

SRH-280

AN EXHIBIT OF THE IMPORTANT TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE RECOVERED
THROUGH READING JAPANESE CRYPTOGRAMS

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

 31 Date 11/2/84

NOTE

Although the handwritten note on the cover page states that the report consists of 243 pages, there are, in fact, only 239.

A comparison of the pages that the National Security Agency (NSA) has numbered 229 and 230 with the handwritten numbers on those pages, 225 and 230, respectively, would indicate that four pages may have been deleted by the NSA. Such is not the case. Those pages are missing; none have been withheld.

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SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY
CRYPTANALYTIC BRANCH

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AN EXHIBIT OF THE IMPORTANT TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE RECOVERED
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FOREWORD

On the occasion of an exhibition presented on 27 June 1944 by B-I to celebrate the achievement of high production and the anniversary of the reading of the first Japanese Army message, it was suggested that a report be prepared to illustrate the important kinds of intelligence recovered from reading Japanese messages. This report accordingly is a collection of translated messages and other data illustrating the types of intelligence available through the interception, cryptanalysis, decryptographing, translation and elucidation, and publication of Japanese messages. As such, in one sense, it supplements the photographic record of the B-I exhibition entitled the B-I Exhibit. Like the exhibition, it represents the work of the several sections of B Branch and of other branches. Thus neither the recovery of the intelligence nor this report on it would have been possible without the cooperation of the sections and the branches.

The three principal kinds of Japanese communications analyzed in the SSA--army, military attaché, and diplomatic--have yielded intelligence of value in many aspects of the war effort. In one very limited field alone, the reading of Japanese messages has supplied comprehensive information. The "Report on the Japanese Signal Intelligence Service" (second edition, 29 June 1944, prepared by the office of the Director of Communications Research), which runs to forty-nine pages exclusive of tabs, is evidence of the richness of the messages read. Concrete information on such subjects as the activities of army field forces, the personalities involved in cryptanalysis, the successes of Japanese traffic analysis and cryptanalysis, and collaboration with allied and neutral nations is to be found in the messages cited in this report. Such a report is one of the few sources of information available which shows to what uses the intelligence obtained from reading Japanese messages can be put. Consequently, the exhibits which follow have been selected according to the principle that they appear to those who process the messages as fruitful sources of the most vital information.

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SECTION I. JAPANESE ARMY COMMUNICATIONS

Types of intelligence derived	1
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1. Types of intelligence derived.--The SSA has now been reading Japanese Army cryptograms for more than a year. By 1 August 1944 upwards of 75,000 translated message parts had been published in the several series of the Bulletin. After several months of study and consultation with Special Branch, I & L prepared an analysis of the types of intelligence contained in these messages. This analysis showing the categories of subject matter of Japanese Army cryptograms is presented in tab A. A distribution of messages published over a period of four months (March to June) in the major Bulletin series according to the principal categories and according to the systems has been prepared and is presented in figure 1. From this it is apparent that most of the intelligence for this period in the first of the major army systems to be read-- (2468)--dealt with shipping and cargoes, and in the second type--the family--most of the intelligence dealt with military units and personnel. Of the total number of messages published in these two systems (nearly 40,000), the percentages for the several categories were:

I. Communications	less than 1 percent
II. Shipping	34 percent
A. Convoys	5 percent
B. Movements and activities of ships (other than convoys)	} 29 percent
C. Condition and identification of ships	
D. Jurisdiction	
E. Harbor and navigation information	
III. Military units and personnel	35 percent
A. Water transport	2 percent
B. Air forces	9 percent
C. Army railroads	2 percent
D. Other military units	} 22 percent
E. Morale	
F. Deaths	
G. Not specified above	
IV. Cargoes and materiel	18 percent
V. Army administration	8 percent
VI. Miscellaneous	6 percent
VII. Reports on Allied activities	6 percent

(The figures total more than 100 percent since one message may deal with more than one subject.)

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STATION	MESSAGE INTER- PREPARED	MESSAGE FOR DATA	TOTAL PDC- STATIONS	TOTAL STATIONS	I. COMMIT- MENTS		II A. COMMIT- MENTS		II B, C, D, E. OTHER MILITARY INFORMATION		III A. WATER TRANSPORTATION		III B. WATER TRANSPORTATION		III C. ARMY R. & A.		III D, E, F, G. OTHER MILITARY INFORMATION		IV. DUMKES		V. ARMY ADMINISTRATION		VI. MISCELLANEOUS		VII. REPORTS ON ALLIES		
					No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Total	19138	39921	11416	6258	18	1	487	6	2916	34	272	6	36	1	3	1	3	1	1747	16	351	4	396	5	151	1	
<p>ALLIED STATIONS</p> <p>Mar 1944</p>																											
Mar	1826	3331	215	91	-	-	-	-	7	8	1	1	6	6	1	1	37	46	23	29	3	3	4	4	13	14	
Apr	3045	1731	2661	264	7	2	4	1	63	22	0	0	15	4	2	2	158	53	46	14	33	19	28	28	12	4	
May	3445	548	2981	424	4	1	15	2	74	16	0	0	35	3	24	5	145	31	86	19	31	9	33	5	17	4	
Jun	3686	1528	1855	1457	3	1	48	3	241	17	38	2	279	18	73	3	368	27	213	19	127	9	39	4	16	2	
Total	23779	12316	2939	983	-	-	24	3	164	17	29	2	166	18	39	3	241	26	197	21	86	16	33	6	53	7	
<p>Mar 1945</p>																											
Mar	15277	31677	9698	3138	14	1	86	3	342	17	56	2	478	15	132	4	899	29	336	17	387	18	193	6	126	4	
Apr	20246	6806	1111	148	1	1	7	3	54	36	0	0	4	3	-	-	96	65	9	6	17	11	15	18	16	11	
May	18148	642	1426	254	3	1	1	1	13	5	0	0	19	7	16	6	96	38	44	16	31	12	14	6	21	8	
Jun	18312	989	1417	1898	1	1	23	2	496	19	16	2	117	12	18	3	266	28	128	13	105	18	36	4	78	7	
Total	17794	3661	1889	331	-	-	13	2	79	13	12	2	78	12	15	3	179	34	35	18	48	9	28	5	78	13	
<p>Mar 1946</p>																											
Mar	9114	4609	289	84	18	12	1	1	32	18	0	0	12	14	-	-	25	38	11	13	9	11	6	7	11	13	
Apr	8298	584	68	77	6	6	2	2	11	11	0	0	7	7	-	-	22	23	22	23	3	3	4	4	18	19	
May	8697	187	891	444	1	1	9	2	92	21	9	2	19	4	-	-	69	16	73	16	42	18	33	7	58	21	
Jun	5397	99	463	182	1	1	2	1	38	29	6	3	15	8	-	-	44	28	36	11	11	6	12	7	8	4	
Total	31392	4619	2487	893	18	2	14	2	187	23	15	2	53	7	-	-	156	19	161	29	67	8	36	7	131	16	
<p>Mar 1947</p>																											
Mar	31504	11798	1374	224	3	1	8	4	66	29	0	0	11	18	-	-	181	45	43	19	28	9	22	14	26	12	
Apr	47776	1428	2136	357	3	1	4	1	43	12	0	0	41	11	-	-	129	35	47	13	28	8	27	8	37	14	
May	66998	1529	2291	1338	9	1	21	4	296	22	34	3	247	18	-	-	262	28	129	15	118	9	26	2	26	7	
Jun	78677	13218	3548	1353	2	1	43	3	177	13	37	3	309	24	1	1	315	21	248	18	95	7	78	5	168	12	
Total	224681	29945	9549	2772	19	1	166	3	582	18	71	3	649	28	1	1	897	25	325	16	261	8	145	4	387	16	
<p>Mar 1948</p>																											
Mar	31594	2635	415	63	2	3	1	2	11	17	0	0	18	16	-	-	37	29	12	19	8	13	4	6	6	18	
Apr	47776	224	250	38	1	3	-	-	6	28	0	0	2	7	-	-	7	22	6	29	4	13	1	3	1	18	
May	4664	37	131	86	-	-	-	-	15	17	1	1	12	14	-	-	16	19	11	15	11	17	1	3	6	9	
Jun	3729	132	118	24	-	-	-	-	6	11	-	-	8	15	-	-	16	38	13	24	4	7	8	15	3	6	
Total	44779	323	916	223	3	1	1	1	38	16	1	1	38	14	4	2	76	33	44	19	27	12	18	8	21	9	
<p>Mar 1949</p>																											
Mar	15212	644	161	46	-	-	-	-	3	7	0	0	5	11	-	-	11	24	12	26	4	9	1	2	5	11	
Apr	26278	311	181	184	1	-	-	-	18	18	1	1	14	13	-	-	29	19	18	17	18	17	15	14	6	6	
May	22068	4	286	21	-	-	-	-	4	19	-	-	7	33	-	-	3	14	3	14	1	5	3	14	2	18	
Total	75948	915	592	171	1	1	1	1	17	14	1	1	26	15	6	4	34	28	33	19	23	13	19	11	13	8	
<p>MONTHLY TOTALS FOR ALLIED STATIONS</p>																											
Mar	128778	42981	5698	843	43	3	21	3	286	28	0	0	81	18	5	1	469	51	115	14	187	13	185	13	69	9	
Apr	127342	3084	7988	1238	19	2	17	1	128	19	0	0	189	9	45	4	481	32	211	17	113	9	79	6	181	8	
May	164278	4698	6698	4433	15	1	131	3	898	19	91	2	668	15	188	2	1809	23	639	14	421	9	174	4	311	8	
Jun	163048	3961	8961	3179	3	1	83	3	484	19	76	2	694	19	28	2	811	28	387	18	248	8	179	6	287	18	
Total	589322	81436	28443	9649	64	1	232	3	1796	18	167	2	1428	15	288	2	2666	28	1754	16	889	9	508	5	588	8	
<p>GRAND TOTAL</p>																											
	771995	114399	39879	15997	78	1	739	5	4616	29	439	2	1424	9	311	2	3451	22	2961	18	1244	8	918	6	999	6	

*Fully translated messages published in the F and J2 series used as basis for the study (not the total of items in the preceding columns since one message may deal with more than one subject).
**Includes Water Transportation for March and April.
***See Other Military Information.

Figure 1
Distribution of Japanese Army messages according to type of intelligence contained.
March - June 1944
(Source: Monthly reports on production trends prepared by I & L.)

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Such are the subjects of these messages. That they give important data concerning them is easily demonstrated.

In the field of communications alone, from March 1943 to 10 August 1944, the SSA read 370 messages containing 130 distinct cipher squares. Information is also available from these messages on such subjects as the dates of cryptographic change, the methods of constructing and applying the running key, the meanings of code groups, and the use of particular editions of code.

By 27 May, further, messages translated by the SSA had made possible the identification of eleven new armies, (of which five are area armies), eighteen new divisions (including the first three tank divisions), fourteen new independent mixed brigades, fourteen new independent infantry brigades, four new mobile ship-borne brigades, and fifty-seven new code names for such units. Included in the divisions and brigades mentioned are three infantry regiments and 140 infantry battalions. Figure 2 presents a copy of a dispatch from Special Branch summarizing the successes of the SSA in producing this type of intelligence. Moreover, it was pointed out at the B-I exhibition that the estimated figure of 1850 planes in the Japanese Army Air Forces (in the periodic report presented in the Japanese Army Supplement to the Magic Summary, no. 70, Tab A, 25 May 1944) was made possible through the reading of Japanese Army messages and that the situation as regards the oil resources (see Magic Summary, no. 807, Tab A, 10 June 1944, and "Summary of Plans for East Indies Oil Operations for the Fiscal Year ending 31 March 1945," Magic Summary, Japanese Army Supplement, no. 97, Tab A, 25 June 1944) and railroads under the control of the Japanese Army--existing track, rolling stock, the extent of damage by Allied attacks, and plans for development--have been fully revealed through such traffic. The value of such messages is also attested by other studies such as "JAAF losses in the New Guinea Campaign" (Far Eastern Summary, no. 103, Tab A, 1 July 1944).

One of the most rewarding sources of intelligence concerning sinking of Japanese ships is these translated messages. Tab B lists the messages processed by the SSA between 1 April and 3 August reporting losses from 17 November to 16 July. Reading these messages has made possible such studies as "Japanese Tanker Strength as of 15 July 1944" (*ibid.*, no. 124, Tab A, 22 July 1944), and "Total Japanese Merchant Ships

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L V PEN NR 537 271305Z PER RAH
FROM MAJOR PERDUE
TO CAPT CONNOR
SW
KC
FROM MAJOR PERDUE ATTN CAPT CONNOR FOR CAPT OVERTON
IM 256

RE PEN V L 827

THE FOLLOWING IS THE BEST AVAILABLE EVIDENCE WE CAN GIVE YOU IN A HURRY ON THE NUMBER OF UNITS IDENTIFIED FROM OUR SOURCE DURING THE PAST YEAR.

ARMIES 11 NEW ONES, SEVEN WITH THEIR CODE NAMES, 5 OF THEM AREA ARMIES.

DIVISIONS 18 NEW, INCLUDING THE FIRST THREE TANK DIVS, 11 WITH CODE NAMES.

BRIGADES 14 IND MIXED BGDDES, ALL WITH CODE NAMES.
14 IND INF BGDDES, 9 WITH CODE NAMES.
4 MOBILE SHIP-BORNE BRIGADES, 3 WITH CODE NAMES.

TOTAL 32 BGDDES, 26 CODE NAMES.

THE LATTER TWO ARE NEW TYPE UNITS, FIRST IDENTIFIED FROM OUR STUFF

INCLUDED IN DIVS AND BGDDES ABOVE, BUT SEPARATELY IDENTIFIED ARE THREE INF REGTS AND 140 PAREN REPEAT ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY PAREN INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

CODE NAMES	MENTIONED ABOVE, FOR NEW UNITS	44
	OTHERS, FOR OLD UNITS, AT LEAST	13
	TOTAL	57 NEW CODE NAMES.

CODE NUMBERS POSITIVELY D// IDENTIFIED ARE TOO NUMEROUS TO COUNT.

Figure 2.

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Available 17 December to 30 June 1944" (ibid., no. 109, Tab A, 7 July 1944). The story of the so-called Take convoys, which still remains to be written in detail, also shows what information to be used in the campaign to destroy Japanese shipping can be derived from reading Japanese Army messages. Briefly, the outlines of the story are these-- certain large units of the Japanese Army were scheduled to sail for the area of New Guinea and the Philippines; the ships making up the convoys, their routes and sailing dates, and the men and materials which they were carrying were revealed; and the sinking of four vessels was reported. In all more than a hundred messages were read dealing with the Take convoys. Tab E (A, 2) presents two of the messages involved, and tab C presents as complete a list as possible of messages thus far translated dealing with the Take convoys.

2. Messages in _____ --The first of the Japanese Army systems to be read was _____ By 8 August 1944, more than 31,370 messages, many of them containing several parts, had been published in the JR series of the Bulletin. The system is used by the water transport organization of the Japanese Army. Thus the intelligence derived from it deals with shipping, cargoes, the position and transfer of military units, harbor reports, personnel, and many other subjects. Figure 1 shows that from March through June by far the greatest majority of messages dealt with the movements, activities, condition, identification, assignments, and uses of ships, and harbor and navigation information. Next comes information about the cargoes that the ships carry. To illustrate the kinds of intelligence derived from the reading of this system, the B-I exhibit presented three posters. The messages presented are given in tab D with the captions used on the posters. In addition, B-I prepared a dossier of types of messages considered to contain significant intelligence. These deal with troop movements, convoys, merchant shipping, commodities, sinkings, the oil situation, and miscellaneous subjects. Copies of these messages as they appeared in the Bulletin are presented in tab E. Two code-instruction messages, one of which was published in the Bulletin, and the second of which appeared in the weekly report on Japanese Army Communications, no. 60, are also given.

3. and allied systems.--The second of the major groups of cryptographic systems read by the SSA are those belonging to the _____ family; these include _____

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The first code recovery on any of these systems was begun in September 1943, and some 350 messages were read. With a change in the system, large-scale production of messages of this family began in earnest in February 1944. By 8 August more than 23,510 messages (not counting the several parts which go to make up a Japanese Army cryptogram) had been read. Figure 1 shows that the largest percentage of these messages deals with military units and personnel, principally their organization and activities, movements and location, strength, training, equipment, morale, casualties, and the like. But messages are to be found in all the categories of subject matter listed in tab A. Three of the systems have been called selfperpetuating because of the fact that cryptographic data necessary for reading future traffic are nearly always recovered from readable messages before a change in the system takes place.

Another type of intelligence made available through reading these messages is a regular monthly report sent in the second half of the month telling schedules of ships assigned to carry military supplies to army units for the following month and their cargoes. The army units concerned are Kagayaki (in April and May these included two series: shipments from Japan and side shipments), Sonae, Watari, Nami, Go, Oka, and, in July, Tama. For each army unit, two messages are sent giving the port of loading, supplies to be carried, the port and date of departure, and the destination. The names and numbers of the ships involved are also given. Of the messages known to have been sent in March, giving the assignments for April, ten were read before 1 April.¹ Examples of these and of other important messages from other categories of subject matter are presented in tab F.

¹The Bulletin numbers with the dates of translation are F 3733, F 3936; and F 3950 (28 March); F 3809 and 3913 (29 March); F 4285, F 4286, F 4287, F 4288, and F 4289 (31 March). F 4636 was translated on 4 April, and F 4218 on 17 April.

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SECTION II

JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

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Communications difficulties between Tokyo and Dublin .	11

4. Introduction.--The Japanese diplomatic and military attaché systems afford perhaps the richest source of information concerning activities within Axis and neutral countries. Japanese representatives in Moscow, the Vatican, Venice, Berne, Madrid, and other leading cities of Europe report to Tokyo on all of the political views current at their stations and on information gleaned from sources which would otherwise be completely inaccessible to the Allies. For instance, conversations between Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, and Chancellor Hitler are reported in full detail for the home office in Tokyo, as are similar conversations with Mussolini and other high Axis officials. Diplomatic messages often reveal the knowledge the enemy has of Allied plans and operations. Economic conditions and the production of armaments are discussed from first-hand observations. Considered together with military attaché messages which often give details of new German weapons and estimates of their effectiveness, these messages reveal information of the greatest value about the enemy--for example, the extent of damage created by Allied bombing attacks both in Europe and in the Far East. Figure 3 shows the categories of subject matter found in Japanese diplomatic and military attaché messages, and figure 4 shows the distribution of diplomatic messages by system during April and May of 1944 in the several categories of subject matter and the proportion of messages of high intelligence value. From these figures it is apparent that a higher percentage of important messages is sent in systems using the Purple machine than in the others and that diplomatic reports on political matters, espionage, and matters relating to protecting powers are more likely to have a high intelligence rating than others. It also shows that the administration of Greater East Asia and routine diplomatic matters are the subjects most frequently discussed.

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CATEGORIES OF SUBJECT MATTER
IN JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

Military

DMI military reports
POW prisoners of war, internees, Red Cross, etc.
ESP espionage - sabotage
SHI shipping
SUP supplies—military, food, industrial

Political

DPL diplomatic report on political matters
DIP routine diplomatic matters
PER minor personnel and personal messages
DEC diplomatic reports on economic conditions
DSO diplomatic reports on social conditions, morale, etc.
DFI diplomatic reports on financial conditions, international exchange, currency, etc.
COM commercial negotiations, business transactions between firms, etc.
AHF reports on the Allied home front
ROT reconstruction of occupied territories—UNRRA, etc.
POP press and propaganda
GPS Greater East Asia, administration, etc.
DPR functions of protecting powers

In addition to the categories listed above, the following are listed for Japanese military attaché messages.

ARM armaments, munitions
ATT military attaché matters
O/B order of battle
PRO production of material, tanks, etc.
STR & TAC strategy and tactics

Figure 3.

Categories of subject matter
(and their abbreviations) recognized in
Japanese diplomatic and military attaché messages.

(Source: SPSIR-1)

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Translations of these messages have made possible such studies published in the Magic Summary as the following:

"Japanese efforts to increase pig iron production in China and Inner Mongolia," no. 667(22 Jan. 44), tab A.

"Japan's aluminum program," no. 849(22 July 44), memo, and no. 751(15 April 44), tab A.

"Air attacks on Germany since the end of January," no. 773(7 May 44), tab A.

"Air attacks on French Indo-China and Thailand during May 44," no. 819(22 June 44), tab A.

"Report on Lt. Col. Nishi's 9 November report on Germany's Atlantic defences," no. 707(2 March 44), tab A.

Many such long-range studies can be made of enemy activities as described in the diplomatic messages which will have importance in the planning of the post-war world as well as value to current operations.

5. Messages in --From the point of view of intelligence (the Purple machine) is perhaps the most valuable of all Japanese systems. The Japanese themselves consider it to be their most secure means of secret communication. Ambassador Oshima in Berlin uses this system to report to Shigemitsu in Tokyo on German activities. These reports contain information about armament production, political unrest in Germany, and other events of diplomatic importance. As early as 24 January 1944 Oshima reported that the Germans had perfected a rocket gun (SSA 109152). This message is a record of a conversation between Hitler and Oshima in which Hitler disclosed the allocation of German troops in France and expressed confidence in the effectiveness of the defenses. Hitler's discussion of the German retreat from the Russian front and of the Italian collapse is also of great interest in this and in other messages(SSA 98315). More recent messages in disclose the invention of many new weapons, among them a new robot plane to be controlled by radio waves (see tab G). Oshima's report on the attempted assassination of Hitler and the repercussions in Germany is presented in tab G. Comments on the event were relayed to Tokyo from cities all over Europe and the Far East in the system. The messages from Berlin are a valuable and reliable contribution to the picture of internal Germany. messages

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from other centers to Tokyo have also contributed in large measure to the knowledge of enemy activities.

Russo-Japanese relations were discussed at great length during the negotiations for the Fisheries Treaty which was signed in Moscow on 30 March 1944. Several hundred messages on this subject are available, the most important being: SSA nos. 91086, 106621, 107098, 107451, 108188, 108300, 108749, 111420, 112287, 112288, 117906, 114484, 115775, 126604, 118809, 116726, 117448, D-5797, 118844, 123750. A summary of the situation, made possible by such messages was published in the Magic Summary no. 785 (11 May 1944), tab A. Negotiations had been carried on between Russia and Japan for many years on the problem of fishing lots in Russian territorial waters. Many agreements and formal treaties had been made and renewed, but the negotiations at this time were to have considerably more significance. Discussions were reopened in November of 1943 and centered around the oil and coal concessions at Sakhalin and the fishing lots off the east coast of Kamchatka and Olyutorski. Arguments over the terms of the treaty, particularly over the method of payment, lasted until the end of March 1944. At every point in the proceedings Japan was forced to give in to the Russians and in the end were definitely the losers. Sato, Japanese Ambassador to Russia, stated in a report to Shigemitsu that "Japan should ostensibly give into the Russians for the time being, while actually holding on to as many lots as possible" (Magic Summary, no. 785, tab A). The price of the gold bullion used in payment by Japan was determined by the United States Treasury at the request of Russia. Japan for this reason insisted on keeping that part of the negotiations secret (Exchange Note, no. 4, appended to the treaty). It appears now that the prime motive on the part of Japan in all of these negotiations was to strengthen the ties between Russia and Japan. Other Japanese sources (see e.g. SSA 120297) felt that the fisheries treaty in large measure assured the allegiance of Russia and tended to alienate Germany. But Oshima in Berlin, reported that Hitler reacted favorably to the results of the treaty and thoroughly understood the diplomatic relationship between Russia and Japan at this time (SSA 118844). After the treaty was made public, the reaction in Russia was faithfully reported to Tokyo by Ambassador Sato. The Russian newspaper announced the details of the treaty simultaneously with an editorial criticizing Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden and praising Russo-Japanese relations (SSA 117448).

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At this time Madame Chiang Kai Shek was refused permission to visit Russia on the grounds that her visit would offend Japan (SSA 123750).

A recent message in (see tab G) on the subject of Russo-Japanese relations is the first hint that negotiations for peace on the part of the Japanese are being seriously considered. Shigemitsu reports on the state of the war in the Pacific theater and requests Sato to sound out Molotov on his views concerning peace. He suggests that Russia and Japan, both being neutral countries, are the logical powers to take the initiative in negotiations for peace. The turn of the war against Germany in the West and against Japan in the East are discussed with extreme pessimism, and the advantages of a Russo-Japanese alliance are pointed out. The obvious need for secrecy is stressed throughout the message, and it is the system which is used to send this vital intelligence. Tab G presents three messages illustrative of the high value of the intelligence contained in messages.

6. Messages in --- is responsible for the largest volume of diplomatic traffic and is used on all circuits in the Far East. It is generally regarded as a fairly low-grade system from a cryptanalytic point of view, but the intelligence contained in the messages is surprisingly significant. is used in emergencies when the use of is impossible. For instance, when the Allies were bombing Berlin, Oshima was forced to send his reports in rather than in One of the most outstanding messages in this system is a detailed description of the bombing of Bangkok on 5 June 1944, the raid in which the B-29 made its test appearance. This message was forwarded to the desk of the Secretary of War, at his request. The extent of damage to official buildings and to production centers was revealed and proved beyond any question the effectiveness of the new B-29 (see tab H). Another important message (SSA 127295) from Bangkok to Taihoku requests serum for a cholera epidemic. Such messages as these increase the value of a great volume of traffic chiefly concerned with requests for funds and Embassy expenditures and minor administrative details.

7. Messages in and ---, -- and are the newest of the Japanese diplomatic systems. is not yet extensively read. Though it is used all over the world, a large part of the traffic emanates from Moscow. It is a joint code of the Japanese Foreign Office and of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Messages in other systems

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are frequently relayed in this system and have proved to be valuable cryptanalytic aids. on the other hand is used exclusively in Europe and has much the same function of relaying messages as A representative message in this system (presented in tab I) is a report from Hidaka in Venice about a conversation between Hitler and Mussolini. The attached translation is only one of fifteen parts of the message. From Budapest the Japanese representative reported (SSA 132534) that the unrest in Hungary was becoming a serious problem. Admiral Horthy, the regent, was suspected of Anglo-American sympathies because he requested that Hitler relent in his persecution of the Jews. The result of Japanese observations in Budapest was "The view is now wide spread that there is a distinct danger that his country (Hungary) may desert Germany."

8. Messages in -- is used only between Far Eastern Stations, and the volume is almost as great as that of This system replaced which went out of use over a year ago. It is from this system and from that G-2 has compiled several long-range studies of the Far East, studies which show in great detail what productive powers Japan has in reserve. A great variety of subject matter is transmitted in this traffic including shipping reports (e.g., SSA 127254) and observations on economic conditions in Asia. One particularly interesting message, (presented in tab I) on 15 July 1944 is an intelligence report on Allied activities in the Far East. A conference between Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai Shek is predicted, and Mountbatten's plans for attacking Rangoon are recorded. The transfer of American troops to the Hengyang sector is also reported in this system.

9. Messages in --Though appears relatively infrequently, it carries important intelligence. The series of messages (presented in tab K) dealing with the Sakimura case are of particular interest. Sakimura apparently was a Japanese who had lived in Germany and had moved to Stockholm where he was suspected of conducting subversive activities with the English and Americans there. Suma in Spain requested that he be liquidated because of his popularity with the Allies as a source of propaganda. On 11 May 1944 the representative of the Japanese Ministry of the Interior in Buki made arrangements to have Sakimura returned to Germany; this move was accomplished on 26 May. He was

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then accused of sending information from Swedish sources to the Daily Mail. On another occasion he is reported to have received money for an article forecasting Germany's internal collapse. Later on, his views changed so completely that he was selling articles discussing the internal strength of Germany. Thus arose the question of whether he was a German spy. What happened to him eventually is not clear, but the last report available on his case states that he denied the accusations and left Germany in order to avoid air raids. Oshima viewed his articles as indiscreet, but not potentially dangerous to Japan.

10. Messages in _____ is a system used only between Dublin and Tokyo. Only a small amount of traffic has appeared, but it has become important recently because of its part in a series of cryptographic errors.

11. Communication difficulties between Tokyo and Dublin. In January 1944 a series of cryptographic difficulties arose in the communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Ministry in Dublin. The first telegram indicating the beginning of these events was sent on 19 January from Shigemitsu in Tokyo to Oshima in Berlin (CI 14601). In it Shigemitsu stated that the Japanese government had been unable to strengthen the diplomatic system _____ used between Dublin and Tokyo since the outbreak of the Great East Asia war. It was felt that the code which was currently in use between the two points was too closely related in cryptography to older codes and had been in use too long to be secure. The only practical and safe way to forward new code instructions to Dublin was, in their opinion, through German channels. Accordingly, a request was sent, in _____ to Oshima in Berlin to arrange with Edmannsdorf, the vice chief of the German Political Bureau, for the transmission of the _____ code instructions to Beppu, the Japanese Minister in Dublin. The first part of this message to Berlin contained the request for transmission and the second part of the message was 86 groups of _____ cipher text preceded by 17 groups of preamble to be sent to Beppu. Unfortunately the whole of part two was incorrectly enciphered on the purple machine _____ in Tokyo. In using the machine setting and sequences indicated on the message part, the code clerk in Tokyo forgot to apply _____ to the indicator. In deciphering the message the clerk in Berlin used the setting indicated on the message part and the correct additive, and although the resultant text was unintelligible, it was

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assumed to be in the _____ code which Dublin would be able to understand. The incorrect _____ text was then forwarded by the Germans in the _____ system to their representative in Dublin for delivery to Beppu. The Germans, perhaps fearing that the Japanese would gain an entry into _____ with the re-enciphered _____ text, devised a method of converting the _____ code for this particular message. When the _____ text finally reached Dublin on 26 January 1944, it was completely unintelligible to all concerned except the British and Americans who had discovered the mistake made on the original _____ encipherment and had also solved the conversion of the _____ message. Beppu, unable to read the message, relayed a telegram to that effect to Tokyo through German channels on 5 March 1944. Negotiations on the subject between Berlin and Tokyo were reopened on 13 April 1944. The Germans were asked again to repeat the _____ text, and the whole procedure was started over again. Finally on 13 May Oshima in Berlin informed Tokyo that Beppu had received the text and was able to decode it. On 16 May Shigemitsu forwarded instructions for the use of the keyword to Beppu in Dublin. Upon Beppu's reply that he understood the instructions, the case was ended and the new _____ system was put into use. Some of the significant documents in the case are presented in tab L.

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SECTION III

CORRESPONDENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHÉS

Messages in Paragraph
..... 12

12. Messages in ---It has been remarked that the most efficient spies working for the United States in Europe are the Japanese military attachés. Having entree to the most exclusive military circles in Axis countries and being themselves shrewd spies and employers of spies, these agents gather the most extensive information concerning the military situation in Axis countries. Such information at present pours out of Berlin, Helsinki, Vichy, Budapest, Sofia, Bucharest, and Cortina d'Ampezzo, and from the rumor capitals: Lisbon, Madrid, Berne, Tangier, and Beyoglu. And the messages from Tokyo to Europe are no less revealing of Japanese plans. The SSA has been reading this traffic since the fall of 1942, and between 1 July 1943 and 15 August 1944, 5,288 separate messages (not counting the several parts that make up a message) have been published in the D series of the Bulletin. The variety of subject matter in these messages is revealed in figure 3. The distribution of these messages for April and May according to subject matter and according to proportions of messages of the highest intelligence value is presented in figure 5. This figure shows that 42 percent of all messages are considered of greatest importance. In fact every translatable message in this system is published in the Bulletin because of the uniformly high intelligence value of this traffic. The categories having the highest percentages of important messages are espionage, diplomatic reports on the political situation, commercial negotiations, the reconstruction of occupied territories, and armaments and munitions. Most of the messages deal with order of battle, tactics and strategy, and armaments and munitions.

Weekly intelligence reports from Tokyo reveal the Japs' appraisal of the military situation in the South, Southwest, and North Pacific and in China, giving important order-of-battle information and American activities (e.g., D 3886, D 4677, D 4810). The order of battle, especially of Russian air units (D 4109, D 4572, D 4671), and Russian plans for offensives in the Balkans (D 5079--a fourteen-part message) and in the North (D 4996) are also revealed. Reports on the production of Allied, German, and Russian armaments (D 4680, D 4689--presented in tab M--and D 4771), on poison gasses and gas masks (D 4388, containing 21 parts), and on airplane potentialities (D 3894) are also to be found.

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	No. of msgs. with high intelligence value	% of total msgs. in category	Total msgs. translated in category	% of important msgs. translated in system	% of all msgs. in category of total in system
COD	25	43	58	1	3
DMI	2	22	9	-	1
POW	1	25	4	-	-
ESP	9	69	13	1	1
SHI	9	18	51	1	3
SUP	41	47	87	2	5
DPL	62	61	102	3	7
DIP	-	-	9	-	1
PER	-	-	9	-	1
DEC	1	13	8	-	-
DSO	6	29	21	-	1
DFI	3	33	10	-	1
COM	1	50	2	-	-
AHF	3	17	20	-	1
ROT	1	100	1	-	-
POP	1	67	15	-	1
GPS	-	-	-	-	-
DPR	-	-	1	-	-
ARM	101	54	187	6	10
ATT	16	8	207	1	12
ESO	-	-	-	-	-
O/B	184	40	461	10	26
PRO	50	40	126	3	7
STR	85	46	185	5	10
TAC	50	26	195	3	11
	751	42	1781		

Figure 5.

The distribution of military attaché messages translated in April and May 1944 according to categories of subject matter and the proportion to each category of message of high intelligence value.

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Negotiations for the transfer of the Wurzburg electric wave-plotting device (D 4158) and a report on the changes in German defense plans for Holland, Belgium, and France (D 4568) are also available. The value of such messages is attested by the files of SPSIR-2 which show that all the messages referred to by number above elicited the special interest of G-2.

In the pages which follow (tab M) are presented the posters prepared for the B-I exhibit showing important messages read in the Japanese military attaché system. That these messages were intercepted by E Branch, cryptanalyzed by B-III, edited, decoded, and translated by B-I, and published by I & L Branch shows the cooperation necessary for the recovery of such intelligence.

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Tab

- A. Index of subject-matter categories--Japanese Army systems
- B. Messages read between 1 April and 31 July 1944 by the SSA reporting the sinking of Japanese vessels (listed according to date of sinking)
- C. Allist of messages pertaining to the Take convoys translated before 10 August 1944
- D. A cross section of traffic--the messages presented on three posters in the B-I exhibit.
- E. Types of messages considered to contain important intelligence (dossier prepared by B-I)
 - A. Movement of troops
 - B. Convoy movements
 - C. Reports on Japanese merchant shipping
 - D. Shipping of commodities
 - E. Reports on sinkings of Japanese ships
 - F. Oil reports
 - G. Miscellaneous
 - H. Cryptographic changes
- F. Types of messages in the family considered to contain important intelligence
 - I. Communications
 - II. Shipping (convoys, movements and activities, of condition and identification, jurisdiction)
 - III. Military units and personnel (water transport, air forces, railroads, others)
 - IV. Cargo and materiel
 - V. Administrative
 - VI. Miscellaneous (not illustrated)
 - VII. Reports on Allied activities
- G. Some messages:
 1. Robot bombs controlled by radio waves
 2. The attempted assassination of Hitler
 3. The first peace feelers
- H. A message describing the bombing of Bangkok
- I. A message part giving a portion of a conversation between Hitler and Mussolini
- J. A report on Allied activities in the Far East
- K. messages concerning the Sakimura case
- L. The Dublin difficulties
- M. Six posters from the B-I exhibit showing messages considered to contain important intelligence

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INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES
JAPANESE ARMY SYSTEMS

- I. Communications
 - A. Code Instructions
 - B. Signal information (enemy)

- II. Shipping
 - A. Convoys
 - 1. Date of departure, schedules, etc.
 - 2. Destination and route (latitude, longitude, landmarks)
 - 3. Composition and speed
 - B. Movements and activities of ships (other than convoys)
 - 1. Schedules, arrival or departure dates
 - 2. Destination, ports of call
 - 3. Escorted, awaiting, joining or leaving convoy
 - 4. Loading, unloading, fueling
 - 5. Position and routes
 - 6. Shipping reports
 - 7. Reports on small ships
 - C. Condition and identification of ships
 - 1. Sunk
 - 2. Shipwrecked, damaged, salvaged, or under repair
 - 3. Ship name and number assignment
 - 4. Type of ship
 - 5. Speed, tonnage, call sign, ownership
 - 6. Construction
 - 7. Lists of names and/or numbers
 - 8. Armament
 - D. Jurisdiction
 - 1. Assignment to area, to military units, etc.
 - 2. Allocation of ship for transfer of military units or equipment or supplies
 - E. Harbor and navigation information

- III. Military Units and Personnel
 - A. Water Transport
 - 1. Organization and activities
 - 2. Movements and location
 - 3. Enlisted personnel and ship's crews and training
 - 4. Equipment used and tonnage carried
 - 5. Officers
 - 6. Code names and numbers (home and overseas)
 - B. Air Forces
 - 1. Organization and activities
 - 2. Movements; location
 - 3. Personnel strength and training
 - 4. Plane strength, losses, etc.
 - 5. Officers
 - 6. Code names and numbers (home and overseas)

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7. Airfield construction and repair
8. Plane movements, and transport

- III. C.- Railroads
1. Organization and activities
 2. Movements and location
 3. Equipment used and personnel strength and training
 4. Construction
 5. Officers
 6. Code names and numbers (home and overseas)
 7. Rolling stock and tonnage carried
- D. Other military units
1. Organization and activities
 2. Movements and location
 3. Personnel strength and training
 4. Equipment used and on hand
 5. Officers
 6. Code names and numbers (home and overseas)
- E. Morale
- F. Deaths or patients in large numbers
- G. Not specified above

IV.

Cargo and Materiel

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| A. Petroleum products | R. Machinery and tools |
| B. Iron and steel | S. Tea |
| C. Coal and coke | T. Tobacco |
| D. Cement and concrete | U. Rice |
| E. Fertilizers | V. Food supplies (other) |
| F. Minerals (other) | W. Fodder |
| G. Cotton | X. Military equipment and parts |
| H. Silk | (a) Small arms |
| I. Textiles | (b) Anti-aircraft artillery |
| J. Clothing | (c) Artillery |
| K. Fibers (jute, hemp, etc.) | (d) Ammunition |
| L. Hides and leathers | (e) Tanks |
| M. Forest products (lumbers,
wood pulp, etc.) | (f) Vehicles |
| N. Paper | (g) Signal equipment |
| O. Rubber | (h) Medical supplies |
| P. Chemicals, drugs and
pharmaceuticals | (i) Chemical warfare |
| Q. Waxes | (j) Miscellaneous |
| | Y. Encoded types |
| | Z. Not elsewhere specified |

- APPLICABLE TO ALL OF ABOVE {
1. Manufacturing and production information
 2. Material on hand or required
 3. Shipments
 4. Lists of material
 5. Indefinite or little information

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- V. Administrative
 - A. Plans
 - B. Political information
 - C. Financial
 - D. Service messages or requests for information
 - E. Minor details

- VII. Miscellaneous
 - A. Weather
 - B. Badly garbled or vague
 - C. Civilians (trips, activities, etc.)
 - D. Not elsewhere specified

- VIII. Reports on Allied Activities
 - A. Knowledge of plans and procedures
 - B. Reports of Allied planes (flights, etc.)
 - C. Allied ships
 - D. Allied communication information
 - E. Prisoners of war
 - F. Allied information not specified above

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TAB B.

Messages read between 1 April and 31 July 1944 by the
SSA reporting the sinking of Japanese vessels (listed
according to date of sinkings)

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Messages read by the SSA reporting the sinking of Japanese vessels according to date of sinking.

(Source: Ship sinkings, lists II (12 July 1944), III (25 July 1944), and IV (3 August 1944) compiled by SPSIR-5.)

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of ships sunk</u>	<u>Messages</u>
November 1943		
17	1	JR 28271
20	1	F 10943 A
26	1	F 10593 A
27	2	F 12377
		F 10680 AB
28	2	F 12757
		JR 22259 C
29	3	F 12817 C-E
		F 11028,
		F 9229 A
30	3	F 13491 B
		F 7520 A
		JR 22485 B
December 1943		
1	2	JR 21805 AB
		F 19901 B
3	3	JR 23061
		JR 24792
		JR 23061
5	1	JR 22416 A
8	3	F 13115
		F 19599 A
		F 9386 A
16	11	F 12312 A
		F 12312 A
		F 12259 B
		F 10987 A
		F 11528
		F 14314
		F 8746 A
		F 8861
		F 9946 C
		F 8746 A
		F 8861
29	1	SSA 119204

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<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of ships sunk</u>	<u>Messages</u>
January 1944		
1	1	F 13297 B
2	3	F 11639 A JR 21173 F 14280 A
5	1	SSA 119425
9	5	F 12537 B F 12108 C JR 25792 F 12092 F 12537 B
10	3	F 19094 D F 19094 D F 19094 D
12	5	JR 25789 JR 23305 JR 25499 JR 24832 C JR 22693
14	2	F 9219 C F 4699 BC
16	3	JR 23701 F11286 F 4263 AB
18	1	F 13606 AC
20	1	F 12135 A
21	2	JR 27020 JR 23801 C
22	2	JR 23455 A JR 28935
24	4	F 12899 AB F 20372 A JR 26526 BD
25	2	F 12937 AB F 13149 B F 13149 AE
30	2	F 14225 BC JR 26417 B
February		
1	2	F 5399 A JR 30589 A
2	1	JR 26623
4	1	JR 26526
5	1	F 11370 AE
6	1	JR 30552 C
10	2	JR 26526 BD JR 26526 BD

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<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of ships sunk</u>	<u>Messages</u>
February 1944		
13	1	F 5371 AC
15	3	JR 25850 A JR 23907 B JR 27312
16	4	F 7282 AC F 14061 JR 24722 B F 11326 A
17	5	JR 26046 F 6607 JR 27467 JR 23603 A JR 28880
19	2	JR 26036 AZ F 11319
26	1	F 13852
March		
3	1	JR 26972 A
4	1	F 8160 B
5	2	F 11759 E JR 26294 A
7	1	JR 27072 B
8	1	F 18977
9	4	JR 25148 FG JR 25064 E JR 25148 G F 12624 F 13365
10	1	F 19141 C
12	1	F 7279
13	2	F 4928 FB F 3512
14	2	JR 26060 A JR 28932 B
17	1	F 5143 B
20	3	JR 27929 SSA 117953 F 4449 A
25	2	F 15166 JR 28930 A
26	3	JR 25509 JR 25509 SSA 119005
27	5	JR 26883 JR 30033 F 17127 F 17595 F 16201

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<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of ships sunk</u>	<u>Messages</u>
March (cont)		
28	3	JR 25798 AB F 20191 A F 21144 J
30	5	JR 26076 JR 27189 JR 24487 JR 27189 C JR 24487
31	7	JR 29288 JR 27189 C JR 25090 A JR 25090 A JR 25090 A JR 25090 JR 27189 C
April		
1	2	JR 27189 C JR 28925
2	1	JR 28445
3	1	JR 28942
6	2	JR 25090 AB JR 25090 AB
12	1	JR 25090 B
15	2	JR 25872 JR 30082 A
16	3	F 19040 A JR 26832 JR 28947
17	1	JR 24347 AB
19	1	F 17582
21	1	JR 26349 A
22	4	JR 27986 B F 13972 AD F 14236 A SSA 121378
23	6	F 13972 AD JR 29210 B F 14246 G F 14236 BC JR 27480 F 14751 ABC
24	2	F 16884 C F 16884 C
25	1	F 14502 AC
26	3	F 16498 AC JR 25776 F 10587
27		JR 28938 C
29		F 20550 B
30		SSA 121590

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<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of ships sunk</u>	<u>Messages</u>
May		
1	3	JR 24965 A F 15514 A JR 27190 F 16250 B F 20375 F 12838 JR 25122 JR 25122 AB JR 25122 AB F 12838 F 14699 AE F 21276 AB F 21276 B JR 25709 B
3	1	"
5	1	"
6	7	"
8	1	"
9	12	"
10	1	JR 25404
14	1	JR 29585
15	1	JR 30096 A
16	1	JR 30508 A
17	1	JR 28892 C
24	1	JR 29419 JR 27216 A
June		
1	2	JR 30389 F 19890 B
6		JR 29285 C JR 29285 C JR 29285 C
11	2	JR 28788 C JR 28788 C
12	2	JR 30350 A JR 30350 A
16	1	JR 29482 C
19	1	JR 28747
20	2	JR 30795 A JR 30668 A
26	1	F #129
28	1	JR 28965
29	1	JR 29519 B

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<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of ships sunk</u>	<u>Messages</u>
July		
4	1	F 21243 D
9	2	F 21556 A
15	1	F 21707 A
16	1	F 21920
		F 21522

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TAB C

A list of messages pertaining to the TAKE convoys
(prepared by SPSIR-5)
(translated before 10 August 1944)

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The Take Convoys
(Duplicate messages are bracketed)

JRX 27667	F 22007	F 20113
F 21874 A & B	F 20047	JR 25453 A
F 15014 A B E	F 20047	F 22092
FX 16953]	JR 19465]	F 17878
F 16953]	F 16774]	F 12302 A
JR 25146	F 13041	F 19253
F 23634 A	F 21559	F 19250 A D G
JR 27739	F 21384 A B	JRX 30085 A
JR 23669 A	F 15243	F 14591
F 14290 R]	F 14055	F 17878 A
F 16934 B]	F 19618]	F 16934 B
JR 26486 A	F 13675 A B]	F 14290 C
F 19215	F 12980]	F 14544
F 19515	F 13200]	JR 24045 A
F 14618	F 20312 A	JRX 27714 A
F 19155]	F 14477 A C	JR 24063
F 20606 B]	F 18463	JR 24192 A B E F I J
F 18987	F 17890	JR 26066 A
F 19794 A]	F 17132	JR 27256 A B
F 10472]	F 14566 D	F 12856 A
F 21573]	F 11600	F 13083 Q
F 13083]	F 18516	F 15968 A
F 15450	F 15646 A	F 15919 A B
F 14130]	F 14436 A	FX 14705
FX 12168]	F 15144 A	JR 25293 A D
F 15355	F 17584 A	JR 28026 A C
F 10235	F 10678	
F 19386		

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JR 27025 C	JR 25796 A	F 15046
JR 27557	JR 25122 A B	F 13869
JR 27570 C	F 12056 E	F 19610 A B
JR 27826 A B	F 22273 A B	F 15546
JR 25210 A D	F 17418 A B C	F 17009
JR 28391 E	F 14908 A C	F 16541 B] FX 17715]
JR 27885 A	F 19721	F 18917 A B
JR 27779 A	F 17791 A	F 13944
JR 25474	F 19733 A B	F 19304
JR 30022	F 22135 A	F 15447 B
JR 26599 Ex.	FX 19188	F 13676 A D
JR 29281 B	F 17783	FX 15281] F 20156]
JR 24397	F 16054 B	F 16498
JR 26334	F 12816 A B	F 20006
JR 24633 A B C E	F 23189	F 14674
JR 24578 A	F 15968 A	F 19389
JRX 25652 Ex.	F 14841 A	F 18587 Q
JR 24609	F 16267 A	F 13466 B C
JR 24882	F 22306 I 8] F 15975] F 12056]	F 9765
JR 25776	F 15287	
JR 26789	F 18748	
JR 29254	FX 15287 A	
JR 27339 X	F 19405	
JR 24302 B D F I	FX 14256 X] F 16868]	
JR 30025		

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TAB D

A CROSS SECTION OF TRAFFIC (the messages presented on three posters)

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I. Poster I.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1. Results and analyses of American operations against the enemy. | JR22362 A |
| 2. Enemy defense operations are outlined. | JR27424 A |
| 3. Consumption of fuel. | JR28050 A |
| 4. Procedural instructions aid the intelligent use of information. | JR22321 F |
| 5. Enemy losses. | JR27242 D |
| 6. Enemy troop movements, sailings, and strength. | JR21816 A |

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JR-22362 A

6720 ds 7--0 6 Fe 44 2327 93, 95
Yo Tsu 1019, 565. on 104, 941 48 6 Fe 1950
Una) Manila Sen to Nanking (--E--)
#2 S.Y. CHIKUTAI KEI Message #602, Part 1.

Ship 1089 - 7809 (? minelayer ?) left Manila at
0830 on the 5th. While sailing for Singapore, it
sustained a torpedo attack from a submarine on the high
seas at north latitude 13° 00", east longitude 120° 30"
--M-- at 2300 on the 5th and sank.

End part.

Trans 29 Mar 44

(2215-f)

JR-22362 A

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JR-27424-A

- de 6420 8 May 44/2028 95
- Tsu 143 on 934 39 8 May 44/1700

Una

--M-- to --M-- (--M--)

48th TETSUKURA KAWAHARA Message #105, Part 1

Please inform the 12th SEMPAKUDAN:

Reply to 12th SEMPAKUDAN Message #--10--01

1. Please make arrangements --10-- to carry
out and complete mine sweeping operations again on both
the 8th and 9th.

Trans 12 June 44 (1927-g)

JR-27424-A

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

039 35

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 28050 A

5840 de 7410 21 Mar 44 4791 --

Yo Tsu -- On 333 46 21 Mar 44 1520

Cebu to Davao (Gkt.) (--U--)

#5 SYS Cebu Shibu Message #--1M--02, Part 1.

Fuel used during the middle of March is as follows:

(Units - 18 litre containers):

HA	123950 litres
YO	2350
--U-- ^a	1450
KE	73
TO	12
SHI	13
MO	36
MA	49
KI	16

End Part.

a - Commodity "T".

Trans 20 Jan 44 (5450-y)

JR 28050 A

~~TOP SECRET~~
040 36

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-27242-D

- de 6300 28 Feb 44/0010 30
- Tsu - on 841 48 27 Feb 44/170-
Palau to Hiroshima, Tokyo (--D--), Rabaul (Rabaul)
4th SYS PALAU SHIEU Message #719, Part 4 *

The following all sent to the bottom of the
sea:

. . . ^a About 1250 cylinders
(?shelter materials - 2900?) cylinders
--10-- total - 15 boxes
Unit baggage - about 70 cubic meters

6. Among the secret documents, the TSUSHIN regula-
tions (?applying to ?) movements of the merchant ship
TAI are unclear due to the death in battle of the captain.
However, . . . ^b the safes.

* - Part 5 same number.
a - In previous part.
b - To be continued in next message.

Trans 11 June 44 (6625-g)

JR-27242-D

~~TOP SECRET~~
042

38

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-21816-A

6519 de 4623 5 Ja 44 0349 15
Na Tsu 614 on 871 48 4 Ja 2130
M to M (--M--) (Hiroshima to Manila Ckt)
Hiroshima "H" Message #18 part 1.

Ship 2430-7569 loading at Ujina and unloading
at Manila:

(?For the?) #69 Kanja Yusobu Han:

Commissioned officers	5
Non-commissioned officers and privates	506
Tosha (徒車) ^a	40
Material	2650 boxes at 260 tons

(?For the?) #(?39?) Hikojo Chutai:

Commissioned officers	10
Non-commissioned officers and privates	230
Motor tricycles	4
Starter truck ^b	1

~~TOP SECRET~~
a - Empty or unarmed trucks.
b - Truck with a device for starting airplane
motors.

Trans 19 Na

(3158-D)

JR-21816-A

043 39

~~TOP SECRET~~

II. Poster II.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1. Human interest | JR22060 A |
| 2. Flowing prose | JR27497 C |
| 3. The quick and the dead | JR27081 A |
| 4. Order of battle | JRX 27934 |
| 5. More results of United States operations | JR27961 |
| 6. Damage report—a successful raid | JR27367 A |

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-22060-1

5570 de 6302

17 No 43 2226

15

on 236

49

17 No 43 1900

--M-- to --M-- (--U--) (Palau to Hiroshima ckt)

#4 S.Y.S. PALAU SHIEU Message #2128, Part 1.

(? 1 ?) TANIGUCHI MASA (? YOSHI ?) (谷口)

Army (? first class private ?) and engineer on ship

0405 - 9594, because he is guilty of murder, (? was

turned over ?) to the captain of ship 1535 - 1997

which (? left ?) Palau on 7 November --2G--.

End part.

Trans 24 Mar 44

(3760-2)

JR-22060-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

045 41

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 27497 C

07502 de 05400 15 Apr 44/1839 2

TO Teu 81 OZ 8003 41 14 Apr 44/2130

Mitsushima to Rabaul (--H--)

#1 Sempaku Kohai message #723, part 3^a.

(?With a successful beginning?) and with
firm solidarity, our army planes are pressing forward
with their whole hearts (?went on?) destruction --G--
--U--.

Message addressed to: #1 Sempaku Kohai Rental.

*Part 2 same number.

Trans. 17 Jun 44

(5062-p)

JR 27497 C

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

048

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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-27081-A

5570 de 5447 18 Feb 44 2118 7
Yo Tsu 284 on 680 46 18 Feb 44 1730
Palau to Hiroshima (--M--)

4th S.Y.S. Palau Shibu Iraiden message #94, part 1

1. (? On board ?) ship 0348-5217 which
is leaving Palau on 18 February:

Patients - 4--2G--
Non-commissioned officers and privates - 41
Civilians in military service - 64.
Wounded in battle - 15--1G--20
--1U--^a - 440.
Surgery cases - 108.
Internal medical cases - 367.
(--2G--4855 ...^b

a- Men, type "K", (patient).

b- Continued in next part.

Trans 7 Jun 44

(3536-w)

JR-27081-A

~~TOP SECRET~~

047

43

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR Extract

JRX 27934

19 Mar 44/2040

From: Hiroshima to Sarai (Akatsuki #61 -E-)

SYS Zai message #549.

As we sent to your unit the #2 Sempaku
Yusō Chikutai which was loaded on ship 2745 - 6143 and which
which left this unit on 17 October 1943 (check 17, 10)
after you contact the other units, please investigate

Message addressed to: 16th Yōrikutai.

Trans. 18 Jun 44

(7308-p)

JRX 27934

048

44

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 27961

16910 de 15920 16 Apr 44/1157 30

MA Tsu 946 On 838 37 25 Apr 44/2300

Rabaul to Ujina (--M--)

5th Kai Yu message #357.

Large iron motor boats #1342, #2505 were attacked and sunk by a heavy bombing attack by bombers in the secret anchorage at the river mouth at Rabaul on 19 April.

Message addressed to: Ujina.

Trans. 19 Jun 44

(9385-p)

JR 27961

~~TOP SECRET~~

049

45

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-27367 A

--de-- -- M--

Tsu -- on -- --M--

--M-- - --M--

#4 S Y S SAN Message #457, part 1

On 11 February from 0830 --G-- for about 1 hour, about 180 planes, combined fighters and bombers attacked at the entrance of the harbor at Rabaul.

The following is the damage to the #45 TEI HAKUBA KOKOPO SHIBU:

1. Personnel total: --G--4
2. Buildings: 7
 Completely destroyed (全 壊): 1
 Partially destroyed: 3

Trans 13 Jun 44 (3462-u)

JR-27367 A

~~TOP SECRET~~

000 #6

~~TOP SECRET~~

III. Poster III.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Significant troop movements. | JR27619 A |
| 2. The same, giving date, ship, and route of movement. | JR22199 A |
| 3. The enemy is obliging. | JR22234 |
| 4. Drama. | JR21883 E |
| 5 and 6. Detailed reports of ship sinkings, ships at harbor, sailings, arrivals, routes, etc. | JR27189 C
JR27922 B |

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 27619A

5385 de 5705 22 March 44/2040 15
Ma Tsu -- on 726 46 22 March 44/2000
Cebu to Hiroshima (--D--)
Sempaku Heidan San Message #(?49?)35, Part 1.

Regarding the matter inquired about in San San Message #2162:

1. The #36 Shidan Kaijō Yusō Tai and the Kaijō Kido (sea maneuvers) --1U--^a #1 Yusō Tai have already --2G--^b under the command of the Heidan, and are sailing for the front.

End Part.

- a - Military unit "GGGG".
- b - Possibly "have been disconnected from the command".

Trans 15 June 44

(5383-D)

JR 27619A

48
052

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-22199 A

6519 de 4625 22 Dec 43 1941 15
Yo Tsu 651 on 31 46 22 Dec 1550
Manila Sen - Hiroshima (E #40)
#2 S Y CHIKUTAI KEI Message #4180, part 1

Although we are making inquiry at the Sempaku Heidan (?regarding?) the --G-- details of the transfer of the 3 Dckuritsu Kuei Rentai's which are being sent by means of Ship 2481 - 3174 and the 2 other ships which left Moji on the 21st, ...^a at the northern part of the Visayas Islands and Mindanao.

End part

a - Contained in following part.

Trans 25 Mar 44

(4239-d)

JR-22199 A

~~TOP SECRET~~

49
053

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-22234

3327 de 3464

Dec 43 1945 19

on 541 65 8 Dec 43 1640

--M-- to --M-- (--U--) (Hakodate to Etorofu Circuit)

#53 Teihaku message #0298

Relay of (? #3 Sempakudan ?) message
#1338.

We have a message from the #30 (? Tei-
hakuba Shibu ?) stating that since it has been
confirmed that there are 2 submarines now anchored
at sea near Horomushiro, we are to warn (? ships ?)
involved regarding exchange of messages in plain
text after the 6th at 0200. (? Please report ?)
to the "K" MARU (? and ?) the "B" MARU regard
--lg-- exchange of communications in plain text.

Message addressed to Tennei Shibu,
Matsuwa Shibu.

END MESSAGE

Trans 26 Mar 44

~~TOP SECRET~~ (3383-W) ~~TOP SECRET~~ JR-22234

054

50

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-21883 E

7420 de 8128 3 Jan 44 2159 15

Yo Tsu 1015,943 on 191,756 44 3 Jan 1700

Ambon Ken - Hiroshima (Sempaku Shireibu)

#48 TEI SHIREIBU Message #18, part 5*

--M-- tons --2M--

(?Even though?) we have (?carried out?)
draining operations, the water has not receded,
and at the moment we are on the point of sinking.
The water-tight compartment^a on the ship has (?been
flooded?), and (?now?) (?we are?) --G-- repairs
with blankets and cork.

*Part 3 JRX-17913.

a - Bōsuihan in text.

Trans 20 Mar 44

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(3383-d) JR-21883 E

51
055

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-27189-C

5344 de 5860 6 Apr 44/1834 2
Yo Tsu 323 on 815 45 4 Apr 44/1500

Palau to Hiroshima (--M--)

#1 SEN KŌ RENTAI, PALAU Message #104, Part 3

Ships 4050-5949

5088-6133

6321-6901

7890-7654

2073-0259

were sunk; ship 2418-3147 returned. Except for
ship 6321-6901, nothing went wrong, although ship
7890-7654 (?left port late?).

Message addressed to: UJINA

Trans 8 June 44 (2782-g)

JR-27189-C

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care.
Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

JR 27922 B

11531 de 11720 24 April 44/1305 2

Yo Tsu 318 on 177 47 25 April 44/2330

Manila Water to Singapore, Ambon, Hiroshima (---2E--
Sambūchō)

#5 SYS Manila Shibu Message #1307, Part 2.

Ships loading: Ship 0285-5370

Ships awaiting Sempakudan:

Ship 2736-4153^a

Ship 4167-4721

Ships unloading: Ship 8187-6367

Ships under repair: Ship 8067-3154

Ship 8124-7431

KAI --1G-- MARU

Ship 1605-1627

Ships being completely equipped:

NAGASAWA

FUKU SHIMA and ...^b

End Part.

a - Possibly 2736-6152.

b - Continued in following part.

Trans 19 June 44

(6624-D)

JR 27922 B

53
057

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB E

Types of — messages considered to contain
important intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~

058

54

~~TOP SECRET~~

A. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS

1. Shipping of part of 54th division, the 106th HOHEI RENTAI, the 36th HOHEI RENTAI and BURMA HOJŪ HEI. JR 29086 A-D
2. Take SEMPAKUDAN
 - a. Shipment and route. JR 24302 B-I
 - b. Report on sinking. JR 25122 A-B

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 29036 A

16242 de 7420 29 Jun 44/0119 15
YO Tsu 902, 952, Cn 2365 47 28 Jun 2400

Nike
Hiroshima to Singapore Water (--E--)

Sen San message #6406, part 1.*

Marine transportation will be established and conducted as follows in accordance with Operational Order "A" #543 (check 543).

1. 54th (check 54) Shidan.

500 (check 500) men, embark at Ujina
28 June (check 26 June), disembark at Singapore during the first part of July; naval vessels. . . .

*Parts 2, 3 and 4 same number.

a - Sempaku Shiroibu Sombō.

Trans. 6 Jun 44

(4874-0)

JR 29036 A

~~TOP SECRET~~
000

56

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

N-90016-B,C,D

16242 da 07420 29 Jun 44 0122 15
Yo Tau 0903 On 7029 50 28 Jun 2400

NIKA

Hiroshima to Singapore Water (Tona 2365)

SEN SA^a message #6406, Parts 2, 3^b and 4^b.

2. 106th (check 106) HOMER RENTAI
3532 (check 3532) men, --G-- about 1100 cubic
meters (disembarking at Singapore).

36th (check 36) HOMER RENTAI 2800
(check 2800) men, unit's baggage 1504 cubic
meters (disembarking at Manila)

The above are embarking at KUSAN
on 1 and 2 July; ship 0648-6240; they will
tranship (?ic?) naval vessels at --U-- and
Ujina between 5 and 7 July, disembarking the
middle of July.

3. Burma HOUJ IEE:

CHINE (gross) RENTAI 2000 (check
2000) men.

FR-2 035 B.C.D

Page 1

081 57

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

KOKU BUTAI 1000 (check 1000) men
embarking at Ujima 7 July ; naval vessels; they
will disembark at Singapore the middle of July.
Message addressed to:

1st S.Y.S.

3rd S.Y.S. ((?refer to?) "I")^c

Singapore SHIRAIJO (refer to OKA)

For information of:

FUSAN

HIROSHIMA SHIBU

- a - SENPAKU SAMEO
- b - Possibly "Unit's baggage".
- c - Kana syllable.
- * - Revised.

Trans 4 Jul 44 (4881-1)

JN-290802, C, D

Page 2

052

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 24302 E

de #9278 29 Apr 44 0233 2
Yo On 864 47 29 Apr 44 0143

Manila --M-- (-M-)

#3 San Maha message #27, Part 2*

(1). Previous route:

Shirataka
#102 and 104 patrol boats
Fujinami
Shiratsu Yu

Total 5 Ships (check 5).

(2). Between Manila and Marui:

End part

* - Part 3 same number.

Trans 29 Apr 44 (5083-1)

JR 24302 E

~~TOP SECRET~~
063 59

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-24302 C

-- de 9278 29 April 44 0235 2
Yo Tsu -- on 951 47 29 Apr 44/0140
Manila to ? (--M--)

#3 SEN MA HA Message #27, part 3

The #37 and #38 Subchapters --U--^a the same
day between Jolo and MARUYO --M-- (Hama Kaze)
--U--^a

4. Between MARU I and MARU HA:
#2 (check 2) --U--^a of the #4 NAN KEN

End Part.

a - The same word.

Trans 29 Apr 44 (5146-u)

JR-24302 C

~~TOP SECRET~~
084

60

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-24302 D

de 9278 29 Apr 44 0235 2
Yo Tsu - on 931 47 29 Apr 44 0140
Manila to ? (--M--)

#3 SEM MA HA Message #27, Part 4.*

- 2. --G-- of the arrangements for the SEMPAKUDAN.
 - 1. The departure from Manila for the SEMPAKUDAN
(? will be ?) on 1 May (check 5, check 1).
 - 2. HIGASHI and KANDE.
 - (Meeting ship #2229 - 6636^a;
 - 8 ships) will both proceed to Manado, via
the Sulu Sea and Jolo.

* - Parts 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9 same number.
a - Possibly 2229 - 3336.

Trans 1 May 44

(3301-2)

JR-24302 D

~~TOP SECRET~~

085 61

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR. 24302 E

-- de 9278 29 April 44 0235 2

YO Tsu -- on 931 47 29 Apr 44/0140

Manila to ? (--M--)

#3 Sen Ma Ha message #27, part 5

Have the 4 ships of the (KAEDE)^a go to the anchorage at BANGKA^b (MENADO --M--) and the 4 ships of the HIGASHI^c go to MARU I^d.
--G--

After that, as soon as the HIGASHI^a has been unloaded, the (KAEDE)^a

- a - HEIDAN - see JR 24045.
- b - Place in Celebes M. Lat 1° 47", E. Long. 125° 08'
- c - HEIDAN (35th Div.)
- d - HALMA HERA.

Trans 1 May 44 (1041-a)

JR 24302 E

~~TOP SECRET~~
088

62

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 24502 F

-- de --

-- Tsu --

On --

29 Apr 44 0140

Manila to --M-- (---M--)

#3 SEN MA HA Message #27, Parts 5 (Revision) and 6*.

We are having the 4 ships of KAEDE stand by at the Bangka Anchorage (North of Manado) and are having the 4 ships of HIGASHI enter Marui --G--. After that, as soon as they unload, HIGASHI, we are having KAEDE enter Marui.

(3) --5G-- at Marui --10G--.

End Part.

* - Parts 2,3,4, 7, 8, and 9 same number.

Trans 2 May 44 (S215-1)

JR 24502 F

~~TOP SECRET~~

0147

63

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-24302 G-I

12116 de 14882 29 Apr 44 0925 2
Re Tsu 987, 988 ca 236, 627 52 29 Apr 44 0140
Manila to Ujina (---H---), Tokyo (---H---), ? (---H---)
#3 EXT MA HA^a Message #27, Parts 7, 8, 9.*

It has been decided to use SHIASHI^b as an anchorage.

4. With regard to the above, if ---G--- we transfer HIGASHI from Maru I to Maru Ka by freighters, then HIGASHI will make port^c at Maru Ha ---2G---.

KAEDZ will branch off at Maru I en route, and will take on food supplies (? at ?) ---J---.

3. We will wire in a supplementary message details for maximum protection which can be furnished by ---G--- air, for both of these.

Message addressed to: 3rd S. Y. S.

Sempaka Shireibu

Unyu Tsūshinshō Kambu

Davao, (Office of the Commander),

END MESSAGE.

- * - Parts 2, 3, 5 same Jr. number.
- a - Manila Haken message.
- b - Same spelling.
- c - TOSUWAI.

Trans 1 May 44

(1208, 4881-2)

JR-24302 G-I

~~TOP SECRET~~
083

64

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-24382 E-I

--M-- --M-- --M--

--M-- --M-- 29 April 44/5140

Manila to --M-- (--M--)

#3 SEN MA HA^a Message #27, parts 5-9

REVISION

We are having the 4 ships of Kaede stand at the Bangka Anchorage (North of Manado) and are having the 4 ships of Higashi enter Maru I --G--. After that, as soon as Higashi is unloaded, we are having Kaede enter Maru I.

3. --5G-- to Maru I --3G--. We will make the starting point Shiashi anchorage, south of Jolo.

4. With regard to the above, if --G-- we transfer Higashi from Maru I to Maru Ha by freighters, then Higashi will make port⁹ at Maru Ha --2G--.

Kaede will branch off at Maru I en route and will take on food supplies (?at?) - U--.

3. We will wire in a supplementary message details for maximum protection which can be furnished by --G-- air for both of these.

Message addressed to Cmd S I G, BEMBAHU SHIREIBU, URYU TSOHINCHU FUREY, IAW.G (Office of the Commander), Maru (Helmbora).

End Message

a - Manila Haka Message.

b - TORBU HAD.

Trans 3 May 44 (4831-u) JR-24382 E-I

65

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 25122 A & B

12166 de 7190 8 May 44 0217 032
Yo Tsu 0906 on 0285 46 7 May 1700
Manila to Tokyo

#3 Sen Ma Ha Message #119, part 1 and 2, revised.

(Tajima)

(Aden)

Ship 2490-3165, ship 0774-8114,
and the AMATSUZAN MARU, of Take #1 Sempakudan,
were torpedoed and sunk on the 6th at 1405, at
20 30' north latitude, 124 10' east longitude.
(The 7 escort ships (? and ?) 2 aircraft (? are
patrolling on the west ?)): The Sempakudan was
thrown off its schedule by 10 hours. It is now
continuing on its course.

(Commander of #3 SYS Haken Han)

Message addressed to: Sempaku Shireibu,

#3 SYS

(Please communicate this to (? 1 ?)).
For the information of -J-a. (Please
communicate this to Seibi Kyoku
(Equipment Office))

a - Personal name "E".

Trans 11 May 44 (3760-b)

JR 25122 A & B

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~~TOP SECRET~~

B. CONVOY MOVEMENTS

1. Eight ships bound for Manila.
2. See also no. JR 24302 B-I under "Movement of Troops."
3. See also no. JR 25122 A-B under "Movement of Troops."

JR 25895 A-B
JR 25886 B

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25886-B

de 9008 (---M---)

(---M---)

1556

---M--- to ---M--- (---M---) (Saigon to ---M--- Circuit)

#3 SYS FUTSUIN SHIBU Message #249, Part 2

A SEMPAKUDAN left Cape St. Jacques for Takao by way of Yumin on the 1st at 2100 with escort as far as ---G--- north latitude $15^{\circ} 00'$. The noon position of the SEMPAKUDAN, speed 9 knots;

On the 2nd:

North latitude $11^{\circ} 12'$, east longitude $108^{\circ} 55'$.

On the 3rd:

North $12^{\circ} 58'$.

Trans. 20 May 44

(3160-c)

JR-25886-B

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

C. REPORTS ON JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Arrival and departure—Palembang to Hiroshima. | JR 30060 |
| 2. Arrivals, breakdowns, departures, loadings, repairs, etc. | JR 30042
JR 30028 A
JR 25121 |
| 3. Routes and noon positions. | JR 22290
JR 30041 B-C |
| 4. Ten-day shipping report. | JR 29887 A |
| 5. Loading details. | JR 25669 |
| 6. Loading aviation gasoline. | JR 25614 A |
| 7. Shipment of bauxite. | JR 25665 |
| 8. See also "Shipping of Commodities." | |

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JR-30060

7420 de 8128 20 Jun 44/0101 5
- Tsu 932 On 845 36 19 Jun 44/2130

KASO
PALEMBANG to HIROSHIMA (--E--)

3rd S.Y.S. NANSU SHIBU Message #513

The #28 NANSHIN MARU arrived here on the
19th at 1530 from SINGAPORE.

After --G-- loading, it is scheduled to
leave for SINGAPORE on the 20th.

Message addressed to: SINGAPORE (MALAYA)

For the information of: SEMPAKU SHIREIBU
MANILA

End message.

Trans 3 Jul 44 (1927-t)

JR-30060

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

075 71

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 30042

-- de 11760 6 Jun 44 1836
Ma Tsu 223 on 224 50 5 Jun 44/1100
Maumari to Manila Water (Tens 389)
MAUMARI SHIBU Message #758

On the 3rd:

Ships arriving: #7 TSUUN MARU

Ships having breakdown: EIFUKU MARU

#2 SAKU RA^a

#3 KATSU RA MARU

Ships run aground:

#13 SAKU RA MARU

Ship scheduled to leave for MARU YO^b: Tow-ship,

SHUGYO MARU

Message addressed to: AMBON

MANILA

Lesser SUNDA Islands

For the information of: SURABAYA

SINGAPORE

a - "MARU" not in text.
b - SURABAYA.

Trans 4 Jul 44 (8625-A)

JR 30042

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076

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 30028 A

17895 de 16235 29 Apr 44 1504 30
-- Tsu 1057 On 690 48 28 Apr 2050

KASO

Surabaya (c) to Hiroshima (c)

#3 S.Y.S. Java Shibu Message #1944, Part 1.

On the 28th:

Ships in the harbor

29 ships

Being loaded:

ship 0036-9963

Preparing to sail:

ship 2454-3101

Being repaired

ship 1197-7791

ship 1710-8289

ship 3876-8481^a

ship 1014-5652

ship 9126-9762

15 motor sailboats

JR 30028 A
Page 1

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Ships leaving port for MARU WO: ^b

ship --LM-- -738

a - Imperfect ship number.
b - Waingapce.

Trans 3 Jul 44 (8625-y)

JR 30028 A
Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~
078

74

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25121

3610 de 3950 8 May 44 2127 19
Yo on 443 53 8 May 44 1635
Hiroshima to Sapporo (--D--)

REVISION

Hiroshima "G" message #280

Oil tanker #21 NANSHIN MARU on the 8th at 0900 leaving Moji for Otaru. Speed 8 knots, route off shore^a of Japan at distance of 10 nautical miles. Scheduled to arrive on the 12th at 1200 with a load of fuel oil 1499 (? kilograms ?) 0857^b.

Message addressed to #5 S.Y.S.

For the information of Sempaku Shireibu, Unyu Tsushinshō Kambu, Niigata Shibu.

a- (正岸) , KYOGAN.

b- Possibly 1499. 0857 kilograms.

Trans 10 May 44

(5088-w)

JR-25121

078 75

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-22290-A

6519 de 4623 12 December 43 0044 15
Yo Tsu 616 on 212 45 11 Dec 43/1930
Manila Sen to Hiroshima (--E--), Palau (--E--)
#4 S Y S MANILA SHIBU Message #15--G--, part 1 .

1. Ship 0678-1543, --G--, is bound for Cebu
on the 11th at 1500, escorted by a flying boat.
--2M-- 8. Scheduled to arrive --M-- at 0300.

2. Noon position on the 12th:
North Latitude: 13° 45"
East Longitude: 122°

On the 13th:
North Latitude: 12° 12'
East Longitude: 124°

End Part.

Trans 27 Mar 44 (3146-u)

JR-22290-A

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000

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 30041 B

13681 de 12904 30 Jun 44 1617 15
Yo Tsu 176 On 548 46 30 Jun 1100

Keelung to Hanking (Tena 540)

#1 SYS Takao Shibu Keelung Shutchōjo Message #869, Part 2.

.....^a leaving for (?Roku?)Kei (六經) on the 30th
at 0600 under escort of the DOWATŌ (奴和島).

Speed - 8 knots.

Route: From Keelung, skirting the Southwest Islands, to
Aizaki Seto, to Rokukei, to Moji.

a - Continued from preceding part.

Trans 3 Jul 44 (8625-y)

JR 30041 B

~~TOP SECRET~~
00177

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 30041 C

15820 de 15179 30 Jun 44/1529 21
MA Tsu 839 On 555 43 30 Jun 44/1100

Una

Keelung to --M-- (Tena 539)
Keelung to --M-- (Tena 540)

1st Sen^a Takao Shibu Keelung Shutchōjo Message #869, part 3*.

Scheduled to arrive on 5 Jul at 0600.

Noon position 30 June: North Latitude 24° 53'.

East Longitude 122° 42'

1 July: North Latitude 25° 12'

East Longitude 125° 25'

2 July: North Latitude 27° 23'

East Longitude 128° 23'

a - SYS.

*Part 2 same number.

Trans. 6 Jul 44

(9525-p)

JR 30041 C

082

78

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-29887-A

5344 de 5860 . 2 May 44 2230 1
Ma Tsu 368 on 745 49 2 May 44 1610

ATE: 417 TE NA

(Hiroshima de Taihoku Circuit)

#5 Sen^a Manila Shibu message #1403, part 1

The 1st:

Ship movements:

Ships unloading:

Ship 0348-5217
1755-7133.

Ships loading:

Ship 1125-8874
1092-1230.

Ships awaiting Sendan:

Ship 2736-6152
5322-7900
3351-9971.

Ships under repair:

Ship 2328-3237

JR-29887-A

~~TOP SECRET~~
Page #1

003

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Yo Tsu - on 606 49 2 May 44 1610

ATE: 924 TENA
Manila(c) to Singapore(c)

a- S.Y.S.

Trans 15 Jul 44

(6624-w)

JR-29887-A

Page #2

004

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25669

- de 16235 29 Apr 44 1432

Tsu - cn 1048 52 28 Apr 2100

KASO

Palembang - --M-- (--M--)

(?Singapore "F"?) Message #1958

Ship #2349 - 6549 loading:

#91 aviation gasoline - 7712.355 kiloliters
Specific gravity at 15° centigrade
00.7389

Loading and unloading report:

Time needed for loading - 11 hours 25
minutes

Unloading --U--^a - 2 hours

Message addressed to Manila, Singapore
(Malaya).

--U--. For the information of Sempaku Shireibu,

a - Commodity "G".

Trans 17 May 44

(5450-d)

JR-25669

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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085
81

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25614 A

7420 de 8128 14 Mar 44 0017 15
Tsu 905 on 422 39 13 Mar 2030

Kaso
(Singapore to Hiroshima (Ckt.) (--M--))

#3 S Y S Nansu Shibu Message #1150 Part 1.

1. Ship 4668-0886 loading "#87"

Airplane gasoline: 991.368 kilolitres.

Specific gravity at 15 degrees centigrade:

00.7395.

#3 Hold: Loading:

126.216 kilolitres.

--G--

End Part.

Trans 17 May 44. (3146-s)

JR-25614 A

008

82

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JR-25665

7420 de 8128 10 Apr 44 0038 15
Tsu 909 on 807 32 9 Apr '2330
--M-- - --M-- (---M---) (Hiroshima - Singapore Ckt)
#3 S Y S MALAYA SHIBU Message #1462.

Ship 2316 - 1536^a is loading as follows:

 JAVA Shipment

To be received by FURUKAWA INDUSTRIES

 Bauxite: 6550 tons

Message addressed to Sempaku Shireibu, Moji.

For the information of #3 S Y S.

End message

a - Incorrect ship number - possibly "0916".
b - Text is Kogyo.

Trans 17 May 44

(3146-d)

JR-25665

007

~~TOP SECRET~~
03

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D. SHIPPING OF COMMODITIES

1. List of commodities and place loaded on ship. JR 28595 B-C-D
2. To be received by various units and positions on ship. JR 28685 A
3. List of commodities shipped. JR 28562 A-I-U
4. Consignment of commodities. JR 28570 D-F

~~TOP SECRET~~

083

84

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-28595-B-0

4282 de 5725 27 Apr 44/1822 2
Ma Tsn 510 on 315 49 27 Apr 44/1705

Un A
Woodsung to Manila (879 Tons)

2 SYS SHANGHAI SHIBU Message #561 Part 2, Part 3 *

a . . . Hold, 52 head

#2 (?upper?) Deck^b

Field guns, 3

Lower Deck^b

Pack Horses, 58

Hold

Trucks, 20
Foodstuffs, 150 cubic meters
Unit's baggage, 1500 packages
Liquid fuel, 160 cans
Water distiller cans, 19
--15--^c, 5

Bunker

--10-- (72)

Upper Deck

Field guns, 10

#3 Upper Deck^b

Field guns, 2

083

~~TOP SECRET~~

85

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#3 and #4-Middle Deck^b

---20---

162 MGN

#3 Lower Deck^b

Pack Horses, 1144 head

(?Medium?) ammunition wagons, 12

Foodstuffs, 10 cubic meters

- * - Part # same number.
- a - Continued from previous part.
- b - These "decks" may be floors within holds.
- c - Commodity "5K", large vehicle.

Form 1 Sub W (5081-2)

01-20505-100 000

~~TOP SECRET~~
B6

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-28595 D

14386 de 12116 . 24 Apr 44/2742 2
- Tsu 19 On 188 48 24 Apr 44/2742

WOOSUNG to MANILA WATER. (TENA 197)

#2 S.Y.S. SHANGHAI SHIBU Message #(?05?)61, Part 4

Units' baggage (? 15 ?)00 packages

Ammunition 59 (? 53 ?) packages

Trucks 10

#4 (? Lower ?) deck

Horses: --G-- --M--

Hold

(? Foodstuffs ?) 50 packages

Trucks 6

--G-- (? 10 ?)00 packages

Ammunition (? 60 ?)00 packages

--Y--^a 1 (? 35 ?)

Message addressed to: #2 (? SENPAKU YUSO CHINWAK ?)

a - Commodity "AAAA"
or Commodity "YTM"

Trans 27 Jan 44 (655-t)

JR-28595 D

081

81

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-28685 A

5610 - de - 3613 28 May 44/2228 10
Mr Tsu - On 158 49 28 May 44/1800

OTARU to MATUWA (TENA 804)

#5 YU SON SHIEU Message #65, Part 1

"D" Loading

#1 Upper Deck:

To be received by ISAO BUTAI:
Coal in bags, 22(200?), 247 cubic meters

#1 Middle Deck:

To be received by KOKU (Aviation) SHURE
(Repair) SHO: --U-- tanks² 26, 43 cubic meters.

To be received by #80 HIKOJO (Airfield)
DAITAI:
Ammunition 651 packages, 54 cubic meters.

a - Containers.

Trans 27 Jun 44 (655-t)

JR-28685 A

052

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JR-28562 A

10242 de 17895

10 Jun 44/0857

95

Teu 022

On 022

47

9 Jun 44/1743

HLKA

--V-- to --M-- (--M--) (HIROSHIMA to SINGAPORE CH. SINGAPORE

AI S.Y.S. FUSAN SHIEU Message #1167, Part 1*

--U-- Ship 2460-0862 loading at FUSAN:

--G--: 2^a

Officers: 5

Non-commissioned officers and men: 1(287?)

Trucks: 6

Light trucks: 4

(? TANKW TEB ?): 5

Supply vehicles: 2

Radio equipments: 122 crates - 40 cubic meters

Anti-aircraft machine guns: 2

Food supplies: 6556 crates - 492 cubic meters.

a - Possibly unit number.

b - Part 21 same number.

JR-28562

023

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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IR 28562 I

de 17890 10 June 44 0914 21
 Tst 923 on 667 44 9 June 44 1720
 FROM: ICP Wada
 TO: MAMA --M-- to --M--
 (Hiroshima (c) to Singapore (c) Cnt.)

1st SHIN FUSAN SHINSU Message #1167, Part 9th.

2. Ship 3006-8993, loading at Fusan.

32nd HIKUJŪ DANBAE:

Officers - 18

Non-commissioned officers and men - 204;

Anti-aircraft machine guns - 2;

Ammunition - 5 cases, 2 cubic meters.

9th --G--:

Officers - 17

Non-commissioned officers and men - 347

Barbets - 2

Light trucks - 4

Trucks - 5

Parts 1 and 21 same number.

10 June 44 (2:00)

IR 28562

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094

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JR-28562 U

15242 23 17895 18 Jun 44/1000 15
FO Wsu 916 On 45 9 Jun 44/2030
to ? (TEMA 105) (HIROSHIMA to SINGAPORE Ckt.)
S.Y.S. FUSAN SHIEU Message #1167, Part 21

Light trucks
Water supply apparatus
Derrick machine
--a 1 each
Rollers 2
Ordnance equipment 436 boxes - 668 cubic meters
Food 1407 boxes - 160 cubic meters
Ammunition 41 boxes - 2 cubic meters

a - Commodity "WWW".

Trans 25 Jun 44 (6624-t)

JR-28562 U

~~TOP SECRET~~

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085

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JR 23570 D

4623 de 6519 19 Jun 44/2112 2
 Ma Tsu 614 On 326 4C 19 Jun 44/1700

Fuzar to Manila (Tenz 0201)

1st S.Y.S. Fuzan Shibu message #1246, part 4*.

Provisions 640 --G--^a 110 cubic meters.

For the 1st Dokoritsu --G-- Tai of the 11th

Yasen Kōku Shūri (repair) Shō.

Commissioned officers 2

Non-commissioned officers and men 99

Repair --G-- 250 boxes 62 cubic meters.

Provisions 190 boxes 40 cubic meters.

Clothing, etc. 40 boxes 9 cubic meters.

a - Possibly "crates".

*Part 6 same number.

006

Trans. 2 Jul 44

(3536 d)

JR 23570 D

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JM 28570-F

4623 do 6519	19 Jun 44	2025	2
Ma Pau 618	on 238	47	19 Jun 44 1745

SAKI NIEA

Fusan (p) to Singapore (Tena 0201)

1 S Y S FUSAN SHEEV Message #1246, Part 6

--2G-- main strength:

Officers: 3

Non-Commissioned officers and men: 317

Light trucks: 3

Tankettes: 2

Rollers and other equipment: 673 bales

148 cubic meters

Feeder: 1050 bales, 1 --1G-- cubic meters

Clothing: 302 bales, 55 cubic meters.

017

JM 28570-F

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E. REPORTS ON SINKINGS OF JAPANESE SHIPS

1. Twenty-day submarine report. JR 24686
2. Enemy submarine activity. JR 25699
JR 22396
3. Wreck and rescue of personnel. JR 25798
4. Some other sinkings. JR 25616
JR 25646
JR 25749 A-C
JR 22270

028

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JR-24686-A

8168 de 8910 21 Apr 44/1618 19
- Tsu - on ---4 49 21 Apr 44/1610
--M-- to --M-- (--M--)

#3 SEMPAKUDAN Message #763, Part 1

(?According to?) --1G-- SEMPAKU SHIREIBU JIN
Message #565, --1G-- , submarine activities --2G-- , the
first part of April (that within the parenthesis is last
10 days of March):

1. Ships detected:

- (1) Waters near JAPAN 29 (36)
- (2) Waters off East China 3 (08)
- (3) Waters off South China . . . ^a

a - Continued in next part.

Trans 4 May 44 (6315-S)

JR-24686-A

0505

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25699

14880 de 12100 2 May 44 2110 21
YO Tsu 104 on 298 53 2 May 1545

(Uns)
Prai to --M-- (--M--) (Tokyo to Manila Crt.)

#3 S Y S Malaya Shibu, Prai Shutchōjo Message #1250.

Submarine activity the 1st, 1700:

At the mouth of (Puket)^a harbor

(North Latitude 7° 51'
East Longitude (798?)^o 28'). --U--

--3G--

Message addressed to: Sempaku Shireibu, #5 S Y S
(Manila, Singapore), Malaya Shibu, Kofuaji, Mergui, #38
Tei, --G--, Malacca.

End Message

a- Kana spelling: Fu Ketsu To,

Trans 18 May 44 (8464-s)

JR-25699

~~TOP SECRET~~

100 gb

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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JR-22396

5570 de 5447 31 De 43 2143 7
Tsu 241 on 136,22 43 31 De 2130
Takeo To Hiroshima (--M--)
1st S Y S Takeo Shibu Message #3351.

Ships 0363-2969
1909-3955a
3051-6948,

which were scheduled to leave for Kowloon on
the 31st, will be delayed because of submarine activity.
We expect them to leave about the 2nd.

Message addressed to: Kowloon.

For the information of: 2nd S Y S, 1st S Y S,
Sempaku Shireibu.

a- Possibly ship 1599-3955.

107

Trans 29 Mar 44 (9385-s)

JR-22396

97

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25793-A-B

5879	de 5576 .	28 Mar 44	2143	15
Yo	Tsu -	On 193	-	28 Mar 44 2130

ATE: --E--

UNA NIKA SURABAYA (c) to SINGAPORE (c)
 REVISION
 3rd SEN JAVA SHIBU Message #1452 Parts 1 and 2

1. Among the persons shipwrecked on ship 2349-6549, 28 commissioned officers, 440 non-commissioned officers and men, and about 44 civilians in military service; (of the above, 37 men are seriously injured and 80 men are slightly injured), were rescued by ship 1713-1519 and the KUNUYAMA MARU, and arrived at SEPANDJANG anchorage at 1730.

2. Naval warships are now putting pressure^a on (?the SUMBA area?).

Message addressed to: 5th SYS, 3rd SYS

a - Selatsu, literally "subjugate".

Trans 13 Jul 44 (8464-E)

JR-25793-A-B

~~TOP SECRET~~

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JR-25616

de 6302

20 Mar 44 1829

7

Tsu

on 490

51 20 Mar 1730

Ni Ka

Palau to Rabaul (--D--) to --M-- to Hiroshima (--M--)
Risayo to --M--, Palau to --M--.

4th S Y S Palau Shibu Message #1002.

The #5 ship (ship 0894-1327) of the Palau Kaigun #22 Wewak Sempakudan was sunk on the 19th at 0839 at south latitude $2^{\circ} 55'$, east longitude $143^{\circ} 40'$. It is uncertain if it was --G-- torpedoed or bombed.

Message addressed to: Rabaul, (Gō), Sempaku Shireibu, Unyu (transport) Tsūchinchō Kambu (cadre), Seibi (equipment) Kyoku (office).

Trans 17 May 44 (3148-s)

JR-25616

11.2


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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25646

14518 de 11904 19 Mar 44 1647 21
Ma Tsu 349 on 2478 33 19 Mar 0400

KASO
Hiroshima - Hollandia (Akazuki)
SEMPAKU SHIREIBU FUKU Message #618

It was announced that the motor sail boat
HOSHU () MARU, mentioned in #31 Tei
request message #215, was sunk as of 12 March.

Message addressed to #31 Teihakuba Shireibu.

Trans 17 May 44

(3146-d)

JR-25646

100

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 24749 A-C

7420 de 8128 9 Apr 44 2358 15
 YO Tsu 1060 on 889 47 9 Apr 44 2330
 Singapore to Hiroshima
 Moji

#3 SEN^a MALAYA SHIBU Message #1460 Parts 1, 2, and 3^a.

While Army Sergeant ONAKA FUKUE --G-- KOIZUMI KYUICHIRO carried out a search for survivors of the SAKURA #1 in coastal waters at a point around 10 knots south (west?) of Pandan Island at 1210 on 5 March, this ship --5GM-- a submarine. Although we made a search with every possible --2G-- up through 10 March, we could find nothing. Since even up to --G-- the present, there are absolutely no clues, we have decided --2G-- this ship was sunk.

(?Memorial?) WAKAMATSU

Address: (1) EHIME KEN, KITA GUN

End Part

* - Parts 2 and 3 revised and Part 5 same number.

a - SYS.

Trans 8 July 44 (6624-z)

JR 25749 A-C

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 25749 B,C

7420 de 8128 10 Apr 44 0007 15
Tsu 903 On 898 49 9 Apr 44 2330

--M-- to --M-- (Singapore to Hiroshima ckt)

3rd SYS Malays. Shibu message #1460, parts 2 and 3.*

While carrying out a search for survivors of the
SAKURA #1 at a point about 10 knots south --1G--, this ship
--5GM-- a submarine. Although we made a search with every
possible --2G-- up through 10 March; we could find nothing.

Since even up to --1G-- the present, there are
absolutely no clues, we have decided --2G-- this ship was
sunk.

(?Memorial?) WAKAMATSU

Address: (1) Ehime Ken, Kita Gun.

End part.

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* - Part 5 same number.

Trans 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 25749 B,C

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 22270

- de 12860 2 Ja. 44 1459 30
YO Tsu - on 925 50 2 Ja 1010

--M-- to --M-- (--M--) (Palau to ? circuit)

#1 (?27?) SEMPAKU KOSHAKO RENTAI Message
#149.

Ship 7241-7768^a while on the high seas, December
29th, at 0200, at East longitude: 134 degrees

North latitude: 8 degrees and 15 minutes
was torpedoed and sunk.

Among the --1G-- owing to this shipwreck,

people --1G--: 7 (men)

--1S--: 2 (men)

were (?reported?).

Message addressed to: (?UJINA?)

AKATSUKI #2953 BUTAI.

a - Probably 2241-7758.

Trans 27 Mar 44 (591-r)

JR 22270

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~~TOP SECRET~~

F. OIL REPORTS

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Oil stored at Singapore and Sumatra, 1 May. | JR 25647 A-B |
| 2. Oil reports analyses. | JR 28679 D |
| 3. Types of oil. | JR 22285 B
JR 22373 C |
| 4. Belawan production reports. | JR 21465 A-E
JR 24813 A-D |

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

IR-25647 A

Ø742Ø de Ø8128 1 May 44 2326 15
 Yo Tsu 1Ø65 on 586 49 1 Apr 225Ø
 Singapore ~ Hiroshima (-E-)
 #3 S Y S SAN Message #1282, part 1

Oil stored at Singapore as of 3Ø March
 is as follows: (Units)

91 aviation gasoline -	27,000
87 aviation gasoline -	16,000
Motor car gasoline -	88,000
Fuel oil -	68,000
--U--a -	10,000(?)00
Kerosene -	5,000

End part

a - Probably a type of oil.

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Trans 17 May 44

(3146-1)...

Ø.ØØØ

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-25647-B

7420 de 3123 1 Mar 44/2529 15

Yo Tsu 1067 on 539 39 1 Apr 44/2230

Singapore to Hiroshima, Tokyo (--M--)

#5 S.Y.S. SAN Message #1282, Part 2 *

Light oil, 3700

SOUTH SUMATRA

Crude oil, 10500

NORTH SUMATRA

Crude oil, 02590 (RIRITSUKU^a)

Crude oil, 6000

Machine oil, 1900

Message addressed to: UJINA

For the information of: UNYU (Transport)

TSUSHINCHŌ KAMBU (CADRE)

- * - Part 1 same number.
- a - Kana spelling, meaning unclear.

Trans 22 May 44 (572-g)

JR-25647-B

100

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-28879-D

--M

18 Mar 44 0149

Yo Tsu 930 on 446 42 9 Mar 44 2330
(TENA 417)
Palembang to Hiroshima (- M-)

#3 S.Y.S. Nansu Shibu message #1075, part 4

Viscosity: at 50° C, 35.5 seconds.

~~Freezing~~ FREEZING POINT: + 8°

Conditions of loading and unloading:

To load: (time required: 12 hours 25 minutes).

Repairs will be made and supplies taken on.

Message addressed to #3 S.Y.S., Malaya Shibu.

For the information of Seapaku Shireibu.

END MESSAGE

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Trans 27 Jun 44

(8162-0)

JR-28879-D

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JR 22285-E

14350 do 14950

16 Jan 44/1420

30

Tsu 124

on 108

64

12 Jan 44/1800

--M-- to --M-- (M) (Rabaul to Hiroshima Okts)

#52 TENHAKU Message #48, Part 2.

--1G-- - 24 (705?) litres

MO - 350 litres

(KU?) - 75 --1G--^a

4. (SA?) - 42,000 (7litres?)

RV - 10,000 litres

MO - 2,200 litres

KU - 250

5. #30 cans

(ZA -18

TA -12)

Message addressed to: RAENEL, (YEMERAN?), UJIMA

a - Probably cans

Trans 5 Apr 44 (5814-G)

JR 22285-E

102

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-22373 C

7324 de 6302 12 Fe 44 2145 93,15,95
Yo on 83, 47 47 12 Fe 44 2115
Palau to Rabaul (Rabaul)
4th S.V.S. PALAU SHIBU Message #537, Part 3.

(3)

TO 86.

(4)

(? MO ?) 530

(5)

SHI 738

(6)

KE 1

(7)

KE 110

(8)

TA 85

(9)

KU 124

(10)

--G-- 19.4

Trans 29 Mar 44

(1496-f)

JR-22373 C

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-21465-A

7420 de 8128

13 Dec 43/0120

15

Tsu 919

on 802

42

12 Dec 43/2030

Belawan to Hiroshima. (---U---)

3rd S.Y.S. MALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTOHOJO Message #1203,
Part 1*

North Sumatra oil report as of 10 December

(units in kilolitres)

1. --G-- quantity - 4644
2. (?oil storage capacity?)^a - 168713
3. Lubricating oil (including Medan Lubricating
oil)

End part

* Parts 2, 4 & 5 same number.

a - May also be some type of oil.

Form 25 Mar 43

(1496-a)

JR-21465-A

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-21465-B

Ø742Ø de Ø8128 13 Dec 43 Ø123 15

Yo Tsu 92Ø on 842 45 12 Dec 43/2Ø3Ø

Belawan to Hiroshima (--U--)

3rd S Y S MALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTCHØJO Message
#12Ø3, part 2

7348 In the crude oil - 564
--2G-- 14375) at Belawan -
Benzine - (87)3544 (3Ø24)
Benzine - (92)4854 (513)

End Part.

Trans 15 Mar 44 (3161-u)

JR-21465-B

116

111

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-21465-B

07420 de 08128

13 Dec 43/0123 15

Yo Tsu 920

on 842 45 12 Dec 43/2030

Belawan to Hiroshima (--U--)

Revision

3rd S.Y.S. MALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTCHŌJO Message #1203,
part 2*

Crude oil - 564

---2G--^a - (14375) including Belawan 7346

High test gasoline (87) 3544 (3024)

High test gasoline (92) 4854 (513)

End part

* Parts 1, 4 & 5 same number.

a - May be "total".

Trans 25 Mar 44

(1496-g)

JR-21465-B

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JR-21465-C

7420 de 8128

13 De 43 ?

15

--M--

41

12 De 2030

Belawan to Hiroshima (--U--)

3rd S.Y.S. HALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTCHUJO Message #1203,

Part 3*.

Automobile gasoline - 9497 (1765).

Gear oil - 2132.

Crankcase oil - 1808 (326).

Fuel oil - 3976 (2471), including Belawan, 610.

End part.

* - Parts 1, 2, 4 and 5 same number.

Trans 25 Mar 44

(1496-f)

JR-21465-C

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR-21465 D

REVISION

7420 de 8128	15 Dec 43	0135	15
Tsu 925	on 872	47	12 Dec 2030

Belawan - Hiroshima (--U--)

3rd S Y S MALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTCHŌJO Message #1203, part 4*

Total - 82510 (22474), including Belawan 7956

- 4. Remaining oil storage capacity - 86405
- 5. 1st 10 days in December
 actually loaded: At
 Pangkalan Seesee: Crude oil - 10948
 #87 high test gasoline - 5890

End part

*Parts 1, 2, and 5 same number.

118

Trans 21 Apr 44

(1496-6)

JR-21465 D

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JE-21465-B

7420 de 8128

13 Dec 43/0136

15

Tsu 926

on 782

43 12 Dec 45/2030

Belawan to Hiroshima (---U---)

3rd S.Y.S. MALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTCHŌJO Message #1203,
Part 5*

92 High test gasoline	1679
Automobile gasoline	3976
Crankcase oil	629
Fuel oil	4749
Belawan crude oil	6100
Total	34171

Message addressed to: S. SHIREIBU

3rd S.Y.S. (UNYU

TSŪSHINCHŌ MALAYA SHIBU)

End message

* Parts 1, 2 and 4 same number.

Trans 25 Mar 44

(1496-g)

JE-21465-B

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F15

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

FR 24815 A, B, C

8500 de 8772 24 Apr 44 0106 2
 YO Tsu 4149 cn 722 622 44 22 Apr 44 2510

KASO

Belawan to Tokyo (---M---)
 Belawan to Ujina (---M---) (Singapore to Tokyo Ckt.)

REVISION

3rd SYS MALAYA SHIBU BELAWAN SHUTCHŌJO Message #731,
 Parts 1, 2, and 3.

Report on North Sumatra oil fields, as of 20 April:

(Unit of measure - kilolitres)

1. Daily production: 169⁵
2. Oil storage capacity: 177931
3. Amount of oil stored (figures within parentheses are for PANGKALAN SUSU)

Crude oil: 64044 (14844), including BELAWAN 1703747

#91 aviation gasoline: 6598 (5975)

Ordinary gasoline: 9492 (2119)

(?Kerosene?) 2234 (0971)

Light oil: 2396

Heavy oil: 9874 (4250), including BELAWAN 1703747

170

~~TOP SECRET~~

FR 24815 A, B, C

WAR DEPARTMENT

Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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Total: 94688 (29159), including BRLAWM 12276.

4. Remaining storage capacity 832.45

a - As given.

Trans 19 June 48

(3511-2)

UR 24813 A, C.

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FCT

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 24815 D

8500 de 8772

24 Apr 44 0106

2

YO Tsu 4155

on 402

43 22 Apr 2315

--M-- to --M-- (Tena 722) (Singapore to Tokyo Okt.)

#3 S Y S Malaya Shibu Belawan Shutchōjo Message #751 Part 4*

5. Actual loadings for the middle of April:

Belawan:

Crude oil: 4261.

Pankalansusu:

#91 airplane gasoline: 13843

Heavy oil : 3248

Total : 21352.

Message addressed to: U.T.K, Sampaku Yusō Shireibu,
3rd S Y S (Malaya Shibu).

* Parts 1,2,3, same number.

Trans 3 Jul 44 (5068-s)

JR 24815 D

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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TOP SECRET

G. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Weather report. JR 28575 B
2. Arrival of a lieutenant and party. JR 27497 A
3. Promotions of officers. JR 26239

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TOP SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

JR 26575 Z

3745 de 3642

20 Jun 44/2029

19

On 411

50

20 Jun 44/1140

Urappa to Numshokata (--E--)

#53 Teihakuba Shireibu message #671, part 2.

Wind direction (風向) - 6

Wind velocity - 1

Weather (天氣) - 22

--G-- --6M--

Visability (視程) - 6

Wind and Wave Direction (風浪向) - 3

End part.

Trans. 26 Jun 44

(54342)

01. 1140

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JRX-27497-A

14 April 1944 2130

HIROSHIMA to RABAU (---E---)

1st SENHŌ RENTAI Message #723 Part 1 *

We shall advise you about the arrival at
your place of 2nd Lieutenant ISHIDA and the men with
him, who are of the BUTAI which is standing by at
KAVIENG.

* - Parts 2 and 3 same number.

Trans 17 Jul 44 (7503-g)

JRX-27497-A

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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JRX 26239

12 April 44/2030

From Hiroshima to Cebu Box (---A---)
Singapore (---B---)

(---13---) SIS Zai Message #586, Part 1

Reply to #3 SIS San Sei message #492.

Mentions supply of armaments to be used by #15 Sempaku
Kohai Rentai and requests relay.

Refers to sailors of ship 0522-9477 on 10 February,
and something having been sent to the SEMPAKU HEIDAN.

JRX 26239

2 May 44/2315

From Hiroshima to Rabaul (---M---)

Sankutan Message #1635

Mentions promotions April 26th of Warrant Officer
1st. Lt. KIMOMIDU and Warrant Officer Special 1st. Lt.
MORI.

Message addressed to: 4th SIS.

JRX 26239

10 May 44/0100

From Saigon to Ujina (---E---)

2nd Taisen Sensho Saigon Shibu Message #43

Mentions #1146 MARU and #86 MARU.

Message addressed to: Sempaku Shiroibu, 5th SIS.
2nd Taisen Sempaku Shō (2nd Maru
Sempaku Kohai Rentai)

Trans 25 ~~TOP SECRET~~ JRX 26239

WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

H. - CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHANGES

1. Changes in running key, square, and code book announced.
2. Changes in meteorological code announced.

RK 2939

Message 23
Weekly Report
#60

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

RM 2939

14520 de 11904 23 JUN 44 1645 2 -- 22 APR 1944
4 T 468 0 1118 42 F 22 JUN 1944

HIROSIMA TO RABAUL (M)
HOLEFU TO HOLEFU (M)

SEN Staff Message #6112, parts 1, 2.

From 1 July you are ordered to begin the use of

RANSU HYŌ "FU" #9 and

Special Conversion Square "FU" #8.

We are issuing you

SEN ANGŌSHO #2

SHIYŌ KITEI "FU" #3

RANSŪHYŌ "FU" #2

Special Conversion Square "FU" #9 in order that you
may begin their use on 1 August.

Addressed to:

All offices under our direct control

UNYU TSŪSHINCHŪ KANBU

Summary: Changes for 2468.

RM 2939

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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FROM: HIROSHIMA
TO : SINGAPORE
DATE: 5 May 44

DATE TRANS: 14 May 44
SYSTEM :
TRANSLATOR : 1181

SEMPAKU YUSO SHIREIKAMBU Staff Message 3989
Parts 1,2,3,4,5, completed

SHIYO KITEI #2 for Meteorological Code OTSU will be revised as described in this message. Please inform the----
TEIHAKUBA SHIREIBU and all naval vessels in the vicinity

1. After 6 May, the rules for the encipherment of the indicator will be as follows. The manner of enciphering the indicator that applied in the past will be changed. The last two digits of the first group (---- ---- #5) will be the row designators of page 337 (the page of indicator designations is to be changed every ten days and we will instruct you in these changes).

The five digits at the (?beginning?) of the line of random numbers are to be subtracted--modulo 10-- from the second group. The second group will be the new indicator. The first group ---- ----, e.g. from the second group of the old indicator 87891-42678 subtract the five digits in (line) 91 of page 337, which makes the new indicator 87891-35016 ----

2. After 10 May the discriminant and the discarded digits will be (?supplanted?).

Message addressed to:

All ships
#1, SYS, #3 SYS, #5 SYS
#58, #59, #60, #61 TEIHAKUBA
Rabaul unit of the ----

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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TAB F. 101

Types of messages in the family considered to contain important intelligence.

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I. Communications

A message giving cryptographic data for
RK 2264

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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RK 2264

From: Tokyo Kōgin
To: Manila
22 December 1945

Kō Tsū Ho Message #611 (Parts 1, 6, 9, 10)

Detailed summary of the orders contained in Hei
Kō Ho Message #332.

1. Communication is to begin December 25th at midnight.
2. Call signs and frequencies of the communication circuits (those in parenthesis, to be used at night).
 - (1) Tokyo, Arbon, Manila circuit to be the #16 circuit with Tokyo as the regulating station.

Tokyo
Nitoro (Ha Ho I)

- (3) Singapore-Manila circuit is to be the #12 circuit with Singapore as the regulating station.

The data to be the same as that in the previous subparagraph.

3. Communication schedule.

- (1) #16 circuit

RK 2264

Page 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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RK 2264

Tokyo-Arbon	0200
	0800
	1200
	1400
	1700
	2000
	2200

#12 circuit

Singapore-Manila	0300
	0900
	1300
	1700
	2300

4. Other communication details will be in accordance with the Procedure Manual.

5. Along with carrying out the first broadcasts of the new circuits, we are endeavoring to remove all conflicts between the different circuits in the matter of the following Appended Tables of the Procedure Manual (2nd revised edition) issued by the Kōkū Tsūshin Hōan Chōkanbu:

Appended Table # 3	Frequency Chart
Appended Table #12	Call Sign Chart
Appended Table #15	Communication Schedule Chart

Addressed to: Nanjōgun, 2nd Hōmōgun, 14th Gun.

For the information of: 7th Hiko Shiden.

Parts 2, 3, 4, 5 missing

Parts 7 and 8 missing

18 May 1944 (3061-0)

RK 2264

Page 2

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II. Shipping

- A. Convoys
- B. Movements and activities of ships (other than convoys)
- C. Condition and identification of ships
- D. Jurisdiction

F 6822 A-P
F 15247
F 11121
F 11161

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F 6822 A - F

17560 de 17886	28 Nov 43	0840	2	
	on 36	59	28 Nov 43	0830

Delgo to Singapore (--M--)
 Transport shipping message
 #506 Parts 1 - 16

The plan of transport ship assignments for December is as follows: (Includes ships assigned in November, but --20-- (? delayed ?)). Order of items: amount of load; (unit of measure is kiloliter); day expected to enter port; place of unloading.

1. Aviation gasoline (place of loading - Singapore; Delgo
 - 35,500 (check 35,500)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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"B" SUSAKI - 1500

15th - TOKUYAMA KAIGUN NENRYŪSHŌ

"A" Ship 3815-4740 - 13,500

20th - YOKOSHIMA RIKUGUN KŌKŪSHŌ

"B" TAKASAKI - 1500

20th - TOKUYAMA KAIGUN NENRYŪSHŌ

"B" ŌSE (1702) - 7,500 (mixed load)^d

22nd - TOKUYAMA KAIGUN NENRYŪSHŌ

"A" (?MICH?) KAN^c MARU - 8500

26th - SHANGHAI RIKUGUN KŌKŪSHŌ

"B" ASHIMIZU - 3000

30th - TOKUYAMA KAIGUN NENRYŪSHŌ

Ordinary gasoline - 16,000 (check 16,000)

"B" ŌSE - 7500 (mixed load)

22nd - TOKUYAMA KAIGUN NENRYŪSHŌ

(?"A"?) ZUJŌ MARU 8500

26th - (?MCHI?) RIKUGUN (?JIDŌSH?)^b

1. Heavy Straits crude oil - 54,000 (check 54,000)

"B" MIYUKE --10--^d MARU 8500

15th - SHIMOTSU TŌA NENRYŪ

"B" Ship 4856-0598 - 13,500

15th AMASAKI NIPPON SEKIYU

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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"E" KURU MARU - 8,500

1500 - YOKKAICHI KAIGUN NENRYOSHŌ

"B" ASASAKI MARU - 8500

1500 KAWASAKI - MITSUBISHI SEKIYU

"B" IYUEN MARU - 15000

2000 SHIMOTSU TŌA NENRYŌ

4. North Sumatra crude oil @ 74,000 (check 74,000)

"A" ICHIRO MARU - 8,500

5th --1G--¹ RO SHIMA RIKUGUN NENRYOSHŌ

"E" SHIP 4536-4352 15,000

1500 IWAKUNI RIKUGUN NENRYOSHŌ

"B" HIRŌ MARU - 8500

1500 - YOKKAICHI KAIGUN NENRYOSHŌ

"B" OMINEYAMA MARU - 15,000

2000 - TOKUYAMA KAIGUN NENRYOSHŌ

"E" ANATEO MARU - 12,000 (mixed load^o with

RIRIKU Crude oil)

2000 - IWAKUNI RIKUGUN NENRYOSHŌ

"A" HIRŌ MARU 15,000

3000 - SHIMOTSU TŌA NENRYŌ

F 6822 A - P

Page 3

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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B. Heavy oil - 44,500 (check 44,500)

"A" Ship 4530-2545¹ - --1G--00

(78115) - MOJI SEKIYU HAIKYU TOSEI

"B" ONCHOSAN^H MARU - 1(770?)00

15th MOJI SEKIYU HAIKYU TOSEI

"B" OKIYAMA^A MARU - 15,000

20th - SAISEBO KAIGUN

"B" Ship 4725-4163 - 8000

22nd - OSAKA MITSU BUSSAN

C. North Borneo crude oil - 112,200

(place of loading - MIRI)

"B" Ship 3014-3921 - 12,000

3rd SHIMOMSU MARUZEN

"A" Ship 3018-6260⁰ - 12,000

11th - GENZAN CHOSEN SEKIYU

"B" Ship 3370-5018 - 12,000 (light quality)

13th - YOKKAICHI KAIGUN WENRYOSEI

"A" Ship 3019-9223 - 8500

17th - GENZAN CHOSEN SEKIYU

"B" #1 ICHIBI MARU - 6200

19th - KUMAMATSU NIPPON SEKIYU

F. 6822 A - P

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~~TOP SECRET~~

1st Ship 1118-1758 - 4000

(121117) - KUDAMATSU HIPPON SEKIU

2nd Ship 1115-4713^D - 8000

about the 26th - SHIMOTSU HARUZEN SEKIU

3rd Ship 1115-4713^D - 6500

about the 26th - GENZAN CHOSEI SEKIU

4th Ship 1350-8649 - 8500

20th - SHIMOTSU HARUZEN SEKIU

5th Ship 1654-6434^D - 6500

about the 26th - SHIMOTSU KYODO KURO

6th Ship 1654-6434^D - 4000

about the 26th - KUDAMATSU HIPPON SEKIU

7th Ship 1953-2612 - 12,000

about the 26th - IWAKUNI RIKUGUN SEKIU

8th Ship 4673-0895 - 12,000 (light quality)

--16--

The ships entering port at WIRI on the 26th

under their sailing conditions and convoy plan

submitted by the Navy at St. Jacques.

Copy delivered to Campaku Enreisibu

F 6822 A - P

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Reference: Ok:
 Minimal Wen
 #1 S.M.S.
 #2 S.M.S.
 #3 S.M.S.
 Malaya
 Mipi

a. - Probably ship 1805-4740.

b. - TSJII AWASE - Probably means that two types of fuel
are loaded, together on the ship. Cf Navy report.

c. - (???) (???) WAKI.

d. - May be KAMA (カマ), SAKURA (木咲) or EI (栄).

e. - 隆盛 MARI.

f. - Or possibly ASASHIO (アサシホ).

g. - 久米 IZUMI.

h. - 一洋 ICHIYANG.

i. - May be IAN, IZUMI or KO.

j. - 本島 HONJIMA.

k. - ミク MIKU.

l. - This part of text imperfect.

m. - 不詳 FUJOSHOU.

F-6822 A - P

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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- 1. - [unclear] [unclear]
- 2. - Probably Encl 4428-6260.
- 3. - Probably Encl 1812-1915.
- 4. - [unclear] [unclear]
- 5. - Probably Encl 3044-3234.
- 6. - [unclear] [unclear]

(9534-B)

F 6322 A -
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~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F-15247 A-D

7035 18 Apr 44 2220 21
To Isu 17 On 555 44 18 Apr 44 2200
USA NIKA

Tokyo to Palau, Manokwari, Singapore (SO NA E --2E--
4 SEMPAJU SHIBU CMC, SE I BUTAI --2E--)
Staff Message #646, Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4.

According to a wire from the Palau SHIBU,
with regard to the completion of the unloading of
the HATSU #5 (check 5), SENDAN, (?after?) the 4th day
of unloading, even though it is thought that the
distribution of the military strength throughout the
Palau Islands will take about 10 (check 10) days --
please use other shipping and escort ships thereafter,
(we have to transport the 43rd (check 43) SHIDAN,
embarking in Japan, the beginning of May (check 5))
and please take every conceivable measure in order to
prevent damage from enemy air attacks, etc. (Please
carry out the distribution, etc., of the military
strength throughout the Palau Islands after unloading
of supplies and personnel first).

~~TOP SECRET~~

5247-A-D

Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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You have to have them complete the unloading in the shortest possible time. (The goal for loading and unloading is 50 (check 50) hours) and have them return. We have fixed the scheduled date for completing the unloading. Moreover, we are loading, in the same SHINDAI, 22 (check 22) large landing barges and some small landing barges. (Transport Shipping Message #568 and the same #574.)

Messages addressed to: I

SONAE

Combined Fleet

SEMPAKU SHIREIBU

Reference:

KAGAYAKI

--3--

FALAU SHIBU

YAMAGUCHI BUTAI

2. Perkin of part 2.

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F 11121 A-C

5430 23 11184 24 Apr 44 0451 15
 MA Tsu 248 On 9785 51 22 Apr 44 0811
 Hiroshima to Singapore (--M--)

Shipping Staff Message #3342 Parts 1, 2, 3.

In accordance with Shipping Staff Message #3511

ship names and dates of departure from Moji are as follows:

KAGAYARI 5 (check 5)^a #1 (check 1) to #10 (check 10)

ships in order of dates of departure.

1. Ship 0552-2770.
2. Ship 0102-3231.
3. Ship 0048-2284.

The above on May (check 5) 10th (check 10)

4. TAISU --G-- MARU.
5. JUNEO MARU

The above on 15th (check 15)

6. Ship 0154-4001
7. Ship 0089-3865
8. Ship --M-- --M--

(19?) --M-- --G-- MARU

9. Ship 0732-2590.
10. Ship 0908-1273
11. Ship 0000-0000 ?) SAN MARU

~~TOP SECRET~~

F 11121 A

WAR DEPARTMENT


Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

13. MING () MARU

The above on 30th (check 30)

14. Ship 2063-3244 on the 24th (check 24)

Moana Bay.



FORM 10 MAY 42 (REVISED)

F 1112. A-

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11121-B

de 6550 23 Apr 44 1828 95

Re Tsu 683 - On 650 49 22 Apr 0830

Miyoshima to Manila Water (-M-)

Shipping Staff Message #3342, Part 2


REVISION


The above on 10 (check 10) May (check 5).

- 4. TATSU --G-- MARU
- 5. JUMPO² MARU

The above on the 15th (check 15).

- 6. Ship 1554 - 4001
- 7. Ship 1689 - 3865
- 8. Ship 4218 - 1347
- 9. HAKUBA⁰ MARU
- 10. Ship 0732 - 2590
- 11.

a - 

b - 

Trans 3 Jun 44 (3134-1)

F - 11121

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~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11121 D

11184 24 Apr 44 0459 15
Tau 251 On 1001 42 22 Apr 44 0830

to --M-- (--M--) (Manila to Singapore Ckt.)

Shipping Staff Message #3342, Part 4.

Now in this message "MŌ" means "bound for the MŌ
SHŪDAN". After they are unloaded at MARU I^a they are to be
sent on successively as ships are available.

Message addressed to: KAGAYAKI RENRAKUSHA
(Manila, Davao)

1st SYS

Refer to: HARU

UNYU TSŪSEIN CHŌKAMBU

--G--

Kaikanaera.

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20 May 44 (800000)

F-11121 D

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11161-A

TO : [unclear] ? ?
FROM : [unclear] ? ? ?
SUBJECT : [unclear] (---M---)

Shipping Status Message #3333, Part 1

In accordance with Transport Shipping Message #3333, the Navy is carrying out the plans of the May (check 5) allotment of military supply transportation bound for G0 HOKM, as follows:

- I Ground ordnance
- R) Air ordnance
- HA Provisions
- WH Clothing
- HO Military supplies^b
- ME Medical supplies
- TO Veterinary supplies
- RU Shipping materials

(Units are in cubic meters.)

... of Australia.

...

...

...

F-11161-A

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11161 B,C

210 to 3244 23 Apr 44 0143 2
 325 21 9058 46 22 Apr 0830

According to --U--, Daver, Nanking (--M--)

Shipping Staff Message # 333 Parts 2 and 3.

1. Things to be unloaded at Maru I:^a

#5 ship of KAGAYAKI 5.

I	-	2200
RO		350
HA		3300
HI		250
HO		200 (MO ^b)
R		200 (MO ^b)

#7 ship of KAGAYAKI 5.

I		2200
RO		425
UNL WANA		500
HA		4800
HI		3000
HO		142

UNL YANSHIKI^c 100

265

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

F-11161 B,C
 Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

RI	400
Total	9232.

- a- Helmehere..
- b- 15th Army.
- c- Port on Tsushima.

19 10 40 (-s) F-11161 011
~~TOP SECRET~~

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100

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11161 D

Sec 11190 25 Apr 44 1753 32
 Pa Tau 340 329 cr. 3250 32 22 Apr 0350
 H. Poshima - Davao (---M---)

Shipping Staff Message #3533, part 4*

#13 Ship of Kagayaki 5

I	2000
RO	400
and OISU ^a	347
HA	3500
NI	200
HO	200 (MO)
HE	200

Total 6847

*Part 12 same number.

^a - As given; a place in Japan.

1944 JUN 44

(3104-1)

F-11161 D

~~TOP SECRET~~

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F47

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-1161-E

0030 de 11190 27 Apr 44 2050 30.2
 -- Tsu 881 On 3205 53 22 Apr 0830
 (Manila to Singapore (kt.))
 Shipping Staff message #3333, part 5*

#14 ship of Kagayaki - 5

I	2200
RO	400
--G--	300 (MO)
HA	4000
NI	250
HO	200 (MO)
HE	250 (MO)
TO	100
RU	200
Total	7900

* - Parts 1-4 and 6-15 same number.

8 - Possibly "ami".

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F 11161 P

1003 de 11134 23 Apr 44 2045 15

TO Tok 582 On 3295 44 22 Apr 44 0830

Hiroshima to Singapore (--M--)

S Y S Staff Message
43133, Part 6*

--(0--)

TO: 200
VA: --4M--

The things being transported are being transferred at MARU 1^a.

2. Things to be unloaded at MARU HA^b:

#1 ship of KAGAYAKI 5

I : 1200
RO : 433
HA : --2M--

Marikawari.
Marikawari.

Paris 2,3,11,12,14,15 same number.

Paris 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 (11-3)

F 11161

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F-11161-G

1950 ca 11190	23 Apr 44	----	30,2
-- 1st --	On --	44	22 Apr 0830

Manchuria to Singapore (--X--)

Shipping Staff message #353, part 7*

MI: 300
 RO: 400
 SE: 135
 TC: 40
 FU: 42
 Total 5850

#4 ship of KAGAYAKI #5

T: 1200
 RO: 303
 RA: 2100
 FI: 250
 TO: 200

Notes: 1-4 5,8,9,10-13, 14 and 15 same number.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-1161-N. 1

INFO de 11190

23 Apr 44 2056

30,2

Info 385

On 3059

47

22 Apr 0830

Message to Singapore (--M--)

Shipping Staff Message #3133, Parts 8 and 9 *

HI 80

TO 80

RJ 50

Total 210

Ship #8 of KAGAYAMA - 5

I 120

RO 50

HI 200

HI 250

HC 200

IE 80

RE 40

RE 30

Total 1250

Ship #9 of KAGAYAMA - 5

I 120

RO 50

HI 200

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~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

F-1161-N. I

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

HS 200

NR 30

TC 40

RL 30

Total 4250

GROUP #12 of KAGAYAKI 5

RC 350

RA 2100

Parts 1-9, 10-15 same number.

Play stand for "13th KAGAYAKI Convoy".

F-11161 H, I

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11161 J

de 11140

24 Apr 44 0440

93

To: Es 1 247

on 3905

49

22 Apr 44 0350

From: P (- - -) (Manila to Singapore ckt.)

REPLYING STAFF Message #5133, Part 10.*

NI p 250.

RO 200.

IE 80.

TO 40.

FU 50.

Total 4250.

3. #11 Ship of Hagayaki 5, which will unload at
Manila.

NI 130.

RO 140 (besides this 500 will be unloaded
at Manila).

Report # 11140
11140.

By 4

(3104-2)

F-11161 J

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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10	-	140
1A	-	2300
11	-	300
12	-	415
13	-	275
Total	-	4100

(257) Things to be unloaded at MARU A d

#--1A-- Ship of KAGAYAKI 5

J	-	1600
30	-	412

(Besides this to be unloaded at MANILA 900)

MA	-	2500
NI	-	400
HE	-	58

- 1 - Parts 2,3 same number.
- 2 - Part in the down part.
- 3 - None?
- 4 - None?
- 5 - None?

F-11101
P-111

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-11161-N-0

5430 de 11184 24 April 44 0045 15
 Ik. Van 246 on 3905 49 22 Apr 44/2830

Hiroshima to Singapore (--M--)

Shipping Staff Message #3333, parts 14 and 15*

#10 Ship of KAGAYAKI 5

1 3000
 RO 700
 (Besides this to be unloaded at Manila, 7717)
 HA 2500
 NI 300
 HO 20
 HE 150
 RU 500
 Total 8907.

(733) The --G-- 17 of aviation ordnance to be unloaded at Manila is empty drums. After it is unloaded at Manila you on the spot will make suitable use of the ship space.

The ship's names and schedule of movements will be sent in a separate wire.

Message addressed to KAGAYAKI, #3 S Y S (Manila Tower), #1 S Y S.

Reference: UYU TSUSHIN CHOKAMEU, HARU, ERME

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

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III. Military units and personnel

- A. Water transport F 23928
F10710 A
10710 D
- B. Air forces F 9488 A
- C. Railroads
- D. Other military units F 8167 A-C
F 15240 D
See also 15247 A-D (II, A)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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F 25928

7800 de 7190	26 Jul 44 2315	21
--- Tsu 4472	on 431	39
---; Shutoho Jocho --U-- --E--		26 Jul 1450
--- (c) Water to Kumamoto (c)		

Br S V S Adjutant Message #775.

1. Reply to Seibu #16 Butai Message #78. The
Brd Sempoku Kōhei Rentai Hojūtai (Taiwan #84 Butai) - Ampin
in Taiwan.

2. Reply to Seibu #16 Butai Message #83. The
9th Sempoku Kōhei Rentai Hojūtai (Akatsuki #16709) Wakayama.

24

(0470-c)

F 25928

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

10710 1

27 Mar 44

2115

8

131 540

on 114 51

27 Mar 44 1800

Shanghai (---E--)

Shanghai Military Governor Administration message #433 1st 1

A. Regarding the coal bound for South China and the
 present time (including that for military use) (from?) the
 #3 S.Y.S. at Shanghai, we have received a wire (#2 S.Y.S.
 Staff message #678) that they cannot assign any ships to dis-
 patch other than the transport ships --G-- SHINRYU^E MARU,
 SHINRYU MARU, --43--

B. (Amount) being loaded at the #3 S.Y.S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

W-13719 D

27 May 44 1911
 on 121 46 27 May 1898
 (Canton - Tokyo Ckt)
 message #435, part 4*

Also, regarding the --G-- of the various
 (factories?) we will use the shipyards. We are
 using ocean going ships to provide connections be-
 tween Hongkong and Canton and between Hongkong and
 Manila; it is imperative that we reduce by half
 the fuel used by these ships --2G--.

see message number.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

F-9488-A

181 24 6240

15 Feb 44 2510

14

181 24 6240

on 615

37

15 Feb 44 1810

181 24 6240 (---) (Batavia to Ambon Ckt.)

181 24 6240 (---) (Batavia to Ambon Ckt.)

1. We have almost completed a special landing
 field (80) by 50) on the eastern tip of the airfield in the
 vicinity of Wakero. Small planes can land there.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F 8167-A B-3

1433 de 5517 16 Dec 43 0852 15
1500 503 on 437 44 9 Dec 43 2200
Days to Davac (-A-)

Plain message #222 parts 1, 2, and 3

Summary of orders issued in Tairikushi
#1751.

1. #72 Yasen Kōshahō Daitai, 12th Chūtai of Tokuritsu Yasen Shokūtai will entrain at Obikuro on 11 December. Will embark at Ujina and debark at Maru Ha^a.

2. #29 Yasen Fōkūtai Shireibu (debarking at Maru Ha^a) #43 and #49 Tokuritsu Yasen Kōshō 1st Chūtai (debarking at Maru Ro^b) and #46 Yasen Mikano Chūtai (debarking at Maru Ha^a) will embark at Ujina on 17 December.

3. #13 Yasen Sokuryōtai will embark at Ujina on 14 and 16 December. Will debark at Maru Ha^a.

4. #17 Yasen Mikano Chūtai will embark at Ujina on 17 December, and will debark at Maru Ha^a.

5. As for other units, we will indicate in separate messages.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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Chibugun, Chōsengun, #42 Shidan.

For reference of Sempaku Shireibu.

a- MANOKWARI.

b- SORONG.

c- HALMAHERA.

Form 2 May 41

(6588-4)

T-3167-A-3 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page #1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

7-15240 D

100	100	100	2505	21
100	100	100	49	1 May 1930

to Tokyo, Nanking (---)

Part 3.

1st Batai the unit which has as its cadre the main force of the 109th Mohai Rentai.

2nd (II) Batai the unit which has as its cadre the main force of the 216th Mohai Rentai.

3rd (III) Batai, the Gun Kōheita.

4th Batai - the Gun Tetsudo.

5th (V) Batai - the Gun Sempaku Batai.

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IV. Cargo and materiel.

F 8164
F 8514 A-D, F, H, I
F 9024 A-C
F 9177 A-B
F 9868 A-C

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F-3164

3198 08 5216 8 Mar 44/1645 15
No HSA 08 520 57 8 Mar 44/1645

Reference to Report

(CONFIDENTIAL) #1 SHIBUKAWA? ORDINANCE Message #65 *

The shortage of ammunition as mentioned in the request in KORIJI #1 SHIBUKAWA Staff Message #92, is as follows: The ammunition is actually not half the battle quota. Since such a condition exists at present, please consider supplying us immediately. (We want have?) 12,572 rounds of mobile 47 mm. artillery armor-piercing ammunition and 5,151 rounds of shells for the same weapon. The #4 CHITAHAI has their battle quota.

Continued on reverse side under FD-7293.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1.0
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~~TOP SECRET~~

7-8514 A-D

6036 de 6234 17 Feb 44 2302 14
 To Tsa 867 on 176 44 17 Feb 44/1830
 Palau to Tokyo (--U--)

OSURUEA Message #515, parts 1-4*

The chief ordnance and ammunition (excluding air ordnance, but including air defense ordnance) which the PALAU BUTAI possessed as of 31 January are as follows:

- Sabres 262
- Bayonets 19,807
- Rifles 6,010
- Light machine guns - 116
- Heavy machine guns - 20
- TATEKI - 50
- Type 100 grenade (擲弾) machine - 100
- Pistols - 401
- Automatic pistols - 22
- Grenade throwers - 95
- (Numerary adjunct for the above - OH5)
- Type 94, 57 millimeter cannon - 8
- Type 97 infantry mortar - 10
- Type 94 --1-- cannon - 1
- Type 94 light trench mortar - 10^a
- Type 94 light trench mortar^b - 2
- Type 97 --3-- - 12
- (Numerary adjunct for the above is MOH)
- Rifle ball ammunition - 8702(283?)
- Pistol ball ammunition - 1431--c--
- Light machine gun ball ammunition - 204,000
- Heavy machine gun ball ammunition - 40,000

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Heavy grenade shells^a - 12,484
 Light grenade pyrotechnics^a - 692
 Type 94 anti-tank shells^b 1,236
 Type 94 anti-tank armor piercing bullets - 4,504
 Type 99 light trench mortar shells - 183

*Parts 6, 8, 9 same number.

- a - KIYAKU GEKIHO
- b - MO HAKU GEKIHO
- c - MI TEKI RYODAN
- d - KEI TEKI SHINGODAN
- e - MAI HO

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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7-8304 3

10 Feb 44	2319	14
No. 872	46	17 Feb 47/1934

Ref to Tokyo (---J---)

NAVIA Message #313, part 6*

--EG--

Type 2 4" millimeter SAITSUKU^a heavy shells - 15
 Tank land mines - 135
 SHUKU KU^b depth charges - 490
 1 kilogram petards - 60
 Bangalore torpedoes - 31
 (The numerary adjunct for the above is rounds)

Charts 1-4, 8, 9 same number.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F-3514

100 to (224) 17 Feb 44 2327 14
 100 to 574 103 51 17 Feb 44/1638
 to Tokyo (---U---)

YOKURA message #515, parts 8, 9*

Lumbering car (鋸 木 車) - 1
 Type 92 power lumbering machine^a - (?6?)
 (Necessary adjunct for the above is DAI)

(Type 103?) --G-- welder and cutting machine^b
 (溶 接 機)

Type 94 --G-- welder and cutting machine^c - 1
 Type 97 air compression^d car - 1
 Type 95 detail work machines - 1
 Type 92 JUKO JJ machine^e (?4?)
 Piling machine^f (打 杭 機) - 6
 (Necessary adjunct for the above is DAI)

Generators - 18

100 to (224) 17 Feb 44
 100 to 574 103 51 17 Feb 44/1638
 to Tokyo (---U---)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F-9594 A C

16 Feb 44 1944

16 Feb 44 1944

16 Feb 44 1944

16 Feb 44 1944

16 Feb 44 1944

The following is a list of important ordnance and ammunitions available for supply at [redacted] on 16 February (This list includes A/A ordnance but not air ordnance):

Near 32 type bayonets	194	(OK)
Type 38 Cavalry rifles	237	(OK)
Type 38 Infantry rifles	193	(OK)

16 Feb 44 1944

Type 95 swords	6	(OK)
Type 94 37 mm guns	1	(OK)
99 small mortar	1	(OK)
Type 94, 6 cm aircraft observation binoculars	2	pr. (OK)
Type 39, 10 cm aircraft observation binoculars	3	pr. (OK)

16 Feb 44 1944

Near transport vehicles	430	(OK)
Deliverable boats	102	(OK)
Near insulated wire	32	(OK)
Type 12 unarmored wire	43	(OK)
Type 11 armored wire	73	(OK)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F 9177 A. S

0811Z 080500 8 Mar 44/2518

2

014, 915 On 405,506 75 8 Mar 44, 2050

Tokyo to Singapore (R) (Tokyo to Singapore Cnt.)
Tokyo to Hanking (R)
Tokyo to Shanghai (R)

Transport shipping message #295, Parts 1 and 2.

At present there is a sudden increase in the demand for oil in Japan accompanying the new developments. However, because of the loss of tankers on the one hand, and the great quantity of fuel being diverted to supply the fleet on the other hand, the amount for (through) shipment during the 1st quarter of 1944 after March is expected to average from 160,000 to 170,000 kiloliters per month. Indeed this is cause for grave alarm. We are only barely able to keep up the regular supply of (for use by our ships). Concerning an increase in shipping strength, we are continuing --20-- with all possible and desirable means of increasing oil supply.

Sagaku Shisaku
Class 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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Reference Material

Wine Sign

41, 42, 43 SES

41 Signets Yash Chikara

Waji Shipoku

Japanese fiscal year starts in March or April.

As given.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1773
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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REFERENCES

F 981 1-1

Re 3478 25 Mar 44 1716 52
 11 Mar 44 on 103 50 2 Mar 44 1000
 Enclosure to Navak (--H--)

RE: Ordinance Message #211, Parts 1, 2, and 3.
 1. (Ordinance?) which was sent to "W" on ship
 3152-0536, which left on the 19th (allotment in accordance
 with MC Rear Echelon Staff Message #938):

Type 92 Small Insulated Wire, 100 (check 100) parts
 Large Insulated Wire, 20 (check 20) parts
 --32-- #2 Insulators, 1000 (check 1000);
 Buckets; 246 (check 246).

(portion left from loading of #20 (?W SENDAN?)):

Type 95 light steering mechanism for boats --22--
 (1 CHI?)

Spare parts for the above: 8 (check 8)

Spare parts for 1 (check 1) Type 94 Mountain Gun.

Assignment as per instructions of Staff Officer KUMIDA.)

Type 99 Small Trench Mortars, 2 (check 2);

Type 97 Motorized Guns, 2 (check 2);

F 981 1-1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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1. 94, 3rd Battalion Anti-Tank Company (Inf.)

2. Sent to "W" on ship 5124-7118^b, which left

on the 20th: ...

• - 敵母機 503000

• - 5124-7108

FORM 37 (1937-E)

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FORM 1

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V. Administrative

F 9012 A, F

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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12118 de 14084 20 Mar 44 1125 2
TO New 950 on 189 58 25 Mar 44

DATA
Davao to Makyo, Hollandia
Davao Tern to Mororan (--E--)

JAGAYAKI Staff "E" Message #265, Parts 2-3 continued.

#2. Estimate of the situation.

1. The MO SHUDAN has made progress beyond expectations, and the morale of officers and men has been high. However, there is an urgent need for a brief recovery in both fighting strength and position. Accordingly while preparing the defense of the --G-- situation we should decide the line of transfer (?to?) the Sepik River. This is especially true in the present situation as we cannot put to good use our air bases in the Hama and Hama areas.

2. As for the enemy, he will carry out his plans in the vicinity of Hama (during the day) and will try to avoid fighting. Our force, depending on the enemy, will...

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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... should seize the opportunity to offer decisive battle to our advantage.

3. In order to (?succeed in our collective) goal aim, contriving anew to cause the? --G-- base the enemy's advance to the Philippines and keep up the #5 SIKDAN's strategy, the Wewak area must be absolutely secured and the air force must (?be kept?) extremely active.

4. It is clear that the enemy bases in the Admiralty Islands will not only exercise a very great influence on the conduct of subsequent operations by the HEMENFUN, but that they will also be the basis for development of the enemy's designs. The HEMENFUN will cooperate closely with the #31 (check 31) GUN and with the KIKODAN, to try to prevent the completion of the enemy bases, and to be assisting in our constructive aid to the persistent, heroic fight of the garrisons involved. We will need to watch closely the enemy's drive for bases in the Admiralty Islands and to study out counter-measures beforehand.

Message addressed to: JICHŌ

IRIJI

SHIN/MAKOTO

KIN

MŌ

S.Ō

Times 8 May 44 (MO-a)

F 800 100

85/1

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VII. Reports on Allied activities

F 9178

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F-9173

3542 de 8460 31 Jan 44 1461 19

or 729 35 31 Jan 44 1330

Manisikuka to Horomushiro ((--U--)) (Sapporo to
Horomushiro Circuit)

Yarafuto Tsū Bei Jō message #5

Communications Intelligence report
for the 31st:

There are direction detectors at
Kuluk and Attu. They have been training
in airplane plotting.

Message addressed to Hokubugun.
Kashiwa Shibu.

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WAR DEPARTMENT (W). F-9173 180
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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

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TAB G

Some _____ messages:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Robot bombs controlled by radio waves. | SSA 132588 |
| 2. The attempted assassination of Hitler. | SSA 132345 |
| 3. The first peace feelers. | SSA 134375 |

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (Oshima)
To: Tokyo
26 July 1944

#756 A 4 part message complete.

Urgent.

In recent statements made by GOEBBELS as well as some that appeared in the German newspapers and magazines, it is frankly admitted in their explanation of the European war situation that German weapons have to yield the palm to the enemy in both quality and quantity. However, at present the Germans are striving to improve the quality and increase the quantity of their weapons, and there are not a few people who say that in time Germany will be able to make up for her present technical inferiority (see my message #706^a). The Military and Naval Attaches have doubtless sent you detailed reports regarding this matter, but as I thought it would be necessary in order to get an estimate of the war situation in general, I am sending you merely the following outline regarding the new German weapons. Moreover, although quite a number of announcements have been made already with regard to this subject, since there are some very important matters in this message relating to military affairs, I wish that you would treat this message with particular care.

Japanese
~~TOP SECRET~~

#132588
Page 1

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~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Weapons connected with the Army:

(a) Tanks: I have already sent you information regarding the Tiger and Panther Tanks, but it seems that they are placing especial emphasis upon the production of Panthers in large quantities.

(b) Assault Guns: This gun is primarily a weapon to be used for the smashing of the enemy's pillbox machine gun bases in cooperation with the Infantry, but it is often used also in anti-tank warfare. This is one of the weapons concerning which the Germans are placing great emphasis at present so far as production in large quantity is concerned. It is an 88 millimeter gun (the same as the gun on the Tiger) and has a crew of four men.

Part 2.

(c) 'The Panther Terror':^b This is a kind of rocket gun that can be used by two soldiers, and is a weapon for close-range fighting to be used against tanks.

(d) The Panzer Fist:^c This is the same kind of gun as the above, but it can be used by one person.

(e) Trench Mortars:^d These weapons could hardly be called a new weapon today, but their size has been increased (up to 15 centimeters) and they are being used in large quantity.

Japanese

#12588
Page 2

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(f) Robot Tanks (Goliath):^e This is a small-type tank controlled by radio waves, and it seems that its effectiveness depends upon the configuration of the ground.

(g) The establishing of artillery divisions with the self-propelled gun units acting as the main strength: The object of such a division is to concentrate the use of artillery.

I wish that in paragraph (c) above you would amend the words Panther Terror to read Panzer Terror.

2. Weapons connected with the Navy:

(a) A New Type Submarine (Very Secret): This new type submarine scarcely shows itself on the surface of the sea, and has long-range maneuverability. At present it is in process of construction and its effect will first be felt from about September, and by November or December it is said that greater results will be effected by its use in great quantity.

Part 3.

(b) Torpedo Boats: I have nothing to add to what I have already reported to you concerning these boats.

(c) A Small-type Submarine (Very Secret): This is a submarine that has been improved one degree and seems to be a weapon that has two torpedoes to be ridden by one man. It is to be used in areas near the seashore.

Japanese

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Page 3

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~~TOP SECRET~~

(d) Special Torpedo (Very Secret): This is a torpedo which by means of special equipment has been made almost 100% effective in hitting the mark, and its testing has already been completed.

(e) The High Speed Boat:^f This in itself is really not a new weapon, but a new type is being produced with a speed of 40 knots an hour, and having a Diesel engine. For this reason it has the special merit of not easily catching fire when damaged. It seems that the Germans are putting forth efforts to produce this boat in large quantity.

(f) Special High Speed Boat (Very Secret): This is a high speed boat to which has been added the principle of radio wave control, and it seems that its explosive power is especially great.

3. Weapons connected with the Air Force:

(a) The Germans are adding substantial improvements to the speed, armament, ammunition, and way the armor is put on, etc., in their various types of fighter and destroyer planes, and besides that they are of course placing special importance upon the production of these planes in great quantity. Furthermore, in the near future propellerless planes are also going to make their appearance, and it seems that these planes will have especially high speed (this last paragraph is very secret).

Japanese

" 132588
Page 4

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(b) For the time being dive bombing has been suspended and as a substitute they are using ground attack planes (SCHLACHT FLIEGER). These planes cooperate with ground fighting, and considerable results have already been achieved in the destruction of enemy tanks (Captain RUUDERU alone, it has been announced, has destroyed more than 200 tanks).

Part 4.

(c) The main strength of anti-aircraft guns lies in the 83 and 105 millimeter guns, it seems. However, 120 and 150 millimeter guns also are gradually being used in large quantity. Matching the improvement in shells the Germans are trying also to increase the power in their aircraft. Again it seems that they are also using rocket guns.

(d) There has been a great deal of improvement in night fighters since last winter but in day-light air raids also special units, STORM GRUPPE, have recently been organized (within 2 minutes 1 American four-motored plane --10G-- and --M--). They will at an appropriate time be newly established and although it may not be possible to call them new weapons, in outline they serve as an indication of the earnest efforts which Germany is putting forth in order to regain command of the air.

Japanese

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Page 5

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(e) Special Type Aircraft (Very Secret): It seems that a study is now being made with regard also to a bomber plan which will unite the rocket gun with the principle of radio wave operation.

4. Equipment for Long Distance Bombardment (Very Secret) I have already described to you in various telegrams the V-1, and it seems that preparations have already been made for the use of a more effective weapon than this. It will have five times the effect of the weapons thus used in the past. And again it is said that they will have a weapon whose effect will extend to a square of more than 1 kilometer. However it is not clear as yet just when both these weapons will be introduced. It is anticipated that with regard to these weapons there will be both substantial developments and improvements made in their construction.

5. The weapons in which the Anglo-Americans made particularly great progress in the past were first of all the direction finder and then radio wave weapons in general, but in both these spheres the Germans by special efforts seem gradually to be catching up with the enemy. It seems that in weapons connected with rockets, because of the fact that the Germans as usual have had longer experience, Germany is temporarily in the lead. Again improvements and progress in explosives have been

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Page 6

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best indicated in the V-1 and it seems that this improvement has been very conspicuous.

- a - V.H. 1391.
- b - SCHIRECK.
- c - The Kana spelling for this word is KUAASUTO, which is doubtless the German word for FAUST.
- d - WERFER.
- e - The Kana spelling for this word is GORIAATO.
- f - SCHNELL BOTE.
- g - ZERSTOERER.

Inter 28 Jul 44 (1) Japanese
Rec'd 29 Jul 44
Trans 31 Jul 44 (1227-A)

#132582
Page 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (Oshima)
To: Tokyo
25 July 1944

#738 (6-part message complete)

Absolutely secret.

Re my message #737^a.

1. At the outset Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP referred to the recent attempted assassination affair and said that since the details were still being subjected to investigation, he, himself, (RIBBENTROP) had no knowledge of them, but that since this affair was a matter that had arisen within the German army, Japan, too, doubtless would have a very deep concern in the matter. Therefore, he said that he would give me further information as the investigation proceeded, but that today he would give me merely an outline of what took place. Then he went on to say: "Sometime in the afternoon of the 24th (please correct that to the 20th) Colonel STAUFFENBERG entered a meeting which was in progress in order to make a report to Chancellor HITLER. After he had placed a bag (in which the bomb had been put) upon the floor about two meters from where Chancellor HITLER was, he said that he had some other business and left the room. At once he ran to the airfield and returned to Berlin by plane. However, as soon as he arrived in Berlin, he was shot by an army unit which had already been apprised of the situation. On the one hand, besides General BECK who was the ring-leader in this assassination affair two officials who were at the same time in a room in the Defense Ministry on Bendlerstrasse, sent out circular telegrams to the Home Army Districts. (Wehrkreise)

Japanese

#132345

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announcing that Chancellor HITLER had died and that they were no longer to take orders from the Supreme Command of the past but that they should obey the orders of a new governing body that had been set up. One of these districts endorsed these instructions, but all the others refused to obey. BECK, meanwhile learning that HITLER had not been assassinated, at once shot himself with a pistol. On the other hand, at Chancellor HITLER's headquarters, after Colonel STAUFFENBERG had left the room the bomb exploded with tremendous force after the lapse of about five minutes. As has already been announced, this explosion caused casualties (General KORTEN suffered some burns which did not seem to be especially serious, but because of a weak heart he died. Colonel BRANDT also succumbed.). What was really mysterious was the fact that the Chancellor, who was nearest to the bomb when it exploded, was unhurt with the exception that his clothes were torn to pieces by the blast and he sustained a few burns.

Pt. 2:

"The truth is that from about two years ago we have been somehow (?instinctively?) aware that an attitude of opposition against Nazism had arisen among some military officials who had been discharged, and I as well as others had advised Chancellor HITLER that resolute steps should be taken against this attitude, but the Chancellor is a man who prefers to deal with problems of this kind with forbearing and gentle measures, and, therefore, so long as there was no clear proof, he did not consent to the taking of measures such as we suggested. Therefore, anticipating this present affair we were going to make a clean sweep of such elements in the German army throughout both those in active service and those on the reserve list, and we had already begun purging operations. This clique is in the main composed of

Japanese

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Page 2 194190

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~~TOP SECRET~~

a gang opposed to the Nazis among the reserve officers. Although there are a few officers in active service among them, their number is very small. While it seems that a small number of commissioned staff officers have joined up with them, there are practically none among the army units as such that have any connection with them. The usual measures have already been taken and at present further investigation is being made. But there are no signs of the disaffection spreading any further. We think that we shall be able through this purge to strengthen anew the unity of the army and do away with any uneasiness regarding the continuing of the war in the future. We believe that we shall be able absolutely to prevent the recurrence of any such weakness or unfortunate incident as has just occurred." When I asked as to the number of people connected with this rebellious element, RIBBENTROP replied that while he did not know in detail, he thought that they might number a few hundreds (Einige Hundert). Then I said: "For a long time I was on a footing of acquaintanceship with BECK, and I knew him as a man of illustrious renown who had come to occupy a leading position as a scholar of strategics and tactics when he was chief of staff. It is difficult to understand why in the world he should have committed such an indiscretion. What on earth was the object of this outrage?" To this question RIBBENTROP replied: "Everybody must entertain doubts with regard to this matter. And while a definite answer cannot be given until our investigation makes further progress, I think that this was a plan for attempting a compromise with England and America after the people involved had secured in this way the real power for themselves. However, while there is some suspicion that the bomb which Colonel STAUFFENBERG used was of British make, we have not yet secured any proof that BECK was communicating with England and America."

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Pt. 3:

2. With regard to the war situation in the west, RIBBENTROP made the statement: "The enemy offensive in the Normandy area is very violent, but in spite of the fact that the numerical strength of the German army here is inferior, we have inflicted very great losses upon the enemy. Germany, of course, acknowledges the necessity of repulsing the enemy at this place, but since at present our air force is very weak as compared with the enemy's, to engage in a general counter-attack at present would entail unreasonably large losses upon our forces. Therefore, until we can replenish our airplanes, we will have to postpone this counter-attack for awhile." Then I said:

"I have been told that the German Supreme Command expects the army groups under PATTON to make a landing in Northern France very soon, and that their policy is to direct their operations against Normandy after they have first knocked out this landing. What do you think at present with regard to the landing of these army units?" To this question RIBBENTROP replied: "No matter when the troops under PATTON make a landing, the German army is fully and infallibly prepared to meet such a situation. I think that the probabilities for PATTON to make a landing before long have grown less. We have intelligence to the effect that because of the considerable effect of the V-1 perhaps as many as three divisions of PATTON's troops have been dispatched for relief and the cleaning up of damages done in London and other places. For that reason it would be difficult for these forces to begin landing operations at once."

Then I asked: "At just about what time would the German army, having realized its increase in the production of airplanes, be able to take the offensive?" RIBBENTROP replied: "I, too, do not

know the exact time, but it is not very far off (In Absehbarer Zeit). Then RIBBENTROP again

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Japanese

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referred to the V-1, and said that its effectiveness has gradually increased from the inception of its use, its results increasing with the length of time that it has been employed. While Chancellor HITLER, too, was satisfied with it, in view of the fact that its accuracy in hitting the mark was not exact, he has ordered that from henceforth as before it should be used chiefly against London and in the areas in that vicinity. Therefore, although the V-1, of course, does not have such a value as to justify a complete change in the tactics which have been pursued in the past, we expect that the V-2 because of its greater accuracy as compared with the V-1 will have greater results militarily when once we begin to use it."

3. On the eastern front ever since something went wrong with the German army in the central sector, the advance of the Russian army has been very rapid. The present (?aim?) of the Germans is first of all to stabilize their battle line. For this purpose they will increase the number of troops in this area and take the offensive." Then I reminded him that at a previous meeting he had said that Chancellor HITLER had decided to strike at the east after he had first cleaned up the west, and I asked whether this policy had been changed. To this he replied: "The object of the offensive in the east is merely to stabilize the line and Chancellor HITLER has decided that the scope and scale of this offensive shall be limited to the extent that it will meet the Russian plans and their fighting strength. It is difficult to say at present just how the German offensive will develop in the future."

4. "In Italy, too, the enemy has been continuing a violent offensive and while the German

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Japanese
~~TOP SECRET~~

#132345 197193

~~TOP SECRET~~

army is fighting one desperate battle after another because of its inferiority in air power, we have hopes that we shall be able to maintain our resistance at the Apennines line.

Pt. 5:

5. With regard to Finland, we have received intelligence to the effect that recently PAASIKIVI has secretly been carrying on peace negotiations with Russia. So by order of the Chancellor, I, myself, went at once to that place, and as you know concluded a treaty. For German aid Finland undertook not to make a separate peace with Russia. That since that time Finland has become gradually stabilized both on the front and in the country itself is a phenomenon for which we should rejoice. As for Hungary, since Premier SZTOJAY assumed office the country has undergone a complete transformation (it seems that she is cooperating with the German army to the extent of 15 divisions), but Regent HORTHY, who has had his day, has come to feel uneasy with regard to the prospects of the war, and because of his dilly-dallying Germany has not neglected to warn him as well as those working with him. Rumania intends to prosecute the war seriously, cooperating with the German army to the extent of 30 divisions under the command of Marshal ANTONESCU. However, the attitude of MIHAI ANTONESCU is not clear, and Germany has continued to caution him. Although the attitude of Bulgaria is (?determined?) by the Regency^b, Prince CYRIL together with FILOFF has been devoting himself faithfully to the prosecution of the war, so that Germany has no apprehensions on that score. Although Spain and Portugal, too, have come to entertain misgivings toward Germany because the war situation has become unfavorable for the latter, they both are really in a predicament so far as the maintaining of their neutrality is concerned. I do not think that they

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Japanese

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will at once espouse the cause of the Anglo-Americans, but the country whose attitude is most doubtful is Turkey. It is a clearly established fact that Russia is planning to have Turkey declare war and then try to take possession of Istanbul, and that to counter this England and America fearing Russia's ambitions are putting forth efforts to limit Turkish participation to the extent of breaking off diplomatic relations with the Axis. Germany is giving very strict attention to the question as to what extent the enemy's pressure has succeeded.

Pt. 6:

6. "The visit of MUSSOLINI was for the sake of discussing the problem of the re-establishment of Italy. His interview with Chancellor HITLER was carried on in a very friendly and helpful manner, and when MUSSOLINI saw the Italian divisions that are now being organized in Germany he was pleased with this gesture. Italy, of course, hopes that the arms for these military units might be increased as well as the number of soldiers, and we think that this is not an unreasonable request. However, since the pressing need of the hour is to win the war first, until that time viewing the situation as a whole it will be of greatest benefit if Italy would provide Germany with as many laborers as possible and would help Germany again through her industries. Of course, Germany has a great deal of interest also in the increasing of the organization of Italian army units, but in view of the temperament of the Italian people, the situation is such that the Italians of their own accord should confine this matter to a very definite limit.

"At any rate we have found our way out of the deadlock which was caused by the defection of Italy. Nevertheless, the fact that forty million Italians dashed over to the side of the enemy was

Japanese

#132345

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without doubt the severest blow that Germany could have suffered. We cannot escape the fact that at a time when the war was undergoing new developments this defection exerted an influence upon the whole war situation. Therefore, that the war situation has for Germany become a desperate fight is a fact of which Chancellor HITLER is fully aware and which I, too, thoroughly understand. As a method of effecting a break in this crisis at least to some extent concrete thought is given to the possibility that peace might be established between England and Germany or between Germany and some other country, but for either Chancellor HITLER or for me to undertake such a thing under present circumstances, would in reality be the same as carrying on capitulatory negotiations. To think of deciding such a grave matter merely by a political course of action without the background of the mailed fist is not the way of complete success. Naturally, it would amount to nothing more than that we should unreasonably harm ourselves. Therefore, Germany's foreign policy will consist in strengthening her union with friendly countries and in directing the attitude of neutral countries in such a way as to make it favorable to us, and at the same time devoting her entire strength in pushing the enemy into an awkward diplomatic position. At present neither Chancellor HITLER nor myself is giving any thought at all to approaching in any way the enemy with a view to effecting a political compromise. I wish that you would believe that."

8. In reply to a question on the part of RIBBENTROP regarding the new Japanese Cabinet I replied: "This new Cabinet was called forth in order that our national strength might be promoted to meet the present war situation and in order that Japan might devote herself more

Japanese

#132345

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completely to the prosecution of the war. Of course, there is to be no change in her foreign policy. Her cooperation with Germany is going to be stronger than ever." Then RIBBENTROP asked as to whether there was going to be any change in our policy toward Russia. To this I replied that naturally there will be no change, and therefore he should set his mind at ease.

I wish that this telegram might be shown only to Premier KOISO and to the heads of the Army and Navy Ministries.

- a - SSA #132344.
- b - Regentschaft.

Inter 26 Jul 44 (4,2) Japanese #132345
Rec'd 27 Jul 44
Trans 28 Jul 44 (1227-d) Page 9

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Tokyo (Shigemitsu)
 To: Moscow
 7 August 1944

#1011, 2-part message complete.

Part 1.

(Handle as secret; Office Chief's Code.)

1. It cannot be denied that the war situation in Europe has taken an extremely disadvantageous turn for the Germans on both the Eastern and Western fronts. The Nazi regime is different from the Bolshevik regime. Having (?avoided criticism?) since its inception, it is inevitable that in time of national crisis the tensions which have existed since its establishment should be revived (the incident of the attempt against Chancellor HITLER). It will be difficult to alter this situation in the future, as is to be expected.

2. At present the American offensive in the Pacific is also becoming violent and the enemy has already broken through our territorial waters' defense line. By maintenance of absolute superiority in sea and air power our enemy is step by step drawing near our national defense line and is planning the cutting of our sea communications and the destruction of our shore installations. This situation will become increasingly severe with the withering away of German military might. (It goes without saying that we are devising counter-measures and will employ our full strength against this.)

3. The above is the general trend in the war situation (in both East and West); but, starting with the posed off) the problem of organizing Europe, America, and Russia, with the addition of China are planning to hold discussions in the United States on post-war world organization.

With the war situation continuing to develop in our disadvantage -- G., it is inevitable that there will be a...

Signature

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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between them divergent views as to their interests in the future (however, it is clear that no rift will develop between them up to the end of the war). This point has come to be the sole enemy weakness of which we can take advantage at this time.

Part 2.

3.^c While Japan and Russia are each engaged (?in a separate phase of the general war?), they are neutral the one toward the other, and this neutrality has been repeatedly affirmed, so that the position of both sides has become quite clear. And both sides hold to an independent policy without being restricted by --G-- (Compare our #699^d.) However, in considering the whole world political situation after the war, one cannot foresee any clash of interests between the two countries over the general situation either in terms of the situation in the Pacific and East Asia or of new expansion in (?Europe?).

4.^c Accordingly, I don't know but that Russia might consider it to her advantage, viewed from both the internal and external standpoint, to have peace advocated in the present situation. For example, it should be determined at the Kremlin whether such initiative in a peace movement should be taken by the United States (and England) or by Russia. (Theoretically speaking, Russia and Japan, both being neutral countries, would be able together to take the initiative for peace.)

5.^c I should like you to sound out Russia's views on these points, or since it would be very convenient if you could get some sort of exchange of views in an interview with Commissar MOLOTOV on the suggestions in our wire #699^d (sent on 17 June) and find out Russia's plans for saving the situation, please handle it that way. Also, if you have any observations to make on this, please reply.

Please be careful how you handle this wire.

a - UCHI NAI YŌ.
b - KOKU.

c - These should be 4,5,6 respectively.
d - SSA #127259.

Inter 7 Aug 44 (5)
Rec'd 7 Aug 44
Trans 9 Aug 44 (2149-c)

Japanese

#134375

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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TAB H

A message describing the bombing of Bangkok

SSA 126498

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
6 June 1944

#707, 3-part message complete

Priority.

Part 1

At 11:25 on the morning of the 5th, 41 enemy planes (number verified), consisting of Consolidated B 24's and Boeing B 17's, made a raid which lasted for about two hours and one half. Flying over the whole city, they flew away in the direction of Moulmein. This was the first daylight attack, and it was much more violent than any that had preceded it. The people were thrown into a panic of fear and confusion. The terrific explosions which destroyed the Prime Minister's residence, the (?CHULALONGKORN?) Theater, and surrounding shops, plus the concentrated bombing of our office, the entire MAKASAN railroad works, and the official residence --G-- presented a ghastly sight.

The Thai authorities made use of 8 fighter planes and anti-aircraft fire. The challenging planes --4G-- and flew off in a northerly direction.

Part 2

The serious damage is as follows:

1. Near our office.

(a) Two bombs fell within the official residence hitting directly an employees' house which was next to the Economics Division building (no casualties among

Japanese

#126498

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 1

205

WAR DEPARTMENT

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201

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

the employees). There were many bombs throughout the neighborhood (buildings behind the former British Legation were bombed and several people were injured).

(b) Between 15 and 20 bombs were scattered for about a kilometer over the MAKASAN works to the northeast, and a concentration of about 250 incendiary bombs were dropped over the same area. --1 li G -- Some of the factories and many neighboring private houses were destroyed.

(c) About 10 bombs were scattered over one kilometer falling near Japanese barracks and surrounding areas. However, since most of the land was used for pasture, little damage was done.

(d) To the south, in the area near Bankappi, incendiary bombs caused great damage to private houses.

Part 3

2. Prime Minister's Residence and vicinity.

The two bombs that fell within the residence caused considerable damage to the roof, windows, and walls. The street, government buildings, and private houses near by were all badly damaged.

3. Damage to the (?CHULALONGKORN?) Theater and neighboring shops.

Considerable damage was wrought by bombings in the central shopping district. There was scattered

Japanese'

#126498

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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206202

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

evidence of crumbling and burning houses. On account of refugees, there was confusion everywhere.

4. Miscellaneous..

Although there has been no time to estimate the damage everywhere, it is expected that about 40 odd persons were killed and a large number wounded (3 Japanese soldiers were wounded). Fortunately, Japanese nationals suffered practically no injury. There were many instances of broken windows, as in the case of the Japanese Conference House. Three hospitals were destroyed.

Please send this on from Hanoi to Saigon.

* - Also sent to Rangoon and Hanoi.

Inter 7 Jun 44 (5)

Japanese

#126498

Rec'd 10 Jun 44

Trans 14 Jun 44 (3299-1)

Page 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB I

A message part giving a portion of a conversation
between Hitler and Mussolini.

SSA 122029

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

204
208

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Venice (Hidaka)
To : Tokyo (FO)
1 May 1944

#116^a Priority.

He said that he had received reports from the officers to the effect that they had every confidence in him as a leader. They also stated that Marshal KEITEL and the German government were so favorably impressed with the training of the Italian army leaders that they have decided to shorten it by some 2 or 3 months.

Marshal GRAZIANI then expressed his views and spoke in a very encouraging manner. However, he emphasized that the Italians would welcome a more trustful and respectful attitude on the part of the Germans --3G--.

8. He then went on to emphasize the importance of the Italian front --5 lines G--

a - Other parts, same number. Part number not indicated.

Inter: 5 May 44 (1) Japanese #122029
Rec'd: 5 May 44
Trans: 18 Jul 44 (1039-E)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB J

Report on Allied activities in the Far East

SSA 132320

~~TOP SECRET~~

206

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

MOUNTBATTEN's landing operations at Rangoon. They have been giving warning that they will launch a powerful attack against Japanese Armies in the Northwest Yunnan and Burma sectors. They have reached a decision --G-- recently to carry out those things on which they have been (?negotiating?) with the American authorities since last October.

3. According to reports which the Chungking Central News Agency^a has received, there have been flown in from India to Chungking recently 600 trench mortars, 400 anti-tank guns, and 8--G-- heavy --G-- (front-line) --G-- artillery (all of these are new-type weapons). They probably will use these in the Central and South China operational sectors.

4. The Chungking authorities have sent reinforcements from the 3rd, 5th, and 7th battle zones^b to the Kengyang regions --6 li M-- and they are accomplishing great success in the (?Canton?)^c region. They have decided to send one unit to the 4th battle zone^b. They are transferring the 64th Army and the newly-formed (?2nd?)^d Army from the 4th battle zone and sending them to the Shūtoku^e sector. (Reliability of report ---A).

Japanese ...

#132520
Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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212

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

* Also to Hanoi-Special Envoy, Bangkok; Saigon; Head of Embassy Offices - Peking, Shanghai; Thai-Ambassador in Thailand; Hankow; Rangoon.

- a- Chuosha.
- b- Senku.
- c- Hankow also possible.
- d- "3rd" also possible.
- e- Shutoku

0/1

Inter 15 Jul 44
Rec'd 15 Jul 44
Trans 27 Jul 44

(2)

Japanese

#132320
Page 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB K

messages concerning the Sakimura case.

SSA 124629
SSA 124630
SSA 127747
SSA 128150

210
214

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (Japanese Ministry of Interior Representative)
To: Tokyo
11 May 1944

No Number.

SAKIMURA Case.²

Please see telegrams to Foreign Ministry from Embassy in Berlin and Legation in Stockholm. I have ventured to make preparations to have SAKIMURA sent back to Germany and trust that you approve. In order to prevent England and America from making further use of this man he should at least be sent back to Germany and we are doing our best to that end. It has been arranged for me to go to the spot with Consul-General TOKUNAGA and the plan is to remove SAKIMURA from Stockholm in due course.

2 - See SSA #121920

Rec'd 2 Jun 44 (C)
ERIC

Japanese

#121920

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
25 May 1944

No Number.

I accompanied SAKINURA to Berlin on the
23rd. A report will be submitted when details of
the case are checked up.

SATO.

Rec'd 2 Jun 44 (C)
HHS

Japanese

#124550

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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g12

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (Oshima)
 To: Tokyo
 13 June 1944

No number, 4-part message complete^a.

Last autumn SAKIMURA forecast Germany's collapse --G-- and (?expressed?) the view that if Germany's collapse were not averted the situation which would arise subsequently would certainly be favorable to Japan. After the German collapse England and America would inevitably come into collision with Russia over the (?domination?) of Europe, --G-- and for that reason --G-- into confusion. He declared on his return from Sweden that the basic reason for his leaving Germany was to carry on any sort of activity --G--.

Part 2.

but one should not overlook (?the possibility that he was also moved?) by fear of air raids. Then SAKIMURA declared himself a political exile and since February of this year received 325 Kroner in relief money.

Part 3.

He associated with about 50 Swedes, 3 Norwegians, and 10 Germans. As to his relations with the (?DAGENS NYHETER?) he (?insists?) that it absolutely did not

~~TOP SECRET~~

#127747

Page 1

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

report what he said. There is also the fact that about last year he said that this Embassy was in error with regard to Germany's economic strength in (?denying?) that Germany was on the verge of famine.

Part 4.

Later on,

seeing that in spite of repeated air raids the German internal (?strength?) was only slightly --3G--, SAKIMURA completely changed his views and by his ranting about the internal toughness of Germany it came to the point of (?our?) wondering whether he wasn't a German spy.

a - This is an inference from internal evidence only.

Inter 13 Jun 44 (4,92,93,2) Japanese
Rec'd 15 18 17 Jun 44
Trans 23 Jun 44

#127747

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (OSHEWA)
To: Tokyo
Date: ?

4?

a. At the end of April, a correspondent of the DAILY MAIL called on SAKIMURA and offered him a large sum of money to contribute an article to his paper. SAKIMURA said that he would try to get material for his article from certain Swedes --3G-- . On another occasion, he received the money. He (? then ?) wrote an article built about the fact that he had stated as early as autumn of last year that the Japanese Embassy was mistaken in its views regarding the imminence of a German crisis--

a - An unnumbered message which clearly fits into the other messages on this subject, run under the same number.

Enter. 13 Jun 44 (4)
Rec'd. [unclear]
Trans. [unclear]

Japanese

(101747)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (Oshima)
 To: Tokyo (Ministry of the Interior)
 13 June 1944

No number.

The (?DAGENS NYHETER?)^a reporter at the demand of his home office sent a report that SAKIMURA had run away to the English and Americans, which deviated from the truth --2G-- (?to an utterly inexcusable degree?). SAKIMURA is at present undergoing domiciliary confinement in the suburbs of Berlin. When we view his acts from a juristic point of view, we need to look at them both in terms of his actions toward Germany and his actions toward Japan. The Embassy is now consulting with the German Foreign Office about his behavior toward Germany. We also plan to send by the next submarine mail a detailed documentary report in regard to SAKIMURA.

a - Text begins "TER"; preceding portions not available.

Inter 13 Jun 44 (2) Japanese #128150
 Rec'd 13 Jun 44
 Trans 28 Jun 44 (2149-1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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2.0

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB I

The Dublin difficulties.

GI 742
CI 1902
CI 1904
CI 2005
CI 2054
CI 2138
CI 2276

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

217

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin
 To: Dublin
 26 January 1944

#11

The telegram which will shortly arrive there via Bern, having initial groups 36712 and 27483, is to be deciphered according to the following instructions:

1. Strike out the first and second 5-digit groups.
2. Add ZANLEINWUM #5008 of the WANCENCLABEL, reading in normal fashion, to the cipher groups remaining.
3. Divide the numbers thus obtained into consecutive 2-digit groups.
4. Convert each of these pairs of digits into one letter. Numbers correspond to letters as follows:
 41 = A, 42 = B, 43 = C, etc., 65 = Z
5. Write down the letters thus obtained consecutively in groups of five. The first deciphered letter-groups should read: OUEWI, the last group: CAUEC.

German CI-741
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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218
 222

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. The telegram is made up of 108 letter-groups. The letter-groups remaining are a repetition of the first groups and are sent only for control purposes.

Please hand the letter-telegram as received immediately to Legation Secretary BEMPU of the Japanese legation there.

Confirm execution of orders by time indication.

Inter 27 Jan 44 (1) German GI-742
Rec'd 27 Jan 44
Trans 28 Jan 44 (2447-2) 2447-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Tokyo (Shigemitsu)
To: Berlin
15 April 1944

#244

Reference the last part of your wire #333^a:

The code text of our wire #210^b is absolutely identical with the code text of our wire #36; both code texts were sent by machine. The initial group is OGGWN, the final group is ELJUS, the group count is 86. The text of our wire #36 including --G-- explanatory text is 103 groups. Our wire #210^c with the explanatory text comes to 97 groups.

- a- In process
- b- Available if requested
- c- CI #1460

Inter 15 Apr 44 (2) Japanese CI-1932
Rec'd 16 Apr 44
Trans 17 Apr 44 (2149-u)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (OSHIMA)
To : Tokyo
13 April 1944

#533

Re your #209^B.

On the 12th, I sent Kawahara to ask Minister ERDMANNSDORF, Vice Chief of the Political Bureau, to tell him what you said in that message and to ask him to transmit to Secretary BEPPU the code text of your #210^D in the same manner as before. ERDMANNSDORF said all right, and continued that he thought that after conferring with the man in charge of the telegraphic section concerning transmitting separately the word count given at the end of your reference message and the beginning and ending groups to Secretary BEPPU, it would rather be quite sufficient for the German Minister in Dublin to wire back whether or not the secretary could decode it. KAWAHARA said all right, so that is that.

Japanese

C.I. 1904

Page 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Again, in your reference message you say parenthetically "The word count is increased to 103. The beginning group has become OUYVI and the final group, CAUEG." Well, your #36^c has always been 103 groups; the first group, OUZWI, and the last CAUGB. So I can't see what you mean by that statement in parentheses. Yet again, in your reference message you say "I am resending the code text of the separate connected message." Now what I want to know is this: are your Nos. 210^b and 36^c separate code messages and is one a paraphrase of the other? I wish to find out, so please wire back.

a - C.I. 1859.

b - C.I. 1460.

c - C.I. 1460. Identical with wire #210.

Inter	14 Apr 44	(2)	Japanese	C.I. 1904
Rec'd	14 Apr 44			
Trans	18 Apr 44	(772-1)		Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (OSHIMA)
To: Tokyo (FO)
13 May 1944

#451

Regarding my message #333.^a

On the 12th, the Germans handed me a report to the effect that the material had been received by Consul-General BEPPU on the 22nd of last month, and that he was able to decode it.

a - CI-1904.

Inter. 14 May 44 (92)

Japanese

CI-2005

Rec'd. 15 May 44

Trans. 15 May 44 (1227-c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Tokyo (SHIGEMITSU) (PO)
 To: Dublin
 16 May 1944

#95

Secret. Hereafter, we will adopt as our method of code communication between this ministry and your office the method indicated by our extra wire transmitted via the German minister in Dublin. However, as for the keyword, we will carry out the following plan. At the beginning of the keyword indicated in our above-mentioned extra wire (I mean the fundamental keyword), we will (? use ?) the particular name of the month which is in the dispatch time --2G-- and (? for your information ?) the key words for the appropriate months are these:

(The following separate words^a are listed in order from January on.)

- MUTSUKI
- KISARAGI
- YOYOI
- UZFIKI
- SATSUKI
- MINAZUYI
- FUZU(? K??)I
- HA-UKI
- NAG-TSUKI
- KAN-ZUKI
- SHIMOTSUKI
- SHIHASU

~~TOP SECRET~~ Japanese 61-2054

Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Upon understanding this wire, please wire
in abbreviated code, "All of us here are in good health,"
and put this into use.

a - These names are deficient as indicated by - and
would appear to be corrupt in other instances.

Inter. 17 May 44 (92)
Rec'd. 18 May 44
Trans. 30 May 44 (6149-0)

Japanese

11-0117

Page 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Dublin (SAXANCTO)
To: Tokyo
22 May 1944

#38.

All of us here are in good health^e.

a - See CI-2054.

Inter 30 May 44 (1)
Rec'd 11 Jun 44
Trans 16 Jun 44 (555-1)

Japanese

CI-2058

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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200

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

From: Dublin (via Berlin) (OSHIMA)
To: Tokyo
19 April 1944

#30.

As to the three unarrived telegrams, we had already had our telegraphic Bureau send "repeats" to Berne, but we wired again on the 19th. Did you receive these, or not? Please wire back answer to this and at the same time how many days of delay there was this last time in the wire we sent. (The incoming telegram was delayed 5 days.)

Inter 28 Apr 44 (EUS)
Rec'd 1 May 44
Trans 28 Jul 44

Japanese ...

CI-2276

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB M

Some messages considered to contain important intelligence.

Poster I

1. Secret German industrial processes. D 4516
D 5179
2. Latest German developments in aircraft. D 4689
3. Japanese purchases in Europe. D 5100

Poster II

4. German order of battle on the Russian front. D 5505
5. Russian order of battle. D 5132
6. Organization of the new Italian army under Mussolini. D 5529
7. Enemy information concerning our own forces. D 5550

Poster III

8. Sinking of ships and submarines. D 5450
D 3013
9. The famous Japanese SE plane. D 1651

Poster IV

10. Disposition of German forces in France. D 4595

Poster V

11. German coastal defenses in Normandy. D 4589
12. German coastal defenses in southern France. D 5000
13. Disposition of German forces in northern Europe. D 5748

Poster VI

14. German rocket bombs and installations. D 4689
15. Disposition of German Air Force units. D 3635
16. Information on German radar. D 5199

Poster VII.

17. German defenses along the Atlantic Wall. D 3348

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

Explanation of developments on the new, secret German process for producing high octane gasoline.


This type of message indicates the highly sensitive nature of the test and the subsequent difficulties faced by the technicians.

~~SECRET~~

transmission yield information on the latest German developments in aircraft.

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~



Part 1

Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide information on the latest German developments in aircraft.

Part 2

Development

The development of the new aircraft is based on the latest German developments in aircraft.

Part 3

Production

The production of the new aircraft is based on the latest German developments in aircraft.

Part 4

Operation

The operation of the new aircraft is based on the latest German developments in aircraft.

Part 5

Maintenance

The maintenance of the new aircraft is based on the latest German developments in aircraft.


Part 6

Conclusion

The conclusion of this document is based on the latest German developments in aircraft.

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT



~~SECRET~~

Through information on Japanese production in Europe on some particularly Japan's industrial weaknesses and shortages.

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

Part 4.

It is a horizontal, cylindrical shaped machine, 600 millimeters in diameter and 500 millimeters in length. In the pulverizing compartment a 40 horse-power, 5000 revolution shaft is installed horizontally. To this shaft arms (hammers) are attached.

The raw material, pieces of H.P.M., is automatically fed into the pulverizing compartment a little at a time. The pulverized iron dust is sucked up by a rotary blower, "CENTRIFUGAL FAN", at the top of the pulverizing compartment there is a funnel-shaped compartment (diameter - 1.5 meters; height - 2 meters).

Part 5.

The dust is collected at the bottom of this compartment in a hopper.

The whole machine, from the openings for raw material to the upper, is joined with "GUTFLANGES" to keep the air out. The machine is filled with a cushioning gas to prevent the explosion and ignition of the iron dust.

The pulverizing compartment and the receiving arms are (reconstructed with) (7-year-resistant) manganese steel (manganese - 14%); or as a substitute, manganese Japanese

b-5174
Page 3

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

Part 6.

Moreover, certain alterations must yet be made in the factory installations. (They are not yet capable of producing a sufficient quantity in advance, and proper conditions for the repair of the 7.62 mm. are difficult). Moreover there is --

(2) ~~Production~~ Following your purchases, we are speeding up the negotiations for the year-motors, boring-machines, grinding-machines and other government-supplied items. As far as the FIAT gear-motors is concerned, because of the damage to the factories, the situation is desperate, but we think that we can get an allowance of as many as 100.

(3) ~~Export~~ We have obtained permission for this and we are working up the lists of requirements.

(4) ~~Manufacturing~~ If you the manufacturing give us their approval on this, we would think that the German authorities would give their permission too. The GALLI'S COMPANY has been ordered to come from Florence in Northern Italy by German demand and they are now carrying out this job of moving. As things are now, the operations in the case of the factories of this company which are in Northern Italy

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Page 3

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

~~SECRET~~

The German Corps of Excellence
The Division Front.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Contains the only complete picture
of the organization of the new Italian Army
since formed in Germany under Mussolini.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~



Various Views

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) 1st Mountain Division
Personnel strength - 2 units 4,000
Light equipment - 2 platoons 1,000
Infantry and artillery 1,000
Equipment - 4 units 1,000
Total personnel 7,000

(4) Attachment units under 1st Mountain Division
Total 60,000

AAT

2. Tanks in division are being organized:
Light tank brigade 16,000
Heavy tank brigade 16,000
Total 32,000

3. Tanks now being organized:
To be used as supplementary to the German Army
Cavalry 6,000
Infantry and artillery 2 units 900
Armored cavalry 2nd and 3rd 800
Total 1,700
To maintain public order 100
Total 1,800

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

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When removed to any other place it must be kept under lock and key in the same safe as the original sheet.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

is the only source of
reliable information of the
German Corps of Excellence.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Headquarters (100)
To: Town (200), Gen. Staff, General Staff
11 March 1944

2205 April *
Subject: Organization of the German Corps of Excellence
The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
1. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
2. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
3. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:

1. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
2. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
3. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
4. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
5. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:


1. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
2. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
3. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
4. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
5. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:

~~TOP SECRET~~

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be kept under lock and key in the same safe as the original sheet.
When removed to any other place it must be kept under lock and key in the same safe as the original sheet.



See Various Views in a Previous



~~SECRET~~

is the only source of
reliable information of the
German Corps of Excellence.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Headquarters (100)
To: Town (200), Gen. Staff, General Staff
11 March 1944

2205 April *
Subject: Organization of the German Corps of Excellence
The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
1. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
2. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
3. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:


1. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
2. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
3. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
4. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
5. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:

1. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
2. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
3. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
4. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:
5. The German Corps of Excellence is organized as follows:

~~TOP SECRET~~

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be kept under lock and key in the same safe as the original sheet.
When removed to any other place it must be kept under lock and key in the same safe as the original sheet.

~~SECRET~~
has contributed to the sinking
of five of the Japanese mining submarines,
called ARUDA.
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
Information from ~~SECRET~~ transmissions
has led to the sinking of the T-141
ships (Japanese numbers flying between
Germany and Japan).
~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

3 Nazi Cargo Vessels Sunk In Atlantic

U. S. Warships Fall
Cargo: 28,000 Tons
Downed Near France

In Atlantic W. France
Shipping companies and
warships were sunk in the
Atlantic Ocean near the
coast of France. The
vessels were carrying
cargo valued at 28,000 tons.
The cargo included
military supplies, food,
and other necessities.
The sinking of these
vessels is a serious
blow to the German
war effort. The
vessels were part of
a regular shipping
line between Germany
and Japan.

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~
This is one of a series of messages
pertaining to the plan for the first
flight of the B-29 planes.
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~
This is one of a series of messages
pertaining to the plan for the first
flight of the B-29 planes.
~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
This is one of a series of messages
pertaining to the plan for the first
flight of the B-29 planes.
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE "B" PLAN
Should be strictly observed in the handling of information
concerning the B-29 planes, the former Japanese Army
B-29 plan (the plan which was to take the test
flight between Formosa and the Crimea, as
part of a plan to organize regular mail) was
destroyed on its first flight.
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
The fate of the B-29 planes.
~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
From: Tokyo (Rikugun)
To: Berlin (GMBK)
9 July 1943
#351
(Strictly secret and confidential).
The Japanese Army is bound for Europe
has been flying since its last departure. Listen to
all British broadcasts and if you hear anything about
this plane let us know immediately.
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
From: Tokyo (Rikugun)
To: Berlin (GMBK)
9 July 1943
#351
(Strictly secret and confidential).
The Japanese Army is bound for Europe
has been flying since its last departure. Listen to
all British broadcasts and if you hear anything about
this plane let us know immediately.
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
From: Berlin (GMBK)
To: Tokyo (Rikugun)
9 July 1943
#358
(Strictly secret and confidential).
The Japanese Army is bound for Europe
has been flying since its last departure. Listen to
all British broadcasts and if you hear anything about
this plane let us know immediately.
~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET
The English version of this memorandum
as it appears in the translation in station
and is provided for the Staff only.

SECRET

From the Vice Chief and Germany, (Be careful how
you handle this.)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

(Kornil)
(CATRICALI) (Foreign Minister)

10 February 1944
(OO)

To the Vice Chief and Germany. (Be careful how
you handle this.)

The strength of the German armed forces in France
was reported in Vichy wire 606 dated the 17th of December,
last year. (These are the same details we talked over
with the Attaché in Germany at the time of the Attaché's
Conference.) Since that time, I have learned further from
Marshal HUNDSTEIN's Chief of Staff of the concentration
of 2 more divisions.

This is as follows:

1. One S.B. armored division (area south of
Bordeaux).
2. A total of 6 Infantry divisions - disposition
as follows:
 - 1 concentrated at Bordeaux.
 - 1 at 5816 (on the Mediterranean coast south-
west of Montpellier).
 - 1 at Toulon (50 kilometers northwest of Dijon).
 - 1 in the vicinity of Luxembourg.
3. They are organizing 2 "SS" divisions in the
vicinity of Bourges (100 kilometers south of Dijon).
4. They are organizing 2 training divisions in the
vicinity of Metz.

~~TOP SECRET~~

D-4555
Page 1

WAR DEPARTMENT
This memorandum is prepared in German service as the work of this organization is the security.

From VICHY
To TOKYO
Date 16 FEB 44
Subject
Date Trans 8 MAR 1944

OK
(JAS)

OK
(JAS)

To the Vice Chief and Germany. (Be very careful
how you handle this.)
The strength of the German armed forces in France
was reported in Vichy wire 606 dated the 17th of December,
last year. (These are the same details we talked over
with the Attaché in Germany at the time of the Attaché's
Conference.) Since that time, I have learned further
from Marshal HUNDSTEIN's Chief of Staff of the
concentration of 2 more divisions.

- These are as follows:
1. One S.B. armored division (area south of
Bordeaux).
 2. A total of 6 Infantry divisions disposed as follows:
 - 1 concentrated at Bordeaux;
 - 1 at 5816 (on the Mediterranean coast south-
west of Montpellier);
 - 1 at Toulon (50 kilometers northwest of Dijon);
 - 1 in the vicinity of Luxembourg.
 3. They are organizing 2 "SS" divisions in the
vicinity of Bourges (100 kilometers south of Dijon).
 4. They are organizing 2 training divisions in the
vicinity of Metz.

D-4555
Date Trans H-VNY-88 303130Z MAR 44
S.A.B.W.C.L.S. D-4575

SECRET

1. Apply portion of vital information as it appears the operations in status and is produced in the Bulletin.

SECRET

SECRET

Can say his own government, the ... ready the operations in ...

SECRET

G-2 URGENT



From VICHY
 To TOKYO
 Date 16 FEB 44
 Classification
 Priority
 Date Trans 8 MAR 1944

Reference
 Subject
 Date Recd 17 FEB 44
 Date Recd 17 FEB 44
 Date Recd
 Trans Recd 16 FEB

To the Vice Chief and Germany. (Be careful how you handle this.)
 The strength of the German armed forces in France was reported in Vichy wire 56th dated the 17th of December last year. (These are the same details we talked over with the Attaché in Germany at the time of the Attaché's Conference.) Since that time, I have learned further from Marshal BUNDTSTEDT's Chief of Staff of the concentration of 9 more divisions.

- This is as follows:
1. One S.S. armored division (area south of Bordeaux).
 2. A total of 8 Infantry divisions - disposition as follows:
 - 1 concentrated at Bordeaux.
 - 1 at Sète (on the Mediterranean coast south-west of Montpellier).
 - 1 at Toulon (80 kilometers northwest of Dijon).
 - 1 in the vicinity of Lausanne.
 3. They are organizing 2 divisions in the vicinity of Bourges (100 kilometers south of ...).
 4. They are organizing 2 training divisions in the vicinity of ...

Reference
 Subject
 Date Recd 17 FEB 44
 Date Recd 17 FEB 44
 Date Recd
 Trans Recd 16 FEB

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From Vichy (Kosni)
 To Tokyo (GAIJUDAIJI) (Foreign Minister)
 16 February 44

To the Vice Chief and Germany. (Be careful how you handle this.)
 The strength of the German armed forces in France was reported in Vichy wire 56th dated the 17th of December, last year. (These are the same details we talked over with the Attaché in Germany at the time of the Attaché's Conference.) Since that time, I have learned further from Marshal BUNDTSTEDT's Chief of Staff of the concentration of 9 more divisions.
 This is as follows:
 1. One S.S. armored division (area south of Bordeaux).
 2. A total of 8 Infantry divisions - disposition as follows:
 1 concentrated at Bordeaux.
 1 at Sète (on the Mediterranean coast south-west of Montpellier).
 1 at Toulon (80 kilometers northwest of Dijon).
 1 in the vicinity of Lausanne.
 3. They are organizing 2 divisions in the vicinity of Bourges (100 kilometers south of ...).
 4. They are organizing 2 training divisions in the vicinity of ...

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

This is a copy of the original document from the Vichy government. It is not to be disseminated outside the Vichy government.

Information of this sort enabled the invasion troops to overcome the German under-water obstacles off the coast of Normandy.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Vient (K3541)
To: Tokyo (MATA(1317)) (Foreign Minister)
18 February 1944

#506

To the Vice Chief and Germany.

The German Army has recently begun the construction of obstacles on the coast in order to prevent the invasion of the coast. These consist of (1) of water mine (2) of barriers in the water.


- (A) See outline since attack end of Pass which are shown into the areas. These consist of (1) of water mine (2) of barriers in the water.
- (B) See outline since attack with sharpened points into areas of setting these in the water system.
- Outline of the construction

Large numbers of both types are installed under water in the cut and they extend offshore to a distance 200 meters from the shore. When land hit these obstructions they are destroyed or sunk because of the holes the boat.

Inter 14 Feb 44 (1) Japanese
Rec'd 12 Feb 44
Trans 2 Mar 44 (1728-1)

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the utmost security to prevent drying up the sort of real intelligence at the source.



Water Mines (Under in 1000 Yds)

OK (JAS)
↓ ↓

The whole defense system of southern France as revealed through

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Vient (K3541)
To: Tokyo (MATA(1317)) (Foreign Minister)
1 April 1944

#506

Part 1.

To the Vice-Chief and Germany.

1. See the outline of the defense system of southern France from the Italian border to the Spanish border and vice versa in the area of the coast of southern France.

2. See the outline of the defense system of southern France from the Italian border to the Spanish border and vice versa in the area of the coast of southern France.

Judgment is that the defense system of southern France is not as strong as it appears to be. The main line of defense is the Atlantic coast and in connection with this the main line of defense is the coast. The front line is very long (see outline) from 50 to 100 km. However, in view of the terrain and location of the road network, it is not, essentially, a continuous line. Consequently, it will be rather easy to weaken an enemy landing attempt.

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~SECRET~~
provides intelligence on Germany's defenses in Scandinavia.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Stockholm (Stock)
To: Tokyo (Gumme) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
10 May 1944



#552 (3 parts complete)

Disruption of the German Forces in Southern France (Swedish General Staff - April 1944)

- Norway front
 - 7th - 10th (1943) 21st Infantry Division (recently transferred to the NAVAL front recently).
 - 27th Infantry Division (SCAVINGO).
 - 28th Infantry Division (BERGEN).
 - 18th Infantry Division (POLARIS - it is a defense division and its organization is small).
- 32nd - 10th (TROCHIMSK) 732nd Infantry Division (SCHUSS - it is said that it may have been transferred elsewhere a small or large unit).
- 105th Infantry Division (STEINKER - it is a defense division).
- 14th LUFT LANDSTORM Division (NO).
- 81st - 10th (1943) 100th Infantry Division (SABERWAGEN).
- 23rd Infantry Division (TROPSIS - coastal defense unit).
- 27th Infantry Division (LAWLESS - it is supposed to have been transferred elsewhere).

Danmark front
-11-10-1944
~~TOP SECRET~~ D-5745 Page 1
WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the utmost security to prevent drying up the sort of real intelligence at the source.



German Defense Structures in Southern France

Information of this sort enabled the invasion troops to overcome the German under-water obstacles off the coast of Normandy.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
provides intelligence on Germany's defenses in Scandinavia.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Vichy (X2511)
To: Tokyo (041411111)(Foreign Minister)
18 February 1944

From: Stockholm (Stock)
To: Tokyo (Sumner) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
10 May 1944

7006

4552 (3 parts complete)

To the Vice Chief and Germany.

The German Army has recently begun the construction of obstacles in the beach in order to prevent the landing of troops in these areas. These consist of (1) water mines, and (2) (3) of barriers in the water.

1. (A) are concrete piles attached to the end of posts which are driven into the sea bottom

2. (B) are made by thrusting iron poles with sharpened points into blocks of concrete and setting these in the sea bottom.

3. Outline of the construction.

Large numbers of both types of obstacles are installed under water in the critical areas and they extend offshore to a distance of 100 to 200 meters from the shore. When landing craft hit these obstructions they are destroyed by the explosion or sink because of the holes torn in the beach.

Inter 14 Feb 44 (1) Japanese D-4569
Rec'd 12 Feb 44
Trans 2 Mar 44 (1078-1)

Disposition of the German Forces in Southern Norway (Western Allied Staff - April 1944)

1. Norway front
A. 7th - 10th (1944)
24th Infantry Division (recently transferred to the W. front recently).
27th Infantry Division (SIAVINGEN).
28th Infantry Division (BERGEN).
12th Infantry Division (MORDE - it is coastal defense division and its organization is relatively small).

Part 2:
B. 11th - 13th (1944)
792nd Infantry Division (MORDE - it is suspected that it has been transferred elsewhere recently in small or large part).
125th Infantry Division (STINKER - same organization)

14th Luft Landwehr Division (NO).
C. 14th - 16th (1944)
100th Infantry Division (SASTEMOEN).
212th Infantry Division (TRONHOE - coastal defense unit).
27th Infantry Division (LAVANG - it is suspected to have been transferred elsewhere).


2. Denmark front
-- (1944)
~~TOP SECRET~~ D-5748
Page 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent falling up the net of vital intelligence at its source.




~~SECRET~~

The whole defense system of southern France as revealed through

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~



From: Tokyo (041411111)(Foreign Minister)
To: Vichy (X2511) (Foreign Minister)
1 April 1944

WAR Parts 1 - 2.

Part 1.

To the Vice Chief and Germany:

1. Under 20 March 1944, the German Army under the direction of the German High Command, has begun the construction of coastal defenses from the Italian border to the Spanish border and westward in the course of the next months.

Part 2.

2. The following Army Directive on the basis of the instructions:

Judgment.


The new obstacle system is more difficult than those along the Atlantic coast and in comparison with the number of troops the front is very long (see diagram). Because of the road network, it is comparatively difficult to make landings on exposed points. Consequently, it will be rather easy to sustain a heavy landing attempt.

The morale of the troops is very high.

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET~~

D-5700
Page 1

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German Coastal Defenses in Southern France
Map of the area is being made.

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
WAR DEPARTMENT
TOP SECRET

for launching them.


3. The rocket gliders were launched from the ground and were controlled by radio. They were used against Allied ships during the invasion of Italy.

4. The rocket gliders were used against Allied ships during the invasion of Italy.

5. The rocket gliders were used against Allied ships during the invasion of Italy.



This photo, smuggled out of Germany, gives a closeup of what is described as a rocket glider, reportedly used against Allied ships during the invasion of Italy.



Same Photo as Next Aerial View

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

This report and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Ultimate security is necessary to prevent drying up the source of vital intelligence at its source.

~~SECRET~~

This tremendously important message enabled Allied air battalions to know exactly how the German Airforce was disposed to combat our bombers.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Information on German "RADAR" facilities. Allied bombers to combat German defensive measures.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TO

NOTE: NOT VERY RELIABLE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION!

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TOP SECRET


WAR DEPARTMENT

This report and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Ultimate security is necessary to prevent drying up the source of vital intelligence at its source.



LUTWAF NEST

A German photographer took this picture of the "Lutwaffe" (German Air Force) "Nest" (headquarters) which were set up on the ground. The nest is apparently deep inside Germany. The photo was reconstructed as though no Allied bombers were present.



~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
TOP SECRET

(1) When providing for circumstances in which radar cannot be fully equipped, several computing machines are constructed with one long-range (above 10 x 1-centers) range and computation of parallel is carried out.

(2) Items concerning the computing machines.

(3) General size of these (10-man?) products. They are large units and easy to manufacture, and are, in addition, apparently adaptable to every type of gun.

(Part 3) The large gun for determining trajectory (1) is one for the basic of elevation, one for range of time, one set of five for ballistic conditions, one for fuse setting and spiral and necessary for loading - all eight of these are so constructed as to be easily interchangeable.

(2) Calculation computing machine:

(a) Since the direct distance is inserted as a technical number for the range and the degree of transformation to this direct distance is determined by the cube of the gun aspect, and is divided into vertical and horizontal distance.

Japanese D-5199
Page 2

Trans-clone of this sort of for the most complicated sort of technical information is addition to a thorough knowledge of Japanese. **SECRET**

This report and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Ultimate security is necessary to prevent drying up the source of vital intelligence at its source.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

One of the only available descriptions in detail of the German system of defenses along the Atlantic Wall--probably the most important message ever received in this system.

~~SECRET~~

From: D-1 (100016)
To: D-1 (100016)
9 November 1943

#870 Parts 11, 12 and 13 - 206

In order to protect her submarine bases and harbors, Germany has not only constructed defenses against sea attack, but has made powerful land front defenses as well. These defenses resemble the fortresses previously described and are safe against attacks from the rear and against working parties.

The organization of the land front defenses mentioned before, consists in construction of several kilometers from the harbors defensive positions which connect points of resistance and strong points.

(Part 11)
The distance between the submarine bases is 10 to 15 kilometers.
The most important Atlantic harbors are:
1. Brest, the largest port in Normandy
2. St. Nazaire
3. Lorient
4. Bordeaux
5. Bayonne
6. Biarritz

In addition to these defenses, another fence line has been constructed around the bases and large ports.

Japanese

OK(SAS)

OK(SAS)

~~SECRET~~

Lt. Colonel HISHI, Assistant Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin (accompanied by Ambassador GOMHA), whose detailed report on German defenses in France was completed during his trip indicated above and which were shown to the Japanese.

~~SECRET~~

Considered of such vital importance and urgency, this message (parts of which are exhibited here) was printed up in booklet form for immediate delivery to President Roosevelt and General Marshall. A special copy was flown to Prime Minister Churchill the same day the message was translated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~



To: D-1 (100016) (Sub 100016)
From: D-1 (100016)
9 November 1943

Subject: The organization of the strong points.

They utilize machine guns, trip mines, and other weapons. The defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop. The defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop. The defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop.

(Part 15)

These defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop. The defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop. The defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop.

For defense against tanks, tank ditches (built in a number of places) with 9 feet across the top of 9 meters and a depth of 3.5 meters) are constructed along the perimeter of the strong points.

Page 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

(Part 16)

In addition to the flame thrower equipment by the use of which 40 to 60 mm anti-tank guns (with 100 mm anti-tank guns) and 2 or 3 cannons with 100 mm anti-tank guns. They have 2 or 3 anti-tank guns (mounted against buildings) and 2 or 3 anti-tank guns (mounted against buildings) and 2 or 3 anti-tank guns (mounted against buildings).

They also have the fields in front of and behind the tank ditches. Mines, trip mines, and other weapons are used together.

(Part 17)

As far as infantry obstacles are concerned, in addition to the mine fields, they have wire entanglements in the tank ditches and within the strong points. For the direct protection of the strong points, the defenses are built on the top of a hill or on a rocky outcrop.

Part 13 not available; parts 11 - 13 and 16 - 23 previously issued under same number; other parts not yet available.

Inter: 13 Nov 43 (4. Japanese) D-1248
Rec'd: 13 Nov 43
Trans: 4 Dec 43 (JST 11-27-1) Page 2

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From: D-1 (Encl. 1)
To: D-2 (Encl. 1)
9 November 1943

Re: Parts 11, 12 and 13 - 206

In order to protect her submarine bases and harbors, Germany has not only constructed defenses against air attack, but has made powerful land front defenses as well. These defenses resemble the fortresses previously described and are safe against attacks from the rear and against dive-bombing attacks.

The organization of the land front defenses as mentioned before, consists in constructing for several kilometers from the harbors defensive positions which connect points of resistance and strong points. Part 11 describes the organization of the defenses on the coast.

(Part 11) - 10 to 15 kilometers.

At Brest, the most important Atlantic port 6 to 8 kilometers.

At Lorient, the largest port in Norway 6 to 8 kilometers.

At Brest - 4 to 5 kilometers.

At Lorient - 3 to 4 kilometers.

In addition to these defenses, another defense line has been constructed around the submarine bases and large ports.

Japanese D-3343
Page 1

One of the only available descriptions in detail of the German system of defenses along the Atlantic Wall--probably the most important message ever received in this system.

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On the other side of the Channel, Field Marshal Rommel, former Afrika Korps commander, inspects Nazi fortifications. Photo reached U. S. through a neutral source.

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Lt. Colonel HIRSH, Assistant Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin (accompanied by Ambassador GOMHA), whose detailed report on German defenses in France was compiled during his trip indicated above and which were shown to the U. S. through a neutral source.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be segregated with the greatest care. Utmost caution is necessary in regard to its use and its dissemination to other personnel.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

From: Berlin (ORILL)
To: D-2 Tokyo (Encl. 1)
9 November 1943

Subject: Organization of the strong points.

The utilization of the strong points is described in Part 11 of the report. The organization of the strong points is described in Part 12 of the report. The utilization of the strong points is described in Part 13 of the report.

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