

SRH- 309

Part 1

PACIFIC OCEAN

MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORTS

1945

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12358
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

MRS Date: 22 August '84

Declassification review
of documents in this
Special Research History
has been coordinated
with personnel of the
United States Naval
Security Group Command

CONTENTS

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Memorandum titled "Notes on Task Force Duty for GXT Officers"; dtd 29 January 1945; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt(jg) USNR (USS YORKTOWN)001
Memorandum from OinC RIU attached ComCarDivSIX to OinC, FRUPAC; dtd 29 January 1945; subject: Report of R.I.U. Operations; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt.(jg) USNR003A
Memorandum from COMCARDIVSIX to USPACFLT Radio Unit; dtd 9 March 1945; subject: Report of R.I.U. Operations - comments on; s/ A. W. Radford004
CARDIVSIX memo from OinC, R.I.U. attached to OinC, USPACFLT Radio Unit; dtd 7 March 1945; subject: Report of RI Information - furnished during operations 10 February to 1 March 1945; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt. (jg) USNR.005
Memo from USS YORKTOWN CV-10, OinC R. I. Unit attached ComC arDiv Six to OinC FRUPAC; dtd 13 February 1945; subject: Weekly report of technical information; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt. (jg) USNR (Report signed by E. J. Forrest, CRM USN)027
Memo from OinC R.I.U attached ComCarDiv Six. USS Yorktown CV-10 to OinC FRUPAC; dtd 21 February 1945; subject: Report of technical information on R.I. operations for period 10 February to 17 February 1945 inclusive; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt. (jg) USNR (Report signed by E. J. Forrest, CRM USN, RinC)031
Memo from OinC R.I.U attached ComCarDivSIX to OinC FRUPAC; dtd .27 February 1945; subject: Report of technical information for period 18 February to 23 February 1945 inclusive; s/ W. M. Kluss Lt. (jg), USNR (Report signed by E. J. Forrest, CRM, USN, RinC)041
Memo from OinC R. I. U. attached ComCarDivSIX to OinC FRUPAC; dtd 3 March 1945; subject: Report of R. I. U. operations for the period 24 February to 28 February 1945, inclusive; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt.(jg), USNR, OinC (Report signed by E. M. Forrest, CRM, USN, RinC)049
Memorandum from Commander, Carrier Division SIX to OinC USPACFLT Radio Unit; dtd 17 May 1945; no subject; s/A. W. Radford056
R. I. U attached Commander Carrier Division Six, Action Report; dtd 14 March to 14 May 1945; s/W. M. Kluss Lt (jg) USNR OinC057
Memo from OinC R. I. U attached ComCarDiv SIX to OinC FRUPAC; dtd 4 April 1945; subject: Report of R.I.U. activities 11 to 14 March 1945. Report of R. I. U. activities 14 to 20 March 1945; s/W. M. Kluss, Lt. (jg) USNR, OinC(Reports signed by E. J. Forrest, CRM USN, RinC097

TITLE

PAGE

Memo from OinC R.I.U. attached ComCarDiv SIX to OinC FRUPAC;
 dtd 20 April 1945; subject: Weekly Reports of R. I. U. activities;
 s/W. M. Kluss, Lt. (jg) USNR, OinC (All reports signed by
 E. J. Forrest, CRM USN, RinC) 107

Memo from OinC R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSix to OinC FRUPAC;
 dtd 7 May 1945; subject: Report of R.I.U. operations;
 s/W. M. Kluss, Lt.(jg), USNR, OinC(Report signed by
 B. A. Lee, CRM USNR, RinC) 142

Memo from OinC, R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSIX to OinC USPACFLT
 Radio Unit; dtd 14 May 1945; subject: Report of RI acitivities
 during operations 24 April to 30 April 1945, inclusive;
 s/W. M. Kluss Lt(jg), USNR, OinC (Report signed by B. A. Lee
 CRM USNR RinC) 152

Memo from RinC, R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSIX to OinC USPACFLT
 Radio Unit; dtd 18 May 1945; subject: Technical report of
 RI activities during operations from 1 May to 14 May 1945,
 inclusive; s/W. M. Kluss Lt (jg), USNR. OinC (Report signed
 by B. A. Lee, CRM USNR RinC) 160

Memorandum from USS YORKTOWN CV-10; undated; subject: Report of
 R I U activity for the period of 8 May 1945 to 14 May 1945,
 inclusive; s/B. A. Lee; CRM USNR, RinC. 169

Memo from OinC, R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSix to OinC USPACFLT
 Radio Unit; dtd 12 June 1945; subject: Report of RI technical
 information concerning operations 15 May to 11 June, 1945;
 s/W. M. Kluss Lt.(jg) USNR, OinC (Reports signed by B. A.
 Lee, CRM USNR, RinC) 175

USS YORKTOWN CV-10 memorandum from OinC, R.I.U attached
 Com Car Div Six to OinC USPACFLT Radio Unit; dtd 20 June
 1945; subject: (A) Weekly report of RI technical information
 concerning operations 12 June to 18 June 1945, inclusive
 (B) Report on personnel and materiel changes; s/W. M.
 Kluss, Lt(jg) USNR, OinC (Reports signed by B. A. Lee,
 CRM USNR RinC) 197

Memo from OinC, RIU #5 attached to Com Car Div 6 to OinC
 USPACFLT Radio Unit; dtd 16 August 1945; subject:
 Report of RI technical information covering operations . .
 from 23 June 1945 to 15 August 1945, inclusive;
 s/A. B. Ragan Lt.(j.g.), USNR OinC. 201

TITLE

PAGE

Memo from USS YORKTOWN CV-10; undated; subject: Report of R I U activity for the period of 23 June 1945 to and including 1 July 1945;s/R. B. Potier, CRM USNR RinC. 203

Memo from USS YORKTOWN CV-10; undated; subject: Report of R I U activity for the period 2 July 1945 to 9 July 1945, inclusive; unsigned. 204

Memo from USS YORKTOWN CV-10; undated; subject: Report of R I U Activity; s/R. B. Potier, C.R.M.(T) USNR RinC. 207

~~SECRET~~

USS. YORKTOWN
29 January 1940.

Notes on Task Force Duty for
GXT officers.

These notes are made in the hopes that a resume of our experiences will help simplify your problems the first time out.

1. Equipment and Transportation:

The equipment is all taken care of by FRUPAC for you, except that you should insist on a clock and an LM-18 frequency meter. This frequency meter is very compact, very accurate, and has proved indispensable in the past operations. It is impossible to obtain a clock of the requisite type from the ship, so bring one with you.

Bring and adequate supply of good charts of all areas you are likely to operate in. Charts showing many place names and operational airfields are most valuable. We had relied on obtaining much of this material from Flag Intelligence, but if the flag has been out a long time, their material often does not cover present and projected operations. The Indo-China strikes are a case in point.

Get all the information you can on Jap air organization and location. FRUPAC CIC publications are excellent and very useful. It would be desirable to arrange for each RIU to be on their mailing list.

Office equipment such as paper for message blanks and logs, carbons, pencils, scotch tape, etc. can be obtained in quantity from the ship. Draw a stapler and large sheets of heavy brown paper and make your own burn bags.

The heavy packing which we used for our equipment proved to be well worth the trouble involved. Our receivers had to be transferred from planes to trucks to LCVP's to the carrier. The heavy packing proved decidedly necessary and because of it our receivers all came through in good shape.

We made a mistake in making one of our boxes too large and heavy. Each receiver should be in a separate box, and spare parts, power supplies, etc. should be packed in as many separate small boxes as are necessary. Boxes the size of those used for the SX-28 receiver are about the right size for all boxes. No one box should weigh more than 150 pounds nor have more volume than about 6 cube, and they can then be passed up the gangway easily by a working party. Otherwise you will have to rig cargo nets and sway the gear up on the crane which is dangerous for personnel in the boat and too rough for the equipment.

Try to get comparatively new receivers to take with you and in any case be sure to get some that have been checked over in the shop at Wahiawa. Two of our receivers gave us some trouble and spare parts for SX-28's are hard to obtain at sea. It was found that the SX-32 does not compare with the SX-28, so bring three SX-28's.

*Carrier plenty for
bad clock but
would work for
months
clocks should
be taken from
Rt. 10
along with
one to the
out*

*Charts are
very well
be out as long as
this chart supply
from JCPDA good*

*Good
strongly
suggested*

*Given almost
the same
here*

~~SECRET~~

Equipment and Transportation, continued:

If you go aboard a new ship you will have to convert a bare compartment into an operating room. The space assigned to RI on the Essex class CV's is generally in the island structure, on the starboard side, just forward of the coding room on the gallery deck. Fill out your work requests and turn them in as early as possible and follow them up to see that the work is being started. Shipfitters and metalsmiths are under the First Lieutenant, electricians under the Engineering Officer. Shipfitters seem particularly hard to catch, so if possible plan the work so that you can do all the welding (installation of tables or shelves, buttons for the electric cables, etc.) at once.

When planning the operating positions, bear in mind that the operators will spend hours at a time on search, continually tuning the receiver. For this reason it is recommended that the shelf for the receiver be built at a comparatively low level so that the operator can lessen fatigue by resting his forearm on the shelf while tuning. We found that a shelf 30 inches high, with wells for the mills sunk 4 1/2 inches below that, to be most satisfactory. A new operating room was built aboard the USS Ticonderoga which seemed to the operators to be almost ideal. The attached sketch will give you an idea of what must be built into the operating room.

Coaxial cable must be used in all cases where antennae lead-ins must pass near power cables, etc. Coaxial cable is hard to get on some ships and you may have to obtain it from a supply ship. Be careful that the power supply for the receiver does not come out of the same boxes which supply the ECM in the coding room, or your receivers will be full of interference from the clacking of the ECM. It is a good idea to bolt down any equipment that is likely to slide in rough weather. Drill holes in the wells so that the typewriters can be bolted down if necessary.

Get your chief to bring a Silex and an electric plate for a coffee mess. You can draw coffee, sugar, and cream from the ship after the Exec has approved your coffee mess.

Be sure to install at least one bunk and if possible, two. During long GQ's and on days of frequent GQ's, it increases efficiency to be able to have the personnel not on watch sleep in the operating room when conditions are such that they could get little or no sleep below decks.

2. Personnel:

The RIU enlisted men are in the Flag Division, and should be berthed in with the other flag enlisted personnel, not with ship's company. Obtain late sleeping passes for them so that they will be allowed to sleep in during the day, after their mid watches.

5. Operations:

It is strongly recommended that GXT officers prepare for duty afloat by sitting in with Lieut. Cdr. Bowman in GXa. Familiarity with this material will prove invaluable at sea. Get some practice in analysis of the logs.

At sea, get a copy of the Operation Plan from the Flag Intelligence officer before you sortie, and study it carefully. From then on, keep up

Should be turned in to flag secretary for approval and signature of 15-11-45

Downs should be on duty during early part of day

good

Also early show passes

Good - could study logs from past RI reports to get familiar with form

ships were fitted - Enterprise - Hornet - Yorktown - Wasp - Lancaester - East - Bunker - Ticonderoga - not fitted - RI officer - Shanghai - Blenheim - Yorktown - Enterprise

SECRET

Operations, continued:

with the situation by reading all Top Secret and Secret dispatches each day.

The method of giving your information to the Admiral will vary according to his desires. One may prefer short verbal discussions two or three times a day, while another Admiral may wish a brief written analysis once a day. Of course information of immediate tactical value should be telephoned to the Admiral in Flag Plot.

*usually kept
on "Board" in
Flag Plot.*

True

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

LT(jg) USNR

OP-20

54649

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

29 January 1945.

From: Officer in Charge R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSIX.
To : Officer in Charge, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific.
Subject: Report of R.I.U. Operations.

1. Report of operations from 24 December 1944 to 24 January 1945 enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ W. M. KLUSS,
Lt.(jg) USNR,
Officer in Charge.

COPY

003A

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Contained herein is a report
of the activities of the R. I. Unit
attached to ComCarDiv Six covering
the period of operations between
twenty-four December 1944 and
twenty-four January 1945.

003 B

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Personnel of R.-I. Unit.

W. M. Kluss, Lt.(jg) USNR, OinC.

E. J. Forrest, CRM, USN.

B. A. Lee, CRM, USNR.

R. W. Blount, RM2c, USNR.

H. E. Bailey, RM2c, USNR.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

29 JAN 1945

General Remarks

An interesting feature of this operation was the Admiral's coordination of Task Group Fighter Direction and RIU information. This was the outcome of a few situations in which RI, by grids, by "TETETE" reports, and sometimes by signal strength, was able to determine the proximity of enemy planes which were not appearing on the radar screen. To combat the threat of Nip planes approaching in radar blind sectors or at altitudes so low that radar could not pick them up, the Admiral arranged to have 24 fighters sent out in groups on bearings about sixty degrees apart. These were to fly low on the water at 100 to 200 feet to form a circle 25 miles from the center of the formation, whenever the RI Unit reported certainty of strong possibility of planes in the immediate vicinity. While no planes were intercepted in this manner as a result of RI alone, the FDO reports that in several instances the RIU reported bogeys some minutes before they were picked up by CIC, and more distant interception (not an unimportant factor in the case of Kamikaze attacks) was thus sometimes possible.

In several cases a high frequency D/F would have proved very valuable for determining the direction of attack as well as the base from which raids were being launched.

These aspects of RI activity afloat seem to this officer to emphasize the conclusion that RI units afloat are valuable, not in attempting to duplicate the over-all strategic intelligence of the FRUPAC organization, but in furnishing immediate tactical information which can be of value to the Admiral in actual operating conditions. It is believed that the Admiral by correlating the strategic information in the Ultra despatches with the immediate information furnished by his shipboard RIU can thus utilize to the fullest possible extent the potentialities of RI and the FRUPAC organization.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ W. M. Kluss, Lt.(jg) USNR,
Officer-in-Charge.

003 D

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

24 December 1944

This unit reported aboard the USS Ticonderoga (CV-14) this date for duty with ComCarDiv Six, Rear Admiral A. W. Radford, USN.

25 December 1944

Commenced fitting out operating room in island structure. Laid out plans and measurements for sheet metal operating tables, power outlets and antennae junction boxes. Arrangements made for running antennae down from super-structure and from Radio One. Job orders and requisitions routed for necessary labor, fittings and for furniture.

26 to 28 December 1944

Operating room nearing completion. Stationary stores drawn and some equipment broken out prior to setting up for operations. Word is received in late evening of 28 December that this unit and Flag will move to USS Yorktown (CV-10) on 29 December.

29 December 1944

Move to USS Yorktown is effected. As unit with Lt.(jg) Palmer was to come aboard USS Ticonderoga a swap of everything but RIPs and publications is made between units. Upon arrival USS Yorktown it is found that operating room, aft on gallery deck, is partially set up but some work remains to be done.

30 December 1944

Task Force sorties from Ulithi at 0640 (minus 10). Completion of necessary work on operating room achieved at 1500 (minus 9).

Commence a one-man watch at 1526. From now on all times shall be minus 9. Our first strike is to be on Taiwan the morning of 3 January 1945. A general search is conducted for frequencies in the Taiwan, North Luzon and Nansei Shoto areas.

Frequencies most prominent this day: 5337J/8332J, Detachments of A.G. 901 and planes. 9045J, Bases and planes of Taiwan, P.I., Empire and Nansei Shoto. 5335A, CinC 1st A.F. and P.I. Bases. 4442J/8885J, Manila B.C. 5135J, Bases and planes P. I. area.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

31 December 1944

Proceeding toward Formosa, continue general search policy and keep Manila B. C. on speaker for information.

Days coverage: 5337J/8332J 9045J 5135J 10170J
3928M*

New frequencies:

- 9480M CinC 1st A.F. Roku B.C. (A later despatch made this 9470J).
- 7865M B & P, P.I. area. This appears to be a day frequency for
3928M
- 5426M KKKN unidents with exception of one ident as A. G. 903.
- 3644M KKN unidents, possibility of being Yokosuka area.
- 2955M KKN unidents. This handled traffic pre-received on 3931M
and may be Taiwan A.B.S. on 2955J.
- 2944M KKN unidents.
- 2115M Manila and CinC 1st A.F., reception very poor.
- 3928M-3931M This frequency had grid and operational traffic from planes
and bases. One base KO7NO was noted here and on 5135J so
they may be related.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

1 January 1945

At ~~0800~~ a partial call change went into effect. Comm Units are using three kana calls prefixed with hanigori, calls on local frequencies are KKN, KKN and KKN. Base Forces seem to use some NKKK calls, KKK and KKK calls are also in evidence. The KO-8 and Otsu calls are retained in some places, notably the P.I. and Nansei Shoto areas. A change of frequencies seems probable.

At 0800 this date a two-man watch was started. Operators keep general search and check on frequencies for call recoveries. It was desired to keep Takao's EWA B.C. on speaker but it is unheard so Manila's is retained. A low frequency search this day was not productive.

Days coverage:

3931M	5135J	5337J	6335J (CinC 1st A.F.B.C.)	6580J
7045A	7310A	8332J	8685A — 8780J	9045J

(3931M and 5135J were again noted as being associated)

New Frequencies:

10344M Manila and A.B. Toko.
6995M A.B.s Yokohama, Takuma and Kanoya.
6640M B & P possibly Hi North.
5832M Unident KKK calls, believe this tied with 7310A/8685A.
5705M Unident NKN and KNK.

2 January 1945

Refueling this morning. Continue general search and very close check on air frequencies, in the evening local frequencies and low frequencies checked for contacts by possible pickets.

Days coverage:

241M*	2115M	2955J	3932M	5135J	5337J	7045A
7865M	8332J	*8600J	8780J	9045J	Manila and CinC	

1st A. F. broadcasts. (Takao B. C. unheard).

Chronology

2 January 1945-cont'd.

New Frequencies:

- 239M Tsingtao B.F. Cdr to unident NKKK.
- 241M Takao to MAM, units and Toko.
- 400M Unident KKK calls.
- 561M KKN unidents with drill traffic.
- 2704M Unident NKN and KKKN, a possible air or A.B. circuit.
- 3582M Unident KKKN calls.
- 3931M Unident KKN calls separate from air circuit.
- 6340M KN and KK unidents.
- 7046M Spec A. B. calls and planes, separate from 7045A.
- 8380M Unident KN, also a Jap voice circuit.

At 2154 units on 5135J shifted down to 3931M. At 2400 there is no indication that there has been any sighting of this force.

3 January 1945

Position for strike on Taiwan is 22.20 N - 122.20 E. Our first strike off at 0540 and second off at 0700. This attack a tactical surprise from all indications as the first full alert was released at 0730 by Takao and for the whole Taiwan area at 0738. One of the bases on 5135J put out an alert at 0830 so it would seem that this frequency is concerned with Formosa also. Our first indications of strike came from 8332J.

CIC reported a Bogey on the screen at 1400 and our CAP shot an Irving down at 1430, there was no reaction on the air frequencies and it is believed that no report of our position was made. A Zeke was splashed by one of our DDs at 75 miles and again no reaction. A continual search of air frequencies throughout the day and night produced nothing to indicate we were reported. In the evening a regular check of fleet frequencies was commenced.

Days coverage:

241M	2955J	3931M (Toko planes showed here)	5131J
5337J	5675J	7045A	7865M
			8332J
			8600J
			8685A

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

3 January 1945-cont'd.

Days coverage (cont'd)

8780J 9045J Manila and CinC 1st A.F. B. C. (Takao B.C. and local frequency unheard).

New Frequencies:

4022M KKK-call to plane.
6716M Spec A. B. calls and planes.

4 January 1945

Position for second Taiwan strike: 22.20N - 122.20E.

Continue close supervision of air frequencies. At 0108 CIC has a Bogey which turns out to be a plane on 8332J. The plane 9HESIMUI transmits two grid reports of our position for which the base at Toko does not Roger for until 0552. This plane was also called on 3930M by an unident A.B. The grids mentioned appeared on 5337J at 0600 and at this time Takao goes under a precautionary alert. The plane, after making report, grew weaker and proceeded to Sama arriving there and securing at 1050. A grid originated by NIMUKU at 1657 giving our position was received over the Manila B. C., the call was in error and should have been 2MUKU. This was corrected on Tokyo's HITU and the plane was found active on 3932M. In spite of information furnished by search planes no attack was made upon our forces.

Days coverage:

3931M 4800A 5135J 5337J 5705J 7045A 7865M
8332J 8780J 9045J Manila and CinC 1st A.F. B.C.'s (EWA B. C. remains unheard).

New Frequencies:

3680M Unident KKN and KNK calls.
4306M A. B. Shinchiku and other KKKN calls.
4400M Takao C.U. and units. Takao was broadcasting RUTU numbers hereon, this frequency looks good as substitute for old 6495J which has been unheard of late.
7675M Unident K, KN, KKK and N calls.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

5 January 1945

Refueling at 20.00N - 126.00E, approximately 300 miles NE of Luzon.

This force was sighted and reported by a search plane at 0408 on 3930A, the grid was re-broadcast by Manila. This plane was apparently a Formosa based unit, it is fairly well established now that Taiwan as well as P. I. bases and planes use 3930A, 5135J and 7865M. Planes on 5135J reported the sighting of our landing forces off Lingayen Gulf. There are indications that planes out of Formosa make about a six hour search patrol while those out of Luzon are somewhat shorter.

The call SINASI on 3930A was compromised as being A.B. Takuma.

Days coverage:

3930A	5135J	5337J	5715J	5705J	7045A	7865M
8332J	9045J	Manila B. C.				

New Frequency:

6854M Unident single kana calls.

6 January 1945

Strikes on Northern Luzon, position 17.30N - 123.30E.

Reception was poor to fair and little activity was noted in the early hours of the day. Manila's B. C. was unheard until 0700 so 1st A. F. B. C. and Tokyo HITU were covered from time to time.

The only active air frequency in the early hours was 3930A and at 0509 the plane SU4N01 originated a grid thereon that gave our position. The grid later showed on 5337J and the Singapore B. C.

Manila went into an air raid alert at 0736 and others in the P. I. followed shortly thereafter.

In the early evening planes on 5135J made reports of Blue units around Lingayen Gulf and sent signals denoting attacks on these units by Kamikazi planes. We were later informed that our units were under attack by suicide planes.

Continued regular checks of fleet frequencies have been made with no result.

The signal MA"1 was compromised as being the same as E"WO.

Days coverage:

3930A	5135J	5337J	6502J	7045A	7865M	8332J
9045J	New Frequency:		3580M	Unident KKKN calls.		

Chronology

7 January 1945

Position for second strike on Northern Luzon: 17.30N - 123.30E.

Weather conditions bad and receiving conditions continue poor. Sighting reports of Blue force's around Lingayen Gulf continue to show on 5135J and lookout stations later report size and composition of our landing forces.

Takao AirGroup Stn appeared on 5135J using his K008 call KEYUHO6 and this further solidifies opinion that this frequency is a joint one for Formosa and the P. I. It may indicate a movement of Air Groups and Air Commands to Taiwan from the Philippines.

Manila's broadcast transmitter had trouble all day and was out for most of the night, in the afternoon this transmitter sounded different and may have been an emergency rig.

The evening was very quiet and little air activity was noted.

Days coverage:

3930A 5135J 5337J 7045A 7865M 8332J 9045J

New Frequencies:

7048M Previously reported as 7046M. May be transport plane frequency for the Empire, Formosa and the Philippines.

7935M Bases and Planes, Spec A. B. calls. A drill tactical air frequency.

8 January 1945

Refueling at position 19.00N - 125.00E.

Receiving conditions remain poor in the early morning. No grids were sent on us this day and apparently we remain unspotted, there was no unusual air activity this day. Takao's EWA broadcast was heard here on 6075J from 2040 to 2255. The frequency of 7865M was being used as a drill circuit today. On 5337J/8332J KKN calls appeared and were identified as A.B. Tansui, A.B. Bako and A.G. 901 Blank Det. These calls plus A.G. 953 at Blank appear on 7048M. On 3930A A.B. Toko, A.B. Takao and Cdr SurEscFor #1 calls appeared as HEφ, WOφ and KEFUNA5.

Days coverage:

3930A 5135J 5337J 6075J 7048M 7865M 8332J
8780J 9045J Manila and Takao B.C.s 4407M (Takao local.)

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

9 January 1945

Strike on Formosa. Position 22.45N - 122.45E.

Conditions remain poor, Takao EWA broadcast was not copyable until 0300. Takao Guard Dist. went under precautionary alert at 0644 and a Taiwan A.B. went into full alert at 0756.

A Bogey at 10 miles brings G.Q. at 1343 and our VF splashes a Dinah about 10 miles away, there was no reaction on air, A.B. or broadcast frequencies. The pilot reported that the Dinah acted as though he were surprised to have company.

The landings on Luzon by our forces brought little reaction.

About 2000 we are making transit into the China Sea through the Bashi Channel.

Days coverage:

3930A	4407M	5135J	5337J	(Sama hereon called the unident A3 who was unheard).
5705J	7865M	8332J	8780J	

(Units on 5337J/8332J using calls Y00 and A1 are identified as A.G. 901 Detachments at Saigon and Sama).

New Frequencies:

455M Takao B.C. Key dual with 6075J.

8292M Spec A.B. calls, unidentified.

10 January 1945

Proceeding toward striking position for Camranh Bay and Saigon.

CIC had three Bogeys in the morning which brought no reaction so it was assumed we were not reported. Jap activities seem to center on the Lingayen landings at present. General search conducted of frequencies in the areas to which we are going.

Days coverage:

3930A	5337J	8332J	Manila and Takao broadcasts.
-------	-------	-------	------------------------------

New Frequencies:

4279M K008 unident calls.

4494M Unident KKK calls.

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

10 January 1945-cont'd.

New Frequencies cont'd:

- 4509M Unident KKK calls.
- 4866M CinC Sixth Fleet to unident KKK.
- 5108M Spec A. B. Call and KKK call.
- 5135M Canton-Sama area very probable. KKNN calls.
- 5393M Unident KKNN calls.
- 5422M Unident KKK, NNKKK, NNKKKK and KKKK calls.
- 5719M Unident (TIOWA) to SATEK04, may be 5727J.
- 7035M Unident KK and KN calls.
- 7675M Unident KKNN calls.
- 7680M Unident KN and KKN calls with Drill traffic.

11 January 1945

Refueling. Position 15.30N - 116.05E.

Continue to check for China Seas activity and for Camranh Bay and Saigon frequencies. Plane signals on 5135J become very strong at 1600 and CIC is notified, our VF go out and knock down three planes. No more is heard from our planes on 5135J but the base said three more were due to depart at 1930 so we stand by for them but they apparently do not hit this sector. It was desired by the Chief of Staff that we get bearings on the base concerned but this was not possible due to no high frequency D/F aboard or on any of our planes. CIC had a Bogey at 1818 at 110 miles but this faded without any reaction.

Some idents on 5135J were made from A"KAs that were received. The unit "ø on 8332J was identified as A.G. 901 Det at Bako. The signal NI"SA was compromised with E"WE.

An SX-28 receiver failed today but was repaired temporarily.

Days coverage:

3930A	5135J	5337J	5427J	7045A	8332J	8780J
9045J	10170J	Manila and Tokyo HITU broadcasts.				

Chronology

11 January 1945-cont'd.

New Frequencies:

- 3493M Unident KKK calls.
- 4667M Unident NKKK and KKNN calls.
- 5336M Planes and Spec A. B. calls.
- 5435M KK calls similar to those previously used on 6535J and 5255J
- 5478M Singapore to Tokyo.

12 January 1945

Strikes on Camranh Bay and Saigon. Position 11.30N - 110.30E.

Strike on Camranh Bay was an apparent surprise, their alert was timed 0825 and first showed on 5427J. The originators call in this instance was OSU. Saigon originated an alert at 0855 and this was intercepted on 4197J at 0858. Both these alerts were rebroadcast by Singapore as were the numerous sighting reports from the Camranh Bay Saigon areas.

Vigorous search failed to turn up any air or fleet frequencies concerning these forces, apparently no search planes came into our area.

Days coverage:

- 4197J - 4492J 5135J 5337J 5427J 6330J 5517J
- 7045A 8332J Singapore B.C.

New Frequencies:

- 4202M Unident KKK calls
- 4823M Unident KN calls.
- 5920M Unident KKK calls.
- 6327M Unident KK and KN calls.
- 7046M KKNN call to Camranh Bay
- 7635M KKN to Soerabaja(/?), this possible weather circuit
- 6530M Spec airbase calls.
- 6532M Puerto Princessa S.P. Base to A.G. 955.
- 6565M Unident KKK to KN Probable Lkt Stns.
- 6872M Unident KKK calls.
- 7835M Yokohama Field of Japanese Air Lines.

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

13 January 1945

Weather is poor and heavy seas running. Position for refueling, 14.15N - 114.10E.

Due to a report of being D/F'd we expected attack but fleet and air activity was non-existent. One plane on 5135J became rather strong in signal but no Bogeys were located and no activity resulted.

At about 1036 Manila's broadcast (TOWIHII) ceased and the call KEHITO6 took over his frequencies and sent traffic prefixed with FUSI numbers, there is no identification for this call at present.

Another SX-28 failure today which was repaired in a short time.

Days coverage:

3930A 5135J 5337J 5427J 7045J 8332J Manila and
Singapore broadcasts.

New Frequencies:

5582M Unident KKN and KKKK calls.

5135M The CDV Tsushima called G.D. 16 Sama hereon.

5784M KKN calls, tentatively identified as Soerabaja and Manado weather stations.

5900M Unident KKN to KKN and Seaplane Base Aparri.

6065M Soerabaja and Tokyo, this may be a new low for 6122J.

8245M - Manila to Davao.

14 January 1945

Continuing refueling operations. Position 18.00N - 115.40E.

Receiving conditions for the day were poor. A plane, 6METO2, on 5135J becomes very loud and at 1606 originates grids giving position of these forces. The plane 6METO1, on the same frequency, reports position of forces near Lingayen Gulf. As 6METO3 was also heard it would seem planes are sent out in threes. The plane 6METO1 reached his base at 1930 and made several requests for a searchlight before landing. Though several requests for A"KA were made on 5135J there were no answers intercepted.

No attack is made upon us this day and no indication is seen that the Jap fleet is on its way to this area.

Days coverage: (Next page)

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

14 January 1945-cont'd.

Days coverage:

3930A 5135J 5337J 5427J 6462J 7865M 8332J

9045J The FUSI and Singapore broadcasts.

New Frequency:

7835M Japanese voice circuit believed to be military.

15 January 1945

Position 21.25N - 118.10E. Strikes to be made upon Formosa, Hongkong and Hainan. Weather conditions poor.

Takao's broadcast was not found although Tokyo rebroadcast traffic previously handled on the EWA, either Takao has shifted or we don't get there at right times. Reception poor in the early day.

Our first strike delayed until near 0800 by bad weather. Takao went into precautionary alert at 0745 and a full alert at 0837. At 0859 a plane on 5135J reported sighting enemy planes and the base MI4KI went into full alert at 0900. A 5135J plane sent a grid of our position p timed 0855, CIC was informed of proximity of plane but failed to pick him up. At 0910 another of 5135J planes reports us, both sightings were widely broadcast.

Hongkong went into full alert at 0920.

CIC reported Bogeys at 1400 but no indications were apparent to us. At 1655 planes on 5135J become very loud again and this report made to CIC, nothing showed on screen but our VF knocked down two planes in the immediate area. Determining proximity of planes by signal strength is not infallible but has proved fairly accurate.

An ident as A.B. Tainan was obtained on a Spec A.B. Call from an A"KA on 5135J.

A.B. Toko, on 8332J, informed A.B. Sama that a flight of planes would depart at 0600 the 16th and requested aviation weather, this will be checked in the morning.

Days coverage:

3930A 4407M 5135J 5337J 5510J 7045A 7865M

8332J FUSI broadcast.

New Frequency:

6385M G.D. 35 Legaspi to A.B. Legaspi.

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

16 January 1945

Position 19.48N - 114.25E. Strikes against Hongkong, Canton and Hainan.

Hongkong went into alert at 0825, about twenty minutes before we expected to strike. Sama originated an air raid alert at 1029.

Apparently the expected 0600 flight from Toko to Sama did not materialize, the only possible flight noted was one from A.R. Toko commencing at 1746 and last logged at 2146, this may have been to Sama.

Air frequencies were comparatively quiet this day though there were planes on 5135J and 8332J. No evidence of planes in our area or that we were reported. A Spec A.B. call on 5135J was identified in an A"KA as being SHOKOZAN H.Q.

The FUSI broadcast was covered intermittently until 0700 but was not heard thereafter, Tokyo's NR 1 was on speaker from time to time. Takao's EWA broadcast was set up at 0800 on the new frequencies of 4572J/9145J.

The calls Nø and FUø on 5337J/8332J were identified as Tansui A.B. and Hongkong Det. 901 respectively.

Days coverage:

3930A	5135J	5337J	5510J	5705J	7045A	8332J
9045J	FUSI, HITU and EWA broadcasts.					

17 January 1945

Commenced fueling operations. Position 16.48N - 116.45E. The weather remains foul and the sea high.

On 5135J there appears to be three Air Bases in control, two in Formosa which are probably Shokoazan and Tainan and one in the P.I.

At 1612 a planes signal became rather strong and CIC notified but no Bogey showed nor was there any reaction or report made. We do have Bogeys at 1900 but only strong signals are on 9045J and once more there are no reactions.

Days coverage:

3930A	5135J	5337J	8332J	9045J	FUSI, HITU and the Takao broadcasts.	
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	--------------------------------------	--

New Frequencies:

5897M Unident KKN calls.

6538M A.B. Toko to Sama and Takao, this may be an overload for 5337J/8332J and the indicator is apparently EI 122.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

Chronology

18 January 1945.

Due to bad weather the 17th we continue to fuel ship. Position is 18.33N - 118.00E .

At 2155, on 5337J, the plane LHESIMUI reported sighting an enemy plane then said he was investigating an unknown plane. Sometime later he reported that heming device was inoperative but returned to base with no apparent trouble and secured at 2245.

This day was a quiet one in all respects. The search for fleet and air frequencies continues.

Days coverage: (Takao B.C. on speaker).

3930A 5135J 5337J 6538M 8332J 8610A 9045J

A Spec A.B. call noted on 5135J was also used on 8610A. From an A"KA on 5135J a Spec A.B. call was identified as A.B. Echague in the central part of Luzon.

New Frequencies:

4307M C.U. Takao to Lkt Koosioo and Lkt EO.

7788M B.A.F. Malay and planes.

7932M Unident KN and KNN calls.

19 January 1945

On a Southern course for the Surigao Straits. Position 14.13N - 117.27E.

Air Activity remained small this day and the only Bogeys reported were identified as friendly. Another Spec A.B. call on 5135J was identified by A"KA as Clark Middle Field.

The 6538M previously report was changed to 6550J per despatch from FRUPAC.

At a late hour this day our course is changed and we proceed on a Northward course again.

Days coverage:

3930A 5135J 5337J 5715J 6390J (Jerk show 0133)

6550J 8610A (Drill traffic) 8332J 9045J EWA and FUSI B.C.s

New Frequencies:

5335M C.U. Takao to units

8625M Spec A.B. and KN.

003 R

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

Chronology

20 January 1945.

Morning position 18.45N - 119.09E. Intention of force is to move from China Sea through Balintang Channel this night.

Search of and for air frequencies re-doubled as an attack is most likely at any time. Thus far, no fleet or known submarine activity has shown in our area. At 0844 a plane on 5135J becomes loud enough for us to report to CIC who picks him up on screen at 0929. This plane kept in contact with base by short transmissions and made his last at 0923 but did not report this force. Our VF splashed him, a fighter, at 0950. The base made attempts to contact this plane repeatedly until 1600.

At 1550 two new planes, apparently from the same base, show on 5135J and one reports planes at 1655 but continues to be heard. The other one sights this force at 1712 and makes a report (KIN) at 1717 and at 1735. These two planes were then unheard from 1755 to 2030 and secured at 2212 after giving an ETA of 2300. In so doing one of the planes compromised the code group NUKON UKON UKO with "Estimated time of arrival".

At 1800 a plane using the call SO6KE shows as squadron leader of the planes SO6KE2-3, he is apparently attacked at 1835 but transmits traffic at 1850. The planes SO6KE2 and 3 also pass traffic and the former has KINs at 1921 and 1925, these units secure at 2039 and 2047 respectively. From signal strength of units mentioned and traffic passed it is most probable that we have been reported again.

On our way through the channel we are in G.Q. and are attacked by planes but come through unscathed after splashing a number of planes. A more concerted and vigorous attack was expected considering that our position and strength were known for some hours.

The call MUØ that appeared on 8332J this day was identified as the Omura Det of A.G. 901.

Days coverage:

3930A 5135J 5337J 7865M 8332J 9045J Takao B.C.

New Frequency:::

2990M SATEK04 to G.D. 14 Nicobar.

21 January 1945.

Strikes on Formosa. Position 22.30N - 122.50E: Takao apparently was not surprised and went into full alert at 0740 but A.B. Tansui did not go into alert until 0814. Numerous alerts and plane sightings were received on 5337J/8332J, these originating all over Taiwan.

At 0812 the plane group leader ØHAHA sends TETETE on 5135J, signal is very strong and it is apparent that he is practically atop us.

0035

Chronology

21 January 1945-cont'd.

At this time we have Bogeys on the screen, we reported ØHAHA to CIC, and our VF go after the plane or planes. At 0831 ØHAHA sends a grid giving our position and other high precedence traffic, at 0836 he commences a report of enemy planes but never finishes transmission. Our VF splashed him at this time and he was identified as an Oscar.

At 0915 the plane 6ERE is apparently near our forces but sends no report and goes safely back to base after first inquiring if they had an alert or planes overhead, the base replied that they did have an alert but that there were no planes there.

At 1225 a formation of planes led by SA8H12 is in vicinity of TG 38.3, within a few minutes we have the word that TF 38.3 is attacked and the planes mentioned release plane sighting reports, reports of a large enemy force including CVs and grid reports. There are numerous signals of "enemy forces" and signals to "attack" (TOTOTO). In spite of one garbled grid it is clear that these forces have been well located by the Japs. It is during these attacks that the Ticonderoga and other ships are damaged by bomb and Kamikaze hits.

We go to G.Q. again at 1606 due to presence of Bogey, fighters find this Bogey at about 30,000 feet which is too high for them to get at him and he escaped after leisurely circling the whole force. No transmission from this plane was intercepted here so it is probable that his report was made upon return to base.

After the noon attack 5135J activity was chiefly restricted to the bases keeping in contact with planes. At about 1850 several planes are called and a 1900 despatch is sent by base and repeated throughout the evening. This is considered as an indication that the Japs are coming back for attacks in force so we go to G.Q. An unident on 5135J sends "enemy sighted" at 1927 and at 1931 our five inch batteries open up shooting down one plane. No others appear and the planes mentioned on 5135J apparently return to base and secure around 2115. No further air action this day.

Prior to the evening attack and about 1915 a Jap voice circuit was heard on 5135J, this seemed to be tactical but interference was too great for absolute identification.

Days coverage:

3930A (Planes make appearance here after several days absence) 5135J
5337J 7865M 8332J 8610A Takao and HITU broadcasts.

New Frequency:

116M Takao EWA Broadcast.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

22 January 1945

Strikes on Nansai Shoto. Position 24.00N - 127.30E. Contrary to later information from Ultra Summary this attack was a surprise at Okinawa. Our planes were over target at 0635 and circled for awhile awaiting sufficient light to bomb, Okinawa's alert was timed 0642. Keelung went into alert at 0727.

One interesting despatch was noted from Okinawa B.F. Cdr to Base One Torpedo Boat Unit 27 and Base One Okinawa Midget Sub Unit for action. This appeared on 4192J in less than an hour of origination so carried a good degree of precedence. Flag notified of possibilities.

No attacks were made upon these forces today and our only G.Q. was brought on by Bogeys later identified as friendly.

There were no indications of search planes in our area nor of any frequency solely concerned with us or finding us. 5715J had been considered an Okinawa area air frequency and while it was active it was mostly confined to signal reports.

Days coverage:

3057J	3930A	4192J	4390J	5135J	5305J	5205J
5337J	5512J	5715J	6115J	7865M	8332J	9045J

Takao broadcast.

New Frequencies:

4275M	A.B.Ibusuki to Spec SC 207 and Unidents.
5180M	Planes and Spec A.B. calls, believed to be Drill.
5257M	
5255J	Unident KK calls believed to be training CVs in Inland Sea.
6266M	Unident KN and NKN calls.

23 January 1945

Position 20.36N - 127.13E. Underway for anchorage at Ulithi.

Maintain a general air search and frequency check. At ~~0600~~ we are fairly close to Kyushu so cover Sasebo broadcast for a few hours.

At the end of the day there had been no activity concerning us so watches are cut to one man.

On 5135J A.G. Takao compromised his call TA750 with KEYUHO6.

U.S.S. YORKTOWN CV-10

Chronology

23 January 1945-cont'd.

Days coverage:

5135J 5305J 5337J 5715J 6550J 7865J 7925J
8332J 9045J Takao broadcast.

New Frequencies:

3900M Jap voice which may be a plane circuit.
3940M Jap voice station "Testing".
9736M Unident KN and KNN calls.

24 January 1945

Continuing on course for Ulithi anchorage.

Watches confined to a general search, little activity on air or other frequencies. 5337J/8332J principal coverage.

At 0457 it was noted that the KUMA broadcast was again active on 4442J and replaced the FUSI.

All watches secured at 1200 this day. Commenced work of bringing publications up to date and going through logs for report data.

Respectfully submitted: s/ E.J. Forrest, CPM
RinC.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 March 1945.

From: Commander Carrier Division SIX.
To : Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Subject: Report of R.I.U. Operations - comments on.

1. I have read the attached report with interest and wish to commend Lieutenant Kluss and his unit on their efforts. I find it extremely helpful to get positive and negative information on enemy air activity. In conjunction with Ultra information the TG can be "alerted" in advance on many occasions. I hope that we can soon obtain a HFDF to assist in intercepting "Snoopers." This equipment is required to properly complement RI intercept watch.


A. W. RADFORD.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~USRA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 March, 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I.U. attached Com Car Div Six
To: Officer-in-Charge, United States Pacific Fleet Radio Unit
Subject: Report of RI Information furnished during operations
10 February to 1 March 1945

1. Subject report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

W. M. Kluss
Lt.(jg) USNR
Officer-in-Charge

Ref

File

005

Report of R. I. Information
furnished to Commander Task Group 58.4
during Operations 10 February to 1 March 1945

In general it was attempted to keep the Task Group Commander in close touch with the current RI situation. To that end, on days when there was little specific information to report, a brief summary of the situation ("little air activity", or "several planes active but do not seem to be near us", etc.) was reported once or twice a day.

Such reports are usually not noted in the following chronology. A time-group in parenthesis following an item of information indicates the time that such information was reported to the Admiral. Reports made immediately, as soon as the information was available, are designated by a star in parenthesis(*).

CHRONOLOGY

10 February, 1945 .

0830 Sortie from Ulithi.

Hahajima reports full air alert at 1040 10 B-24's heading North. (1215)

CDV ALIAGUSA is indicated to be in the Yokosuka - Chichijima area.(1910)
This is indicated by this vessel's working Yokosuka and Chichijima on the local ship - shore frequency.

Similarly Transport No.137 is indicated in the Iwojima area, by its close contact with Iwojima on the local ship - shore circuit.(1910)

Today's information reported to the Admiral principally by way of general interest and background for the coming operation. We are still very far from operating areas and in a region where reception conditions are poor.

11 February, 1945

Underway, Northeast of Ulithi.

102325 Takao Guard District ordered a precautionary alert for Okayama area and Taiwan Western Sea Frontier.(0810)

0229 Yokosuka Central District orders precautionary alert.(0810)

Air raid alerts in areas of our projected operations are considered to be of value to the Admiral in assessing the extent of alertness of enemy anti-aircraft defence, and in evaluating the effectiveness of raid and heckler missions.

0950 Picket boat reports planes, in position 30-00N, 139-30E, and seems to have considerable difficulty getting his message through to Cru Div 22 Cdr.(1245)

Pickets sighting Blue search planes and B-29's will report positions. By maintaining a daily plot of these, besides knowing individual locations we can get an idea of their number and the extent to which the picket boats actually cover the approaches to the Empire. The delay in getting messages through to Cru Div 22 Cdr is interesting in that we might, with favorable circumstances, and prompt action, sink a picket before we could be reported. It is further noted that pickets send weather shortly after a sighting. This is presumably to coordinate pickets with search or attack aircraft.

Warnings sent out today to Hookoku Maru, Hakuho Maru, Shooei Maru No.2 concerning a sighting of Blue sub at 102140 in position 41N. 146-18E.(1545) Indicates these ships to be in that vicinity. Information such as this is considered valuable not only to locate enemy shipping which may later be targets for carrier aircraft, but also to indicate effectiveness of enemy anti-sub warfare as it might effect our air-sea rescue operations.

12 February 1945.

Underway, East of Guam.

Morning report of night's air alerts, (0655):

112313 Yokosuka Western District under precautionary alert, condition 2.

112335 Yokosuka Western District to condition 3.

0130 Back to condition 2.

0200 Changed to condition 3.

Almost no reaction (one sighting) yesterday to a supposedly extensive search for picket boats by B-29's. (0655) It is found that they got off late and flew over such a heavy overcast that they found nothing.

0800 Ficket reports one plane heading South in position 31-00N, (garbled)-00E. (1145)

1530 The picket boats suddenly becomes very active, with numerous sightings.

Fickets are in following positions:

30-08N, 134-26E

30-05N, 135-34E

30-00N, 136-30E

30-00N, 136-23E

31-00N, 137-27E

31-40N, 136-30E

Two others are heard but do not give positions. Present total, eight; positions for six. (1645)

Large volume of traffic on Yokosuka local circuit indicates shipping in the Yokosuka area, probably approaching Yokosuka from Chichijima. This includes CDV No.4 and CDV No.49, which seems to be command ship. Presence of escort vessels suggest possibly of a convoy. Traffic suggests air cover from AG903 and AG Tateyama. Such shipping might become possible targets for our planes (1645)

13 February, 1945.

Fueling in position 19-50N, 149-00E.

Fagan Weather Station sent 1800 and 2000 messages last night in operational code to Air Base Iwojima and Naval Weather Department, Suggesting possible flights from Iwojima to Fagan. (0645)

0130 A new picket, 30-00N, 135-25E.

0130 Ficket in 30-06N, 135-34E moved to 30-00N, 135-30E. This way we can plot their patrol movements if any. Total number of pickets now nine, positions for seven. One (in position 30-00N, 136-23E yesterday) seems to have contacted Blue submarine. (0645)

0415 Okayama (Formosa) precautionary alert.(0645)
0650 New picket boat, at 31-00N, 139-30E.(1145)
1115 Marcus Guard Division secures from full air alert.(1145)
1128 Iwojima secures from full air alert.(1145)
0940 An air circuit shows up and by 1100 there are 3 planes up with signals S-4. Probably these are in Bonins area, but are on a transport - ferrying freq, and we are still about 500 miles from Chichijima, so this is not considered a threat to our force.(1330)
1000 We hear two planes working right on the picket boat circuit, and work Ominato Comm Unit. Their traffic reappears on Ominato EC. This indicates close cooperation between picket boats and patrol planes.(1330)
Following vessels are indicated between Yokosuka and Chichijima; CDV AMAKUSA, CDV No.4, CDV No.49, TAKUNAN MARU No.2, SHOONAN MARU No.8, KYUSHU MARU, Transport No.15. These are not believed to be all in one group, however. Air cover seems to be furnished by AG Tateyama and District Escort Force at Yokosuka.(1330)

14 February, 1945.

Our 0800 position: 23-50N, 147-10E.

0142 A new picket boat sighted planes heading North, in position 29-30N, 136-50E.(0600)
Air contacts for the night:
132030 Hahajima secures from full air alert.
0220 Full air alert at Hahajima.
0240 Yokosuka Naval District Cdt reports plane bearing South at 120 miles, circling.
0300 Yokosuka Western District under precautionary alert, condition 2.
0302 Full alert, unident place(Chichijima?)
0318 This alert secured. "Were bombed".
0324 Yokosuka Central District precautionary alert, condition 1.
0333 Guard Division Hahajima secures full alert - one large plane going South.
0340 Yokosuka Central District secures precautionary alert to condition 3.
0442 Unident place(Chichijima?), under full alert.

- 0500 New picket sights something in position 31-05N, 143-10E.
- 0522 Full alert secured at above unident place(Chichijima?) "Did not bomb".
- (All the above air contacts reported to the Admiral in outline form at 0600)
- Total number of picket boats now heard is fourteen, with positions for ten. Watch 3 of these boats was supposed to have been relieved by Watch 1 by 10 February, and Watch 1 to be on the picket line for the following ten days. However only one Watch 1 picket has been heard (no position given) and evidently the relief has not been effected. This might affect our operations in that during the actual process of relief there might be nearly twice the normal number of boats in the area.(0600)
- 1200 Signals of two planes on 8725J became very strong and Flag notified of possible presence of Nip planes. However CIC has no bogeys, and signals faded in a couple of hours. This is probably a transportation flight between Iwo and Marcus which would pass almost over the force. However our presence seems to remain undetected in spite of a scare over what at first appeared to be a garbled grid sent by this plane.(1220)
- 1338 Received a Nr.1 from plane Nu8Ne2 on the Tokyo Broadcast. Time of message 1115, precedence simply "Te Te Te" (enemy force sighted). No large grid square is given and three possible positions indicated. All three possibilities reported to Admiral(1345), and 15-30N, 144-10E (100 miles West of Saipan - possibly our amphibious forces) seems the most logical. No possible position was near us. Nothing more develops from this.
- 1423 New picket spots something(probably a sub) in position 30-00N, 142-00E.(1535)
- 1425 A picket reports one plane heading South, position 31-00N 142-00E (vessel's position same as reported 12 February).(1535)
- 1425 New picket reports one plane heading South - no position.(1535)
- 1440 The 1423 picket-is noted sending weather following his sighting.(1535)
- Twenty-one pickets have now been heard (excluding two probable idents for for pickets). Positions plotted for eleven.(1535)
- 1500 Picket boat circuit very active, with numerous reports of planes and subs(?).
to Two new positions intercepted and plotted.
1700

15 February, 1945 .

Our 0700 position 29-10N, 146-35E.

The last day of the "fun-in" for Tokyo. All pertinent circuits covered carefully to see how far we get before being spotted.

Last night's contacts:

2103 Secure full alert at (Chichijima?) "Did not bomb".

120 Full alert at Hahajima; one plane heading North.

135 Secure full alert at Hahajima "Did not attack".

2150 Full air alert at (Chichijima?).

2212 Full alert at Hahajima.
(All these reported at 150550.)

1018 Flag Flot informs us that a DD in our screen has sunk a small boat near the formation. Nothing has appeared all morning on the picket boat circuit or the Yokosuka ship-shore circuit, so Flag is informed that we believe nothing was transmitted by boat. Questioning of one Jap survivor brought aboard in the afternoof confirms this. The boat had no radio.

1123 Flag Flot tells us one Betty was shot down outside the screen. We have no RI indications of any report of our forces, and report to Admiral that we believe TF58 is still undetected.

1200 picket boat circuit begins getting active. Following contacts noted:
1238 Picket reports planes heading North.

1326 Yokosuka Central District precautionary alert, condition 1.

1340 AG 903 reports sound of unident planes over Kushimoto, heading NW.

1342 Osaka Defense Unit Cdr - precautionary alert.

1345 Yokosuka Western District precautionary alert,; secured at 1355.

1438 (TOR) CDV No.4 reports 8 planes, South at 20 miles.

1500 Picket reports aircraft heading South in position 31-00N, 139-00E.

1500 Picket reports planes in position 31-07N, 140-30E.

1535 Picket sends weather and position 31-00N, 143-00E.
(Above contacts reported to Admiral about 1800, together with statement that we still believe force is undetected.)

1540 A TETETE appears on the Tokyo Broadcast. However no position is given and it does not seem to be in our area. Ultra despatches later say that this was D/F ed at 345 degrees from Guam and probably was a report of Blue amphibious forces.

1913 Picket reports aircraft in position 31-00N, 139-00E.(2030)

2005 Full alert at Hahajima.(2030)

2015 Precautionary alert for Yokosuka Central District. (2030)

We still seem to be undetected. The large volume of picket boat sightings and alerts are caused by B-29 searches and raids today.

16 February, 1945.

Tokyo strikes - position, 33-55N, 141-20E.

0155 Osaka under a precautionary alert. This phoned to Flag Flot as a possible indication that our forces presence was known, but we are informed that a B-29 raid is in progress.

Also at this time report hearing a drill circuit about 2100 -2200 practicing with "TOTOTO" (attack) and "RAIRAIRAI" (attack with torpedoes) - which might be indicative of the type of attacks we might expect.

0545 First strike is launched -- Still no indications that we have been detected. All activity is as quiet as is usual at this early hour. No air circuits are up; and lookout circuits tell each other they have no traffic.

NOTE: Hereafter, a star in parenthesis (*) indicates that the preceding information was telephoned to Flag Flot immediately upon receipt .

0644 A radar contact from unident in Yokosuka area bearing 140, distance 80. Our bearing from Yokosuka is about 140, so this might be on us. (*)

0700 First contact of Blue planes --6 small planes heading North from unident AN0078(*)

0702 Yokosuka Central District precautionary alert. (*)

0703 All of Yokosuka Naval District under precautionary alert(*)

0704 Received air alert from unident place, TOC 0650. (*)

0705 Unident planes bearing 230 at 20 kilometers from unident. (*)

0710 37 small unident planes, circling, bearing 180 at 10 kilos from same unident(*)

0710 Yokosuka area full air alert. (*)

0715 (TOC 0705) 30 shipboard planes heading NW from Inubo. (*)

It is then reported to Admiral that because of air alerts coming only after visual sighting of planes we may consider the force to have effected a complete surprise. (0715)

Coverage is shifted from contacts to possible air attack frequencies. The Atsuki fighter director and interceptor frequency seems most valuable.

0818 Atsuki tells his planes there are 4 Blue planes circling Taito(*)

0818 18 Probable shipboard planes, bearing 200, heading North from unident(*)

0825 Atsuki planes informed that 30 Blue planes are at Katsuura. (*)

0840 Plane tells Atsuki he is making altitude. Our FDC says that is very valuable because he wants to know if Nips are flying high or low this morning. (*)

0905 Plane tells Atsuki he is going to Iwakuni. Evidently they are getting out of Tokyo area. (*)

0910 20 carrier bases planes at Oshima. (*)

0911 Atsuki tells 0905 plane to go to Maebashi. (*)

0920 At least two planes land at Maebashi. (*)

0924 CIC has bogey. One of Nips is S-5 plus but is not sending any sighting reports. (*)

0931 And 0946 -- Atsuki tells planes to go to Maebashi. (*)

0957 Plane reports being over Maebashi. (*)

1013 Plane on 7035J sends grid position 34-57N, 141-13E. This is on us. (*)

Still telling planes to land at Maebashi, which is a field NW of Tokyo, somewhat in the hills, out of range of our VF sweeps.

1000 (Time approx) Eight plane calls heard on 5890A, the interceptor circuit. (*)

1102 Nip FDO says "Enemy South of Katase". (*)

1202 Plane using security procedure sends grid at 23-27N, 144-32E. This is East of Iwojima -- the Blue amphibious and bombardment forces. (*)

1537 Unident place under air alert -- reports 60 planes heading NW.

This reported to Admiral at 1550, together with a report of the general situation -- air activity slight, activity in general slow.

1550 Bogies to North, splashed by CAP. No RI reactions.

Checking sub broadcast to see if our grid appears. Nothing so far.

1720 and 1723 -- FDO at Atsuki tells planes to land at Atsuki. They seem to be returning from Maebashi now. (*)

Surprisingly little activity today considering that we were striking Tokyo.

Force retires a bit in the evening but remains in the general area.

17 February, 1945

Second Tokyo Strikes -- Posn 33-55N, 141-20E.

0636 CIC reports a Zeke near th force, low on the water. We report no reaction of sighting.

- 0637 Unident station in Yokosuka area sends radar report bearing 140 degrees, distance 100. This is approximate position of the TF, so is reported to the Admiral. (*)
- 0640 Our first VF sweep leaves.
- 0650 Full alert from Yokosuka Naval District Central District. (*)
- 0658 The interceptor circuit becomes active. Obviously no surprise today, and the interceptors seem to be airborne. (*)
- 0710 "12 small type enemy planes at 080 degrees at 30 kilometers heading north", reported by unident. First visual contact of Blue planes. (*)
- 0720 Unident lookout station reports Blue planes and a full air alert. (*)
- 0728 Same place says enemy planes are over Taitozaki heading East. (*)
- 0805 Picket boat (in position 31-10N, 142-55E on the 14th) reports planes heading North. This is a B-29 strike. (*)
- 0819 CIC reports bogey at 20 miles which is spashed. No RI reaction to this. (*)
- Activity in general is very light —this fact reported to the Admiral about noon. It is raining and weather rather unfavorable in general.
- 1255 A strong signal from a plane on 6640A is reported to Flag Flot as a possible snooper in the area.
- 1524 CIC has bogies at 90 miles. Nothing further develops here or in CIC.
- 1652 Plane on the fighter director circuit sends "TE SI RA" which is tactical signal for "Enemy main body sighted". Upon reporting this to Flag Flot, find that CIC has a bogey at 40 miles—which fades shortly after. (*)
- In the evening, activity remains very dull, and Admiral is informed of this fact.
- We are now retiring due South from Tokyo.
- 2030 A picket boat sends a contact report —"large enemy force sighted". This is amplified by Yokosuka Naval District Comdt. at 2110, saying "large enemy force sighted (including one CV(?)) heading North from 31-00N, 142-00E". This is 35 miles ahead of Yorktown's position, but we have DD pickets out there. (#)
- 2050 Picket which sighted us originates a "Banzai" farewell message as it is taken under fire by the DD's and sunk. This is broadcast to all hands by Cru Div 22 Commander at 2345. (180600)
- 2143 This sighting report appears on the Tokyo Broadcast. (*)
- 2150 Another picket possibly sights us, as he originates a long encoded position including the time 2042 which appears to be the time of the actual sighting. This picket is not sunk and is still heard in the morning. (180600)

The picket boat contacts did not appear on Sub Broadcasts this evening. (180600)

18 February, 1945.

Strike on Chichijima - position 28-05N, 140-20E.

- 0223 Another picket boat sights our force. At 0225 he repeats his sighting report and says, "We are charging".(*)
- 0230 A farewell "Banzai" message from this picket. He charges our DD and is in turn rammed and sunk by our destroyer. (*)
- 0741 "TOTOTO" (All units attack) heard on a Bonins frequency — presumably the attack is on Blue surface forces massed in the Bonins area. Nothing more heard of this attack. (*)
- 0951 Unident base in Yokosuka area reports 8 carrier planes heading North. (*)
- 1100 A search plane sends a grid, 29-42N, 138-03E. This is not on us though possibly on some other task group on their way down from the Empire. (*)
- 1110 Chichijima under full air alert. Our strikes evidently are over target. (*) Late launch, about 1000.
- 1124 Chichijima reports 30 shipboard planes. (*)
- 1243 Notify Flag Flot of planes with strong signals on 6740A and on 5590A (*)
- 1415 A plane is staying over the force, sending weather. (*)
- 1423 Receive a grid (TCO 1250) on the Tokyo Broadcast, with position 27-30N, 139-10E. This appears to be on us. (*)
- 1645 Plane that sent the first grid appears again on 6740A — Tokyo had garbled plane's call on the broadcast.
- 1630 Plane on 6685A sends a grid 26-57N, 139-08E — on us. This same plane sends another one appearing on Tokyo broadcast at 1654 — 27-17N, 139-38E. (*) Our CAP is now chasing this Nip, but he is fast and clever and we can't get him.
- 1640 Plane sends his KiN NR3 with weather and grid position 26-57N, 139-08E. (*)
- 1803 CIC says the bogey is at 30 miles, closing fast; at 1809 we receive a 1746 message from the same plane giving a double grid (26-57N, 139-28E) and (26-37N, 139-03E) which also includes the symbols "71 1 ISa 2 HoSa 71". It has been noted that various previous grids were marked "2 HoSa", "1 HoSa", etc. This leads to a theory that this may be a method of designating the side or corner of the formation on which the position is being given. This theory is strengthened when CIC plot shows that this plane flew a square around the whole formation.

- 1843 Sixth (submarine) Fleet Broadcast carries these grids.(*)
- 1914 Tokyo Sub Broadcast also repeats the grids.(*). Thorough observation of composition and disposition of our forces has been made and the information is being passed to submarines which Ultras say are quite numerous in Bonins area.
- 2116 GQ -- a bogey, closing. We inform Flag Flot that we have no Jap air activity. Bogey turns out to be a B-29 without its IFF turned on.
- 2220 Unident air base sends a long aircraft code message containing position 28-02, 139-18. This appears to be an action report of the day's activities.(*)
- 2305 Flag Flot requests us to check unfamiliar CW sigs reported by USS Randolph on 399.5 kcs. Results nil.

19 February, 1945.

Fueling -- position 23-00N, 140-00E.

This is D-day for Iwojima.

In early hours of morning Iwojima AB is noted sending hourly weather to AB K Kisaratsu and to CinC Third Air Fleet. This indicates strong possibility of Jap air support in the Bonins. All air traffic otherwise quiet.(0600)

- 0747 Eight planes heard transmitting on 6685A -- a major flight of some sort, somewhere. Reported this to the Admiral at 0800. A scheduled flight from Kanoya to Bonins is mentioned in the Ultras -- this may be it.
- 0955 A couple of these planes' signals become loud enough to warn Flag Flot. About 1000 the planes begin using "dit dit" security procedure.(*)
- 1030 Several planes are now S-5 and Flag Flot is notified; nine planes are now being heard. (*)
- 1129 Plane sights blue planes and sends position 25-57N, 132-23E (or 147-23E). Not near us.(*).
- 1140 Marcus Guard Division under full air alert.(*)
- 1151 Another plane, 9RuU, signal S-5 plus, contacts carrier planes.(*)
- 1217 Another plane, 5WiTe, contacts carrier planes.(*)
- 1224 9RuU again contacts carrier planes, and at 1226 sights the force. He sends an encoded Nrl with no grid. (*)
- 1227 9RuU continues sending "TETETE" (enemy force), adding "HCHCHO" (carriers).(*)
- 1230 He sends a KiN grid at 25-50N, 140-10E -- which is on the other task groups operating today off Iwojima.(*)

- 1235 Sends another KiN with same position and different text. (*)
- 1235 A message with same time group, same position, but still different text than the other 1235 message. (*)
- 1245 He sends weather .(*)
- In the meantime 5WiTe sends grid 23-17N, 139-23E. This appears to be on our task groups. (*)
- 1300 5WiTe sends weather. (*)
- 1310 The 1230 grid appears on the Tokyo broadcast. (*)
- 1315 9RuU sends a grid 23-30N, 140-10E (on us). (*)
- 1327 1300 Weather sent by 3WiTe appears on the Broadcast. (*) This is unusual and might indicate an attempt to get as many Jap planes as possible into the Bonins area quickly.
- 1350 These planes seem to be leaving our area — signals begin to fade and security measures are lessened. (*)
- About 1600 — 7035J circuit bursts into activity, and soon eighteen planes calls are heard, of a nature indicating three and perhaps four organizations involved. About 1700, these planes one by one secure their transmitters, although their signals are strongest when they secure. The suggestion is made that these planes may have flown from the Empire to Chichijima. (*)
- Iwojima is still on the air and transmitting a large volume of traffic in the evening. (2000)

20 February, 1945.

Air support for Iwojima — position 25-20N, 139-40E.

- 0445 Iwojima transmitter still on the air, passing traffic to Kisaratsu and Chichijima. (0600)
- 0750 Sumisu Island (South of Tokyo Bay, 31-27N, 140-03E) is sending weather to unident on an air circuit, which might indicate Southern flights, and is unusual for a little lookout station to be on an air circuit. (*)
- 0800 Word is received from FruPac in a urgent Ultra that planes are being flown down from the Empire to attack us. All hands alerted for the attack. Their ETA is 1100 to 1130.
- 0815 A plane on 6740A sends "Weather bad, I am returning". Much weather is being passed around between air bases. We are at present in a front but aerologist thinks that beyond that, weather should be good all the way up to the Empire.

- 0955 Plane sends Nr1 -- a grid at 30-27N, 138-23E. This is way North of TF58 -- possibly a Blue sub or plane. (*)
- 1005 Same plane sends a Nr2 in position 30-27N, 138-58E, and seems to be sending weather at that position. It is a possibility that this is a weather plane sent out ahead of the attack.
- 1125 Two planes on 7035J are ordered by base to "return".(*)
- 1130 Grid by a plane in 27-17N, 135-28E. Again far from our position. However these widely separated grids seem to indicate a large - scale search program today. (*)
- 1131 Plane 4NaN sends grid 24-10N, 140-10E. "enemy force sighted". That is us. We pick this up at 1219. (*)
- 1228 CIC has a bogey, probably the same plane.
- Planes on 6740A are being very cagey, using the "dit dit" security procedure which has come to be a good indication that they are somewhere near Blue forces. They keep in touch with base about every five minutes. Flag Flot is advised of probability of enemy planes in area. (*)
- 1440 A plane sends "TETETE" and grid 30-57N, 131-43E (or 146-43E). This is not in our area, and planes signals are S-3. He follows this with a grid at 1455 in position 33-12N, 133-02E. (*)
- 1545 A long aircraft code message is originated by the plane which first reported our position. This message contains positions 23-57N, 139-18E and 23-40N, 140-10E. This appears to be a summary of his search and a description of the disposition and composition of our force.

No attack developed, and by 1700 all air circuits are quiet. The numerous search planes seemed to have no desire to attack, and seemed to go home shortly after sending their grids. The arrival of these planes over our forces was much later than the Ultras led us to expect. Possibly the first attack was turned back by weather and an extensive search program begun later in the day instead. (2000)

21 February, 1945.

Strikes on Iwojima -- position 24-57N, 139-50E.

Oroku sent much weather during the night to Kanoya, and Kisaratsu to Kanoya, indicating possibility of flights between those bases. (0600)

- 0906 Hahajima under full air alert. (*)
- 0915 Plane sends a grid nowhere near us, at 27-07N, 131-28E. At 0940 another plane sends one close to the previous one, 27-02N, 132-58E. (*)
- 1000 By this time, eight planes are working on 6685A, and some of these are S-5 plus. Three more planes up on 6640A. (1000)

- 1200 10 planes up on 7035J by this time, although these planes do not seem to be in our immediate area.
- 1228 Yokosuka West District precautionary alert.(*)
- 1630 Another TG reports a big flight of bogeys on the radar on their way down to us.
- 1650 The planes on 7035J are S-5 plus; those on 6685A S-5 plus, and using security procedure.(*)
- 1726 Plane 1KiKu on 7035J sends tactical signals seeming to be "formation rendezvous".(*)
- 1729 This plane says "weather good.(*)
- 1732 Gives a bearing of 345, corrects it to 335 at 1735.(*)
- 1737 Sends "wind direction 300" "formations of four(?)".(*)
- 1740 1 KiKu secures transmitter, saying "wait".(*)
- 1741 We go to GQ. The five-inch open up at 1746.
- 1745 (TOR 1807) receive a grid from plane 1NoYa1 on us, 26-17N, 141-38E.(*)
- The planes above us are sending weather and ETA.(*)
- 1835 The guns open up again.
- 1904 Plane 3NoYa2 (with a good S-5 signal) begins sending KiN - KiN (signifying urgent operational highest priority traffic") and at 1906 gets out a KiN message timed 1850, evidently a report of these forces. This report is immediately relayed by Chichijima to Kisaratsu. (Chichi goes under air alert at 1906). This relaying to Kisaratsu via Chichi may possibly indicate origin of the attack.(*)
- 1915 This KiN traffic appears on Tokyo Broadcast.(*)
- 1950 Secure from GQ. Several planes are still ditting around with good signals, but starting to fade, and Flag Plot is informed that we believe they are heading back. By 2100, the signals are down to S-2, and shortly after barely audible. However at 2240 signals reappear with some strength, and by 2300 Flag Plot is informed of this renewed activity, but soon after signals fade away again (toward Empire?). Signals from the bases remained fairly stable during this interval, so change in aircraft signals judged not to be a result of atmospheric.
- This incident, together with the way in which Chichi intercepted and relayed the aircraft traffic leads to suspicion that planes are being staged through Chichijima. By midnight all faded.(*)
- 1824 Tokyo broadcast put out an operational message from enciphered originator Kita Iwojima, addressed to Chichijima and double headed to CDV 59 (which is believed to be actually Iwojima transmitter) and Blank Intelligence data and one unident. The time is 1602, about the time we were within visual distance

of Kita Iwojima. This appears to be a report of the task force and is possibly the basis for the attack on us. No transmitter has previously been noted on Kita Iwojima. (2030)

22 February, 1945.

Strikes on Iwojima — position West on Iwojima

In early hours, Iwojima is noted addressing traffic to Chichijima and telling him to relay it to Kisaratsu. Aside from that, everything is quiet. (0600)

At 0838 a base on 7035J begins working plane lKiKu. At 0840 this base sent the plane and another base what appears to be an important message — each character is repeated twice on the first transmission, and then the whole message repeated several times. At 0910, one base asks the other base "HiKi TaTu: ToKi" (tactical give this as "time of planes arrival in battle area"). Other base replies "1030". The plane has already been heard, so this cannot be referring to departure time. By 0935 the bases get into the closest possible communication; calls are no longer used, and bases answer immediately to all services. One asks for correct time — the other gives time ticks, and they seem to synchronize watches. At 0950 they secure "until 1020". At 1020 they are back, right on the dot, and make contact without using calls. At 1025 one base says "report plane's arrival time", and at 1027 gets reply, "unknown". The Jap operators appear to be nervous and are holding the circuit open — sending V's at short intervals and apparently waiting for something to happen. At 1049 one base asks the other if he has any traffic, and is told "no". So he calls plane lKiKu (last called at 0903) and gets no answer.

The whole procedure looks very unusual and suspicious, and the possibility of an attack at 1030 is reported to the Admiral about 0920, together with a brief description of the reasons for expecting attack, and of the possible unreliability of some of the Risako tactical signals.

The weather is said to be very bad between here and the Empire. This activity could concern a flight between bases, but if so, certainly a very unusual amount of attention is being given to it.

1108 Base contacts plane lKiKu, and at 1220 one base asks other lKiKu's "time of arrival", answered "1025". Then the base inquires what time lKiKu secured his transmitter and was answered "1150".

No attack was observed here, nor were any bogeys on radar.

1230 Base Ke Ø Si on the same circuit gets off a two-page aircraft code despatch with several enciphered place names in it. This is believed to be an action summary, or rather a summary of why the attack did not come off. Immediately a flood of aircraft-code traffic follows. For about an hour a huge amount of aircraft traffic — some messages up to four pages long — is exchanged between the bases.

The Admiral is informed that this very unusual volume of aircraft code traffic indicates that Japs seem to be cooking up something. (1300)

At 1450 planes begin to appear on the same frequency, and at 1500 a message from Ke Ø Si is rogered for by planes 1,3,5Ume. Soon 1,2,3,4,5, and 6Ume are heard. About this time a message comes from CTF 58 suggesting we listen to this frequency.

At 1530 the Ume planes secure their transmitters and Ø,1,2,3,4,5KiKu planes are heard. These begin securing about 1550. One plane, 5KiKu, does not secure with others, and bases seem worried about him and call him until 1715. At 1819 bases inquire if either base has heard plane 4KiKu (indicating that planes did not land when they secured their transmitters).

At 1900 the whole circuit secures until 0600 tomorrow.

No other air activity of importance noted all day. No attacks today, and everything appeared normal. However all RI indications pointed to unusual Nip air activity somewhere, and the Admiral was informed of the potentialities as regarded this force.

No explanation for this day's activity ever appeared in the ultra despatches.

23 February, 1945.

Fueling — position 24-00N, 144-00E,

The ident for CDV 59 is still passing traffic to Chichijima in the early hours. However, this ident seems to be actually Iwojima. Perhaps the call has been reassigned, or CDV 59 is acting as a transmitter for Iwojima.(0600)

A good deal of weather, originated by Kisaratsu, is going to Oroku and Kanoya—indicating probable flights from Kyushu to Kisaratsu.(0600)

A few planes are up on three different frequencies today, but everything seems routine and normal, and not affecting our area.(1400)

Usual late evening flurry of aircraft — 1,2,3YuRi ; Ø,1,2,3,4Ume; and Ø,3 KiKu calls appear. They secure transmitters from 1723 to 1740, though still are called by base after that. The strongest signals are heard in each case just prior to the securing of transmitters. Air raids in force are reported from Iwojima at 1800, 1815 and 1833. This appears to strengthen our theory that these planes secure their transmitters just before attacking, as in the attack on this force 21 February.(2000)

24 February, 1945.

0600 Underway for Tokyo again -- position 28-27N, 147-44E.

0738 A picket boat becomes loud enough to justify our informing Flag Flot of the possibility of picket boats in the vicinity. Nothing more comes of this.

0940 A message comes from CTF 58 saying that they believe the force has been spotted by Jap airplanes. We have no indications of this, either in air activity, the broadcast or any signs of excitement anywhere. Everything

appears very normal, and Flag Plot is so informed. (0940)

1205 Hahajima reports "enemy, bearing 230, 50 kilometers". This message is of the lookout type, not aircraft code, and so suggests a visual sighting from land. We find a Blue DD is up near there looking for a downed pilot. (*)

1539 A radar report is intercepted which seems to be originated by picket boat 7 I I U. The Admiral is informed of the possibility that pickets are radar equipped.

2215 Picket boat 7 I I U reports enemy force in 31-20N, 144-40E. That position is right on TG58.1 at that time. (*)

Picket 5 TeNaTa also has traffic of 2130 which is widely circulated -- evidently two of them have spotted us.

The picket boat messages receive wide distribution and cause considerable excitement -- confirming belief that we were not detected this morning, and that this is the first sighting of our force. All reports appear quickly on the Tokyo broadcast, and are repeated over and over on the picket boat circuit. We will be expected in Tokyo in the morning.

25 February, 1945.

Tokyo strikes -- position 32-47N, 143-49E.

0502 Yokosuka Naval District Commandant orders precautionary alert, condition 2. (*)

0502 CIC reports that a bogey passed 20 miles to the North of us, but did not turn in. No reaction observed by RI. (*)

0630 Our first VF sweep is launched.

0644 5890, the interceptor frequency is heard; Jap interceptors are airborne. Some planes are told to land at Kameyama (just SW of Nagoya). They seem to be again withdrawing aircraft from the Tokyo area. (*) This circuit goes down shortly after 0800 and is not heard again.

0642 Yokosuka AA Defence Control sends an operational code despatch to Yokosuka Naval District Force collective. This appears to be an Op Order for the days activity. (*)

0707 A radar report from unident station Yokosuka area gives bearing of 120 degrees, distance 90 miles. This is probably on our VF approaching. (*)

0716 Radar reports are now "140 degrees at 75" as our planes move in.

0724 A plane on 5590 has difficulties with his right engine, and makes a forced landing. Later another plane makes a forced landing at Toyohashi, and a third gets lost and asks for bearings. (*)

0735 Radar reports are reading 55 to 60 miles, presumably on our VF.(*)

0739 Yokosuka Central District under full alert.(*)

0747 Receive message of TOO 0727 reporting "what seems to be enemy aircraft" at 140 degrees, 140 kilometers from Inubo, heading NW. This probably from a radar contact also.(*)

0748 First visual contact: "35 small enemy planes, at 3000 meters distance 7 kilometers, heading North".(*)

0750 "Small planes, 2 formations, 42 planes, heading North.(*)

0751 "51 Grummans, altitude 3000 meters, heading North".(*)

0755 4 planes, altitude 3000 meters heading East.(*)

0803 We switch coverage from contacts to possible air attack frequencies.

0935 By this time no air activity can be found other than bases on 7035J. A couple of planes are up on 6740A around noon.(1300)

1315 9 B-29's reported heading North from unident place.(*)

1603 Yokosuka Central District secures full alert and goes into condition 2.(*)

1630 Yokosuka Naval District secures precautionary alert.(*)

1852 Flag Plot notifies us that a small craft ahead is about to be taken under fire.

1858 Picket boat 8 SaTiKo sends a short contact reporting a Blue DD.(*)

1915 The same boat reports 3 DD's.(*)

1925 Same picket reports an enemy cruiser. No positions were sent. During this time, the picket boat was returning our fire, and some casualties were suffered on a DD.

1926 The picket reports the cruiser once more, then begins repeating former messages. (*)

2000 The picket is last heard at this time and presumed sunk, A small coastal freighter was also sunk about this time, but we hear nothing from him.

2315 Another picket, 5 SilieTa, sends a "Banzai" farewell message as the DD's get the range.(*)

2338 This picket reports enemy force heading South, and repeats this numerous times before being sunk.(*)

26 February, 1945.

Position: 30-40N, 139-50E.

Weather exceedingly bad, and we are far behind schedule. Our strikes on Nagoya are cancelled.

0645 Picket Ø MiMiSe says "last night in the snowstorm I lost sight of the Luzon Maru. Am searching for it." The LUZON MARU is probably the small coastal freighter we sank. (*)

0700 Picket 8 KiNoSo reports "a single plane passed at 0600, bearing 270 from Kogiriyama". (*)

0753 We are notified by Flag Flot that we are within visual range of Toorishima. However fog is very thick, and no sighting reports are originated.

About 0800 several picket boats seem to have good signals and Flag Flot is advised that we may run into more of them. (*)

0820 Yokosuka Central District secures precautionary alert. (*)

0907 CIC has bogeys, and a plane on 7862 is close enough to hear his oscillator, and Flag Flot is so advised. (*) No attack develops.

However, at 0930 plane on 6740A sends a Nrl message, with a good signal, and containing code group for "enemy". The Admiral is informed that we believe we have been sighted, and we learn the screen has just fired on a snoopers, who faded. No position was sent.

Shortly after 1000, we get a message from CTF 58 that "16 planes are in the air, some loud and clear". We have a few planes up on each of several air circuits, and some good signals, but nothing to indicate a single flight of 16 as message suggests. The Admiral is informed that nothing indicates a large-scale air raid. (*)

1015 Comm Unit Ominato reports "carriers, bearing 180 at 35 kilometers". This is of interest only because picket boat traffic goes via Ominato, but this report is not in picket boat form and is not believed to affect us. (*)

1100 A grid in position 28-17N, 141-18E. This is our longitude, but much too far south. (*)

1143 A picket reports aircraft in position 25-44N, 133-05E. This is interesting because it is way out of the usual picket boat area, and indicates pickets may be guarding approaches to Okinawa. (*)

About 1320, planes on 6740A get very strong, and snoopers may be in vicinity. (*)

1540 A message between two air bases on 7035J contains a grid on our 1100 position 29-52N, 138-08E. This message is believed to be an action report of the plane we shot at, about that time. Plane did not transmit at that time, and this message presumably sent by base upon his return. (*)

1700 The usual evening flight on 7035J seems to begin. 1,3,5, and 6YuRi are heard in the small flurry of traffic between planes and bases, and between the two bases. All seem to be departure and ETA reports. Some of these signals get very strong, and then secure their transmitters at 1746. We are now quite near Chichijima, and this again presents the possibility that these planes operate out of Chichijima and go down and hit Iwojima.

2322 We go to GQ -- a bogey. However no RI indications of this plane are heard, and bogey fades without bothering us.

No strikes today because of very bad weather. The force is retiring in the afternoon.

27 February, 1945.

Fueling -- position 23-30N, 140-00E.

Various air frequencies are active from time to time, but nothing to interest or concern us. At 0700 and again in afternoon, it is reported to the Admiral that all is quiet.

28 February, 1945.

Underway for Ulithi.

Our activity is reduced to a one-man watch, and nothing of interest noted. With the Admiral's permission, operations are secured at 1800.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

W. M. Kluss

Lt(jg) USNR

Officer in charge, RIU

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

13 February 1945.

From: Officer in Charge R I Unit attached ComCarDiv Six.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.

Subject: Weekly report of technical information.

1. Subject report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted:

W. M. Kluss

W. M. KLUSS, Lt. (jg) USNR.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I Unit activity for
period 3 February to 9 February
1945.

3 February 1945.

At 0800 this date commenced a one man watch to check frequencies that may be used in the coming operations. Particular attention to be devoted to Empire Air Base, Base and Plane, Lookout and Picket Boat frequencies. As our position, Ulithi Anchorage, is an unfavorable one from a standpoint of radio reception the watches are not continuous.

Days coverage:

8725J 8332J 6985A 6705J 7586M (Shokozan H.Q. B.C.)

New Frequency:

7000M Unident KN calls.

4 February 1945.

This day was very unproductive from an intercept standpoint, nothing of value was received.

Days coverage:

9045J 6705J 5255J 3875J

New Frequencies:

3758M Unident KKK to KKKK calls, possible Murotsusaki Lkt frequency.

6448M Unident KKNN call to B.F. 21 Det. Jakarta, possible Celebes Nor-For frequency of 6460A.

8015M Unident TANO making test.

5 February 1945.

Signals from the desired area were scarce and conditions poor.

Days coverage:

4045A 6470A 6490J 6985J 8722J 8725J 6678M(New)

New Frequencies:

5241M Unident K calls. 6678M B & Ps. 7002M Unident KKK calls.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

6 February 1945.

Empire activities remain difficult to bring in, nothing of value noted this day.

Days coverage:

3747J 5100J 5512J 6490J

New Frequencies:

2998M Unident KKK calls. 6290M Unident KN to NKKK calls.
6865M Unident KN calls, possibly 6855J.

7 February 1945.

Days coverage:

6490J 6705J 7460A 8722J

New Frequencies:

3913M Unident KKK calls, possible 3915J. 6673M One Spec A.B. call heard here, nothing else.
6775M Unident KKK to NKKK and KKK calls. 7476M Unident KKK calls.

8 February 1945.

The morning watch was interrupted and secured due to work being done by Air Conditioning crew. Desired activity remains light.

Days coverage:

3747J 3875J 6490J 6705J

New Frequencies:

6773M Previously reported as 6775M, still no idents.
7157M Unident KK calls, good weather traffic sent here but signals were too weak for copy.
7158M Singapore Det A.G. 936 to A.B. Kotobaru. This considered to be 7165JC.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

9 February 1945.

The watch was secured at 1100. Rest of this day devoted to bringing publications up to date and correlating information for the coming operations.

Days coverage:

6462J 6470A 8722J 9045J 9830J

New Frequencies:

5988M Unident KN to N call. 6420M Unident KKN to KN call.
6682M Spec A.B. calls, this probable 6685A.

Respectfully submitted:

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest, CRM USN.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

21 February 1945.

From: Officer in Charge R.I.U. attached
ComCarDiv Six. USS Yorktown CV-10.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit,
Pacific.

Subject: Report of technical information on R.I.
operations for period 10 February to 17
February 1945 inclusive.

1. Report of subject operations enclosed
herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss
W. M. KLUSS
Lt. (jg) USNR
Officer in Charge.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I Unit activity for
period 10 February to 17 Febru-
ary 1945.

At 0730 this date commenced a one man continuous watch
and Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi at this time. We now
comprise Task Group 58.4

Coverage to be of Air Base, Base and Plane, point to
point, Lookout and Picket Boat frequencies from the Bonins
to the Empire.

10 February 1945.

Days coverage:

5100J	5305J	5335J	5512J	5835J	6490J
6705J	7505A	7562M	8685A	8772J	8725J

10200J Tokyo HITU B.C. The frequency of 7562M is
a new low for the ROKI B.C. One plane was called and
heard on 8725J.

New Frequencies:

7440M ✓ C.U. Tokyo to C.U. Owada and C.U. Yokosuka, this
is probable D/F.

8276M ✓ Soerabaja Airfield of Japan Airways to unident
KKNN call.

8424M ✓ Unident KKK calls.

8649M ✓ Unident KKK calls.

11 February 1945.

Position East of Guam. Reception of Empire frequencies
is not too good, very little air activity noted. 5256M ✓
reported by FRUPAC as 5257M heard briefly. 6685A was heard
at 1900 but did not re-appear for a 2000 sked. 6490J was
active with Picket Boat and aircraft reports.

Days coverage:

3747J	3875A	4240J	5256M	5305J	6330J
6490J	6685A	6705J	8725J	Tokyo HITU B.C.	

New frequencies:

4870M Unident KKKN. 4871M Unident NKKK.

5686M Unident KKN in D.E.I. 6866M Unident KNN and KN.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

12 February 1945.

Remain in area East of Marianas group, coverage the same fundamentally. Several CDVs showed on 6705J to work Yokosuka, 6490J continued to produce Picket Boat traffic.

Days coverage:

3747J 3987J 6490J 6685A 6705J 6765J
7285J 8725J Tokyo HITU B.C,

New frequencies:

4872M / Unident KKKN calls which fit garble table.
5804M / Brief appearance of Bases and Planes.
5881M / Unident KKK calls with Drill traffic.
6538M / A.B. Shinchiku and A.G. 931 using K008 calls, may be 6550J.
6712M / Bases and Planes, Special A.B. and KKK calls.
8800M / Bases and Planes.

13 February 1945.

Commenced a two man continuous watch at 0630 this day. Position at 0800, 19.50N - 149.00E and heading North. We proceed toward Tokyo but have not as yet reached search plane sector nor Picket Boat area. 6490J was very active this day with aircraft being noted thereon for the first time. Traffic from planes routed to Ominato who placed it upon his NISA B.C. and re-broadcast it upon 6490J. Due to an apparent mix up of keying lines 6490J and 8510J were keying simultaneously from 1340 to 1345. The activity upon 6490J provided us with the positions of many Picket Boats. CTF 58 reported planes with strong signals over Chichijima and these were subsequently found on 8725J. The extensive use of the prefix SI^HTU on Base and Plane traffic is noted. This is probably due to the numerous drill frequencies now in operation and transmitting aircraft traffic.

At 0611 the frequency of 6740A was found active and it appears to be an Empire Plane search set up, five planes with good signals were noted thereon.

Days coverage:

3167J 3747J 3875A 4075J 4180J 4202M

033

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

13 February 1945, Cont.

Days coverage, cont.

5305J 5430J 5485J 6025J 6315J 6490J

6705J 6740A 8725J Tokyo HITU B.C. and YOTU.

Ominato NISA B.C. A.B. Toko and units on 4180J reported by FRUPAC as was 4205M with A.B. Kisaratsu and Unidents.

New frequencies:

3166M Unident KKK, possible 3167J. 3763M Unident KKK.

3780M Night frequency for ROKI B.C., reported by FRUPAC.

3846M Unident NKKK with drill traffic. 4493M Unident KKK calls, possibly 4492J. 4832M Special A.B. calls with drill traffic. 5696M. Fujisawa A.G.

to probable fighters, KO08 and NKN calls used.

5925M Unident NKKK calls with drill traffic.

6586M Two Jap voice stations with exchange of signal strength.

7695M Unident KNN and KN calls.

14 February 1945.

Approximate position 24.00N - 147.00E, nearing Bonins. Activity on 6490J shows and increase but this may be due to use of low power by Pickets so that we were unable to hear them all formerly. Close attention is paid this circuit for Picket positions and traffic.

The HITU broadcast put out a grid timed 1115 from the plane NUSNE2 which probably gave the position of our forces, (Amphibious), West of Saipan. This plane was not heard here on any frequency. Signal strength of planes on 8725J was good and these may be in the Bonins area. 6740A continued to be active with several planes heard.

The use of the prefix TETETE on grids and other aircraft sightings is noted.

Days coverage:

3747J 3875A 5100J 6025J 6115J 6490J

034

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

14 February 1945, Cont.

Days coverage, cont.

6705J 6740A 8685A 8725J 8915J 9045J

New frequencies:

4446M / Special A.B. calls with drill traffic, the same calls were noted on 7932M.

4826M / Special A.B. calls previously reported as 4832M.

4894M / Jap voice station with call up.

7106M - Brief appearance of unident KKN calls.

7112M A.G. Tokushima to A.G. Tokushima planes, K008 and Special A.B. calls used.

7932M / Special A.B. calls, this may be 7935J.

8051M / Planes and Bases, latter used KKK calls.

8437M / Planes with EN traffic.

6640M Special A.B. and KN calls. This may be the 6640 mentioned as an attack frequency in a captured document.

15 February 1945.

Position about 260 miles NE of Chichijima at 0800. This brings us into the Picket Boat and search plane area so a careful watch is maintained upon 6490J and for the search plane frequency which is yet unknown.

Around dawn a plane of our force strafes and sinks a 60 foot Japanese fishing boat, one survivor brought aboard this vessel in a wounded condition but all the others are dead. Interrogation by Lt. (jg) Kluss reveals that this vessel had no radio and because of engine trouble had been drifting for thirty days. Vessel out of Choshi.

A Betty was reported as shot down by CTF 58.1 at 1330 but no reaction was noted here. Several plane frequencies were heard this day but none indicated planes in the immediate area.

- A call change was effected on 3747J and 3875A with Yokosuka call being compromised as AN089 in place of old YORAU5.

Tokyo HITU broadcast a message from the SC#22 to the unident REWAE5 directing coverage of FUTU. This was picked up and Tokyo noted sending old HITU traffic to the

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

15 February 1945, Cont.

-unident. Tokyo employed his own as well as the SCs call.
At days end there is no indication that we have been reported.

Days coverage:

3747J	3875A	3915J	4205M	5100J	5295J
5290A (We average this)			5890A	6490J	6640M
6705J	6740A	6985J	7035J	8725J	9045J

Yokosuka was off frequency from his 5100J and showed on 5158M.

New frequencies:

3888M / Unident Hanigori KOSUTI to Jerk with drill UTU numbers.
3904M / Special A.B. calls with drill traffic.
4174M / Unident NKKK calls, same noted on 5925M previously reported.
4407M / Special A.B. calls.
4412M /
5054M³ / Unident KKK calls.
5785M / Transport #----- and unident.
5835M / Unident KKK calls with EN traffic.
6784M / Unident KNN calls with EN aircraft type traffic.
6880M / Unident KN and K calls.
7225M / Unident KN and K calls.
8785M / Unident KKN calls which may be 8780J.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

16 February 1945.

Morning position 33.55N - 141.20E, laying off Honshu. First strikes on Tokyo area this day, the early hours are quiet and there is no indication on any frequency that we are spotted up to 0545 when our planes take off. A close watch on the Lookout frequencies of 3747J and 3875A finally give us Radar reports from an unident at 0639 and 0643 on 3875A which could be us and one from the unident AN078 which is us at 0647, this is followed by HIIHI at 0701. The attack is a positive surprise as Yokosuka area does not go into full alert until 0710. After receiving numerous contacts full coverage is shifted to air circuits at 0715. A grid from the HITU at 0714 was originated by a plane from 5290A at 0630 but was not on these forces. Another by the plane NASITA6 timed 0800 was not on us either but the frequency of origination was not found though thought to be 6740A from the type of call. The grid timed 1013 from the plane WALTIL is our position and this plane is found on 7035J using cut security procedure. Only a few "Bogeys" were reported and most were splashed by our CAP. One at 0924 may have been plane 5M01 heard on 5890A as his signal at that time was exceptionally good but he was unheard after 0927.

Air frequencies were slow in coming up and showed in the following order: 6640M at 0649, 5290A at 0711 and 5890A at 0730. This last frequency is a fighter director frequency with A.G. 302, A.B. Atsuki and planes and gave us much good information about disposal of fighter planes. This was active intermittently throughout the day but was the most active up to 1155, one plane, 7M01, also appeared on 8725J. 5590A did not appear until 0915.

Days coverage:

2980J	3747J	3875A	3915J	4045J	5255J
5290A	5345J	5590A	5485J	5890A	6490J
6640M	6705J	6740A	7035J	7505J	7675A

8725J Tokyo HITU and YOTU. The latter was active all day and handled much operational traffic.

The operators of the stations KEØSI and AØKI on 7035J are considered to be Jap Army personnel and use a mixture of Jap Army and Navy procedure.

New frequencies:

3930M 4400M 4700M 5586M 7200M All Jap voice stations.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

16 February 1945, Cont.

New frequencies, cont.

- 3865M Unident hanigori KKK and NKKK calls.
- 4485M Unident NKKK calls.
- 4528M Unident KK calls.
- 5255M Bases and Planes, Special A.B. calls. Empire area.
- 5357M Special A.B. call which appears on 6640M.
- 5933M Unident NKKK calls noted on the 14th and 15th with EN traffic but now handling aircraft operational and grid types. Prefix SOMOS used instead of EN but still considered to be Drill.
- 6728M Planes, possibly low for 6740A.
- 6778M Unident KNN calls passing EN air type traffic.
- 6854M Planes and Bases, Special A.B. Same calls that show on 7045M.
- 6857M Unident K and KN calls.
- 6954M Special A.B. and KN calls the same as appear upon 6640M.
- 7045M Previously reported Bases and Planes, Special A.B.
- 7162M Base and Plane circuit employing KN calls and using security procedure, this may be 7162J.
- 7227M Unident K and KN calls.
- 7678M Unident KN calls.
- 8024M Plane worked by and unident KKK call.
- 8052M

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

17 February 1945.

Morning position again 33.55N - 141.20E for second strike on Tokyo area.

The early hours of the morning were quiet. About 0445 Hachiojima and Torishima originate Radar reports on aircraft, probably upon B29's. At 0636 we have a ZEKE near us and low on the water, no reaction noted here and he is believed splashed.

At 0637 and unident in the Yokosuka area sends Radar report giving bearing 140 degrees, distance 100. This is our approximate position and is so reported. Our fighter sweep is off at 0640 and at 0650 Yokosuka N.D. goes into a full alert. The fighter director frequency of 5890A is active at 0658 and planes thereon are air-borne. This days strike is not unexpected. From 0658 on numerous plane contacts are reported.

Air activity was in spurts but generally slow. No reaction is noted from a "Bogey" splashed at 20 miles at 0819 nor from one plotted 90 miles away at 1522. AT 1652 a plane on 5890A sent the signal to mean "Enemy main body sighted" and what is believed to be, this plane was found by our VF at 40 miles.

One operating position was out of commission for fifty minutes due to a heavy rain leak from overhead in corner of the compartment. A power failure put all positions out of commission from 1135 to 1150.

In the evening of the 17th we retired in a southerly direction and were reported by a Picket Boat on 6490J, this sighting and subsequent traffic from the boat were broadcast upon the HITU and to units on 6490J. Yokosuka on his circuits amplified the report. Before our DD's sunk this vessel he released a "Banzai" message.

When units on 7035J shifted down to 2980J the signals O"HI KIØ1Ø were used and this is considered to be frequency indicator for 2980J. At 0046 on 2980J one base directed the other to shift to 4125Kcs (plain language) and secure until 0100. These bases were found on 4126M at 0106 and this frequency shall henceforth be called 4125J. This ties 2980J, 4125J and 7035J in the same series.

Units on 3987J abbreviated their KKNN calls by using NN calls. So far, the frequency of 6640M does not seem to be concerned with Empire air operations although the calls thereon are heard on frequencies that are so concerned.

39J which should be dual with the HITU broadcast was noted running dual with FUTU on 4630J, the frequency of 33J which should be FUTU was unheard.

Days coverage:

17J 39J 190M(Probable 189J Yokosuka Radio) 2980J
3747J 3875A 3915J 3987J 4125J 5512J

039

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

17 February 1945, Cont.

Days coverage, cont.

5890A 6490J 6640M 6740A 7035J 7675A
8725J

New frequencies:

5240M Unident K calls.

5357M Special A.B. calls noted the 16th. The non changing call AØRE shows on here as well as on 6640M and on 6954M.

5686M Bases and Planes with EN traffic.

5802M Unident KN calls, a possible Base and Plane circuit.

5904M Unident NKKK calls.

5933M Unident NKKK calls, beleive reported previously as 5925M.

4480M Unident NKKK calls with drill traffic.

4600M Jap voice circuit, "SIKARA".

4650M Jap voice circuit.


4838M Special A.B. calls with drill traffic.

6735M Bases and Planes, KN and K calls.

6782M KNN calls with drill plane traffic and grids.

64.5M KEIRIN weather broadcast.

Respectfully submitted:



E. J. Forrest, CRM USN, Rinc.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

27 February 1945.

From: Officer in Charge R.I.U. attached
ComCarDivSIX.

To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit,
Pacific.

Subject: Report of technical information for
period 18 February to 23 February 1945 inclusive.

1. Subject named report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

W. M. KLUSS,
Lt. (jg), USNR,
Officer in Charge.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I Unit activity for
period 18 February to 23 Febru-
ary 1945, inclusive.

18 February 1945.

A two man continuous watch is still in effect. We are still proceeding on a Southerly course from the Tokyo area. In the early hours we are still in the Picket Boat areas and one previously encountered has been sunk.

At 0223 on 6490J the Picket 7SARINO makes a sighting report of a part of these forces, at 0225 he reports that he is "charging". At 0230 he originates a "Banzai" message and repeats that he is charging. We later learn that this vessel attempted to ram one of our DDs but was himself so rammed and sunk. His traffic was given wide distribution.

At 0900 our position is approximately 28.20N - 140.20 E and a strike on Chichijima is planned for about noon and our planes take off at 1000. Operators concentrate on air and local circuit coverage. Chichijima puts out an alert at 1110 and later reports 30 ship-board planes.

A TOTOTO was heard on 5290A at 0741 but considered to be concerning forces in the vicinity of Iwojima. A search plane, NASOTE4 on 6740A, originates a grid at 1100 which appears on the HITU. This grid is believed to be on other Task Group returning from the Empire. Plane mentioned on 6740A becomes very strong at 1243 as do a couple on 5590A. A grid from the plane NIKIKEL appears on the HITU at 1423 and looks like our position, this plane is found on 6740A and planes of the same series show on 6685A. We are again plotted at 1630 and 1654 by the plane NIKIKE4 on 6685A, this plane apparently stays above us and sends weather. He later flies completely around the force and sends complete information about it and an excellent plot of position at 1746. These grids appear on the HITU, YOTU and Kure Sub B.C. Our CAP attempts to get this plane but he is much too fast and clever.

At 2220 a base on 2980J sends a long '...' containing grid positions previously recieved on 6685A, this is evidently an action report and shows a link between 6685A and the 2980J/7035J series.

The Randolph (CV) reports unfamiliar CW characters on 399.5Kcs in the evening, this is checked with no result. The rest of the day is quiet except for a G.Q. brought on by a B29 who failed to use his IFF.

Days coverage:

2980J	5100J	5256M	5290A	5590M	5890A
6490J	6685A	6705J	6740A	8725J	9045J
10200J	Tokyo HITU B.C.				

✓ *Handwritten notes:*
Kure 6685A
+ also on
2980J/7:35
/

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

18 February 1945, Cont.

New frequencies:

- 3637M Unident NKKK calls similiar to those on 5925M, EN traffic passed here.
- 5592M Special A.B. call KAØKA that is unchanging to NK, NKK and KNKN calls. Security procedure is employed here and this frequency is probably not connected with 5590A.
- 6497M Unident KKN and KN calls.
- 8720M JDL to MAA.
- 8804M Planes and Bases, Special A.B. calls.

On 6685A it was noted that the signal RESA was used before a call sign to indicate "I am calling-----". The plane or unit called would answer with the call followed by " " .

19 February 1945.

Position 23.00N - 140.00E for re-fueling. Landings are to be made upon Iwojima this morning. Coverage of the frequencies likely to produce information of the landings was commenced but abandoned for coverage of air circuits. This was brought about by information of an intended "Kamikaze" strike against these forces sometime today. Previous to this however, it was noted that A.B. Iwojima was sending hourly weather to A.B. Kisaratsu and 3rd A.F.

A plane on 6685A at 1129 reports enemy planes and proceeds to give his position by grid. Some planes hereon become very loud, another plane reports enemy planes at 1217 and "Enemy carriers" at 1226. Grids appear from the plane 4IMI at 1220 and others follow. These activities are indicated to be around our forces at Iwojima by the grid positions given. Planes concerned were handled both on 6685A and 6740A so the two are allied at least for the time being.

At 1300 the plane 5WITE on 6685A sends a grid giving our position and follows this with weather. Plane 9RUU also has a grid on us at 1315, above traffic appears on the HITU. Traffic from planes on 5590A also showed on the HITU but did not appear to concern us.

In the afternoon the air circuits again became active and 7035J was particularly so. Eighteen plane calls were noted about 1600, these secured around 1700 while signals were good and it is thought that they were flown from the Empire and are staging through Chichijima.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

19 February 1945, Cont.

Apparent planes on 8725J are now noted using KKNN calls. The signal RI"A was used hereon to mean the same as E"WO. The call KAL has appeared on 6705J calling and working both Chichijima and Yokosuka.

Days coverage:

2980J	3642J	3840J	3915J	4240J	5100J
5135J	5228M	5255A	5590A	6685A	6705J
6740A	7035J	8725J	Tokyo HITU and YOTU B.C.s		

5255A and 5590A were averaged this day. Today's was the first appearance of 5135J for some time.

New frequencies:

3633M Empire A.B.s, A.B. Kisaratsu and A.B. Kasonohara.
5136M NKKKN and KKKK calls, A.B. Davao #1, A.G. 102 and A.B. Zamboanga.
5246M Unident NKKK calls.
5268M A.B. Kanoya and unident K008 calls, this may be 5255J.

20 February 1945.

Providing air support for Iwojima forces today, morning position 25.00N - 138.00E. Again expect attack from planes flown from Empire so air is the principal coverage. Weather is reported to be adverse.

Planes on 6740A, KIHERR4, 3NAN1, originated grids at 0957, 1011, 1454 and 1522 but none seemed to be upon us. As weather was also sent with some grids it is probable that certain planes were sent ahead of main flight to plot weather and report same on course taken.

Grids were originated by planes on 6685A at 1131, 1138 and 1555, the first and last were by plane 4NAN and gave our position.

Planned attack upon these forces was apparently called off on account of weather and a large scale search was conducted instead. Grids and traffic abounded and the air circuits were active throughout the day. The broadcasting of our positions in the past few days seemed to have attracted enemy submarines as our DDs were active in the evening dropping numerous "Ashcans".

2046

044

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

20 February 1945, Cont.

Some identical calls were noted on 6740A and 6685A and others on 5590A and 8725J.

A.B. Tainan was heard for the first time on 4122J.

The use of security procedure by planes seems to be standard practice when in proximity of Blue forces but excitement often causes them to revert to old procedure.

Tokyo's HITU transmitter was off the air from 0855 to 0914 this day.

Power trouble was again experienced several times by this unit today. Activities here were secured at 0800 for thirteen minutes during installation of a new table.

Days coverage:

3642J	3840J	3915J	2980J	5100J	5305J
5590A	6115J	6390J.	6640M	6685A	6740A
7035J	8725J	Tokyo HITU BC.			

New frequencies:

4154M Unident KKK calls.

5906M KN and Special A.B. calls with Drill traffic.

6055M Bases and Planes, Special A.B. calls.

6728M K, N and KN calls, aircraft circuit.

21 February 1945.

Morning position 24.57N - 139.50E. One strike on Iwojima this day.

Again expect attacks. The planes 4EI and 9YOYU sent grids on 6685A at 0915 and 0940 respectively but they are not upon these forces. Several planes appear on 7035J in the morning and steadily become stronger, around 1300 the signals are good and security procedure in use. At 1600 we are looking for a large flight of planes to attack us and at 1630 have numerous "Bogeys" at 80 miles, these hang off for quite a while. Plane 1KIKU on 7035J sends signals at 1725 to mean "formation rendezvous", "weather good", "bearings-----, wind direction-----, speed----". At 1740 he secures his transmitter and says "wait". At 1741 we go to "G.Q." and at 1746 our guns commence firing as we are under attack. Plane 1NOYAL on 7035J sends a grid on us timed 1745 but not put out until 1807. Whole force firing heavily at this time but this ship secures at 1835. "KIN" traffic from 7035J appears on the HITU

045

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

21 February 1945, Cont.

and most immediately upon 5100J thus strengthening our belief that base KE7RI on 7035J is Chichijima and that planes from the Empire were staging through that base. When planes arrived in this area and prior to attack KE7RI assumed control of the circuit.

At 1824 Tokyo HITU transmitted and operational from KitaIwojima timed 1602. It was about that time we were within visual distance of that island and probably were so reported by the Lookout Stn.

It was learned that the plane attack was by torpedo planes and "Kamikazes", the latter scored four hits on the Saratoga, sunk a CVE and damaged another. The planes dropped considerable "window" which made Radar plot poor and led us to believe the force larger than it was.

G.Q. was secured at 1950, plane signals at this time were still good but weakening and were so at 2030. At 2230 they again became good and continued to be until 2345 when they faded out. Its possible they stopped at Chichijima before returning to the Empire.

Tokyo's HITU handled much traffic previously sent on the Takao EWA broadcast.

We again had power troubles this day, fuses keep on blowing and cause not found as yet.

Days coverage: Tokyo HITU B.C.

3642J 3840J 3915J 5290A 5255J" 5255J'

5590A 6640A@ 6685A 6705J 6740A 7035J

8725J 5255J" With KK calls. 5255J' With A.B. Kanoya.

6640A@ Two separate Base and Plane circuits here.

New frequencies:

4200M A.B.s Kanoya, Oroku and unident KKK call, considerable weather handled here.

6788M Unident KKK calls with good traffic.

7102M KN calls with EN air and grid traffic, the same calls appear on 6775M.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

22 February 1945.

Position West of Iwojima, strikes on the island are intended.

The early hours of the day are quiet. There is much exchange of tactical signals between bases on 7035J concerning arrival of planes in "battle area". We have a report of bad weather between here and the Empire. One of the bases on 7035J transmitted a short operational words twice to the plane LKIKU and the other base, this was repeated several times. There is much long operational traffic between the bases.

Planes appear on 7035J at 1450 and secure by groups by 1604, though the plane 5KIKU had secured one base called him incessantly with no result and continued to call after shifting to 2980J.

One plane on 6685A became rather strong but nothing came of it. Base RE5KU on here is thought to be in the Bonins due to increase of signal since arrival this area.

By the time the planes on 7035J had secured their signal strength was fairly good and it is possible that they have secured at Chichijima or continued on to attack our Iwojima forces.

In general, the air activity was slight this day.

Days coverage:

2980J	3840J	5100J	5590A	6115J	6640A
*6685A	6705J	6740A	7035J	9045J	Tokyo HITU.

New Frequencies:

4784M Special A.B. calls with EN traffic.

4826M Special A.B. calls with EN air and grid traffic.

6770M Sub Base Unit Kure and unident KKK call, this may be the non current frequency of 6765A.

23 February 1945.

Position 24.00N - 144.00E, re-fueling and then on course north for the Tokyo area. Search planes and possible attacks expected.

Bases on 7035J call planes in the morning with no answer. One plane showed at 1358 and another at 1524 others appeared by 1715 and signals were good. Considering this and the late time of showing it is probable that they came from Chichijima. These planes start securing from 1723 to 1738 but shift with bases to 2980J at 1800, signals then fading and last plane was heard at 1953.

047

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

23 February 1945, Cont.

These forces were not reported or attacked today but Iwojima was hit by Jap bombers around 1800 and these may have been the ones heard on 7035J.

An apparent new A.B. showed on 6685A today and the operator states the transmitter characteristics are like those of transmitter used by C.U. Yokosuka on 6705J.

Air activity was light today. Coverage in the evening shifted to Picket Boat and air frequencies.

A KKK call identified at the CDV59 on 3840J was worked by Chichijima but looks better as an ident for Iwojima unless Iwojima has shifted his communications to a vessel.

Days coverage:

2980J	3840J	3915J	4200M	5035J	5590A
5485J	6490J	6640A	6685A	6705J	6740A
7035J	8725J	Tokyo HITU B.C.			

New frequencies:

3801M C.U. Tokyo and A.B. Kasonohara.

6346M Unident K calls, one operator here very good.

6641M Planes using KNN and KN calls with security procedure.

7117M KK and KKN calls the same as appear on 5255J and 5430J, this may possibly be 7110J.

Respectfully submitted,

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest
CRM, USN,
RinC.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~USPFR~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

3 March 1945.

From: Officer in Charge R. I. U. attached ComCarDivSIX.
To: Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit Pacific.
Subject: Report of R. I. U. operations for the period 24 February
to 28 February 1945, inclusive.

1. Subject named report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss
W. M. KLUSS,
Lt.(jg) USNR,
Officer in Charge.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R 1 Unit activity for the
period 24 February to 28 February
1945, inclusive.

24 February 1945.

Position at 0600 is 28.27N - 147.44E, proceeding on a course for Tokyo area.

At 0738, on 6490J, the Picket ~~Ø~~NINETA has a very strong signal. Flag Plot is so informed but the vessel is not encountered as yet, the frequency is intermittently active throughout the day.

At 0940 CTF 58 informs us that we have been spotted by a plane, there had been no such indication observed but careful watch is maintained on air frequencies. This report was later confirmed as erroneous.

Planes on 7035J made their first appearance at 0848 with fair signals in the morning but poor later in the day, it was inferred that these planes remain in the Bonins. In general, the air circuits were not busy this day. Some traffic from planes on 5590A showed on the HITU but did not concern these forces. Bases heard on 6740A were also found on 5255A. The base SE6WO on 8725J also used the call WOWOE. In the evening the fighter director frequency of 5890A was heard and information from base to plane regarding movements of enemy planes was considered to be on our B29 weather mission planes.

Tokyo's HITU broadcast was off the air with transmitter trouble from 0949 to 1012.

Hahajima, at 1205, reported "enemy force" which is considered to be one of our DDs looking for a downed pilot in that vicinity.

At 1235 we have G.Q. due to a crashed plane on flight deck which caught fire, exploded ammunition and endangered bomb equipped planes in the area. There were some casualties but it was quickly brought under control.

On 6490J at 1539 we received a message originated by the Picket 7IIU which seemed to be a Radar report, the Admiral is informed that these vessels may be Radar equipped.

At 2000 Flag Plot informed us that all Radar and TEF except the ultra high frequencies are secured for the run in on Tokyo, this is added responsibility for us and our efforts are increased.

The Picket 7IIU on 6490J at 2215 reports enemy forces and gives position good for TG58.1, more traffic and positions follow. The Picket 5TENATA also has traffic originated at 2130 which is widely circulated and it is apparent that we have been spotted by both vessels. Traffic from these Pickets is given wide distribution and causes some excitement on the circuits. This is believed to be the first contact made on us.

The SubRon Eleven frequency of 6105J, long non-current, made its first observed appearance this day, one despatch was addressed to the "Sub School".

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

24 February 1945, Cont.

Days coverage:

2980J	3747J	3930A	5100J	5255A	5590A	5890A
6105J	6490J	6685A	6705J	6740A	7035J	8725J

Tokyo's HITU B.C.

New frequencies:

4710M Unident KN calls.

6744M Unident KN calls.

6995M Bases and Planes, traffic not prefixed EN but was originated very close to time of transmission and in such quantity as to create suspicion that it was drill.

7357M Base and Plane drill circuit using KNN and KKN calls. One plane reported a forced landing and the base requested position but this may have been part of the exercise.

7693M KNN and KKN calls similar to 7357M and also believed drill.

25 February 1945.

Position at 0600 is 32.47N - 143.49E. Weather very poor and sea rough. Due to conditions we are behind schedule and this combined with the presence of snow over Tokyo reduces our strikes to fighter sweeps.

There are a few air frequencies up in the early morning but we are principally concerned with the Lookout frequencies. An extra man is on watch as of 0450 and remains for a few hours.

Yokosuka went into precautionary alert at 0502 so they are not surprised this time. Our fighter sweep is off at 0630 and at 0705 the unident AN056 puts out a Radar plot which could be our VF and numbers of others follow. Yokosuka addressed a collective call and sent the signal to mean "number probable enemy planes headed your way. This and above mentioned traffic intercepted on 3875A. Yokosuka went into full alert at 0739 and various Lookouts release HHHHIs about 0750.

Our second fighter sweep is off at 0820.

Earlier in the morning we had a Bogey at 20 miles but there was no reaction to this. In these early hours considerable traffic was still being passed concerning the Ficket sightings of the night previous.

After Yokosuka went into full alert and our planes definitely sighted we secured watch on Lookouts and concentrated on air coverage. The middle morning hours found reception poor due to atmospheric, Tokyo's HITU had keying trouble and was erratic. Air frequencies produce very little and nothing that concerns these forces, this is surprising as we expected at least some search plane activity.

In the evening we retire in a Southerly direction, the sea is rough and we have sleet and snow. As we are re-entering the Ficket

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

25 February 1945, Cont.

area our coverage is again on their frequencies though a watch is kept on search plane frequencies.

At 1852 word comes from our advance DDs that small craft are ahead and at 1857 we hear the Picket 8SATIKO very loud on 6490J. He reports a DD in message timed 1855 and three DDs at 1915, at 1925 he sights a probable cruiser. This vessel had a very difficult time getting the attention of CruDiv 22 or Ominato. At about this time it is reported that our DDs have sunk a small coastal freighter and a Picket but the call 8SATIKO is still heard and remains on the air until 2000, he is believed to be sunk about that time. The Picket 5SIMEETA showed also and originated despatch at 2338 reporting an enemy force heading South, at 2355 he reported probable destruction of code books and followed this with a typical "Banzai" farewell message before sinking. None of these reported our actual position but their approximate position was doubtless known ashore. The coastal freighter apparently had no radio as he was not heard here. The Picket 8SATIKO, before he was sunk, put up a battle and succeeded in killing and wounding some men on a DD.

In the evening a SATEKO4 was heard calling Yokosuka on 4240J but did not establish contact, his signal was very strong to us.

Planes on the fighter director frequency of 5890A reported that they had made landings at Kameyama near Nagoya in the morning, this looked as though they were dodging our planes in the Tokyo area.

Days coverage:

475J	3747J	3875A	4240J	5228M	5390A	5485J
5590A	5890A	6705J	6740A	7035J	8915J	9045J

New frequencies:

5610M Jap voice circuit thought to be plane to base. Also heard stations giving weather on here and one repeating "weather will be fair tomorrow".

7115M Unident KK calls the same as appear on 5255J and 5430J, this previously reported.

26 February 1945.

Position south of Hachiojima Island. As the weather is very poor and we are considerably behind schedule the intended strikes against the Nagoya area are cancelled. We are well within both Ficket and Lookout areas in the morning. One extra man on watch for a few hours.

Coverage kept to Picket, Lookout and air frequencies. Several Pickets are heard on 6490J and from signal strength it is apparent that we are liable to be contacted by one at any time. At 0645 the Picket 0MILISE reported that due to the snow storm last night he had lost sight of the Luzon Maru and was now searching for her, this

052

26 February 1945, Cont.

in all probability was the coastal freighter we sunk last night.

CIC reported a Bogey at 0907 and a plane on 6740A sounds as though it might be the one. Our screen fired on the Bogey so we will doubtless be reported. We have power failures at 0916 and 0950 for a few minutes each time.

Plane NASOTE2 on 6740A sends his NRL message which is not a grid but as he mentioned "enemy" it is believed to be a report of our position, this was timed 0930.

At 0750 in the morning we were in visual distance of Torishima Island and a close check of Lookout frequencies was kept at this time but we were apparently not reported by that island.

No grids showed on 6740A or other frequencies but on 7035J at 1542 a base released an apparent action summary including the position 29.52N- 138.08E which was our approximate 1100 position. This could be from a report made by plane upon return to base and shows a possible alliance between 6740A and 7035J.

Tokyo's HITU broadcast was again in trouble this day.

In the evening we retired toward the Bonins. Noted planes on 7035J which became strong and secured at 1745 while S5, probable that they landed at Chichijima. Planes were unheard again on 2980J or on 7035J.

Due to suspected Bogeys we have G.Q. at 2322 but no reaction from this is observed.

Days coverage:

2980J	3747J	3875A	5100J	5255A	5255J	5485J
5590A	6490J	6580M	6640A	6685A	6740A	7035J
9045J	Tokyo's HITU B.C.			Note: The base HA3HA was heard on 6740A and 9045J.		

New frequencies:

- 3956M Jap voice, very clear with news broadcast.
- 6055M Base and Plane circuit, may be non current 6050A.
- 6580M Base and Plane circuit which is probable 6580J which was last reported in December 1944. A grid was intercepted on here but was too far South to be on these forces.
- 6860M Brief appearance of one plane.
- 6969M Bases and Planes with EN air traffic.
- 7102M KKN call and plane, brief showing.
- 7862M Bases and Planes with EN air traffic, probable 7865M active during Taiwan operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

~~SECRET~~

27 February 1945.

Our 0800 position is 23.00N - 140.00E and we remain in this area most of the day while re-fueling. In the evening we proceed on a course for Ulithi to re-arm and re-supply. Two man watch is maintained until evening and then reduced to one man.

G.Q. inaugurated at 2322/26th is secured at 0007 this date with no reaction observed on air frequencies. Another Bogey at 0035 fades out around 80 miles at 0050, again nothing observed.

Maintain watch on air and air base frequencies in the Bonins area as we are fairly close to them. Planes with good signals were heard on 7035J in the morning but secured early. One plane was noted on 2980J in the evening. A few air frequencies were heard this day but were not operationally busy.

Days coverage:

2980J	3575A	5100J	5590A	6685A	6705J	6740A
7035J	8725J	9045J				

New frequencies:

3803M Tokyo and unident. No calls were made here but from service one unit was considered to be C,U. Tokyo.

5096M Unident KKK calls with EN air traffic.

52.8M Shokoozan Headquarters to unident, KOC8 calls in use.

28 February 1945.

Proceeding to Ulithi. This day very dull as we are well out of range of enemy molestation. No air action was observed in the early hours and little encountered later in the day.

All watches were secured in the early evening.

Days coverage:

6685A	7035J	9045J
-------	-------	-------

New frequencies:

6740M A.G. 903 Detachments using KKNW and K calls.

8840M A.G. Koochi to KW calls believed to be aircraft.

9777M A.B. Toko and SEF #1.

10248M Unident KKK calls.

054

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Addenda.

The term "security procedure" employed throughout this report is clarified as follows.

The best use of this procedure was demonstrated by bases and planes on 6685A and their procedure was usually this:

Example. Plane call 6HAMI2. Plane wishes to get signal report from base. Makes RA 6HAMI2 Base replies if signal heard. 6HAMI2 " Base does not make own call.

Quote from captured document Bulletin #1705 SollesPac:

"Operations (security) Communications Procedure Request signal ... (RA) Reply signal .. (!) The field will not transmit its own name."

This procedure is not always adhered to and is modified or neglected altogether in excitement or due to poor circuit discipline. 7035J is a good example of a lax circuit.

On 6490J the traffic from Picket Boats is handled in this manner: From Picket to CruDiv 22 Cdr. who is apparently South of Tokyo by signal strength. This Cdr. repeats the traffic and Ominato receipts for it then broadcasts it to SATEKO4 and Shimushu receipts for it. He, in turn, broadcasts it to SATEKO4. During this procedure C.U. Yokosuka intercepts the traffic and may in turn relay it to his Deffor or other interested units.

There is a good possibility that C.U. Tokyo has an intercept watch stood on any frequency that is urgently operational at the time in order that such traffic may reach his broadcast earlier than if handled through normal channels.

Respectfully submitted,

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest
CRM, USN
RinC

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

17 May 1945

From: Commander Carrier Division SIX

To: Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit

1. In forwarding Lt. Kluss' report I again wish to commend him and his unit for their untiring devotion to duty. The results obtained speak for themselves particularly the time differential noted in enclosure. No Task Group Commander in the Fleet can now afford to be without an R.I. Unit.

A. W. Radford
A. W. RADFORD

056

Do Not Destroy
NSA Technical File when no longer needed
S-41848 AV 1012 1

R. I. U. attached
Commander Carrier Division Six

Action Report

of Operations from
.14 March to 14 May 1945

057

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

In nearly all cases, RIU information was telephoned to Flag Plot as soon as received. Frequent reports of the number of Jap planes indicated to be airborne, together with an estimate of their signal strength, were given to the Admiral in addition to the information noted below.

14 March 1945

0700 Sortie from Ulithi:

At 2005 a picket boat, 9 SA KE U, originates a sighting of "Enemy destroyers", and picket, 0 ME E SA reports "Enemy DD in position 30-48 N, 144-53 E. 9 SA KE U sends a message at 2020 giving a position 30-58 N, 144-54 E, and follows this with further traffic. At 2035 he reports "2 BB, 2 CA", and various other unidentified ship types, heading north, and at 2103 sends a garbled message appearing to be a Banzai farewell message. 0 ME E SA is last heard at 2011, and 9 SA KE U at 2125.

All this excitement is the result of an antipicket boat sweep being conducted by two destroyers in that area.

15 March 1945

Underway, north of Ulithi.

0530 Southern and Eastern Honshu seafrontiers under precautionary alert, probably as a result of exaggerated sightings sent in by the picket boats.

Indication of several flights from Formosa to the Empire.

16 March 1945

Refueling at 19-50 N, 137-40 E.

The Air circuits are quite active today, but not affecting this force. Several grids are noted in widely divergent positions during the morning, and are evaluated as drill.

About 0900 and again at 1400 several planes are observed making about a forty-five minute flight between bases. This does not seem to concern our area.

At 1615 a plane sighting of "Enemy" appears with grid position 25-02 N, 131-48 E. This is followed by another, 25-17, 131-44 at 1628, and weather is sent from the same plane. These messages all appear on the Kanoya broadcast. Another grid from a different plane 25-50, 132-10 appears at 1838, and at 2000 one from an unidentified origin at 28-27, 132-03. Seven or eight more grids in the same general area are sent until late at night. All seem genuine and appear on Kanoya broadcast, but no Blue forces are known to be in that area.

17 March 1945

0600 position 24-50 N, 135-50 E. Run-in to Kyushu

About 0200 to 0330 picket boats are very active with sightings of Blue search planes. Some of this traffic contains enciphered positions.

At 0550 grids appear at 27-10, 132-10, and 27-30, 132-50. These are still too far away to concern us. Until 0800 many more are sent in that same area, and appear on Kanoya broadcast. Traffic all seems genuine although we are unable to identify the Blue forces supposedly sighted.

For the rest of the day aircraft circuits are very active, and more grids, definitely drill this time, appear on one Empire circuit.

Around 1330 to 1400, picket boats are being attacked by search planes and one is sunk. B-29's are reported by the picket boats, and Yokosuka goes under precautionary alert at 1350.

At 2150 radar has bogeys. We go to GQ, and a sighting report of "Enemy" sent at 2245 by a plane. This message contains grids 29-22 N, 133-33 E, and 29-47 N, 133-33 E. Later grids at 2310 and 2330 give positions 28-57 N, 134-18 E, and 30-12 N, 133-53 E respectively. All are close to the force, and our approach is known to the Japs.

18 March 1945

Strikes on Kyushu-0545-30-40 N, 133-00 E.

Grids continue to be originated by planes in the vicinity. At 0005, 29-22 N, 133-43 E, and 30-02 N, 133-28 E appear as a double grid in one message. At 0235, position 29-02 N, 134-03 is sent, and at 0245 30-22 N, 134-28 E from another plane. We go to air defence at 0318. At 0320, 0325, 0340, and 0420, grids are sent on us by various tracking planes, with other traffic besides.

At 0457 and 0458, two planes report "being chased" by the CAP. At 0500 another plane sends the tactical signal for "We are commencing illumination", and flares appear. At 0522 another plane reports completing a torpedo attack, and his "brother" plane sends a 0510 position of 29-50, 132-50.

At 0602 Kanoya goes under a full air raid alert.

At 0603 the tactical signal "All units attack" is heard, and again at 0605 the Japs signal "All units attack the carriers". At 0625 a grid 31-17, 133-23 is sent. Others on us at 0605, 0610, 0620, 0625, 0630, 0645, 0650.

A plane's signal gets at S-5 plus at 0707 and Flag Plot and CIC are notified. At 0738 we go to GQ, and the Enterprise is hit.

0740 a plain language message says "Estimated position of enemy now 110 degrees, 100 miles from Toizaki". At 0800 TOTOTO ("All units attack") is heard and we begin firing. At 0825 a plane sends a plain language-"From now on we are diving into the carriers". At 0826 our guns fire again. Other plain language messages are received giving weather and composition of Blue forces. More grids at 0810, 0820, 0830 and 0924. At 0844 Air Base Tanegashima reported engaging 40 Grummans.

At 1057 an operational message is originated by A.B. Kanoya, going action to Addressees First Mobile Base Air Force OpOrds, and four unidents - probably the Op order for further attacks today.

New plane calls appear and at 1244 a plane sends a grid 31-42, 133-23, on us. At 1258 he reports "carriers"; and at the same time a "brother" plane gives the attack signal, and again at 1302. At 1310 our guns open up, and we receive two near misses. At 1500 we fire again and the ship is hit by a 600 pound bomb. At 1510 a plane sends a grid and immediately afterwards reports being chased by the C.A.P. Another reports being pursued at 1525, and at 1649 a plane is being chased. More grids on us appear at 1555, 1700, 1715, 1716, 1735, 1748, 1800, 2200, 2206, 2300, 2320, and 2344. Planes report being chased by the combat air patrol at 2223, 2323, and 2336.

19 March 1945

Strikes on Kyushu and Shikoku. 31-50 N, 133-50 E.

The day begins with air defense at 0043. A plane sends a grid at 0100, at 31-00 N, 133:20 E. This is about 60 miles NW of us. More grids appear at 0135, 0317, 0342, and 0355. The 0317 grid was interrupted in the middle and possibly this plane was shot down as he was not heard again. At 0424, a Jap plane reported sighting Blue planes. More grids on us at 0450 and 0455, and at 0455 a plane sends tactical signal for "two minutes before illumination". The flares do not appear in our immediate vicinity. Grids again at 0505, 0520, 0522, 0616, 0624, 0630, 0640, 0645, 0729, 0750, 0816, 0820, 0857, 0915, 0925, 1015, 1023, and 1030. Some of these messages are repetitions of grids previously received but with different accompanying text.

At 0732 the ships guns fired for a short time.

Again at 1242 a plane sights "enemy force" and at 1247 "carriers", and at 1248 and 1304 gives the attack signal. TG. 58.3 was attacked and shot down two Zekes. At 1407 the attack signal is again heard.

1413 a plane reports being chased and at 1415 he sights carriers. 1430 another plane is being chased.

1525 Kanoya goes under full alert. At 1629 another plane reports being chased by C.A.P.

By about 1700 the air circuits become fairly quiet and remain so the rest of the day.

20 March 1945

Protecting the badly damaged Franklin while retiring slowly from Kyushu-Shikoku area.

Little air activity in the early hours of the morning. Picket boats became active about 0430, one in position 31-00 143-00 another at 31-00, 142-50. They sight Blue DD's, but this activity is of slight interest to us here.

At 0926 a plane originates a grid "enemy sighted" 31-32 N, 131-58 E which is not on us, but is near. A second grid is at 31-42 N, 134-58 E, and more grids in this area follow at 0945, 0947, 0950, 0954, 1005, 1015, 1030, 1032, 1035 and 1040, originated by three search planes, giving weather and disposition of the forces sighted. These positions are not directly on our Task group, but appear to be in the area where the Franklin is believed to be. From 0952 until 0959 one search plane reported being chased. Another was chased at 1023, and another from 1039 to 1047. This last is being chased by our own C.A.P. and we go to GQ at 1051.

At 1100 a despatch is noted passing between two bases, containing three grids, 31-57 N, 134-18 E; 31-42 N, 134-58 E; 30-57 N, 134-18 E. This is probably an Opor for later attacks. About 1330 Kanoya broadcast begins repeating the mornings grids.

A new search plane at 1412 sends a grid about 100 miles from us. At 1428 we go to Air Defense, with bogeys on the screen. A grid is sent at 1442, again south of us; and at 1445 a different plane sights "enemy" and "carriers" at 29-37 N. 135-28 E, which is close to our position. At 1454 to 1457 the attack signal is given, and Task Group 58.2 begins firing. During all this time more grids appear, at 1450, 1455, 1525, from other planes.

The attack signal is again heard at 1539 from another plane. (Neither of these planes giving attack signals are heard or are called again).

More grids are sent at 1540 and 1555. At 1620 a plane is interrupted in a report containing a grid and reports being chased. This position checks with position of an interception by our C.A.P. Another plane reports being chased at 1615, and again at 1623.

At 1632 and 1638 we again hear the attack signal with very strong signal, and the guns open up to port at 1642. The attack signal is again heard at 1704. At 1705 a plane reports "three carriers", and follows that with a grid.

A plane with a very loud signal sights "enemy" at 1746, and at 1751 reports being chased. Another grid appears at 1800, and a grid with weather at 1810. Activity temporarily dies out about 1930.

At 2048 a new plane sends a grid on us, and at 2055 he reports being chased as our C.A.P. tally-ho's him. Another grid comes at 2112, and more by other planes of the same group at 2117, 2122, 2130, 2140, 2155 (with weather), 2210, 2220, 2230, 2235 (with weather), 2250 (disposition of forces) and 2255.

At 2248 a plane signals "drop window" and window appears on the screen among the bogeys that are milling around all this time. Again at 2258 the signals to "drop window" appears. This is repeated again at 2306, 2313, and 2322. At 2327 they signal "drop flares" and at 2332 "all units attack". "Am dropping flares, 2340" is signalled, and flares appear at 2343.

21 March, 1945

Still retiring from Kyushu area.

Another grid is sent by a Nip plane at 0004 (time group 2337), and others are originated at 0020, 0023, 0050, 0135, 0137, 0210, 0220, and 0320. Some of the planes send ETA's and some signals begin to get weaker.

At 0402 a base sends a grid (28-40N, 134-00E) to a plane. This plane does not roger for this message, and Flag Plot informs us our VFN splashed a Betty in that approximate position about 0338.

Air activity gradually lessens, and by 0500 is quiet.

About 0750 some planes are heard S-5 on the attack frequency, and by 0810 we have heard nine planes, signals S-5. Flag Plot and CIC are notified. At 0858 a grid near us (26-57N, 134-38E), is sent by a plane reporting "enemy". At 0919 this plane says he is "being chased" as we carry out interception. At 0935 a plane asks in plain language "Number of carriers?"

Another grid is sent at 0940, and at 0945 a message containing two grids (26-57N, 134-38E) (26-47N, 134-28E), is originated.

At 1011 a plane sights one of our planes, and CIC at 1016 reports two Bettys splashed. A base at 1020 sends the first one of the above grids but to collective calls for four groups of planes, and confirms our suspicions that a large-scale attack is on its way down.

The signal for "Drop window" is sent at 1023, and again

at 1034. At 1034 a plane reports being chased. A plane sends the tactical signal "form for attack" at 1037, and we go to G.Q. At 1045 another plane reports being chased, and at 1053 a different plane reports he will make a water landing. During this time there were several more reports of Bettys being splashed by the combat air patrol. Another grid appears at 1100, and others at 1150, 1155, 1200, and 1210, some with weather. A bogey reports being chased at 1151.

At 1221 "All units attack" is heard with a very loud signal. The base again sends a grid (25-50N, 134-30E) to four collective calls for groups of planes. A grid with weather is sent by a plane at 1335, and another from the same plane at 1410. Another message is sent by the base to collective aircraft calls at 1425 and then the circuit becomes quite quiet. At this time a large raid is being intercepted by our VF quite far from the force; by 1452 seventeen Bettys have been splashed. Little air activity is heard after that. A remaining tracking plane sends a grid south of us at 1600, and at 1702 he too sends an ETA base. The rest of the day is quiet.

22 March, 1945

Refueling at 22-00N, 132-00E.

Activity in general is very light, and air activity especially so. The little air activity that is noted does not concern our force, and there are no indications of searches out for us.

23 March, 1945

Strikes on Okinawa.

In our approach we pass about 65 miles from Okino Daito Shima, but no indications of knowledge of our presence comes from them. Our strikes are launched at 0555, and apparently achieved tactical surprise as first air alert is by Oroku detachment of Air Group 951 at 0645. At 0655 the whole of the main Okinawa Island went under full alert. Air Group 951 at 0733 says in plain language "Air alert-surprise attack by carrier planes".

At 1003 a search plane sights "enemy" and sends a grid (25-22N, 128-03E). Another plane sends one (25-37N, 128-18E) at 1015. At 1240 a third plane sights "enemy" but gives no position. 1243 we go to G.Q. and open fire from 1244 to 1246. At 1251 another plane of the same group sends "enemy" with grid position (24-42N, 129-18E), and follows this with target weather and another grid with S-5 Plus signal. At 1328 we go to G.Q.

again, and at 1355 this plane reports "being chased". At 1408 he sends a grid with time group 1355. About this time another task group splashes a Myrt. Several planes seem to remain in the area, with S-4 to S-5 signals. At 1604 one plane says he is "being chased", and at 1610 the CAP splashed a Myrt. More bogeys appear on the screen and we again go to G.Q. at 1638. About 1700 these planes shift to their homing frequency and give ETA at base.

The air circuits become less active during the evening, but at 2247 a grid is received giving a position just south of Kyushu, and at 2334 a plane sights "enemy" at 25-27N, 127-43E, signal S-3. This does not seem to be near us and is explained by a report of an attack on Task Group 58.3 about 2345.

24 March, 1945

Strikes on Okinawa.

The plane in contact with Task Group 58.3 sends weather messages at 2400 and 0040. At 0135 another plane sends a grid.

Okinawa mainland went under full air alert at 0625. At 0715 planes are reported circling over Minami Daito, and at 0749 11 Grummans are over Kume Jima.

At 0800 a plane originates a grid at 25-52N, 127-28E which is quite close to us. Another plane sends a grid at 1010 which is also near us. About 1100 four or five planes are heard with signals ranging from S-3 to S-5, and at 1130 one becomes S-5 Plus. A plane sends a grid near us at 1135. At 1220 we go to G.Q. and a bogey is splashed just after.

Kikaijima reports engaging carrier planes at 1410.

Jap aircraft traffic gradually falls off, and except for some transportation flights on one circuit during the evening, the rest of the day is quiet.

25 March, 1945.

0700 Position; 21-53N, 127-57E.

At 0132 Kanoya broadcast puts out a grid at 25-22N, 128-13E. This is about 100 miles north of us. We do not hear this plane, and nothing more comes of this contact.

Minami Daito Shima went under air alert at 0843, and except for aircraft sightings by picket boats, the early morning was quiet. A Formosa based plane gives position 25-30N, 128-30E at 1025. This is not on us. Several Planes are heard on this frequency, and some become fairly loud.

At 1117 one of them sights blue planes, and at 1142 he sights carrier planes. He says he "will make a forced landing" at 1206, but is heard later so evidently does not. His signal becomes very loud, and we report that to CIC. The plane at 1215 sights "Enemy"; and at 1225 sends a grid 22-20 N, 128-58 E, which is very near us; and another at 1340. At 1450 a plane with an S-4 signal gives the attack signal, and we go to air defence at 1500, and GQ at 1508. No attack on us develops, however.

The base keeps these planes informed regularly as to air alerts, and presence of Blue planes over the field.

Air activity continues, and a new Formosa-based plane at 1610 sends a grid to the north of us, and another grid follows at 1650. At 1733 this plane reports "Enemy force", and sends another grid at 1800. A plane sights carrier planes at 1819, and the plane sending the grids is "being chased".

Another plane at 1900 reports an "Enemy force" bearing 080 at 380 (miles ?) from unknown point.

No attacks develop and air activity dwindles off until about 2130 when it becomes quiet.

26 March 1945

0400 position 25-42 N, 129-21 E.

Several planes are up in the early hours, and at 0242 one signal grows loud enough to inform Flag Plot, but nothing more develops.

Our strikes launched 0550, and Okinawa air alert at 0650.

A Formosa-based plane with an S-5 signal at 0640 sends grid 25-32-N, 129-08, which is close to us. He sends another at 0650, and again at 0724. At 0858 an S-5 plus plane sights our planes, and reports being chased by our CAP. At 0938 another Nip sights carrier planes, and is "being chased". He sights the carriers at 0940 and is still being chased at 0946. At 0949 he transmits a grid on our position. He seems to hang around in our area, and at 1114 again sights "Enemy planes". The signals of these planes begin to fade, and they enquire of base if there is an air raid, and if Blue planes are around.

Kyushu-based planes are out in the afternoon, and at 1520 one contacts "Enemy" in position 26-32 N, 127-23 E. Another grid follows at 1535, and one with weather at 1555. Another grid is sent at 1640. Shortly afterwards these planes shift frequencies, and head for home.

About 1900 more Kyushu planes become active. Signals grow stronger, and at 2036 we have bogeys and go to air defense, and the CAP burns a bogey.

Some Jills are supposed to be staging through Kikaijima air base about 2100, so that circuit is covered but no indications of their arrival is noted.

We still have S-4 to 5 signals around, and at 2143 bogeys put us at air defense again, and into GQ at 2146.

At 2155 a Jap plane sends position 26-57 N, 128-58 E, and another at 2200. At 2228 another plane is being chased by the CAP. At 2254 a plane signals "form up for attack", and a plane of that same group reports "being chased" at 2302. Another plane reports being chased from 2325 to 2337; and another one sends a grid on us at 2330 and then reports being chased at 2355.

27 March 1945

0800 position 26-10 N, 129-03 E.

Planes are up on the Kyushu attack frequency, and have very loud signals. A grid near our position is sent at 0045. At 0055 one reports being chased. Another plane at 0125 says "We are making torpedo attack", and at 0130 sends another signal which seems to mean "torpedo attack completed". These attacks are on other task groups.

Many bogeys stay around and at 0220 we have air defense and at 0228 go to GQ. A plane reports "Enemy" at 0232, and at 0236 a plane with S-4 signal sends the attack signal. Our task group is not attacked. A grid near us is originated at 0235, and more grids in the vicinity are sent at 0250, 0340, 0350, and 0400. After about 0430 there is a temporary lull.

At 0633 bogeys again send us to GQ, and at 0646 "all units attack" is sent by a plane. One of the BB's is under heavy air attack at this time. Planes send grids at 0655, 0715, 0750, 0810, and 0817, but most of these positions are on our forces near the beach at Okinawa. Activity gradually diminishes, and is rather quiet by 0930.

Two or three Formosa-based planes are heard briefly about 1230, but by 1600 air circuits are quiet, and remain so the rest of the day.

28 March 1945

Fueling and rearming at 24-43 N, 132-47 E.

Various frequencies are active from time to time during

the day, but no tactical traffic develops. A drill circuit is active during most of the day,

At 1057 the lookout station on the south tip of Okinawa reported sighting "10 battleships, 6 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 11 minesweepers, 1 special duty ship, 1 seaplane tender, 4 subchasers".

Searches are out from Formosa, and send one grid (26-22N, 127-33E) on the Okinawa forces, at 1454; and another one at 1504.

A fighter sweep goes over Minami Daito Jima, which goes under air alert at 1534.

We pass close to Minami Daito Jima, and we note two Highest precedence operational going from Minami Daito to Kanoya, Oroku, and others at 1610, and 1632. These are probably reports of sighting our force.

Ultra dispatches say the Jap fleet may sortie, so the fleet tactical frequency is checked, with no results.

29 March 1945

0400 position 28-42 N, 131-20 E. Strikes on Kyushu and search for Jap fleet.

Early hours all air circuits, and fleet tactical frequencies are quiet. Our strikes are launched at 0550, and Kanoya goes under full air alert at 0630, after receiving radar reports from outlying warning stations.

About 1130 the Kyushu search/attack frequency becomes active, and at 1135 a plane sends a grid (31-12N, 131-28E), which is well to the north of us. Kanoya went under full alert again at 1148. A plane reports "2 carriers" at 29-57N, 130-38E. Another grid in that area appeared at 1253.

Bogeys close about 1400, and the attack signal "NI NI NI" is heard. A Judy is shot down by the ship's gunfire, and lands close aboard on our port beam.

About five planes with good signals are heard up on the frequency being used for the attack, but they seem to be going home, and activity dies out by about 1900.

The major Kyushu search/attack frequency becomes active about 1930, with several planes, and at 2145 one sends "Enemy" and grid at 32-07N, 132-58E. Other grids from other planes follow at 2200, 2210, 2225, and 2310. All are up near the Bungo Channel. We know of no Blue forces in that area, and suspect a change in grid system. This activity, involving 18 planes kept up until 2400.

30 March 1945

0700 position 26-50 N, 129-24 E. Strikes on Okinawa.

The Kyushu attack frequency remains very active, and signals are strong. At 0026 we have GQ, the screen fires, and a plane at 0035 says he is being chased. Another plane at 0038 says our "course is 180". An S-5 plane sends a grid (with Bungo Channel area position ?) at 0030, a bogey is splashed, and at 0052 a plane sends "drop flares". At 0100 a message is sent by a plane containing two grids which seem to be close to Okinawa. "All units attack" is heard at 0114 but is about S-4 signal and does not concern us. These are probably attacks on the Okinawa area forces. "Drop flares" again at 0135, and 0200, with many more grids on Okinawa area.

The rest of the day aircraft traffic was very light, although planes are up on Empire and Formosa frequencies, they do not approach our area.

31 March 1945

0800 position 26-41N, 129-26E. Strikes on Okinawa.

Three or four planes are up in the morning, but signals are not too good and they do not bother us. One has engine trouble, and makes a forced landing.

Just before noon planes appear on an Empire frequency and eight are heard active until about 1800. These again appear to be transportation flights, and do not concern us.

The Kyushu search/attack frequency becomes active about 2330, and a grid on Okinawa forces is sent at 2350 (DTG 2315)

1 April 1945

0400 position 27-00N, 129-16E. Landings on Okinawa.

"All units attack" is heard at 0028, but these attacks are not on forces in our immediate vicinity. At 0130 however, one of these planes stumbles upon our force and sends a grid with an S5 plus signal. At 0132 he is "being chased" and our VFN splash a Jap. Another is "being chased" at 0145 and another plane is splashed. Planes on this circuit remain active. Another grid on us is sent at 0420; but no further attacks develop.

Kanoya had a full air alert at 0810 which was secured at 0837.

Several planes are up during the morning but do not contact us and do not attack elsewhere. Search planes are out and a grid (not on us) appears at 1235, followed by others at 1240, 1245, 1330, and 1555, with the usual accompanying weather and disposition reports.

From 1607 to 1609 an S-5 Plus plane reports being chased and follows that with a grid about forty miles from us, at 1600 and 1610.

Things quiet down until about 2200 when four S-4 planes are heard. One is being chased at 2254, but is not in our vicinity. Grids (of the type seemingly based on a new system), appear from this plane at 2331 and 2340.

2 April, 1945

Strikes on Okinawa. 0500 Position, 26-30N, 129-16E.

Another plane is being chased at 0000, and sends a grid of his position. Still a third plane sends a grid at 0007 and reports being chased at 0020, and again at 0059. These signals are S-3 to S-4 and are not as yet right near us.

More grids show up at 0100, 0105, 0120, 0127, 0135, 0145, 0155, 0210, 0220, and a double-barrelled one at 0250. Another plane reported "being chased" at 0103, and another at 0119.

After 0300 new planes begin to appear on this circuit, and at least twelve different aircraft calls are heard, some of which are collective calls. We go to G.Q. at 0415 and at 0418 a Jap reports being chased by the CAP. The screen opens fire at 0420. At 0430 a plane sights "enemy" and sends a grid of our position. He reports being chased at 0441 (S-5 Plus), and a Betty is splashed at 0442. Activity continues on this and related circuits as the planes return to base and land.

By noon all air circuits are quiet, and only sporadic activity appears the rest of the day, and does not concern our area.

Air activity is at a standstill in the evening, probably because of poor weather.

3 April, 1945

At fueling and rearming rendezvous, 0600 Position. 23-09N, 130-52E.

Fueling and rearming impossible due to heavy seas. Grids are noted at 0315, 0440, 1301, 1305, and a message with two grids at 1745. However all positions are far from us.

4 April, 1945

Refuel and rearm. 0400 position; 23-45N, 128-54E.

Air activity very light in the morning. Two planes appear with S-3 signals about 1600, but no activity concerning us appears all day.

5 April, 1945.

Strikes on Sakieshima Gunto. 0600 position; 23-04N, 126-58E.

All air circuits quiet in the early hours. Our planes are first reported at 0730, but this message takes an hour and 25 minutes in appearing. One circuit becomes active about 1030, and by 1300 eight planes have been heard, but no attacks result and the circuit is quiet by 1500.

Little air activity the rest of the afternoon and evening. At 1843 the Kanoya Broadcast sent in plain language "firing rockets", and then held the key down in a manner suggesting a signal of execution. No further information ever received on this.

At 2348 a plane is heard S-5 on the Kyushu search/attack frequency and is reported to Flag Plot.

6 April, 1945.

Fueling and rearming. 0600 position 23-18N, 130-26E.

Planes begin to appear in quantity on the Kyushu attack frequency, six by 0220, ten by 0430. At 0324 one says "we will attack with torpedoes at 0330"; another is "being chased" at 0325; another says "form up for attack" at 0328, and a fourth is making a torpedo run at 0329. Another reports being chased at 0336. This activity concerns attacks on units in the Okinawa area and signals are weak for us.

Search planes appear about 0700 and send positions on the usual position of TF58 off Okinawa, at 0715. Kanoya has a full air alert at 0800. At 0822 a search plane reports "4 carriers" in position 27-02N, 129-43E. Various other grids follow at 0820, 0821, 0826, 0830, 0837, 0840, 0845, 0905, 0910, 0930, 0935, 1005, 1015, and 1115. None are anywhere near us. One of a new group of planes reports two carriers, with a grid, at 1133, and again at 1155. More grids appear at 1150, 1230, 1306 ("4 carriers") 1323 ("2 carriers") 1325, 1335 1349, and at 1420 a message containing four grids. 1505 "4 carriers" are reported, with a grid; and grids at 1525, 1535, 1540, 1544 ("2 carriers"), 1605 and 1615. All the above grids are accompanied with the customary weather, and disposition reports. All positions in the Okinawa area or on the other task groups.

Tactical signals are also heard; "bombing attack completed" at 1536 and 1549; "make approach on enemy" at 1540, 1547, and 1550. The other task groups were under attack about this time.

Air activity almost nil in the evening as we go back toward Okinawa. At 2329 a plane with S-4 signal was "being chased".

7 April, 1945.

0600 position; 26-46N, 129-54E.

071

Planes are up on the Kyushu attack frequency with S-4 to S-5 signals. At 0159 one of these reports being chased, and at 0204 this plane sends a grid (DTG 0155) at position 27-17N, 132-03E. This is not near us, and signals start to fade, and these planes bother us no more after 0317.

This frequency again becomes active at 0719 with a new set of planes. At 0801 one plane sights "enemy" and sends a grid in our area. At 0813 a brother plane reports "3 carriers" at 26-57N, 129-43E. That is a sighting of this task group. The usual volume of grids, weather reports, and disposition reports follows, with grids at 0814, 0822, 0828, 0855, 0900, 0905, 0920, 0925, 0928, 0930, 0940, a double grid at 0957, and one more single grid at 1003. One of these planes reported being chased at 0958 to 1000, and another one at 1018.

At 1050 we launched VB and VT strikes on units of the Jap Fleet moving down toward Okinawa from Kyushu. The Jap Fleet tactical frequency was covered, but no activity was found.

A Nip with an S-5 Plus signal reports being chased at 1141, this seems to be the bogey being intercepted by our CAP. He continues to report being chased at 1151, 1158, 1200, and 1204; and at 1200 he sends a grid on us, reporting "3 carriers". A brother plane reports "2 carriers" at 1255, and also sends a position very close to us.

Bogey's are all around us by this time. At 1319 a Jap plane sights 8 carriers planes, and at 1329 another plane reports "2 large carriers" with grid, and DTG 1250. At 1334 we go to G.Q. We have at least 9 S-4/5 planes. By 1405 several Judys are splashed. At 1406 a Jap plane reports sighting carrier planes, as does another at 1410, a third at 1413, a fourth at 1418, and a fifth at 1433. The last one reports "being chased" at 1436, and at 1444. Another plane sights carrier planes at 1438. All these signals are S-5 Plus. At 1509 a plane says "we are dropping bombs". A plane at 1525 gives the tactical signal for "carriers" and then the signal "attack". No more is heard from this plane. At 1526 a Jap reports sighting carrier planes: then his key is held down about a minute and he is heard no more. At 1534 and 1538 a plane reports being chased, breaks off in the middle of his transmission and is presumably shot down.

About 1600 the base begins calling nine planes. Only one answers. By 1830 the air circuits are quiet.

At 2205 a Formosa based plane with a good signal sends the tactical signal for "take bearing on me". Base signals "transmit for bearings" and the plane holds his key down. This plane's signal is loud enough to inform Flag Plot, and we find CIC has a bogey also. The plane holds his key down for bearings at 2208, 2230, 2237, and 2246, is told by the base "transmit every five minutes". Another joins in the fun, and both make DAHS for several minutes. At 2250 the base reports bearing as 126. That would locate this base either at Naha or at Shanghai. By 2330 the signals are beginning to fade, and Flag Plot is informed plane is shoving off.

This is confirmed by a fade of radar bogey as well.

8 April, 1945.

Support strikes on Okinawa. 0300 position; 26-20N, 129-40E.

Air activity is slow during the early hours.

Miyako Jima reports 8 Blue fighters at 0718, Okino Daito has unidentified aircraft at 0721; Ishigaki sights seven carrier planes at 0725, and Miyako has 30 enemy aircraft at 0814.

About 0900 four Jap planes are heard on one circuit and appear to be a transportation flight of some kind. This activity dies down by 1100.

At 1030 Kanoya sends out a plain language report "The enemy is bombing Kanoya Area".

About 1340 two planes appear on another circuit with S-4 to S-5 signals, and at 1439 two bogeys are splashed but no RI reaction can be found. The rest of the day remains quiet, with only intermittent distant air activity.

9 April, 1945.

Sweeps on Amami and other Nansei Shoto islands. 0300 position; 25-42N, 130-37E.

The early hours have no activity. At 0345 a plane reports leaving Takao at 0335, heading for Sama. About 0600 two planes are working Shinchiku and give ETA's about 0800.

At 0600, Okino Daito Jima lookout station reports "what appears to be enemy-transport ship group, four carriers, two cruisers, and 15 destroyers". This appears as a highest precedence message on Kanoya Broadcast.

Kikai Jima reports 12 carrier planes at 0906, and 20 carrier planes over Amami Oshima at 0920.

Various frequencies are active off and on during the afternoon.

Five planes are active on a Formosa frequency from about 1645 to about 1900, but signals remain about S-3. At 1720 the base tells one of these planes that the airstrip at Miyako Jima is unuseable. One plane reports landing at Ishigaki at 1830.

About 1930 four aircraft collective calls show up on another Formosa frequency and rise to S-5 signals, and seem to head for home again about 2100. The circuit is quiet by about 2230. This may have been the attack on Okinawa this evening although no tactical signals were heard.

The rest of the day remains quiet.

10 April, 1945.

Fueling and rearming. 0400 position; 24-32N, 132-21E.

Air activity almost nil all day, except for several drill circuits. Two Formosa planes are up between 1400 and 1600 but seem to do nothing constructive (or destructive). The rest of the afternoon and evening no airborne planes can be found.

11 April, 1945.

Fighter sweeps over Nansei Shoto. 0600 position; 26-27N, 130-05E.

Air activity is rather dull until 0940 when one of a group of search planes on the Kyushu search/attack frequency sends a grid near us, sighting "3 carriers". He reports (with S-5 Plus signal), that he is "being chased" at 0958. A brother plane was previously being chased at 0945. Another of the group at 0957 says he is turning back because of bad weather, while another is over Okinawa and reports seeing no carriers around the Okinawa area. The other planes are told to join in tracking the enemy. At 1000 a message comes out which reports "enemy strength+2 large carriers, 1 converted carrier, 3 BB's, 3 cruisers, and 7 destroyers, course west, speed 20"-with a repetition of the previous grid. At 1000 "the enemy formation is ring-shaped", at 1005 "enemy has four fighters as combat air patrol, at 800 meters". At 1010, he reports finding no enemy within 50 miles to the east, and at 1015 none within 50 miles to the south. At 1025 he sends target weather, including "torpedo attack possible, dive bombing impossible".

At 1111 another plane of the group sights us, is jumped by the CAP, reports being chased, and reports making a forced landing. CIC reports one bogey smoking at this time. About noon these planes appear to be well on their way home, shift to the homing frequency, and land about 1300.

A new group of planes have already left Kanoya and at 1225 are at 29-37N, 131-43E where one sights a Blue flying boat. Little more is heard from them, but by 1400 we have many bogeys, and at 1443 the five-inch open up. At 1446 a plane sends a grid near our position, reporting "2 carriers". This is followed by a weather report at 1453, and at 1455 the Jap complains that "enemy is attacking our attacking force". About a dozen planes are heard around this time. One plane at 1639 sends a grid on us again, and at 1647 sends one (DTG 1610) saying "enemy's CAP is 4 fighters at 500 meters altitude". At 1655 another plane says the same thing and also gives the composition of the force again.

At 1658 a new plane reports "estimated time of arrival battle area 1840". Another at 1700 expects to arrive at battle

area at 1840. At 1717 Kanoya tells the planes to "attack after 1900." At 1720 the tracking plane says there is no other enemy within 100 miles of our force, and at 1725 says he is stopping tracking and starting for home. At 1800 another plane gives ETA battle area as 1900, and another says "1920". More ETA's come in - 1845, 1905, 1900, 1910, 1855, - a total of nine who have sent ETA's. At 1840 a plane says flares will be dropped when enemy is discovered.

One tracking plane at 1749 sights carrier planes, is "being chased" at 1750, and splashed at 1753. By 1833 we have lots of bogeys, and at 1853 we open fire with everything. We fire again at 1902. Various Japs report being chased, "all units attack" is sent at 1903, 1905, and 1910, and "we are attacking with torpedoes" at 1916, and at 1922. "Drop flares" at 1922 is followed by "attack with torpedoes" at 1927 and 1930. "Drop flares" again at 1934. At 1942 a plane reports "will illuminate in 3 minutes".

At this time we are up to Raid twenty-six on the radar screen.

At 1952 one plane reports seeing "2 explosions"; at 2004 another plane starts a grid but is nipped off before he can finish it. At 2010 and 2015 two planes say they are starting for home. At 2020 a plane says "we made torpedo attack; one Battleship or large Cruiser blew up and is on fire."

There is little activity then (except for the survivors returning to base) until 2312 when a plane reports being chased. Another one is being chased at 2328, and a Mavis is splashed. At 2333 the first plane sends a grid on us (DTG 2322) and has an S-5 plus signal. Still another plane is being chased at 2355 to 2358 as the day ends.

12 April 1945

Off Okinawa.

The Kyushu search/attack frequency is active with two planes "being chased" at 0006. At 0055 a plane sends a grid of "enemy". At 0102 he has engine trouble and says he is making a forced landing. Another plane sights our force and reports us with a grid at 0120, adding that "AA fire is intense". At 0150 a base sends to two new planes "enemy task force was at 080 deg. and 30 miles from Kikai Jima at 0100"; and at 0153 orders these two planes to search in a radius of 30 miles of 28-00 N, 130-20 E. Shortly after 0200 several of the previous group of planes report "mission completed, starting for base". A plane reports being chased at 0208.

About 0250 a new group of five plane calls appears on another frequency. These planes are told by base at 0330 that "position of enemy carriers is 28;20 N, 130-20 E," and adds in a second message "change your target to the carriers". These planes are later called by base from about 0430 to 0600 and

apparently are splashed, as they never answer.

At 0700 seven calls of a new group of planes appear on the attack frequency. At 0825 we go to air defense, and at 0840 one of this new group (an army plane) sights "enemy", giving bearing and distance from unknown reference point. At 0849 we go to GQ.

At 0910 one of these planes sends an "enemy disposition" report: "B sector, enemy's strength - 9 BB, & Cruisers; 16 to 20 DD's, and about 60 plank ships, and about 100 surface vessels besides, in a ring-shaped formation between Naha and Kerama". Another plane at 0935 is ordered to search within a 40 mile radius of 27-40 N, 130-20 E.

Air activity is then slow for a period, until at 1302 a plane sends a grid (26-40 N, 129-40 E) - "3 carriers".

On another frequency the signal "prepare to attack" is heard at 1410. This attack is not on us but on the beach. The signal "all units attack" is sent at 1425 and 1430; "Form up for attack" again at 1431, "prepare for attack" at 1432, "form up" at 1433, "attack" at 1434 "being chased" at 1437. Similar activity continues, with "attack battleships" at 1442, and more attack signals at 1452, 1455, 1456. At 1447 one plane reports hits on a battleship. At 1501 to 1504 another plane is being chased by carrier planes (our C.A.P.) At 1558 a plane reports seeing a BB blow up and sink in position 26-57 N, 127-03 E. This follows his previous report of sighting an enemy force "not including carriers" in that position.

Many planes are up; some are going home, and others are new ones coming out. However little traffic and no tactical signals are sent for some time.

At 1848 a plane reports searching for 60 miles around 26-20 N, 129-40 E without finding any enemy units. Shortly after that a base sends "if you cannot find enemy, attack Okinawa".

"All units attack" is heard at 1907, and this plane sights Blue planes at 1908 and is cut off in his prime. At 1922 another signals "form up for attack", and at 1940 "all units attack". These signals are weak for us, and the attack is going on on the beach. At 1952 one plane sends "attack completed, starting for base".

At 2030 a plane "contacts large enemy force" at 26-12 N, 129-38 E. At 2037 he reports "carriers". Another plane is "being chased" at 2038, and another at 2050. At 2055 a plane orders "form up for attack" with an S-5 plus signal. At 2100 another plane says "we are attacking with torpedoes". At 2102 "dropping flares"; at 2106 "We illuminated, 2100". Most activity from then on consists of reports of "being chased", which ~~are~~ heard at 2113, 2115, 2116, 2119, 2134, 2137, 2140, 2142, and 2155. After 2130 the survivors start for home, and send ETA's.

A new plane, sights "Enemy force-uncertain whether it contains carriers". At 2200, gives a grid right on us.

At 2203 he says "am maintaining radar contact from cover", and gives another position close by. At 2209 he reports "4 to 5 ships of unidentified type are afire". At 2300 he reports "stopping tracking and returning".

A brother plane who was ordered by base at 2018 to "verify contacts" reports "being chased" at 2339, and is not heard from again.

13 April 1945

0400 position 26-15 N, 130-21 E.

Tactical frequencies are still active as the day begins. At 0012 a plane transmits a grid (DTG 2355) which is just north of us, and follows this with more grids at 0015, 0100, 0130, 0129. At 0145 he says he is being pursued by two night fighters and at 0215 he gives up tracking and goes home. Another plane at 0220 contacts a "large enemy force" at 25-52N, 130-18E. At 0303 he is "being fired on by enemy ships". Another grid appears at 0320, and another at 0440. The plane sending the latter grid is being chased at 0505.

Activity becomes slack, except for these planes returning to base. At 0655 a plane reports "Arrived on search line, enemy not sighted". Another at 0900 says "End of search, enemy not sighted, visibility 20 miles, flying at 100 meters". However he has an S-5 plus signal, and at 0909 he sights us, and is immediately being chased by the CAP, but is able to send a grid and "3 carriers", "I am on fire", and "Banzai" before hitting the drink at 0928.

The base orders a brother plane to search a 40-mile radius from 26-40N, 129-40E, but he declines the invitation, reports oil pressure dropping, and makes a forced landing.

The afternoon remains fairly quiet, though there is considerable activity on both Kyushu and Formosa tactical circuits.

14 April 1945

0400 position 26-17 N, 130-08 E.

A Kyushu plane at 0029 says he sights "Enemy", but at 0032 he says to cancel this report. A brother plane reports "being chased" with an S-3 to 4 signal at 0130. By 0400 all activity stops. A bogey is splashed at 0508 but there is no RI reaction.

About 0800, the search frequency again becomes active. At 0853 an army plane sights "Enemy" and "one carrier", and

gets out a report in army code. Other planes of this group are out, but are using Navy code. One at 1000 reports "Enemy bears 125 at 80 miles from Tokuno Shima". However he conveniently develops an oil leak, and goes home.

A lull follows until activity again begins around 1300. 1316 a plane sights Blue planes, and a Zeke, and a Betty are splashed. At 1342 the attack signal is heard, and we go to GQ at 1343. A plane sends a grid on us at 1347, reporting "one carrier", and at 1350 tells a plane of another group to "report position of attack". At 1428 the first plane tells base to inform him of the bearing from Tor Saki, and at 1440 he sends a grid reporting "1 regular carrier, one converted carrier, and about 15 others besides, course 000; speed 20". At 1445 he starts for base. By 1524 CIC reports 22 splashes mostly Bettys.

A Formosa tactical frequency becomes active about 1600, and many planes are heard on it. At 1705 a plane sends a message "around Kerama there are no carriers, four cruisers, and about 30 other ships. Off Kasote are 150 vessels". At 1902, 1922, and 1925, the signal "all units attack" is heard. A big air battle is in progress on the beach at Okinawa. At 1930 a plane reports completing a torpedo attack, and another plane reports "attack completed" at 2002.

In the meantime five new groups of planes appear about 1800 on the Kyushu attack frequency. At 1920 one sends "Estimated time of arrival in battle area 2000". At 1950 a search plane reports "large enemy force" at 26-52 N, 130-38 E. Another contacts us and sends a grid at 2000. By this time several planes have already been splashed some distance from the force.

At 2013 one plane asks another when he will illuminate, so we stand by for fish. At 2015 they signal "illuminate", and "course 020". Again at 2023 "illuminate", and at 2025, "all units attack". This attack is carried out on the other task group. At 2045 a plane reports "setting out for base", and little activity is heard the rest of the day except for the base calling planes who do not answer.

15 April 1945

Fueling and rearming, 24-04 N, 132-06 E.

Little air activity all day. Eight planes are heard on the Kyushu search/attack frequency between 0630 and 1000, but no contacts are made with Blue forces.

16 April, 1945.

0400 position; 26-52N, 129-54E.

Kyushu based planes are active at midnight. At 0010 a plane sights "enemy force, no carriers included" at 27-20N, 130-03E. Another plane is being chased at 0044, as is another at 0107. Several other search planes are out, and go back about 0300 to 0330 without any contacts on our forces.

After 0700 more search planes are heard. One at 0715 sights "one enemy cruiser" at 28-52N, 131-28E. At 0750 a brother plane is on us with a grid and report of "two carriers, three BB's, and many others". At 0800 he adds "about five cruisers" to that. Later reports describe "a ring-shaped formation", and give target weather. He is "being chased" at 0808. A third brother plane is over Okinawa and reports "about 50 flying boats; about 70 small transports; and 3 large transports afire" at 0835. The base tells him to "track the carriers at 27-12N, 130-28E," when he has "finished reconnaissance at Okinawa." The plane reports "enemy is beginning to land on Ieya Shima-enemy strength 1 BB, 10 cruisers, 21 DD's, about 30 others. Naval shelling is intense," (DTG 0835, also). At 0845 he says "on the north airfield 15 large or small type planes, on the central airfield 30 small-type planes. CAP at 5000 to 6000 meters."

In the meantime more planes are sending grids on "the enemy" near the island. A base tells a plane to report bearing and distance from Kikai Jima. At 0947 this base reports "16 shipbased planes overhead".

The attack signal is heard at 0931 (S-4) and planes report being chased at 0938, and 1002.

About 1025 some new planes are heard and these steadily grow stronger. At 1200 we go to G.Q. and at 1206 an S-5 Plus plane sends a grid on the task group, reporting "1 regular carrier, 2 converted carriers, and 25 other vessels, heading east at 12 knots". Various other grids follow. At 1333 the screen is firing and the Intrepid is hit. We fire again at 1512, and 1519. Various planes are holding the key down or making long dashes with S-5 Plus signals at this time.

A Formosa frequency is active at 1700 and at 1725 a plane sights our planes. We go to air defense at 1728. Bogeys are around, and good strong signals from the Jap planes.

At 1935 a Kyushu plane sends "estimated time of arrival in battle area 2040". At 2045 this plane and a brother plane sight enemy. At 2046 another plane signals "form for attack". A grid comes out at 2047. At 2048 a plane is "being chased" and at 2058 "all units attack" is heard very loudly. At 2103 they signal "illuminate-attack", "form up for attack-illuminate" at 2107; "we are attacking with torpedoes" at 2111, and "stop illumination" at 2115. At 2120 a plane reports making a torpedo run on a BB and setting it afire at 2058, in a position well to

the north of us. They say "attack completed, returning to base" at 2115. A plane at 2118 reports seeing "one explosion". A plane asks the base to take bearings on him and at 2149 base reports "bearing 007, distance 50". Numerous other similar bearings are sent to different planes.

A new series of planes suddenly appear just before midnight, with one sending a grid on us at 2355.

17 April, 1945.

Off Okinawa, 0800 position; 26-41N, 129-58E.

Kyushu-based planes as usual are active at midnight. At 0140 an S-5 Plus plane sends a grid, 26-37N, 130-23E. He reports being chased by the CAP at 0152 and again at 0219. Nothing more develops and by 0500 all is quiet.

About 0700 a new bunch of planes are heard on the Kyushu search frequency, and at 0820 we go to air defense. At the same time a plane sends a grid some distance north of us. This plane signals he is making a forced landing. A plane is sighted in the water about 100 miles north. At 0850 another plane reports "enemy in position 26-07N, 129-53E." Other grids continue at 0910, and 0915. At this time a large attack is being intercepted, and 17 or more Zekes are splashed by 1000.

After 1100 air circuits are quiet, except for several drill circuits.

In the evening some Formosa planes are up, and the signal "all units attack" is heard at 1953. This signal is moderately weak, though, and apparently is an attack on the beach. The rest of the day is quiet.

18 April, 1945.

Off Okinawa.

All air circuits quiet until 0600 when a Formosa tactical frequency becomes active, and is followed by Kyushu activity about 0900. This activity consists of calling back and forth, and gradually dwindles away until by 1200 all is quiet.

In the afternoon there is various routine activity. About 1700 the Formosa tactical circuit again becomes active, and five different planes or groups are heard. Signals become fairly strong and at 1942 "all units attack" is heard. However we have no bogeys, and this attack again is on the forces at Okinawa. No more tactical signals appear, though the circuit remains active while the planes return home and arrive about 2300.

19 April, 1945.

0600 position; 24-53N, 128-33E.

Scarcely any air activity is noted all day, and the little that does appear is routing establishment of contact between bases. No aircraft are found on any tactical frequencies.

20 April, 1945.

Fueling and rearming. 0400 position; 24-42N, 132-12E.

No activity on air channels until after 0630 when bases on several circuits contact each other. Two Kyushu planes are up between 1200 and 1400. One sends a grid (27-02N, 128-58E) at 1224; another is sent at 1243. Nothing more comes of this, and all is quiet by 1430. In the evening two circuits are active; one of them (a Formosa frequency) has a few planes on it. The Kyushu tactical circuit comes up just before midnight.

21 April, 1945.

0700 position; 26-38N, 130-02E.

The day begins with air defense at 0043 and G.Q. at 0044. Kyushu-based planes are around with S-5 Plus signals at this time. At 0106 one plane sights the force, but does not get off his grid until 0145 (with 0110 DTG) because of "being chased" at 0130 by the CAP. A couple of Bettys are splashed but not this one. At 0153 he sends another grid (DTG 0120), and follows this with a couple of weather reports. These planes start for home, and things are rather quiet by 0500.

A B-29 raid is picked up by Jap radar about 0550 and Kanoya area has full alert at 0605. The Inland Sea area, and northern Kyushu area go under precautionary alerts. The B-29's are reported over Kanoya at 0625. Sasebo area had a full alert at 0640.

Jap air activity is light during the morning. More Kyushu search planes are heard with S-4 to S-5 signals about 1300. At 1353 a plane reports "being chased". He sends a grid (27-25N, 129-55E) at 1357, reporting "carriers". At 1420 he is "being chased" again. At 1437 he gets off a message (DTG 1410) of enemy dispositions", containing three grids; presumably on our three task groups. Weather follows, then at 1500 a different message containing the same three grids. At 1501 a brother plane sights "five carriers". Several bogeys are splashed around this time. By 1630 the remainder are well on their way home,

and at 1650 are told that Kanoya is having another air raid.

There is a lull until 2130 when new plane calls begin to appear on the Kyushu tactical circuit. This continues for some time and by 2330 six new groups have been heard. One of the sixth group reports being chased at 2330 at position 31-22N, 132-53E. At 2343 an earlier plane is heard "being chased", S-4, A Betty is splashed.

22 April, 1945.

0800 position; 26-37N, 129-29E.

The Kyushu attack frequency is very active and some planes have good signals. At 0117 we go to air defense, and the VFN are intercepting about 30 miles out. At 0123 we go to G.Q. and a torpedo wake is sighted astern. A plane is being chased at 0150, and another plane at 0156 reports "we attacked with torpedoes at 0125." Activity continues, and at 0247 another plane reports "being chased" and a twin-engine is splashed.

The B-29's are noted over Kanoya again, shortly after 0700.

At 1130 activity begins on the Kyushu attack circuit again, with S-3 planes appearing. One plane locates himself for us with a grid (29-47N, 131-48E) at 1208. By 1300 signals are S-5, and at 1337 another plane sights "enemy", with a grid near our position. A third plane sends his grid on the "enemy" at 1343 with DTG 1335. At 1358 we go to G.Q. and open fire at 1358. At 1406 one is "being chased" and again at 1412. He starts to say it again at 1420, but breaks off in the middle and changes to "Banzai" as he heads for the drink. The CAP reports splashing a Myrt.

Air activity becomes slow about 1630, when base gives up trying to call the splashed planes. Activity continues on various homing frequencies as survivors go back, landing about 1900.

Not much of interest goes on in the evening, though the Kyushu tactical frequency comes up again at 2330.

23 April, 1945.

0700 position; 26-15N, 129-43E.

Nothing but routine air activity shows up all day, and that is very light.

B-29's were over Kanoya about 1230.

24 April, 1945.

Fueling and rearming. 0400 position; 24-30N, 132-11E.

Searches are noted out of Kyushu about 0900, and at 0935 a plane sights something at 27-37N, 130-33E. This may be the other task group though there is no indication to show that it is a sighting report. Other grids, even farther north appear from the same plane at 1100 and 1220. Little else of interest appears all day.

25 April, 1945.

Continue fueling and rearming. 0500 position; 24-36N, 133-14E.

Little activity until 0800, when Kyushu searches appear. Grids appear at 0925 and 1000 but are not designated as sightings of "enemy". However at 1030 one of these planes does sight the Blue Forces at 27-02N, 129-18E. Various other messages containing the same grid show up shortly after. By 1400 all air activity is dead again.

A new group of search planes appear after 1500. Seven grids are sent by these planes between 1515 and 1738 but are north of 29N.

After 1900 all pertinent air frequencies are quiet.

26 April, 1945.

0700 position; 26-09N, 129-08E.

Air activity very light, and nothing of interest to us.

B-29's were over Kyushu about 0650, attacking Oita, Fukuoka, Miyazaki, Kanoya, and Kushira.

Miyake Jima had a full alert at 0425, and Ishigaki had one at 1749.

27 April, 1945.

0200 position; 25-26N, 129-31E.

Light activity on the air circuits until the Kyushu search planes are heard at 0720. At 0730 one is "being chased" with an S-4 signal. By 0839 one sounds quite loud, but no bogeys appear on the screen and the Jap does not sight us. At 0805 a grid is originated by a search plane but it is well to the north of us (29-12N, 131-28E) and has no "enemy sighting"

precedence indicator. The homing frequency is active after this as these search planes return. Their return is considerably complicated by Kanoya's full air raid alerts from 0745 to 0950 and 1010 to 1025.

Various Empire frequencies are active during the afternoon and evening, but no grids, tactical signals or attacks are heard, until late in the evening. About 2240 a Kyushu based search planes are heard, and one sends a position 30-27N, 132-18E at 2350.

28 April, 1945.

Fueling and rearming. 0400 position; 23-59N, 130-33E.

Two Kyushu frequencies are active, with four search planes on one frequency and seven planes on the other. After 0230 another frequency is heard with more planes and by 0330 a total of 17 planes have been heard on all circuits.

The search planes send several grids which are around Okinawa area but are not designated "enemy sightings". All this activity becomes slow by 0500, without any more developments. There is a strong possibility that this is deception traffic.

At 0645 Ishigaki has a full air alert; Kanoya has a precautionary alarm at 0720 and a full alert at 0730.

A new group of planes is noted on the Kyushu search/attack frequency about 0715, and at 0745 one originates a sighting of "enemy" at 26-57N, 129-23E. This is on the other task groups north of us. The same plane at 0833 transmits one with a 0727 DTG with a grid position falling on Kerama Retto. Another plane locates himself at 29-47N, 131-53E. at 0752. A third plane at 0900 sights the task groups at 26-17N, 129-23E. The usual number of additional grids and weathers follow. The signals of these planes begin to fade, and they ask the base if there is an air raid, and seem to land about 1030.

At 1249 a highest-precedence message of 1135 from Okino Daito Shima appears on the Kanoya Broadcast, in operational code. This is followed by another also with 1135 DTG and highest-precedence, which is an abbreviated contact report of sighting a large enemy force with five carriers and 30 cruisers. This is probably the assemblage of ships in our area, which is close to Okino Daito.

New Kyushu-based planes are up again at 1230 and at 1308 one sights the "enemy" at 26-12N, 130-08E. At 1319 he reports "four carriers" in that same position. More grids follow at 1315, 1318, 1415, and 1425.

Formosa-based planes are out also, and one sights the "enemy" at 1120 in a position just south of Miyake Jima. This is evidently the sighting of the British Pacific Fleet. Another grid in that area appears at 1557.

On the Kyushu search/attack frequency, a new group of five planes show up about 1640. At 1942 a plane reports "being chased" and two planes send probable attack signals at 1953 and 2004. These signals are S-4. They^{are} called on a homing frequency from 2200 to midnight, with no audible planes here.

The Formosa tactical circuit is also active in the evening from about 1800 to after 2100. About eight planes are involved, working Shinchiku and Takao.

Three or four planes are also operating on another frequency, and one of these planes reports arriving at Kikai Jima at 2342.

29 April, 1945.

0700 position; 26-46N, 129-04E.

Three Kyushu frequencies continue active. At 0230 a bogey is being intercepted by VFN but visual identification as a Jap is uncertain. A bogey at 0240 reports "being chased" and thereupon is splashed. Several other planes of the same group are airborne but do not seem to come close to us. One at 0407 reports being in position 25-57N, 130-43E.

The B-29's are reported heading in over Toi Zaki for Kanoya, about 0800.

Suddenly a new group of planes appear on the Kyushu tactical frequency with a plane sighting 3 carriers at 26-30N, 129-30E, at 0815. This plane has an S-5 Plus signal. More grids are sent at 0816, and 0825. Another Blue task group is evidently sighted at 0840 when the same plane reports "2 carriers" at 26-50N, 130-10E. At 0850 he sends one containing two grids which appear to be more accurate fixes for the two positions previously given. Lengthy reports on "enemy dispositions" are sent, as well as target weather. These planes send ETA base about 1000, and by 1150 all air activity is quiet.

Various circuits are up with routine activity for awhile. At 1300 new Kyushu-based planes appear. One of those at 1355 says he will have to make a forced landing, and is not heard after 1406. Around 1500 loud signals are heard from unsigned plane on this same frequency.

Three Zekes are splashed about 1620 without any RI reaction. By this time several Formosa planes are active as well as the Kyushu ones. At 1659 we open fire and a Kyushu plane at 1704 reports "7 carriers". He enlarges on this at 1725, with a grid on us. Signals are S-5 Plus and CIC has a bogey at 30,000 Feet. He sends weather at 1730.

Activity continues on three tactical circuits, but no more grids or tactical signals appear.

A base on a frequency which we discovered only recently sends to his planes "we pray for success", at 1750.

By 1900 twelve Japs have been splashed.

A plane at 1939 sights Blue aircraft but the signal is very weak and does not concern us.

Two new groups of planes show up on the Kyushu tactical frequency at 2315; by midnight signals are S-3.

30 April. 1945.

0800 position; 27-17N, 129-56E.

With the new day a Kyushu tactical frequency is up and active. At 0005 a plane with a weak signal sends "estimated time of arrival battle area 0230". We go to G.Q. at 0047 and splash two Nips without any RI reaction. At 0106 and 0113 a plane is "being chased". Signals are S-5 for some of these planes by now. At 0142 a plane sights "enemy" and gets off his grid on us at 0200-reporting being chased in the meantime, at 0153.

"Form up for attack" is sent by a plane with an S-3 signal, at 0220. Another plane of a different group is "being chased" at 0229, and a brother plane says the same at 0237. A plane of a third group at 0230 sends a grid very close to our position, but is "being chased" by the VFN at 0302. Another is "being chased" at 0358, and another at 0414. After 0330 some shift to a homing frequency, and some ETA's appear about 0430.

Others are still with us, however, and a plane reports "being chased" at 0438 and 0450. A plane at 0445 sends a grid far from us, at 28-17N, 129-13E.

The Kyushu tactical circuit becomes active with two new planes. At 0630 Flag Plot is notified. At 0753 radar has a close bogey and we go to G.Q. Our planes are now S-5 Plus. At 0755 one reports "being chased" and a Jill is splashed. At 0810 the other one is "being chased" and a Myrt is splashed. These planes are at about 30,000 feet altitude. Base tries to establish contact with them until 1400.

At 1000 a third plane of the group (who evidently took off after the first two) says he thinks he may have to make a forced landing and is returning to base. At 1206 he reports that "trouble is repaired", but seems to continue to base.

B-29's are reported passing over Hahajima at 0900, and at 1040 are over Kyushu in force, attacking Kanoya, Kokubu, and Miyakonojo.

The afternoon is rather quiet. After 1900 a search plane seems to be leaving Kyushu, and sends three grids at 1910, 1930, and 1945, as he flies westward at about 30-30 north. He is told at 1940 to return to base, and sends an ETA of 2050. Three groups of planes are noted working Kanoya after 2000 and one at 2230 says "attack completed, returning to base". These planes never got louder than S-3 for us, and no tactical signals were sent. Presumably this attack was on Okinawa. Planes which seem to be lead planes of two groups are told by a base at 2255 that

"Kikai Shima airfield is unuseable." This is the result of bombing by our task group during the day.

1 May, 1945.

1200 position, 26-14 N, 129-37 E.

The planes which were unable to land at Kikai are heard returning to base until 0130.

Air activity today is very light and is limited to communication between bases. Almost no planes are noted air-borne.

Kanoya has a routine precautionary alert at 0500; precautionary and then a full alert at 1223.

2 May, 1945

Refueling and rearming. 23-57 N, 130-26 E.

No air activity noted all day, other than a couple of drill circuits late in the afternoon.

3 May, 1945

0500 position. 26-36 N, 129-31 E.

Three planes are out on a Kyushu frequency at 0130, but at 0215 one says he is turning back on account of bad weather, and little is heard from them after that.

About 0640 there is a slight flurry of activity as eight planes on another circuit arrive at Miho. The rest of the morning is only slightly active, with weather traffic and drill. The B-29's came over again, and Kanoya's full alert was at 1055.

An Empire air circuit is busy all afternoon calling many planes, but the planes are weak and do not affect us. The B-29's are back at Kyushu around 1400.

A Formosa tactical frequency comes into activity early in the afternoon. One of these planes at 1425 transmits a message with DTG 1340, describing Blue forces at Okinawa: "Off Katena, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, about 4 destroyers, 60 large and medium transports, and more than 100 others. At Kerama, more than 200 large and medium transports". At 1444 he sends another message timed 1340: "Low clouds over enemy airfield, reconnaissance impossible". At 1505, Air Base Shinchiku orders him to "report on the enemy situation at Nakagusuku Bay". The plane at 1538 reports "3 battleships, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 40 others in Nakagusuku Bay". At 1546 he says he is starting for base.

In the meantime, about ten planes are heard on an Empire frequency, and are trying to come in for a landing at Kanoya.

This appears to be a flight staging in from other Empire bases. At 1555 the base tells four of them that "B-29's are bombing (Kanoya ?) and many more to follow". At 1600 the base tells six planes that they should use the north runway. All of these planes secure not long after 1700.

A single Kyushu search plane is out, and at 1648 says he is "at search line, but enemy not sighted".

The Formosa planes are still active, and nine or ten are now heard, with signals about S-3. One plane at 1847 says in plain language "we are crash-bombing, we believe in the ultimate victory" - and other similar misguided sentiments. Another plane at 1914 sends a grid 26-32 N, 126-48 E - "enemy sighted". At 1947 "all units attack" is heard. In another plain language message at 2035, a plane says "lost sight of enemy in a squall. Visibility zero. Am heading for Kikai Jima". His sending is very poor, and base at 2203 asks him to report his destination, and is told "we are making emergency landing at Kikai Jima." This activity is all occasioned by an attack on Okinawa.

At 1921 Kanoya goes under air alert because of a sweep by Fleet Air Wing PB4Y's. The Japs report "Consolidated Planes" and do not secure until 2030.

4 May, 1945

0700 position. 26-41 N, 129-34 E.

At midnight the primary tactical frequencies of both Kyushu and Formosa are very active. One Kyushu plane at 0115 gives his ETA in the battle area as "0250." Another at 0125 says "arrive battle area 0220", and third at 0200 says "0245". At 0154 we go to air defense and splash an Emily. "All units attack" is sent at 0245. At 0248 they send "enemy sighted, all units attack", and the attack signal is also heard again at 0249, and 0305. Their signals are about S-3, and at 0315 one plane which had sent an attack signal sends its position, 27-20 N, 127-40 E. Another plane at 0322 reports "completed torpedo attack - explosion".

At 0417 one plane wanders over our way and reports "being chased". A Betty is splashed 60 miles away. At 0448 another plane breaks off in the middle of a message, and another Nip is on fire and splashed. This plane was in the midst of reporting that he had reached the end of his search line without sighting the enemy.

In the meantime the Formosa planes are busy too. By 0140 we have heard ten of them. A plane at 0210 reports "attack completed, am returning. Attack targets, cruisers at anchor. Results unknown". Another says "torpedo attack completed, battle results unknown" at 0250. At 0325 and at 0350 two planes sight Blue planes.

"All units attack" is heard with an S-3 to S-4 signal at

0354. This is given again at 0401. Planes sight our planes at 0432, 0449, and 0453. A plane of a new group at 0525 reports "attack completed at 0430".

In the early morning Kyushu planes are out again, and at 0625 and 0700 two planes report "mission accomplished".

The B-29's are over Kyushu again, shortly after 0800.

Several frequencies are active and again the Japs head for an attack on the beach. A plane at 0832 sends "attack" and "Banzai" but quickly changes it to "being chased". Another plane says "all units attack" at 0843. More tactical signals are heard from many planes, in rapid succession: "enemy sighted" at 0845, "attack" at 0850 and 0852; "being chased" at 0853; "attack" at 0854, "being chased" at 0855; "attack" at 0856 and 0858. A plane at 0859 reports "hits on a BB" and an encoded message from this plane at 0905 enlarges on his report - "a large cruiser sunk".

More tactical (attack) signals are sent at 0914, 0915, 0919 and then there is a considerable lull until about 1300.

A Formosa plane sights the British Task Force at 23-42 N, 125-18 E. Then at 1304 a base says in plain language "enemy is within 60 miles south of Miyako". The base tells a plane at 1505 to "report precisely the enemy's strength". No more of interest is heard on this circuit.

A Kyushu plane at 1858 reports "being chased" with an S-2 signal, but no more is heard from him. By 2000 all is quiet, and remains so the rest of the day.

5 May, 1945

1200 position. 25-55 N, 129-06 E.

About 0130 five planes are heard staging into Kikai Jima.

A Formosa based plane at 0520 says "we are being chased by night-fighters". Between 0530 and 0600 he is sending signals for the base to take homing bearings on him, and soon after is heard no more.

A Kyushu search plane starts out, but at 0703 says he is "having engine trouble in position 29-42 N, 129-03 E, and ~~am~~ returning." His base (Kanoya ?) says they are having an air raid, and tells him to go to Chiran or Bansei.

Kanoya is under full alert again at 0900, securing at 0930.

Another Kyushu plane does no better than his predecessor, and at 1105 says he has an oil leak and is returning. A third plane however gets above Okinawa and reports "In B sector, enemy strength is two carriers, 1 battleship, 6 cruisers, about 10 destroyers, about 10 small transports. In C sector, one carrier, one battleship, 6 cruisers, about 10 destroyers, and about 20 large transports," at 1110. At 1115 he sends weather and at 1130 he reports that "due to lack of oxygen am abandon-

ing reconnaissance east of the island chain, and am starting for base". This shows him to be one of the customary 30,000 foot boys. He arrives at base at 1400.

Kanoya has another air alert at 1438.

Several air circuits are active from time to time during the rest of the day but nothing unusual is noticed.

6 May, 1945

0200 position. 25-22 N, 129-25 E.

Five planes (in two groups) are active on a Kyushu tactical circuit at midnight. At 0110 one sends a message which looks like an "estimated time of arrival in battle area", but no tactical signals are heard. However from 0300 on, the base calls several of these planes without receiving an answer, and it is believed that an attack was carried out on the island around 0230. At 0400 a plane reports that "enemy vessels are milling around Ieya Shima in large numbers".

All is quiet until about 0730, when light activity begins which continues all day. Various circuits are up with calls between bases and a few planes - nothing of unusual interest.

The Formosa tactical circuit becomes active about 1630, with three groups of planes which appear to be on their way to an attack. The attack signal finally appears at 1929, signal S-3 to S-4. The only air activity the rest of the evening consists of some of these planes returning to base.

7 May, 1945

Fueling and rearming. 0700 position. 23-40 N, 130-43 E.

Three plane calls are heard on the Kyushu tactical circuit about S-2 for us. No tactical signals are heard, but at 0235 a plane reports "torpedo attack completed, am returning to base".

At 0510 both Haha Jima and Chichi Jima report B-29's, and they come over Kyushu about 0800.

At 0945 a plane sends a grid at 20-12 N, 121-08 E, with a designator "target weather". However no allied forces are known to be in that position which is in the Balintang channel.

There is extremely light air activity, involving a few planes, during the day; but even this dies out shortly after 1800.

The primary Kyushu tactical circuit was not heard all day after 0330.

8 May, 1945

0700 position. 26-02 N, 130-05 E.

No tactical circuits from either Kyushu or Formosa are noted all day. Air activity in general is almost non-existent, possibly due to bad weather both here and in Kyushu. The B-29's are over Kyushu again, Kanoya going under full alert at 0710. Oita reports being bombed at 0830, and Miyakonojo, Miyasaki, and Shibushi also report being attacked.

9 May, 1945

Three planes show up on a Kyushu frequency about 0050. At 0220, 0225, and 0228 these three planes send identical messages which are most likely "estimated time of arrival in the battle area". No more is heard of these planes, and base does not try to call them again.

A flight of planes is up on an Empire frequency between 0800 and 1000, but in general air activity is dull in the morning.

A couple of planes appear on a Formosa tactical frequency, and at 1205 one sights what is probably the British Pacific Fleet, at 23-42 N, 125-23 E. About 1545 more planes begin to appear on this frequency. By 1700 there are few planes, obviously up to no good, working Shinchiku Air Base. A couple more appear, and at 1830 one of the group sights Blue planes. At 1850 two planes signal "all units attack", and a third plane gives the attack signal at 1853, 1854, and 1855. The signals are S-2 to S-3, and probably this attack is on the British units sighted by the Japs this noon. Little more is heard on this circuit.

Three planes are noted at 2300, and appear to be staging into some airbase, which later appears to be Kikai Jima. They are still up as the day ends.

10 May 1945

0300 position, 25-37 N, 129-43 E.

The three staging planes are noted arriving at their base (Kikai ?) about 0100, and another comes in about 0200.

A number of planes are active on both Kyushu and Formosa frequencies. "Form up for attack" is heard from two Kyushu

planes at 0253 and 0256. One of these at 0255, 0329, and 0332 is "being chased", and the other is "being chased" at 0348 in position 26-37N, 127-58E, (which indicates this attack to be on Okinawa).

The attack signal comes from the Formosa planes at 0318 followed by "Banzai". A brother plane at 0342 says "Am carrying out bombing attack 0350". The signals are S-3 or so, and probably this is another attack on the island.

The B-29's about 0730 hit Kyushu again.

At 0830 two Kyushu-based search planes are first heard, with good signals. A high-flying Judy is splashed at 0834, but the other is on the loose above Okinawa. He reports "four carriers at 25-27 N, 127-13 E" at 0920. He also must have come near us, for at 0930 he sends a message marked "Enemy dispositions" which contains those grids, 25-12 N, 127-28 E, 25-02 N, 127-48 E, and 26-07 N, 129-18 E. This last is very close to our position. The plane has an S-4 to S-5 signal at this time. He sends an ETA at 1030; and thereafter the circuit quiets down except for the bases calling the plane that was splashed.

Just after 1200 two new Kyushu search planes appear. By 1350 one has a very strong signal; and shortly afterwards a bogey appears on the screen at 31000 feet. He sights "Enemy" at 1428, and puts out a grid at 25-52 N, 129-18 E. A second task group is fixed at 25-35 N, 128-55 E. Weather and details of our disposition follow. By 1515 he has sent eight messages. Shortly after that he shifts to a homing frequency and starts for base.

Activity comes up on a Formosa frequency about 1700; six planes are heard. These secure between 1900 and 2000, however, without causing any trouble.

At 2040 a base which appears to be Kikai goes under full air alert. Our night hecklers are over both Tokuno and Kikai. Two planes (or flights) are trying to land at Kikai but seem to have great difficulty. After much calling back and forth an ETA of 2310 is given by one plane. However both are still up when base has another full alert at 2347. Base tells the plane this in a service message, then at 2353 repeats it in a code message sent operational highest priority.

Two planes of a new group of Kyushu planes are first heard at 2330.

11 May 1945

0700 position 25-22 N, 129-12 E.

Kikai Jima's air alert is secured at 0100; and after assuring the staging planes until 0200 that there is no air raid, and no Blue fighters around, they fool around until there is

another full alert at 0252.

In the meantime three large groups of planes are active on a Kyushu circuit. Two of these planes report "being chased" at 0112 and 0113 respectively. Signals are S-5 plus and bogeys are on the screen by 0130. Another plane is "being chased" by VFN at 0150, and another at 0202. One plane previously reporting "being chased" sends a grid (25-22 N, 129-18E) with an S-5 plus signal at 0214. At 0232 he is "being chased" again, but gets off another grid at 0245. A plane, which had last reported "being chased" at 0227, says "making forced landing" at 0306. However he is heard later, so must have limped for home.

Another grid is sent at 0354, and another plane is "being chased" at 0434. A S-4 plane sends "All units attack" at 0446. A brother plane says "making forced landing" at 0453.

Formosa planes are out, but are at some distance from us, and an attack signal is heard S-2 at 0331. Another plane at 0735 sights "Enemy" (probably the British group) at 23-57 N, 124-33 E.

Some of the Kyushu planes shift frequency and start home about 0500.

New groups are on their way out, however, and a couple report being chased at 0830 and 0842. The latter plane is chased again at 0844, and at 0850 sights "Enemy", in position 26-32 N 129-28 E. He alters this, shortly after, to 26-02 N, 129-18 E. We go to GQ at 0857. The attack signal is heard at 0900.

The plane which sent the grid on us still sounds very close. He is being chased, again, from 0912 to 0914; and at 0915 says he must make a forced landing, tries to say "Banzai", and breaks off in the midst of his transmission. A Myrt is splashed.

Another at 0945 sends both previous grids in one message, but at 0955 tries to say "being chased" (?), and is not heard again--a Jill is splashed. Many Zekes are splashed around this time, but no RI reaction is observed to that. From 1100 to 1115 the base calls planes who do not answer, and after that the air circuits are quite quiet.

Kanoya goes under full alert at 1455, and reports being bombed at 1510.

Many air frequencies are active in the afternoon; but nothing threatening develops, and by 2000 all circuits quiet down.

Blue planes are reported over Kyushu again between 2200 and 2230.

12 May 1945

Underway for Ulithi.

Air activity is very light and no tactical circuits show. The unit is secured at noon.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

W. M. Kluss

Lt (jg) USNR

Officer-in-Charge.

The Admiral desired that an analysis be made of the time of receipt of Ultra information by RIU as compared with the time that Ultra information sent out in despatches becomes available to Flag Plot.

A sequence of twenty-one urgent Ultra despatches, received during some of the hottest activity, is used as the basis for this comparison.

As will have been noted in the foregoing report, a Jap plane's first transmission of his message is often much later than the time group which is placed on the despatch. This is the reason for the apparent discrepancy between time of origin of messages, and time^{of} RIU receipt direct from the plane.

DTG of message	TOR by RIU	D/T written up in comm office	Time difference hours-minutes
172245	172315(BC)	180123 U	2-08
180510	180515	180700 U	1-45
190640	190700	190925 MI	2-25
190645	190706	190925 MI	2-19
190750	190829	191050 MI	2-21
190820	190837	191050 MI	2-13
190816	190839	191005 U	1-26
200945	200950	201341 OP	3-51
201412	201426	201645 U	2-19
202112	202119	210021 U	3-02
202117	202134	210021 U	2-47
231015	231015	231245 U	2-30
260640	260643	260930 U	2-47
260650	260653	260930 U	2-37
260720	260728	260945 U	2-17
260940	260949	261200 U	2-11
261535	261549	261905 U	3-16
262300	262307	270310 U	4-03
280947	280955	281214 U	2-19
281454	281516(BC)	281935 U	4-19
292145	292150	300031 U	2-41

NOTES:

1. All RIU receipts are direct from plane, except those designated (BC) which were received on the broadcast.
2. Precedence of the Ultra dispatches is noted as follows;
U: (Urgent); MI: (Most Immediate); OP: (Operational Priority).

A8-2(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

4 April 1945.

From: Officer-in-Charge R. I. U. attached
ComCarDivSIX.
To: Officer-in-Charge Fleet Radio Units
Pacific.
Subject: Report of R.I.U. activities 11 to 14
March 1945.
Report of R. I. U. activities 14 to
20 March 1945.

1. Subject reports enclosed herewith.
2. Due to continuous sustained strikes during the day and Japanese air attack at night, the R.I.U. was continually operating at an exceedingly intense pace, and it was found impossible to do the paperwork and clerical research, necessary for such reports, at any earlier time.
3. It is expected that similar situations will prevail whenever extended carrier operations are conducted in waters close to the Japanese Empire.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

W. M. Kluss,
Lt. (jg) USNR,
Officer-in-Charge.

Do NOT Destroy Return to the NSA Technical Library when no longer needed 5-41 848AV Copy no. 1
--

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

CARRIER DIVISION SIX

4 April 1945.

USS Yorktown CV-10.

Report of R. I. activity for the period 11 to 14 March 1945. At this time we remained in Ulithi Lagoon but commenced watches due to Kamikaze attack upon CV Randolph the evening of 11 March about 2010.

Institute watches at 2115 to cover periods of possible air attack. One man from 0430 to 1700, two men from 1700 to 2200 and one man from 2200 to 2400 at which time watch was secured.

As origin of attacking planes was not at first known all search was general. Domei press intercepted confirms Kamikaze type of attack and Ultra from FruPac eventually informs us that planes came, or staged through, Truk.

Coverage shifted to Truk frequencies, Tokyo-Truk, Truk's broadcast and possible air. Very little current data at hand about the latter. This coverage was continued until time of sortie from Ulithi at 0625 14 March.

During the 12th and 13th alerts caused Air Defense and G.Q. several times but all planes proved friendly. Nothing heard by this unit could be construed as indicating further attacks.

Coverage: Sasebo, Tokyo HITU and Truk B.C.s

5095J 5100J 5125J 5590A 6640A 8137J
8480J 9045J 9770J

New frequencies:

6081M Unident KKK calls with Drill A/C traffic.
6642M Unident KN A/C calls with Drill traffic, previously reported.
9772M Detachments of A.G. 901, previously reported as 9777M.
7876M Kanoya A.B. broadcast, inactive.

Reception, as usual in this area, was very poor.

Respectfully submitted.

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest,
CRM, USN
RinC.

098

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

4 April 1945.

CARRIER DIVISION SIX
USS Yorktown CV-10.

Report of R. I. Unit activity for
period 14 March to 20 March 1945.

Force sorties from Ulithi Lagoon at 0625, to conduct gunnery practice prior to proceeding to vicinity of Kyushu and strikes.

At 0700 coverage of Truk frequencies is dropped and search conducted for Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu A.B. and Air frequencies. A one man watch is maintained at this time.

Local receiving conditions remain very poor. Activity for the day is light and the only air frequency active was 6640M which handled Drill traffic. Kanoya's B.C. was mostly inactive but did pass some traffic including A.B. weather, Radar and traffic from Nansei Shoto area.

In the evening 6490J becomes active with the picket boat 9SAKEU reporting contact with enemy DDs, CAs and BBs plus some unident types at 2004. At 2005 the picket 0MEESA also reports enemy DDs and gives position 30.48N - 144.53E, this boat was last heard at 2011 and may have been sunk. The boat 9SAKEU stays up and passes several messages becoming more excited as time passes, at 2102 a possible "Banzai" message is sent but he is by then unreadable, "VA" is sent at end of this. He was again heard at 2125 with a plain language message concerning "Enemy doing _____ to _____ vessel". This boat was unheard again. Ominato and CruDiv 22 Cmdr. repeated most of pickets traffic and it showed on Tokyo's HITU. Ominato-a-CruDiv 22 did not receive last transmissions of this picket.

This activity was believed to be occasioned by some of our DDs on an anti picket mission.

Days coverage:

Truk B.C.	Tokyo HITU B.C.	Kanoya B.C.	5125J
6490J	6640M	10200J	

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

15 March 1945.

Position North of Ulithi. Continue one man watches this day. Reception continues poor and much local line noise is present.

From observations of activity on 8725J and 9045J it is believed that transport planes on these frequencies now use KKNN calls.

Days coverage:

Tokyo HITU B.C. 2980J 6490J 6740A 7035J
9045J 9776M

New frequencies:

3996M Spec A.B. calls with EN A/C traffic.
6640M KN calls with EN A/C traffic, previously reported.
8437M A.G. 903 Detachment to KN A/C calls, this may well be 8435J.
8612M Unident KKK to KKNN calls.

16 March 1945.

Position for rendezvous at 0700 is 19.50N - 137.40E. Refuel this date.

Reception varies from fair to poor. Two man watch is again commenced at 1230. Aircraft action is good this day but none of it affects us as yet. No picket boat sightings of these forces are made. It was noted on 6490J that often the call ANA042 is used by stations also using SATEKO4.

Considerable traffic including many grids were sent by units on 6740A but all these were evaluated as Drill though not so prefixed. Message NR was followed by a kana, different for each unit, and one plane originated several grids giving widely divergent positions within a short time. None of this appeared on the broadcasts.

6685A was also active but traffic appeared good and was centered around Daito Jima area, this traffic and subsequent traffic from 3344M appeared very quickly upon Kanoya's B. C. considerably sooner than Tokyo's B.C. had it. A number of planes were noted upon 7035J but not considered in this area. Most of traffic on 6685A was noted to be prefixed and suffixed with NKK, (Example 1ROSA) and with repeated KKK, (TETETE, UUU, or KIKIKI). The first of these is supposed to concern "Enemy" and the last "Weather". The numeral of the NKK prefixes seems to coincide with last numeral of the planes call.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10
16 March 1945.
Continued.

Kanoya A.B. broadcast frequencies are made 3937A and 7875A this date.

Days coverage:

Tokyo HITU	Kanoya B.C.	3057J	3575A	3875A
5100J	5255J	5590A	6115J	6640A
6740A	7035J	6490J		6685A

New frequencies:

3344M Bases and Planes Kyushu area, this proves to be night frequency for 6685A.

4424M Spec A.B. calls with Drill traffic.

6855M NK and K calls.

7033 NKK plane calls here, this was weak and not a part of 7035J.

7110M Planes with good traffic, NKKN calls.

7124M KKNN and KK calls.

7162M KN and K calls with A/C traffic, previously reported.

17 March 1945.

Position for 0600 is 24.50N - 135.50E. Reception improved.

A flurry of picket boat traffic intercepted on 6490J in the early morning, signals are weak and do not concern us. Another burst of activity is noted around 1330 and it is thought that both are occasioned by Blue search planes attacking the pickets.

Air activity was very brisk today and many Drill aircraft circuits were noted. Traffic on 6740A again thought to be Drill. One plane hereon became rather strong and CIC notified by us but nothing resulted.

On 8725J the signal WA"SA was used to mean E"WO (Secured).

6685A was active early in the day and traffic immediately showed on Kanoya's B.C. At 2150 we went to G.Q. because of Bogeys, no reaction at this time but at 2252 our screen has many Bogeys. A grid giving our position at 2313 was received

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

17 March 1945, Cont-

from Kanoya's B.C. The plane originating this was found to be on 3344M which was very active and more grids and traffic show.

Days coverage:

2980J 3167J 3344M 5715J(EN today) 6490J
6640A 6641M(EN) 6685A 6740A 7035J 7820J
8725J Kanoya and Tokyo HITU B.C.s.

New frequencies:

3754M Spec A.B. calls with EN A/C traffic.
5240M Jap voice station.
5802M Unident KN calls passing Yokosuka area alerts, this may be part of the Lookout or Deffor net.
5978M KN A/C calls with EN traffic.
6083M KNN A/C with EN traffic.
6524M Bases and Planes, inactive.
6580M CLT Kashima, A.B. Shuuzan and A.G. 931, this is possible 6580J.
6842M A/C and Spec A.B. calls with Drill and good traffic.
6862M Spec A.B. calls, inactive.
8054M A/C calls with EN traffic.

18 March 1945.

Position for strikes on Kyushu, 30.40N - 133.00E at 0545. We were spotted and reported by planes on 3344M at 2313 the 17th and planes are all around us in the early hours, this frequency seems to be the only air circuit up. Numerous grids appear from time to time. Our VFN splash a Bogey at 0105.

Planes on 3344M drop flares at 0505 probably to make a torpedo attack, at this time a three man watch is instituted. By 0730 units on 3344M have shifted to 6685A, this as well as 6640A and 6740A are busy with many planes. Bogeys plentiful.

Attacks commence with a TOTOTO from plane on 6685A, screen and all ships firing. About this time we heard that the CV Enterprise was hit but no record of attacks or hits on other vessels is possible here.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

18 March 1945, Cont.-

A message from a plane on 6055M said "We intend rushing into carriers", other plain language follows and one plane reports inability to find enemy force and that he is returning to base.

Bogeys stay with us and air circuits remain very busy, we are attacked several times and have near misses. At 1316 we are hit by a dud and at 1500 we are hit by 600 lb bomb just aft and below the R. I. room. Gear is knocked around somewhat, a receiver becomes temporarily inoperative but is restored quickly to partial efficiency, one antennae carried away but no serious damage sustained. Personnel unharmed.

At 0605 a TOTOTO on 3344M commenced a burst of activity that necessitated placing two men to cover the frequency. A good many tactical signals were used in reporting the forces and in taking action today, the signal NININI seems to mean about the same as TOTOTO.

Enemy planes are in vicinity all day and night with attacks at intervals and activity on the air frequencies fluctuating from comparative quiet to a bedlam of signals. The frequencies of 3344M, 6685J, 6640A, 6740A and 6055M were the ones concerning us most. 6740A seemed to be used by planes when retiring to base. Kanoya B.C. handled all traffic rapidly and Tokyo HITU also rebroadcast this traffic.

As action had dwindled somewhat the three man watch was secured for a two man watch at 2018.

A.B. Kanoya was called on 6740A by A.B. Omura using K008 calls and it is probable that some planes concerned today were from Omura.

Days coverage:

2955J	3057J	3167J	3344M	4180J	5255J
5715J	6055M	6115J	6640A	6685A	6740A
6740M	7035J	HITU and Kanoya B.C.s			

On 4180J the CLT Kashima was noted working A.B. Shinchiku and on 6740M a single kana call put out KUHA at 1604 which may indicate units on this frequency are in Kyushu area.

New frequencies:

3745M Spec A.B. calls, inactive. Reported as Kyushu area by FruPac.
3965M Spec A.B. calls, inactive.
7095M Unident KKN calls.
7115M KKKN and KK calls.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

18 March 1945, Cont.-

New frequencies, cont.-

7896M A.B. Hyakurigahara to plane, K008 calls.

8905M A/C KN and KK calls.

19 March 1945.

Strikes upon Kyushu and Shikoku, our launch position about 31.50N - 133.50E.

Imminence of Bogeys causes Air Defense at 0043, action is all on 3344M but signals not banging in at that time. However, at 0101 grids appear from planes thereon and activity continues to be brisk. The Enterprise reported a frequency of 3366M to us and checks were made for this with no result, it is possible that our 3344M is the same.

A three man watch is maintained from 0525 to 0820 to catch alerts from Kyushu and Shikoku areas and to free other men for tactical air circuits which are busy.

3344M/6685A continue active and planes report enemy planes at 0423 and "enemy force" at 0645. This is followed shortly by an attack which is driven off. Various "Enemy" and "CVs" are reported throughout the morning and a number of grids appear. AT 1304 the signal NININI is heard and T.G. 58.3 is attacked. At 1417 NININI is again heard and shortly thereafter a plane reports he is being chased, two others report "CVs". Bogeys remain in vicinity and at 1653 our screen fires again, we had no reaction this time.

Air activity dwindles in the evening but the Bogeys stay with us most of the time.

Kanoya A.B. was noted using both K008 and FU3 call on his 3937A broadcast and also called A.B. Oroku thereon.

3344M/6685A are made 3342J/6685J per despatch from FruPac.

Days coverage:

3167J	3342J	3575A	3747M	3875A	4480A
6685J	6740A	7035J	Kanoya B.C.		

New frequencies:

4748M Unident KN calls, brief appearance.

5293M A.G. 951 Oroku, A.B. Sasebo and others using K008 calls, this may be 5300A.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

19 March 1945, Cont.-

New frequencies, cont.-

5785M Jap voice station. Using standard KANTO"KA procedure. Miyako was mentioned and this may be a Lookout Stn or AA Defense in that area. Miyako under attack today.

6746M Bases and Planes with good signals, Drill traffic.

7934M Spec A.B. calls, inactive.

20 March 1945.

Retiring slowly from Shikoku - Kyushu area, necessity of staying with badly damaged CV Franklin retards whole force.

Air activity is nil in the early hours of the day. 6490J observed for possible contacts by picket boats, a flurry of picket traffic is occasioned by their sighting and reporting "Enemy DDs" in positions 31.00N - 143.00E and 31.00N - 142.50E. Units reported are not part of this force.

At 0913 planes become active on 6685J, signals are strong and grids follow reports of "Enemy". These sightings are not on our immediate force but thought to be about where Franklin is. Planes report being chased by our CAP several times. Kanoya B.C. rebroadcasts this traffic immediately. Base on 6685J has difficulty making planes hear him although he receives them alright. Base (Kanoya) puts despatch on broadcast to Miyasaki A.B. timed 1040 saying that due to poor contact he desired that A.B. to relay his "R" for NRs 1.2.3 to plane 8NEFU3.

Grids and sightings on 6685J continue and attacks are made but activity seems centered on the other Task Groups although we have numerous Bogeys. Attack signal NININI is made again at 1621, 1632 and 1638 and at 1642 we open fire for short time.

This sort of thing goes on intermittently throughout the evening and night. At 2327 flares are dropped and at 2332 on 3342J the signal TOTOTO is heard and more flares are dropped at 2343, again other groups attacked.

6055M and 6740A were also active this day with 6055M planes reporting our position and composition of force, planes from this frequency also attacked other Task Groups probably in an attempt to finish off already damaged units. Base on 6055M sent grid traffic to planes thereon, grids originated on 6685J.

The signal HOTE4 as used by planes appears to mean "Drop window", this checks with Radar.

Some planes were noted using signal NININI and locking key down, after a short time the signal was no longer heard nor were the planes mentioned. It is possible that this was used as attack signal by Kamikaze planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10
20 March 1945, Cont.-

Days coverage:

2980J	3167J	3342J	3745M	6055M	6115J
6490J	6685J	6739M	6740A	7035J	Kanoya B.C.

Tokyo HITU.

Bases on 7035J repeated traffic originated upon 6685J, was incorporated in action summary type of traffic.

New frequencies:


2979M Spec A.B. calls with EN traffic, weak and inactive.

4840M Okinawa Spec B.F. Cdr; Midget Sub Base and MTB Base using K008 calls.

6105M Spec A.B. calls, brief appearance.

6685M KN calls with EN A/C traffic.

Respectfully submitted,


E. J. Forrest,
CRM USN,
RinC.

AS-2(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

20 April 1945

From; Officer-in-Charge R. I. U. attached ComCarDiv SIX.
To; Officer-in-Charge Fleet Radio Units Pacific.
Subject; Weekly Reports of R. I. U. activities.

1. Subject reports enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted;

W. M. Kluss
W. M. KLUSS,
Lt. (jg) USNR,
Officer-in-Charge.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period 21 March 1945 to
27 March 1945 inclusive.

21 March 1945.

Retiring from Kyushu area.

Activity continues on 3342J in the early hours, some signals are good. Base broadcasts our position as given in grid sent by plane in late evening of 20 March. Positions of other Task Groups are reported by planes and base again puts out grid on us to a plane who does not "Roger".

About 0400 a Betty gets in too close and is splashed.

Kanoya broadcast handles air traffic rapidly but that fades out about 0500 and Tokyo HITU is substituted although traffic comes out somewhat later.

Units continued to be active after shift to 6685J, a plane reports "Enemy" and sends grid near our position at 0903. By this time there are ten S5 planes on this frequency and business is good. At 0919 a plane reports he is being chased but gets away and sends grid on us and weather this area. At 1011 a plane sends "HIHIHI" and we splash two Bettys. At 1023 a plane makes HOTE4 (Drop window) and this is done, confirmed by CIC. More reports of "Enemy", "being chased" and "drop window" follow. We have numerous Bogeys about this time and go to G.Q. The signal "prepare to attack" or "form for attack" is heard at 1037 and more Bettys are splashed shortly thereafter.

Some planes drop off 6685J, but new ones keep appearing and activity remains high, numerous grids and sightings. A very loud plane makes "TOTOTO" at about 1221 and others of our forces are attacked. Frequency slow from 1350 to 1430 but at 1415 we have many Bogeys closing and go to G.Q. at 1418. Out of a flight of twenty Bettys and others our CAP splashes seventeen which may explain sudden lack of signals. 6685J becomes active again but dies out at 1645 and all is quiet, the evening shows only slight air interest. 6740A up but is occupied with getting planes back to base.

Other air frequencies were logged this day but bulk of action and all interest was centered on 6685J. Again due to inability to keep track of who is concerned with attacks other than this particular vessel no attempt is made to report such.

Days coverage:

3057J	3342J	4205M	6115J	6055M	6640A
6685J	6740A	6855J	8630J	MIKA and HITU	B.C.s

New frequencies:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

21 March 1945, Cont.

New frequencies, Cont.

4001M Kure DefComPost and units.

4140M ASG2M901 Detachments, Ex 4180J,

6842M A.B. Kanoya and unident to planes, good signals.

6861M Spec A.B. calls, brief.

22 March 1945.

Position 22.00N - 132.00E, re-fueling.

Air activity was nil in the early hours and light throughout the day. What few frequencies were heard did not concern us at this time.

Late in the evening the C of S informs us that all air search is secured and much reliance for news of contact is placed upon R I U.

Days coverage:

2980J	3057J	3167J	4361J	5250J	5305J
5337J	5715J	6115J	6550J	6855J	7035J
8725J	9045J	9770M	MIKA and HITU broadcasts.		

New frequencies:

3741M KKN calls that do not fit FU-2.

3745M Spec A.B. calls. Pre-reported.

3961M Spec A.B. calls, believe Drill.

4140M A.G. 901 Detachments, pre-reported.

5905M Shuuzan A.B. and CLT Kashima, (K008 Calls).

6650M Bases and Planes, brief.

7118M Camranh A.B., Singapore Detachment A.G. 936, Kattara and Kotabaru S.P.Bs and unidents, (K008).

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

23 March 1945.

Strike on Okinawa, approach made passed us close by Daito Jima but no reaction was noted on local circuits.

Our first strikes off at 0555, attack is an apparent surprise as first alert, other than probable Radar, at 0645 from A.G. 951 Det Oroku who also originated message of 0733 saying they were surprised by carrier planes.

Reception is very poor due to atmospheric. The Base and Plane frequency of 6650M was active in the early hours but considered to be Drill though not so prefixed. A plane on 6055M sends grid and reports "enemy" at 1003, another plane appears with a grid at 1015. These appear on 6685J and the Kanoya B.C. A 6685J plane reports "enemy" and a grid at 1305 which is followed by more of the same and weather, signal becomes very loud and he reports that he is pursued at 1355. Prior to this, at 1243, Bogeys are close and we go to G.Q. We fire from 1245 to 1247 as Bogeys make attack, our screen units fire again at 1412 and bring down a Myrt. At 1604 a plane on 6740A says he is chased and a few minutes later another Myrt is splashed by the CAP. The Bogeys close in and we have G.Q. at 1638 and again at 1826 due to two low ones.

Air activity diminishes in the evening about 2100 but 3342J becomes busy at 2240 and remains so the balance of the night, planes thereon report positions of forces close to us. Activity on 3342J later explained by report of an attack upon 58.3 about 2345.

Days coverage:

3057J	3342J	4140M	4192J	5250J	5305J
6055M	6115J	6640A	6650M	6685J	6740A
6855J	6985J	MIKA and HITU broadcasts.			

New frequencies:

3549M KKNNN calls and Jerk, Yokosuka Deffor Shimiru MTB Base.
3944M Spec A.B. calls, brief.
4842M K and KN unidents, brief.
5233M A.B. Kanoya, Boromisaki Lkt (K008 Calls) and unident KN, this may be low for 5250J.
6687M K calls, drill but not A/C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

24 March 1945.

Continue to cruise in vicinity of Okinawa and to make strikes there.

Activity on 3342J continues in the early morning, some grids and other traffic show and signals are fair to good. This last showed at 0405 and the day frequency of 6685J was picked up at 0615, bases thereon were also heard or called on 6055A. A plane on 6055A originates a grid at 0827 which is very near us. Grid traffic from a plane on 6650M showed on Kanoya's B.C. thus indicating that traffic is good, there was some doubt of this on the 23rd. This frequency continues to be active in this area.

A few planes become loud around noon and a Bogey is splashed at 1220.

6740A became active and operational in the afternoon and some grids were intercepted there. Activity dies out in the evening however and with the exception of flights on 5337J all was quiet.

Days coverage:

3057J	4140M	5337J	6055A	6115J	6340A
6640A	6650M	6685J	6740A	6985J	7035J
7675A	8630J	9774M	MIKA B.C.		

6055 Averaged this day.

New frequencies:

3908M KO08 and FU-3 calls, #2 D/F Net activity.

4420M Spec A.B. calls, Drill.

6792M Shanghai A.B. Japan Airways (KO08) to unident KN.

25 March 1945.

Position at 0700, 21.53N - 127.57E.

Air activity is very light in the early morning and reception is poor. Some power trouble is experienced.

At 0152 Kanoya B.C. puts out a grid giving position about one hundred miles north of us, this originated by the plane SI7WI3 and a search for the original frequency of this was unproductive. Shokozan H.Q. broadcast using TAWO (ROKI) picked up at 1030, this handles air traffic for Taiwan and

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

25 March 1945, Cont.

from air frequency 6650A. This frequency is apparently a Formosa air frequency and becomes increasingly active this day. Some planes become loud and a few grids appear, these are quickly re-broadcast by TAWO B.C. Plane here reports "enemy carrier planes" at 1142 and signal "am making a forced landing" at 1206, he stays on the air however so he must have gotten away or signal "FUFUFU" is in error. This plane has a very good signal by 1215 and sends a grid which is very near us, other traffic follows. About this time we have a Bogey. Plane who made sighting makes "FUFUFUTOTOTO" at 1450, signal about S4 at the time but we go to G.Q. as there are Bogeys nearby. No attack develops however so the meaning of above signal is obscure. Bases on 6650A keep the plane informed of situation as to alerts and presence of enemy planes in vicinity of bases. More planes appear and grids show again, a plane at 1857 reports he has a large enemy force in sight but being chased. Another reports an "enemy force" at 1900 and an apparent bearing but gives bearing at 380 from area 80, other signals follow which are not clear either. This frequency continues busy until 2130 then gradually dies out.

Other air frequencies were up this day but 6650A seemed to be the only one operationally active and conducting a combatant search.

Reception remained poor on all bands.

Days coverage:

3057J 5337J 6115J 6640A 6650A 6740A
9775A MIKA and TAWO B.C.s

9775 made average this day.

New frequencies:

3321M KN and KNN A/C calls with Drill.

3340M Spec A.B., brief and handled DEI traffic.

3372M Bases and Planes, a very good possibility that this is the night frequency for 6740A.

3800M C.U. Tokyo and A.B. Kanoya. Think Tokyo reported on here working A.B. Kasonahara previously.

3932M Spec A.B., brief. May be 3930A Taiwan air frequency.

5918M KN and KK calls, brief.

5965M KN A/C circuit.

5979M KNN A/C Drill.

TOP SECRET
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

26 March 1945.

Position at 0400, 25.42N - 129.21E.

Both 6650A and 3342J were busy in the early hours, the latter frequency had a plane which became very loud but nothing developed.

At 0653 a plane on 6650A sent a grid on these forces, other planes showed and frequency was very active. At 0858 a plane reported "enemy" and said he was pursued. CIC confirms this but said he got away. Another plane with the same story at 0937 and reports "carriers" at 0939, grids from this plane appear. Activity high and traffic heavy. A plane here sends TOTOTO at 1130 but signal was weak and some doubt expressed by operator, nothing develops and the action diminishes and dies out.

6740A was moderately active and became operational about noon and again in the late evening. Planes, apparently from Toko and Sama, showed on 5337J in the morning and were thought to be making flights.

From 1445 to 1520 all signals on 3.0 to 11 megs dropped to zero and varied thereafter, general reception was poor.

6685J became busy in the afternoon and remained so until 1700, a plane thereon sent our approximate position at 1526 and other planes seemed to be in our area judging from their signal strength. All these had trouble working the base.

At 1900 3342J became active and remained so throughout the rest of the day, plane signals were good. Bogeys are numerous and a Bogey is burnt at 2039. Grids appear from 3342J and the signal "form preparatory to attack" is given at 2254. More grids sent and activity high but we are not attacked, several planes are chased by our VFN and so state.

Information was given us that Jills were expected to stage through Kikai Jima so an attempt was made to get some reaction and information as to time or arrivals and departures but local frequencies of that island did not put out desired dope.

Traffic from 3342J/6685J was slow appearing on the Kanoya B.C. today. Traffic from 6650A showed immediately on the Shokozen B.C., then on HITU and finally on MIKA.

Air action was good today but spasmodic in appearance, several frequencies were heard but only a few were tactical.

One base on 6685J had an extremely powerful transmitter using a modulated note, this was similar to the one used by Yokosuka C.U. on 6705J.

Days coverage:

3057J 3342J 5337J 6115J 6650A 6685J

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

26 March 1945, Cont.

Days coverage, Cont.

6740A 7035J 8630J HITU, MIKA and TAWO B.C.s

New frequencies:

3372M KNN and K unidents.

3372M Base and Planes, night for 6740A.

5054M Spec A.B., Drill.

5075M Base and Planes, A.B. Irimote on here.

5333M Bases and Planes, brief.

6062M K, KN aircraft, Drill.

6342M K, KN, KNN A/C.

6640M KN A/C, Drill.

6778M Bases and Planes, Drill. This drifted up from about 6740E.

27 March 1945.

0800 position. 26.10N - 129.03E.

At beginning of day 3342J is still up and going, signals are very loud. Evidence develops that some of our forces are under attack. Plane at 0125 sends signals to mean, "we have completed torpedo attack", this is followed by other signals relating to torpedo attack but not clear in meaning. Another plane sends traffic and a grid giving our approximate position.

Bogeys are numerous and we go to G.Q. at 0228.

Plane reports "enemy" at 0232 and at 0236 an S4 plane makes "TOTOTO" but these immediate forces are not attacked. This frequency becomes very active with traffic and grids on or near these forces, Kanoya B.C. expedites broadcast of all this.

Bogeys closing in and again G.Q. at 0635. Plane with a "TOTOTO" at 0649, (planes and bases now shifted to 6685J) and plane with "enemy" at 0651. About this time the BB North Carolina is under heavy attack from a number of planes. More grids appear and the frequency remains operational to 0930. Bases on here often resort to the use of ICW to contact and work planes.

6640

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

27 March 1945, Cont.

6640A and 6740A were also active in the morning, the latter partly so with attack/search planes of 6685J that were returning to base. This remains active until 1530 and gives planes directions where to land. Two planes of the same series that showed on 3342J/6685J were found on 6640A.

After 1600 all air was quiet with the exception of 3342J which was active from 2054 to 2201.

Days coverage:

3057J	3342J	5337J	6640A	6650A	6685J
6740A	7035J	MIKA B.C.			

New frequencies:

5075M Spec A.B. calls to plane.
6082M KN and KNN A/C calls with Drill.
6854M Spec A.B. calls to plane, probable 6855J.

Respectfully submitted,

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest,
CRM, USN
RinC.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

Contained herein is the report
of R I U activities for the
period 28 March 1945 to 3 April
1945 inclusive.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

28 March 1945.

Fueling and re-arming. 0800 position 24.43N - 132.47E.

This day was fairly quiet from our view point, several air frequencies were intermittently active but no search or tactical frequencies concern us at the moment.

6740A was most active from 0620 to 1840 but bulk of traffic was considered Drill though not so prefixed. However, use of Kana after message NR seems to denote Drill. One plane sent widely divergent grids within a short space of time. No traffic from this frequency showed on the broadcasts.

In the afternoon we pass close by Minami Daito Jima and it is probable that we are reported by that island. Two or three operationals from Minami to Kanoya and others would seem to bear this out.

It is learned that the Jap fleet may appear so all possible fleet and fleet air frequencies are checked when so practicable.

The bases on 6740A are lately very prompt to inform the planes as to conditions of fields and status of alerts etc.

A search was conducted on 6650A today and planes there reported forces in the Okinawa area.

On the Fighter Director frequency of 7820J two transmitters were noted using the call YOSUE.

Days coverage:

5075M 5337J 5890A 6115J 6640A 6650A
6740A 7820J TAWO and MIKA B.C.s

Some A.G. 903 detachments were noted on 5890A this day.

New frequencies:

3340M Macassar S.P.B., #2 Soex Fleet SP AttGrp and unident, all K008.
3593M Spec A.B. calls, brief.
3966M Spec A.B. calls, no traffic.
4835M Okinawa Spec B.F. Cdr and Okinawa Midget Sub Base.
6595M Bases and Planes, no traffic.
6740M Spec A.B. calls, signals weak and not a part of 6740A.
6856M Spec A.B. calls, probable 6855J.
7897M A.B. Hyakurigahara (FU-3) to KKN unident.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

29 March 1945.

0400 position, 28.42N - 131.20E. Strikes on Kyushu and search for Jap fleet reported on the loose.

In the early hours air frequencies with the exception of slight action on 5075M and 3342J were quiet, no evidence of an extensive search. No fleet action was noted on the air.

Our first strikes off at 0550 and Kanoya puts out alert, evidently from Radar, at 0600. It was found that contacts and alerts appeared on the Kanoya B.C. as fast as upon the local circuits.

At 0638 the base (KI) on 6734M directed all planes to return to base, doubtless due to raid. This places units of this frequency in Kyushu area.

Several Bogeys in the morning prove to be friendly with IFF turned off.

Numerous drill air frequencies are heard throughout the morning. 6685J became active about 1130 with fair to good signals, a grid shows at 1144 and "enemy" and grid at 1305. These seem to be North of us. 6740A and 6685J alternately handle planes but do not seem very tactical nor was 6055A which was also up.

Grids and aircraft traffic appear on Kanoya's broadcast, calls concerned have not been heard on current frequencies and search is made for them.

Bogeys are with us off and on and get close about 1400, attack is made upon us. Signal "NININI" picked off Kanoya broadcast at time of attack and we continue search for the original frequency. At 1410 things are rather warm and we fire shooting down a plane which tried to crash us, this was a Judy and he landed about twenty yards off our port beam. At 1432 we discover 7408M to be the frequency originating grids and attack signals previously mentioned. Several planes are heard there but for the rest of the time the frequency is up action is confined to call and answer.

Bogeys continue to show in our area.

Air slacks off in the afternoon, in the evening 3342J and 5075M are active and similar plane calls are noted on both frequencies. This would make 5075M a part of the aircraft communication net for Kyushu area.

At 2150 "enemy" is heard and grids commence appearing on 3342J again, plane signals are loud but positions of grids place sightings near Bungo Channel. It seems there has been a change in grids. 3342J remains active until the end of day but signals weaken.

In late evening we retire toward Okinawa area.

Beleive 7910J was heard around 1400, SATEKO4 to unidents WENOME and NUWANI, operator was very good. However, this was during a heavy air attack and as emphasis was on air we were

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

29 March 1945, Cont.

unable to measure this or stay with it, subsequent checks on this revealed no more activity.

Days coverage:

3057J 3342J 5075M 6650A 6685J 6740A
6985J 8725J 3055J/7910J (Check) M̄KA and HITU B.C.s
(3955J)

New frequencies:

3965M Spec A.B. calls.
5117M Unident with AMA numbers, traffic from DEI and this considered to be Rangoon B.F. on 5117J.
5118M Jap voice station. Reported, "enemy planes heading North over Bungo Suido", probable Lkt Stn that area.
6615M KN aircraft calls with Drill.
6622M
6734M K, N, and KN A/C calls.
6778M Bases and Planes with Drill.
7116M Tokushima A.G. to his planes, K008 calls.
7407M Bases and Planes Kyushu area, this a search and attack
7408M frequency allied with 6685J.
7896M FU-3 and FU-2 type calls with Drill.
8623M Bases and Planes, considered Drill by reason of very high numbers on traffic.

30 March 1945.

Strikes on Okinawa, 0700 position is 26.50N - 129.24E.

In early morning 3342J continues active and signals once more become strong. Bogeys about and close-in, we go to G.Q. at 0026 and our screen commences firing. A very loud plane reports being chased at 0035, our course is reported and a grid sent, other grids follow. One Bogey splashed at 0045. Several grids appear on 3342J but all seem to be on our amphib forces SE and NW of Okinawa. A great many tactical

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

30 March 1945, Cont.

signals are heard for "enemy", "illuminate", "drop flares", "enemy course" and so on. A "TOTOTO" is heard at 0114 and grids keep appearing, however none of this concerns us.

Our first strikes off at 0600.

Several air frequencies are heard throughout the day and evening but operational activity was confined to 3342J in the early morning. Nothing develops that implicates our forces. Our forces nearer Okinawa are attacked about 1345 but there is no reaction.

From O^{HI} given by A.B. Kanoya at 1805 on 7285J it is assumed the indicator (KERI022) represents 3642J.

A.B. Yokohama was heard using a FU-3 call on 6640A.

On 6650A, Okinawa B.F. Cdr. called A.B. Tansui and A.B. Koniya, A.B. Tansui and Cdr B.F. Okinawa worked thereon.

Days coverage:

3057J 3342J 5075M 6640A 6650A 6685J

6740A MIKA and TAWO B.C.s

New frequencies:

3321M KN A/C calls with Drill, same that appear on 6640M.

3696M NKN and NKK A/C calls.

3742M Spec A.B. calls.

5344M Spec A.B. and KKNN plane calls, possible transport.

5430M NNN calls, previously Drill but may now be good.

5904M CLT Kashima CLT, Bo A.B. and A.G. 931, KO08 calls.

6778M Bases and Planes.

6860M Spec A.B. calls, may be 6855J.

6950M KN A/C calls.

7110M Bases and Planes, good traffic.

7408M Reported as tactical the 29th. Spec A.B. calls only today and inactive.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

31 March 1945.

Strikes on Okinawa. 0800 position, 26.41N - 129.26E.
Our first strikes off at 0550.

A couple of Oscars are splashed in the early morning but no action was noted on current frequencies. All air activity seemed to concern flights, several frequencies were heard but nothing developed operationally. At end of day 3342J became active and grids appear around 2330, these are not on us.

Days coverage:

3057J 3342J 5075M 5250J 6265J 6640A
6650A 6685J 6740A 6855J 7110M MIKA B.C.

New frequencies:

4982M C.U. Tokyo and Air Flot 101 Cdr.
6548M Planes.
6555M Spec A.B.
7422M Spec A.B. Previously reported on 29th and 30th as
7408M.

1 April 1945.

Invasion of Okinawa. Position at 0400, 27.00N - 129.16E.

The day starts off with a "TOTOTO" from 3342J at 0028, this on other forces. A plane of that frequency stumbles on us at 0130 and sends a grid of our position, shortly thereafter he is splashed. Several Bogeys put in appearance about 0155 and more grids follow, action continues here until 0627 but no attack is made upon us.

Our first strikes off at 0500.

Air action was apparently confined to search, grids of us and other forces appeared from time to time. 6650A, 6685J, 6740A, 7035J and 7110M were all logged from time to time. In the evening 3342J and 5075M were up and same series of plane calls were common to both, the latter frequency may have been used for returning planes.

5075 was averaged this day.

Days coverage:

3342J 5075A 6640A 6650A 6685J 6740A

121

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

1 April 1945, Cont.

Days coverage, Cont:

7035J 7110M MIKA and HITU B.C.s.

New frequencies:

4020M KK calls similar to those heard on 5255J/5430J,
traffic seems to be aircraft.

6059M Planes with Drill.

6154M KN A/C.

6570M Bases and Planes with weak signals.

7186M KN A/C calls, brief.

7605M C.U. Tokyo and A.B. Kanoya, this probable day
frequency for 3800M reported previously.

8048M A.B. Hakata to planes and unident FU-3.

2 April 1945.

Okinawa strikes. Position at 0500, 26.30N - 129.16E.

Considerable activity and numerous planes on 3342J at the start of day, tactical signals and grids show in quantity. About 0330 additional planes appear on here and the total is large. By 0400 Bogeys are close and we go to G.Q. at 0410, our screen firing by 0420. At 0431 a plane reports "enemy" and sends a grid on us. Shortly after he reports being chased and is splashed by our CAP, was a Betty.

Reception was poor at beginning of day and by 0500 is very bad.

Several other air frequencies are up in the morning but nothing concerning us, by noon all air is quiet and activity is only intermittent for the rest of the day and evening. 3371M proves to be the night frequency for 6740A. Bases and planes are again active on 5075A in the evening.

The weather is very poor at night so probably explains lull in air operations.

Days coverage:

3342J 3371M 5075A 6580J 6640A 6650A
6685J 6740A 7110M MIKA B.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV -10

2 April 1945, Cont.

New frequencies:

5430M SATEK04 to C.U. Singapore.

6070M K and KN calls.

6075M K and KN A/C calls.

6155M K and KN calls.

6550M Spec A.B. calls, brief.

3 April 1945.

Position at 0600, 23.09N - 130.52E. In vicinity of the fueling grounds but heavy seas prevent fueling or re-arming. Reception was generally poor throughout the day.

Several air frequencies are logged, grids show on 3342J and 6685J but all activity is a considerable distance from us. A quiet day from our view point and a welcome change.

Days coverage:

2980J 3342J 3370A 5075A 6650A 6685J

6740A TAWO and MIKA B.C. s.

3370 averaged this day.


New frequencies:

7116M Tokushima A.G. to his plane.

7323M Kasumigaura A.G. to planes, brief.

5342M Unident KKNN calls.

Respectfully submitted,


E. J. Forrest,
CRM USN,
RinC.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

Report of R I U activities
for the period 4 April 1945
to 10 April 1945 inclusive.

4 April 1945.

Re-fuel and re-arm at sea. Position at 0400, 23.45N - 128.54E. Sea still rough.

Again several air frequencies are heard but only small action noted, nothing shows in our area. Receiving conditions were only fair today and from 1340 to 1435 there was a complete signal null possibly due to sun spots. Antennas and gear checked over during this time and found a broken insulator on one fore and aft antennae, this does not affect our reception however. One SX-28 that had been shaken up badly by bomb explosion of 18 March is steadily becoming inefficient and will be repaired at first opportunity.

It is noted that Kanoya's B.C. often compromises his FU-3 call by using it on the B.C.

Days coverage:

3057J 4017M 5075A 5337J 6650A 6740A
9045J MIKA and TAWO B.C.s

New frequencies:

5240M K calls, very brief.
5475M N and NN calls with A/C procedure.

5 April 1945.

Strikes on Ishigaki, Myako and others of the Sakishima group. Position at 0600, 23.04N - 126.58E.

Contacts and sightings resultant from our strikes were from forty minutes to an hour late in coming on the air, they showed first on the TAWO broadcast and continued to appear there about as fast as on the local circuits.

5075A units handled Drill traffic this day. Considerable action noted on 6740A and a few other air circuits were heard but none concerned us or became operational until 3342J does so about 2340.

Kanoya was noted using call OMARO to designate that base in signals to planes, as in instructions concerning landings.

During a lull in his MIKA B.C. Kanoya was heard using the broadcast transmitter and the call E to work SE, at 1843

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~MIKA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

5 April 1945, Cont.

using this call he sent SEØ the following: ROKETUTOWOHA TUSIYASITE followed by a long dash. Then he picked up his broadcast again. This was thought to be the signal "launch rockets" and the long dash for "execute". Nothing further developed on this and no more information obtained.

Days coverage:

3057J	3342J	3720J	4017M	5075A	5250J
5290A	5337J	6650A	6740A	6855J	7035J

MIKA and TAWO broadcasts.

New frequencies:

4209M A.B. Kasumigaura to A.B. Hakata, possible 4205M.

6011M KN calls, brief.

6 April 1945.

Fueling and re-arming. Position at 0600, 23.18N - 130.26E.

The days action commences with 3342J, numerous planes thereon and one at 0324 said "we will make torpedo attack at 0330", at 0328 he sent "Form for attack". We learn that units close to Okinawa are under attack at this time. This frequency slows down about 0530 and planes are noted on 3370A and a bit later on 6740A so it is presumed that they are returning to base.

6685J becomes operational at 0730 with new plane groups showing, planes report "carriers", send grids and the frequency becomes very busy. New calls appear about 1038 and some of the older ones come up on 6740A to return to base. More sightings and grids follow, new planes appear again at 1500 and things are quite brisk until 1730 then quiet down.

Other air circuits appeared during the day but did not do much except for 6650A which had a few grids. All is very slack in the evening until 2255 when 3342J is heard briefly.

On 6535M, a base and plane circuit, some units were passing Drill traffic but others sent tactical signals that seemed authentic. Signals referred to approach on enemy and bombing attacks, these seemed to check with a report of an attack on others of our forces.

Kanoya was noted using the call OMARO, previously

TOP SECRET

USS Yorktown CV-10

ULTRA

6 April 1945, Cont.

mentioned on 5 April, on 6740A to work planes which seemed to be Army units from traffic sent and procedure employed, it is possible that this is an Army air field at Kanoya.

Days coverage:

3057J 3342J 3370A 4017M 5075A 6640A
6650A 6685J 6740A MIKA and TAWO broadcasts.

New frequencies:

5711M CruDiv 22 Cdr called by ANAØ42, these are 6490J units.
5875M KKN A/C calls with Drill.
6349M KN A/C calls.
6535M Bases and Planes, Drill and good traffic.
6744M A.G. 903 Yokosuka Det Cdr and A.G. 903 Komatsushima Det.
6745M Unident K008 plane calls from Spec A.B. and usual type of plane calls.
7896M Unident FU-3 and KKN calls.

7 April 1945.

Position at 0600, 26.46N - 129.54E.

Air confined to 3342J in the early morning, signals are strong and a couple report being chased and a grid shows at 0204. We have Bogeys appear but are not too close, signals weaken and are last heard at 0317. After a quiet period 6685J is operational at 0719 and grids on us are sent, these are passed around to all hands. Plane that reported us sends other grids and a number of reports of "carriers" are made. Radar was somewhat slow in picking these planes up but got on them shortly after we were sighted. About 1120 some of these planes are found on 6740A and considered to be going home. Bogeys are numerous around 1200 and 6685J continues to be hot.

At 1050 we sent off a VB and VTB strike against the Jap fleet reported to be off the Southern tip of Kyushu, to this time no transmissions of the Jap fleet were heard here though a check has been maintained.

At about 1220 Task Group 58.3 is under attack, Bogeys are numerous in these areas and several report being chased

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

7 April 1945, Cont.

on 6685J, these times check with times of Bogey splashes. Frequency is very busy with grids and reports of "carriers" but no attack signals were heard while 58.3 was being hit.

In the afternoon 6580J becomes tactical and signals are good. Several Bogeys draw near and a number of Judys are splashed about 1400. At 1406 a 6580J plane reports "carrier planes" and more such follow, grids appear. Things continue to be hot and plane says he is dropping bombs at 1509, more "carriers" are reported and the attack signal "NININI" is sent at 1525. Two Francis are splashed at 1540.

Our forces are under attack from about 1215 to 1600, different Task Groups at varying times. Many Bogeys are splashed by gunfire and by the CAP.

By 1700 6580J had slowed down considerably and died out eventually.

Kanoya's B.C. channel and A.B. Kanoya on 6685J became mixed today and the MIKA was also heard on 6685J about 1535. This frequency became inactive about 1730.

In the evening 5290A is the only really active air heard though some others are up occasionally. Planes hereon used Spec A.B. calls and sometimes added numeral to last Kana. One of these (W03RO) became very loud and was evidently in our area. He requested bearings from a base and transmitted for bearings after being so directed by the base N18KO, this base also instructed him to make transmissions each five minutes and he did so, much holding of key down. This was reported to CIC and Flag Plot and the former said a Bogey showed at 2230. Base N18KO sends bearing as of 2255 "HOKO 126,2250". From then on plane becomes weaker and is last heard at 2335, about the time he was going away the Bogey CIC had also shoved off. Bearing given plane would seem to indicate that base N18KO was Shanghai or even Naha but the former more likely. It is considered a possibility that this plane made his transmissions to get bearings but also to beam other planes out to the forces or to fix a course for them to use in coming out here.

Our returned strikes against the Jap fleet gave report that they sunk the BB Yamato, the CL Yahagi, the DD Terutsuki¹⁵ and two other DDs and damaged others. Checks for transmissions by the Jap fleet were made at approximate time of attack by our planes but nothing was heard. At the time we were again more seriously concerned with imminent air attacks upon ourselves.

Days coverage:

3342J 3370A 4020M 5075A 5290A 6580J

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

7 April 1945, Cont.

Days coverage, Cont:

6650A 6685J 6740A MIKA and TAWO broadcasts.

New frequencies:

5430M KK and KKN aircraft calls.

5686M KNN aircraft calls, Drill.

6226M Bases and Planes, Drill.

6347M KN aircraft calls.

6504M KKNN unidents, probable Basefor or Deffor circuit.

8 April 1945.

Support strikes on Okinawa. Position at 0300, 26.20N - 129.40E.

The day starts off slowly with little air activity, a few frequencies are heard but none become operational. 5337J was busy with planes and these believed to be making flights from base to base.

Afternoon is still quiet and we top off DDs. Bogeys show up at 1430 and a couple are splashed but there is no R I reaction on current frequencies. Possible search planes are heard off and on this day but nothing develops from it. The evening and night were also inactive, a nice quiet day.

Receiving conditions were fair to poor.

Days coverage:

5075A 5290A 5337J 6550J 6640A 6685J

6740A 7035J MIKA broadcast.

New frequencies:

5085M C. U. Takao and the unident 'SIKOSU.

5217M A.B. Kanoya and unident FU-3 call.

6344M Unident FU-2 call to Jerk.

6778M Bases and Planes with Drill.

8432M Bases and Planes with Drill, possible 8435J.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

9 April 1945.

Sweeps on Minami and other Nansei Shoto islands. Our 0300 position, 25.42N - 130.37E.

A quiet morning, some aircraft appear on 5337J but do not concern operations. 6268M bases and planes were up about 0600 passing traffic in KA separator code but went down in a short time.

In the evening 6650A was heard for a few hours but nil developed. 5290A was active all evening and up to the close of day, planes hereon may have been the ones that struck at Okinawa forces. Planes again noted using Spec A.B. calls here.

Unident KKK and KKKK calls were noted calling Spec A.B. call on 5075A at 0545 and 0547, these were not answered and were not heard again.

Kanoya's broadcast handled a good amount of four numeral Army traffic this day.

Days coverage:

3057J 5075A 5290A 5305J 5337J 6115J
6550J 6650A

New frequencies:

3622M KKN unidents with Drill.

5985M A.G. 903 Detachments.

6065M K and KN aircraft calls.

6268M Bases and Planes.

6340M K and KN aircraft calls.

6347M KN aircraft calls.

6714M A.B. Tansui and Oshima Deffor unit, KO08 calls.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

10 April 1945.

Fueling and re-arming. Position at 0400, 24.32N - 132.21E .

The early hours produce no air and all is quiet. Reception is very poor. A few air frequencies are heard throughout the day and evening but nothing develops to concern us.

Late evening finds us on a course back toward Okinawa.

Days coverage:

3057J 5075A 5250J 5290A 6268M 6345A
6650A 6650A 6685J 6740A 7035J MIKA and TAWQ.

6345 K and KN calls averaged this day.

New frequencies:

3252M C.U. 12 to KK unident.

3343M A.B. Kanoya and C.U. Sasebo.

5274M KN calls, thought to be low for 5291M.

5291M Kn calls.

6149M KKNN calls, vessel and probable China area unit.

6495M KKNN unidents.

6506M

6550M Base to Planes.

Respectfully submitted,

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest,
CRM USN,
RinC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

~~ULTRA~~

Report of R I U operations for
the period 11 April 1945 to 16
April 1945 inclusive.

Fighter sweeps on the Nansei Shoto islands. Position at
0600, 26.27N - 130.05E .

The early morning hours are very quiet and produce no air. The rest of the morning hours a few frequencies show but only 6685J develops into anything operational. Search planes hereon become very loud and around 0940 grids which are close to us are sent. Frequency gets very busy with traffic, sightings of "enemy" and planes with "TUSEU" as they encounter our CAP. It is noted that the "TUSEU" is often followed by the last numeral of the planes call as a means of identifying originator of transmission. At 1126 after a "TUSEU" a plane reports he is making a forced landing and this is confirmed by CIC who states that one is smoking and going down. The plane is unheard here again. From 1145 to 1400 this frequency is somewhat slow though planes are still present and not far from us. At 1400 we have many Bogeys and commence a three man watch which lasts until 1712.

By 1430 our CAP has splashed many Bogeys but plenty are left and closing in, our guns commence firing at 1443 and the attack is underway. No particular R I reaction noted prior to the attack other than loud signals.

A loud plane reports "enemy" and "carriers" and sends a grid on us at 1445. The attack is in progress and we are firing heavily at this time. Various other grids and traffic make their appearance. After this the attack draws off but closes again at 1615 and our screen is firing at 1625. Loud signals prevail and a plane reports "three carriers" at 1627, traffic and grids in our area follow. The base repeats this to all hands.

Activity remains high for a time and then relatively quiet until time of shift to 3342J at 1812. Some units remained on 6685J until 1920 and a few of these keyed both frequencies or else harmonics were unusually good.

ETAs in the battle area began to appear upon 6685J at 1800 and continued to show on 3342J so another attack was expected. We have a multitude of Bogeys by 1830, splashes are reported by our CAP from time to time. A little traffic is passed on 3342J but mostly keys are held down for short periods, Bogeys appear to be forming up.

Around 1850 a preliminary attack is made upon these forces and we commence firing. Signals of "enemy" and grids appear about 1900, Bogeys close in again and we fire at 1902. The major attack is precipitated by a "TOTOTO" at 1903 and others that follow. Much firing here and by all around us, 3342J is a bedlam for a time with numerous

"attack" signals.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

11 April 1945, Cont.

At 1916 a 3342J plane makes "we will drop torpedoes" and another sends the same at 1922, signals for "flares" and "drop torpedoes" follow. Our screen firing heavily at 1930. Frequency is madly active with tactical signals of all types and plain language. It is evident that one of the other nearby forces is being attacked. At 1950 a plane here reports "two fiery columns".

Frequency becomes quiet from 2030 to 2300 when we have many Bogeys again, a few report being chased and more grids appear and this continues to the end of the day.

A night frequency for 6580J was found in 3291M at 2036 and this handled planes previously heard on 3342J/6685J. It is considered to be used by returning planes and this is supported by traffic from planes on 3342J saying they are returning to base and their early appearance thereafter upon 3291M. The frequencies of 3370A/6740A were unheard this day and it is possible that 3291M/6580J have replaced them as homing frequencies.

Traffic from 6685J was heard being broadcast upon 6432M by an unident KKK call in the morning.

A.B. Tansui was called by A.B. Koniya on 6650A.

Days coverage:

3342J	5075A	5290A	6345A	6580J	6650A
6685J	7035J	MIKA B.C.			

New frequencies:

3291M Bases and planes, night for 6580J.
5430M KK and NNN calls, may be Bases and planes.
6142M Bases and planes, brief and weak.
6432M Unident KK calls, one with UTU numbers, see above.
6964M Spec A.B. and KKN calls.
7178M KN aircraft calls.
8047M Bases and planes, Drill.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

12 April 1945.

Position about the same as for the 11th of April 1945.

The new day again finds 3342J very active. A couple of planes of the same group send "TUSEU", one sends grid and is heard no more. Our CAP reported splashing a museum piece Mavis about this time. Grids continue to show and new planes make appearance. At 0040 the base calls and sends probable Opord to four KKK calls which are considered to be plane groups. Planes are plentiful on this frequency and activity continues high until 0330, Bogeys are near us at the time.

A new frequency of 3320M, proven night for 6640A, shows at 0110 and planes heard on 3342J appear on there, others also show and this seems to be an operational rather than a homing frequency. This stays active until time of shift to 6640A at 0650.

Planes returning to the base in the early morning again used 3290A.

At 0700 6685J is heard and is mildly active in the morning. The frequency of the hour seemed to be 6580J for about 0815 we have a number of Bogeys and this frequency becomes busy with signals strong. Reports of "enemy", "one carrier", "twenty different enemy units" and other contacts including bearings and distance follow by 0834. One or more planes on here are evidently Jap Army jobs by the traffic, three numeral, and procedure employed. Bases use Army procedure with these and standard Navy with the others, there is no ident for the base call KITEMA and it could be an another Army field. Plane calls of the same groups also appear on 6685J.

A brief flurry of contact signals around 1305 seems to be the final tactical use of 6580J, later in the afternoon it is used by returning planes and its night frequency of 3290A came into the same use later in the evening.

About 1300 6685J comes into its own again, planes are numerous here and signals good. Signal for "prepare to attack" and "attack" are heard at 1414 and 1425 respectively. Nothing in our area at this time but Okinawa has many Bogeys and raid is in that vicinity. A plane makes "target for attack" followed by a grid at 1429. Several "form for attack" and "attack" signals are heard from four or five different planes. These are all of the same call group and probably led attack planes out to target and will report results as they do not attack themselves, this last gleaned from signals "I am not participating in this attack" which are sent.

A "TOTOTOSESESE" (attack battleships) is made and one plane later reports hits upon a BB. From activity it seems that attack lasted until near 1500.

A new burst of signals develops and from grids and signals it seems as if a cruiser force West of Okinawa were

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

12 April 1945, Cont.

attacked. By 1600 action on here is reduced to bases and planes keeping in communication with occasional traffic.

The spell is broken at 1907 by the signal "prepare to attack", this is not signed nor is the sighting of "enemy carrier planes" that he sent, doubtless he was splashed. "Form for attack" and "attack" are heard again at 1940 and from the weak signals it appears that attack is on or near the island again. Units shift to 3342J at 2009 and action continues brisk with tactical signals and grids appearing.

Around 2100 signals become louder and signals to indicate the use of flares and a torpedo attack are heard. Apparently one of the Task Groups is jumped but not in this particular force. This seems to be the last effort of the day but the frequency stays up and working to the end of day.

The re-occurrence of RESA procedure in call ups was noted today in a few instances on 6685J, this had not been seen for a month or more.

The Spec A.B. call TI3KE was heard both on 6650A and on 6267M this day. Kanoya's broadcast transmitter and the one for Kanoya A.B. on 6685J were in bad shape around noon.

Days coverage:

3290A	5075A	5290A	6345A	6580J	6640A
3342J	6650A	6685J	6740A	MIKA broadcast.	

3290 averaged this day. 6740A was heard but did not appear to be associated with current operations.

New frequencies:

3320M Bases and Planes, night for 6640A.

5979M A.G. 903 Detachments.

6267M Bases and Planes.

6530M Bases and Planes.

6636M Bases and Planes.

6739M Base to Plane, call only.

6742M Unident FU-3 type calls.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

1313 April 1945.

Position at 0400, 26.15N - 130.21E.

As customary of late 3342J is in full swing at the new day. Planes with very strong signals and one releases a grid. New planes here by 0300 and one sends a grid which seems to be upon us, another at 0350. Frequency is active until 0523.

3290A and 3320A were active in the early hours and some planes were common to both. Operator on 3290A noticed that one of three bases there only handled planes of one series.

6650A was up intermittently throughout the early hours and the day but became quite busy in the evening.

On 6155M at 0634 a plain language sighting despatch was intercepted, this is believed to be a 5th Air Regt frequency.

At 0643 6640A became active and planes previously heard upon 3290A and 3320A are found thereon.

At 0724 6580J showed with another Army plane working there employing Army procedure and passing three numeral traffic. New planes appear and signals are good but this does not become operational.

A plane on 6685J reports "enemy" at 0909 and sends a grid, our CAP jumped him at 0910 and he sent "TUSEU" and his grid again followed by "three carriers". At 0925 he reported "I am on fire" and at 0928 he sent his "Banzai", this was the last heard of him. A brother plane also sends a grid on us at 0935. The rest of the day this frequency was mildly active to inactive.

A number of air circuits were logged today but none were tactical and no attacks were made.

Days coverage:

3290A	3320A	3342J	4020M	5075A	5290A
6267A	6580J	6640A	6650A	6685J	7035J

MIKA broadcast. 3320 and 6267 averaged today.

New frequencies:

5875M Bases and Planes with Drill.

6155M KN aircraft calls, plain language contacts here.

6155M Bases and Planes, conventional calls.

6636M Bases and Planes.

6740M Unident FU-3 type calls.

6948M Bases and Planes.

8050M Bases and Planes, Drill.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

14 April 1945.

Position at 0400, 26.17N - 130.08E.

A plane starts the day off with "enemy" on 3342J at 0029 but cancels this at 0035. Little more occurs except for a plane with "TUSEU" at 0130. Signals were all weak and last heard here at 0247 but later appear on 3320A. A couple of air frequencies other than these were up intermittently but all was quiet by 0400.

A Bogey is splashed at 0508 but no reaction is noted.

A few air frequencies appear by 0600 and at 0711 6685J shows up, a plane there sights "enemy" at 0823. Considerable traffic is passed and good signals are heard but all quiets down from 1100 to 1245. Plane at 1316 sights "enemy planes" and soon after a Zeke and Betty are splashed and this is followed by two more Bettys going down at 1334. Bogeys are very numerous.

At 1342 a plane gives the signal "prepare to attack", grids and reports of "one carrier" and "two carriers" are heard. A plane sends a grid on us at 1434 and several messages, all are repeated to all hands by the base. Activity dies out at 1530.

During all this a great many splashes are made by the CAP and the total is twenty two or better.

6580J was very active at 0850 with many reports from planes of "enemy", "carrier" and so forth. Planes put out more Army traffic which does us no good but also send a number of tactical signals for "seven enemy" and "carrier". At 0939 a plane inquired of the base if "enemy attack certain" and the base replied in the negative. This is quiet until 1528 when a brief flurry develops again but soon dies out.

Commencing at 1700 6650A was busy with a number of aircraft and at 1902 a "TOTOTO" is heard and another from a weaker plane at 1914 and one more from the first at 1925. We have no Bogeys at the time but a big attack is in progress at or near Okinawa. At 1938 and 1942 traffic is intercepted indicating that the attack is completed. All quiet at 2100.

About 1930 we have Bogeys show up and signals on 3342J become good, Bogeys close in and our CAP knocks down two of four planes. Plane on 3342J reports "enemy" and "enemy battleships" at 1947 and a grid on us shows at 1952, more contacts and grids follow. Signals regarding illumination and course appear then, "TOTOTO" at 2025. Signals to mean "am making torpedo attack" at 2026 and 2029 the signal RASE which is taken to mean "attack completed". A plane reports "a fiery column" at 2032. This attack was apparently upon nearby forces, no passes are made at us though Bogeys come close.

3290A was occupied in the late evening with returning planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS Yorktown CV-10

14 April 1945.

Continued.-

This was another day of heavy though intermittent air activity, numerous frequencies were logged that did not become operational.

The Spec A.B. call KI6Y0 was heard on 6650A and 6632M and the call HI6ME was common to both 6650A and 6267A.

Days coverage:

3290A	3320A	3342J	5075A	5890A	6055A
6150M	6267A	6345A	6580J	6650A	6685J

MIKA broadcast. 6055 averaged this day.

New frequencies:

6147M KKNN unidents beleived to be Shanghai units.

6491M KKNN unidents.

6492M Spec A.B. calls.

6530M Bases and Planes, Army A.G. 96 concerned here.

6632M Bases and Planes.

7272M Bases and Planes, think to be Army units.

7766M Bases and Planes.

15 April 1945.

Position at 0500, 24.04N - 132.06E. Re-fuel and re-arm.

Various air frequencies are heard this day but none concern us nor become operational. A very satisfactory day.

Days coverage:

3167J	3290A	3320A	3342J	5075A	6267A
6580J	6650A	6685J	7035J	MIKA broadcast.	

New frequency: 8050M Bases and Planes, think Drill.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

16 April 1945.

Position at 0400, 26.46N - 129.54E, back at Okinawa area.

Once again the day is started with a burst of activity on 3342J, planes with "TUSEU", "enemy" and grids shortly after the beginning of the day. These are not very loud and ensuing hours bring more contacts which are not on us, things quiet again at 0444.

Various other frequencies show in the early morning but do not become operational.

At 0730 action starts on 6685J with grids and a "TUSEU". A report of "one carrier" and grid seems to be us and signals become louder. Many tactical signals and grids show, action builds up to 0930 when signal for "attack" appears followed by a grid at 0933. Other forces are jumped at this time, the "TUSEU"s fly thick and fast then activity dies down for a while.

At 1206 a very strong plane reports "two carriers" and sends a grid, others follow. Bogeys closing on us at 1330 and our screen fires heavily. Planes at this time are quiet except for an occasional key held down briefly. At this time the CV Intrepid in our group is hit by a Kamikaze job. Planes still just holding key down. Bogeys come after us, screen fires again and we join in at 1512 and this goes on to 1519.

Bogeys are still with us but action dies down on 6685J at 1649.

In the morning 6650A was inactive but became active at 1720 with loud signals and a plane reports "enemy planes" at 1725. Bogeys are still around us. Plane reports making a forced landing at 1751 but neither operator here or at the base is able to read his call. Despite good signals nothing develops from this frequency.

Bogeys are plentiful for us about 1845 and closing in. 3342J warms up at 1856 and signals for "enemy", "prepare to attack" and "attack" develop from 2045 to 2058, signals are very loud. Planes make "illuminate" and "attack" at 2103, "will make torpedo attack" at 2111 and "cease illumination" at 2115" shows at 2113. This attack is very apparently on our forces but not on this particular ship. At 2118 a plane on 3342J called KAWI (a 4017M base) and sent signal for "one fiery column", frequency slows down after this.

During above attack 4017M was also up and units from 3342J were heard there, at 2119 a plane thereon made "no illumination needed" so this frequency was involved with the attack also. Action simmers down here at 2156. Earlier in the day this frequency showed calls from both 3342J and 7035J so all seem tied in for the present operations.

A plain language service message on 6155A at 0640 said that call SU2 was either at Tokushima or is that A.B. and that SULL is at Matsuyama or is that A.B. Kanoya A.B. was

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

16 April 1945, Cont.

noted on here using his FU-3 call and the call E.

Days coverage:

3290A	3320A	3342J	4017M	5290A	5890A
6155A	6225J	6267A	6580J	6640A	6650A
6685J	7035J	MIKA broadcast.			

New frequencies:

3320M KNN and KKKN calls.

3600M Bases and Planes.

5138M KN and KKK calls, call only.


6666M Spec A.B. and FU-3 type calls.

7127M Bases and Planes.

7766M Spec airbase calls.

8035M Bases and Planes, consider Drill.

Respectfully submitted,


E. J. Forrest
CRM USN,
RinC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10

16 April 1945.

Addenda.

Widespread use of the signal "TUSEU" to denote "being chased" or "followed" in the past month would seem to indicate that at least some Jap planes have some method of picking up our pursuing planes other than by visual means. The number of Jap planes actually surprised and shot down appears to be diminishing. It is obvious that Jap search planes are Radar equipped but often the planes involved are not search planes, in many cases fighter planes heard have used this signal.

Growing lack of tactical signals prior to, during and after attacks of late may be explained in one of several ways.

1. Planes concerned have a good fix on the target from grids furnished by search planes and do not need to communicate.
2. Planes may be Jap Army and employ voice exclusively, either ultra high or intermediate frequencies though the latter is not likely.
3. Use of mixed Air Groups may preclude communications through inability to make plan in time.
4. Search planes, who seem to favor holding key down for several moments, may find target, send grids and then beam attack planes in by holding key down for bearings.
5. Japs may have gained knowledge of the presence of R I U afloat and are becoming security conscious.

In many cases no transmissions are made by planes on search or other missions until actually over or near our forces or in the battle area. Often the first knowledge of an attack is gained from the signal "TOTOTO".

The use of the security procedure (.. and ..) to maintain communication is becoming so universal that even drill circuits utilize it.

Due to lack of current frequency book and very little frequency information from Jusits there will be a great many discrepancies between frequencies reported by this unit and those FruPac are cognizant with.

Respectfully submitted,

E. J. Forrest
E. J. Forrest, Rinc.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS Yorktown CV-10


Personnel.

16 April 1945.

On 15 April 1945 L.D. Levitt, RM2/c USNR reported to this unit from CV Bunker Hill to fill vacancy in complement occasioned by departure of E. J. Forrest, CRM USN.

As of 16 April 1945 duties as RinC of R I U aboard this vessel are turned over to B. A. Lee, CRM USNR.

Respectfully submitted,


E. J. Forrest,
CRM USN.

7 May, 1945

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Officer in Charge R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSix.
Officer in Charge Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific.

From:
To:
Subject:

Report of R.I.U. operations.

Report of operations from 17 April 1945 to 23 April 1945,
inclusive, enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss
W. M. KLUSS,
Lt.(jg), USNR,
Officer in Charge.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV 10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 17 April 1945
to 23 April 1945, inclusive.

1. A continuous two man watch was maintained throughout the week. When operations required, three operators were used, utilizing one man of the "off watch" section.

2. Frequency coverage for the week was as is outlined below.

DATES:	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
FREQ.							
7875a	Speaker	Speaker	Speaker	Speaker	Speaker	Speaker	Speaker
3937A							
6685J	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck
3342J	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg
6640A	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check	Part	Part
3320A						covrg	covrg
6650A	Part	Part	Part	Part	Part	Part	Part
	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg
6267A	Part	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check
	covrg						
7035J	Part	Part	Check	Part	Part	Check	Part
	covrg	covrg		covrg	covrg		covrg
5852M	Part	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check	Part
	covrg						covrg
7200M	Part	Check	Check	Check	Part	Part	Check
3600M	covrg				covrg	covrg	
8035A	Part	Check	Part	Check	Part	Check	Part
4017A	covrg		covrg		covrg		covrg
6115J	Check	Check	Part	Check	Check	Check	Check
3057J			covrg				
5290A	Check	Part	Check	Part	Part	Check	Check
		covrg		covrg	covrg		
6842J			Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck	Cont ck
					& covrg	& covrg	& covrg

2. (frequency coverage, continued)

DATES:	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
FREQS. 5075A	Check	Check	Check	Part covrg	Check	Check	Part covrg
5135M				Part covrg	Part covrg	Part covrg	Part covrg
6740A 3370A	Check	Check	Check	Check	Part covrg	Check	Check
5882M					Part covrg	Part covrg	Part covrg
6290J					Part covrg	Part covrg	
6055A	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check
6580A 3290A	Check	Check	Check	Check	Check	Part covrg	Check
3170M						Part covrg	Check
5345J						Part covrg	

3. New frequencies heard are outlined below. The amount of time spent and dope logged on these frequencies is sparse in some cases, but was determined by the relative value of the frequency to present or future operations.

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS	USE	IDENTS
6534m	4/17/45	Spec AB	Bases	?
6334M	4/17/45	KN	?	?
6065M	4/17/45	KN KKN	P's B's	Appears to be drill
4333M	4/17/45	KN K	?	?
7200M	4/17/45	Spec AB	P's B's	Day freq for 3600M reported by Hornet RIU
6666M	4/17/45	Fu 3 Calls	P's B's(?)	Little dope on this.
8050M	4/17/45	NN De K	?	?
6451M	4/17/45	KN K	?	?
7894M	4/18/45	Spec AB	P's B's	Drill
6716M	4/18/45	Koo3 Calls	Ooshima Def Unit	To&De Tansui AB

3. (new frequencies, continued)

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS	USE AND	IDENTS
5253M	4/19/45	N De N	?	?
6844M	4/19/45	KNK De KKK	J Army	?
6857M	4/19/45	Spec AB	P's B's	Does not appear to be drill
5335M	4/19/45	KKN K	Possibly	5335J
6866M	4/20/45	KNK De(unsign)		?
8415M	4/20/45	Spec AB	Bases	?
5882M	4/20/45	SPEC AB	DRILL?	Fu suffix on calls at times
6573M	4/20/45	KN	Drill	P's B's
6372M	4/20/45	Spec AB	?	?
6740M	4/20/45	Koo8 Calls	P's B's	Kure Agrp To&De NavAir Depot 11 plane
5135M	4/20/45	Spec AB	P's B's	Kushira AB, also possible Korean Air Base(from tfc analysis)
8660M	4/21/45	?	-UMo BC	Handles Kyushu Alerts
6340M	4/21/45	KNN KN K	P's B's	Uses A/C security procedure.
6025J 5996M	4/21/45	Koo8 Calls	Tajimazaki AirDefComd Sta	De Nomosaki Lkt
6157M	4/21/45	KN	P's B's	A/C security procedure used.
7030M	4/21/45	K	?	?
8050M	4/21/45	Spec AB	P's B's	
3145M	4/21/45	Fu 3 Calls	Kanoya to unidents bases	(note- 4/25 AB Kushira to unidents)
5293M	4/22/45	Spec AB	Bases	Units not part of 5290A ckt.
8415M	4/22/45	Spec AB	Bases	?
3170M	4/22/45	KNN KN K	P's B's	A/C security procedure used.
6948M	4/22/45	Spec AB	P's B's	Previously reported on 14th as drill..no indications of drill today.
5082M	4/25/45	°Ni Mi Ne De He Ni8		Tokyo De unident possibly in the Formosan area(sez:i-ru(°SiRiRo)

4. A chronology of this task groups operations and the RI reactions with the above frequency coverage is as follows.

17 April, 1945.

Cruising East of Okinawa, furnishing Combat Air Patrol and support for forces on Okinawa.

A bogey shows on the radar screen, and immediate reaction is noted on 3342J at 0002 with a plane giving a grid on us. This plane shows at this time with an S5 signal, apparently maintaining radio silence until the contact was made. Our Combat Air Patrol is right after him, reporting a splash at 0004. The plane giving the grid on us, and one other plane on this freq send out TUSEU at 0011, indicating the possibility of there being three planes in this raid or search group, with RI reaction from two of them at the time of contact, and no reaction from the other one. The base calls the two units that reported TUSEU, continuously thereafter, with no reply from them. No report is received from our VNF of more than the one splash.

The above base sends a message to two new planes at 0047, possibly directing them to our force. The planes receipt for it with S5 signals, and one of the appears over our force at 0149, giving our position in a grid. Our VNF is right on him, but he gets away, issuing a TUSEU at 0152, just four minutes after giving our position out. This plane gets off five more messages by 0455, consisting mostly of weather. The frequency 3320A is used for homing, by this plane with the shift being made at 0407 with the signal TEKA (probably meaning "shift to Otsu Channel").

At 0822 we receive word that thirty five planes are heading this way. The only previous RI indications of this, is a flight of two planes making contact with a base on 6685J from 0644 to 0712. The raid is intercepted at 0832, with the two planes on 6685J now a good S5. One plane is reported by our VF, to be in the water a hundred miles North of us. At this same time a plane on 6685J sends out a grid timed 0835, saying he is making a forced landing. This jibes with our VF report, except that this plane sends a message number one on 5852M at 0932. No sighting is made of our force, apparently, 'til 0851 when an unident plane gets out a TETETE with a grid. As he finishes the grid he dies out, apparently splashed. Only one plane appears to remain active after this raid, and he stays on 6685J, getting out several messages to the base. A search is made for other possible freqs used by these planes, but only show is a group on 5852M using NKKK calls. One of these making a landing at 0937 with the sig NEE (repeated) and the other two of this group continuing on til 1037 when they receive a KUHA from a base which appears to be Kanoya. One other possible plane is noted on 6640A at 1032 using NKKK call; securing at 1039.

The tally on this raid is 25 planes including Oscars, Tonys, and Zekes. The Zekes possibly being some indication to the lack of RI reaction. Seventeen of these are definitely splashed, and possibly all of them.

Everything is quiet 'til 1410 when two bogeys are picked up by our radar. VF reports splashing two Bettys at 1419. There was no previous indication of this activity except a short call-up of a new plane by Kanoya on 5852M, and an occasional dit S5 on 6685J from 1412 to 1419. Plane Nr.2 of the above series that was called by Kanoya, shows on 6685J at 1530 with an S5 signal. However nothing develops of this apparently, tho, he is called later at 1845 on 3342J and does not answer.

Air base Tansui and Air Base Okinawa make a short call-up and exchange of signal reports on 6650A at 1843. They end this contact with Tansui saying KoNl.O-Hi(HeI)NM, and immediately Special Air Base Calls appear; one being identified as Air Base Shinchiku, the others unidentified. Only possible follow-up of this activity, is a TOTOTO heard at 1953. This sent by unidentified unit with a weak signal. Probably a nuisance raid on Okinawa.

More calls show on 6650A and 3342J in later evening, but do not develop into either search of attack, and everything quiets down by midnight.

Radar interference is noted today for the first time, centering around 7000 Kcs. It is only S2, so doesn't bother us. At about the same time, 1516, Kanoya appears to boost his power on his broadcast. However, this and the radar interference may be due to some ionosphere disturbance. Extreme fades have been noticed before at about this time, in this area.

18 April, 1945.

Remaining East of Okinawa, in approximate position of 26;56 North, 129;32 East, for further support of Okinawa forces.

The early morning hours are very quiet. Activity is first noted at 0557 on 6650A with what appears to be one search plane, operating out of Shinchiku Air Base. At 0904 a group of plane calls show on 6685J, but nothing develops in the way of a normal search or an attack. The situations remains about the same when this group is variously replaced by other groups at 1154, 1751, 1916 and 2103. It seems possible that this whole setup is for deceptive purposes, as the few messages the base puts out during the day carries the prefix -KuRo. Also, The fact that none of the planes were heard, fairly substantiates this as deceptive. A careful search was made for the possibility of another frequency being used by the planes, but with no results.

Only authentic activity is what at first appears to be a transportation run on 6650A at 1713, with two planes working unidentified bases. However, one plane appears working Shinchiku A.B. at 1755 and breaks into an attack on Okinawa at 1940. This plane gets off several messages; one to an unidentified KNK call that seems to be another plane. Other Formosan frequencies are checked at this time, showing Takao Air Base working one possible plane on 5290A using a KNK call, but seems to concern a regular flight and there is no indications of any connections with the attack on Okinawa.

It may be noteworthy in connection with the apparent deception this afternoon, that a base on 3342J handles one message to a plane using a KNKN call at 2242 which does not have the

prefix of -KuRo as used previously.

About the only other air activity today concerned a flight of planes on 7035J at 1545, apparently heading for Air Base Kisaratsu; securing at 1640, approximately.

The new three numeral-period traffic was noted for the first time, showing on 5473M to and from unidents at 0922.

19 April, 1945.

All-out offensive is planned for today by army and naval forces in this area. We take position in area approximately 25-30North 128-40East for most of the day, flying Combat Air Patrol and Bombing Strikes.

Word received from Frupac of the proposed use of the series 3421J/6842J by the 3rd Air Fleet as a Koo Channel. This freq previously noted on the 13th and 17th of March, with Kanoya working planes using Special Air Base calls on the 17th. Little indication at that time tho, of it's use as a Koo Channel.

No search plane activities noted throughout the day. This possibly due to the B29 raids on the air bases during the day. Activity for the main part consisted of 5 bases making contact on 6685J at 0757, then securing, and 3 bases appearing on 6650A, one of them idented as Air Base Upper Nansei Shoto.

20 April, 1945.

Heading South for refueling and rearming.

Air activity light, and consists namely of numerous drills, and what appears to be deceptive communication action. This deception activity noted on 6685J, starting at 0225 with what it is believed is two bases; one of them assuming the part of a plane and carrying on normal activity. Infact a grid is handled by the supposed plane, at 1247. The fact that this is deception is judged mainly by our close association with the circuit under normal operations; the deception showing up in operator peculiarities and the plane to base signal strength ratios.

Numerous new circuits appear, but little traffic is handled and no indication obtained as to their purpose or the area concerned. These appear to be base circuits, with the exception of 5882M which appears at 1212 with a ku5te series of planes. This basic call is suffixed with Re, Fu or Hi, possibly indicating individual planes identity. Regular aircraft security procedure is used on here part of the time.

New activity shows on 5135M. Intermitant coverage of this from 1935, shows four bases and one plane, with the plane being called by two of them. One of the bases working the plane is identified as Air Base Kushira, and the other is possibly in the vicinity of Southern Korea; indicating a possibly short transport run across the channel. Considerable operational traffic is handled. Two messages are from Kushira A.B. to unidents and several are from an unident (Sa2A), routed variously to Air Group Genzan, and

for information to Kanoya A.B. Kanoya possibly not on this lash-up, as the unident (Sa2A) ask Kushira to deliver one message to Kanoya. One weather is sent from the unident (Sa2A) to Air Base Kanoya and an unident. From routing of traffic, Sa2A is in Southern Korea, and this activity may be a ferry of planes .

Another possible ferry of planes takes place on 6650A in the late evening, involving Takao Air Base, Shinchiku Air Base, and some Nansei Shoto Air Bases. This activity starts at approximately 2030 and continues til some time after 2330. Considerable traffic passed between the planes and bases in this time, but we do not have a recovery on the code at this time.

The new Koo Channel 3421J and 6842J was checked continuously throughout the day. The first appearance was at 2359, with a plane called by an unident S5 base on 3421J.

21 April, 1945.

Our force cruises in area about 120 miles East of Okinawa during the day, for Okinawa support.

Our first activity shows at 0000 on 3421J with several search planes probably operating out of Kyushu bases. These planes use the normal aircraft security system, observing very strict discipline, with the minimum of transmissions. This made it impossible at first, to tell,aurally, which was the base and which was the plane. One of these planes casually gets off his second message by 0102, possibly indicating the end of his search, when he runs into our force. At this time he disregards all security, and puts out a long winded TETETE, signing his call repeatedly. Our VNF immediately takes chase, but no reaction is noted. By 0126 another plane of this apparent three-plane-group, shows with a number one message. The third plane of this group shows at 0130, reporting that he is being chased. There is no indication, other than the S5 signal, that these planes are joining the one that made the original sighting. Possibly they do this volutarily, or are ordered as noted before, to rally around that point to substantiate the sighting. At any rate, two planes are shot down at about 0145, which it is assumed is the one that made the sighting and the second one that appeared. No reaction is noted tho, at the time of the splash. All probable air frequencies were checked, for this. At 0145, the third plane, which go t away, gets off a sighting timed 0110 which is 100 miles West of us, and follows it with three other messages which are probably weather, by 0300.

Other air activity was noted during this period, but bore no relation, apparently, to this search group, or to our forces.

Activity continues from previous night, on 6650A. No indication has yet been found, as to the mission of these planes, except possibly a large ferry of planes. Three large flights appear to be handled by Shinchiku Air Base, taking about three hours, and four other smaller flights of about an hour and a half, with Takao Air Base appearing to handle one flight of approximately three and a half hours.

A flurry of activity is noted at 0159, on 3370A by planes that are apparently homing, involving a forced landing. These units were not noted previously on any Ko Channel. Sigs concerning this are as follows; FUSI(repeated), FUSI(repeated)ORUSI"SU, FUMARINE?, FUSI(repeated)FUMARINE, MESU(repeated), MONI(repeated), and FUSU (repeated).

Bases on 5883M noted using call system, or calling procedure, again, of base charlie call suffixed with FU. This may be a new version of the plane-to-base communication security system already used, but for adaption to inter base calling security. This circuit does not seem to be operational or drill, but may be a test of this calling system, as at 0850 one of the bases, apparently the control, says .DE HA FUYOU.RENRAKUHA.RESATE"YARE, which may be "Use RESA communications system". RESA Calling system noted sometime ago. The control, after saying this, says secure 'til 0930. No dope received after this.

At 0935, a possible new broadcast is noted on 8600M using the indicator -UMO, with BC nrs. in the 700's, handling Kyushu Alerts. The broadcast indicator is omitted on these alerts, and there is about 5 minutes delay on Sasebo alerts, and 10 minutes delay on Omura alerts. Omura alerts carried a routing of all detachments of Air Group 901; apparently originating on 6550J or similar circuit.

Renewed air activity shows on 6842J at 1258, with three planes. Within an hour one of these planes sights our force. The sequence of reporting contact with our planes, sighting our CV's and giving our positions, covers a period of five minutes, indicating a very good search unit. By 1437, he gets out a message timed 1410 with three positions, which appear to be the disposition of our forces. As usual, the other two planes of the group seem to rally around, with a sighting of five of our CV's by one of these units at 1501. Our CAP is on these guys, but little RI reaction is noted to the chase; infact the number we splash does not coincide with the number appearing here. All known frequencies checked for possibility of alternate channel, but no luck. However, this activity does seem to have a deceptive counterpart today, on 6685J. This 6685J activity would lead intercept to believe that everything was normal, if he weren't on to the use of 6842J. In other words, grids rarely appear, nor contacts, and planes are rarely heard except when they are on their way home. But sufficient activity is carried on by the bases, at times seeming to act as planes, that would satisfy an RI unit as long as the planes were not contacted by our force's CAP.

Several new planes appear on 6842J at 1637, and the previous ones are apparently expected home at about 1654, as the base puts out a KUHA to them at this time.

Various other air activity appears during the evening on other freqs, but nothing of a tactical nature concerning our force, until 2130 when activity is renewed on 3421J. By 2343 six groups of plane calls appear and one of them reports being chased. The position given though, off the East coast of Kyushu, seems to be deceptive, as no forces known to be up there. Our Combat Air Patrol splashes a Betty at 2347, with a TUSEU showing at this time on 3421J.

22 April, 1945.

Ko Channel of 3421J continues to furnish us dope on what turns out to be a torpedo attack on our force. At 0124 our look-outs report a torpedo wake astern. One of the planes on 3421J puts out a message at 0156, timed 0125, saying he completed torpedo attack. This coincides with our sighting etc, except that the plane had an S3 signal at the time of the attack. This plane carried on his communications mainly, with other planes in the attacking force though, so possibly had a much smaller transmitter than usual. What appeared to be a call-up was made by the attacking plane, two minutes before the attack, at 0123, METOSU DE NEHIFU2 (his call) ?? . This may have been a tactical signal concerning torpedo attack.

A plane which has been noted since midnight, appears S5 on 3421J at 0229, and we notify Flag Plot. CIC picks a plane up on the radar immediately, and our CAP splashes him at 0310. No RI reaction is noted of the splash, however.

It seems almost definite, by this time, that the 3342J/6685J series is being used for deception. Planes seemingly appear on this frequency after they have made their contact with the force and are safely out of our range. The messages showing here give no indication of the contact. It's possible in fact, that the planes do not actually appear on here, and it is two bases carrying on this deception to conceal the use of the real tactical frequency of 3421J series.

Renewed activity on 6842J, produces a grid near Kyushu at 1130. By 1337 our forces are sighted by two of these planes, with the usual grids, weather, and disposition of our force sent to the base. Our CAP is after them and splashes one of them while in the middle of a message; the plane then forsaking the message, for screams of Banzai while on his way down.

Several planes replace this last group, at 1506 on 6842J with no contact of the forces by this latter group. They appear on 5852M for homing. At this time NKKN calls appear here also, and seem to be interchangeable with the KKN at times.

23 April, 1945.

Cruising East of Okinawa for target support.

Deception seems to continue on 3342J in the early hours. A careful watch is kept on all current air frequencies throughout the entire day, but discounting the 3342J activity, there is nothing found concerning our forces. A meager search is noted in the evening, but quiets down by 2200 with no contact of our forces.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM, USNR
RinC

151

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

14 May 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSIX
To: Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit
Subject: Report of RI activities during operations 24 May *APRIL*
to 30 ~~May~~ 1945, inclusive.
APRIL

1. Subject report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss

W. M. KLUSS
Lt (jg), USNR
Officer-in-Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV 10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 24 April 1945
to 30 April 1945, inclusive.

1. A normal two man watch was maintained except through a request of the Admiral, the watch was cut to one man during the refueling and rearming period, 0830 24 April to 2359 25 April.

2. The frequency coverage for the week was as is outlined below. Check, as is used in this outline, means that the circuit was checked for information concerning the operation, but none found. No attempt is made to outline whether a particular circuit was active.

DATES:	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
FREQ.							
7875J	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker
3937J							
6842J	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck
3421J	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg
6685J	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont	cont ck	cont	cont
3342J	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	check	& covrg	check	check
6650J	check	check	check	check	prt covr	prt covrg	prt covr
7200J	check	check	check	check	part	part	part
3600J					covrg	covrg	covrg
6740J	check	part	part	check	part	check	check
3370J		covrg	covrg		covrg		
6640J	check	part	check	part	part	part	part
3320J		covrg		covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg
6580J	check	check	part	check	check	part	part
3290J			covrg			covrg	covrg
6267A	check	check	check	prt covrg	check	check	check
5852A	part	part	part	part	part	part	part
	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg
5290A	part	check	check	check	check	part	part
	covrg					covrg	covrg
5135A	part	part	part	part	check	check	check
	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg			
5075A	check	check	check	check	check	ck ck	check
7035J	part	part	part	part	check	part	part
(2980J)	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg		covrg	covrg

2. (frequency coverage, continued)

DATES:	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
FREQ.							
6115J	part	check	part	check	check	check	check
5057J	covrg		covrg				
8035J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
4017J							
5882M	check	check					
3145J			part cov				
2974M				part cov			
8052M				part cov			
8438M				part cov			
4362M				part cov			
6949M						part cov	part cov
6715M							part cov
8725J							part cov

3. New frequencies heard are outlined below. The amount of time spent and dope logged on these frequencies is sparse in some cases, but was determined by the relative value of the frequency to present or future operations.

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS.	USE AND IDENTS .
5135M	4/24/45	Fu 3	Air Bases A.B. Kushira De Dummy-C-
5852M	4/17/45	Spec AB and KKN KKK	Homing Kanoya AB(Army) This hrd on 17th B's & P's thin Quiet 'til the 20rd.
5600M*	4/17/45	Spec AB Calls and KKN	P's & B's *4/28 ident A.B.Kanoya and possible ident A.B.Kikaishima
3600M	4/22/45	*S Si Ri Ro	Broadcast(ENa) Probably 3617J
5281M	4/27/45	KN KKN	? ?
2974M	4/27/45	Spec AB Calls	Air Bases ?
3144M	4/27/45	Fu 3	? Unident De I405 (A ident)
8052M	4/27/45	Spec AB Calls and Fu 3	B's & P's AB Kanoya AB Miho Panes
8438M	4/27/45	Spec AB Calls	B's & P's ?
4362M	4/27/45	KKN	AB's(?) Possibly 4361J(tfc hdng)
6949M	4/29/45	KKN	P's & B's This hrd 29 and 30th only may be 6947J Suzuka Agrp
6715M	4/30/45	Koo8	AB's Tansui A.B. Koniya A.B.
8434M	4/29/45	KKK KKN	P's & B's Drill

4. The following is a chronology of the RI reactions pertaining to operations, obtained with the above outlined frequency coverage.

24 April, 1945:

This Task Group is heading South for refueling and rearming. The search plane activity in the early hours consists of three planes on 3342J. This however, may be deception. This activity quiets down by 0240, and there seems to be no further search.

By 0742 several planes show on 5852A, working an army base. These possibly search planes, but do not seem to observe the regular security. At about 0938 they shift to 6842J, and send a couple of grids for Northeast of the Okinawa Group. They don't seem to sight anything, however, and shift to their Otsu channel of 5852A again at 1254. Deception, using one of these planes calls, appears to be conducted on 6685J.

The only other air activity that was noted throughout the day, was a seven hour flight of about four planes on 5852A in the afternoon, and one plane or flight on 5290A in the evening.

It may be noteworthy that only one of the planes appearing on 5852A this morning, seems to carry out his entire search. One of them disappears entirely while still on 5852A at 0843, while the other shifts to 6842J for an hour, handling a grid at 0935 in position 27-37N 130-33E, then disappears.

25 April, 1945:

Refueling, rearming, and replenishing. The CV Shangrila joins our task group at this time.

No indications of air activity are noted til 0413 when a KNKNN plane is called on 3370J by a KNK base. Other air activities are relatively quiet until 0732, when 6640J shows with slight, but normal, activity.

A regular search, similar to yesterday, starts out at about 0800 from Kyushu on 5852A. Two of the three planes here shift soon, to 6842J. The remaining plane disappears at about the time of the shift. One of the remaining planes runs a search line down toward Daito Shima, and the other one down the Nansei Shoto. This latter, makes a sighting of some of our force at 1030, and gets off a stack of five messages in the next hour and a half. Both planes shift to 5852A for homing. The first of the set two shifts at 1030, apparently at the end of his search line, but the one sighting the force maintains the Ko Channel 'til 1147 to get his traffic off.

All is quiet by noon and remains so until 1500 when a third search line to the West of the Nansei Shoto Group is sent out. This plane is first noted on 6842J and stays there until 1800, handling numerous grids. This is probably weather data, as no sighting seems to occur.

The evening is quiet, as far as air activity is concerned.

26 April, 1945:

This force cruising East of Okinawa, mainly for support of the forces on Okinawa. No enemy search noted all day in this area, but considerable movement of planes is apparent. Slight activity in morning on 6740J involving KNKNN planes, but goes undeveloped. 6580J shows with three plane calls for a half hour before noon. The afternoons activity centers around three planes on 7055J, and two planes on 5852A in the evening.

Considerable dope is received on the Kanoya Broadcast between 0455 and 0747, concerning alerts in the Kyushu area. This type of dope, though not of a direct tactical nature, is furnished to the Admiral each morning as operations permit.

At approximately 1600, our force passes within visual distance of the Northern end of Okinawa. This portion is practically cleared of the

enemy at this time, so it doesn't seem impossible that we are undetected. At any rate, no reaction is noted from an RI standpoint.

The only activity throughout the day that resembled an attempt at search starts at 2348 with three plane calls on 3421J. Two plane calls appear on 3342J at 2321, but seem to be deception.

27 April, 1945:

Cruising East of Okinawa again. The search activity which started last night on 3421J, continues in early morning, but goes undeveloped. We receive a report of a raid on Okinawa at approximately 0645, consisting of three Vals, all of which were splashed. There is no reaction noted to this activity.

Search activity out of Kyusyu is noted in a grid received on the Kanoya Broadcast at 0751, from a familiar search plane call. Though 6842J has been on a speaker previous to this, nothing is heard but a TUSEU at 0730. One of these planes appears S5 at 0839, but we go apparently undetected when he gets weaker and shifts to 5852A at 0925, for homing.

Slight activity, supposedly out of Formosa, is noted on 6267A at 0700, but is of no consequence to us.

Air activity shows on 8438M at 0750, using special air base calls, but is possibly drill. Prefix -SaMi and -MuNi is used on most of the messages; one of them containing a grid in the East China Sea. The time lapse in message origin and transmission makes this appear authentic, but traffic volume is way out of proportion to a legitimate circuit.

Homing activity on 5852A appears to be normal, but it may be noteworthy that at 0957 one of the planes is told to go to TIRAN. Later, at 1015 the base, which appears to be Kanoya, tells them all that his alert is cancelled; later yet, telling one of them to land there. The third plane, which was told to go to TIRAN, tells the base at 1037, that he is going to land at YoSiNo which may be the army call for TIRAN. This activity is replaced by another group of planes at noon. The latter communicates until 1700, with nothing so far directly concerning our force.

Considerable activity concerning a flight between Miho A.B. and Kanoya, shows on 8052M. This may possibly be 8045J. Bases use their Fu3 calls on here when working each other, but observe normal Aircraft Security when contacting the planes. This activity takes place between 1450 and 1600.

The evenings activity consists mainly of two groups of 3 plane calls each on 3320J. This first noted at 1847. Security procedure is used, but extensive communication between the base and planes makes this appear to be a transportation run of some sort, or a ferry of planes. Base, who uses army call MaSuKe, appears to be in the Nansei Shoto Group, judging from the signal strength. The planes remain about S2 to 3 in signal strength and though they are still in extensive communication with the base, nothing seems to develop by midnight.

The evenings search activity begins at 2237 on 3421J; the plane getting off a grid East of Kyushu at 2355.

28 April, 1945:

Our force refueling and rearming. Activity continues from the previous night on 3320J. The base makes contact with the individual planes for awhile then makes a long call-up of the whole group of six planes. Judging from the communications, this may be quite a large flight of army bombers. This fact was fairly well substantiated by the morning ultra dispatch, that Okinawa had been under a bombing attack during the night.

One of the above planes disclosed a possible homing frequency at 0254 by asking the base HOTE NAMI 450KC. It seemed peculiar that a group of three planes appeared here for homing (3320J) from 3421J, working another base.

Activity involving four plane KKKN calls in two groups, is noted on 3370J between 0242 and 0400, but proves of no value to us. These appear to be search planes homing, but is more probably a small raid. At any rate no follow-up is noted.

A peculiar search planes set-up is again noted this morning, involving five planes on 5852A and 6842J. The planes seem to have a pre arranged system for relaying contacts to the base. This possibly utilizes a regular relay plane, but may possibly be taken care of by the other search planes. Two of these search planes sight the forces near here and get off numerous grids, disposition reports and weather. Some of these reports are handled by the relay plane on 5852A. When they are relayed in this manner, they appear immediately; sometimes the plane is in the SARA of the message on 6842J when the relay starts.

New search activity shows on 6842J at 1228 with one plane. A sighting of four carriers is made by this plane at 1309, followed by disposition and weather. The homing frequency is 5852A; the shift being made at 1505.

A new search of three planes is sent out at 1636 on 6842J. A shift is made to 3421J at 1754. An attack signal is heard at 2004, preceded by TUSEU. Nothing is heard of these planes from then on.

Considerable air activity is noted on 6650J from 0655 to 2305 today, involving Takao A.B., Shinchiku A.B., and Ishigaki; the latter appearing to be the destination of at least one flight in the morning. A grid was sent by one of the planes on here at 1851, presumably on the British Fleet off Formosa.

Renewed activity shows on 3600J at 2030. Three plane calls are heard. A service message is received at 2334 indicating one of these planes of the three to arrive at Kikaishima.

The usual activity shows on 3320J at 1928, with the base calling the usual planes. With the exception of the fact that none of the planes are heard, this would appear to be another bombing raid. The base calls more furiously near midnight, but is still undeveloped by 2359.

29 April, 1945:

Still cruising off Okinawa in the 0400 position 26-45N 129-23E.

A continuation of the attacks slated for this area is expected today. The activity of last night continues on 3320J and appears very much the same as of the night of the 27/28th. The same calls are also used, as used before. Judging the signal strength of the planes, this flight may possibly end in the Nansei Shoto Group somewhere.

Considerable activity is also noted in early hours on 3600M, 6650J and 3421J. The latter has four search planes on it, one of which appears over our force at about 0230. The radar picks him up and has a VNF run out and investigate, insisting on a visual ident being the moon is full and bright. The planes on 3421J and other frequencies give no indication of going near any force, or being in our vicinity, so it's suspected that this is a B26 when the visual contact is made. Our VNF is told to give him a few burst and see what happens. At this time he shows up on 3421J with an S5 plus signal and gets off a TUSEU timed 0240. This is reported to Flag Plot and the plane is splashed at 0243, while giving out another TUSEU. The base receipts for it but receives no position from the plane. The plane was a Betty.

Activity continues on this frequency between the remaining three planes, but does not develop into anything by 0508 when it fades out with the still calling the splashed Betty; receiving no answer. The three remaining planes variously shifted to 3320J by 0458 for homing, and continue on there 'til 0630, when the signal TEKA is given. This signal was previously assumed to mean "shift to Otsu Channel", but may now mean "Shift frequency" as no evidence is found of the channel that the shift was made to.

All is quiet at 0800, with only one new plane noted on 6842J in a short call-up. At approximately 0815 a bogey is picked up on the radar, and at 0822 we go to G. At this same instant a new plane opens up S5 plus on 6842J, sighting three of our carriers and giving our position. A possible relay plane is noted at this time on 5852A, repeating this. Amplifications on this sighting are timed 0825 and 0835. This plane runs across two more of our carriers and gets off a sighting at 0840. Another message is timed 0850, with two grids in it forming a line about 25 miles West of our forces. Considerable other traffic is handled between this plane and the base 'til 1424; possibly concerning further search activity. This plane used 5852A for homing; making the shift at 0950 after the base base gives him a message " O"NO 1300.1400.0951VE ". The other plane of this search group does not figure in the sighting, apparently searching the sector West of Okinawa. Both receive the dope from the base at 0949, that landing is unfavorable a unidentified army base whose call is metosu, being under KUHAI.2 alert. A follow-up of this may be indicated in a message the base sent on 6842J at 1408, mentioning TANEGASHIMA. The second plane however, reports at 1031 that he is over another unidentified army base whose call is KAKINA. This plane though, is still in the air apparently at 1513.

A new search plane appears on 6842J at 1305, but at 1355 sends the signal FUSI(forced landing expected) . He next shows on 6640J for a short time at 1413. Then at 1453 he shows on 5852A and disappears completely at 1507.

New search activity shows in two planes on 6842J at 1525. Likewise a NKKN plane shows on 5852A at this time; developing into three planes by 1624. One of them is S4 to 5 and we go to G. This may not be immediately connected, but we splash three ZEKES at 1627. The three planes on 5852A continue to show, but disappear at 1658 when we start firing at bogeys with AA.

One of the new planes on 6842J shows over our force at about thirty thousand feet altitude at 1703, sighting seven carriers. Amplification on this sighting is timed 1704 and 1726 with a grid on us. This latter amplification changes the sighting from seven to five carriers. These sightings are followed with the usual weather etc.

Activity involving two planes is noted on 6650J from 1500 to 1700, but does not appear to effect our forces.

It may be noteworthy, however, that the tally for the action this afternoon was a total of 12 splashes by 1900, but outside of the sightings on 6842J, no reaction can be directly attributed to the raid.

The evenings activity involves a flight of 3 planes on 6580J between about 1745 and 1845. Two planes were also heard on 3600 between 1900 and 2100 when the circuit faded out. One of these planes reports being attacked at 1939 and is unheard thereafter.

Unusual activity is noted on a new frequency of 6949M with three planes of a call series KKKN, at 1746. They are apparently securing their transmitters at this time and the base broadcasts a message to them in plain language SEIKOU WOINORU VE. This sounds like a farewell, with the possibility that this is Suzuka Agrp, 6947J, leaving for some forward base. The planes and base exchanged signals at this time, giving each other S4 and 5.

Activity renews on 3421J at 2315 and on 3320J at 2350, but goes undeveloped by midnight.

30 April, 1945.

Continue in waters East of Okinawa, for support, and patrol of Amami O Shima. Enemy activity starts early in the morning with a few bogeys; two of them being shot down at 0057. No reaction is noted to this, but at 0106 a plane with an S5 signal reports being chased on 3421J. By 0142 another planes nears our force and sends off a sighting and grid at 0203. At 0153 still another planes shows; with a TUSEU. A fourth fogey shows up and makes an attack at 0219,

using the signal TUTUTU. He is unheard from this time on, tho the base ironically asks for a SaRa on the attack signal. The plane which is supposedly flying with the attacking plane, calls him at 0222, with no answer, so calls the base and reports engine trouble "WARE.HAKO" which appears to be very convenient. Altogether there seems to be three sets of calls participating in the attack. The group appearing to be the search group, uses 6580J for homing. The one plane left in the attacking group disappears completely after developing engine trouble at 0222. The third group show on 3320J for homing, with all four planes of this group apparently in tact, tho they repeatedly report being chased.

More planes are sent out, and first appear on 6842J at 0631. A bogey shows on the radar at 0753 and we go to GQ. Our CAP gets on the bogeys tail and immediate reaction is noted on 6842J with an S5 signal and a TUSEU at 0755. One ZEKE splashed at 0800! One more is left though, and gives out a TUSEU at 0810. Another splash; a MYRT, at 0812. We are notified a little too late for action, that an extremely large parachute was supposedly dropped from the MYRT, with a box on it. The parachute drifts away and no further dope is obtained on it, but it was supposedly a radar reflector, or a signaling device for getting a DF plot on our position. This parachute supposedly stays up for several hours, being dropped from an altitude of about 33000feet.

It may be noteworthy that an altitude of 30000 feet seems to have been found very advantageous for slipping in on our forces, not considering the RI standpoint.

It was supposed that there were only the two planes in on this raid, but at 1217 a plane with a call of the same series, shows to be homing on 5852A, and a fourth one shows at 1003 on 6842J, apparently making a forced landing. The signal FUSI(repeated) was used; then WARE.NEN.FU.KITO. This plane later at 1206, reports KOFU(trouble repaired).

Air activity is routine, until 1631 when several planes appear on 5852A, apparently homing. However, these planes have not been on any Ko Channel.

Another search seems to develop on 3421J at 1908, but the planes shift to 3320J at 2012, and disappear with no apparent sighting.

Other flights noted today, which bore no relation to our forces apparently, were on 6942M(measured previously as 6949) at 0921. Also, flights on 6580J at 1543, 6640J at 1710(KNKNN calls) and 3600J at 1925.

The MYRT and ZEKE which were splashed this morning, were called repeatedly all day. Possibly just to keep the frequency open, but it may be assumed that these guys were pretty important.

Kanoya Broadcast goes off the air for nine minutes at 1035 this morning, preceeding a flurry of contacts for his area.

All air activity quiets down by midnight.

Respectfully submitted,

B.A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

18 May 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSIX
To: Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit
Subject: Technical report of RI activities during operations
from 1 May to 14 May 1945, inclusive.

1. Subject report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss
W. M. Kluss
Lt (jg), USNR
Officer-in-Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 1 May 1945 to
7 May 1945, inclusive.

1. A continuous two man watch was maintained during operations. However, while fueling and replenishing supplies, the watch was secured to one man between 0000 and 2359 on the 2nd of May, and to a one man watch with one man standing by, between 0830 and 2359 on the 7th of May.

2. The frequency coverage for the week was as is outlined below. Check, as used in this outline, means that the circuit was checked as a source of information, but none obtained. No attempt is made to outline whether a particular circuit was active or not.

DATES:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
FREQ.							
7875J	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker
3937J							
6842J	cont ck	speaker	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck
3421J			& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg	& covrg
6685J	check	check	part	check	check	check	check
3342J			covrg				
6650J	part	check	part	part	part	part	part
	covrg		covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg
7200J	part	check	check	check	check	check	check
3600J	covrg						
6740J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
3370J							
6640J	part	check	part	part	part	check	part
3320J	covrg		covrg	covrg	covrg		covrg
6580J	check	check	part	part	check	part	check
3290J			covrg	covrg		covrg	
6267A	check	check	check	check	check	prt cov	check
5852A	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov
5290A	check	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check	check
5135M	prt cov	part cov	prt cov	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov
5075A	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
7035J	check	check	part	check	part	check	part
2980J			covrg		covrg		covrg

2. (frequency coverage, continued).

DATES: FREQ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8035J 4017J	check	part covrg	check	part covrg	part covrg	part covrg	check
6942M 6949M	check	check	check	part covrg	part covrg	check	check
6115J 3057J	part covrg	check	check				
6550J	part cov						
5250J	part cov		part cov			check	
3385M	part cov						
3145A		part cov					
3780M			part cov				
6358M			part cov				
6055A			part cov				
7164M			part cov				
6282M			part cov				
8052M			part cov			check	
6530M				check	check	check	part cov

3. New frequencies heard are outlined below. The amount of time spent in research on these frequencies was determined by the value of the frequency to present or proposed operations.

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS	USE AND IDENTS.
6858M	5/1/45	KN K <u>KKNN</u>	Kushimoto Det AG903 De Komatsushima Det AG 905
3780M	5/3/45	Koo Ful 1A1	Brdcst(?) Air Fleet 1 CinC
7100M	5/3/45	KKKN	Brdcst -HaTi BC indicator
6358M	5/3/45	KKKK KKKN	A.B.'s Appears to be Hi North AB'S
7164M	5/3/45	KN KNK KKKN	A.B.'s(?) Handled Kanoya alerts 2 min after orig. Also appears part Drill.
7014M	5/3/45	KKK	Army 3Num A/C code
6282M	5/3/45	KKKN	A.B.'s(?) A.B. Kanoya-D-. (alerts) (possibly Nansei Shoto also)
8052M	5/3/45	Spec AB CallsP's & B's also KKKN	Flight to Kanoya on here.
5081M	5/3/45	(KooFul 1A1 call) De KKKN	Pt. to Pt. Tokyo De unident KKKN

3. (New frequencies, continued)

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS.	USE AND IDENTS.
6156M	5/5/45	KN	? Says YUKU YOI? KANOYA YUKU? (Going to Kanoya?)
6585M	5/4/45	KKKN	Pt. to Pt.
5135M	5/5/45	Spec AB Calls	P's & B's New "A" ident TAON Kikaishima
6843M	5/5/45	NK	Drill
3285M	5/5/45	KKN De KKKN	(Little dope) Seems to be Air Bases.
6472M	5/6/45	KN	? ?
6983M	5/6/45	KNN De K	P's B's Drill
5321M	5/6/45	K	? ?
5321M	5/6/45	KK	? ?
8052M	5/6/45	KKKN	?
7225M	5/7/45	K De KN	? Possibly Air Bases or Wx Stas.
6530M	5/7/45	Spec AB Calls	P's & B's KNKN Planes

4. The following is a chronology of the RI reactions pertaining to operations, obtained with the above outlined coverage.

1 May, 1945:

- Cruising East of Okinawa.
 Slight activity shows on 3600J, from 0000 to 0139. This consists of just call-ups and has no developments.
 The first four hours of the day are spent in a routine check of air activity; the first note of the new call system is at 0408 on 3057J. A "B" ident is readily made on 3057J of NO YO RA Ø as Air Base Kanoya. This is later compromised on the day frequency 6115J at 0743. The use of Koo8 Calls continues on 5255J. The new calls, however, with an additive, is used in the headings of the weather messages on this frequency, adding a note of discouragement.
 Kanoya broadcasts a routine alert at 0500. No planes are slated for there this morning, however.
 Air activity shows on 6640J at 0749, with KNKN planes. There are no developments on this though.
 A check of 5135M shows a KKK call system used, which doesn't break on the Fu3 list. We make "D" idents on two of these calls as HE TO WA Kanoya, and RA O TU A.B. Kikaishima. Kikaishima used a Koo 8 Call in a weather message here at 0917.

Air activity is practically nil all day, with only a small amount noted on 6650J. This proves of no value to us.

On a request of the Admiral, we secure the watch to one man, as we are heading south to refuel and rearm. The watch was secure to one man, at midnight.

2 May, 1945:

Our force refuels and rearms this day.

The only air activity noted is a slight amount on 5852A at 1618, and three flights on 4017J between 1754 and 1900.

3 May, 1945:

Early hours show a little search activity, but with no apparent results. These search planes show on 3342J exclusively; first being noted at 0130 and disappearing at 0330, apparently reaching the end of their search line at 0215. There is a possibility of deception being used here; there being one plane, instead of three as calls would indicate.

A flight of about 8 sections of planes arriving at Miho Air Base at about 0642, is noted on 6580J. These are first picked up on 3290J at 0535.

At 0500, a new broadcast was noted tuning up on 3780M, with a call -FuKARI (1st Air Fleet CinC)(Full ident) and an indicator -TaWo. This apparently in plane of the LKFGB(3782J).

Another new broadcast was noted at 0727 on 7100M. The calls intercepted were RoEO 7 De NeSaKo 4, and the indicator -HaTi. Two operational messages were received here then the broadcast was secured with a MuFu.

The new frequency of 6358M, produces considerable weather and traffic concerning operations in the Hi North. The traffic was addressed to Misawa AB, Chitose AB and some unidents, and originated by Kasumigaura Air Groups. These identifications were Koo8. Some relation to the HaTi Broadcast is noted, as one base asks another if he had received several designated messages from the HaTi Broadcast. This at 0954.

A stack of contacts and alerts are received from Kanoya, between 1040 and 1120, concerning B29 raids, on his BC. Some Kanoya alerts were also received from a circuit on 7164M at 1123. This circuit handled these alerts and also some drill traffic. Alerts, apparently in the Kanoya area, were also received on 6282M. These sent to SaTeKo4 and an unident (possibly Kanoya). This circuit was heard at 1245.

NKK calls were heard working each other on 6640J at 1220. These call a NKKN plane at 1327.

A search plane using NKKN call, sends a message in the 3 numeral traffic on 5852A at 1301 saying "nothing unusual is sighted". Search planes normally use KKKN calls on here.

Activity is noted on 6650J involving a sighting of the force at Okinawa at 1426. The plane uses a NKK call; the base Si4Ro is identified at Shinchiku AB.

Considerable activity involving six planes is noted on 8052M, beginning at 1544, and continuing 'til past 1730. This seems to be a flight to Kanoya Air Base.

Two army bases appear on what is possibly 6840J, one of them working a NKK plane. The plane is possibly observation.

A search plane is contacted on 6842J at 1105, but does not sight us by 1648, when he sends a Nr.1 message and disappears.

The reconnaissance on 6650J is followed up by an attack by suicide planes. The first of this activity shows in the appearance of a new plane, at 1558. Variously, nine planes show, and the attack starts at 1847. It is noted that coded messages from these planes are scarce; most traffic being handled in plain language. This is probably due to the nature of the attacks. One of the planes sends a plain language message that he is going to Kikaishima, at 2037. He seems to be the only plane left of the raid. Another message in plain language states "we are suicide bombing". This, and a TOTOTO, at 1947, were the only outward indications of the attack.

New search shows on 3421J at 2249, but goes undeveloped by midnight.

A set-up is noted on 3320J, which is very similar to what developed into a bombing raid on Okinawa a few days ago. This involves two groups of KKN plane calls, the first of which shows at 2311. Nothing, however, develops by midnight.

4 May, 1945:

This force East of Okinawa, for Okinawa support and Kikaishima patrol. Position at 1100: 26-45N 129-51E.

Morning activity develops slowly at first, with what appears to be one search plane, on 3421J, a routine bombing raid on 3320J involving three plane calls, and sporadic splurges of activity on 6650J. By 0045 though, four plane calls show on 3421J; one a search plane of last evening. An "ETA in the battle area" is sent by three of these planes on 3421J, an hour and a half in advance of their expected arrival. An ETA of this sort proves to be one of our most valuable intercepts. The one search plane on here, seems to search on a line about 200 miles East of the Okinawa group of islands, so it is not known how the attack planes sized up our forces. This was probably done by radar, as the forces that were attacked were about 50 miles from land, according to positions given by the attacking units. The attack comes off about on schedule, at 0245, with a T.TOTO from one unit, immediately followed by the other two units at 0249 and 0305.

What appears to be two new search planes, appear on 3421J at 0225 and 0312, and seem to reach our force at about 0345, as we get bogeys on our radar and start shooting down Bettys at this time. One splashed at 0345, one at 0420, and one on fire at 0448. Reaction to this was a TUSEU from one of these search planes on 3421J at 0417, a half finished message at 0448, and another half finished message at 0522, marking the disappearance of these planes from the circuit. Our force was not sighted, judging from the reaction.

An Emily is splashed by our VNF at 0154, just 19 miles away. No reaction was noted for this.

Activity developing on 6650J, involves ten plane calls, variously appearing by 0138. First signs of their contact is a HIIHI at 0325. This is followed up by a TOTOTO at 0354, by the same unit. Another TOTOTO shows at 0401, by another unit. This is the only warning of the attack that is noted here. In fact these are hardly warnings. The only warning, would possibly come from a judge of the proximity of the planes, by their signal strengths.

We are unable to give very close attention to what seem to be a bombing raid heading for Okinawa, on 3320J, but what coverage we did give it showed no developments by 0600.

Three search planes appear to be homing on 5852A, at 0643. These have not previously appeared on 3421J.

The Formosan frequency, 5290A, seems to be used for homing between 0534 and 0600.

Renewed activity shows on 6842J at 0608. We go to GQ at 0818. Attacks turn out to be on the forces near the beach. Reaction shows on 6948M at 0834, and on 6842J at 0843. One flight involving possibly 4 planes showed on 6948M; one of these giving out a "Banzai" at 0834. When the base asks for a repeat on this, the plane sends SETA (repeated) HE (repeated), then a long dash as he apparently goes into his dive.

The activity on 6842J seems to involve 3 units, or flights, sending attack signals almost continuously between 0843 and 0914, saying also, in both code and plain language, the results of the attack.

Air activity shows during the rest of the day on 6580J, 6650J, 6948M, and 5852A, but does not prove of any tactical value to us.

5 May, 1945:

Our force has no bogeys throughout the day. However, air activity appeared normal, and included the usual search activity on 6842J. Search activity was first noted at 0626, on 6842J. The homing frequency used was 5852A. One of these planes is told to go to TIRAN or BANSEI. The Otsu Channel for these places is apparently 5852A; and as is noted later, the army call for one of them is possibly TOKESO. This latter is by deduction only. Other planes, apparently search, show on 6842J during the morning, and also use 5852A for homing. A plane of one of these latter groups makes a sighting of two large forces near Okinawa consisting CV's, BB's, Cl's, DD's, and transports. Apparently flying at extremely high altitude, he gets away. His sightings were times 1110.

A small amount of activity is noted on 6948M in the morning and early afternoon. This involves one NKK plane call.

Considerable activity is noted in the evening, on 5235M with three plane calls of a series. This does not prove of any value however.

Slight splurge of activity on 4017J in late evening, produces a service message, giving three plane call assignments with KKKK calls of a series (ONORA), the plane numbers, and the time of departure. These show on 3421J on the 6th and 7th May.

6 May, 1945:

Cruising East of Okinawa, our force again experiences no enemy activity. Air activity proves normal, however, with the usual Kyushu search planes active from 0000 to 1830, using the usual homing channel of 5852A.

A follow-up of last night's service message on 4017J, appears in the base calling the three designated planes on 3421J. This noted at 0047, which is a half hour to an hour and a half after the arranged schedule, and produces no planes. This is probably a misunderstanding of the schedule, as at 2334 the following evening the planes are again called and the schedule is kept.

6650J is active throughout the day, and develops into an attack on forces, presumably at Okinawa, at 1929. The attack consists of three planes or flights working and Air Base on Taiwan. Though this A.B. Taiwan is not involved, a service message this morning mentions the frequency designators KUY055 and KUY056; the latter being 6740J.

The only other activity of note, was a couple of planes on 5290A in the morning. One of these planes, at 0519, says he is being chased by a night fighter, in plain language. The plane is later homed by DF bearing on this frequency, to a base which appears to be Ishigaki. This at 0558.

A breakdown of a message on 5135A at 0110, disclosed the call assignment TAON on this frequency, as Kikaishima.

7 May, 1945:

Heading South to refuel and rearm.

A transmission, as mentioned before, was picked up at 2320 on the 5th, on 4017J, and indicated that 3 planes were scheduled to leave at 2330; assigning the calls ONORAL, 2 and 3 to planes Nr. 538, 572, and 933. The planes were called last night on schedule, 2334, and now this morning develop into a torpedo attack. The one plane gets a message off at 0243, saying he made a torpedo attack and is returning home. The Otsu Channel is probably used from then on, but is not found.

Our position is well south by 0400, in position 23-48N, 130-15E, so there is little air activity effecting us, but some unusual activity as noted was as follows. One plane on 5135 appears to be making an important point to point run. This is judged from the large concern over the plane, and the fact that the traffic between the bases requires a receipt from the plane. The plane has poor communication with the base that is sending most of the traffic, so he and the other base shift to 3320J, where the base relays the traffic to him. The plane appears here also, and by the signal strength appears to be in the Nansai Shoto Group. It is noted that security procedure is adopted when the shift to 3320J is made, whereas no attempt was made at security on 5135A.

Air activity is extremely light the rest of the morning, with a little showing on 5852A and 6650J, but with no developments of tactical or technical value.

Activity is noted for the first time on 6530M at 1510, involvint five planes and two bases.

Evenings activity is light, with only one plane showing on 6640J. The signal TEKA is compromised on this circuit between 1816 and 1819, as meaning "shift frequency".

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 8 May 1945 to
14 May 1945, inclusive.

1. A continuous two man watch was maintained from 0000
8 May to 2030 11 May, while in Okinawa area.

Our force begins retiring from the combat area the
evening of the eleventh, and the watch is lightened to one man at
this time. The watch is entirely secured at 1200 12 May as we reach
position of 21-45N 132-31E.

Due to probability of Kamikaze attack, on arrival in
Ulithi Area, the watch is resumed at 0900 14 May with one man on
continuously and strengthened to two men between 1700 and 2100.

A further strengthening to two men on at dawn and dusk
will be noted in subsequent report.

2. The frequency coverage for the week was as is outlined
below. Check, as used in this outline, means that the circuit was
checked as a source of information, but none obtained. No attempt
is made to outline whether a particular circuit was active or not.
As activity permitted, a general search was conducted.

DATES:	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
FREQ.							
7875J	Speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker
3937J							
6842J	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	cont ck	check		cont ck
3421J		& covrg	& covrg	& covrg			part cov
6685J	check	check	check	check	check		check
3321J							
6650J	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check		check
7765J	prt cov	check	check	check	check		check
7200J	check	check	check	check	check		check
3600J							
6740J	chek	check	check	check	check		check
3370J							
6640J	check	check	prt cov	prt cov	check		check
3320J							
6580J	check	check	check	prt cov	prt cov		prt cov
3290J							
6267A	check	check	check	check	check		check
5852A	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check		prt cov
5290A	check	check	check	check	check		

DATES:	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
FREQ.							
5140J	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check		check
5075A	check	check	check	check			
7035J	prt cov	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov		check
8035J	part	part	part	part	part		check
4017J	cover'g	cover'g	cover'g	cover'g	cover'g		
6948M	check	check	prt cov	check	check		check
6530J	check	prt covr	prt cov	check	check		check
6610J		prt covr	check	check			
8052M		prt covr	check	prt cov.			
6625J							prt covr

3. New frequencies heard are outlined below. The amount of time spent in research on these frequencies was determined by the value of the frequency to present or proposed operations.

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS.	USE AND IDENTS.
6332M	5/8/45	KNN K	P's & B's
6528/30M	5/8/45	K KN	P's & B's security procedure used
4218M	5/8/45	Koo8 Koo7	Jaluit Army De NaRaE (sent wx msg)
8123M	5/9/45	KN KK	Hidget subs (?)
5853M	5/9/45	K	? ?
6764M	5/9/45	KKKN	A.B.'s (same calls appear on 8052M)
6663M	5/9/45	KNK De K	P's & B's
5083M	5/9/45	KKKN	Pt. to Pt. (Heading of msg sent to Tokyo) (#1 SuNiSa9 HaToWiHiI BT) (TaWo BC mentioned in svc, also
6530M	5/10/45	Spec AB Calls	P's&B's Probably 6530J
6950M	5/10/45	NKN NKK	P's & B's Probably 6948M reprinted before
5835M	5/11/45	KKN	Pt. to Pt.
5995M	5/11/45	N NN	Shifted to SaT15 which is 2875J listed as Tajimatoka AA Def Cont.

4. The following is a chronology of the RI reactions pertaining to operations, obtained with the above outlined coverage.

8 May, 1945:

Heading back to Okinawa Germany surrender announced. No air activity is noted throughout the day, except a slight amount on 7035J and a couple of drill circuits using K and KN calls. Bases were up on numerous circuits, but with only light activity.

Bases were noted for the first time on the new frequency of 7765J noted in a Jusit of 30 April. Mention was made of a KNKN plane on here at 1531 with one base asking TIYAKU, but the plane was unheard.

Numerous contacts etc., concerning the raids on Kyushu, were received from the Kanoya Broadcast between 0704 and 0845:

It was noted at 1827 on 4281M, that a station signing the call NARAE sent a weather message to SATEKO6 which is listed in Koo8 list as Jaluit Army. The station said VA after he got the one weather message off.

9 May, 1945:

Our position is again East of Okinawa.

Enemy air activity is very slow in the early hours, and seems to develop only as a matter of routine. Search consists of three planes in the early morning, on 3421J. They send identical messages at about 0220, apparently on reaching the end of their search line, and disappear. No homing frequency is noted.

The Otsu Channel 5852A is used in the morning for a flight of three planes. This seems to be a local flight, and proves of no value to us. No homing activity is noted on here.

Activity is for the first time noted on 6610J, which was mentioned in a RAGFOR Jusit. Six planes are logged. This activity proves of no value today, but has prospects possibly.

A small movement of planes is noted on 8052M about noon.

A sighting of enemy carriers is made by a Formosan search plane at noon on 6650J. This is probably on our allies the British Fleet, as the amplification at 1220, timed 1205, would indicate. The plane is apparently splashed at 1238 while he is in the act of sending another message, as he stops abruptly, and is unheard thereafter.

New planes begin showing on here at about 1600 and by 1730 eleven planes have been noted. Shinchiku Air Base is identified as working at least part of them. A very peculiar procedure is used between the base and planes, giving the outward appearance of a great number of planes and several bases. This may be true in the case of the planes, but the base seems to be operating several transmitters. It is also evident that the communications run too smoothly to involve the force that this would appear to be. The effectiveness of this type of deception would be mainly in creating confusion in intercept. It works very good, to this extent, as it is quite a problem keeping track of the planes when the plane and base signals vary on alternate transmissions. Considerable tuning during

this activity, may substantiate this type of deception. We are at a considerable distance from the particular battle area, however, and can't judge the actual effectiveness of this procedure.

At 1840 one of these planes reports being attacked with the signal HIIHI, and at 1850 this plane and another of this supposed large group give the attack signal TOTOTO. This is followed at 1852 by SI"SI"SI"TOTOTO from the one plane and at 1855 by the other. The base receipts for all this, and the planes disappear after the latter signal. From our interception there are only the two planes actually giving the attack signal, and only the one base receipting for it.

Three planes enroute to Kikaishima appear on 5140J at 2304. These planes shift to 3320J at midnight and disappear at about 0100 on the 10th.

10 May, 1945:

Cruising East of Okinawa.

Normal search activity out of Kyushu, is carried out on 3421J in the early morning hours. 3320J is used by the first group, for homing. A later group seems to attempt an attack at 0253, with the signal TUTUTU. This is immediately followed by TUSEU. Two planes seem to participate in this; one of them giving his position at 0330, which is near Okinawa. One of these planes disappears right after reporting he was chased, at 0332. No homing frequency is noted for this group.

Considerable activity on 6650J in the early hours, develops into an attack at 0318, with one of the planes giving the signal TOTUTOTUTUTU. This is followed immediately by a Banzai. Another plane of this group gives the signal HA"SI HA"SI HA"SI 0350, at 0342, indicating a proposed bombing attack.

A service message on 5140J mentions the Army call MUNONE and the frequency designator KUYO45.

A new search group appears at 0830, on 5852A and 6842J. The one on 5852A is apparently homing, as is indicated by his inquiries about KUHA's, while a plane of the same call series on 6842J becomes S5 at 0832. At 0834 our VF splashed a Judy at 30000 feet altitude. This plane does not appear after this. A third plane of this series on 6842J somehow arrives over our force with an S5 plus signal at 0837. He gets off a sighting of four carriers at 0918, giving a position just South of Okinawa. It is peculiar that this is followed up at 0957 with a disposition report which includes three grids; one of which is our 0900 position. This would indicate that he possibly made a bee-line for the position that his brown brother the Judy was downed. We did not have any indication of his presence other than the S5 signal, at the time. If he likewise, was at 30000 feet, the radar may have missed him.

The base continues calling the Judy that was splashed, and in the meantime starts out another search at 1209 on 6842J. Our radar picks up a bogey at 1352, at 33000 feet altitude. One of the new search planes was S5 at 1319 and has reached S5 plus by 1350, so we are pretty sure of having him. He gets off his

sighting at 1429 in a message prefixed TETETE. This is followed by seven other messages in the next hour, consisting of the usual disposition reports and weather. This plane pulled over our force, to within ten miles, and dropped a box on a parachute, then turned. Our VF is unsuccessful in getting him, probably due to his altitude. We tune around, for indication of a signal being sent out by this box that he dropped, but nothing definite is found. This groups homing frequency is 5852A.

The air activity for the remainder of the day consists of 6650J in the evening and 5140J at night. The latter seems to control a flight of Kikaishima.

11 May, 1945:

Cruising East of Okinawa.

Activity involving a flight to Kikaishima on 5140J, continues from last night. Though it is believed that these planes are flying to Kikaishima, a study of signal strength reports given by the planes and bases indicates that they are up to something else also. No conclusion is made, except the possibility that they continue on down the Ryuku Chain, due possibly to the difficulty in landing at Kikai, with our Night Hecklers in that area.

Considerable activity on 6650J terminates in a sighting, probably the British, at 0747.

A bogey is spotted and chased by our VFN at 0145. The reaction to this shows on 3421J at 0150 with a plane S5 plus saying TUSEU. He gets away, but at 0216, still shows S5 plus and gets off a grid on our position. He's chased again at 0252 and is possibly hit, as his transmitter is really fouled up, though still S5. His transmitter improves later, and he seems to hang around sending numerous grids near us.

Other planes are sent out, and an attack signal is received at 0446. One of the new search planes indicates at 0644 on 5852A, that he made a forced landing at 0630. The base asks for his position, but he insists on only giving an Army base call to indicate it. He apparently takes off right away again, to continue his search, as he reappears on 6842J and makes a sighting at 0850, after being chased at 0842. Very soon afterward, at 0859, a signal TETETE UYATE INI De I is received. This is followed immediately by TOTOTO TOTETOTETOTE TOTUTOTU TOTU De IHAI, then TOTUTOTUTOTU De I. This is only S3 signal so may be some distance from us, and it is, but no reliance can be put on signal strength in a peculiar set-up like this.

The plane that was being chased at 0842 is S5 plus at 0903 and makes a sighting with no position. He's chased immediately by our VF and a MYRT is reported splashed at 0915, at which time he disappears from the circuit with a FUFUFUHA "KUEA" KU.

We are at GQ at 1010 as a nearby force is under attack, and splash three ZEKES and a JILL by 1021.

Air activity is light for the rest of the day. Our force retires from the battle area in the evening, and we are well enough on our way to Ulithi by 2030 to secure the watch to one man

12 May, 1945:

No activity of interest is intercepted this day. Our force is well on it's way South to Ulithi, and by noon the watch is secured.

14 May, 1945:

Nearing Ulithi, a watch is set on any possible frequencies that may be used in Kamikaze attacks in this area. No dope however, is received. A close watch is kept on 6640J in particular, which is reported by RAGFOR to have been used in a previous attack. This discloses activity between Truk and Rota on 6625J, but proves of no immediate value.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

CD RETAIN

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

12 June, 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I.U. attached ComCarDivSix

To: Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit

Subject: Report of RI technical information concerning
operations 15 May to 11 June, 1945.

1. Subject report enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W.M. Kluss
W.M. Kluss
Lt.(jg) USNF
Officer-in-Charge

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Contained herein is a report
of the activities of the R I
Unit attached to ComCarDivSix
for the period 15 May to 11
June 1945, inclusive.

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 15 May 1945 to
21 May 1945, inclusive.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

1. A one man watch strengthened to two men at dawn and dusk (0400 to 0800 and 1700 to 2100) was maintained throughout the week. It has been customary to secure RI operations while in Ulithi Anchorage, but the watch is kept during this period in anticipation of a Kamikaze attack.

2. Frequency coverage consisted of a general search, a regular check of all current air frequencies, and a speaker watch on 6640J/3320J. The attack did not come off, and nothing was intercepted during this period, of value for this report.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 22 May 1945 to
28 May 1945, inclusive.

1. A one man watch was maintained, strengthened to two men at dawn and dusk, until we sortied from Ulithi at 0730 on the 24th of May. At this time the watch was reduced to one man. At 0400 27 May, upon our entry into the fueling area, a full two man watch was set in an attempt to obtain information on the proposed Kikisui operations.

2. A casualty rendering our antenna system useless was noted at 1700 24 May. One antenna was found to be broken loose from its feed-through to the RI shack the other broken away from its mooring and hanging down the side of the ship. The cause of this casualty was not definitely determined, though a crystalized soldering joint at the feed-through, and a little rough treatment possibly by the camouflage crew, seemed plausible.

One antenna was temporarily restored by 1900, and permanent repairs were made to both of them the following morning, by 1040.

3. Frequency coverage while in Ulithi consisted of a general search along with a check on all current air channels. This was supplemented by a speaker watch on 6640J/3320J. Though Kamikaze planes were scheduled and expected to make an attack on our forces, none was made, and nothing was intercepted in relation to the proposed attack.

On leaving Ulithi, coverage consisted of a general search and a check of current air activities. This was mainly to familiarize the operators with the current operations and any new use of the air channels. Nothing of tactical value was obtained.

Upon entering the fueling area on the 27th, the frequency coverage was as is outlined below, in preparation for the coming Kikisui Operations. Check, as is used in this outline, means that the circuit was regularly checked but nothing of tactical value was intercepted. No attempt is made to outline whether a circuit was active or the periods of activity. As operations permitted, a general search was conducted.

DATES:	27	28	Dates:	27	28
FREQ.			Freq.		
7875J	speaker	speaker	6842J	cont ck	cont ck
3937J			3421J		
6685J	check	check	6650J	check	check
3342J	check	pvt cov			
7765J	check	check	7120M	pvt cov	check

3. (frequency coverage, continued)

DATES:			DATES:		
FREQ.			FREQ.		
7200J	check	check	6740J	prt cov	check
3600J	check	check	3370J	prt cov	prt cov
6640J	prt cov	prt cov	6580J	prt cov	prt cov
3320J	prt cov	prt cov	3290J	check	check
5852A	check	prt cov	6267J	check	check
5290A	check	check	5140J	prt cov	check
8035J	check	check	7035J	prt cov	prt cov
4017J	check	prt cov			
6948A	check	prt cov	6530J	check	check
8052J	check		3600M		prt cov

4. New frequencies logged are outlined below.

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS.	USE AND IDENTIS.
7120M	5/25/45	KKN	A.B.'s(?) Same call that appear on 4017J
6740M	5/25/45	K	P's&B's Security procedure used(A/C)
6842M	5/28/45	Spec AB	calls Probably 6841J as service msg rcd hr HIKI KC6841 (in ans.to: HIKI KC?)
3600M	5/28/45	KN De K	

5. The following is a chronology of the RI reactions pertaining to operations from the time our force entered the fueling area to the end of the ~~week~~ week.

27 May, 1945:

Enter fueling area. 0400 position, 23-33N 130-35E.
Air activity is quiet in the early morning. A two man watch is set at 0400.

First air activity of tactical value shows at 1524 on 6580J with one, and possibly three KKN flights to Miyazaki. One arrives at 1552, another at 1610, and a third at 1840.

Some activity concerning two bases and possibly three seaplanes shows on 6640J at 1720 and shifts to 3320J at 1847. The bases use KN and KNN calls when working each other, and the one base is noted to use the call TUORO when working planes TESOMAL, 3 and 4.

No search plane activity is heard all day. This is possibly due to poor weather in Kyushu.

First activity noted on the primary tactical frequency 3421J is noted at 2006. Eleven planes show on here variously by midnight, with three of them giving indications of an attack on the Okinawa forces at about 2235 in position 26-27N 127-23E. The appearance of four planes of various KKN call groups within the first

fifteen minutes proves to be a very sinister indication. Three more planes gradually appear, and by 2113, an hour and a half before the attack, an "ETA in the battle area" is received. The tactical signals used in the attack were TETETE followed by a grid position, and WARE.TUTUTU. Torpedo attacks were reported by the planes upon completion of the attack, both by encoded message and RAYU.KITO or RAYU RAYU RASI RASI.HIHA"HIHA".

Four planes of a KKKN group appears on 3370J at 2340 with one of them giving an "ETA in the battle area" as 0125 in an encoded message.

Other activity throughout the day included flights on 7035J before noon, and some activity similar to 8035J appearing on 7120M. Activity involving KKKN and KNN planes showed on 6740M early in the morning, but is believed to be drill. Drill also showed on 6842M, disclosing frequency as possibly 6841J, with the service message HIKI KC 6841 in response to HIKI KC?.

28 May, 1945:

Strike on Okinawa. 0300 position:24-43N 128-11E.

Several of the planes that appeared late last night at about 2345, continue their activity on 3421J, and develop into an attack at 0036. This is apparently another attack on the Okinawa forces, as a weather message received at 0050 gave the position of 27-30N 127-30E. There was no RI pre-warning of the attack; the only tactical signals used were TUTUTU with the present time group.

The only forewarning of an attack of this type seems to lie in an accurate judge of the planes proximity by the signal strength. This involves, however, a consideration of the planes transmitter power, the time of day, and the frequency used. In the case of search planes, which usually have high powered transmitters the signals strength will unquestionably place him by the time he gets to within twenty five to fifty miles. Some indication may be gained by the appearance of four or more planes on the primary tactical frequency. In the case of an attack on a fast carrier task force however, this would have to be preceded closely by a sighting of the force; usually the attack planes will leave about the time the search plane arrives back at the base.

At 0340 the above planes shifted to 3320J for homing, using the signal TEKA prior to the shift.

An attack was also carried out by the planes appearing last night on 3370J. This attack appears to be carried out entirely on the one frequency. However, no tactical signals were heard here, and the only indication of the attack was an "ETA in the battle area" received an hour to an hour and a half ahead of the attack, and messages giving the results, at the termination of the attack. This being a torpedo attack, as the messages indicated, substantiates the possibility that inter-phone was used to form the attack.

Our force goes to General Quarters at 0407 due to a bogey, but no RI reaction is noted. It is supposed from radar indications that the bogey dropped radar window and took evasive action.

Morning search activity consists of several planes on 6842J using KKKK calls. The final kana, when converted to a numeral, using the numeral verifiers, forms the usual KKKN calls. There is

is no sighting by the time the planes reach the end of their search lines, and the planes shift to 5852A for homing.

Activity for the remainder of the day is very light due to lousey weather in this area. Some spasmodic activity does appear on 6640J with NKKK calls and 3600M with KN and K calls. The regular activity appears on 7035J all afternoon, but proves of no tactical value.

Bad weather continues in the evening, and renders the Kyushu search on 3421J unsuccessful. This latter search uses 3320J for homing.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
Rinc

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 29 May 1945 to
4 June 1945, inclusive.

1. A continuous two man watch was maintained throughout
the week.

2. Frequency coverage for the week was as is outlined
below. No attempt is made to outline active periods of these fre-
quencies, therefore check, as used in this outline, means that the
circuit was checked for tactical information, but that none was
obtained.

DATES:	May 29	30	31	June 1	2	3	4
FREQ.							
7875J	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker
3937J							
6842J	con cov	con cov	con cov	con cov	con cov	con cov	con cov
3421J	con cov	con ck	con cov	con ck	con ck	con ck	con ck
6685J	check	prt cov	check	check	check	check	check
3342J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
6650J	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check	prt cov
7765J	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check	prt cov	check
7200J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
3600J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
6740J	check	check	prt cov	check	check	check	prt cov
3370J	check	check	check	check	prt cov	prt cov	check
6640J	prt cov	check	prt cov	prt cov	check	prt cov	check
3320J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
6580J	prt cov	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check
3290J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
6267J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
5850J	check	prt cov	check	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov
5290J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
5140J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
7035J	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov

2. (frequency coverage, continued)

DATES:	May 29	30	31	June 1	2	3	4
FREQ.							
8035J	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
4017J	prt cov	check	prt cov	check	prt cov	check	prt cov
6948A	check	check	check	check	check	check	check
8045A	prt cov	check	prt cov	check	prt cov		
7728M	prt cov						
6325J	prt cov		prt cov			prt cov	
6155J	prt cov		prt cov	prt cov		prt cov	
7125J		prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov		
5337J		prt cov	prt cov		prt cov		
7102.5M			prt cov	check			
6845M				prt cov		prt cov	
5075J				prt cov			
6845J						prt cov	
6338M							prt cov
7120M							prt cov

3. New frequencies logged are outlined below.

FREQ	DATE	CALLS	USE AND IDENTIS
5330M	5/29/45	NK NKNMN	P's & B's
7728M	5/29/45	KKNK KKNK	
6226M	5/29/45	KNK	A.B.'s
6841M	5/29/45	KKKN	A.B.'s
7047M	6/1/45	KKKN	?
6638M	6/1/45	NK	?
5259M	6/2/45	K KK	Army
5318M	6/2/45	K	?
7765M	6/3/45	KNK	P's & B's

3. (frequencies, new, continued)

FREQ.	DATE	CALLS	USE AND IDENTS
6055M	6/3/45	KKKN K	P's & B's Drill
3584M	6/4/45	KKN	?
5832M	6/4/45	,	Drill (unsigned)
6338M	6/4/45	KNN K	P's & B's Bases sign Wo & Sa; possibly this is 6340J Saeki
7120M	6/4/45	KKKK	Base Matsuyama area (tfc break)

4. The following is a chronology of the RI reactions pertaining to operations, obtained with the above outlined coverage.

29 May, 1945:

Cruising South of Okinawa for Okinawa support and CAP. 0400 position: 24-29N 128-36E.

Weather remains poor in most of the Southern Kyushu - Nansei Shoto Area, all day.

Only air activity showing in the early morning is a search plane being called on 3421J until 0200.

Some indications of tactical air activity shows on 6650J from 0830 'til early evening using NKK calls. Only a couple of planes show here however, and no signs of attack are noted. These planes report being chased though, at 0829, 1316, and 1318.

Wheat appears to be seaplane base activity shows from 0545 to 0700 on 6640J. One of these same KNN bases shows also on 8052A. Has some prospects for future use possibly.

30 May, 1945:

Cruising South of Okinawa for target support. Our 0700 position: 24-53N 128-15E.

Air activity in the early hours centers on a proposed suicide attack from Formosan bases, as mentioned in Ultra despatch. This is picked up on 6650J with a KNK plane giving the attack signal TOTOTO at 0235. This plane is unheard previous to this, though a KNK base identified as Takao calls him twice at 0227 using security procedure, then again at 0230 signing his base call. The signal strength of the plane at the time of the attack was S3 here.

Activity involving KNKN, KNK and KN calls appears on 6685J at 0739. Breakdown of heading of 5 numeral traffic, heading includes Base Forces and Subchasers in Balikpapan area. Possibly this is a new anti sub set-up. Does not appear to be of interest to our operations, so little dope is intercepted.

A similar set-up is noted at about the same time on 7765J with KNKN, KNK and KN calls. Again, little time could be spared to conduct research on this type of activity which is not of immediate tactical value.

Mornings search activity is as usual, on 6842J, first showing at 0843. KKKK calls are used again today, with the numeral verifier in place of the regular number. One of these planes comes to within about fifty miles of our force, and sends a grid, at 0907, saying he has reached the end of his search line with no sighting. Our radar apparently does not pick him up. By his signal strength, it would appear that he did not come as near as his grid indicated. Homing is done on 5850J.

Considerable good dope is recovered from the traffic received on 7035J and 7125J employing the usual calls.

Some type of search activity develops on 6842J in the evening at 1720. This involves two planes of a series and a KINN base identified in recent activity in another circuit, as Koniya. One of the planes develops engine trouble at 1801 and nothing further of a tactical nature is intercepted.

31 May, 1945:

Cruising South of Okinawa in approximate position of 24-50N 128-05E, for target support on Okinawa.

Early morning activity consists solely of base calling three planes on 3421J shortly after midnight.

Search plane activity is very light, with only one being heard all day. This was probably a Francis which was splashed over on the beach. Reaction for this splash was a TUSEU from a KKKK plane on 6842J from 1502 to 1505. Indications of another search is noted in two weather messages from the Kanoya Broadcast, containing a grid in a line extending South of Kyushu, from a KKKK plane and timed 1700 and 1730. This plane is not found to be operating on the regular search frequency of 6842J.

Considerable activity was found throughout the day, concerning the movement of planes. Frequencies involved were 8052A with a movement from Kansanohara and involving Miho and Kanoya, 7035J involving Miyazaki Keijo and Miho, 7125J involving Miyazaki, 6580J with Miyazaki and Miho. Also 6640J, 6740J and 7765J with unidentified. A movement of possible Kamikazes was noted on 6155M, involving Kanoya and possibly Tokushima. The suicide aspect was deduced from the prevalence of planes using plain language entirely. Though this does not definitely place them in the Kamikaze group, it has in past instances.

A movement, which may possibly have been an attempt at search activity, was found on 6650J with a plane giving bad weather conditions and a grid Northeast of Formosa. Considerable activity is noted all day on this frequency, but proves of no value to us.

The weather is good today, in our area, but is very poor in Formosa - Ryukyu and Kyushu areas.

1 June, 1945:

Fueling and rearming in position 23-49N 128-40E.

Poor weather minimizes air activity for Formosan bases mainly. 6650J is very active throughout the day with Takao, Shinchiku, and several unidentified KKK and KKK bases. Activity seems

to concern for the main part, transportation runs between the various bases, though one KKKN plane sends a HiHiHi at 1926. Though we are in the vicinity, there is no indication of any of this activity being of a tactical nature.

No search activity shows from Kyushu, except one plane picked up at 0905, prior to heading back to its base.

Other air circuits picked up spasmodically, included 6580J with KKKN bases, 7035J with K bases Miyazaki Keijo and Miho, 6155M with KN planes, 6638M with NK calls believed to be bases, 7765J a KNKN plane and a KNK base, 7102.5M with KKKN plane and a KKK base, 6325J with Saeki and a plane, and 6640J a KKKN plane.

This constitutes the very limited air activity for the day, as received here. None of it appeared to have any tactical value to us.

2 June, 1945:

Strike Southern Kyushu Air Bases. Our force cruises in position 26-00N 130-15E. Launch aircraft from 26-18N 130-26E.

Activity nil of tactical value in the early morning. K Kyushu alerts are taken from the Kanoya Broadcast. A close check is made of all current air frequencies, but no apparent attempt is made to search for us until 1234, when a search plane shows on 6842J with a grid just South of Kyushu, and saying he is returning because of bad weather.

An hour later another plane of the same call series shows; and indicates he has reached the end of his search line. These planes were NKKK planes, the last kana being a verifier. These planes were probably to use 5850J for homing, though only the latter was heard there. The base was identified as Kanoya, by a simultaneous alert here and on the Kanoya Broadcast. This plane, while homing, is chased -- presumably by a land based fighter as we have no planes out at that time. Several other planes of a KKKN call series are noted on here at this time and about an hour previous. No significance is attached to this however. Another NKK base appears on here and appears to be Matsuyama. This base is apparently used as an alternate for Kanoya, when Kanoya is unserviceable.

Air bases, thought to be drill, were noted on 6845M using KKKN calls. Of particular interest was the use of the old Ta81 A/C code. This circuit later shows indications of being a legitimate circuit.

The remainder of the air activity today was of no tactical value to us. However 8052M (8045A?) was copied and involved KKKN bases and KNKN planes. Likewise, 6650J had KKKN and KNK planes and KKK bases.

Due to the poor weather, the forces Combat Air Patrol is secured in the evening, until 0200 in the morning. The Admiral calls at 2115 and informs us that we can put the CAP up again when we think it necessary, by calling the Chief Of Staff. So we watch all air frequencies very carefully. ~~But apparently the weather is keeping the Japs in too.~~

3 June, 1945:

Long range strike again at Souther Kyushu air activities. Strike is launched from position 26-03N 130-19E.

Air activity throughout the day is light in this area due to bad weather. However, a search is noted out of Kyushu at 0810 on 6842J. This plane gives a position considerably North of us and says he will head for home. This is followed by another message s saying he will continue to search. He is unheard then until he runs into us. Our Radar has a bogey for about five minutes, at 34000 feet altitude, when this plane shows S5 plus with a TETETE. This is followed by amplification when another plane of this NKKK series shows, sighting our 3 CV's. Latter plane probably is directly over our force, while the other plane possibly remains over the other force on our horizon. Our radar picks up only one bogey during this period. Amplifications indicate that both of our task groups are sighted. Our CAP attempts interception, but runs into difficulty due to high altitude, presumably, and both of the planes get away. We have no dope from our planes whether contact was made, but one of these planes, right after sighting our force and getting out a plain language report, states that he has engine trouble and is landing at Kikaishima, ~~in the water~~. This latter report is also in plain language. The admiral tells Adm Clark, whose fliers burn plane on runway.

Another search plane is picked up at 1317 on 6842J, but turns back with no sighting. Homing frequency in all of the above cases was 5850J.

Considerable activity in early morning on 3370J, concerning a flight of two NKKK planes of one call series, which appears to be an attack on Okinawa. An attack signal is received encoded at 0213, preceded by an hour and ten minutes with an "ETA in the battle area". We send the ETA to the beach for their information, at 0130

Other air activity throughout the day concerning flights but of no tactical value were noted as follows. A flight of 8 planes of four series using KKKN calls appeared on 6580J between 0500 to 0713. One of these arrives at Miyazaki at 0643. Another similar flight of 5 planes of three series showed from 1622 to 1730 with KKKN calls, going to Miyazaki. On 5850J the same NKK calls of yesterday are used, possibly identified as Kanoya and Matsuyama, working homeward bound search planes. Considerable activity is noted on 6845J from 1611 to 1835 concerning 8 planes of three NKKN call series, and the base Ko~~o~~ with four unident NKK bases. A position was given at 1700 as Nagasaki and at 1830 as 18 miles Southwest of Tsurigane Sag.

Other air activity of little or no interest to us, involved NKK calls on 6840J, KM K and KKKN calls on 6155J, K calls on 6325J, KKKN and NKN calls comprising two drill circuits on 7765L, KKK army bases on 6580J, and the regular activity on 7035J. Drill activity bordering on the real thing, was noted on 6055A using KKK and KKKN calls.

We receive reports that attacks were made on ~~our~~ ^{Okinawa} forces

during the afternoon, but no direct RI reaction is noted. However the plane mentioned before, at 1317 on 6842J, as a search plane, sent a message stating that the Suicide planes were rushing in. This plane was up for several hour, and though there are no indications, he may have acted as an observer and guide plane for the afternoons attacks.

4 June, 1945:

Operating South of Okinawa for Okinawa CAP.

No air cactivity shows in the early hours. First signs of search plane activity shows on 6842J at 0710 with two NKKK planes. One reports that he will head back, giving position about 60 miles North of Omami O Shima. Both of them then shift to 5850J.

Search activity shows again on 6842J at 1435. This plane is very active in an area about 100 miles South of Kyushu, giving numerous grids and indicating search is impossible to the South. He continues on 6842J til 1515, then disappears.

The weather is again very poor in this area all day. infact, at about noon, we receive word of a typhoon heading up the Ryukus. If the Japs had known of this it doesn't seem they would have sent this search plane out in this direction.

Considerable activity appears on 6650J at 1710, involving 4 KKKK planes and Shinchiku Air Base using a KKK call. These planes maintain normal contact, exchanging signal strength, etc, to within ten minutes of the attack signal TOTOTO timed 1929. Two of the other planes follow with TOTOTO's at 1942 and 1946. The plane giving the initial attack signal made only one transmission prior to the attack. The new code (Ta83?) was noted for the first time, in this activity. The attack was presumably on Okinawa.

Other air activity throughout the day was very light, and consisted of KKKK calls on 7120J, KNN and K calls on 6340J, KNKN and KNK calls on 6740J.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee.
CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~INTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 5 June 1945 to
11 June 1945, inclusive.

1. The regular two man watch was secured to one man, on the fifth of June from 0600 to midnight. Our force was battling a typhoon during this period, making us very invulnerable to any attack. Also, one receiving position was flooded by salt water, and air activity was at such a low level that a one man watch with three receivers and two speakers, was found sufficient to maintain our necessary coverage.

A two man watch was resumed at midnight, as the typhoon subsided a little.

The watch was again reduced to one man at 0000, 11 June, as we approach position 22-00N 130-50E, South bound for anchorage at Leyte, PI.

2. Frequency coverage for the week was as follows:

DATES:	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
FREQ.							
7875J	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	speaker	
3937J	"	"	"	"	"	"	
6842J	con ck	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	
3421J	con cov	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	covrg	
6685J	check	check	check	check	check	check	
3342J	"	"	"	"	"	"	
6650J	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check	cont cov
7765J		prt cov	check	check	check	check	
7200J		check	check	check	check	check	
3600J		"	"	"	"	"	
6740J	check	prt cov	check	prt cov	prt cov	check	
3370J	"	check	prt cov	check	"	"	
6640J	check	check	check	check	prt cov	prt cov	
3320J	"	prt cov	"	"	"	"	
6580J	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	check	
3290J	"	check	check	check	check	"	
6267J		check	check			check	check
5850J	check	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	prt cov	

2. (frequency coverage, continued)

DATES: FREQ.	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
5290J		check	check	check	check	check	check
5140J		check	check	check	check		
7035J		prt cov	prt cov	check	check	check	
8035J		check	check	check	check	check	
4017J		prt cov	"	"	"	"	
6948A	check	check	check	check	prt cov	prt cov	
8045A		check	check				
7764M		prt cov					
7110J					prt cov	prt cov	
7565J	(TaWo BC)						speaker
3782J							speaker

3. New frequencies logged during the week are as follows:

FREQ.	DATE.	CALLS.	USE AND IDENTIS.
7764M	6/6/45	SaTeKo4 MeMiHa	to & de Rcd HIRIHI (NuRi03) at 1013.
3370M	6/7/45	KN	P's & B's Probably 3370J (KuYoø56)
3803M	6/7/45	KN de KK	Possibly 3807J (Sasebo DF cont)
7110M	6/8/45	K to&de KKKK	P's & B's May be Drill (high msg nrs.)
6839M	6/8/45	KKKN	A.B.'s
6842M	6/8/45	KKKN	A.B.'s
6841M	6/8/45	KKKN	Drill -- not air bases.
6845M	6/8/45	KNN	Calls, Koøø and Roø6
6587M	6/8/45		Phone station called Aomori, Ominato, Takata and others.
2851M	6/8/45	KKNN	Unident - callseries assigned "3 Suicide Attack Sqdn" DE Unident - assigned to "Kawatana Assault Unit Cdr"

4. The following is a chronology of RI reactions to the operation of our force.

5 June, 1945:

Our force hits a typhoon in area of 22-58N 132-17E, in early morning. We manage to miss the center by about twenty miles, so escape with no damage. However, fueling and rearming operations scheduled for today, are canceled.

There are no indications of air activity until 1350, when a grid by a KKKK plane is received on the Kanoya Broadcast. The only possible indications of this planes activity, is an S1 plane on 6842J at 1738 sending a message, but uncopeable.

Activity on 6650J begins with the appearance of two groups of KKKN plane calls, at about 1856, working two bases. This culminates in a TOTOTO by one of them at 1947. The planes are unheard from then on, but the base (unident KKK) calls all of them until 2341, with no results. In this period, two other bases (KKK) appear, but shed no light on the situation.

During a similar period, 2007 to midnight, 3421J is active with NKKN planes and NKK bases. Considerable traffic is passed between planes and between the bases and planes, but no breakdown is available for the new code as yet. This activity may be a simultaneous attack from Kyushu, timed with the one mentioned above, from Formosa. Similar activity continues on here, into the morning.

6 June, 1945:

Fueling, rearming, and striking the remainder of Okinawa, in position 24-46N 129-33E.

Activity continues from last night, on 3421J. A new group of three NKKN planes appears at 0108. No purpose behind this activity is derived from RI, but it is presumably a raid out of Kyushu on the Okinawa forces. One of the planes reports interception (TUSEU) at 0311, but continues on and is found to home with the rest of the planes on 3320J at 0433.

The first Kyushu search activity is noted in the appearance of a NKKK plane getting off a message, apparently indicating termination of his search line, on 6842J at 0650. He, one other of his call series, and also a KKKK plane appear on 5850J shortly after this, with the former receiving instructions to land at about 0720. The circuit is quiet by 0805.

Another plane of the same call series, shows at 1053 on 6842J, giving his position, in a grid, as about 150 miles North-east of Daito Jima. By 1115 he is on 5850J for homing, where he works base 3KiRe previously identified as Kasanohara.

At 1352 a search plane appears on the Formosan frequency 6650J, with an S3 to 4 signal. A couple of grids are exchanged, between him and the base, indicating a possible search to the East of Shinchiku Air Base. The plane indicates a sighting at 1511 with

an S5 signal and a TETETE. He is quiet then until 1528, when he comes up with a message prefixed -ITiHo containing a grid, possibly indicating the sighting of our other task group; the prefix meaning carrier position presumably.

Within two hours, at 1718, new KN and KKKN calls begin to appear on 6650J making routine call-ups to the three KFK bases. At 1845 several of the planes seem to be securing their transmitters using the signal Ri"A. This is followed by an"ETA in the battle area" from one of the other planes, at 1906. At 1955 and 2010, two of the planes send the attack signal TOTOTO. This attack signal comes just about an hour after the signal Ri"A appeared. Apparently all of the planes that appeared on here were out to attack, but only the two planes sending the initial attack signals could be directly connected with the attack. Everything is quiet by 2246. This raid was presumably on Okinawa forces.

No other air activity was noted today. Only other activity of any value to us was the usual alerts and contacts received on the Kanoya Broadcast.

7 June, 1945:

Cruising South of Okinawa for Okinawa Target Support. Our 0500 position is 25-18N 129-49E.

The early morning air activity for this area consists of three planes of a KKKNN call series on 6650J at 0145. At 0243 one of the planes gives the signal I-Fu (I'm securing my transmitter) It might be noteworthy that this was just thirteen minutes before his signal to attack, TOTOTO, timed 0256. A similar incident was also noted in the attack last evening.

There is no indication that the other two planes participate in the attack; one of them appears to attempt a forced landing, and asks base for bearing, using signals FUFUFU and HOI. This plane disappears at 0330 after saying E"WO. The plane that sent the attack signal, and the other, continue on the circuit and secure at the base at 0627 and 0652.

At 0720, three planes of a NKKK series appears on 6842J. These planes appear to be on a search to the Southeast of Kyushu; one of them giving a position at 0730 in 29-00N 135-20E. All but one of them appear on the homing frequency at 0750, the remaining one using 6842J for homing (this is probably due to a defualty in his transmitter). Considerable activity is involved in homing these guys. The base consistently violates code security, for some reason, by sending plain language radar (X) bearing to the planes, and then encoding them in the 3 numeral army A/C code. This traffic will be forwarded with this report. The planes variously head for Matsuyama, Fukuoka, and possibly Kanoya, by 1030 the the circuit is quiet.

A new plane call, KKKN, appears on 6650J at 0608, apparently on a search mission, A Nr.2 message is sent at 1046 prefixed -KiN and indicating a position in 24-32N 126-42E, which is about a hundred sixty miles West of us. This message later appears on the Kanoya Broadcast prefixed -TETETE. Another plane of a different KKKN series was active during this period, on here, but did not seem

so sinister. However, he sends weather messages prefixed KIKIKI, immediately after the other plane got out the apparent sighting. The plane sighting us had an S5 signal, while the latter was about S2.

A new search plane suddenly appears at 1602 on 6842J, and sends a Nrl message prefixed UUU with a grid about a hundred miles West of us, timed 1510. Radio silence was apparently observed up to this time. Another disposition report and a weather message follow. The base calls him several times on 5850J at about 1655, but he is unheard on his homing frequency.

Considerable activity is noted on 6580J, apparently involving a couple of flights between Miho and Miyazaki, between 1612 and 1742.

Activity begins on 6650J at 1705 involving two groups of KKKN plane calls totaling 8 planes. The procedure and calls indicate another raid on Okinawa forces. The signal Na"E was used by two of these planes at 1854 and 1907 in much the same way that it was used in the two previous raids on Okinawa. Possibly the same as Ri"A and I-Fu meaning securing transmission, and possibly indicating approach to the target. Previously attacks followed in 13 minutes in one case and in an hour in the other. In the case the attack signal followed in an hour.

Renewed activity, which resembles a raid, shows on 3421J between 2241 and midnight. This includes five groups of NKKN plane calls. One of these appears to be a search plane, as he sends a grid about 150 miles East of Kanoya. The others appear to head down the Ryukyus, possibly for an attack on the Okinawa forces.

8 June, 1945:

Strike Southern Kyushu Air Activities. Launch first strike from position approximately 27-08N 133-32E at 1000.

In the early morning our force passes within 18 miles of Minami Daito Shima. Check is made of 3057J, 5250J and the Kanoya Broadcast for indications of a sighting, but there appears to be no reaction.

The air activity continues on 3421J, handling considerable traffic including grids to the West of the Ryukyus. This totals up to 6 groups of NKKN plane calls, amounting to about 11 planes. One of these planes previously indicated position about 150 miles East of Kanoya; possibly a search plane. Two of them report being chased at 0201 and 0211, but there are no actual indications of an attack. The planes disappear at about 0300, but no homing frequency is found. Activity between bases is noted on 5850J between 0415 and 0419, but it is believed that these planes homed on the tactical frequency.

The usual activity appears on 6650J at 0124 and lasts until about 0715. There are no indications that the activity in-

volved a raid, but the usual set-up of plane calls and procedure was the same as in previous raids. A similar activity shows again at 1650 and lasts until 2230. A flurry of attack signals, TOTOTO, was noted this time, however, at 1954, 2004, 2006, and 2007. One of the planes discloses his base as Keelung, in a plain language message "Turn on the search lights at Keelung".

6580J is active in the morning with several planes and Airbase Miyazaki, but proves of no tactical value to us

Search activity during the day consists of two NKKK planes of the same series; one of them appearing on 6842J at 1133 sending a frid for West of the Ryukyus, then returning to his base; the other appears at 1410 with grids and disposition reports off the Southwest coast of Okinawa. Both of these planes use 5850J for homing. A new NKKK plane appears, on 5850J, while this latter plane is homing, and sends a Nr.3 message. This plane continues on here for four hours with indications of homing, without having previously appeared on the tactical frequency 6842J.

3421J becomes active at 1945 with NKKK calls, appearing to be another raid heading for the Okinawa area. Evidence of the mission of these planes shows at 2140 with a TETETE.TUTUTU, followed by a flurry of TETETE's, TUTUTU's, SEUHA, RAYU, and a grid indicating a position off the West coast of Okinawa.

A similar set up of plane calls shows again on here at 2354, but does not develop by midnight.

The Kanoya Broadcast provided information on alerts and contacts for our Kyushu strikes, throughout the day.

A new circuit concerning the Nr.3 Suicide Attack Squadron was found on 2851M. Calls were of the KoFu 1A3 type, and the traffic was a 4 Kana U separator code.

9 June, 1945:

The Okinawa Operation is completed. Our force lays off Okino Daito Jima for A/A practice, battle problems, and research on bombing tactics. Okino Daito is the victim of our bombing experiments. Our BB's run in close, for a little firing practice, also.

Our only reaction to this activity is a HIRIHI received over the Kanoya Broadcast, originated by Okino Daito at 0615.

At 0216 at grid prefixed TETETE is received from a NKKK plane on 3421J in a position about 60 miles Northwest of us. This is followed by the customary weather. At 0255 three other NKKK planes begin to show. One of them gives a TUSEU at 0256, and by 0310 they appear on 3320J for homing, continuing then until about 0545.

At 0828 a search shows on 6842J with two NKKK planes. One of them makes a sighting of three CV's and gives a position about a hundred miles West of us. This appears to be on a force of Jeep CV's which are in that area. The usual disposition and weather follow.

A group of NKKKN planes show on 6650J at 0249; likely a raid on Okinawa again. The signal I-Fu (securing transmitter) is received from one of them at 0302, and is followed in ten minutes

by the attack signal TOTOTO from the same plane. Another plane gives a TOTOTO at 0315 subsequent to a HIIHI at 0305 and 0308. The regular contacts are then established between the bases and planes and at 0428 another of these planes gives a TOTOTO. This latter plane is S5 here, but this exceptional signal strength may be a phenomenon of the remarkable reception we have experienced in this area the last couple of days. These planes continue contact with the bases until about 0700. One KKK base requests their time of arrival from another KKK base, but without success. This however, may indicate that they landed or returned to a different base than they started out from.

Activity shows again on 6650J at 1548 with one KKKN plane. He secures at 1648 and is replaced by the usual set-up of KKKN calls, typical of previous raids on Okinawa. Though a couple of these planes continue on 'til midnight, there is no actual indication of any raid taking place.

Other air activity during the day was noted on 6580J with KKKN planes and Miho and Miyazaki airbases. Also, a couple of KKKN planes working a KKK base on 6948A, appearing to be a transportation run, and KKKN planes on 6740J with similar activity.

10 June, 1945:

Our force cruises most of the day in the approximate position of 24-00N 131-30E for AA practice and maneuvers, etc. At sundown we head South for Leyte.

Only activity possibly concerning us, was a search plane showing on 6842J at 0821. He disappears at 0835 by which time his signal has reached S3 with no indications of sighting us. No homing frequency is found.

Though of no tactical value NKKN planes appear on 3421J at 0049. There is no indication of their mission, and between 0215 and 0319, they shift to 3320J; possibly for homing.

At 1707, 6640J becomes active with KKKKNN planes. Likewise this is of no tactical value to us, and is dropped while still active at 1745.

7110J is active from 0645 to 0745 with NKK calls identified as Matsuyama and Kasanohara, working KKKK planes. Prior to this, these bases are found to be contacting each other using the same NKK calls, on 5850J. The signal and indicator used in making the shift was O-Hi (Ke Ri 11), at 0642. The planes were not noted to appear on 5850J.

Activity involving KKKN, NKKN planes, and KKK, NKK bases appeared on 6948A between 1611 and 1915. The base Ka O Hi seemed to be the same as 4 Ke Ro; the latter appeared on 3421J at 2245 on the fifth of June.

The watch is reduced to one man at midnight, as we reach position 22-21N 130-50E, heading South, for Leyte.

11 June, 1945:

Our force heading Southward for Leyte and conducting drills enroute. Our 1900 position: 18-29N 129-41E.

Watch is reduced to one man. Coverage for the day consists of a constant check for Formosan air activity, and a speaker watch on the Air Fleet 1 Broadcast (TaWo).

Nothing of tactical value was intercepted, and everything is very peaceful in this area.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~INTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

20 June, 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge, R.I.U. attached Com Car Div Six

To: Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit

Subject: (A) Weekly report of RI technical information concerning operations 12 June to 18 June 1945, inclusive

(B) Report on personnel and materiel changes

1. Subject reports enclosed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. Kluss
W. M. Kluss
Lt(jg) USNR
CinC

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

Contained herein is a report of activities of the RI Unit attached to ComCarDiv Six for the period 12 June to 18 June 1945, and a brief report of personnel and material changes within this unit.

~~TOP SECRET~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 12 June 1945 to
18 June 1945, inclusive.

1. Watch was secured at 0800 13 June 1945 as we approach Leyte Gulf. Our Force enters Leyte Gulf at approximately 1200 13 June, 1945.
2. Frequency coverage prior to entering the anchorage consisted of a check of 6650J and a speaker watch on the First Air Fleet Broadcast (TaWo). Nothing of tactical or technical value was intercepted for the period of this report.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

Personnel.

1. On 22 May 1945, R. W. Jackson Rm2c USN reported aboard as an addition to this units complement.
R. B. Potier CRM USNR, D. D. Heiner Rmlc USNR and R. E. Westerberg Rm2c USNR reported to this unit 15 June 1945, as reliefs for B. A. Lee CRM USNR, R. W. Blount Rm2c and H. E. Bailey Rm2c USNR, respectively. Bailey and Blount were detached from this unit 17 June 1945. B. A. Lee is detached on 22 June 1945.
2. As of 21 June 1945, duties as Radioman in Charge of R I U aboard this vessel are turned over to R. B. Potier CRM.

Materiel.

1. Inventory of equipment was made on 18 June 1945, and all equipment was determined to be in good condition. A copy of the inventory has been forwarded, with an inventory of Confidential Publications, under separate cover to Frupac and Ragfor.

Respectfully submitted,

B. A. Lee

B. A. Lee
CRM USNR
RinC

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

Do NOT Destroy - Return to the
NSA Technical Library when no longer needed
5-41,848AV Copy 100. 1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION SIX

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

16 August 1945

FROM: Officer in Charge, RIU #5 attached to Com Car Div 6.
TO: Officer in Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
SUBJECT: Report of RI technical information covering operations
from 23 June 1945 to 15 August 1945, inclusive.

REFERENCES: (a) CINCPAC 0005507, Par. 8.
(b) FRUPAC JUSIT of 28 June 1945.

1. Subject report enclosed

Respectfully submitted

A.B. Ragan
A.B. Ragan
Lt.(j.g.), USNR
Officer-in-Charge

CC: OP-20-G (CNO)
Fleet Intelligence Officer, CINCPAC (Advan.)
RAGFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for
the period of 23 June 1945 to and
including 1 July 1945.

1. The task force was at anchor in Leyte Gulf during most of this period. The intercept watches were secured.
2. On the twenty-fifth the R I shack got a new 150 foot antenna which was installed by the ships' R T's.
3. Scobey, R. W. Rm2/c reported aboard for duty with this unit on the twenty-sixth.
4. On the thirtieth of June on SX-28 receiver with speaker was received. Our ship left Leyte Gulf for a days gunnery practice.
5. The ship returned to the anchorage in Leyte Gulf on the first of July. The intercept watches remained secured.

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Potier
R. B. Potier
CRM USNR
RinC

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

Report of R I U activity for the period 2 July 1945 to 9 July 1945, inclusive.

2 July 1945.

1. The task force got underway from Leyte Gulf for strikes against Tokyo area air fields and installations.

2. The R I U was placed on a two man three section watch. Receiving conditions were poor. The Kanoya broadcast was put up on a speaker watch and covered for tactical traffic. We held only a few values of the code so very little of the traffic other than plain language can be read. During the hours of darkness the picket frequency, 6490J was covered for a possible sighting of our forces. Continuous search for active air frequencies was maintained. Nothing intercepted concerned our force.

3. July 1945.

1. The force continued its northeasterly course. Reception was still poor. Most signals were very weak.. We had gunnery practice and encountered a good deal of interference from the automatic gun computers. Apparently nothing can be done about it since the ship's radios have the same trouble and can't get anything done about it.

4. July 1945.

1. A two man watch was maintained and search for a Honshu tactical or patrol plane circuit was started and several frequencies looked like good possibilities but later are proved to be of little or no value to our force.

5 July 1945.

1. All activity intercepted was a long way from our forces. We felt quite safe but continued to search for air circuits and coverage of the Kanoya broadcast for tactical information. Reception improved a little.

6-7-8 July 1945.

1. We continued an unfruitfull search for patrol plane frequencies used by planes out of Honshu.

2. On the eighth we were in the fueling area off Honshu prior to our run-in.

9 July 1945. Off Honshu. Position 28-45N, 147-16E. Running-in For strike on the Tokyo area.

1. The unit was informed by air-plot that a Jap phone station was blocking out their channel on 4475kcs. Little dope was recovered from this except the standard Jap pharses, "KAN MEI DOO KA" and "KOTIRA". This frequency was logged between 0300 and 1740.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

Coverage for the period 2 July 1945
to and including 9 July 1945.

1. The Kanoya broadcast was covered for any tactical traffic and then the Kisarazu broadcast was set up on the third. A check was also made of the traffic on the Tokyo number one broadcast. 6490J the picket frequency was covered during the hours of darkness prior to our strike on the Tokyo area. The following list of frequencies were checked and partly covered during this period:

3057J	3320J	3421J	4017J	4015J	4022J	5337J
5850J	6067J	6155J	6255J	6340J	6325J	6530J
6550J	6555J	6640J	6650J	6685J	6740J	6795J
6835M	6845J	6880J	7035J	7045J	7125J	7260J
7845J	8025A					

2. The following is a list of new frequencies logged for this period:

Freq.	Type Calls	Remarks
3344M	KKKN	Sent number traffic. Possibly 3342J
3393M	KKK	Army circuit. Was of no value.
3445M	KKN	The same calls appeared on 3418M.
4721M	KKK	Unidentified
5157M	KKNN	Sent nine kana code.
5780M	KK	Linked with SA101 which is 3807C.
5854M	KN	Traffic was originated by Saeki area defense force.
5955J	NONE	Sent "ITO" broadcast. Kure "WAU" broadcast was listed for this frequency.
5972J	KKKN	Unidentified.
5974M	KKK KKNN	Unidentified drill circuit.
6030M	KKK	Sasebo to Owada.
6130M	KKKN	Assigned to suicide attack squadron. Assault unit 31 comdr.
6137M	KK KKN KKNN	BASES and planes.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

New frequencies (Cont.)

Frequency	Type	Calls	Remarks
6880M	KKKN		Unidentified. Sent weather traffic.
6988M	KNK		Possibly 6995J, third air flt. Drill.
7010J	Nkk	KKKN KKKK	Measured 7005 and 7007 when first heard. Kasanohara and Kanoya area air bases. Same calls appeared on 5850J.
7086M	KKKK		Unidentified. The last Kana was a numeral verifier.
7087M	KKKN		Unidentified but not 7086M.
7738M	K		Unidentified.
7761M			Takao KEI broadcast. Also measured 7740.
7777M	NK		A.G. 901 activity.
7902M	KKK	KN	Army circuit.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

USS YORKTOWN CV-10

REPORT OF R I U ACTIVITY

10 July 1945: Position: 33-42N 142-58E. Strike Day.

1. Our task force launched the first air strike at 0355. We put Tokyo number one broadcast up in place of Kisarazu broadcast to get the first reaction of the Nips to our raid. We got no dope from Tokyo's broadcast. The first reaction was received from the Kisarazu broadcast when we got an air alert originated by Kisarazu for the Kantoo area at 0518. At 0525 we got another air alert originated by the Yokosuka broadcast for his area, timed 0517. We got many air alerts for the Yokosuka area all day long but other reaction as to being attacked is nil. We had bogeys on the screen at 1330 and the CAP splashed a FRANCIS a DINAH and a MYRT at 1400. We went to GQ at 1430. No more bogeys appeared on the radar screen so GQ was secured at 1455. We received a "CQY" from Com Third Fleet for 6530J but this frequency proved to be valueless. On 6351M we heard a base MAETU calling a plane MEKUMI at 1610 but was unheard further. This frequency was sent out in an ultra dispatch and was apparently the same frequency we received on the "CQY", but had been garbled when transmitted to us. According to RAGFOR a position report was transmitted at 1245 on this frequency that corresponded to our forces position at that time.

2. Coverage:

The Tokyo number one broadcast, HITU, and Kisarazu broadcast, MIKO, were kept on a speaker watch. The HITU broadcast proved to be worthless for the type of information we wanted and was later dropped. The picket boat frequency, 6490J was covered during the hours of darkness. Nothing of value to our force was received.

Frequencies covered:

3747J 5850J 6067J 6490J 6530J 6640J 6740J
6855J 7010J 7035J 7045J 7050J 7125J 7480J
7765J 8725J

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
3369M		Sent radar traffic from Osaka G.D.
3418M	KKN	Assault unit 12 comdr.
4275kcs	KKK	Army circuit. Was of no value.
6137M	KKN KK	Unidentified.
6351M	KKK	Army base and planes.
6345M	KKK	Army circuit. Called KAKU. Not 6351M.
6948M	KKN	Drill circuit.
6950M	KNKK	Drill circuit.
7034M	KN KKN	Unidentified.
7820M	KKN	Drill circuit.
8025M	NNN NN	Planes and base.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

11 July 1945

RETIRING TO FUELING AREA - POSITION, 33-54N 145-04E

1. 3421J, Kanoya search-attack frequency, became active at 0135 with the appearance of a plane, 9NHE3, sending a message which probably meant he was returning to the base. This planes signal strength was s4, indicating that he was pretty close to our forces. The base called number 1 and 2 of this call series but received no response.

3320J showed with an unidentified base sending a message to 9NHE3 at 0255. 9NHE3 first appeared at 0354, when he sent a message. Two bases were working this plane which was unusual for Kanoy's homing frequency. TUSEU (being pursued) was sent by 9NHE3 at 0416. This was the last appearance of this plane though the bases tried in vain to re-establish communication with him.

*different
air traffic*
A very interesting thing was noted in connection with the two bases up on 3320J, in the fact that Kanoya's MIKA broadcast did not send the traffic from the plane but Kisarazu's MIKO broadcast did send the traffic. In the past five months there were very few instances when Kanoya failed to put out air traffic very soon after it was sent on either the search-attack frequency or the homing frequency. In view of the extraordinary loud signal strength of the plane it was doubtfull that the plane was based at Kanoya since planes from Kanoya normally never extended their search further east than southern Shikoku. It became even more doubtfull when Kanoya failed to transmit this planes traffic.

6351M, Army frequency, became active at 0616 with three planes. One plane reported that he sighted an enemy warship at 0632, the position was not recovered. Another plane reported being pursued by enemy aircraft. The circuit remained active until 0804 when it was last heard.

6842J became active at 0712 with a base sending message Nr1. No more air activity for this area was intercepted for the remainder of the day.

We resumed coverage of 6490J at sunset. It yielded nothing throughout the evening

2. COVERAGE: MIKO, MIKA broadcast on speaker watch.

3320J	3421J	5850J	6067J	6490J	6351M	6550J
6580J	6740J	6842J	6952J	7035J	7065J	
NEW FREQS.	TYPE	CALLS	REMARKS			
3420M	LA3		Assults units. RIYO series calls.			
3840E	KKK		Army. 3 numeral code, not 888.			
6345E	KKK		Army. Not believed to be air.			
6840M	LA3		AB Ominato and Wakkanai. Maybe Low for 6855J			
6948M	KNKK		Planes. Drill. Takuma area.			
6965M	KKK		Army air. Central Honshu			

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

12 July 1945. FUELING PRIOR TO STRIKE ON OMINATO AREA
POSITION - 40-53N 145-48E

1. The frequency, 6490J was covered on into the new day. The appearance of only one picket boat was noted during our coverage period. Traffic was very low and of no importance to us. This circuit was dropped at daybreak.

A base on 3320J was heard sending a message, Nr4, to two planes at 0254. Both planes had negligible signal strength when they receipted for this message. The traffic flow between the base and planes was normal. Miyazaki was specified for the planes to land. Meanwhile, the frequency, 3421J was heard with a base calling two other planes of the same call series as that on 3320J. The base called spasmodically from 0342 until 0447, but the planes were not contacted. This circuit was dropped since this activity was out of our area. 3320J continued active during this time with the base having a hard time keeping in contact with the two planes here. Miyazaki went under a precautionary alert at 0433 (this was copied on 5295J). The planes had not as yet landed.

6640J was heard at 0622 with a base still trying to contact the planes heard on the night frequency, 3320J. This circuit was dropped since it was not in our area.

No search planes were noted for the remainder of the day. Air traffic for Northern Honshu and Southern Hokkaido appeared to be very scarce. Several new frequencies were heard but the bases were only active without any planes up. The weather was extremely foul this day and was probably the cause for lack of activity.

6490J was covered again at dusk. Our run-in had started for the following day's strike. Eight picket boats appeared on 6490J but their signal indicated that they were not in our area.

2. COVERAGE: MIKO broadcast on speaker watch.

3320J 3421J 6067J 6490J 6640J 6740J 7035J 7125J

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
6580M(J)	KKK	Three numeral traffic, not 888. One base heard. Army.
6815M	1A3	AGRP 903 Comdr. AB Wakkanai -B- AB Ominato -C-

13 July 1945. OFF OMINATO - STRIKE CANCELED - FOUL WEATHER

1. No picket boats appeared on 6490J so the circuit was dropped at 0510.

A new Kasumigaura air group frequency, 7770M, was heard today with planes air-borne from 0720 until 1252 when it was last heard. These planes used a Kasumigaura air group plane K008 call with a numeral suffix. There were four planes. Only one message was sent and it was unbreakable. The planes had good signal strength but their distance was undetermined.

6740J was heard from 0824 to 1658. Chitose air base worked six planes that had weak signals. Two messages were copied that appeared to be weather reports. It was doubtful that these planes were on a search mission.

Six picket boats appeared on 6490J during the evening coverage. Nothin of tactical value was obtained.

2. COVERAGE: OMINATO'S NISA broadcast on speaker.

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS			
6067J	6490J	6640J	6740J	6880J	7765J
6815M	1A3	AGRP 903 CDR			
7770M	KKKKN	Kasumigaura AGRP planes.			
8445M	KKN	Drill. Air.			
6880J	KKN	Unident.			

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

14 July 1945. STRIKE DAY - NORTHERN HONSHU - SOUTHERN HOKKAIDO

1. The picket boat frequency, 6490J, was covered during the hours of darkness. Nothing of any importance was intercepted. Numerous circuits in this area were covered to get the first radar contacts of our striking planes. The first precautionary alert for the Ominato-Tsugaru area was received at 0440. The first full alert was received at 0543. An unidentified station reported 20 Grummans contacted at 0510.

A destroyer was sighted by our striking planes and was reported to be steaming in the direction of our force. The mobile frequencies for this area were checked but no reaction was noted.

An unidentified base, probably AGRP 903 CDR, was heard sending a message to a plane at 0524. The same base told this plane to return to the base at 0535. Nothing more of value was recovered from this circuit for the remainder of the day.

6351M, Army for central Honshu search, was heard at 1007 with two planes engaged in a search mission. No sighting report was originated by these planes even though their signals became very loud. This circuit was active until 1524. No reaction was noted at 1235 when two BETTYS were splashed by the CAP.

6855J, ARGRP 903, Hi-north, was heard at 1155 with nine planes active during the afternoon until 1617. The plane's signals strength ranged from s1 to s3. No traffic was passed on this circuit while we were covering it.

A bombarding group of ships from this task force moved in to shell shore installations during the evening but no RI reaction was recovered. There was no other tactical activity intercepted the remainder of the evening.

2. COVERAGE: NISA broadcast.

3832J 6067J 5055J 6340J 6365J 6351M 6530J 6740J 6855J
7125J

NEW FREQS.	TYPE	CALLS.	REMARKS.
5347M	KN		RE series calls. Drill.
5376M	KNK	NKK KKK	This appeared to be a drill circuit altho no drill indicator was used on the traffic.
5864M	1A1	OTSU	Ominato radio and unidentified OTSU call.
6021M	KN		SU series. Believed to be air bases of BAF 5.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

15 July 1945 STIKE AGAINST NORTHERN HONSHU AND SOUTHERN HOKKAIDO.
BOMBARDING GROUP SHELLLED SHORE INSTALLATIONS.

1. The coverage of 6490J, netted nothing of value and was dropped at daylight.

3832J, Hi-north lookout stations, reported contact of our planes shortly after taking off. The first air alert was received at 0452 for Tsugaru area.

The Central Honshu Army air search frequency, 6351M, became active at 0419 with an s2 plane calling an unidentified base. Another plane appeared a little later but nothing of importance appeared until one of these planes sent a message stating that clouds were too low for searching and was returning to the base. A few minutes later this same plane reported that he had sighted small aircraft. The base and plane exchanged a few messages and the the plane was last heard at 0735. The other plane on this circuit had a hard time keeping in communication with the base due to his having trouble with both his transmitter and receiver. The traffic passed between the plane and base was unbreakable. The circuit was last heard at 0933.

6740J became active at 1653 with AB Ominato working five planes. One message was sent which was unbreakable. The planes were all weak and nothing of value was received. This circuit was last heard at 1838.

Ominato and Tsugara areas secured from ail alerts by 1642. 6490J was again covered during darkness but nothing of value was received.

2. COVERAGE:NISA Broadcast

3832J	6067J	6351M	6455J	6490J	6530J	6555J
6740J	-6765J	6855J				

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS.	REMARKS.
6531M	HEIFU4 Numeral.	Calls fit HEIFU4 call list. Planes. Drill traffic passed.
6535M	KNKN	Planes. Drill.
6609M	KNK KK	Army circuit. Three numeral traffic but no 888 code sent.
6610M	K KK	No traffic received. Unidentified.
6815M	KKNN	Det. of AGRP 903 and CDR. No planes. Routine 5 numeral traffic.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

16 July 1945. The Force retired to the fueling area.

1. We went to a two man watch from a three man watch as the force withdrew from the Hi-north strike.

6490J was again covered with negative results.

A continuous search for tactical air frequencies for our area was maintained with negative results. 6351m was checked but unheard.

6740J was active again with four planes between 1133 and 1500. One message was sent to a plane but the text was unbreakable.

6550 was logged but no aircraft appeared during our coverage.

6455J, Yokosuka air group circuit, was active at 1605 with one plane. Four unidentified bases were heard passing traffic. This circuit did not look like a search plane frequency. The circuit was unheard after 2147.

6740J was up again at 1724 and copied but dropped at 1736 because of the lack of tactical information. Eight planes were called and four heard with weak signals. No traffic was sent.

Ominato's broadcast was dropped in preference to Kisarazu's MIKO broadcast in the hopes of getting some better tactical information

COVERAGE: NISA B.C. until 0355. MIKO B.C. After 0355.

5255J	6067J	6137M	6455J	6490J	6530J	6740J
6765J	7035J	7125J	6855J	7322J		

17 July 1945 STRIKE ON TOKYO AREA AIRBASES

1. A three man watch was resumed this morning at GQ (0330). The HITU broadcast, Tokyo's number one, was set up in place of the Kisarazu broadcast with the hope of getting better coverage of tactical traffic. Kisarazu put out the first air alert for the Yokosuka area so the Tokyo broadcast was dropped. Yokosuka went under a full air alert at 0522.

No tactical air circuits were heard for this area. 6351M was checked constantly but was not heard. None of the other air circuits in this area appeared to be handling normal traffic with no search planes out in our vicinity.

The Yokosuka broadcast was covered from 2000 and into the next day for traffic in regards to the bombardment but nothing was recovered with regards to this action.

2. COVERAGE: MIKO, HITU, KIMU broadcasts.

6351M	6455J	6555M(J?)	6740J	6842J	7035J	7322J
-------	-------	-----------	-------	-------	-------	-------

NEW	TYPE CALL	REMARKS
6955M	KKK	ARMY Hamamatsu area search
7090E	OTSU	AirFleet 5 Base circuit. Kanoya etc.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

18 July 1945 STRIKE ON TOKYO AREA AIR BASES

1. No reaction was noted to the bombardment mentioned in the report for the seventeenth. No tactical air of any value was heard during the morning.

Our strike was delayed until 1130 due to foul weather over our forces. The first sweep was launched at 1130 and Yokosuka went to a full air alert at 1224.

6351M became active at 1418 with an unidentified base working one plane. Another plane was contacted by the base and told to land. This plane "rogered" and secured. During the following three hours the one remaining plane kept in communication with the base at intervals and at 1724 with a good signal, sent a message saying he had sighted four carriers, and nothing more. This information was given to "Flag Plot" and they said the Japs had probably sighted a group of four of our destroyers that had been detached from the main task group. These "Cans" were near Choshi Cape and that is where the plane had reported his position a little while prior to this sighting. After the sighting, no position was sent but the plane asked the base for his bearing. Then the plane asked if there were enemy planes over the base and received a "negative". Both base and plane secured at 1759 and were heard no more.

No other activity was noted for the day. No planes were intercepted near our force by the CAP.

2. COVERAGE: MIKO broadcast.

2955J 5120J 6351M 6365J 5935J 6455J 6640J 6650J

6455J 6855J 7035J 7322J 8625J 7090J(7102J)

NEW FREQS	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
3320M	1A1 1A3	Kure radio to unident. KKNN.
5101M	1A1	CU 1Ø Det 3. May be 5097J
5303M	1A1	Yamato AGRP. Probably 5302J Now current.
5222M	KKN	Army. Was of no value.
5248M	KKN 1A3	Assult unit 32 Comdr.
5881M	KN	KO calls. Probably Yokosuka, AGRP activity.
5885M	1A1	Ominato radio. Wakkanai det. RNO Otaru.
6137M	KK	Bases only.
7645M	OTSU	AGRP 721 Bases. Komatsu, Matsuyama etc.
7806M	KKKNN	NOMAKU41 fits K008 list but not listed. Sent plane type traffic,

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

20, 21, 22, and 23 July 1945. IN FUELING AREA

1. A one man watch was set for most of this period and two men put on when activity in our area seemed likely.

Search and coverage was concentrated on search plane frequencies and tactical air circuits in the Kure - Miho area and also Northern Kyushu and Shikoku areas.

6351M was heard on the twentieth with a base calling a plane which was unheard. One unbreakable message was sent.

Air activity intercepted was limited to 7010J. One plane was heard. The bases were passing four numeral traffic which was no value to us. Nothing further of interest was copied for the twenty-first.

On the twenty-second, one plane was heard on 6842J at 1006. Only two of eight messages were received from this plane that was on a search mission. Nothing of further interest was received on this circuit. 6351M was active at 1100. Three planes were airborne but the traffic passed was of no value. These planes were not too near to us so didn't concern us greatly. The circuit secured at 1227. One plane was heard on 6580J at 1731 was soon dropped for lack of traffic and activity.

7010J was active again the twenty third with one plane with an s3 signal who sent one message at 0910. Two other planes were heard on this circuit before it became inactive at 1038. 5255J, carrier training frequency, became active at 1729. A Yokosuka AGRP base worked two planes at 1729. This was of little interest and was dropped at 1820.

2. COVERAGE: MIKO, MIKA broadcasts.

5255J	5850J	6067J	6351M	6480J	6842J	6380J
7010J	7035J	7322J	7427J	6137M	6845J	6580J

NEW FREQS: TYPE CALLS: REMARKS:

4193M	KN	SU series calls. Probably air bases in the Empire.
4225M	K008 - K007	NARAE called SATEK06 (Jaluit)
3322m	\$K K K K K K N N	Kure radio.
6020M	N K K K	Air - Drill
6285M	2A3	AGRP 903 Yamada Det. 4Kana U separator code. EN traffic.
6705M	KN	TO series calls.
6685M	K K K	Army.
6920M	KN	SU series calls.

TOP SECRET

ULTRA

24 July 1945. OFF JAPAN - STRIKES IN THE KURE AREA

1. All air circuits were quiet and nothing was intercepted that indicated that the Japs knew what was going to hit them today. The first preliminary alert for the western Inland sea area was received from 3987J at 0547. Much more traffic was passed on this circuit with regards to our planes.

The first indication of a search for our forces was when a message was received from an s3 plane on 6842J at 0815. No more activity was heard here and the plane shifted to the homing frequency, 5850J at 0918. This circuit was active until 1017.

A JILL was splashed by the CAP at 0926 and another was shot down shortly after. Two planes of a new series were called by the base on 6842J and 5850J from 1100 to 1139 but neither plane was heard. Possibly the two planes shot down were the ones being called but we got no RI reaction.

Two more planes of a different group appeared on 5850J without previously being heard on 6842J. They were of no tactical value. One plane was called on 6842J from 1550 to 1624 but was not heard from. This was the last activity heard on this circuit.

6148M, army, was picked up at 1729 with a base working planes which appeared to be tactical from the traffic handled. This circuit was active until 1822 when it secured.

A DINAH was splashed at 1757 but everything was quiet on the circuits we were covering.

Nothing more of tactical value was received for the day.

2. COVERAGE: MIKA broadcast.

3421J 4017J 3987J 5850J 6148M 6137M 6351A

6640J 6842J 6845J 6885J 7010J

NEW FREQS: TYPE CALLS REMARKS

5935M KKK ARMY NUIYO Hamamatsu area.

5975M N LKT stations. Kure area.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

25 July 1945 CRUISING SOUTH OF SHIKOKU - STRIKES BEING LAUNCHED
AGAINST KURE SHIPPING, MAIZURU SHIPPING AND AIR-
BASES AT MIHO AND OSAKA.

1. ON 3421J, one tactical search plane was up at the start of the new day. Another plane came up at 0012 with an s5 signal, the former plane's signal was s2. Flag plot was notified of the s5 plane. A third plane was up at 0027 with an s4 signal, flag plot was also notified of this plane. No bogies appeared on the radar screen. The first plane mentioned continued with an s2 signal and sent a long message, probably weather. One more message was sent by plane number two and then was unheard and the circuit became quiet.

3320J became active at 0007 with a station using an OTSUFUL call who sent the first message that was passed on 3421J. This circuit was silent for twenty minutes until an unidentified base called one of the planes previously heard on 3421J. When the plane that was called, came up, he asked the base what the signal strength was of one of the other planes that was still on 3421J. This would indicate that these tactical planes had been trying to stay in radio contact with each other and has not been noted previously. A greater amount of traffic was passed on this circuit, 3320J, the homing frequency for 3421J, which seemed rather unusual since prior to this time the bulk of traffic was handled on the search channel and not the homing channel. All the planes on this circuit had apparently landed by 0250 when the bases only were passing traffic.

The MIKA broadcast, Kanoya, failed to be of much value in regards to his sending the traffic handled on the afore mentioned circuits as in times past. One message was all that was intercepted from it.

On 5850J, Kanoya told Matsuyama and Oita to secure on 7010J and set up KERIØ1, which was 3505J. At 0425 Kanoya was heard calling the other two station on 3505J. This is half of 7010 and has not been heard previously.

The army search frequency for south of Tokyo, 6351A, was active from 0755 to 0820. Two planes were heard working an unidentified base and asking for bearings. The planes received a "negative" to their question of enemy planes over base. Nothing more was heard after 0820.

6842J became active at 0808 when a base called two planes. We went to G.Q. for a bogey and a British Seahawk splashed a MYRT at 0838. One plane came up on 5850J, the homing frequency, at 0854 with an s4 signal. The base called a second plane that didn't answer and may have been the MYRT just splashed. The other plane asked the base if he was under attack at 0927 and the base told him to land. Three more planes became active on 5850 and 6842 until 1430, when these circuits secured.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

25 July 1945. (Cont.)

6842J was active again at 1638 with one plane, s4 to s5, who sent a message and then sifted to 5850J and was heard there for five minutes and then was unheard.

Miller
At 1516 a sighting report was copied from the broadcast and we received T.G.38.1 "CQY" for 7200J. This circuit was heard at 1525 with an s5 plane sending a message. We had no bogeys on the radar but this plane's signal strength indicated he was very close. A second plane came up with an s2 signal. Several sightings were reported by these two planes that also sent disposition reports. The circuit became quiet after 1654 when the two planes sent their ETA at the base. Four planes came up between 1739 and 1745 with signals from s1 to s3. At 1747 an s5 plane said he had sighted carriers and sent a grid. This traffic came out on Kisarazu's MIKO broadcast three minutes after the original transmission on 7200 so Kisarazu was believed to be the base working these planes. We went to air-defense at 1752 for radar bogies. All planes were silent until 1900 when a plane sent HIIHI and then heard no more. Three planes were splashed at this time forty miles out. Another plane on this circuit told the base he was retiring. There was still one plane left on the circuit and sighted carriers and sent the attack signal. Our CAP engaged these planes or plane in a "dogfight" and at 1948 the plane sent RAKO 048 and the ships CIC reported that the unfriendly bogey was heading out.

3421J was active again during the evening but signals were weak so we were not very much concerned.

3600J, the night frequency for 7200J, was heard at 2323 with one plane for a few minutes and then the circuit was quiet.

2. COVERAGE: MIKA, MIKO, ITO broadcasts.

3320J	3421J	3600J	5850J	6137M	6155J	6148M
6351A	6640J	6845J	6842J	7010J	7035J	7200J

NEW FREQS: TYPE CALLS: REMARKS:

3505J		Night frequency for 7010J
6955M	KNK	Hamamatsu search.
6690M	KNK	Army, unidentified.
7090J	KN	Unident.
7180E	KNK	Army, unidentified.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

26 July 1945. Retiring from the strike on KURE / OSAKA area, and heading for the fueling area.

1. Activity dropped off rapidly after the flurry last evening. 3600J was heard with stations calling only and no traffic being passed at 0017-0018 and then was heard again at 0222 when a plane came up making one call. This frequency was then quiet for the remainder of the mid-watch. 3421J remained active with a plane, 7RUNE2 who sent a message containing a grid position just south of Kyushu and was probably on the forces in that area. At 0028 a plane using the call 7RUNE1 appeared on this frequency and sent his number one message at 0117 and number two at 0210 with a grid position slightly south of the first grid received on this circuit. Several other planes showed here after 0115 when the base called them and sent his number one message which contained the grid as originated by 7RUNE2. All these planes had poor signals and copy was made with great difficulty through heavy interference. These planes later homed on 3320J after completing their search. 7RUNE1 with an s1 signal sent his number two with an "ETA" of 03??, at 0231. All this activity is not immediate concern to our task group but was covered in the event that one of the planes line of search came into our area.. Reception was poor for the mid-watch.

7200J became active at 1020 on the day watch with two search planes heard. At 1128 one of the planes with an s4 signal sent a grid position fairly close to where our forces were. At the time of receipt the grid breakdown was not held so a guess was made of the planes distance from us at the time. We assumed that some units of our force had been sighted and such information was given to the admiral. At 1132 this plane that sent the grid, sent 0'HI KIE21, which was 5335J. The plane then appeared on this frequency along with others from 7200J, and were homed thereon. We got more grids 7200J and 5335J and at 1448 the plane TUESE3 on 7200J preceded a correction of his number one message with the signal "TUSETUSETUSE" which indicated that this was a new signal meaning to correct or change. The army search plane frequency, 6148M was active during the early evening but the traffic was unbreakable so it was almost worthless to us. Several planes were heard here with poor signals.

COVERAGE: Kisarazu air base broadcast, MIKO.

3320J 3421J 3600J 5335J 6148M 6155J 6351A
6650J 6640J

NEW FREQ.

5331M \$KARIU called UROØØ. This was believed to a new frequency for Yokosuka radio.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ULTRA~~

27 July 1945 Fueling area off Honshu.

1. One man from each watch was secured, leaving two men on. Reception was fair but activity was light.

2. Coverage: MIKO broadcast.

3320J 6137J 6155J 6351A 6640J 6580J 6845J

3. New frequencies:

Freq.	Type Calls	Remarks
6117M	KKNN	Two calls identified as assault unit comds.
7212M	KKKN	A.B. OITA, MATSUYAMA and KANOYA.
7012M	2A3	Unidentified.

28 July 1945. Strike day against Kure shipping and air fields in MIHO area. Position, 30-58N, 136-01E.

1. No air activity was heard until 0355 when IWAKAWA tactical frequency 6155J showed with a base working five planes. All had weak signal and were of little concern to us. Our first strike planes were launched at 0447. By 0453 three more planes with weak signals came up on 6155J but none of these were in our area. A full air alert for Kure area was received on 3987J at 0600. By 0648 all the planes previously heard on 6155J had reported they were landing at Kanoya and Miyazaki or had secured their transmitters. No further air activity was heard during the morning. A bogey was reported at 14 miles by flag plot at 1207 and we went to GQ, but secured at 1217 as the bogey turned out to be friendly. The tactical frequency, 7200J became active at 1306 with two planes, HOKOH01 and HOKOH02, the latter had an s4 signal and the former was unheard. 6842J, tactical frequency, was heard at 1320 with one plane which had an s3 signal using the call 2NANEFU and sent two grids but gave no indication of sighting anything. At 1336 2NANEFU shifted to the homing frequency, 5850J and at 1344, he sent his number-one message which indicated that he did not transmit on 6842J. By 1400 this frequency became dark which probably meant that the planes had landed or reached the vicinity of the base. The plane HOKOH02 came up on 7200J again at 1446 and sent his Nr1 message. His signal had increased to s5, showing that he was getting closer, but he gave no indication of sighting us. Also on 7200J with an s3 signal the plane HOKOH01 sent his Nr1 message at 1527. The message was weather prefixed by KIKIKI and contained a position grid. Bogeys appeared on the radar at 1600 but by 1608 all were evaluated as friendly. Our CAP splashed a FRANCIS at 1708 but we had no RI reaction. At 1715 we received a "CQY" for 6145 which was apparently the army tactical frequency 6143M that we were covering but did not seem to concern us.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

28 July 1945 (Cont.)

All the planes heard had weak signals and gave no indication of having sighted enemy forces or being chased by enemy planes. We went to GQ again at 1802 when the CAP had a "TallyHo" at ten miles.

At 1816, one plane, 8NIENO with an s2 to s3 signal appeared on 5850J and was calling only. His transmitter seemed to be fouled up and he soon became uncopyable so we didn't let him worry us. We secured from GQ at 1850. By 1900 all signals on the army tactical frequency, 6148kcs had faded so much that they were no longer copyable. On 7200J, bases continued to call the plane HOKOHOL untill 1934. The plane had been unheard since 1657 which was approximately the time that a FRANCIS was splashed. No more activity appeared during the evening watch as our force withdrew.

2. Coverage: MIKO broadcast on continuous speaker watch.

3382J	3987J	5850J	6148M	6155J	6335J	6351A
6640J	6705J	6842J	6885J	6953M	7010J	7090J
7200J	7235J					

3. New Frequencies:

Freq.	Type Calls	Remarks
3140M	2A3	Kure defense force comdr.
5335M	KN	Drill circuit EN traffic.
6953M	KNK	Unidentified army circuit.
7110M	KKKN	Unidentified.
7115M	KKK	Unidentified. Possibly was army.
7235J		Takao, had been unheard on here since 1-4 ⁵

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~INT UPA~~

29 July 1945. Entering fueling area. Position 30-13N 136-14E.

1. Prior to another strike in the Tokyo, Kure area we went on a two man watch. A close check was kept on all known tactical navy and army circuits and search for other activity was maintained.

On 3421J, several planes were heard with sl signals. A grid was received from one of them with a position, 133-23E 29-27N, which is far enough away from us so as not to concern us. Later this same plane was heard on the homing frequency, 3320J and sent a grid position a little further away from us. Several other planes were heard on 3320J with weak signals so we were not concerned about them. The FUYOO force frequency, 6155J, became active at 0148 with bases and planes using tactical procedure. Little traffic was passed. Only very short operator type messages were received. There was much calling and answering attached to this circuit with the stations keeping in contact. One of the bases using the "E" was identified as the same station signing the call, TAWATE8, by the transmitter characteristics. The planes on this frequency were all very weak and were probably south and southeast of Kyushu. The army tactical plane circuit, 6148 was heard at 0759 with two stations. Nothing was received of value at this time. Later at 1007 the circuit again became active with the same two stations. One was telling the other he had enemy planes over his field. The circuit was then inactive after 1013 when it secured until 1200. The circuit was picked up again at 1558 with several planes and much calling and answering taking place with some traffic being passed but was no value to us. The base using the call NI9U compromised his call by also signing the call KUMAKA.

The task group passed within approximately 100 miles of Hachijojima, so a close check was kept for radar contacts from him. No reaction was noted.

2. Coverage: MIKA broadcast on speaker watch.

3320J 3421J 3952J 6148M 6155J 7010J 7125J

New frequencies: Type Call: Remarks:

3605M	KKKN	AB Kyushu area
3865M	KKKNN KKK	Possibly 3882J. AntiSub patrol.
6160M	1A5	Kawatana assault unit comdr. and unident.
7200M	KKKN	A.B.s Kyushu area. Day freq. for 3605M
7209M	NK K	Unidentified tactical drill.
7886M	NKK	Unidentified drill circuit.

TOP SECRET

ULTRA

30 July 1945. Strike Day - Off Honshu - Position, 33-55N 137-52E.

1. The strike for today was conducted throughout the Tokyo area for the purpose of destroying enemy aircraft with shipping being of secondary importance.

The early morning activity was relatively light with 4017J, an army-navy staging frequency showing with a little activity at 0340. This circuit went dark at 0400.

Our first strike was launched at 0447, and the first precautionary alert was received for the Kantoo area over the Kisarazu broadcast at 0532. This was presumably for our aircraft. Yokosuka went into a precautionary alert at 0550 and then went to a full alert at 0600.

The frequency, 7010J showed activity at 0649 and five planes using KKKK calls of the ROWEMA series were heard at that time. The signals ranged from s1 to s2 and since this was believed to be a staging frequency they of no immediate importance. The rest of the morning was quiet with practically no activity at all.

At 1214 a plane, RIHAME, came up with an s4 signal and sent a tactical signal, HOHOHOHO, on 6351A. This tactical signal indicated that aircraft carriers had been sighted at that time. Three minutes later, at 1217, the base sent the plane a service message indicating that the plane was bearing 227 degrees from the base. This bearing would have put him in our general direction. At 1244 this same plane sent a message indicating that two carriers had been sighted. Three minutes later the base requested the position of the enemy and the plane came back and asked what the enemy situation was over the base. He was told that there were no enemy near. At 1301 the plane sent a message saying that his left engine was missing and immediately following this the base started frantically requesting the enemies position. The plane sent it as bearing 214 degrees at 260 miles. This meant that it was undoubtedly us that he had sighted. Soon after that the plane landed and no more was heard from him. At 1403 another plane came up with an s3 signal and sent a weather message. The base came up at 1427 and sent to ROHANO, the second plane, a message which told him to observe carriers west of Hachijojima. This would have been our approximate position. At 1546 a plane which was believed to be ROHANO sent two operational signals. One was taken to mean that carriers were sighted and the other meant "I am forming for an attack". Three minutes after this message was sent a NICK was chased by one of our planes, but his guns jammed so the enemy got away. This circuit shut down at 1645.

A submarine sighting report was copied from 3545A at 1749. This was the only traffic of value on this frequency.

At 1833 the tactical frequency, 3600J became active and at 2000 the plane MAMA5 was heard with an s2 signal. No traffic was sent. At 2019 the plane TIRU3 was heard with an s1 signal. This circuit was last heard at 2021.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

30 July 1945 (Cont.)

Our battleships and cruisers moved in and shelled the coast. The bombardment was completed by 2330 and the fleet moved out. No RI reaction of any type was noted.

2. Coverage: MIKO and KIMU broadcasts on speaker watch.

3320J	3525M	3600J	3600M	4017J	5850J	6137M
6351A	6480J	6650J	6685J	6915M	7010J	7665J
8625J						

New Freqs.	Type Calls	Remarks
3600M	KKKN	Matsuyama, Kanoya and other A.B.s.
3595M	2A3	Unident. Also measured 3599.
5935M	KKNN	Unident.
6340M	KKK	Army circuit.
6137M	KK KKN	Bases and planes Empire. Ass. with 4017M
6617M	2A3	Hachijojima and unident.
6915M	KKK	Army circuit.
6919M	KN	Unidents.
7212M	KKKN	Unidents.
7440M	NK	Unidents.
7805M	NNN	Unidentified. Jap voice also heard which may be associated with this circuit.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

31 July 1945. Fueling and rearming Pos. 31-07N 137-45E.

1. The watch was decreased from three men on to two men on. Air activity was nil during the early hours of the morning. Army air circuit, 6351A (Tokyo area?) was picked up at 0845 with three aircraft, signal strengths ranging from s1 to s3. Activity between base and planes was moderate and a small amount of traffic was passed. NAYARA, a plane, originated a message at 0906 saying that he was passing over YOSHIBA, and gave his altitude and engine conditions. The same plane originated another dispatch at 0915 stating that he was then passing over ASHIYA and gave a complete weather report for that area. At approximately 0940 the remaining two planes on this circuit sent RIKU (Am coming home) and nothing was heard from this circuit after this time. The planes were definitely not in our area.

Later in the mornig, 7010 was up with a base calling three planes. Only two answered with signals from s1 to s2. No traffic was passed between planes and base.

Beginning at 1432, 7200J was up for a short while and only one plane was heard who had an s3 signal. The plane finally made radio contact with an unheard unit and sent several messages. The precedence indicators were -EN and -SI" TU. Late in the afternoon, 3320J was up but no planes were heard. Also on 6155J, air activity was about nil. One plane was heard here with an s1 signal. All air activity was quiet during the latter hours of the day.

2. Coverage. MIKO broadcast to 1900, then MIKA B.C. on speaker.

∅ 2952J 3320J 4017J 6137M 6155J 6351A 6640J

7010J 7200J

NEW FREQS. TYPE CALL

REMARKS

3597M KKNN Assault units.

5336M NK NKN Unidentified units.

7113M KKKN A.B. Oita and others

∅ At 2235 on the MIKA B.C., Kanoya called AB Oita saying he was KAN5 on KIE∅5∅. This indicator was listed as 2925C and was immediately checked by the operator on watch. These two units were heard working each other there. This confirms this frequency as "J" (2925J).

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

1 August 1945. In fueling area. Two man watch.

1. Air activity was very low. The FUY00 force circuit, 6155J, was heard at 0751 with two stations exchanging signal strengths and securing until 1200. It was heard again at 1152 with the same two stations exchanging signal strengths. No traffic was passed. The circuit was quiet after 1222.

6351A, army circuit, was heard with a plane, s2 signal strength, from 0808 to 0815. 6148M, also army, was active between 1617 and 1730 with five plane calls logged. Several messages were copied but were of no value. One plane had a signal strength of three to four but did not develop into importance.

6640J was heard at 1836. One plane was called but not contacted. Other air circuit activity was confined to bases passing traffic with no planes showing.

2. Coverage: MIKA broadcast on continuous speaker watch.

3320J 3421J 3600J 3600M 5850J 6148M 6155J

6351A

NEW FREQ.

REMARKS

6847M UMO broadcast. Indicator was used for escort fleet 1 CinC.

2 August 1945. In fueling area. Two man watch.

1. Activity was extremely light. Air circuit activity was confined to bases with no planes being heard. All tactical air circuits were frequently checked with negative results.

2. Coverage: MIKA broadcast on speaker watch.

2955J 3320J 3842J 7010J

New Freqs. Type Calls

Remarks

3424M KKNNN Unidentified.

4480M KN Appeared to be a new AGRP 901 circuit.

7144M KKKN Unidentified.

7150M Ominato to Tokyo.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

3 August 1945. In fueling area.

1. Air activity remained low. On 6530M an army station, EHOU, called INARE, UNARE and RANARE at 1507. Several army 888 codes were received but of no value to this task group. The circuit secured until 0900, at 1537.

One plane call appeared on 6640J but signals were too poor to obtain satisfactory coverage. At 2154 on 3705M, army circuit, three planes were logged working two bases. Several 888 code messages were received. At 2309 all the planes indicated they were going home, and the circuit was dropped.

2. Coverage: MIKA B.C. CONTINUOUS SEARCH AND CHECK OF TACTICAL AIR FREQUENCIES.

3705M 6148M 6155J . 6640J 7050J 7200M

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
6147M	KKNN	Unidentified. May be 6145A.
6530M	KKK	Army
6845M	K KN	Drill circuit.
7023M	KN KKNN	Unidents.
7175M	KKNN	Unidents.

4. August 1945. In fueling area.

1. Reception improved a little as the task force moved closer to the Empire. Air activity increased a little also.

At 0916 a search plane on 6650J sent TETETE (enemy sighted), followed by his number two message which contained a grid. Signals were too weak for copy but both messages were received later from the MIKA broadcast at 1214, a three hour delay. The grid position was about 300 miles southeast of Formosa and didn't concern us.

2. Coverage: MIKA B.C. CONTINUOUS SEARCH AND CHECK OF TACTICAL AIR CIRCUITS.

3505J 3705J 6145M 6148M 6155J 6290J 6325J
6340J . . 6351M 6530J 6530M 6640J 6650J

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS.	REMARKS
3515M	KKNN	Unident.
3699M	KN	Tactical drill. Unident.
6003M	KKKNN KKK	Unidnt. Base and plane.
6127M	KN	Unidentified.

TOP SECRET

ULTRA

5 August 1945. The Task Force continued to fuel and held gunnery drill, after cancelation of the Kyushu and Honshu strikes planned for this period. We headed northeast for a proposed strike on northern Honshu and Hokkaido. A two man watch was maintained.

On 3705M and 3515J, both army circuits for Kyushu, planes were heard between 0138 and 0445. From the breakdown of some of their traffic these planes seemed to be engaged in some sort of bombing mission. The planes' signal strength was very poor so were considered to be far enough away to be out of our area.

Unidentified army units were heard on 3608M using a confusing type of procedure to the extent where the station calling used the same call as the station that answered. The three numeral traffic that was passed would not break and nothing of value to us was recovered before the circuit secured at 0644.

On 6148M, several units were active and were possibly airborne. Traffic passed was the three numeral variety code which did not break.

Unidentified army activity was heard on 7380M from 1823 to 1907, using tactical abbreviated procedure. One 888 code weather message was received. The other traffic consisted primarily of bearings from the base to home the planes.

5890A was active from 1805 to 1858 with planes. This was believed to be an interceptor circuit against Blue force bombers. The base was identified as Atsuki.

Coverage: MIKA B.C. on speaker watch.

3382J	3320J	3505M	3515J	3882J	5850J	5890A
6530M	6640J	7010J	7200M			

NEW FREQ.	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
3608M	KK	Unidentified army circuit. Used abbreviated procedure. Sent 3 numeral code Unidents.
3694M	KKNN	
3700M	KKKN	Not OTSU FU1 calls. Believed to be comereial stations.
4020M	KKNN	Unidents.
6580M	KKKN	Unidents. Sent drill traffic.
6635M	KKNN	Unidents.
6685M		Ominato FUKA B.C.
6903M	KKNK KK	Unidents
7020M	KK KKK	Army base and planes. Abbreviated procedure.
7645M	KKKN	Kanoya Air Base and others.

*Bombard
Security
Procedure*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

6 August 1945. Off Japan headed northeast for Hokkaido strike.

1. We shifted our broadcast coverage from Kanoya to Yamato at 0930. The Kisarazu broadcast was covered for several hours while interference rendered Yamato's broadcast unreadable. All nip air activity appeared to be in other than our area. A close check was made of tactical air frequencies. The army's 3515J and 3705M, tactical circuits were heard again from 0004 to 0212 with poor signals. At 0226 a grid originated by a plane, 40RA2, was copied from the Kanoya broadcast. The grid break-down position was, 125-23E 29-47N. The plane was later heard on the homing frequency, 3320J. This activity did not concern this force.

One plane was heard on 6740J with an s1 to s2 signal. 6148M was again active with unidentified units, probably some planes, passing three numeral traffic which would not break. 6530J was heard with probable air-borne units. The bases here were identified as MATSUSHIMA and MISAWA air bases. On 6547M two unidentified army units were heard. Bearings in plain language were copied which indicated that one of the units was air-borne.

Other air activity appeared to be of routine nature.

Coverage:

3320J	3382J	3515J	3705J	6365J	6530J	6740J
7010J	7110J					

NEW FREQS	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
3522M	KKNN	Appeared to be a new circuit with Kanoya and other air bases. No Planes were heard.
6063M	KKNN	Unidentified unit called Yokosuka.
6079M	KKN \$KKK	Yokosuka and assault units.
6355M	KKK	Ominato to Tokyo. FUKA broadcast.
6547M	KKK	Unidentified army base and plane.
6900M	KKNK KK	Unidents. Calling only.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

7 August 1945. FUELING - HEADING NORTHEAST OFF HONSHU

1. Coverage was concentrated on high-north air circuits with a check of others and continuous search for new circuits.

The picket boat frequency, 6490J, was also checked with negative results.

At 0524, 6740J was heard with Air Group 903 commander at Ominato working planes. This circuit remained active off and on most of the day until 1826. 6530J was also active with bases and planes between 0555 and 1800. Activity on both of these circuits appeared to be normal with no sightings of BLUE forces being copied.

At 2235 approximately, units of this Task Force picked up about twenty four surface bogeys on the radar which may have been a Nip convoy. A CRUDIV and a DESRON were dispatched to intercept this bogey. A check was kept on 4015, 3955 and 6490J with negative reaction at 2359.

2. Coverage: NIA B.C. until 0815. NISA B.C. after 0815.

3705J 3875J 4015J 6148M 6490J 6530J 6580J
6740J

8 August 1945. HOKKAIDO STRIKE CANCELED - BAD WEATHER

1. No more information became available on the surface units that were picked up by radar and mentioned in yesterday's report.

At 0710 we went to GQ. Two radar bogeys were closing and came within nine miles. 6530J and 6740J were being covered at the time but no reaction was noted. The weather was so foggy that no CAP was put up and visibility was about 200 yards so a possible sighting was very unlikely. The two bogeys got away. Planes were up nearly all day on these two frequencies with routine traffic.

On 7386M two unidentified units were heard passing army 888 traffic which concerned practice operations for the day.

On 6925M, possibly 6930J, several units were heard calling using numeral kana calls but this circuit didn't develop. The army circuits, 6148M and 6351A were heard with meager activity which appeared to be routine. On 6067J one plane was heard with an s3 signal, using a KN call. The bases used single kana calls.

2. Coverage: NISA B.C. Continuous check and search for air circuit activity.

3503M 3515J 3705J 3832J 4015J 6067J 6148M
6265M 6351A 6365J 6530J 6580J 6640J 6740J
6855J 6925m 7386M 7770M

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

9 August 1945. STRIKE AGAINST INSTALLATIONS ON NORTHERN HONSHU.

1. The watch was increased to three men on. The first planes took off at 0410. The Ominato broadcast sent a preliminary air alert at 0606. Air alerts were then forth coming from Matsushima and Misawa on 6530J at 0615. Full air alerts were received at 0709 from these latter two and they secured their stations. At 1042, 7200J became active with an s2 plane, SOSOI, who contacted the base. Communication between plane and base was kept by frequent calls. At 1145 the plane was s5 and at 1200 he sent TETETE (sighted enemy). Then at 1206 he sent HOHOHO4 (four carriers) with a grid position, 143-04E 37-32N. This was about sixty miles from this task group and it may have been a sighting of four destroyers that were going in to shell the coast who were about this position. The plane sent his number at 1224 which included the same grid as above.

(We shifted from Ominato broadcast to Kisarazu broadcast since this activity was believed to be originating at Kisarazu.)

The planes number one message was copied from the Kisarazu MIKO broadcast at 1227. At 1240 the plane originated his NR2 which contained a grid position of 143-30E, 27-50N. This was about 50 miles from us. The plane still had an s5 signal at his last transmission. Then at 1253 a MYRT was splashed at approximately the same position of the last grid and another Nip was forced into the water. SOSOI, the plane, was then heard no more. Between 1348 and 1430, five other planes came up on this frequency using TUNAMA and a kana suffix series calls. At 1432, one of them said he was turnig back due to motor trouble. Another sent a garbled signal that may have been TUTUTU (attack signal) at 1457 and we learned that our pickets were under an attack. Several short tactical type signals were copied from this plane but their meaning was undetermined.

After this attack the destroyers were under an attack again at 1601. An s5 plane signaled TETETE (enemy) and then an unidentified signal. Our ships guns started firing and two GRACES were splashed at 1612 and the pickets got another Nip also at 1625. After this we still had one s5 plane up who received a message from the base at 1700. At 1852 this plane's signal had dropped to s1 and he sent his first message prefixed TETETE with a grid position, 143-38E, 38-02N which was close to our force. It appeared that this plane had gone nearly home before sending his traffic because of his weak signal at the time of transmission.

The Russians declared war on the Nips this A.M. Activity of other air circuits was very light and did not concern us.

2. Coverage: NISA and MIKO broadcast.

5337J	5335J	6365J	6530J	6850J	6855J	6938M
7200J	7386M					

~~SECRET~~

10 August 1945 STRIKES NORTH AND SOUTH OF SENDAI ON HONSHU

1. Three men were kept on watch although air activity was very light. A close check and search for air activity uncovered almost nothing that concerned us.. At 1630, 7200J became active with three planes working an unidentified base. Four messages were passed that also appeared on the Kisarazu broadcast a few minutes after transmission. At the same time three planes were heard on 5337J sending drill traffic. Signals on both circuits were weak. Nothing developed from either of these circuits which remained quiet after 1710.

At 2130 the Captain announced that the Swiss government had received word from the Japs that they were ready to accept the agreements of the Potsdam conference.

2. Coverage. MIKO B.C. CONTINUOUS SEARCH AND CHECK FOR AIR CIRCUITS.

3630J 5337J 6148M 6530J 7200J 7200M 7386M
8625J

NEW FREQS.	TYPE CALLS	REMARKS
6046M	KKK	Two unidentified army stations sending 888 traffic which didn't concern us.
6055M	K	Unidents.
6135M	KKK	Unidents. Army.
6916M	KN	Unidents.
6902M	KKKN	Matsuyama and unidentifieds.
7386M	KKK KNK	Army air activity.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11 August 1945

OFF NORTHERN HONSHU

The task force retired after receiving word that Nippon wished to surrender. No strike was planned for the day. A one man watch was set at ~~0000~~. No air activity was noted for our area.

Coverage consisted of continuous check of air circuits and coverage of the Kisarazu broadcast. The only traffic copied was air alerts and radar contacts. None concerned our force.

12 August 1945

OFF HONSHU FUELING AND REARMING.

This was the second day of probable peace, but continued preparations for another strike in the event that peace was not forthcoming. Air activity was extremely light. Two men were placed on watch during daylight with one man at night.

Coverage: MIKO broadcast and search.

13 August 1945

STRIKE AGAINST TOKYO AREA AIRFIELDS

1. Three men were placed on watch at 0400. The strike that was planned for today was canceled and then later carried out.

Activity commenced when the planes of the first strike took off at 0420. At 0520 a MYRT was splashed at 60 miles. Yokosuka sent his first air alert at 0530.

7200J became active and was CQY'D by 3rd fleet, at 0615. One plane was up with an s3 signal and another was being called by the base but no answer was heard. The plane that was s3 increased in signal strength until he was s5 at 0757 when he said he had sighted small enemy carrier planes. A few minutes later, this plane sent a position grid of enemy carriers which was us. He sent a weather message with the same grid as before and two other short messages. All his traffic was being broadcast within a few minutes on the MIKO (Kisarazu) broadcast. Between messages the plane would say he was being chased by small planes but evidently he got away because at 1127 he told the base to shift to 5335j (the homing frequency) but they were probably out of communication at the time so the base didn't get the word and the plane called the base for a long time on 5335J.

Just before a NICK was splashed at 1124, a jap came up on the task group fighter director circuit, 36.5mcs, using voice. He was moaning and groaning as if he were shot and said he was spiraling or circling and heading home. This incident indicated that the Japs navy was monitoring our circuit and that the plane used it so he could get his message out in a hurry.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ULTRA~~

13 August 1945 (Cont.)

Several more planes came up on 7200J and the task group was under attack off and on during the day. A total of 21 Nips were splashed. Activity subsided after dark with no more planes showing.

The task force started retiring to the fueling area after all our planes were landed.)

2. Coverage: MIKO B.C. AND CONTINUOUS SEARCH

3320J 5335J 6155J 6343M 6620M 6640J 6855J
6930J 7090J 7200J 7386M

14 August 1945 FUELING OFF JAPAN

1. The watch was secured to two men. Very little activity was noted and traffic was confined to that received on the broadcast. Radio Tokyo said today that a reply had been sent to Washington via Switzerland in answer to Allied surrender terms.

2. Coverage: MIKO B.C. AND CHECK OF TACTICAL CIRCUITS.

3705J 6906M 6920M

15 August 1945 STRIKE AGAINST TOKYO AREA INSTALLATIONS

1. The strike for today was started, but halted at 0619 by order of CINCPAC. Three men were on watch.

7200J was active at 0415 with three planes heard but all had weak signals. Another was called but unheard. At 0532, one of the planes reported he saw carrier planes and two minutes later he said he was being chased by ten carrier planes and got off a grid position at 0535 which broke to 141-30, 34-10N, which was about 60 miles from us. The plane had an s5 signal. At 0552 a MYRT was splashed and may have been this plane. Two other planes on this circuit had s2 signals and originated grids that were about 500 miles from us. Another plane came up with an s5 signal but failed to send anything other than keeping in communication with the base. At 0901 this plane had an s3 signal and sent a short message which we could not break.

The force started retiring from the launching point after our planes were landed.

Three planes remained on 7200J until 1130 when one of them told the base to shift to the homing frequency, 5335J. At 1157 a new series of calls appeared on 7200J. One plane was heard with an s3 signal and another was called by the base.

About ten planes were splashed during the day but activity became nil by sundown.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ULTRA

15 August 1945 (Cont.)

2. Coverage: MIKO broadcast on speaker watch.

3705J	5335J	5376M	5838E	6530J	6640J	6885J
6922M	6955E	7200J	7777M			

Respectfully submitted,

R. B. Potier

R. B. Potier
C.R.M.(T) USNR
RinC