

SRH- 281

UNITED STATES NAVY
FILE OF
CORRESPONDENCE WITH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1919 - 1950

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12356
by ~~Director~~, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date: 21 May 1984

REVIEWER'S NOTE:

The first review of this document was conducted by personnel of the U. S. Navy. The original classified versions were retained by them and have been placed in the NSG Repository, Crane, Indiana

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Kreer205

Op-58-M

9023-249

Dec. 3, 1919.

Sir:

It is requested the Navy Department be furnished one copy of the Consular Code for the use of the Commandant (Supply Officer) Naval Station, Cavite. This Consular Code is required for communicating with the Consuls in the various places in the Orient, relative to pending bids and quotations on required material which information it is desired to be kept confidential. The Consular Code requested affords the only confidential means of communicating with the various Consuls.

Sincerely yours

Josephus Daniels

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Dec 12, 1919

In reply refer to
CO 119.25/408

NAVY DEPT.
RECEIVED

December 12, 1919.



The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy.

Sir:

APR 10 1925

File

I have the honor to refer to your letter of December 3, 1919, requesting a copy of the Consular Code for the use of the Commandant (Supply Officer) Naval Station, Cavite, and to transmit herewith, in compliance with your request, a copy of the Department's Red Code, No. 369.

A blank receipt for this Code is enclosed, which should be signed by the officer in Cavite who is to use it, and forwarded to this Department.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

(signed)

ALVEY A. ADEE

Second Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:

Blank receipt.

Sent by messenger to Secnav's office, Dec. 12, 1919.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16
APH:ALH

18 March 1920.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF BATTLE OPERATIONS.

Where commanding officers of ships, squadrons or fleets have to communicate with our ministers and ambassadors in foreign countries which have naval attache's the method of communication between the naval officer and chief of mission is through the codes in possession of the naval attache'. It is extremely desirable that some arrangement be made, however, for communication with ministers or with ambassadors where there is no naval attache'.

I was asked a few days ago by our minister in Belgrade, who was returning to his post, what codes he could use to communicate with Rear Admiral Andrews at Spalato, the two ports being in the same country. It seems to me on general principles that the Navy Department and State Department should come to some definite agreement as to joint codes.

J. B. Hiltner

56301
51
MAR 19 1920
Op. 11-LES 3/19
4023-258

1st Endorsement.

MEMORANDUM.

MAR 19 1920

From: Chief of Naval Operations. ✓
To: Director of Naval Communications.

SUBJECT: Communication between ministers or ambassadors and
naval officers in foreign countries.

- 1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

B. S. Litchman

Acting

April 27, 1920.

TO: Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Joint Code for Navy and State Departments.

1. In the Operations' Conference of 20 March 1920, a memorandum was read from the Director of Naval Intelligence, suggesting that arrangements be made by which a code would be made available for communication between Naval and State Department officials, and possibly to include officials of the War Department.

2. The minutes of the conference contain the statement that the Asst. C. N. O., said a Board had been appointed to consider a joint code. This statement was undoubtedly made under a misapprehension caused by a statement made by the Director Naval Communications. It now develops that this matter was not referred to the Board which is at present engaged in preparing a joint system of visual and radio signaling applicable alike to the Army and Navy, and further it is not believed that the need for such a code is apparent. Considering the very few occasions when such a code would find any use, and these would only be in localities where there was no Naval representative, such as a Naval Attaché, and the consequent care required in keeping these suggested codes confidential, it is believed the existence of such a code would cause greater embarrassment than any good it might accomplish. Codes are difficult to guard at all times and they should be restricted as much as possible, consistent with necessary communication.

3. It is therefore recommended that a separate code for communication between officials of the Navy and State departments be not authorized.

4. On special occasions, Naval officials might be furnished with the necessary State Department codes to carry on special communications, if thought desirable; Naval codes should not be extracted to anyone outside the Naval Service.

W H C BURBANK

ADDRESS DIRECTOR NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AND REFER TO NO.

181

NAVY DEPARTMENT
NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

FINISHED-ORAL MAIL

ENCLOSURE

WASHINGTON, 28 April 1920

Memorandum for Admiral Bullard:

Salmon?

The State Department (Mr. Simon of the State Department Code Section), in reply to a telephone request, informed the Officer-in-Charge of the Code and Signal Section that the Minister at Belgrade would be directed to send Admiral Andrews a copy of the State Department Code. This takes care of this particular case only. Naval Attaches are stationed at London, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Copenhagen, Madrid, Lisbon, Peking, Tokio, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Ayres and Santiago.

Captains of Naval Vessels are provided with spare copies of Naval Code F, which they may issue to any agent or consul or anyone which in their opinion requires it. F Codes so issued are to be withdrawn by the officer issuing them when the conditions which required their being issued no longer exists.

In view of the limited communication which takes place between consuls and naval officers, the difficulty of keeping codes secret and the necessity for frequently changing codes, no additional code is considered necessary or desirable.

If the codes mentioned in paragraph 2 are not considered adequate, it is strongly recommended that the State Department supply Naval Vessels with a State Department Code, 1st: because fewer codes would be required to supply consuls with a naval code and 2nd: it is considered the Navy as a whole safeguard codes more effectively than do the State Department representatives.

M. P. [Signature]
To supply the Navy those would be required

Op. 11-MES 4/29
9023-261

1st Endorsement

April 30, 1920.

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Director of Naval Intelligence.

Subject: Joint Code for Navy and State departments.

1. Forwarded for information in connection with the question of establishing a mutual code of communication between Naval officers and ambassadors and ministers in foreign countries, which was suggested by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Further comment is requested.

B.F. Hutchison.

Op-16
APW:ALH

2nd Endorsement

3 May 1920.

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

1. Returned. Some solution of this question is urgently needed. It is requested that the Secretary of the Navy be requested to write a letter to the State Department suggesting that the State Department furnish one or more of its codes to each flagship of the Commanders-in-Chief of the various naval forces, with a view to having them issued to ships, which for political reasons are stationed on the coasts of foreign countries where it is desired that the ministers should communicate with them. It is a curious fact that there is no way that ministers, ambassadors and commanding officers of ships can communicate secretly. All messages between such officials should be confidential or secret and some means should be provided. This correspondence suggests that the State Department furnish the code.

A.B. Niblack.

DNO

57587-51

MAY 8 1920
May 7, 1920.

9023-261

Sir:

It has been brought to the attention of this Department that occasions frequently arise which require secret communication between officers of the Navy and officials of the State Department in various parts of the world, and for the present, there exists no ready means for such communications.

This condition suggests the use of a code which would be equally accessible to those requiring such communication. The preparation of a separate code for such use would seem to be undesirable, as the addition of an extra code for any purpose only adds to the dangers attending the use of other codes which should be carefully guarded.

I have, therefore, the pleasure to suggest that, if acceptable to the State Department, a certain number of copies of a suitable State Department code be furnished the Code and Signal Section of this Department for issue to our several Commanders in Chief, who in turn would issue them to Commanding Officers of ships and other officials who would find themselves in localities where it would be desirable to communicate secretly with officials of the State Department.

It is not necessary to add that every safeguard provided for the safe keeping of the Navy's codes, the method of accountability and issue, etc., would be applied to the State Department codes, and at any instant it will be known in whose custody the copy of any particular code rests.

It is estimated that fifty copies of the code would be ample to supply all needs.

Sincerely yours,

Josephus Daniels

The Honorable
The Secretary of State.

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575 87-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

0-13-4

In reply refer to
IS 119.25/425

✓ June 25, 1920.
20.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Navy.

9023-261

Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 8, 1920, (9023-261 DNC), wherein you state that occasions frequently arise which require secret communication between officers of the Navy and officials of the State Department in various parts of the world, and suggesting since no ready means for such communication now exist that this Department furnish copies of one of its codes to be issued to Commanding Officers of ships and other officials who might find it necessary to communicate secretly with officials of the State Department.

The Department regrets that at the present time it has no code which it could issue for this purpose. However, it is suggested that the Navy Department may possibly have a code from which a sufficient supply could be issued to this Department, to be forwarded to such consular officers with whom it is likely it would be necessary to communicate.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

Alvey A. Adee

Second Assistant Secretary.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

Second Assistant Secretary.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

56-328B

U.S.S. TACOMA,
At Sea
17 December 1920.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander, Special Service Squadron.

SUBJECT: Code for communication with Consular and Diplomatic Officials.

1. The Commanding Officer has on a number of occasions in the past year been embarrassed by the lack of a suitable code for communicating confidentially with diplomatic representatives of countries visited. There are frequently times when it is to the best interests of both the ship and American consular or diplomatic representatives that the latter be communicated with secretly. Time is usually lost if our representatives ashore do not know of a ship's intended visit or departure or the exact time of either. While the TACOMA was visiting Salvadorean waters last Summer after the Cabrera overthrow, with instructions to keep in touch with the U.S. Minister at Guatemala, it was necessary to depend on the Larrabee Code. While the latter is very convenient in some respects it is clumsy and can only be used by previous agreement on a key-word. While the legation guard from this ship was in Guatemala City last Spring this same unsatisfactory code had to be depended on. Difficulty was encountered in satisfactorily communicating with the Charge in Tegucigalpa last February due to lack of a consular or diplomatic code on the ship and the inability of finding at the moment a thoroughly reliable person to carry a key-word from Amapala to the Legation in Tegucigalpa. The Castine, it is known, also had to arrange for a Larrabee key-word with the Consul in San Jose, Costa Rica, in the emergency in June 1919. As a general rule (or in many cases) the consular or diplomatic representatives have not been informed (definitely at least) by the State Department of the prospective visits of this ship during the past year. The Commanding Officer did not deem it wise to inform the Consul at Mazatlan in plain English of his prospective visit of 12 December 1920. In order to inform the Minister at Guatemala of the visit now in prospect the Consul at Mazatlan was requested by the Commanding Officer to send a message in code to the former. By thus notifying the Minister much possible delay may be avoided as there is not (or was not last Spring) telephonic connection between San Jose and the Capital and it is an all-day trip by train and back.

2. It is therefore recommended that ships - at least, ships on this duty - be provided with a copy of a code, other than the Larrabee, suitable for messages with the U.S. Consuls and diplomatic representatives. In any event one is requested for this vessel.

/s/ W. S. JACKSON

012

U.S.S. TACOMA
At Sea
17 December 1920

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander, Special Service Squadron.
SUBJECT: Code for communications with Consular and Diplomatic Officials.

1. The Commanding Officer has on a number of occasions in the past year been embarrassed by the lack of a suitable code for communicating confidentially with diplomatic representatives of countries visited. There are frequently times when it is to the best interests of both the ship and American consular or diplomatic representatives that the latter be communicated with secretly. Time is usually lost if our representatives ashore do not know of a ship's intended visit or departure or the exact time of either. While the Tacoma was visiting Salvadoranean waters last Summer after the Cabrera overthrow, with instructions to keep in touch with the U.S. Minister at Guatemala, it was necessary to depend on the Larrabee Code. While the latter is very convenient in some respects it is clumsy and can only be used by previous agreement on a key-word. While the legation guard from this ship was in Guatemala City last Spring this same unsatisfactory code had to be depended on. Difficulty was encountered in satisfactorily communicating with the Charge in Tegucigalpa last February due to lack of a consular or diplomatic code on the ship and the inability of finding at the moment a thoroughly reliable person to carry a key-word from Amapala to the Legation in Tegucigalpa. The Castine, it is known, also, had to arrange for a Larrabee key-word with the Consul in San Jose, Costa Rica, in the emergency in June 1919. As a general rule (or in many cases) the consular or diplomatic representatives have not been informed (definitely at least) by the State Department of the prospective visits of this ship during the past year. The Commanding Officer did not deem it wise to inform the Consul at Mazatlan in plain English of his prospective visit of 12 December 1920. In order to inform the Minister at Guatemala of the visit now in prospect the Consul at Mazatlan was requested by the Commanding Officer to send a message in code to the former. By thus notifying the Minister much possible delay may be avoided as there is not (or was not last Spring) telephonic connection between San Jose and the Capital and it is an all-day trip by train one way.

2. It is therefore recommended that ships - at least, ships on this duty - be provided with a copy of a code, other than the Larrabee, suitable for messages with the U.S. Consuls and diplomatic representatives. In any event one is requested for this vessel.

/s/ E. S. JACKSON

REFER TO
No.

1161-20
JLL/JE

SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
KEY WEST, FLORIDA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

21 December 1920.

From: Commandant,
To : Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Red Cipher Code.

Enclosure: (1) Copy of lettr received from American
Consul General.

1. I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter received from the American Consul General at Havana, relative to a method of communication between his office and the Commandant of the Seventh Naval District, by code.

2. It will be noted that in this letter it is stated that special circular Consular Instructions #255 of the Department of State, notify Consular Officers that the Red Cipher Code had been placed in the hands of certain Naval Officers to enable them to communicate with the Consulates. If this code is still in use, it is requested that I be furnished with a copy. I have already found on several occasions, the necessity for the use of such a code, and similar cases are liable to arise at any time.


J. L. Latimer

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Habana, Cuba. December 13, 1920.

Captain J. L. Latimer,
Commandant Seventh District,
Key West, Florida.

Sir:

I acknowledge your letter of December 8, 1920, relative to the desirability of a method of communication between your office and this Consulate-General by Code.

I find that by Special Consular Instruction No. 255 of the Department of State, consular officers were notified that the Red Cipher Code had been placed in the hands of certain naval officers to enable them to communicate with Consulates through its use. If your office has been provided with this code messages may be sent to the Consulate-General by it, but I find no other method provided for by existing regulations.

Very respectfully,

HURST
American Consul-General

872

015

C O M M A N D E R

65296-51

206-226

3 Special Service Squadron
U.S.S. DOLPHIN, Flagship
Balboa, Canal Zone.
31 January 1921.

From: Commander Special Service Squadron
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations)

SUBJECT: Code for communication with Consular
and Diplomatic Officials.

Enclosures: (1) Commanding Officer U.S.S. TACOMA'S
letter 56-WRB

1. I recommend that a code other than the Terrance Code be adopted which will permit vessels of the Special Service Squadron to communicate with diplomatic and consular officials located in the area of activities of this squadron.

2. The necessity of such a code has been brought to my attention in conversation with various commanding officers of vessels of this squadron; and is very well explained in the enclosure.

/s/ H. F. BRYAN

C O M M A N D E R

65096-51 3 Special Service Squadron
 U.S.S. DOLPHIN, Flagship
206-226 Balboa, Canal Zone.
 31 January 1921.

From: Commander Special Service Squadron
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations)
SUBJECT: Code for communication with Consular
 and Diplomatic Officials.
Enclosures: (1) Commanding Officer U.S.S. TACOMA'S
 letter 56-WRB

1. I recommend that a code other than the Larrabee Code be adopted which will permit vessels of the Special Service Squadron to communicate with diplomatic and consular officials located in the area of activities of this squadron.

2. The necessity of such a code has been brought to my attention in conversation with various commanding officers of vessels of this squadron; and is very well explained in the enclosure.

/s/ H. F. BRYAN

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

Cy-18-D
61917-51

FEB 1 1921

Attention E & L:

Sir:

Enclosures (a) and (b) are forwarded for information. The instance requiring confidential communication referred to was occasioned by the recent cable controversy. In view of the length of time the Red Cipher Code has been in effect, it is considered it cannot be relied upon for any degree of secrecy. It is regretted there is no Naval Code which will permit of so wide a distribution as to Consuls.

As a means of confidential communication between certain officers of the Navy and representatives of the State Department, which is manifestly to the best interests of the United States, and as it is believed ships and stations to whom the code or cipher might be issued have ample means for its protection and safe custody, it is suggested a regular means of confidential communication used by Consuls in their confidential communication with the State Department be considered for this purpose.

If this does not appear feasible, it is suggested that the Secretary of State designate a representative to confer with a representative of the Navy Department with a view of adopting a means of confidential communication to meet the above requirements which will be satisfactory to both Departments.

Sincerely yours

Josephus Daniels

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.

Enclosures (2)

- (a) Letter 1161-20 JLL/JF From Comd. 7th Naval District
- (b) Letter from American Consular Service, Habana, Cuba

File in the
of the
Naval Cipher

018

9023-271

54747-5

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

19

Memorandum for Captain Bryant

I telephoned Mr. Salway
- he said they had
been so rushed they
had been unable to
get the cipher approved
but that he would
take it up again
immediately. They
have had the manuscript
since early April.
(or late March)

Respectfully
M. H. [Signature]

64747
51



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*see signature file
for original*

In reply refer to
Case # 64747/51.

February 17, 1951.

17/51

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy

Sir:

9013-2711

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter of February 14, 1951, in regard to the avail-
ability of fiscal files and records with cipher codes
to naval officers and personnel with consular offices.

In reply to inform you that at the present time this
Department has no records which it could loan for this

purpose. The records referred to are the fiscal files of

the various offices of the Department of State and this
Department, which are maintained in the Department of

State. The records referred to are the fiscal files of
the various offices of the Department of State and this

Department, which are maintained in the Department of

State. The records referred to are the fiscal files of

the various offices of the Department of State and this

of confidential communication to meet the requirements of the two Departments has been noted, and I am glad to designate Mr. David A. Salmon, Acting Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, who also has charge of the Telegraph Office of the State Department, for this purpose. Mr. Salmon has been in communication recently with the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department with a view to some arrangement with that Department such as you now suggest in connection with the Navy Department, and it occurs to me that it would be very desirable to arrange a conference between representatives of the three Departments, and I believe that an International Code for the use of the three Departments could be prepared without a great deal of difficulty. The arrangement would be most beneficial.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



PAGE NO. 022
NOT USED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
CO 119.251/986

February 12, 1921

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 4, 1921, in regard to the desirability of furnishing naval vessels with cipher codes to enable them to communicate with consular offices. I regret to say that at the present time this Department has no code which it could issue for this purpose. Some years ago your Department was furnished with a number of copies of ~~the~~ Red Cipher Code of this Department which copies were distributed I understand among naval vessels, but there are no additional copies now available.

Your suggestion that a representative of this Department be designated to confer with a representative of the Navy Department with a view to adopting a means of confidential communications to meet the requirements of the two Departments has been noted, and I am glad to designate Mr. David A. Salmon, Acting Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, who also is in charge of the Telegraph Office of the State Department, for this purpose. Mr. Salmon has been in communications recently with the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department with a view to some arrangement with that department such as you now suggest in connection with the Navy Department, and it occurs to me that it would be very desirable to arrange a conference between representatives of the three

Departments, as I believe that an Inter-Departmental Code for the use of the three Departments could be prepared without a great deal of difficulty or expense and would be extremely useful.

I have the honor to be , Sir,

Your obedient servant,

/s/ D. Bainbridge Colby

C-O-P-Y

C-O-P-Y

C-O-P-Y

RECEIVED
JUN 29 1921
1-17084
JEE

E-73

PARAPHRASE

From : C in C Asiatic.
Action: Oper.
Via : San Diego Calif.,

2018 (455) Commander in Chief at present has no means of confidential or secret communication with our consular service. Recommend that C in C be furnished with copy of State Department's code. It is requested that I be informed of action taken. (054)

C in C Asiatic.

3 15 pm June 18th, 1921 S

- 19
- 20
- 18
- 03
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- 12
- 13 - Original

Office of the Director
64747 Naval Communications
51 JUN 29 21

f-17084

J-E

--75

PARAPHRASE

From : C in C Asiatic.
Action: Opanv.
Via : San Diego, Calif.,

2018 (435) Commander in Chief at present has no means of confidential or secret communication with our consular service. Recommend that C in C be furnished with copy of State Department-code. It is requested that I be infomred of action taken. (o34.

C in C Asiatic.

3 15 pm June 18th, 1921 S

19
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13 - Original

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

026

Op-18-D
64727-51

JUN 24 1921

Sir:


I desire to bring to your attention the fact that there is no manner in which the Commander of a United States Naval Vessel can transmit a confidential communication to a United States Consul or vice versa.

Repeated requests for a confidential means of communication between Naval Officers and United States Consuls have been received from ships operating off Central America and I have this day received a similar request from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station.

In accordance with the suggestion made in my letter of February 1st 1921 and approved in your letter, CO 119.251/986 of February 12th 1921, it is understood Mr. Salmon of the State Department and Commander Draemel of the Navy Department have arranged a cipher for this class of communication. This cipher has been approved by the Director Naval Communications for the Navy Department.

It is requested this cipher be approved by the State Department as soon as practicable, or if an approval is not considered practicable, that an opinion be expressed as the need for this cipher is considered urgent.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin Denby

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
State Department,
Washington, D.C.

B *SM*

Please return this copy to File
of Director Naval Communications
When Original is Signed.

9023-278

027

Cy-16-G

LMC (0)

C-16-G
16-17

~~SECRET~~

8 July, 1921.

TO: The Secretary of the Navy.
 VIA: Chief of Naval Operations.
 SUBJECT: State - Navy Department Cipher.
 INCLOSURE: (1) Sample of Cipher.

1. The State-Navy Department Cipher was prepared by the State Department for secret and confidential communication between Naval Officials and Consuls.

2. It is recommended that the Secretary of the Navy approve this Cipher for use in the naval service.

W. H. G. Bullard.

03.177-14 MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT
 9 July 1921

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
 To: Secretary of the Navy.

1. Forwarded approved.

*Approved for use by
 Sec. Navy on July-9-1921*

Op-18
70056-51

6-10)

001 20132

Sir:-

The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Mare Island, California has in his possession one copy of "Cipher of the Department of State," register number 324, dated 1876, and requests instructions as to the disposition to be made of the cipher, since it is no longer required.

It is respectfully requested that the Navy Department be advised as to the disposition the State Department desires to make of the above cipher.

Respectfully,

Theodore Roosevelt

The Honorable,
Secretary of State.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Please Return This Copy To Files
of Director Naval Communications
When Original Is Signed.

9023-285

029

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES. EUROPE
U. S. S. PITTSBURGH. FLAGSHIP

Leghorn, Italy.
9 January, 1923.

From: Commander, Naval Forces EUROPE.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Code for communicating with State
Department representatives.

Reference: (a) CMO let. Op-20-G, S.C.177:18:1
of 21 December, 1923.

1. The contents of the above reference are noted.
2. The Commander Naval Forces Europe requested additional means for communicating with State Department representatives for the reason that occasions have arisen where the State Department distribution of C.S.P. 423 did not cover all officials with whom it was most desirable to communicate by means of Secret despatch. One of these officials was the U.S. Ambassador to Spain and the other the U. S. Consul at Havel.
3. It is suggested that the State Department distribution of C.S.P. 423 be increased to include all Embassys, Legations and Consulates.
4. Since this cipher is a mere transposition arrangement and therefore easily broken by a cryptographer and since it has been in use by the Navy for a considerable period of time, it is not considered a safe means of sending an important despatch.

Philip Andrews
/PHILIP ANDREWS

Secret-Confidential Files RECEIVED	
JAN 25 1924	20
NAVY DEPARTMENT	
File No. S.C.177-18:1	

OP-10-3
648

(6 August 1923)

107

AUG 7 1923

SIR:

In reply to your letter, dated 27th July, 1923, of August 1, 1923, I have the honor to inform you that the Navy Department receives the publications of the radio-telegraph section of the International Bureau of the Telegraph Union direct from the Bureau.

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely,
Respectfully,

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT



AUG 7 1923
RECEIVED

THIS ORIGINAL IS TO BE DESTROYED

COPY

COPY

COPY

Op=30=G
S43

(6 August 1923)

August 7, 1923

Sir:

In reply to your letter file 373-151/189 of August 1, 1923, I have the honor to inform you that the Navy Department receives the publication of the radio-telegraph section of the International Bureau of the Telegraph Union direct from the Bureau

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1924.

Code and Signal Corps,

Navy Department.

Attention Lt. Loventhal.

Dear Sir:

In response to your telephonic request for a list of the Consular Offices to which the State-Navy Cipher has been sent since May, 1923, I take pleasure in forwarding herewith a complete list of the offices possessing the cipher above referred to.

Very truly yours,

David G. Johnson

Chief, Bureau of Indexes & Archives.

DIPLOMATIC OFFICES POSSESSING STATE-NAVY CIPHER

- ✓ Belgium
- ✓ Costa Rica
- ✓ Cuba
- ✓ Denmark
- ✓ Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Egypt
- ✓ Finland
- ✓ Greece
- ✓ Guatemala
- ✓ Haiti
- ✓ Honduras
- Liberia ?
- ✓ Mexico
- ~~Mexico~~
- Morocco ?
- ✓ Nicaragua
- ✓ Panama
- ✓ Salvador
- ✓ Uruguay
- ✓ Venezuela

OFFICES TO WHICH STATE - NAVY CIPHER HAS BEEN FURNISHED.

Adelaide ✓	Colombo ✓
Alexandria ✓	Colon ✓
Amoy ✓	Constantinople ✓
Antofagasta ✓	Corinto
Antwerp //	Dairen ✓
Arica ✓	Foochow ✓
Auckland ✓	Genoa //
Barbados X	Guadeloupe X
Barcelona ✓	Guayaquil ✓
Batavia ✓	Halifax X
Beirut ✓	Hankow ✓
Bluefields	Hamilton, Bermuda ✓
Buenos Aires ✓	Havre ✓
Cairo ✓	Hongkong ✓
Calcutta ✓	Iquique ✓
Canton ✓	Kingston, Jamaica ✓
Cape Haitien ✓	Kobe ✓
Caracas X	La Cueva
Catania //	Madras ✓
Changsha	Marseille X
Chefoo ✓	Melbourne ✓
Cherbourg ✓	Messina
Chungking	Montevideo ✓
Cienfuegos ✓	Nagasaki ✓

Nanking ✓

Maples X

New Castle, N. S. W. ✓

Palermo //

Panama City ✓

Para

Peking

Pernambuco X

Port au Prince ✓

Port Said ✓

Saigon ✓

Santo Domingo X

Seoul ✓

Shanghai ✓

Smyrna ✓

Swatow ✓

Sydney, N.S.W. ✓

Tampico

Teneriffe ✓

Tientsin ✓

Trieste X

Trinidad

Valparaiso ✓

Vera Cruz

Vladivostok ✓

Yokohama X

✓
721-160
Op-20-4 ET 2/12/24

Sir:

Reference is made to the letter from the office of the Secretary of State, file SA 110.25/091, of 18 November 1924, enclosing attachment No. 2384 dated 1 October 1924 from the American Legation at Peking, China, in which attached it is suggested that the Navy Department supply each vessel of the Yangtze Patrol Force with a copy of the State-Navy Code with the least possible delay.

Upon the receipt of the previous letter from the Secretary of State, dated 14 January 1924, relating to the subject of the State-Navy Department Cipher, copies of the State-Navy Department Cipher were forwarded to the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, Cavite, P.I., for further issue to the vessels of the Yangtze Patrol Force.

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, reported the issue of the cipher to the Yangtze Patrol Force as of 9 June 1924. Subsequently the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force advised the Navy Department that the State-Navy Cipher had been received by all vessels under his command with the exception of the U.S.S. PIGEON.

The Navy Department has taken steps to expedite the delivery of the State-Navy Cipher to the U.S.S. PIGEON.

Respectfully,

CURTIS D. WELLS, NAVY DEPT.

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

721-160
Op-20-G EF 2/12/24

DEC 4 1924

Sir:

Reference is made to the letter from the office of the Secretary of State, file FA 119.25/591, of 18 November 1924, enclosing despatch No. 2524 dated 1 October 1924 from the American Legation at Peking, China, in which despatch it is suggested that the Navy Department supply each vessel of the Yangtse Patrol Force with a copy of the State-Navy Code with the least possible delay.

Upon the receipt of the previous letter from the Secretary of State, dated 14 January 1924, relating to the subject of the State-Navy Department Cipher, copies of the State-Navy Department Cipher were forwarded to the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, Cavite, P.I., for further issue to the vessels of the Yangtse Patrol Force.

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, reported the issue of the cipher to the Yangtse Patrol Force as of 9 June 1924. Subsequently the Commander of the Yangtse Patrol Force advised the Navy Department that the State-Navy Cipher had been received by all vessels under his command with the exception of the U.S.S PIGEON.

The Navy Department has taken steps to expedite the delivery of the State-Navy Cipher to the U.S.S. PIGEON.

Respectfully,

Curtis D. Wilbur

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

A7-3

Commander
U.S. Special Service Squadron
U.S.S. Rochester, Flagship

Passage from Balboa, Canal Zone,
to Arica, Chile,
29 July 1925

From: Commander Special Service Squadron.
To: Chief of Naval Operations, (Registered
Publications Section).
Subject: C.S.P. #208 - request to retain in use.

1. The Commander Special Service Squadron, was issued registered numbers 198 and 356 of C.S.P. 208. This code has been superseded as a Naval Code.

2. While in command of the Special Service Squadron, Rear Admiral J.H. Dayton, U.S. Navy turned over one of these publications, number 198, after it had been superseded, to the Minister of the United States at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, who now has it in his possession and has used this code in communication with the Commander Special Service Squadron, due to inability to communicate successfully by means of C.S.P. 423.

3. It is recommended that the Department authorize the present Squadron Commander to continue this arrangement.

J.L. Latimer.

039

SC 177-18

Op-30-G
SC 177-18

LS
24-8-25

Aug. 24, 1925.

FROM: Chief of Naval Operations.
TO: Commander Special Service Squadron.
SUBJECT: Confidential Communication with American Minister
at Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
REFERENCE: (a) Comdr. Special Service Squadron file A7-3(625)
of 29 July 1925.

1. In reference (a) Commander Special Service Squadron states that his predecessor had given to the U.S. Minister at Tegucigalpa a copy of C.S.P. 208 for the purpose of conducting necessary secret communications between the Legation and the Special Service Squadron and requested authority to continue this in effect in view of the difficulty of using the State-Navy Cipher.

2. C.S.P. 208 has been superseded by C.S.P. 414.

3. The instructions in the front of C.S.P. 208, as well as C.S.P. 414, contemplate the use of this code by "Agents" and therefore under the circumstances its use by the U.S. Minister at Tegucigalpa is authorized, it being understood that the U.S. Minister has been cautioned as to its secret nature and the care necessary to prevent its compromise and that the Commander Special Service Squadron will be accountable for the copy issued to the Minister. However, as C.S.P. 208 has been superseded, a copy of C.S.P. 414 should be issued to him, and all copies of C.S.P. 208 should be destroyed by burning and report made to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publication Section).

4. In paragraph two of reference (a), it is stated that "due to inability to communicate successfully by means of C.S.P. 423" C.S.P. 208 was used. This is the first report that has been received since its issue in 1921, to the effect that the State-Navy Cipher could not be used successfully. It is requested that this office be informed of those unsatisfactory features of C.S.P. 423, so that proper action can be taken to provide adequate means for confidential communication under conditions for which that cipher was intended to be used. It will be very much appreciated if this report be made with as much detail as possible.

E.W. Eberle.

040

Op-20-G
20 177-18

EF

20/10/28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander Special Service Squadron.
Subject: Confidential Communications with American
State Department Officials.

Reference: (a) Comdr. Special Service Squadron Secret
file 4725(945) of 20 September 1925.

1. Receipt of reference (a) is acknowledged.
2. It is noted in paragraph 5 of reference (a) that it is recommended that C.S.P. 423 be superseded as follows:

"It is believed that C.S.P. 423 should be superseded by a State Navy Code Book in which code words are assigned certain meanings and not by a transposition code. This code book to be similar to C.S.P. 414."

3. The Department does not concur in the recommendation that a special State Navy Code Book be provided. The necessary secret communications exchanged between the two departments are extremely limited in amount and generally local in character. A code book which would satisfactorily fulfill requirements would be very large and expensive, and would from a cryptographic viewpoint be far less secure than ciphers. It would moreover add to the already large number of codes which it is now necessary to provide for the Naval Service. For the limited and essentially local communications required between ships and officials of the State Department, cipher has long been recognized as being far better adapted than code.

4. In order to put to practical test C.S.P. 423, two officers who had never before used it, each enciphered a message, one of 25 and one of 20 words. These two messages were then deciphered by a third officer who had never seen the cipher before. It required one officer 40 minutes and

Op-20-G
SC 177-18

EF

29/10/25

~~SECRET~~

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander Special Service Squadron.
Subject: Confidential Communications with American
State Department Officials.
Reference: (a) Comdr. Special Service Squadron Secret
file 1705(949) of 20 September 1925.

1. Receipt of reference (a) is acknowledged.
2. It is noted in paragraph 5 of reference (a) that it is recommended that C.S.P. 423 be superceded as follows:

It is ~~believed~~ believed that C.S.P. 423 should be superceded by a State Navy Code Book in which code words are assigned certain meanings and not by a transposition code. This code book to be similar to C.S.P. 414."

3. The Department does not concur in the recommendation that a special State Navy Code Book be provided. The necessary secret communications exchanged between the two departments are extremely limited in amount and generally local in character. A code book which would satisfactorily fulfill requirements would be very large and expensive, and would from a cryptographic viewpoint be far less secure than ciphers. It would moreover add to the already large number of codes which it is now necessary to provide for the Naval Service. For the limited and essentially local communications required between ships and officials of the State Department, cipher has long been recognized as being far better adapted than code.

4. In order to put to practical test C.S.P. 423, two officers who had never before used it, each enciphered a message, one of 23 and one of 25 words. These two messages were then deciphered by a third officer who had never seen the cipher before. It required one officer 40 minutes and

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

the other 55 minutes to encipher their messages; the third officer required one hour to decipher the first, and with the experience thus gained deciphered the second in 55 minutes.

5. From the above test it is believed that the cipher can be successfully and expeditiously used after two or three practice messages have been enciphered and deciphered. In view of the limited number of values in Code Y, it is believed that the use of C.S.P. 423, after short practice, would result in greater speed and furnish greater security than that code.

SECRET

the other 35 minutes to encipher their messages; the third officer required one hour to decipher the first, and with the experience thus gained deciphered the second in 29 minutes.

5. From the above test it is believed that the cipher can be successfully and expeditiously used after two or three practice messages have been enciphered and deciphered. In view of the limited number of values in Code F, it is believed that the use of C.S.P. 423, after short practice, would result in greater speed and furnish greater security than that code.

DP

Op-20-9

31 March 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P.A. SAENGE, BUREAU OF INDICES AND ARCHIVES,
STATE DEPARTMENT.

Under date of 29 March 1936 the American Consul in charge at Singapore, Mr. Hugh S. Miller, received from Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, one copy of the State-Navy Cipher bearing register number 125.

From conversation with you this date it appears that the most expeditious manner of accounting for this copy which is technically still the property of the Navy Department and now accounted for to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, would be to formally transfer this copy (register number 125) from the Navy Department to the State Department. In order that the records of both the Navy Department and the State Department may be correctly adjusted, it is requested that you forward this office a receipt of transfer. A suggested form of transfer receipt is enclosed.

Upon the transfer of this one copy of State-Navy Cipher, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, will be relieved of charge, and the records of this office will show that this one copy was returned to the custody of the State Department. It is further suggested that the Consul at Singapore be suitably advised of this transfer and that he remove from that cipher the mark of Naval identification thereon, that is the marking "C.S.F. 422" both on the outside cover and on the first page.

There is enclosed herewith a certified copy of the receipt signed by the American Consul for this subject cipher.

L.W. Constock,
Lieut. Commander, U.S.N.
Officer in Charge, Code and Signal Section.

EF

Op-20-G

31 March 1927.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. D.A. SALMON, BUREAU OF INDEXES AND ARCHIVES,
STATE DEPARTMENT.

Under date of 29 March 1926 the American Consul in charge at Singapore, Mr. Hugh J. Miller, received from Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, one copy of the State-Navy Cipher bearing register number 125.

From conversation with you this date it appears that the most expeditious manner of accounting for this copy which is technically still the property of the Navy Department and now accounted for to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, would be to formally transfer this copy (register number 125) from the Navy Department to the State Department. In order that the records of both the Navy Department and the State Department may be correctly adjusted, it is requested that you forward this office a receipt of transfer. A suggested form of transfer receipt is enclosed.

Upon the transfer of this one copy of State-Navy Cipher, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, will be relieved of charge, and the records of this office will show that this one copy was returned to the custody of the State Department. It is further suggested that the Consul at Singapore be suitably advised of this transfer and that he remove from that cipher the mark of Naval identification thereupon, that is the marking "C.S.P. 423" both on the outside cover and on the first page.

There is enclosed herewith a certified copy of the receipt signed by the American Consul for this subject cipher.

L.W. Comstock
Lieut. Commander, U.S.N.
Officer in Charge, Code and Signal Section

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

AG-1 (1097)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

YANGTZE PATROL 05/3n

U. S. S. LUZON. FLAGSHIP

Hankow, China,
10 October, 1930.

From: The Commander Yangtze Patrol.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.

SUBJECT: Communication Instructions - Recommended
Amendment Regarding Class "B" despatches.

Reference: (a) Communication Instructions, 1929.

1. It is recommended that a new paragraph be added to
Article 728 of reference (a) as follows:

"(r) Under circumstances and in localities where the contents of coded class "B" messages filed by the originator for transmission may be of value to the senior naval officer present in carrying out his mission, he shall request a paraphrase of all such messages before releasing them."

2. In foreign ports where the senior naval office is charged with responsibility for action necessary for the protection of American interests, and to eliminate misunderstanding and to further cooperation in the transaction of the business of the Government, it is essential that he be cognizant of information and advice which may be sent out by other American officials.

/s/ T.T. CRAVEN.

(O-O-P-Y)

Enclosure.

047

A6-1 (1697)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL 05/Bn
U. S. S. LUZON, Flagship

Hangkow, China,
10 October, 1930.

From: The Commander Yangtze Patrol.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet

SUBJECT: Communications Instructions - Recommended
Amendment Regarding Class "B" despatches.

Reference: (a) Communications Instructions, 1929.

1. It is recommended that a new paragraph be added to
Article 728 of reference (a) as follows:

"(r) Under circumstances and in localities
where the contents of coded class "B" mes-
sages filed by the originator for transmis-
sion may be of value to the senior naval
officer present in carrying out his mission,
he shall request a paraphrase of all such
messages before releasing them."

2. In foreign ports where the senior naval office is
charged with responsibility for action necessary for the protec-
tion of American interests, and to eliminate misunderstanding
and to further cooperation in the transaction of the business of
the Government, it is essential that he be cognizant of informa-
tion and advice which may be sent out by other American officials.

/s/ T.T. CRAVEN.

(C-O-P-Y)

Enclosure.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

In reply refer to initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Op-20-G EF

WASHINGTON

21 October 1930.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR.

Replying to your memo of this date, R.P.S. 3, issued April, 1927, showed that a State-Navy Department Cipher was in use and had been issued to all flag officers and Naval Districts. The Commander Light Cruiser Divisions and the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PENSACOLA, knowing the mission on which that vessel was proceeding could have arranged to obtain this cipher for the PENSACOLA. (The Issuing Officer, Fifth Naval District, has a reserve of 17 copies of this cipher.) However, experience has shown that in the absence of definite instructions vessels cannot be relied upon to provide themselves with the necessary means of secret and confidential communication; and, furthermore, it is incumbent upon the office issuing the movement order to provide necessary communication channels.

The only positive assurance that vessels ordered on special missions will be provided with necessary secret and confidential systems is to notify the Registered Publication Section as soon as it is contemplated sending a vessel on such a mission. With just such a situation in mind, the Registered Publication Section, two weeks ago, requested the Ship Movements Division to furnish it with an advance copy of all movement orders that deviated from the routine printed schedule. This request was denied. The first intimation the Code and Signal Section had of orders having been issued to the PENSACOLA was three days after the issue of these orders, when it was found they had violated existing regulations. On receipt of this information the question of providing the PENSACOLA with suitable means of secret communication was taken up immediately, but it was then too late as she had already sailed.

This occurrence is but another excellent example of a point that I have been trying so hard to stress in the past few weeks; namely, of how essential it is for each of the divisions of Operations to keep the other divisions concerned advised of what is going on. The Registered Publication

Section cannot render efficient services to forces afloat unless it is advised of every prospective movement of vessels.

The instructions contained in R.P.S. 3 are not specific enough to hold commanding officers responsible for providing themselves with necessary codes and ciphers to meet all contingencies. For this reason, in preparing the manuscript for R.P.S. 4 and 5, detailed instructions have already been incorporated to take care of all emergency situations that can be foreseen, including the exact situation at issue.

Respectfully,


J.W. McClaran.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL
U. S. S. LUZON, FLAGSHIP

20 APR.
20 G
20
←
pls prepare copy.

Chinglingki, China,
5 March, 1931.

Dear Hooper:

I have not heard from you or from your office for some time but have been pretty well occupied hereabouts and in a variety of ways.

An interesting thing in connection with communications occurred last summer when a gunboat at Ichang intercepted and relayed through, traffic from the Midshipmen's Practice Cruise then in the Eastern Atlantic and unable to raise Washington direct. Ichang is a curious place and that neighborhood has a peculiar quality for reception.

The radio equipment in these gunboats is excellent and communications give me very little trouble.

From time to time in the British papers published in the Orient, I notice articles dealing with visual communications between British merchant vessels and men-of-war. The names of ships that are particularly good and the captains thereof are noted and evidently the British government goes to considerable trouble in fostering this contact and utilizes publicity freely. I think we could do better in this respect. Nothing like putting the name of the skipper in the paper occasionally.

One other thing. Enclosed herewith is a copy of a letter sent through on October 10th. The Commander in Chief did not see fit to forward it as he is not anxious to stir up issues. I can understand his point of view perfectly but do not believe that good cooperation is promoted when one Bureau or one office or one department of the government is pitted against another. Such becomes the case in a situation such as we have gone through in past months in this neighborhood.

A Consul sends a coded despatch which is transmitted and the Naval officer knows nothing whatsoever of its contents. This particular letter was prompted because the Consul General at Hankow saw fit to make some recommendations with regard to the navy which were unnecessary and undesirable and reflected somewhat unfavorably on the navy, all without knowledge of the S.O.P. In

They can send such messages on cable 051
+ navy would not know of them

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL
U. S. S. LUZON, Flagship

Chinglingki, China,
5 March, 1931.

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(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL
U. S. S. LUZON, FLAGSHIP

ordinary and every day affairs it makes no difference of course to the navy what we send, but when there is an emergency and cooperation of all hands and understanding between officials of the State and Navy Department is of paramount importance, a common knowledge between representatives of the State and Navy Departments on the spot is vital.

^{of which}
The British Rear Admiral tells me that he has a copy of his consular code and no despatches go from one of his ships ~~that~~ the contents are not known by the captain. You will note in Communication Instructions, Article 539 (a), that we contemplate the same thing but the issue which I now bring to your attention has never been taken up.

Sometime when the opportunity is afforded and it is politic to do so, I advise you to raise this question, for in emergency the settlement of this issue might become a detail of vital importance.

With kindest regards,

delicate
Faithfully yours,

Craven

*Can we not obtain
Copies of consular codes for operation helms
the basis of furthering cooperation
the two services. Do not think we should
use this letter as a basis for obtaining them
206 pls see Queiroz before taking them
up with State Dept.*

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL
U. S. S. LUZON, Flagship

ordinary and every day affairs it makes no difference of course to the navy what we send, but when there is an emergency and cooperation of all hands and understanding between officials of the State and Navy Department is of paramount importance, a common knowledge between representatives of the State and Navy Departments on the spot is vital.

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With kindest regards,

Faithfully yours,

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

206
NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

To Capt Hoop

Memorandum for Ops 13

This is a matter of policy
but I think it will
be dangerous to bring the
matter up + recommend
against it strongly

Hoop

I agree with
memorandum attached
+ your remarks
(WR Johnson)

206

file
No reply, as adm
Craven will soon
be on way
home
S.H.

In reply refer to initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-20-G EF

8 April 1931.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR.

I don't know what your attitude is regarding this question, and consequently am at a loss to prepare the reply. The question is fraught with more serious consequences than is apparent from the surface, and hasty action in which you might commit yourself or the Navy is the one thing to be avoided. I understand perfectly why the Commander in Chief, Asiatic, declined to forward Admiral Craven's letter, and, personally, I think that he used good judgment in so doing.

Apparently the relationship existing between the British Foreign Office and Admiralty is quite different from that existing between our State and Navy Departments. Likewise, it is obvious to anyone who has been in a position to observe, that there is a marked difference in the relationship between British Consuls and Naval Commanders and the relationship between American Consuls and Naval Commanders. The mere fact that the British Naval Commander is supplied with the Consular codes is in itself no reason for us to adopt a similar practice. Cooperation and mutual understanding between officials of the State Department and Naval Commanders should come from personal contact and not by virtue of the Naval Commander decoding the private messages of the State Department official. To issue Consular codes to our Naval Commanders is tantamount to placing in the hands of the latter the power of censorship over the Consuls. Furthermore, if the Naval Commander is given the codes by which the Consul transmits secret information, the Consul can with equal justification demand the Naval codes used by the Commander afloat for transmitting his secret information. This would be an untenable situation, and I am sure that the Navy Department would never in the world consent to it.


If this practice of exchanging codes were instituted, there is no telling to what extent it might not go. Certainly, it would be extended to include Naval Attaches, and the Naval Attaches would thereby be made subservient to the State Department representative with whom they were serving. This

would defeat one of the two main purposes for which Naval Attaches are appointed. History has shown that the perspective of Naval and Military Attaches is entirely different from that of foreign service officials, and that the former have always sensed strained diplomatic relations or impending war when the latter have been blind to these indications.

As stated before, the exchange of codes between the Navy and State Departments will result in the one service exercising power of censorship over the other, and it is inevitable that in the United States Government this power of censorship will ultimately pass to the State Department. I am certain that when all the circumstances are considered, the Navy Department will never consent to sticking its head in the noose suggested by Admiral Craven, and in view of the fact that his Commander in Chief would take no action on his recommendation, I beg to suggest that you do not commit yourself in any way and become involved in this matter.

Please send for me when you have finished this memorandum, in order that I may get your view in the matter and be better able to prepare the reply.

Respectfully,


J.W. McClaran.

057

Gp-20-G
(SC)AG-3(6)

16 February 1932

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Receipt of the Department of State's confidential letter of February 11, relating to the dispatch received from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, pertaining to the Naval Attache's confidential code, is acknowledged with thanks.

Sincerely yours,

C.F. Adams

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State.

Op-20-0

28 May 1934.

My dear Chapin:

With further reference to our telephone conversation of this morning, I am enclosing a clipping from the Washington Times of Friday, May 25, which I promised to send you.

I will appreciate it if you would return this clipping to me after you are finished with it.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

S.C. Hooper,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Vinton Chapin,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Op-20-G

28 May 1934.

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S.C. Hooper
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Communications

Mr. Vinton Chapin,
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

060

JAP CODE MACHINE IS EASY, CRYPTOGRAPHERS SAYS

(Copyright, 1934, By International News Service)

Secret diplomatic or military messages sent by Japan's newly perfected telegraphic code machine could be "busted" within a few hours, if necessary, by this government's expert cryptographers.

This was the belief expressed to International News Service today by a highly authoritative source, who disclosed the Government already has experimented with these telegraphic code machines and found them unreliable.

Word that Japan intended to use these machines for code messages was received with interest.

Various nations, it was explained, have been experimenting with them since the war, but none of them is known to be using them.

This Government experimented with one of the latest types some time ago. Two of the machines were set up in the State Department and a set of 12 ordinary code messages sent over them.

The coded messages then were turned over to one of the department's expert cryptographers, who had made a study of these telegraphic machines, but had no knowledge of the new type. Within one hour and 10 minutes, he had "busted" or deciphered the messages.

Other incidents of comparatively rapid deciphering of these messages are known to State Department cryptographers, who are convinced the ordinary manual code is the safest.

CLIPPING FROM WASHINGTON TIMES OF FRIDAY, 25 MAY 1934.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1934.

Dear Captain Hooper:

Thank you very much for letting me have the clipping from THE WASHINGTON TIMES. I have brought its contents to the attention of the appropriate officers of the Department and I can assure you that you may count on their full cooperation regarding such matters in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur C. Hooper

Captain S. C. Hooper,
Director of Naval Communications,
Navy Department.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1934.

Telegrams - Symbol "Stcor" to be used instead of "Stacostrep", and cost of interested party messages to be stated in United States currency. Indication "Rush" to be used instead of "Urgent", "Priority" and "Double Priority".

To

American Diplomatic and Consular Officers.

Sirs:

With reference to the Department's circular instructions of June 6, 1914 and October 20, 1915, and to Paragraph 461, Section 4 of Consular Regulations, wherein it is provided that whenever telegrams are sent for an interested party and a reply thereto is requested, that the last word of such a message before the signature shall be an arbitrary word "Stacostrep", you are now advised that due to the decisions reached at the International Telegraphic Conference at Madrid in 1932, governing the word count on code messages and limiting code words to five letters, the word "Stacostrep" is now counted as two words.

To serve the same purpose and effect a substantial saving in telegraph tolls, the arbitrary five letter word "STCOR" will be used hereafter in requesting the cost of replies to interested party messages, instead of "Stacostrep".

With a view to avoiding accounting and other difficulties the cost stated at the conclusion of a message in reply to a "STCOR" message must be stated in United States currency and in the exact amount as it will appear in the accounts of diplomatic and consular officers.

To expedite messages and indicate that they are other than routine, the word "Urgent" has been used for many years. Under the new regulations governing word count "Urgent" is counted as two words. This also applies to "Priority" and "Double Priority", the former being counted as two words, the latter as four. In view of this added cost for the transmission of these indications the word "Rush" should be used in future

instead of "Urgent", "Priority" and "Double Priority".

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

WILBUR J. CARR

Index under:

Telegrams;
Regarding change of "Stacostrep" to "Stcor"
and use of "Rush" instead of "Urgent",
"Priority" and "Double Priority".

Embassy or Legation File No. 124.66

Consulate File No. 125.66

Cross Reference File No. 872

A7-3(CF331)

21/hjs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Shanghai, China,
21 June, 1935.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
From: Commander in Chief, ASIATIC FLEET.
To : Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publication Section).

Subject: C.S.P. 423.

Reference: (a) CinCAF letter A6-1 (CF1161) of 29 September, 1934.

1. In reference (a), the Commander in Chief called attention to a situation which existed in the office of the American Minister, Peiping, relative to the non-use and obsolescence of CSP 423. Since that date, it has been learned that this publication is not on hand at the present date in the office of the Consul General, Shanghai. The Consul General, Nanking, did have a copy of CSP 423, but there was no record of ever having used it. The Commander in Chief is of the opinion that the State Department does not employ any system of accountability for this publication.

2. In view of the above, and the consequent confusion which would result in naval vessels from the use of a system with an incorrect distribution list, it is recommended that CSP 423 be placed out of effect. The Commander in Chief has not found a naval vessel which has employed this system, but hesitates to make a specific recommendation on the replacement or non-replacement of this system on the Asiatic Station because of a special situation which may or may not exist in other parts of the world.

3. The Commander in Chief has noticed that the standards of security, the precautions taken for safeguarding, accountability and transportation of secure documents as employed in the State Department on the Asiatic Station appear to be considerably more lax than the equivalent standards employed by the naval service. In the event that CSP 423 is superseded by a similar publication, the difference in security standards noted above are worthy of consideration.

F. L. UPHAM.

035

OP-20-GC
(EC)ES/GN/A6-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9 Sept. 1935.

Sir:

In 1921 the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy placed in effect a CONFIDENTIAL cipher, known as "The State-Navy Department Cipher", for use between all Consuls and all Flag and Commanding Officers of vessels in the U.S. Naval Service.

Since that time numerous changes have been necessary, and instances have arisen which make it appear at least possible that the publication has been compromised. These conditions make it desirable to place this publication out of effect.

The records of the Navy Department indicate that this cipher has been used but very little during the fourteen years of its effectiveness, and doubt has arisen as to the necessity or desirability of replacing this cipher with a new one for similar purposes.

It is therefore requested that the Secretary of the Navy be advised as to the views of the Secretary of State in this matter. If it appears desirable to replace the present cipher with a new one, the Secretary of the Navy will proceed with production and will deliver to the Secretary of State sufficient copies for distribution as he sees fit.

Respectfully,

W.H. Standley
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Acting Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.

Copy to: RPS

036

To reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

OP-20-G

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 September 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Subject: Improvement in State Department Cryptic Systems.

1. Up until a few years ago, the codes used by the State Department and its foreign representatives for conveying information of a secret or confidential nature had a very low order of security, and in consequence our state messages were known to certain foreign governments. To what extent this condition has been improved in the past few years I do not know, but I doubt that any extensive improvement has been effected because there is no one attached to the State Department who is versed in cryptic knowledge. A Mr. Salmon is at the head of the section in charge of the building of their codes and ciphers. He has had no special training for this work but is a highly paid employee based on the fact that he does supervise the design and construction of codes. From what I know of him through hearsay and observation of his actions, I should say that he is somewhat antagonistic toward the Navy, due most likely to a fear that the Navy might disclose to State Department officials his lack of knowledge as well as the real weakness in State Department cryptic systems. An effort to do the latter has been made from time to time over a long period of years; in fact as far back as the time Admiral McLean was Director of Naval Communications he challenged the State Department to permit the Navy to attempt breaking down their codes, but the challenge was not accepted. Since then there have been sporadic attempts to induce the State Department to improve its secret means of communication, but these have met with no success, with the exception that at the time Yardley published his book, *The Black Chamber*, the State Department became embarrassed and the International Tel. & Tel. succeeded in at least interesting it in a code machine built by that company and designed by Colonel Hitt. The State Department was apparently about to adopt this machine which had no security whatsoever, but before doing so submitted it to the Army for test and recommendation (the Navy was never made cognizant, officially or otherwise, of any of this undertaking). The Army decrypted the messages set up by the machine in such a shockingly short time that the State Department dropped all negotiations. It is possible that additional steps toward improvement have been made since that time, but if they have no one in this office has knowledge to that effect.

2. Although, strictly speaking, it is not within the province of the Navy Department to influence the State Department in such matters, yet I can't help feeling that our national affairs are frequently placed in an embarrassing position by virtue of supposedly secret matters of state being known to foreign governments through the weakness of State Department codes. It is conceivable that this condition might even lead to serious consequences, and therefore I should like to see another attempt made to improve the State Department's means of secret communication. To this end the following concrete recommendation is made. That the State Department procure from Mr. Hebern a sufficient number of his latest model electro-mechanical ciphering machines to equip all embassies and legations. It would be feasible and very practicable to provide each machine with two complete sets of wheels. One set of the wheels could be wired to provide an independent secret means of communication for each embassy or legation with the State Department, and the other set to provide a universal means of communication between any and all embassies and legations. Although the machine recommended does not quite attain the high standard of security demanded by the Navy, it is nevertheless of such a high degree of security (real not relative) that it should amply meet the State Department's requirements. Furthermore, if this machine were purchased by the State Department it, the State Department, could take necessary steps to prevent Mr. Hebern from ever disposing of other machines to foreign governments.

3. I have no definite idea as to the best means of bringing this matter to the attention of responsible persons in the Department of State, but due to the great amount of derogatory criticism to which that Department is now being subjected publicly, it might be a propitious time for either the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy to bring it to the attention of the Secretary of State.

Respectfully,

J. W. McClaran
J. W. McClaran.

008

JWMcC/EF

OP-20-3

17 September 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR.

Although I hope it will not be necessary for you to take any action regarding improving State Department systems for communication after Wood returns from his trip, nevertheless I am forwarding herewith the questionnaire that I agreed to prepare.

I am also sending up "The Contribution of The Cryptographic Bureaus in The World War". If you have not already read this book pretty carefully and thoroughly it would really pay you to do so, not only because every question that you might wish to ask and every answer that you might have to make are contained therein, but also it will put you in the position of knowing more about the subject than any officer or individual with whom you may discuss the matter outside of the few experts in this section. This publication can be taken home and read at your leisure.

Respectfully,

J. W. McClaran.

OP-20-G

17 September 1935.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Who prepared codes and ciphers in effect?
2. What training have they had to fit them for such work?
3. Are they cryptanalysts as well as cryptographers?
4. Where were systems printed?
5. How were they guarded during printing?
6. What steps were taken to insure delivery of every page and destruction of all extra pages run off?
7. What steps were taken to insure integrity of all persons handling the printing and binding?
8. How were publications distributed? By whom? By what means? Under what instructions?
9. What are the requirements for storage? Are they carried out? When are they required to be in their assigned storage?
10. What are the instructions as to who is to have access to storage? Who actually has access? Is a time-lock safe used? Who is permitted to learn the combination? Where is it kept? By whom?
11. What are the instructions as to who can have custody of the documents? As to who can actually handle them? As to who can actually use them? Who actually does use them and handle them?
12. What training have the users had both in using codes and in general communication security?
13. Have the codes universal or sectional distribution?
14. Are different systems used for varying degrees of secrecy?
15. How long have the current systems been effective?
16. How many messages have been sent in them?

17. What measures are taken to prevent compromise when quoting conversations of and with foreign officials, press reports, etc.?
18. Is stereotypic phraseology employed?
19. Are serial numbers employed and is it customary to refer to these?
20. How many copies of translations are made? What provision is made to insure safe custody of each copy? How many paraphrased copies?
21. Who types secret and confidential dispatches?
22. What provision is made to destroy carbons and stencils containing secret and confidential matter?
23. What provision is made to dispose of obsolete secret and confidential matter? Are such papers burned? By whom? What record of their destruction is kept?
24. Are the personnel aware that burned papers can be restored by chemical means unless they are broken up into small pieces?
25. Is there any requirement that a report be made when documents are suspected of having passed into unauthorized hands? When documents have been left unguarded?
- x 26. Has the State Department any definite plans for handling communications in war or during strained relations?
- x 27. Does the State Department realize that lack of security in its systems may jeopardize naval systems?

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1935

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of a letter of the 9th instant from the Acting Secretary of the Navy concerning "The State-Navy Department Cipher" in which the statement is made that it is possible that the cipher referred to has been compromised and that it would, therefore, seem desirable to discontinue its use. Reference is also made to the fact that during its fourteen years of existence little use has been made of it, thereby raising the question as to the necessity and desirability of superseding it by a new cipher.

The Department of State has also made little use of this cipher and shares the doubt expressed by Admiral Standley that there is a need at the present time for such a cipher and is of the opinion that it can be withdrawn without detriment.

Will you please advise this Department the date on which you anticipate withdrawing the copies of this cipher distributed by your Department so that the Department of State at the same time may recall the copies which it distributed to its offices abroad.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

The Honorable
Claude A. Swanson,
Secretary of the Navy.

DGC. NO. 4854


Dept. File: (SC)EE/CN/AS-3

072

LOW COPY TO: 20-G (Miss Fear) ✓
20-GC (Wood)

DOC. NO. 4854

OP-20-GC CCW/EF 11/3/35
(SC) EG/CH/A6-8



NOV 11 1935

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 20 September 1935, relative to the withdrawal from use of "The State-Navy Department Cipher."

In accordance with the opinions expressed in the above-mentioned letter and the opinions of the Secretary of the Navy on the same subject, it has been decided to make this cipher ineffective within the Navy on 21 March 1936 and to order all copies destroyed as soon as possible after 30 April 1936.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER L. GREENE

WMB

Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

HAS BEEN SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
PR 811.22746E/1.

August 11, 1937

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and in view of a note dated August 6, 1937, from the British Ambassador at Washington, inquires whether it will meet with the approval of the War Department for Mr. W.C. Gee, an Assistant Engineer in the Wireless Branch of the Posts and Telegraphs Department in Malaya, to spend four months during the first half of the next year at the Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Radio Corporation of New York.

Mr. Gee has been awarded a grant from funds placed at his disposal by the Trustees of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, to enable him to undertake certain studies in short-wave telephony transmission and ultra short-wave transmission in various countries.

A similar communication has been addressed to the Secretary of War.

Dept. file: A2-14(9)/EF13(370811)B-4

Op-20-G

20 August 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR 20-A

1. The Director of Naval Communications can raise no specific objections to Mr. Gee's extended visit to the Bell Laboratories. However, it is considered an undesirable practice for this country to disclose its technical secrets to foreigners while getting nothing in return.

L.F. Safford,
Op-20-G.

In Reply Refer

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

To No. 13-1 (1042)

U. S. S. AUGUSTA (Flagship)

20/22

Manila, P. I.,
8 February 1938

From: Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Communications during Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Reference: (a) Comyangpat rest. ltr. serial 1290 of 11 Dec., 1937.

1. The portion of reference (a) dealing with drafting, assignment of precedence and security of radio traffic in the Yangtze Valley during the subject hostilities is quoted:-

" Embassy traffic was as a rule poorly drafted and often assigned higher precedence than its subject seemed to warrant. One occasion arose where part of Navy restricted message was quoted verbatim causing concern for the security of their own codes and our ciphers. All copies of messages sent to Embassy were then paraphrased. Conferences were held at the Embassy and their communication staff was instructed in the use of Navy precedence. It was discovered that the use of 'rush priority' and 'triple priority' by the Embassy was intended to apply to handling of the despatch at destination and not to transmission. After several conferences and the explaining of the Navy's meaning of 'priority', 'routine', 'night', etc., no further difficulty arose and the fullest cooperation by both parties reduced the work upon the operators and relaying stations by distributing the load more evenly.

" The tendency towards verbosity in the majority of the Consular, Embassy and State Department traffic was observed. The staff at Hankow cooperated along this line. Closer cooperation between Navy and State Department and between the officials of each on duty in foreign countries could be improved upon. Often despatches were sent by diplomatic officials only to their own members by Navy radio when it should have been apparent that such news was of immediate importance to the Senior Naval Officer in that locality. The British have such a system whereby their diplomatic and Naval activities are linked close together.

" Navy messages did not prove difficult as to drafting, assignment of precedence, etc., except in one instance. This occurred when an assistant Naval attaché reported to Embassy Hankow. He was not attached to any ship. Upon arrival LUSHAN

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U. S. S. AUGUSTA (Flagship)

20/hl

In Reply Refer
To No.
A6-1 (1042)

Manila, P. I.,
5 February 1938

From: Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Communications during Sino-Japanese hostilities

Reference: (a) Comyangpat rest. ltr serial 1990 of 11 Dec., 1937

1. The portion of reference (a) dealing with drafting, assignment and precedence and security of radio traffic in the Yangtze Valley during the subject hostilities is quoted:-

" Embassy traffic was as a rule poorly drafted and often assigned higher precedence than its subject seemed to warrant. One occasion arose where part of Navy restricted message was quoted verbatim causing concern for the security of their own codes and our ciphers. All copies of messages sent to Embassy were then paraphrased. Conferences were held at the Embassy and their communication staff was instructed in the use of Navy precedence. It was discovered that the use of 'rush priority' and 'triple priority' by the Embassy was intended to apply to handling of the despatch at destination and not to transmission. After several conferences and the explaining of the Navy's meaning of 'priority', 'routine', 'night', etc., no further difficulty arose and the fullest cooperation by both parties reduced the work upon the operators and relaying stations by distributing the load more evenly.

" The tendency towards verbosity in the majority of the Consular, Embassy and State Department traffic was observed. The staff at Nanking cooperated along this line. Closer cooperation between Navy and State Department and between the officials of each on duty in foreign countries could be improved upon. Often despatches were sent by diplomatic officials only to their own members by Navy radio when it should have been apparent that such news was of immediate importance to the Senior Naval Officer in that locality. The British have such a system whereby their diplomatic and Naval activities are linked close together.

" Navy messages did not prove difficult as to drafting, assignment of precedence, etc., except in one instance. This occurred when an assistant Naval attache reported to Embassy Nanking. He was not attached to any ship. Upon arrival LUZON

In Reply Refer

To No.

13-1 (1042)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

U. S. S. AUGUSTA (Flagship)

Subject: Communications during Sino-Japanese hostilities.

In Hanking in November difficulties were ironed out. These had been caused by differences in opinion between Commanding Officer Station Ship and attache as to responsibilities of each in handling encrypted traffic. When officers are sent into the field to make certain reports it seems advisable to arrange beforehand some method by which he can encrypt his own messages. "

R. F. MCKENWELL,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Comysagpat.

MAR 19 1938

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U. S. S. AUGUSTA (Flagship)

In Reply Refer
To No.
A6-1 (1042)

Subject: Communications during Sino-Japanese hostilities.

in Nanking in November difficulties were ironed out. These had been caused by differences in opinion between Commanding Officer Station Ship and attache as to responsibilities of each in handling encrypted traffic. When officers are sent into the field to make certain reports it seems advisable to arrange beforehand some method by which he can encrypt his own messages. "

R. F. McCONNELL,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Comyangpat.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-20-GS/LMD

14 April, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: State-War-Navy Cooperation in Communications.

REFERENCE: (a) CinC, Asiatic Fleet ltr. A6-1(1042) of
5 February, 1938, to Opnav.

1. For the past several years the security units of the Army and the Navy communication divisions have worked in close cooperation. The Army has adopted much of the Navy's nomenclature and standards. The State Department, however, has continued independently, and its nomenclature, standards of security, etc., are somewhat different from the Army or the Navy.

2. Correspondence in our files traces the history of the State-Navy Department cipher, which was prepared and put into effect soon after the World War and withdrawn from use and destroyed about two years ago. The reason given for withdrawal of this cipher was that it was used very little, that it was possibly compromised, and that the cipher was very slow and difficult to use. Following its destruction the Spanish and Asiatic situations developed and it became necessary for the Navy Department to handle numerous communications for the State Department, and the State Department officials in Spain and China found it necessary to communicate direct with the Navy in those locations. It has been evident in the Navy Department that communication between the State Department and the Navy Department is not entirely satisfactory due to differences in security standards and instructions. For instance, the State Department has no classification "Restricted" or "Secret" and instead uses "Confidential" and "Strictly confidential." It is impossible for the Navy Department to determine what Navy classification to give information submitted to it by the State Department for transmission.

3. From time to time various officers in our security section have indicated a feeling that the State Department codes and ciphers were not secure and that if it could be done the matter should be brought to the attention of the State Department.

No official action has been taken by the Navy Department.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations (reference (a)), has pointed to some of the difficulties in communications between State Department officials in the Orient and the Navy there. This letter is a justification for making an attempt to cooperate with the State Department along security lines.

5. Mr. Friedman of the War Department Communication Security Group is a personal friend of Mr. Salmon, Chief of the State Department Communication Division. Through him Mr. Friedman learned that Mr. Sumner Welles has recently suggested in a memorandum to the President that the State, War and Navy Departments confer on a number of matters, one of which is communications.

6. The Navy Department should receive a letter soon from the State Department paving the way for cooperation in communication matters. When this letter is received a member of the Communication Security Group should be detailed to confer with the State and War Department representatives.

P. V. Mercer
P. V. Mercer.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-20

17 May 1928.

FROM: Rear Admiral C.E. Courtney, U.S. Navy.
TO: Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Minutes of Subcommittee on State, War, and Navy
Department Communications.

1. The Subcommittee on State, War, and Navy Department Communications met at 10:00 a.m. this date in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications.

Present:

Rear Admiral C.E. Courtney, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Senior Member.

Mr. D.A. Salmon, State Department,
Major E.C. Reeder, U.S.A., War Department,
Members.

Mr. W.F. Friedman, War Department,
Commander L.F. Snifford, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Lieutenant P.V. Mercer, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Technical Advisors.

2. Admiral Courtney opened the meeting and stated that a Subcommittee on Communications, consisting of Admiral Courtney, Mr. Salmon, and Major Reeder, had been appointed to investigate improving communications between the State, War, and Navy Departments. The Subcommittee was to study and report on classification of messages and a new interdepartmental code or cipher system.

3. Lieutenant Mercer stated that the Naval Communication Service had been handling a considerable amount of State Department messages to and from the Far East since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese difficulties and that he had observed certain discrepancies and chances for improvement. The Navy and State Departments apparently gave different meanings to the same words used in connection with security classification of codes and ciphers and the precedence to be given messages. Everything was

~~SECRET~~

working smoothly now because the people concerned understood the terms used by the other service; but there had been trouble in the past and there would be similar trouble in the future if the Navy had to handle State Department messages in some other quarter of the world. On many occasions messages identical in substance and similar in wording would be sent from the American Minister to the State Department in a State Department code and from the Commander in Chief to the Navy Department in a Navy system. This was very bad cryptographically, as it subjected both systems to cryptanalytic attack. A common system held by State and Navy Department officials, and possibly the Army, plus a wider use of information addresses, would reduce the amount of radio traffic and afford considerable protection to the system used.

4. Commander Safford stated that the State, War, and Navy Departments had a common responsibility in national defense and preservation of official secrets. It was therefore very desirable that the three Departments use the same phraseology and, if practicable, have common standards of security. At the present time there was in existence an Army-Navy cipher but it was restricted to joint operations, particularly in coastal defense, and should not be used for administrative matters or intelligence. There had been a State-Navy cipher for many years but it was little used because it was of very complex type and difficult to operate, and was generally unsatisfactory. It had been withdrawn from service about three years ago. There was need of a State-Navy cipher, and it would be wise to include the Army, as there would be many occasions when direct communications between the State Department officials and Army officers, or military missions, might be necessary.

5. Mr. Friedman stated that the Army, Navy and Coast Guard now had at least one cryptographic system common to all three services, and that the State Department was purchasing some of this apparatus with the War Department on a joint order. Therefore it should be a very simple matter to supply a common cipher for the three Departments. In determining a cipher of this nature it was necessary to consider possible future conditions rather than the immediate present, as distribution took such a long time that we could not wait for the situation to arise. The Army should be included in this system, as there is an instance of a military intelligence officer coming aboard a Navy ship abroad to send a message to the War Department in a Navy cipher.

~~SECRET~~

6. Mr. Salmon stated that although common standards of security were doubtless desired in principle and might be practicable between the Army and Navy, the State Department's problems were so different that they could not possibly agree to a common standard. Messages in which other departments were interested were another matter and he thought the State Department could agree to anything proposed by the Army and Navy. We should be able to iron out our difficulties in regard to secrecy classification and precedence of messages. The Treasury Department also to be included in the distribution of this new cipher system as consuls frequently have to communicate with Coast Guard cutters in regard to narcotic and liquor smuggling, and there were other occasions when Coast Guard vessels would find this cipher very useful.

7. Commander Safford stated the Navy Department already had the facilities for the production of alphabets and key lists for the proposed system and that the Navy Department would be willing to print the first two editions; subsequent editions could be left to the future. The Navy Department would prepare the manuscripts and submit them directly to the other two Departments for inspection and approval.

8. A general discussion then followed and the following decisions were reached:

(1) Each Department furnish its instructions relative to security classification and precedence of messages to the other two Departments. Each Department would make an independent study and submit a proposal for uniform phraseology.

(2) To adopt a common cipher for interdepartmental communications between the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments, distribution going down to destroyers and gunboats of the Navy and Coast Guard cutters. The question of the exact distribution of this system and whether to make a second cipher of limited distribution to be deferred for the time being. The Navy to undertake preparation and printing of the alphabets and key lists for the new system and to start without delay in order to meet the completion of the physical apparatus which had been ordered for the State Department.

9. The Subcommittee then adjourned at 12:15 to reconvene at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, May 23, 1938, in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications.

C.E. Courtney.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

~~SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-201

23 May 1938.

From: Rear Admiral C.E. Courtney, U.S. Navy.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Minutes of Subcommittee on State, War, and Navy
Department Communications.

1. The Subcommittee on State, War, and Navy Department Communications met at 10:00 a.m. this date in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications.

Present:

Rear Admiral C.E. Courtney, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Senior Member.

Mr. D.A. Salmon, State Department,
Major W.O. Reeder, U.S.A., War Department,
Members.

Mr. F.F. Friedman, War Department,
Commander L.F. Safford, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Lieutenant P.V. Mercer, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Technical Advisors.

2. Commander Safford presented a paper containing the Navy's study of secrecy classification and precedence and suggested that it be used as the basis of discussion. This was agreed to and a general discussion followed.

3. It was pointed out that the classification "Secret" and "Confidential" were substantially identical for the Army and Navy and had the same scope for the State Department, except the element of national security was not involved. The State Department classification of "Routine" corresponded exactly to the Army and Navy classification "Restricted" and there was no purpose in changing a word which was well established by usage within the State Department.

4. In the matter of precedence of messages similar uniformity existed. Army, Navy, State Department all used "Routine" and "Nite". The State Department's "Rush" corresponded exactly to the "Priority" of the Army and Navy. The term "Rush" had been adopted for reasons of economy and would cause no confusion on Navy circuits provided its meaning was known to our operators.

5. Mr. Salmon stated that he would like a copy of the minutes of the last meeting to present to Mr. Welles. Major Reeder said that he would like a copy for the Chief of Staff. It was explained that the instructions had been to prepare only one copy of the minutes of the meeting and submit it to the Chief of Naval Operations. Major Reeder suggested that the Subcommittee meet again tomorrow morning to review and approve the minutes of last week's meeting and this week's meeting, and receive their personal copies if consent could be obtained meanwhile.

6. The following decisions were reached:-

(1) Retain the present nomenclature for secrecy classification and for precedence of messages as follows:

SECRECY CLASSIFICATION

<u>State</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>
Secret	Secret	Secret
Confidential	Confidential	Confidential
Routine	Restricted	Restricted
Plain Language	Plain Language	Plain Language

Note: "Routine" considered identical with "Restricted".

PRECEDENCE

<u>State</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>Navy</u>
Rush	Priority	Priority
Nite	Nite	Nite

In the absence of the above two designations messages will take precedence after "Rush" and "Priority".

Note: "Rush" considered identical with "Priority".

(2) The Navy Department to commence the preparation of the Interdepartmental Cipher, submitting it to the State and War Departments for approval before printing.

7. The Subcommittee then adjourned at 11:30 to reconvene at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, May 24, 1938, in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications.

C.E. Courtney.

In reply refer to initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-20

24 May 1938.

From: Rear Admiral C.E. Courtney, U.S. Navy.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Minutes of Subcommittee on State, War, and Navy
Department Communications.

1. The Subcommittee on State, War, and Navy Department
Communications met at 10:30 a.m. this date in the Office of the
Director of Naval Communications.

Present:

Rear Admiral C.E. Courtney, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Senior Member.

Mr. D.A. Salmon, State Department,
Major W.O. Reeder, U.S.A., War Department,
Members.

Commander L.F. Safford, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Lieutenant P.V. Mercer, U.S.N., Navy Department,
Technical Advisors.

2. Each member was furnished a copy of the minutes of
the meetings for 17 May and 23 May 1938, and after general dis-
cussion these minutes were approved.

3. The Subcommittee then adjourned at 11:15, having
completed the duties for which it was appointed.

C.E. Courtney.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-65 BFR/ef 2/1/39
Serial 2722
(SC)A7-3(1)

4 February 1939

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

SUBJECT: State-Navy Cipher for Asiatic Waters.

1. Copies of Strip Cipher No. 66 and Strip Alphabet No. 66 (Navy short title CSP 773 and CSP 774) are being distributed to officials of the State Department in China, Japan, and Hongkong in order that these publications may be used for confidential communications between them and naval commanders in Asiatic Waters. This cipher was chosen because it is now held by the Asiatic Fleet and the only distribution required being to the State Department officials concerned. Since this system has been used for Navy traffic for some time, it will be superseded by a new system each such can be distributed.

2. The copies of CSP 773 being distributed for the State Department officials are designed to fit their strip device, known as Cipher Device M-138A. This device has recently been adopted by the State Department, but none of their officials in China, Japan, or Hongkong are familiar with its use. The State Department has requested the Navy to assist in the distribution of their devices and copies of CSP 773 and CSP 774 in order that the distribution may be expedited and a demonstration of its operation may be made by the naval officer effecting delivery. This is considered feasible as the operation of Cipher Device M-138A is identical with that of CSP 622, which is held by all Naval activities in Asiatic Waters.

3. Eighteen self-addressed packages are being forwarded via the RANASO to the Issuing Officer, Sixteenth Naval District, to be distributed as follows:

- | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Ambassador, Tokyo | Consul, Chungking | Consul, Hankow |
| Consul, Tokyo | Consul, Nanking | Consul, Shanghai |
| Consul, Kobe | Consul, Amoy | Consul, Swatow |
| Consul, Nagasaki | Consul, Canton | Consul, Tientsin |
| Consul, Yokohama | Consul, Chanco | Consul, Tsingtao |
| Consul, Peiping | Consul, Foochow | Consul, Shanghai |

Op-20-GC
Serial 2722

BFR/ef 2/1/39

4 February 1939

(SC)A7-3(1)

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To : Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

SUBJECT: State-Navy Cipher for Asiatic Waters.

1. Copies of Strip Cipher No. 66 and Strip Alphabet No. 66 (Navy short title CSP 773 and CSP 774) are being distributed to officials of the State Department in China, Japan, and Hongkong in order that these publications may be used for confidential communications between them and naval commanders in Asiatic Waters. This cipher was chosen because it is now held by the Asiatic Fleet and the only distribution required being to the State Department officials concerned. Since this system has been used for Navy traffic for some time, it will be superseded by a new system when such can be distributed.

2. The copies of CSP 773 being distributed for the State Department officials are designed to fit their strip device, known as Cipher Device M-138A. This device has recently been adopted by the State Department, but none of their officials in China, Japan, or Hongkong are familiar with its use. The State Department has requested the Navy to assist in the distribution of their devices and copies of CSP 773 and CSP 774 in order that the distribution may be expedited and a demonstration of its operation may be made by the naval officer effecting delivery. This is considered feasible as the operation of Cipher Device M-138A is identical with that of CSP 642, which is held by all naval activities in Asiatic Waters.

3. Eighteen self-addressed packages are being forwarded via the RAMAPO to the Issuing Officer, Sixteenth Naval District, to be distributed as follows:

Ambassador, Tokyo	Consul, Chungking	Consul, Hankow
Consul, Tokyo	Consul, Nanking	Consul, Shanghai
Consul Kobe	Consul, Amoy	Consul, Swatow
Consul, Nagasaki	Consul, Canton	Consul, Tientsin
Consul, Yokohama	Consul, Chefoo	Consul, Tsingtao
Consul, Peiping	Consul, Foochow	Consul, Hongkong

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Each package contains one copy of Cipher Device M-136A and one copy each of CSP 773 and CSP 774. The Consuls concerned have been instructed that this system is effective upon receipt between them and naval activities, but is not effective between Consuls unless they have been notified that the distribution has been completed.

4. Change No. 1 to CSP 774 was forwarded to the Asiatic Station via the HENNINGSON, Change No. 2 to the same publication will be forwarded via the RAMAPO. Change No. 1 provides for the use of Internal Indicators (see An CSP 772), and Change No. 2 lists the State Department holders and gives the External Indicator to be used when communicating with them. These changes have been incorporated in the copies of CSP 774 being issued to the State Department officials. It is necessary that these changes are made effective before this system is used for communication with the State Department holders.

5. It is requested that the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet:

- (a) Direct the distribution of the State Department packages, having the officer making delivery give a demonstration of the operation of the cipher whenever practicable, and
- (b) Place Changes Nos. 1 and 2 to CSP 774 in effect when their distribution is completed, notifying the Department of the date when effective.

A.P. FAIRFIELD
Acting

Copy to:
Comdt. 16th Nav. Dist.
Comdt. 14th Nav. Dist.
Registered Publication Section.
Code Room.

030

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial 2722

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Each package contains one copy of Cipher Device M-238A and one copy each of CSP 773 and CSP 774. The Consuls concerned have been instructed that the system is effective upon receipt between them and naval activities, but is not effective between Consuls unless they have been notified that the distribution has been completed.

4. Change No. 1 to CSP 774 was forwarded to the Asiatic Station via the HENDERSON, Change No. 2 to the same publication will be forwarded via the RAMAPO. Change No. 1 provides for the use of Internal Indicators (as in CSP 799), and Change No. 2 lists the State Department holders and gives the External Indicator to be used when communicating with them. These changes have been incorporated in the copies of CSP 774 being issued to the State Department officials. It is necessary that these changes are made effective before this system is used for communication with the State Department holders.

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(a) Direct the distribution of the State Department packages, having the officer making delivery give a demonstration of the operation of the cipher whenever practicable, and

(b) Place Changes Nos. 1 and 2 to CSP 774 in effect when their distribution is completed, notifying the Department of the date when effective.

A.P. FAIRFIELD
Acting

Copy to:
Comdt. 16th Nav. Dist.
Comdt. 14th Nav. Dist.
Registered Publication Section
Code Room

031

Op-13/PS Nov. 9
(SC)A6-3
Serial No. 09913

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOV 12 1940

Sir:

As a result of staff conversations with Latin American Republics the necessity for a special code for communications between our own naval forces and those of the other countries concerned has become apparent.

The Navy Department has undertaken the preparation of this code which will be in English, Portuguese and Spanish, and has now advanced to the point where the services of naval representatives from Canada, Brazil and Peru are desired to assist in its preparation.

Accordingly, it is requested that Canada, Brazil and Peru each be invited to send one suitably qualified naval representative to Washington for a period of about six months to assist in preparing a code for communicating between the navies of the United States, Canada, and the other American Republics. The Brazilian and Peruvian representatives should have a thorough knowledge of English.

It is requested that the above arrangements be expedited and the officers arrive Washington as soon as practicable.

Respectfully,

FRANK FLOYD

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~Confidential~~

May 12, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department of State is desirous of having made a most careful survey of its codes and ciphers to determine their efficacy at this time and to discover and establish additional means of preserving the secrecy of its highly confidential communications under present world conditions.

I wish to enlist the aid of the Navy Department in the conduct of the survey contemplated and I hope you may be in a position to designate a qualified commissioned officer of the Navy Department to serve in an advisory and a consultative capacity with officers of the Department of State, the War Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for these purposes, the importance of which I believe I need not emphasize.

Your cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

The Honorable
Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.

Doc. 30638

Dept. file: A6-3/ES

RETURN 20 20-G ✓
20-GC

Op-20-G (FLD/ef 5/16/41)

Doc. 30638

(SC)A6-3/28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 17 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Navy Department will be very glad to comply with the request contained in your letter of May 12. Commander Lorraine F. Safford, U.S. Navy, is designated to act as advisor and consultant to the State Department representatives for the survey of codes and ciphers.

I await your further desires in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

Anticipated by the Navy.

Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 12, 1942.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department of State is desirous of having made a most careful survey of its codes and ciphers to determine their efficiency at this time and to discover and establish additional means of preserving the security of its highly confidential communications under present world conditions.

I wish to enlist the aid of the War Department in the conduct of the survey contemplated and I hope you may be in a position to designate a qualified commissioned officer of the War Department to serve in an advisory and a consultative capacity with officers of the Department of State, the Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for these purposes, the importance of which I believe I need not emphasize.

Your cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Cordell Hull

The Honorable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.

ATTACHMENT 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

035

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 12, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department of State is desirous of having made a most careful survey of its codes and ciphers to determine their efficiency at this time and to discover and establish additional means of preserving the accuracy of its highly confidential communications under present world conditions.

I wish to enlist the aid of the War Department in the conduct of the survey contemplated and I hope you may be in a position to designate a qualified commissioned officer of the War Department to serve in an advisory and a consultative capacity with officers of the Department of State, the Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for these purposes, the importance of which I believe I need not emphasize.

Your cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Cordell Hull

The Honorable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.

APPENDIX 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

PAGES 097 AND 098

NOT RELEASABLE

7-20-41

Handwritten initials

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90 June 1941
25 June 1941

REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE SECURITY OF
STATE DEPARTMENT COMMUNICATIONS

1. In respective letters dated May 12, 1941, to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of State requested that representatives of these agencies be designated "to serve in an advisory and consultative capacity with officers of the Department of State" for the purpose of assisting the Department in making "a most careful survey of its codes and ciphers to determine their efficacy at this time and to discover and establish additional means of preserving the secrecy of its highly confidential communications under present world conditions." (Appendix 1.)

2. With these ends in view the following were designated:

Commander L. F. Safford, U.S.N. (Office of Naval Communications)

Captain H. C. Hayes, U.S.A. (Signal Corps, Office of the Chief

Signal Officer)

X

(Federal Bureau of Investigation)

Mr. Frederick Livesey (Department of State)

(In addition to the foregoing, ^XMr. William F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst, War Department, was designated to serve as Technical Advisor to Captain Hayes.

3. The Committee completed its investigation in four sessions, held on May 27, June 2, 9 and 12, 1941. Its findings and recommendations are embodied in this report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE SECURITY OF
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2. With these ends in view the following were designated:
Commander L. F. Safford, U.S.N. (Office of Naval Communications)
Captain H. C. Hayes, U.S.A. (Signal Corps, Office of the Chief
Signal Officer)
(Federal Bureau of Investigation)
Mr. Frederick Livesey (Department of State)

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3. The Committee completed its investigation in four sessions, held on May 27, June 2, 9 and 12, 1941. Its findings and recommendations are embodied in this report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. At its first session, May 27, a preliminary meeting was held in the office of Mr. G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, who discussed with the members of the Committee the nature and scope of the studies to be pursued by them and indicated that the Secretary of State desired the Committee to investigate all related phases of communication security in and for the Department.

5. The Committee then resumed its meeting in Mr. Salmon's office and after brief preliminary discussion agreed that its agenda embraced the following phases of communication security:

a. The technical soundness and the respective degrees of efficiency of the codes and ciphers now in use by the Department; and the related procedures and safeguards followed in their compilation or preparation, physical distribution, transportation, and accounting.

b. The facilities, procedures, and regulations for insuring the physical security of cryptographic paraphernalia both at the Department and at its offices in foreign countries.

c. The definitions and delimitations of classes of messages and documents with respect to the various degrees of confidentiality; and the regulations governing the drafting of messages to be transmitted in cryptographic form, as well as those pertaining to the placing of responsibility for determining and indicating the classification of messages.

d. The regulations governing the selection and proper technical

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employment of the various authorized cryptographic systems in cryptographing messages; the regulations governing the preparation, handling, distribution and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages; and the regulations governing the preparation of press releases dealing with matters which may have forced the subjects of cryptographic communication.

a. The principles followed in the selection, training and assignment to duty of personnel permitted to have access to cryptographic material or to perform cryptographic duties; and the principles followed in selecting the agencies of transmission employed in forwarding messages to their destination.

b. The details of the findings of the Committee in respect to the foregoing subjects of study are as follows:

a. (1) Although [in general the several cryptographic systems now employed are technically sound and efficient], it appears that the various codes and ciphers could be distributed to holders according to a better defined and more orderly system.

(2) Although the methods used to superspheripher messages prepared in certain systems are sufficiently secure, this is perhaps not true as regards certain other systems and it would appear that the latter might not yield the degree of security desirable for the com-

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employment of the various authorized cryptographic systems in cryptographing messages; the regulations governing preparation, handling, distribution and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages; and the regulations governing the preparation of press releases dealing with matters which may have formed the subjects of cryptographic communication.

e. The principles followed in the selection, training and assignment to duty of personnel permitted to have access to cryptographic material or to perform cryptographic duties; and the principles followed in selecting the agencies of transmission employed in forwarding messages to their destination.

6. The details of the findings of the Committee in respect to the foregoing subjects of study are as follows:

a.(1) Although in general the several cryptographic systems now employed are technically sound and efficient, it appears that the various codes and ciphers could be distributed to holders according to a better defined and more orderly system.

(2) Although the methods used to superencipher messages prepared in certain systems are sufficiently secure, this is perhaps not true as regards certain other systems and it would appear that the latter might not yield the degree of security desirable for the com-

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munications for which they are intended. The Committee is not in a position to submit a positive opinion in this respect because in order to do so a long and extensive cryptanalytic study would be essential.

27 (3) The methods and means used to encipher messages of highest secrecy and importance appear to be too slow for modern rapid communication and require more labor and personnel than would be the case if certain mechanical-electrical apparatus now available were employed for this purpose. Moreover such apparatus if technically sound can yield far greater cryptographic security than is possible with the present "hand-operated" means.

ca (4) The procedures and safeguards followed within the Department itself in the compilation and preparation of the codes and ciphers, and in their physical distribution and accounting appear to be satisfactory. However, registration of documents by "short titles" is not now the case and its establishment would be advisable. The Committee also feels that special forms for the receipt, destruction, semiannual accounting, and transfers of documents from one holder to another are quite necessary for an effective accounting system.

(5) As regards the methods followed in the transportation and forwarding of cryptographic publications and documents to

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authorized holders thereof, it is understood that such material is invariably carried by diplomatic courier, which should insure its safe delivery without possibility of compromise.

b. Except at the Department itself and at only a few of the large embassies the facilities, procedures, and regulations for insuring the physical security of cryptographic paraphernalia appear to be woefully inadequate, those constituting in all probability the greatest source of danger to the security of all communications of the Department. Without adequate safeguards to preserve physical security of the cryptographic paraphernalia itself, no system for secret communication regardless of how sound it might be technically can be considered safe for use.

c. The Department does not appear to have clear-cut definitions of

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authorized holders thereof, it is understood that such material is invariably carried by diplomatic courier, which should insure its safe delivery without possibility of compromise.

b. Except that the Department itself and at only a few of the large embassies the facilities, procedures, and regulations for insuring the physical security of cryptographic paraphernalia appear to be woefully inadequate, these constituting in all probability the greatest source of danger to the security of all communications of the Department. Without adequate safeguards to preserve physical security of the cryptographic paraphernalia itself, no system for secret communication regardless of how sound it might be technically can be considered safe for use.

c. The Department does not appear to have clear-cut definitions of

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and limitations for various classes of confidential matter; it does not appear to have clear-cut regulations governing the drafting of messages to be transmitted in cryptographic form; nor does it appear to place responsibility upon the proper persons as regards determining and indicating the classification according to which an outgoing message should be handled.

- d. (1) Is the absence of well-defined regulations governing the matters referred to in subparagraph g it is apparent that regulations governing the selection of the specific cryptographic system in specific cases cannot be applied properly or with certainty.
- (2) The regulations governing the technical employment of the various authorized systems appear to be adequate.
- (3) The regulations and procedure governing the preparation, handling, distribution, and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages, while satisfactory within the confines of the Communications and Records Division itself, appear to be grossly inadequate when these documents pass outside the aforementioned division. It appears that an unspecified and constantly varying number of verbatim translations of incoming cryptographed messages must be prepared by ECR upon the request of officials of the Department who deem it necessary to furnish copies for the information of others who might be concerned. The

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and delimitations for various classes of confidential matter; it does not appear to have clear-cut regulations governing the drafting of messages to be transmitted in cryptographic form; nor does it appear to place responsibility upon the proper persons in regards determining and indicating the classification according to which an outgoing message should be handled.

- d. (1) In the absence of well-defined regulations governing the matters referred to in subparagraph c it is apparent that regulations governing the selection of the specific cryptographic system in specific cases cannot be applied properly or with certainty.
- (2) The regulations governing the technical employment of the various authorized systems appear to be adequate.
- (3) The regulations and procedure governing the preparation, handling, distribution, and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages, while satisfactory within the confines of the Communications and Records Division itself, appear to be woefully inadequate when these documents pass outside the aforementioned Division. It appears that an unspecified and constantly varying number of verbatim translations of incoming cryptographed messages must be prepared by DCR upon the request of officials of the Department who deem it necessary to furnish copies for the information of others who might be concerned. The

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reproduction of copies is now by means of uncontrolled mimeograph and this is regarded by the Committee as a highly dangerous practice. No accounting for the multiplicity of copies is made nor is there any assurance that additional copies are not made and circulated within the various divisions. Accounting for copies under these circumstances is not possible even with much more clerical assistance than is now available. Further, there is neither uniformity nor certainty as to the manner in which these verbatim translations are handled or filed in the respective divisions to which they are sent, and in many cases doubt exists as to their ultimate disposition. While the Committee made no investigation as to the procedure followed in the case of outgoing messages initiated within the respective divisions, it would appear probable that there is considerable danger from the existence of work sheets and carbon paper bearing rough and final drafts of outgoing messages to be cryptographed in confidential code and ciphers. Finally, it appears that no great care is exercised with regard to the number of persons to whom verbatim or even paraphrased copies of secret messages are shown, in many cases this being perhaps wholly unnecessary. These unsatisfactory conditions probably constitute the second great source of

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danger to security and, if not corrected, security of communication can neither be maintained nor even established. In this connection it is to be noted that in the military and the naval service a commissioned officer is not, merely by virtue of his commission or his rank, entitled to receive secret information in which he is not directly and officially concerned.

(4) The Committee has reason to believe that there is no careful coordination between the persons having knowledge of the contents of cryptographed messages and those who prepare information embodied in the form of press releases which may contain matter transmitted or received in cryptographic form.

c. (1) Although the principles followed in the selection, training, and assignment to duty of cryptographic personnel within the Department itself appear to be satisfactory, the Committee has no knowledge of what may be the case in this regard in the Department's Embassies, Legations, and Consulates. It is true that the Department has specific regulations governing these matters, as embodied in Section VII-4 of its Foreign Service Regulations, but there appears to be no assurance that these regulations are scrupulously and uniformly observed at all stations. This appears to be a subject on which direct personal and

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periodic observation by properly trained inspectors would be essential before definite assurance could be had as to the extent of conformity with pertinent regulations.

C-7 (2) It would appear that the Department avails itself of cable routes rather than radio channels wherever possible, a procedure which is to be highly commended.

Further, the Committee understands that the practice of discussing confidential subjects over the transocean radiotelephone has been practically eliminated. The Committee desires to point out that despite assurances of "privacy" so often reiterated by the telephone company, such conversations are private only so far as the casual listener-in is concerned. They offer no obstacles to any person or organization having a real interest in learning the substance of such conversations.

7. The recommendations of the Committee are embodied below, but in order to present them in a well-integrated manner the successive recommendations do not follow the order in which the subjects and findings are treated in paragraphs 5 and 6 above. The Committee recommends:

a. That the Department of State adopt the same definitions of and delimitations for classes of messages and documents (with respect to the various degrees of confidentiality, viz: RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET) that now subsist in the War Department and in

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periodic observation by properly trained inspectors would be essential before definite assurance could be had as to the extent of conformity with pertinent regulations.

- (2) It would appear that the Department avails itself of cable routes rather than radio channels wherever possible, a procedure which is to be highly commended. Further, the Committee understands that the practice of discussing confidential subjects over the transocean radiotelephone has been practically eliminated. The Committee desires to point out that despite assurances of "privacy" so often reiterated by the telephone company, such conversations are private only so far as the casual listener-in is concerned. They offer no obstacles to any person or organization having a real interest in learning the substance of such conversations.

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- a. That the Department of State adopt the same definitions of and delimitations for classes of messages and documents (with respect to the various degrees of confidentiality, viz: RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET) that now subsist in the War Department and in

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111 | the Navy Department (both of the latter now have identical classifications and practically identical definitions and delimitations therefor). These three classifications have been effective in these Departments for a number of years and have proved themselves technically sound and practicable. Furthermore, if the Department of State were to adopt the same classifications and definitions the three Departments would be well coordinated in this fundamental respect when intercommunication or the exchange of documents becomes necessary.

b. (1) That based upon the foregoing recommendation, the Department of State revise its present set up of cryptographic systems so as to provide adequate systems for cryptographic treatment of the three classes of messages in the following categories*:

- (a) For communication between the Department and selected Embassies and Legations; and for intercommunication among them.
- (b) For communication between the Department and all Embassies and Legations; and for intercommunication among them.

* Note: Each category should be provided with cryptographic paraphernalia belonging to all lower categories.

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the Navy Department (both of the latter now have identical classifications and practically identical definitions and delimitations therefor.) These three classifications have been effective in those Departments for a number of years and have proved themselves technically sound and practicable. Furthermore, if the Department of State were to adopt the same classifications and definitions the three Departments would be well coordinated in this fundamental respect when intercommunication or the exchange of documents becomes necessary.

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- (b) For communication between the Department and all Embassies and Legations; and for intercommunication among them.

* Note: Each category should be provided with cryptographic paraphernalia belonging to all lower categories.

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- (c) For communication between the Department and selected Consulates; and for intercommunication among them.
 - (d) For communication between the Department and all Consulates; and for intercommunication among them.
 - (e) For communication between the Department and such Special Observers and Special Missions as may be found necessary.
 - (f) For communication between U.S. Naval Vessels and U.S. Embassies, Legations or Consulates.
 - (g) For such other special purposes as may be found desirable.
- (2) That this distribution of cryptographic systems according to categories be accomplished by a suitable redistribution or reassignment of the present codes, so far as is possible, the codes to be provided with the same general system of superencipherment but operating with different cipher keys. For the latter purpose ~~hand-operated~~ methods employing cipher tables may be used, but it is possible that a cryptograph might be suited for the speedier superencipherment of certain types of confidential messages.
- (3) That the Department establish a more detailed system of accounting for cryptographic paraphernalia, using special forms for receipt, semiannual report of possession, report of transfer from one holder to another, and reports of

destruction, these reports to be based upon "short titles" for all registered documents, devices or publications.

- (4) The Department of State be provided with such literature and technical advice by the War and the Navy Departments as will be of assistance in the execution of this recommendation.

c. (1) That for its most secret communications the Department of State look periodically into the subject of automatic, electrically-operated cipher machines; and that the Department collaborate with the War Department or the Navy Department with a view to the introduction of suitable machines for use at the Department and at the largest and most important Embassies where speed and security of communication is essential under present world conditions.

- (2) This recommendation, while entailing certain initial expenditures for machines, will ultimately result in some saving by virtue of a reduction in cryptographic personnel, since one machine can do the work of several clerks.

- (3) In this connection the Committee takes cognizance of the fact that negotiations with the foregoing and in view have been in progress between the Department of State and the War Department for some time and before the appointment of this Committee. It recommends, therefore, that these negotiations be concluded as promptly as practicable so that the

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machines may be placed in service without undue delay.

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d. (1) That immediate measures be taken by the Department of State to provide suitable combination safes for the storage of cryptographic paraphernalia and confidential files at all its Embassies, Legations, and Consulates not now provided with adequate facilities for proper safeguarding of these materials when not in use. Further, that the Department take immediate action to insure that only suitably paid American citizens are employed at outlying offices as guards when these offices are closed between office hours. On this crucial point reference is made to paragraph 6 b.

(2) That instructions be issued to all offices requiring a complete change in the combinations to safes at least once a year and that these changes be made by competent and duly authorized personnel in the office. (There is nothing about this matter which requires the services of "outside" experts; the application of ordinary common sense and careful study of the instructions which usually accompany such safes are adequate for the purpose.)

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(3) In this connection the Committee takes note of the present requirement (Par. VII-4, Note 2(c) of Foreign Service Regulations) that "each time a change is effected in the combination of a safe the Department shall be informed by

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means of a card prepared in the following form..."

and that "this card shall be transmitted to the Department in a sealed envelope...". The Commission doubts the necessity for this requirement and recommends its immediate elimination.

(4) That the Department of State collaborate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in regard to the types of safes, cabinets, locked pouches, envelopes, etc., that should be employed for storage and transportation of cryptographic material.

g. (1) That the Department of State draw up new regulations governing the drafting of messages to be transmitted in cryptographic form, basing them upon the new classifications recommended in paragraph 7 a.

(2) That responsibility for proper drafting, for proper classification and for clear indication of classification be placed upon the originators of messages; that the latter two decisions not be made a responsibility of the cryptographic personnel; and that the Department take such action as will insure observance of the regulations applicable to these functions.

(3) That new regulations governing the selection of the specific cryptographic system to be employed by cryptographic personnel be drawn up by the Department and that they be

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 - (3) That new regulations governing the selection of the specific cryptographic system to be employed by cryptographic personnel be drawn up by the Department and that they be

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based upon principles that are technically sound, arising out of the recommendation contained in paragraph 7 a.

(1) That the Department of State be provided with such literature and technical advice by the War and the Navy Departments as will be of assistance in the elaboration of the new regulations in point.

1-8 } f. (1) That the Department draw up new and detailed regulations governing the preparation, handling, distribution, and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages for the guidance of all Divisions within the Department and of all of its Embassies, Legations, and Consulates, these regulations to be based upon technically sound principles arising out of the adoption of the recommendation made in paragraph 7 a.

(2) That these new regulations be rigidly and strictly enforced and that the Department take all necessary disciplinary measures to insure their strict enforcement by all concerned.

(3) That the Department be provided with such literature and technical advice by the War and the Navy Departments as will be of assistance in the elaboration of the new regulations in point.

7 } g. That a tour of duty as control officer at the Department in Washington or at an important office be made one of the mandatory requirements for

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(2) That these new regulations be rigidly and strictly enforced and that the Department take all necessary disciplinary measures to insure their strict enforcement by all concerned.

(3) That the Department be provided with such literature and technical advice by the War and Navy Departments as will be of assistance in the elaboration of the new regulations in point.

g. That a tour of duty as coding officer at the Department in Washington or at an important office be made one of the mandatory requirements for

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the training and duties of junior career officers of the Foreign Service. These duties should correspond to those of coding officers in the Navy and should consist of the safeguarding of secret and confidential materials; the actual coding and decoding of secret and confidential messages; plus routing, filing, distributing and paraphrasing messages; and advising superior officers as to correct procedure for the maintenance of communication security.

- 4-10
- h. (1) That the Department take such measures as may be necessary to provide an adequate and technically informed inspection service for its cryptographic operations in foreign countries, with a view to insuring that all the regulations having a direct bearing upon communication security are observed.
- 4-11
- (2) That the Department take steps to have designated at the Department in Washington and at each of its offices in foreign countries an officer who shall in addition to his other duties perform the duties of "cryptographic security officer", who will be responsible for the enforcement of all cryptographic and communication security regulations at his station.
- 4-12
- (3) That the Department serve notice on all personnel concerned in the maintenance of communication security that severe disciplinary action will be taken in future cases of laxity,

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- (2) That the Department take steps to have designated at the Department in Washington and at each of its offices in foreign countries an officer who shall in addition to his other duties perform the duties of "cryptographic security officer", who will be responsible for the enforcement of all cryptographic and communication security regulations at his station.
- (3) That the Department serve notice on all personnel concerned in the maintenance of communication security that severe disciplinary action will be taken in future cases of laxity,

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(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

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carelessness, or negligence in the observance of regulations established to preserve security.

Richard W. Stafford,
Commander, U.S.N.

Harold G. Hayes,
Captain, Signal Corps, U.S.A.

Frederick Livesey

William F. Friedman

APPENDIX 1:- Copy of letter
from Secty of State to
Secty of War, May 12, 1941

APPENDIX 2:- Findings of study
of methods followed in
transportation and forwarding
of cryptographic publications
and documents

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Leland F. Safford,
Commander, U.S.N.

Harold G. Hayes,
Captain, Signal Corps, U.S.A.

Frederick Livesey

William F. Friedman

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from Secty of State to
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APPENDIX 2:-Findings of study
of methods followed in
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(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

OP-16-F-7

A6-3/EN3-11(RE)

Serial No. 1337716

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Director of Naval Communications.
Subject: Request for Department of State Cipher
No. 397, "Gray Cipher."

Reference: (a) Ltr. Naval Observer, Recife, Brazil,
to D.N.I., A6-3(049) undated.

1. The following from reference (a) is quoted
as a matter under the cognizance of the Division of Naval
Communications:

"It is requested that this office be
furnished, at the earliest possible date, one
copy of Department of State Cipher No. 397,
known as the 'Gray Cipher'.

"Daily reports of ship movements are
made to the Naval Attaché, Rio de Janeiro, in
this cipher.

"To date...it has..been possible to use
the copy of the 'Gray Cipher' held by the
American Consul.

"When a Vice Consul arrives at Recife...
the Consul's copy of the Gray Cipher will no
longer be available.

"Air mail reply is requested."

JUL 1 1941



NAVY DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS

H. D. Bode

H. D. Bode,
By direction.

July 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM

For: Mr. D. W. Salmon,
Dept. of Communications and Records
Department of State

Subject: Request from U. S. Naval Observer, Recife, Brazil
for a copy of "Gray Cipher".

1. The following information received from the U. S. Naval Observer, Recife, Brazil is quoted for your information:

"It is requested that this office be furnished, at the earliest possible date, one copy of Department of State Cipher No. 397, known as the 'Gray Cipher'.

"Daily reports of ship movements are made to the Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro, in this cipher.

"To date..it has..been possible to use the copy of the 'Gray Cipher' held by the American Consul.

"When a Vice Consul arrives at Recife...the Consul's copy of the 'Gray Cipher' will no longer be available.

"Air mail reply is requested."

2. Will you please advise this office as to your desires in the above case?

3. We will be pleased to obtain from you a copy of the "Gray Cipher" and forward it to the Observer, Recife, or take any other steps deemed best by you.

L. F. Safford,
Commander, U. S. Navy
Communications Security Section

Copy
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Memorandum

First Page of this
delivered to DHC by
20-0
10/9/41

From: The Director of Naval Communications.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Navy Cryptographic Systems available to
American Mission in Moscow.

1. I have ascertained from Mr. Salmon, Chief of the Records and Communication Division of the State Department, that the President's note to Mr. Stalin which was published by the Nazi Press was sent in the State Department "broom" code. This code is one of their low security systems which they use for matters like this where the direct translation must be given to a foreign government and where no great matters of secrecy are involved. I surmise, although this was not confirmed by the State Department, that this note may have been sent in the "broom" code with the expectation that it would be read by the Nazis. The American Legation at Moscow holds two or three other systems of enciphered code which possess real security and are available for any important negotiations between Russia and the United States.

2. If it becomes necessary to make Navy cryptographic systems available to Mr. Harriman and the American delegation in Moscow, our Naval Attache in Moscow has a brand new private cipher system which will offer ample security for any traffic which we can conceive will be sent. The chief difficulty with this system is its slowness. This system is immediately available. The key is photographed by micro-photography and carried in the case of a watch on the person of the Naval Attache so we may feel confident as to its physical security. The Naval Attache also has a more common Naval Attache and Observer System which should not be used for highly important matters as it is widely distributed ashore where it is exposed to theft and other methods of compromise.

3. In addition we have other cipher systems available which could be sent to Moscow for the use of the American Legation, the great difficulty being that of delivery. The most rapid method would be to take from Cavite a reserve cipher system in store there, transfer it to Vladivostok by destroyer or cruiser and then send over land to Moscow by whomever the future seat of the Soviet Government will be in case Moscow should be captured.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-G

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

From: The Director of Naval Communications.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Navy Cryptographic Systems available to
American Mission in Moscow

1. I have ascertained from Mr. Salmon, Chief of the Records and Communication Division of the State Department, that the President's note to Mr. Stalin which was published by the Nazi Press was sent in the State Department "brown" code. This code is one of their low security systems which they use for matters like this where the direct translation must be given to a foreign government and where no great matters of secrecy are involved. I surmise, although this was not confirmed by the State Department, that this note may have been sent in the "brown" code with the expectation that it would be read by the Nazis. The American Legation at Moscow holds two or three other systems of enciphered code which possess real security and are available for any important negotiations between Russia and the United States.

2. If it becomes necessary to make Navy cryptographic systems available to Mr. Harriman and the American delegation in Moscow, our Naval Attache in Moscow has a brand new private cipher system which will offer ample security for any traffic which we can conceive will be sent. The chief difficulty with this system is its slowness. This system is immediately available. The key is photographed by micro-photography and carried in the case of a watch on the person of the Naval Attache so we may feel confident as to its physical security. The Naval Attache also has a more common Naval Attache and Observer System which could not be used for highly important matters as it is widely distributed ashore where it is exposed to theft and other methods of compromise.

3. In addition we have other cipher systems available which could be sent to Moscow for the use of the American Legation, the great difficulty being that of delivery. The most rapid method would be to take from Cavite a reserve cipher system in store there, transfer it to Vladivostok by destroyer or cruiser and then send over land to Moscow or wherever the future seat of the Soviet Government may be in case Moscow should be captured.

CONFIDENTIAL

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This would necessitate the Navy providing two officer couriers to transport this system from Vladivostok to Moscow, and would require special arrangements with the Soviet Government to expedite land or air transportation from Vladivostok to Moscow.

4. Since there is no evidence that the State Department high security codes and ciphers held by Moscow have been compromised, we will take no further action in the matter pending further instructions.

Respectfully,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This would necessitate the Navy providing two officer couriers to transport this system from Vladivostok to Moscow, and would require special arrangements with the Soviet Government to expedite land or air transportation from Vladivostok to Moscow.

4. Since there is no evidence that the State Department high security codes and ciphers held by Moscow have been compromised, we will take no further action in the matter pending further instructions.

Respectfully,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

Op-13/18 Oct. 22
Serial No. 036413

(OC)111-1/DI432

Sir:

In confidential despatches numbers 53 and 55 of October 19, 1941, the American Minister at Lajevik reported the details of recent damage incurred by the U.S.S. KUMBY.

The probability that State Department codes have been compromised not only endangers the security of the matters described in such despatches but also jeopardizes the Navy ciphers in which the same information is reported by responsible naval officials.

It is therefore earnestly requested that the State Department give consideration to the discontinuance of such reports when the originating official is located in a place where the information can be conveyed to cognizant authorities through normal naval communication channels in the appropriate cryptographic system.

Respectfully,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

CC: Op-16.
Op-20 ✓

Op-13A/PS Oct. 22
Serial No.036413

~~SECRET~~

(SC)L1101/DD432

Sir:

In confidential despatches number 53 and 55 of October 19, 1941, the American Minister at Reykjavik reported the details of recent damage incurred by the U.S.S. KEARNY.

The probability that the State Department codes have been compromised not only endangers the security of the matters described in such despatches but also jeopardizes the Navy ciphers in which the same information is reported by responsible naval officials.

It is therefore earnestly requested that the State Department give consideration to the discontinuance of such reports when the originating official is located in a place where the information can be conveyed to cognizant authorities through normal naval communication channels in the appropriate cryptographic system.

Respectfully,

FRANK KNOX

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Op-16.
CC: Op-20

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

file

HRS/mjf

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL ROYES

There has been a lot of talk about the
lack of security of State Department Codes: - Is
anybody doing anything about it?

HRS J

Please see attached memo.
Mr. Salmon of State Dept. is
on a world tour to
check up on conditions in all
foreign service points.

S.M.

Op-20

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

8 December 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Subject: Security of State Department Codes.

1. The following extracts are quoted from the report (dated 26 June 1941) of a special committee which investigated the State Department communications. These cover the more important aspects of the report.

A - The Committee consisted of the following:

Commander L.F. Safford, U.S.N. (Office of Naval Communications).

Captain H.G. Hayes, U.S.A. (Signal Corps, Office of the Chief Signal Officer).

Mr. William F. Friedman, War Department, Technical Advisor to Captain Hayes.

Mr. [redacted] (Federal Bureau of Investigation).

Mr. Frederick Livesey (Department of State).

B - The Committee completed its investigation in four sessions, held on May 27, June 2, 9 and 12, 1941.

C - Findings:

- (1) In general the several cryptographic systems now employed are technically sound and efficient.
- (2) The methods and means used to encipher messages of highest secrecy and importance appear to be too slow for modern rapid communication.
- (3) The procedure and safeguards followed within the Department itself in the compilation and preparation of the codes and ciphers, and in their physical distribution and accounting appear to be satisfactory.

- (4) Except at the Department itself and at only a few of the large embassies the facilities, procedures, and regulations for insuring the physical security of cryptographic paraphernalia appear to be woefully inadequate, these constituting in all probability the greatest source of danger to the security of all communications of the Department.
- (5) The Department does not appear to have clear-cut definitions of and delimitations for various classes of confidential matter; it does not appear to have clear-cut regulations governing the drafting of messages to be transmitted in cryptographic form; nor does it appear to place responsibility upon the proper persons as regards determining and indicating the classification according to which an outgoing message should be handled.
- (6) The regulations and procedure governing the preparation, handling, distribution, and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages, while satisfactory within the confines of the Communications and Records Division itself, appear to be woefully inadequate when these documents pass outside the aforementioned Division. It appears that an unspecified and constantly varying number of verbatim translations of incoming cryptographed messages must be prepared by DCR upon the request of officials of the Department who deem it necessary to furnish copies for the information of others who might be concerned. The reproduction of copies is now by means of uncontrolled mimeograph and this is regarded by the Committee as a highly dangerous practice. No accounting for the multiplicity of copies is made nor is there any assurance that additional copies are not made and circulated within the various divisions. Accounting for copies under these circumstances is not possible even with much more clerical assistance than is now available. Further, there is neither uniformity nor certainty as to the manner in which these verbatim translations are handled or filed in the respective divisions to which they are sent, and in many cases doubt exists as to their ultimate disposition. While the Committee made no investigation as to the procedure followed in the case of outgoing messages

initiated within the respective divisions, it would appear probable that there is considerable danger from the existence of work sheets and carbon paper bearing rough and final drafts of outgoing messages to be cryptographed in confidential codes and ciphers. Finally, it appears that no great care is exercised with regard to the number of persons to whom verbatim or even paraphrased copies of secret messages are shown, in many cases this being perhaps wholly unnecessary. These unsatisfactory conditions probably constitute the second great source of danger to security and, if not corrected, security of communication can neither be maintained nor even established. In this connection it is to be noted that in the military and the naval service a commissioned officer is not, merely by virtue of his commission or his rank, entitled to receive secret information in which he is not directly and officially concerned.

- (7) The Committee has reasons to believe that there is no careful coordination between the persons having knowledge of the contents of cryptographed messages and those who prepare information embodied in the form of press releases which may contain matter transmitted or received in cryptographic form.
- (8) Although the principles followed in the selection, training, and assignment to duty of cryptographic personnel within the Department itself appear to be satisfactory, the Committee has no knowledge of what may be the case in this regard in the Department's Embassies, Legations, and Consulates.
- (9) It would appear that the Department avails itself of cable routes rather than radio channels wherever possible, a procedure which is to be highly commended.

D - Recommendations:

- (1) That the Department of State adopt the same definitions of and delimitations for classes of messages and documents (with respect to the various degrees of confidentiality, vis: RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET) that now subsist in the War Department and in the Navy Department (both of the latter now have identical classifications and practically identical definitions and delimitations therefor.

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- (2) That the Department establish a more detailed system of accounting for cryptographic paraphernalia, using special forms for receipt, semiannual report of possession, report of transfer from one holder to another, and report of destruction.
 - (3) That for its most secret communications the Department of State look seriously into the subject of automatic, electrically-operated cipher machines.
 - (4) That immediate measures be taken by the Department of State to provide suitable combination safes for the storage of cryptographic paraphernalia and confidential files at all its Embassies, Legations, and Consulates not now provided with adequate facilities for proper safeguarding of these materials when not in use. Further, that the Department take immediate action to insure that only suitably paid American citizens are employed at outlying offices as guards when those offices are closed between office hours.
 - (5) The Committee takes note of the present requirement that "each time a change is effected in the combination of a safe the Department shall be informed by means of a card prepared in the following form..." and that "this card shall be transmitted to the Department in a sealed envelope...". The Committee doubts the necessity for this requirement and recommends its immediate elimination.
 - (6) That responsibility for proper drafting, for proper classification and for clear indication of classification be placed upon the originators of messages; that the latter two decisions not be made a responsibility of the cryptographic personnel; and that the Department take such action as will insure observance of the regulations applicable to these functions.
 - (7) (1) That the Department draw up new and detailed regulations governing the preparation, handling, distribution, and filing or ultimate disposition of plain-language versions of cryptographed messages for the guidance of all Divisions within the Department and of all of its Embassies, Legations, and Consulates, these regulations to be based upon technically sound principles arising out of the adoption of the recommendation made above.

- (2) That these new regulations be rigidly and strictly enforced and that the Department take all necessary disciplinary measures to insure their strict enforcement by all concerned.
- (8) That a tour of duty as coding officer at the Department in Washington or at an important office be made one of the mandatory requirements for the training and duties of junior career officers of the Foreign Service. These duties should correspond to those of coding officers in the Navy.
- (9) That the Department take such measures as may be necessary to provide an adequate and technically informed inspection service for its cryptographic operations in foreign countries, with a view to insuring that all the regulations having a direct bearing upon communication security are observed.
- (10) That the Department take steps to have designated at the Department in Washington and at each of its offices in foreign countries an officer who shall in addition to his other duties perform the duties of "cryptographic security officer", who will be responsible for the enforcement of all cryptographic and communication security regulations at his station.
- (11) That the Department serve notice on all personnel concerned in the maintenance of communication security that severe disciplinary action will be taken in future cases of laxity, carelessness, or negligence in the observance of regulations established to preserve security.

(GC TAS:ir 11/26/41)

A6-3(1)/GS1(411209)

DEC 9 1941

Sir:

On October 16, 1941 State Department and Navy Department representatives in conference tentatively agreed upon the following points:

1. The need of providing a confidential code or cipher for the control of United States shipping.
2. That any such cipher should also be used for reporting the location and movements of U. S. Merchant Vessels and foreign merchant vessels to the Navy Department and for important messages between the Masters of U. S. Merchant Vessels in designated ports and the owner or operator, where this is considered to be to the public interest.
3. This cipher should be distributed to Naval Attaches, Naval Observers and Naval Shipping Advisors and to Consular Officials at designated ports.
4. Where a naval representative is present the duty of encrypting, decrypting and filing the despatch for forwarding rests entirely upon such representative; but in the temporary absence of the naval representative this duty will be assumed by the consular official.
5. In seaports at which there is no naval representative the consular official will perform the duties as required in paragraph 4 above.
6. The Navy Department should prepare the necessary ciphers and provide the State Department with the number of copies required for distribution to consular officials.
7. That the practice of consular officials sending reports of foreign and U. S. shipping to the State Department for decoding and forwarding to the Navy Department should be discontinued as soon as practicable.

8. That the State Department, in collaboration with the Navy Department, would issue any instructions considered pertinent to consular officials handling this cipher.


The Secretary of the Navy approves the foregoing agreement subject to approval by the Secretary of State, and desires that this arrangement be put into effect as soon as possible.

The cipher in question has been prepared and is ready for delivery to the State Department.

Very respectfully,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State



Op-16-7
A6-3/EN3-11 (MU) (12-22-41)

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence

Serial No. 087416

Jan 7, 1942

Second Memorandum Endorsement

From: The Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Director, Naval Communications.
Via: The Director, Ships' Movements Division (Op-38-0)
Subject: State Department SP-1 Code - Request for copy of.

1. Forwarded, as a matter under the cognizance of the Communication Division, requesting return of papers with information upon which to base reply.

W. A. Heard,
By direction.

Op-37-I:d1
A6-3/EN3-11 (MU) (12-22-41)
Serial 03537
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(SC)A6-3/ES

February 28, 1942.

Third Memorandum Endorsement

From: The Director, Convoy and Routing Division, Op-37.
To: The Director, Naval Communications.
Subject: State Department SP-1 Code - Request for Copy of.

1. Alphabets from CSPl302-M are being issued to Naval observers and Attache's for the reporting of ship movements. Distribution has probably already reached the originator of subject letter.

2. The issuance of State Department SP-1 Code should therefore not be necessary.

M. K. Metcalf

ASS'T NAVAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN LEGATION
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
CENTRAL AMERICA

A6-2/47-42.

December 22, 1941.

From: Assistant Naval Attache, Managua, Nicaragua.
To: Director of Naval Intelligence.
Via: U. S. Naval Attache, Guatemala City, Guatemala.
Subject: State Department SP-1 Code - Request for copy of.

1. It is requested that this office be furnished a copy of the State Department SP-1 Code. This code is now being used by the Naval Observer in Corinto and consular officers in reporting ship movements and other matter to the Assistant Naval Attache. The American Legation in Managua possesses two copies of this, one of which has been temporarily assigned to the Naval Observer in Corinto. The Legation requires the other copy for its own use.

2. It is requested that if a copy of this code is supplied this office that it be sent by State Department pouch direct to Managua.

Allison Dunham.

Office of Naval Attache, 1st Indorsement 27 December,
Guatemala City, Guatemala. 1941.

From: The Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air,
American Legation, Guatemala City, Guatemala.
To : The Director of Naval Intelligence.

1. Forwarded. Ship movement reports from seaport consulates are being received in this code. One copy has been drawn from the Consulate General in Guatemala for use in this office.

F. M. JUNE.

Op-20-G (LFS/ef)

January 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NOYES.

Via: Op-20-A.

Subject: Report of conference.

1. Conference held in Communication Security Section on January 15, 1942, with representatives of the State Department.

Present:

Captain Safford, Naval Communications
Lieut. Comdr. Ellison, Finance Officer Buships
Mr. Frank, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Mr. Salmon, Chief of Communications and Records
Division, State Department.

Subject:

Cipher Machines for State Department.

Time:

From 2 p.m. to 3 p.m.

2. The State Department inquired as to the Navy's ability and willingness to make a number of our obsolescent ECM's available to the State Department to speed up their communications and increase security. At an earlier conference, at which I was not present, Admiral Robinson stated that he was willing to pay for such equipment or make necessary replacements out of Bureau of Ships money.

3. The State Department indicated the need for a total of about 30 ECM's, including spare machines and 300 sets of code wheels. They desired a few machines as soon as possible but could wait for six months or a year, as necessary, for the others.

4. The State Department representatives were informed that:

- (1) It was the Director's desire to divert our own obsolescent machines to the most useful purposes possible.

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- (2) That we could furnish a total of 80 machines in about six months or less, depending on our difficulties in recalling them from the present places of issue.
 - (3) That we consider certain alterations very desirable before issue in order to increase both the reliability and cryptographic security. Also, a general overhaul would be advisable.
 - (4) That it would be necessary to purchase new code wheels for them and this would probably require at least six months.
 - (5) That we could issue the machines on custody receipt the same as any other CSP publication upon approval of official request for the same.
 - (6) That it would be possible to issue six or eight machines, with associated code wheels, within 30 days.

4. Mr. Frank stated that if this general plan was approved by the Secretary of State an official request would be submitted, and that the request would be so worded that it could be declined without embarrassment, in case the Navy was unable or unwilling to make the obsolescent FCM's available to them.

Respectfully,

L.F. Safford,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Op-20-G.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In reply refer to
A-S

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1942

~~Strictly Confidential~~

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In its efforts to improve communication facilities between the Department and its Foreign Service establishments discussions with officers of the Navy have developed the possibility of assignment to the Department of State of cipher machines now being modernized by the Navy Department. It is believed that a very considerable improvement can be effected and it will be greatly appreciated if, as has been indicated, eighty of these machines, together with three hundred wheel sets, can be furnished for distribution to Foreign Service establishments in the American Republics and in such other countries as may be feasible.

The cooperation of the Navy Department in thus enabling the Department of State to strengthen its communication facilities and the preservation of the secrecy of its messages will be a valued contribution to the national defense.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

The Honorable
Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.

151

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~
Op-20-GC

(TAS/ef)

January 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-20-A.

Via: Op-20-G.

Subject: Distribution of Shipping Control Cipher.

1. In compliance with your verbal order, the following information is submitted concerning the distribution of the Shipping Control Cipher by the State Department.

2. About November 10, in conference with Mr. Salmon and other State Department representatives, the question of distribution was raised. Mr. Salmon stated that the State Department would prefer to make the distribution to American Consuls. This cipher, with each package individually addressed to the American Consul concerned, was delivered to the State Department on December 2, 1941. At that time Mr. Salmon was absent on a tour of inspection. Mr. Drissol, his aide, was contacted and instructions given him relative to distribution. Mr. Drissol desired to take no action until official instructions were received by letter. These instructions were signed by Seoney on December 8.

I again contacted Mr. Drissol but he seemed reluctant to take action, stating that Mr. Salmon was due to return to his post in the next day or two. Mr. Salmon called Captain Safford, about December 19, and inquired into certain details of the Shipping Control Cipher. He stated that he desired further discussion but was so heavily laden with work at the time that he preferred to delay until after the Christmas holidays.

On January 2, I paid a visit to Mr. Salmon at the State Department and further discussed the distribution of the cipher, stating that the commencement of distribution was most imperative. Mr. Salmon agreed to take immediate action. I told him that we would be glad to cooperate in any way.

Yesterday (January 16) finding that no action had been taken, the ciphers were obtained from the State Department, with Mr. Salmon's approval, and delivered to C.N.I. mail room. C.N.I. will give this distribution priority.

Respectfully,

T.A. Smith,
Cp-20-CC.

(SC)N36-10
(03900A)

January 18, 1942

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL LEIGH NOYES

Please note the enclosed letter from the Secretary of State asking for some cipher machines. Will you advise me as to how to answer this letter and just what we can do.

FK

Attachment

14

file

Op-13A/PS Jan. 15.
(SC)A6-3(7)
Serial No.04413

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sir:

At the request of the Navy Department, certain consular officials of the State Department have been for some time making confidential reports of shipping to and from the ports at which these officials are stationed.

A representative of the State Department recently called the attention of a representative of the Navy Department to the fact that certain of the State Department codes used for these shipping reports are definitely known to have been compromised, or are of a low degree of security.

While appreciating the fact that these codes have been compromised, it is felt that until secure codes now in process of distribution are received the information in regard to ship movements is of such importance that the possibility of interception must be accepted.

Respectfully,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

CC: Op-16
Op-20
Op-38

January 26, 1942

OP-20-3 / EP (LPS 1/24/42)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Subject: Cipher Machines for the State Department.

Enclosures: (A) Tentative letter to the Secretary of State.

1. It is possible to fully comply with the request of the Secretary of State, dated January 16, 1942, for 80 cipher machines and 300 wheel sets. The Chief of the Bureau of Ships has indicated that he could handle all charges out of Navy funds and without specific authorization.

2. It is proposed to issue these machines, together with wheel sets, instructions, etc., to the State Department without charge on a loan basis, but the Navy retaining ownership. The Navy will retain a reserve of approximately ten machines at the Washington Navy Yard and will handle the matter of overhaul and repairs by recalling a defective machine and issuing a new machine as replacement. The State Department will be responsible for accounting for the individual machines. This same procedure is followed with other codes and ciphers which in past times have been furnished by the Navy to the State Department or by the State Department to the Navy, as the case may be.

3. A tentative reply to the Secretary of State is appended.

Respectfully,

H. R. Stark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 26, 1942

Op-20-G /EF (LFS 1/24/42)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subject: Cipher Machines for the State Department.

Enclosure: (A) Tentative letter to the Secretary of State.

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2. It is proposed to issue these machines, together with wheel sets, instructions, etc., to the State Department without charge on a loan basis, but the Navy retaining ownership. The Navy will retain a reserve of approximately ten machines at the Washington Navy Yard and will handle the matter of overhaul and repairs by recalling a defective machine and issuing a new machine as replacement. The State Department will be responsible for accounting for the individual machines. This same procedure is followed with other codes and ciphers which in past times have been furnished by the Navy to the State Department or by the State Department to the Navy, as the case may be.

3. A tentative reply to the Secretary of State is appended.

Respectfully,

H. R. Stark

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

January 31, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(SC) H36-196900A

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate with the State Department in supplying eighty cipher machines and three hundred wheel sets, as requested in your letter of January 16, 1942.

It is believed preferable that the Navy Department retain the title to these machines and issue them on a loan basis for an indefinite period, the same as has been done with codes and ciphers issued by the Navy to the State Department, or vice versa. In this way the Navy Department will be responsible for the repair and upkeep of these machines (aside from routine cleaning and maintenance) and awkward questions of accounting and transfer of funds will be avoided.

It will be possible to issue a few machines in the near future but it will be at least six months to a year before all eighty machines can be made available. This is due to the fact that many of these machines will have to be recalled from ships in the Pacific, and the fact that the machines will have to undergo thorough overhaul and modernization prior to issue.

The Navy Department is only too glad to cooperate with the Department of State in strengthening its communication facilities and preserving the secrecy of its message.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

January 31, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(SC) N36-105900A)

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate with the State Department in supplying eighty cipher machines and three hundred wheel sets, as requested in your letter of January 16, 1942.

It is believed preferable that the Navy Department retain the title to these machines and issue them on a loan basis for an indefinite period, the same as has been done with codes and ciphers issued by the Navy to the State Department, or vice versa. In this way the Navy Department will be responsible for the repair and upkeep of these machines (aside from routine cleaning and maintenance) and awkward questions of accounting and transfer of funds will be avoided.

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The Navy Department is only too glad to cooperate with the Department of State in strengthening its communication facilities and preserving the secrecy of its message.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

RETURN TO 20-G ✓
20-GC

dup & simplified
(copy 2 - ltr in file)

Op-20-G/EP
(EC)N34-10
Serial 05920

(LFB 2/4/42)

FEB 5 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
Subject: Cipher Machines for State Department.
Reference: (a) Secnav Conf Ltr (EC)N34-10 (05900A)
of January 31, 1942.
(b) Opnav Conf Serial 02120 of January 13,
1942.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. In reference (a), the Secretary of the Navy agreed to make available to the State Department 20 cipher machines and 300 associated wheel sets.

2. It is requested that 20 Mark III ECM's (CSP 1127) and 300 Mark III ECM wheel sets be manufactured by the Washington Navy Yard and turned over to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publication Section) for distribution. This is in addition to the 20 Mark III ECM's (CSP 1127) requested in reference (b).

3. Authority is hereby granted the Washington Navy Yard to utilize 20 CSP 691 and 692 devices for this purpose, as they become available. Authority is also granted to utilize CSP 694 devices, as necessary, in case there is undue delay in the procurement of unalred ECM wheel sets. Destruction reports for CSP's 691, 692 and 694 should be submitted together with preparation reports for CSP 1127 and associated publications.

4. It is understood that the Chief of the Bureau of Ships has funds available for this purpose.

Copy to:
Comdt, Washington Navy Yard.
Registered Publication Section.

John E. ...
...

RETURN TO 20-G
20-GC

CONFIDENTIAL

Op-20-G/EF (LFS 2/4/42)
(SC)N36-10
Serial 05920

FEB 5 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
Subject: Cipher Machines for State Department
Reference: (a) Secnav Conf Ltr (SC)N36-10 (05900A):
of January 31 1942.
(b) Opnav conf Serial 02120 of January 13,
1942.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. In reference (a), the Secretary of the Navy agreed to make available to the State Department 80 cipher machines and 300 associated wheel sets.

2. It is requested that 80 Mark III HCM's (CSP 1127) and 300 Mark III HCM wheel sets be manufactured by the Washington Navy Yard and turned over to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publication Section) for distribution. This is in addition to the 20 Mark III HCM's (CSP 1127) requested in reference (b).

3. Authority is hereby granted the Washinton Navy Yard to utilize 80 CSP 691 and 692 devices for this purpose, as they become available. Authority is also granted to utilize CSP 694 devices, as necessary, in case there is undue delay in the procurement of unwired HCM wheel sets. Destruction reports for CSP's 691, 692 and 694 should be submitted together with preparation reports for CSP 1127 and associated publications.

4. It is understood that the Chief of the Bureau of Ships has funds available for this purpose.

Joseph R. Redman
By direction

Copy to:
Comdt. Washington Navy Yard.
Registered Publication Section.

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

COPY

C-N36-10(483)
Serial 483-717

Feb. 24, 1942

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
To : The Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington.
Subject: Bureau of Ships Project Orders 510/42,
516/42, and 531/42 to Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Reference: (a) OPNAV Conf. Ltr. Op-20-C/EF (SC) N36-10,
Serial 05920 of February 5, 1942.

1. A recent directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, reference (a), authorizes the utilization of 102 Mark I ECM's for the manufacture of CSP-1127 devices on Bureau of Ships Project Order 531/42. This directive obviates the need for the further manufacture of Mark I ECM adapters on Bureau of Ships Project Order 510/42.

2. It is requested that copies of destruction reports for Mark I ECM's, submitted in accordance with reference (a), be retained in the applicable project order file.

3. It is requested that Project Order 510/42 be terminated and that the balance of funds remaining; unexpended be returned to the Bureau of Ships. Parts built on Project Order 510/42 may be used to complete equipment being constructed on Bureau of Ships Project Orders 516/42 and 531/42.

4. It is requested that this Bureau be notified of the date of termination and of the unexpended balance of Project Order 510/42.

/s/ S. F. PATTON
By direction

Copy to:
BUSANDA
OPNAV (Op-20-G)

COPY

162

~~TOP SECRET~~
Op-20-0/1k (LES 2/27/42)
(69)135-10
Serial 08222

February 28, 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

Subject: ECM Adaptor (CAF 961) - Manufacture of.

Reference: (a) Supply Conf. Ltr. Serial 453-717 of February 24, 1942, to Commandant Washington Navy Yard.

1. Reference (a) closed out the project order for the manufacture of the subject device by the Washington Navy Yard due to the fact that 102 CAF 691 devices would be utilized for the manufacture of CAF 1127 devices. This action is considered desirable in order to obviate any possibility of misunderstanding.

2. After the manufacture of the CAF 1127 devices there will remain about 85 CAF 691 devices which are in good condition but of no further use in their present form. These are capable of conversion to the cryptographic equivalent of the Mark II ECM. It is desired that two ECM adaptors be manufactured for each of the above Mark I ECM's, so that all Mark I and Mark II ECM's will have two "baskets" per machine. It is understood that most of the parts for these adaptors have been made but the final assembly has not been started.

3. It is therefore requested that a project order be issued for the manufacture of 170 ECM adaptors (CAF 691) in accordance with original plans. Eighty-five of these should be given fairly high priority and the remaining 85 may be given low priority. These should be turned over to the Registered Publication Section for distribution when completed.

4. It is also requested that 85 conversion kits be made up so that the necessary alterations to CAF 691 can be made on short notice.

Copy to:

Comdt. Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. JOSEPH R. REIDMAN
Chief of Bur. of Supplies & Accounts By direction
Registered Publication Section

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-Q/ik
(SC)N36-10
Serial 08220

(LFS 2/27/42)

February 26, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
Subject: ECM Adapter (CSP 961) - Manufacture of.
Reference: (a) Buships Conf. Ltr. Serial A83-717 of February 24, to Commandant Washington Navy Yard.

1. Reference (a) closed out the project order for the manufacture of the subject device by the Washington Navy Yard due to the fact that 102 CSP 691 devices would be utilized for the manufacture of CSP 1127 devices. This action is considered desirable in order to obviate any possibility of misunderstanding.

2. After manufacture of the CSP 1127 devices there will remain about 85 CSP 691 devices which are in good condition but of no further use in their present form. These are capable of conversion to the cryptographic equivalent of the Mark III ECM. It is desired that two ECM adapters be manufactured for each of the above Mark I ECM's, so that all Mark I and Mark II ECM's will have two "baskets" per machine. It is understood that most of the parts for these adapters have been made but the final assembly has not been started.

3. It is therefore requested that a project order be issued for the manufacture of 170 ECM adapters (CSP 691) in accordance with original plans. Eighty-five of these should be given fairly high priority and the remaining 85 may be given low priority. These should be turned over to the Registered Publication Section for distribution when completed.

4. It is also requested that 85 conversion kits be made up so that the necessary alterations to CSP 691 can be made on short notice.

Copy to:

Comdt. Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. /s/ JOSEPH R. REDMAN
Chief of Bur. of Supplies & Accounts By direction
Registered Publication Section

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RETURN TO: 20-Q ✓
20-Q1

CP-20-Q/BR
(GC)AS-3/ES
Serial 08720

(LPS 3/2/42)

MAR 4 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Assistant Naval Attache, Managua, Nicaragua.
Via: The U.S. Naval Attache, Guatemala City, Guatemala.
Subject: State Department SP-1 Code - Request for copy of.
Reference: (a) Asst. Naval Attache, Managua, Conf. ltr.
AG-2/47-42, of December 22, 1941; with
Naval Attache, Guatemala City, 1st Ind.
Dated December 27, 1941.

1. Reference (a) requested copy of State Department SP-1 Code for reporting ship movements.
2. A special cipher (CSP 1302) has been recently furnished for reporting ship movements and for other communications between Consular and Naval Officials in Latin American countries.
3. In view of the foregoing, the SP-1 Code will not be issued.

Copy to:
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Registered Publication Section.

C-N36-10(483)
Serial 483-1142

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1942

Sir:

With reference to your recent conversation with Rear Admiral E. G. Allen regarding 80 code machines for the State Department, it is understood that these devices are identified as CSP-1127, that they are conversions of the CSP-691 and CSP-692 devices which are now being retired from field service, and that the conversion is being accomplished at the Washington Navy Yard. Components required for the conversions have been manufactured and final assembly operations have been initiated based on a production rate of 12 CSP-1127 devices per month.

A total of 102 CSP-1127 devices are scheduled for manufacture, 22 for the Navy and 80 for the State Department. The delivery schedule for these devices is as follows:

<u>Delivery Date</u>	<u>Number of CSP-1127's</u>	
	<u>Navy Dept.</u>	<u>State Dept.</u>
Prior to June 20, 1942	18	2
June 30	4	6
July 31	0	12
Aug. 31	0	12
Sept. 30	0	12
Oct. 31	0	12
Nov. 30	0	12
Dec. 31	0	12
Total delivered	<u>22</u>	<u>80</u>

The delivery of 12 CSP-1127's per month beginning July 31 will be improved if practicable.

Respectfully,

A. H. Van Keuren
Chief of Bureau of Ships

Mr. R. D. Vining,
Bureau of the Budget,
17th & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dept. file: (SC)N36-10

Doc. 54006

COPY

May 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM for: The Army and Navy Representatives considering the question of Suppression of Clandestine Radio Stations in Latin America.

1. The following countries have agreed to send radio personnel to Washington for the course of instruction to be given at the Federal Communications Commission, in accordance with the letter sent out by the State Department on April 1, 1942, to all Latin American countries:

Argentina
Brazil
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay

2. Guatemala stated that it was in general accord with the plan but did not desire to send men at this time. The State Department has sent an additional request asking that men be sent at this time, explaining that it is desirable for all of these men to come at one time.

3. Mr. de Wolf of the State Department believes it would be possible to make the necessary arrangements to have these men here to begin their training on June 1.

4. Mr. Siling and Mr. Norman of the Federal Communications Commission stated that they could begin the training course at any time, provided they were given sufficient notice to make the necessary preparations. The course will take approximately one month. They both feel that these classes should be limited to not more than 24 men at one time. Their facilities are not such that they can handle more men without disrupting their own operations, which must continue while the training course is in progress.

5. Mr. Bonsal in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs has reported that his office will take charge of getting the men to Washington, providing for them while here, and assure return to their respective countries. He stated that through the student exchange system set up to handle problems of this nature, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs could take care of this matter very easily. This work will be coordinated with the State Department.

6. The equipment to be used in the location of the clandestine radio stations is either available at present or is on order. The 10 Adcock type direction finders to be set up at various locations in South America are available at any time. Lt. Comdr. Walker has charge of this equipment at present, and is holding it until such time as it will be needed. The 50 portable, loop-type direction finders, the ten high frequency transmitters, and the 20 fixed frequency receivers requested are on order in the Bureau of Ships and will be available in July. The 10 commercial communication receivers and the 10 frequency meters are on order in the Bureau of Ships and will be available very soon.

7. When the men finish their course at the Federal Communications Commission in July, provided they begin June 1, all of the equipment ready for transportation and installation will be available. The plan is to have this go back with the personnel who are to use it and have them install it immediately.

8. The details as to how the system for the location of clandestine stations is to operate will be worked out by Mr. Herman, based on the F.C.C.'s experience in doing similar work in this country.

9. The Director of Naval Communications will work out a suitable code for the use of the 10 major station networks for intercommunications in connection with their work.

S. C. Hooper,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

COPY

OP-20-3/100
(SC) P11-1/N34-10
Serial 026220

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington.
Subject: Instruction in Cipher Machine.

1. It is requested that arrangements be made for Mr. Paul E. Goldsberry of the State Department to be given instruction in the care and operation of CSP 1127 and associated publications at the Radio Laboratory of the Washington Navy Yard.

2. Please inform the Vice Chief of Naval Operations when these arrangements have been made in order that Mr. Goldsberry may be advised.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op-20-Q/fbd
(SC) P11-1/N3h-10
Serial 026420

JUL 31 1942

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington.
Subject: Instruction in Cipher Machines

1 It is requested that arrangements be made for Mr. Paul E. Goldsberry of the State Department to be given instruction in the care and operation of CSP 1127 and associated publications at the Radio Laboratory of the Washington Navy Yard.

2. Please inform the Vice Chief of Naval Operations when these arrangements have been made in order that Mr. Goldsberry may be advised.

Joseph R. Redman
By direction

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
July 31, 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to a request from the Department of State, dated January 16, 1942, the Navy Department on January 31, 1942, graciously agreed to loan to this Department eighty cryptographic machines and corresponding rotor equipment. Thus far, under this arrangement twenty offices have been or are in the process of being equipped with these machines, and the State Department desires to express its deep appreciation for this valued assistance.

As this Department has experienced considerable difficulty in keeping the machines presently used in operative condition, it is anxious to have the most up-to-date electrically operated cryptographic machine obtainable to meet its present and postwar needs and in this connection it is understood that the Navy Department has newer and sturdier electrically operated cryptographic machines in operation. Therefore, it is earnestly requested that sympathetic consideration be given to the loan to this Department of a corresponding number of the latest type of machine in use by the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.

Dept. file: (SC)N36-10/ES

Doc. 129811

Op-20-K-mr
Serial 01606920
(SC)N36-10

7 AUG 1944

MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Communications
To: Sub Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Release of ECM to State Department

1. From unofficial information received by me, I understand that the Secretary of State has, or will in the very near future, forward a letter to the Secretary of the Navy requesting that the State Department be supplied with the latest and most up-to-date cipher machine which the Navy has available. This machine is in use by both the Army and Navy for encrypting our highest forms of classified traffic. It carries today approximately 85 per cent of all classified dispatches passing through the Naval Communication Service. The Navy Department has maintained the policy of not allowing this machine to be used by anyone other than the U.S. Army and Navy, and it is considered that this policy should be strictly adhered to. The Officer-in-Charge of the Army Signal Security Agency concurs in this policy.
2. For reasons of communication security, it is considered it would be most undesirable to release ECM to the State Department, at least for the duration of the war.
3. This memo is for your advanced information only.

J. V. Murphy
Acting

ES 24
Pers-4-ohs

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

JUN 20 1945

To: All Stations within the Continental United States
(except Alaska and Newfoundland)
ComNavEu
ComTen

Subj: Application for designation to take the written examination
for a commission as Foreign Service Officer, Unclassified.

1. General. The Department of State has urgent need for additional Foreign Service Officers, Unclassified. Information concerning the Foreign Service of the United States, its organization and functions, the classification and duties of Foreign Service Officers, and methods of selection, and opportunities for entrance into the Foreign Service of the United States are described in the enclosed Department of State Circular and application blank.

Etc, etc, etc.

Copy of ltr in EN4 BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL file

Op-20-4-isp
Serial 04120
(SC)A6-3

25 Jul 1945

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This is written in response to your letter of 13 July 1945, in which you forwarded a copy of the Executive Order of 3 July 1945, creating the Cryptographic Security Board. It is noted that you have appointed Mr. Julius C. Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State, as the State Department member of the Cryptographic Security Coordinating Committee. I have designated the Director of Naval Communications to serve as the Navy member of the Coordinating Committee. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, USN, is the Director of Naval Communications, and is advised of his appointment.

In anticipation of the President's creation of the Cryptographic Security Board, certain plans for the implementation of its functions have been developed in the Navy Department. Admiral Redman will submit these plans to Mr. Holmes, and to the War Department member of the Coordinating Committee, as tentative recommendations for consideration by the Coordinating Committee. It is hoped that they will be helpful to that Committee in formulating organization plans for submission to the Cryptographic Security Board at an early date. After recommendations are received from the Coordinating Committee, you will doubtless wish to hold a meeting of the Cryptographic Security Board for the official establishment and authorization of the working organization in its lower echelons.

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

See also ltr from DUC to Hon. Julius C. Holmes
and Secy of State for Administration, State Dept.
Ser. 04120 of 30 July 1945 in "QB Cryptographic
Security Board" file.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Op-20-NI-gb

File -
Diss. of CIA to
State EPS

5 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. R. F. PACKARD, STATE SPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF

From: Alexander S. Bortolet, Op-20-NI.

Subject: Identification of State EPS Packages.

1. The Supplementary Activity correspondence section (Op-20-NB) desires to log in all packages received. It is therefore requested that the packages from the State Special Projects Staff to Op-20-NI have entries on the outer envelope indicating (1) the name of the originating section and (2) a package number. The packages will not be opened by anyone except the authorized personnel in Op-20-NI.

S. BERTOLET

cc: Op-20-NI-5
Op-20-NB

Capt. Hewitt
THU

SA-E - Mr. Hamba

June 6, 1947

SPS - Mr. Packard

Teletype Circuits within the New SPS Area.

Arrangements have been concluded with the Communications Supplementary Activity Washington (CSAW), Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Intelligence Division, WDC (ID) whereby 3 teletype circuits are to be installed for use between the new SPS area and those organizations. These circuits are as follows:

No. 1: From Room 7016, New State Department Building to Room 5208, Naval Communications Annex, 3301 Nebraska Avenue, NW, (SPS - CSAW).

No. 2: From Room 7016, New State Department Building to Room 161C-3, Arlington Hall Station, Lee Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia (SPS - ASA).

No. 3: From Room 7016, New State Department Building to Room 2C-553, the Pentagon (SPS - ID).

SA-E has agreed to (1) obtain the circuits, (2) effect installation of the circuits and terminal equipment, and (3) bear the expense of installation, maintenance and monthly rental of the circuits. CSAW, ASA and ID, respectively, have agreed to provide Navy and Army owned (rent-free) terminal equipment and the necessary cryptographic devices for both terminals of all these circuits.

The Department of State should make arrangements for the procurement and installation of all these circuits.

(1) Terminal equipment for circuit No. 1 (SPS - CSAW) will be provided by CSAW upon advice that the circuit has been installed. Any questions concerning this circuit and the installation of its terminal equipment should be referred directly to Captain L. S. Hewitt of CSAW at the Naval Communications Annex (Ordway 2800, Ext. 3851) or Mr. Packard of SPS (REpublic 5600, Ext. 3274). The Departmental requisition for installation of this circuit need not include terminal equipment.

(2) Terminal equipment for circuit No. 2 (SPS-ASA) and circuit No. 3 (SPS - ID) will be provided by the Army Communications Service, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, War Department. Any questions concerning circuits No. 2 and No. 3 and the installation of their terminal equipment should be referred to Mr. George Porter of ASA at Arlington Hall Station.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Glabe 4300, Ext. 265) and Capt. G. E. Wicker of Special Distribution Branch, ID (Republic 6700, Ext. 72248), respectively, or Mr. Packard of SPS (Republic 4300, Ext. 3274).

(3) The Departmental requisition for circuits No. 2 and No. 3 should include the terminal equipment and cipher devices listed below with a statement to the effect that this equipment and cipher devices are to be ordered from the Army Communications Service, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

4 Sub-sets (131-B-2)

4 Printers (M-15-132)

4 Cipher devices (SIGRUAD)

It is requested that steps be taken and requisitions initiated to obtain the circuits and equipment specified above and provide for their installation at the time when the operating office of the Special Projects Staff moves from the Pentagon to its new location within the New State Department Building. It is further requested that Mr. Packard of SPS be advised of the steps which have been taken.

~~RESTRICTED~~

(GLEbe 4300, Ext. 265) and Capt. G. E. Wicker of Special Distribution Branch, ID (REpublic 6700, Ext. 72246), respectively, or Mr. Packard of SPS (REpublic 5600, Ext. 3274).

(3) The Departmental requisition for circuits No. 2 and No. 3 should include the terminal equipment and cipher devices listed below with a statement to the effect that this equipment and cipher devices are to be ordered from the Army Communications Service, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

4 Sub-sets (131-B-2)

4 Printers (M-15-XSR)

4 Cipher devices (SIGHUAD)

It is requested that steps be taken and requisitions initiated to obtain the circuits and equipment specified above and provide for their installation at the time when the operating office of the Special Projects Staff moves from the Pentagon to its new location within the New State Department Building. It is further requested that Mr. Packard of SPS be advised of the steps which have been taken.

~~RESTRICTED~~

SPS:RFP:lgc

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

~~RESTRICTED~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

100
200



June 12, 1947

Memorandum for Captain L. S. Howett, Room 17109,
Naval Communications Annex

Subject: Teletype Circuits to the Special Projects Staff, Department
of State.

Enclosed please find one copy of a memorandum which has been forwarded to the Division of Central Services, Department of State to initiate arrangements for the procurement and installation of teletype circuits to the new Special Projects Staff area in the New State Department Building.

I am advised that the circuits will be installed by the telephone company within the next few days.

As yet, no definite date has been established for the transfer of the Special Projects Staff. However, the transfer will not take place prior to July 1. It is therefore suggested that the terminal equipment not be made available or installed until just prior to the transfer of the Special Projects Staff. I shall advise you as soon as the date of transfer is established.

Robert F. Packard
Chief, Liaison Section
Special Projects Staff

Copy

~~RESTRICTED~~

OUTGOING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
May 11, 1948
12:30 p.m.

3
J
ORIGIN CY
INFO
FC
GFS
ODA

MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY ATTACHE AND NAVAL
ATTACHE CRYPTOGRAPHIC MACHINES

CIRCULAR TO

CERTAIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS

Arrangements have been worked out between the Department of State and the Departments of the Army and Navy whereby the Department of State has agreed to supply service for cryptographic equipment held by Military and Naval Attaches when required and when convenient to the Foreign Service establishment providing the service. Communications Technicians are hereby instructed to make themselves available to Military and Naval Attaches whenever servicing equipment at any location where MA's or NA's are assigned.

Machines held by Military and Naval Attaches are to receive the same service as if the machines were those of the Department of State. Spare parts provided for Department of State machines may be used to repair Attaches machines at the communications technicians' discretion. Any parts thus used are to be reported to the Division of Cryptography on the standard form used when repairing machines in order that replacements may be obtained. Any service offered or performed not reported on the standard form, shall be reported in the communications technicians' monthly reports to the Department.

MARSHALL

Sent to:

USPOLAD, BERLIN
AMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES
LEGATION, CAIRO
AMBASSY, LONDON
AMBASSY, PANAMA

AMBASSY, PARIS
AMBASSY, ROME
AMERICAN CONSUL, SHANGHAI (CHINA)
AMBASSY, CANBERRA

ODA

CY:RVAnderson:ms
WEGoodman
5-7-48

181

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

AG-4

A

15 July 1949

KGC
K Sec 13
K5 TG
K7 R.H.F.

AF-KIB

MEMORANDUM

To: All Bureaus, Boards and Offices, Navy Department
Commandant, Marine Corps

Subj: Communication with the Department of State

1. The Secretary of Defense has requested that in the future, copies of every communication sent to, or received from, the Department of State by Departments and Agencies of the National Military Establishment be furnished his office.

2. In order to comply, it is requested that the following procedure be followed by Bureaus, Boards, and Offices of the Navy Department, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

(a) Provide this office with one additional copy of all correspondence to the Department of State prepared for the Secretary of the Navy's signature.

(b) Forward two copies of each incoming and outgoing direct communication with the Department of State to this office.

3. Copies of voluminous attachments and enclosures to letters and memoranda are not required.

/e/ D. T. Hammond
D. T. HAMMOND
Commander, U.S. Navy
Administrative Officer

C O P Y

2881

AS

MEMO FOR FILE

25 July 1949.

Memorandum for File:

Subject: Security Review of State Department White Paper on China.

1. At 1300 on 23 July, Captain Hansen and Mr. Shaw, ^{who} ~~that~~ acted on orders from Joint Chiefs of Staffs, U.S. Communication Intelligence had directed the forthcoming State white paper on China be screened to insure that the extensive quotations from messages occurring therein and which effect the security of Army, Navy and Air Force, State Department crypto systems. The Army was assigned primary responsibility ^{for} of this screening and Captain Hansen was instructed to furnish a working party. A statement as to the extent to which security was violated was to be presented to USCIB on Monday morning 25 July 1949.

2. The Army and the Air Force ^{Succeeded in identifying a} ~~searched for~~ small number of Army messages and in satisfying themselves as to the security of the systems involved.

3. The author of the document informed Navy representatives ^{that} ~~or~~ only about 2 Navy messages were involved, ~~and~~ that, Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Hurley were known to have used US Navy systems on occasion, ^{and that the} ~~the~~ Navy messages concerned ^{would} ~~to have~~ probably been found in the Chapters of Harriman and Hurley, VIZ., Chapters 3 and 4. He also provided the Navy representatives with Copies of the following Top Secret Naval messages, ^{encrypted} ~~secret~~ of which were found in CP-202E2 files:

<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>NOE</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>YEAR</u>
ComNavOps China	101436	7123	June	1945
Alusna Moscow	101435	16	Aug	1945
Alusna Moscow	141040	2402	Aug	1945
Alusna Moscow	111258	652	Aug	1945
Alusna Moscow	141845	2602	Aug	1945
Alusna Moscow	092630	8779	Aug	1945
ComNavOps China	111543	8340	Sept	1945

4. On page F63 of the galley proofs quotations were found from Alusna Moscow 101425 August 1945 and 141040 Aug 1945. These were verbatim quotations but very brief. The quotation from 101425 consisted of 2 sentences of about half the actual message, but was not identified in the text as having come from any message. The quotation from 141040 consisted of one sentence ^{part} of a 5 page message; in the text ~~with the message~~ ~~with the message~~ ~~with the message~~ it was not stated that the quotation came from a message, after considerable investigation the Navy representatives were unable to find in the text the material contained in other 5 messages.

5. In view of the lack of identification of msgs in the text of the documents, the publication of the extracts mentioned in the preceding paragraph is ~~considered to be~~ considered to be an acceptable risk.

6. The document was further reviewed on Saturday, 23 July, and a concerted effort was made to identify Naval messages from which any of the Harrison and Kuryev quotations could have been taken. With the possible exception of Alusna Moscow 231053Z April 1945, a translation of which is not available, no further Naval messages were identifiable.

7. The Moscow messages were all encrypted in CSP 1964, a special U.S. Navy COM, and the ComNavGru China messages were encrypted in the CSP 1844, A special U.S. Navy COM. These systems were provided for attaché posts in exposed positions, and were not held outside the Intelligence structure.

8. In view of the fact that several thousand State Department documents are involved, OP-302K gave no assurance that State systems were adequately protected. Mr. PARKER has stated that State systems are protected to his own satisfaction.

9. The manner in which references were phrased in the White Paper leaves much to be desired from a communication security standpoint. The paper itself was uneven in this respect: sometimes a quotation was introduced by a phrase such as: "It was reported that ..."; at other times, unfortunately, quotations were prefaced by: "On xx April 19xx, Ambassador Hurley sent the following telegram from Chungking:". Much of the difficulty encountered in this review could have been removed by using the general phrase in each instance; the narrative would not have suffered thereby. Another objectionable practice was the identifying of a paraphrased message by prefacing it with the word "Paraphrase"; this type of identification is extremely dangerous, and does not add to the value of the document.

10. * Tremendous aid in such a review would be obtained by requiring that all messages used as source material be appended to the document when it is submitted for review. If this were done as the document was written, it would not involve any additional labor.

A. Hansen
Capt USN

D/T G R	FROM	TO	NCRS	Prec.	CLASS IFICA TION	SYS
111543 Sept 45	CCMNAVGR CHINA	COMINCH	8340	P	T/S	1844
141845 Aug 45	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRESIDENT SECSTATE	2502	P	T/S	1964
082330 Aug 45	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRESIDENT SECSTATE	8773	P	T/S	1964
111258 Aug 45	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRESIDENT SECSTATE	652	Urgent	T/S	1964
151826 Jun 45 (D/T not on msg)	AAS. HURLEY	SECSTATE	7128	CP	T/S	1844
101425 Aug 45	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRESIDENT SECSTATE	16	P	T/S	1964
141040 Aug 45	ALUSNA MOSCOW	CFO	2402	Urgent	T/S	1964

Special Hard Searches Made

Chart 3, page F 46 - "Section IV. China and the Soviet Union"

Message from Moscow Amb. to SecState of 4 February 1945 re "agenda for Soong's Moscow conversations"

Note: not located at annex or in Sec or TopSec at NCR.

Chart 3, page F 46 - msg from General Hurley (Moscow to Wash) Act SecState Treas of February 18.

Note: not located at Annex or in Sec or Top Sec at NCR

Chart 3:, page F48: section on "Comments on Hurley's Report";

"The Charge d'affairs in Moscow, George Kennan, sent a telegram dated 23 April to Mr. Harriman personally in Wash commenting in part as follows":

Note: not located at Annex or sec or top sec at NCR.

Chart 4:, page F60: section on "United States Reaction to the Treaty":

"In a telegram of Sept 10, 1945, to the Department the American Embassy in Moscow summarized its views with respect to Russian intentions in the Far East as follows: ---- longquote

Note: Not located at Annex or sec or top sec at NCR

Special Hard Searches Made

Chapt 3, page F 46 - "Section IV. China and the Soviet Union"

Message from Moscow Amb. to SecState of 4 February 1945 re"agenda
for Soong's Moscow conversations"

Note: not located at annex or in Sec or TopSec at NCR.

Chapt 3, page F 46 - msg from General Hurley(Moscow to Wash) Act SEcState
Grew of February 18.

Note: not located at Annex or in Sec or: Top Sec at NCR

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Embassy in Moscow summarized its views with respect to Russian
intentions in the Far East as follows: ---- loggquote

Note: Not located at Annex or sec or top sec at NCR

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

2 clips on ~~message~~

~~SECRET~~
Albana Moscow 101425Z (~~SECRET~~ NOR 16) Aug 1945) 2 page msg

Personal and top secret ^{For} ~~FROM~~ the president and Sec State from Harriman:

-----"I told him also as a matter of record that the United States government considered that his present proposals had fulfilled the Yalta agreement and that any further concessions would be with the understanding that they were made by the Chinese government because of the value it attached to obtaining Soviet support in other directions. He thoroughly understands and accepts the correctness of this position."

Text in book:

page F 58, Chapt 4:

"On 10 August, 1945, Mr Harriman, acting on instructions, informed Dr. Soong as a matter of record that the United States Government considered that the proposals which he had already made fulfilled the Yalta agreement and that any further concessions would be with the understanding that they were made by the Chinese Government because of the value it attached to obtaining Soviet support in other directions. Mr. Harriman reported that Dr. Soong "thoroughly understood and accepted the correctness of this position"-----"

clip on right edge

Alusna Moscow 1 41040 (██████████ NCR 2402) August 1945 : Action : CMC.
(Note : This msg 5 pages long)
Personal and top secret for the president and the SecState from
Harriman

-----"He is very grateful for our support and is convinced that
unless we had taken an active part in the negotiations he would have
had to concede to all Stalins demands" -----

Text in book:
Chapt: 4, page F58

Footnote #8: "About Aug 10, 1945, Dr. Soong told Mr. Harriman that
agreement had been reached on all outstanding points. Mr. Harriman
reported that Dr. Soong was "very grateful for our support and is
convinced that unless we had taken an active part in the negotiations
he would have had to concede to all Stalins demands".

- Chapter I - A Century of American Policy 1844-1943
- Chapter II - A Review of Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Relations
1921 - 1944
- Chapter III - The Ambassadorship of Major General Patrick J. Hurley
1944-1946
- Chapter IV - The Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
1945
- Chapter V - The Mission of General George C. Marshall
- Chapter VI - The Ambassadorship of John Leighton Stuart 1947-1949
- Chapter VII - The Military Picture 1945-1949
- Chapter VIII - The Program of American Economic Aid 1947-1949

Each Chapter also contained an Annex

Special Agent
AS-6
Serial 135000-2

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. J.C. Crilly
Division of Foreign Reporting Services
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Subject: Telecommunications reporting.

1. The draft of the proposed Economic Reporting Circular on Telecommunications Reporting was furnished me by Miss Mitchell of your office on 14 November. As the key member of the working group appointed by the Telecommunications Committee to assist in the preparation of this circular, I concur in this draft subject to the following remarks:

- (a) Since the Department of Commerce Trade Lists are closely related to the reports required by the circular, it is suggested that the place of Trade Lists in the system of reports be shown by mentioning them in para. 3.22 of the circular and including an additional paragraph concerning them similar to paragraphs 3 and 4.
- (b) In page 4 of Appendix I, subparagraph 3.12(1), the parentheses around "residence and business extensions" do not seem to serve any purpose.
- (c) On page 10 of Appendix I, paragraph 3, the two lines at the end of this paragraph are not clear, but would seem to preclude reporting the information concerned from countries which are not members of the ITC. If so intended, this does not seem reasonable.
- (d) Since the basic reports will require some time to prepare if they are to be at all comprehensive, the due dates listed in Appendix III require revision depending on the date of issue of the circular.

2. In reply to a question asked by Miss Mitchell with regard to participation of Local Attaches in collection of the Telecommunications data, I have been advised that FBI concurs with the collection requirements set forth in the circular and will cooperate in the collection, provided copies of

OP-202B/rem
A6-2
Serial 11368P20

21 NOV 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. A.C. Crilley
Division of Foreign Reporting Service
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Subject: Telecommunications reporting.

1. The draft of the proposed Economic Reporting Circular on Telecommunications Reporting was furnished me by Miss Mitchell of your office on 10 November. As the Navy member of the working group appointed by the Telecommunications Committee to assist in the preparation of this circular, I concur in this draft subject to the following remarks:

- (a) Since the Department of Commerce Trade Lists are closely related to the reports required by the circular, it is suggested that the place of Trade Lists in the system of reports be shown by mentioning them in para. 2.12 of the circular and including an additional paragraph concerning them similar to paragraphs 3 and 4.
- (b) On page 4 of Appendix I, subparagraph A1(b)(2), the parentheses around "residence and business extensions" do not seem to serve any purpose.
- (c) On page 10 of Appendix I, paragraph 9, the two lines at the end of this paragraph are not clear, but would seem to preclude reporting the information concerned from countries which are not members of the ITU. If so intended, this does not seem reasonable.
- (d) Since the basic reports will require some time to prepare if they are to be at all comprehensive, the due dates listed in Appendix III require revision depending on the date of issue of the circular.

2. In reply to a question asked by Miss Mitchell with regard to participation of Naval Attaches in collection of the telecommunications data, I have been advised that ONI concurs with the collection requirements set forth in the circular and will cooperate in the collection, provided copies of

-1-

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

OSU
STATE DEPT
Op-2023/rom
73-2
Serial 11388P20

Subject: Telecommunications reporting.

The reports are furnished ONI. The various Naval Attaches will be told to cooperate in the collection of the economic data in addition to the responsibility for Naval Communications data which they already have as part of their military responsibility for things naval. In the field covered by the proposed draft, ONI feels that the Commercial Attaches should have prime significance in the same manner in which the Naval Attaches have significance in the Torin and Virginiana Field. In case you wish to see the general instructions which govern the Naval Attaches, reference is made to the Naval Intelligence Collection Instructions, a Confidential non-registered publication dated July 1949, of which 10 copies were furnished to the Department of State. Articles 1000, 1001, and 1002 thereof apply. In this connection, the Navy at present has attached in or responsible for 25 of the 28 locations listed in Appendix III of the proposed circular. In 17 of the 25, the attaches are responsible for the areas concerned but are assigned to posts in adjacent or nearby countries. Any questions that may arise concerning collection by the Navy may be referred to Captain H.M. Rodgers of ONI, Room 54730, Pentagon, telephone extension 5701.

5. When the circular is issued it is requested that a copy be furnished to the Office of Naval Intelligence and also that I be furnished one.

L.H. SCHULL
Commander, U.S. Navy
Navy Communication Station
3801 Nebraska Ave., S.F.

Copy to: Capt. H.M. Rodgers (Op-2023)

Op-2023
Op-2023
NB (3)

Op-202B/rem
A6-2
Serial 11368P20

21 NOV 1949

Subject: Telecommunications Reporting.

the reports are furnished ONI. The various Naval Attaches will be told to cooperate in the collection of economic data in addition to the responsibility for Naval Communications data which they already have as part of their primary responsibility for things naval. In the field covered by the proposed draft ONI feels that the Commercial Attaches should have prime cognizance in the same manner in which the Naval Attaches have cognizance in the Ports and Facilities field. In case you wish to see the general instructions which govern the Naval Attaches, reference is made to the Naval Intelligence Collection Instructions, a Confidential non-registered publication dated July 1949, of which 10 copies were furnished to the Department of State. Articles 1006, 1008, and 1009 thereof apply. In this connection, the Navy at present has attaches in or responsible for 55 of the 96 locations listed in Appendix III of the proposed circular. In 15 of the 55, the attaches are responsible for the areas concerned but are assigned to posts in adjacent or nearby countries. Any questions that may arise concerning collection by the Navy may be referred to Captain R.H. Rodgers of ONI, Room 5A736, Pentagon, telephone extension 6781.

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L.R. SCHULZ
Commander, U.S. Navy
Navy Communication Station
3801 Nebraska Ave., N.W.

Copy to: Capt. R.H. Rodgers (Op-30)

Op-202
Op-202B
NB (3)

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. A. G. Grilley
Division of Foreign Reporting Services
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Subject: Telecommunications Reporting.

1. This is to acknowledge receipt of your memorandum of 10 August and to comment on the Trade List instructions proposed by the Department of Commerce attached thereto.

2. The proposed Trade List instructions appear to be readily understandable, and the form attached for guidance provides a ready means of recording the information collected. It is noted that the information desired duplicates such, but not all, of that which is also listed in the Department of Commerce draft proposed instructions of March 1949 and in the draft proposed by the CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department. It is understood that the Trade List report is a spot or one-time affair, whereas the other 2 drafts of instructions (just mentioned) are intended to provide basic reports and periodic or recurring reports to keep the basic cases up to date. It seems to me that a requirement for spot reports in addition to basic and recurring reports would place an undue load on the reporting personnel in the field unless the spot reports are used sparingly. Because of the duplication involved, the result of such a load will be, I believe, to reduce the completeness or the number of the basic and recurring reports submitted.

3. No new items included in the 3 proposed drafts of instructions, I believe, all the elements of information required by the departments concerned. Some of these elements appear in all three drafts. In order to avoid confusion in the field, it seems to me that there should be only one set of instructions and that the duplication should be eliminated. I suggest that the solution to the problem, therefore, is to consolidate the 3 sets of instructions in to one. This might be done by the working committee, or preferably by a similar group of representatives from each of the Army, Navy, Department of State, and Department of Commerce. Since the Army has the service responsibility of preparing the national intelligence surveys, the Navy's

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. A. C. Crilley
Division of Foreign Reporting Services
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Subject: Telecommunications reporting.

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3. We now have included in the 3 proposed drafts of instructions, I believe, all the elements of information required by the departments concerned. Some of these elements appear in all three drafts. In order to avoid confusion in the field, it seems to me that there should be only one set of instructions and that the duplication should be eliminated. I suggest that the solution to the problem, therefore, is to consolidate the 3 sets of instructions in to one. This might be done by the working committee, or preferably by a smaller group of perhaps one representative each of the Army (representing the NME), FCC, Department of State, and Department of Commerce. Since the Army has the Service responsibility of preparing the national intelligence surveys, the Navy's

30 Aug 49

Subject: Telecommunications reporting.

Requirements will be reflected in those of the Army. The single draft thus prepared should then be considered by the entire working committee and accepted or altered by agreement or vote. If the consolidated list appears to be so long as to preclude accomplishing the task of collection of basic data in a reasonable length of time, I would favor eliminating some of the finer details.

4. The foregoing sums up my thoughts, as of now, on the problem before us. I shall be glad to meet with you or any of the committee whenever you wish and to assist in whatever way I can to complete the committee's work.

L. R. SCHULZ
CDR., U.S. Navy
Navy Communication Station
3801 Nebraska Ave., N.W.

67:
242
12(3)

30 Aug 49

Subject: Telecommunications reporting.

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L. R. SCHULZ
CDR., U.S. Navy
Navy Communication Station
3801 Nebraska Ave., N.W.

CC:
202
NB(3)

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REF ID: A6-3(2)

Serial: 0782

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Rec'd
 Action in AG
 9 Jan 51
 file 01366 P22*

A6-3(2)

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, U.S. ARMY
 DIRECTOR, NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
 DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Systems - use of by agencies not represented
 in USCIB

1. In my capacity as USCIB Coordinator, I have been requested to obtain the following information:

- a. What agencies not represented in USCIB make use of cryptographic systems and/or devices.
- b. Which of above agencies use cryptographic systems, the compromise of which would be injurious to the cryptographic security of USCIB activities.
- c. To what degree would activities of USCIB members be injured by the compromise referred to in b. above.

2. Any information or suggestions which you might have to offer with reference to the foregoing would be greatly appreciated. In particular, however, I would appreciate a list of any U.S. departments and agencies making use of cryptographic facilities of your department.

3. In response to a request similar to this one, I obtained the enclosed reply from the Chief, Division of Cryptography, State Department, which may be of interest to you, and indicates the nature of the information which I am requesting.

Earl E. Stone

Inclosure - 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply Refer To
AFSA-00/wn
Serial: 0782

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, U.S. ARMY
DIRECTOR, NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE

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s/ Earl E Stone

Inclosure - 1

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

(RTYPED FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1950

My dear Admiral Stone:

In answering the questions in your letter of 27 November 1950, Serial 0766, I am adding information which is related and which I think should be considered by USCIB members.

Question "a" could be answered by stating that in 1948 the Executive Committee of the Cryptographic Security Coordinating Committee knew of only three agencies, other than those represented on USCIB, holding cryptographic systems. These were the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, and The Panama Canal. I believe that a better answer to this question includes the attached list of departments and agencies which "make use of cryptographic systems" by bonding their messages to the State Department for transmission.

If agencies on the attached list did not use State Department facilities, many of them might have to make use of cryptographic systems of their own. Numerous requests for cryptographic systems were sent to the War and Navy Departments during World War II and a list of agencies which were supplied in that manner would be the most realistic answer to question "a". To this should be added those agencies which used commercially available systems; for example, the Office of War Information used Swedish Hagelin machines.

In answering question "b", I am assuming that a number of agencies, other than those represented on USCIB, "make use of cryptographic systems". If not strictly true now, I believe it would be in war time. Question "b" can be answered in a general way by saying that all agencies which receive information from others can injure cryptographic security if adequate protection is not given to classified information. An example of this is the interest of the Department of Defense in the China "White Paper" in July 1949.

I doubt that question "c" could be answered satisfactorily if all the data regarding a particular situation were known, because there are too many intangibles in cryptologic activities. Also, there are no good terms for expressing degree of injury to a cryptographic system and relating this injury to an activity would be even more difficult. No doubt this question anticipates a negative answer as seems to me to be the case for the other questions as well.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

/s/ L. T. Parke
L. T. Parke
Chief, Division of Cryptography

Dear Admiral Earl A. Stone,
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Washington, D.C.

202

Enclosure - 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 1, 1950

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I doubt that question "c" could be answered satisfactorily if all the data regarding a particular situation were known, because there are too many intangibles in cryptologic activities. Also, there are no good terms for expressing degree of injury to a cryptographic system and relating this injury to an activity would be even more difficult. No doubt this question anticipates a negative answer as seems to me to be the case for the other questions as well.

Sincerely yours.

/s/L.W. Parke
L.W. Parke
Chief, Division of Cryptography

Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone,
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Washington, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

Inclosure - 1

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

List of Departments and Agencies making use of
Department of State Cryptographic Facilities

Department of the Treasury
Department of Justice
Post Office Department
Department of the Interior
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Labor

Executive Offices of the President
War Claims Commission
General Accounting Office
Library of Congress

Economic Cooperation Administration

American Battle Monuments Commission
The American National Red Cross
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Civil Aeronautics Board
Displaced Persons Commission
Export - Import Bank of Washington
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Power Commission
Federal Reserve Board
Federal Security Agency
General Services Administration
Interstate Commerce Commission
U.S. Maritime Commission
National Academy of Sciences
National Labor Relations Board
The Panama Canal
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Securities and Exchange Commission
Smithsonian Institution
U.S. Tariff Commission
Veterans' Administration

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



STATE DEPT

650

In reply refer to
DC/S

December 28, 1950

A6-2(1)

①

My dear Admiral Redman:

Informal discussion took place on 21 December 1950 between representatives of the State Department, Captain A. M. Patterson of the Navy Department and Captain E. A. Taylor of the Standing Group, relative to the possible need for establishing separate cryptographic channels to handle U.S. State Department telegraphic communications in the COSMIC category between the Department and the London Embassy.

In this regard it was established and mutually agreed:

1. That the volume of such traffic so far generated is wholly negligible;
2. That there is nothing in immediate prospect to indicate a significant upward change in that volume;
3. That the situation obtaining at the moment in the London Embassy communications section is such that the installation and preparations necessary to the activation of such a channel, regardless of the volume actually transmitted, would constitute a real burden to the prejudice of other important operations;
4. That the War Department Crypto Center is prepared and willing to continue to accommodate the State traffic in the military channels at this end;
5. That

Rear Admiral John R. Redman,
Chief of Naval Communications,
Department of the Navy.

Approved by
SEC. 00066 P10
of 5 Feb 51

05375

5. That it would be most expedient if CINCNELM could accommodate the same traffic at the London end until or unless the volume should increase to the point where it constituted a disproportionate burden upon CINCNELM's operating facilities.

If the view expressed (in paragraph 5 above) is concurred in by your office, it is requested that CINCNELM be advised accordingly.

The Department appreciates your indulgence in this matter and awaits advice as to the final action taken.

Sincerely yours,



R. G. Kreer
Assistant Chief for Telegraph
Division of Communications and Records