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THE JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

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THE JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

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
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
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



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ORGANIZATION OF PRINCIPAL JAPANESE  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

7 August 1945



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## INTRODUCTION

This project is a comprehensive study of Japanese intelligence during the Pacific War. All information available to M.I.S. has been used in its preparation. Information on many phases of the subject is extensive, on others scanty. The organization, methods, and effectiveness of Japanese intelligence have been stressed, and the operations of Japanese intelligence in all areas where it has been active have been outlined. The subjects treated in detail are especially important or are illustrative of Japanese intelligence as a whole.

No information of more recent date than 7 August 1945 has been included in this study.

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CHAPTER I. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE  
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

Section 1. General

The Japanese intelligence system consists of four major components: military intelligence under the Army General Staff, naval intelligence under the Naval General Staff, diplomatic intelligence under the Foreign Office, and diplomatic intelligence (in the Far East only) under the Greater East Asia Ministry.

The nerve centers of the Japanese intelligence system are the various Japanese diplomatic establishments, the intelligence departments of the various Army and Navy commands, and certain special military and naval organizations. Geographically, the distribution of these intelligence centers is now limited to the few remaining neutral countries, mostly in Europe, and the Japanese-occupied parts of the Far East. Information is collected by these centers and forwarded to Tokyo where it is evaluated and used for the planning and conduct of the war. Tokyo on its part frequently disseminates intelligence to the diplomatic establishments abroad and to the field commands for their information.

The principal sources of information used by Japanese intelligence are: espionage, signal intelligence, prisoners of war and captured documents, observation, interrogation of travellers, and press and radio. The Japanese rely heavily on espionage, and spy reports make up a large proportion of the total number of reports sent to Tokyo.

The organization of the Japanese intelligence system is very complex, and many of the details concerning it are not known. A general outline of the known facts is presented in the succeeding paragraphs.

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## Section 2. Military Intelligence

Imperial General Headquarters (Daihonei) is the highest Japanese military organization. It is made up of the Ministry of War (Rikugun Sho), the Ministry of the Navy (Kaigun Sho), the Army General Staff (Sambō Hōshū), the Navy General Staff (Gunrei Bu), and the Premier. Imperial General Headquarters has no chief, and has little staff of its own. It apparently functions as a joint board of the four chiefs of the two armed services, and is roughly analogous to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Organizationally, it is divided into an Army Department (Rikugun Bu) and a Navy Department (Kaigun Bu), through which it carries out its functions; but these two departments appear to be nothing more than the Army and Navy General Staffs operating in a concurrent capacity. While it is possible that the Imperial General Headquarters may have its own separate intelligence agency, apart from those of the two armed services, there is no clear evidence that this is the case.

The Army General Staff is divided into departments (bu) which are subdivided into sections (ka). The Second Department is charged with the intelligence function. It receives Army intelligence reports which are forwarded to Tokyo, and, although a staff rather than a command agency, may exercise some control over Army intelligence work abroad and in the field. However, few details are known concerning the organization, functions, and powers of the Second Department. It is possible that the Central Special Intelligence Department (Chuō Tokushū Jōhō Bu), Army's highest signal intelligence agency, is subordinate to the Second Department, but here again positive information is lacking.

Abroad, the Army's intelligence representatives are the military attachés, who are attached to the embassies in the various neutral

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and Japanese-controlled countries. These officers account for a large proportion of the information collected by Japanese intelligence, especially in Europe. They serve not only the Army General Staff but also various War Ministry agencies such as the Ordnance Administration Headquarters, Fuel Headquarters, Air Headquarters, and Technical Headquarters. Many serve more than one of these agencies, according to their training and interests. They frequently have sizable staffs which include civilian employees.

In the field of operations each commander is responsible for intelligence in his command, and insures that intelligence received from higher headquarters is disseminated to his subordinate commands and that intelligence collected by his and subordinate commands is forwarded to higher headquarters. Thus, the intelligence departments of the Army commands form a hierarchy culminating in the Second Department of the General Staff.

The Military Police Headquarters (Kampai Hombu) has a system of subordinate units distributed in various parts of Japanese-occupied territory. These units are known to perform certain intelligence functions, the most important of which is counterintelligence.

The Army also has special service organizations variously referred to as Tokumai Kikan (Special Service Agency), Renraku Bu (Liaison Department), and Rikugun Bu (Army Department) which have intelligence functions, but also are charged with subversive activities and liaison work with puppet governments and local leaders in occupied areas. For some purposes each special service organization is answerable to the Army command responsible for its area. But the exact relations of the individual special service organizations to the Army General Staff, to the local Army commands, and to other special service organizations is not known.

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### Section 3. Naval Intelligence

In the case of the Navy, the General Staff department charged with the intelligence function is the Third Department, an agency analogous to the Second Department of the Army General Staff. Crypt-analytic activities are directed by another agency of the Navy General Staff, the Special Service Section (Tokumu Han).

Otherwise naval intelligence organization closely parallels that of military intelligence. The naval attachés and the intelligence departments of the fleet commands function in a manner similar to their Army counterparts, the military attachés and the intelligence departments of the field commands. Moreover, like the Army, the Navy has special service organizations, variously termed Tokumu Bu (Special Service Department) and Zaigin Bureu Fu (Office of the Resident Officer), with functions similar to those of the Army. The exact organizational status of the Naval special service organizations is not known.

### Section 4. Foreign Office

All countries outside of "Greater East Asia," including Asiatic Russia, are within the scope of Foreign Office intelligence. The Foreign Office is organized into a Secretariat and four bureaux. The bureau primarily concerned with intelligence activities is the Investigation Bureau (Chōsa Kyoku), although it is possible that some or all of the other bureaux have intelligence functions. The Investigation Bureau is divided into three sections as follows:

Section I: Diplomatic history; collection and organization of data; investigation of areas other than those under the jurisdiction of Section II.

Section II: Investigation with respect to Russia and West Asia.

Section III: Collection of intelligence.



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Abroad the intelligence agents of the Japanese Foreign Office are its diplomats and their employees. The embassies, legations, and consulates function as intelligence collection centers in addition to their normal diplomatic functions.

#### Section 5. Greater East Asia Ministry

The Greater East Asia Ministry was founded in 1942 to handle all business other than the "purely diplomatic" relating to political, economic and cultural affairs in "Greater East Asia." Intelligence concerning countries in the Far East, exclusive of Asiatic Russia, is primarily its responsibility. The ministry is organized into a Secretariat and five bureaus -- a General Affairs Bureau (Sōmō Kyoku), three regional bureaus, and a Trade Bureau. The bureau primarily concerned with intelligence is the General Affairs Bureau, although it is possible that the regional bureaus also have intelligence functions, particularly with respect to their own regions. Of the five sections of the General Affairs Bureau, the General Affairs Section (Sōmō Ka) is most concerned with intelligence. According to best available information, it is charged with the collection of intelligence and dissemination of propaganda. This is a manifestation on the highest level of the unitary concept held by the Japanese of intelligence and propaganda, a concept which is testified to as well in the organization and operation of the diplomatic intelligence system.

The fact that the posts of Foreign Minister and Greater East Asia Minister are held by the same man and that many of the functionaries abroad serve both ministries probably make for close co-operation and interdependence between them. Abroad the Greater East Asia Ministry intelligence service functions, like that of the Foreign Office, through the various Japanese diplomatic establishments in the Far East.

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CHAPTER II. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED BY FIELD OFFICES  
OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

Section 1. General

This chapter is devoted to the intelligence activities of the major commands of the Army and Navy; no attempt is made to discuss the intelligence activities of units below divisional level.

The bulk of the available material deals with the intelligence activities of the Japanese Army. Comparatively little information is available concerning those of the Japanese Navy.

The separate treatment of the intelligence operations of the field commands is primarily a device for convenience in exposition. From the point of view of the Army General Staff, the military attachés and the field commands are both intelligence collecting agencies, and the final intelligence product is frequently based on information from both sources. The same observation can be made concerning the Navy General Staff.

Section 2. Signal Intelligence

Signal intelligence is a prime source of information for the field units of the Japanese Army and Navy. Although Japanese signal intelligence has apparently not succeeded in reading any high-grade American or British systems, it has had considerable success with Chinese systems of all types and has been able to read several low grade British and American systems, principally weather and aircraft codes. A careful study is made of the volumes and patterns of Allied radio traffic, and on the basis of such traffic analysis, conclusions are drawn as to aircraft movements, the movement of task forces, and the probability of air, naval, and amphibious operations.

It is convenient to discuss Japanese signal intelligence activity first from the point of view of organization, and then to summarize

the principal activities in conducting cryptanalysis and traffic analysis.

A. Organization.

(1) Army. The usual designation of signal intelligence by Army units is "special intelligence" (tekushu jōhō), the term covering both cryptanalysis and traffic analysis. The units engaged in this work are called Special Intelligence Sections. Supervision of all Army signal intelligence activities is vested in the Central Special Intelligence Department (Chūō Tekushu Jōhō Bu), with Special Intelligence Sections assigned to all area armies and air armies. Normally signal intelligence activities are not conducted in units smaller than area armies or air armies, although a number of cases have been noted in which special intelligence units are assigned to armies and in some cases to divisions. Four instances have also been noted in which Special Intelligence Sections are assigned to flying divisions.

(a) Organization in Tokyo. The first available reference to the Central Special Intelligence Department was in a transfer list assigning Major General NAKANO as head of the Department on 15 July 1943. Before that date the functions of directing signal intelligence work were apparently assigned to the Special Intelligence Department; it is not known whether the addition of the term "Central" involved any change in organization. There are also early references to the 18th Section of the Army General Staff supervising signal intelligence; it is not known whether the section still exists or whether its functions were taken over by the Special Intelligence Department or Central Special Intelligence Department.

The Central Signal Examination Department conducts technical analysis of Allied signals. Its precise relation to the Central Special Intelligence Department is not known, but it is believed to be

subordinate to this latter Department. The Central Signal Examination Department has issued summaries of the characteristics of B-29 traffic to the Special Intelligence Sections of the field commands; on many occasions it appears as an addressee of reports forwarded by the Special Intelligence Sections in the field. The normal procedure is for all Special Intelligence Sections in the field to address reports to the Central Special Intelligence Department. Signal intelligence summaries from Tokyo are labelled simply as "Tokyo broadcasts" or appear in the regular Tokyo Staff message series to the field commands. Only a few reports have been observed coming directly from the Central Special Intelligence Department; those reports have been chiefly concerned with descriptions of Allied cryptographic systems which apparently were intended to aid Japanese cryptanalysts in the field.

(b) Organization of Special Intelligence Sections in the Field. The precise relation of the Special Intelligence Sections to the organizations to which they are assigned is not wholly clear. Normally the Special Intelligence Section sends out reports in the same numbered series employed by the headquarters to which it is assigned, thus indicating that the Special Intelligence Section is simply a staff agency of the command. The reports are usually addressed to adjacent commands, and to the Special Intelligence Sections of those commands as well, or for the attention of the Special Intelligence Section, indicating that the Special Intelligence Sections enjoy a quasi-independent status. On technical matters, the Special Intelligence Sections sometimes communicate directly with each other, and it would appear that the Central Special Intelligence Department retains some measure of control over the Special Intelligence Sections assigned to the field commands.

An indication of the fact that the work of all Special

Intelligence Sections is co-ordinated by the Central Special Intelligence Department is shown by an analysis of the intelligence summaries produced. Normally the Special Intelligence Section monitors traffic in the immediate area, and thus produces intelligence reports of direct interest to the command to which the section is assigned. On the other hand, there are many cases in which the Special Intelligence Section monitors traffic originating in an area outside the sector of the unit to which the Section is assigned, and disseminates intelligence reports which are of no direct interest to that unit.

Several examples may be cited. The Special Intelligence Section of the Second Area Army in the Southwest Pacific has had considerable success in reading low-grade air movement and other air cryptographic systems. Originally the reports were concerned with plane movements and unit dispositions in New Guinea, which is in the sector of the Second Area Army. Since the development of the Philippine campaign, however, the movements reported have been almost entirely in the Philippine sector, which is the responsibility of the Fourteenth Area Army. For several months the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul issued intelligence reports based on B-29 traffic monitored and evaluated by its Special Intelligence Section. Still another example is the Special Intelligence Section assigned to the 21st Division at Hanoi, which has turned out many reports on air transport traffic between India and China, a subject in which the 21st Division is not likely to be primarily interested.

Control of subordinate Special Intelligence Sections is also exercised by the Special Intelligence Section of the superior command. Thus an order of the Southern Army dated 27 July 1944 stated that the Special Intelligence Section of the Southern Army would coordinate the work of the Special Intelligence Sections of the Second Area Army, the 14th Army, and the Fourth Air Army, all commands

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subordinate to the Southern Army.

Another directive from the Southern Army, dated 11 June 1945, stated that the Special Intelligence Section of the Southern Army would reassign its branches to different commands, but that as in the past the Special Intelligence Section of the Southern Army would issue instructions directly with regard to technical signal intelligence matters.

Little information is available as to the internal organization of the Special Intelligence Sections. Thirty-six officers have been identified as assigned to the Special Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army, and 23 have been identified as assigned to the Central Department in Tokyo, but these figures are almost certainly incomplete. It is not known whether special intelligence personnel monitor Allied traffic, or whether this is done by some other unit and the results of the monitoring turned over to the Special Intelligence Section for study. It is believed that units known as Air Special Intelligence Units may be engaged in monitoring at least some of the traffic.

Information on the organization of the Special Intelligence Section of the 14th Area Army in the Philippines has been given by a corporal who worked in that section. According to his statement, the Special Intelligence Section was initially made up of about 300 men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with at least ten subordinate officers, although by the end of April 1945, there were only 200 men left. The Section was divided into four subsections, entitled Wireless, Broadcast, Air-Ground Liaison, and Task Force Designation. The Wireless Section apparently monitored tactical ground circuits, the Broadcast Section recorded Allied broadcasts, the Air-Ground Liaison Section intercepted messages transmitted from aircraft, and the Task Force

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Designation Section presumably monitored naval communications and did direction-finding work. In the words of the informant, the latter section "detected task force designations." The prisoner did not disclose what particular Allied systems were read or the techniques employed.

Normally the Special Intelligence Sections issue finished intelligence reports, indicating a high degree of decentralization. In some cases, however, raw traffic is forwarded to Tokyo for cryptanalytic research, and many intelligence reports based on cryptanalysis and traffic analysis are issued from Tokyo.

(c) Role of Central Special Intelligence Department in Decoding Diplomatic Traffic. There are a number of indications that the Central Special Intelligence Department does cryptanalytical work on diplomatic codes. For some time the 23rd Army at Canton has monitored \_\_\_\_\_ traffic emanating from \_\_\_\_\_ and has transmitted the raw traffic to the Central Special Intelligence Department. Intercepts of \_\_\_\_\_ traffic have been noted both in Japanese military reports and diplomatic reports. It appears probable that the Central Special Intelligence Department decodes the traffic and passes the decoded messages to the Foreign Office (CHAPTER III). United States, \_\_\_\_\_ diplomatic messages have also been noted in Japanese Army intelligence reports.

The most convincing evidence that the Army has worked on diplomatic codes is the fact that liaison with \_\_\_\_\_ on cryptographic matters was conducted by the Japanese military attachés. Extensive summaries of Allied raw diplomatic traffic and code solutions were passed between \_\_\_\_\_ and Tokyo, and \_\_\_\_\_ and Tokyo, through military attaché channels. Generally the messages to Tokyo were addressed to the General Affairs Section or the Vice Chief of the General Staff; in one instance, however, a

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message was addressed to the Central Special Intelligence Department.

Despite the evidence above, it can not be stated with certainty that the Central Special Intelligence Department does all of the decoding of diplomatic messages cited in Japanese diplomatic reports. Some of this work is apparently also done by the diplomatic authorities (CHAPTER III).

(2) Navy. The authority directing Naval signal intelligence activities appears to be the Special Service Section (Tokuma Kan) of the Naval General Staff. That section has issued a number of reports giving recoveries of Allied codes. Similar reports have also been issued by the Third Department (intelligence) of the Naval General Staff and the First Department (operations). Presumably those reports were based on material passed to them by the Special Service Section.

Little is known about the relation of the Special Service Section to the Fourth Section of the Naval General Staff (which is concerned with communications) and the Naval Communications Department. In 1940 the Chief of the Naval Communications Department was also Chief of the Fourth Section of the Naval General Staff, and many other officers held concurrent appointments in both organizations. The Naval Communications Department exercises control over all Japanese Naval signal activity, including the organization and allocation of Communication Units (charged with signal intelligence activities in the field) and the training and allocation of all radio operators. According to a Japanese naval captain who was Resident Officer at Hankow until his capture early in 1944, the 11th Department of the Fourth Section of the Naval General Staff controlled signal intelligence activities. No other information on the 11th Department is available.

Signal intelligence activities in the field are carried on principally by Communication Units located at the principal Japanese bases. As with their Army counterparts, the Communication Units turn

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out finished intelligence reports. A directive of May 1944 gave a very complete outline of the allocation of responsibility among the Communication Units. The Fourth Communication Unit at Truk, the Fifth Communication Unit at Saipan, the Sixth Communication Unit at Wake, the Eighth Communication Unit at Rabaul, and the First and Third Combined Communication Units were given specific responsibilities, with separate letter designations for the different classes of intelligence produced by each unit. Three named Communication Units were also given assignments: the Shimushu Communication Unit, the Yokosuka Communication Unit, and the Owada Communication Unit. Shimushu is in the Northern Marianas; Yokosuka and Owada are both near Tokyo. Attention was to be given to both air and naval operations, and special emphasis was laid on reports of positions of Allied surface craft as determined by direction finding.

A number of other naval units also disseminate radio intelligence. Numbered communication units have been identified at Rangoon, Manila, Singapore, and Scarborough, and radio intelligence reports have been sent by the Hainan Guard District, Yangtze Special Base Force, China Area Fleet, and the 15th Special Base Force at Rangoon.

Close liaison in radio intelligence matters between Army and Navy units is found in some areas. In the Northern Marianas traffic analysis reports have been noted which were sent to Army and Navy addressees in a joint Army-Navy cryptographic system. The Eighth Area Army at Rabaul regularly quotes naval intelligence summaries in its reports; the Burma Area Army has on several occasions referred to traffic analysis information made available by the Navy. Another example of interchange of information is seen in the daily Tokyo intelligence summaries. These are made up very largely of traffic analysis of United States Navy traffic. It is possible that the

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Central Special Intelligence Department conducts its own traffic analysis of United States Navy traffic, but it appears much more probable that this information is simply handed over by the appropriate naval agency in Tokyo, particularly since the reports are very similar to those sent in by the Naval Communication Units.

B. Cryptanalysis.

(1) Chinese Systems. Japanese cryptanalysts have had considerable success with Chinese codes. Chinese tactical traffic, military attaché traffic, and diplomatic traffic have all been read by the Japanese signal intelligence service. While the full scope of Japanese activities in reading Chinese codes is not known, in those areas where information is available the Japanese have always been able to read at least some Chinese traffic.

The most detailed information available on Japanese activities of this sort concerns the Burma area. Reports have been observed from the Burma Area Army, the 33rd Army, the 15th Army and the 56th Division. The Chinese messages intercepted describe the tactical movements of units of battalion and even company size and appear to give the Japanese a detailed and fairly current picture of Chinese order of battle. A large number of messages are British situation reports transmitted by the Chinese, thus giving the Japanese a picture of British order of battle as well.

The accuracy of reports on Chinese units has not been evaluated, but reports pertaining to British units have been checked and the identifications made have been accurate in all instances but one.

Chinese Army messages have also been read by the 15th Army at Shanghai and the 23rd Army at Canton. The 21st Division at Hanoi has also been engaged in reading Chinese traffic, although signal intelligence activities there have been mixed with espionage, and it

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is impossible to determine the source of the reports in most cases.

Internal evidence indicates that Chinese codes are recovered at least in part through cryptanalysis rather than through physical compromise. The decrypted messages are often fragmentary in form with gaps where the recovery is not complete.

There is also evidence that the Japanese are able to read Chinese weather ciphers; reports have been observed which give the actual text of ciphers used for this purpose.

The Japanese have also been successful in reading the codes of Chinese military attachés. A report of 29 August 1944 from Tokyo states that the traffic had recently become readable, and cautions the field commands in the use of the intelligence in order to preserve the security of the source. A number was assigned to intelligence reports emanating from Chinese representatives in London, New Delhi, Ceylon, Sydney, Melbourne, Washington, Ankara and Chungking.

More than twenty reports giving intercepts of Chinese attaché messages have been observed. Chinese messages from four points have been noted: Melbourne, Sydney, Washington, and London. Most of the reports originated by the Chinese attachés and intercepted by the Japanese have not contained classified information, but in at least three instances the Japanese have intercepted figures giving Allied estimates of Japanese air strength. Those figures appeared originally in "secret" intelligence publications which were available to the Chinese. In a number of cases the original Chinese message is available, and checks closely with the Japanese version.

Intercepts of Chinese diplomatic messages are normally found in Japanese diplomatic material; on several occasions, however, such

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messages have been noted in military reports. On 25 January 1945 a Tokyo Staff message summarized a message sent by T.V. 20043 on 17 January to the Chinese Ambassador to the United States concerning the reorganization of the Chinese army. On a number of occasions Japanese intelligence summaries have contained extracts from Chinese propaganda directives.

(2) Russian Systems. The Japanese have shown great interest in Russian messages. The Kwantung Army is known to have a large Special Intelligence Section engaged in signal intelligence work, and according to a captured Kwantung Army intelligence summary a considerable volume of information on Russian dispositions was obtained through "special intelligence." A signal intercept station in the northern part of the Japanese half of Sakhalin sends out periodic intelligence summaries based on the reading of Russian messages, principally traffic between Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok. From the available reports it does not appear that the Japanese are obtaining much significant intelligence from this source; the quoted messages describe flights of American planes, Japanese shipping movements, minor administrative details, and a few identifications of Russian units. A series of messages giving the movements of Vice President Wallace's plane during his visit in July 1944 were intercepted by the Sakhalin station; the information contained checked closely with Wallace's actual itinerary as given by the State Department.

The Japanese appear to have learned more about Russian codes from liaison than through their own researches.

A number of cases have been observed in which purported

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messages from the Soviet Ambassadors to Australia, China, and the United States have been quoted. These messages are discussed in more detail in the section dealing with espionage (Section 5), as they are believed to be derived from that source. The only indication that has been noted that the Japanese are reading Russian diplomatic traffic is a report from Tokyo dated 25 January which states that according to the "A intelligence" from the Soviet Military Attaché in Chungking dated 9 January, the Americans were preparing for a landing on the China Coast. ("A Intelligence," in Japanese Army traffic, almost invariably refers to intelligence derived from cryptanalysis.)

(3) British Systems. There is little evidence of success in reading British cryptographic systems. There have been references to the solution of Indian weather codes by both Army and Navy units, although no details of solution or intelligence reports based on the solution of such codes are available. The British Merchant Ship Code has been solved by the Japanese Navy on at least one occasion. The code is not considered to have a high degree of security.

A single example has been noted in which the text of a British message is given. That example, however, does not speak well of Japanese cryptanalytical ability. A report dated 13 April 1944 from the Southern Army gave the purported text of a message from

the message described the shipment of 25,000 phosgene shells and 25,000 phosgene sprayers. On 12 January and 29 February messages actually were sent .

but the messages dealt with the shipment of 25,000 phosgene capillaries, used as canyles for instructional purposes, and not with phosgene shells or sprayers.

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(4) American Systems. Japanese success in reading American codes has been confined almost entirely to systems used by the Air Forces. Special intelligence personnel have derived important information on aircraft movements and unit dispositions in the Southwest Pacific Area; Navy signal units in China were able, for several months, to determine the possibility of B-29 attacks by reading messages giving instructions to turn on homing beacons.

The Special Intelligence Section of the Second Area Army [headquarters at Pinrang in the Celebes] has been the most successful of all Japanese signal intelligence units in reading American systems. Particular success has been achieved in reading codes used for the transmission of aircraft movement messages. Such messages are sent from one airfield to another and contain information on the numbers and types of planes arriving and departing at bases throughout the Southwest Pacific Area.

That code did not present any great difficulty, and by 24 April the new code was solved. The Japanese have continued to read the code, despite frequent changes, through July 1945. A comparison of the solution values which the Japanese determined with the actual codes shows that in both cases the recovery was only fairly accurate.

Similar success in reading air movement systems was achieved by the Special Service Section of the Naval General Staff. From late in 1942 to June 1944 reports were forwarded to the Communication Units at Rabaul and Truk giving recoveries of a United States Navy air movement code; \_\_\_\_\_ The accuracy was



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approximately 60% correct, and from March to June 1944 recoveries were made within three days after code was placed in use.

The Special Intelligence Section of the Second Area Army has also succeeded in reading other unidentified cryptographic systems.

Since July 1944 periodic reports have been issued on the location and movements of units of the Far East Air Force. The reports are headed "A" intelligence, the usual Japanese term for intelligence derived from cryptanalysis, and the evidence appears clear that some Allied code or cipher is the source of the reports.

It has not been possible, however, to determine the particular cryptographic system. The initial reports were very inaccurate, identifying many non-existent units and placing actual units in incorrect locations. Recent reports have been much more accurate, suggesting that the standard of cryptanalytical recovery has improved. A tabulation of these "A" intelligence reports shows that the Japanese have identified every bomber and fighter group in the Far East Air Force, and about one-third of the bomber and fighter squadrons. The units listed are carried at incorrect locations in many instances, and identifications are still made of non-existent units. Non-existent units are with one or two exceptions identified only once, indicating that the erroneous identifications are due to an error in transmission or recovery.

The subject is still under study to determine what cryptographic system or systems are being read and what remedial measures can be taken.

Another instance in which aircraft codes have been read has been observed in the China theater. In December, 1944, and January and February, 1945, a number of reports were issued by an unidentified Japanese Navy signal intercept station (or stations) giving the texts

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of messages from Chengtu directing all stations to turn on homing beacons for a specified period at some time during the following day. Homing beacons are turned on to guide planes returning from an operational flight; a network of homing beacons had been constructed in China to guide B-29's returning to Chengtu bases from raids on Manchuria and Japan. Shortly before a raid a message would be sent from the Twentieth Bomber Command base near Chengtu directing that the homing beacons be turned on. Such messages were also sent when flights by single reconnaissance planes were scheduled, and hence the fact that a message was sent was not a reliable indication that a raid was in prospect, although the intercept of such a message would indicate the possibility of a raid.

An investigation of the situation was made by the theater cryptographic security officer. The conclusion was reached that the Japanese were reading a simple voice brevity code which was being used for transmission of messages from a base near Chengtu directing subordinate stations to turn on homing beacons. The last report giving an intercept of a homing beacon message was dated 12 March 1945; it therefore appears that effective countermeasures have been taken.

A number of reports have also been noted from both Army and Navy intercept stations which describe movements of American planes between bases in China; it is believed that at least some of those reports are based on the reading of point to point aircraft movement codes.

No other examples of successful cryptanalysis of United States Army or Navy systems by Japanese signal intelligence units have been observed. Study of other cryptographic systems has been made, however, and some success has been achieved in recognizing certain characteristics. The Japanese have succeeded in ascertain-

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ing the construction of the converter M-209, presumably from the examination of a captured machine, and have described correctly its mode of use. One report indicates that some success has been achieved in reading M-209 traffic, but no actual intercepted messages have been observed.

United States diplomatic codes of low security have been read by the Japanese on a number of occasions. Formally, such messages are not quoted in Japanese military reports; on 26 January 1944, however, the Southern Army reported the text of a message from the United States Ambassador at Chungking to Washington. The message had actually been sent in the so-called "Brown" code, which was not intended to offer a high degree of security.

Other messages sent in the "Brown" code were reported by the Military Attaché at Budapest; the messages had been read by the Germans and were turned over to the Japanese. On 5 June 1944 the General Affairs Section of the Army General Staff dispatched a report to the Attaché in Turkey which contained the text of a wire from the American Ambassador to Turkey dated 22 May; the American message dealt with the construction of airfields in Turkey.

It appears that the Japanese cryptanalysts received much more of their information on United States diplomatic systems from their allies than through their own research.

(5) Other Systems. A variety of other systems have also been used. In a report dated 29 September 1944 Tokyo reported the text of a message dated 16 September which had been sent by the \_\_\_\_\_ in Japan to the \_\_\_\_\_ Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs. The Japanese version checks closely with the original message.

References to the reading of messages usually are found only in Japanese diplomatic reports. On at least two occasions, however, messages have been noted in Japanese military messages. One such message, dated 3 August 1944, was originated by a representative in China and forwarded to the other, dated 22 January 1945, was sent by the original message. The original message checks very closely with the Japanese version. Japanese Army interest in traffic is further indicated in a request made by the Southern Army on 26 January 1945, for an officer who knew to be sent to for employment by the Southern Army Special Intelligence Section.

No references have been noted in reports by the Japanese field commands to decrypted messages in other systems. A number of minor systems, however, were read by the Germans and decrypted messages were passed on to the Japanese Military Attaché in Budapest.

The Attaché at was also transmitted messages which were apparently decrypted

C. Traffic Analysis. A large volume of traffic analysis reports made by Japanese Army and Navy signal stations are available. Radio traffic in the Aleutians, Southwest Pacific Area, Central Pacific, and Southeast Asia is observed closely to determine movements of aircraft and naval task forces, as well as to predict coming operations. In some instances elaborate logs are kept of all messages intercepted, and an attempt is frequently made to draw conclusions about tactical operations from unusual developments in the signal pattern.

(1) Northern Area. The most detailed reports are submitted

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by signal stations in the northern area. The Special Intelligence Section of the Fifth Area Army appears to have outposts spread throughout Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and these outposts send in daily reports of Allied signal activity. The reports give the number of messages intercepted, grouped by priority classification, patrol districts flown by Allied aircraft, movements of aircraft from one base to another, and new call signs appearing in the traffic. Less frequently the reports give estimates of Allied air strength at each base and predictions of Allied air raids in the Kuriles.

An examination of half a dozen predictions of air raids made during April 1944 shows that in every instance in which a specific prediction of a raid was made a raid did in fact occur within the following 24 hours. Predictions of raids were made on the basis of radio silence at certain bases, movements of submarines, and communication between air bases and of ships acting as tenders. The value of such predictions is somewhat questionable, however, since during that period raids were made whenever weather permitted, which was at least half the time. No fighter opposition was put in the air, the only Japanese reaction being anti-aircraft fire. Since ample notice for this purpose was secured by early warning radar, no substantial advantage could have been derived from advance notice of the raid.

Estimates of air strength at bases were not accurate, although they were not so exaggerated as other Japanese estimates of air strength in the Kuriles. The method by which the strength estimates were derived was not stated, nor was it stated whether the figures represent total inventory or planes with squadrons. Although there are a great many reports of planes moving from base to base, only three reports giving total strength at each base have been observed.

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(2) Southwest Pacific Area. The principal centers of

signal intelligence activity in this area have been the Second Area and Eighth Area Armies. In addition to reading aircraft codes, the Special Intelligence Section of the Second Area Army has issued regular reports based on traffic analysis. The Malang Agency, which at first sent its reports through the Second Area Army liaison office at Soerabaja, and later through the headquarters of the 7th Flying Division at Malang, monitors traffic incident to the movement of aircraft between Australia and New Guinea, and maintains records of the number of planes flying between Australia and New Guinea on the basis of traffic analysis.

The Second Area Army has monitored air-ground communications passed between bombing planes and ground bases and between reconnaissance planes and ground bases and point to point communications passed on Army Airways Communications Service circuits in the New Guinea-Philippines area.

On the basis of such traffic, the Second Area Army has prepared net reconstructions giving call signs and frequencies, has made estimates of the Allied scale of air effort from an analysis of air-ground contacts, has reported information on the locations of headquarters and the movements of planes from direction finding and air-ground communications, and has made inferences concerning Allied tactical intentions on the basis of changes in the overall signal pattern. The accuracy of the results produced has not been fully determined, although serious errors have been noted. With regard to the net reconstructions, the call signs are usually assigned to the correct locations but the frequencies given by the Japanese vary widely from the correct frequencies; the reports on Allied bomber activity are seriously incomplete and do not in themselves give a reliable index of the scale of effort. Information on the movements of planes has not been checked; reports of the

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movement of headquarters are frequently incorrect. Predictions made are somewhat easier to evaluate; while several accurate predictions have been made, the majority of those noted have been late or too far in advance to be of value.

Nevertheless, the intelligence reports are circulated to a wide number of Japanese Army commands and on a number of occasions those commands have stated that the information is of great value to them.

The Eighth Communication Unit at Rabaul transmits detailed reports of Allied naval signals. These reports are given to the Eighth Area Army, which passes them on in turn. In first three months of 1945 the Special Intelligence Section of the Eighth Area Army monitored communications of the 21st Bomber Command in the Marianas, and made predictions of B-29 raids and estimates of B-29 strength from the analysis of this traffic. This work is also conducted in Tokyo; a detailed analysis of the characteristics of B-29 traffic was sent by the Central Special Intelligence Department to the Eighth Area Army.

A special committee from the United States Army Air Forces and the Military Intelligence Service was sent to the Marianas in February 1945 to study the problem of security of B-29 communications. Among the conclusions of the committee were the following:

(a) The Japanese have identified the frequencies and most of the call signs used in air-ground communications and control tower contacts of B-29's. They are constantly monitoring these frequencies and studying the communications intercepted.

(b) Through monitoring of air-ground traffic, the Japanese have made a few accurate predictions of major B-29 missions but the total of known predictions has been less than 50% accurate. The phenomena on which the Japanese have chiefly relied - periods of silence of the air-ground stations and weather reports from planes in flight on weather missions - do not furnish a basis for accurate

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predictions of major missions.

(c) The Japanese have not been able to predict in advance the target, course, or time of take-off of major raids.

(d) In raids before 6 December 1944 the take-off was probably detected by the Japanese through interception of control tower contacts. This will be prevented by the present system of using visual signals for take-offs.

Recommendations were also made for corrective action.

B-29 activities are reported from other signal intelligence centers as well. The Special Intelligence Section of the Burma Area Army at Rangoon has sent several reports to Tokyo giving characteristics of B-29 traffic, although no predictions of actual raids have been observed. No reports from this source have been noted since November 1944. Warnings of B-29 attacks on the basis of communications intelligence have also been made by the Kure and Osaka Naval Districts.

(3) Central Pacific. Signal activities in this area are reported at length in the daily Tokyo Army broadcasts. Since the reports are concerned almost exclusively with activities of the United States Navy, it is believed that the reports are prepared by naval signal units either at Tokyo or at Japanese Navy outposts, and given to the Army for dissemination.

These broadcasts attempt to follow movements of United States naval forces. Close attention is paid to unusual message routings, radio silences and heavy volumes, the appearance of new units, the concentration of submarines in an area, activities of merchant transport vessels, and reconnaissance flights by Allied planes. It has not been possible to evaluate the accuracy of most of these reports. In the case of every major carrier strike or landing operation, however, some indications of large fleet movements have been noted in traffic

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analysis reports, although in many cases the target and timing of the attack were not correctly determined.

Communication Units at Yokosuka and Otsu, both near Tokyo, send out direction-finding reports on the location of United States naval vessels, and Communication Units at Wake and Truk have in the past sent out summaries of radio intelligence.

(4) Southeast Asia. The principal subject of interest in this area is the recording of Allied plane movements. Special Intelligence Sections at Rangoon, Canton, and Hanoi, as well as a German station at Canton working in connection with the Japanese, have been transmitting reports on the movement of transport aircraft flying between India and China. The signal intercept stations apparently derive their information from reading plain text messages and conducting traffic analysis of cryptographed messages sent between airfields in India and China. A check with Air Transport Command figures shows that the information reported is fairly accurate, although estimates are usually too low.

The Special Intelligence Section of the Fifth Flying Division at Rangoon sends out detailed reports of aircraft activity at air bases in eastern India and Burma, and the Special Intelligence Sections at Hankow, Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, and other centers record movements of aircraft in China on the basis of traffic analysis and monitoring of plain text. Naval signal stations with the Yangtze Special Base Force, Second China Fleet, and Eizan Guard District intercept and report clear text messages describing operational sorties and giving sighting reports of Japanese convoys.

Naval Communication Units at Rangoon and Singapore have sent periodic reports on the movements of naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the activities of planes.

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Section 3. Espionage  
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Section 3. Espionage

Espionage is an important source of intelligence for the field commands. The Army and Navy have built up elaborate special organizations, usually known as Tokuma Kikan in the Army and Zaigin Bukan Fu in the Navy, which have as one function the gathering of intelligence through espionage. While there have been few known examples of successful espionage in the islands of the Pacific, operations on the continent have been widespread. The following sections describe what is known of the organization of the two espionage agencies and of espionage activities in the principal operational areas.

A. Organization. Little reliable information is available on the organization of the Tokuma Kikan [Special Service Agency], the Zaigin Bukan Fu [Office of the Resident Officer], and similar organizations. The principal source of information on them has been captured intelligence personnel; most of the prisoners have not held positions which would enable them to know the higher organization of the two highly secret organizations. It is therefore not surprising that no consistent account can be constructed from all of their statements.

One of the more plausible accounts of the working of the Tokuma Kikan is furnished by an intelligence sergeant captured in the Philippines who attended a six months non-commissioned officers' intelligence school in 1941. According to his account, the Tokuma Kikan is under the Chief of the Army General Staff, and not under the head of the Second Department. Carefully selected candidates are given a five-year course of training at the Tokuma Kikan Training Center; graduates are assigned by the Chief of the General Staff to their posts. Tokuma Kikan units in the field communicate directly with Tokyo over Army or civilian channels, using a distinctive code.

No information is available concerning the organization of the Naval Special Service Organizations.

B. Principal Areas of Espionage Activity.

(1) Manchuria. Little direct evidence is available of espionage or other intelligence activities under military auspices in this area. Captured Japanese documents show that the Kwantung Army issues intelligence reports on the Soviet Far Eastern Army, based in part on espionage, but it has not been possible to assess the reliability of the intelligence or to determine the organization of the network.

Some evidence is available, however, concerning espionage activities in Harbin. During the past year a series of reports known as "Harbin Special Spy Reports" have been issued by the Army General Staff. These reports purport to be based on messages from Russian diplomatic representatives in Australia, China, and the United States, and are concerned with general questions of military strategy. It is not altogether clear how the supposed messages are obtained, although in one instance they are characterized as espionage reports obtained in Harbin. Judging from the reliability of the reports, it seems clear that the messages on which they are based are not genuine. The Japanese themselves treat the reports with great reserve, and in passing them on to the field commands a warning is frequently added that the reports are of doubtful reliability. An evaluation of the material contained in the reports shows that their skepticism is more than justified. The Allied order of battle information given in them has been largely erroneous; and even descriptions of battles which had been fully described in official communiques by both sides are incorrect.

It is known that a branch of the Tokusan Kikan, often referred to as the Harbin Kikan, is located at Harbin. It is probable that this

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is the agency that has been passing on the suppositious Russian reports.

It is noteworthy that for some time Harbin has been a center for such activities. In 1942 and 1943 the Foreign Office issued a series of reports based on what were believed to be Russian messages, containing sensational rumors about Russian-Japanese relations (CHAPTER III). German intelligence representatives have also been active in this area, and two reports have been noted which were sent by the German Consul in Harbin which are similar in tenor to some of the Japanese reports. The reports were said to have been obtained from an informant known as "Earl," who is described as having worked for the Japanese Military Mission in Harbin.

It should also be noted that three reports from the Harbin Zaigin Bukan Fu, dated in March and April 1945, have been observed which cite Russian messages. In one case a supposed message from the Russian Naval Attaché in America is quoted, and in two cases messages to the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs are quoted. None of the three reports indicate the means by which the messages were obtained; nor is any estimate given of their authenticity. It is possible that the same individual or individuals have been responsible for purveying copies of supposed Russian messages to the three Japanese intelligence services and to the German intelligence service. Moreover, there is no indication that any of the intelligence services realizes that such material is being offered to the other services.

(2) China. China has been the principal field for the operation of the Army and Navy special service organizations. The activities of both agencies include more than the collection of intelligence; before operations they disseminate propaganda and

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employ Fifth column tactics, and subsequent to military operations in a particular area they are responsible for surveillance of the population and liaison with puppet regimes.

The most fruitful source of general background information on Japanese Army and Navy espionage activities in China has been the interrogation of \_\_\_\_\_ who, until his capture after an airplane accident in January 1944, was the Zaigin Bukan (Resident Officer) in Hankow. As such he was chief of the naval counterpart of the Tokuma Kikan in the Hankow area. \_\_\_\_\_ paints a bewildering picture of successive changes in the names, duties, and subordinations of espionage organizations in China. No clear-cut organizational diagram of activities in China, even at a particular time, can be drawn from his statements, and no useful function would be served by recounting here the successive organizational changes he describes. As of the time of \_\_\_\_\_ capture, however, the following agencies were in operation, according to his account:

(a) Army. Kemraku Bu (Liaison Department): Responsible for functions relative to the puppet government. Under command of local Army Headquarters, in Shanghai known as Rikugun Bu (Army Department).

Tokuma Kikan (Special Agency): Responsible for espionage and counter espionage functions. Answerable to the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force at Nanking.

(b) Navy. Zaigin Bukan Fu (Office of the Resident Officer): A naval resident officer is assigned to each of the principal cities in China, and is responsible for naval espionage and liaison with the puppet government in that area. The resident officers are under the control of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. Formerly there was a distinct agency

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devoted to naval espionage, known as the Kaigun Tokuzan Bu (Naval Special Service Department). A branch of that agency existed on Hainan and was still known by its old name at the time of capture.

It is believed that units of the Army's Tokuzan Kikan are found in the important centers of occupied China, such as Kalgan, Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking, Canton, and Hong Kong. A Tokuzan Kikan branch is also known to be located at Macao, Portuguese colony on the South China coast. There are Naval Zaigin Bukan Fu in the principal ports and some of the more important inland towns as well. The degree of co-operation between the Naval and Army agencies in any one locality varies widely according to the personalities involved and the local situation.

Considerable evidence of the activities of the Shanghai Tokuzan Kikan is available. Intelligence messages from the Rikugun Bu [Army Department] in Shanghai have appeared in Japanese Army traffic from 15 August 1944 to the present date. This is the organization which according to the Japanese naval captain referred to above is the Shanghai branch of the Tokuzan Kikan.

The subject matter of the Shanghai Rikugun Bu reports falls into two general classes, those dealing with administrative matters and those reporting intelligence. The organization therefore may be divided into two sections, one handling administrative affairs, possibly connected with the puppet Chinese government, and the other collecting intelligence. Such a division has been reported to exist in other branches of the Tokuzan Kikan in China.

Since only a few of the available reports deal with administrative matters, it is difficult to make an accurate analysis of the type of material generally reported by the administrative

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branch. The reports that are available, however, seem to be primarily concerned with economic matters and shipping along the China coast rather than liaison with the puppet government. Several of the reports, for instance, deal with economic matters such as the price of soy bean cakes and the condition of the stock market; others concern shipping activities between Shanghai and Canton, Tsingtao, and Hong Kong.

Almost all of the intelligence messages issued by the Shanghai Kikugun Bu are labeled "Uae" intelligence; a few are labeled "Chi" and "B" intelligence. It is believed that those terms refer to three distinct sources from which the intelligence branch of Shanghai Kikugun Bu obtains information.

The term "Uae," which means "plus," is similar to the names given to branches of the Tokuma Kikan in China. In fact, several prisoner of war reports have referred to an "Uae Kikan" as the Shanghai branch of the Tokuma Kikan, which was formed for the specific purpose of supervising the installation of the Nanjing Government. Although the Uae Kikan was said (by the captured Japanese naval captain) to have been disbanded in 1940 when the object of its mission was completed, it seems probable that the term "Uae" is still associated with Japanese Army espionage in the Shanghai area.

At the beginning or the end of all the available "Uae" intelligence reports the Japanese term "kei" appears, preceded by "Swiss," "German," "French," "Yaman," or "Portuguese." Although the term "kei" is sometimes used to mean an electric circuit, in this case "network" seems a more appropriate translation, since for the following reasons the intelligence does not seem to be derived from cryptanalysis:

1. The subject matter of the reports does not concern matters which would be expected to pass over the

circuits. Furthermore, there is no correspondence between "Ums" intelligence reports and the available traffic from Shanghai passed over circuits.

2. Not only are many of the "Ums" reports erroneous in fact, but comments are frequently found in the messages to the effect that the intelligence is of doubtful reliability. If they were derived from cryptanalytic sources, presumably there would be less doubt as to their reliability.

3. The 13th Army in Shanghai has issued reports headed "A" intelligence, which appear to quote the text of Chinese messages. It seems unlikely that cryptanalytic activity would be carried on by two Army agencies in the same area.

It is most probable that "Ums" intelligence is derived for the most part from agents whom the Japanese believe to be operating in Swiss, French, German, and Portuguese consulates and other agencies in Shanghai. As there is no Chinese Communist consulate in Shanghai, the "Yenan network" probably refers to a group of agents who have contacts with underground Chinese Communist organizations in the Shanghai area. This explanation of the source of "Ums" intelligence is confirmed by a reference to "intelligence collected from foreign agencies based on Shanghai" contained in a directive from the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff to the Shanghai Rikugun Bu, the China Expeditionary Force, and the 13th Army. Moreover, it is noteworthy that spying on foreign agencies is also a favorite technique of Japanese diplomatic intelligence in Shanghai (CSAFNER III).

The Swiss consulate is specifically referred to in several of the reports. One, dated 20 January 1945, names "Secret agent" as the source of an intelligence report. Two other reports

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indicate espionage as the source of the intelligence; one refers to a plan "to expand the spy network cautiously," and the other is concerned with information which was "revealed by a railway employee."

For the most part "Uae" intelligence is of a general nature, concerning political, economic and military policies in China, India, and Burma. The political intelligence is concerned with broad international policies as well as with the internal political situation in China. A number of reports refer, for instance, to such subjects as Anglo-American plans to draw Russia into war against Japan, and the attitude of the United States toward the Communist regime in China. As is to be expected, the internal political reports deal particularly with the problem of friction between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. In most cases the military reports give low-grade intelligence concerning Chinese, British, and Indian units in China, Burma, and India. Very little specific order of battle information is included; in most instances where it has been checked, the identification and location of units has been incorrect.

Predictions of allied attacks appear in a number of the "Uae" reports; however, the predictions are usually so general as to be worthless. In the few cases in which specific predictions have been made, they have usually not been fulfilled.

The subject matter of the Rikugun Bu reports labeled "Chi" and "E" intelligence is essentially the same as that of the "Uae" reports. It is believed, however, that the information is derived from different espionage sources. "Chi" intelligence is apparently derived from agents in Shanghai who have contacts in Free China. "E" intelligence apparently consists of reports which were given to the

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Rikugun Bu by the Emharit Agency, a German intelligence organization which operated in Shanghai until the fall of Germany.

That broad dissemination is given to intelligence from all three sources is indicated by the list of addressees, which include the Army General Staff in Tokyo, Chinese Expeditionary Force at Nanking, Southern Army at Saigon, 7th Area Army at Singapore, Burma Area Army at Rangoon, 38th Army at Saigon, 15th Army at Shanghai, and the 22nd Army at Canton.

Further dissemination is indicated by the fact that a number of those addresses have originated intelligence summaries which appear to be based on "Uae" intelligence, and in one instance on a "Chi" report. Two instances have also been noted in which units not normally addressed by the Shanghai Rikugun Bu have quoted "Uae" reports, indicating that the addressees disseminate the intelligence to their subordinate units.

Scattered references are also available to other branches of the Tokuma Kikan. The Kōa Kikan [Agency for the Development of Asia], has been identified at Hong Kong; in January 1945 that agency was assigned to the 6th Area Army (headquarters at Hankow) by the China Expeditionary Force but was instructed to remain at Hong Kong to collect intelligence relating to the United States. Another agency that has been noted is the Amyo Kikan, which has been referred to as a source of intelligence in two early reports from the Formosa Army. The reports contain information as to Chinese order of battle and plans for the setting up of United States air bases in Fukien Province; they appear to be based on espionage reports.

Another agency which has produced intelligence reports on Free China is located at Hanoi. The reports are referred to as "KI" spy reports and are issued by the 21st Division at Hanoi; they appear to take their name from Captain Kito, an intelligence officer located at Hanoi. Captain Kito's interests are very wide; such topics as

construction of United States air bases, movements of Chinese Army units, and aircraft movements are all covered. Some of the reports are clearly based on espionage, and others on cryptanalysis of Chinese messages; in most cases it is impossible to determine the particular source. This mixture of intelligence from cryptanalytical and espionage sources has not been observed elsewhere. No details are available as to the precise organization of the espionage network.

(3) Burma-Malaya-Thailand. Southeast Asia is the area in which Japanese Army espionage activities have been most closely observed and recorded. The controlling agency here is the Hikari Kikan, an organization responsible for gathering intelligence on British dispositions in India, spreading propaganda among the Indians, and controlling the Indian National Army. Activities of this organization reached a climax at the time of the Japanese penetration around Imphal in the spring of 1944, and since the failure of that campaign the organization has been less active.

Intelligence duties of the Hikari Kikan have been principally of two sorts: collection of short range tactical intelligence for the field armies, and the collection of strategic intelligence by agents who operate in the principal cities of India and who communicate by radio. Tactical intelligence is collected by large numbers of native agents who are sent across the lines on short range missions. Strategic intelligence is collected by agents in the principal cities of India who communicate intelligence to their control station by radio. The agents on tactical missions have been able to secure a limited amount of accurate information; all known active agents on strategic missions, on the other hand, are under Allied control and have served as a valuable deception channel for imparting false information to the Japanese intelligence services.

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Detailed information on the methods of recruiting, training, and employment of agents by the Hikari Kikan is available. These agents, who were employed in large numbers, were given training which appears to have been quite thorough.

The organizational structure of the Hikari Kikan indicates its wide variety of functions. The principal section of the agency is the Burma Branch. The subordination of other branches is not definitely known, although there are a number of other agencies in Burma, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies which may be under the general control of the Hikari Kikan. The Burma Branch, as of the end of 1943, was divided into five sections and five outposts; each outpost was in turn divided into five subsections. The main office was located at Rangoon, and the outposts were located at Akyab, Kalewa, Khamlin, Myitkyina, and Kwaygo. The five sections had the following duties:

Section 1 -- Administrative affairs and counter-intelligence.

Section 2 -- Direction of the affairs of the Indian Independence League.

Section 3 -- Evaluation and dissemination of espionage reports; also direction of propaganda activities.

Section 4 -- Collection of espionage reports and conduct of propaganda activities in the field.

Section 5 -- Political education and military guidance of the Indian National Army.

The key officers of the Hikari Kikan are all Japanese, even though the Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army are nominally under the control of Indians. The Japanese have been skillful in setting up Subhas Chandra Bose as the head of the Indian National Army and giving him the appearance of full authority while

retaining full control of his activities.

It is noteworthy that the Hikari Kikan, like other branches of the Tokumu Kikan, was organized primarily as an agency for offensive warfare, and that its activities with regard to propaganda, fifth column tactics, and control of puppet governments have not been well suited to the requirements of a campaign of withdrawal to which the Japanese have been committed in Burma.

The principal naval intelligence agency in the Burma Area is the Ushio Kikan. The organization of this agency is not fully known, but it is believed to be principally engaged in counter-intelligence activities. It is also known that the organization passes on intelligence received by the Hikari Kikan from agents in India.

Only very scanty references to espionage activities in Thailand, Malaya, and French Indo-China are available. The armies garrisoning these regions have on occasion referred to spy reports as a source of intelligence, and the names of several agencies have been noted, presumably units of the Tokumu Kikan.

(4) Southwest and Central Pacific. The geography of this area does not lend itself to successful espionage. There is virtually no opportunity for running espionage agents on the small islands of the Pacific, and there are few if any sources of strategic intelligence concerning the Allies to be exploited. Even in New Guinea and the Philippines the Japanese do not appear to have fully exploited espionage as a source of intelligence.

A number of agencies have been identified in the New Guinea area, entitled Rosaku Kikan [Activities agencies], which were engaged in setting up native espionage networks, and in controlling and administering the natives. In 1942 a training school existed

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at Mandauri which trained native Papuans in secret police methods. The available evidence indicates that none of the above agencies produced any significant volume of information. Although many reports from operational units in the New Guinea area are available, only a few scattered references to "native reports" as a source of intelligence have been noted.

In the Netherlands East Indies naval espionage activities appear to predominate, although little information is available. Resident Naval Officers are stationed in Batavia and Jokjakarta in Java; presumably collection of intelligence is part of their duties. A naval espionage organization known as the Kana Kikan has been identified at Soerabaja, and another naval espionage organization known as the Otari Kikan at Koepang on Dutch Timor. An Army organization noted is the Katsu Kikan, which operated under the control of the 19th Army. The Katsu Kikan has sent out at least two expeditions of agents to the North Coast of Australia; it is not known whether the expeditions were successful. One of the boats and some crew members in the second expedition were captured. Another Army organization, referred to in a captured document, is the Kami Kikan in Borneo.

The most favorable opportunity for the development of espionage in the Pacific Area was in the Philippines. An intelligence sergeant with the 16th Division has described the activities of the Army espionage setup in the Philippines in some detail. There were three agencies, located in the Northern, Central, and Southern Philippines. These agencies took their names from commercial firms in Manila, Cebu, and Davao, which were used as cover for espionage activities.

The Japanese special service organizations played an

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active part in controlling the Philippine population, and there is evidence that the Japanese were kept well informed of guerrilla and other dissident activity through these organizations. So far as known, the Japanese did not attempt to build up a stay-behind organization in the Philippines which would report intelligence after an area had been occupied. Many espionage agents in the Philippines have been apprehended, however, and captured documents have revealed a widespread espionage net.

#### Section 4. Prisoners of War

Interrogation of prisoners of war is conducted by both the Japanese Army and Navy commands. Although some valuable information on Allied air and ground order of battle has been derived from interrogation reports, there is little evidence of highly classified or operationally important information being obtained in this way.

The Japanese have been handicapped in exploiting the source because of the difficulty of capturing prisoners under present conditions. A considerable number of prisoners from the Allied Air Forces have been captured when planes crashed over Japanese occupied territory, but there has been very little opportunity to take prisoners in ground operations against the British and Americans in the past year. It is not believed that the Japanese take any considerable number of Chinese prisoners of war; and, even if they did, their intelligence value would probably be less than that of English or American prisoners.

In most cases the actual interrogation of the prisoners is carried on in the field, and the reports are forwarded to Tokyo. However, if it is believed that further information can be obtained through more thorough investigation, the prisoner himself is sent to

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Tokyo. A time lapse of only a few days between the date of capture and the date of the average interrogation report indicates that the Japanese recognize the importance of timely dissemination of prisoner of war interrogation reports.

In general no effort is made to evaluate the accuracy of the information derived, although information obtained from prisoners of war is usually labelled as such, and the particular prisoner is frequently identified. In some cases discrepancies in the prisoners' statements are noted, or an index of reliability is assigned to the report. Cases have also been observed in which supplemental reports have been issued correcting errors in earlier reports.

The most valuable intelligence which the Japanese Army has been able to obtain from interrogation reports has been concerned with the identification, location, and strength of Allied air units. This is understandable as most of the prisoners captured by the Japanese are Air Forces personnel, who would be expected to have general knowledge of Allied air order of battle in addition to detailed information on the military unit to which they are assigned.

No evidence has been noted which indicates that the Japanese employ "truth serum," lie detectors, or other such devices to elicit information.

The examination procedure appears to be thorough and psychologically well thought out. According to a document captured at Hollandia in April 1944 (apparently a transcription of an unidentified official document) the procedure of interrogation is as follows:

- a. Prisoners of war are segregated and statements made by one are checked with the statements of others. The reliability can be judged by the number of identical statements.

b. Known information and articles carried by prisoners of war are used to assist the interrogation.

c. When several prisoners are captured at the same time, they are placed under special surveillance to prevent them from conversing and preparing false information. In case officers, non-commissioned officers and men are captured simultaneously, one must be careful and on guard in regard to the prisoners' hesitancy to talk, their schemes, instructions, etc.

d. Prisoners captured at the front line should preferably be interrogated at the spot on matters requiring the pointing out of the actual ground.

e. Particular attention must be given to the first interrogation. This is because the prisoner is still in a state of spiritual unrest and does not have the time to prepare his reply.

f. In interrogating many prisoners, preference should be given to the interrogation of one who is considered to have the most valuable information. At this time, the remaining prisoners should be made to write the answers or reply to questions of statistical value, or they are assembled and made to reply 'yes' or 'no' to questions by raising their hands.

g. During interrogation, the prisoner's conduct, behavior, attitude and eyes must be watched closely. Close observation of the prisoner's activities and deportment before and after interrogation or while with others is often valuable to interrogation.

(1) If the prisoner looks repeatedly and inquisitively at the interrogator's face and steals a glance at his eyes, this is a sign that the prisoner is concealing vital knowledge.

(2) During the questioning, if the prisoner complains repeatedly that he is thirsty and demands water, this is a sign that he is in agony such as one experiences just before confessing matters of a vital nature.

h. Interrogation should preferably be conducted in such a manner that the prisoner is led on to talk. However, when the situation demands speed, methods in which pain is inflicted on the prisoner may be used as well.

i. In order to carry on a persuasive interrogation, the prisoner should be freed from the sense of fear, security consciousness, maliciousness toward the enemy, and fear of the consequences of talking to calm his feelings and make him harbor a sense of safety and confidence in regard to his life. However, against a calm person who thinks it is natural to become a prisoner of war, threats must be made.

j. In order to induce a prisoner to change his mental state, a prisoner who has been captured previously or one who is of the same nationality and who is already in our hands should be made to contact him.



k. In examining a young person or a woman, advantage should be taken of his or her vanity; that is, a method in which flattery is used is preferred.

l. Persons who are stubborn and who do not confess readily must be handled with patience and with the persistent intention that questioning will not cease until they confess.

m. Methods of making stubborn persons confess.

(1) Instead of asking direct questions pertaining to the desired information, outline matters are examined at first to get an idea of the general situation. Then, by applying skillful methods, the questions are shifted gradually to the core of the problem, and finally, with intensive questioning, the problem is penetrated.

(2) Because a stubborn person has a strong conviction and is self-confident, he must be persuaded with persistence and patience, and reconsideration education must be conducted. At this time, it is preferable not to use force for this will only make him increasingly firm in his will.

(3) Make a trusted prisoner live together with him.

(4) In applying third degree, a method in which the interrogator does not feel himself as being cruel and in which the prisoner is not injured so as to leave a permanent scar is preferred. When releasing him, it is important to see that he does not hold ill-feeling toward us in the future.

(5) In regard to women, advantage should be taken of their shyness, and they should be made to confess with intimidation.

(6) Taking advantage of the prisoner's love or greed of money, he should be pressed to confess by offering him security or the safety of those persons he loves in exchange for information.

n. Methods in which the prisoner is made to write down his impressions at will or present a written explanation of a particular problem are useful.

The Japanese interrogation report follows a fairly well standardized outline. A typical report covers the points listed below on personal history and military background of the prisoner and then gives further information on general subjects in accordance with what the prisoner knows or professes to know. The points listed under section 3 give the general topics on which prisoners have been questioned:

1. Personal History

- a. Nationality
- b. Name, age
- c. Education

2. Military Background

- a. Branch of service and special ability.
- b. Chain of command, organization and equipment of unit to which attached.
- c. Route taken after embarkation from home and the military installations of various places while en route.

3. Allied Military Intelligence

- a. Allied air situation especially enemy plans, disposition of strength and movements.
- b. Organization, equipment and tactics of Allied air force.
- c. Types, characteristics and equipment of Allied planes.
- d. Opinions concerning the disposition, weapons, and tactics of Allied forces.
- e. Condition of airfields.
- f. Methods of education, training and replacement employed by the Allied Air Force.
- g. Airplane production.
- h. Fleet strength, organization and movements.
- i. Identification, location and strength of ground forces.
- j. Technical information concerning radar and other electronic devices.
- k. Chemical warfare.
- l. Morale.

A considerable volume of Japanese Army prisoners of war interrogation reports is available, and it is therefore not possible to cite more than a few typical examples. A comprehensive series of reports covering the interrogation of a group of

personnel who made a forced landing on Soerba Island was issued

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by the 48th Division on Timor during the latter part of May 1945. The prisoners gave accurate information on the identification, location, and organization of Allied Air Forces in the northern Australia area, including the names of airfields, units stationed at the various bases, and types of aircraft employed. An attempt was made to interrogate the prisoners concerning Allied plans to attack Timor, and Allied espionage agents, but apparently the prisoners did not furnish any information on these subjects.

Another of the more accurate and detailed reports is that of ..

He expressed his personal views with respect to Allied strategy against Japan: the isolation of Japan from her outer zone and the continent, the bombing of the central part of Japan and the securing of contact with China. As for air attacks against the Japanese mainland, he stated that the general aim was to launch attacks from Attu, China and particularly the Philippines. Further details of the interrogation gave approximately accurate information on such subjects as United States aircraft characteristics, equipment, and losses, as well as correct identifications of bomber groups in the 15th Air Force.

and another prisoner of unknown identity made rather general statements to the effect that chemical warfare should be applied only as a retaliatory measure. They also said that very large stocks of offensive chemical warfare equipment had been accumulated in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.

A number of other Japanese Army reports derived from the interrogation of Allied Air Force personnel are summarized below:

- (a) A report from Tokyo, dated 17 April 1945, sum-

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summarized the interrogation of prisoners shot down on 27 March and 15 April 1945. According to the report the main force of the 20th Bomber Command was passing in the Marianas sector. As of the date that the prisoners were captured the movement had not taken place but the plan was scheduled for the near future.

(b) A report from the Formosa Army, dated 12 March 1945, summarized the questioning of a pilot of a P-47 who was captured when his plane was shot down over Taichu on 7 March. The report contained accurate information on the organization of the 35th Fighter Group to which the prisoner was assigned. The pilot also gave accurate information on the location and composition of four other groups in the Philippines area, as well as information on aircraft characteristics.

(c) A 13 February 1945 report from the 35th Division in northwest New Guinea summarized the interrogation of an American 1st lieutenant and sergeant assigned to the 70th Bomber Squadron of the 42nd Bomber Group, who were shot down on 20 January. The prisoners correctly identified the squadrons assigned to the 42nd Bomber Group. They also disclosed the correct number of planes per squadron, the type of plane used, the number of air-duty personnel, and the number of ground-duty personnel. The prisoners gave erroneous identifications, however, of the squadrons in the 18th Fighter Group.

(d) A report from the Second Area Army, dated 10 February 1945, summarized the interrogation of an warrant officer who was a crew member of a shot

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down in the vicinity of Macassar on 1 February. He disclosed information on the strength and organization of as well as the combat tactics and the special equipment used in the

(e) An example of incorrect intelligence derived from prisoner interrogation is found in a 12 January 1945 report of two aerial gunnery sergeants who crashed in the Celebes. They gave detailed figures, which were far too high, on the number of planes broken down by types at Wana and Pitoe airfields on Morotai.

(f) A 29 December 1944 report from the Japanese Ambassador at Rangoon summarized intelligence on the 20th Bomber Command acquired from an Allied air officer who was taken prisoner on 14 December. The prisoner disclosed fairly accurate information on the composition, plane strength, objectives, and bases of the 20th Bomber Command.

(g) In a 6 December report from Tokyo, a prisoner who crashed during the 3 December B-29 attack on Tokyo gave the correct identification and strength of four B-29 groups on Saipan, the route followed by B-29's from Saipan to Tokyo, and background information on B-29 operations.

The Japanese Army has also been able to derive some valuable information on the identification and organization of Allied task forces from interrogation reports. In most cases the prisoners were naval pilots who had flown carrier-based planes.

One of the most detailed reports was transmitted by the Army headquarters at Chichi Jima on 19 February 1945, and dealt with the questioning of prisoners shot down over Chichi Jima on the previous day. The prisoners disclosed the organization and the route

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followed by Task Force 58. A Tokyo intelligence broadcast, dated 11 April 1945, contained information obtained from the interrogation of prisoners who were crew members of planes shot down in raids on Palembang on 24 and 29 January. The report dealt with the markings of English aircraft carriers and carrier-based planes.

Only a few reports are available which indicate that the Japanese have obtained information from the interrogation of prisoners assigned to Allied ground units. Most of the prisoners were captured in the Southeast Asia Theater.

A typical example is a report issued by the Hihari Kikan at Rangoon in April 1944. An officer and thirty-two enlisted men assigned to the 23rd Indian Division, captured in the campaign around Imphal, gave information on the number of divisions on the Imphal front, reinforcements that had been flown in, and the morale of the Imphal garrison. Other prisoners captured by the Japanese in SEAC have given less accurate information, in some cases identifying non-existent divisions.

Comparatively few prisoners have been captured from United States ground forces operating in the Philippines. The 14th Area Army transmitted a report on 25 January 1945, a little more than two weeks after the landing at Lingayen Gulf, based on the interrogation of a 1st lieutenant in the Armored Force. The lieutenant stated, and the Japanese apparently believed, that an armored division participated in the Lingayen landings. The prisoner identified the armored division as the 16th, and said that it had left San Francisco in the latter part of October. In fact the 16th Armored Division was in the United States at the time. It is noteworthy that at least three subsequent Japanese intelligence reports have identified the 16th Armored Division on Luzon, although all divisions actually partic-

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ipating in the campaign were correctly identified in press releases.

Captured spies are also interrogated. A report based on such an interrogation, issued in January of this year by the 48th Division on Timor, described the activities of an Australian warrant officer and sergeant who were captured on a small island north of Timor on 17 January 1945. The prisoners had set out from Perth in September 1944, with the objective of sabotaging shipping at Singapore.

Japanese naval units have also interrogated prisoners, usually Air Force personnel.

Two reports from Guard Division #25 at Nanconry, in the Nicobar Islands, dated 18 and 19 May 1945, described the interrogation of seven survivors of a B-24 which was shot down by anti-aircraft fire on the 15th. The prisoners revealed that the objective of their mission had been to carry out shipping reconnaissance in the Malacca Straits and Andaman Sea and gave figures on the strength of a small Allied garrison. Another Navy report, dated 17 January 1945, gave information on the organization of Task Force 38, which was apparently obtained from a pilot who was picked up in French Indo-China.

Reports derived from captured submarine personnel have also been observed. On 31 December 1944 the Third Section of the Naval General Staff dispatched a message to the Japanese Naval Attaché in Germany giving information on the movements of the French battleship Richelieu obtained from questioning prisoners from a British submarine.

#### Section 5. Captured Documents and Materiel

Captured documents and materiel are a comparatively minor source of intelligence to the Japanese Army field commands. The Japanese realize the importance of the source but military conditions during

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the past year have made it difficult for them to secure any significant volume of documents or material. Intelligence sections of the field commands have nevertheless made every effort to collect documents from casualties and prisoners of war, and to search Allied ships and planes that fall into Japanese hands.

Some screening of captured materiel is done at division headquarters, but in the instances observed the normal procedure is to forward documents to Tokyo for translation and study. Small items of equipment requiring technical knowledge to examine properly are also sent to Tokyo; larger items are examined in the field and a report forwarded to the Army General Staff. Intelligence from this source is important to the Japanese in improving their own equipment and in designing effective countermeasures.

Although there has been no evidence that any highly classified papers, operational orders, or personal diaries have fallen into enemy hands, some valuable information has been obtained from captured manuals and diagrams. For instance, detailed information was ascertained about call signs and frequencies of sending stations at Allied airfields from documents found on a B-24 shot down on 8 February 1945. The composition of Task Force 38 was revealed in documents captured from airmen shot down over Miyako. Bomb charts, technical manuals and diagrams dealing with airplane equipment and operations, documents containing information on Indian order of battle, drawings of ground materiel, airfield lists and maps, and production estimates have also fallen into enemy hands. In most cases the Japanese do not refer to the actual names of the documents; the following, however, have been mentioned: "Outline of the American Army," "American Military Landing Operations Field Regulations," "How to Assemble the B-24," "How to Overhaul the B-24," "How to Calculate the Consumption of Gasoline by the B-24," "How to Use the Radio Set on the B-24," the "American Tank

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Manual," and "Observations of the English Army on the Japanese Army."

One of the most important discoveries of captured documents was made by the Japanese Navy from the U.S. submarine Darter, which ran aground west of Palawan on 23 October. The Japanese recovered many documents dealing with radar, radio, and communications procedure, as well as instruction books, engine blueprints, and various ordnance items.

It is difficult to evaluate the intelligence which the Japanese have obtained from documents, but in those cases where it has been possible the information has been found to be relatively accurate. The most noticeable errors appeared in intelligence summaries on Indian order of battle. The Japanese apparently make no attempt to rate intelligence from this source according to reliability.

With regard to captured materiel, until the end of the war in Europe the Japanese relied most heavily on German sources for information, particularly for the examination of complicated technical equipment. Nevertheless the field commands do not neglect the opportunity of examining and reporting on any Allied materiel that falls into their hands.

Particular attention is given to captured Allied aircraft. Numerous intelligence reports have been observed which describe characteristics of Allied aircraft that could be learned only by examination of the plane on the ground. Intelligence officers have measured the size of the plane and investigated the engine, fuselage, landing gear, fuel capacity, and cruising range. Although the Japanese had received fairly accurate reports on the B-29 from Berlin since April 1943, it was not until after the first Yawata raid on 15 June 1944 that they obtained access to the wreckage of a B-29 and were able to make a detailed examination.

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The Japanese have also had access to captured navigation and radar devices, bomb-sight adjusters, anti-freezing devices and other air forces equipment. Aerial bombs and munitions and weapons abandoned after battle have also been carefully studied.

As is to be expected, information derived from the examination of such materiel checks vary closely in most instances with actual specifications.

#### Section 6. Aerial Reconnaissance and Ground Observation.

The Japanese exploit these fundamental sources of intelligence within the limits of their capabilities. The progressive deterioration of the Japanese Air Force has made a large-scale exploitation of aerial reconnaissance difficult, particularly of Allied rear bases. The adverse development of the military situation and lengthening of flights required has made impossible strategic reconnaissance of Allied base areas. This source, however, still remains a primary source of intelligence on Allied fleet movements and Air Force dispositions.

An examination of the units forwarding reports of aerial reconnaissance shows that the Armies and Area Armies are the agencies responsible for collecting and evaluating intelligence from this source. Reports are not usually forwarded by the air unit making the reconnaissance, nor by its superior air headquarters. A number of instances have been observed, however, where the results of aerial reconnaissance were transmitted by the Fifth Air Army at Hankow and the Seventh Flying Division at Kakassar. Reports have been observed emanating from the Southern Army, the Second Area Army in the Celebes, the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul, the Second Army in New Guinea, and the Sixteenth Army in Java, as well as from the 14th

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Division in the Palau Group. Virtually all the reports concern the Pacific Area.

Occasional references are found to aerial photographs; in most cases, however, it is not stated whether the report is based on visual observation or on the examination of photographs.

A classification of aerial reconnaissance reports according to subject matter shows that principal emphasis is placed on reconnaissance of ships and harbors. Nearly half the reports are of this category. The rest of the reports describe the construction and location of airfields and the number of planes located at airfields. There appears to be little effort to reconnoiter the dispositions of ground troops, or to ascertain the location and size of reserve units and supply stocks. No references to aerial mapping operations are available.

A list of places subjected to aerial observation indicates that the range of reconnaissance is short. In the available material there are only three references to aerial reconnaissance of Australia, all cases being reconnaissance of the area around Darwin. Particular emphasis is placed on reconnaissance of strategic island bases, such as Ulithi, Saipan, and Peleliu.

Only one unit devoted purely to aerial photography is carried in current air order of battle lists--the 1st Air Photographic Unit. No actual reports made by this unit have been observed. The 70th Independent Flying Squadron, based in Western New Guinea, is credited with making many aerial reconnaissance flights. In most cases the particular unit making the flight is not mentioned in the reconnaissance report.

Comparison of the dates of the reports of aerial reconnaissance with the dates on which the reconnaissance was made shows that the

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Japanese appreciate the importance of rapid dissemination of this type of intelligence. The average interval is about one day, although in many instances reports are issued on the same day as the flight, in one case with an interval of only five hours from the time of observation.

Naval reconnaissance reports are particularly important in giving advance notice of carrier and fleet strikes. As an example, a Japanese naval reconnaissance plane sighted Task Force 58 at 2245 on 17 March 1945, at a point approximately 250 miles southeast of Kyushu. The first carrier planes attacked Kyushu at 0615 the next morning. Naval reconnaissance planes also keep the principal bases under surveillance in order to detect the sortie of large fleet units. As a result the Japanese have almost always received some advance warning of our fleet movements.

Not much need be said here on the subject of ground observation. The Japanese are well aware of the importance of ground observation posts to detect the approach of hostile planes and to tabulate the size and composition of the attacking forces. After air raids detailed reports are usually sent to higher headquarters, and even when planes fly over without attacking a report is frequently rendered. Picket boats stationed far out from Japan give advance warning of raids. Responsibility for detecting the approach of hostile planes is given to Air Intelligence Regiments; they are equipped with sound locating devices and early warning radar. While Japanese radar technology is behind that of the Germans and the Allies, radar equipment is present in sufficient quantity to give advance warning of attacks against the most important areas of the home islands.

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### Section 7. Newspapers and Radio Broadcasts

Close attention is given to open sources of intelligence by the Japanese Army field commands. The principal agents for the collection of intelligence from open sources are the military and naval attachés in neutral countries, where ready access can be had to Allied periodicals and newspapers; intelligence from those representatives is regularly made available to the field commands. Allied radio broadcasts, on the other hand, are monitored in Japan and the operational areas and are widely distributed throughout all echelons of command.

Regular quotations from propaganda broadcasts are made in daily intelligence summaries issued by the Army General Staff. These summaries include reports from military attachés, Harbin Special Spy Reports, and decoded intercepts of messages transmitted by Chinese service attachés; but principally they are made up from texts of Office of War Information broadcasts from San Francisco, Australia, and the Philippines. These quotations are concerned with a wide variety of subjects; favored topics are identifications of American units, descriptions of operations, statistics on casualties, and actions of leading commanders.

Quotations from the Allied press are also frequently found in reports from Tokyo. Reuters reports have been mentioned on many occasions, as well as extracts from the New York Times and Daily News.

The field commands also quote intelligence from open sources in reports to their subordinate units. The area armies, armies, and in some cases even divisions monitor radio broadcasts and transmit intelligence derived from them. The Burma Area Army reports broadcasts from India, whereas the Southern Army and Eighth Area Army report on Australian broadcasts. It cannot be determined in all cases whether the radio broadcasts cited in the reports of subordinates

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units and relays from higher headquarters or the result of their own monitoring. In any case, the reporting of news broadcasts by units on a divisional level is exceptional. Intelligence reports from this source have been noted from only three divisions, and only one of these, the 51st Division at Wevak, has issued reports in any volume.

The importance of open sources is greatly increased by the American policy of identifying, in public announcements, all United States divisions participating in a campaign either at the beginning of operations or shortly afterwards. It is a striking fact that orders of battle summaries of American units issued by the Japanese Army General Staff contain identifications which when correct usually coincide closely with information already released to the Allied press.

An illustration of this point is found in a summary of Allied dispositions issued early in February 1945. In this estimate there were stated to be 37 United States divisions in the Pacific area and 31 numbered divisions were identified. This estimate is much too high; actually there were only 27 divisions. Of the 31 identified divisions, 19 were identified in their correct locations, 9 were assigned to an incorrect location, and 3 of the divisions were non-existent. Of the 19 divisions correctly identified, all but 2 had been announced in press releases. As a further indication of Japanese reliance on open sources, in four instances divisions were assigned to the latest locations given in press releases, although the divisions had moved since the date of the announcement.

By contrast, the list of Australian divisions identified contained only 4 correct identifications out of 13 divisions identified. The location of Australian units is not generally announced in the press.

Even though information contained in public announcements may

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already be available to the Japanese from other sources, it is clear that they follow open sources closely to provide confirmation. No definite conclusion can be drawn from the mere fact that correct identifications made by the Japanese have also appeared in the press, as the intelligence may have been available from other sources, but the interest shown by the Japanese in broadcasts and the regular reporting of divisional identifications made in news reports suggests that this source provides intelligence in some cases more quickly and more reliably than normal combat intelligence sources.

#### Section 8. Counterintelligence

A. General Security Measures: The Japanese attitude on security presents something of a paradox. The field commands are critically aware of the urgent need for security; there are innumerable references to the necessity for guarding the secrecy of military movements, preventing Allied espionage and assuring the security of Japanese codes. Nevertheless the Japanese have been guilty of the most elementary errors in security, errors that have permitted the Allied intelligence services to develop accurate information on Japanese dispositions and future plans.

Outstanding examples of poor Japanese security are the volume of captured documents of all security classifications that falls into Allied hands and the willingness of Japanese prisoners of war to divulge military information. Maps, operational orders, diaries, and means of identification are found on dead Japanese soldiers; and important command posts that have been overrun have yielded a very large volume of important documents. Although the number of Japanese prisoners captured has not been large, they too have been a valuable source of information.

The Japanese are aware of the importance of these sources of intelligence to the Allies, and directives have been issued attempting to remedy the situation. Apparently these directives have not been entirely successful.

The following two sections discuss Japanese security measures with regard to protecting Japanese communications and preventing Allied espionage; the last section discusses Japanese attempts to undertake positive deception measures.

B. Signal Security. The most costly breaches of security on the part of the Japanese have been in the field of signal security. The field commands are aware of the critical importance of insuring the security of military codes, and the most elaborate precautions are taken to make sure that cryptographic materials do not fall into Allied hands. In this endeavor they have been generally successful; code books are regularly burned before a command post is seized, and by insisting on a detailed report of the circumstances surrounding the loss of code books the signal authorities can determine whether there is any possibility of compromise. In several instances, however, cryptographic materials have been captured intact. Moreover, signal intelligence is disseminated within the Army without proper security safeguards, a fact that has contributed to the compromise of Japanese signal intelligence activities.

In regard to communications procedure the Japanese are less careful. Some of the more elementary rules of cryptographic security are known and generally observed, such as the prohibition against sending of identical messages in code and plain text. There are many strongly worded directives stressing the necessity for code security and reprimanding individuals who have committed security violations; the frequency of these directives, however, is good evidence of poor



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signal security discipline.

C. Japanese Reaction to Allied Espionage. The Japanese appear to regard espionage as the most effective means of securing intelligence on Japanese dispositions available to the Allies. This attitude is probably the result, in part, of the emphasis placed on espionage in their own intelligence operations. Consequently all echelons of command are constantly enjoined to be alert to circumvent Allied espionage. On several occasions the Japanese have noted that American submarines seemed to have advance notice on the movements of Japanese convoys, and the explanation has been advanced that this information was probably obtained through espionage. Instructions were issued to tighten up counterespionage procedure.

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Primary responsibility for counterespionage in Army units is delegated to the military police (Kempai). In the Navy, the Base Forces appear to assume the responsibility, although in the Rangoon area the Ushio Kikan appears to have some counterintelligence functions. While it is impossible to make any generalization about the effectiveness of Japanese counterespionage measures, it is certainly true that a large number of Allied agents have been rounded up shortly after being dispatched.

Allied agents apprehended by the Japanese have made entry into Japanese territory by landing on the coast from submarines or by being dropped by parachute; in many cases native guerrillas have acted as espionage agents.

Landings by submarine are referred to most frequently in Japanese reports. Naval units have reported landings of Allied agents in this manner on an island off the west coast of the Kra Isthmus, on Morotai, and on islands in the vicinity of Singapore. United States troops of Thai origin were picked up in Thailand by the military police shortly after landing from a submarine. The most detailed report available describes the capture of a group of 23 English and Australian soldiers in the Singapore area. The group landed at a small island southeast of Singapore, and managed to attach some delayed action magnetic mines to ships in the harbor before they were captured on the next day.

There have also been reports of Allied agents being dropped by

parachute... Several parties have been landed in Thailand, one unit having 70 parachutists. The Japanese have also referred to spies being landed in the Philippines by parachute, but they apparently did not succeed in apprehending those agents.

D. Japanese Deception Measures. The Japanese have not been content with attempting to prevent the Allied intelligence services from obtaining information; they have also attempted to plant false information. It is believed that to date little success has been achieved, primarily because the deception plans have been revealed before they were ever placed in effect.

At the tactical level the Japanese realize the value of confusing Allied aerial observation by constructing dummy works. A series of instructions from the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul tells how to set up coast line fires to conceal the movement of units, and how to draw fire from raiding planes by putting worn out motor vehicles on roads, and by constructing dummy harbor installations. The Japanese are also known to use deceptive tricks in front line combat.

The Japanese realize some of the potentialities of radio deception. References have been noted by both Army and Navy units to the sending of dummy messages to conceal significant volume patterns. A carefully worked out plan for maintaining a flow of dummy messages between Japanese Army headquarters was issued by the Southern Army in March of this year.

Perhaps the most elaborate Japanese deception campaign noted to date is that connected with the withdrawal of the 46th Division and elements of the 48th Division from the Lesser Sundaes to Southern Malaya. The Southern Army was anxious to avoid disclosing the fact that strength was being withdrawn from the Lesser Sundaes and desired

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to create the impression that reinforcements to Malaya were being brought in from Japan. In addition to the usual instructions to tighten up counterespionage measures, the following deception plan was outlined:

(1) When the 46th Division arrived in the Malay peninsula, the members of the division were to "pretend" to be gradually reinforcing that area from Japan, with a force of more than two divisions. Temporary operational code names of an imaginary force were to be used as much as possible when referring to all other units under the direct control of the 46th Division.

(2) Each soldier engaged in the movement would have attached to his right breast a cloth strip bearing the temporary code name of the unit.

(3) Each unit was to use the prescribed temporary code name until the distribution of its troops had been completed.

(4) The units were to do their best to pretend that the boxes and bales being unloaded were presents taken from home, and were to affix to them labels bearing the names of Women's Associations and Young Men's Clubs in every prefecture of Kyushu.

(5) The Army Headquarters would use some of the local newspapers at an opportune moment to carry out a careful propaganda program.

The Japanese have also employed double agents for the purpose of deception. Espionage agents dispatched by the Allied intelligence service have been utilized by the Burma Area Army and the Seventh Area Army at Singapore to feed back information which the Japanese wanted the Allies to believe. The Japanese have used those double agents for supporting their deception programs, notably in the case of the movement of the 46th and 48th Divisions mentioned above. How-

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over, the effectiveness of Japanese double agents in many cases has been lessened or nullified by the fact they are known by the Allies to be Japanese-controlled. The Allies have used instructions transmitted to such agents by radio as a channel for passing Allied deception material to the Japanese.

#### Section 9. Methods of Evaluation and Dissemination

A. Evaluation. In general the reporting agencies of the Japanese Army field commands are careful to note the source of the intelligence which they transmit and even in reports from Tokyo the source of the intelligence is often noted. In many cases the source is not specifically given but it is clear from the context what the source is. A common procedure is to use abbreviations or letters to indicate the source of intelligence; thus "A" is generally used to refer to intelligence derived from cryptanalysis, "B" denotes intelligence derived from monitoring plain text, and "C" denotes intelligence derived from traffic analysis. Espionage reports are usually labelled with a distinctive symbol, in some cases the name of the agency, in others the number of a specific agent.

Indications of reliability are considerably less frequent. The Japanese are well aware that the reliability must be considered in evaluating intelligence reports, but in most cases it is apparently felt that to name the source gives sufficient indication concerning reliability. Thus signal intelligence is not usually graded as to reliability; apparently it is assumed that intelligence from this source is always reliable. In drawing conclusions from traffic analysis, the traffic phenomena upon which the conclusions are based are almost invariably stated, thus enabling the recipient to make his own evaluation of reliability. The one exception noted is that

naval communication units in transmitting direction-finding reports on the positions of Allied submarines usually add a letter as an index of reliability.

In transmitting espionage reports, however, an indication of reliability is usually added. This is to be expected in view of the wide variation in the reliability of such intelligence. Thus Harbin Special Spy Reports are classified as reliability "B-3," doubtful, or unreliable, and caution is often enjoined in employing them. Reports of agents of the Hikari Kikan and other espionage agencies are often graded "Ko," "Otsu," or "Eoi," one of the Japanese ways of writing "A," "B," and "C." "Otsu" is the evaluation symbol most frequently used. This same rating scale is also employed upon occasion in grading the reliability of prisoner of war reports.

The Japanese also know the importance of collating intelligence from different sources. A number of instances have been observed in which intelligence from cryptanalysis and espionage sources have been compared. Estimates of air strength are sometimes described as based on signal intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, and the scale of enemy air operations. In speculating on future Allied strategy, Japanese intelligence officers make every effort to tie in evidence from different sources pointing to the same conclusion.

It may be concluded that Japanese Army procedure in evaluation is based on sound principles, and is considerably more effective than that of the diplomatic intelligence system (CHAPTER III). Their acceptance of espionage reports may sometimes appear somewhat uncritical, and a number of instances have been noted where their conclusions have been incorrect (often where Allied deception was involved), but these deficiencies are perhaps attributable to defects in the procedure of collection rather than of evaluation.

B. Dissemination. The Japanese disseminate intelligence reports

throughout all echelons of the military command. Daily and weekly intelligence summaries are issued by the Army General Staff to all the major field commands, and these are in turn passed down to lower echelons.

Normally there does not appear to be much interchange of intelligence between Army and Navy Commands, although both at Rabaul and in the Kuriles there has been a regular interchange of traffic analysis reports. There are also frequent references to reports received from the other service, indicating that the degree of interchange varies with the location and the particular situation at hand.

In general, the Japanese field commands make no effort to restrict the dissemination of intelligence in accordance with the source. An excellent example of the tendency to mix reports from various sources is found in the daily intelligence summaries, which contain unrelated items derived from broadcast monitoring, espionage, and cryptanalysis. Even with regard to signal intelligence the Japanese do not in general appear to take particular pains to see that such intelligence is not disseminated below the higher echelons of command.

It is true that at least some of the field commands realize the importance of security in disseminating intelligence from signal sources. On one occasion the Second Area Army protested to Tokyo when information relative to air transport movements which its Special Intelligence Section had obtained from the reading of codes was sent out on a plain text broadcast. The Southern Army, in an order of 2 September 1944, instructed all units under its command to limit distribution of signal intelligence to the utmost in order to keep the source secret.

The fact remains that intelligence derived from cryptanalysis

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is transmitted in the same manner as intelligence from other sources and to the same addressees. Furthermore, evidence that the Japanese have failed properly to protect the security of their signal intelligence is found in the fact that a considerable number of Japanese documents have been captured which summarize intelligence derived from the reading of Chinese codes.

Another point to be observed is that so-called "intelligence" reports cover a very wide field, and in most instances are simply an account of current operations. This is particularly true of the weekly intelligence summaries issued by the Army General Staff. In this and other reports there are detailed descriptions of the progress of the Japanese Army, tributes to the indomitable fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier, and exhortations to fight until victory, together with the more orthodox subject matter of an intelligence summary.

#### Section 10. General Effectiveness

The effectiveness of each particular source of intelligence has been discussed under the description of each source, but it is instructive to examine some typical intelligence reports compiled from several sources in order to determine the effectiveness of the intelligence organization of the field commands.

Intelligence reports can be divided into three classes by subject matter: ground, air, and naval order of battle; characteristics and production of Allied materiel; predictions of Allied air, naval and ground operations.

In none of these fields can the Japanese be said to be conspicuously successful. Detailed estimates of Allied ground and air order of battle have been observed and evaluated. Units that are currently engaged in operations at the time of the report are usually

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identified correctly. This is to be expected since full details are given in official communique. The Japanese have been consistently unable to determine the forces opposing them before actual contact has been made. Except for information compiled from combat operations or newspaper reports, the Japanese have been unable to produce a substantially accurate order of battle list of American or British dispositions in any theater. With regard to intelligence on Allied materiel, the information collected by the field commands is largely correct, although apparently insignificant compared to the information on the subject formerly given to the Japanese military attachés by the Germans. On the subject of predicting Allied operations the Japanese have likewise been unsuccessful; their estimates of strategic objectives are sometimes wide of the mark, although the general pattern of Allied strategy has been announced too frequently by Allied spokesmen to be unknown to the Japanese.

Some specific examples of Japanese errors may serve to illustrate the point. A number of order of battle lists of Allied forces in India and Burma prepared by the Japanese Army General Staff have been observed; without exception these lists have overestimated British and Indian strength. Divisions engaged in operations are correctly identified, but actual divisions in the rear areas are omitted and many non-existent units identified in their place. The total divisional strength has been set as high as 48 as against a correct total of 18. Estimates of British divisions in India (as opposed to Indian, African, Chinese, and American) have been even more out of proportion; a summary issued in June 1944 identified 15 British divisions in Burma and India when in fact there was only one. An analysis of the sources upon which the Japanese draw such unwarranted conclusions shows that most of the incorrect identifications are made in espionage reports, although identifications made on the basis of prisoner of war interrogation,

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captured documents, and other combat intelligence sources are wrong in almost as many cases as they are correct. The only source from which consistently accurate identifications have been made is cryptanalysis of Chinese messages.

Several intelligence summaries of ground order of battle in the Pacific theater have been observed. Those noted have shown a considerable overestimate of American strength; divisions have been identified in Alaska, Australia, and islands of the Pacific where no divisions at all are located. Only in the zone of current operations are the estimates correct, and such information is publicly available.

Detailed estimates of Allied air order of battle have also been observed and evaluated. The activities of the Second Area Army in reading low-grade air codes have been described above (Section 2). It will be remembered that many non-existent air units have been identified and the overall estimate of air strength has been placed too high.

Estimates of air strength in other theaters show similar errors. Usually the estimates are too high, although in one instance a Southern Army estimate of air strength in the Central Pacific and Southeast Asia was only about 60% of the correct figure. Estimates for air strength in the Aleutians have always been too high, usually three or four times the correct figure; on the other hand, overall estimates of United States aircraft in China have been relatively accurate. Perhaps the most accurate estimates are those of B-29 strength. In general, it is impossible to reconcile the various estimates of Allied air strength; conflicting estimates have been observed which were disseminated by the Southern Army, the Army General Staff, and the sections of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff which issue reports to military and naval attachés.

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It appears that there is very little collaboration between any of those sections in preparing estimates of Allied air strength.

Another difficulty in appraising Japanese estimates of United States air strength is that the meaning attached to the figures is rarely explained, and there is no way of knowing whether the figure given is supposed to represent total inventory, planes with squadrons, planes in immediate operational readiness, or some other category.

Analysis of the predictions of Allied attacks made by the Army and Navy field commands shows that they have no special competence in this field. Here again it is difficult to tie down the actual prediction made; the language employed is usually very general, various alternative courses are predicted which cover many possible eventualities, geographical areas are frequently not precisely defined, and the whole prediction is so qualified as to be of little value. For every prediction that appears to be correct, there are half a dozen that are either completely wrong or of no significance.

For example, it can be stated that on the basis of available material the Allied leapfrog tactics on New Guinea took the Japanese completely by surprise, at least until a few days before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, and that no accurate prediction was made of Allied operations against the Marianas until the task force was under way.

In the case of the Philippines the Japanese were of course well aware that a landing was planned, but the exact location and timing took them by surprise. The forecasters did somewhat better with regard to operations in the Ryukyus; there are a number of indications that the Japanese expected these operations at just about the time that they took place. The attack on Iwo Jima also was predicted on several occasions.

A number of campaigns which the Japanese have predicted repeatedly

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have never taken place. Continuous predictions of a major amphibious attack on Southern Burma, as well as anticipations of Allied operations against Malaya and Sumatra, have never been fulfilled. Anxiety over the northern area has quieted somewhat, but for a long time attacks were predicted in this sector; this is hardly surprising in view of the gross overestimate that the Japanese made of American strength in the Aleutians. Attacks on Rabaul were predicted up to the middle of 1944.

Considerably more success has been achieved in predicting carrier strikes on the basis of traffic analysis, although even here the predictions are frequently uncertain and the general conclusion is "we must be on the alert." The prediction of air raids on the basis of traffic analysis has been even less successful.

The failures of the Japanese intelligence system just described are quite understandable in view of the sources of intelligence that are available. It is hardly surprising that Japanese order of battle estimates are a concoction of errors, since they are derived principally from espionage agents who seldom have access to classified information and are frequently controlled by the Allied intelligence services. Nor is it surprising that predictions of Allied strategy are wide of the mark when the only source of information is traffic analysis and the general operational situation. In view of the fact that the Japanese have apparently not been successful in reading any high-grade British or American cryptographic systems, that Allied air superiority has made effective aerial reconnaissance extremely difficult, and that for over two years a campaign of continuous withdrawal has made the seizure of prisoners and documents infrequent, it is easy to understand the ineffectiveness of the intelligence system of the Japanese Armed forces. It must also be remembered

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that Japanese intelligence has suffered the disadvantage that the Allies have had considerable success in reading high-grade Japanese cryptographic systems, enabling them to conduct an elaborate deception program and take security measures in the light of information gained from that source.

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### CHAPTER III. THE JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE FAR EAST

#### Section 1. General

A. Organization. The Japanese diplomatic intelligence system in the Far East is under the control of the Foreign Office and the Greater East Asia Ministry. Headquarters of the system are in the home offices of the two ministries in Tokyo. Outposts and local centers are located in their offices throughout the Far East; these include the various embassies, embassy offices, consulates general, and consulates, all of which do intelligence work. Some evaluation is done in the major centers, such as Hanking and Nanking, but most of it is probably done in Tokyo. While the intelligence functions of the Foreign Office and the Greater East Asia Ministry frequently overlap and are nowhere clearly defined, it is generally true that the main concern of the Foreign Office in the Far East is intelligence concerning Soviet Russia, while intelligence concerning other countries in the Far East is the province of the Greater East Asia Ministry.

The principal areas where the diplomatic intelligence system operates in the Far East are Siberia, Manchukuo, China, French Indo-China, and Thailand. China, where there are more diplomatic offices than in the rest of the Far East, is at the present time the area where Japanese diplomatic intelligence is most active, French Indo-China and Thailand being the areas of least activity. No activity at all has been noted in recent material concerning Malaya, the East Indies, or Hong Kong, probably because these areas are administered by the Army and Navy and are therefore beyond the range of diplomatic intelligence. Japan, Korea, and Formosa, being considered home territory, are likewise outside the province of diplomatic intelligence. The most important overseas centers of the diplomatic

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intelligence system in the Far East are Hanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Canton, Hsinking, and Harbin. Activities in these cities and in other diplomatic intelligence centers are discussed in Section 4 below.

A March 1943 directive from Hanking gives the outline of a plan for the organization of diplomatic intelligence in China. One overall network having its center in Peiping and six subsidiary interlocking networks, each with a different intelligence target, are described. But there is no evidence that Peiping was ever in fact the center of diplomatic intelligence in China or that any such complex system was ever put into effect. On the contrary, the various intelligence centers appear to have considerable independence of action and to report whatever they consider worth reporting. The less important centers sometimes report to the nearest large center and sometimes directly to Tokyo.

In fact, jurisdictional lines are sometimes so fluid that local centers may enjoy so much independence as to impair the efficiency of the intelligence machine. A case in point is a Hankow spy report containing information obtained from a certain Japanese military unit in Fen-yang, Shansi. This report shows that although Fen-yang is only about 60 miles from Taiyuan, a large intelligence center with its own spies, Hankow, which is at least 300 miles distant, also has a spy stationed there. It is hardly conceivable that such an overlapping of operations, if generally practiced, could fail to affect the efficiency of Japanese intelligence. Another point about this report is that it shows the Consulate General in Hankow to be collecting information from a Japanese military unit by means of spies. Certainly for this type of intelligence collection it would be better to go through normal channels.

Little is known of the internal organization of the overseas

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intelligence centers beyond the fact that most of the embassies and embassy offices in the Far East have an Intelligence Department. In the case of the Nanking Embassy this department is, according to most recent information, one of four departments and is headed by a counselor.

As noted before, a fact of fundamental importance about Japanese diplomatic intelligence, reflected in the very organization of the system, is that propaganda and intelligence are considered as two phases of the same activity. The General Affairs Section of the General Affairs Bureau of the Greater East Asia Ministry is charged with both intelligence and propaganda functions. The Intelligence Department of the Nanking Embassy also has charge of propaganda activities. Canton combined a former Cultural Department and a former Intelligence Department into one "Cultural-Intelligence Department" in November 1943. A single fund to cover both propaganda and intelligence activities and known as an "intelligence development" fund is granted various diplomatic offices annually. This unity of the propaganda and intelligence functions in the diplomatic intelligence system is confirmed by the fact that in numerous cases, both in the Far East and elsewhere, the Japanese have employed journalists, editors, and writers as spies. Moreover, on at least one occasion a spy report has appeared in a Japanese propaganda broadcast.

Such confusion of propaganda and intelligence functions is undoubtedly of more benefit to the former than to the latter. Not only does it afford the directors of Japanese propaganda with a ready source of material in the form of intelligence reports; it also keeps them informed as to the propaganda policies of other nations. On the other hand, it may lead to the reporting of information for its propaganda value rather than for its intelligence value, and to a confusion

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between propaganda and intelligence as such. This confusion can have serious results, for while in propaganda work accuracy may be of secondary importance, in intelligence work it is a necessity. This may be one reason for the frequent occurrence of rumors and fantasies in Japanese intelligence reports, and for the general weakness of the evaluation process in Japanese diplomatic intelligence.

Evidence of a considerable amount of co-operation between the intelligence systems of the diplomatic and military services has been noted. Probably the most striking example is the formation of the IWAKURO Kikan [Agency] believed to be the predecessor of the famous Hikari Kikan (CHAPTER II), in Bangkok in 1942. This organization, although under an Army colonel, was partly a Foreign Office endeavor, and three important members of the Foreign Office staff in Thailand were attached to it. There was also co-operation between the diplomatic and military intelligence systems in the founding of the Southwest Activities espionage organization in South China (Section 2).

Considerable exchange of information takes place between the diplomatic and the military systems. Local intelligence centers quite frequently report information obtained from local military authorities and themselves sometimes collect information requested by the Army, as in the case of "101 Intelligence" (discussed in Section 4). Exchange of information has also been noted, though less frequently, on the higher levels in Tokyo. Intelligence forwarded by the Ambassador in Nanking and by a diplomatic office in Canton has appeared in Army reports, and information supplied by both the Army and Navy Intelligence services has appeared in diplomatic reports from Tokyo.

While co-operation between the diplomatic and military intelligence organizations is quite close in some areas, there is no evidence

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that it has extended to the point of one system's submitting itself to the authority of the other. Moreover, there is a certain amount of overlapping of function and duplication of effort.

B. Types of intelligence reported. Reports on political and economic subjects naturally account for a large part of the information collected by the diplomatic intelligence system in the Far East. Nevertheless, a surprisingly large number of reports deals with matters of a military nature. Predictions as to where United States forces will land on the China coast, the location and condition of Allied air fields, troop movements in Siberia, and the number and types of naval vessels in Vladivostok are typical of the subjects treated. Even quite detailed reports on Allied battle order have appeared.

The Japanese intelligence system in the Far East probably collects more information on China than on any other country. Both the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist regime are treated quite fully in available material. In spite of the volume of information already being reported on China, in May 1944 the Greater East Asia Ministry complained to Nanking that the material on the military and political strength of the Chungking Government, received by the central authorities, was "of a very fragmentary nature compared with what has been obtained on England, America, and Soviet Russia." The Ministry went on to state that it had determined to remedy this situation and issued the following instructions to Nanking: "From now on I should like to have you collect all information which is picked up from the back areas of China by any of our diplomatic establishments. I should also like you to relay any such information directly to the Ministry. We have especially resolved to make this

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process of getting information a continuous one, and we earnestly hope that this material can be gotten as quickly as is humanly possible." Perhaps as a result of such promptings from Tokyo, the coverage on China is now such that the authorities in Tokyo must be quite well informed as to conditions in Free China. The subjects to which most attention has been paid recently are Communist-Kuomintang relations, relations between the Chinese Communists and Russia, the American program to improve the Chinese economic and military position, and the underground activities of both the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists in occupied China and Manchukuo.

Another country given much attention in Japanese intelligence reports is the United States. Diplomatic reports from the Far East contain little or no material on internal conditions in the United States, political conditions, war production, or such matters; but they do contain considerable information on the activities of the United States in the Far East, American military forces in the Far East, and American strategy in the Far Eastern War. The locations and condition of airfields are discussed. American relations with the Chinese Government are described, and American relations with the Chinese Communists are the subject of constant speculation. But perhaps the topic that has most absorbed the energies of the diplomatic intelligence system in recent months is the imminence of American landings on the mainland of Asia. Reports from Shanghai alone have mentioned a dozen different places along the China coast, including nearly all logical places for a landing, as the sites of anticipated American landings. The Greater East Asia office at Canton even set up a special espionage net in December 1944 to collect information on this subject, in response to requests received by the Greater East Asia Ministry

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from the Army (Section 4).

While the quantity of the information reported on the United States is impressive, its quality is less so. Much of it is of an unverifiable nature, and its intelligence value to the Japanese is difficult to evaluate. A number of the reports on the United States are fanciful. A December 1944 Shanghai report stating that an American commercial air line was "soon" to be opened to Yenan, "capital" of the Chinese Communist regime, is a case in point.

Intelligence concerning Soviet Russia is another of the major interests of Japanese diplomatic intelligence in the Far East. Most information on Russia is reported from the consulates in Siberia and the various diplomatic offices in Manchukuo, but a certain amount also originates at points in China proper, especially in Shanghai. Russia's attitude toward Japan, Russian military and naval movements in the Far East, and speculation as to Russian intentions in Europe and Asia are the main topics discussed in these reports. Attention is also paid to Communist underground activities, in occupied China and in Manchukuo, where both Russian and Chinese Communists are active. It is impossible to judge the accuracy of most Japanese intelligence concerning Russia, but available reports indicate that Japanese coverage on Russia is probably far from complete. Russian security measures have probably made it impossible for Japanese diplomatic intelligence to obtain any important amount of classified information.

In addition to the positive intelligence work mentioned above, a certain amount of work of a counterintelligence nature is also performed by the diplomatic intelligence system. The underground activities of the Russians and Chinese Communists, the Chinese secret service, the Koreans, the Annamese and French in Indo-China, and other similar

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groups are frequently reported on. In many cases, however, the information on these subjects is collected by local police rather than by the diplomatic authorities. Also, the attitudes and political opinions of the various national groups throughout the occupied area--such as the Russians in Harbin--are carefully watched and reported on.

C. Espionage. The Japanese diplomatic intelligence system in the Far East makes extensive use of espionage as a means of collecting information. In fact espionage is with little doubt its greatest single secret source. Almost every major diplomatic establishment has its spies, sometimes organized into elaborate networks. Even the less important establishments frequently maintain spies.

At the present time Japanese diplomatic espionage is most active in China. The reasons for this are many. While the outposts of the Japanese occupied area are now being reduced or cut off, Japan's hold in China continues strong. The physical similarity of the Chinese and Japanese peoples facilitates the employment of native Japanese spies. The existence of important disaffected elements in the Chinese population, willing to co-operate with the Japanese, is a ready source from which Chinese spies may be recruited. There are also in China, notably in Shanghai, considerable numbers of Europeans who may be employed by the Japanese for espionage purposes. Passage back and forth across the line of Japanese occupation is relatively easy in China; this facilitates the movement of spies and other persons carrying information to and from Free China. But probably the most important single factor accounting for the extent of Japanese espionage in China is the fact that Free China contains the only Allied capital and the only important Allied military headquarters in the Far East within easy range of espionage operations. Chungking is not only

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the seat of the Chinese Government and the general headquarters of the Chinese armed forces, it is also the location of the headquarters of the United States Army Forces, China Theater. Important Allied embassies are in Chungking and important Allied leaders frequently visit the city. Other attractive Allied intelligence targets are to be found in such Chinese cities as Kuming, Chengtu, Sian, and Yenan.

Considerable espionage in Free China is launched from points in North and Central China, but the most aggressive and active Japanese diplomatic espionage net known to be operating in Free China is based on Canton, large Japanese-occupied city on the South China coast. This net, known to the Japanese as "Southwest Activities," is described in detail below (Section 2).

There is little evidence that the Japanese diplomatic intelligence system in the Far East conducts espionage operations in Siberia, and none that any extensive networks similar to those in China have been established there. No clear case has yet been noted in which intelligence based on spy reports from within Russian territory has been forwarded to Tokyo from a diplomatic post in the Far East. It is likely that the Japanese attempt to use Manchukuo citizens as spies in Siberia. But the only known case is that of a certain "Gei Un Kai" (Japanese spelling of a non-Japanese name), a Manchukuo spy who, according to a July 1942 report, was to be sent into Russia via Khabarovsk in the guise of a Chinese Communist. No further reference to this venture has appeared in available material.

There is evidence that Japanese diplomatic intelligence conducts espionage in Outer Mongolia (Russian dominated semi-autonomous state in Central Asia) but no details are known.

A large proportion of the espionage done on behalf of Japanese

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Chinese Government, arrived in Nanjing from Chungking in June 1943. Interviewed by the Japanese, he gave them considerable information concerning the Chinese intelligence system. In discussing the work of the "Statistical Bureau" (probably the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, an intelligence organization) of the Chinese National Military Council he said, among other things, that it listens assiduously to Japanese radio messages and reads coded messages sent by Japanese Army units to one another. He went on to say that it reads about 70% of Japanese Foreign Office wires and that it is constantly intercepting messages between Japanese warships. A later Nanjing report dealing with Soviet advisers to the Chinese National Military Council may also have originated with [redacted]. In July [redacted] was employed by the Japanese and put in charge of certain intelligence work under the Japanese Embassy.

However, much of the information the Japanese obtained from this type of source is of very dubious reliability. A case in point is a Nanjing report of January 1943 containing a "secret report" brought by a person claiming to be a representative of SHEEH Shih-ts'ai, then governor of Sinkiang (Chinese province in Central Asia). This report detailed a joint United States-Russian-Chinese plan to outfit a large army in Sinkiang and launch an attack eastward against Japanese positions in China.

The Japanese also believe that they have contacts within various Chinese underground organizations. The Investigation and Statistics Bureau of the National Military Council, the "Blue Shirts," and the "CC Group" have all been mentioned in this connection.

Another Chinese intelligence channel is open to the Japanese through the Chinese peace emissaries sent into Free China from time to time to feel out the attitude of the Chinese Government toward a

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peace settlement with Japan. YUAN Liang, one of the most prominent intermediaries in these dickering, is mentioned in one report as giving the Japanese information concerning CHIANG Kai-shek's attitude toward Japan and America. In another case a report that the United States had decided to effect landings at Hangchow Bay and Lien-yün on the China coast appears to be based on a letter sent from Chungking by another such emissary. The accuracy of information received from this source is in each case open to some question, however, since it is known that such "emissaries" have at times tricked the Japanese in the past.

Some intelligence is apparently also received from the puppet Chinese Government. Very little is known of the puppet Chinese intelligence system except that it exists, that it employs spies who operate in Chungking, and that it has on at least one occasion reported to the Japanese. How much information is obtained from this source is not known.

At various times the Japanese have believed themselves in contact with sources inside certain neutral consulates in the territory they occupy. A group of 1942 messages from Shanghai contains information ascribed to the "radio room" of the French Consulate in that city. The Russian Consulate General in Harbin is supposed to be responsible for a large part of the information reported by the Japanese Consulate General there. Harbin reports contain references to statements made by the Soviet Consul General or members of his staff and to reports in his possession. In Shanghai the Japanese apparently believe that their diplomatic intelligence has penetrated both the Russian Consulate and the Russian secret service. However, the generally poor quality of the intelligence supposedly derived from these Russian sources suggests

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that the sources themselves are not genuine. The reports in question may be the work of enterprising Japanese spies who ascribe their information to official Russian sources to enhance its money value.

The sources that Japanese spies in Free China claim to have at their disposal are described more fully below (Section 2). Briefly, they include agencies of the Chinese Government, diplomatic circles, and journalists in Chungking.

E. Open sources. Japanese diplomatic intelligence in the Far East makes extensive use of open sources of information.

The most important open source used is foreign broadcasts. These are monitored at many points where diplomatic posts are located, and are reported on to Tokyo. Some specialization is noticeable in monitoring activities. For example, Peiping pays special attention to Chinese Communist broadcasts, Kalgan and Taiyuan to broadcasts from Urga in Outer Mongolia. Radio messages of press agencies are also intercepted. By this means non-secret information can be made quickly available.

Foreign newspapers, magazines, and other publications are also used for what information they may contain. The situation in the Far East is less favorable than in Europe for the collection of foreign publications, but some of this work is known to be carried on in China. Hanking is apparently the center for the collection and processing of published material from Free China.

Some newspapers are collected as they pass through customs. Other publications are apparently obtained from European sources in Shanghai. For example, in April 1945 Shanghai reported on an article in a two months old issue of the Scandinavian edition of "Time" magazine. Sometimes spies are delegated to obtain publications deemed of special interest, such as CHIANG Kai-shek's book "China's Destiny"

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and the "China Year Book."

Another source to which Japanese diplomatic intelligence pays considerable attention is rumors and gossip. Harbin and Shanghai have been found especially fertile sources of such information, and a rather surprising number of intelligence reports from these cities is based wholly or in part on rumors circulating among the local population. Obviously, such sources are not dependable, and no information so obtained could be safely used for intelligence purposes without the most careful evaluation; but careful evaluation is seldom accorded this material by reporting officers. An example which demonstrates well the unreliability of reports based on such sources is a Peiping report of November 1944 citing "sources near the Russian Club in Tientsin." The report, which was transmitted without any evaluation, contains the statement that Soviet Russia and Japan plan to "overthrow" the British and Americans after the war in Europe comes to a close, that preparations for this are already being made, and that Moscow is sending a "strategical unit" of 1,000 persons into the United States to create internal disturbances.

Some mention must also be made of direct observation by Japanese diplomatic officials themselves. While this is not an important source in Japanese-occupied areas, it is one of the few sources available to Japanese diplomatic intelligence in Siberia. There both consuls and diplomatic couriers assiduously report their observations. These men are often qualified observers and their reports frequently contain information which must be of interest to Tokyo; but it is doubtful that they obtain such information by this means without the knowledge of the Russians.

F. Signal Intelligence. Not much is known of Japanese diplomatic

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signal intelligence in the Far East. The great bulk of Japanese signal intelligence work in the Far East is probably done, not by the Foreign Office or the Greater East Asia Ministry, but by the Army and Navy; and some of the decodes of foreign messages appearing in diplomatic traffic have been supplied by the Army or Navy authorities. However, some work on foreign secret radio communications is done by the diplomatic intelligence system, both in Tokyo and at other stations in the Far East.

Outside of Tokyo, only a few centers are known to be engaged in signal intelligence work. In Peiping some traffic analysis of Chinese Communist radio communications has apparently been done. Hankow has intercepted and translated messages in "abbreviation" codes emanating from Chungking. Hankow is the center where the "H" messages (discussed in Section 3 below) are read, although this is a process depending at least partly upon espionage. In Shanghai work is done on the interception of "unpublished" foreign traffic. However, whatever "unpublished" traffic may be, it does not demonstrably involve codes. In May 1945 it was reported that the diplomatic authorities in Shanghai were to take over the German "radio interception agency" in that city; but there is no positive indication that this agency was engaged in cryptanalysis. Finally, a May report from Canton indicates that the diplomatic authorities in that city were planning to begin cryptanalytic work. Whether or not Canton ever carried out the plan, the fact that such a plan did exist shows that cryptanalytic work is not considered beyond the scope of diplomatic intelligence.

So far as is known, China is the one Allied power whose codes may be read by Japanese diplomatic intelligence. However, the only positive evidence on the point is the occurrence of quotations from or summaries of actual Chinese messages in Japanese diplomatic traffic.

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It is impossible to decide in these cases whether the cryptanalysis was actually done by the diplomatic authorities or whether it was done by the armed services and the product given the diplomatic authorities for their information.

A summary of a message has also appeared in Japanese diplomatic traffic. However, here too it is not demonstrable that the translation was done by the diplomatic authorities.

The only foreign traffic that the Japanese diplomatic authorities are known to be working on is the and the A Tokyo message of 25 April 1945 to Saigon and Hanking contains the following remarks: ". . . After you have procured [word or words missing] copies of the back . . . coded messages from either the North China Telephone and Telegraph Company or the Army authorities, I would like you to send them to me immediately by some secure means. (We expect to be able to solve them here.)" But although the diplomatic authorities are known to have had some success in the past with the codes, they were apparently not reading the as of March 1945.

G. Evaluation. Available evidence shows Japanese diplomatic intelligence to be most deficient in the field of evaluation. Since evaluation is the process whereby "information" becomes "intelligence," this is clearly a serious defect.

The clearest evidence of the shortcomings of Japanese evaluation is in the kind of information reported to Tokyo. Japanese diplomatic offices quite frequently forward inaccurate or speculative reports to the home ministries in Tokyo, sometimes without comment. For example, a Harbin report of 12 June 1945 citing "Soviet Consulate General quarters" and containing no comment beyond an indication that the information was obtained from spies of the Harbin Consulate General.

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made specific predictions concerning impending Allied landing operations in the Pacific. According to this report three great operations were about to take place, as follows:

1. Immediately following completion of Okinawa operations by 15 June, a landing by American forces on the Japanese mainland.
2. A landing on Formosa by other American forces on about 20 June.
3. A landing by British and Canadian combined units on the China coast.

Moreover, in at least one case--that of the "NC" reports (Section 3)--they have continued month after month to report from a source which careful evaluation could have demonstrated to be partly or wholly unreliable. Other similar instances could be cited.

Little is known about the evaluation of information in higher headquarters in Tokyo, but something is known of the methods of evaluation used by reporting officers. Diplomatic intelligence officers usually cite the source of their information. While these references are often quite complete, they are sometimes only vague phrases such as "according to secret information..." or "I understand that ...". Dates are not commonly given, but it is true that the general nature of the information often makes exact dating unnecessary.

Many diplomatic intelligence reports contain some form of evaluation, but a very large number, perhaps the majority, are forwarded without any evaluation or comment whatever.

One common method of evaluation practiced by diplomatic reporting officers is to add a simple warning at the beginning or end of their reports. Such comments as "I am passing on this information to you for as much as it is worth" or "I suppose this is just some more Chungking propaganda, but I send it along for your information" occur quite often. At other times a general statement that the information is

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reliable is considered sufficient.

Nevertheless, evaluation by a rating system is an increasingly common practice in Japanese diplomatic intelligence. The first known Japanese rating system was set up in May 1941 by Ambassador NOMURA in Washington for use in his own reports to Tokyo. This system was twofold. One class--labelled "A" (KS)-- was to contain reliable intelligence; the other--labelled "B" (Otsu)-- was to include hearsay of sufficient importance to warrant reporting. Although this or a similar system was used on occasion by other offices of the diplomatic intelligence system, it never came into general use.

About June 1944 another and more elaborate rating system began to be used by certain diplomatic offices in China. By this system a "degree of reliability" (kakudo), which was to take into account the source from which the information derived, could be assigned to any report. How many degrees of reliability this system includes, and how each is defined, is not known. So far the grades "A", "A.", "B.", and "B" have been noted. Only a small proportion of the total number of intelligence reports known to have been forwarded to Tokyo are rated by this system. It appears to be used most consistently by Canton. In September 1944 Tokyo asked Shanghai for the source of a certain report and asked that in the future Shanghai give the source and degree of reliability of all "western reports" (apparently meaning reports from Free China).

A few cases have been noted of inter-office co-operation in the evaluation of information. The Macao reports afford a good example. In the middle of April 1945 Macao reported that a spy claiming contact with a certain Chinese Communist leader had reported that YKH Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Communist 18th Group Army, had

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arrived in a guerrilla area behind the Japanese lines in South China from the Communist area in North China. If true, this would have been a very significant development. Both Hanking and Peiping, to whom the report had been addressed, replied that they had information indicating the report to be in error. Hanking stated that it had information (probably "NC" intelligence, see Section 3) that showed YEH to have been in Chungking since August 1944, and Peiping quoted a Communist news despatch to the effect that YEH was in Yenan at the time he was supposed to be in South China.<sup>1</sup> Such inter-office comparing of notes is not common, however, in available material.

In general, available evidence shows evaluation methods in Japanese diplomatic intelligence to be haphazard and ineffective. Attention is paid to sources and dates, but too little evaluation is done before reports are sent to Tokyo. A reliability rating system exists, but is used only occasionally. The danger of this condition, especially in an intelligence system like the Japanese which places so much dependence on espionage and undercover sources, is apparent.

#### Section 2. Japanese Diplomatic Intelligence Espionage Net Operating in Free China

By far the most active and aggressive espionage net known to be operated by Japanese diplomatic intelligence in the Far East is an organization known to the Japanese as their "Southwest Activities." Headed by Consul TORIJI at Canton, it is also often referred to as the "TORIJI Kikan [Agency]." Its main office is in Canton and its agents

<sup>1</sup> No comment has been noted on the fact that the discrepancy between the Peiping and Hanking reports might be an indication of the unreliability of the "NC" reports themselves.



are most active in the Chungking area. As far as known it is the only diplomatic espionage net in the Far East active on a large scale in Allied territory. Southwest Activities reports, which were still being received in considerable volume by Tokyo in July 1945, constitute the best espionage intelligence known to be collected by the diplomatic authorities in the Far East.

The history of "Southwest Activities" may be said to begin in March 1942 when a Foreign Office establishment was set up in Kwangchow. By the early part of that month spies had been despatched from Kwangchow to Kweilin, Chungking, and Kunming in Free China. Kwangchow, being French leased territory, still nominally neutral, and geographically close to the important centers in Southwest China, provided an advantageous route by which to conduct espionage operations in the interior of Free China. Japanese-held points in South China, such as Hong Kong<sup>1</sup> and Canton, were surrounded by the Japanese line of occupation which presented something of an obstacle to travel and communication.

One of the principals in the founding of the set-up at Kwangchow was a Shanghai agent known by the cover-name "JK." This agent had been turning in reports to the Japanese in Shanghai as early as July 1940, and in 1941 he sent in some of his reports to Shanghai by radio, apparently from some point in Free China. Late in April 1942, in accordance with orders from JK in Shanghai, an agent or group of agents

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<sup>1</sup>An espionage net based on Hong Kong and operating in Chungking, Kunming, and Kweilin had been organized by the Japanese agent (Alias XYZ) early in 1939. Its spies reported to headquarters in Hong Kong by air mail. How long organization continued to be active is not known, but the outbreak of the Pacific War would in any case have made it necessary for it to change its method of reporting and probably also its base of operations. The need to establish a new organization relying on clandestine radio for its communications may have been what led to the founding of the Southwest Activities net.

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left Hong Kong for Kwangchow. This person (or group) was referred to as "Pa Ti"<sup>1</sup> and is known to have been connected with JK, but has not been otherwise identified. Pa Ti's mission was to investigate the situation and set up a system of radio communications. Pa Ti was also to "resume" contact with JK in the Shanghai area. How the undertaking developed beyond this point is not known, but a Kwangchow intelligence report dated 27 April 1942 indicates that an intelligence center had already been set up there by that date.

Vice Consul TONEGI, who was associated with JK in the Kwangchow enterprises, appears to have had charge of its administration. JK himself remained in Shanghai. He came to South China in late 1942 or early 1943 and worked with TONEGI for a while. However, he had returned to Shanghai by April of the same year, and nothing is known of his activities subsequent to that date. As for Pa Ti, the name does not appear again in the available material.

By February 1943 Southwest Activities had organized, in the interior of Free China, an extensive network of spies who reported by means of radio. Some idea of its extent can be gained from TONEGI's assertion at that time that he planned to expand it by establishing 130 new "positions." The organization planned to obtain the use of a radio station in the city of Liuchow (in Kwangai), and of the radio station of the "Kwangai Daily News" in Kweilin. Radio communication with Chungking had been established after Southwest Activities agents in Chungking succeeded in buying a radio there. The organization's three key agents at that time were PA, JK, and KC.

Kwangchow was occupied by the Japanese in February 1943. Since this destroyed its neutrality, its usefulness as an espionage base was

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<sup>1</sup>These are the Chinese words (八弟) meaning respectively "eight" and "brother." Together they may mean "eighth brother" or "eight brothers."

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seriously impaired. Because of this changed situation there was considerable discussion of moving Southwest Activities to Macao, and an attempt was made to set up the base there. The plan was to set up another "radio espionage system" centering its attention especially on Kweilin, but apparently a "geographical obstacle" stood in the way of communication between Macao and the interior.

Whatever the reasons, the Macao office of Southwest Activities was closed by the end of March 1944, and Kwangchow continued as its forward base of operations until 22 July 1945 when the Southwest Activities office and radio was withdrawn from Kwangchow. How Southwest Activities reports are now forwarded to Canton is not known, and as a matter of fact Canton reported on 25 July 1945 that contact with one of the most important Southwest Activities agents, GH, had ceased to exist. A few days later Canton asked Macao for permission to set up a small radio station in the Macao Consulate for the purpose of handling the reports of the organization's most important agent, PA. Referring to this request, Tokyo on 6 August 1945 stated that great stress was laid in Tokyo on Southwest Activities intelligence and urged Macao to do everything possible to assist in maintaining its intelligence channels.

A short discussion is given below of the most important agents known to be connected with Southwest Activities.

PA

The most productive Japanese spy known to be active in the Far East is the secret agent whom the Japanese designate "PA."<sup>1</sup> Altogether over 130 reports containing information ascribed to PA have appeared in

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<sup>1</sup>Apparently also referred to sometimes as "P".

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Japanese diplomatic traffic as of 3 August 1945. PA's reports cover a wide variety of subjects, and constitute what is on the whole the best espionage intelligence known to be available to the Japanese in the Far East. Many of PA's reports have been considered of sufficient importance to be relayed from Tokyo to various Japanese diplomatic posts abroad, including Moscow, Washington, and Hanking. Moreover, except for "NC" intelligence, PA's reports are the only diplomatic espionage intelligence known to have appeared in Japanese Army traffic.

The first available PA report was sent to Tokyo by the Japanese Consul General in Hong Kong in January 1941. The Hong Kong Consulate General is known to have forwarded a total of 18 reports containing information ascribed to PA prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific, of which the latest is dated 15 November 1941. From that date to early in 1943 no PA reports at all were noted in Japanese diplomatic traffic, and nothing is known of PA's activities or whereabouts during this interval.

During the period from January to November 1941 PA was apparently in Hong Kong, although he may have made trips to Chungking, travel between Hong Kong and Chungking being relatively easy at that time. His main source of information was apparently friends in Chungking and Hong Kong who moved in official Chungking circles. He appears to have made his reports orally to members of the Japanese Consulate General, and on one occasion he sent in a report by mail. There is no evidence that he reported by radio during this period.

In his 1941 reports PA pictures himself as a person of some importance in Chinese circles. One report contains the statement: "He himself (P.A.) had suggested to CHIANG Kai-shek the advisability of seeking now some way of pacification." Another makes the assertion that CHIANG Kai-shek had wired PA to accept a certain position which

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a Chungking official, probably TU Yüeh-sheng, had resigned, but that PA had hesitated to accept because he did not approve "Chungking's dealings in the past."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, PA is represented in these reports as moving in exalted circles. According to them he numbers among his acquaintances TU Yüeh-sheng, former Shanghai underworld figure who enjoys great influence in Chinese official circles, C. T. WANG, former Chinese Ambassador to the United States, and ESU Shih-ying, Chairman of the Chinese National Relief Commission. In one report it is also stated that "it appears to be true" that PA has had talks with the British and Russian Ambassadors to China.

The first PA report known to have been forwarded by Southwest Activities appeared in January 1943, in the first Southwest Activities report available. Since that time PA reports have appeared in an almost uninterrupted flow, up through 3 August 1945, the date of the latest available report. Not only is the total volume of PA reports considerable, but the proportion of Southwest Activities reports that originate with PA is strikingly large. It is possible to estimate with a fair degree of accuracy<sup>2</sup> that from 60% to 70% of all Southwest Activities reports forwarded by Canton between 1 February 1944 and 26 April 1945 contain information reported by PA. Between the latter date and 3 August 1945 PA was the only Southwest Activities agent whose reports were forwarded from Canton.

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<sup>1</sup>The text of the report is not clear. It seems to say that the position in question was that of Chairman of an "investigating committee" of the Chinese 7th War Zone and that the previous incumbent (probably TU Yüeh-sheng) had resigned after difficulty with the Chinese Government over a "question about searching for wireless."

<sup>2</sup>This estimate is based on a study of report serial numbers, which is made possible by the fact that since February 1944 Southwest Activities reports have with few exceptions borne distinctive serial numbers.

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PA reports to the main Southwest Activities Office in Canton by clandestine radio. His reports presumably had been relayed to Canton by the Southwest Activities radio in Kwangchow. How they have been forwarded since the removal of that radio on 22 July 1945 is not known. On 28 July Canton asked the Macao Consulate to be allowed to set up a small radio station with one operator for the express purpose of handling PA reports. But, by whatever route they came, PA reports funnel through Canton, whence they are forwarded to Tokyo, sometimes by the Canton Embassy Office and sometimes by the Consulate General.

Since January 1943 most PA reports purport to have originated in Chungking; but Chengtu, Kunning, Kweilin (prior to its occupation by the Japanese), Lanchow and Sian are also given as points of origin. It may be that PA has his headquarters in Chungking and correspondents in each of the other cities or it may be that PA himself travelled to these cities and reported information obtained there.<sup>1</sup>


PA reports cover a wide range of subjects. Allied strategy in the Far East, activities of the United States Air Force in China, the shipment of military supplies to China, Allied post-war plans, the military and political situation in China, the Kuomintang-Communist problem and similar topics are the main subjects discussed. While PA very seldom, if ever, is able to obtain highly secret intelligence concerning the Allies, the quality of his reports is in general considerably above that of the average Japanese spy report. He makes

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<sup>1</sup>If the latter hypothesis be true, the dates of the reports in question afford considerable information on PA's movements, for on this basis it may be assumed that PA was in each place at about the date of the corresponding report. The following are the dates of these reports so far as it has been possible to ascertain them. Kweilin: before 7 October 1943, before 28 January (probably before 14 January) 1944, 27 February 1944. Sian: 16 May 1944. Lanchow: between 16 and 29 September 1944. Chengtu: 19 January 1945. Kunning: 3 February 1945.

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fewer utterly fantastic statements and indulges in less speculation. In general, PA's reports are about what one might expect from an enterprising newspaperman; and it cannot be denied that they are of value to the Japanese. The following, dated 8 February 1945 (11 days before the United States landing on Iwo Jima), is one of the better PA reports:

According to information obtained from the Army, the plans of battle drawn up last year called for:

a. The setting up of a Philippine Army and the completion of the task of wiping out the powerful Japanese garrisons by the forces under MacArthur's command, all within a four-month period.

b. The extension of Philippine harbor installations and dock ~~word or words missing~~ which will make it possible for these harbors to meet a large part of the Army's needs.

Meanwhile in order to get hold of additional advance bases for the Air Force, at the same time as the above shore-landing operations are carried out, the Ogasawara Islands ~~which include Iwo Jima~~ and Okinawa may be seized.

The most important source claimed by PA is the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In many instances PA cites this source. The identity of PA's contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not known. But it is known that in April 1944 the Japanese sent a sum of money in care of PA to a "foreign affairs official" by the name of "Sen Zō Kei." It is likely that "Sen Zō Kei" is one of PA's Foreign Ministry contacts, but unfortunately it has not been possible further to identify this man. <sup>1</sup> Also, in one case PA claimed to have obtained

<sup>1</sup>"Sen Zō Kei" is apparently the Japanese version of a Chinese name. In Chinese it might be rendered by any combination of the following:

SEN (surname)	Zō	Kei (given name)
CHEN	Hsiang	chi
CHUAN	Chuang	chieh
CH'UAN	Tsa	ching
CHEN	Tsang	ch'ing
CH'EN	Ts'ang	chiung
ESSEN	Tsang	ch'ung
SEWAN		hsi
JAN		hsing
SEAN		hsiung
TAH		hui
TSAN		kuai
		jung

This list is not exhaustive, but it is believed to include the likeliest possibilities. Of the surnames, CH'EN is the commonest.





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information concerning the Stalin-T.V. Soong conference in Moscow from the Foreign Ministry wireless station on 5 July 1945.

The official Chinese Central News Agency is apparently another of PA's most fruitful sources of intelligence. In one case the director of the agency himself, HSIAO T'ang-tzu, is cited as a source, but it is not known whether PA obtained the information from HSIAO directly or indirectly. The Chinese Kuomintang Publicity Board, commonly known as the Ministry of Information, is also credited with some of PA's information. One report, detailing CHIANG Kai-shek's reactions to the news of the late President Roosevelt's death, is allegedly based on information given PA "confidentially" by Hollington K. TOBE, Vice Chief of the Board.

PA is supposed to be indebted to foreign press circles in Chungking for much of his information. Not only does he cite and quote various foreign newspapers, named and unnamed; he has frequently cited reports from the "Foreign Correspondents' Club" in Chungking, an unofficial organization of foreign correspondents in that city. From this it would appear that he may frequent the Press Hostel in Chungking, the local "headquarters" of foreign correspondents, and collect various items of news and gossip that he hears there.

Foreign diplomatic sources, especially the American Embassy, are also cited by PA. On one occasion "United States Embassy sources" are mentioned, on another the Embassy Press Office in Chungking, and on another the Embassy Press Office at Kremlin. Other sources claimed by PA include the Chinese National Military Council and an instructor (nationality unknown) in the Chinese Air Force.

Most of the clues to PA's identity are based on his own statements, which may be untrue or exaggerated. But some information about him is

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based on other evidence. His family was residing in Shanghai in 1944. From January to November 1941 he was probably living in Hong Kong, and from January 1943 to the present he has been in Free China, most of the time in Chungking. It is also known that he reports to his Japanese employers by means of clandestine radio contacts. The number and frequency of his reports suggest that he may have collaborators.

On the basis of the above it is possible to hazard a guess as to what type of person PA may be. His early association, together with other Southwest Activities agents, with the "Kwangai Daily News"; his contacts in high places; his numerous contacts among the members of the press, both Chinese and otherwise; his access to the Foreign Correspondents' Club at Chungking; the very nature of his reports -- all suggest a newspaper man. The known proclivity of the Japanese to employ journalists as spies makes this hypothesis all the more likely. Such a person could have arrived in Chungking some time prior to February 1943, pretending to have "escaped" from either Shanghai or Hong Kong, and could have continued his newspaper work in Chungking as a "front" for activities on behalf of Japanese intelligence. Such a front would be most useful, for it would allow him to collect information without provoking undue suspicion.

GH

Next to PA the agent known by the cover-name "GH" is probably the most important agent of Southwest Activities in Japanese eyes. He is, however, an Allied double agent and his activities are probably wholly under Allied control. The following account is based almost entirely on Japanese reports.

GH's output is far below that of PA. As a matter of fact, it is

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estimated that only about 8% of Southwest Activities intelligence reports forwarded by Canton between 1 February 1944 and 26 April 1945 contained information from GH.

GH began to send in reports from Chungking in June 1943. His identity is not definitely known. However, it is known that a Chinese by the name of \_\_\_\_\_ is intimately connected with GH's operations, apparently being either GH himself or one of his assistants. Like PA, \_\_\_\_\_ was an agent in the employ of the Japanese Consulate General in Hong Kong before the outbreak of the Pacific War. In November 1941 Tokyo ordered him to Singapore with instructions to co-operate with the Japanese Consul General in underground intelligence and subversive work among the Chinese and Malaysians there. \_\_\_\_\_ activities during the first year and a half of the Pacific War are not known. But by June of 1943 he was in Chungking taking part in the setting up of the GH organization. He was at that time in contact with a certain Lieutenant Colonel LI Yü-kuang, staff officer of the Board of Military Operations (roughly equivalent to a general staff) of the Chinese National Military Council, from whom he apparently planned to obtain information.

In June 1943 GH claims to have bought a radio from the Chinese Ministry of Economic Affairs, and began sending in his reports by this means. It is possible that by this time he had already come under Allied control. Study of the dates of GH's reports indicate that he has continued to report by radio. In 6 cases the date of the original GH report is known, as well as the date on which it was forwarded to Tokyo from Canton. The shortest time-lag between these two dates is 3 days (2 cases), the longest 14 (1 case), and the average 6. Moreover, it is known that GH receives instructions from Canton by radio.

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While GH's whereabouts are seldom mentioned, when they are he is placed in Chungking; and the nature of his sources makes Chungking his most likely station.

Being under Allied control, GH reports more confidential "information" than PA. The same general subjects are treated, but with more stress on strictly military information. For example, two GH reports have been received which purport to give details of Allied order of battle in the Southeast Asia Theater, and are in fact quite inaccurate.

One of GH's specialties is the acquiring of official documents. In the first half of 1944 Canton asked GH to obtain a copy of the text of a certain treaty. Whether he ever succeeded in this endeavor is not known. In October 1944 GH sent Canton the text of a purported Allied document, with which he had been provided by the Allied intelligence service. This item of Allied deception material predicted an Allied invasion of Sumatra by March 1945 and mentioned a disagreement between the United States on one hand and Great Britain and Holland on the other; it was the subject of at least two reports from Canton to Tokyo.<sup>1</sup>

GH claims to have contacts within the Chinese National Military Council, highest military organization of the Chinese Government. These "contacts" are probably all either national or are among the channels by which Allied deception material is passed to GH. In June 1944 he reported on the purpose of Vice President Wallace's trip to

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<sup>1</sup>GH has also been delegated on occasion to obtain such published works as the "China Year Book" and CHIANG Kai-shek's "China's Destiny."

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China, citing as the source of his "information" one staff officer to General Stilwell from the National Military Council, who was stated to have obtained the information from General Stilwell himself. In the same month GH forwarded the text of a purported message from PAI Ch'ung-hsi, Vice Chief of Staff of the National Military Council, to LI Tsung-jen, Commander of the 5th War Zone. This message is stated to have been obtained from the head of PAI Ch'ung-hsi's "telegraph service." Finally, in two instances GH reported on Allied order of battle and military movements in the Southeast Asia Theater, citing as his source messages from FENG Yen, Chinese liaison officer at the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Command, to the National Military Council. All the above reports probably originated with the Allied intelligence service.

Other sources claimed by GH include the Press Bureau of the United States Embassy, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

GH reports were relayed to Canton via Kwangchow until the removal of the Southwest Activities radio from that place on 22 July 1945. Since that time contact between GH and Canton has ceased to exist, and it is not known what plans for re-establishing GH's communications, if any, are contemplated. The last available GH report was sent from Canton to Tokyo in April 1945.

YF

YF is the third of the trio of agents responsible for the bulk of Southwest Activities reports. Originally in the employ of a Japanese diplomatic office in Shanghai, he was transferred to Southwest Activities between the end of March and the end of July 1944.

YF's station is not definitely known, but the nature of the

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subject matter of his report makes it probable that he too is in Chungking. As in the cases of CH, analysis of the time-lag between the original date of YF's reports and their forwarding by Canton makes it clear that YF reports by radio. In the five cases where the time-lag is known, the minimum is 1 day, the maximum 11 days, and the average about 5 days. The route by which YF reports are relayed to Canton is not known.

The subject matter of YF's reports show him to be a specialist in Chinese affairs. His reports chiefly concern Chinese politics and military matters. YF is apparently not considered as valuable by the Japanese as his two colleagues, for he is paid much less than either of them.

Nothing is known of YF's identity. The only fact known about his sources is that once in Shanghai he claimed to have obtained information from a secretary of CH'EN Ch'eng, present Chinese Minister of War.

The last available YF report was sent from Canton to Tokyo in April 1945.

In addition to the reports of the above three major agents, there are some reports, apparently originating with the Southwest Activities organization, which either are not attributed to any specific source or are credited to sources other than these three. Some of these reports

originate from Kwangchow and some from Canton. One of these reports contains information obtained from a "special worker on the Chungking side" through a Kwangchow newspaper (probably named "Kungmin Jih-pao" or "Citizens' Daily"). One other information obtained from one FU Ching-yang, who is not otherwise identified. Another, concerned with Chinese politics, cited "AS" as its source. This cover-name has appeared in Japanese intelligence messages from China as early as 1937,





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but no other information is available concerning it.

### Section 3. Hanking "EC" Intelligence

From June 1944 to July 1945 Hanking "EC" intelligence was one of the most voluminous series of Japanese diplomatic intelligence reports known to have existed in the Far East. But its intelligence quality did not equal its volume; and the fact of its persistence is eloquent commentary on the evaluation process in Japanese diplomatic intelligence.

The "EC" reports, so designated by the Japanese themselves, were sent to Tokyo from the Japanese Embassy in Hanking, China. They were first reported to Tokyo in June 1944 and continued to be sent with one long interruption, until July 1945, when Hanking informed Tokyo that it was terminating the series. They purported to be the text or gist of certain Chinese messages of the kind that would ordinarily have been sent in code. The purported messages fell into four classes: 1) messages sent by and addressed to officials of the Chinese Government and officers of the Chinese armed forces, 2) messages exchanged between Chinese Communist leaders, 3) messages sent by HO Feng-shan, head of the Information Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to an unidentified addressee, and 4) messages between individuals or agencies whose identities have not been established.

The Greater East Asia Ministry attached great importance to the "EC" reports and they were accorded special handling. Many of these were relayed from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. Tokyo once stated that although the Embassy in Hanking considered "EC" material of high reliability "we for our part are testing its reliability further." What conclusions the Ministry in Tokyo may have come to with regard to the reliability of the "EC" messages is not

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known directly. However, there are examples of "NC" material being used in Army intelligence reports from Tokyo, and it is not likely that the Greater East Asia Ministry would have given the Army material about the reliability of which it had serious misgivings. Moreover, in one case the Army itself in relaying "NC" material termed it "reliable."

The Japanese obtained the "NC" material by receiving coded radio messages and decrypting them. This much is clear from a request made by Tokyo in December 1944 that Nanking from time to time send messages that it had "listened to and recorded" just as received in code. However, this decrypting was done at least in part by means of compromised code books, not by pure cryptanalysis, for in February 1945 a report was sent to Tokyo by Nanking in which the originator stated:

"I have had NAKAMURA get in touch with the spies a number of times about reviving NC intelligence, and they have been at work on the matter, but the spies tell us that they are afraid that the NC codes will hereafter be changed every month."

A subsequent Nanking message makes it clear that NAKAMURA's work on "NC" intelligence involved his having a special staff, which included telegraphic personnel, and contact agents in Shanghai. It was the desire of the parties with whom these agents had contact to sever relations with the Japanese that brought about the cessation of "NC" intelligence." It is therefore plain that the process by which "NC" intelligence was obtained was as follows: the Nanking Embassy received or intercepted certain radio messages, decoded them, at least partially by means of purchased code books, and then forwarded the intelligence thus obtained to Tokyo.

However, to determine the source of the original radio messages that were received by Nanking presents one of the nicest puzzles in the study of Japanese intelligence. Although superficially the messages

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seem authentic, there is a mounting body of internal evidence that they are at least in part spurious. <sup>1</sup> And if some are spurious, doubt is cast on all.

<sup>1</sup>CHOU En-lai, a leading representative of the Chinese Communist regime, was alleged to have sent and received messages in Chungking between 5 and 11 September 1944, but according to information available to MIS and the State Department CHOU had not been in Chungking since 1943. A report attributed to CHOU states that he attended a conference between Donald Nelson and Chungking leaders, but Mr. Nelson has stated that he did not meet or confer with any Chinese Communist leaders. "EC" wires have placed YEH Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army (Communist), in Chungking during the period from September to October 1944 when there is reason to believe that he was in the Communist area throughout this period because of the visit of the American Observer Section. Moreover, YEH is definitely known to have been in the Communist area on 22 September 1944. LIN Tsu-han, Chairman of the most important Chinese Communist border region, is alleged to have sent a wire from Yenan at a time when reliable reports placed him in Chungking. CHU Teh is quoted in an alleged wire of 5 September 1944 to "LIN Pai-ch'ü" as saying, "We also sent a wire to LIN Tsu-han..." But LIN Pai-ch'ü is merely another name for LIN Tsu-han and it is quite inconceivable that CHU Teh, for many years his close colleague, should not have been aware of the fact. An "EC" message from "SEI" to "TO" (both otherwise unidentified) quotes a statement from the Communist newspaper "Hsin Hua Jih Pao" concerning the possible effect, on the distribution of American lend-lease supplies, of the visit of the American Observer Section to Yenan. But examination of back copies of this newspaper reveals that no such statement was made. Another report quotes an alleged wire from HU Shih-tse, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, which has the appearance of having been sent from Chungking. This message is dated five days after HU was on his way to the United States. On 2 April 1945 CH'EN Ch'eng, Chinese Minister of War, is supposed to have sent a message to ED Ying-ch'in, Chief of the Chinese General Staff, asking that he send certain supplies to the front after conferring with TSENG Yang-fu. TSENG had long been Chinese Minister of Communications and would at one time have been a logical person to consult on such a matter; but since his resignation in January 1945 and especially since his departure for the United States on 20 March it seems hardly likely that CH'EN would have considered consulting him necessary. Finally, MAO Pang-ch'ü, Director of the Washington Office of the Chinese Aeronautical Affairs Commission since 1943, is alleged in an "EC" report to have sent a message from Chungking to a deputy commander of one of the Chinese war zones. But according to information available to MIS, MAO was in Washington at that time.

While no one of the above items of evidence can be considered conclusive in itself, the cumulative effect is sufficient to show that at least a portion of the "EC" reports quoting messages of Chinese officials and Chinese Communist leaders is spurious.

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If some of the "NC" reports are spurious, who fabricated them? While it is impossible on the basis of evidence now available to give a conclusive answer to this question, two possible solutions suggest themselves: 1) they represent deliberate Chinese deception, or 2) they were forged by unknown persons for the purpose of sale to the Japanese. The fact that most of the very discrepancies that cast doubt on the "NC" messages are mistakes that would not have been made by an official source is against the first hypothesis.

If one accepts the other hypothesis for the source of the "NC" messages, two alternatives must be considered: 1) the Japanese believe that they are intercepting and reading actual Chinese Government and Chinese Communist radio traffic or 2) they believe that they are intercepting or receiving certain clandestine radio traffic containing texts of Chinese messages. Under the first alternative the forgers would have had to have quite elaborate facilities to make the messages appear genuine -- including transmitters at least at Chungking and Yenan, the two principal points of origin of the purported Chinese messages<sup>1</sup> -- or run the risk of detection by the Japanese.

The second alternative therefore appears more likely. But in this case the Japanese must have had some explanation for the existence of the clandestine traffic or they would not have continued, as they did, to believe in the intelligence value of the "NC" reports and to pay for the codes. With the evidence now available on the subject, it is not possible to do more than speculate as to what such an explanation might have been. One tentative theory that suggests itself

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<sup>1</sup>The following points of origin were mentioned in the internal addresses of the "NC" messages: Chungking, Kweilin, Chengtu, Hwangshan, Yenan, Ti-hua, Pao-shan, Kweiyang, Kunming, and unidentified points in Hunan.

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is that the Japanese in the Nanking Embassy were under the impression, which may or may not have been correct, that they were buying codes of the puppet Chinese Government at Nanking and that they were intercepting and reading clandestine radio traffic of agents of the puppet Chinese Government. The supposed Chinese Government and Chinese Communist messages could then be explained by the Japanese as messages purloined or bought by these puppet agents, perhaps in Chungking.

This tentative theory is supported by certain facts. For one thing, the fourth class of "EC" messages -- those between unidentified individuals or agencies -- [were] apparently sent by persons who had been spying on the Chinese Government. For example, one "EC" report contained a message sent from "IN" to "TSM" (both unidentified) which mentioned a plan to build an aircraft factory at Chengtu and ascribed the information to "our secret intelligence." Unless "IN" had been collecting intelligence on the Chinese Government he would hardly have used "secret intelligence" to acquire such information. Other similar examples could be cited. This same class of messages also contained messages apparently sent by persons of very pro-Japanese sympathies.

"SKI" was quoted in one report as sending the following remarks to "TO":

"The moderate party at Chungking attaches unusual importance to Premier Koiso's declaration granting the right to vote to Formosans and Koreans. It is clear from daily observations of the situation that this has implications reaching beyond the Formosans and Koreans. Chinese who have political brains in their heads are welcoming this news with sympathy and satisfaction."

Such statements could only have been made by a Japanese or a very pro-Japanese person. But this class of messages in the "EC" traffic could hardly have originated with Japanese, for the Japanese would not have to buy codes to read the messages of their own agents. But the supposition that these messages were sent by agents of the puppet Chinese Government would fit the above facts. Such agents would be interested

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in gathering intelligence on the Chinese Government, would express pro-Japanese sentiments, and might send messages in a code unknown to the Japanese.

As to the intelligence content of the "NC" reports, they dealt with a wide variety of subjects usually pertaining to the China Theater. Reports sent to Tokyo since February 1945 have dealt with such topics as relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, an alleged "secret agreement" between the United States and CHIANG Kai-shek to dispose of the Chinese Communist problem, speculation as to the time and place of expected American landings on the China coast, American assistance in Chinese war production, the type of goods being shipped over the Stilwell Road, and rumors of future Allied operations against Japan.

However, the intelligence value of the "NC" reports must be rated very low. For one thing, since some of it is based on material which is in all likelihood spurious, and since its origin is anything but clear, careful evaluation would be necessary before it could safely be used for intelligence purposes. However, there is no evidence of careful evaluation of the "NC" reports either in Nanking or Tokyo. On the contrary, the Embassy at Nanking, as noted above, considered them of high reliability; and the Army authorities in Tokyo once termed "NC" material of the probably spurious variety "reliable."

Moreover, even if there had been no doubt as to the authenticity of the "NC" material, its intelligence value would still have been low. Too often it dealt with unevaluated rumors and highly speculative topics, such as a report that the British Prime Minister flew into Germany at the end of March 1945 to negotiate peace secretly with Germany. Even more frequently the "NC" material consists of ambiguous statements, information available in the press, and trite assertions

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couched in non-committal and vague language. A good example is the following message alleged to have been sent on 6 May 1945 to CHIANG Ting-wen, Deputy Commander of one of the Chinese war zones, by MAO Pang-ch'ü, Director of the Washington Office of the Chinese Aeronautical Affairs Commission:

"The India-China oil pipe-line has been completed as a result of several months of active construction, and the transportation of oil from India to Kuming has already begun. Previously, all sorts of difficulties had arisen for the American and Chinese air forces as a result of the shortage of petroleum. However, it is believed that this problem will be gradually settled and that the two air forces will become even more active in the future."<sup>1</sup>

The first sentence of this message is ambiguous in that it does not state just how far the pipe-line is supposed to have been completed. The fact that the pipe-line was "pumping gasoline and diesel oil from Calcutta into China" was made public on 7 May; but according to information available to MIS, the India-China pipe-line was still many miles short of Kuming on that date. The second sentence contains no information not already long familiar to high-ranking Chinese officers such as MAO and CHIANG. The last sentence is only a vague generalization such as any informed person might make with respect to the completion of the India-China pipe-line. The report as a whole is not the sort of thing that would have repaid the expense and trouble of coded transmission. Its intelligence content is correspondingly meager -- certainly not worth the expense to which the Japanese were put to obtain it.

What is known of the Nanking "NC" reports may be summarized as follows:

1. The "NC" messages were received by radio and decrypted by the Japanese in Nanking.

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<sup>1</sup>Not the least of the puzzling features about this "message" is MAO's motive for sending this type of information to a local commander in north central China just the day before he left Washington for the San Francisco Conference.

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2. The Japanese decrypted the "RC" messages at least in part by means of purchased code books obtained from spies. Reports on the messages were then sent to Tokyo.

3. At least some of those "RC" messages that purport to have originated with Chinese officials or Chinese Communist leaders were spurious.

4. The real origin of the "RC" messages may have been (a) fabrication by unknown persons as part of a scheme to defraud the Japanese, or (b) puppet Chinese spy reports many of which contain forged messages allegedly from Chungking and Communist leaders.

5. The intelligence value to the Japanese of the "RC" reports was very low. The continued reporting of this material by the Hanking Embassy is a conspicuous example of the weakness of the evaluation process in Japanese diplomatic intelligence.

#### Section 4. Operations in Various Areas

A. Siberia. Japanese diplomatic intelligence operations in Siberia are conducted, so far as is known, by the Japanese consulates in the area and by the consulates of the government of Manchukuo.

(1) Vladivostok. Reports from the Japanese Consulate General at Vladivostok reveal this agency to be a very active intelligence center. Dating from 1941 to the present, its reports deal with such subjects as naval vessels and commercial shipping in Vladivostok Harbor, military conditions and movements in the Vladivostok area, quantities and types of lend-lease goods unloaded at Vladivostok, weather conditions in the area, and items quoted from the Russian press. Near the beginning of each month, the Consul General submits a report to Tokyo on conditions

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in his district during the previous month, a report which is apparently drawn up in accordance with a standard form. Vladivostok reports are normally addressed to Tokyo and frequently relayed to the Japanese Ambassadors in Moscow and Hainking.

The principal sources of information used by the Japanese Consul General in Vladivostok are his own observations and those of the members of his staff. For example, on 9 January 1945 he reported: "I have also seen large shipments through the city of [One word doubtful, probably "textiles"] from Canada and sugar from the United States. This leads me to believe that there are large surpluses of lend-lease materials stored here." That the Consul General is a careful observer, trained in military matters, is evident from the following report made by him to Tokyo on 29 August 1944:

"The following are the observations I made today. Today another cruiser entered the harbor, so that there are now two cruisers of 'A' class in port. Both of these cruisers seem to be similar to the 'Balizin' type cruisers [word or words missing] and seem to be new ships. However, I did not notice any catapulting mechanism on them. I still do not know the names of these ships....."

The observations of couriers who pass through Vladivostok are another source of information. In September 1944 Consul General HIROSE asked Tokyo for permission to send an interpreter on a six-week round-trip to Moscow "to observe conditions along the railway line." However, available Vladivostok reports show few examples of actual intelligence collected by this method. One reason for this is certainly the counter-measures of the Russians. Vladivostok reports have mentioned the drawing of shades on trains and have contained numerous references to the "trailing" of Japanese couriers.

The Vladivostok Consulate General has had plans for employing spies. This much is clear from the mention of a sum of 6,000 rubles as

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"spy allowance" in a list of proposed expenditures sent by HIROSE to Tokyo in February 1945. But it is not likely that the Japanese in Vladivostok have had great success in their plans for espionage, and to date no clear case of intelligence based on spy reports being forwarded to Tokyo has come to light.

Frequent references to open sources, such as press and radio, occur in Vladivostok reports. The principal interest of the Japanese in these sources is to watch for clues to the development of the official Soviet attitude toward Japan. In report after report careful note has been taken of the treatment of news of the Pacific War in Soviet papers.

(2) Other places. There is a Japanese Consulate at Petropavlovsk, but no material is available on its intelligence activities. They are probably similar to, if on a smaller scale than, those of the Consulate General at Vladivostok.

There are also Manchukuo Consulates at Chita and Blagoveshchensk, both of which have turned information on Russia over to the Japanese. While little is known of the work done at Blagoveshchensk, it is known that the information collected at Chita is in some cases at least is forwarded to Hsinking where it is transmitted to the Japanese authorities. A Hsinking report of 7 June 1945, for example, contains detailed observations of east-bound traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad made by the Chita Consulate.

In addition to the consular establishments themselves, the Japanese also make use of couriers and other official travellers for intelligence purposes. These couriers are sometimes persons of high rank and importance. For example, a courier who was to travel under the name of OTA was actually a certain Colonel OMSHI of the Ministry of War, described as having "to do with important internal and external questions."

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Obviously, such a person would be a well qualified military observer. The observations of couriers deal with items of interest seen along the route travelled, especially the number of trains and the cargoes carried.

B. Manchukuo. The primary mission of Japanese intelligence in Manchukuo is to collect information concerning Russia, especially concerning Russian military forces in Asia, and concerning the activities of Communists. The greater part of this work is probably done by Japanese military authorities, the Kwantung Army and the special service organizations (CHAPTER II). However, a considerable amount of intelligence work is performed by Japanese diplomatic authorities in Manchukuo and by the Manchukuo Government itself.

The Japanese maintain an embassy at Hsinking, Consulates General at Hsinking, Harbin, and Mukden, and consulates at various important towns throughout the area.

(1) Harbin. An important city in north central Manchukuo, Harbin is an active Japanese intelligence post. There is in Harbin one of the largest European populations in the Far East outside of Siberia. This population includes a large number of White Russian emigres and provides fertile soil for intrigue and espionage.

Information of a general military and political character concerning Russia and Europe constitute the bulk of Harbin diplomatic intelligence reports. The reports on Russia are vague and on the whole of relatively little intelligence value. They deal with such topics as reported movement of troops to and from Siberia, Russian plans in Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, the attitude of the Russian Government toward Japan, and Russian relations with other nations. Most of these

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Russian reports are stated to have originated in the Soviet Consulate General in Harbin.

There are also some reports on European affairs which are stated to be based on information from the Russian and Vichy French Consulates, on rumors being circulated among Russians and Jews, and on propaganda being spread by Soviet officials. It is not surprising that their quality is not impressive.

A few reports on the United States emanate from Harbin. These consist partly of sheer fantasy and partly of vague unverifiable predictions. This is not surprising when one notes that the two sources most frequently cited are the Russian Consulate and a "Jewish source."

The Japanese obviously believe that they have a contact within the Russian Consulate in Harbin. However, the generally questionable quality of the information supposedly obtained from this source suggests that these reports may be sold to the Japanese by enterprising spies who attribute them to the Russian Consulate to enhance their cash value. It is possible that some of these reports may be Russian deception material, but in such an event one would expect a more noticeable and consistent pattern of deception than has so far been noted.

A significant proportion of the Harbin reports deal with counterintelligence matters, rather than with positive intelligence. In these reports the activities of Russians, Chinese Communists, and agents of the Chinese Government are discussed.

(2) Harbin "A Intelligence." A series of reports purporting to contain the content or gist of certain Russian diplomatic messages and often labelled "Harbin A Intelligence," have in the past appeared

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among Harbin intelligence reports. The first of these reports is dated 15 August 1941 and is worded in such a manner as to indicate that the purported Russian message which it contained was obtained from an espionage source designated "A". They are supposed to have originated at the following offices: the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Moscow; the Embassy in China; the Embassy in Tokyo; the Embassy in the United States; and the Consulate General in Harbin.

Obvious inaccuracies, such as one would not expect in official Russian documents, have occurred in these messages. Some of them, for example, mentioned Russian submarine bases on the coast of China. Others, dated May 1943, stated that the Russian Government had received information that part of the "American air force section in Russia" was planning to attack Japan secretly, and had demanded the punishment of the "plotters." Such statements render the authenticity of the whole "Harbin A Intelligence" series suspect. Hence, the likeliest explanation of their existence is that they were fabricated by the spies who gave them to the Japanese.

The latest available diplomatic report that could belong to the "Harbin A Intelligence" series is dated August 1944. However, it is possible that the "Harbin special spy reports; appearing in Japanese military and naval reports (CHAPTER II) are a continuation of "Harbin A Intelligence" in different mediums.

(3) Man-chou-li. Man-chou-li, a town near the Russian border in extreme western Manchukuo, is the site of a Japanese Consulate. Available Man-chou-li intelligence reports deal with such matters as the activities of the Russian Consulate General, the arrest of suspected persons, and the attitudes of the local population toward the war.

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(4) Hsinking. Capital of the Japanese-controlled puppet state of Manchukuo, Hsinking is an important Japanese diplomatic intelligence center. It has a Japanese Embassy and a Consulate General.

Hsinking is known to have had plans for conducting anti-Russian intelligence work as early as January 1941, and an intelligence net directed against Russia and the Chinese Communists was founded there in about September 1942. Later material indicates that Hsinking has continued as a center for the collection of intelligence on Russia and that the diplomatic authorities co-operate in this work with the Manchukuo Government and probably also with the Army. In April 1943 Hsinking set forth the scope of its intelligence work as follows:

- 1) The "general situation" in Manchukuo;
- 2) Russian plans and activities;
- 3) Activities of the Chinese Communists directed at Manchukuo;
- 4) Activities of other Chinese elements directed at Manchukuo;
- 5) The foreign affairs situation and activities of Mongols in Manchukuo;
- 6) Activities of Koreans in Manchukuo.

Although Hsinking is undoubtedly a center for intelligence concerning Russia, relatively few Hsinking intelligence reports containing information of Soviet Russia have been noted since 1942. The most recent Russian reports deal with the shipment of troops and military equipment eastward over Russian railroads and are based on Manchukuo Government sources.

One type of intelligence known to have been emanating from Hsinking continuously and in considerable volume since 1942 is counter-

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intelligence concerning the activities of the Russians, the Chinese Communists, and the Chinese Government in Manchukuo. These reports are frequently relays or compilations of information received in Hsinking from other parts of Manchukuo.

C. North China.

(1) Peiping. Peiping, location of a Japanese Embassy Office and Consulate General, is the most important Japanese diplomatic intelligence center in North China. During 1945 it received a fund of 1,710,000 yen for "intelligence development" expenses the third largest sum known to have been granted any diplomatic station in the Far East for such purposes. At least 650,000 yen of this amount was specifically allocated to intelligence.

An intelligence directive of March 1945 designated Peiping as the center of an over-all intelligence network for the China area. But there is no evidence in available material that this plan was ever put into effect. A March 1945 report indicates that a new "system" of intelligence activities had been or was to be put into effect at Peiping, but further details are not known.

Some information concerning the United States is collected in Peiping. Its topics follow the same general pattern as information collected on the United States elsewhere in the Far East. American airfields in China, speculation as to future American landings on the China coast, American dealings with the Chinese Communists--all these are discussed. While it has not been possible to check the accuracy of most of the information reported, on the whole its intelligence value does not seem impressive.

But Peiping's main interest is the Chinese Communists, and

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it appears that it is the most important center for the collection of information concerning them. This is reasonable, in view of the fact that Peiping is relatively near Yen-an, the Communist "capital," and that the main strength of the Chinese Communists, both militarily and politically, is in North China.

Peiping intelligence reports on the Chinese Communists treat of general political and military affairs and pay considerable attention to the Japanese Communist organization sponsored by the Chinese Communists. The sources used, as enumerated in a Greater Asia Ministry directive of August 1944 are: 1) "Traffic load of code telegrams" between Yen-an and other Communist headquarters, 2) spies, 3) the Chinese Communist press, and 4) monitoring of Chinese Communist radio broadcasts. The reference to traffic analysis, together with the failure to mention cryptanalysis, makes it appear improbable that Peiping has done much successful cryptanalytic work on Chinese Communist codes. The reference to spies, together with evidence in other Peiping reports, makes it clear that a spy net based on Peiping operates in at least part of the Communist area; but nothing is known either of its organization or extent.

A considerable quantity of information on non-Communist Free China is also collected in Peiping. Spy reports supply some of this material; but little is known of this espionage either, beyond the fact that it is active in the Sian area. Another important source is the reports of travellers of various kinds who arrive from Free China. These people are often such as might well have information of use to the Japanese. Persons described as having connections with both the Chungking and Communist secret services have been noted among them.

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Peiping is also a base for certain mysterious activities, which probably include intelligence work, being carried on by the Greater East Asia Ministry with respect to Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan). Little is known of these activities, and but one report on Sinkiang is known to have been forwarded from Peiping.

(2) Tientsin. A Consulate General is at Tientsin. Its "intelligence development" fund for 1945 is 90,000, an amount which indicates Tientsin to be an intelligence center of relatively minor importance.

The chief concern of the Tientsin intelligence center appears to be counterintelligence. In a June 1944 report to the Greater East Asia Ministry, Tientsin noted the increase in Chinese, Chinese Communist, and Russian activity in the Tientsin area and asked for funds to cover an investigation of the following matters: 1) subversive, intelligence, and propaganda activities of Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, 2) "connections" between the above two groups, and 3) their methods of operation and the "general situation in Russian circles."

(3) Kalgan. The diplomatic intelligence center at Kalgan, where an Embassy Office and a Consulate General are located, is chiefly concerned with collecting information on Outer Mongolia (large Russian-dominated state in Central Asia). Some of Kalgan's reports contain information of a secret variety, such as the number of Outer Mongolian troops on the border and the capture of Outer Mongolian spies; but the majority of them are based on Outer Mongolian broadcasts, which appear to be regularly monitored in Kalgan. Kalgan maintains spies, but nothing is known of their activities. Kalgan itself stated in May 1945 that it had so far "refrained" from sending spies into Outer Mongolia.

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(4) Taiyuan. According to the statement of the diplomatic establishment at Taiyuan, Taiyuan's sphere of intelligence activities includes Outer Mongolia, the area of operations of the Chinese Communist 18th Group Army, and the Northwest China region. Taiyuan's principal intelligence objectives for 1945 are outlined as: 1) the activities of Chungking and the United States in Northwest China, 2) the loyalties and activities of Chinese Government officials stationed in Northwest China, 3) relations among the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communists, and Soviet Russia, 4) the activities and strategy of the Chinese Communist Army, and 5) the activities of the Chinese Communist Party in the general area of Shansi and Suiyuan.

Available Taiyuan reports generally bear out the above statement of Taiyuan's intelligence functions. They are based largely on spy reports and the reports of travellers, some of whom came from as far as Sinkiang. Although an espionage net is known to be based on Taiyuan, few details concerning it are available.

Taiyuan is also a listening post for monitoring foreign broadcasts. Broadcasts from Outer Mongolia, Chungking, New Delhi, Ankara, and Rome have been mentioned in Taiyuan reports. In May 1942 Tokyo requested that Taiyuan make a special effort to report anti-Russian broadcasts from German-occupied territories, which may indicate that Taiyuan monitors European broadcasts as well.

(5) Other places. Other Japanese intelligence centers in North China include K'ai-feng, Kuei-sui, and Shan-hai-kuan. Little is known of the last two, but it is known that in November 1944 K'ai-feng planned to maintain three spies--one in Lo-yang, one in Sian, and one in Yenan--and to concentrate on political and economic information from

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the Sian and Yenan areas. One of K'ai-feng's spies did penetrate to Sian, where he claimed to have "interviewed" a member of the staff of the Chinese Eighth War Zone and to have obtained information on the strength and plans of the American Air Force in China.

D. Central China.

(1) Nanking. Nanking, seat of the Japanese Embassy to the puppet Chinese Government and of a Japanese Consulate General, is one of the most important diplomatic intelligence centers in the Far East. A measure of its importance is the fact that Tokyo granted a total of 5,042,000 yen to Nanking diplomatic offices for "intelligence development" for 1945, largest sum known to have been granted any diplomatic establishment in the Far East for these purposes. It must be remembered, however, that "intelligence development" is a term which includes both intelligence and propaganda and that in many cases, of which Nanking is one, the separate allotments for intelligence and propaganda are not known. In 1944 Nanking's intelligence collection allotment constituted only about 16% of the total "intelligence development" fund.

According to "Regulations for the Organization of the Embassy," dated November 1945, the Nanking Embassy is organized into four departments, of which an Intelligence Department is one. The Intelligence Department, which has a branch office in Shanghai, is headed by a counselor and is charged with collecting intelligence and directing propaganda. The Embassy Intelligence Department was functioning as late as January 1945, at which time it was headed by a man named KISHI.

Nanking's principal concern in the collection of intelligence is Free China. In this field its main effort was the series of reports known as "EC" Intelligence which were discussed in detail above (Section 3). Other reports on Free China have been turned in by Nanking, but they

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cannot compare in volume to the "NC" material.

A fairly regular flow of material on the activities of the United States in the Far East was noted from Nanking from early in 1942 to early in 1943. After the latter date the volume of such reports fell off sharply.

Nanking maintains an espionage system. In April 1942 Nanking stated that it had sent an agent into the Chinese Third War Zone. Various Nanking reports are based on the reports of spies. Even the "NC" Intelligence depends to some extent on spies for its existence. However, little is known of the organization or operational area of the Nanking spy net. Like Peiping, Nanking also exploits the accounts of travellers from Free China as an intelligence source.

Nanking is a center for the exploitation of open sources of information. Newspapers and similar material are sent to the Nanking Embassy for processing. For example, in May 1944 Nanking reported that it had completed a translation of CHIANG Kai-shek's book, "Chinese Economic Theory." Allied and neutral broadcasts have apparently been monitored in Nanking since 1942. Chinese broadcasts are mentioned most frequently in Nanking reports, but some attention is also paid to Chinese Communist and Russian broadcasts.

(2) Shanghai. Shanghai is the location of a Japanese Embassy Office and Consulate General. It is one of the most active Japanese intelligence centers in the Far East. Its "intelligence development" allotment for 1945 amounted to 4,000,000 yen, the second largest sum known to have been granted for this purpose in the Far East. A large cosmopolitan city, Shanghai is admirably suited for certain kinds of intelligence work. Its extensive underworld is believed to have contacts with persons and organizations in Free China, and its large European

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population is a fertile source of rumor and speculation on international affairs.

The Embassy Office and the Consulate General had apparently been independent of each other in intelligence work, but in June 1945 the Embassy Office asked for authority to issue orders to two of the vice consuls in charge of certain types of intelligence work in the Consulate General. This is evidently an attempt to unify control over diplomatic intelligence in Shanghai.

The most abundant type of intelligence reported from Shanghai is intelligence concerning non-Communist Free China. Reports on this subject have been forwarded since at least 1938, discussing political trends in Chungking, the Kuomintang-Communist problem, inflation, and military affairs.

An intelligence conference held in March 1944 decided that intelligence relating to the Chinese Communist New 4th Army should be made the responsibility of Shanghai. In August of the same year Vice Consul FUKUMA in Shanghai stated that he had drawn up a proposal for studying the advances being made by the Chinese Communists in Central and South China and for instituting "countermeasures." As a matter of fact, the volume of reports on the Chinese Communists emanating from Shanghai increased sharply just after the March 1944 intelligence conference, and Shanghai is now second in importance only to Peiping in the collection of Chinese Communist intelligence. Peiping's main concern is the 18th Group Army area in North China, while that of Shanghai is understandably the New 4th Army area in Central China.

Shanghai is one of the most important centers for the collection of information on United States activities in the Far East. Shanghai reports have devoted much attention to predictions concerning the point

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at which the United States forces intend to land on the China coast and to alleged secret dealings between the United States and the Chinese Communists. Although the information in these reports is usually difficult or impossible of verification, it does not appear to be of a very high order. Other subjects treated include American air aid to China and the activities of Americans in forward areas in China.

Relatively little information concerning Russia has been reported by Shanghai. However, a directive of May 1945 ordered Shanghai to stress matters relating to Soviet Russia in its future intelligence activities, and Shanghai itself has stated that it is watching carefully the increased Russian activity in Shanghai with a view particularly to detecting any connections between the Russians and the Chinese Communists.

In addition to its espionage sources, which are discussed below, Shanghai is a station for the monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts and plain-text radio traffic. This activity probably dates back to 1941. Among the agencies doing this type of work is the Domei "Interception Office," which monitors and records the despatches of Tass correspondents and sends the results weekly to Tokyo by plane. A May 1944 Shanghai report indicates clearly that an agency of the Shanghai Consulate General monitors "published" foreign radio traffic. The same report refers to a "Foreign Intelligence Office" as an organization for the reception of "unpublished" foreign traffic. The distinction between these two kinds of traffic is not clear. But it is clear that as of May 1944 there were at least three agencies in Shanghai carrying on some kind of monitoring activity: the Domei Interception Office, an agency of the Shanghai Consulate General, and the Foreign Intelligence Office.

(3) Shanghai espionage. More is known of the Japanese diplomatic espionage system in Shanghai than in any other place outside

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of South China. The main reason for this is that Shanghai intelligence reports frequently cite the espionage source from which the information was obtained usually by the use of two- and three-letter cover-names, such as "JK," "CP," or "XYZ," making it possible to correlate spies, sources, and types of intelligence reported. This type of cover-name is a trait that Shanghai has in common with the "Southwest Activities" organization of South China (Section 2). The principle, if any, by which such names are assigned is not known.<sup>1</sup>

Altogether seventeen cover-names have been noted in the Shanghai intelligence reports,<sup>2</sup> and of these two have been identified.<sup>3</sup> Also four agents are known by name,<sup>4</sup> some or all of whom may be included among the cover-names. A significant fact about these spies is that all but one of them are known to be connected with the puppet Chinese press. One of them is a writer; three others head puppet newspapers.

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<sup>1</sup>However, the fact that CP is known to have contacts with the Russian Consulate and the Chinese Communists and that all of his reports now available concern the Chinese Communists strongly suggests that his cover-name (which is also a common abbreviation of "Communist Party") reflects his connections with the Communists. The agent or agency known as "CC" has reported information obtained from contact with the Chinese political group known as the "CC Group," and it is quite possible that this cover-name was assigned for a like reason.

<sup>2</sup>These are: AK, AM, AQ, BM, CC, CK, CP, HQ, JK, SK, TK, WA, WB, WL, XYZ, YF, and "agent #1."

<sup>3</sup>XYZ, who is known to be an important figure in the Shanghai puppet press. HQ is the cover-name for an intelligence net headed by one who is described as a former member of the Chinese Communist Party. The net was organized by the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai in April 1941. It was supposed to be in contact with the Chinese Communist "Cultural Mobilization Committee" and the Kuomintang San Min Chu I Youth Corps. No HQ report has been noted since the beginning of the Pacific War; but from April to November 1941 the HQ organization was very active, and approximately 25 HQ reports from that period are available.

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Of the 17 cover-names in the Shanghai reports, six (AK, AQ, BM, EQ, SK, and "agent #1") have not appeared in Shanghai reports since 1941, three (WA, WB, and WL) have not appeared since 1942, and two (JK and SK) have not appeared since 1943. Only two (AM and CP) have been noted in 1945 material.<sup>1</sup> Some of these spies may have moved to other areas. This is known to have occurred in the case of YF who in 1944 became one of the three principal agents of Southwest Activities (Section 2).

Before the beginning of the Pacific War, an espionage net using clandestine radio communications and operating in Free China had been based on Shanghai. Little further is known of this net beyond the fact that JK, prominent figure in the founding of the Southwest Activities organization, was one of its agents. It seems to have been abandoned after the outbreak of war in December 1941.

At the present time it does not appear that Shanghai espionage operates beyond the line of Japanese occupation, although there is evidence that some Shanghai spies operate in the Chinese Communist area behind Japanese lines in Central China. Of the 18-20 known Shanghai agents (or agencies) 11 are represented as reporting information from sources in Shanghai (or possibly in some cases Nanking). There is no evidence that any of them operate outside Shanghai and Nanking.

The Shanghai spies make the best of sources available within Shanghai itself. They contact various informed persons who come to Shanghai for one reason or another. While this is a pro-

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<sup>1</sup>The first available AK reports is dated September 1939, the latest February 1945. This active life of over five years exceeds even that of the leading "Southwest Activities" agent PA (Section 2).

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ductive source of information, the intelligence thus obtained is sometimes quite inaccurate. A good example is a report secured by YF from a person describing himself as the private secretary of CH'EN Ch'eng, Chinese Minister of War (then Commander of the 6th War Zone). This person, who had arrived "secretly" in Shanghai in about December 1943, told YF about a reorganization in the Chinese high command which never took place, complete with erroneous details.

There is some evidence that the Shanghai spies have contacts with certain secret Chinese organizations there, including the "Blue Shirts" and the "CC Group." AK has reported contact with the "Blue Shirts," CC has reported information from the "CC Group." Shanghai agents also have claimed access to sources within the Chinese Communist Party. Aside from the fact that AK, CP, and JK have reported information from Communist sources, little is known as to how contact is made.

Shanghai agents have also claimed contacts within certain neutral agencies in Shanghai. WA apparently had a contact in the "radio room" of the French Consulate early in 1942. But there is no evidence that the information thus obtained concerned or was based directly on French radio messages. In fact one report cites "surmises" arrived at by the radio room. More recently CP has claimed to have obtained certain rather dubious data concerning American plans to land on the China coast and shipment of American arms to the Chinese Communists from sources in the Russian Consulate. In addition to the Consulate, the Japanese apparently believe that they have penetrated the local Russian secret service. One Shanghai report cites a Chinese spy in the employ of the Russians as a source; another purports to give the opinion of the "leader of Soviet intelligence activities" on the subject of future American

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military operations against Japan. The local office of the Tass news agency is also credited with some of the information collected by the Japanese in Shanghai. This is the same type of source apparently used by the Army's Rikugun Bu in Shanghai for its "Ume" intelligence (CHAPTER II).

(4) Hankow. Hankow, where a Japanese Consulate General is located, has been a Japanese intelligence outpost since at least 1941. At least 10 spies were known to be in Hankow's employ early in 1943. Some of these spies range as far afield as Fen-yang in Shansi.

Hankow too is a listening post for the monitoring of Allied broadcasts and plain-text radio traffic. One Hankow report containing information from this source refers to the decoding of an "abbreviated code message" from the Chungking "International Wireless Station." This is probably not a code used for security purposes and hence cannot be taken as evidence of cryptanalytic activities.

(5) Other places. The Greater East Asia Ministry office at Pang-fou (Pengpu), a town about one hundred miles northwest of Nanking, once had and still may have members of the Army Special Service Organization among its personnel. Little material is available concerning intelligence activities carried on there, but it is known that they have concerned pro-Allied Japanese organizations in China and the underground activities of the Korean independence movement.

Intelligence work is probably done also at Hangchow and Sūchow, but few details are known.

E. South China. A large part of the espionage work done by Japanese diplomatic intelligence in South China is performed by the organization known as "Southwest Activities," which was discussed fully above (Section 2). Hong Kong is not discussed below because no Japanese

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diplomatic intelligence activity is known to be carried on there since shortly after the beginning of the Pacific War.

(1) Canton. This city is the most important base of Japanese diplomatic intelligence in South China and among the most important in the Far East. An Embassy Office and a Consulate General are located there and both of them are concerned with intelligence work. They appear to work closely with the Army and on at least one occasion lent personnel to the Army. In February 1943 the Canton Consulate General was taking steps to unify intelligence and propaganda activities in South China. In November of that year a reorganization in one of the diplomatic offices in Canton resulted in the combining of a Cultural Department and an Intelligence Department into a Cultural-Intelligence Department.

Aside from Southwest Activities, the most important intelligence activity recently noted in Canton is that known as "101 Intelligence." This was instituted in December 1944 in response to a request that the Army had made of the diplomatic authorities in Tokyo for certain kinds of intelligence, including the "American Army's plan to land on the mainland of China." It was to be an intelligence net headed by Secretary IWAJ and covering an intelligence area consisting of Kwangtung and adjoining coastal provinces.

So far only eight "101 Intelligence" reports have become available, none of these being more recent than 8 February 1945. Most of them contain speculations as to where the United States forces plan to land on the mainland of China. One states that the United States has decided to send 8 divisions to Chungking and another mentions the movements of American "special duty agents."

The "101 intelligence" reports are based largely on espionage sources. "101 intelligence" agents are despatched to various points

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within the "101 intelligence" area, some as far afield as northern Kweichow. None of the agents has been identified. All that is known of their sources is that on one occasion the Commander of the Chinese 63d Army is quoted and on another the Commander of a local puppet military formation.

The lapse in "101 intelligence" reports since 8 February 1945 may be the result of the transfer of the Chief of "101 Intelligence," IWAI, to the Consulate at Macao.

Outside of "Southwest Activities" and "101 Intelligence" no important amount of secret intelligence activities is known to be carried on at Canton. However, Canton does do some monitoring of Allied broadcasts and hoped in May 1945 to expand into intercept and crypt-analytic work.

(2) Amoy. The Amoy Consulate General was granted the sum of 180,000 yen for its 1945 "intelligence development" fund, but no other recent information is available concerning intelligence activity at Amoy. An old report indicates that at one time Amoy maintained secret agents.

(3) Swatow. Prior to 1945 very little intelligence from Swatow was noted. But since the beginning of 1945 there has been a considerable flurry of intelligence activity there. This, like "101 Intelligence," is probably motivated by the Japanese fear of Allied landings on the South China coast. A typical report concerns the activities of seven United States Army "technicians" said to be in the Swatow area. Another states that the Commander of the "American Expeditionary Force in the Philippines" is in radio communication with certain elements (possibly Chinese Communists) on the South China coast,

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who have reported to him concerning Japanese defenses in the area. In all cases known, these Swatow intelligence reports have been based on spy reports or on information from the local police.

(4) Hoihow. One of the largest cities on Hainan Island and the location of a Japanese Consulate General, Hoihow is a Japanese diplomatic intelligence center of some importance. Hoihow too has been affected by the pressing fear of Allied landings. A May 1945 report from there states that the Chinese Hainan Garrison Headquarters has "announced" that it received instructions from MacArthur's Headquarters to prepare for landings between the end of May and the end of June. Hoihow is also concerned with watching the espionage and subversive activities of Chinese agents on Hainan Island.

(5) Macao. The only neutral territory remaining in China, the Portuguese Colony of Macao has a natural attraction for Japanese espionage. The Japanese Consulate in Macao has played an important role in Japanese intelligence in South China since 1941, and it has figured prominently in the operations of the Southwest Activities organization (Section 2).

In February 1945 Consul FUKUI, who had been Japanese diplomatic representative in Macao since 1941, was assassinated. He was succeeded temporarily by IWAI, who had been in charge of Canton's "101 Intelligence" setup. As IWAI himself states, he took with him to Macao "a considerable number of influential Chinese secret operators" with whom he had been associated at Canton. This probably accounts in part for the increased number of intelligence reports noted from Macao since that time, as well as for the observed lapse in "101 Intelligence" reports from Canton.

Macao too has been obsessed with the subject of imminent

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Allied landing operations on the China coast. Since the beginning of April 1945 a number of reports have come to light containing information concerning preparations for such landings in concert with Chinese Communist forces. The first of these reports was supposedly obtained by a Japanese spy from a Communist named LIU Ping-chang who is described as Commander of the Red Army in South China. It purportedly contains details of planned Allied operations on the mainland of China and Chinese Communist supporting operations. LIU himself is stated to have been in close touch with the British Consul in Macao, who, it is implied, has been acting as a liaison channel between the Allied command and the Communist guerrillas.<sup>1</sup> Interest in the activities of the British Consul has continued. A May report accuses him of secretly buying gasoline to supply Allied planes or submarines operating in the vicinity of Macao.

The Macao Consulate employs spies, some of whom were brought from Canton by IWAI. It is clear that these spies claim to have access to the inner circles of the local Communist Party, but there is no evidence that a spy net of more than local proportions is operated by the Macao Consulate.

With the closing of the Southwest Activities office at Kwangchow in July 1945, Macao assumed a new importance for Japanese diplomatic intelligence. On 28 July 1945 Canton told the Macao Consul that it considered Macao the "last really useful intelligence base that still remains in the southern area" and asked permission to set up a radio post in the Macao Consulate for the purpose of handling PA reports (Section 2).

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<sup>1</sup>Japanese Army and Navy authorities have both reported on alleged messages to the British Consul in Macao from the Ambassador in Chungking dealing with plans for a landing on the China coast.

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(6) Kwangchowan. This area is French leased territory now under Japanese occupation. Its former importance as an intelligence outpost was owing to its convenience as a point of entry and exit for Japanese spies operating in Free China. It served as a forward base of the Southwest Activities organization until 22 July 1945 when the Southwest Activities office and radio were removed. On the same day the Japanese diplomatic office at Kwangchowan notified Tokyo that it was planning to withdraw as soon as possible.

F. French Indo-China. The administration of French Indo-China was taken over by the Japanese Army in March 1945. Since that time it is likely that intelligence operations in this area have come increasingly under the control of the Army authorities, although Japanese diplomatic offices in French Indo-China have continued to function.

Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, French Indo-China has not been of prime importance to the Japanese from the standpoint of intelligence, for little information concerning the Allies could be picked up within its borders. Indo-China's principal value is as a potential staging area for espionage operations across its northern border into Free China. However, although the Army is known to have exploited these possibilities rather fully (CHAPTER II), there is little evidence that the diplomatic authorities have attempted to do so.

(1) Saigon. An Embassy and a Consulate General are located in Saigon, and the Embassy is known to have an Intelligence Department. Saigon received an "intelligence development" fund of 235,000 yen for the year 1945, the largest sum known to have been granted any place in Indo-China for such purposes.

The only important type of positive intelligence that Saigon

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is known to report is military and political information concerning Free China. While some of this was supplied the Embassy by the Army, most of it is probably based on spy reports. Saigon is known to maintain a spy system which operates among local Chinese residents, and it is probably from this source that its information on Free China mainly comes. There is little evidence that spies in the employ of the Saigon Embassy operate beyond the limits of Indo-China.

A considerable amount of counterintelligence work is also done by the diplomatic authorities in Saigon. There is some evidence that the Japanese have attempted to "buy" Allied agents in the Saigon area. However, whether they have been successful, and if so, whether purchased agents have been used for deception purposes is not known. A Saigon report of December 1944 contains information obtained when the local military police authorities uncovered a Chinese espionage ring and arrested many of its members, together with radio transmitters, receivers, code books, and a number of compromising documents. The original discovery of the ring's existence had been made by means of radio direction finding methods. The report states that "later investigations" revealed that the ring had originally been connected with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but that since the occupation of the area by the Japanese forces they had come directly under TAI Li, head of the most important Chinese secret service organization. The report then goes on to state that there was evidence of a "widespread Chungking spy network" throughout Indo-China. "Several thousand" items of intelligence described as "relatively accurate" and covering a wide range of subjects had been sent back by it to Chungking. That such a spy network should have been allowed to exist so long in Indo-China speaks ill of the effectiveness

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of Japanese counterintelligence in the area.

(2) Hanoi. Both an Embassy Office and a Consulate General are in Hanoi, and the Embassy Office has an Intelligence Bureau. The Hanoi diplomatic offices were allotted at least 160,000 yen for "intelligence development" during 1945.

The only type of positive intelligence on the Allies noted in Hanoi reports is information concerning Free China, which has occurred in limited volume. However, as in Saigon, considerable attention is paid to counterintelligence concerning the activities of pro-Allied elements, French, Chinese, and Annamese. Also as in Saigon, the local military police authorities arrested several agents, including a Chinese Lieutenant, who were found to be connected with TAI Li's secret service.

Although some agents are in the employ of the Hanoi offices and although a few of these apparently operate along the border between French Indo-China and China, there is little evidence that they are true intelligence agents and there is some reason to believe that they are concerned rather with political activities and propaganda. What intelligence work they do perform is probably confined to reporting on the activities and attitudes of local Chinese residents, a subject in which the Japanese in Indo-China have evinced much interest. Diplomatic reports and available Army material indicate that what espionage may be conducted across the border into China is probably in the hands of the Army authorities.

G. Thailand. Prior to and immediately after the beginning of the Pacific War, Thailand was of great importance to Japanese intelligence. At that time it functioned as a center for collecting intelligence to be used in Japan's plans for expansion to the south and west. However,

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recent military events have largely nullified Thailand's importance for Japanese diplomatic intelligence.

(1) Bangkok. The Bangkok Embassy received an "intelligence development" fund of 500,000 yen for 1945, largest such sum known to have been awarded any place outside China. But Bangkok's importance does not seem commensurate with the size of this sum, and intelligence on the Allies reported by Bangkok, never very considerable in volume, appears to have fallen off drastically since 1942. At the present time Bangkok's main concern is counterintelligence, and propaganda and intelligence work among local Thais and Chinese. Bangkok is known to employ spies, some of whom have claimed access to sources within the Thai Army.

(2) Other places. Japanese Consulates throughout Thailand watch the activities and attitudes of the local population in their areas, Thai, Chinese, or Indian. The Consulate at Singora, town of the east coast of the Malay Peninsula near the northern border of the Malay States, was in 1941 the hub of a "Thai-Malay intelligence net," and at least part of this spy net was still in existence as late as August 1943. Also, some monitoring of Allied broadcasts has been done at Chiangmai in Northern Thailand.

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#### CHAPTER IV. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OUTSIDE THE FAR EAST

##### Section 1. General

Before hostilities broke out between Allied and Axis nations, the Japanese carried on intelligence activities throughout the world. A great deal of information on various subjects was obtained by diplomatic and military representatives, students, Japanese nationals who traveled for business or pleasure, and Japanese firms which carried on business in foreign countries.

After the outbreak of hostilities, it became increasingly difficult for the Japanese to obtain information in certain areas, particularly in the western hemisphere. For some time they continued to operate in South America, but after they were finally forced to stop activities there, their intelligence gathering centers outside the Far East became concentrated almost wholly in Europe. Some intelligence work is still being done in Afghanistan. In Europe, the Japanese gather information about the United States, Great Britain, South America, North Africa and Europe itself, and territorial assignments covering those areas were allotted to the Japanese representatives in Europe.

After the surrender of Germany, the Japanese in Europe were deprived of their best source of technical information. Their centers of intelligence activity in Europe have been reduced in number recently and the information now being sent from Europe to Tokyo is only a fraction of what it was a year ago.

The difficulties which the Japanese have faced in organizing their intelligence activities in Europe have been manifold. For one thing, the physical characteristics of the Japanese among Europeans have worked against them and have forced them to resort generally to employing agents

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of European nationalities for espionage work.

Communication facilities between Europe and Japan have presented serious problems, and financial difficulties have arisen since Japan currently has no established trade with European nations. Also, rapidly changing conditions within Europe have compelled the Japanese constantly to think of the evacuation of personnel from countries where relations were precarious and to maintain plans for coping with emergency evacuations at all times.

What to do with personnel withdrawn from intelligence centers which have been lost through enemy military action or diplomatic pressure has been a matter of great concern to Tokyo. A reassignment of personnel to neutral countries through Berlin was carried out to a certain extent, but the number of people permitted to enter neutral countries in official and semi-official capacities is subject to the approval of the countries involved and is limited. In addition, Tokyo warned against moving relatively large numbers of people within a short time into neutral countries for fear of stimulating Allied investigations. The warning applied not only to persons in official capacities but also to those with semi-official "cover", such as Japanese news agency representatives, and to those who were expected to be assigned to laboratories, universities and hospitals as students or student-technicians.

It was possible to return some evacuated persons to Japan via Russia. That was done with many of the Japanese representatives in Finland following Finland's defection from the Axis; and after the surrender of Germany many Japanese with and without diplomatic "cover" were permitted to travel home through Russia.

The Japanese Intelligence Service operating in Europe is under the control of the Army and Navy General Staffs and the Foreign Office in

Tokyo. A subsidiary control center for Europe was organized in Berlin for the military and naval intelligence organizations; and representatives of those organizations there acted in administrative capacities. It is true, however, that Japanese military and naval attachés elsewhere in Europe communicated directly with Tokyo without notifying Berlin.

The three main branches of Japanese intelligence which function in Europe are as follows:

1. Foreign Office Intelligence Service under the Foreign Office in Tokyo.
2. Military Intelligence Service under the Second Department of the Army General Staff.
3. Naval Intelligence Service under the Third Department of the Naval General Staff.

Since Japan's entry into the war an appreciable amount of the intelligence collected by the Japanese in Europe was passed to them under Allied control. Instances of Allied deception material being forwarded to Tokyo have been noted in almost every European country where the Japanese have maintained espionage centers.

## Section 2. Foreign Office Intelligence Service

A. General. European representatives of the Japanese Foreign Office collect items of information and dispatch them to the Foreign Office in Tokyo. The subjects reported are as a rule general, political, or economic in nature, though there have been numerous instances where rather detailed military reports have been furnished by the diplomats.

In the fall of 1944, following an inspection tour of European

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intelligence centers by Secretary Ono of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, Tokyo was informed that, considering the availability of materials only, Spain and Portugal were the best centers for the gathering of information about Great Britain and the United States. The future in Switzerland was regarded as promising, but in Germany, the only advantage was the opportunity to exchange ideas with German diplomatic, military and economic officials.

B. Methods of collecting information.

(1) Open sources. The bulk of the information forwarded to Tokyo from the Japanese Foreign Office representatives in Europe is obtained through regular diplomatic channels. Such information may be derived from official interviews with representatives of the countries to which the Japanese are accredited or through informal conversations with diplomats from other countries, newspapermen, and various influential persons. The intelligence gathered from such sources is almost wholly of a political or economic character, and is in many cases speculative.

Japanese diplomats also obtain a substantial amount of information from press and radio sources. References are frequently made to British and American magazines, newspapers, and radio broadcasts as the source of the information contained in their reports; and it is known that the Japanese spend sizeable sums in Europe for magazine and newspaper subscriptions.

Newspaper men of the country to which they are accredited are also a source of information for Japanese diplomats. The Minister to Switzerland has reported to Tokyo that it was possible to send certain Swiss newspaper correspondents, with whom the Japanese had contacts, to

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England, France, Italy and the Balkans in order to procure reports on the activities of the Allies. Whether the newspaper men were to obtain information through espionage or through regular channels is not clear.

Occasionally diplomats forward to Tokyo reports in which the sources of information are the observations of persons recently returned from visits to other countries.

(2) Secret sources. There is evidence that Japanese diplomats use spies for the collection of information. In some instances, spies have been used to procure information concerning the country to which the Japanese are accredited. The Japanese Ambassador to Germany even complained that his spies in Germany were able to get only fragmentary information on the results of Allied bombings. The fact that direct espionage against a country to which diplomatic persons are accredited might cause serious diplomatic embarrassment does not appear to concern the Japanese. Spies were used by the Japanese diplomats in Turkey very frequently after the breach of Turco-German relations. However, Japanese diplomats in Europe in general make limited use of secret agents; and some diplomatic offices make more extensive use of espionage than others.

In Afghanistan, the Japanese Minister sends rather frequent espionage reports to Tokyo. Most of the available reports for the past year have concerned Soviet and Iranian affairs and have been supplied by agents who attributed their information to contacts in the Afghan Foreign Ministry. Until the German surrender there was close cooperation in Kabul between the German and Japanese diplomats; and, in some cases at least, they used the same spy sources. The agents who

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supplied information for the Japanese and German diplomats in Afghanistan were almost all under Allied control.

### Section 3. Army Intelligence Service

A. General. The intelligence collecting activities of the Army Intelligence Service include the gathering of ordinary military information, technical information and air information. Technical intelligence is compiled under the direction of the Ordnance Administration Headquarters of the War Ministry, while air intelligence collection is directed by the Air Headquarters of the War Ministry. The Army Intelligence Service proper is controlled by the Army General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters (Daihomai) forwarded to military attachés in Europe a directive containing the outline of a plan for the collection of intelligence for the year 1945 which reveals a great deal about the allocation of intelligence duties. The general objective in Europe, as stated in the plan, is to collect accurate and timely judgments on the Allied conduct of the war with particular emphasis on British, American and Chinese plans for operations in the Far East. Information was requested on changes in general conditions, especially in anti-Japanese activities on the part of Russia, and on the capacities of the various enemy nations for carrying on the war, including any weak points of enemy nations and Russia. Information also was solicited on public conditions and activities in Axis countries and countries in Great East Asia.

In its plan outline, Tokyo lists certain intelligence requirements more specific than the foregoing generalities. Detailed information was called for on armaments, strategy and operational plans,

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qualitative fighting strength, shipping, technical developments and chemical warfare developments of the enemy.

Each Japanese military attaché in Europe was assigned a geographical area embracing the country to which he was accredited and adjacent countries, along with some Allied territory more distant from his immediate sphere. The attachés were charged with the gathering of intelligence concerning their assigned territories. In the delegating of areas, there was a considerable amount of overlap, and almost all the attachés were instructed to gather intelligence about the United States and Great Britain. The regions assigned included all European nations, North Africa, South America, England and the United States. It was added that all attachés were expected to report any available intelligence outside their assigned areas. Tokyo requested the Military Attaché in Germany to concentrate on collecting information regarding the United States and Great Britain with reference to the military strength of the two nations, their fighting spirit, shipping conditions, weapons, methods of warfare, and relations with each other.

B. Methods of collecting information.

(1) Liaison with Axis nations. The Japanese Military Attaché in Germany maintained liaison, of course, with the German Army. Early in the war the liaison was apparently taken for granted by the Japanese but reciprocation by the Germans was only halfhearted. Later it appeared that Japan was interested in obtaining as much information as possible from Germany before her collapse. In connection with this liaison it is noteworthy that the Japanese were, to say the least, indifferent to German representatives throughout the Far East. For some months before the surrender of Germany, however, the relationship between

the Axis partners seemed to improve. One indication of the improvement in relations was the granting of permission by the Japanese to the Germans to establish radio communication between Shanghai and Canton in connection with German intelligence activities in the Far East.

The Germans supplied information in considerable volume to the staff of the Japanese Military Attaché in Germany. A great deal of the information which the Military Attaché sent to Tokyo was data on German technical developments. There were reports in that category dealing with such subjects as metallurgy, medicine, aircraft manufacturing, and fuel and engine developments. Another class of reports dealt with military developments, giving periodic information on the situation of the German Army on all fronts and recounting German predictions of Allied operations. In addition, there was a large volume of reports on Allied weapons and other equipment which were forwarded under the heading "Ordnance Administration Intelligence". Air intelligence was gathered by the Japanese Air Attaché in Germany and included information about German planes and aircraft developments and available data on Allied aircraft. Some facts of a military nature, mostly dealing with the Russian Army, were obtained through liaison with the Finnish Army. Through their contacts in Germany, Sweden and elsewhere, the Japanese have been able to obtain military documents captured from Russian, British and American forces.

(2) Open sources. Another source of information exploited by Japanese military attaches in Europe is the press of Allied and neutral countries. British and American newspapers in particular are cited as the source of much information of all types. Other publications which have been mentioned as having been used include Allied

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engineering, financial, aeronautical, manufacturing and general news magazines. Allied and neutral radio broadcasts are frequently cited as a source of information, in spite of occasional warnings that they contain propaganda. Japanese news agency representatives in Europe are also used in the collection of information from published sources.

(3) Secret sources. A great deal of intelligence was and, to a lesser degree, still is procured by Japanese military attachés in Europe from paid espionage agents and confidential unofficial reports of influential persons with whom the Japanese maintain contact.

There was formerly a general exchange of information among nations in the Axis system of spy nets in Europe, which was probably prompted by a desire on the part of the Axis nations to economize and avoid duplication of effort in espionage operations. However, some difficulties arose in the exchange of secret information with the Germans, probably due to the reluctance of the Germans to hand over any such information to the Japanese without approval of the highest authorities.

C. Secret intelligence activities in various countries. Nations in Europe which are currently being used as important Japanese intelligence gathering centers, or which were formerly so used, are listed below, with a short discussion of the known secret intelligence activities of the offices of the Japanese military attachés in each. A number of the agents who gathered information for the Japanese in Europe were Allied controlled. Known controlled agents are discussed under the countries in which they operated.

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Attention was directed principally toward Russian order of battle, weapons, and industrial capacity. Some information was also collected on British and American order of battle in Europe and the Mediterranean area.

The sources from which the Military Attaché obtained his information included espionage agents, captured documents, and prisoner of war interrogations.

(2) Germany. Some of the information which the Japanese obtained through open liaison with the Germans was actually based on German spy reports and secret investigations. Such reports contained intelligence covering a wide variety of subjects including Allied order of battle, shipping, production, technical developments and operational plans. Typical of those reports was a series which the Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin sent under the heading "SS intelligence". Some, if not all, of the "SS" reports contained information planted by the Allies through controlled agents who gave the information to the Germans. The Germans then passed the information to the Japanese Military Attaché who forwarded it to Tokyo.

It is known that some information regarding the Russians was handed over to the Japanese in Germany by the Finnish Military Attaché to Germany, but it is not clear whether this was done secretly or openly.

(3) Spain. The Spanish Government has in the past co-operated with the Japanese in intelligence operations against the Allies; and until she broke relations with Japan, Spain was considered an extremely valuable information collection center by the Japanese. For a long time

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they had been concerned about the possible rupture of Spanish-Japanese relations and had speculated on the possibility of losing both Portugal and Spain as intelligence centers. They even made tentative arrangements to continue the operation of their existing espionage networks in the two countries after the evacuation of Japanese personnel. However, following the actual rupture of Spanish-Japanese relations on 11 April 1945, there has been no evidence of continued Japanese intelligence activity in Spain. Some of the activities formerly carried on in Spain were supposedly transferred to Portugal. On 17 April, Japanese Minister Suma in Madrid notified the Foreign Office in Tokyo that the former intelligence sources of his office would continue to operate and that important intelligence items would be wired through the Manchukuo Legation, the Legation of the puppet Chinese Government, and the German Embassy; but there is no evidence to indicate that this has been done.

Much of the intelligence gathered in Spain concerned the United States and England, and there were several secret sources from which that information was obtained. A series of reports labeled "Kai Intelligence" was said to have been obtained from the Spanish Secret Police, and a similar series labeled "San Intelligence" was supposed to have been supplied by the Spanish General Staff. This latter series was referred to as "special intelligence", but was not supposed to have been based on signal intelligence sources. Both series contained information on various subjects, primarily Allied shipping and air matters. Another source was identified as the "Italian Attaché", who was supposed to have obtained his information from the "Spanish Attachés" in the United States and in England. His reports dealt largely with German war materiel, Allied fleet operational plans, and

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British and American opinions on Axis strength and materiel.

One very prolific source of information for the Japanese Military Attaché in Spain was an agent known by the cover-name "Fu" who was apparently employed chiefly for the purpose of obtaining information from the United States. He has been identified by the British authorities as \_\_\_\_\_ a clerk in the Hungarian Legation in Lisbon. The information which he supplied, however, was not entirely confined to facts about the United States; a few of his reports dealt with England, Canada and North Africa. But "Fu" intelligence items generally dealt with such topics as the logistics of American forces, characteristics of American aircraft, American war production, and so forth.

The Japanese have tried from time to time to send agents to the United States from Spain. In 1942 a Spaniard

who formerly had been employed by the Germans, organized a group of agents who were sent to the United States for espionage purposes. Reports allegedly from those agents were sold to the Japanese in Spain by \_\_\_\_\_ and were forwarded to Tokyo under the designation "To reports". \_\_\_\_\_ later confessed to the Allies that, though he had actually sent agents to the United States, he had never received information from them, and his reports to the Japanese were pure invention on his part. As late as February 1945, the Japanese, still unsuspecting of \_\_\_\_\_ despatched one of his former agents,

to Washington in the guise of correspondent for a Spanish newspaper. \_\_\_\_\_ was supposed to transmit information to Spain in his news reports, but his activities came under Allied control, a fact of which the Japanese seem to have been unaware.

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(4) Turkey. Before the rupture of Turco-German relations on 2 August 1944, the Germans were operating various intelligence activities in Turkey. After the breach of relations, the Japanese took over these activities and continued to operate them.

At least some of the German networks were run by a man nominally Assistant Commercial Attaché of the German Embassy in Ankara but actually head of the German Secret Service in Turkey. is now a prisoner of war in Allied hands.

The information supplied to the Japanese by the former German network was partly political and partly military in scope. There were some reports on the relations between England, Russia and the United States, and the relations of those countries with Turkey and the countries of the Near East. The Japanese Military Attaché himself has stated that most of the material obtained by his office was acquired through illegal means. It is known that some of the Japanese agents in Turkey were under Allied control.

Following the breach of relations between Turkey and Japan on 6 January 1945, the Japanese made arrangements with the Spanish Minister in Turkey to communicate the intelligence collected by the former German network to the Japanese authorities in Madrid care of the Spanish Foreign Office. The funds for that undertaking were to be provided jointly by Germany and Japan. Actually, intelligence reports from Turkey were supplied to the Japanese according to this arrangement, but after the rupture of Spanish-Japanese relations in April 1945 the arrangement presumably was revised or terminated.

It is not impossible that some of these may have been communicated to



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the Japanese by some new channel, although there is no evidence on the point.

(5) Portugal. The Japanese have long regarded Portugal as an excellent intelligence gathering center and have set up there an extensive network of spies. Since relations between Japan and Portugal have been uncertain at times, the Japanese have made preparations to continue operation of their established networks in Portugal in the event of a breach of Portuguese-Japanese relations.

One secret source of information in Portugal was the Hungarian Military Attaché, whose reports appeared under the heading "'S' Intelligence." No "'S' Intelligence" reports have appeared in available material since the end of April 1945. The Hungarian Attaché cooperated with the Japanese Military Attaché, supplying him with information purportedly obtained by a spy in England who maintained radio contact with Portugal. The British authorities have reported that, to their knowledge, no such direct radio contact existed.

Another informant who supplied intelligence to the Japanese, at least until the middle of March 1945, was a former Italian Military Attaché of the Mussolini Government whose reports were sent as "'N' Intelligence." His information dealt primarily with Allied activities in France, the disposition of Allied troops in the Far East, and Allied shipping through Gibraltar.

Other agents who work for the Japanese in Portugal purport to obtain their information from spy networks located principally around the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean area. The information supplied by these agents deals principally with Allied shipping movements, aircraft movements, and troop strengths. Of this group of agents, the most active seems to be one whose reports

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are headed "M" Intelligence." "M" has been tentatively identified by the British as a Portuguese lawyer : alias Lima, whose asserted sources of information include direct observation of sea and air routes by spies in Tangier and Gibraltar and contacts with British Air Force officers and with the United States Pan-American and the British Overseas Airways companies in Lisbon. "M" also is supposed to acquire some of his information by bribing persons connected with certain Portuguese government agencies and officials, including the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the police.

Veracity checks made by the British on some of the "M" Intelligence" reports which pertain to Great Britain herself have shown them to be largely incorrect. There is evidence that Tokyo believes some of them to be unreliable; and some information gathered by "M" in Portugal and sent to Germany by the Japanese was reported by the Germans to be of little reliability. Some of the "M" reports contain information which was passed under Allied control.

(6) Russia. Little is known regarding the information which the Japanese Military Attaché in Russia sends back to Tokyo. Intelligence which the Japanese are able to obtain in Russia is believed to be almost entirely from open sources. There have been reports containing some information which was obtained through the observations of couriers travelling from Tokyo to Moscow. On at least two occasions the Japanese have sent army officers under assumed names as couriers. The officers were apparently sent mainly for the purpose of passing on to members of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow the views of the War Ministry about important problems, but it is probable that they observed as much as possible while travelling through Russia. Several reports based on

the observations of such couriers have been noted.

(7) Sweden. Although both Spain and Portugal were regarded as very important intelligence gathering centers, the fact that relations between those countries and Japan were uncertain at times forced the Japanese to concentrate on setting up large intelligence centers in Sweden and Switzerland.

Before the German surrender a great deal of information was collected from secret sources in Sweden. One agent whom the Japanese employed to collect intelligence was a man whose reports appeared under the heading of "'K' Intelligence." The British authorities identified "K" as [redacted] who was connected with the German Air Intelligence Office (Eins Luft) in Stockholm, where he supplied information to both the Germans and the Japanese. The very substantial amount of money allotted to [redacted] by the Japanese is indicative of the fact that they regarded his information as extremely valuable. Following the surrender of Germany, [redacted] was taken prisoner by the British and he has made statements verifying his connection with the Japanese in Stockholm.

[redacted] was supposed to have had informants in London from whom he received intelligence through a communications arrangement the details of which are not yet clear. His reports were largely concerned with Allied air matters and production figures, though a few dealt with miscellaneous military subjects. The British authorities have made veracity checks on those [redacted] reports which pertained to Great Britain and have reported that they were quite accurate. The accuracy of his reports which pertained to the United States, however, was generally spotty, and a listing by "K" of the locations of all American divisions was highly inaccurate.

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Another source which furnishes information for the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm is an agent known as "M". The British have identified "M" as an Estonian who had contacts chiefly with Swedish intelligence and military circles. Messages from the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm to Tokyo under the "M Intelligence" heading were mainly on military subjects of a general nature and usually did not include detailed information. A few of those messages reported on Allied plans and relations among Allied nations. A check made on "M" intelligence by the British authorities has shown it to be low grade or to contain much inaccurate information.

The Military Attaché in Sweden also sent reports to Tokyo, at least until the middle of February 1945, under the heading "Swedish General Staff Intelligence." A veracity check on some of the items in those reports has shown them to be generally inaccurate. The British believe the information was supplied by a member of the Swedish Intelligence Service; but there is no indication that the Swedish Government sanctioned his dealings with the Japanese.

A series of reports labelled "Su intelligence," sent by the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm to Tokyo, are Allied controlled. "Su intelligence" reports first appeared in late 1944. The last available report is dated 4 July 1945.

(8) Switzerland. This country is regarded by the Japanese as an extremely valuable intelligence gathering center for matters concerning Russia, the United States, and Britain. Before the capitulation of Germany, at least, it was also highly regarded as a center for collecting technical information.

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Switzerland has important newspaper correspondents stationed throughout Europe. The Japanese believe this to be because Switzerland for the sake of her own interests must keep watching the shifting situation in Europe from every available point of observation. Moreover, the Japanese consider the reports from those correspondents fairly impartial as compared with those of other European correspondents, and this enhances their intelligence value in the eyes of the Japanese.

Some secret intelligence was obtained from German spy sources and was sent from Switzerland to Tokyo. It is not clear whether the information was gathered by German agents who operated in Switzerland. The information obtained from the German sources dealt with military matters for the most part, especially with the locations of Allied units. Most of that intelligence was supposed to have been procured in London, Paris or Washington. In one instance the information was said to have been based on a statement by an English colonel to the Portuguese Attaché in London.

The Japanese apparently used secret agents in Switzerland much less than in other neutral countries. There is some evidence, however, that such activities may increase in the future.

#### Section 4. Naval Intelligence Service

A. General. The Japanese have naval representatives accredited to neutral European countries, who collect intelligence under the supervision of the Third Department of the Naval General Staff. The information which the naval attachés collected in Europe before the fall of Germany was chiefly of a technical nature involving lengthy descriptions of manufacturing processes, the results of tests, the properties of

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fuels, and so forth. Such technical descriptions were generally concerned with naval matters, shipbuilding, air matters or aircraft production. Tokyo apparently believed that technical and air intelligence was of extreme importance, and was most anxious to get all she possibly could before the end of the European war. In this connection the Naval General Staff in Tokyo was concerned with the disposition of naval personnel in Europe as the situation in Europe became more and more unfavorable. The representatives in Europe were ordered in case of emergency, to go to Russia with all possible haste.

Formerly there was very little activity on the part of the Japanese Naval Attaché in Switzerland, but the Japanese have recently increased their activity there. The intelligence which the Naval Attaché sends to Tokyo is largely from the press or from observation.

B. Methods of collecting information.

(1) Open sources. As was the case of the Japanese Military Attachés, the naval attachés enjoyed liaison with their German partners. A large amount of technical data on German equipment, manufacturing processes, and new developments was given to the Japanese Naval Attaché in Germany. Numerous joint military and naval attaché reports were sent back to Tokyo, most of which dealt with technical developments in aircraft. Such joint reports indicated that there was co-ordination between the two attachés, probably to avoid duplication of effort in collection and transmittal.

A few of the naval attaché reports from Germany were sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine in Tokyo, and gave accounts of German researches in the medical field. Some of those reports dealt with sanitation in submerged submarines, while others were concerned with more general health problems.

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A great deal of intelligence on technical matters was obtained from the Chief of the Technical Bureau of the German Navy and from liaison with other German organizations. Other reports, not so technical in scope, were based upon observation, upon analysis of enemy publications obtainable in Germany, and upon prisoner of war statements which were passed to the Japanese by the Germans.

In Sweden, the Japanese Naval Attaché collects a great deal of intelligence from British and American publications, from sources open to Domei, and from enemy broadcasts. The reports sent from Sweden to Tokyo deal principally with the production and characteristics of Allied ships and aircraft. The intelligence gathered by the Japanese naval representative in Switzerland is of the same general type as that collected in Sweden, but some of his reports have contained Allied controlled information.

(2) Secret sources. The only evidence of the use of secret sources of information by Japanese naval representatives in Europe was found in Germany. The Naval Attaché in Germany forwarded to Tokyo a substantial volume of reports under the heading "'K' Intelligence." Those reports frequently, though not always, purported to be based on German spy reports; and it is known that most, if not all, of the information contained in them was given to the Japanese by the Germans. The available "'K' Intelligence" items deal for the most part with Allied military and naval operations in the Far East. Some of the "K" reports contained Allied controlled information.

#### Section 5. Methods of Evaluation

No systematic method of evaluating information is practiced by

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Japanese reporting officers in Europe. As a rule, reports contain no comments whatsoever regarding reliability of the information they contain. In the few cases where comments do occur they make such statements as that the information does not agree with previous reports, that the source is considered reliable or unreliable, or that, in the case of material obtained from the Germans, the Germans expressed confidence in the accuracy of the information. There are also examples of reports in which the information itself is followed by expressions of uncertainty as to its accuracy. Occasionally reports are labelled with a letter indicating the degree of reliability of the contents, but there is apparently no consistency in the use of the indicator letters.

#### Section 6. Signal Intelligence

There is evidence that before the fall of Budapest the Germans

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there were passing foreign codes to the Japanese Military Attaché in Budapest, who relayed them to Tokyo. Among the systems which the Germans gave to the Japanese were British, Russian, French, and American codes.

The Japanese Military Attaché in Bucharest obtained some information from the interception of United States Navy code abbreviation wires and from the interception of personal wires of American and Australian soldiers, but the information so obtained was actually of little value.

The only place in Europe where the Japanese appear still to be doing cryptanalytic work is Sweden, though the Military Attaché office in Portugal was allotted some money for cryptanalysis.

The Japanese Naval Attaché in Germany is known to have made arrangements with the Chief of German Naval Communications Intelligence for German-Japanese co-operation in signal communications intelligence activities. Under the terms of the arrangement it was agreed that the German Navy would forward to Japan all material it had pertaining to communications intelligence, and that Japanese personnel would be placed in the German Communications Intelligence organization.

There has been no evidence in the reports of the Japanese naval representatives in Germany or in other European nations to indicate that their information was derived from enemy signal communications.

Despite the work of Japanese military and naval attachés in Europe in the field of cryptanalysis, there is no evidence that the Japanese in Europe have obtained any important information through their own reading of Allied codes.

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## CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS

The Japanese intelligence system as a whole has the following characteristics:

1. The quality of Japanese intelligence reports is generally poor. Some vital subjects are inadequately covered. Secret Allied information is seldom reported. Veracity checks, time and again throughout the war, show reports to be inaccurate.
2. Spy reports constitute a large proportion of Japanese intelligence. Because these reports are not systematically or critically evaluated, they contain much worthless or inaccurate information.
3. Signal intelligence is the best source of secret information utilized by the Japanese. Though its quantity is limited its reliability is high. The Japanese are not known to have broken into high-grade American, British, or Russian cryptographic systems, but other foreign cryptographic systems have been exploited, notably those of the Chinese.
4. Open sources, notably the press and radio of foreign countries, constitute one of Japan's best sources of intelligence. Though not secret, they have been reliable.
5. The Japanese intelligence system has shown itself to be gullible. Because of faulty evaluation and a tendency to over-rate spy reports, the Japanese have been victimized by Allied deception and even by private persons selling false information.

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