 TAYARE3 has radar contact 27:22N-129:33E.
0445 TAYARE2 has enemy jamming his radar 25:17N-129:48E.
Planes all on way back by 0500.

DAY ACTIVITY

At 0749 Kanoya came up and called seven snoopers search planes. At 0800 one of them, MITUSI3, turned back because of an oil line failure. The other planes flew on in their sectors and at 0811 MITUSI2 sighted enemy in the position 25:47N-129:03E. This was our approximate position at the time. In the meantime MITUSI5 covered the Okinawa anchorage quite thoroughly and sent back a long report on the enemy shipping in that area (TCO 0910). MITUSI7 sighted nothing and had motor trouble. MITUSI1 also had oil trouble and returned. This left MITUSI2 and 5 to finish the reconnaissance.

At 1247 we had the first indication that a new group was on its way down when MUYU3 reported that he had motor trouble. Since blue forces had already been thoroughly snooped this new group looked like the logical ones for the attack. Large raids were reported as closing in the Okinawa area and at 1415 MUYU2 gave the signal "all units stand by for an attack". This was followed by a large number of tactical

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12, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(CONT'D)

~~TOP SECRET~~

signals "to form for attack" and "all units attack" given by NUYU2, NUYU8, NUYU6, NUYU4, NUYU3, and NUYU9. At 1425 NUYU2 had stated his target was in the position 27:07N-123:13E and at 1442 NUYU4 singled out a BB for his attack. The attack lasted from 1415 to 1530. The results of the attack as reported by the Japs were as follows:

- 1455 NUYU8 reports attack completed results unobserved.
- 1535 NUYU3 sights body of ships not containing carrier posit 26:57N-127:03E.
- 1553 NUYU3 see 2 BB's sinking in this position.

NIGHT ATTACK

The night attack was carried out on the task group north of us and like most night attacks proved to be a miserable failure. Planes were on their way at 1845 and the attacks was launched between 2030 and 2110. Two attack groups (KIYUCU, KATEMI) were involved and these were preceded by 3 groups of snoopers (NOTATA1,2; FIYURAL; IARCRI4).

There were indications as early as 1814 that elements of the KIYUCU group were on their way and the KATEMI group was called at 1847. The attack follow the following order:

- 1815 KIYUC3 will arrive at 1920.
- 1927 Base tells plane groups MCKIKI and KEESU to go to Okinawa and attack if they don't sight the enemy. Neither one of these groups came up on the air although all the planes in the air received for this message making it appear these were general collective calls for all plane groups.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ 12 April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(CONT'D)

- 2031 NIYURAL sights enemy 26:07N-129:18E.
 - 2036 NOTATAL has radar contact on large force 26:12N-129:38E.
 - 2040 MARCRI5 has fighters on his tail.
 - 2044 NOTATAL has fighters on his tail.
 - 2046 FUFUNC3 has radar contact 25:52N-130:43E.
 - 2049 KIYCUL attacks and reports he had attacked a cruiser with no results.
 - 2056 NCTATAL reports he dropped flares and sighted carriers.
 - 2058 KIYCUL "form for an attack".
 - 2100 NCTATAL "drop flares".
 - 2102 KATEMI2 sights enemy.
 - 2103 KATEMI2 attacks.
 - 2104 More flares from NCTATAL.
- No more attack signals were heard after 2104 and all activity thereafter was snooper activity.
- 2123 FUFUNC1 reports he sees something burning 28:12N-130:13E.
 - 2127 FUFUNC1 sights something burning 26:47N-129:23E.
 - 2143 KIYCUL reports he completed a torpedo attack but that results are unknown. He later reports he will arrive at his base at 2200.
 - 2159 FUFUNC2 sighted enemy 25:52N-130:03E.
 - 2227 FUFUNC1 has definite radar contact 25:37N-129:13E.
 - 2236 NCTATAL sees fires 28:32N-130:48E. (Most of these fires were Jap planes burning)

The snooping was continued until midnight but no attack

developed.

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12, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(CONT'D)

There is a possibility that another attack went into Okinawa at 1929 when KIYOCU with a very weak signal gave the order "form for attack" (cf. 2143 report).

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. Falmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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Radio Intelligence Summary

Activity slacked off gradually on the 13th. During the early morning hours the snoopers or night hecklers kept up the good work with the NCTUTU elements active until approximately 0800 and the TAYARE elements (1,2,3) active from 0800 until 0430. Grid positions were received at various times during the night but no attacks developed. The activity died down at 0500 with the planes on their way back to Kyushu.

At 0749 Kanoya started calling the snoopers MITUSI2 and 1 and MITUSI2 was heard on the circuit at 0750 and MITUSI1 at 0840. Bogies appeared on the screen at 0900 and at 0908 MITUSI2 sighted the enemy in the position 25:57N-129:08E, our approximate position at the time. At 0915 he had fighters on his tail and 0918 he sighted 3 carriers in the position mentioned above. At 0923 he had 2 fighters on his tail and 0930 he sent out the dramatic statement "Banzai" as he was splashed. MITUSI1 never quite made the grade and at 0948 he said he was going in for a forced landing. Activity after this time was negligible and at 2100 the watch was secured since we had received our orders from CTF58 to report to COMCarDiv. (one aboard the Essex. This is our fourth move and we felt like the Flying Dutchmen of opera fame.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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20 April, 1945

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division One.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Report for the period from 12 April
to 18 April, 1945, inclusive. Submitted by
T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of six (6) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer Lt.(jg) USNR

cc: Officer in Charge 5th Fleet RI Units.
File.

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~~ULTRA~~

20 April, 1945

Weekly Report Covering Period
12 to 18 April, 1945, Inclusive

12 April, 1945

Air activity continued at a high level throughout the day on the 3342J/6685J series. Two large scale attacks were launched by the enemy. The first against our forces ashore and afloat at Okinawa, and the second, a night attack on Task Force 58 units. The attack on Okinawa occurred from 1356 to 1530 with numerous attack signals received. The night attack on the Task Group to the north of us occurred from 2030 to 2110, with numerous signals to drop flares, prepare to attack, and attack, received.

It was noted that some of the planes that appeared on 3342J, later came up on 3320M; for instance, plane MITEMA2 who sent his Number 1 message to his base on 3342J at 0115 saying that he was returning, came up on 3320M at 0208. This leads us to believe that 3320M is used by planes when through with their attack mission on 3342J, and are on their way back to their base. The day frequency of 3320M was found to be 6640M.

It was again noted that both 3342J and 6685J are active during the hours from 1800 to 1900.

6650J was active again today, with Formosa bases and planes up.

Frequencies

6685J	Search and Attack. Kyushu based.
6640M	Same planes that are active on 3342J/6685J. Believe this to be homing or returning frequency.
6638M	Base and KN Calls.
6650J	Bases and Planes Formosa Area.
6490J	ANCO42 and Picket Boats.
6340J	K and KN Calls. Air Group 951 Activity.
6051M	K and KN calls. Believe this to be drill activity.
3342J	Same as 6685J.
3320M	Same as 6640M. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

13 April, 1945

Air activity subsided somewhat today. The 3342J series was fairly active up until 1208. An interesting incident occurred in the case of plane MITUSI2. This plane had spotted us at 0905 and at 0915 announced that he had fighters on his tail. CIC had picked

20 April, 1945

Weekly Report Cont'd

13 April, 1945

up the "Bogey" at approximately the time the plane spotted us and had sent Fighters to intercept. At 0918 MITUSI2 announced he had spotted 3 Carriers, and again gave our position. At 0923 he said that Fighters (2) were on his tail. At 0927 he frantically repeated, "Fighters on my tail" and 0928 in a very nervous and excited manner the radio operator said something about "We are being attacked" or something of that nature. His sending was very poor. At 0930 in a very slow but evenly sent manner MITUSI2 sang his swan song or in other words "BANZAI". At the same time we asked Flag Plot if they had any information on a plane being "Splashed", and they informed us that the plane was at that time being shot down. MITUSI2 was identified by the Fighter Pilots as being a type "Myrt", single engine recco plane. The plane MITUSI1, also in our area but out of Radar range, announced at 0948 that he was going to make a forced landing at Air Base call E2I, and did make a landing at 0949. The ident on E2I was not known but believe it to have been Kikai Jima Air Base. Activity on this circuit remained quiet throughout the rest of the day.

3320M was up again and proved beyond doubt that this circuit is used by planes returning to their bases after completing their attack missions on the 3342J series. The planes that were active in the night attack of the 12th were heard during the early hours of the 13th returning to their bases. This confirms the information received from FRUPAC this date, concerning the use of KOC Channels for attack and search and CTSU Channels for return of planes to their bases. With this information 3342J/6685J is a KOC frequency and 3320M/6640M is an CTSU frequency.

By order of Commander Task Force 58, Plaum, H. T. RM2/c was detached this date and reported to Commander Task Force 58 aboard the U.S.S. Bunker Hill.

By order of Commander Task Force 58, this unit was ordered to report to Commander Task Group 58.3 aboard the U.S.S. Essex, on the 14th of April. With this information on hand, we secured watches on the U.S.S. Enterprise at 2100 and made preparations to leave the following morning.

Frequencies

6740J	Air Group 903-Hachiojima Detachment(SA6TU) and plane.
6685J	Search and Attack. Kyushu Based.
6650J	Bases and Planes Formosa Area. Air Base Shichiku.
6642M	Base and KN Calls. Believe to be Drill.
6640M	Bases and Plane. Used for homing frequency by Planes on 6685j.

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20 April, 1945

13 April (Cont'd)

6550J Bases of Air Group 901.
6640J KN Calls. Air Group 951 Activity.
3342J Same as 6685J.
3320M Same as 6640M.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

14 April, 1945

Reported aboard the U.S.S. Essex to Commander Carrier Division ONE, Admiral Sherman, at 1800. No watches were ^{stood} this date, as we were busy setting up equipment.

15 April, 1945

Watches were resumed at 0800. Air activity was light on the 3342J series. Only one grid position on our force was received. Activity seemed to be concerned with "Snoopers" and possible staging flights to northern Nansei Shoto bases. 5285J was up with Air Base Shinchiku and planes active. Planes made several requests for bearings on this frequency.

Frequencies

7195M Base(YA4NU) and planes(KKN)
7035J Kanoya Air Base (KE/ST) and planes(KKN).
6685J Base and planes-Search only.
6340J KN Calls. Air Group 951 Activity.
3342J Same as 6685J.
2980J Same as 7045J.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

16 April, 1945

Air activity increased considerably today. Large scale attacks were launched against our forces at Ckinawa from approximately 0730 to 1000. At first it seemed that this attack was headed for our Task Force but our Fighters intercepted and shot down a large amount of them, probably causing them to change their minds and attack Ckinawa. A night attack was launched against our Task Force from approximately 1930 to 2130. The 3342J series was used by the planes in both of these attacks as well as by the "Snoopers" who were active throughout the day. The CTSU Channel 6580J was up today, with planes returning from the attacks on Ckinawa. The characteristic "KANYC" and the use of the "Go Ahead" signal "K" was noted being used by these planes and their base. This type of operating procedure is primarily

20 April, 1945

Weekly Report
Cont'd

Army so it seems reasonable to believe that the aircraft using the KKKN Calls are Army Aircraft under command of the First Mobile Base Airforce.

The night frequency of 6580J was picked up on 3290M at 0114. It was noted that plane NONN1 was keying dual with 3342J, on this circuit.

A new attack frequency was picked up on 3600M with Bases and planes both active. Planes used NKKN calls and also NKK. It is believed that these planes are based at Miyazaki as one of them mentioned that he was returning to that Base.

6650J was active with Air Base Shinchiku and planes up. Planes were apparently engaged in attacks on our shipping in and around Okinawa.

Frequencies

6685J	Search and Attack. KOO Channel of 1st Mobile Base Air Force.
6660M	Army Air Activity. Base used KKK call and planes used KNK calls. The base was noted giving bearings to planes. Example; KAI177I.HOO13. The operating signal TERE used by the base on this circuit is tentatively identified as "Transmit for bearing or make long dash". It was noted that one of the planes worked on 6650J by Air Base Shinchiku was worked by base TIMAKA on this frequency.
6650J	Air Base Shinchiku-Planes. Search and Attack. KOO Channel for 5th Mobile Base Air Force.
6580J	Base and Planes. OTSU Channel for 1st Mobile Base Air Force.
5285J	Bases and planes-Formosa Area. Probable OTSU Channel for 5th Mobile Base Air Force.
3600M	Attack frequency. Bases and Planes. Used in night attacks. Probable based out of Miyazaki.
3342J	Same as 6685J(Night freq).
3290J	Same as 6580J(Night freq). Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

17 April, 1945

Air activity continued heavy today. Our Task Group was under attack by enemy planes from 0930 to 0939. The planes were all of the suicide variety and all were shot down without doing any damage. They gave us quite a scare though.

The day frequency of 3600M was found on 7201M, and was used by the planes engaged in today's attack. Plane 7LQWO gave us quite a thrill when he came up on the circuit right over our force. His signal, was,

to

20 April, 1945

Weekly Report Cont'd.

to say the least, terrific. We believe this plane was shot down by gunfire soon after this.

3320M showed again today, with planes enroute to their bases.

Frequencies

7201M Attack frequency. Believed under command of 1st Mobile Base Air Force. Used by planes engaged in attacks against this Task Group.
6685J Search and Attack. KCO Channel 1st Mobile Base Air Force.
6660M Army Air Activity. KKK Calls.
6650J Air Base Shinchiku, unident Air Base and Planes. KCO Channel 5th Mobile Base Air Force.
6643M KN Calls. Drill.
3342J Same as 6685J(Night freq).
3320M Planes and Bases. OTSU Channel 1st Mobile Base Air Force.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

18 April, 1945

Air activity dropped off considerably. On the 3342J series, only the Base was heard calling planes. The 5th Mobile Base Air Force KCO Channel-6650J, was active from 0557 to 0852 with Air Base Shinchiku and planes up. A new circuit was heard on 6114M, with both bases and planes heard. Base signed KKN call while the planes used NKK calls. The Base used the collective KAØ when calling all planes. This activity is unidentified as to area and purpose.

Frequencies

8915J Air Base Kjsaratsu, Air Group Omura, and planes.
7035J Air Base Kanoya(KEØSI) and planes.
6685J KCO Channel 1st Mobile Base Air Force. Only Base heard.
6650J Air Base Shinchiku and Planes. 5th Mobile Base Air Force KCO Channel.
6526M Unsigning station calling SU3KI.
6114M Base and Planes. KKN and NKK Calls.
6054M KN and K Calls. Believed to be drill.
3342J Same as 6685J. (Night freq)
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

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~~ULTRA~~

20 April, 1945

Weekly Report Cont'd

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

17 May, 1945

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division One.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Report of Operation Covering the Period
from 19 April, 1945 to 25 April, 1945 inclusive.
Submitted by T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of seven(7) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer
R. B. Palmer Lt.(jg) USNR

cc: CinC Fifth Fleet RI Units.
CinC SUPRAD
File.

~~SECRET~~

17 May, 1945

Weekly Report Covering Period
19 April to 25 April, 1945
Inclusive

19 April, 1945

Air activity was very poor today. None of the frequencies used by the First Mobile Base Air Force were heard. This includes both KOO and OTSU Channels. 6650J, KOO Channel for Fifth Mobile Base Air Force was active from 0645 to 0745.

This Task Group is still operating off Okinawa. Straight two-section two man watch system is in effect under normal operating conditions.

Frequencies

6857M	Unsigning Base calling RO6NU1, 2, and 3.
6650J	Bases and Planes of 5th Mobile Base Air Force.
6645M	Air Base Kanoya, Base Force Okinawa Area Cmdr., and Air Base Tansui. (KOO 8 Calls)
6641M	KN Calls. Drill activity.
6550J	Air Group 901-Shanghai Detachment and Air Group 901-Toko Detachment.
6594M	Unsigning Station calling KI3KC.
6340J	Air Group 951 Activity.
6115J	Miyako Jima Air Base, Kanoya Air Base, Croku Air Base, and Takao Air Base. (KOO 8 Calls)
5905J	Kanoya Air Base and Ibusuki Air Base.
5135M	Unident FU-3 Calls. Believe Hansai Shoto or Formosa Area. Weather originated by these calls appeared on Kanoya Air Base Broadcast. This might be the old 5135J with only Air Bases active.
4325A	Karenko Air Base and unident FU-3 Call.
3577M	KKN Calls. Believed to be drill activity.
3366M	Kanoya Air Base and other FU-3 Calls.
3322M	Same as 6641M. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

20 April, 1945

Air activity increased somewhat today. Most interesting development occurred with the appearance of 3342L/3421L series. This circuit had been mentioned in a despatch from FRIWAD as assigned to Third Air Fleet. The first indication that the frequency was active came at 1749 when plane KUTS11 called his base. At 1742 plane KUTS12 made his appearance. KUTS12 sent a

17 May, 1945

20 April, 1945
Cont'd

grid at 1238. At 1238 a Base on 6885J came up and repeated this same message. The same thing occurred when KJCSUL sent his grid message at 1248. There was no cross frequency operation noted. It is believed that both the bases (6842M and - 6885J) are First Mobile Base Air Force bases, probably Kanoya or in the Kanoya area, and the traffic from planes on 6842M is rebroadcast on 6885J for the benefit of the planes still operating on that frequency. It was noted that there were two unsigning stations on 6885J. One fairly well identified as Kanoya and the other, either a plane or another base. Although the signal did not sound like the usual plane type transmitter. This other station receipted for traffic being sent by Kanoya. It is our assumption that the 6842M activity is planes of the Third Air Fleet and that Kanoya rebroadcasts the traffic from these planes over the 6885J series for information to First Mobile Base Air Force Aircraft. However, when the planes on 6842M shifted to 842M, the traffic sent by them was not observed being rebroadcast on 8842J.

The activity on 8740J/8870J seems to have been the deception traffic predicted by FRUFAC.

Although the "Snoopers" on 8842M/842M were out looking for the Blue Striking Force, no actual sightings occurred during the day. The two grid positions originated by planes on 6842M were apparently the position of the planes at the end of their search sector.

Activity showed again today on 360M/7205M, with Bases and planes active. Both KKK and NKKK, as well as KKKK plane calls were heard.

6860J was again active with Air Base Shinchiku and other Bases, probably Takao and Ichigaki working planes. Planes used KKKK and KKK calls.

Frequencies

8045J	Air Base Shanghai, Air Base Shinchiku and Planes.
8725J	Air Base Atsuki, Air Base Yokosuka, and Planes.
6885J	Air Base Atsuki.
7205M	Base and Planes. Measured 7201/17th.
7085J	M/3I and Planes.
6842M	Base and Planes. Search Activity.
8740J	Base and Planes.
8885J	Bases only.
8741M	M Calls. Drill Activity.
8840J	Air Group 881 Activity.

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17 May, 1945

20 April, 1945
Cont'd

6115J Air Base Croku, Air Base Minami Daito Shima, Air
Base Kikai Jima, and Air Base Kanoya. (KCC 3 Calls)
6114M Base and Planes. Same activity as heard on 13th.
3601M Same as 7205M.
3421M Same as 6842M.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

21 April, 1945

Air activity was fairly heavy throughout the day. Most interesting development was the attempted night attack against our forces. First indication that attacks were forthcoming was at 2125 when plane 7MUKC on 3600M gave the position of the entire Task Force. This plane had been picked up on the Radar and had been tracked completely around the Force, but did not break radio silence until he was on his way back to base. The base on 3600M (UAMA) immediately sent this grid report to plane 0KUK11. The base on 3421M followed suit shortly after, when he sent the same message to MAHEMAL, NEHIFUL, and group UIFU at 2145. The base on 3421M again sent the same message to MAHEMAL and NEHIFUL at 2317 and at 2323 sent it to group YCFYU. "Bogeys" appeared on the Radar at approximately 2330, with one "Betty" shot down shortly after this. No attack signals were noted or flares dropped. It seems that our Night Fighters disrupted the enemys plans.

It was noted that plane TOWAU1 on 3320M at 0453 later appeared on 6842M at 0652 and sent out a grid position, indicating that CTSU Channels are used enroute to the Battle Area as well as a homing channel.

The base on 6885J was again noted rebroadcasting traffic originated by planes on 6842M. It was also noted that the planes active on 6842M later came up on 6885J, indicating that 6842M/3421M is probably First Mobile Base Air Force circuit and not Third Air Fleet channel as first believed.

The CTSU Channel 3320M was active again with planes up who had previously been active on 3421M and 6842M.

6850J was very active from 1812 to 2030 with Air Base Takao, Air Base Shinchiku, and Air Base Ishigaki heard. Planes enroute between these bases were also heard.

Frequencies

6842M Search and Attack.

(Page 3 of 7)

17 May, 1945

21 April, 1945

Cont'd

6650J Air Base Takao, Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Ishigaki and Planes.
6639M Base and Planes. Base E2YA and planes ØKUMI1 and 2.
6115M Base calling plane. Measured 6114 on 20th.
3421M Same as 6842M.
3370J Deception activity continued early morning hours.
3320M Bases and Planes.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

22 April, 1945

Air activity continued fairly heavy today. The night attack on our forces during the late hours of the 21st was followed by another attack at about 0200 today, with the same results. Only two "Bettys" were shot down this time. The "Snoopers" who were up yesterday on 6842M, namely the KUUSU group, were again active and did a fine job of observing our forces, but paid for this work by losing two planes to our Combat Air Patrol. Planes shot down were KUUSU2 and 3. Plane KUUSU1 might have been shot down by ships AA but their is nothing definite on that. However these planes were able to get off their sightings before being destroyed. We take our hats off to these "Snoopers", as they do a fine job. It appeared that another attack was shaping up in the afternoon but nothing ever came of it. Activity died down to practically nothing during the evening.

6650J showed briefly with Air Base Shinchiku and several planes active.

The CTSU Channel, 3321M was active during the early morning with planes returning to their Kyushu bases.

6685J showed very briefly with base calling planes. It appears now that 6842M/3421M has replaced 6685J/3342J as a KCC Channel for First Mobile Base Air Force.

Frequencies

7035J Unident MELRI calling plane E6FU2.
6843M Search and Attack. Probable new KCC Channel for First Mobile Base Air Force. Measured 6342 on 21st.
6685J Base calling planes.
6650J Air Base Shinchiku and Planes.
6650M Base Force Okinawa Area Cmdr., Air Base Tansui, and Air Base Kanoya.
3302M Base and Planes. Measured 3300 on 21st.
3421M Same as 6843M.

~~FINNE~~

17, May, 1945

22 April, 1945
Cont'd

3342J Base and Planes. Showed briefly.
3321M CTSU Channel First Mobile Base Air Force.

23 April, 1945

Air activity was relatively quiet throughout the day. The only tactical frequency that was active was 6650J, with Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, and probably Air Base Ishigaki working planes. Air Base Shinchiku was noted using both NALYU and NALYU.

Frequencies

9045J Air Base Takao, Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Shanghai,
Air Base Shinchiku and planes.
6650J Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, Air Base Ishigaki,
and planes.
6632M KN Calls. Drill activity
6650M Base Force Okinawa Area Cmdr., and Air Base Tansui.
6105M Base to KE4NO, SUØ, SU1, and SU2.
4192J Sasebo Radio, Base Force Okinawa Area Cmdr., and
Oshima Defense Unit.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

24 April, 1945

Air activity showed on 6842M today with on search plane (KUUSUL) appearing. This plane approached fairly close to our Task Group, but apparently did not sight anything. He originated three grid positions and gave the weather at that position in each case. KUUSUL later appeared on 6685J, further substantiating our belief that 6685J/3342J is an CTSU Channel now.

A new air base circuit appeared on 8414m today using "Charlie" calls. KI8SA was heard calling RU7KE and SO3KU.

Frequencies

9045J Air Base Shanghai and Air Base Takao.
8720M Unident KN Calls KIMU6, FUMI6, WOME6, and MEKI8.
8725J Air Base Atsuki, Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Shinchiku,
and planes.
8490M Army activity.
8414M KI8SA to RU7KE and SO3KU.
7670J Yangtze Base Force Cmdr., and Base Force Tsingtao Cmdr.
7200M SALHO and KIZEO-Army activity.

~~FINRE~~

17 May, 1945

24 April, 1945
Cont'd

7035J Base and planes. Both drill and JITU traffic.
6842M Search and Attack.
6685J Base and plane.
6650J Air Base Shinchiku to plane.
6340J Air Group 951 activity.
3320M KM calls. Drill activity

25 April, 1945

Air activity still continued light, possibly due to poor weather conditions in this area. Kyushu based search planes were up on 6842M, and one (KUUSU2) sighted one of our Task Groups at 1030 and amplified this sighting at 1035. It was noted that 6685J came up shortly after the two messages were sent and the Base on this circuit using the call of the plane (KUUSU2) repeated both messages. This same procedure was used on the 20th and 21st. Seems that only the actual sighting of the enemy reports are rebroadcast in this manner. Plane YOSIU1 came up on 6842M at 1510. During the course of his search he originated 7 grid positions all of which were the planes own position and did not include any sighting of Blue Forces. It appeared that this plane was on more of a weather flight than on a search mission.

A new air base frequency was found on 6766M, with identified Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Komatsu, and Air Base Tomitaka. FU-3 calls were used. A good deal of weather traffic was handled.

Frequencies

7035J Planes and Base.
6842M Search activity only.
6766M Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Komatsu, Air Base Tomitaka,
and other unident FU3 Calls.
6685J Base only.
6636M AZRE to KM calls.
6245J Chinkai Defense Force.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

(page 6 of 7)

~~FILE~~ 17 May, 1945

Weekly Report
Cont'd

Personnel

Present compliment of enlistedmen of the Radio Intelligence Unit assigned to Commander Carrier Division One, aboard the U.S.S. Essex, are listed below.

Gilmore, T. E. Jr, CRM(PA) USNR
Buster, W. S. RM2/c(T) USNR
Clinkinbeard, D. E. RM2/c(T) USNR
Sullivan, R. E. RM2/c (T) USNR

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

15 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Today at 0800 we ~~STARTED~~ watches on the U.S.S. Essex (CV9), for Admiral Sherman, Commander Carrier Division One.

Air activity was down during the entire day until late in the evening when Snoopers came down from Kanoya.

In the morning Kanoya came up and called nine planes, but none of them were heard on the circuit. Since we were not on watch on the 14th while moving to the U.S.S. Essex, we cannot evaluate the early morning traffic with any accuracy.

During the day planes were being staged into Kanoya and Kanoya reported first ten and then forty enemy planes, all carrier based, in the area at 1525. At 1531 Kanoya was under air raid alert and at 1630 he reported twenty carrier planes over Sakurajima.

Formosa frequencies were fairly inactive with Takao bearing the brunt of the traffic. Nothing of importance was noted.

At 2030 Kanoya came up and called two groups of Snoopers consisting of NONN1, 2, and 3 and NOTUT1 and 2. At 2103 NONN2 was in the air on his way down toward our forces and at 2325 NONN1, NOTUT1, NONN2, and NONN3 were heard on the air. At 2349 NOTUT1 sent out a message giving his position as 30:12N- 132:03E and said he expected to arrive (at his base?) at 0220. No sighting on Blue Forces were received.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

16, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Kikusui NR3 was carried out today, the 16th of April in three phases. These phases included Phase 1 with wide spread snooping in the early morning until approximately 0400; Phase 2 with snoopers followed by a large group of attack planes (The main attacks were carried out against amphibious forces in the Okinawa area. This phase was active from 0730 until 1000); and Phase 3 the night attack carried out from about 2040 until 2200 with intermittent snoopers activity thereafter.

PHASE 1

After midnight on the 16th of April at least 9 night snoopers kept in close contact with the Blue task force. Plane NONN1 who was heard called by Kanoya at 2152 came up with his NR1 message (TCB001C at 0045. This grid position was approximately 27N-130:13E and the sighting was on 20 surface ships headed NE at a speed of 24 knots. The other contacts received during the night by 3 plane groups (ie TEMUYO1, TEWAE1,2,3, MINATA1,2) will be listed chronologically. The general succession of relief seemed to be as follows: the NOTUTI group which came into contact with Blue Forces previous to midnight, the NONN group which gained contact shortly after midnight, the TEMUYO group which was up at the same time, and the TEWAE group which took over at 0200.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

16, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

The contacts are as follows:

<u>TOR</u>	<u>TOO</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>GRID OR MESSAGE CONTENT</u>
0059	0050	TEMUYO1	27:12N-130:53E Sighted large force.
0114	0052	NONN1	Plane has motor failure and is returning.
0204	0140	TEMUYO1	Radar failure and is returni and position at the time 27:42N-131:48E.
0255,0308, 0315	0240,0240, 0315	TEWAE2	Has not sighted enemy and is in position 28:27N-134:48E at 0315.

It can be seen from this table that only one plane actually sighted the enemy and maintained contact. The rest were either operational failures or just plain failures.

PHASE 2

At 0730 the day snoopers and attack planes came up on the circuit and the first grid was sent out at 0754. At least 6 snoopers took part in the general attack plan and 4 large groups of attack planes were involved. The snoopers^{CONCERNED} themselves with reconnaissance of Okinawa and TF58, ~~but~~ the attack planes after they had been attacked by our planes suddenly veered toward Okinawa and attacked the amphibious groups of the landing force with varied success. The snoopers had the calls NKAR11-4 while the attack plane groups were headed by YAKUI1-4. One of the attack groups (YAKUI1) sighted the enemy at 0932 and carried out an

~~TOP SECRET~~
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16, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

attack at 0933. One other attack group (YAKUII) came up at 0935 and said he was attacking a cruiser in the position 27:17N-127:03E, the position of the amphib group. These planes had completed their attack by 0950 and were on their way back to Kanoya. The grids received from the snoopers in chronological order are

<u>TOR</u>	<u>TOC</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>GRID CR MESSAGE CONTENTS</u>
0745	0715	NKARI1	Sighted cruiser 28:52N-131:20E. (This position is considerably to the north of us)

The attack group was first heard sending his call at 0749. NKARI3 had fighters on his tail at 0752 but was not shot down.

0754	0754	NKARI2	Sighted one carrier 27:53N-130:02E.
0803	0750	NKARI2	Sighted 2 carriers, 1BB 27:42N-130:13E

NKARI2 has fighters on his tail but was not shot down. He continues to send out messages giving the formation of the Blue task force.

0836	0825	NKARI4	This plane has motor trouble in the position 27:42N-127:03E.
------	------	--------	--

0846	0834	NKARI3	The plane gave out orders saying that the snoopers after completing reconnaissance of Okinawa should keep close contact with ships in the position 27:12N-130:28E i.e. TF58.
------	------	--------	--

The message was a good indication that the main attack was being carried out against Okinawa and not against us. The same plane came up at 0852 and sent out detailed information about shipping in the Okinawa area. It was again evident from the number of snoopers and

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~~ULTRA~~

16, April 945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

from their contacts that an organized search plan was being followed covering Okinawa and the sea lanes in the Okinawa area.

<u>TOR</u>	<u>TOO</u>	<u>CALL</u>	<u>GRID OR MESSAGE CONTENTS</u>
0912	0900	NKARI2	Sights two groups one bearing 320 from the position 27:17N-130:38E
<u>TIME</u>	<u>CALL</u>		
0900	NKARI1		is now in the Kikaijima area on his way back to the base
0940	NKARI3		still in the Okinawa area reports results of reconnaissance of air field.
0932	YAKUI4		sights enemy (Okinawa area).
0933	YAKUI1		attacks.
0935	YAKUI1		says his target is a cruiser in the position 27:17N 127:03E.
0943	YAKUI2		previously unheard has fighters on his tail but gets away.
0955			reports BB in position 26:57-127:23E.
1006	YAKUI4		has ⁶⁷ fighters on his tail. It looks very much as though this plane was shot down.
1025			New snooper NAHEMUL comes up.
1048	NAHEMUL		sights a submarine surfaced in the position 29:52N-131:58E. This gives us a good idea of when he will arrive over the force.
1053			Kanoya? has an air raid alert.
1210	NAHEMUL		sights 2 carriers 27:52N-130:23E.
1214	NAHEMUL		changes the contact to 27:37N-130:23E and keeps repeating the grid.

16, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

TIME

1236 Kanoya ? has an air raid alert.

1321 Alert secured.

1520 Anew plane is called and came up saying he has motor trouble and ~~is~~ is returning.

The planes returning to Kanoya were told about the air raid alert and were told to go to some unident base and return to Kanoya after 1730. Evidently Kanoya expected the Blue raids to be over at this time.

PHASE #3

This completed phase two of the day's operations and phase three or the night attack came up at approximately 1930 when at least 2 groups of planes ^{WERE HEARD} ~~came up~~. These planes came down from Kanoya and at 1938 one of them (MINATA2) said he would arrive over the target at 2040. At 2046 MINATA2 of the ^{FIRST} ~~same~~ group sighted the enemy. At 2048 MINATA3 of the same group said "Form for the attack". At the same time MINATA2 also of this group also sighted the enemy and sent out the grid 27:37N-130:38E. Our position during the attack was . At 2051 MINATA1 was under gun fire and at 2053 he sent out the weather (TOO 2050). A plane of the second group, KANIMO2, gave the signal to attack at 2059. At 2106 he said "form for the attack". In the meantime at 2104 MINATA1 had given the signal for commence illumination and had followed this up with the signal "all units attack". At 2112 KANIMO2 said "we have completed

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

16, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

a torpedo attack" and at 2115 MTNATAL was returning. At 2123 MINATAL said he and his group had carried out a torpedo attack and a BB was on fire in the position 27:32N-130:58E. The TOC of this message was 2058. At 2124 he said he was returning to his base.

This wound up the torpedo attacks and the activity after 2200 was all snoop activity. ~~Four~~ snoopers ~~came~~ came up on the circuit at 2135, 2249, 2359 respectively and none of them actually sighted blue forces until after 2400 although one of them, TEMUYO1, sighted enemy planes in the position 27:12N-130:48E.

Another group or groups of planes on an entirely different frequency evidently took part in the night torpedo attack because at 2051 one of the groups came up and said that at 1933 they had carried out a torpedo attack against a cruiser with unknown results. This group or groups seemed to have been Kyushu based because one of the planes came up 2113 and said he was heading for Miyazaki. Another plane on the circuit also headed for the same place. No real estimate of the size of these groups can be made although there were at least 5 planes involved.


The Formosa tactical frequency was also quite active during the day with Shinchiku working 5 planes. Of these MELRU1 and MELRU2 were definitely committed in an attack. MELRU1 came up at 1924 and said he had sunk a cruiser results certain (TOC 1015 probably an error for 1915).

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

16, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

17, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Jap search activity continued during the early morning of the 17th with at least two snoopers keeping close contact on us during darkness. This was followed by a new group of determined snoopers who evidently were sent ahead of the attack which followed at approximately 0918. Air activity after this slacked off and came to a standstill in the late afternoon. I shall list the events in a chronological order so that a fairly clear picture of the events of the day can be drawn. The first snoopers with the radio call (TEMUYO1) was up in the air at 2057 when he was called by the base. AT 2356 he first sighted blue forces and gave out the grid 27:12-130:48. This was to the north of us at this time. His number two message gave the same position and also complained that he was under gunfire. This plane was splashed soon after this transmission by gunfire. AT 0107 Kanoya called another night snoopers (TEWAE1) and at 0150 he was heard on the circuit transmitting a grid 26:37N-130:23E. Our position was 26:38N-130:28E. The plane said he had radar contacts on two groups. AT 0103 he had our fighters on his tail but he eluded them and continued the good work. He then sent out the weather over the target but his keying was so poor the base did not get the information until 0236. AT 0358 he sent out a long message (TOR0330) in which he gave the weather around Okinawa and finally at 0501 he was on his way back to Kyushu. At 0627 Kanoya came up and called the day snoopers* coordinators NKARI1 and NKARI2. These planes were heard at 0644 and at 0833 the plane NKARI2 sighted us and sent out the position (TOR 0820)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

17, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

28:42N-130:38E and said he had sighted enemy planes. This pretty well tipped off his position to us and it was no surprise to us when he said he was making a forced landing in the position 28:42N-130:03E. NKARIL however got through at 0925 and sent out his first message (TOR 0910) giving the position 26:27N-129:53E. Our position at this time was 26:49N-129:50.2E. After this he sent out five more messages which probably amplified what he had sighted. At 1041 Kanoya told him he was under an air raid alert and at 1045 he was told by Kanoya that the all clear had been sounded.

At 0918 a plane with an exceedingly loud signal came up and sighted three carriers. The plane (7MOWO) at 0923 said he was getting ready for an attack. His signal was so loud there was absolutely no doubt in our minds he was right overhead and at 0932 he said he sighted two carriers and one CVL. Finally at 0933 he came on in and we saw him dive at us from the port hole. This plane was shot down by ship's gunfire soon thereafter. Although we can't be absolutely sure it seems quite possible the attack planes were also Kanoya based. They certainly seemed to have been vectored into position by the Kanoya snoopers.

Air activity after this died down and only one Kanoya based plane was heard after this time at 1615. This plane however must have turned back because the frequency died down at 1700 and no more activity was noted.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

17, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Formosa based planes showed a slight flurry of activity from 0600 to 0800 and from 1800 until approximately 2100. Only two or three planes were noted on this circuit and in each case they were working Shinchiku. This might indicate search activity was going on and there is some possibility some of these planes were being staged into Ishigaki although there is no definite proof of this in the traffic.

Kanoya was under air alert at 1041 and 1407. At 1418 he had eleven B-29's overhead. Kokubu had an air alert at 1437 and Kikai Jima had one at 1646.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

18, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Since we have retired to the fueling area most of today's air traffic does not concern us intimately. Tactical air traffic more-over dropped surprisingly from that of the preceding days. Planes were up on the important tactical Formosan frequency with Shinchiku working at least one plane. The plane however had a weak signal at all times and was probably out on a two hour search flight in the Formosa area. The plane sent out three messages and from all indications sighted nothing of importance. The main Kanoya tactical frequency today was almost unsuspectingly quiet although Kanoya called three groups of planes in the early afternoon and one other group at 1754. None of these plane were heard and reports of bad weather in the Kyushu area seem to explain the general slump in the Nips air activity. Weather information was still sent regularly from Naha to Kanoya and from Minami Daitoo Shima to Oroku (Naha).

Tonight one group of planes who participated in the so called torpedo attack of the 16th was called by Kanoya but here again there was no word out of the plane and activity died down at 2145. Evidently these planes are controlled by Kanoya where the First Mobile Base Commander is stationed. The fact that the base calls the planes is generally a fair tip off that the planes are on their way but in cases such as today the planes probably never took off since no traffic of any kind was heard from these planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

18, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

This lack of coordination between base and planes has been noted before in the Iwojima campaign when there were several cases where flights had been postponed with^{out} the controlling base's knowledge with the result that the base called the plane for some time before he actually received word of the postponement.

Kanoya was under an air raid at 0654 and it is interesting to note that advance warning of the blue attack was received from the Tanega Shima radar at 0517.

The aircraft code which was captured recently has now gone out and we are no longer able to break every message intercepted. This however should not affect us seriously since we can still rely on the grid position and signal strength.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~


19, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity on the 19th was as slow as it has ever been. Not a single plane was heard on the circuits and this generally is a good indication that weather conditions are so bad that practically everything operational has been grounded. Air bases sent a good volume of operational traffic and air base Koroku (Naha) sent weather information to air base Takao, air base Shinchiku and Minami Daitoo Shima. This indicates that some sort of strike was planned but the condition of the weather will probably postpone any plans in this direction. Kanoya air base and Base Force Okinawa Commander kept in close contact but no message of great importance seems to have been sent. In short it can be said the day was notable for its lack of Nip air activity of any type.

A picket boat in the southern approaches to Kyushu said he had been attacked by enemy planes at 0033 but that "he had received no damage even though a flare had been dropped".

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

20 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity on the 20th was extremely light during the early morning. Not until approximately 1000 was there any sign of tactical air traffic. However at 1000 2 search planes (KUUSU 1 and KUUSU2) came up and kept close communication with their base, possibly Kanoya. At 1236 plane KUUSU2 sent out a grid position (TOO-1236) of 27:02N-128:58E. Although we are no longer able to break down the code because the captured code we have is now out of date, it seemed quite obvious that the plane had reached the end of his search leg and had not yet sighted Blue Forces. The position was his position at the time. At 1248 the other search plane, KUUSU1, came up and sent out a similar position-27:52N-131:08E (TOO-1243). This plane also had not sighted Blue Forces. These planes were probably "Myrts" of #11 Force. It is interesting to note that one of our Fighters sighted a high flying "Myrt" in the approximate position mentioned above. Activity died down after this until 1700. At 1700 the Formosa frequency became active with Air Base Shinchiku working at least 6 planes and Air Base Takao working one or two. However, no traffic of any consequences was sent and it appears that this traffic concerned either negative search activity or a possible staging of planes into a forward area, such as Ishigaki. The activity died down at 1900. At 1900, planes came down from Kanoya. At least 7 and probably 9 planes were involved (TEHIMU1,2,5, and NEON11,2,3,4). Close contact was kept with the controlling base, (Probably Kanoya or southern Kyushu base), and at 2137 plane NEON11 sent out the tactical signal "Illuminate disposition ready", and 2233 he said, "Commence Illumination". At 2250 he was told to send weather information. All of these planes had a good signal, but not good enough to be in our immediate area.

This leads me to believe that either attacks are being carried out on the Blue Air Field in Northern Okinawa by ~~illumination~~^{ELSE} illumination is being carried out off the Northern Okinawa coast by Jap planes trying to find Task Force 58, which up to yesterday had been operating in that general area. These planes are still up at 2400.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

21 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Plane activity was active with Snoopers keeping fairly close contact with us all day. At 2342 on the 20th, two planes came up and sent out their calls indicating they were on their way from Kanoya. Both of these planes sent out messages which appeared to be weather information. However at 0108, NISOSC3 sighted the enemy and at 0147 he sent out a message originated at 0110, in which he gave the grid position 25:47N-128:23E. Our position was 26:00N-129:17.9E. At 0156 he sent out another message with the grid position 26:12N-128:38E. He later elaborated on his sighting and gave out weather information. At 0300 he indicated he was on the way back and expected to land soon thereafter. The other planes in this search did not sight anything and were probably in different search sectors. It is quite possible these planes were among the three shot down last night, since the Snooper groups included at least five planes and the base called NISISOL, 2, and 5 without receiving an answer from them. We also know that these three planes ~~Did not~~ came up on the circuit after 0130.

At 0652 another Snooper (TCWAU1) came up and sent out a grid position of 27:17N-131:28E, which he had originated at 0110, but had not sent until this late in the morning.

Activity remained quiet until 1230 when another group of Snoopers consisting of three planes came up. At 1355 one of these (KUUSU3) had Fighters on his tail. At 1359 he sighted Carriers in the position 27:22N-129:58E. At 1440 he sent out a long message (TOO 1410), in which he sighted three Task Groups in the following positions: 27:22N-129:58E, 27:17N-129:58E, and 27:17N-130:13E. Our position was 27:15N-130:11E. At 1446 he repeated the grid 27:22N-129:58E. At 1507 KUUSU1 sighted five Carriers but he never sent out a grid position. KUUSU2 did not report any grid. At 1700 the activity here died down as the planes were returning to their bases.

Activity which concerned us closely, again came up at 2132, when plane 7MUKO who had already waltzed around the whole Task Force without once breaking Radio Silence, came up on his way back and sent out the grid position 27:20N-130:20E. This plane maintained excellent circuit discipline on the whole flight because from an Radio Intelligence standpoint he was non-existent until he his Number 1 message at 2132. He had already been on the radar screen for over thirty minutes. The grid position of Blue Forces was put out by the base on the circuit (possibly Miyazaki) to at least one plane, 0KUKI1 on this circuit and also on another circuit to attack groups composed of approximately 10 planes in all. One group was composed of at least three planes, WANEMAL, 2, and 3. Two single planes were also called and heard, i.e., NEHIFUL and KEKITUL. The collective call UITU was also called by the base. This collective

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~~ULTRA~~

21 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

call could include an indefinite number of planes. These planes were up on the circuit at 2135 and grew gradually louder. Bogeys appeared on the screen at 2330 and the activity is continuing into the next day.

A snooper who was up last night came up at 2330 and sent out his position as 31:37N-127:13E, and said he had Fighters on his tail. The position seems questionable as far as our Fighters are concerned and it is possible he might have encoded his position incorrectly.

The planes which were to have carried on Radio Deception last night were up during the entire early morning hours sending out, "bum dope" of all varieties. I must confess they had me confused for a while, until we ferreted out the wheat from the chaff.

Kanoya received treatment from B-29's at 0650, 0730 (12 Bombers), and 1650.

The Formosa tactical frequency became quite active at 1800 and there are definite indications that a flight of planes moved from Shinchiku to Ishigaki, probably in readiness for Kikusui #4. Ishigaki was under air raid alert at 1843 but this was secured at 1850. At least three groups of planes moved up to Shinchiku, possibly for further staging into the Nansei Shoto group.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer.
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

22 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The attack group which came in last night at 2330 returned at about 2400 and at 0043 the planes MANEMAL and 2 started to call each other and it appeared that they were getting ready to make another run on us. This second attack came in at about 0200 and cluttered up the radar screen, but nothing was accomplished. Three planes, possibly Snoopers, were up at the same time. The first one, NISISO2, called his base at 0005, the second, KUMIRU2 at 0035, and the third KUMIRU1 at 0224. Another Snoopers? MAKOKI1, appeared on the circuit at 0423. None of these planes got in closer than 60 miles from our force and no grids were received. At 0246 NISISO2 had Fighters on his tail but he was still up at 0520. It is quite possible that most of these planes were night hecklers instead of Snoopers, because no great effort was made on their part to send out any information about Blue Forces. The NISISO groups included at least two planes, the KUMIRU groups two planes, and the MAKOKI groups four planes. All the activity died down at about 0600.


At 0900 two planes were called by Kanoya, but the planes were never heard, indicating that this flight was postponed or had fallen through in some way.

Everything was quiet until 1147 when the three planes of Force 11 (KUUSU1, 2, and 3) came up. At 1211 one of them, KUUSU2, came up and sent out a grid position of 29:47N-131:48E. This plane had not sighted Blue Forces and the position was his at the time. Finally at 1337 KUUSU2 sighted Blue Forces in the position 27:02N-130:38E. Our position was 26:33N-130:14E. At 1342 KUUSU3 sighted Blue Forces in the position 26:42N-129:23E and as soon as we reported this he popped up on the radar screen in this exact position. Planes were sent out immediately and at 1404 he complained of Fighters on his tail. At 1412 he was "Tallyhoed" and again screamed about the Fighters. At 1418 he stopped in the middle of a transmission and at 1420 he was "splashed". KUUSU2 in the meantime elaborated on his contact at 27:02N-130:38E at 1352, and 1407. This plane was "Splashed" a few minutes after this.

At 1544 a new plane came up on the search and attack frequency and two other planes appeared on the circuit sometime thereafter. At the same time bogeys were reported at Kikaijima and several "Toms" were shot down. None of these planes got near the force and their signals were never very loud.

Activity after 1700 was practically non-existent and has remained that way.

Kanoya received a lot of attention in the morning from B-29's, with air raid alerts reported at 0645 with 12 planes overhead and at 0730. The all clear was sounded at 0910.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer.

157

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

23 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity on the 23rd was of little importance. Ishigaki was up at 0639 working a single plane but no traffic was sent by the plane or by Ishigaki. The fact that Ishigaki was working a plane at least points to the fact that this field is still operative and that future strikes can still be expected from there.

Planes were being staged from Shanghai to Kanoya at 1130, but this merely shows that the shuttling of operational planes into Kanoya continues.

Shinchiku worked a group of planes from 1830 until 2000, but here again no important activity of a tactical nature was uncovered.

On the whole it can be said Jap plane activity was extremely low throughout the entire day.

Kanoya had B-29's overhead at 1241.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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~~ULTRA~~

24 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air traffic on the 24th was still low. About the only activity of any importance which concerned us was the appearance of a snoopers of #11 Force at 1146. This plane however did not sight Blue Forces and at 1109 he put out a message (TOO 1100) in which he gave the position 28:42N-131:38E and reported on the weather in the area. At 1210 he came out with the position 28:37N-131:03E and supplied more weather information. At 1240 he seemed to be on his way back to his base. It is interesting to note that this plane (KUUSU1) came out alonetoday mostly because his two compatriots KUUSU2 and KUUSU3 had been shot down on the 22nd. If we continue to shoot down these reconnaissance planes it should cause a severe shortage of really good pilots in this branch of the Nip Air Arm. It has always been the snoopers who were the most seasoned pilots of the Jap Air Fleet and it is they for the most part who seem to coordinate most of the day and night attacks.

Bad weather must explain the low level of plane activity in the Empire. A few planes were "Drilling" in the Kanoya Area. Several planes were being staged from Atsuki to Kanoya. Shinchiku was working a plane at 1544 and at 1644 the plane seemed to have made a forced landing. No other activity of any importance was uncovered.

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. Palmer
R. E. Palmer

Radio Intelligence Officer.

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~~ULTRA~~

25, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Bad weather kept Nip air activity at a low level. Despite the weather, however, two Nip snoopers of #11 Force came out on a search at about 0800 and headed in our general direction. At 0907 KUUSU1 sent out general weather information and this was followed by his position at 0930. The position was 28:27N-131:33E (TOC 0925). At 1000 he was in the position 26:47N-131:53E. His compatriot KUUSU2 in the meantime was flying in his search sector and at 1031 he sighted blue forces in the position 27:02N - 129:18E. Our position at the time was 26:49N-128:53E. This sighting was followed by 4 messages giving the condition of the weather over the target. From the general condition of the weather it is very doubtful that this plane saw anything but our pickets. Activity on this circuit died down at 1200.

However at 1500 another plane YOSIU1 another snoopers came up on the circuit. This plane must have been sent out to send back detailed wather reports of the Ckinawa area and vicinity because he did not make any determined effort to find blue forces. His course can be tracked quite easily by the positions he sent back to the base. He followed the general procedure of sending out a position and then giving a detailed account of the weather in that position . The positions are as follows:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
1515	30:40N-129:40E
1540	29:40N-128:40E

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25, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
1600	29:00N-128:00E
1620	28:20N-127:20E
1640	29:00N-126:40E (Returning)
1700	29:40N-128:20E
1738	30:00N-126:20E

This plane secured after 1800 and no more activity of any importance was heard.

Respectfully submitted,
R. B. Palmer
R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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26 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity continued at a very low level, still probably because of bad weather. B-29's hit Kanoya in the early morning at 0755, when formations of planes were sighted over Tanega Shima headed north. Okino Daito Shima also heard 8 Carrier plane overhead headed NW at 1655. There were indications of continued plane movements into Southern Kyushu but this activity was curtailed greatly from that of previous days. Weather information took up a great deal of the volume of the traffic. The tactical Formosa frequency showed slight signs of life from 1400 to 1600, but all activity died down after this time and nothing of any importance was received during the slight period of activity.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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27 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Tactical air circuits were much more active than they were yesterday. The activity can be divided into three sections, namely; Traffic sent out by two snoopers of #11 Force from 0733 until 1015; Wide spread activity which came up at 1824 and concerned attacks against Okinawa shipping and air fields; Snooper activity or night heckling which was carried out inland around Task Force 58. The last two phases carried over into April, 28th and I shall treat them separately at the end of this report since the continuity of the attacks would otherwise be broken up.

The first phase concerned two potential snoopers of #11 Force, who came up at 0733 (KUUSU1 and 2). At 0735 KUUSU1 was in the position 30:52N-131:28E and at 0805 he was in the position 29:12N-131:28E. KUUSU2 was heard at 0910 and at this time he sent out weather information. Both of these planes were up until 1015 and seemed to be under the control of Kanoya. No sightings were noted.

Kanoya was under repeated air raids during the morning with 9 B-29's overhead at 0841 and 13 overhead at 0850. At 0955 Kanoya reported they were engaging the planes and at 0940 the all clear was sounded. Another raid occurred at 1010 with the all clear at 1025. It is interesting to note that the information about these raids was sent to the special addressees Air Base Miyakonojoo

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27 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Ishigaki, Shinchiku, and Minami Daito Shima.

During the Kanoya raids Air Base Miyakonoojoo reported his field was open for landings.

Miyakojima had an air raid at 0500 and Ishigaki an air raid at 0525.

Phase two of the air activity which lasted from 1824 to 0500, concerned at least 30 planes. These planes used three frequencies and it became quite clear after a period, that the attacks were being staged against the Okinawa Anchorage and air strips. The planes on the first frequency came up at 1824 and were divided into 3 groups, with at least 2 planes in each group. (3MUNO, 5YOA, and 8YUYU). These planes must have attacked at about 2200 as the activity on the frequency died down a little after midnight. The planes on the second frequency were lead in by four guide planes and might have been composed of at least two groups, (TEHIMU and NMCNIO). These planes were heard on the circuit at 0036 and their attacks were carried out between 0200 and 0300. This activity died down at 0530 and it is believed that these groups carried out the most aggressive part of the attacks.

I was sure this group was headed for Okinawa as early as 0120 when the base sent a message (TOO 0030) to two of the guide planes telling them to do something about Katena. The attacks occurred

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27 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)


in the following chronological order:

- 0109-At least 3 plane groups on circuit.
- 0120-Base tells planes to head for Okinawa.
- 0152-Plane TEHIMU2 gives signal to drop flares.
- 0216-From for Attack.
- 0234@Another Attack.

Continued activity until 0530 when it was quite evident from signal strength the planes had retired.

The planes on the third frequency were up from 0150 to 0400. At least two groups were involved. At 0152 the two groups were told by the base to head for Okinawa and their greatest period of activity was between 0230 and 0330.

The only activity which actually concerned us was the snooper or night heckler activity which came up at 2300 and continued intermittently until 0215. Of the five planes up on this frequency only one (NISIS05) came anywhere near us. At 0113 this plane sent out a position of 26:52N- 128:48E(T00-0045), and at 0125 he was in the position 26:27N-129:08E. Our position at 0100 was 26-09N 129 01E. The other four planes ~~had~~ had loud signals and might possibly have carried out reconnaissance and heckling of the Okinawa Area.

Respectfully submitted,

R. S. Palmer

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28 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Since the activity of April 27 carried well into the early morning of April 28, this report will cover air activity of April 28 from 0600 to 2400.

Tactical air activity continued at a high level and can be divided into at least 3 sections; the snoopers activity from 0643 to 1100; the snoopers activity from 1319 to 1500; air activity which seemed to be headed towards Okinawa which came up at 1700 and continued until 2017. No transmissions were heard from the two bogies which appeared on the Radar Screen at 2030, although they might have been part of the group which was concerned with the Okinawa strike.

The first snoopers activity appeared at 0643 when 4 snoopers came up on the circuit. Of the 4 snoopers, evidently of #11 Force, two (KUUSU2 and 4) sighted our Task Group. These 4 snoopers had been sent out on a definite search pattern and at 0745 KUUSU4 sighted the enemy in the position 26:57N-129:23E. This was undoubtedly a sighting of our pickets, since our position at the time was 26:30N-129:35E. This was followed by several weather messages and amplifying reports. At 0725 the plane had sent out a position of 25:60N-127:20E, which had been put on the Kanoya Broadcast. At 0900 KUUSU3 sighted the enemy in the position 26:17N-129:23E. At 0845 he had been over in the Okinawa Area and from there he had proceeded to our general area. It is extremely doubt-

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~~ULTRA~~

28 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

-ful that either of these planes actually sighted our carriers
(Revised code groups may prove they sighted 4 carriers)
although I am sure they sighted the Task Force. No bogies were on
the screen during the period.

The second snoop activity came up at 1319 when a high flying plane who had been on the radar screen for sometime finally opened up and sent out a sighting of 4 carriers in the position 26:07N-130:08E. This was our position at the time. At 1425 this plane (YOSIUL) was in the position 26:57N-129:23E and had already sent out 5 amplifying reports giving the strength of the force and the weather in the area. This activity died down at 1500.

At 1743 5 planes were on their way down from southern Kyushu. At 1814 these planes were told by Kanoya to head for Okinawa and from ^{an} evaluation of signal strength it seems this order was carried out. It is just possible that 2 of these planes came into our area at 2030, but we have no proof of this. Previous to this time, at 1630, the Formosa tactical air frequency became extremely active. Several planes who seemed to be snoopers were up on the air and numerous groups of planes were making operational flights into the lower Nansei Shoto's. At least 8 separate planes and 7 groups were heard making an estimate of 20 to 30 planes, a logical possibility.

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~~ULTRA~~

28 April, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

One of the snoopers sighted what appears to have been surface units in the position 23:42N-125:48E. This might well have been the position of the British Task Force and from the great volume of air activity on this circuit it looks very much as though an attack was carried out on these units between 1700 and 2000. At 1740 the controlling Base (probably Shinchiku) sent out a plain language message telling 5 groups of planes "If you do not see the enemy in the appointed place, search to the Northeast". At 1835 one plane said he could not sight the enemy and was returning and at least one of the ~~yūhūes~~ never planes reached the target because of motor trouble.

Southern Kyushu was under attack from B-29's this morning ^(11 28) with the first sighting of the "Monsters" by Tanega Shima at 0736. The planes reached Kanoya at 0837 and Miyazaki at 0845. At 1118 Miyakonojco in southern Kyushu told all planes that his field was open for landing.

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. Palmer
R. E. Palmer.

Radio Intelligence Officer.

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~~ULTRA~~

29, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity continued at a high level today. Night hecklers were up during the early morning from 0047 to 0406; a high flying snoopers was up from 0820 to 0947; and attack planes were on the circuit from 1512 to 1850. Planes came up from 2000 to 2300 but this activity did not concern us at any time since the signals were almost too weak to be heard. It is just possible that they were the planes who went in against Okinawa tonight. As soon as we receive the captured code book we shall be able to determine this definitely.

Four night hecklers came up from 0047 to 0400 and at 0205 NISISOL sighted the enemy. At 0239 his compatriot NISISOC3 had fighters on his tail and at 0240 we were able to report he had been shot down. NISISOL sent out his second message at 0406 giving the position 25:57N-130:43E. This activity died down at 0500.

At 0820 a high flying plane (FUFUNO1) sighted 3 carriers in the position 26:30-129:20. This plane sent out the following grids:

0815	26:30N-129:50E	Sighted 3 carriers
0825	26:50N-129:50E	Weather information
0839	26:50N-130:10E	Sighted 2 carriers
0850	26:22N-129:13E and 26:42N-129:38E.	These two

grids were put out on the Kanoya broadcast along with a long

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29, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

amplifying report. At 0930 this plane was on the way home. No bogeys were reported on the screen during his appearance. His partner FUFUNC2 in the meantime was reconnoitering the Okinawa area and at 0824 he was in the position 26:50N-127:10E. At 0915 he sent out a long message (TOC 0840) in which he gave a full report of Okinawa shipping.

At 1320 a plane TEFUMEL came up on the air but at 1354 he thought he would be forced to make a landing and at 1407 he was told by Kanoya to land at Tanega Shima.

The attack groups of Zekes were on their way at 1515 when the coordinator of the attack MMAU1 was called by the base. There was no indication at the time that the plane had suiciders with him. At 1615 bogeys appeared on the screen and at 1702 the coordinator sighted 7 carriers. At 1725 he sent out the position 26:37N-129:58E and said he had sighted the enemy. Our position was 26:35N-129:50E. At 1730 this plane again repeated the position 26:37N-129:58E and it appeared he was trying to vector the suiciders to this area. At 1813 he said he was on his way back to Kanoya and activity around the task force died down.

At 2000 an attack frequency came up but the signals of the planes were always so weak that we were sure they did not concern us. It is hard to say whether this was concerned with the Okinawa

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29, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

raids which came off tonight at about this time. This frequency was active until 2400 and until we receive the captured code book no definite evaluation on this circuit can be made.

Kancya had B-29's overhead at 0617 and the raids continued during the morning. Miyakojima had an alert at 0300.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

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30, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Activity on the 30th dropped somewhat although night hecklers were around the force during the early morning and a group of snoopers came out at daybreak.

The night hecklers were first heard on the circuit at 2317 when REKUWA2 signed his call with a very weak signal indicating that he had just left the base. Soon afterward REKUWA1, KEKITU2, and KEKITU1 were heard on the circuit. At 0112 another plane NISIS05 was heard with a fair signal. At 0119 2 planes were splashed by blue night fighters and 0140 KEKITU2 finally sighted the enemy. Bogies were overhead at 0150 and at 0152 a new plane NISIS01 had fighters on his tail. This plane was not shot down but continued to send out messages later on.

Finally at 0204 the first message was received and KEKITU2 said that he had carried out a torpedo attack against a BB which was dead in the water in the position 23:37N-129:58E. At 0308 Kanoya wanted to know more about this because he told one of the hecklers (NISIS05) to carry out reconnaissance in the area 27:30N-129:50E. However at 0327 this plane told Kanoya he had motor trouble and was returning. At 0357 another plane NISIS02 had fighters on his tail but he too got away without much trouble. By 0430 the hecklers were on their way home and most of them reached their base between 0530 and 0630.

An ideal situation occurred in the morning when two snoopers (FUFUN01,2) were shot down before they could send out a single message.

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~~ULTRA~~

30, April 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

These planes were on their way at 0630 and at 0754 FUFUNC2 had 58.4 fighters on his tail. At 0809 FUFUNC1 also was being chased and flag plot reported that one plane had been splashed at 0800 and the other at 0811. The base patiently called these planes until 1500. A third plane FUFUNC3 who never got into this area announced at 1000 he was making a forced landing because of fuel difficulties.

No other important air activity was noted during the day. At 2000 one of the night hecklers NISISOL was in the air in the possible position 30:20N-127:40E. reporting the weather. At this time he stated that the weather was getting progressively worse and this probably explains the apparent lack of activity during the night. We retired to the fueling area during the night and no other activity concerning us was noted.

Kanoya had B-29's overhead at 0955 while planes were sighted over Sasebo and other southern Kyushu bases from 0856 until 1000.

Respectfully submitted

R B Palmer
R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~

18 May, 1945

FINUP

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division One.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Report of Operations Covering the Period
from 26 April, 1945 to 2 May, 1945 inclusive.
Submitted by T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of six (6) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Rohit B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer Lt. (jg) USNR

cc: CinC Fifth Fleet RI Units.
CinC SUPRAD
File.

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13 May, 1945

Weekly Operations Report
26 April-2 May, 1945
Inclusive

26 April, 1945

This Task Group is still operating in support of the landing Operations on Ckinawa.

Air activity was rather quiet today. Most interesting development was the activity on 7035J. Air Base Kanoya, (YCSWI) RC7KI, and planes using calls YAARI(N) were heard. Air Base Kanoya also used the call FUSO.

6650J showed briefly with Air Base Ishigaki calling Air Base Shinchiku and unident U7U.

Frequencies

4215J Air Base Kisaratsu, Air Group Cei, and Air Group Hakata.
8720M Unidentified KKM calls. Same activity as reported on the 24th.
8725J Air Base Kanoya, U3TE, SONAKE, and planes.
9045J Air Base Shanghai and planes.
8685J Air Base Atsuki and Air Base Kanoya. (FU-3 Calls)
7673M TC1 and TC4. Possible 7675A.
7460J Surface Escort Force #4 Commander and Radio Sasebo.
7035J Air Base Kanoya, RC7KI, and YAARI(N)-Planes.
6761M Air Base Kanoya and unidentified calls. Measured 6766 on the 25th)
6747M Station signing call RC8KA. Heard only once at 0700
6650J Air Base Ishigaki calling Air Base Shinchiku and U7U.
3320M Base and KM plane calls. Drill activity.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

27 April, 1945

Air activity increased somewhat today, with "Snoopers" active on 6842M during the morning. Nothing was sighted by these planes. At 2300, search planes appeared on 3421M and were active through 2400. No actual sightings occurred.

At 0640 an unsigned Base, and plane U6HI2 were heard on 6357M, but both secured shortly after this. No traffic was passed. At 1630 RC2WI and SI5A7 were heard on 6386M.

Frequencies

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INDEX

13 May, 1945

27 April, 1945 Cont'd.

Frequencies

9045J Air Base Shanghai, Air Base Takao, E7RI, and planes.
6922M Possible Army Air Activity.
6857M Base and plane.
6842M Search activity. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6651M Ckinawa Area Special Base Force Cmdr., Lookout Station
Ckinodaite, and Construction Battalion #323.
6641M KN Calls. Drill activity.
6115J Miyakojima Air Base, Ishigaki Air Base, Shinchiku Air
Base and Oroku Air Base,
6114M Base to planes 6TEKU, 7TEKU, 4TEKU, 6KEMO, 8LAWI,
2KEMO, and YA5NE. Sent one grid position, but believe
this circuit is drill activity of some kind.
3601M Air Base Kanoya (WE8MI), MI5NI, and planes using KNKN
and NKKN calls.
3421M Night frequency of 6842M.
3057J Night frequency of 6115J.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

28 April, 1945

Air activity continued over from the evening of the 27th, and remained active during the early morning hours of today. 3370J came up at 0636 and continued until 0644. Attacks against our forces on Ckinawa and shipping in vicinity was carried out by planes on this frequency. It is the first appearance as far as we know, of this circuit since the attacks against Blue Task Force off Kyushu on the 18th, 19th, and 20th of March. The attack frequency, 3601M, continued active until 0100. It appears very definite that the planes active on this circuit during the evening of the 27th were engaged in attacks against Ckinawa. 3421M continued active during the early morning with "Snoopers" engaged in search operations for the Blue Task Force. No actual sightings occurred however. 3320M was active during the early morning with planes returning to their bases from the attacks on Ckinawa. The base on this circuit signed his call MASUKE. At 0132 plane NISISCI was keying dual on 3320M and 3421M. Several requests for bearings were noted on 3320M.

6842M became active at 0639. Our Task Group was sighted at 0745 by plane KUUSU3, on this circuit. We were again sighted at 0800, by plane KUUSU4, on the same circuit. Activity died down around 1015 but became active again at 1327, when plane YOSIU1 sighted our Task Group. This plane kept us under close observa-

SECRET

18 May, 1945

28 April, 1945
Cont'd

tion until 1500. Activity on this circuit died down after this but became active again at 1743 when planes RCSCH1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 came up. These planes shifted to 3421M at 1819 and continued active until 2110. It is believed that this group of planes carried out attacks against Ckinawa.

6650J was active from 1600 to 2000. Air base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, and Air Base Ishigaki and a very great number of planes were heard on this circuit. From the position given by a "Snooper", it is believed that the British Task Force was the object of the attack on this circuit.

6640M became active at 1157 and continued until 1500. Planes using call NISISC(N) were up here.

Plane KUUSU5 was heard on 7152M calling METOSU. METOSU was not heard.

Frequencies

7152M	KUUSU5 calling METOSU.
6842M	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Circuit.
6640M	Bases and planes. Secondary channel of First Mobile Base Air Force.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force circuit.
3601M	Attack circuit, believed under First Mobile Base Air Force Command.
3421M	Night frequency of 6842M.
3386M	TENEKE sending operational traffic (grids) to HIWANA. This traffic had been originated by planes on 3421M.
3320M	Night frequency of 6640M. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

29 April, 1945

Air activity was heavy throughout the day. "Snoopers" were active on 6842M throughout the day, and kept our Task Force under close observation.

An attack was launched against our forces starting at 1615 when "Bogeys" appeared on the Radar screen. Plane MAUF2 was apparently the guide plane for this attack. At 1710 he sighted 7 Carriers in our position. This plane repeated this grid position three times. "Zekes" were reported in our vicinity shortly after this. The ships in this Task Force opened up with AA fire for a short time around 1711. Numerous "Zekes" and "Tojo's" were

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13 May, 1945

29 April, 1945
Cont'd

were shot down around this Task Force. The attacks were over at about 1815. During this attack a close check was made on the 30 to 50 megacycle band but the results were negative.

Air Base Kanoya, NESMO, ØSAR01, ØSAR02, and 8NET11 were active on 3600M during the evening. We believe that the planes on this circuit were engaged in an attack against Ckinawa.

"Snoopers" came up on 3421M at 2317 and are probably en-route to our area.

6640M/3320M was active again today. The base on 6640M signed his call AØRE. This is an old friend of ours, as he has been active on this circuit for some time. We have noticed that the planes using the call NIIE(N) on 3320M have never been found on any other frequency.

6650J was active from 1430 to 1700 with both bases and planes heard.

At Ø241 plane NISIS03 was "Splashed" by one of our night fighters. This plane had been active on 3421M up to the time that he met his end. It is interesting to note that NISIS03 was a type "Betty", leading us to believe that the group of planes using the NISIS0(N) calls are probably used for offensive search purposes. At the same time it would be appropriate to mention that the planes using the call KUUSU(N) have proved, when shot down, to be type "Myrt" recco plane.

Frequencies

6842M	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force circuit.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force circuit.
6640M	Secondary circuit. First Mobile Base Air Force circuit.
3600M	Search and Attack. Probably under command of First Mobile Base Air Force.
3421M	Night frequency for 6842M.
3320M	Night frequency for 6640M. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

30 April, 1945

The "Snoopers" that were first heard at 2317 on the 29th came down to our area, and at Ø14Ø plane KEKITU2 sighted our Task Group. The NISISC group also made their appearance when NISIS05 came up on 3421M at Ø112. Our night fighters "Splashed" two planes at Ø119, undoubtedly part of the force engaged in the night

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PINUP

18 May, 1945

30 April, 1945
Cont'a

attack. Most of these planes had our fighters after them throughout the attack. These planes came up on 3320M at 0400 and still continued to be attacked by our fighters. These planes reached their base at approximately 0540.

"Snooper" activity came up on 6842M at 0630 when the plane group FUFUNO became active. FUFUNO2 had fighters after him at 0754 and FUFUNO1 was in the same situation at 0808. From a recheck with Flag Plot we were able to determine that FUFUNO2 was "Splashed" at 0800 while FUFUNO1 was "Splashed" at 0811. These two planes were type "Betty". Plane FUFUNO3 of this group was low on gasoline at 1000 and expected to make a forced landing. At 1206 he stated that repairs had been completed. Nothing more was heard from this plane. The base continued to call FUFUNO1 and 2 until 1353.

3421M came up at 1930 with NISISOL active. This activity died down at 2005. Receiving conditions were poor on this frequency.

Frequencies

9045J	Air Base Takao and planes.
8725J	Air Base Kanoya and planes.
	Air Base Atsuki and planes.
7146M	Possible Army Air circuit. Bearings were passed from HIMAYO to REHAWI. Example: SO.KIHO214.I
7035J	KE0SI and planes.
6928M	OYAYA and planes TOYOK, 2, 3, and 4. Drill activity.
6842M	Search and Attack. First mobile Base Air Force circuit.
6760M	KISOSI and NWII(FUS). Measured 6761 on the 26th.
6600J	Air Base Takao, E7A, and RC7HI. Fifth mobile Base Air Force circuit.
6340J	KN Calls. Drill activity.
6111M	Base to plane 8TEKU. Appears to be drill activity. measured 6114 on the 27th.
3421M	Night frequency of 6842M. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

1 May, 1945

No important air activity heard. Appears that a partial call change is now in effect.

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~~SECRET~~

18 May, 1945

1 May, 1945
Cont'd

Frequencies

5044M Air Group 903-Haishimoto Detachment and other 1-A-3 calls.
3575A Air Group 903 and Air Group 903-Yamada Detachment.
3381M New calls. YUUR04, NOYORA0 and KUUU7.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

2 May, 1945

Air activity still quiet on current tactical frequencies. A new air circuit was found on 6947M with unsigned base and planes 0MIYA, ROKEWA0, ROKEWA2, and ROKEWA5 heard. Base called ROKEWA1 and ROKEWA3, but these planes remained unheard. Plane ROKEWA3 was called by the Base on 6842M at 0757 on the 29th. This circuit does not seem to be a tactical frequency.

Frequencies

8725J Bases and planes.
8420M SALNE and TELNI. Army activity.
7201M SALHO and KI5HO. Army activity.
7038J RI0KU and planes AK03 and KI11. Believe RI0KU is ex-KE0SI.
6947M Base and planes.
6759M Air Base Kanoya and other Kyushu and Shikoku Bases. New calls being used. Measured 6760 on the 30th April.
6290M Probable Air Base Kanoya to unident call. Measured 6280 3/45.
6115J Air Base Kanoya and other Formosa-Nansei Shoto-Kyushu Air Bases. Using new calls.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

Route

PINUP

29 May, 1945

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division Cne.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Report of Operations Covering the Period
from 3 May, 1945 to 9 May, 1945 inclusive. Sub-
mitted by T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of six (6) pages.

Respectfully submitted

Robert B. Palmer
R. B. Palmer Lt.(jg) USNR

cc: CinC Third Fleet RI Units.
CinC SUPRAD
File.

PINUP

29 May, 1945

Weekly Operations Report
3 May to 9 May, 1945,
inclusive

本

3 May, 1945

Air activity increased somewhat today. The Formosa tactical air frequency was very active with planes engaged in attacks against shipping at the Okinawa anchorage during the early evening. Some of these planes went on to land at Kikai Jima after completing their attack.

The attack frequency of 3600M came up at 2329 and was still active at 2400. Probable attack against Okinawa was underway. 6842M was active for a short while during the late afternoon with only one plane heard.

Frequencies

7528M	Base and KNKN Plane calls. Drill traffic.
7035J	RIKUKU and planes. (KII(N))
6842M	First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6650J	Fifth Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6586M	KAG and YOSIO
6115J	Air Base Croku and Air Base Kanoya.
6115M	Base and KNKN Plane calls.
3600M	Probable First Mobile Base Air Force tactical frequency. Base and KNNK attack planes. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

4 May, 1945

Attack planes became active on 3421J at 0025. Their attacks were carried out against Okinawa between 0241 and 0330. 3600M came up at 2329 on the 3rd and continued active until 0346. Attacks against Okinawa were carried out by planes on this frequency at about 0120. 6650J became active at 0514 and continued active until 1437. Attacks against a carrier force near Miyakojima were carried out, probably at about 1300. 6842J became active at 0600 and continued until 0952. Planes on this circuit attacked Okinawa from 0840 to 0952. 6947M (first heard on the 2nd) was used by planes attacking Okinawa at about 0900. Signals were very poor on this frequency. Plane 4TOHI and the Base came up on this circuit at 1610 and were active until 1638. 6640J was up at 1536 with one plane (NNAKI3) who was active on

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29 May, 1945

4 May, 1945
(Cont'd)

3421J during the early morning attack. 6580J showed today with plane RE5RU5 and an unsigned base heard. The plane stated at 1802 that he expected to arrive over the battle area at 1835, but at 1838 he stated he was making a landing. The planes use of the signal "TATUYO" was probably in error as there was no indication that an attack was made.

Frequencies

7035J	RIOKU
6947M	Attack planes and unsigned Base.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6640J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6580J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6340J	Single Kana calls. Air Group 951.
3600M	Attack frequency.
3421J	Night frequency of 6842J.
3320J	Night frequency of 6640J. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

5 May, 1945

Air activity fair for the day. Attack was carried out on Okinawa by planes using 3421J, during the early morning. These planes used 3320J on their return to base. 6842J became active at 0624 and continued active until 1256. This was probably a search mission as there were no indications of an attack. No sighting occurred. 6650J became active at 0559 and continued active until 0924. Plane 6NMI was engaged in a search mission and released a sighting report originated at 0850 and sent out at 0924. Activity died down on this circuit after this. 6947M showed up at 0600 with the Base calling plane 7TOHI, but no contact was made.

Frequencies

6947M	Base calling plane 7TOHI.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force.
3421J	Night frequency of 6842J
3320J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force. Air Base Kanoya (2)

PINUP

29 May, 1945

6 May, 1945

Air activity fair for the day. 3421J became active at 0017, and continued active until 0437 with evidence of an attack, probably against Okinawa around 0346. Base on 6842J was heard calling plane MESUKIL, but that is all the activity heard on that particular frequency. 3421J became active again at 2337. 6650J was active from 0730 to 0800 with air bases in northern Formosa heard. No planes were noted. New frequency of 6530M was picked up at 0823. Base WISRI and plane MOONUL were in communication while unsigned base was heard sending drill traffic to KA2ME, SU, and SE. This activity is probably circuit referred to by FRUPAC on the 4th. 3320J was up from 0025 to 0100 with Base and plane WI4NU2 heard.

Frequencies

6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6637M	8WAKU to 8TUMOL.
6530M	Base and planes. Drill and JITU traffic.
3421J	Night frequency of 6842J
3320J	Secondary frequency of First Mobile Base Air Force. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

7 May, 1945

Air activity increased somewhat today. 3421J became active at 0014 and there was evidence of an attack, probably against Okinawa shipping, when plane ONORAL stated at 0235 that he had completed his torpedo attack and was returning. This circuit became quiet after 0325. 6842J came up at 0801 with two planes, probably search, heard. This activity died down at 1010. There is a possibility that the "Francis" that was shot down by our CAP at 1109 was one of these planes.

At 1019 plane 7TOHA was heard on 7198M sending grids to planes 8NN and 9KII. At 1041 another plane signing same call (7TOHA) sent a grid to 8NN, 9KII, and 1TERU4. This plane came up on 6640J at 1212 and sent his number three grid to E4WO. The positions of the grids appeared doubtful.

6530M became active again today with identified Air Base Miyazaki and two other unidentified bases and seven different planes heard. Plane flights seemed to be in progress. This circuit was active from 1707 to 1922. At 1712 plane T08FU2

PINUP

29 May, 1945

7 May, 1945
(cont'd)

asked if he could land at Chitose.

Frequencies

7198M Plane 7TOHA to 8NN, 9KII, 1TERU4, and W09.
9KII to 7TOHA.
7035J SEON, RIOKU, and planes using KKN calls.
6985M Base to TI43. Drill traffic,
6842J Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
6745J Bases YO8SA and E9NA.
6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
6640J 7TOHA and E4WO.
MERUYA4 and Base.
6580J TAWAT01 to NKNK Call.
6530M Air Base Miyazaki and planes.
Base MA6WE sending drill traffic to AØ (Collective) ?
3421J Night frequency of 6842J.
Air Base Kancya Broadcast.

8 May, 1945

Air activity quiet on the Kyushu and Formosa Tactical channels. Several new unidentified frequencies were heard. On 8044M Base SAKEA4 and plane TA8TU2 were in communication, also on this same circuit were MIYAA9 and UYAYA2 (Yokohama Air Base). At 0900 MIYAA9 told Yokohama Air Base to set watch on KERI44. Listed as 7765J. Check was made on this frequency and at 0939 bases TE3MU and Y03A were up and in communication with planes NO3RU1 and YUØE1. The frequency measured 7767KCS. Both drill and JITU traffic were handled. 7035J was active with the usual non-changing bases and plane calls. Also on 7035J but separate from above were bases K06WA, TA3WI, and KI2MA in communication with planes 8KOTAL and 8KOTA2. 6530M was active with bases KI2MA and NI4YU in communication with planes KU7ME and NU6TAL.

A new frequency was found on 6369M with unsigned base and planes 1TEKU, KE2RU2, KE2RU3, and KE2RU5 in communication. This circuit did not appear to be drill, but was almost impossible to copy due to the strong interference from NPM Broadcast on 6370KCS.

Frequencies

PINUP

29 May, 1945

8 May, 1945
(cont'd)

8044M Bases and Planes.
7677M Bases and Planes.
7732M Naval District Yokosuka Air Defense Command Post
and ANU75.
7035J RIØKU, SEØN, and KKN plane calls.
Bases and planes.
6737M Base to TEØ
6530M Base and planes.
Base sending drill traffic to AØ.
6369M Unsigning Base and planes with NKK and KNKN Calls.
6340J KN and K Calls. Air Group 951.
6251M Army activity. TUNASO to O2KI.
6148M Base SU6TE to KA5MO.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

9 May, 1945

Air activity fairly heavy today. 6650J was very active from 1800 to 2130 with planes attacking our ships and installations at Okinawa. 3421J was active during the early morning hours with one group of planes heard. No attacks were made and no sighting occurred. One plane (MESIKA2) was called by unident base FUYØMIØ on 4Ø17J. Plane was not heard. 8Ø45m was up again with Air Base Kanoya (TAYUSA6) and plane RIØME2 active.

Frequencies

8Ø45M Air Base Kanoya and plane.
Unident AYØSA7 and plane.
7035J RIØKU SEØN, and KKN plane calls.
6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
6575M Air Group Ootsu and planes.
6340J Air Group 951 activity.
4Ø17J Secondary frequency of First Mobile Base Air Force.
3421J Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

This Task Group was operating in the Okinawa Area during the week this report covers.

~~RINCP~~

29 May, 1945

Due to the heavy activity and numerous watches, it has become very difficult for the RinC of this unit to keep up with the Weekly Reports. I realize that there are long delays between each one of them, but under the circumstances it cannot be helped. I am doing the best I can.

Respectfully Submitted

T. E. Gilmore
T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR

(6)

PINUP

30 May, 1945

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division One.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Report of Operations Covering the
period from 10 May, 1945 to 16 May, 1945
inclusive. Submitted by T. E. Gilmore CRM
(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of seven(7) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer Lt.(jg) USNR

cc: OinC Third Fleet RI Units.
CinC SUPRAD
File.

~~SECRET~~

30 May, 1945

Weekly Operation's Report
from 10 to 16 May, 1945
inclusive.

10 May, 1945

Air activity heavy throughout most of the day. 3421J became active at 0011 with 5 planes up. This circuit became quiet at 0419. 6842J came up at 0854 and continued active until 1530. Three planes were active with plane YUROYA3 sighting our Task Group at 0919 and plane KOUK01 sighting us at 1428. 3320J was active at about 0330 with plane MEYURAI who had previously been up on 3421J. 6650J was active from 0642 to 0911 with 3 planes up. No evidence of attacks were noted. This circuit became active again at 1600 with attacks occurring at approximately 1921. This circuit became inactive around 2300. Ten planes were heard during this activity. 6580J was active from 1540 to 1640 (when it was dropped) with two unidentified bases (KNK) and 4 planes using KNKN calls heard. On 6530M one unidentified base (FUØRI) was up calling HI5MA. Also on this circuit were base AØKA and 2 planes (NKK). Base AØKA has been active on 6640J for some months and it is the first known appearance of this station on 6530M. Base sending drill traffic to collective call AØ was also heard. 7035J was up with two separate circuits active. Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Kisuratsu, and unidentified base FUØRI. (FUØRI also heard on 6530M) These bases were in communication with each other and two planes using NKKN calls. The usual activity with RIØKU, SEØN, and planes was also heard.

Frequencies

8042M AYOSA7 and plane (KNN).
ROØ2 and ROØ6 sending drill traffic. This circuit measured 8045 on the 9th.

7035J Air Base Kanoya, Air Base Kisuratsu, unidentified Base, and planes. (NKKN)

6842J Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.

6580J Unidentified bases and planes.

6530M FUØRI to HI5MA.
AØKA and NKK plane calls.
Drill circuit.

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(cont'd)

6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
3421J Night frequency for 6842J.
3320J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

11 May, 1945

Air activity heavy during the morning hours. 3421J was active from 0009 to 0524 with 8 planes heard. Possible Radar contact on Task Force 58 units were originated by a plane on this frequency. No evidence of attacks were observed but believe some of these plane went into Okinawa. Two of the plane groups, namely MERUYA and KETUHI came up on 3320J at 0507, after they had stated they were shifting frequency from 3421J. 6842J came up at 0605 and continued active until 1112. Six planes were heard on this circuit during the time it was active. Plane MESUKI1 sighted this Task Group at 0848 and sighted the other Task Group at 0850. This plane had fighter after him from 0842 to 0914. At 0914 MESUKI1 tried to send something but his keying was hurried. Our CAP splashed one "Myrt" at this time and it seems reasonable to believe that this was MESUKI1. The plane was never heard again although the base called him several times thereafter. There was evidence of an attack at 0857, probably against Okinawa, by planes on 6842J. At 0610 6947M became active with planes NMITEØ and NMITE4 up. These same planes were active on the 4th of May, and continued to use plain language and RISA signals. Plane NMITE4 at 0723 using plain language said he was making a forced landing at Yokoate Jima. At 0752 plane NMITEØ sent the signal for all units to attack. This attack was against Okinawa and was probably made up of Suicide planes. The base on 6947M (MISUKU) is tentatively identified as being either Kanoya or in the Kanoya area by reason of his telling REWAMO that the Kanoya area was under air alert at 1455. 7201M was active for a short time during the morning with plane NENENO and base active. There was no evidence that this activity was concerned with attacks.

This Task Group was under attack during the morning and at 1010 a suicide attack came into the formation. Two planes crashed, in quick succession on the flight deck of the U.S.S. Bunker Hill causing a very large fire, which burned for about two hours.

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PINUP

30 May, 1945

11 May, 1945
(Cont'd)

From the sightings of the two Task Group's by plane MESUKIL at 0848 and 0850 respectively, there was no indication of any attack headed in our direction. This seems always be the case in which suicide planes are involved. The exception to this is of course the appearance of 6947M with suicide planes. The planes on this circuit are probably the trainers that are supposed to be used by the enemy. In the case of today's attack and all previous attacks by suicide planes against Task Force 58 the planes were "Zekes". These planes evidently do not carry any radio equipment of great range and therefore we have no way of receiving any advance information from them. If they do carry ultra-high frequency voice equipment we have been unable to hear any such transmissions, although we have searched the 30 to 50 megacycle band for them. Enemy voice circuit was heard on 36.5 megacycles today, but they were heard after the attack on the Bunker Hill was over. There is a possibility that these were suicide planes who had not been able to find us.

Frequencies

7201M	Base and plane NENENO.
7035J	RIOKU and KKN plane calls.
6947M	Base MISUKU and KKN planes. Used for attacks against Okinawa.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6580J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
3421J	Same as 6842J.
3320J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

12 May, 1945

Air activity moderate. Only tactical frequency heard was 6650J, with Air Base Shinchiku and planes active. 6580J was quite active. Unsigning base and planes using KKN calls. Two other bases were heard on this circuit using calls KOSAWA3 and TAATCØ. 6640J was heard with one plane (MERUYA5) active. 3320J was active during the early morning with base MISUKU and planes RCTUØ1 and 2 heard. 6947M was active for a short time with the base and plane 6NUU heard. 8044M was quite active. Bases used FU-1 calls and planes used KKN calls.

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PINOP

30 May, 1945

12 May, 1945
(cont'd)

During the late afternoon Task Force 58 headed north for Kyushu and a two day strike against air installations on Kyushu.

Frequencies

8044M Bases and Planes.
KNN calls. Drill activity.
7035J RIØKU? SEØN, and KKN plane calls.
6950M Base and plane 6NUU. Measured 6947 on the 11th.
6739M Single kana and KN calls.
6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force.
6640J Base and plane MEYURA5.
6755M Kyushu and Shikoku Air Bases. Measured 6761 on 26 April.
6340J Air Group 951 activity.
5715J Base KE and plane YO31.
3320J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

13 May, 1945

This Task Group is now operating approximately 100 miles southeast of Southern Kyushu throughout the day. Strikes were made against aircraft and air installations on Kyushu.

The Task Group was sighted by plane YUYORA4 at 0641, operating on 6842J. The plane was splashed three minutes after he sighted us, a little too late, but it wasn't this RIU fault. It was noted that the base on 6842J had vectored the YUYORA group of planes to position 29:20N-132:40E. Our Task Group was in the position 30:24N-132:30E when sighted. Only correct conclusion obtained from this is that we were sighted earlier in the morning, probably by some of the planes that were encountered by our CAP. One of these planes was a float type, probably a recco plane. If these planes were up on the air we were unable to find the frequency, Lord knows we looked for it.

Air activity was light in spite of the fact that we were, figuratively speaking, stirring up the hornets nest. 3320J continued active from the evening of the 12th with the same planes and base active. 6842J was active from 0611 to 1412. Five planes were active and two sightings occurred. The one mentioned above and another by plane TAKOTEL at 0859. Plane YUROYA4 proved to be a "Myrt" when shot down. 3421J became

~~PIRGP~~

30 May, 1945

13 May, 1945
(Cont'd)

active and continues active through midnight. Three planes are at present active. Plane MESIKA2 sighted this Task Group at 2305.

During the early morning an unsigned base 8 planes were heard in communication on 6052M. The base was also heard on 6127M keying dual with 6052M. This activity is believed to have been the evacuation of planes to more secure bases, probably in Honshu.

The night frequency of 8044M was found on 4022 with the base and 2 planes using KNKN calls passing drill traffic.

Frequencies

7035J	RIOKU, SEON, and KKN plane calls.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6640J	Base and planes. Secondary frequency of First Mobile Air Force.
6638M	Base to plane 2MUTI.
6530J	Base to planes.
6340J	Air Group 951 activity.
6127M	Base to planes. Keying dual with 6052M
6052M	Base and 8 planes. Planes used KNKN and KNK calls.
4022M	Base and Planes. Drill traffic. Night frequency of 8044M
3421J	Same as 6842J.
3320J	Same as 6640J.
	Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

14 March, 1945

This Task Group is still operating off Kyushu. Air activity was heavy throughout the day, climaxed by an attack of suicide planes from approximately 0700 to 0815. The U.S.S. Enterprise was hit at 0700 by one suicide plane. The U.S.S. Essex narrowly escaped damage by shooting down several suiciders just before they were about to crash into us. We have an excellent Gunnery Department aboard. Our heartfelt thanks to them.

3421J continued active from the evening of the 13th. A total of 11 planes were heard on this circuit. A night torpedo attack was carried out by these planes from approximately 0315

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30 May, 1945

14 May, 1945
(cont'd)

to 0430. Rogeys were shot down all around the whole Task Force. Activity died down on this circuit at 0453. 6842J became active at 0614 and continued active until 1821. The "Snoopers" were undoubtedly guiding the suicide planes into our position. We were consistantly spotted from 0700 to 0815, but these "Snoopers" stayed active throughout the day and kept us close observation. UNDER

A new secondary frequency was found on 5852M with planes NIRARE1, MESUKI1, MESUKI2, and TAKOTE3 and the unsigned base active. On same frequency but entirely separate were base SO9MA and plane 7UME.

Frequencies

6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
6580J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
5852M	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
4017J	Secondary Frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
3421J	Same as 6842J.
3320J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

15 May, 1945

This Task Group now enroute to fueling area.

Air activity on Kyushu frequencies light. Three planes heard on 6842J during late afternoon. No sightings occurred. 6650J became active at 1130 with search planes up. Surface sighting reported by one plane at 1555. Considerable number of planes became active shortly after this sighting and the attacks were pressed home from about 1930 to 2030. A total of 18 planes were heard along with Air Base Shinchiku, Air Base Takao, and probable Air Base Ishigaki. Attacks were against Okinawa and vicinity. The operating signal HO"A was compromised with E-WO(I am securing after this transmission), by a plane on this circuit.

Lt. C. A. Sims reported to Commander Task Group 58.3 from Commander Task Force 58, for temporary duty with this RI Unit.

Frequencies

6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency.
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~~FINUP~~

30 May, 1945

15 May, 1945
(Cont'd)

6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
6580J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6155J Bases E and IWA.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

16 May, 1945

6650J continued active through 2400 on the 15th to 0700 on the 16th. Seven planes were heard and evidence of an attack was noted. This circuit became active again at 1600 and continued through most of the evening. 6842J became active at 1200 and continued until 1545. Three search planes were up but no sightings occurred. 3421J became active during the evening with 7 planes heard. A torpedo attack against shipping in and around Okinawa occurred from 2245 to 2318.

Frequencies

6842J Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
3421J Same as 6842J.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.
7035J RIØKU and planes.
8045M FUL calls and planes.(KNKN)
6340J Air Group 951 activity.
6580J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.

In spite of the efforts of the Radio Material Departments of the U.S.S. Enterprise and the U.S.S. Essex and the Rinc of this RI Unit, the SX-28 receiver Serial #15147Ø has proved to be a "Lemon" and should be replaced as soon as possible. // //

Respectfully submitted,

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR

(7)

~~SECRET~~

31 May, 1945

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division One.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Report of Operation's covering the
period of 17 to 23 May, 1945, inclusive.
Submitted by T. E. Gilmore CRM(PA) USNR.

1. This report consists of five (5) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B Palmer

R. B. Palmer Lt. (jg) USNR

cc: Oinc Third Fleet RI Units.
Oinc SUPRAD
File.

PINUP

31 May, 1945

Weekly Operations Report
Covering the period from
17 to 23 May, inclusive.

17 May, 1945

Air activity fairly heavy throughout the day. Evidence of an attack by a group of five planes on 6650J during the evening. Activity on 3421J continued over from the 16th until approximately 0200. 3421J became active again at 1940 with five planes heard. These planes carried out an attack against Okinawa at about 2248. 3600M was up at the same time with two planes heard. Attacks were carried out by these planes at about 2218, probably against Okinawa. The base on 6842J was heard calling several planes from 0725 to 0800. No planes were heard.

Frequencies

7035J	RIOKU, SEON, and KKN plane calls.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency. Base heard only.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency. Very light activity.
6580J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force. Base and KNKN plane calls.
3600M	Base and KNKN attack planes.
3421J	Same as 6842J. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

18 May, 1945

Air activity fair for the day. Two attacks were sent against Okinawa. One by planes on 6650J around 1946 and the other by planes on 3421J around 2200.

7110J was active with two planes heard. This activity believed to be staging activity into Kyushu. 6580J was very active with five KNKN plane calls heard. 8045M also appeared with two KNKN plane calls heard. All this activity appeared to be the staging of aircraft into Kyushu bases.

(1)

PINUP

31 May, 1945

18 May, 1945
(cont'd)

Frequencies

8045M Base and planes.
7223M KN Calls.
7110J Base and KNKN plane calls. Base on here is believed to be Kanoya.
7035J RIØKU, SEØN, and KKN plane calls.
Air Base Kanoya and unidentified MU7KA.
6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
6640J Base and A7.
6580J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
FU-1 calls and KNKN plane calls.
6340J Air Group 951 Activity.
5715J Base KE and KNN plane calls.
3421J Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

19 May, 1945

6947M (6950M on 12th) was active from 0806 to 1835 with five planes heard. Planes were involved in movements from rear bases, Shikoku or Honshu, up to forward bases in Kyushu. One plane definitely landed at Miyazaki. Planes active on 3421J during evening of the 18th continued active on this circuit until 0500. Some of these planes returned to their bases on 4017J with WOWIØ controlling the circuit. One plane (MESIKAL) used 6640J to return from the battle area on. 6842J was active from 1200 to 1600 with 3 planes out on search. No actual sightings occurred although two grid positions were received.

Frequencies

7035J RIØKU, SEØN, and KKN plane calls.
6952M (6947M) Bases and planes (NKK) TI6YO and SI6WA.
6842J Search and attack.
6740J Plane TOYOSIL and base.
6640J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
4017J Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
3421J Night frequency for 6842J.
3320J Base and plane ROTUO2.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

PINUP

21 May, 1945

20 May, 1945

Air activity today was fair. Two search planes came up on 6842J at 1225. A plane, YUROYA2 sighted 2 carriers in position 25:27N-129:23E at 1430. He later amplified his sighting to 2 CV's and 3 CVL's. It seems reasonably certain that he sighted our particular T. G. Radar had a bogey on their screen at this time and YUROYA2 stated he had fighters on his tail. At 1447 our CAP splashed one Myrt. YUROYA2 was no more, but he did his job. Plane YUROYA1 complained of motor trouble shortly after and turned back. 6650J was active from 1758-2325 with 5 planes heard. An attack was carried out by these planes around 2009. 7035J was active with the usual non-changing calls, both bases and planes. Also on 7035J were unsigning base and 3 KNKN planes. 6947M was active for a short time during the morning with some of the planes that were active there yesterday. 3600M was up for a short time with planes NENENOL, ~~MA~~ KITAFUL, and unsigning base heard. 6740J and 3320J were both active with planes ROTUO1 and 2 heard.

Frequencies

7035J	RIØKU, SEØN, and KKN planes.
6842J	Search and attack.
6947M	Base and planes.
6745J	MA4YU and WEØN52.
6740J	ROTUO1, 2, and base.
6531M	TØ1 and SI1.
6340J	Base and RE3Ø, NA25.
3600M	Base and planes (KKKN).
6155J	Bases E and IWA.
	Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

21 May, 1945

Activity light for the day. Two search planes up on 3421J from 0008 to 0212 but obtained negative results except for being chased by night fighters all over the sky. Plane ØANI came up on 6650J at 1330. At 1358 this plane stated that he had sighted a large enemy force, no grid was given. At 1444 ØANI said he had sighted enemy planes. Nothing more was heard by this plane and it is believed to have been shot down at this time.

(3)

PINUP

21 May, 1945

Frequencies

7035J RIØKU, SEØN, and KKN planes.
7105M TØL.
7225M KI1, SA1, and SA2.
6650J Search and attack.
6340J A. G. 951 activity.
6325A Single kana calls.
3600M Base and KKKN planes.
3421J Search and attack.

22 May, 1945

Air activity very light. The frequency 5851M (5850M on this 14th) was active today. Bases NIKUKO, ~~MIØNU~~ KONUMI, and 3 KNKN planes were heard. 6267M was up with A. B. Tokushima and 2 other bases heard. Later in the afternoon two NKNK planes were up on this frequency. 6650J was active for a very short period with one base and 3 planes heard. No sightings or attack were noted.

Frequencies

7164M KN-NK and K. N compromised his call with RANONO7.
7035J A. B. Kanoya and MIØNU. RIØKU, SEØN, MIØHO and planes.
6740J Base and N1.
6650J Base and 3 planes.
6640J Base and one KKKN plane.
6267M A. B. Tokushima, two other bases and 2 KNKN plane calls.
5851M Bases NIKUKO, KONUMI and 3 NKKN planes.
A. B. Kanoya Broadcast.

23 May, 1945

Air activity heavy today, with considerable amount of aircraft staging from rear bases in Honshu to the forward bases in Kyushu.

Three search planes up on 6842J at about 1200. One plane (HAKIKA4) sighted some of our ships west of Okinawa at 1335. Plane HAKIKA2 sighted Task Force 58 (which was refueling), at 1409 in position 25:17N-130:38E. Our position at the time was 25:21N-130:24E. The other plane, (HAKIKAL) sighted nothing on his search mission.

(4)

3 June, 1945

SECRET

From: Officer in Charge Radio Intelligence Unit,
Commander Carrier Division One.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly Operations Report covering the period
from 24 to 30 May, 1945 inclusive.

1. This report consists of five (5) pages.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer Lt. (jg) USNR

cc: Cinc RI Units Third Fleet.
Cinc SUPRAD
File.

3 June, 1945

WEEKLY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
COVERING PERIOD FROM 24 TO
30 MAY, 1945 INCLUSIVE.

24 May, 1945

This Task Group operating in direct support of the Landing Forces on Okinawa.

Staging activity continued at a high level with numerous flights going to Kanoya and Miyazaki from Honshu bases. Heavy search activity in the afternoon resulted in the sighting of both Task Force 58 and units of Task Force 51.

In the case of the search activity today, it was discovered that the search planes appeared on 5850M before they came up on 6842J. It seems apparent that planes use 5850M to approach the Battle Area, then shift over to the prime tactical frequency (6842J), complete their mission, then shift back to 5850M for the return to their bases. The two bases on 5850M were identified through breakdown in traffic as Kasanohara (NITUKO) and Matsuyama (MOMUJI).

Base YUCRO on 3320J was rebroadcasting grids originated by the search planes on 6842J.

3421J became active at 2043 and in a short while it became apparent that a large scale attack was developing. Ten separate planes were heard and the base called seven other groups. This activity continued through 0000.

Frequencies.

8045M	Base and planes. Staging activity.
7752M	Single Kana calls.
7163.5M	Single Kana and KM calls.
7110J	Bases and planes. Staging activity.
7035J	RIØMU, SEØM and KEM planes.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical Frequency.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force Tactical Frequency. Light activity today.
6640J	Base, IEM, and IEMM planes.
6530J	Air Base Miyazaki and IEMM planes. Staging activity.
6340J	Air Group 951 activity.
6271M	SOØMU and IEMM planes.
5850M	Air Base Kasanohara, Air Base Matsuyama, IEMM, IEM, and IEMM Planes.
3421J	Same as 6842J
3320J	Base YUCRO to planes.

(1)

203

3 June, 1945

24 May, 1945
(Cont'd)

Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

25 May, 1945

The activity on 3421J which began at 2043 on the 24th continued until 0400 today. Attacks against Okinawa were carried out by these planes. A group of attack planes appeared on 3370J shortly after ~~0000~~ and carried out attacks against some force around 27N-131E. Believe these planes were vectored to the wrong area. We had no force in that area.

Some of the planes on 3421J were engaged in offensive search but failed to make contact with Task Force 58. A total of 29 planes were heard on this frequency.

6740J became active at 0500 with unsigned base and single kana plane calls. Planes used plain language and RISA signals. It became apparent shortly after the circuit was heard that they were en-route to Okinawa. The planes began their attacks around 0840. This activity died down at 1800. A total of 18 planes were heard. Believe these planes were guide planes for suicide units, and with 13 planes heard the combined total of planes involved must have been near 100.

6842J was active from 0740 to 1350 with 7 planes heard. The TOHMI group was apparently an attack group, but due to very poor weather in this area they were unable to locate Task Force 58. The single kana call I appeared on 6842J for a short time. This plane had been previously heard on 6580J. The CIUM group heard on 6842J today, had previously been active on 5050J, adding further evidence to the procedure used on the 24th. 6580J was used by some of the attack groups returning from the night attack on Okinawa. Another group of planes used 4017J to return from Okinawa.

Frequencies

7110J	Base and plane.
6842J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical Frequency.
6740J	Base and single kana plane calls. Believe suicide attack units.
6580J	Bases and planes. Secondary channel of First Mobile Base Air Force.
5050J	Shanghai Detachment of A.G. 904.
4017J	Secondary Channel of First Mobile Base Air Force.
3421J	Same as 6842J
3370J	Base and KLEW attack planes. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

3 June, 1945

26 May, 1945

Air activity was very light today. This is usually the case following a day of large scale attacks.

Frequencies

7765J Bases and planes.
7110J Air Base Miyazaki and planes. (KKN and KIN)
7035J Air Base Miho, Air Base Keijo, Air Base Miyazaki,
and KKN planes.
6650J Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency. Very light activity.
6740 6740J Base and KKN plane.
6640J Base and KKN plane.
6267M Bases only.
6340J Air Group 951 activity.
6054M Bases and KKN planes.
5715J Base and planes. Drill activity.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

27 May, 1945

The First Mobile Base Air Force Tactical frequency 3421J became active at 2000. Planes on this circuit carried out torpedo attacks in the Okinawa Area from 2200 to 0000. A total of 19 different planes were heard.

6947M was up from 1530 to 2028. Air Base Takuma and three planes were heard.

Frequencies

6947M Air Base Takuma and planes.
6530J Unsigning Base and KKN planes. Drill activity.
3421J Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force
Tactical frequency.
Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

28 May, 1945

The torpedo attack planes that were up on 3421J on the evening of the 27th continued active until 0257. 6947M became active at 0457 with three planes heard. Indication that these planes carried out a small scale suicide attack against our forces at Okinawa. It was noted that the bases on 6947M were using KKN calls. 6342J was heard for a very short time around 1012. One plane reported negative results after reaching the end of his search sector. 3421J came up at 2028 with three planes heard and three other groups called

SECRET
3 June, 1945

28 May, 1945
(Cont'd)

by the bases. However these planes were ordered to return to base at 2105, because of bad weather. Base SU on 3600J was up working four KN call planes, and told them to return to base at 1900. 3370J was active at 0043 with four planes heard. These planes carried torpedo attacks against Okinawa at 0134, 0140, and 0155. They were enroute to their base at 0210. The NEURA group on 3421J were on a search mission but reported negative results. 5850M was active with the base and three planes heard. The planes on this frequency were using a numeral substitute in place of the regular numeral suffix. Base KINEYA was heard on both 6640J and 6947M.

Frequencies

3421J	Search and Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force.
3370J	Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force.
3600J	Attack. First Mobile Base Air Force.
4017J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
5850M	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6340J	Air Group 951 activity.
6580J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6640J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force.
6650J	Search and Attack. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force. Light activity.
6947M	Suicide Attack frequency.
7035J	Air Base Miyazaki, Air Base Miho, Air Base Keijo, and IIII planes.
7110J	Air Base Miyazaki and KIN planes.
7765J	Base and KKKK planes.
8045J	Base and NKKK planes. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

29 May, 1945

This Task Group underway from the Okinawa Area to the Fleet Anchorage Leyte Gulf. Watch was reduced to a one man three section watch when clear of the operations area. Close check kept on 6650J.

Frequencies

6947M	Base only.
6650J	Search activity. Fifth Mobile Base Air Force.
6530J	Secondary frequency. First Mobile Base Air Force. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast.

SECRET

3 Juns, 1945

30 May, 1945

6650J active throughout the day with evidence of an attack against Okinawa at about 0234. One plane on this circuit was apparently engaged in a reconnaissance of Manila Bay Area. A new frequency was found on 6063M with B-24 planes sending drill traffic. Air Base Kanoya Broadcast covered throughout the day.

Respectfully submitted

T. E. Gilmore

T. E. Gilmore CRM USNR

(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

21 May, 1945

From: Cinc R. I. Unit ComCarDiv. Cne.
To: Cinc Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Via: Commander Task Group 58.3.
Subject: Report of Operations covering the month from April 15th to May 15th. The report for the most part is covered in the daily summaries to the Admiral.

Robert B. Palmer
Robert B. Palmer

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Commander Task Group 58.3.
To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Subject: Report of Operations of Radio Intelligence Unit of Commander Task Group 58.3, 15th April to 15th May, 1945.

1. The Radio Intelligence Unit assigned this command has been of considerable value in combatting enemy air attacks. With the gradual deterioration of Radar equipment due to the prolonged period at sea without adequate overhaul, its value has been increased markedly due to its ability to advise when enemy aircraft are in the immediate area or when they may be expected, and within limitations, the number of planes involved.

2. Lt.(jg) Palmer's unit has performed to my entire satisfaction and I should be pleased to retain it under my command as long as possible.

3. I have no comment as to improved service.

Frederick C. Sherman
Frederick C. Sherman

~~PINUP~~

21, May 1945

This report covers RI activity from the 15th of April to the 15th of May, a month of the time during which we were aboard the Essex under the command of ComCarDiv. One, Admiral Sherman.

I am including the daily written reports to the Admiral along with a brief summary of the important contributions RI was able to make each day.

14th of April

Detached from ComCarDiv.7, Enterprise and sent by destroyer to ComCarDiv. One aboard the Essex. This is our fourth move. The radio gear was all set up and watches were started at 0800 on the 15th.

15th of April

Covered in daily report. We were able to predict that snoopers NONNI, 2, 3 and NOTUTUL and 2 were on their way down on a search. The information was gotten to the Admiral at 2040 and the first sighting was at 0045. Bogeys appeared on the screen at 2200.

16th of April

We were able to predict three phases of Kikusui #4 as reported in the daily report. Since the snoopers give away their own position when they sight blue forces, this information often identifies a bogey as a Jap plane. We were able to keep the Admiral informed about the night snoop activity and at 0730 we predicted the arrival of the large search attack group which arrived over the Okinawa area at 0930. Bogeys first appeared on the screen at 0915.

We were also able to predict and cover quite thoroughly the night attack. The information was gotten to the Admiral at 1930 and MINATAI's message saying he expected to arrive over the target at 2040 was quite helpful. At 2046 the first sighting was received and the attacks followed immediately thereafter.

17th of April

We were able to keep the Admiral informed about the snooper's activity in the early morning (cf. daily report). At 0644 we predicted another group of snoopers were on their way down and the first sighting was at 0833. At 0918 we predicted an attack was imminent and at 0923 7MOWO said he was getting ready for the attack. The attack came at 0932.

18th of April

Covered in daily summary. The aircraft code is out now and we are now back to normal conditions.

19th of April

Covered in daily summary.

21, May 1945

(2)

20th of April

We predicted snoopers were on their way at 1000 and at 1236 KUUSU2 was at the end of his search leg and had sighted nothing of importance. The task force had moved south during the early morning and was in latitude 25 while previously we had operated in latitude 27. This probably threw the Nips off balance for the moment. The rest of the day's activity did not concern us intimately and is covered in the daily summary.

21st of April

We informed the Admiral at 2342 that at least two snoopers were on their way down. At 0108 the first sighting was received and at 0156 we were sighted.

At 1230 we told the Admiral another group of snoopers were on the way and at 1359 the first sighting was received. Flag Plot was kept closely informed on all activity during this period (cf. daily summary).

We were not able to predict 7MUKO's arrival at 2132 because he maintained strict radio silence and opened up only after he was on his way home. This was the only instance to date in which RI was unable to produce some sort of warning. Radar was also confused by this plane who cruised around the entire force at about 120 knots without being shot down. We were able to predict the night heckler attacks were on their way down. The fact that 7MUKO's message was sent by the base to several plane groups was a dead give away that night hecklers were being vectored into this position. This was reported to the Admiral at 2145 and the planes came in at 2330. We were able to predict the night heckler's second attack after they had been broken up by our fighters and one Betty had been shot down. The bogey's closed again at about 0200.

22nd of April

We kept the Admiral closely informed as to the snoopers activity carried out during the early morning although none of these planes came in any closer than 60 miles. We were also able to give him a fair idea as to the number of the planes involved.

At 1147 we predicted three snoopers of Nrll force were on their way down. The first sighting appeared at 1337. At 1342 KUUSU3 gave away the position 26:42N-129:23E and popped up on the radar screen in that area. This dope was given to the FDO by the Admiral and the plane was splashed about 60 miles north of us after a lively chase. The rest of the day's activity is covered in the daily summary.

23rd of April

No important tactical air activity.

21, May 1945

(3)

24th of April
Covered in daily report.

25th of April
Covered in daily report.

26th of April
Covered in daily report.

27th of April
The most important contribution we were able to make on the 27th was the coverage of the Okinawa attack and the heckler activity around TF 58. We were able to determine thru a few recovered groups that the attacks were going into Katena. This was reported to Flag Plot as early as 0120 and the first actual signal to attack was heard at 0152. The heckler activity was reported to Flag Plot at 2300. The first grid was received at 2353 but the first plane in our area did not appear until approximately 2400. The rest of the activity is covered in the daily report.

28th of April
We were able to warn Flag Plot that snoopers were on their way at 0643. The first sighting occurred at 0745. No bogies appeared on the screen and the only information on these planes was supplied by RI. The information on the snooper activity helped CIC to a certain extent and the information that we had been thoroughly snooped was important. We kept the Admiral informed on the plane activity out of Formosa but none of these planes ever got into our area. We were not able to receive any transmissions from two bogies who appeared on the screen at 2030.

29th of April
We were able to keep a close check on the night hecklers. At 0047 we knew they were on their way and at 0200 they were over us. We were able to tell that NISISC3 was splashed at 0240.

The snooper FUFUN01 did not give away the fact he was in the air until he sighted us at 0820. However, we were able to give the only warning of his appearance because no bogies were on the screen during the time he snooped.

We were not able to predict that there were suicide Zekes on their way to attack us in the afternoon. We had, however, told the Admiral that planes were on their way down toward us at 1515 when NMAU1 and 2 were called by the base. Bogies appeared on the radar screen at 1615 and it became quite evident that NMAU2 was actually a coordinator. Our biggest contribution here was the fact

21, May 1945

(4)

29th of April (Cont'd)

that we were able to tell when the attack was over because we knew NMAUL was returning. Had we had the code at this time a better estimate of the situation could have been made. This was particularly the case in the evening when the attacks went into Okinawa. We were never actually positive until the following day when we got the code that these planes were over Okinawa.

30th of April

The night heckler activity was caught at 2317 and the planes were overhead at midnight. The snooper activity during the day was a perfect case with two planes heard and two planes splashed before they could send out a position. This seemed to stop the Japs for the day because no other bogies appeared on the screen. 58.4

1st of May

No activity. Fueling. Call change noted.

2nd of May

No activity.

3rd of May

Covered in daily report.

4th of May

We were able to predict the general time of each raid of the Kukisui #5 operations. The only activity which concerned us closely was the night attack which we were able to predict with some degree of accuracy since we had the aircraft code. The Bettys which stumbled across our force were probably headed for Okinawa but did not quite make the grade. Our CAP took care of the greater part of the suiciders of the morning attack. The day's activity is handled in detail in the daily summary.

5th of May

Covered in daily summary.

6th of May

Covered in daily summary.

7th of May

Covered in daily summary.

8th of May

No activity.

21, May 1945

(5)

9th of May

Covered the usual Kyushu Formosa based raids on Okinawa. None of them concerned us intimately but we were able to keep the Admiral informed. (cf. daily summary)

10th of May

Fueling. Activity covered in summary.

11th of May

We were able to forewarn the Admiral on all of the activity of Kikusui #6. We did not hear the Kamikazes who dove on the Bunker Hill but we did know Kamikazes were in the area. It is still highly doubtful that we have actually heard any Jap UHF voice frequencies. cf. daily summary concerning ~~MAN~~ ^{MAN} frequency.

12th of May

No activity.

13th of May

Kyushu strike. We were able to keep the snooper activity under control during the day and were able to follow our planes' activity during the strikes. Covered in daily summary.

14th of May

Covered in daily summary. Here again we were able to inform the Admiral that there were snoopers in the area but we could not tell him that Kamikazes had also appeared. The Enterprise was hit by a Kamikaze and absolutely no transmissions on any known freqs. were heard during any of this action which could definitely be labeled as Kamikaze communications.

15th of May

Covered in daily summary.

~~SECRET~~

21, May 1945

From: OinC Radio Intelligence Unit, ComCarDiv.One.
To: OinC Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Subject: Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries submitted
to the Admiral.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert Palmer

R. B. Palmer

R. I. Officer ComCarDiv.One.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

1, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

No activity of any sort. Everything is deadier than dead. Numerous weather messages of a high priority were received but a complete call change keeps us from identifying the bases involved. B-29's were over Kanoya at 1200. From the general appearance of the traffic it looks as though the Nips are consolidating for Kikusi #5.

Respectfully submitted,

R B Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

2 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity today was practically non-existent. Kanoya evidently expected a B-29 raid early in the morning since he set a precautionary alert at 0458. At 1138 a B-29 appeared over Kanoya headed north. A large number of weather messages were sent out on the Kanoya Broadcast and it is believed that the continuance of bad weather and the preparations for Kukuisei #5 explains the extremely low level of air traffic.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

3, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

From all indications part of Kurisui #5 took place today with air activity rising sharply in the afternoon. All the attacks came out of Formosa and were directed at East Okinawa and the Okinawa anchorages. The first indication we had that something of this sort was planned was when the reconnaissance plane OROYU came up on the Formosa tactical air circuit working Shinchiku at 1228. Finally at 1257 he sent out his Nr.1 message in which he gave the weather conditions around him. At 1350 he had motor trouble but this did not seem to stop him because at 1425 he sent out a message (TOO 1340) in which he described at great length the shipping lying off Katana and Kerama Retto. At 1445 he sent his Nr.5 message (TOO 1440) saying that the weather conditions over the blue airfields had prevented thorough coverage of this area. At 1453 he said the weather was good over the target but bad everywhere else in the vicinity. Finally at 1527 he said he expected to return at 1610 presumably to Iarigaki.

While this activity was going on planes and plane groups started to appear on the circuit. It became quite evident that attack planes were on their way from Formosa and Southern Hainan Shoto bases to hit Okinawa. Nine groups of planes were heard and it is known that a minimum of 18 planes were on their way. Actually the count must have been closer to 30 planes since each plane heard on the circuit is calculating for 3 or 4 planes. The last activity heard is follows:

1454 Enemy plane (1100).

1515 Plane reports "We are bombing the enemy heavily. We are a victory!" (1100).

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

3, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

From all indications part of Kukisui #5 took place today with air activity rising sharply in the afternoon. All the attacks came out of Formosa and were directed against Okinawa and the Okinawa anchorages. The first indication we had that something of this sort was planned was when the reconnaissance plane ØROYU came up on the Formosa tactical air circuit working Shinchiku at 1228. Finally at 1257 he sent out his Nr.1 message in which he gave the weather conditions around him. At 1350 he had motor trouble but this did not seem to stop him because at 1425 he sent out a message (TOO 1340) in which he described at great length the shipping lying off Katena and K erama Retto. At 1445 he sent his Nr.5 message (TOO 1440) saying that the weather conditions over the blue airfields had prevented thorough coverage of this area. At 1458 he said the weather was good over the target but bad everywhere else in the vicinity. Finally at 1527 he said he expected to return at 1610 presumably to Ishigaki.

While this activity was going on planes and plane groups started to appear on the circuit and it became quite evident that attack planes were on their way from Formosa and Southern Nansai Shoto bases to hit Okinawa. Nine groups of Planes were heard and it is known that a minimum of 13 planes were on their way. Actually the count must have been closer to 30 planes since each plane heard on the circuit is communicating for 3 or 4 others. The attack activity went as follows:

1832 Enemy sighted (MI6KAØ)

1845 Plane states "We are bombing the enemy heavily. A great victory has been won." (A2U3).

217A

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

3, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

- 1902 All units attack (AZU1).
1907 What appears to be a destroyer (AZU 1).
1913 Enemy sighted in position 26:34N-126:48E (I7N 1).
2033 Plane I7-1 says he can not tell what damage has been done because the visibility is zero. He says he is going to Kikujima.

This is the first indication we have had that Formosa strike planes did not return to their bases but went on to Kikujima. It is an ironic coincidence that the Kikai Dusk CAP was landing on the Essex at the time this plane said he was heading for Kikujima.

At 1549 there were good indications that a search was being sent out of Kanyo in our general direction. Only one plane was heard and at 16.8 this plane reported he had covered his sector and had not sighted the enemy. The circuit died down after this and no sightings were received.

Kanyo and southern Kyushu received a good working over from blue planes with the first precautionary alert at 1011. B-29's were over Fuchinobori at 1032 and planes were over Yaku Shima at 1045. At 1055 4 Grumans were sighted over Kagoshima and were expected to arrive over Kanyo at 1100. Sightings all over the southern approaches to Kyushu followed until 1145 when Kanyo secured the alert. At 1300 another alert occurred and the all clear was not actually sounded until 2030.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

218

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

EO

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

3, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

- 1902 All units attack (A2U1).
1909 What appears to be a destroyer (A2U 1).
1913 Enemy sighted in position 26:32N-126:48E (I7N 1).
2038 Plane I7N1 says he can not tell what damage has been done because the visibility is zero. He says he is going to Kikaijima.

This is the first indication we have had that Formosa strike planes did not return to their bases but went on to Kikaijima. It is an ironic coincidence that the Kikai Dusk CAP was landing on the Essex at the time this plane said he was heading for Kikaijima.

At 1549 there were good indications that a search was being sent out of Kanoya in our general direction. Only one plane was heard and at 1648 this plane reported he had covered his sector and had not sighted the enemy. The circuit died down after this and no sightings were received.

Kanoya and southern Kyushu received a good working over from blue planes with the first precautionary alert at 1011. B-29's were over Kuchinoerabu at 1044 and planes were over Yaku Shima at 1045. At 1055 4 Grumans were sighted over Kagoshima and were expected to arrive over Kanoya at 1100. Sightings all over the southern approaches to Kyushu followed until 1125 when Kanoya secured the alert. At 1340 another alert occurred and the all clear was not actually sounded until 2030.

Respectfully submitted,

s/R B Palmer
R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

218A

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

4 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Traffic on the tactical air circuits was at a very high level and it was quite evident that Kukisui #5 was definitely on its way. The attacks as in other Kukisui operations can be divided into 3 phases. These phases are the night attack extending from about midnight to 0500, the day attack from 0600, when the first signs of planes were received until 1000, and phase 3, the attacks by Formosa planes against the British Task Force, which must have taken place between 1000 and 1300.

The first two attacks were based out of Kyushu and large groups of planes were involved. Both attacks went against Ckinawa and Okinawa shipping and at no time could it be said that the planes intended to attack Task Force 58. The planes which were shot down last night within 30 to 40 miles of us must have blundered into our CAP since no concerted effort was made to attack us at anytime.

I shall take up each phase in chronological order to show to some extent just how and when the attacks occurred.

PHASE 1.

At 2329 there were fairly good indications that planes were on their way down from Kyushu. No estimate could be made at this time to just where they were going. but their appearance on an attack frequency made it definite they were headed our way. At 0031 another search and attack frequency became active and the appearance of at least 5 different plane groups on this frequency pointed to a large attack.

4 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Finally at 0116 plane NOHIH1 came up and announced he expected to arrive over the battle area at 0235. At 0120 plane 5SUHA1 came up and gave the signal to form for attack. His signal was so weak we were able to determine that the attacks were going in against Okinawa. No definite estimate of the number of planes involved in the attack could be made since one plane can be the coordinator and bell wether for 10 to 15 Kamikazes. This must have been the case last night since 7 groups of planes were heard and it is reported that approximately 70 planes appeared. The more important events of the night are as follows:

0116. NOHIH1 expects to arrive over battle area at 0235
0123 5SUHA1 orders "Form for Attack".
0127 HASCSU1 expects to arrive over battle area at 0220.
0135 5SUHA2 reports he completed a torpedo attack, results unknown.
0200 N1R1RE1 expects to arrive over battle area t 0245.
0224 5SUHA1 reports torpedo attacks completed results unknown.
0241 N1R1RE1 sights the enemy. (4 minutes before his expected time of arrival)
0244 N1R1RE1 give signal "All units Attack".
0248 HASCSU1 sights the enemy and attacks.
0304 NOHIH1 Attacks.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

4 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

0319 NIREL says he has carried out a torpedo attack and 1 Cruiser has been sunk in the position 2620N-12740E.

0348 HASCSU1 has completed attack with results unknown.

The planes were all on their way back by 0345. Several planes never made the grade and did not participate in the attacks because of fuel trouble and other operational troubles.

PHASE 2.

At 0606 it appeared that another group of planes were on their way. No estimate as to the number could be made although 5 coordinators were heard. At 0840 the first signal to attack was given. Numerous tactical signals followed.

0849 1 BB sighted and attacked.

0851 BB Attacked.

0852 Fighters on plane's tail.

0853 "Form for Attacks" sent by coordinator.

0858 "Attack".

Activity died down here at about 0930 and at 0906 one of the 5 coordinators, evidently on his way back, reported that 1 large type cruiser had been sunk.

PHASE 3.

This concludes the attacks against Ckinawa shipping. In the meantime Formosa planes had not been inactive and at 0616 a search plane(3EKA) was being called by Shinchiku. This recco plane was

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

4 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

finally heard at 0828 when he sighted enemy carriers in the position 2347N-12423E. At 0837 another recco plane (ØSESU) came up on the Formosa tactical circuit and reported carriers in the position 2342N-12510E. This was followed by weather information from both planes and at 0844 3EKA saw 5 carriers in the position mentioned above. ØSESU saw 4 carriers and 10 additional ships and gave the base the information as to what altitude the enemy CAP was flying.

At 0955 attack planes were on their way and from the calls heard on the circuit 8 groups were involved. Roughly this ~~number~~ meant at least 35 planes took part in the attack. At 1046 the controlling base, probably Shinchiku, told a coordinator that one wave of suiciders had left Giran at 0950 and another at 1010. At 1120 the 4th wave had left.

At 1222 a third snooper ØSCNE, sighted a force containing 4 cruisers and 8 DD's in the position 2422N-12533E.

Finally at 1230 the base came up and told the attack units in plain language to change the attack area to the position 2342N-12533E or the approximate position of the carrier forces. This was followed by another plain language message at 1300 saying the enemy was 60 miles south of Iiyako Jima. The activity on this circuit died down at 1430.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

4 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

No other activity of importance was noted after this time.

Kanoya secured a precautionary alert at 1710 but set up another precautionary alert at 2000. There were no reports on the Kanoya Broadcast of raids on Southern Kyushu.

165
Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

5 May, 1945

~~SECRET~~

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity dropped quite decidedly today. During the early morning some sort of bombing attack on Okinawa must have been carried out by several Kyushu planes because at 0430 plane MERUYAL came up on the circuit with his Number 1 message in which he stated " We have completed our bombing but due to the clouds, results are unknown". This attack must have occurred at about 0400. The plane was on his way back to Kyushu at 0500.

A Formosa snooper was up at 0700 with a very loud signal. At 0924 this plane sent out a message stating he had sighted 3 Carriers, 3 Cruisers and 12 other ships in the position 23:27N-124:53E. No reaction from Formosa followed and it is believed that this plane was checking on yesterday's strike results.

Several abortive attempts were made during the morning and early afternoon to send out searches from Kyushu, but one plane returned at 1105 because of an oil line failure and another at 1130 because of lack of oxygen. Neither plane sighted anything. Possibly our southerly position threw these planes off in their reconnaissance.

Southern Kyushu received the careful attention of the B-29's and the first group of the monsters was sighted at 0658. Kanoya was under a precautionary alert at 0700 and this blossomed into a full alert at 0705. It is interesting to note that a snooper who had just taken off was told by Kanoya to go to Chiran. Another alert occurred at 0900 and others followed at 1433 and 1450. Finally at

~~SECRET~~

5 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

1810 the precautionary alert was secured.

Respectfully submitted,

RB Palmer
R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

107

~~SECRET~~

6 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The only important activity noted during the 6th was the raid which went against Okinawa from about 0130 to 0400. At least 3 groups of planes were involved. The first sign that planes were on their way down from Kyushu was noted at 0011 when planes MENOTOL, 2, and 3 came up on the circuit.. The exchange of calls between the base and planes continued until 020200 when the first message was received. The captured aircraft code we have has now been superceded so no information could be culled from the traffic. At 0346 the signal to form for attack was given and an attack must have been carried out a few minutes after this. All the signals were quite weak and it was clear that the attack was being carried out in the Okinawa area. Activity died down on the circuit at 0430 and there was no indication that the planes got back since all 3 were called from 0350 to 0440 apparently without any success.

Air activity during the day was limited to operational traffic between air bases and there were no indications that any strikes were staged. Drill activity in the Empire was received on several ~~several~~ circuits.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~SECRET~~ 7, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The usual early morning attack on Okinawa must have occurred from about 0000 to 0300. At 0014 the base (Kanoya) came up and called ONORAL and ONORA2 and 3 were heard soon after this. The planes maintained strict radio discipline and no messages were heard until 0245 when ONORAL came up and stated he had completed his torpedo attack and was returning. The other two planes might have been shot down because no transmissions were heard from them after 0042. If the attacks follow the usual procedure, at least 15 planes were involved since the guide planes generally control 5 planes apiece. When these planes maintain such strict radio discipline the only warning we can give will be the general time when they leave the base and the time when the attack has been completed. No estimate can be made as to where they are going although signal strength will often give some clue in this direction.

In the morning at 0801 a snoopers was called by Kanoya. At 0940 another snoopers was on his way and it is our belief that one of these snoopers stumbled on our force this morning at 1109. No transmission was heard and no information came out on the Kanoya broadcast. This leads us to believe that the plane was shot down before he could transmit or possibly before he sighted blue forces.

An odd sighting was noted during the morning when at 1019 a plane reported something in the position 20:12N-131:08E. There is a slight possibility this was the planes' position at this time and that nothing had actually been sighted. This¹⁵ strengthened by the

~~PIREP~~

7, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

fact that the very same plane at 1425 in the afternoon reported himself to be in the position 28:27N-134:33E. This plane might have been making an evacuation run from the Philippines because he was in the air from 1019 until after 1700. The information of his sighting or of his position, however, was passed on to 3 planes and this fact argues for a possible sighting of enemy forces.

No other activity of any importance was noted and it is believed weather conditions prevented the usual Okinawa ^{air} attacks.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

265

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Important air activity in the Ckinawa area was non existant from an R.I. standpoint. A few planes were in the air in Kyushu but all activity seemed to concern local flights. B-29's were over southern Kyushu at 0642 and over Kanoya at 0704 with Kanoya under a full alert at 0710. Another wave came over at 0816. The alert was secured at 0900. At 1349 several Martin Bombers were over the target. Undoubtably weather conditions explain the relative inactivity of Jap tactical circuits.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~SECRET~~

9, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

There were two flights of planes today which concerned the Okinawa area. The first one took place between 0040 and 0231 when 3 planes came up on the search attack frequency concerned with Kyushu based planes. There is no indication that any of these planes reached the Okinawa area since no tactical attack signals of any kind were heard. At 0220, 0225, and 0228 respectively MESIKA3, MESIKAL and MESIKA2 sent out practically the same message. This message probably indicated they were returning to their base. Weather conditions probably prevented these planes from carrying out their usual night raid.

Plane activity during the day was perfectly normal with search planes up locally in the Kyushu area.

At 1820, however, there were good indications that Formosa planes were close to Okinawa. 7 elements, (possibly 30 planes), were heard working Shinchiku and some unident base with a loud signal probably Ishigaki. At 1827 the blue forces at Okinawa were sighted and at 1840 plane WA5KUL had planes in sight. Finally at 1850 WA5KUL went in for the attack against a cruiser. At 1852 another plane gave the signal "all units attack".

At 1919 plane unit TISTA secured and it is believed that this plane went on to Kikaijima to land. The main reasons for this assumption are as follows:

~~SECRET~~
9, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

1. The time lapse between the attack at 1850 and the time the plane secured 1919 was too short to permit the plane to return to either Ishigaki or Shinchiku, the bases which controlled the attack.
2. On May 3 a Formosa based plane involved in the Okinawa strike came out in plain language and stated he was going to Kikaijima after the attack.

The second attack came at 1946 when plane unit N13WE gave the signal "all units attack". A possible third wave came in at 2000 although no tactical signals were heard at this time. Activity slowed down considerably after 2100 and the last transmission on the attack frequency was heard at 2130.

FBI's were over the tip of Korea today at 1245. Kanoya had a precautionary alert at 0600 but this was secured at 0730. There were no indications on the Kanoya broadcast that B-29's were over Kyushu.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~SECRET~~

10 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity pointed today to preparations for Kukisui #6 operations. At 0011 two groups of planes must have raided Okinawa since two messages were received at 0011 and 0034 respectively from the plane who had completed or were completing their attacks. The planes raiding Okinawa at night are very rarely heard on the circuit until they are either just about to attack or just after they have completed their attacks and are on their way home. This follows closely the procedure used to attack other permanent installations (for example the Iwojima raids). The planes involved had the calls MERUYAL and 2.

At 0049 another group of planes (MENOTUL, 2, and 3) were called and it is believed from an examination of the circuit that these attacked at 0300 or shortly thereafter. Activity on this attack died down at 0419. Approximately 30 planes took part in these two attacks.

At 0642 the Formosa tactical circuit became active and it seemed that planes were being staged into forward bases ie Ishigaki and Miyako Jima. This activity died down at 1000. Some of the planes were working Takao and some of the staging at this time might have been from Takao to northern bases in Formosa.

At 0854 there were indications that 3 snoopers were on their way down from Kyushu. At 0919 YUROYA3 sighted 4 carriers in the position 25:27N-127:13E. After flying about for some time at 0956

SINIE

10 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

he sent out a long message (TOO Ø93Ø) in which he listed 3 grid positions, evidently 3 different sightings. These were 25:12N-127:18E, 25:Ø2N-127:48E, and 26:Ø7N-129:18E. The last position looked like Task Group 58.4. The plane sent out 2 other messages amplifying his other reports and probably including the weather over the targets.

At 12Ø7 another 2 planes were on their way down (KUREL and 2). Since we do not have the aircraft code we were unable to determine whether these planes were merely snoopers or target coordinators. From the appearance of the traffic, however, the first assumption seems more likely since no tactical signals were received. KUREL sighted the enemy at 1428 in the position 25:52N-129:18E. At 1438 he gave out the grid 25:37N-128:48E. This was followed by 4 other messages. This activity died down at 1511.

The Formosa tactical frequency became active again at 1656 and between this time and 2Ø3Ø 1Ø elements were heard on the air. A signal "All units attack" was heard at 1921 and it is believed a sizable attack went into Ckinawa at this time. Some of the planes on the circuit did not seem to be involved in the attacks but seemed to be staging for tomorrows activity. Shinchiku and Takao were the controlling bases on the circuit and it is interesting to note that Takao was the control for the plane element which attacked. No sightings of Blue Forces were noted and this leads me to believe that the attacks went in against Ckinawa and not against any element of

~~SECRET~~

10 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Task Force 58.

At 2303 3 planes were heard with a weak signal on the Kyushu attack circuit and these were good indications that an attack was on its way down. The planes involved (MEMOTO1,2, and 3) were the same group who participated in the attack between 0049 and 0419. No indications of an attack have been received up to 2400.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Summary.

AC

11, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Needless to say air activity hit a very high level today. Kukisui #6 operations were very much in evidence from midnight until 1200 with only sporadic activity of little importance after 1200. The hours of darkness from 1200 to 0500 were taken up by the night hecklers in 4 groups. The MENCOC group with 3 communicating planes from 2303 to 0230; the MERUYA group with 5 communicating planes from 0113 to 0500; the KETUHI group closely associated with the MERUYA planes from 0104 to 0500 and the YUMCHI group with 2 communicating planes heard first at 0444.

Of these groups only the MERUYA group composed of at least 5 planes concerned us directly. MERUYA2 was the first plane to be heard and he introduced himself at 0112 with the comment that he had fighters on his tail. The activity listed in chronological order follows:

0112 MERUYA2 first heard with fighters on his tail.
0149 MERUYA2 still has the fighters chasing him.
0209 MERUYA5 has fighters on his tail.
0212 MERUYA8 heard calling.
0214 MERUYA2 sends out grid 25:22N-129:18E, our position was approximately 25:40N-129:17E.
0251 MERUYA2 another grid 25:42N-129:23E.
0335 Same plane another grid 25:37N-129:45E (FOC 0150).
0358 Same plane grid position 25:27N-129:13E (FOC 0230).

At no time did this plane indicate he had actually sighted the enemy but I am confident from past procedure that he had radar contacts in

11, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

the positions he cited.

It is believed the other groups mentioned above went in against Okinawa in relatively small plane raids. At 0304 some plane came up and stated he was making a forced landing. No call was signed. At 0507 these groups were all on their way back to the base and at 0536 MERUYA5 was informed by his base that there were no air raids at the base. This concluded the night activity.

DAY ACTIVITY

The day activity was divided into two obvious attacks-namely, the suicide and bombing attacks against Okinawa and the snoopers activity and suicide attacks against TF58.

At 0605 we knew snoopers were on their way down and at 0620 one of these snoopers, MESUKI1 gave away his position as 29:12N-131:03E. These snoopers (or it is possible they were actually target coordinators who brought suiciders along with them) were divided into two groups-the MESUKI group composed of 2 planes who snooped TF58 and the TCMALC group composed of 4 planes who went over to the beach. The activity again listed chronologically is as follows:

0605 first indication MESUKI1 is on his way.

0626-0629 TCMALC3 and 4 are heard calling.

0647 MESUKI2 sends message unreadable due to lack of code values.

0701-0704 TCMALC1 and 2 are heard.

0718 A new group RCAYA is heard. This group must have gone to the beach because they are not heard on the circuit again.

11, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

- 0828 TCNAMO2 has fighters on his tail.
- 0837 TCNAMO2 gives position 26:57N-127:33E.
- 0842 MESUKI1, the plane who later sights us has fighters on his tail in the position 26:23N-129:28E.
- 0848 MESUKI1 sights enemy 26:32N-129:28E. Cur position is 26:23N-129:28E.
- 0850 MESUKI1 sights another group 26:02N-129:18E.
- 0852 Same plane has fighters on his tail.
- 0856 Same plane sends out amplifying report on the enemy in the posit 26:02N-129:18E:
- 0912 MESUKI1 still has fighters on his tail and he sounds rather ~~scared~~ scared.
- 0914 Plane all confused. (1 Myrt was splashed at this time).

Both of the sightings of this plane were put out on the Kanoya broadcast approximately 10 minutes after they were received.

- 0952 MESUKI2 sends out a long message containing 2 grids 25:32N-130:08E and 25:02N-129:18E.

All of this activity died down at 1030.

At 0610 we knew that KAMIKAZIS were on their way down to participate in the general melee. This became evident when the frequency used in Kukisui #5 by the guide planes for these suiciders came up on the air. Two guide planes were called (NMITE4, NMITE4). Abbreviated plane language and tactical signals were used by the planes and very close contact with the planes was maintained by the base.

At 0722 the first message was received from NMITE4 in which he said his motor was damaged and that he was making a forced landing at

11, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

~~PIRCE~~
YOKO ? JIMA (This might possibly be Yokoate Jima although the message was too garbled to make this certain).

At 0752 MMITEO sighted the enemy and the attack went in soon after this. The base which controlled these planes is either Kanoya or a base close to Kanoya since at 1501 this base told a plane on this circuit that Kanoya was under an air alert at 1455.

Jap voice was heard on the ~~Mann~~ circuit (^{36.5}36580) at the time the three suiciders dove on the Bunker Hill. Nothing was sent but calls, but the signal strength was excellent. They stopped ~~im~~^{soon}ly after the Bunker Hill had been hit. As far as we can determine no flash reports were sent back by the Japs concerning the hits on the Bunker Hill and until we capture the current aircraft code it will be impossible to determine whether the snoopers who sighted us were actually snoopers or guide planes with Kamikazes.

Sporadic activity was noted on the Formosa tactical circuit but we were able to cover this circuit only sporadically because of much more important activity which actually concerned us.

B-29's were sighted over Chichijima at 0548 and Chichijima reported they would be at Kanoya between 0630 and 0700. Another raid went in at 1455.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~SECRET~~

12 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

There was no air activity of any importance all day. Blue planes were over Miyazaki headed toward Cita at 0946. Kanoya had a precautionary alert at 1213 and 1 B-29 overhead at 1225. Kagoshima had 11 planes overhead.

The second group of raids went over at 2235 and numerous sightings of planes were noted after this time from various southern Kyushu lookout stations. Among the bases covered were Izumi at 2222, and Kasanohara at 2221.

There were normal plane movements in Kyushu but no great concentration of planes in any specific area were noted. No searches or tactical operations seemed to have taken place. The nips seem to be consolidating for their next attack.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

13, May 1948

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity during the day was comfortably low. Although bogies appeared on the radar screen soon after midnight there was absolutely no indication from any of the air circuits or from the Kancya broadcast that we had actually been sighted until 0611 when the First Mobile search attack frequency came up. At this time the base sent out the information to the collective plane call YURCYA that Kancya was under an air raid. At 0617 the base came up and vectored the YURCYA group to the position 29:20N-132:40E. Our position at 0630 was approximately 30:24N-132:30E. Between 0626 and 0630 YURCYA4,5 and 2 receipted for the message. Finally at 0641 YURCYA4 sighted the enemy in the position 30:17N-131:58E. This plane had been on the radar screen for a short time before this and Radar plot had been informed about 20 minutes ahead of time to expect some high flyers in our area. At 0643 the plane had fighters on his tail and at 0644 a Myrt was splashed just 3 minutes too late. At 0653 YURCYA5 had fighters on his tail and at 0730 he sent out a grid posit 31N-131E. There was ^{no} indication that he had sighted the enemy. The activity after this time is as follows:

- 0741 Base sends YURCYA group long message probably giving them a bearing. No grid received .
- 0859 A new group seems to have taken over the snoopers duty. TAKOTEL has fighters on his tail and has also sighted the enemy.
- 0907 TAKOTEL has fighters on his tail.
- 0942 TAKOTEL still has fighters on his tail.

13, May 1943

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

- 1042 TAKCTE1 in position 30:22N-132:46E sent out message probably giving radar contact.
- 1049-1133 Base keeps calling YURCYA4 with no results.
- 1300-1352 TAKCTE2 and 3 are called by base and at 1352 are given instructions by the base. No grid position.
- 1433 TAKCTE3 sends posit 29:07N-130:18E. Cur position 30:17N-132:51E.
- 1457 TAKCTE3 in posit 30:17N-130:38E. No indication of sighting.
- 1506 TAKCTE3 in posit 29:37N-131:03E.
- 1650 Base tells TAKCTE2 to return.
- 1700 YURCYA5 is told there is a good field at some unident base.

At 0750 there were good indications that rather large movements of planes were being made to bases outside of the attack areas. At least 5 groups were noted.

Southern Kyushu bases set up a wild clamor all day as was to be expected. At 0021 and 0030 planes were over Tanega Shima and Sibuchi Wan respectively. The first strikes to hit Kanoya came in at 0535. Numerous sightings were received after this. It was interesting to note that Kanoya reported his field was not operational at 1350. The sightings were continued all afternoon as strike after strike went in. At 1550 Kanoya hopefully declared that all was clear and at 1553 he was under attack again.

MIKE ACTIVITY

At 1350 there was some indication that planes had taken off. Finally at 2017 MEROYAL, an old favorite we have had in the air on

13, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

previous nights, was heard on the search attack frequency. At 2021 two groups MERUYA and MESIKA were called by the base and WERE vectored to the position 30N-132:30E. At 2022 MERUYAL was heard receipting for the message and MESIKAL was heard at 2059. The action chronologically from this time on is as follows:

- 2139 MERUYAL has fighters on his tail and sounds nervous.
- 2200 MERUYAL sights enemy or rather gets radar contact on enemy posit 30:40N-133:20E. The position was wrongly encoded and was sent over the broadcast wrongly encoded and for this reason can only be considered an approximation. Our position was 30:30N-132:49E.
- 2218 MESIKA gives the weather over the target.
- 2232 The base gives MESIKAL some instructions.
- 2251 Base sends MESIKA2 a vector to 30:50N-133:30E. MESIKAL receipted for this message.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer
R. E. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

PINUR

14 May, 1945

14 May, 1945

Activity on the 14th picked up quite a bit on our second day in the Kyushu area. An early morning attack kept the Night Fighters busy and the morning Kamikaze attacks pretty well put the Enterprise out of commission not to mention the scare the other "One-way boys" gave the rest of the Task Group. Air activity was limited to "Snooper" activity which pretty well pin pointed us but no attack came in.

Night Attack

The night attack covering the hours from midnight to dabreak caused a good deal of operational traffic on the main search and attack frequency, but the results of the attacks as far as the Task Group was concerned was absolutely nil. At several times during this period planes closed on the Task Force in accordance with the tactical signal given and torpedos must have been dropped but nothing happened since all torpedo's were dropped at an extreme range. Two "Snooper" groups (MESIKAL^{1,2} and MERUYAL) participated. Five night attack groups (MENOTO, NOHIHI, HASOSU; HAU1, and ONORA), were involved. The main effort was carried out between 0330 and 0400. The activity listed chronologically is as follows:

- 0009 MESIKAL called on the circuit and told by the base to "Let me know the condition of the enemy".
- 0025 MERUYAL appears on the circuit.
- 0030 One twin-engine plane "Splashed" by the Enterprise Night Fighters.
- 0103 "Bogey" now on the screen 27 miles, 18 miles and 72 miles.
- 0214 ONORAL heard on circuit.
- 0221 to 0250 MENOTOL, 3, 4, 5, NOHIH1, HASOSU1, 2 heard.
- 0253 HASOSU2 reports he will be over the target at 0338.

PINUP

14 May, 1945

(2)

- Ø255 NOHIH1 reports he will be over target area at Ø345.
- Ø256 MENOTO4 has Fighters on his tail.
- Ø316 MERUYA1 sends out position in which he sighted enemy at Ø13Ø. Position is 29:12N-132:28E. This position is to the south of us.
- Ø322 MENOTO5 tells MENOTO3 and MENOTO4 he will arrive over the target area t Ø34Ø.
- Ø324 HAU13 has Fighters on his tail.
- Ø325 MENOTO4 expects to arrive over the target at Ø333.
- Ø333 NOHIH1 sights the enemy.
- Ø335 MENOTO5 gives the signal "Form for Attack" and says he is preparing to carry out a torpedo attack.
- Ø354 MENOTO4 has the target in sight.
- Ø356 MENOTO4 gives the signal "Commence Illuminatin". Flares are dropped.
- Ø356 NOHIH2 gives the signal "Form for Attack".
- Ø357 MENOTO5 has carried out attack, results unknown, position of attack-30:17N- 132:43E.
- Ø42Ø NOHIH1 has completed torpedo attack against a BB in position 30:22N-13Ø:Ø3E-results unknown.

Activity died down at Ø5ØØ with most of the planes in this brilliant night attack groups up on their returning frequency.

Day Activity

At Ø614 a "Snooper" or target coordinator, MESUK11 was heard on the circuit. At Ø625 a "Zeke" was splashed to the north of us while at Ø633 a "Myrt" was splashed.

~~FINOP~~

(3)

14 May, 1945

MESUKI2 also appeared on the circuit and had fighters on his tail at 0646. Finally at 0700 MESUKI2 sighted the enemy in the position 30:47N-132:23E. This was followed by a message at 0705 in which he stated he had sighted an enemy Task Force in the position 30:57N-132:33E. The weather followed at 0720 and at 0752 MESUKI2 was told by his base to stay around and confirm the results of the attack. We did not have the code until the 15th and since we were not able to read the message until the following day we were not able to confirm the fact that "Suicides" were definitely on their way for the kill.

The U.S.S. Enterprise was hit by a "Suicider" at 0700 - a beautiful bit of execution by a Kamikaze. At 0752 the U.S.S. Essex started firing at some diving "Zekes" and several were splashed just before they were going to hit us.

MESUKI1 in the meantime repeated he was in the position 30:40N-132:40E at 0845, and was told by his base at 0852 to carry out his reconnaissance. We did not seem too eager because at 0934 he reported he had not sighted the enemy.

NIRARUL took up the "Snooper" duty after this and at 1344 he sighted the enemy in the position 30:40N-132:40E. Our position was 30:12N-132:57E. KOUKOL and 2 appeared on the scene and NIRARUL reported at 1407 that he was returning to his base.

KOUKOL sighted 3 Carriers at 1520 in the position 30:07-133:38E (probably T.G. 58.1), and at 1640 he reported the position 29:52N-133:53E. KOUKOL finally came through with a sighting at 1650 reporting 1 Carrier and 10 other vessels in the position 29:32N-132:58E. At 1700 KOUKOL reported he was breaking off contact and was returning. The base told KOUKOL to return at 1754.

This completed the important activity of the day, and Task Force 58 moved out the area to re-fuel.

~~SECRET~~

15, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The bulk of today's activity was concerned with strikes based out of Formosa and the advance bases along the southern Hansai Shoto chain. The attacks followed the usual procedure. A snooper, 3WIRI, was sent out ahead at approximately 1100. At 1430 he sent out his first message giving out the weather, and finally at 1555 he sighted enemy surface forces in the position 26:12N-132:38E. The base (Shinchiku) was very sceptical about the longitude and kept asking the plane whether he meant 132:38E. The plane ignored the base for a long time and evaded the issue in every way conceivable. Finally at 1658 he changed the longitude to 125:38E, a much more logical position. The base still wanted to be sure and the plane assured him the final position was correct. Finally at 1710 he repeated his original message and with characteristic stupidity repeated his first mistake. The base gave it all up as a bad job. At 1549 attack planes were on their way and by 1830 10 elements had been heard on the circuit. At 1950 one of the planes, 1TCTC1 expected to arrive over the target at 2000 and it is assumed the majority of the attacks occurred between 1900 and 2030. The only signal for all units to attack, was heard at 1930, given by WE2I. The plane had previously been working Shinchiku from 1651 on and was heard on the air until 2017.

~~SECRET~~


15 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Three planes came up at 1500 on the Kyushu search frequency but the searchers found absolutely nothing.

Kanoya was under a precautionary alert at 0005 but this was secured at 0152. Everything was secured at 0215. Other plane sightings were reported at 0630 and 1400.

Respectfully submitted,


R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

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~~SECRET~~

16 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Since we have been in the fueling area for two days none of the Nip Air Activity has concerned us too closely. However from the general appearance of the circuits it looks very much as though the Nips were pointing toward another Kikusui operation.

Formosa based planes were active all night with 8 separate plane elements noted. The raids seemed to be concerned with Okinawa and the bulk of the activity seemed to be centered around 0300. The circuit was active from 0020 to 0545.

Activity during the morning was normal but at 1225 the Kyushu search frequency became active and 2 planes, MESUKI1 and 2 were out on a search. The search seemed to produce negative results. Another possible search plane, TAKOTE2, was heard at 1548 when he reported he had motor trouble and was contemplating a forced landing in the position 28:27N-131:18E. This activity died down at 1544.

At 1703 the Formosa frequency became active again and at 1832 6SCW11 said he expected to arrive over the target at 2000. There is some indication that the plane was Koniya based. At 2020 the plane had completed his attack. 9 elements were heard on the frequency but it is my belief that only 2 or 3 actually took part in the Okinawa raids. The other planes were staging into advance bases for raids tomorrow.

~~SECRET~~

16 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Strike's were also launched out of Kyushu by the regular night attack planes (Betty's) with MEMCTO, MIRIRE, MOHIHI, and HASCSU groups involved. It was the same group of planes who heckled us on the early morning of the 14th. The first group said they would be over the battle area at 2250. The battle area was undoubtedly Okinawa since no sightings of surface forces had been observed. The attacks followed the following order:

2210	MIRIRE1	Expects to arrive over target area at 2250.
2235	HASCSU1	Expects to arrive over target area at 2300.
2245	MIRIRE1	Will commence illumination in 5 minutes.
2248	HASCSU1	Sights enemy.
2311	MIRIRE1	Has completed illumination.
2318	MIRIRE2	Completed torpedo attack.
2321	MIRIRE1	Completed bombing?

This activity seemed to slack off at midnight.

Martin Bombers were over southern Kyushu at 1127 and Kanoya had a precautionary alert at 1200.

Respectfully submitted,

R. E. Palmer

R. E. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

SECRET

17, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The attacks on Okinawa continued today although it was a nice quiet day for TF58. A search from Kyushu was out early in the morning at 0800 but the results of the search were negative.

The Formosa frequency was up during the early morning from 0800 to about 1200 but the activity was quite moderate with all indications pointing to a long flight from a base in the Nansei Shoto chain to Takao. One plane or plane unit was concerned.

This frequency came up again at 1720 and this time it appeared that an attack was on its way to Okinawa. The raids seemed small and involved no more than 4 elements. No tactical signals were received.

At 1840 the regular night attack from Kyushu was on its way down to Okinawa. The groups involved were the MENCTC, HASCUS, and the HAZU elements. Two frequencies were used and it is believed the planes were staged out of Miyazaki and Kanoya. At 2008 MENCTC4 had motor trouble and had to return. Finally at 2243 HASCUS1 sighted the enemy and gave the signal "all units attack". This attack was carried out in the position 26:27N-127:33E.

Approximately 10-15 planes seemed to be involved and from former attacks we know them to be Bettys. A signal ~~for~~ for attack was received at 2215 but all the activity seemed to die down a little before midnight with the planes on their way back at 2000.

Respectfully Submitted,

R. B. Palmer
R. B. Palmer

~~SECRET~~ 13 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity today was again average. The searches which were to have come out of Formosa according to FRMPAC were up from 0357 to 0749 and from 0800 to approximately 1200. One unit was up between 0357-0749 and two from 0800 on. As far as we can determine nothing of importance was sighted. STEFU, a search plane up from approximately 0600 reported he was returning at 0730 because of bad weather and the other planes seemed to have the same trouble.

During the day, flights were noted in the Kyushu area on several secondary circuits from about 1300 to 1443 and it is believed these were flights from the northern Kyushu bases into Kanoya and Miyazaki.

The regular attacks went into Okinawa again tonight with the NIKIRI, MASCSU, MAUI, LERUYA, MESIKA, and CNORA groups involved in their usual attacks. The frequency became active at 1942 and it became evident that these planes had left Kyushu. At 2000 MAUI sent a grid giving position as 26:12N-128:03E, but there is no definite indication Blue Forces were sighted other than the fact that the message came out on the Kanoya Broadcast. The LERUYA group did not appear until 2231 and the MESIKA group was first heard at 2234. Approximately 15 planes

~~SECRET~~ 18 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

took part in the attacks and it seems that the main attack occurred shortly after 2200. This activity is continuing into the next day.

The Formosa frequency also became active at 1903 with only one plane heard, but at 1946 a signal, "Form For Attack" was given and it seems quite possible suiciders went into the Okinawa anchorage at this time.

Southern Kyushu received its usual pounding with Kanoya under a precautionary alert at 0705. This was secured at 0915. Miyazaki had planes overhead at 1030 and at 1317 B-29's were sighted over Kanoya. Finally at 2240 the alert was secured.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~SECRET~~
19, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Activity today naturally did not concern us too closely because of our position in the fueling area. The Kyushu based night hecklers who had been up last night continued their activity until 0233. MERUYA2 and MESIKA2 sent out several messages which we were not able to break since the code has once again gone out. During the morning and, as a matter of fact, during the entire day the suicide float plane frequency was up and units of these planes seemed to be moving from northern Honshu and Kyushu bases to southern Kyushu staging bases possibly in preparation for an attack for tomorrow. Five groups of planes were involved with ZNITA up from 0813-1112, YURCYA from 0823-1039, 3NEU from 0827-1114, 6SAFU from 0828-1306 and 5NAYC from 1731-1835. Of these units it is known that 3NEU definitely landed at MIYAZAKI at 1110. ZNITA seemed on a southerly course over Kyushu and at 1020 was over Miyazaki and must have landed somewhere close to this base. No definite location can be given for the other planes other than a general southerly Kyushu heading.

At 1405 three search planes came down from Kyushu in a search pattern and at 1440 YURCYA1 sighted something in the position 28:07N-130:08E, possibly TG 58.1. YURCYA2 and 3 were unsuccessful and reported searching the end of their search legs without sighting the enemy at 1420 and 1510 respectively.

111

19, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

No indications of an attack were noted but the day's activity points in general toward a possible suicide effort tomorrow, probably in the morning.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

ditto

~~PINUP~~

20 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity during the morning was of little consequence and it seemed to be caused by the weather since a southern Kyushu base at 0900 gave the weather as rainy and cloudy with only a 10 mile visibility. At 0910 however this base gave out an order saying that all the units of an unidentified force would make preparations to advance to Okinawa. No tactical activity was noted however until 1225 when a Kyushu search plane YUYORA2 was called by his base. The plane was heard giving his call at 1226. At 1430 this plane sighted 2 CV's and at 1436 he sent out a message in which he stated he had sighted 2 CV's and 4 CVL's in the position 25:27N-129:23E. A bogey had been on the radar screen at this time and at 1447 YUROYA2 stated he had fighters on his tail and a Jap plane was splashed in the approximate position given above. YUROYA1 was called at 1536 and at 1618 he sent out a message saying he had motor trouble and was returning. His position was 28:27N-132:08E and he reported the weather as drizzly with a 3 mile visibility. The sighting originated by YUROYA2 were broadcast by Kanoya and it seems fairly definite that we were the force sighted.

At 1838 the Formosa tactical frequency became active and it seemed evident that planes were going in to attack Okinawa.

PINOP

20 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Ever since the shuttle system between Formosa and Kikaijima and Amami Oshima has been set up it is difficult for us to determine (unless the plane actually says so) whether he is coming up from a southern Nansei Shoto base or down from a northern Nansei Shoto base. Since most of the bogeys on the beach seemed to come from the north the planes seem to have come from Amami Oshima. At 1923 one of these planes had fighters on his tail. Finally at 2019 4MEKUL gave the signal "All units Attack". At 2040 this plane reported he was south of Ie Shima.

This plane was heard again at 2325 when he reported he was returning to his base. From an RI standpoint the raids on Okinawa must have been small with no more than 6-8 planes involved.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer.
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~SECRET~~

21, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Bad weather kept the volume of Nip tactical air traffic at a low level. At 0000 two search attack planes MERUYAL and 2 were on their way down from Kanoya and at 0008 MERUYAL sent out a message (TOO 0000) in which he stated that his radar was snafu, but that he was continuing on his mission. At this time his position was 27:30N-131:10E and the weather was cloudy. At 0010 he reported he had fighters on his tail and he repeated this sad bit of news until 0030 when he again gave his position as 27:12-130:53E. Finally at 0105 he reported in a message originated at 0010 that the weather in the position 27:30N-131:10E was getting worse, visibility was practically zero etc. At 0129 he reported he had completed his search without sighting the enemy. Nothing was ever heard from MERUYA2 and all of the activity died down at 0212.

Air activity during the day was low and a flight of the white forces returned to their base because of bad weather.

At 1306 the Formosa frequency became active with a snoopers on his way. The plane GANI reported the weather was clear in his area with a visibility of 30 miles. At 1444 he sighted enemy planes and wasn't heard on the circuit after this.

There was a very slight indication on the Formosa tactical frequency at 1932 that planes were up on their way to Okinawa but no tactical signals were heard.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer

~~TINUP~~

22 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Air activity continued at a low level undoubtedly because of the weather. Very few planes were heard in the air and little staging activity was noted. Although Okinawa had a flash red at 0800 we had no indication that planes were in the area. At 1515 the weather in Southern Kyushu according to a base, was drizzly and cloudy with visibility of only 10 miles and at 1452 a group of planes were told to wait for a special order before they moved up to Miyazaki.

A Blue plane was sighted at 1145 headed for Kanoya but no large strikes on the Empire were noted.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer.
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~PINUP~~

23, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

From all indications in today's traffic the Nips are pointing for Kikusui #7. The staging frequencies were all crammed with plane activity and Miyazaki and Kanoya seemed to play a leading role as the advance staging bases. Miho was the base in the rear echelon for many planes coming down from Northern Honshu. At 1334 a plane group consisting of possible suiciders staged into Hiro (near Kure). The weather in Kyushu however seemed to be none of the best since one base reported the weather as cloudy with only a 10 mile visibility.

In the early afternoon search planes came out of Kyushu and came down in a regular search pattern. At least 3 planes were involved with one covering the Okinawa anchorages (HAKIKA4), one following longitude 130 down until he sighted us (HAKIKA2) and one evidently covering longitude 131 to latitude 26. HAKIKA2 sighted 4 carriers in the position 25:17N-130:38E at 1409. Our position was 25:21N-130:24E. At 1408, just previous to this time he had seen fighters in his area. At 1437 he reported one regular carrier, 3 CVL'S, 2BB'S and 10 other ships headed in a south westerly direction and at 1511 he reported the weather in the area.

HAKIKA4 sighted a force not containing carriers consisting of 2BB'S and 2 Cruisers headed NW in the position 25:52N-126:48E. This was followed by another sighting on a

~~PINUR~~

23, May 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

force containing a carrier and 2BB'S headed N in the position 25:52N-126:48E. The usual weather message was sent out at 141Ø and wasn't very favorable.

HAKIKAL in the meantime had completed his search leg and at 1517 he reported he had not sighted the enemy. HAKIKA2 returned at 15ØØ and HAKIKA4 at 153Ø.

Minami Daito Shima reported 34 carrier bombers at 13Ø5 and Kanoya reported a B-29 overhead at 1224.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~PINUP~~

24 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Although Kikusui #7 did not occur today there were numerous indications that the Nips are pointing for tomorrow. The search carried out in the early afternoon concerned us directly. Four Kyushu planes probably out of Kasanohara took part in the search (HAKIKAL, 2, 3, and 4). HAKIKA4 and HAKIKA2 sighted enemy Task Forces, HAKIKAL saw no enemy in his sector, and HAKIKA3 proved to be a negative quantity since he was only heard a few times.

There were indications these planes were in the air as early as 1021 and 1032. One of them, HAKIKA4, was heard at 0751 but he seemed to be staging into a forward base prior to his departure on his search leg. The first sighting occurred at 1235 in the position 26:50N-129:10E. Our position was 26:23N-129:48E. The plane, HAKIKA4, reported at 1305 he had sighted 2 CVL's, 2 BB's, 3 Cruisers, and 10 DD's, speed 20 knots, headed NE (TOOL245). The following activity is listed in chronological order:

TOR	TOO	PLANE	
1307	1250	HAKIKA4	Reports weather in position 26:23N-129:48E.
1315	1255	HAKIKA4	Reports there are no search planes in the area.
1315	1310	HAKIKA4	Reports there are too many clouds in the area for a moonlight attack.

~~FINUP~~

24 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

<u>TOR</u>	<u>TOO</u>	<u>PLANE</u>	<u>REPORTS</u>
1332	1330	HAKIKA1	Reports he has finished his search without sighting the enemy.
1350	1320	HAKIKA4	Sights 7 CV's and 3 BB's in the position 27:17N-129:18E (Much too far north for T.F. 58)
1357	1337	HAKIKA4	Sights another large force (1 CV, 1BB, and 10 other ships) in position 27:20N-129:30E.
1408	1335	HAKIKA4	Gave weather in position 27:37N-129:18E, and states the weather to the East is bad but that the weather to the West is ideal for maintaining contact with the enemy.
1417	1345	HAKIKA4	Reports first enemy group bears 000 from the other at a distance of 20 miles.
1420	1400	HAKIKA4	Says enemy is in wheel formation in position 27:17N-129:18E. This plane sent out all of this information while he was being chased by our fighters. Only at one time (1317) did he complain of fighters. From all indications he led our fighters a merry chase.
1426	1245	HAKIKA2	Reports large force 1 CV; 2 CVL's, and 10 other vessels in position 26:07N-130:28E.
1436	1224	HAKIKA2	Sighted force with 2 CV's, 10 ships in position 25:52N-129:03E, and another large force in position 25:27N-131:08.
1458	1330	HAKIKA2	Weather information in position 26:20N - 130:20E .

~~PINUP~~

24 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

<u>TOR</u>	<u>TOO</u>	<u>PLANE</u>	
1500	1437	HAKIKA2	More weather in position 26:00N-129:00E.
1500	1500	Base	Base tells HAKIKA2 to go to Matsuyama because there is an air raid on at Miyazaki and Kasanohara.

It is to be noted that HAKIKA2 waited until he had gotten out of the active combat area before he sent off his messages - a good example of ideal radio discipline.

All of these planes were on their homing frequency at 1430 and the base (Kasanohara) told HAKIKAL that Kuchino Shima was under a precautionary alert, indicating that the planes had had the intent of landing there. They next tried to land at Kasanohara but here again they were told there was an air alert and they were finally vectored to Matsuyama (Shikoku). These snoopers should be up again at 0400 since Kasanohara told Matsuyama to communicate with them again at this time.

An interesting turn of events occurred during the time the snoopers were out over us. One of these planes probably HAKIKA4 reported that there were too many clouds to carry out night attacks in the moonlight. This evidently was taken to heart by Kasanohara since at 1430 he told Matsuyama to delay the advance of the Shiragiku trainers, the planes which were to make moon-

~~PINUP~~

24 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

light attacks on the Okinawa area.

Planes which were staging into Miyazaki in the afternoon were told to go to Tachiarai, Fukuoka because of the Blue Carrier plane raids over southern Kyushu. Another group coming down from Yonago (Honshu) were told to return.

At 0856 Yaku Shima sighted 2 groups of carrier planes and 2 Martins were sighted at Towimisaki at 0925. 21 small planes were over Sata Misaki at 1450 and 13 Grummans were over Kanoya at 1610. 34 more came over Towi Misaki at 1621 and 20 Martins were over Minami Tanega at 1730. One of our subs was sighted off Towi Misaki at 1630.

Since the activity which came up from 2040 on is actually a part of the activity of the 25th I shall include it in tomorrow's report.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~PINUP~~

25 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Kikusui #7 was carried out last night and in the morning of the 25th with the general result of the operations ~~made~~ pretty well obscured from the Japs and us by a foggy misty day which must have raised particular hell with the suiciders. The activity was divided into two separate categories, namely the night attacks and the early morning attacks. Unprecedented numbers of planes were up at both times and the communication channels were clogged with plane calls.

Night Attacks.

From all indications the main night attacks went against the Okinawa area from approximately 2100 to about 0400. Thirteen groups of planes with 29 planes actually heard on the circuit participated, and a conservative estimate would put at least 50 to 60 planes in the night operations. Although these planes might well have created havoc on the beach the ones who came out to take care of TF58 were involved in a real comedy of errors. From all indications the snooper who reported our position in the afternoon in a latitude 27N must have give the Nips the idea that TF58 was on its way to attack Kyushu again. This report of Blue forces in a northerly latitude in addition to the fact that carrier planes struck Southern Kyushu during the after-

~~FINUP~~

25 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

noon seemed to strengthen the Nips belief that TF58 was to be found just south of Kyushu instead of offshore of Okinawa.

At 2345 a base told 7 bases that the enemy carrier disposition was 40 miles from Yaku Shima on a bearing of 160 degrees. This was a general position at the time but none of the planes seemed to take advantage of the offer. One group of planes (REMENU1) evidently seemed to be on offensive search but at 0155 REMENU1 stated that he had gone to the prescribed area and had not seen any carriers and his running mate REMENU2 reported at 0235 that he had reached the end of his search leg without sighting the enemy. One search plane, OMIWA1, had fighters on his tail in the position 25:02-131:33 but from all indications none of the planes ever got any closer than this. To add to the general confusion the base told the KIYOU group at 0100 that the enemy striking force was 14 miles from Yaku Shima on a bearing of 120 degrees.

From an examination of the circuit only two of the 13 groups seemed to be on an offensive search for us and neither one of them found us. The beach however received a good deal of the enemy strength and there were good indications that the Nips had carried out attacks with good results. Four of the planes reported fighters on their tail and another plane at 0240 reported his starboard motor was out. All of this activity had died down by 0400.

25 May, 1945

~~FINUP~~

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Day Activity

The day attack planes were on their way at 0500 when the frequency used by the suicide planes came up. 18 suicide guide planes were heard on the circuit from 0500 to 1606. A conservative estimate would put approximately 3-5 planes with each guide plane making a total of from 50-100 suiciders. This did not include the planes heard on the regular Kyushu attack and search frequencies on which 13 planes were heard in six groups a possibility of at least 40 planes.

Bad weather proved TF58's greatest ally although it did not seem to hamper the enemy's strike against Okinawa shipping. An offensive search group (TOHIMI) probably the Francis Suicide Unit which was to have included 11 planes, was out looking for us but all the search efforts were in vain. The group was first heard at 0730 when TOHIMI1 was called. Another attack group (NOHIHI) was heard on the circuit at 0742. However at 0805 NOHIHI3 reported the weather was rainy and that he was returning to Kasanohara. TOHIMI3 at 0824 reported the same thing. TOHIMI6 continued on his way reporting he was going to arrive over the battle area at 0920. TOHIMI5 reported at 0845 he was returning because of the weather. At 0926, however, TOHIMI1 reported dramatically that he was going to continue his search until he had run out of gas. There was no real indication that

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25 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

any of these planes carried out an attack.

The first valid indication we had as to the arrival of the suiciders was given to us by a message intercepted on an operational channel in which Kasanohara told Matsuyama that the 171 Force should take 1 float recco plane and have it leave at 0600 to arrive at Ie Jima and Okinawa at 0915 to observe battle results.

The suiciders in the meantime were heard leaving their base at 0500. The base from all indications was probably Matsuyama in Shikoku. Of 18 suicide guide planes heard, 2 actually sighted the enemy, 2 made forced landings, 2 sighted fighters, 3 returned to their base because of the weather, and 9 were unaccounted for on the circuit, ^{probably} indicating they went into Okinawa and carried out the attacks.

A chronological listing of the important activity follows:

0503 to 0600 Suicide guide planes YO, NO, MI, A, KA, TA, KI, NE, RU, KE, MU, WA heard on the circuit.

0637 MI reports his arrival time as 0840.

0630 YO reports he has fuel trouble and is headed for Miyazaki.

0700 MI is in position 28:40N-130:50E

0710 YO changes his mind and says he is going to Okinawa. This was our first indication the planes were actually headed for Okinawa and not for us.

0710

PINUP

25 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

Ø718 HO reports he will arrive over Battle Area at
Ø916.

Ø72Ø MI hits the bad weather in our area. This must
have put the Nips into a dither since the weath-
er at Kikaijima at the time was fairly good while
the visibility in our area was almost zero.

Ø725 MI is in the position 27:52N-131:Ø8E and reports
there are no fighters in the area. There were'nt.

Ø73Ø MI reports he has sighted enemy 26:52N-131:Ø8E,
possibly four fighters.

Ø751 YO makes forced landing.

Ø8Ø4 RU expects to arrive over the Battle Area at Ø85Ø.

Ø848 KE is on his way in for a forced landing.

Ø948 WA sighted enemy.

1ØØØ RU sights enemy.

This activity died down at 18ØØ. Only one plane
was heard on the circuit from 1314 to 18ØØ.

Activity during the rest of the day was negligible.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Palmer

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer.

~~PINUP~~

26 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

All tactical air activity was at a standstill during the day. This is not at all unusual after a Kikusui operation since the Nips generally need some time to lick their wounds and get prepared for the next all out attack. Weather conditions moreover were not conducive to large scale attacks. Blue Planes were over the Empire with 13 Grummans over Yaku Shima at 1110. Takuma was under a full alert at 1743.

Respectfully submitted,



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

PLAIN

27 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Activity on the 27th was practically nil until 1600 when the Shikoku suicide frequency became active with 3 elements in the air. These elements were in the air for approximately 3 hours and it appears that the activity was for the most part flights to advance bases. No tactical signals were intercepted and it seems quite doubtful that these planes went into Okinawa.

At 2005 the regular Kyushu search and attack frequency became active and a minimum of 9 elements were on their way to the Okinawa area for the regular moonlight torpedo attacks. 14 planes were heard on this circuit and a rough estimate would limit the attack to approximately 4 planes. The first attacks must have occurred at approximately 2243. The enemy was sighted at 2236 by NKOWA1 in the position 26:27N-127:23E. At 2243 the signal "Form for Attack" was heard. and at 2300 NARAHI2 had completed his bombing attacks with unobserved results. OTAMA3 completed a torpedo attack at 2303 and NKOWA1 at 2317. Finally at 2322 NKOWA1 reported a large cruiser had been sunk in the position 26:22N-127:23E. Another plane, KIKONU2 reported at 2330 that an unknown type ship was sinking in the position 26:40N-127:40E,

While

271

27 May, 1945

FINUR

Radio Intelligence Summary
(Cont'd)

while a large cruiser was reported sunk at 0030/. All of the planes had weak signals because of our distance from the battle area. It seems that at least one group of these planes^{was} sent out on an offensive patrol to find Task Force 58 because the REURA groups reported on the 28th at 0113 that they had not sighted the enemy even though they had reached the end of their search.

B-29's were over Southern Kyushu during the early hours of the 27th but all activity ceased after 0216 when Kanoya secured his precautionary alert. More planes appeared from 0928 to approximately 1200.

Respectfully submitted



R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer

~~PINUP~~

28 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

The torpedo attack planes reported as going into Okinawa in the report of the 27th continued their activity into the early morning of the 28th. At 0043 a Kyushu frequency became active with at least 4 torpedo attacks on their way to Okinawa. The attacks occurred at 0134, 0140, and 0155 and the planes reported they were on their way back at 0210/. One plane had one motor out of commission at 0240 but nothing was heard to indicate he went into the sea. The search planes (REURA) who were out looking for Task Force 58 reported negative results. General weather reports indicated the weather was cloudy and misty for the most part.

At 0457 suiciders seemd to be approaching the Okinawa area since guide plane (KITUHE2) who had been reported yesterday as moving up for a forward base on the suicide frequency was heard again on this same frequency with fighters on his tail. From all indications the attacks must have been fairly small with only 4 elements involved.

Search planes were up previous to 1000 (Kyushu bases) and at 1012 NIWAA2 reported he had completed his search without sighting the enemy. His position was 27:57N-130:48E.

~~PENUP~~

28 May, 1945

Radio Intelligence Summary

Most of these searches in recent days seem to be defense held for the most part to assure the Nips that Task Force 59 is not moving toward the homeland.

At 2028 some of the night torpedo planes who were up last night were heard again. 3 elements (KIKONU, REYAHU, NKOKA) who are known to be torpedo attack planes from their traffic of last night were heard on their way to Okinawa. However at 2105 the base called NKOWA1, KIKONU2, and REYANU1 and told them to return because of bad weather. Another group of attack planes on a different frequency (3600J) were told to return at 1945 for the same reason.

The search attack plane who seemed to be searching for Task Force 58 last night were called again on the Kyushu frequency at 2258.

A single B-29 was over Kyushu this morning from 0800 on and his route was Towimizaki to Miyazaki, Kasanohara, and Kanoya could be checked by Nip sightings. Other planes were over Kyushu at 1000.

Respectfully submitted

R. B. Palmer
Radio Intelligence Officer