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SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

(JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY)

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SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

(JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY)

- 1 -

Sino-Japanese relations, based on a study of ultra traffic confirms the over-all picture seen from a summarization of the most reliable collateral information. In the early days of the, "China Incident," the Japanese sought to gain Chinese support and cooperation through an intense campaign against, "Western Imperialism," and the, "Dictatorial Chinese Central (later Chungking) Government," branding them variously and successively as Fascists, Communists, Imperialists and (particularly Chiang Kai Shek group) traitors and pawns of the Anglo-Americans and, as some of the charges were based on an element of fact, a certain amount of success was attained by the Japanese. This was, however, for the most part, short lived; the failure of the Japanese government and General Staff to agree on and adopt, and the inability of the government to enforce, anything resembling a unified, equitable or workable China policy had resulted in the application of amazingly short-sighted (regional) policies, doomed to failure from the start. The utter ruthlessness and stupidity of the invading forces together with the selfishness and arrogance of their economic, political and industrial followers made all the fine words and propaganda of, "Co-Prosperity" and, "Greater East Asia, " meaningless (of anything but "Greater Japan")

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to the realistic Chinese and in time created the anomaly whereby only the Japanese themselves were deluded by their own propaganda and their entire East Asian structure was thus, "built on a foundation of sand."

With the advent of the American counter-attacks following, "Pearl Harbor," there appeared to be a realization that the situation was fraught with dangerous possibilities. There were a million odd fighting men bogged down in China with, "everything going in and nothing coming out." "China-Reborn," proved to be a bastard child, congenitally ridden with the disease of corruption, unloved and untrusted by its own progenitors. It was apparent; there must be a speedy termination of the, "China Incident," if not in accordance with original plans, then at least some reasonable compromise. New themes were gradually adopted; CHIANG KAI SHEK was no longer the, "Arch-enemy of Greater East Asia." He was merely being misled by the Anglo-Americans. Occupied China was gradually granted a semblance of self-government and the people treated more equally and, where it would do most good,

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\* In 1943 the Japanese government, with a great flourish of publicity and propaganda showed its magnanimity (and set a moral example for the world) by officially renouncing and surrendering extraterritorial rights in CHINA; However even though the puppet police and courts were heavily larded with Japanese, "advisors," the perfidious Nipponese continued to operate their extraterritorial courts and consular police.

As late as 16 August 1945 the courts were still functioning and as of 6 September, "secret arrangements were being made (evidently to avoid publicity) to dismiss all, civil and criminal cases being continued." H-204898 Nanking/Tokyo.

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were actually patronized. But there is no indication that the Japanese had correctly evaluated (the solidity of) their position, either in CHINA-proper or Manchuria, until it was too late. This is demonstrated in the various intelligence dispatches from CHINA reporting the, "true feeling" of the people in the manner of a sudden realization, such as the report from HARBIN as late as 28 March 1945, in which is brought out:

"In view of the general situation, the trend of thought among the Manchukuoans is of the greatest importance. But there are (only) few who will reveal their true state of mind to a Japanese, and for that reason, there may be discontent, whether we are aware of it or not.... (here follows a representative outline)..... It is generally expected that the Japanese-American war will end in Japan's defeat. Influential Manchukuoan officials and private citizens pretend to believe in a Japanese victory, but that is not their true belief..... The feelings of the ordinary people toward the Manchukuoan Royal Family are without any loyalty; quite the contrary, the people have not even a kind word to say."

Another realistic (albeit too late) evaluation brought forth by the, "General situation," was sent to TOKYO from SHANGHAI, on 25 July 1945 following the fall of OKINAWA. The dispatch mentions that, the fall of OKINAWA was generally expected among the local Japanese, and therefore did not occasion a, "sudden shock," but did cause, among the intellectual class, a, "wave of grave concern," and the circulation of pessimistic statements. The report continues in

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\* N-175624, Jap Dip - Parenthetical remarks and underscoring supplied.

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part:

1. "On the whole the Koreans are of the belief that JAPAN will be defeated. All of a sudden there has been a series of cases in which certain groups among the intellectuals..... and among the youths have stirred up feelings of national consciousness and discussion of the matter of Korean independence.....
2. On the whole, the Formosans were of the belief that JAPAN would meet with early defeat; so, they showed no special reaction to the fall of OKINAWA.....
3. The Chinese, who believe blindly in an early Japanese collapse considered the fall of OKINAWA as a natural development, and were not particularly shocked at the incident."

By 1944 the Allied counter-attack had indeed, become serious. The Allied landing and subsequent advance in Europe, the American advances in the Pacific with the blockade of the Homeland inexorably tightening day by day was forcing on more and more informed Japanese, the realization, that JAPAN was being relentlessly driven down the road to inevitable defeat. But even then, the Japanese government, in part due to the disunity and lack of coordination between the various organs, was gradually being, "hoist on its own petard," by continued delusion and self-hypnotism with its own propaganda. There is available an abundance of material showing this state of mind allowed them to accept in good faith, the lip service and flattery of their most venal sycophants, and in all sincerity to make such

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statements as that contained in the, "draft of the Government's declaration," sent in a dispatch by the Foreign Minister (Shigenitsu) on 4 July 1944 to his Ambassadors. Quote:

"The Japanese government has striven earnestly toward ..... stabilizing East Asia and establishing a new world order.... The Chinese people have been on our side from the very beginning and have repudiated the Anglo-American offers of cooperation. The Chungking government is not our real enemy. Our only intention in CHINA has been to frame the Japanese-Chinese alliance and to obtain China's adherence to the cooperative effort of a greater East Asia Sphere. We have already respected China's sovereign independence and now we have accomplished our aim of securing the eternal friendship of the Chinese and Japanese nations. The Japanese Empire is now involved in a decisive battle; however, by applying the principles proclaimed in this declaration, we shall advance on to final victory."

By August (1944) the new theme (mentioned in part 1, Page 2) had progressed to its natural conclusion. The Japanese Supreme Council for Conduct of the War decided that, "political activities," designed to bring about peace with CHUNGKING should be undertaken with the HANKING government, and such activities were forthwith undertaken with Puppet cooperation in arranging contact with CHUNGKING through the regular espionage and underground channel already in use, and during the next few months exploratory talks were conducted with influential persons and officials in CHUNGKING. The results were negative as far

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\* Jap Dip #130761 - underscoring supplied.

\*\* Dip Sum #1066, 24 Feb. 1945.

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as termination of the war (Chinese-Japanese) was concerned, but the atmosphere did allow better conditions for ground work to be laid toward CHUNGKING and JAPANESE/PUPPET cooperation against future Chinese communist army activities in the event of an American invasion or as it so developed a Japanese capitulation. These activities also served to provide JAPAN with propaganda ammunition for future use in prosecution of the, "Hundred Years War," and use by subsequent Japanese agencies in CHINA.

Ultra traffic reveals that at this time, (end of 1944) informed Japanese, both in the Government and military had conceded a German defeat in Europe and it follows (and is to an extent confirmed from Ultra traffic) that; at least some of the Japanese military minds who had conceived their own (acknowledgedly sound) tactics and (particularly, short-range) strategy, could not have failed to see the ominous spectre of their own defeat. A significant analysis is available in a German dispatch. The German Ambassador STARNER, in Tokyo had sent a 34 part dispatch to BERLIN reporting a, "summary of several hours private conversation with section chiefs of the Japanese General Staff

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\* On 29 March '45 Stahmer reported to Berlin that -- "The Jap Foreign Ministry considers it improbable that Chiang Kai Shek will seek a way out of (blank) increasing difficulties through a settlement with Japan since he believes in the victory of America and England....His faith in their victory is not taken away by Japan's decisive strategic victories (in China). E-187835, German Dip.)

\*\* DS #1066, 24 Feb. stal. (see PSIS 400-20 part IX)

\*\*\* German Dip. E-184575 Tokyo/Berlin.

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and the German Foreign Office replied on 15 February:

"From the conversation repeated in (vide supra \*)....  
It appears that to follow that even those in the army,  
which is authoritative in axis policy, (?at the present?)  
have serious doubts as to the possibility of bringing  
the East Asian war to a successful military conclusion."

- III -

The Japanese surrender necessitated certain changes in procedure and a flexibility in method of prosecuting their long-term plans for the continent and steps were immediately taken to turn, even the most unfavorable situations to the ultimate use of the empire. Japanese officials in every part of occupied China began issuing orders and making plans for Japanese Nationals to remain in CHINA as a, "cornerstone for future Sino-Japanese cooperation," and on 21 August the Japanese Embassy at KANKING sent out a circular directive outlining, "the measures to be taken towards CHINA immediately after the establishment of peace," as follows:

\*(A) BASIC POLICY:

In the future, CHINA, as the sole remaining power in East Asia will have to carry out....undertaking for strengthening itself under pressure from the other great powers; as a result, Japan.....should contribute to the future restoration of the empire and the reconstruction of East Asia by clearing up the misunderstandings between herself and CHINA and aiding the strengthening of CHINA wherever possible.

\* German Dip H-205905 Berlin/Tokyo - underscoring supplied.

\*\* Jap Dip H-202520.

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**(B) OUTLINE:**

Throughout the entire period of the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of our troops, the Imperial Army and Japanese residents, inspired by an undaunted fighting spirit should lay a firm foundation for Japanese-Chinese collaboration.....(etc.)

The.....withdrawal of our troops should be carried out with the strictest military discipline....and in such an orderly manner that the Chinese will be impressed and instilled with a wholehearted respect....In the event that force has to be used for self-defense, we should adopt a firm attitude and not lose the opportunity to exhibit the true worth of the Imperial forces.

.....In increasing our assistance to CHINA, our primary objective will be to win over the Chinese people. However we should facilitate the unification of the CHUNGKING central regime and thus cooperate in the reconstruction of CHINA.

CHUNGKING-YENAN relations should naturally be handled by the Chinese themselves. However we should punish (blanks) if YENAN maintains its anti-Japanese attitude.

As a general rule, the Japanese residents in CHINA, including those who have newly (blank) to the Chinese, should carry on with their activities on the CHINA continent..... However the undesirable Japanese who obstruct friendly Japanese-Chinese relations will be cleared out.....

In order to assist CHINA's development, we will dispatch Japanese technical experts to CHINA on a large scale; and, in particular, we will develop widely in CHINA those branches of industry (prohibited) in JAPAN as well as mining and agriculture techniques.\*

The working details employed in execution of the, "Basic Policy," would of course be obvious, and in accordance with normal Japanese method, as is seen in the dispatch from KUSUMOTO, at PEIPIING

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\* The outline contains 14 enumerated paragraphs containing considerable detail, part of which, for the sake of brevity is omitted. The periodic spacing corresponds to the omitted parts. (underscoring supplied).

to TOKYO:

"The China Airways Company was largely engaged for military purposes during the war. However, we understand that if it is continued as such, it will simply be confiscated as army property. Consequently, we want to avoid this if at all possible, carry out the following measures in order to return the company as a Chinese corporation and thereby enable JAPAN to develop her aeronautical technique.

1. On the 24th of the month at 0800, a ban was placed on flying. However, we will negotiate to have navigation resumed as quickly as possible and to produce advantageous fautes accompli at the armistice negotiations through its continuance as a company.
2. We will abolish army operation and control..... and plan to utilize Chinese personnel to the extent permitted by equipment, employees and fuel.
3. We will have capable Chinese, who have expressed good will toward us, participate in the company.
4. If circumstances allow, we will have capable aircraft production technicians from JAPAN participate in the company.
5. We will discontinue the entrance into the company of large numbers of pilots from the general army and will limit ourselves to the training (?) of a few distinguished pilots from the army and navy."

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The reply from TOKYO expressed doubt as to the success of such a proposition at the present, saying: "It would be most difficult to carry this out and, besides it seems unsuitable just now for the proposal to come from us." However, it was suggested that

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\* H-203799, 24 August 1945 - underscoring supplied.  
 \*\* Dip Sum #1264, 10 September 1945.

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it be proposed, "subtly at some good opportunity during the negotiations between OKAMURA and HO YING CH'IE that, "if the Chinese so desire, we would extend our help and cooperation."

Among the Japanese on the spot, there was expressed some apprehension over the ability to effect their policy at that time. One deterring factor was the hostility of the Chinese toward the Japanese residents. However, this is known to be a varying factor mainly due to the difference in policies that were enforced by the Japanese military authorities and consuls in the different occupied areas, as well as the amount of antagonism created by arrogance and imperialism on the part of the Japanese residents (backed up by their Consular and secret police) during the periods of, "economic warfare," before and between the actual military operations. A case in point may be seen in the report from KAIFENG in which OSAWA states in part:

"The unfavorable attitude of the people here towards the Japanese is well known and the causes go back to the time of the Imperial Army's occupation and even before that. It is deep set....The economic nature of the residents here is mainly tied up with the Imperial Army. The army is the thing which they follow and (on which they depend?) and I regret to say that without the Army, they have no definite power economically. We will have to bring about developments in the future for most of them."

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\* H-203083, 19 August.

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Another report, from TSINAN, which although mainly concerned with the protection and welfare of Japanese nationals, mentions that:

"Most of the residents came to CHINA after the incident .....and it seems to me that large scale unemployment will develop.....owing to the restitution of enemy property.....the discontinuance of enterprises under military management, and the reconversion of munition production. ....I believe that not more than one third.....will be able to engage in legitimate occupations.

A part(?) of the army is indulging in some highly wishful thinking. It hopes to work out an arrangement with CHUNGKING whereby, on the pretext of maintaining order, it will be able to continue protecting the residents for a rather long time ..... Some quarters believe it will require 2 to 4 years for the evacuation."

In the same report, certain "emergency measures," to cope with the situation were suggested. Among them point #2 was, "To have the representatives of our interests in CHINA live in the principal cities and request them to see to the management of property and the protection of residents that stay behind," and TOKYO, in the reply stated; "As for point #2 .... the time is not ripe for that yet, but after we have seen how the Allies are going to act towards us it may be well to consider the matter again..

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Other highly placed Japanese, in their casting about for ways and means of prosecuting their (secret?) aims are seizing upon

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\* H-203397, 24 August, Tsinan/Tokyo.

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every utterance and incident and with their characteristically tortured analysis, attempt to take advantage of the situation. This has led to some workable ideas, some confused and again, to much wishful thinking and self-delusion, and to such theses as: "You forget Pearl Harbor and we will forget Hiroshima," and to hold Generalissimo CHIANG to the letter of his address to the populace wherein; according to a dispatch from TSINAN to TOKYO, he;

"Admonished that, without thought to the evil of the past, we must serve by attending upon the Christians (philosophy); love our enemies, do good for the sake of mankind and refrain from heaping up of revenge and dishonor; and chided the arrogant rashness of the people of this country."

A most fertile field and one that is receiving full attention, is the exploitation and development of anti-foreign sentiment among the Chinese. To further exploit this field, every attempt was made to get in direct contact with CHUNGKING officials for private (By-passing the Allies) understandings. In this respect the Japanese Vice-Chief of Staff IMAI received a little disappointment (but not discouragement) during his truce meetings with General HO YING CHIN.

\* R-202725, 23 August.

\*\* Also in Part V, Page 19 (2nd paragraph of Shigemitsu's message)

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IMAI's statements on the meetings which were reported to TOKYO by Ambassador TANI included the remarks:

"Among the Chinese representatives, there were those who tried to assume the air that CHINA is a victor, and so the attitude shown toward me by the Chinese was very frigid indeed....In certain very informal talks which I had with the Chinese.....I myself told the following to HO YING CH'IN; "Conversations have been held on the nature of (blanks) toward CHINA immediately after the advent of Peace. You, of course fully understand the Japanese feeling on this matter. After you come to HANKING in September, I would like you to confer directly with Commander OKAMURA on the subject."

A further disappointment was received in HANKING as revealed in the same dispatch; Tani states:

"In arranging for the arrival at HANKING and the reception of the representatives of the CHUNGKING army, the .....GENERAL ARMY tried to take into consideration the face of the Chinese (puppet) officials..... At the arrival at the HANKING airport, a group of Chinese officials were to welcome those coming from CHUNGKING, however, SOKTAI (?) and other CHUNGKING representatives refused flatly to have anything to do with these Chinese and expressed their desire that they be dispersed. This was a bitter blow indeed for the group of officials, who were going to welcome them.....The CHUNGKING representatives probably want nothing to do with the HANKING government and other Chinese in the pacified areas and are of the opinion that the leaders (?) and others have aided the Japanese and are now trying to save their own necks.

It is my belief that the first thing is to have HANKING (blank) improve the atmosphere between JAPAN and CHINA."

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In a later dispatch to TOKYO, TANI had mentioned that the CHUNGKING intellectuals probably shared the feeling for (the

\* H-203372, 24 August.

\*\* H-204024, 25 August.

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desirability of) increased SINO-Japanese collaboration in the future, to combat Russian and AEGLO-AMERICAN control, but expressed the fear, "granting that CHUNGKING does hold these sentiments," the UNITED STATES may, "goad CHINA on, and will force CHINA to face JAPAN with the uncompromising attitude of a bitter-and victor."

On 8 September, TANI reported he had been informed that the Japanese 13th army Chief of Staff had found a receptive ear in the person of CHANG HSUEH CHUNG the vice commander of the CHUNGKING advance forces (3rd army) at HANKING. He states in part:

"I understand that the Chief of Staff met with CHANG secretly on the 6th, in order to have a friendly talk (without the interference of?) the AMERICAN ARMY representative who had accompanied CHANG here. On that occasion CHANG said; since CHINA obviously did not defeat JAPAN, not only had she (blanks) with the UNITED STATES, but in post-war reconstruction she must, willingly or not, depend on the assistance of the UNITED STATES.....The authority of MacArthur's headquarters is extremely great.....For CHUNGKING to fail to solicit MacARTEUR's opinion would be a matter of great moment. Thus CHANG said, while CHINA may to some extent, present strong representations to ENGLAND and FRANCE, in the case of the UNITED STATES it is absolutely impossible for her to do so. Therefore, he concluded, he would like the JAPANESE authorities to fully appreciate and acknowledge this point....."

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\* H-205004.

\*\* Chang's personal history other than his military career is not known. It is not possible to conclude whether he is expressing sincere sympathy or merely being diplomatic in the interest of cooperation in fulfilling his mission.

Collateral information shows there is no doubt that; there are those, among the Chinese intelligentsia and influential families who, through past experiences and/or their racial-conscienceness, feel that; CHINA will always be kept in an inferior position and subject to exploitation at the hands of the ANGLO-AMERICANS and that China's destiny and elevation to a position of equality in the world can only be attained in cooperation with the Japanese people. Some of these Chinese see or profess to see in the ANGLO-AMERICANS anti-Japanese propaganda of today; that which may tomorrow, be translated into an anti-Chinese or anti-Yellow movement. In this vein, the (presumably) Greater East Asia director in PEIPIEG reported on 21 August:

"Piecing together various circumstances that have arisen since the 15th, I would judge that at least part of the Chinese intelligentsia are convinced that Japan's misfortune is actually the misfortune of East Asia. They feel that while at first glance, it may appear that CHINA is on the side of the victors, a deeper analysis will show that CHINA's position will ultimately be the same as JAPAN's. There will only be a difference of degree. Fortunately, China will comparatively freer than JAPAN so that country will have to strive to achieve her objectives henceforth through CHINA. They thus feel that JAPAN should not let any opportunity slip by to cement the bonds between the two countries."

While there is undoubtedly some basis for the above analysis of Chinese, "feelings," this type of report has all the earmarks of the G. E. A. Ministers' own wishful thinking and the desire to present his, "humble opinions," in an unpretentious (of course you have already thought of this) manner.



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Much of the Japanese planning and policies for the underground operation of her national policy and her future prosecution of the, "Hundred Years War," by means of utilizing such devices as giving sanctuary to Chinese traitors and puppets and collaboration with powerful Chinese militarists or officials of feudalistic tendency, who are only nominally subordinate to the Chinese Central Government such as YEN HSI SHAN and FU TSO YI of SHANSI, (who may well have dreams of an independent empire) are based on an imperfect understanding of the completeness of JAPAN's defeat and are pertinent more for a record of her intentions and desires than an expose' of method. This lack of realization is everywhere current and is revealed in ninety percent of the available ultra traffic comprising several hundreds of dispatches since the Japanese capitulation. It is exemplified in SHIGEMITSU's dispatch to Ambassador TAKI in HANKING on 16 September 1945, in relation to the wording of the surrender document General OKAHURA had signed at HANKING. SHIGEMITSU stated:

"The fact that unconditional surrender was made to the UNITED NATIONS applies only to the Japanese Imperial Army and does not include the Imperial Government. Since we are putting great stress on this point as a

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\* The JAPANESE Ambassador in LISBON, MOROSHIMA suggested granting Japanese citizenship to the various puppets and sympathizers in order to maintain their loyalty. He bases the right to do so on the precedents, "found in CHURCHILL's advocacy of a union with FRANCE prior to her defeat, and the proposal to grant BRITISH nationality to the POLES in BRITAIN." (LISBON/TOKYO, 10 Sept. '45 - H-206219.)

\*\* Similar to the machinations of the well known (self-styled, "Lawrence of Manchuria") Kenji Doihara.

\*\*\* H-206352 - underscoring supplied.

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matter of policy, we would like.....(etc.)

Rare indeed is the realism and understanding such as expressed by Ambassador SATO in MOSCOW during the projected peace negotiations last July when he admonished TOGO:

"Since the Manchurian incident Japan has followed a policy of expediency. When it came to the East Asia War, we finally plunged into a great world war which was beyond our strength.....Ever since the Anti-Comintern pact, our foreign policy has been a complete failure.....After the war we must carry out thorough going reforms everywhere.....by placing our country on a more democratic basis, destroying the despotic bureaucracy. We must try to raise up again the unity between the Emperor and the people."

On the suggestion which SHIU SAKUMA, (former Minister in

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\* SHIGEMITSU is apparently basing his argument on Article 13 of the POTSDAM declaration viz. "We will call upon the government of JAPAN to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all armed forces and to provide adequate assurances of their good faith...."etc. whereas the ALLIED reply, to the Japanese surrender proposal and which the Japanese finally accepted stated;....."Our position is as follows; From the moment of surrender the authority of the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the supreme commander of the ALLIED powers.....etc." (Article 13 from Washington Post. Allied reply from Jap Dip #45 and 46, 11 August) Spec. Series.

\*\* H-197715 - 20 July 1945.

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the BERLIN Embassy) sent to TOKYO from STOCKHOLM, on 23 August:

".....The democratization of JAPAN is one of the demands which the ANGLO-AMERICANS are to make of us. However, the democracy which ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL had in mind is quite different from the democracy which we used to consider such a thorn in the flesh of our country, and is an extremely realistic conception of democracy which is thought to be quite compatible with our national structure.

Accordingly I think that after the signing of the surrender terms it might be expedient for our government to take the initiative in engaging prominent ANGLO-AMERICAN scholars and politicians to act as advisors on democracy."

Likewise the dispatch from Minister TSUKAMOTO in HANOI to TOKYO, in reply to a message regarding the number of Japanese nationals to be evacuated and the number to settle down in the area. TSUKAMOTO remarked:

"Narrow minded patriots are putting the pressure on persons other than the above (old settlers) to remain, and there has arisen a greedy type of person, who is getting on the patriotic bandwagon..... Others are determined to carry on their enterprises even at a loss and still others are cooperating with the ETSUMSI (ANNAM Independence League) or the CHINA army, selling their souls in the interest of saving their homeland.

It is feared that we will get involved in a situation where we will have no control over the guidance of the residents as a result of their not acknowledging defeat....."

\* H-202972.

\*\* H-206298 - 13 Sept. 1945.

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A fitting summarization of JAPAN's intentions regarding CHINA, without repeating or returning to the Japanese, "Basic Policy," (reported on Pages 6-7), may be drawn from SHIGEMITSU's dispatch of 25 August, repeated below. Particular attention is directed to the first paragraph and the use of the plural therein, illustrative of a mental process possible only in a Japanese (of SHIGEMITSU's school.):

"Ever since the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese incident, both of our countries have recognized each other's status as fully independent and sovereign nations and both our countries have realized that the best way to assure their own continued existence and welfare and stability of East Asia would be to form a close coalition. Unfortunately, however, we were unable to extricate ourselves from the impasse in which we found ourselves and neither side was willing to retreat from its position. It is truly most regrettable that we should have gotten ourselves into such a predicament.

However, in the measures recently taken by the CHEUNGKING Government to cope with the present situation, we can see how deeply concerned that government is with the maintenance of order. It is particularly worthy of note that in his radio address of the 15th, CHIANG KAI SHEK strictly prohibited any acts of retaliation or insults directed at Japanese soldiers or civilians. He declared that this would only perpetuate the --2 lines G-- and called upon the people to exercise the utmost self-control.

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\* H-203373 -- underscoring supplied (following page)

Furthermore, although Chungking has now won the objectives for which she has fought and although she ranks as a victorious power alongside of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, I am sure that she is well aware of the fact that her future will not be easy, and that she will ultimately come to realize the necessity of a coalition with Japan.

Meanwhile, of course, we fully expect all sorts of annoying circumstances to arise and are well aware of the fact that we cannot be optimistic (? about the near future ?). However, at this turning point in the history of mankind, Japan is ready to turn her back on the past and alter her course of action. It is in this spirit that she will henceforth strive to foster a basis for a Japanese-Chinese coalition. However, before we can even hope to achieve this end, we shall carefully have to lay the groundwork by using every possible approach open to us.

Bearing the above in mind, I urge you to direct all quarters under your jurisdiction to try to establish contacts with the Chinese authorities in order to broach this subject in as tactful and circumspect a manner as possible.

One thing more, I would like to say just a word on the problems of Koreans in China. We cannot, of course, make any plans bearing on the fate of Korea. However, I need hardly to say that, thinking of the distant future, we still cherish the desire to see Korea revert to the Empire. In order to foster measures designed to strengthen our future relations with Korea, we shall have to have men of high quality cooperate with us along this line. I, therefore, hope that you will see to it that nothing frustrates our efforts along these lines.

I have sent on the above to the 4 Embassy offices and to all Consul-Generals.