

SRH-306

OP-20G

EXPLOITS AND COMMENDATIONS

WORLD WAR II

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12356  
by ~~Director~~, NSA/Chief, CSS  
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REVIEWER'S NOTE:

The material in this Special Research History is a compendium of papers found in several files. First review of the complete document has been accomplished by U. S. Navy personnel. The classified versions of those portions of this SRH which were discovered in Navy files has been retained by the Navy and have been stored in the NSG Repository, Crane, Indiana

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SECTION I



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COMMENDATIONS RECEIVED BY THE U.S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION  
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION SINCE 1 JANUARY 1942.

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CHAPTER I

COMMENDATIONS OF OP-20-G FOR COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE PACIFIC

The following is a collection of comments on the work of the U.S. Naval C.I. organization received from important American and Allied naval authorities and from collaborating technical organizations.

Part A. Commendations by American Authorities

a. Battle of Midway

In June 1942 after the striking victory won by the forces of the U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway, Admiral King commended Op-20-G for its important contributions to the success of the fleet with his not easily won "Well done". The message follows:

No. 1

23 June 1942

1. Advise all personnel that the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral King, has this date transmitted to all U.S. Naval radio intelligence activities the words, "Well done".
2. Admiral Horne, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, expressing his concurrence, passes this on via the Director of Naval Communications.
3. This is a source of pleasure, but issue the reminder that this fact also must be kept secure.

Op-20-G

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On 30 October 1942 Admiral King issued an official commendation for the part Op-20-G had already played in the war. It read as follows:

No. 2

30 October 1942

From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
To : Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Special Commendation for Radio Intelligence Unit.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations commends the Radio Intelligence Unit under your direction for the very excellent work which it individually and in cooperation with other units has accomplished in the war to date. The results achieved have been of great and lasting benefit to the war effort.

E. J. KING

Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, forwarded a copy of Admiral King's official commendation to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, with the following endorsement:

No. 3

8 November 1942

From: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
To : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District  
Subject: Special Commendation for Radio Intelligence Units.  
Ref: (a) OpNav Conf. Ltr. FFL/P15 Serial  
02665 of October 30, 1942.

...The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, takes pleasure in forwarding these very deserving



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No. 3 (Cont.)

words of praise from the Chief of Naval Operations and desires that a copy of this letter be appended to the fitness reports of officers and that a suitable brief entry be made in the records of the enlisted men concerned.

C. W. NIMITZ

b. Battle of Guadalcanal

On 17 November 1942, a few days after the very important Battle of Guadalcanal in which the U.S. Navy won a decisive victory, Admiral Nimitz released the following dispatch:

No. 4

17 November 1942

From: CINCPAC  
For Action: COMSOPAC  
COMSOWESPAC  
COMINCH  
OPNAV  
BELCONNEN COM 14 170139 CETYH

Once again radio intelligence has enabled the fighting force of the Pacific and Southwest Pacific to know where and when to hit the enemy. My only regret is that our appreciation, which is unlimited, can only be extended to those who read this system.

To this commendation from CINCPAC was added:

No. 5

"Well done."

E. J. KING

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c. Commendations by CINCPAC

It was announced on 13 May 1944 that the following communication had been received from Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet:

No. 6

An invaluable contribution to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific has been made by the consistent and unflinching service of the personnel of the Communications Intelligence Organization. It is with profound regret, that for reasons of security, this expression of my appreciation can not be proclaimed to all, but must be confined to members of this organization.

In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated 27 August 1945, CinCPac stated:

No. 7

During this war, CinCPac has been in a position to observe the tremendous contributions of communication intelligence to the success of Pacific operations. Communication intelligence has repeatedly provided timely and accurate information upon which to base tactical and strategic decisions. A vast amount of important information affecting matters of broad scope has also been forthcoming from the same source. An outstanding example of the contribution of communication intelligence is the part it played in making possible the victory at Midway. Without communication intelligence the war would have been greatly prolonged and the cost in men and material far heavier. Those who have labored to produce vital information have performed an invaluable service which, unfortunately, cannot be publicized.



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d. Commendation by COMSOPAC

When Admiral Halsey left his post as COMSOPAC on 15 June 1944, he expressed himself as follows:

No. 8

15 June 1944

From: ComSoPac

Action: Comb

COPEK

150620

With my departure from the South Pacific I wish to express my appreciation for the invaluable service of the R.I. organization in prosecuting our campaign against the enemy and particularly for the alert and tireless work of the unit assigned to my command. It is regretted that security requirements permit only readers of this system to be informed of my appreciation.

HALSEY

e. Commendation by Army Air Forces

On 25 September 1944 Brigadier General Clinton D. Vincent, 68th Composite Wing, 14th Air Force, said of the Naval Radio Unit 68th Composite Wing:

No. 9

During this time this Unit has rendered valuable intelligence service to Headquarters 68th Composite Wing by furnishing timely information and reports on enemy shipping positions, exact times at which enemy cities and areas were alerted by American Planes, general intelligence trends, prediction and evaluation relative to intelligence matters. On many occasions combat



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No. 9 (Cont.)

intelligence information has been received from this Unit in advance of that from other sources. The operational value of much of this information is reflected in the successful operations of our combat units against enemy shipping and installations.

f. Commendation by COMSUEPAC

On 14 April 1945 the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, advised the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

No. 10

14 April 1945

From: ComSubPac  
To : CincPac Adv Hdq  
Info: ComSubPacAdComD  
ComTaskFor 71 131237 NCR 1231

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is based on Ultra information...

The Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, further expressed his appreciation on 3 July 1945 as follows:

No. 11

3 July 1945

From: FRUPAC  
To : Op-20-G 030119  
Guam

Knowing that the credit belongs to all officers and enlisted in the Comintorg FruPac is pleased and proud to pass on to you as Top Secret

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 11 (Cont.)

the following "Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of FruPac for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

g. The Okinawa Campaign

As a result of communication intelligence supplied prior to and during an all-out attack by the Japanese on 6-7 April 1945 against American forces engaged in the occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. Navy was able to beat off concerted air attacks and sink most of the enemy's striking force, including the battleship Yamato. Subsequently, both Fleet Admiral King and Admiral Horne transmitted "Well done". (No. 12)

The comments of Admiral Turner on the value of the communication intelligence supplied to U.S. Naval forces at Okinawa were transmitted on 23 May 1945 as follows:

No. 13

23 May 1945

From: FruPac  
Action: Guam  
Info: Op-20-G 222123 PAEES

Admiral Turner has indicated that the despatches



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No. 13 (Cont.)

in 35S were of immense value and that the analysis of impending Jap operations, particularly air, were of highest quality and "Perfectly fine in every respect". A well done to station A and the joint activities under your supervision.

Admiral Spruance, Commander FIFTH Fleet, stated in his report on the Okinawa campaign:

No. 14

The Fifth Fleet Radio Intelligence Unit has been of very great assistance to this command during the ICEBERG (Okinawa) operation. (Ref: Ltr. dated 23 May 1945 from Comdr. 5th Fleet to Oinc, FruPac, Ser. 000128.)

In June 1945 HMS Trenchant sank the Ashigara, a Japanese cruiser, as a result of information made available by U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence.

No. 15

10 June 1945

From: Com7thFleet, Tolosa  
Action: COMINCH  
Info: Com7thFleet (Adm. Barbey) 100213 NCR 4748

Connection Trenchant-Ashigara case 2 important factors involved.

- (a) Success unlikely except for magnificent intelligence information made available.
- (b) Impossible for large US type submarine to have conducted daytime operation similar to Trenchant. They had tried and failed south of Banka.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Part B. Commendations by Allied Authorities

a. Commendations by Australians

A cryptanalytical success of considerable importance brought recognition from the Australian unit at Melbourne:

No. 1

12 January 1945

From: FRUMEL  
Action: DAZE 121135

FRUMEL will reciprocate with a case of Melbourne bitters if Negat supplies under lend lease a duplicate of the crystal ball used to unravel the ( ). Congratulations on a magnificent piece of work.

On 23 May 1945 Admiral Guy Royle, Chief of Staff, Royal Australian Navy, sent the following communication to the Director of Naval Communications:

No. 2

23 May 1945

Commonwealth of Australia  
Department of the Navy  
Navy Office, Melbourne, S.C. 1

My dear Redman

On relinquishing my appointment as Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Navy, I would like to express thanks for the great assistance rendered to me as Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontiers by your Communications Intelligence organization.

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No. 2 (Cont.)

I also appreciate very much the continued help you have given us since FRUMEL was transferred to the control of the R.A.N...

With kindest regards, I remain

Yours sincerely

Guy Royle

b. Commendations by the British

During the course of the war in the Pacific, the British congratulated Op-20-G on many cryptanalytical successes. Pertinent messages from the authorities of the British Government Code and Cipher School follow:

No. 3

4 June 1943

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV 040932 CANDO ULTRA

Hearty congratulations on breaking the new indicator system so soon and so effectively.

No. 4

10 November 1943

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV  
Info: WX 517 100901Z CANDO ULTRA

We would like to offer you our hearty congratulations on getting into                     \*,                     ; in what must be the shortest time on record.

\*Principal Japanese Navy code.



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No. 5

1 January 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV 010836 CANDO ULTRA

Now that \* system is solved necessity for cabling material no longer exists. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

\*Japanese Navy.

No. 6

14 January 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV for Op-20-G 191019Z WX721 CANDO

Your R.I. and R.I. Summaries greatly appreciated here. Same applies to crypto-intelligence daily summaries. Many thanks.

No. 7

14 February 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV for Op-20-G  
Info: 111412Z WX115 CANDO ULTRA

Congratulations on your very successful work in getting into the new \*.

\*Principal Japanese Navy code.

No. 8

22 February 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV 211721/Z

Very pleased to have your reconstruction of the

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No. 8 (Cont.)

Jade\* keyboard and would be interested in further details.

\*Japanese Navy cipher machine.

No. 9

18 March 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: OPNAV 171553Z

Many congratulations on your reconstruction of wheels of \*. Much impressed by your phenomenal progress after original break.

\*Japanese Naval cipher machine.

No. 10

9 May 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: Op-20-G 081549Z

Warmest congratulations from our \* party and the rest of us on your very important discovery of relationship between and \*\*

\*Japanese Naval additive cipher.  
\*\*Japanese Naval cipher machine.

No. 11

30 May 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: Op-20-G AI 14475

Congratulations your break in \*.

\*Japanese Naval cipher machine.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 12

2 November 1944

From: GCCS  
Action: Op-20-G 021505

Congratulations on your progress with \*!  
We are clearing the decks to take on code, and  
await further details from you.

\*Principal Japanese Navy code.

No. 13

5 May 1945

From: GCCS  
Action: NEGAT 051338

Congratulations on speedy solution of new indi-  
cator procedure on \* and In view of  
your success there is no point in our continuing  
to receive headings. Thank you for sending  
them to date.

\*Japanese Naval auxiliary code.

No. 14

17 May 1945

From: GCCS  
Action: NEGAT 170901

Congratulations on !\*. We eagerly await full  
report. Please signal immediately order of letters in  
input.

\*Japanese Naval code.



~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 15

18 May 1945

From: GCCS  
Action: NEGAT 181040

\* , Heartiest congratulations on a brilliant piece of work.

\*Japanese Naval code.

No. 16

18 June 1945

From: GCCS  
To: Op-20-G

GCCS has requested me to convey their congratulations on your solution of

No. 17

6 July 1945

From: FRUEF  
Action: NEGAT

Congratulations on speed of recovery in this phase.

This completes the list of specific commendations for the contributions of communication intelligence to the success of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. The next chapter will contain citations indicating the important role played by Op-20-G in the war in the Atlantic and European theaters.

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CHAPTER II

COMMENDATIONS OF OP-20-G FOR COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN THEATERS

During the course of the war in the Atlantic many commendations were received from the British in regard to the speedy decipherment of German messages in machine systems which the enemy and many others believed to be unbreakable.

No. 1

5 February 1943

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G

Many thanks for the Limpets. (Offizier Traffic)..

No. 2

March 1943

From: GCCS  
To : OPNAV 161521

"---- Congratulations from on colossal  
Bovril\* week."

\*Machine assigned to German Air Force problems.

No. 3

November 1943

From: AMNAVDEL (London)  
To : Op-20-G 221433

"-----work done by you very much appreciated  
here and many worthwhile jobs have been done that  
could not otherwise have been attempted."



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~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 5

11 July 1944

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G

...Duenna\* will be of vital importance to us...

\*High speed analytical machine

No. 6

17 August 1944

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 171431

Most grateful for your work on Rocket\* 2 and 3 which effectively proves that these keys are not on Rocket machine. Further attempts to break will therefore be made on assumption that they use normal machine.

\*Unknown German Air Force keys.

No. 7

17 August 1944

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 171432

Assistance of Bovril\* bombs is found invaluable by

\*See No. 2.

No. 8

17 November 1944

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 170856

Congratulations from all on

\* break.

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No. 9

26 December 1944

From: AMNAVDEL 260953

Hearty congratulations from AMNAVDEL to Duenna\* party.

\*See No. 5

No. 10

26 December 1944

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 261046

Heartiest congratulations on Duenna\* success. Puma\*\* is key of first class importance which we were most anxious to break.

\*See No. 5  
\*\*German Army key.

No. 11

27 December 1944

From: GCCS  
To : NEGAT 261923

Congratulations on good work by Duenna\*.

\*See No. 5

No. 12

27 December 1944

From: GCCS 271803

Your Duenna\* success has enabled us to read Puma\*\* 17 through 23 December with a chance that either 16 or 24 will follow.

\*See No. 5  
\*\*See No. 10

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No. 13

30 January 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 301604

Congratulations on Duenna Greenshank\* break. Intelligence value high but Greenshank Dora\*\* now suspicioned daily affair.

\*German Army key.

\*\*

No. 14

1 February 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 011303

Many thanks break H-27 which is most welcome as no Puma\* read since 7th. Break of H-21 secured H-19 on same key.

\*See No. 10.

No. 15

13 February 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 130944

Very many thanks for particularly successful Bovril\* work (29 breaks) during last four days.

\*See No. 2.

No. 16

11 March 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G

Many thanks for quick break and complete solution of H-38\*.

\*German Army system.



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No. 17

11 March 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 112105

Congratulations on H-35, todays second very welcome Duenna\* break.

\*See No. 5.

No. 18

3 April 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 031949

Many thanks for grand work on Jaguar\*. Quick break most valuable.

No. 19

6 April 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 061021

Congratulations on Sonder\* break and very interesting information.

\*Special submarine key.

No. 20

8 May 1945

From: GCCS  
To : Op-20-G 081047

Thank you for very successful results (re Hypo\* work on Dolphin)\*\*

\*High speed analytical machine recovering settings.  
\*\*Northern submarine key.

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No. 21

10 May 1945

From: GCGS  
To : Op-20-G

Your telegram GYA 570 deeply appreciated by all of us here. Op-20's invaluable loyal help and cooperation will remain one of our happiest memories. We are with you now to help as and how best we can in what remains of the war against Japan.

No. 22

24 May 1945

From: GCGS  
To : Op-20-G

241749

On closing down this correspondence would like to convey our great appreciation of Duenna's\* successes and of our very friendly relations.

\*See No. 5.

The following comments are taken from the GC & CS history of work on the Enigma. Since they were obtained from material which apparently was not intended for our perusal, it is believed that they represent the true British evaluation of our contribution. Their comment on our concentration on the Shark problem is explained by the fact that we were determined to get the submarine problem under control, after which our interests became more widespread.

No. 23

Op-20-G

Before attempting to assess the value of the contribution of Op-20-G, which was immense, and also the difficulties which arose, which were fairly numerous,



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it is essential to understand that they were very different from ourselves in their fundamental organization. They were second in the field and agreed, and kept to the agreement, to play second fiddle and so naturally the people they put into their German machine cryptography were not the best cryptographers they had, but rather efficient and intelligent organizers with cryptographic knowledge. Also most of them started at a time when every member of \_\_\_\_\_ had at least 2 years invaluable and varied experience of machine cryptography and doubtless mistakes they made were only the same mistakes as we ourselves had been making 2 years before. Their organization and its machinery was created for the special problem of Shark [Atlantic U-boat keys] and was staffed with Naval personnel; there existed no cooperation between the services comparable to that existing between ourselves, \_\_\_\_\_ Naval Section and \_\_\_\_\_ and they had not the knowledge of or the dealings with other machine keys which we had over here; it was therefore natural, however regrettable, that they should tend to be narrow minded and to regard Shark as the only really important thing in life. This attitude let it be said at once, was rapidly thrown over by such people as Commander Engstrom, Lt. Commander Church, and the series of U.S.N. liaison officers in this Section and we could be sure at all times of their cooperation in any scheme calculated to increase the return to be got from the bombes.

-----

In the course of 1944 it became obvious that Op-20-G were as well qualified as ourselves to decide which Shark \_\_\_\_\_ were worth running and by half way through 1944 they had taken over complete control of Shark and undoubtedly knew far more about the key than we did. Our function was to send reencodements from Narwhal or Plaiice as they occurred and we played no part in the \_\_\_\_\_ The number of days they broke in \_\_\_\_\_ with comparatively small expenditure of bombe time in the very \_\_\_\_\_ days which followed the death of Biscay Weather represent an extremely fine achievement.

The acceptance by Op-20-G of the principle of pooled bombe resources was a fairly slow one. An analysis at the end of 1943 of the bombe time used per day's traffic read on various Naval keys showed that on Porpoise the average number of hours was 9, Grampus 11,



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Dolphin 74, Sunfish 186(?), Seahorse 280, Shark 500, Turtle 1500.....On this the Weekly Report comments:

"We are asking the Americans to give Bovril jobs preference over weak Turtle menus as these give such poor return for money."

By the time the Second Front opened very close and efficient cooperation existed. Priorities of keys were decided at weekly meetings at which the U.S.N. representative was present and Op-20-G stuck most loyally to the priorities as laid down, running a vast number of jobs and enabling them to break keys which would otherwise have remained unbroken. I think it is a considerable tribute to the good sense of all parties concerned, and most especially to Op-20-G who were in a somewhat irksome position, that relations were at all times extremely cordial and that it was possible to get so much work so efficiently done when the machinery had to be shared by 3 groups of people, each feeling at heart that their own particular problem was the one which really mattered.

-----  
The credit for reviving (the cipher used between Berlin and Tokyo) in 1944 goes entirely to Op-20-G who reaped their reward in the great interest shown in the key not only in America but also in Naval Section who came to regret their erstwhile disdainful attitude.

-----  
To Op-20-G goes the credit for discovering how the Starfish 3 keys worked. Starfish were groups of traffic externally similar to Sunfish but using different ; they were distributed to individual blockade runners. Starfish 3 was built up from the Sunfish keys on a principle; the first Starfish break was made in December 1943, and discovery of the Starfish 3 relationship came in March 1944.

-----  
Breaking of Porpoise was possible on the American bombs and intensive research produced a number of excellent . Breaking of Porpoise on gave

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-----

The discovery of \_\_\_\_\_ reflects  
very little credit on \_\_\_\_\_ Most of the work was  
done in May 1944 at Op-20-G by Lt. Comdr. Church and  
his assistants. There is no doubt that we had paid  
insufficient attention to the study of \_\_\_\_\_  
and by our failure had wasted a considerable amount  
of \_\_\_\_\_ time in the past.

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CHAPTER III

GENERAL COMMENDATIONS, COMMENTS AND STATEMENTS ON  
THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

Part A - General Commendation by the Secretary of  
the Navy

On 23 May 1945 the Secretary of the Navy inspected the Naval Communications Annex, and as a result sent the following communication:

No. 1

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON  
23 May 1945

My dear Captain:

I was greatly impressed, as I know anyone would be, with the visit to your building yesterday.

Incidentally, I spoke of it to the President this morning and recommended to him very strongly that he make a similar visit himself, which he said he would do in the very near future.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James Forrestal

Op-20-G,  
Naval Communications Annex,  
Navy Department,  
Washington 25, D.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Part B - General Commendations by CNO

On 17 September 1945 Admiral King sent the following message to the Communication Intelligence organization:

No. 1

I wish to express, to all those concerned with the collection, production, and dissemination of Ultra, my appreciation of the value of their work in direct contribution to the winning of our wars. You will always be entitled to a sense of deep satisfaction in the knowledge of your contribution to the saving of thousands of lives and the hastening of the destruction of our enemies by your efforts.

In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 October 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations stated:

No. 2

It is fully appreciated that our successes in both the Pacific and the Atlantic were, in a large measure, due to the accomplishments of the Navy's Communication Intelligence Organization.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Part C - General Commendation by VCNO

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, visited the Naval Communications Annex on 14 November 1943, and as a result of his observations sent the following letter:

No. 1

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington

Op-01 Hu  
Serial 89002

13 November 1943

From: Chief of Naval Operations  
To : Op-20-G

Subj: Communication Intelligence - efficiency of  
organization

1. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations has been greatly impressed by the effective efficiency of the organization of Communication Intelligence, and he wishes to take the occasion of his visit to the Communication Annex today, 13 November 1943, to express to you, and through you to all members of your organization, his hearty congratulations on the extremely important work that has been done and the assistance that has been given to our forces afloat in the destruction and defeat of enemy forces.

2. I cannot stress too greatly the vital importance of the work that each individual in your organization



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No. 1 (Cont.)

is doing, and I can assure each one of them that no matter how small to them may seem their part, each part is vital to the production and dissemination of the information obtained and that each one of them is doing an essential part in the ultimate victory that will come to this Country.

/s/ F. J. Horne

Vice Chief of Naval Operations

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Part D - Comments by Deputy Officer in Charge, JICPOA

The following remarks are extracts from the Narrative of the Combat Intelligence Center, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, prepared by Captain W. J. Holmes, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Deputy Officer in Charge of JICPOA, dated 8 November 1945. This narrative was forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with this comment: "Captain Holmes had an unequalled opportunity to observe and take part in the development throughout the war of Intelligence for high command. He played an able part in this development and his recorded observations and opinions are therefore of unusual value."

No. 1

"The factors that vitally affected the Battle of Midway were many and complex, but it is undoubtedly true that without radio intelligence it would have been impossible to have achieved the concentration of force and the tactical surprise that made the victory possible.

.....

"The fate of the nation quite literally depended upon about a dozen men who had devoted their lives and their careers, in peace and in war, to radio intelligence.

.....

"In the defensive stages of the war, radio intelligence was not only the most important source of in-



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~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

telligence in the Central Pacific, it was practically the only source. There were very few captured documents or prisoners of war. There were no photographs of enemy held positions. In the Central Pacific, excluding the Solomons and New Britain, spy and coast watchers' reports never supplied any important intelligence.

.....

"During the whole war the enemy's traffic was consistently read in detail and in great volume. After the Battle of the Coral Seas, most of his major moves were disclosed through this source alone. Whenever the main code was not being read, a feeling of frustration and exasperation permeated the radio intelligence organization and spurred them on to each new success. Even during these periods the darkness was not complete. Much information was learned from traffic analysis short of decryption. Minor ciphers were usually being read. Frequently the information gained from the minor ciphers rivaled in importance that gained from the main naval code. Rather consistent success in breaking the weather code resulted in more and more reliance on an excellent Japanese weather observation system.

.....

"Just how many submarine contacts were made through radio intelligence will probably never be known. Particularly in the beginning of the war, every effort was made to destroy all traceable connection between submarine operation and radio intelligence. However, it is known that the number of successful contacts rose and fell with the success of radio intelligence in decrypting enemy messages. On several occasions every submarine on patrol in the Central Pacific area was busy on information supplied by radio intelligence. From the intelligence viewpoint, the results were most gratifying. This was one form of intelligence that showed immediate tangible results. Sometimes it was only a matter of hours between decryption of a message and a submarine report of a successful attack. The news of these successes was immediately relayed to



~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

radio intelligence personnel who were responsible for the results. Thus everyone in the business felt they had a personal contact with the submarines on patrol and felt personal responsibility for the quality of the information furnished them. The effect of this on morale is difficult to overestimate.

.....

"Radio intelligence had been, and continued to be, phenomenally successful in its field.

.....

"For the duration of the war, Combat [i.e., C.I.C.] was engaged in the production and processing of intelligence of high classification for higher command echelons only. The most timely, and the most important part of this intelligence, was produced by radio intelligence."

Part E - Statement of the Honorable C. E. Hancock

The following statement was made by Congressman Hancock of New York on the floor of the House of Representatives in support of S. 805 and is extracted from the Congressional Record, 25 October 1945, Vol. 91, No. 187; p. 10210:

"....I believe that our cryptographers in the war with Japan did as much to bring that war to a successful and early conclusion as any other group of men. Their work saved thousands of precious lives. They are entitled to glory and national gratitude which they will never receive. We broke down the Japanese code almost at the beginning of the war, and we knew it at the finish of the war. Because of that knowledge we were able to intercept and destroy practically every supply ship and convoy that tried to reach the Philippines or any Pacific island. We knew, for example, that shortly after MacArthur landed on Leyte a large convoy with 40,000 Japanese troops was dispatched to reinforce the Japanese forces there. They were met by our fleet and by our airplanes at sea and were totally destroyed. Not a Jap reached Leyte. Another small example: Our forces knew that a certain high-ranking Japanese admiral was headed for a certain spot at a certain time. When he arrived there our planes were on hand to receive him."

Part F - Statement of Pearl Harbor Investigating  
Committee

The following statement with regard to "Magic", the cover name for Communication Intelligence, appears on page 232 of the Report of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee of the 79th Congress:

"....All witnesses familiar with Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives."



Part G - Statement of The Honorable Chan Gurney

The following statement was made by Senator Gurney of South Dakota on the floor of the Senate in opposition to proposed reductions in the Naval appropriation for 1948 and is extracted from the Congressional Record, 14 February 1947, Vol. 91, No. 30, p. 1081:

"....Not only will curtailment of programs be required in the areas just mentioned, but research and development of vital concern to all of us will be necessarily retarded; intelligence activities, so important when other factors of national security are shrinking, must be curtailed. Naval communications, including communication intelligence which played a vital role in the recent conflict, will suffer."

Part H - General Marshall's Letter to Governor Dewey

The following is the text of a letter General Marshall sent to Governor Dewey of New York on Sept. 25, 1944 concerning the breaking of secret Japanese codes:

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(FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY)

25 September, 1944

My Dear Governor:

I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning the letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore, I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Col. Carter Clark who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the political campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese are using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this, a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages.



Part H - (Continued)

Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department-rather than, as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information-but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before Dec. 7, which did not reach our hands until the following day, Dec. 8.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the Battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate on our limited forces to meet their advances on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place.

We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys.

The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action largely results from the fact that we know the sailing dates and the routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper point.



Part H - (Continued)

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utter tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS), without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the savings of American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking toward the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present polit-

Part H - (Continued)

ical campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall



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Part I - Statement of Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN

Vice Admiral Lockwood sent the following letter to the Chief of Naval Communications, enclosing a statement as to the value of Communication Intelligence against the Japanese in World War II:

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Washington, 25, D. C.

17 June 1947

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From: Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN  
To : Chief of Naval Communications.  
Subject: Communication Intelligence against the Japanese in World War II.  
Enclosure: (A) Statement as to value of subject activity.

1. I am enclosing herewith a statement as to the value of communication intelligence against the Japanese in World War II.

2. I feel that this is a very modest outline and that there are undoubtedly a very great number of incidents and examples which time and memory have obliterated. However, I hope that there will be no thought of curtailing the operations of this activity, or of eliminating research and training in peacetime of a facility which must of necessity be immediately available on the approach of war.

C. A. LOCKWOOD



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Part I - (Continued)

CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE  
TO THE SUCCESS OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST  
THE JAPANESE IN WORLD WAR II.

The contribution to the defeat of Japan in World War II by United States submarines is a matter of record. More than two-thirds of the entire Japanese merchant marine and numerous warships, including some of every category, were sunk. These sinkings resulted, by mid-1944, in isolation of Japan from her overseas sources of raw materials and petroleum, with far reaching effects on the capability of her war industry to produce and her armed forces to operate. Her outlying bases were weakened by lack of reinforcements and supplies and fell victim to our air, surface and amphibious assaults; heavy bombers moved in to the captured bases and decimated and demoralized the Japanese to the point where they were forced to accept unconditional surrender. These effects of submarine operations have been substantiated, both from Japanese and Allied official records, and for the most part have been made public in detail, but nothing has been told about the manner in which such outstanding results were achieved by such a relatively small submarine organization.

As Commander of the Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, from February, 1943, through the end of hostilities, I can vouch for the very important part which Communication Intelligence played in the success of the submarine campaign. Through intercept, cryptanalysis and translation of Japanese messages, Communication Intelligence supplied the Submarine Force with a continuous flow of information on Japanese naval and merchant shipping, convoy routing and composition, damage sustained from submarine attacks, anti-submarine measures employed or to be employed, effectiveness of our torpedoes, and a wealth of other pertinent intelligence.

The Submarine Force Operations Officer was designated the Combat Intelligence Officer. He was given access to all of the Communication Intelligence files and through him information was furnished to the Force Commander and thence to the individual submarines concerned. A private telephone was installed between SubPac operations office and the combat intelligence center of JICPOA so that information on convoy routing could be supplied with a minimum of delay. Special internal codes, carried only by submarines, were used for relaying this type of in-



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Part I - (Continued)

formation, so that our own surface ships, though they might be able to decipher the submarine messages, were unable to determine the type of information being supplied. When ComSubPac moved his operational headquarters to Guam a special cryptographic channel was authorized by OpNav to supply this information direct from JICPOA at Pearl Harbor.

The information furnished made possible the assignment of submarines not only to the most profitable patrol areas but also to specific locations at particular times where contacts were made with convoys of known composition and importance, and frequently with enemy course and speed known exactly. Combatant units of the Japanese Fleet were similarly located on many occasions. During periods, which fortunately were brief, when enemy code changes temporarily cut off the supply of Communication Intelligence, its absence was keenly felt. The curve of enemy contacts and of consequent sinkings almost exactly paralleled the curve of volume of Communication Intelligence available. There were many periods when every available submarine on patrol in the Pacific Ocean Area was busy on information supplied by Communication Intelligence. The vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean could not otherwise have been covered so thoroughly unless a far greater number of submarines had been available. In early 1945 it was learned from a Japanese prisoner-of-war that it was common saying in Singapore that you could walk from that port to Japan on American periscopes. This feeling among the Japanese was undoubtedly created, not by the great number of submarines on patrol, but rather by the fact, thanks to Communication Intelligence, the submarines were always at the same place as Japanese ships.

Regulations required that messages containing Communication Intelligence be destroyed, and as a consequence, no record of the many successes due to this intelligence can ever be compiled. However, some of the more notable achievements come immediately to mind:

Severe damage to carrier HITAKA (or HIYO) by TRIGGER in June, 1943, which put her out of commission for almost a year.

Sinking of aircraft transport MOGAMIGAWA by POGY in August, 1943.

Sinking of escort carrier CHUYO by SAILFISH in December, 1943.



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Part I - (Continued)

Sinking of submarine I-42 by TUNNY in March, 1944.  
Decimation of large Saipan-bound convoy by PINTADO and SHARK II just prior to our landings on that island.  
Sinking of submarine I-29 by SAWFISH in July, 1944.  
Sinking of submarine I-41 by SEA DEVIL in September 1944.  
Sinking of escort carrier JINYO by SPADEFISH in November, 1944.  
Sinking of carrier UNRYU by REDFISH in December, 1944.  
Severe damage to carrier HAYATAKA (or JUNYO) by REDFISH and/or SEA DEVIL in December, 1944, which put her out of commission for remainder of war.  
Sinking of submarines RO-115, RO-112 and RO-113 by BATFISH within four days in February, 1945.  
Sinking of submarine RO-56 off Wake Island by SEA OWL in April, 1945.  
Sinking of light cruiser ISUZU by CHARR in April, 1945.  
Contact and trailing of YAMATO task force by THREADFIN and HACKLEBACK in April, 1945, which resulted in sinkings the following day by carrier air forces of the battleship YAMATO, the cruiser YAHAGI, and destroyers HAMAKAZE, ISOKAZE, ASASHINO and KASUMI.

The above are but a few of the many successes against the Japanese Navy that can be directly attributed to Communication Intelligence. The sinkings of Japanese merchant ships resulting from Communication Intelligence ran into hundreds of ships and probably amounted to fifty percent of the total of all merchantmen sunk by submarines.

In addition to the direct results there were equally as important indirect results which must be credited to the same source of information. For example: From an analysis of Communication Intelligence extending over a period of many months it was determined that our magnetic torpedo exploders were not functioning properly, and steps were taken to correct the defects. Then again, information concerning enemy minefields was so complete that defensive minefields laid down by the enemy served our purpose rather than his. Not only were our submarines able to avoid the areas of danger, but Japanese ships, being required to avoid them as well, were forced into relatively narrow traffic lanes, making it easier for the submarines to locate and attack them. It is impossible to estimate the number of our submarines which were saved and the number of Japanese ships



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Part I - (Continued)

which were lost because of the accurate information about enemy minefields supplied by Communication Intelligence. Also, information concerning names of ships sunk, nature of cargo and number of troops lost was of inestimable value in assessing damage sustained by the enemy and gauging his capabilities.


Without Communication Intelligence submarine operations would unquestionably have been far more difficult and costly because of the vast areas which had to be covered and the attainment of the ultimate objectives would have been greatly delayed.



/s/ C. A. LOCKWOOD

Part J - Chart of Japanese Naval and Merchant  
Vessels Sunk by United States Forces

In February 1947 the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, consisting of representatives of the Army, the Navy, and the Army Air Forces, released a report entitled: "Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses during World War II by All Causes". This report included the graph of Japanese shipping losses which is reproduced on the following page.

# JAPANESE NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS SUNK BY UNITED STATES FORCES



 NAVAL LOSSES  
 MERCHANT MARINE LOSSES

SOURCE: JOINT ARMY-NAVY ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE



Part K - General Commendation by Assistant Secretary  
of State

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Part I - Statement of the Honorable Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State

Regarding the value of Communication Intelligence in diplomacy, the Secretary of State stated in a memorandum dated 3 January 1944:

"....The Department has found this material valuable at all times, and vital in a number of highly important situations. It would appear that information of this kind, and its analysis, will be even more vital in the future than in the past, both during the period of actual hostilities, and after hostilities may be concluded. This material is of great value in determining the facts on which policy must be formulated or action taken."

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Part M - Statement of General of the Army  
Douglas MacArthur

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme  
Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, has made  
the following statement regarding the value of  
Communication Intelligence:

"....The information from this source  
saved us many thousands of lives and  
shortened the war by no less than two  
years."



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Part N - Letter of Appreciation from the Department  
of State

In the letter which follows the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence extends his appreciation to the Communication Intelligence organization for the valuable intelligence made available to the Department of State [redacted]

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1948

Dear Admiral Stone:

It is with pleasure that I write to you, as we enter the new year, to express the appreciation of the Department and of my office for the unique source of intelligence which is made available to us through you and the personnel of your division. I refer, of course, to communication intelligence and the very real benefit which it brings to bear upon the complex problems of our country's foreign relations and of the Department's efforts to maintain and consolidate a state of peace favorable to the national welfare.

The Department now relies upon the technical facilities and the skills of the Communication Supplementary Activities, Washington, and the corresponding unit in the Army, for its basic communication intelligence material, and I should be grateful if you would inform Captain Wenger and Captain Harper of our appreciation for this indispensable service. It is certainly an outstanding example of interdepartmental collaboration to mutual advantage and in the spirit of teamwork which is now, more than ever, the expressed goal of our Government.

The relationships which exist on the working level between our people and yours are still another source of gratification to me, and I should like to extend our thanks to them through you.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.  
Acting

Rear Admiral E.E. Stone,  
Director of Naval Communications,  
Department of the Navy,  
Washington 25, D.C.

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SECTION II



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P  
Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-G (G/jse)

June 23, 1942

①  
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL SUB-SECTION HEADS NO. 65:

1. Advise all personnel that the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral King, has this date transmitted to all U. S. Naval radio intelligence activities the words, "Well done".

2. Admiral Horne, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, expressing his concurrence, passes this on via the Director of Naval Communications.

3. This is a source of pleasure, but issue the reminder that this fact also must be kept secure.

JOHN R. REDMAN

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-20-G:

A review of the final report of the Battle of Midway reveals the following statements indicative of the value of the radio intelligence which was disseminated prior to the engagement:

CINCPAC to COMINCH, A16, Ser. 01849, June 28, 1942.  
Page 24, paragraph 69:

"Had we lacked early information of the Japanese movement, and had we been caught with Carrier Task Forces dispersed, possibly as far away as the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway would have ended far differently."

COMCRUPAC to CINCPAC, June 14, 1942.  
Page 2, paragraph 5:

"Radio intelligence indicated that the enemy had sighted our carriers."

C.O. HORNET to CINCPAC, CV8/A16-3, Ser. 0018, June 13, 1942.  
Page 1, paragraph 2:

"On the night of May 30 a CinCPac intelligence report, giving an accurate estimate of the Japanese Midway force organization, was received."

AIR OPERATIONS OFFICER to C.O. HORNET, CV8/A16, OF29-AS, June 12, 1942.  
Page 7, paragraph 5:

"Through superb intelligence work we were given the advantage; however, we cannot expect such advantages on every occasion in the future."

COMDR. L.C. RAMSEY to CINCPAC, A16-3/A4-3/VZ/(0027), June 15, 1942.  
Page 2, paragraph 6:

"The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, ordered that, if practicable, the expected enemy rendezvous, 700 miles to the westward (of Midway) be investigated by B-17's on May 31st and June 1st at about 1500 yoke each day."

/s/ G. W. DAISLEY



FF1/P15

64731

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

Serial: 02665

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Oct. 30, 1942

(2)  
From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
To : Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Special Commendation for Radio Intelligence Unit.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations commends the Radio Intelligence Unit under your direction for the very excellent work which it individually and in cooperation with other units has accomplished in the war to date. The results achieved have been of great and lasting benefit to the war effort.

/s/ E.J. KING

Copy to:  
BuPers  
ComFourteen  
Snr.Mbr., Navy Dept.  
Permanent Bd. of Awards.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

C  
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Y

Pac-20-af  
A6-2/P15

Serial 02338

November 8, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.  
To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
Subject: Special Commendation for Radio Intelligence Units.  
Reference: (a) OpNav Conf. Ltr. FF1/P15 Serial 02665 of October 30, 1942.

1. Reference (a) is quoted herewith:

"From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
Commander United States Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific.

Subject: Special Commendation for Radio Intelligence Units.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations commends the radio Intelligence Unit of your command for the very excellent work which it individually and in cooperation with the other units has accomplished in the war to date. The results achieved have been of great and lasting benefit to the war effort.

E.J. KING"

2. ... The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet takes pleasure in forwarding these very deserving words of praise from the Chief of Naval Operations and desires that a copy of this letter be appended to the fitness reports of officers and that a suitable brief entry be made in the records of the enlisted men concerned.

Copy to:  
Cominch  
Vice OPNav  
Comsowespac

C. W. NIMITZ

057



COPY

COPY

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Drafter	Extension Number	Addresses	Precedence
From CINCPAC	FOR ACTION INFORMATION	COMSOPAC	OP
Released By		COMSOWESPAC	Priority
Date 17 NOVEMBER 1942		COMINCH	Routine RRRRRR
		OPNAV	Deferred
TOR CODEROOM		CELCONNEN COM 14	OP
Decoded By BRYANT			Priority
Paraphrased By			Routine
			Deferred

170139

TEXT

CETYH

ONCE AGAIN RADIO INTELLIGENCE HAS ENABLED THE FIGHTING FORCES OF THE PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC TO KNOW WHERE AND WHEN TO HIT THE ENEMY X MY ONLY REGRET IS THAT OUR APPRECIATION WHICH IS UNLIMITED CAN ONLY BE EXTENDED TO THOSE WHO READ THIS SYSTEM DYL

NOTE: ADMIRAL KING HAS ADDED "WELL DONE"

~~RI SECRET RI~~

058

COPY

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE  
of the U.S.Pac.Fleet  
Hdqtrs.of the Comdr.

Jry

Al6-3/(11)  
Serial 0024

~~SECRET~~

1st Endorsement on  
ComTaskFor FORTY-TWO  
Secret Ltr Al6-3 Serial  
00137 dated Dec. 27, 1942 Jan. 7, 1943

From: The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.  
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.  
Subject: U.S.S. FLYING FISH (SS229) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, with the Force Commander's congratulations added to those of the Task Force Commander. Two (2) SHIRATSUYU Class destroyers make a creditable bag in any man's hunt.

2. The sinking on December 4 is probably the first instance of a successful approach and attack by radar. To complete its contribution, the SJ indicated the disappearance (sinking) of the target.

3. The entry at 1930 Love November 30 mentioning receipt of orders to shift station to intercept enemy ships and the entry at 0606 Love December 1 telling of the resulting contacts show how radio intelligence may be capitalized upon. That the contacts did not culminate in successful attacks does not detract from the utility of such a procedure.

W. F. HALSEY

Copies to:  
VCNO  
Cincpac  
Cinclant  
Comsowespac  
Comsubpac  
Comsublant  
Comsubsowespac  
Comsubron 10  
Comsubdiv 101  
CTF 42  
C.O. FLYING FISH

059



COMSOPAC  
A16-3/(11)  
Serial 0024

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE  
of the United States Pacific Fleet  
Headquarters of the Commander

1st Endorsement on  
ComTaskFor FORTY-TWO  
Secret ltr. A16-3  
Serial 00137 dated  
December 17, 1942.      JAN 7 1943

From:        The Commander South Pacific Area and South  
              Pacific Force.  
To:           The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subject:     U.S.S. FLYING FISH (SS229) - Report of Third  
              War Patrol.

1.           Forwarded, with the Force Commander's congratulations  
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complete its contribution, the SJ indicated the disappearance  
(sinking) of the target.

3.           The entry at 1930 Love November 30 mentioning  
receipt of orders to shift station to intercept enemy ships  
and the entry at 0606 Love December 1 telling of the resulting  
contacts show how radio intelligence may be capitalized upon.  
That the contacts did not culminate in successful attacks does  
not detract from the utility of such a procedure.

/s/ W. F. HALSEY

Copy to:  
VCNO  
Cincpac  
Cinclant  
Comsowespac  
Comsubpac  
Comsublant  
Comsubsowespac  
Comsubron 10  
Comsubdiv 101  
CTF 42  
C.O. FLYING FISH

C O P Y

060

March 18, 1943

COMMENDATION FOR RADIO INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. The Radio Intelligence Unit was Commended by the Chief of Naval Operations Conf. ltr FF1/P15 Serial 02665 dated October 30, 1942 (copy attached). A survey was made of the personnel records by Op-20-GR-1 and all enlisted and officer personnel who have been in the Radio Intelligence Unit for at least one month prior to October 30, 1942.

2. A copy of the Commendation letter has been inserted in all Ensigns fitness reports as of December 31, 1942 and also in fitness reports of officers who have been detached. A copy of the Commendation is also being inserted in the fitness reports of March 31, 1943, on all officers other than Ensigns who are eligible for the Commendation. The submission of the commendation on the latter date will take care of all the officers at the Navy Department.

3. This office (Op2-OGR-1) is now in the process of drafting a letter to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to forward a copy of the Commendation on all Communication Intelligence affairs in the Field and at the Navy Department for inclusion in the respective officers personal jackets.

4. The survey of the eligible enlisted personnel for the Commendation has been made and letters from the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G) to all Commandants in which our Field Stations are located will be drafted, listing the above personnel by name and enclosing a statement which will be included on page 9 of each man's service record.



FF1/P15

64731

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

Serial: 02665

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Oct. 30, 1942

From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
To : Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Special Commendation for Radio Intelligence Unit.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations commends the Radio Intelligence Unit under your direction for the very excellent work which it individually and in cooperation with other units has accomplished in the war to date. The results achieved have been of great and lasting benefit to the war effort.

/s/ E.J. KING

Copy to:  
BuPers  
ComFourteen  
Snr.Mbr., Navy Dept.  
Permanent Bd. of Awards.

NAVAL MESSAGE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: GCCS  
Date 4 JUNE 1943  
Decoded by BALSLEY

For Action OPNAV  
Routine

040932

~~ULTRA~~

CANDO

(6)

YOUR WB 2881&2881. WE HAVE RECEIVED . AND WILL  
SIGNAL THEM TO KILINDINI (( OPNAV FROM GCCS WWW 331&331))  
[ HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS ON BREAKING THE NEW INDICATOR SYSTEM  
SO SOON AND SO EFFECTIVELY. ]

NOTE: WB 2881&2881 WAS 311741



NAVAL MESSAGE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

From GCCS  
Date 10 NOVEMBER 1943  
Decoded by KING  
Paraphrased by EXACT

For Action OPNAV  
Information WX 517  
Al 23346

100901Zc

~~ULTRA~~

CANDO

②  
TO OFFER YOU OUR HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS ON GETTING (( OPNAV FROM  
GCCS WWW 625E626 (WOULD LIKE )) INTO

IN WHAT MUST BE THE SHORTEST TIME ON RECORD

064

TWX: ASVL 175-176  
RADIO: CONAS  
PHONE: 2400  
GT/br

~~Restricted~~

*Liaison*  
*for*  
*20K*

ARMY AIR FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING  
ASHEVILLE, N. C.

12 November 1943

SUBJECT: Direction Finding Assistance Received  
from the United States Navy

TO: Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U.S.N.  
Director of Naval Communications  
Navy Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

① GX  
② GF RK  
③ GX  
file

1. This headquarters wishes to take cognizance of the excellent cooperation received from Captain E. E. Stone and his staff at the Navy Communications Annex, concerning the radio direction finding program projected by the Army Air Forces.
2. It is felt this assistance has contributed materially to the selection of an evaluation and net collection system that will prove successful when placed in operation. If continued coordination is permitted throughout the critical stages of development, the eventual results should prove quite satisfactory.
3. The attention and consideration extended to the representatives of this organization on their recent visit to the Communications Annex is commendable, and their findings have more than justified the efforts made to obtain such technical assistance.

For the Commanding Officer:

WENDELL W. BOWMAN  
Col., Air Corps  
Asst. Chief of Staff,  
Plans & Operations

*20K*

065

~~Restricted~~



Copy to be inserted in fitness report of \_\_\_\_\_

This commendatory letter will be regarded as CONFIDENTIAL.

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-01 Hu  
Serial 89002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
WASHINGTON

13 November 1943

III

From: Chief of Naval Operations  
To: Captain E. E. Stone, U.S. Navy

SUBJECT: Communication Intelligence - efficiency of  
organization

1. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations has been greatly impressed by the effective efficiency of the organization of Communication Intelligence, and he wishes to take the occasion of his visit to the Communication Annex today, 13 November 1943, to express to you, and through you to all members of your organization, his hearty congratulations on the extremely important work that has been done and the assistance that has been given to our forces afloat in the destruction and defeat of enemy forces.

2. I cannot stress too greatly the vital importance of the work that each individual in your organization is doing, and I can assure each one of them that no matter how small to them may seem their part, each part is vital to the production and dissemination of the information obtained and that each one of them is doing an essential part in the ultimate victory that will come to this Country.

/s/ F. J. HORNE

Vice Chief of Naval Operations

C O P Y

066

NAVAL MESSAGE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

A1 43715

FROM: GCCS

RELEASED BY:  
DATE: 01 JANUARY 1944  
DECODED BY: PANNELL  
PARAPHRASED BY: EXACT

FOR ACTION: OPNAV  
ROUTINE

010836

~~ULTRA~~ (8)

CANDO

IS SOLVED NECESSITY FOR CABLING MATERIAL PAREN ~~WWW-545E545~~  
AND ~~WB-243E2432~~ REFER PAREN NO LONGER EXISTS. ((OPNAV FROM  
GCCS. WWW 811E811. (NOW THAT [REDACTED] SYSTEM))) THANK YOU  
FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL U IF  
THE SAME PROCEDURE COULD BE ADOPTED NEXT TIME.

~~CHANGES~~ MMM

WB2432

AO 14869  
T/D 212151 (OCTOBER)  
DRAFTER: GY



C  
O  
P  
Y

SECRET

14 January 1944

MEMO FOR CMDR. FORD

Subj: Material for Lt. Connorton's War Diary.

1. GY-8 was commended by the British in an R.I. Dispatch of 14 September 1943, as follows:

"CONGRATULATIONS SIGMA SUCCESSES.  
DECODES VERY VALUABLE. ((OPNAV  
FROM GCCS WWW 480 & 480. ITALIAN  
NAVAL ; (ONE)) TWO. WOULD  
APPRECIATE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF  
METHODS EMPLOYED."

2. The reference is to the Italian Submarine Operational system, which had been taken over in toto by GY-8 a few weeks previously. When the Italian Armistice occurred on 11 September, the GY-8 party was able to decrypt all the texts showing how the Italians were or were not complying with the armistice terms for surrender, and at which ports they were intending to hand over. Inasmuch as the British were then relying upon our decodes for all intelligence in this field, it can be seen that in this case decryption had a direct military importance.

(initialled)GCM  
GY-8

Navy Message

A I 49031

From; FRUMEL

FOR ACTION: TUNA

Date: 14 JAN L(\$\$

Priority

Decoded By: PENFOLD

Paraphrased By: EXACT

COPEK

140311

TEXT

CONSECUTIVE HH ANSWERING OPNAV ONE TWO ZERO WEEEEEEEEEEEEEV TWO TWO SIX

X TWO COPIES ORIGINAL MESSAGE GIYE FOURTH GROUP JJ

TWELFTH GROUP

V FOURTEENTH GROUP

XX

XX BAKER SERIAL EIGHT NINE XERO XXOUR DISGR

UNTLEMENT AT NOTKHAVING THOUGHT OF THE METHOD OF NEXATS EXTREMELY CLDVE

R ANALYSIS JOB ON

IS EXCEEDED ONLY BY OUR ADMIRATION FF

AUTUMN AITYU

#890

NAVAL MESSAGE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
A148986

For Action: OPNAV FOR OP20G  
Routine

From: GCCS

Date 14 JANUARY 1944

Decoded by: KISTLER

Paraphrased By EXACT

191019Z WX 721

~~ULTRA~~

9

CANDO

APPRECIATED HERE. SAME APPLIES TO ((OPNAV FROM GCCS.

WWW 855&855. (YOUR R.I. & R.I. SUMMARIES GREATLY) CRYPTO-  
INTELLIGENCE DAILY SUMMARIES. MANY THANKS.



Naval Message AI 61588 Navy Department

From: CCCS For Action Op Nav For Op 20-G

Date 14 February 1944 Information 111412Z

Decoded by CCILEGEL

Paraphrased by Exact Routine RRRRRRR

TEXT WX 115

Ultra 10 CANDO Ultra

THE NEW ((OPNAV FROM GC GS WWW 9730973 CONGRATULATIONS ON  
YOUR)) VERY SUCCESSFUL WORK IN GETTING INTO

~~TOP SECRET~~

No. 4

British Naval Staff  
Combined Chiefs of Staff Building  
Washington, D. C.

BRITISH ADMIRALTY DELEGATION

~~U. S. SECRET~~

~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

February 19, 1944

My dear Admiral:

I have just received a secret communication from the First Sea Lord asking me to convey to you his sincere appreciation of the excellent work against the German enemy that is being carried out by the section, Op-20-G, under the direction of Admiral Redman, U.S.N.

The most fruitful cooperation which has been maintained with the British counterpart could hardly have been bettered and has produced results in all fields of high value to the Allied cause.

It is likely to be necessary in view of forthcoming important operations, to increase the joint scale of effort, and any further extension to the machine side of this which could be effected, would be very greatly appreciated in the United Kingdom.

I am happy to send this message, and should you desire to discuss this matter, I am at your disposal.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Percy Noble  
ADMIRAL

Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N.  
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet,  
3054 Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

British Naval Staff  
Combined Chiefs of Staff Building  
Washington, D.C.

BRITISH ADMIRALTY DELEGATION

~~U.S. SECRET~~  
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(11)  
February 19, 1944.

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Yours sincerely,

/s/ Percy Noble  
ADMIRAL

Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N.,  
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet,  
3054 Navy Department,  
Washington, D. C.

COPY

073



ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: FURPAC X  
DATE: 20 FEB 1944  
FOR ACTION: TUNA

AI 65415

200457

CATFISH TT REFERENCE NEGAT ONE EIGHT TWO ONE ONE FIVE FEBRUARY  
X FRUPAC AGREES THE WILL BE EFFECTIVE ONE APRIL BUT AS  
CUSTOMARY WITH NIPS NOT ALL CONFORM AT ONCE X BELIEVE CRIP  
ON THE WORTHWHILE CHANCE X ANOTHER SUBJECT X X H IEU IEU  
IEU XX REFERENCE NEGAT XERO EIGHT N NE ERROR ONE SEVEN FOUR  
THREE FEBRUARY X EXCELLENT DATA CONTAINED IN THIS DESPATCH WAS  
INSTRUMENTAL IN VERIFYING FACT THAT KO RA FIVE WAS IN CAPTURED  
WEATHER BOOKS MAKING IT POSSIBLE WITH AID OF TRANSLATION FROM  
CAPTURED WEATHER BOOK NIP REGISTER NUMBER TWO SIX TWO FIVE TO  
OBTAIN KEYING SYSTEM X CLUE AND DETERMINING FACTOR IN FRUPAC  
MAKING DECISION TO CONCENTRATE ON BREAKING BROADCAST WAS  
REFERENCE TO X  
DATA WAS HIGHLY APPRECIATED AND EXCELLENT ANALYSIS X FRUPAC  
WOULD APPRECIATE COPIES OF ALL TRANSLATION FROM CAPTURED  
WEATHER DATE NN PEANUTS

C O P Y

COMINCH FILE  
FF1/A8

UNITED STATES FLEET  
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief  
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Serial 00238

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

21 February 1944

My dear Admiral:

With reference to the matter which you brought to my attention by letter of February 19, you may be assured that our efforts in the matter will be increased to the maximum possible extent in order to combat enemy actions and because of the well recognized value of the work.

Insofar as the machine side of the effort is concerned, immediate steps are being taken to increase our efforts by 30% prior to the end of April which percentage is about the maximum possible.

Sincerely yours,

Admiral U.S. Navy

Admiral Sir Percy L. H. Noble, GBE, KCB, CVO, ADC,  
British Admiralty Delegation,  
Washington, D. C.

A TRUE COPY

075

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS AI 66435  
DATE: 22 FEB 1944  
FOR ACTION: OPNAV

211721/Z

(12) 11 in folder  
[VERY PLEASED TO HAVE YOUR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE JADE&JADE  
KEYBOARD AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER DETAILS.] WE ARE  
NOT&NOT CLEAR WHY YOU SUSPECT THE

((OPNAV FROM GCCS WWW 101621016 JIG NAN  
157&15.. YOUR JARS 8473&8473. XW E WERE))



~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

2. GF  
2 March 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMDR. B. F. ROEDER, U.S.N.

Subj: Incident in the destruction of German blockade runners,  
South Atlantic, January 1944.

1. On \_\_\_\_\_, Navy Department Communication Intelligence informed the CO, South Atlantic Strategic D/F Net, that German blockade runners when sighted had previously used a type of message commencing with the letters "PPP". These messages had been noticed in the logs of the Recife station one or two days prior to this, when a blockade runner was sunk. Although the type of message was noticed and studied to a certain extent, the significance of it was not realized until the information was received from Washington.

2. On \_\_\_\_\_, the Fourth Fleet Operations Officer informed Captain Harper that a strange vessel, not on the merchant ship plot, had been sighted by a cruiser plane. A special extra watch was immediately put on DAN frequencies, with instructions to listen for this particular type of message commencing with PPP and to inform the watch officer or commanding officer immediately if he received such a message. Approximately twenty minutes later this type of message was noticed being transmitted to Germany. The commanding officer immediately called the Fleet Operations Officer and informed him that in all probability the vessel sighted was a German blockade runner.

3. Acting on this information, orders were sent to a cruiser at sea to intercept the vessel. This resulted in the sinking of two blockade runners and the capture of nearly all of their crews. As a small dividend, the United States salvaged something in the neighborhood of 1,000 tons of raw rubber.

J. S. Harper,  
Captain, U.S. Navy.

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS  
DATE: 18 MARCH 1944  
FOR ACTION: OPNAV

171553Z

13

MANY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR RECONSTRUCTION OF

MUCH IMPRESSED ~~(OPNAV FROM GCCS WWW 1131~~

~~& 1131-~~

BY YOUR PHENOMENAL PROGRESS

AFTER ORIGINAL BREAK.

ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: FRUPAC / AI99134  
DATE: 1 MAY 1944  
FOR ACTION: TUNA

302321

RAREBIT YY APPEARS TO BE ADDED WHEN CONDITIONS WARRANT SAME  
WHEN RAINFALL GROUP HAS BEEN USED FOR RAINFALL DATE XX

XX FOURTH AND LAST OF FOUR PARTO XX MORE STUDY  
IS RPT IS BEING MADE ON ALL ECCENTRICITIES PARTICULARLY PRESSURE  
CHANGE GROUP XX

XX WEATHER OBSERVATIONS APPEAR TO BE MUCH MORE  
DETAILED THAN IN PAST XX NEGAT CRYPTO SUMMARIES HAVE FURNISHED  
EXEERRPR ESERROR EXCELLENT DATA AND ARE APPRECIATED XX DESIRE  
ANY COMMANTS ON THIS SUMMARY NN WHALEBONETS



ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS AI 3767  
DATE: 9 MAY 1944  
FOR ACTION: OP-20-G

081549Z

14

((OPG 526&526 FROM GCCS 343&3432 CPT HNS WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS  
FROM OUR \_\_\_\_\_ PARTY AND THE) REST OF US ON YOUR VERY  
IMPORTANT DISCOVERY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN :

VN&VN

copy

9 May 19

MEMORANDUM FOR  
Lt. Cdr. F.A. Raven, USNR

Delivered with my  
heartiest congratulations.

/s/ P.R. Kinney  
P.R. Kinney  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Op-20-G

copy

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Washington 25, D.C.

8 May 1944

From: Director of Naval Communications.  
To : Lieutenant Commander F. A. Raven, U.S.N.R.  
Subject: Commendation.

1. It has come to my attention that an outstanding contribution in the field of Communication Intelligence has been made by the sub-section of the Communications Annex for which you are directly responsible. I am also informed that the above result was made possible largely due to your personal efforts. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of this project.

2. A copy of this letter will be included in your next Report of Fitness.

/s/ Joseph R. Redman

Joseph R. Redman



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-G/es  
(SC)A3-2(4)

13 May 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HANDS IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE  
ORGANIZATION:

Subj: Communications Intelligence Organization -  
Commendation of.

1. The following is the substance of a confidential communication received from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet:

"An invaluable contribution to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific has been made by the consistent and unflinching service of the personnel of the Communications Intelligence Organization. It is with profound regret, that for reasons of security, this expression of my appreciation cannot be proclaimed to all, but must be confined to members of this organization."

2. Commanding officers will insure that copies of this commendation are incorporated in the next report of fitness for officers, and that appropriate entries be made in the service record of enlisted personnel.

PHILIP R. KINNEY  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
OP-20-G

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS  
DATE: 30 MAY 1944  
FOR ACTION: OP-20-G

AI 14475

(15)

((OPG 116-116 FROM

GCCS 7000-7000 CP T HNS

IS BERLIN • SEQUENCE

FOR FIFTEENTH APR 11 1942-1942 FOUND ON TOKYO NNNNNN NNNNN SMS

40/14-40114. [ CONGRATULATIONS YOUR BREAK IN MJR ]

OP-20-G

~~ULTRA~~  
NAVY MESSAGE

A1 23208

~~ULTRA~~  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

From <u>COMSOPAC</u>	ACTION	COMB	URGENT
Date <u>15 June 1944</u>			OP-PRI
Decoded By <u>Pitts</u>	INFO.		PRIORITY
Paraphrased By <u>Exact</u>			RRRRRRROUTINE
			DEFERRED

TEXT

COPEK

150620

~~WINTERTIME MOONLIGHT DESK BUCKET XX~~ WITH MY DEPARTURE FROM THE SOUTH PACIFIC I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE INVARIABLE SERVICE OF THE ROGER ITEM ORGANIZATION IN PROSECUTING OUR CAMPAIGN AGAINST <sup>enemy</sup> THENQ HGS AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE ALERT AND TIRELESS WORK OFF THE UNIT ASSIGNED TO MY COMMAND X IT IS REGRETTEED THAT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PERMIT ONLY <sup>leaders</sup> VQADERS OF THIS SYSTEM TO BE INFORMED OF MY APPRECIATION X HALSE/XX LOCK GARDS SPRING TIME IN THE ROCJMES

~~RI SECRET RI~~



OP-20-G

~~ULTRA~~  
NAVAL MESSAGE

AI 23208

~~ULTRA~~  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

From	COMSOPAC	For Action	COMB	URGENT
Date	15 JUNE 1944			OP-PRI
Decoded By	PITTS			PRIORITY
Paraphrased By	EXACT			ROUTINE
	COPEK	Info.	150620	DEFERRED

TEXT  
 WINTERTIME MOONLIGHT DESK BUCKET XX WITH MY DEPARTURE FROM THE SOUTH P  
 ACIFIC I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE INVALUABLE SERVICE OF  
 THE ROGER ITEM ORGANIXATION IN PROSECUTING OUR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THEM<sup>EN</sup>  
<sup>EMY</sup> HGS AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE ALERT AND TIRELESS WORK OFF THE UNIT ASSI  
 GNE<sup>D</sup> TO MY COMMAND X IT IS REGRETTE<sup>D</sup> THAT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PERMIT  
 ONLY <sup>RE</sup> VOADERS OF THIS SYSTEM TO BE INFORMED OF MY APPFECIATION X HALSE  
 Y XX LOCK CARDS SPRING TIME IN THE ROCJMES

WORRY FOLDER	
G	
G-1	

ACTION 31	
G-1	<i>[Signature]</i>

~~RI-SECRET-RI~~

IMPORTANT. -The Information contained herein is not to be reproduced or referred to in any manner which may disclose its source.

INFO.	

C  
O  
P  
Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-G-es  
(SC)A3-2(4)

21 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HANDS IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE  
ORGANIZATION:

Subj: Communications Intelligence Organization -  
Commendation of.

1. The following is the substance of a communication received from Commander, South Pacific:

"Throughout my tour of duty as COMSOPAC the Communications Intelligence Organization performed invaluable service. I am pleased to indicate my appreciation for this service and particularly wish to commend the SOPAC unit for their alert and untiring efforts."

2. Commanding Officers will insure that copies of this commendation are incorporated in the next report of fitness for officers, and that appropriate entries be made in the service records of enlisted personnel.

PHILIP R. KINNEY  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
OP-20-G



~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

16 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GH:

Subject: The role of Communication Intelligence in the sinking of Axis blockade-running submarines and surface ships.

1. During the past year or more, Germany and Japan have made strenuous efforts to transport strategic materials, technical information and technical personnel between Europe and Asia by the use of blockade-running submarines, as well as surface vessels. Thanks in no small measure to the contributions made by Communication-Intelligence, the results of these blockade-running attempts have been relatively poor, and are growing progressively worse. It is therefore suggested that a chapter of your C.I. history might profitably be devoted to the role which Communication Intelligence has played in the destruction of the Axis blockade-running traffic.

2. Much of the material which you would wish to use is contained in the files of GI-A. However, as a sample of the kind of information available in GI-P from which you might weave an interesting story, I am attaching a chronology of the last cruises of the MATSU (I-29) and the MOMI (I-52), the two most recent victims of the C.I. organization. There is similar information available in the files of GI-A and GI-P concerning the fates of blockade-running surface vessels and other subs.

*G. W. Daisley*  
G. W. DAISLEY

Attached: Chronology



~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Chronology of the Last Cruises of the MATSU (I-29) and MOMI (I-52)

MATSU - I-29

16 April 1944

Departed Lorient, France, for Japan. Passengers included four German technicians and thirteen Japanese Army, Navy and civilian personnel. Cargo included German anti-submarine counter-measure equipment, acoustic and magnetic torpedoes, radar apparatus, plans for latest high submerged speed subs, and influenza virus.  
(GI-A Memo - 18 April)

25 April

Fragmentary message gave several positions on route.  
(OPNAV 051518 May)

10 May

In approximately 25 N., 40 W.  
(GI-A Memo - 11 May)

9 June

Message from Berlin gave position of 15 S., 24 W.  
(OPNAV 121643 June)

3 July

Singapore broadcast message in dip code addressed to I-29 only, indicating latter's presence in Indian Ocean.  
(FRUPAC 032008 July)

8 July

Singapore continued to broadcast to I-29.  
(FRUPAC 082112 July)

11 July

"Friendly sub scheduled to pass through Sunda Strait on morning of 12 July, and arrive at eastern entrance to Singapore at 1200 on the 14th." Identified as probably the I-29.  
(GZ 5772 - 12 July; CINCEF 131031 July)

14 July

"Arrived Singapore".  
(OPNAV 151625 July)

17 July

Message from Berlin to Tokyo listed cargo in detail, including 5 "special weapons", various radar apparatus, 20 Enigma coding machines, ordnance parts, rocket-type launching apparatus, bomb sight plans, pressure cabin parts and plans, parts of British Mosquito plane, and atabrine ampoules and tablets.  
(OPNAV 221956-7-8 July)



19 July

Berlin to Tokyo - "It is indeed gratifying to learn that the MATSU has arrived safely at Singapore with her passengers and cargo. We pray for her safe voyage to Japan."  
(OPNAV 222123 July)

20 July

"From Captain of I-29. Will proceed Kure according to following schedule:  
At 1500 on 22nd - depart Singapore  
At 0300 on 23rd - bearing 310°, distant 30 miles from Anambas Island.  
At 1400 on 25th - 15 N., 117 E.  
At 1200 on 26th - in Balintang Channel.  
At 1230 on 28th - bearing 145°, distant 120 miles from Kikai Jima.  
At 1700 on 28th - bearing 90°, distant 90 miles from Kikai Jima.  
At 1000 on 29th - enter western channel of Bungo Channel.  
At 1000 on 30th - Arrive Kure."  
(OPNAV 202158 - 202207 July)

24 July

CINCPAC Bulletin - "I-29 recently arrived Singapore from Europe carrying samples and plans of many recent German developments in fields of radar, communications, gunnery, aeronautics and medicine. Left Singapore 22 July enroute Kure. Believe above very important cargo very likely still aboard. Will pass through posit 15 N., 117 E., at 251400, and through Balintang Channel at 261200, speed 17, arriving western channel of Bungo Channel at 291000."  
(CINCPAC 240251 July)

25 July

From I-29 - "At 250630 sighted surfaced sub in 13-30 N., 115-40 E."  
(OPNAV 250324 July)

26 July

From USS SAWFISH - "He did not pass. At 0755Z [261655I] in posit 20-12 N., 121-55 E. [Balintang Channel] put three fish into Nip sub which disintegrated in a cloud of smoke and fire."  
(USS SAWFISH 260808 July)

7 August

Tokyo to Berlin - "The MATSU left Singapore 22 July. On the 25th, while enroute Japan, she reported a surfaced enemy sub about 300 miles west of Manila. All her passengers had proceeded to Tokyo from Singapore by plane, but her cargo had been left aboard. Though it is indeed regrettable, we can no longer hope for her safety. Despite the fact that we received, through your great efforts and the understanding cooperation of the Germans, many articles which were to strengthen the nation's capacity to prosecute the war, our inability to utilize them owing to the loss of the ill-fated ship is truly unfortunate and will have a great effect throughout the Imperial Army and Navy."  
(OPNAV 082353 August)



MOMI (GINMATSU) - I-52

7 February 1944

Message from Tokyo - "The I-52 will depart Kure the middle of March. While docked at Singapore, preparations will be made for her trip to Germany. Arrange space for a cargo of 270 tons, including 80 tons of rubber."  
(FRUPAC 090828 March)

12 March

From I-52 - "Will proceed to Singapore as follows:  
Until 120900 in Kure Communication Zone.  
Until 191200 in Takao Communication Zone.  
From 191200 on in Singapore Communication Zone."

(FRUPAC 060812 May)

20 March

"Will arrive Singapore at 1600 on 21st."  
(FRUMEL 171237 April)

9 to 27 April

At Singapore, by traffic analysis.

7 May

Singapore broadcast message in dip code addressed to I-52 only, indicating that she had probably left for Europe with a diplomatic official aboard.

(FRUPAC 072104 May)

10 May

In approximately 20-40 S., 77-30 E.  
(GI-A Memo - 11 May)

27 May

Message from Tokyo to Berlin indicated there are four civilian technicians on board, bound for Germany.  
(OPNAV 020635 June)

5 June

Message from Berlin to Tokyo advised that, in order to protect the MOMI, a public announcement would be made on 15 June that part of the Jap submarine force had reached a German base and completed important operations, the idea being to convey the impression that the Jap subs had already departed European waters.

(OPNAV 071321-28 June)



9 June

Message from Berlin to Tokyo stated that MOMI crossed the equator on 4 June.  
(OPNAV 121643 June)

Berlin to MOMI - "Anglo-American forces have landed on French coast between LeHavre and Cherbourg, but your destination is still Lorient. The rendezvous will be at 15 N., 40 W., at 2115 (G.M.T.) on 22 June. After rendezvous, you will proceed due North to 38 N., 40 W., and thence to 43 N., 30 W. From the latter point, you will make for the Spanish coast as directed by the German liaison officer. Special precautions must be taken against enemy aircraft, particularly since two German subs have recently been sunk by carrier aircraft in the vicinity of 15 N., 30 W."  
(OPNAV 132117-23-26 June)

12 June

Message from Tokyo to Berlin gave list of personnel aboard the MOMI, including 14 technician passengers, and itemized its cargo which included 2 tons of gold bullion, 228 tons of tin, molybdenum and tungsten, amounts of opium, quinine and raw rubber, code books and other documents.  
(OPNAV 172046-47 June)

16 June

From the MOMI - "On 11 June we were in posit 10 N., 31 W. Proceeding at 11 knots, have sufficient fuel remaining for 12,000 miles."  
(OPNAV 211513 June)

24 June

Enemy sub, probably MOMI, believed sunk by USS BOGUE early on 24 June in vicinity of 15-15 N., 40-00 W.  
(GI-A MEMO - 28 June)

28 June

Message from Berlin to Tokyo advised that on 27 June the Germans received word that the MOMI had safely made her rendezvous with the German sub scheduled for 22 June.  
(GZ 5077 - 1 July)

7 July

Berlin to the MOMI - "Although Cherbourg has fallen, there is no great change in the situation in Northern France. Your port of destination is still Lorient."  
(OPNAV 102331 July)



10 to 26 July

Berlin and Tokyo exchanged a number of messages with respect to the material planned to be carried back to Japan by the MOMI on its return trip. Included among this material were such items as (1) all types of communication intelligence material now in the possession of the German Navy, (2) special steel, (3) mercury, (4) blueprints and samples of late German anti-tank weapons, (5) plans and samples of the German T-5 acoustic torpedo, and (6) information concerning the one-man torpedo, one-man submarine and radio-controlled assault boat.

(OPNAV 131451, 151800-06, 221830-38, 222332-39-51, 261919 July; 022019, 051412 August)

31 July

Berlin to Tokyo - "Yesterday, the 30th, contact with the MOMI was established, and it is estimated that she should enter port about 3 August."  
(OPNAV 031949 August)

6 August

Message to the MOMI - "Although the German escort vessels waited for you on August 1st, 2nd, and 4th at the rendezvous point outside Lorient, they did not meet you. They are now waiting at Lorient. Please inform us again of your expected date of arrival at the rendezvous point."  
(OPNAV 071936 August)

Name of the MOMI changed to the GINMATSU.  
(OPNAV 082308-37 August)

7 August

Message from Tokyo to Berlin announced the loss of the MATSU, and requested that, as partial relief for the great loss represented by the MATSU's cargo, the GINMATSU (MOMI) load on her return trip duplicates of a number of the items lost on the MATSU.  
(OPNAV 082353 August; GZ 8818 - 10 August)

8 August

Message to the MOMI - "Although we have had no communication from you, we pray for your safety. Since it has become dangerous to enter Lorient or other French ports, proceed to either Trondheim or Bergen in Norway."  
(OPNAV 101609 August)

9 August

Berlin to Tokyo - "GINMATSU rendezvoused safely with the German submarine on 23 June, and since then the German Navy has been sending route instructions direct to the liaison officer. The arrangement was that she was to report 3 or 4 days before reaching the rendezvous, but this was not done. On 30 July, she suddenly sent out the pre-arranged signal QWF, meaning she was 36 hours from an indicated point on her route. Accordingly, on 1 August a German escort ship stood by at the agreed spot outside Lorient, but did not meet her.



9 August (continued)

In the meantime a similar agreed signal was received continuously throughout the forenoon of 1 August, and also in the afternoon, whereupon on 2 August an escort vessel again stood by, but failed to rendezvous. The German Navy then sent a message to the GINMATSU on 3 August establishing a rendezvous on the 4th, and requesting a report in the event of another failure to meet. Still another message was sent on the 5th, but to date [9 August] there has been no reply. I have begun to have doubts as to the safety of the ship.

It is of course possible that QWF was a fake message by the enemy; but the action taken by the enemy does not tally with this. Consequently it is impossible to guess what has happened to her. As nothing has been heard from her up to the present, the German Navy has given up all hope. I, however, think it possible that the Captain is attempting to detour north on his own initiative, without sending a radio signal. I have accordingly instructed him to go to Norway, and have asked the German Navy to assist in making contact with her."

(GCCS 120109-11-15-19-23 August)

11 August

Berlin to Tokyo - "In addition to our former loss of contact with the SATSUKI [RO - 501] and the recent report of the loss of the MATSU, we have still failed to receive word from the GINMATSU. The disaster which has befallen these liaison submarines one after another, at a time when they were playing such an important role in transportation between Japan and Germany, is indeed an extremely regrettable loss to both countries."

(OPNAV 141757 - 141802 August)



REF ID: A66823  
17-105 U.S.A.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 68TH COMPOSITE WING  
14TH AIR FORCE  
A.P.O. 430

*Extra*

~~SECRET~~

COPY

25 September 1944

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO: Officer In Charge, Naval Radio Unit, APO 430, c/o PM,  
New York, N.Y.

1. I desire to commend the following personnel of the Naval Radio Unit 68th Composite Wing for outstanding performance of duty in direct support of combat operations during the period 3 May 1944 to 24 September 1944.

- |                               |      |                 |
|-------------------------------|------|-----------------|
| Lt. (jg) Hoose, H.P.          |      | USNR            |
| Lt. (jg) Mann, L.H.           |      | USNR            |
| Radio Electrician D.W. Harold |      | USN             |
| Altevogt, C.E.                | RM1c | USNR            |
| Cowan, J. K.                  | RM1c | USNR            |
| Cox, C.L.                     | RM1c | USNR            |
| Day, H.L.                     | RM1c | USNR            |
| Ervin, R.D.                   | RM2c | USNR            |
| Geary, E.J.                   | RM1c | USNR            |
| Hall, B.C.                    | RM2c | USN             |
| Jansen, L.J.                  | RM2c | USNR (Deceased) |
| Jerome, Bob                   | RM2c | USNR            |
| Lazke, J.M.                   | RM2c | USNR            |
| Miller, J.L.                  | RM2c | USNR            |
| Lynch, R.J.                   | RM2c | USNR (Deceased) |
| Miller, J.E.                  | RM2c | USNR            |
| Reising, J.L.                 | RM2c | USNR            |
| Richards, B.R.                | RM2c | USNR            |
| Ross, J.W.                    | Y1c  | USNR            |
| Rutan, R.L.                   | RM2c | USNR            |
| Schumacher, R.H.              | RM2c | USNR            |
| Sellers, C.E.                 | RM2c | USNR            |

2. During this time this Unit has rendered valuable intelligence service to Headquarters 68th Composite Wing by furnishing timely information and reports on enemy shipping positions, exact times at which enemy cities and areas were alerted by American Planes, general intelligence trends, prediction and evaluation relative to intelligence matters. On many occasions combat intelligence information has been received from this Unit in advance of that from other sources. The operational value of much of this information is reflected in the successful operations of our combat units against enemy shipping and installations.

~~SECRET~~

BASIC; Ltr., of Commendation, TO: Officer in Charge, Naval Radio Unit, APO 430, dtd 25 Sept 1944.

3. The personnel of this Unit have worked long hours handicapped by limited equipment and facilities in order to insure that twenty-four hour coverage was maintained at all times. Frequently they have been interrupted and distracted by air raids but in spite of this have continued to furnish vital, accurate and timely information.

4. The spirit of the men of the Naval Radio Unit together with the high degree of service rendered to Hq, 68th Composite Wing typifies the close cooperation which exists between two great branches of our Armed Forces.

/s/ CLINTON D. VINCENT,  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,  
Commanding.

036



~~TOP SECRET~~

1 November 1944

Sinking of the  
JINEI MARU and TAKANE MARU

As another indication of the continuing contribution made by Communication Intelligence to the destruction of Japanese naval strength, the following notes have been compiled from OP-20-GI-P's files of the JINEI and TAKANE MARU's, large fleet tankers which were sunk by U.S. submarines on 25 and 30-31 October 1944, respectively.

On 19 October, the STRIKING FORCE REPLENISHMENT FORCE was organized, consisting of JINEI MARU, TAKANE MARU, AKIKAZE (DD) and four Coast Defense Vessels. The JINEI MARU, a 10,500 ton XAO, and the TAKANE MARU, an unlisted tanker which first appeared in traffic on 26 September and which was later described by the TRIGGER as "the biggest ship I ever saw", were ordered to fill to capacity with fuel oil at Kure and to prepare to sortie. This information was disseminated to COMB by OPNAV on 19 October.

Thereafter, the STRIKING FORCE REPLENISHMENT FORCE was apparently divided into two forces as follows:

#1 REPLENISHMENT FORCE  
TAKANE MARU  
3 Coast Defense Vessels

#2 REPLENISHMENT FORCE  
JINEI MARU  
AKIKAZE  
1 Coast Defense Vessel

On 23 October, the #2 REPLENISHMENT FORCE was ordered to proceed from Kure to Oshima Strait, leaving Kure at 240000(I) and arriving at the western entrance of the strait on the 25th. The message containing the route points of this movement was disseminated to COMB in OPNAV 231016(Z), and included a 250400(I) position of 30-00 N., 129-20 E. At 250435(I), the AKIKAZE reported that the JINEI MARU had been sunk by a submarine in 30-15N., 129-45E. No report from the submarine making the sinking is yet available.

The #1 REPLENISHMENT FORCE apparently succeeded in reaching Oshima Strait safely and in fueling the STRIKING FORCE, because on 27 October the former was ordered to unload at Takao the heavy oil remaining after replenishing the STRIKING FORCE, and to then proceed to Singapore with its three escorts. This message was disseminated to COMB by both FRUPAC and OPNAV on the 27th.

At 291400(I), however, another message, sent out to COMB in OPNAV 291417(Z), revised the movements of #1 REPLENISHMENT FORCE, and called for departure from Oshima Strait at 291500(I), destination Kure. This message set forth four route points, including a 301200(I) position of 29-25 N., 132-08 E.



~~TOP SECRET~~

At 302200(I), the TRIGGER reported having obtained 4 hits on "the biggest ship I ever saw" at 301615(I) in 30-10 N., 132-55 E., and that attacks were continuing by the wolfpack. At 310112(I), TRIGGER further reported that the first attack had blown the stern off the target, leaving it dead in the water, but had not sunk it, and that the STERLET had "just put four more" torpedoes into it in 32-10 N., 132-48 E.

Although there is not yet available any further report from our submarines on the results of this attack, the whole story appears from the following Japanese messages:

- 301630(I) - "TAKANE MARU hit by two torpedoes, unable to navigate, at 1620 in 30-13 N., 132-49 E."
- 302040(I) - "One more hit in TAKANE MARU at 2030. Bulkheads have carried away. She is in danger of sinking."
- 310100(I) - "TAKANE MARU sank at 0039 as result of third torpedo attack."



ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS  
DATE: 2 NOV 1944  
FOR ACTION: OP-20-G

AI 16444

021505

16

STUPENDOUS YY YOUR NOUGHT ONE ONE FOUR TWO SEVEN NOVEMBER XX  
ULTRA FROM GCCS XERONINEONEFIVE OPG FOURSEVENFOUR CPT HNS XX  
TO BIRCH PD [CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR PROGRESS WITH

PD WE ARE CLEARING THE DECKS TO TAKE ON  
CMA AND AWAIT FURTHER DETAILS FROM YOU ] HH CIRCUMSTANTIAL

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: FRUMEL  
DATE: 12 JANUARY 1945  
FOR ACTION: DAZE

AI 72493

121135

(17)

EDITORIALS CC FOR NEGAT X [FRUMEL WILL RECIPROCATE WITH A CASE  
OF MELBOURNE BITTERS IF NEGAT SUPPLIES JJ UNDER LEND LEASE JJ  
A DUPLICATE OF THE CRYSTAL BALL USED TO UNRAVEL THE

X CONGRATULATIONS

ON A MAGNIFICENT PIECE OF WORK DD PUPPET PENDAGOGY



Op-20-3-jw  
A3-2(4)

27 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL SECTION HEADS:

Subj: Army Distinguished Unit Badges - Presentation of.

1. The following personnel have been awarded the Army Distinguished Unit Badges and Oak Leaf Clusters:

	<u>Section</u>
ANDERSON, Raymond V. CY	3-GY-P-1
BARKER, Kenneth Hollis CRM	3-GT-P
BOULIER, Kenneth Alexander CY	3-GY-P-1
CHAMBERLIN, John Edward CY	3-GY-P-1
DOWD, Robert Eugene Ylc	3-GY-P-4
FOSTER, Grover Cleveland, Jr. CY	3-GY-P-1
GONDER, Frank Bennett CY	3-GI-P
KEPHART, John Edgar, Jr. CY	3-GY-P-1
MYERS, Albert Edwards, Jr. CY	3-GY-P-1
OSBORNE, Oscar Leonard CY	3-GY-P-3
TREMBLAY, William Howard CY	3-GY-P-3

2. Presentation will be made by the Officer-in-Charge, NCA, at 1000, 30 January 1945, in the main lobby of Building No. 1.

3. Section Head or SubSection Head of personnel concerned will assemble for presentation. Other Section Heads are invited.

4. Make necessary adjustments in watches to insure that all personnel concerned can attend.

P. R. KINNEY

Copy to:  
All Sections

ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: FRUPAC  
DATE: 13 FEB 1945  
FOR ACTION: NEGAT

AI 95842

132031

ALTAR FF WE HAVE NOTED IN YOUR DAILY PROGRESS REPORTS FOR TWO  
THROUGH FOUR FEBRUARY THAT YOU HAVE DECRYPTED WHOLLY OR IN PART  
TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY TWO MESSAGES IN / AND ONE  
THOUSAND ONE HUND REDAND TWENTY THREE IN X  
ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE DECRYPTS FOR THREEFOURTH OF FEBRUARY  
IN REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FIVE PERCENT  
OF ALL INTERCEPTS IN THAT SYSTEM X THIS IS A VERY COMMENDABLE  
SCORE XX PART ONE OF THREE XX WE ASSUME THAT THESE DECRYPTS WERE  
MADE IN CURRENT CIPHERS AND THAT THE DATA OBTAINED WAS SUFFICIENTLY  
RELIABLE FOR OPERATIONAL USE X IF THIS IS THE CASE  
WE WOULD LIKE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESSES BEING USED  
SO THAT IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE MADE LOCALLY X FF VIOLINUNXC



~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~  
Op-20-G/gob

RETURN TO OP-20-3  
17-105, N.C.A.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

9 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-20:

Subj: C. I. Contributions to Operations, 6-7 April 1945.

1. The following brief resume may be of interest in connection with the information supplied by the Communication Intelligence Organization prior to and during the recent all-out attack by the Japanese on our forces engaged in the occupation of Okinawa.
2. For some time ULTRA sources have indicated that the enemy has had a plan of operation for the "inner sphere of defense" of the Japanese Empire when threatened by Allied landings. Although the general nature of the plan was surmised, details had not been aired by the Japanese until quite recently. Once the decision was made to execute part of the plan, a flurry of operation orders ensued upon which the C.I. Organization was able to capitalize. The highlights of each of the plans for air, land, and sea action follow.
3. Air Operations. The planned air operations were the most comprehensive and ambitious attempted to date - approximately 1200 planes being involved. A Japanese dispatch originated at 031648I ordered all-out air attacks by day and night on Blue landing forces in Okinawa area until destroyed; the tentative date for commencement was 5 April 1945. This message was broken and the contents sent to CINCPOA by URGENT dispatch at 050021I. (3 hours and 44 minutes later CTF 51 warned TF 51 "Be prepared for heavy attacks by enemy aircraft from KYUSHU throughout today 5 April"! ) A Jap message at 042250I (decoded and sent to CINCPOA 17 hours later) changed the date for the air attacks to 6 April. Thereafter followed a series of orders which established the composition of the enemy air forces and detailed plans for their employment, including mining of the anchorage off Okinawa used by our landing force, and attacks on our fast carrier groups. The decodes of all such messages were delivered to CINCPOA headquarters at Pearl Harbor in an average of 13½ hours from time of their origination by the enemy.
4. Land Operations. At 060345I, a despatch was delivered to CINCPOA advising him of the intention of the 32nd Army (on Okinawa) to commence an attack to "annihilate the enemy landing force". Such information was derived from a Jap message originated 12 hours earlier.



~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Op-20-G/gob

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Subj: C.I. Contributions to Operations, 6-7 April 1945.

5. Naval Operations. The first definite information regarding naval action by the enemy was sent to CINCPOA at 060142I. It was derived from a Jap message originated 9 hours previously which requested fuel oil to be supplied at once in connection with "the 2nd Fleet's sortie". One hour later CINCPOA was advised that the surface force was to sortie from BUNGO Channel on 7 April and carry out heavy attacks on enemy transports to the east off Okinawa at dawn on 9 April. An hour latter, the time of sortie was established as about 0730I. At 060404I, CINCPOA was advised that the date for the above attack was most likely the 8th instead of the 9th of April. At 061305I a Jap message was originated which was the most important single one from our viewpoint. It gave the exact route and schedule of the enemy surface force from Bungo Channel to Okinawa. This information was delivered to CINCPOA 6½ hours after the original Jap despatch was originated. At 0025I on 7 April, the composition of the enemy force (YAMATO, YAHAGI(?) and 8DD) was sent to CINCPOA. Thereafter followed a series of related despatches which confirmed the above intelligence.

6. Blue submarines and planes made contact with the enemy surface force as it proceeded south off the east coast of KYUSHU. Contact was apparently lost while the enemy was still on a southerly course. 10 hours later a Blue patrol plane regained contact 150 miles to the westward within 10 miles of the track prescribed in the Jap message of 061305I. The extent of damage inflicted upon the enemy was obtained by reading Jap message 081530, which established that the YAMATO, YAHAGI(?) and 3 DD's were sunk, plus 1 DD probably sunk.

7. Practically all of the ULTRA information relating to the above activities was derived from the Japanese general purpose cryptographic system. The basic code book for this system came into effect on 1 February 1945 and the cipher changed on the first of each month. In spite of the increased complexity of this system, was broken with unprecedented speed. Primarily due to the efforts of the Washington Unit (where the initial breaks were made) the new cipher introduced on 1 April was solved the next day and since 3 April the cipher has been read currently.

8. The recent progress toward completing and improving the C.I. communication system in the Pacific contributed in




~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~  
Op-20-G/gob ~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Subj: C.I. Contributions to Operations, 6-7 April 1945.

no small part to this performance. Raw traffic from Pacific intercept stations was brought in to Washington expeditiously, and intelligence despatches westward were handled with minimum delay. It is doubtful if the necessary speed could have been obtained without communication networks for the exclusive use of the C. I. Organization.

9. There are several interesting aspects of this performance of the C.I. Organization which are worthy of mention. These are:

- (a) Although situated 8000 miles from the scene of operations, the Washington Unit participated actively in those operations by supplying timely intelligence which could not have been obtained from Non-ULTRA sources. This illustrates the unique function of the Washington Unit as an integral part of the combatant forces.
- (b) The demonstrated ability of the Washington Unit not only to supply the technical information to permit exploitation at FRUPAC, but to back them up in the derivation of intelligence, confirms the soundness of the fundamental concept and current operating plan of the C. I. Organization.

  
J. N. WENGER  
Op-20-G



~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

W-118  
TO :

Capt Smedberg  
Op 70 G

DATE: 4/11/45

FROM :

SUBJECT:

Attached was prepared as directed  
by DNC. Please return to me.

*J. M. [Signature]*

Thanks — Magnificent work on  
the part of the "drones"  
I may want to see this again some day.  
JMS  
F-20

15



~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

Office Memorandum • United States Government

TO : Capt Smedberg

DATE: 4/11/45

FROM : Op 20 G

SUBJECT:

Attached was prepared as directed  
by DNC. Please return to me.

s/J.- N. Wenger

Thanks -- Magnificent work on  
the part of the "drones".

SM

F-20

I may want to see this again someday-

15

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)



Office Memorandum

20-3

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

Admiral Fleet Admiral <sup>suggest</sup> <sup>and Admiral</sup> <sup>be promoted</sup> <sup>dated</sup> King / Home

DATE

gms

I feel you will be interested in this resume relating to the recent action south of Buys Channel

Respectfully

Joseph H. Friedman

well done

gms

RETURN TO OP-20-0  
17-105, N.C.A.



Office Memorandum

20-3

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
FROM :  
SUBJECT:

Admiral <sup>suggest</sup> ~~King~~ <sup>Admiral</sup> ~~Home~~ <sup>be promoted</sup> ~~DATE~~ <sup>gms</sup>

I feel you will be interested in this resume relating to the recent action south of Buoy Channel

Respectfully  
Yours faithfully  
John G. Federman

well done

John G. Federman

RETURN TO OP-20-G  
17-105, N. C. A.



20-3

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Suggest comments of  
Fleet Admiral King and Admiral  
Horne be promulgated

JMW

TO :

DATE:

FROM : Admiral King

SUBJECT:

I feel you will be  
interested in this resume' relating  
to the recent action south of Bungo  
Channel

Respectfully

Joseph R. Redman

Well done - K

JMe

\*

H

RETURN TO OP-20-G  
17-105,N.C.A.

\*Reviewer's comment:  
These initials questionable

(RETIYPED FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)



NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ADNC(OP-20-G) AO 16362  
RELEASED BY: P. G. STOKES, COMMANDER, U.S. NAVY FOR CAPT. WENGER  
DATE: 11 APRIL 1945  
FOR ACTION: DISC YAPO

JOMEK

FLEET ADMIRAL KING HAS COMMENDED COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION WITH QUOTE WELL DONE UNQUOTE FOR WORK CONNECTION OPERATIONS COMMENCING SIX APRIL XX DISSEMINATION OF THIS TO BE CONFINED TO CHARLIE ITEM PERSONNEL AND OTHER AUTHORIZED ULTRA RECIPIENTS.

~~SECRET~~

Op-20-3-fk  
(SC) A3-2(4)

11 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL SECTION HEADS:

Subj: Commendation by Fleet Admiral King and  
Admiral Horne.

1. Fleet Admiral King and Admiral Horne have given the Communication Intelligence Organization a "well done" for valuable contributions to recent Pacific operations.
2. Please convey this information to personnel of your section.

P. R. KINNEY.

Copy to:  
All Sections



AI 61204

~~TOP SECRET DISPATCH~~

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMSUBPAC</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		<b>CINCPAC ADV. HDQ</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>14 APRIL 1945</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>0751</b>			DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY <b>SOWERS</b>			BASEGRAM 6
PARAPHRASED BY <b>SOWERS</b>	CHECKED BY <b>BERNETT</b>	<b>COMSUBPACADCOMD COMTASKFOR 71</b>	7
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		8
			PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 12
			BASEGRAM 13
			14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 1 OF 2

131237

NCR 1231

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMSUBPAC HEAVES TO CINCPAC ADV HDQ FOR ACTION. COMSUBPAC-ADCOMD AND COMTASFOR 71 NEED INFO COPIES.

CINCPAC/CINCPDA ALVHED PASSED TO COMINCH AND CNO FOR INFO AS 132317

~~TOP SECRET.~~

STRICT APPLICATION OF REQUIREMENTS CSP 1805 PARTICULARLY PARAGRAPH 8 TO SUBMARINE FORCE WILL RADICALLY REDUCE SUCCESS OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS. HIGH PERCENTAGE OF SUBMARINE SINKINGS IS BASED ON ULTRA INFORMATION. WIDE RANGE OF MOVEMENT PERMITTED SUBMARINE COMMANDING OFFICERS AND LACK OF INFORMATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND AS TO SUBMARINES POSITION AND CONDITION PROHIBITS SUPPLYING ULTRA INFORMATION IN THE FORM OF OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVES. IN THE PAST ULTRA INFORMATION HAS BEEN SUPPLIED

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

ACTION F-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFO:G-6

G-1

G-5

CGDO

G

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.



~~TOP SECRET DISPATCH~~

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		12
			BASEGRAM 13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2

131237

NCR 1231

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SUBS IN CHANNEL 105 OR 108 USING INTERNAL CODE AS GIVEN IN APPENDIX 1 ANNEX B MY OPLAN 1-45 WITH ADDITIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED PARAGRAPH 2 OF ANNEX A OF THAT OPLAN. CHANNELS 105 AND 108 ARE HELD ONLY BY SUBMARINE COMMANDS AND REGULAR CLASS 5 HOLDERS. SAME WILL APPLY TO CSP 1700 WHEN IT REPLACES OTHER CHANNELS IN NEAR FUTURE. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING ULTRA INFORMATION TO SUBMARINES IN THE ABOVE MANNER WHICH HAS WORKED SO SUCCESSFULLY IN THE PAST.

COMINCH COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.



ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS  
DATE: 5 MAY 1945  
FOR ACTION: NEGAT

AI 60078

051338

DISCRIMINATION UGLY HOODING LANK BB [CONGRATULATIONS ON SPEEDY  
SOLUTION OF NEW PROCEDURE ON.

X IN VIEW OF YOUR SUCCESS THERE IS NO POINT IN  
OUR CONTINUING TO RECEIVE , SOLN THANK, XXX  
~~ULTRA NEG FOURSIXTWO GCCS NOUGHTTWOONENINESEVEN CPT HNS XXX YOU~~  
FOR SENDING THEM TO DATE DD ESTIMATION HONOUR HUNDRED TIMES



13 25

67  
*[Handwritten signature]*

PSHQ V OPNAV

FOR CAPTAIN DE MARBOIS FROM CAPTAIN WENGER X

ON THE OCCASION OF OUR VICTORY IN THE ATLANTIC THE ENTIRE U.S.N.C.I.

ORGANIZATION JOINS ME IN THANKING YOU AND YOUR PERSONNEL FOR THE

SPLENDID COOPERATION WHICH HAS PREVAILED THROUGHOUT OUR COLLABORATION X

IT IS A GREAT SATISFACTION TO KNOW THAT OUR COMBINED EFFORTS HAVE

CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THIS GREAT VICTORY.

TOD 081345 SNJ CS END GA PSE

TOR 081345/5/45 MC AR



SENT

1945 MAY 8 13 45

OP-20-GT-A

G-7

JNW

PSHQ V OPNAV

FOR CAPTAIN DEMARBOIS FROM CAPTAIN WENGER X

ON THE OCCASION OF OUR VICTORY IN THE ATLANTIC THE ENTIRE U.S.N.C.I.

ORGANIZATION JOINS ME IN THANKING YOU AND YOUR PERSONNEL FOR THE

SPLENDID COOPERATION WHICH HAS PREVAILED THROUGHOUT OUR COLLABORATION X

IT IS A GREAT SATISFACTION TO KNOW THAT OUR COMBINED EFFORTS HAVE

CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THIS GREAT VICTORY.

TOD Ø81345 SNW CS END GA PSE

TOR Ø81345/5/45 MC AR

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

SENT

1945 MAY 8 13 47

OP-20-GT-A

*G-7*  
*[Signature]*

ADMY V N NR 6  
FOR DSD 9 FROM CAPT. WENGER  
ON THE OCCASION OF OUR VICTORY IN THE ATLANTIC THE ENTIRE  
U. S. N. C. I. ORGANIZATION JOINS ME IN THANKING YOU AND  
YOUR PERSONNEL FOR THE SPLENDID COOPERATION WHICH HAS  
PREVAILED THROUGHOUT OUR COLLABORATION X IT IS A GREAT  
SATISFACTION TO KNOW THAT OUR COMBINED EFFORTS HAVE  
CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THIS GREAT VICTORY  
TOD 081346 SGW JF



DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSES	PRECEDENCE
From <u>WENGER</u>		TRAVIS <i>GT</i>	OP
Released by _____			PRIORITY
Date <u>08/1348 MAY</u>			ROUTINE
TOR Coderoom _____	INFORMATION	<i>[Signature]</i>	DEFERRED
Decoded by _____			OP
Paraphrased by _____			PRIORITY
TEXT GYA 570 INT DTR			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

P

16-32615-2

ON THE OCCASION OF OUR FINAL VICTORY PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND DEEP APPRECIATION FOR YOUR SPLENDID LEADERSHIP IN THE ATLANTIC PROBLEM. I FEEL THAT THE ATTACK ON THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN CONDUCTED WITH THE UTMOST IN EFFICIENCY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. PLEASE CONVEY TO THE PERSONNEL OF GC & CS HIGHEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FROM NEGAT AND GEORGE.

ACTION


**RI-SECRET-RI**

IMPORTANT.—The information contained herein is not to be reproduced or referred to in any manner which may disclose its source

*Wenger*  
INFO


ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS  
DATE: 17 MAY 1945  
FOR ACTION: NEGAT

AI 67357

170901

19

HEATWAVE RAINING SMOKING TOBACCO CC YOUR NEG TWO EIGHT FIVE TWO  
EIGHT OF XX ULTRA NEG FIVEFOURONE FROM GCCS XEROTHREETWOEIGHTFSVE  
CPT HNX XX ONE FIVE ONE BINE THREE ONE MAY

CONGRATULATIONS X WE EAGERLY AWAIT FULL REPORT X PLEASE SIGNAL  
IMMEDIATELY

VIX X WHAT WE CALL

THE

BB

INCORPORATE MUNICIPAL COOPERATION LARKSPUR KR



~~ULTRA~~  
NAVAL MESSAGE

A1 67972

~~ULTRA~~  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

From	GCCS	For Action	NEGAT	PPPPPP	URGENT
Date	18 MAY 45				OP-PRI
Decoded By	ELLIOTT				PRIORITY
Paraphrased By	EXACT				ROUTINE
		Info.			DEFERRED

TEXT

KADY3

181040

RECEPTION RAILWAY STATIONS HH YOUR TWO NINE FOUR FOUR ONE OF ONE  
 XX ULTRA NEG FIVEFOUREIGHT FROM GCCS XEROXHREETHREESIXSEVEN CPT H  
 NS XX EIGHT XERO FOUR XERO XERO X XX HEARTIEST C  
 ONGRATULATIONS ON A BRILLIANT PIECE OF WORK XX VV LEISURE LADYLIK  
 E LIF

ACTION

5794	

~~RI-SECRET-RI~~

IMPORTANT. -The Information contained herein is not to be reproduced or referred to in any manner which may disclose its source.

INFO.

5VP	
31	
3CTD	
6	

ULTRA NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: GCCS  
DATE: 18 MAY 1945  
FOR ACTION: NEGAT

AI 67972

181040

20

RECEPTION RAILWAY STATIONS HH YOUR TWO NINE FOUR FOUR ONE OF  
ONE XX ULTRA NEG FIVEFOUREIGHT FROM GCCS XEROXHREETHREESIXSEVEN  
CPT H NS XX EIGHT XERO FOUR XERO XERO X [ XX  
HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON A BRILLIANT PIECE OF WORK ] XX VV  
LEISURE LADYLIKE LIF



COPY

NAVAL MESSAGE AI 135 Y DEPARTMENT C O P Y

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
From FRUPAC	ACTION	GUAM	OP
Released By			PRIORITY
Date 23 MAY 1945			ROUTINE DEFERRED DDD
TOR Coderoom	INFO	OP-20-G	OP
Decoded By			PRIORITY
Paraphrased By			ROUTINE DEFERRED
TEXT PABES		222123	

ADMIRAL TURNER HAS INDICATED THAT THE DESPATCHES IN 35 S WERE OF IMMENSE VALUE AND THAT THE ANALYSIS OF IMPENDING JAP OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY AIR, WERE OF HIGHEST QUALITY AND "PERFECTLY FINE IN EVERY RESPECT". A WELL DONE TO STATION A AND THE JOINT ACTIVITIES UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. HARPER.

COPY

~~RI CONFIDENTIAL RI~~

COPY

NAVAL MESSAGE AI 135 Y DEPARTMENT

COPY

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
From FRUPAC	ACTION	GUAM	OP
Released By			PRIORITY
Date 23 MAY 1945			ROUTINE DEFERRED DDD
TOR Coderoom	INFO	OP-20-G	OP
Decoded By			PRIORITY
Paraphrased By			ROUTINE DEFERRED
TEXT	PABES	222123	

ADMIRAL TURNER HAS INDICATED THAT THE DESPATCHES IN WERE OF IMMENSE VALUE AND THAT THE ANALYSIS OF IMPENDING JAP OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY AIR, WERE OF HIGHEST QUALITY AND "PERFECTLY FINE IN EVERY RESPECT". A WELL DONE TO STATION A AND THE JOINT ACTIVITIES UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION. HARPER.

COPY

~~RE CONFIDENTIAL RE~~



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Department of the Navy,  
Navy Office, Melbourne, S.C.I.  
23rd May, 1945

My dear Redman

On relinquishing my appointment as Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Navy, I would like to express thanks for the great assistance rendered to me as Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontiers by your Communications Intelligence organisation.

I also appreciate very much the continued help you have given us since FRUMEL was transferred to the control of the R.A.N., and in this connection the zeal and devotion to duty of Commander J. R. Bromley, USN., and Lieutenant R. E. Cook, U.S.N.R., are particularly commended to your attention.)

With kindest regards, I remain

Yours sincerely

Guy Royle

COPY

HQNSG?  
(G500) TS CONTROL # CDD 705

122

R.S. 67129

A8-2(R.I.)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET  
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET  
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial 000128

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

COPY

23 May 1945

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~  
~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~  
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:  
OinC, R.I. Unit, FIFTH  
Fleet Ltr. A8-2(R.I.)  
Serial 000127, dated  
22 May 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.  
To: Officer in Charge, Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

1. Forwarded.
2. The FIFTH Fleet Radio Intelligence Unit has been of very great assistance to this command during the ICEBERG operation.
3. The recommendation included in paragraph 6 of basic letter is conservative. The enlisted strength should be increased to ten (10). The officer in charge should have a commissioned officer as assistant. Operations of the fleet are more extended than ever before. Closer and more continuous contact is maintained with the enemy. The Radio Intelligence Unit cannot operate at peak efficiency when fatigued as a result of personnel shortage.

R. A. SPRUANCE.

Copy to:  
CNC (Op-20-G)  
PacFlt IntelOff.



*By officer hand only*

*Ept. Taylor  
10 Jan to F-20  
for accounting and disposition.  
23 May 1945.*

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Admiral YAMAMOTO, The Death of.

The following is a chronology of events associated with the death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto:

April 14, 1943

1. At 140108Z, FRUPAC sent out a dispatch to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, and COM7thFLT containing a fragmentary translation of a Japanese message, dated 1755/I 13 April 1943, from CINC SOUTHEASTERN AREA FLEET to several addressees, including COMDR. BALLALE GARRISON: A paraphrased version of this message follows:

On 18 April CINC COMBINED FLEET will \_\_\_\_\_  
as follows: Ballale Island \_\_\_\_\_.

Comment by FRUPAC: This is probably a schedule of inspection by CINC COMBINED FLEET. The message lacks additives, but work will be continued on it.

2. At 141910 and 142157Z, FRUPAC and Op-20-G, respectively, sent out more complete translations of the same message. Op-20-G's paraphrased version read as follows:

In accordance with the following schedule CINC COMBINED FLEET will be at Ballale and Buin on 18 April:

1. In a medium attack plane escorted by six fighters depart Rabaul at 0600. At 0800 (1000 "L" time) arrive Ballale. Proceed by minesweeper to \_\_\_\_\_, arriving at 0840. At #1 Base have minesweeper ready to proceed to \_\_\_\_\_ arriving at 0840. At 0945 depart \_\_\_\_\_ in minesweeper and arrive at 1030 at Ballale. In a medium attack plane depart Buin at 1400 and arrive at 1540 at Rabaul.

2. The Commander in Chief will make a short tour of inspection at each of the above-mentioned places and will visit the sick and wounded, but current operations should continue. Each Force Commander \_\_\_\_\_.



3. In case of bad weather the trip will be postponed one day.

April 15, 1943

1. At 150249Z CINCPAC issued a daily ULTRA Bulletin to all Task Force Commanders in the Pacific. The following is a paraphrased extract:

At 1000 on 18 April YAMAMOTO himself, via bomber escorted by six fighters, will arrive from Rabaul in the Ballale-Shortland area. He will leave Kahili at 1600 the same day to return to Rabaul. All dates and times are "L". In case of bad weather the trip will be postponed until 19 April.

2. At 150643Z, FRUMEL disseminated to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOPAC and COM7thFLT the translation of another Japanese message, dated 122/I April 14, from RABAUl BASE FORCE to an unidentified addressee, wherein reference was made to "the special visit of Yamamoto", and "in view of the situation regarding air attacks on the post", certain precautionary arrangements were requested, including the moving of the "post" to a new location.

April 18, 1943

1. At 0505 and 9535/I April 18th, a Jap plane was noted by FRUPAC originating encoded weather reports. FRUPAC commented (in his 181926) that this was an "unusual time for Nip plane weather mission".

2. At 180229Z a paraphrased message of COMAIRSOLS reported as follows:

"Major J. William Mitchel, USAAF, led P-38's into Kahili area. Two bombers, escorted by six Zero's flying in close formation, were shot down about 0930L. One other bomber shot down was believed to be on test flight."

May 21, 1943

1. At 1500 I May 21st, the Japanese Navy Department originated an Alnav, in plain text, reading in part as follows:



"The Commander-in-Chief of the COMBINED FLEET, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, died a heroic death in April of this year in air combat with the enemy while directing operations from a forward position."

2. Chungking reported on May 21st that, according to a Domei radio broadcast of that date, Admiral Yamamoto had been killed in April in an air combat somewhere in the Southwest Pacific area, and that he had been shot down by U.S. fliers.

The following report was contained in the intelligence summary of Headquarters Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, Serial No. 101, May 8, 1943, Page 8:

P-38s Fly 410 miles to Intercept BETTYS, ZEKES

28a. Sixteen P-38s took off from Guadalcanal on April 18 at 0725 to intercept 3 Type 1 M/B BETTYS and 6 Type 0 SSF ZEKES. Four P-38s were designated the attacking section, the balance as their protective cover. From the take-off the flight went 410 miles over the circuitous all-water route, flying all the way at an altitude of 10 to 30 feet above the water. The course had been figured and timed so that the interception most probably would take place upon the approach of the P-38s to the Southwestern coast of Bougainville at the designated time of 0935. As this point was reached the enemy was sighted!

29. The Lightnings were at 30 feet, heading in toward the coast and just about to climb for altitude. The enemy aircraft were in a "V", about three miles distant, proceeding down the southern coastline towards Kahili.

30. Two bombers were together, flying at 4,500 feet, with the ZEKES in two sections of three each, 1500 feet above them and slightly to the rear.

31. As the enemy, apparently unaware of opposition, pursued his course, the covering group of P-38s climbed for altitude, ultimately reaching 15000 to 18000 feet.

32. The attacking section of four P-38s flew nearly parallel to the course of the enemy, flying in toward them a bit and indicating 200 m.p.h. in a 35° climb. Actual rate of climb was




2,200 feet per minute. When level with the enemy bombers and about 2 miles away two of the P-38s dropped their belly tanks and swung into the attack at 280 m.p.h. indicated. One P-38 had difficulty in releasing his tank and another remained with him until he could do so.

33. When the two attacking P-38s were within one mile of their objective, their attack was observed by the enemy. The BETTYS nosed down. One started a 360° turn dive; the other retreated toward the shore line. The escorting ZEKES dropped their belly tanks and three of them peeled down in a string to intercept one of the P-38s. When our pilot saw this and realized that he could not reach the BETTY he turned up and into the ZEKES, exploding the first and firing into the others as they passed. By this time he had reached 6000 feet, so he nosed over and went down to the tree tops after the escaping BETTY. He came into her broadside and fired. The BETTY burst into flames, lost a wing, and crashed to earth.

34. The P-38 was then forced to out-run and out-maneuvre the pursuing ZEKES who had the advantage of altitude. Meanwhile, the second of the two attacking P-38s had destroyed the other BETTY. The other two P-38s now had jettisoned their belly tanks and came into help ward off the ZEKES. Many shots were then exchanged but results were not observed. The flight was leaving the combat area and in the neighbourhood of enemy bases at Kahili, Ballale and Shortland-Faisi when a stray bomber was noticed near Moila Point flying low over the water. One P-38 dived on it, his bursts setting it smoking in the left engine; a second P-38 shot at it and a third P-38 finished it off with a burst in the fuselage. A piece of the enemy bomber flew off, cut through the left wing of the P-38 and knocked out the left inner cooler, and other chunks left paint streaks on the left wing, so closely was the attack driven home.

The remaining ZEKES attacked and three more were destroyed.

Respectfully submitted,

  
J. N. WENGER  
Captain, USN  
Op-20-G



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER AI 84662 EXTENSION NUMBER ADDRESSEES PRECEDENCE

FROM	COM 7TH FLT TOLOSA	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY	1
RELEASED BY			COMINCH	ROUTINE	2
DATE	10 JUNE 45			DEFERRED	3
TOR CODE ROOM				DDDDDDDD	4
DECODED BY	1722/10 MELTON	INFORMATION	COM 7TH FLT (ADM BARBEY)	PRIORITY	5
TYPED BY	MELTON/WOODWARD			ROUTINE	6
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED	7
				DDDDDDDD	8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: 10213 DATE NCR 4746 TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

( COM 7TH FLT TOLOSA SENDS ACTION COMINCH, ANCON NOT ADDEE PASS INFO COM 7TH FLT ADM BARBEY)

FOLLOWING COMMENTS COMSUBS 7TH FLT PASSED FOR INFO.

" CONNECTION TRENCHANT ASHIGARA CASE 2 IMPORTANT FACTORS INVOLVED.

(A) SUCCESS UNLIKELY EXCEPT FOR MAGNIFICENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE.

(B) IMPOSSIBLE FOR LARGE US TYPE SUBMARINE TO HAVE CONDUCTED DAYTIME OPERATION SIMILAR TO TRENCHANT. THEY HAD TRIED AND FAILED SOUTH OF BANKA."

*Signatures*  
*Be. Tan*

G  
G1  
G-5  
GI-P

~~SECRET~~

ACTION	
F-0	
F-00	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX0 1	
FX07	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

C O P Y

TOP SECRET ULTRA

TO: Commander C. A. Ford  
FROM: Major J. R. Cheadle

18 June 1945

SUBJECT: *GCCS*  
*operator*

REF: CNA 2

(21)

1. [*has* GCCS ~~have~~ requested me to convey their congratulations on your solution of \_\_\_\_\_ and have asked whether you can conveniently make available: \_\_\_\_\_

- A. \_\_\_\_\_
- B. Texts of messages after removal of deciphering process.
- C. \_\_\_\_\_
- D. \_\_\_\_\_

J. R. Cheadle



AI 94046  
~~TOP SECRET~~ DISPATCH

G's copy

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	CINCPAC ADV. HDQTRS.	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		ALL HOLDERS OF CRYPTO-CHANNEL ROUTE 35-S	PRIORITY 2
DATE	28 JUNE 1945		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY	GWYNN/HERRBERMANN		BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY	EXACT		
CHECKED BY	HARDY		
ROUTED BY	NISTLE		
			6
			7
			8
			9
			10
			11
			12
			13
			14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL  
CHECK BELOW

280439

PAGE ONE OF TWO

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

~~ULTRA~~ THE FOLLOWING REMARKS FROM COMINCH ULTRA WEEKLY ARE QUOTED FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF ALL HOLDERS OF THIS CHANNEL. "A RECENT JAPANESE NAVY DESPATCH REPORTING THE FAILURE OF AN OPERATION FOR REINFORCEMENT OF SEVERAL ISLANDS NORTH OF OKINAWA ATTRIBUTED THE SUCCESS OF ALLIED OPERATIONAL TACTICS TO THE APPARENT INTERCEPTION OF JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING DETAILS OF THE TRANSPORTATION INVOLVED. THOUGH THIS MESSAGE MAY MERELY REPRESENT AN EXCUSE ON THE PART OF THE COMMANDER CONCERNED, IT FOCUSES ATTENTION ON THE RECURRENT SUSPICION IN THE JAPANESE MIND THAT HIS TRAFFIC IS BEING READ. AS THE WAR HAS MOVED CLOSER TO JAPAN AND AS JAPANESE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES HAVE GREATLY DECREASED, THE EMPHASIS IN VALUE OF ULTRA INTELLIGENCE HAS GRADUALLY SHIFTED

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

CC: COMINCH, F-241  
(6 COPIES)  
OP-20-3-G1  
(2 COPIES)

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.



~~TOP SECRET~~ DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____			PRIORITY 2
DATE _____			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY _____			6
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____		PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY _____	DITTOED BY _____		ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			BASEGRAM 12

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

280409

PAGE TWO OF TWO

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM TACTICAL TO STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. THE LONG-RANGE WORTH TO OUR FORCES OF VITAL INFORMATION CURRENTLY BEING OBTAINED ON JAPAN'S ANTI-INVASION PLANS, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MEANS, AND DISPOSITIONS NOW FAR OUTWEIGHS ANY ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED THROUGH THE USE OF ULTRA INTELLIGENCE IN SMALL-SCALE ENCOUNTERS, AND CALLS FOR EVER CLOSER SCRUTINY OF OPERATIONAL PLANS PRIMARILY BASED ON ADVANCE INFORMATION DERIVED FROM THIS SOURCE."

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.



AI 96561

~~TOP SECRET~~ DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>FRUPAC</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PPPPPPPPPP
RELEASED BY		<b>OP-21-G</b> <b>GUAM</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>3 JULY 1945</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM		FOR ACTION	DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <b>ENGLISH</b>			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED <b>EXACT</b>	CHECKED BY	FOR INFORMATION	BASEGRAM 6
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		PRIORITY 7
			ROUTINE 8
			DEFERRED 9
			BASEGRAM 10
			PRIORITY 11
			ROUTINE 12
			DEFERRED 13
			BASEGRAM 14
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL
<b>PABES</b>			CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>

Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP **030119** (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

KNOWING THAT THE CREDIT BELONGS TO ALL OFFICERS AND ENLISTED IN THE COMINTORG FRUPAC IS PLEASED AND PROUD TO PASS ON TO YOU AS TOP SECRET THE FOLLOWING "COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE DESIRES TO EXPRESS HIS ADMIRATION AND APPRECIATION TO THE OFFICERS OF FRUPAC FOR THE SPLENDID SUPPORT AND COVERAGE GIVEN BY YOU TO THE RECENT SUBMARINE OPERATION IN THE JAPAN SEA. MAY THE GREAT SUCCESS OF THIS EXPEDITION REPAY YOU SOMEWHAT FOR YOUR TIRELESS EFFORTS TO STRIKE THIS BLOW AT THE HEART OF THE ENEMY'S EMPIRE. IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DONE WITHOUT YOUR HELP."

G \_\_\_\_\_

G6 \_\_\_\_\_ G1-P \_\_\_\_\_  
 GCDO \_\_\_\_\_ G3 \_\_\_\_\_  
 G5 \_\_\_\_\_ GY-P \_\_\_\_\_  
 G2 \_\_\_\_\_ GT-P \_\_\_\_\_  
 G4 \_\_\_\_\_ GZ-P \_\_\_\_\_  
 G1 \_\_\_\_\_

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

74949

AO 61085

DRAFTER

20G

EXTENSION NUMBER 2551

From: OP-20-G

For Action:

Released by: WENGER

FRUPAC

Date: 17 AUGUST 1945

FRUMEL

ABLE

NEGAT

Routine

TEXT

PABES

172108

ULTRA

FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM SIR EDWARD TRAVIS DIRECTOR OF GC & CS LL THIS FINAL VICTORY SETS THE SEAL UPON THE GREATEST PARTNERSHIP IN THE WORLD'S HISTORY X EYE REJOICE TO THINK THAT THIS PARTNERSHIP HAS NOWHERE BEEN CLOSER THAN BETWEEN YOUR ORGANIZATION AND OURS AT BAKER PETER X MAY EYE THANK YOU AND ALL YOUR STAFF FOR THEIR HELP THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND FINE SPIRIT OF COMRADESHIP AND CONGRATULATE YOU ALL UPON THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY MADEBY AMERICAN SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE IN ALL ITS BRANCHES LL

CC:G

G1

GCDO

20-3, G10

21 August 1945

133



Op-20-4-em (23 August 1945)  
Serial 0005020  
SC A6-2/A8

25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. FLEET, AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: The continuation and development of Communication Intelligence  
Ref: (a) VCNO Conf Memo for Cominch and CNO of 23 Aug 45, Op-20-4 Ser 04920, (SC)P14-2.  
Encl: (A) Top-Secret-Ultra Memo of DNC for VCNO of 21 Aug 45, Op-2 lmd, Ser 000805520.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for your personal attention. The post war program for Communication Intelligence which it projects has the strongest and most vigorous support that I can give. I am aware of your own constant recognition of the immeasurable importance of this activity to the defense and protection of this nation. It is clear as stated in the basic memorandum, that scientific progress during the war, in the development of new weapons and new techniques in communications and cryptanalysis, makes it more imperative than ever that the strength of the United States in Communication Intelligence be given every ounce of support needed to insure its post-war continuation and growth. Constancy and continuity of scientific research in this field, in particular, must not be neglected.

2. Reference (a) presents a typical problem with respect to Communication Intelligence personnel, which must be solved and solved promptly to preserve for this activity indispensable and irreplaceable technical specialists. Routine and general policies and procedures will not serve in the case of this unique activity. It is not desirable that the peculiar and special requirements of Communication Intelligence should have to be constantly explained, defended and justified to all other activities on whose support it must depend, especially in view of the highly classified character of all phases of Communication Intelligence.

3. The security and very life of the nation depend upon the continued efficiency and success of the operations in question. It is most urgently recommended, therefore, that the post-war program outlined in the basic memorandum be given your personal, active and always effective support.

4. It is further specifically recommended that:

The Secretary of the Navy be informed of the basic memorandum and advised of the absolute necessity of this project, to the end that it may receive complete Departmental support at all echelons of authority.

F.J.HORNE  
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

~~TOP SECRET~~U. S. NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONULTIMATE POST-WAR STRENGTH

By VJ day plus 180 days the intercept stations, direction finder stations, and processing centers of the C.I. Organization will be reduced to peace-time strength (post-war status), which will be as follows.

<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>				<u>RCVRS</u>
			<u>Off.</u>	<u>RM</u>	<u>Yeo.</u>	<u>Spec* and others</u>	
A		Intercept D/F. & pro- cessing	28	125	6	78	60
	Dupont	Intercept & DF	2	38	1		20
H		Intercept, DF & Pro- cessing	65	235	12	233	100
		Intercept & DF	3	44	1		25
M	Cheltenham	Research	4	30		2	35
20-G& M	Washington	Processing & adminis- tration	225	20	25	455	5 (Stand by)
		Intercept & DF	2	46	1	1	25
	Port Lyautoy	Intercept & DF	1	28			12
S	Bainbridge	Intercept, DF and train- ing	5	60	2		30
		Research	4	19	1	11	12
	Toro Point	D/F	1	12			5

Enclosure with Op-20-G Serial 00805520



~~TOP SECRET~~U. S. NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONULTIMATE POST-WAR STRENGTH

<u>STATION</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>				<u>RCVRS</u>
			<u>Off.</u>	<u>RM</u>	<u>Yco.</u>	<u>Spec.*and others</u>	
	Samoa	D/F		6			5
W		Intercept & DF	2	46	1	1	25
		DF		6			5
	Kwajalein	D/F		6			5
	Recife	Intercept & DF	1	24	1		15
		Intercept & DF	2	57	1	2	30
Totals			345	802	52	783	414

\* Or yeoman with special qualifications

# To be established prior to or during the demobilization period with personnel from D, C, W, and AR.

‡ Plus 518 civil-service employees to be added when positions can be established.

Total Projected Post-War Strength

Officers	345
Enlisted	1637
Civilians	518
	2500

*Commendation(?)*

UNITED STATES FLEET  
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

C O P Y

24 August 1945

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: The Continuation and Development of Communication Intelligence.

1. I strongly recommend the attached papers to you as I believe you will find the subject interesting and worthy of your personal attention.
2. This whole subject is a very live one at the present time. General Marshall and I have directed that an immediate study be made and recommendations submitted which will effectuate a merger of Army and Navy Cryptanalytic activities and efforts for joint post-war operation, to serve the President, State, War and Navy Departments.
3. Details of the post-war plan will, of course, have to be worked out as a joint project but I recommend, as a matter affecting the continued security of the U.S., that the proposed plan for the post-war continuation and development of communication intelligence be given your personal approval and support.

Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.

C O P Y



UNITED STATES FLEET COPY OF COPY  
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Washington 25, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

24 AUGUST 1945

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E. J. KING  
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.

6-7  
[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NAVAL SERVICE

OTTAWA, CANADA

COPY

~~SECRET~~

29th August, 1945.

Dear Admiral Redman:

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of the 18th August. It is indeed very gratifying to my staff and to myself to receive your personal appreciation for our efforts in the field of combat intelligence.

It has indeed been a great privilege to have been associated with your organization which has done so much to defeat our common enemies.

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ J. M. deMarbois  
Captain, R.C.N.

Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U.S.N.  
Director of Naval Communications,  
Navy Department,  
Washington, D. C.



~~TOP SECRET DISPATCH~~

DRAFTER	F-20	EXT. 63319	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMINCH & GNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	ADMIRAL E.J.KING		OP-20-G	PRIORITY 2
DATE	17 SEPTEMBER 1945		FRUPAG	ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			FOR ACTION G-7 File	DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY				BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		FOR INFORMATION Commentation CINCPAC (ADV & REAR)	6
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY			PRIORITY 9
				ROUTINE 10
				DEFERRED 11
				BASEGRAM 12
				13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

182206

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS IS ~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~. ORIGINATED BY COMINCH AND GNO.

I AM AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND FEELINGS EXPRESSED IN FRUPACS

150029 TO OP-20-G. FOR THIS REASON I WISH TO EXPRESS, TO

ALL THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE COLLECTION PRODUCTION AND

DISSEMINATION OF ULTRA, MY APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF THEIR

WORK IN DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO THE WINNING OF OUR WARS. YOU

WILL ALWAYS BE ENTITLED TO A SENSE OF DEEP SATISFACTION IN

THE KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SAVING OF

THOUSANDS OF LIVES AND THE HASTENING OF THE DESTRUCTION OF

OUR ENEMIES BY YOUR EFFORTS. THERE IS NOW AND WILL CONTINUE

TO BE A SEVERE TEST OF YOUR LOYALTY OCCASIONED BY THE

WRITINGS OF IRRESPONSIBLE PEOPLE CONCERNING THE WORK YOU

HAVE DEVELOPED AND WHOSE SECRET YOU HAVE GUARDED SO WELL.

HOWEVER THE NAVY DEPARTMENT DOES NOT INTEND TO DIGNIFY ANY

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

CC: OP-20  
 OP-20-G  
 e-1  
 F-20

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.



DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		DEFERRED 11
		BASEGRAM 12	
			13
			14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

182206 PAGE 2 OF 2

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

STORIES CONCERNING SUCCESSES IN ULTRA BY OFFICIAL DENIALS OR CONFIRMATIONS. THE OATH WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN MUST NOT BE VIOLATED. I REPEAT THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT LEAKS AND PARTIAL DISCLOSURES BE NOT FORTIFIED OR REINFORCED NOR FURTHER DISCUSSION STIMULATED BY ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF THOSE WHO KNOW THE FACTS FROM THE INSIDE.

150029:- DISCUSSES FUTURE SECURITY OF ULTRA MATERIAL IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT OPEN DECLARATIONS AND PRESS DISCUSSIONS OF THE EFFECTIVE RESULTS OF SUCCESS IN ULTRA WORK.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.



Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.



~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCERPT FROM Marshall-King letter to SecNav & SecWar dated September 1945.

During the German and Japanese Wars, the United States Army and Navy and the British Government Code and Cipher School collaborated closely [redacted] and exchanged fully the intelligence derived from cryptanalysis. The information resulting from this collaboration and exchange was an important factor in the success of many military and naval operations of the Allies.

[redacted]

EXCERPT FROM the joint letter Secretary of State, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to the President, dated September 1945.

You are aware of the outstanding contributions to the success of the Allied forces in defeating Germany and Japan which have been made by the cryptanalytic units operating under the direction of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Not only were many military and naval victories of the Allies made possible by learning the plans and intentions of the enemy, but also much important diplomatic and economic information, otherwise unobtainable, was furnished to cognizant authorities.

~~TOP SECRET~~



FF1/P15

COPY

Serial: 002254

3 Oct 1945

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

**From:** Commander in Chief, United States Fleet  
and Chief of Naval Operations.

**To:** The Secretary of the Navy.

**Subject:** Recognition of Accomplishments of Navy  
Communication Intelligence Groups.

**Enclosures:** (A) VCNO Secret Memo Op-20-G-es, serial  
00677620 (SC) P15 of 14 May 1945, with  
enclosures thereto.  
(B) VCNO Secret Memo Op-20-G-hs, serial  
00677720 (SC) P15 of 14 May 1945, with  
enclosures thereto.  
(C) List of Cominch Hdqtrs. personnel  
recommended for Navy Unit Commendation.

1. It is fully appreciated that our successes in both the Pacific and the Atlantic were, in a large measure, due to the accomplishments of the Navy's Communication Intelligence Organization. Many of the personnel, because of their knowledge and skill, have been retained for long periods in this specialized work against their personal desire and to the detriment of their naval training for senior assignment. There can be no doubt that such service merits recognition, and since large numbers are involved, I consider the Navy Unit Commendation the most appropriate award.

2. It now appears that, of the Communication Intelligence personnel concerned, the Communications Intelligence Groups in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Headquarters of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet have contributed most to the successful prosecution of the war. For the reasons set forth in the enclosures, I recommend award of the Navy Unit Commendation to the Communication Intelligence Groups named.

3. Because of the nature of the work of the subject units, I concur in the recommendation that no publicity be given these commendations



FF1/P15

Serial: 002254

3 Oct 45

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Subject: Recognition of Accomplishments of Navy  
Communication Intelligence Groups.

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4. By copy of this letter, Director of Naval Communications is directed to assist the Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals in the compilation of list of names of personnel meriting the award. Attention is invited to the Department's policy which specifies that care should be taken to avoid the commendation of large groups for the actions of one or more of its component parts.

E. J. KING.

Copy (this ltr. only) to:  
CinCPac  
Dir. Naval Communications

COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations

Op-20-A-vb  
Serial 523P20

23 Nov 1945

From: Chief of Naval Communications.  
To: Lieutenant John V. CONNORTON, USNR  
Subj: Commendation.  
Encl: (A) Letter of Commendation from M.I.S.,  
War Dept.

1. Encl. (A) is delivered with congratulations.
2. A copy of this letter with enclosure, is being forwarded to the Bureau of Naval Personnel for inclusion in your jacket.

/s/ J.V. Murphy  
By Direction



COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Military Intelligence Service  
Washington

19 November 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO: John V. Connorton, Lieutenant, USNR

1. It is desired to commend Lieutenant Connorton for meritorious performance of duty as a member of the Secretariat of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, and the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee.

2. The problems dealt with by ANCIB and ANCICC were numerous and complex. For the proper functioning of both organizations, an efficient Secretariat, capable of organizing and coordinating the matters coming before both groups, was essential. Lieutenant Connorton's thorough understanding of the problems involved, his judgment and tact, and his efficient handling of the agenda, minutes, and other matters made a major contribution to the successful functioning of both ANCIB and ANCICC. It is a pleasure to commend him for outstanding performance of a difficult and important assignment.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Deputy Chief, MIS



Op-20-G-jac

~~SECRET~~

5 January 1946.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR Op-20.

Subj: Commendation.

Encl: (A) Excerpts from Narrative of the Combat Intelligence Center, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (TOP SECRET-ULTRA), dated 8 Nov 1945. (2 copies)

1. Enclosure (A) is submitted for inclusion in your Commendation Folder. It is strongly recommended that a copy of this be given to Admiral Hayler because of its unusual interest and timeliness in connection with the question of awards.

J. H. WENGER  
Op-20-G.



COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

*Comm*

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Op-20-G-fk      WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
Serial 10812P20

7 January 1946

From: Chief of Naval Operations.  
To: Lieutenant John V. Connorton, USNR.  
Subj: Commendation.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has noted that you have served as secretary of the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Committee from the time of its beginning as an informal group for the coordination of Army and Navy communication intelligence operations. Upon the creation of the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board as a formal joint agency for this purpose, your duties were extended to include also the secretaryship of that Board.

2. Your keen interest in the subject of communication intelligence, the wealth of background you acquired, your initiative and your untiring devotion to duty have been important factors in perfecting the joint coordinating structure, extending the scope of its effectiveness, and dispatching efficiently the business brought before it.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations desires to commend you for this outstanding work as a valuable contribution not only toward the successful prosecution of the war, but also toward laying a firm foundation for improved future collaboration between the Army and Navy in the important field of communication intelligence.

s/ JOSEPH R. REDMAN

JOSEPH R. REDMAN  
By direction