


SRH-279

OP-20-G FILE

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

ORGANIZATION

1942-1946

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12356
by , NSA/Chief, CSG
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REVIEWER'S NOTE:

The first review of this file was conducted by personnel of the United States Navy.

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COPY

Op-20-G

January 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NOYES:

Via: Op-20-A.

Subject: Reorganization of "Op-20-G" Section.

1. The following plan of reorganization of the Op-20-G Section is submitted for approval.

2. The present section will be split into two sections, immediately upon approval, namely:

Cryptography Section (Op-20-Q), under
Captain Safford

Cryptanalytical Section (Op-20-G),
under Lieut. Comdr. Welker

At a later date, certain personnel will be transferred from the new 20-G Section to form a Detached CI Unit, under Lieut. Comdr. Densford, operating under the general control of the Commandant, Washington Navy Yard. Also certain personnel will be transferred to the CI Unit, Pearl Harbor, in accordance with present plans.

3. The duties and responsibilities of Op-20-Q will be as follows:

Cryptography Section (Op-20-Q)

- (a) Design, preparation and reproduction of codes, ciphers, and other cryptographic aids. (Does not include Signal Books, Call Signs, Recognition or Identification).

001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ENCLOSURE (1)

- (b) Allowances, placing in effect, supersession and destruction of cryptographic aids.
- (c) Instructions concerning use of cryptographic aids.
- (d) Scrambled speech apparatus.
- (e) Liaison with Buships and Buair concerning cryptographic aids.
- (f) Liaison with other departments of the U. S. Government concerning cryptographic aids.

4. The duties and responsibilities of Op-20-G will be as follows:

Cryptanalytical Section (Op-20-G)

- (a) Radio Intelligence
 - (1) Radio Interception
 - (2) Radio Tracking of Ships and Aircraft.
- (b) Cryptographic Intelligence - Immediate
 - (1) Decryption of Known Systems
 - (2) Traffic Analysis
 - (3) Collateral Information.
- (c) Translation and Liaison
 - (1) Translation of Decrypted Messages
 - (2) Liaison with ONI
- (d) Research and Training (until Detached Unit is established)
 - (1) Cryptanalysis of Unknown Systems
 - (2) Research in Cryptanalysis
 - (3) Practical Training of Personnel for Outlying CI Activities - Particularly Pearl Harbor.
- (e) Preparation of RIP Publications.
- (f) Planning (equipment, personnel, etc.) for Intercept and D/F Stations and Decrypting Units.

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(g) Liaison with appropriate agencies.

The duties and responsibilities of the Detached CI Unit in Washington (when established) will be as follows:

- (a) Cryptographic Intelligence - Long Range (Cryptanalysis of Unknown Systems)
- (b) Research in Cryptanalysis.
- (c) Practical Training of Personnel for other CI Units.
- (d) Tabulating Machine Work for Op-20-G and Op-20-Q.

6. It is recommended that consideration be given to liquidating the Intelligence Liaison Section (Op-20-I) and dividing the duties of that section between Op-20-Q and Op-20-G.

Respectfully,

L. F. Safford
Captain, U. S. Navy
Op-20-G

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

003

~~SECRET~~

Op-20-K/1k

~~SECRET~~

Jan. 26, 1942

ORG No. 01-1

MEMORANDUM FOR 20-A:

Subject: Reorganization of Section 20-G.

Reference: (a) Captain Safford's memo. of Jan. 23, 1942.

1. The following comment is submitted as directed.

2. I have made a careful study of the organization of communication intelligence and security activities at the Navy Department and have discussed the matter with all persons here whose special experience and knowledge lend any weight to their opinions. This survey and my own experience in the Department and in outlying activities, have firmly convinced me that while security activities can and should be separated from intelligence activities, any break-up of the latter can only be seriously detrimental to results.

3. The reasons for this are as follows:

- (a) The field to be covered is so wide, the personnel and equipment so limited, intercept stations so far removed from sources of material, and demands on speed so great, that only by the closest possible coordination can we hope to accomplish our task.
- (b) Intelligence is a cumulative thing. Much is obtained by inference. Normally only isolated facts and indications are at first obtained, and a "background" must be laboriously built up before they have any significance. Moreover, indications are often misleading and must be carefully checked against all available intelligence. This is particularly important to combat deception.
- (c) Success in cryptanalysis depends largely upon linkage with known facts. This requires a constant and prompt feedback of all available information about enemy and own operations. Traffic analysis also contributes greatly to this linkage.

ORG 01-1

~~SECRET~~

- (d) Cryptanalysis must progress hand-in-hand with decryption. Once a break is obtained in a code, cryptanalysis begins to produce information. First words, then phrases, then sentences become intelligible. Information is at first only suggested, then gradually increases in certainty and in amount as cryptanalysis progresses. Information thus results from the combined processes of decryption of known values plus cryptanalysis to recover the remaining unknown values. In the case of ciphers, new keys are constantly having to be recovered. Actually cryptanalysis is seldom completed before new codes or ciphers are placed in effect.
- (e) In working with foreign languages, the later processes of cryptanalysis cannot be performed without the aid of translators.
- (f) Work loads are variable, depending upon the frequency with which systems are changed and their resistance to attack. Personnel skilled in the various phases of the work must be available for use wherever needed most in the attack.
- (g) And lastly, only the final product - intelligence - counts. Each function plays an essential part in producing the result.

4. In order to improve the present situation, I strongly recommend that the following steps, listed in their order of importance, be taken as soon as possible:

- (a) Assume active coordinating control at the Navy Department of all Intercept Stations, D/F nets, and Decrypting Units.
- (b) Organize within the Communication Intelligence Section an adequate information group for correlation and interpretation of communication intelligence and for supply of collateral information to cryptanalysts.

- (c) Provide for a more direct flow of intelligence to the main intelligence coordinating center and to operational authority, with adequate security provisions.
- (d) Begin intercepting as much Orange Naval traffic as possible on the West Coast in order to
- (1) Back up Hawaii in event Corregidor is lost.
 - (2) Be prepared for any attempted invasion of Alaska.
 - (3) Obtain material for the Washington Decrypting Unit.
- (e) Separate all security activities from intelligence activities and place in charge of the latter an officer thoroughly trained and experienced in the entire field of communication intelligence who can devote his entire time to administration and control of this activity.
- (f) Reorganize the Communication Intelligence Section along the following lines:
- GROUP A - Control and coordination of Intercept Stations, D/F nets, and Decrypting Units.
- GROUP B - Combat Intelligence obtainable by methods short of cryptanalysis.
- GROUP C - Intelligence obtainable only by cryptanalysis.
- GROUP D - Information correlation and interpretation.
- GROUP E - Planning, training, personnel, equipment, research, and routine administration (this group may be separated from others if necessary.)

- (g) Organize Groups B, C, and D for priority handling of all information immediately available or quickly obtainable.
- (h) Provide adequate communication facilities between all naval communication intelligence activities.
- (i) Arrange for more definite cognizance and closer coordination among all intercept, D/F, and monitoring activities of the Government and allies to improve coverage.

5. It has been my experience in administrative capacities both in Washington and in the Orient, and I cannot emphasize it too strongly, that there must be a central coordinating authority for all communication intelligence activities, except those of a mobile nature designated to operate with and for forces afloat. All officers who have served in any outlying activities have expressed the same opinion. The field to be covered is so great, the qualified and experienced personnel so few, and intercept stations often so far removed from sources of material, that only by the closest possible coordination can we hope to accomplish what is necessary. Success in this work, furthermore, depends very largely upon quick and frequent exchange of "background" and technical information among all units so that traffic may be efficiently intercepted, stations identified, and the vital collateral information made available to those who must have it. It was only after we began this sort of coordination that we were able to achieve any practical success at all in our work, and it is vital to future operations.

6. With regard to the proposed transfer of personnel to Hawaii, I should like to point out that:

- (a) Seventy-six officers and men assigned to R. I. work are now at Corregidor. This group includes some of the most experienced and valuable personnel in the Navy.
- (b) If Corregidor is lost --

- (1) Our R. I. activities will suffer a severe set-back.
- (2) Only one intercept station and decrypting Unit (Hawaii) will be covering Orange Naval traffic.
- (c) Washington is now dependent for material upon what can be forwarded from Hawaii plus some that is intercepted at Bainbridge and at Cheltenham.
- (d) The British unit at Singapore has been compelled to move to Colombo.

7. In order to back up the Hawaiian unit and provide necessary material for analysis at the Navy Department, it is essential that at least one station on the West Coast cover Orange Naval traffic. Original plans envisaged an offensive war in the Western Pacific. Present indications are that the war may be defensive in nature for at least a year, with a probable if not certain attack on Alaska. Some Intercept Station should be prepared to cover this area without disrupting the present organization, or at least affecting efficiency, as would now be the case. My own conviction is that in the present situation Hawaii should be concerned chiefly with combat intelligence, and that the Research Section in Washington should assist it as much as possible until we can begin to assume the offensive more definitely in the Pacific. The Hawaiian affair should teach us that the impossible can still happen.

8. Experience in working on Orange operations in the past has repeatedly indicated that correlation and interpretation of communication intelligence requires much training, experience and skill in this special field. Indications which are very significant to persons so qualified often have no meaning to others, and may have no significance or be misleading to anyone unless correlated with other information. It is for these reasons that I also lay much stress on the creation of an adequate information correlating group within the communication intelligence organization. The output of this group should, of course, be subject to such correlation and evaluation as may be necessary at the main intelligence and operating centers.

J. N. WENGER

*These are copies of memoranda that led
to the reorganization of Cp 206 following
the Pearl Harbor Attack.*
J. Wanger

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

OP-206/dx

6 February, 1919

MEMORANDUM TO CAPTAIN SAFFORD, COMDR. WENZEL, LT.-COMDR. DENSFORD, LT.-COMDR. VELKER, LT.-COMDR. FAIRKE, LT.-COMDR.

1. By direction of 20-A a copy of memorandum prepared by Captain Safford dated January 25th, memorandum prepared by Commander Wanger dated January 26th, and copy of organization of diagram for communication intelligence activities is transmitted herewith for your information and study.
2. The Assistant Director desires you to hold yourself in readiness for a conference on this subject on or about Tuesday, February 11th.

John R. Fedman,
Commander, USN
OP-206-K

These are copies of memoranda that led to the reorganization of Op20G following the Pearl Harbor Attack.

J N Wenger

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

WASHINGTON

Op-20-K/dk

6 February 1942

MEMORANDUM TO CAPTAIN SAFFORD, COMDR. WENGER, LT.-COMDR. DENSFORD, LT.-COMDR. WELKER, LT.-COMDR. PARKE, LT.-COMDR KRAMER

1. By direction of 20-A a copy of memorandum prepared by Captain Safford dated January 23rd, memorandum prepared by Commander Wenger dated January 26th, and copy of organization of diagram for communication intelligence activities is transmitted herewith for your information and study.

2. The Assistant Director desires you to hold yourself in readiness for a conference on this subject on or about Tuesday, February 11th.

John R. Redman,
Commander, USN
Op-20-K

SECTION 01-20-9

CRYPTOGRAPHY

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Capt. Safford

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Faith

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Fowler

- (a) Design, preparation and reproduction of codes, alphabets, and other cryptographic aids. (Does not include Signal Books, Call Signs, Recognition or Identification).
- (b) Allowances, placing in effect, supersession and destruction of cryptographic aids.
- (c) Instructions concerning use of cryptographic aids.
- (d) Scrambled speech apparatus.
- (e) Liaison with Bashijs and Buser concerning cryptographic aids.
- (f) Liaison with other departments of the U. S. Government concerning cryptographic aids.

SECTION 01-20-8

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY INVESTIGATION

(For combat intelligence information available, or obtainable by other than decryption)

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Comdr. Sedgwick

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Bolker

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Scott, USN

- (a) General operational control, coordination of intercept and monitor stations.
- (b) General operation and coordination of D/F nets.
- (c) Exchange with other activities of information pertaining to interception, D/F operation, and traffic analysis.
- (d) Traffic analysis (call signs, routing, volume, etc.)
- (e) Correlation and interpretation of all radio intelligence.
- (f) Study of methods for offensive and defensive interference and decryption.

SECTION Op-20-Q

CRYPTOGRAPHY

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Capt. Safford

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Smith

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Fowler

- (a) Design, preparation and reproduction of codes, ciphers, and other cryptographic aids, (does not include Signal Books, Call Signs, Recognition or Identification).
- (b) Allowances, placing in effect, supersession and destruction of cryptographic aids.
- (c) Instructions concerning use of cryptographic aids.
- (d) Scrambled speech apparatus.
- (e) Liaison with Buships and Buaer concerning cryptographic aids.
- (f) Liaison with other departments of the U. S. Government concerning cryptographic aids.

SECTION Op-20-K

COMMUNICATION COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

(For combat intelligence immediately available, or obtainable by means other than decryption)

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Comdr. Redman

ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Welker

Assistant: Lt. Comdr. Scott, USNP

- (a) General operational control and coordination of intercept and monitor stations.
- (b) General operation and coordination of D/F nets.
- (c) Exchange with other activities of information pertaining to interception, D/F operation, and traffic analysis.
- (d) Traffic analysis (call signs, routing, volume, etc.)
- (e) Correlation and interpretation of all radio intelligence.
- (f) Study of methods for offensive and defensive interference and deception.

SECTION Op-20-G
COMMUNICATION CRYPTANALYTICAL IN-
TELLIGENCE

(For intelligence not immediately available, or obtainable only by decryption.)

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Comdr. Wenger
ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Kramer
ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Parks

- (a) Cryptanalysis and decryption.
- (b) Translation.
- (c) Exchange with other activities of information pertaining to cryptanalysis, and coordination of own decrypting units.
- (d) Research in R. I. methods and equipment.
- (e) Training, personnel and planning for intercept and D/F stations and decrypting units.

NOTE: Functions (d) and (e) need not be located at Navy Department.

SECTION Op-20-V
SECURITY SECTION

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Lt. Comdr. Dearborn
ASSISTANT: Lt. Clark

- (a) Analysis of own traffic.
- (b) Security review of own communication plans.
- (c) Authentication.
- (d) Training and instruction for security improvement.
- (e) Liaison and coordination with other agencies.
- (f) Attack on own cryptographic systems.

SECTION Op-20-G
COMMUNICATION CRYPTANALYTICAL IN-
TELLIGENCE

(For intelligence not immediately available, or obtainable only by decryption.)

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Comdr. Wenger
ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Kramer
ASSISTANT: Lt. Comdr. Parke

- (a) Cryptanalysis and decryption.
- (b) Translation
- (c) Exchange with other activities of information pertaining to cryptanalysis, and coordination of own decrypting units.
- (d) Research in R. I. methods and equipment.
- (e) Training, personnel and planning for intercept and D/F stations and decrypting units.

NOTE: Functions (d) and (e) need not be located at Navy Department.

SECTION Op-20-U
SECURITY SECTION

OFFICER IN CHARGE: Lt. Comdr. Densford
Assistant: Lt. Clark

- (a) Analysis of own traffic.
- (b) Security review of own communication plans.
- (c) Authentication.
- (d) Training and instruction for security improvement.
- (e) Liaison and coordination with other agencies.
- (f) Attack on own cryptographic systems.

(50) A3(1)

Safford

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-20-G

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL MOYER.

Subject: Reorganization of Communication Division.

1. Since submitting my memorandum dated January 23, 1942, on the proposed reorganization of the present Op-20-G Section, certain information has come to me which was not known to me before. Furthermore, the current reorganization of the Office of Naval Operations has crystallized to some extent. I, therefore, desire to withdraw the previous plan and submit the following plan which is based on the proposed organization submitted with Op-20-K's memorandum dated February 6, 1942.

2. The division of the present duties of Op-20-G and Op-20-K between four new sections fits perfectly with a plan which, I understand, was approved by Cominch on February 6, 1942. Particularly, the Communication Combat Intelligence Section (Op-20-K) is exactly what the Communication Division is required to provide in the "Operational Intelligence Center." With this established, the duties assigned the other sections fall into natural groupings, as recommended by Op-20-K.

3. Two minor changes are recommended for the "Communication Cryptanalytical Intelligence Section" (Op-20-G), namely:

- (d) Change "RI" to read "Cryptanalytical" and
- (e) Delete the words "intercept and D/F stations and."

Furthermore, provision should be made for transferring part (or all) of this section out of the Navy Department and establishing a "Detached Cryptanalytical Unit."

015

ENCLOSURE (2)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-20-G

February 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NOYES.

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Furthermore, provision should be made for transferring apart (or all) of this section out of the Navy Department and establishing a "Detached Cryptanalytical Unit."

ENCLOSURE (2)

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

016

017

4. My objection to Op-20-K's proposed organization is that I do not consider the senior officers concerned would be utilized to the best advantage. Detailed comment follows:

Op-20-K:

Items (a) and (b) are Lieut. Commander Welker's present duties, in which he should continue.

Item (f) is Commander Redman's specialty for which he was particularly assigned to command the Op-20-K Section.

Item (g) naturally comes under Commander Redman as Officer-in-Charge.

Items (d) and (e) are Commander Wenger's specialty, and he is better qualified to carry out those duties than any other officer available. It would strengthen the organization very much if Commander Wenger remained in Op-20-K, where he now is. In this connection, Commander Wenger is the logical relief for Commander Redman when the latter goes to sea.

Op-20-G:

I recommend that I be substituted for Commander Wenger as Officer-in-Charge of Op-20-G Section and that Lieut. Commander Densford be added as an assistant. I was assigned to "Engineering Duty Only" on the basis of my knowledge and experience as a cryptanalyst, and I should be logically assigned to cryptanalytical duties so long as I am on active duty. The many administrative responsibilities falling upon me in my present duty have left very little time for cryptanalysis. It is likewise believed that Lieut. Commander Densford's services would be more valuable to the nation in the Cryptanalytical Section than in the proposed Security Section.

Op-20-Q:

It is recommended that Lieut. Commander T.A. Smith be designated as Officer-in-Charge and Lieut. Commander Alverson, C-V(X), USNR, be designated as assistant, in addition to Lieut. Commander Fowler, USNR. It is understood that Lieut. Commander Alverson's commission will be issued in the near future and he will report to the Office of Naval Communications for duty. Lieut. Commander Alverson served in this section throughout the "World War" and had about twelve years' subsequent experience as a commissioned officer in the regular Navy, resigning about 1930.

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Item (f) is Commander Redman's specialty for which he was particularly assigned to command the Op-20-K Section.

Item (c) naturally comes under Commander Redman as Officer-in-Charge.

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Op-20-G:

I recommend that I be substituted for Commander Wenger as Officer-in-Charge of Op-20-G Section and that Lieut. Commander Densford be added as an assistant. I was assigned to "Engineering Duty Only" on the basis of my knowledge and experience as a cryptanalyst, and I should be logically assigned to cryptanalytical duties so long as I am on active duty. The many administrative responsibilities falling upon me in my present duty have left very little time for cryptanalysis. It is likewise believed that Lieut. Commander Densford's services would be more valuable to the nation in the Cryptanalytical Section than in the proposed Security Section.

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The Cryptography Section is now expanded to the point where it can build up a reserve of publications for future use as well as keep abreast of current needs. It is rapidly catching up to the point where it will have reserve editions for twelve months as contemplated in the War Plans.

For the next month or two my services are undoubtedly of greater value in the Cryptography Section than in the Cryptanalytical Section. After that time my knowledge and experience will be largely wasted, as the billet is one which calls for a Lieut. Commander or junior Commander fresh from sea duty, rather than an EDO Captain who has not been in the fleet for six years.

Op-20-U.

It is recommended that Commander Myers be detailed as Officer-in-Charge of Op-20-U in place of Lieut. Commander Densford. Commander Myers is very interested in Communication Security and has submitted numerous comments and recommendations on the subject during the past six months. He should be given the opportunity to try his ideas and the responsibility for their results.

Lieut. Commander Willenbucker could take over Commander Myers' present duties in creditable manner.

5. If the proposal to retain me in charge of the Cryptanalytical Section is not approved, it is requested that consideration be given to ordering me to command the "Detached Cryptanalytical Unit," when such unit is established.

Respectfully,

L.F. Safford,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Op-20-G.

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It is recommended that Commander Myers be detailed as Officer-in-Charge of Op-20-U in place of Lieut. Commander Densford. Commander Myers is very interested in Communication Security and has submitted numerous comments and recommendations on the subject during the past six months. He should be given the opportunity to try his ideas and the responsibility for their results.

Lieut. Commander Willenbucker could take over Commander Myers' present duties in creditable manner.

5. If the proposal to retain me in charge of the Cryptanalytical Section is not approved, it is requested that consideration be given to ordering me to command the "Detached Cryptanalytical Unit," when such unit is established.

Respectfully,

L.F. Safford,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Op-20-G.

Asst. Chief of Naval Operations
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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations
Washington

Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

April 19, 1943

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
 To: The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
 The Commander, SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
 Policy concerning operation and development.

Reference: (a) VCNO Secret Serial 0824620 of Apr 3, 1943.
 (b) VCNO Secret Desp 182025 of Nov, 1942.
 (c) VCNO Secret Serial 0815720 of Mar 8, 1943.
 (d) COMINCH Secret Serial 00551 of Mar 25, 1943.

Enclosure: (A) U. S. Naval Communications Intelligence
 Coordination Chart dated April 8, 1943.

1. From time to time various directives have been issued covering matters of policy in the operation of the U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence Organization. Some of these directives initiated previously untried plans of operation. War experience has been sufficient to crystallize ideas which are herein combined into a general directive to serve as a basis for operation and development of the Communication Intelligence Organization.

2. MISSION. The primary mission of the U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence Organization is as follows:

- (a) To obtain from enemy communications all possible information regarding enemy policies, plans, strength, disposition, movements, probable intentions, and any other information of value to the United States and our Allies.
- (b) To disseminate this information through established channels to certain Operational and Intelligence authorities to whom the information may be useful; such dissemination to be made as directed from time to time by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet or the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Enclosure (B)
Superseded by Lt. COMINCH 00179 27 19 June 15 44

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OP-20-GX

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Policy

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operation and development.

3. ORGANIZATION. In order to accomplish this mission the various U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence Activities are organized as illustrated in the attached chart, enclosure (A). The exact status of the Melbourne Communication Intelligence Center is set forth in reference (a).

4. CONTROL. The Washington Communication Intelligence Center (Op-20-G), under authority of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, exercises control over the centers at Pearl Harbor and Melbourne as necessary to coordinate all efforts for maximum efficiency of the entire organization. Each of the latter two centers normally operates in accordance with general policies and specific assignments outlined by the Washington Center, and disseminates all information obtained to designated Fleet Commanders, to the other two centers and to other authorities as directed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

5. The obtaining of Communication Intelligence is thus a combined enterprise of the entire Communication Intelligence organization in which each center plays its part, closely coordinated with the other two centers. This coordination and complete exchange of results between all Communication Intelligence Centers is essential because of:

- (a) The world-wide nature of radio communications;
- (b) The large number of communication circuits that must be covered;
- (c) The limited number of Communication Intelligence facilities and trained personnel available;
- (d) The increasing effectiveness of enemy security measures; and
- (e) The importance of background and collateral information in the correct interpretation of Communication Intelligence.

6. Because of the frequent necessity for quick re-orientation to meet swiftly changing situations and because of the importance of speedily disseminating the information obtained, it is recognized that the Fleet Commanders in the areas in which the Communication Intelligence Centers are located must

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operation and development.

have certain latitude in directing the operations of the three Centers. These Commanders at times obviously must be able to obtain Intelligence of a particular nature or from a particular source. They are accordingly authorized to divert temporarily the Communication Intelligence facilities in their respective areas of operational control from normal assignments, as necessary to obtain particular Intelligence required. In case of diversions from coordinated operations, however, it is important that the Washington Center be advised so that the assignments of other facilities may be adjusted as necessary to accomplish effectively the general mission of the organization.

7. ALLOCATION OF TASKS. After more than a year of war operation, it has become clear that consolidation of effort should be the aim whenever possible. The problems of obtaining timely Intelligence from communications have become so complex that only by the employment of large numbers of persons and highly complicated equipment can any information of current value ordinarily be produced. Experience with small exploitation units has indicated that they have difficulty in functioning satisfactorily for want of proper background and collateral information which is available at each of the large Centers. In recognition of these facts, a trial reallocation of tasks was made by reference (b). Subsequent performance records have demonstrated that such a division of work was not only feasible but has actually resulted in an overall increase in production. The difficulties of keeping outlying centers supplied with personnel and improved equipment necessary to carry on major cryptanalytical efforts against frequently changing enemy systems have made it clear that the allocation of tasks established in reference (b) is sound, and this allocation is therefore re-affirmed:

(a) In general, Communication Intelligence Operations in the Atlantic area will be directed primarily against German and Italian Naval and Clandestine communications;

Operations in the Pacific and Asiatic areas will be directed primarily against Japanese Naval and Clandestine communications,

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operation and development.

communications will be studied in accordance with their bearing upon the primary tasks assigned.

- (b) Cryptanalytical work for the Atlantic area will be carried on by the Washington Center.
- (c) Cryptanalytical work on Japanese and other Asiatic communications will be allocated to Washington (Negat), Pearl Harbor (Hypo), and Melbourne (Baker) as follows:
- (1) Negat will investigate new enemy systems to discover initial breaks. However, Hypo and Baker should assist, as may be practicable, and whatever results are obtained by any unit, will be reported promptly to the other two units.
 - (2) Negat will undertake the solution of enemy systems which require special equipment or a large amount of statistical data. This will apply to the bulk additive recovery in system [redacted] as well as to other difficult systems. Hypo and Baker, however, should assume some of this type of work, as may be practicable, but they should endeavor to reduce duplication of effort so far as possible. In this connection, it should be remembered that in war time the enemy might be able to eliminate or seriously disrupt one or more of our main Centers. Those remaining should be prepared to carry an increased work load, at least temporarily until any disrupted station can be restored.
 - (3) All three Centers will undertake spot recovery of incomplete solutions as necessary for reading traffic.
 - (4) Likewise, all three Centers will undertake code recovery of operational type codes.

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

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Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operations and development.

- (5) Negat will undertake code recovery of administrative type codes, as well as the solution of any minor systems not covered by above allocations. Other Centers may assist on minor systems, if practicable and desirable to do so.
- (6) Negat will undertake the recovery of such obsolete systems as may be desirable.
- (7) All Centers will constantly search for . This is particularly desirable on the part of any Center which has early access to initial traffic transmissions.
- (8) All stations will undertake the decryption of current traffic as a primary function.

In any of the above cases where doubt may exist as to work to be undertaken by Hypo or Baker, those stations should refer question to Negat for decision.

8. HIGH FREQUENCY DIRECTION FINDERS. Operations of the East Coast and Atlantic Strategic High Frequency Direction Finder Nets will be controlled by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Control of the West Coast and Pacific Nets will be as set forth in reference (c).

9. DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE. Dissemination of information by Communication Intelligence Centers will be as shown on enclosure (A), and in accordance with references (a), (c) and (d). Further dissemination may be made by the Centers as specifically authorized or directed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, or the Fleet Commander of the area in which the Center is located. The provisions of this paragraph are not intended to change any existing authorized special arrangements, particularly with the British.

10. ENLISTED PERSONNEL. All Communication Intelligence enlisted personnel is on the allowance of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. No transfer to or from Communication Intelligence activities should be made without his authority. All recommendations for promotion should be forwarded to the Bureau of Personnel via the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G). Except for the

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operations and development.

foregoing, Communication Intelligence personnel matters will be administered by the designated Naval District Commandant, Fleet Commander or other designated authority for the Area in which the particular personnel is stationed (Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District for Hypo, and Commander, SEVENTH Fleet for Baker).

11. PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES. The personnel requirements for all stations will be subject to change from time to time, depending upon the nature and amount of work allotted to each. The personnel currently considered necessary for each major Center is indicated below. If any station is directed to assume a large additional work load - as might be the case if one of the three main Centers were suddenly eliminated - the Vice Chief of Naval Operations will endeavor to increase promptly the personnel at any station assuming the major additional load:

(a) Station Negat. An upper limit of 5000 has been placed on the personnel for Negat. It is expected that about 3000 persons will be employed at Negat by early Summer of this year. Any additional personnel employed thereafter will be determined by the nature and amount of enemy communications to be processed. About two-thirds of the total personnel at Negat will be enlisted WAVES. As WAVES qualify for details now filled by enlisted men, the trained enlisted men to be released from Negat will be utilized principally to build up Stations Hypo and Baker, as may be necessary.

(b) Station Hypo. An upper limit of 1149 has been established for Hypo, (including outlying stations under the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District). This station will be the primary standby station for both Negat and Baker. The currently authorized personnel for Station Hypo is that existing on 9 December 1942 plus that indicated in Vice Opnav Secret Despatch 092035 of December 1942. This has been interpreted as follows:

Officers	101
Enlisted	1048.

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operations and development.

Considering the allocation of work set forth above, and the trained personnel which will be available for transfer to Hypo, it is expected that Hypo will be built up to about 101 Officers and 800 enlisted men by the end of Summer, 1943. Personnel supplied thereafter will depend upon the work load to be required of Hypo.

(c) Station Baker. An upper limit of 300 is hereby tentatively established for Baker (including Darwin). The present complement for this station is 30 officers and 174 enlisted men. This does not include the foreign personnel which is now attached to Baker. Recommendations as to additional personnel for Baker up to the limit established herein should be submitted via the Commander, SEVENTH Fleet to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

12. TRAINING. Pre-service training will be conducted by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Intercept and Direction Finder Operators' Schools will be maintained for the Atlantic Area at Cheltenham, Maryland, or Chatham, Massachusetts, and for the Pacific Area at Bainbridge Island, Washington, and All activities will carry on such local training as is practicable.

13. MATERIAL. Allowances of equipment and procurement programs for Communication Intelligence Activities will be established by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Effort will be made to keep outlying centers and other activities supplied with the latest improvements insofar as is practicable.

14. EXPANSION, DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations will direct expansion programs and will coordinate all research and development for Communication Intelligence purposes, including "RFP" and "TINA".

15. LIAISON. Liaison with Communication Intelligence Activities of other Government Departments and foreign nations will be maintained by the Washington Center except as specifically authorized by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

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Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0833920

Subject: Communication Intelligence Activities -
Policy concerning operations and development.

16. Details concerning policy as set forth above will be subject to change hereafter, depending especially upon the nature, extent and location of enemy operations.

17. Transmission of this document by registered mail is necessary and authorized.

/s/ J. H. Newton
Acting.

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OinC Station "H"
OinC Station "B"

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
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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION CHART

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


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APRIL 8, 1943

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OPERATION OF COMBINED NAVAL COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS




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U.S. NAVAL C.I. ORGANIZATION SLIDE 16

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031

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EXTRACT from: Weekly News Memorandum - Week Ending 23 April 1944;
U.S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit
Serial: Z-3093
Date: 25 April 1944

1. (SECRET) I have just been informed by Commander DENSFORD that the Commander Shore Based Air, Forward Areas, Central Pacific (General HALE), as of 1 May 1944, has been offered a radio intelligence company provided by the Army Air Force. I understand that this company consists of 200 to 300 men of whom about 80 are intercept operators, the rest being "cryptanalysts". It is understood that this company is to be sent to some forward area, probably Kwajalein, where they will presumably function as part of the organization of the Commander, Air Forces, there. I am at a loss to understand just what this organization proposes to do. I cannot but feel that they will be a long time producing anything unless they are intimately associated with the Arlington Hall outfit. The existence of such an organization in the Pacific poses a number of problems involving security, communications, etc. In addition to the above, the Army is operating certain intercept and direction finder outfits in the Pacific. It appears to me that the coordination of communication intelligence in the Pacific area will sooner or later have to be undertaken by the Commander in Chief. I have discussed this matter with Captain REDMAN and it is being taken up with the Commander in Chief by him as a communication matter. At the present moment, we both subscribe to the principle that communications is responsible for everything to do with communication intelligence until it is delivered to the Commander. This information and the consideration of this problem will require certain study and the formulation of directives. I suggest that you consider the matter, undertake to learn something of the plans which the Army and the Army Air Force have in the Pacific. I hope that within a few days this matter will be brought to a head locally and that something tangible can be decided upon. There will be more from me on this later.

(A)

TOP SECRET

EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF SECOND MEETING OF
ARMY-NAVY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE 10 MAY 1944

"A question concerning the status of certain Army Air Force radio intelligence units, reported to be enroute to stations in the Pacific, was raised. In this connection, an extract from a memorandum from Capt. Goggins of FRUPAC was read. Col. Corderman explained that the purpose of the Army Air Force unit was merely to work on low grade material affecting the Air Forces in the Pacific and that there would probably be several of these units attached to various Air Force commands in the area. A question was asked as to what control the Army Ground Forces radio intelligence organization exercised over these units. Col. Corderman stated that, unfortunately, there was no provision for any such control and that the Army Air Force units were working entirely at the direction of the local commanders. It was pointed out that, from the Navy's point of view, this was considered undesirable and that when the Marine Corps organized similar units, general direction of their work was assumed by Op-20-G for the purpose of insuring proper coordination. Considerable latitude was, however, left to the local commander in order that his special needs might be supplied. It was felt that a similar arrangement should be in effect with regard to the Army Air Force units. Col. Corderman considered that this was desirable and that it was to both the Army and Navy's interest that such control be established. It was decided, therefore, that an official communication should be addressed by the Navy to the proper authority in the Army Air Force, inviting their attention to the Presidential directive regarding coordination of cryptanalytical activities and requesting a statement as to the general operating plans for these Army Air Force units."

~~TOP SECRET~~

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-20-G/lmd

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

25 May 1944

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL CARTER W. CLARKE

Subj: Army Air Force Communication Intelligence Activities.

1. Enclosed is a proposed draft of a memorandum for Admiral King and one for General Marshall, as was suggested during the Second Meeting of the Army-Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee. I would appreciate your comments.

2. Admiral Redman has been informed of the substance of these memoranda and has given his approval.

Wesley A. Wright
Wesley A. Wright,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

L.P. 3054

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER WRIGHT


Subject: Army Air Force Communication
Intelligence Activities

1. I have gone over this paper very carefully and feel that it is most excellent. There is one point that I would like to raise in connection with this paper and any other paper which may be written on this subject and that is the reference to SSA as quoted "the Ground Forces of Radio Intelligence Organizations". For your information, and I would appreciate if you would incorporate this thought in your study, SSA is part of the Service Forces and has nothing whatsoever to do with the Ground Forces.

2. Another thing which I think you should know is that the Air Forces, of course, are going to say that the statements contained in your memorandum do not entirely consociate with the facts. I think you should know that in the past it has been agreed orally, at least, between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps that there is to be "technical coordination" of the activities of the Radio Intelligence section in the theaters. From our point of view and the point of view of the paper, I do not consider this to be the control which we all feel is essential.

3. The Air Forces insist that these Radio Squadrons operate only for the Air Force and insist further that no personnel can be attached or detached therefrom; neither should the theaters give them any operational directives in the sense that we think of it.

*has been corrected
in accordance with
suggestions in paras 1 & 2
GWC*


CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief, Special Branch, M.I.D.

(B)
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Op-20-G/lmd
Serial 0456120

5 June 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL E. J. KING, U.S.N.

Subj: Army Air Force Communication Intelligence
Activities.

1. Indications have been received that the Army Air Force is proceeding independently with radio intelligence operations in the Pacific. In the latter part of April, a memorandum request was received from the Chief of Training Plans Division, Army Air Force, for the training of a small group of officers in certain naval communication intelligence matters. This request was referred to the Chief of the Special Branch, G-2, who expressed opposition to the plan and recommended that the request be returned to the originator for forwarding via G-2. Shortly after receipt of this request, our communication intelligence center under CINCPOA reported that the Army Air Force was apparently contemplating the setting up of a large radio intelligence company in some forward area, probably Kwajalein, to function presumably as part of the organization of the local Air Force Commander.

2. At a meeting of the Army-Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee on 10 May, the question was raised by the Navy representatives as to the status of the Army Air Force radio intelligence units in the Pacific. In reply it was stated that SSA, the Service Forces radio intelligence organization, was required to train the personnel but exercised no control over the Air Force organization, although some technical coordination had been agreed upon. After some discussion, it was agreed by the committee that, in view of the Presidential directive regarding coordination of cryptanalytical activities and on the basis of actual operating experience in the Pacific, effort should be made to establish some central control, preferably through SSA, of the Army Air Force radio intelligence operations, in order to avoid duplication of effort and to insure proper handling of resulting intelligence.

3. While it would appear that the problem of getting the Army Air Force units under control is strictly an Army matter, SSA and G-2 have both endeavored without success to gain control and would now welcome any assistance we might be able to give them in reaching a solution.

Serial 0456120

Subj: Army Air Force Communication Intelligence Activities.

We are definitely interested parties in view of the Navy's participation in a joint allocation agreement and also because the Navy, through CINCPAC, is ultimately responsible for operations in the Pacific.

4. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that you address a communication to General Marshall expressing your views on the matter.

F. J. HORNE
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL, U.S.A.

Subj: AAF Communication Intelligence Activities.

1. By virtue of a memorandum submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, under date of July 6, 1942, and Presidential approval thereof, and as a result of a triangular agreement by the United States and British communication intelligence organizations (Op-20-G, SSA, and GC & CS), the latter organizations are successfully coordinating their operations in the Pacific Theatre so that the maximum intelligence is produced with available facilities and the resulting intelligence is insured proper dissemination and security handling.

2. It is understood that the Army Air Force is contemplating the organization and establishment in the Pacific Area of certain communication intelligence units for independent operation under control of the local commanders in that area. In view of the fact that such operation will not be in accord with the above-mentioned agreements and will not conform to the best operating procedure developed by war experience, it is requested that the Navy be informed as to the Army Air Force plans in the premises. The Navy feels that it has a distinct interest in this matter, not only as a result of being a party to a joint operating agreement but in view of the fact that Admiral Nimitz has assumed responsibility for directing joint operations in the Pacific Theater and therefore feels obliged to exercise some measure of control over all forces in that area.

E. J. KING

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



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Serial: 001792

Policy file
[Handwritten notes and stamps]
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19 JUN 1944

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From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet.
Commander, Seventh Fleet.
Officer in Charge, Fleet Radio Unit,
Pacific.
Officer in Charge, Advanced Fleet Radio Unit
(now located at Melbourne).

Subject: Pacific Communication Intelligence Activities.

Reference: (a) VCNO Secret Serial 0833920 of 19 Apr 1943.
(b) VCNO Secret Serial 0824620 of 3 Apr 1943.
(c) VCNO Secret Serial 0815720 of 8 Mar 1943.
(d) COMINCH Secret Serial 00551 of 25 Mar 1943.

Ref. (F)

Enclosure: (A) U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence
Coordination Chart.

1. This letter supersedes reference (a).
2. MISSION. The primary mission of the U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence Organization is as follows:
 - (a) To obtain from enemy communications all possible information regarding enemy policies, plans, strength, disposition, movements, probable intentions, and any other information of value to the United States and our Allies.
 - (b) To disseminate this information through established channels to Operational and Intelligence authorities to whom the information may be useful, such dissemination to be made as directed from time to time by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. In order to fulfill this mission complete coordination of the Communication Intelligence Organization is essential, due to:

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Serial: 001792

19 JUN 1944

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Subject: Pacific Communication Intelligence Activities.

(a) The world-wide nature of radio communications.

(b) The large number of communication circuits that must be covered.

(c) The limited number of Communication Intelligence facilities and trained personnel available.

(d) The rapidly increasing effectiveness of enemy security measures.

(e) The importance of background and collateral information, both in obtaining Communication Intelligence and in the correct interpretation thereof.

(f) The necessity of producing the maximum information with the least duplication of effort.

4. ORGANIZATION. In order to accomplish this mission the various U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence activities are organized as illustrated in enclosure (A). The exact status of the Advanced Fleet Radio Unit, now located at Melbourne, is set forth in reference (b).

5. CONTROL. The Washington Communication Intelligence Center (Op-20-G), under authority of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, shall exercise control over the Fleet Radio Units at Pearl Harbor (FRUPAC) and Melbourne (FRUAD) and over all other Communication Intelligence activities as necessary to coordinate all efforts for maximum efficiency of the entire organization. These activities shall operate in accordance with general policies and specific assignments outlined by the Washington Center.

6. DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE. Dissemination of information by Communication Intelligence units shall be as shown on enclosure (A), and in accordance with

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Serial: 001792

19 JUN 1944

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Subject: Pacific Communication Intelligence Activities.

on minor systems already identified and on which the initial break has been made.

(f) Op-20-G shall undertake the recovery of such obsolete systems as may be desirable.

(g) All units shall constantly search for [redacted] and shall promptly report results to all other units.

In any of the above cases where doubt may exist as to the work to be undertaken by any unit, the question shall be referred to Op-20-G for decision. Similarly, if any change in the existing situation indicates to any unit that a revision of the above allocations may be desirable, this information, together with a suggested or recommended revision, shall be forwarded to Op-20-G for decision.

8. HIGH FREQUENCY DIRECTION FINDERS. Control of the West Coast and Pacific Direction Finder nets shall be in accordance with current directives issued separately.

9. PERSONNEL. Officers performing Communication Intelligence duties are under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Operations. All Communication Intelligence enlisted personnel are on the allowance of the Chief of Naval Operations. No transfers to or from the Communication Intelligence Organization shall be made without his approval. In order to prevent inequalities, recommendations for promotion, advancement in rating, or transfers shall be forwarded to the Bureau of Personnel via the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G). Except for the foregoing, Communication Intelligence personnel matters shall be administered in the customary manner by the Naval District, Fleet Commander, or designated authority for the area in which the particular activity is stationed (Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for FRUPAC, and Commander, Seventh Fleet, for FRUAD). The personnel requirements for all stations will be subject to change from time to time, depending upon the nature and amount of work allotted to each. If any station is directed to

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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Serial:

19 JUN 1944

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Subject: Pacific Communication Intelligence Activities.

assume a large additional work load, the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G) will adjust the personnel of that particular station accordingly. If the officer in charge of a station considers that an increase of personnel is required, he shall submit a request to the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G) for consideration, and the latter shall make suitable recommendation to the Bureau of Personnel.

10. TRAINING. Training will be conducted by the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-20-G). Intercept and Direction Finder Operators' Schools shall be maintained at Bainbridge Island, Washington, and All units shall carry on such local training as may be practicable.

11. MATERIAL. Allowances of equipment and procurement programs for Communication Intelligence activities will be established by the Chief of Naval Operations. Effort will be made to keep outlying centers and other activities supplied with the latest improvements in so far as is practicable.

12. EXPANSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESEARCH. The Chief of Naval Operations will coordinate expansion programs and all research and development for Communication Intelligence purposes. Suggestions and recommendations along these lines from field units will be welcome.

13. LIAISON. Liaison with Communication Intelligence activities of other government departments and foreign nations shall be maintained by the Washington Center, except as specifically authorized by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. Authorization for visits by U.S. and Allied personnel to activities of a communication intelligence organization, other than that to which such personnel are assigned or directly connected, shall be obtained in advance from the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Communications).

HOWARD E. OREM,
Flag Secretary.

E. J. KING

Cincpac File
Pac-33-jcr
A8/S67
Serial: 000469

C O P Y

June 29, 1944

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From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To: Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area.
Subject: Radio Intelligence Unit.
Reference: (a) ComGenUSAFICPA ltr. AG676.3/205 of 8 June 1944.

1. Please refer to reference (a) which sets forth a proposed method of employing a Radio Squadron (Mobile) in the forward area of the Pacific Ocean Areas and requests my concurrence therein.
2. I agree in general with the concept that, if there are potential capabilities in all or portions of this unit in the form of particular types of intelligence which will directly contribute to our war efforts and which are currently not provided for in the forward areas, the unit or portions thereof should be utilized.
3. That the training of the personnel and their administration remain your responsibility is quite satisfactory, and to assist you in this function it is desirable that you be kept apprised of their results.
4. Your proposal that the operational control of the radio squadron should be vested in CinCPOA is concurred in. In effecting this control, which I know you will understand must be cautious and rigid due to the extreme importance of the subject to national interests, it is my plan to designate an experienced officer to function in the Forward Area, whose orders will place him in charge of radio intelligence activities in the Forward Area as a representative of CinCPOA with additional orders to Commander Forward Area. It would then be my desire that all forms of radio intelligence activities in the Forward Area operate under the guidance and control of this officer. Under existing plans this officer will initially be stationed at STEVEDORE. Dissemination of final intelligence must remain the responsibility of CinCPOA, but it is planned to delegate the responsibility of dissemination of certain types of intelligence of an immediate nature to Commander Forward Area. This contemplates flexibility and the passing of such information on the spot to all operational commanders who have the need for it.

Pac-33-jcr
A8/S67
Serial 000469

June 29, 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Radio Intelligence Unit.

5. The best method of integration of new intelligence activities into planned organizations for the Forward Area is not one which is clearly apparent until more information on the technical capabilities of such new activities and the nature of material to be processed is at hand. It is felt that the many highly technical and intricate aspects of the subject require minute discussion and planning by qualified officers. As an example, the advanced location of planned radio intelligence activities will be at STEVEDORE. If the entire unit is required in the Forward Area and must be kept intact, its location at STEVEDORE, where the termination of special radio circuits for intelligence material and special cryptographic aids will be available, is indicated. Although immediate tactical intelligence would be then available to operational commanders on the spot, it must be passed back to the CinCPOA agency responsible for integration of all intelligence. On the other hand, it may develop that the major portion of the unit will best be located at STEVEDORE with certain subordinate groups such as voice plain language interception and VHF direction finding to serve operational commanders, at TEARAWAY and possibly TATTERSALLS. Experience and circumstances will have to determine this. Your nomination of two or three officers to assist officers of my staff in such planning will be welcomed. The attendance of the officer in command of the Radio Intelligence Unit in question might be helpful and if you concur it is suggested that he be brought to this area as soon as practicable.

6. For your further consideration at this time is the fact that, based upon available shipping and the necessity for advanced planning, all material and personnel have been echeloned well beyond September, 1944, and to care for the shipment of the unit will necessitate the elimination or deferment of other personnel and material to compensate therefor. Your tentative recommendations in this regard are requested. It is believed that consideration should be given to lifting the unit in whole or in part from the coast to its ultimate destination.

C. W. NIMITZ

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 958

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 June 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

AG 676.3/205

SUBJECT: Radio Intelligence Unit.

TO: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

1. A Radio Squadron (Mobile), consisting of 44 officers and 300 enlisted men, is scheduled for shipment to the Central Pacific Area in September 1944. This Squadron will be equipped to provide high frequency and VHF voice and CW intercept. VHF and high frequency direction finding, traffic analysis, cryptanalytic and intelligence analysis and evaluation of this information. This organization is designed to provide interception and evaluation of air traffic having immediate tactical importance, which can not be furnished from long range intercept systems. Functions of this unit must be constantly coordinated with other intercept facilities in the area in order to insure proper output.

2. It is recommended that the Radio Squadron (Mobile) be employed under the operational control of CinCPOA and that it be stationed, upon arrival, in the Forward Area for use by ComAir-Forward. Training of the personnel and administration of the unit would remain the responsibilities of this Headquarters. Intelligence derived from the operation of this unit would be distributed as directed by CinCPOA, or by such subordinate commanders as he may designate. It is requested that the distribution of this information include Commanding General, Central Pacific Area.

3. The table of organization for this Radio Squadron (Mobile) (Inclosure No. 1) is authorized by the War Department for theater Army Air Force commanders, to provide a flexible, mobile organization to meet the tactical situation. Army Air Force Training Standard No. 50-11, dated 22 May 1944, for this unit, is attached as Inclosure No. 2. The First Radio Squadron (Mobile) in the Southwest Pacific Area has already begun operation, with its headquarters at Nadzab, New Guinea. It is recommended that the headquarters of the Central Pacific Area Radio Squadron (Mobile) be located initially at TEARAWAY, and thence moved forward as the tactical situation dictates. If additional information is desired, representatives of this Headquarters are available for conference.

~~TOP SECRET~~

AG 676.3
8 June 1944 - cont'd.

4. Your concurrence is requested in the proposed employment of the Radio Squadron (Mobile) as outlined herein.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ O. N. THOMPSON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

2 Incls:

- No. 1 - T/O for Radio Sqdn (Mobile)
- No. 2 - CyAAF Tng Std 50.11 dtd
22 May 44

(Note: No copy of Incl. No. 2 kept in Op-20-G/
returned to Opnav SC Files.)

AAF TRAINING STANDARD)
No. 50-11

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, 22 May 1944

RADIO SQUADRON MOBILE

1. Training Objective. To develop a highly trained unit fully capable of:
 - (a) Intercepting radio transmissions on all frequencies.
 - (b) Taking bearings and obtaining fixes through use of direction finding equipment.
 - (c) Breaking enemy codes and ciphers capable of being broken in the field.
 - (d) Analyzing and evaluating the information thus obtained.
2. Units. The Unit as a whole will demonstrate proficiency in:
 - (a) Administrative and Technical:
 - (1) The administration of normal housekeeping functions and maintenance of required records under field conditions.
 - (2) Maintenance of assigned equipment.
 - (3) Assembly and disassembly of equipment in the shortest possible time.
 - (4) Safeguarding military information.
 - (5) Measures and discipline necessary for the successful camouflage of units and equipment, especially those which operate in advanced combat areas.
 - (b) Tactical:
 - (1) Intercepting and recording enemy transmissions, and locating, by utilizing direction finding equipment, enemy stations or bases and clandestine radio stations in areas controlled by friendly forces.
 - (2) Obtaining DF bearings upon enemy source transmission, including VHF voice and CW transmissions.

4-8523, AF

Incl #2 to ltr CPA, file 676.3, dated
8 June 1944, Subject: "Radio Intelli-
gence Unit".

- (3) Obtaining specific foreign intercept by roving or searching the entire spectrum.
- (4) Breaking intercepted enemy messages.
- (5) Analyzing enemy traffic.
- (6) Evaluating the intelligence derived from the several sections of the squadron.
- (7) Maintaining all necessary communications within the squadron and to Air Force headquarters.
- (8) Properly using a Traffic Center when it is in operation.

3. Basic Elements, Sections, or Teams:

- (a) Headquarters Section (Administrative). The personnel of the Headquarters Section, Administrative, will be adept in: the direction of squadron activities, proper authority having been given; squadron administration, including the preparation and distribution of forms, records, and reports; the handling of squadron correspondence; the carrying out of security regulations and procedures; the operation of office equipment; the maintenance of files of Army Regulations and WD and AAF directives; accurate typing and other operations necessary to administration.
- (b) Mess Section and Teams (Administrative). The personnel of the Mess Section, Administrative, will be adept in the preparation of menus; the procurement, storage, preparation, and distribution of food; and preparing meals on field ranges.
- (c) Supply Section (Administrative). The personnel of the Supply Section, Administrative, will be versed in the procurement, storage and issue of clothing, equipment and supplies; in the nomenclature of radio equipment and radio parts; and have attained and maintained required typing speed.
- (d) Transportation Section (Administrative). The personnel of the Transportation Section, Administrative, will be adept in the operation and maintenance of motor equipment; in all methods of checking motor vehicles; and in map reading.
- (e) Communication Section (Technical). The personnel of the Communications Section, Technical, will be adept in installation and operation of telephone and radio equipment, in construction of wire lines; in telephone and switchboard repair; in operating a rapid and secure messenger service, and in coordinating any other type of communication facilities within the squadron.

- (f) Analysis Section (Tactical). The personnel of the Analysis Section, Tactical, will be adept at breaking enemy code and cipher messages capable of being broken in the field; in analyzing and preparing reports on cryptanalyzed material; in plotting direction finding bearings; in traffic analysis; in the use of cipher devices and all forms for breaking messages capable of being broken in the field; and in translation from the enemy language to our own.
- (g) CW Intercept Section and Teams (Tactical). The personnel of the CW Intercept Section, Tactical, will be adept in the technique of intercepting hostile radio transmissions; in enemy radio procedures in the theater in which the squadron is to operate; in assigning radio intercept and direction finding missions; in the operation of recording and transcribing equipment; in the installation and repair of all radio and recording equipment in the squadron; in installation and operation of teletypewriter equipment; and have attained and maintained required typing speed and pencil copying speeds.
- (h) Direction Finding Section and Teams (Tactical). The personnel of the Direction Finding Section, Tactical, will be adept in the technique of radio direction finding; in the operation and maintenance of the intercept, direction finding and communications equipment; in enemy radio procedures in the theater in which the squadron is to operate; in the technique of intercepting enemy voice and CW transmission.
- (i) Intelligence Evaluation Section (Tactical). The personnel of the Intelligence Evaluation Section, Tactical, will be adept in evaluating all data on hostile actions collected by the various sections of the squadron; in assigning radio intelligence missions; in intelligence liaison; in enemy communications organizations; and be familiar with enemy intelligence characteristics.
- (j) Voice Intercept Section and Teams (Tactical). The personnel of the Voice Intercept Section, Tactical, will be adept in the technique of radio direction finding; in the operation and maintenance of the intercept, direction finding and communications equipment; in enemy radio procedures in the theater in which the squadron is to operate; in the technique of intercepting enemy voice transmissions.
- (k) Teams (Typical), Intelligence. The personnel in these teams will have the same training as in paragraphs 3f and 3i.

- (l) Teams (Typical), Radio Communication. The personnel of the Radio Communication Team will be adept in installing and operating radio transmitters and receivers; in radio operating procedure; and be versed in radio security.
 - (m) Teams (Typical), Teletypewriter. The personnel in the Teletypewriter Team will be adept in installation and operation of teletypewriter equipment and have attained and maintained required typing speed.
 - (n) Teams (Typical), Traffic Center. The personnel in the Traffic Center Team will be adept in traffic (message) center procedure; ^(pwr) in all applicable clerical duties; be versed in all applicable clerical duties; and in cryptographic security.
4. Individual Basic Element or Team Member. Will demonstrate proficiency in:
- (a) Those standards of proficiency as required by appropriate 80 and 110 series AAF Training Standards.
 - (b) Communications Chief. Installing and supervising the necessary communications facilities in accordance with the volume of traffic and available means of communication.
 - (c) Analysis personnel. Maintaining methods and devising new ones in cryptanalytic work; analyzing and directing the analysis of radio traffic; translating messages written in foreign languages and assisting in the solution of foreign cryptographic systems.
 - (d) Translators. The translation of codes already broken down, the solution of foreign language encoded traffic, and translation of all other routine traffic in foreign language.
 - (e) Cryptographic Technicians. Preparing or breaking cryptograms and messages through the use of code and cipher systems and keys.
 - (f) Traffic Analysts. Processing all intercepted messages and bearings and studying operators' logs, messages and D/F bearings for the purpose of extracting information to aid further intercept and information. This will include studies of call signs, procedure, operating schedules, frequencies and net organization. They will indicate the types of traffic and bearings required which will be translated into technical information required for the assignment of specific missions. Plotting of DF bearings will be done by this group.
 - (g) Control Officers. Arranging for the proper dissemination of missions to the Intercept, Voice, and DF Teams as circumstances ^(pic)

- (h) CW Intercept Operators. Intercepting transmissions in the appropriate enemy language.
- (i) Intelligence Evaluation Officers. Carrying out of missions and converting intercepted material and DF data into useful air intelligence; liaison with A-2 and other intelligence agencies.
- (j) Voice Interceptors. Intercepting voice transmission in the appropriate enemy language.
- (k) DF Operators. Operating rapidly and accurately the assigned DF equipment.
- (l) Radio Operators. Operating the squadron radio net.

5. General:

- (a) Basic Training. Deficiencies in basic training will be corrected.
- (b) Movement. Standard operating procedures (including loading tables for movement by railroad, truck, aircraft, or ships will be established and maintained so that movement may be made with the least delay and difficulty.
- (c) Physical Training. A continuous, progressive physical training program will be conducted.
- (d) Chemical Warfare. Training will include identification and characteristics of chemical agents, treatment of casualties, defense against chemical attacks, decontamination, and control of incendiaries.
- (e) Defense against Air and Ground Attack. Training will include organization and methods of repelling and minimizing air and ground attacks.
- (f) Preparation of overseas Movement. All officers and key non-commissioned officers will be familiar with pertinent POM instructions.

6. References. FM 21-6, 21-7 and all changes thereto will be used as a source for reference material. In addition the following references will be used:

- (a) AAF Manual on Radio Squadrons, Mobile.
- (b) Intelligence Reports and Letters.

50-11
6 Pages
Page 6

- (c) War Department Informational Bulletins.
- (d) AAF Training Standards.
- (e) Army Regulations.
- (f) AAF Regulations.
- (g) AAF Memorandums.
- (h) War Department Training Circulars.

By Command of General ARNOLD:

BARNEY M. GILES,
Lt. Gen., United States Army,
Chief of Air Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X"

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053

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTRACT FROM 9TH MEETING OF ARMY-NAVY
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
13 DECEMBER 1944

SECTION III - New Items

Page 18

"8. Function of Army Units at Guam (of. III 6 in agenda).

"Captain Wenger said FRUPAC had advised that the AAF has sent intelligence units to Guam. Admiral King had asked General Marshall concerning the plans, and the Chief of Staff had replied that all such activities would be coordinated. Admiral Nimitz had appointed Commander Howeth in charge of intelligence activities on Guam. The AAF sent out 500 persons and SSA sent a detachment. Material had been requested which according to General Clarke was too high a level to be sent. A reply to Commander Howeth was pending until the necessary information could be secured.

"Colonel Hayes stated that the SSA unit was nearly exclusively an intercept organization. SSA had no control over AAF Squadrons in the field. The Signal Officer usually assigned the missions. He inquired as to the nature of the material to be sent since low level material was usually requested.

"Captain Wenger replied that while SSA had no control over the AAF it would be desirable, and could be arranged under the existing circumstances, that control be exercised through Admiral Nimitz. Colonel McCormack said the matter was already being discussed. It was a problem of coordination of low level traffic without reference to Washington. Captain Wenger said that Commander Howeth wanted to know what his position was. Colonel Hayes replied that General Powell would be sent material approved by G-2. It was agreed that G-2 would investigate the problem."

~~TOP SECRET~~

054

COPY

16 December 1944

Guam~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN W. B. GOGGINS, USN

Subj: Function of AAF 8th Mobile RI Squadron.

Ref: (a) FRUPAC 020217 December.

Encl: (A) Copy of Secret memo for Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, USA, dated 9 December 1944.
(B) Memos of Col. S.P. Collins, USA, dated 14 December, and Lt. A.M. Conant, USN, dated 16 December 1944.

1. Reference (a) was immediately referred to SSA for information on which to base a reply. After repeated promptings on our part, we were referred to Col. C.I. Hoppough, of AAF. The latter, apparently endeavored to side-step the matter, but finally referred us to G-2. Accordingly, enclosure (A) was prepared. Repeated inquiries have failed to produce a definite answer.
2. On 13 December I raised the question at the monthly Army-Navy Coordinating Committee meeting but got nothing out of the G-2 or SSA representatives, except that they were trying to do something about it.
3. On 16 December I called General Clarke and reminded him that we had been endeavoring to get an answer since 2 December and that as yet nothing had been received. He promised to call me back on the subject. Later in the day I received a call from one of his subordinates, who told me that SSA had been instructed to send the necessary directive to General Harmon, who is apparently in command of the Army Air Forces in the Mariannas. Enclosure (B), which has just been received, apparently bears on the subject. General Clarke told me that Howeth was at liberty to request them to give us any assistance that we needed. I would suggest, therefore, that Howeth endeavor to keep them busy in whatever way is possible until the problem is settled.
4. It appears that some reorganization is underway which will place G-2 in control of the situation. Until that time it will probably be difficult to obtain a satisfactory answer. We could, of course, take a firm hand and demand satisfactory response, but under the circumstances it appears advisable at the moment not to make such a move.

J. N. WENGER

Op-20-G.

055

Op-20-G

~~SECRET~~

COPY

9 December 1944

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. CARTER W. CLARKE, USA

Subj: Activities of Army Air Force 8th Mobile Unit at Guam.

Encl: Copy of Secret Disp FRUPAC 020217, December 1944.

1. You will recall that, by agreement between Admiral King and General Marshall, the Army Air Forces R.I. activities in the Pacific have been placed under the general direction of Admiral Nimitz for purposes of coordination and control. In order to implement this agreement, Admiral Nimitz designated Comdr. Howeth as his representative in controlling all R.I. activities on the Island of Guam.
2. A request was recently received from the AFF 8th Mobile Unit on Guam, via Comdr. Howeth, for certain material to be supplied to them. This request was referred to you for consideration and you disapproved it. Accordingly, the material has not been supplied.
3. The attached message was sent to me by Frupac for the apparent purpose of clarifying the functions of the Army Air Forces R.I. units in order that necessary instructions could be issued to Comdr. Howeth in the premises.
4. I discussed the matter with Col. Collins, who referred me to Col. Hoppough of AAF. The latter told me that it was up to the theater commander to issue the necessary instructions. I informed him that the naval R.I. organization in the Pacific was run by Op-20-G, and that Admiral Nimitz looks to us to issue operating directives. We, of course, can do so in the case of the AAF units, but we would prefer to have any directives so given conform to your wishes.
5. We are in agreement with your view that work of the AAF Mobile Unit should be confined to low grade material. It was noted in their request for material that they were apparently contemplating work on weather systems. As you know, processing of this material is now confined to Frupac by agreement, and we should like to have that arrangement continue, at least until a change in policy is indicated.
6. Will you please advise us how to reply to the attached dispatch, or inform us as to what directives you may issue in the case.

/s/ J. N. WENGER
Op-20-G.

Enclosure (A)

056

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SPSIS-1

~~SECRET~~

14 December 1944

MEMORANDUM for Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke

Subject: Mission of 8th AAF Radio Squadron Mobile
Unit at Guam

1. The following is quoted from a radiogram, 13 December, from General Powell: "CTF 93 (GENERAL HARMON) EXERCISES OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF RADIO SQUADRON MOBILE AT GUAM. ALL INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM THIS SQUADRON IS COORDINATED WITH COMGENPOA AND CINCPA. DIRECTIVE OUTLINING THEIR OPERATION WAS ISSUED BY HEADQUARTERS THIS THEATER."
2. In connection with the above, Colonel Hayes is preparing a list of material which is recommended to be furnished the 8th AAF Radio Squadron through General Powell. This list contains no ultra material other than Air Order of Battle which we are recommending be furnished by your office.
3. We are furnishing General Powell a list of radio coverage desired by SSA which might be given to the AAF Radio Squadron as a secondary mission.

S. P. Collins
Colonel, Signal Corps
Acting Chief, Signal Security Branch

Copy for Captain Wenger:

Material in paragraph 3 was sent by radio to Powell by SSA on 15 December.

/s/ THOMAS IRVIN
Major, CAC
Chief, Special Branch, MIS

C O P Y

Enclosure (B)

057

16 December 1944

To: Capt. Wenger

From: Conant

Major Ervin says that as soon as he finds out what the primary mission of 8th AAF Rdo. Sqd., as assigned by Gen. Powell, is he will let you know.

Respectfully,

/s/ CONANT

Enclosure (E)

058

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Minutes of Conference, held 27 December 1944, in office of
U. S. Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.

Present: Captain Redman, Pacific Fleet Communication
Officer
Captain Goggins, O-in-C, FRUPAC
Comdr. Holtwick, FRUPAC Operations Officer
Comdr. Blaisdell, Fleet Security Officer
Col. Ankenbrandt, AAFPOA Signal Officer
Col. Cresswell, Fleet Comm. Plans & Training
Lt. Col. Sandretto, AAFPOA, Ass't. Signal Officer
Lt. Col. Frame, SIO, Army Forces, POA
Major Fager, Special Security Representative, POA
Major Miller, AAFPOA, Special Security Officer
Captain Spitzer, Representative, 8th Radio Sqdn
Mobile

1. Conference called to discuss the aspects of establishing a Joint Army Navy Analysis Group on Guam for analysis of enemy radio traffic, particularly air and air-ground, and for processing of exploitable low-level traffic intercepted, for the purpose of furnishing quickly such information of immediate tactical importance as may be developed to local commanders of all services who may require it.

2. For the purpose of giving all present the background on the projects, the following items were read (included with these minutes as enclosures).

- A. Minutes of conference of 18 December.
- B. Description of present installations on Guam.
- C. Messages from Commander Howeth, 25 December.
- D. Recommendations from Commander Howeth, 26 December.
- E. Resume of situation regarding assignment of mission of 8th Radio Squadron.
- F. FRUPAC recommendations.

3. Col. Ankenbrandt read the notes (enclosure G) which his organization had prepared on the 8th Radio Squadron.

4. General agreement was expressed by all conferees with the FRUPAC recommendations (enclosure F) and it was decided that CinCPOA would formulate and send immediately a basic directive by dispatch, to be followed by a letter more in detail.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

5. It was agreed that the personnel of the Joint Analysis Center (later decided to be called Joint Communication Analysis Group, Forward Area, short title CAGFOR) would probably consist initially of the Evaluation Section (4 officers and 8 men) of the 8th Mobile Squadron, plus such assistance as could be furnished by local Army and Navy units. Probable augmentation of this group by one or two traffic analysts from FRUPAC and personnel from Army Forces POA, AAFPOA, and SSA, if and when available, was agreed upon.

6. It was agreed that the work of this unit would be primarily analysis of all locally intercepted traffic pertaining to Jap air or air-ground communications, for the purpose of deriving information of immediate local importance, plus the exploitation of such air and air-ground systems, both Army and Navy, as are suitable for field processing.

7. All products of this unit's work are to be passed to FRUPAC (who will pass onto Op-20-G) and to Fort Shafter (who will pass on to Arlington Hall).

8. It was agreed that a similar Joint Group on Guam covering the problems of Communication Security would be desirable, and that further steps along this line would be instituted.

9. On the question of dissemination of information derived by CAGFOR, considerable discussion brought out the agreement that some agency was required to evaluate the information locally, and to screen and control its dissemination. It was conceded that this was a function of Intelligence rather than Communications, and two divergent views were expressed as to the exact set-up most practicable. One held that this should be done by the Fleet Intelligence Officer's immediate local staff (augmented if necessary by trained CIC and MIS officers). The other view held that a separate small replica of the present FRUPAC-JICPOA CIC (to be known as AIRCIC) be set up to handle this.

10. Pending a discussion of the ultimate set-up for dissemination with the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Cinc, JICPOA, it was agreed that as a temporary measure, Commander Howeth would be directed to include an AIRCIC as part of CAGFOR, utilizing personnel available locally.

11. The following dispatch was therefore prepared, and sent, after concurrence by General Twitty, Comdr. Holmes, Comdr. Hudson, Captain Goggins and Captain Redman:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

To : ComForwardArea

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

Info: ComGenAAFPOA
ComGenPOA
IsCom Guam
JCA Guam

JOINT COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS GROUP FORWARD AREA PAREN SHORT
TITLE CAG FOR PAREN AT GUAM AN IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR ANALYSIS

JAP AIR RADIO TRAFFIC AND LOCAL AREA DISSEMINATION OF TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE TO ALL SERVICES WHO REQUIRE FOR IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL

PURPOSES X DIRECT COMMANDER HOWETH PROCEED IMMEDIATELY ORGANIZE
ESTABLISH AND OPERATE SUCH A GROUP X COMGENPOA AND COMGENAAFPOA

REQUESTED MAKE AVAILABLE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE X
AS EXPEDIENT PENDING FURTHER CONSIDERATION HERE OF PROVIDING

PERSONNEL AND ESTABLISHING SUBORDINATE JICPOA GROUP AT GUAM
ORGANIZATION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A LOCAL SMALL CIC SIMILAR TO

FRUPAC DASH JICPOA CIC ARRANGEMENT WITH SAME SECURITY FEATURES X
BASIC LETTER DIRECTIVE IN PREPARATION

12. Commander Holtwick was directed to prepare a pre-
liminary draft of the basic letter of instructions, and submit
it to Lt. Col. Sandretto and Lt. Col. Frame for comments and
suggestions. (It was later decided that the portion of the
letter bearing on dissemination would have to await Captain
Layton's return before final promulgation)

Respectfully submitted,

J. S. HOLTWICK, JR.,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

Copies to: Comdr. Hudson
Comdr. Holmes
Col. Corderman
Capt. Wenger
Comdr. Howeth

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

DIGEST OF CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION MATTERS

Held at FRUPAC, 18 December 1944

Present: Captain Goggins, O-in-C, FRUPAC
Captain Huckins, R. I. Officer, FRUPAC
Comdr. Holtwick, Operations Officer, FRUPAC
Comdr. Dennis, Traffic Analysis Officer, FRUPAC
Col. Corderman, Chief, Signal Security Branch
Col. Ankenbrandt, Signal Officer, ComGenAAFPOA
Lt. Col. Frame, SIO, ComGenPOA

1. The position of Commander Howeth at Guam with respect to FRUPAC, CINCPOA and Army intercept activities was clarified for the benefit of Army personnel present. It was brought out that Comdr. Howeth was serving in a dual capacity, on the one hand as Officer-in-Charge of the FRUPAC forward intercept station, and as such was administratively and operationally under the Officer-in-Charge, FRUPAC. On the other hand, Comdr. Howeth has additional duties as CINCPOA representative in charge of all radio intelligence matters in the forward area, and as such, has cognizance over the various Army units involved in R. I. work on Guam, but this control is exercised as CINCPOA representative, and FRUPAC interest is purely academic. Therefore, it was brought out that the FRUPAC officers present were acting in the capacity of advisors to the Fleet Communication Officer rather than as persons who could enunciate or agree to matters of policy.

2. For the benefit of the Navy representatives, Col. Corderman outlined the functions, responsibility and missions of the four Army units now present on Guam:

- (a) Second Signal Battalion. Directly under Arlington Hall. Mission, almost exactly parallel to that of the Navy intercept station, i.e. the interception and forwarding to Arlington Hall of raw material to fill in gaps in the coverage of other Army intercept stations. The mission does not and is not planned to include exploitation of any material, especially in view of the fact that interception of other than "high level" raw material is purely fortuitous and a by-product of listening on certain channels where low-level material might also appear.

(ENCLOSURE A)

- (b) 130th Radio Intelligence Company. Unit of Army Ground Forces. Responsible to ComGenPOA. The function of this unit is the intercept of Japanese Army traffic in the general Central Pacific Area, and transmitting these intercepts to Lt. Col. Frame's unit on Oahu for traffic analysis. No exploitation is planned on Guam although spot traffic analysis of intercepted material will be undertaken. On Oahu this material undergoes traffic analysis as well as processing of exploitable low-level messages. Since material intercepted by the Second Signal Battalion is returned over the same radio channels as the material intercepted by the 130th Radio Intelligence Company, all this material is available for the above processing by Lt. Col. Frame's outfit and all available for further transmittal to Arlington Hall.
- (c) Eighth Radio Squadron Mobile. Component of Army Air Forces. Control by ComTaskForce 93 (General Harmon). At present, due to some confusion, this unit has not been assigned a mission or methods of operation.
- (d) Detachment of 111th Radio Intelligence Company. This consists of a Direction Finder Unit belonging to the First Radio Squadron Mobile in the Southwest Pacific and is a unit in their direction-finding network. All control and assignment of mission is under Southwest Pacific Command.

3. A considerable discussion took place regarding the proper functions and control of the Eighth Radio Squadron Mobile. It was generally agreed that CINCPOA should furnish the general directive and General Harmon the specific mission for this unit. The nature of the directive and mission would depend on the agreements reached after discussion both here and in Washington regarding the over-all plans for the various units, and the decision regarding a Joint Tactical Communication Intelligence Unit on Guam.

4. The question of the use of some 35 Nisei members of the Eighth Radio Squadron personnel was brought up. It was agreed that this was a question to be settled between Col. Ankenbrandt and Captain Redman, and was not properly a subject pertaining to this discussion.

5. After a short discussion of the Army communication problems incident to the transmission of raw material from Guam,

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

it was agreed that until such time as the various multi-channel circuits were available, FRUPAC would authorize Commander Howeth to forward Army traffic on his raw material channels at any time that he had idle circuit time, with the proviso that the transmission of Navy raw material would not be interfered with.

6. A discussion of the recommended mission for the various units resulted in general agreement that it was extremely desirable, and in fact, necessary, to undertake a joint traffic analysis at Guam of the combined intercept of both Army and Navy Japanese air traffic. It was decided that if concurrence could be obtained from CINCPAC and Op-20-G (Col. Corderman vouched for concurrence by Arlington Hall) it would be recommended that a Joint Center for this purpose be established at Guam. The various proposals and suggestions made during the conference are to be examined by FRUPAC and a comprehensive recommendation submitted.

Respectfully submitted,

J. S. HOLTWICK, JR.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

PRESENT GUAM INSTALLATIONS

AA. Main intercept station (Target Area 798)

Main Bldg. 7296 sq.ft. (Navy)	Intercept 2800 sq.ft. (60 positions)
	D/F Net control 576 sq. ft.
	Communication 1680 sq. ft.
	Code Room 256 sq. ft. (separate bldg.)
	U.H. equipment 256 sq. ft. (")
	Materiel 1040 sq. ft.
	Storage 560 sq. ft. (")
	Analysis 1120 sq. ft. (available)
Administration 512 sq. ft. (2 buildings)	
2nd Signal Service Unit 1360 sq. ft. (10 positions to be 18 later)	

Power: 3-75 KW generators.
8 Rhombics - 210 to 010 degrees.
Multicouplers. Service Navy and 2nd SSU.
2-6 pr. lines to JCC.
12 - U.H. channels to Radio Barrigada

AB. Army Area (Target Area 782)

8th Squadron - 2300 sq. ft. (20 positions, to be 30)
130th R.I. Co.- 2300 sq. ft. (20 positions)

2 Rhombics (to be increased to 3) with multicouplers. Joint use.
Power: Gas units, to be replaced by 2-15 KW generators.
11 pair lines to AA thence 6 pair to AC.

AC. Portable D/F (Target Area 830)

8th Squadron - SCR 502
SCR 555
SCR 556
130th R.I. Co.- SCR 255 (eventually)
Southwest Pacific outfit.
6 pairs line to AA.

AD. HF D/F (Target Areas 799 and 814)

Standard DAB - DAH
2 - 15 KW diesels.
11 pairs to AA
11 pairs to AA and AP.

AP. RFP (Target Area 829)

6 Rhombics - 240° to 360°
4 position multicouplers (1 position now in use)
Power: 2-15 KW diesels.
11 pair lines to AA and AD.

(ENCLOSURE B)

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

MESSAGES FROM COMMANDER HOWETH, 25 DECEMBER

From: Commander Howeth
T o: FRUPAC

PLEASE PASS TO CINCPA X REFERRING TO COMGEN AAFPOA TWI THREE ZERO THREE FOUR FIVE EIGHT SQUADRON MOBILE PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED MISSION DIRECTED THEREIN X REFERENCE PARAGRAPH THREE YOUR SERIAL ZERO ZERO ZERO FOUR SIX NINE OF JUNE TWO NINE DO YOU AUTHORIZE FORWARDING TRAFFIC AND LOG SHEETS TO COMGENPOA X CONCERNING CLARIFICATION OPERATIONAL CONTROL DISCUSSED IN REFERENCED DESPATCH I DESIRE TO INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT JJ THOUGH VERY WILLING JJ NOT ONE ANALYTIC OFFICER OF THIS UNIT HAS HAD PREVIOUS ROGER ITEM EXPERIENCE AND IT IS MY OPINION THAT ANY INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATED LOCALLY MUST BE THOROUGHLY SCREENED

From: Commander Howeth
To: FRUPAC

CONSIDER PLAN SUGGESTED BY BSU IN PARAGRAPH NINE* YOUR SERIAL ZEBRA THREE SEVEN FOUR ONE ESSENTIAL TO OBTAINMENT INTELLIGENCE JAPANESE ARMY DASH NAVY AIR FOR BOTH LOCAL TACTICAL AND LONG RANGE FRUPAC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND REQUEST IT BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER LOSE NO FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES X WE ALREADY HAVE SMALL NAVY GROUP WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM BUT COMBINATION FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL WILL FACILITATE SOLVING OF PROBLEMS XX IF APPROVED RECOMMEND ESTABLISHMENT COMBINED AIR ANALYSIS ACTIVITY IN ISOLATED SECTION NOW OCCUPIED BY ARMY SIGNAL SERVICE AND PROVIDE ALL AVAILABLE MATERIAL REGARDLESS OF SOURCE XX THIS NOT ADDRESSED TO GEORGE BUT REQUEST YOU RELAY IF DEEMED DESIRABLE

* This is covered as last point in minutes of conference of 18 December.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM COMDR. HOWETH, 26 DECEMBER

From: Commander Howeth
To: FRUPAC

COMES NOW OUR IDEAS AS PART 4 OF THE 260600 XX REFERENCE CINCPA
SERIAL 000469 OF JUNE 29 PARAGRAPH 4 STATES POLICY WHICH CANNOT
BE QUESTIONED XX PARAGRAPH 5 OF SAME REFERENCE LEAVES THE METHOD
OF INTEGRATING NEW ACTIVITIES INTO ORGANIZATION FOR FURTHER
DISCUSSION X BELIEVE IT IS NOW ESSENTIAL THAT ANALYSIS OF ENEMY
ARMY NAVY COMMUNICATIONS JJ ESPECIALLY ARMY NAVY AIR AND AIR
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS JJ BE CONDUCTED BY A SINGLE AGENCY HAVING
ACCESS TO ALL INTERCEPTED MATERIAL X FURTHER BELIEVE ENEMY TAC-
TICAL COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE BEST ANALYZED AT INTERCEPT SOURCE
WHERE CLOSE CONTROL OVER COVERAGE CAN BE EXERCISED X STRONGLY
RECOMMEND JOINT ARMY NAVY ANALYSIS GROUP COMPRISED OF FRUPAC JJ
SPECIAL BRANCH JJ AIR FORCE AND GROUND FORCE ROGER ITEM PERSONNEL
BE AUTHORIZED FOR THIS AREA X INFORMATION TO BE DISSEMINATED
THROUGH CINCPA BUT ALLOWING TACTICAL INFORMATION REQUIRING IMMEDIATE
ACTION TO BE PASSED ON SPOT WITH CINCPA PROMPTLY ADVISED X SUGGEST
AIR LIAISON OFFICER HAVE ACCESS TO LOCAL RESULTS AND BELIEVE
CAPTAIN KINGSTON LOGICAL OFFICER X ENVISAGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AS
CHIEF SOURCE OF INFORMATION BUT BELIEVE CERTAIN LOW LEVEL TACTICAL
JAPANESE CRYPTOSYSTEMS SHOULD BE PROCESSED BY JOINT GROUP AS AID
TO TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND FOR THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUCH
MESSAGES MAY CONTAIN X CONSIDER SPACE NOW ALLOCATED FOR ANALYSIS
SUFFICIENT JJ SECURE JJ PRACTICABLE AND IS ISOLATED FROM OTHER
ACTIVITY DIRECTION FINDING ASPECTS WITHOUT CONSIDERING MID PACIFIC
STRATEGIC NET X PART FIVE OF 260600 X WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALL
STATIONS OF FIRST AND EIGHTH MOBILE SQUADRONS COMBINED INTO ONE
AIR INTELLIGENCE DOG FOX NET BUT HAVE BEEN ADVISED THIS IMPOSSIBLE
X IN VIEW ABOVE RECOMMEND ESTABLISHMENT OF FORWARD AREA AIR INTEL-
LIGENCE NET WITH STATIONS PALAU JJ GUAM AND SAIPAN AND TO BE
IMMEDIATELY EXPANDED AS SUITABLE LOCATIONS BECOME AVAILABLE X THIS
NET TO BE USED ADDITIONALLY FOR TRACKING LOST PLANES IN SAME

(ENCLOSURE D.)

067

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM COMDR. HOWETH, 26 DECEMBER

MANNER INTERISLAND NET USED X FREQUENCIES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS X CAPTAIN SPITZER HAS OUR IDEAS RELATIVE THIS X LAST PART DEFERRED UNTIL MORNING X SIXTH AND LAST ONE OF 26~~0600~~ X BOM COM TWO ONE VERBALLY REQUESTS ABLE INCLUDED IN HIS HOW FOX OPERATION CIRCUIT IN ORDER PROVIDE MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE LOCATING LOST AND FORCED LANDED PLANES X THIS WILL NOT REQUIRE OPERATORS AS WILL BE TYPE FIFTEEN TELETYPE AT DOG FOX CONTROL X RECOMMEND FAVORABLE ACTION IN INTEREST SAFETY LIVES XX RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PART FOUR CAN BE PUT INTO EFFECT ONE JANUARY JJ THOSE OF PART FIVE AS SOON AS EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTED AND FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED JJ ONE ABOVE AS SOON AS CIRCUIT ESTABLISHED XX

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

RESUME OF SITUATION REGARDING ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION OF
EIGHTH RADIO SQUADRON

1. On 2 December the question of the mission for subject unit was referred by FRUPAC to Op-20-G, and by them to SSA and G-2.
2. The question is apparently still under consideration in Washington.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

FRUPAC RECOMMENDATIONS

After careful consideration of the items previously covered on the agenda, FRUPAC recommends as follows, provided Op-20-G, Arlington Hall, ComGenPOA, CTF 93 and CINPOA concur:

- (1) That a small joint Army-Navy communication intelligence center be established on Guam, administratively under the Commander Forward Area, operationally under CINCPOA, with Commander Howeth in charge.
- (2) That the mission of this center be the analysis of all pertinent traffic intercepted on Guam, plus the processing of air-ground, low-level systems for the primary purpose of obtaining tactical communication intelligence of immediate importance to Army, Navy, and Air Force operations in the forward area.
- (3) That the personnel of this unit consist primarily of personnel of the Eighth Mobile Squadron, plus one or two experienced analysts from the Navy intercept station and the Second Signal Service Battalion.
- (4) That all necessary aids for the analysis and exploitation of air and air-ground low-level traffic be furnished this unit by Arlington Hall, Op-20-G, FRUPAC and the Army Air Forces as appropriate.
- (5) That local dissemination of intelligence obtained be in the form of ULTRA material and be closely controlled by Commander Howeth under the Fleet Intelligence Officer at the advanced headquarters.
- (6) That all products of the work of this unit be made available to FRUPAC, Op-20-G and Arlington Hall.
- (7) That all intercept material available on Guam be made available to the joint unit, but that its work not overlap the analytical work of the Navy station or the Army station.
- (8) That Commander Howeth's proposal for a Forward Area Air Intelligence Net be further investigated in the light of current plans for extension of Mid-Pacific D/F Net in the forward area.
- (9) That steps be taken to implement the above recommendations at the earliest practicable date.

(ENCLOSURE F.)

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

8th Radio Squadron Mobile

1. The 8th Radio Squadron Mobile arrived at Guam 9 November and joined the Radio center there, under the operational control of Commander Howeth, O-in-C Supplementary Radio Station, Guam, under the Army administrative control of Lt. Col. Parker, Signal OIC (Admin.) of the Army Communication Service activities, and under the general administrative control of Captain Wilson, OIC Radio Station Guam. This unit has contributed to the joint camp activities, its vehicles and messing facilities constituting much of the joint facilities so established. In the case of transportation, apparently its share consisted of 95% or more of the total vehicles available. This unit has prepared its camp site, cleared D/F areas and set itself up to accomplish its task, and is now ready for operation.

2. To date, XXI Bomber Command and CTF 93 have received no immediate information of an operational value from the 8th Radio Squadron Mobile. This is due partially to the fact that the Squadron has only recently got set up and is not yet in full operation. Additionally, it is the result of the method of operation which has been set up.

3. It is believed essential that in order to satisfy the operational intelligence requirements of BomCom 21, CTF 93 and CTF 94 for information of an immediate value, that air personnel be included in the joint Evaluation and Screening Sections of Commander Howeth's organization, with direction under Commander Howeth to disseminate immediately to the three commands concerned such air information as comes to light as a result of their operations. Initially it is recommended that the entire Evaluation Section of the 8th Radio Squadron Mobile, consisting of four (4) officers and eight (8) men semi-trained in their task, be placed directly under Commander Howeth for this purpose. The senior officer of this group, Captain Nygard, is a graduate of USMA 1941 and has been through various intelligence and evaluation schools. It is believed that with further training he will be able to produce good results very quickly. Eventually, it is recommended that two (2) fully accredited War Department officer specialists from the Military Intelligence Section be obtained to head up the air portion of the Evaluation and Screening Section under Commander Howeth. This should produce the final results that are desirable from an air operational point of view.

4. It is recommended that a Central Radio Intelligence, Evaluation and Screening Center be maintained at Guam to serve all of the commands concerned in derived information rather than to permit the various operational headquarters to set up their own sections for this purpose. This will be especially advantageous at Guam because the three headquarters most immediately and vitally concerned with this information -- CTF 93, CTF 94, and BomCom 21 -- all will have their headquarters on this island and close to one another.

(ENCLOSURE G.) 071

Guam file

GB RS #51690

A8-1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

Serial 00037

9 JAN 1945

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

To: Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific.
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas.
Island Commander, GUAM.
Officer in Charge, Joint Communication Activities, GUAM.

Subject: Correlation of Radio Intelligence Activities, Forward Area, Central Pacific.

- References:**
- (a) Cincpac - Cincpoa Top Secret Ser. 000469 of 29 June 1944.
 - (b) Cincpac - Cincpoa Top Secret Ser. 000793 of 9 September 1944.
 - (c) Cincpoa Top Secret Despatch 280535 of December 1944.

1. Reference (a) enunciates the basic policy for correlation of radio intelligence activities in the forward area. Reference (b) designates Commander L. S. Howeth, U. S. Navy, as the representative of Cincpac and Cincpoa in supervising this correlation.

2. Currently established in the forward area are one (1) Navy and four (4) Army radio intelligence units:

- (a) U.S.N. Supplementary Radio Station "A".
- (b) U.S.A.A.F. Eighth Radio Squadron Mobile.
- (c) Second Signal Battalion, U.S. Army S.I.S.
- (d) 130th R.I. Company, U.S. Army Ground Forces.
- (e) Detachment of 111th R.I. Company, CinC, SWPA.

3. In order to correlate the functions of the above listed activities in the collection and exploitation of such enemy radio traffic as is of immediate local interest and which is capable of being analyzed and processed in the field, an amalgamation of certain components of these units into a joint communication analysis group in the forward area was directed by reference (c).

A3-1
Serial 00037

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

9 JAN 1945

Subject: Correlation of Radio Intelligence Activities, Forward Area, Central Pacific.

4. The mission and functions of this group, which is known by the short title "RAGFOR", are stipulated as follows:

- (a) To examine all enemy radio traffic intercepted locally by any of the above listed Army, Navy and Air Force units in accordance with their respective missions and directives.
- (b) To select from this traffic any material pertinent to the local analysis of enemy operations in the immediate forward area, particularly with respect to enemy air operations.
- (c) To process, decrypt, and exploit by means of correlation with traffic analysis, voice intercept, and direction finder bearings, any enemy low level cryptographic systems capable of being processed in the field with cryptographic aids which may be furnished by the Army or Navy communication intelligence organizations.
- (d) To furnish to the designated evaluation and dissemination agency all items of information produced by the above analysis which are of immediate local importance.
- (e) To furnish a complete report of all results of local analysis to the Army and Navy communication intelligence organizations at Washington and on Oahu by appropriate channels.

5. Pending further consideration of the methods and agency to be used in the evaluation and dissemination of the above information, it was directed in reference (c) that "RAGFOR" temporarily include the necessary communication intelligence center for this purpose.

Copy to:
Op-20-G
FRUPAC
Col. Corderman
Comdr. Howeth

FORREST SHERMAN,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Op-20-G/jac

~~TOP SECRET~~
W/128

Ragfor file

3 March 1945.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. W. PRESTON CORDERMAN, U.S.A.

Subj: Dissemination of Weather information from RAGFOR.

Encl: (A) Copy of COMINCH Top Secret-Manx dispatch
022249 of March.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for your information and represents the action taken in response to your memorandum of 23 February 1945.
2. It is regretted that there has been some delay but the matter had to be referred to COMINCH for action.

J. N. WENGER
Captain, U. S. Navy.
Op-20-G.

OPNAV-ZNX-2
NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER G-5 EXTENSION NUMBER 2521 ADDRESSES PRECEDENCE

From <u>COMINCH</u>	FOR ACTION	CINCPAC	OP
Released by <u>CAPT. W. R. SMEDBERG, III USN</u>			PRIORITY
Date <u>1 MARCH 1945</u>	INFORMATION	FRUPAC RAGFOR	ROUTINE
TOR Coderoom _____			DEFERRED
Decoded by _____			OP
Paraphrased by _____			PRIORITY
TEXT			ROUTINE
	022249		DEFERRED

16-32615-2

~~ULTRA~~

~~TOP SECRET - MANK~~

~~ULTRA~~

FLEET WEATHER CENTRAL JJ GUAM JJ AND UNCLE SUGAR ARMY SEVENTH WEATHER SQUADRON ARE CONSIDERED AT FORCE HEADQUARTERS LEVEL WITHIN THE MEANING OF MY ZERO EIGHT ONE SEVEN TWO TWO X DESIRE RAGFOR BE DIRECTED SCREEN ALL ENEMY WEATHER INFORMATION PRODUCED FROM SYSTEMS EXPLOITED LOCALLY AND DELIVER PERTINENT DECODES TO THE ABOVE AGENCIES X HANDLING PROVISIONS OF REFERENCE APPLY IN SPITE OF LOW GRADE QUALITY OF SYSTEMS EXPLOITED

Ø81722: DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENT WITH BRITISH AND U.S. ARMY CONCERNING HANDLING OF ULTRA WEATHER

CC: F-20, Op-34-E, Op-20-G, Gen. Clarke

ACTION

~~RI-SECRET-RI~~

INFO

IMPORTANT.—The information contained herein is not to be reproduced or referred to in any manner which may disclose its source

OPNAV-20-611
NAVAL MESSAGE

AO 48475

NAVY DEPARTMENT *File Rayford J.*

DRAFTER **G-2** EXTENSION NUMBER **2661** ADDRESSES PRECEDENCE

From OP-20-G	FOR ACTION	PROPAC GUAN	OP
Released by Capt. J.N. WEGGER			PRIORITY
Date 10 JULY 1945			ROUTINE
TOR Coderoom	INFORMATION	=	DEFERRED
Decoded by			OP
Paraphrased by			PRIORITY
			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

TEXT **CETYH** **10 21 23**

~~ULTRA~~

16-32615-2

~~ULTRA~~

EXCHANGE OF AIR TECHNICAL DATA AND EVALUATED PINUP INTELLIGENCE
 AMONG BAGFOR JJ CENTRAL BUREAU JJ AND PAFAPRIC RPT PAFAPRIC JJ
 AND FURNISHING JB ONE SIXTYSIX DATA TO PAFAPRIC JJ APPROVED X
 THIS ANSWERS GUANS ZERO FOUR ZERO ZERO FORTY

643949: REQUEST CONCURRENCE RADIO INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
 AT MANILA.

cct G, G-1, G-5, GX-P, GZ-P, GI-P, GEDD

G-5 (ORIO)

ACTION

~~RI-SECRET-RI~~

INFO

IMPORTANT.—The information contained herein is not to
 be reproduced or referred to in any manner
 which may disclose its source

NAVAL MESSAGE

AO 48475

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER G-2

EXTENSION NUMBER 2661

ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE

From OP-20-G

ACTION

OP

Released by Capt. J.N.WENGER

FRUPAC
GUAM

CETYH

102123

~~ULTRA~~

~~ULTRA~~

EXCHANGE OF AIR TECHNICAL DATA AND EVALUATED PINUP INTELLIGENCE
AMONG RAGFOR JJ CENTRAL BUREAU JJ AND FEAFRIC RPT FEAFRIC JJ
AND FURNISHING JB ONE SIXTYSIX DATA TO FEAFRIC JJ APPROVED X
THIS ANSWERS GUAMS ZERO FOUR ZERO ZERO FORTY

ø4øø4ø: REQUEST CONCURRENCE RADIO INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AT MANILA.

cc: G, G-1, G-5, GY-P, GZ-P, GI-P, GcDO

G-5 (ORIG)

~~RI SECRET RI~~

(RETYPE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY)

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Extract from OINC, SUPRADPAC, TOP SECRET-ULTRA
Serial Z-0006147, dated 17 Jan. 1946, Encl.(J),
(History of RAGFOR).

35. The basic theory upon which RagFor was established is considered sound. Assuming a future conflict is anything like the one concluded, it is believed that a radio analysis group should be promptly set up in the forward area and that the primary function of that group should be concerned with enemy air-ground radio communications. The intelligence center for air to the mutual advantage of the two groups should be located at the same place.

36. The most striking single fact about RagFor is believed to be its success as a combined unit. The advantages of cooperative Army - Navy effort were continually apparent; instances of mutual aid were frequent. (The degree of separate-ness of the Japanese Army and Naval Air Forces was probably as great as, or greater than, may be expected to be encountered in the future. It is therefore a fair basis for concluding that Blue efforts should in the future represent increasingly a combined effort.)

37. An alternative is to have a Blue Army (or Navy) activity attempt analytical and decryption intelligence on Army, Navy, and Air radio communications of an opponent. At least two Army agencies attempted to cover all enemy air activity;- the Far Eastern Air Force 1st Radio Squadron Mobile and the Central Bureau of GHQ, SWPA. Neither is believed as successful as RagFor, and much of RagFor's superiority is attributable to

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

*Can't quite agree am sure
The trained personnel
and those who
carried the
burden were
Navy*

its having trained personnel from both US services.

38. It is perhaps permissible to draw a limited comparison between U.S. Army and Navy efforts to obtain intelligence from enemy air force radio communications as seen from a necessarily limited point-of-view. The Navy's organizational

set-up is considered far superior. The Naval side of RagFor was able at all times to look for aid to a parent organization, the Fleet Radio Unit at Pearl Harbor. Desirable research could be requested, flexibility in adding or withdrawing personnel was possible, and generally complete guidance was available. The Army system suffers most sharply by comparison. It is almost true to say that the Radio Squadrons Mobile were sent out and ordered to shift for themselves.

The Navy's system of strong centralization, existing in fact as well as on paper, is believed the only sound system.

39. The Navy is possibly guilty of according its radio intelligence teams afloat somewhat the same sort of lackadaisical treatment that has just been criticized as to the Army with regard to its Radio Squadrons Mobile. At least, improvement was belated and could have gone further.

40. Radio intelligence teams afloat are believed to have made a major contribution in the prosecution of the Japanese war. In a conflict of the future such teams both afloat and ashore may have a similarly important role. If so, it is believed

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

they should be given more backing than they received in this war. The RagFor equivalent in the future should be specifically designated so to do. The O-in-C, RagFor should also be in charge of all Radio Intelligence Teams; he should be responsible for their receiving all necessary aid in the form of data, records and the like.

Believe this would have happened had we added longer to

1. One feature of RagFor should be noted as contributing substantially to the measure of success RagFor achieved. The intercept facilities were a few steps from RagFor's quarters; two intercommunication systems connected RagFor with the intercept supervisor and the search supervisor. Relations were very close and physical propinquity is believed responsible for this. It is a strongly held belief that analysis and decryption can best be undertaken at the actual scene of interception in view of the advantages gained.

*glad to see Holtwick's physical
implied recommendation
consolidation York + NYPO
(D)*

*This enclosure
is unsigned*

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

Extract from OINC, SUPRADPAC, TOP SECRET-
ULTRA Serial Z-0006147, 17 Jan. 1946,
Encl. (K), OINC, CICFOR, TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ltr. of 20 Aug. 1945 to OINC Station A

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations have been made on the basis of
2½ years experience at CIC Pearl, 5 months at CominCH, PSIS
and Op-20-G and 2½ months at CICFOR, SUPRAD.

(1) Too few personnel and too little effort have been expended in the exploitation of communications intelligence information. Thousands of people have been employed to produce the best information in the world, but only a handful have been employed at CominCH, PSIS, CIC Pearl, CICFOR and Com 7th Fleet to study the information in detail and mould it into a sound intelligence picture. The evolution at Pearl of a CIC to exploit communications intelligence has proved a practical necessity that should be followed in the future. GI, whether at Op-20-G, FRUPAC or SUPRAD, has been too burdened with traffic handling to do an adequate intelligence job.

(2) The relationship between intelligence personnel at CominCH and CIC Pearl has not been sufficiently close to traffic analysts, translators and cryptanalysts of the communications intelligence organization. By working together as a team all hands can be of enormous mutual benefit to each other and produce a far better intelligence picture, which is the ultimate objective of all concerned. There has been far too much of a tendency to compartmentize and segregate the work of cryptanalysts, traffic analysts, translators and intelligence officers. Once thousands of personnel engaged in these activities were admitted to the secrets of communication intelligence the security problem was not rendered one bit easier by unsuccessfully attempting to hide from the left hand what the right hand was doing.

(3) Intelligence officers with staffs who have had access to ultra reports and 35-S dispatches should have been trained in the communications intelligence organizations and CIC functions. Here there has been a serious security problem because intelligence officers with fleets and task forces often have not been sufficiently educated in the necessity of strict observance of security regulations. Furthermore without experience in the communications intelligence organization and CIC functions, these fleet and task force intelligence officers have often lacked the necessary experience and training for proper evaluation of information.

(4) There has been too much of a tendency to retain all communications intelligence at a rear headquarters, first in Washington and later at Pearl. Communications intelligence should

have kept more abreast of the commands it served. We should have been equipped to establish CICFOR at Guam no later than January 1945 and much earlier if possible. Instead CICFOR did not become fully operational on Guam until 1 June.

(5) There has been an enormous waste of communications time and effort in transmitting useless information to Comb and Disc addressees. Selection was not feasible because GI personnel, particularly in Washington and to a lesser extent at Pearl, have not been sufficiently cognizant of operational and intelligence requirements and utilization of information. For example, innumerable aviation fuel status reports have been radioed from Washington to Guam in spite of CICFOR and CinCPAC having arranged with CominCH and PSIS to have all intelligence study of these status reports be made in Washington.

(6) War experience has proved it essential that the Army and Navy combine their CIC personnel and information to form a single intelligence organization. The need for a single Army-Navy intelligence effort has been accentuated by the fact that United States Navy communications intelligence facilities have been used on Japanese Navy communications and United States Army communications intelligence facilities have been used on Japanese Army communications. Information from all sources must be processed by CIC for a sound intelligence operation. At CIC Pearl since August 1944 and at CICFOR during its brief existence, the Army and Navy have functioned as one; elsewhere the services have continued to pool their sources by trading and liaison officers.

(7) War experience has proved the absolute necessity of combining all sources of information into a single intelligence product. Ultra and Pinup decryption and traffic analysis have to be studied in conjunction with photographic reconnaissance, captured documents, prisoner interrogations and other sources of information. CIC Pearl and CICFOR have operated on this principle.

*Concern in this
Sounds like I might
have been written
by Emory*

(Signature)
R.W. Emory
Lt.-Comb USN
14 Wds
082