

JAPAN
(Reaction to Defeat and Current Problems)

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JAPAN
(Reaction to Defeat and Current Problems)

As was to be expected, since the surrender of Japan (or as the Japanese prefer to term it, the "cessation of hostilities"), there has been a large volume of military and diplomatic Ultra traffic. Many of these messages fall roughly into two categories: (1) Attitude toward defeat and (2) Current problems; and will be reflected below in so far as possible in that order.

Attitude toward defeat:

A somewhat different picture is presented by a Japanese diplomatic representative in Tsinan, who on 18 August informed Tokyo that "the soldiers (of the North China Army) and all the resident nationals are clenching their fists in indignation, and their grief and resentment know ^{no} bounds".²

An earlier Summary (PSIS 400-29, 29 August) reflected a tendency on the part of certain Japanese leaders to refuse to accept the fact of defeat and to consider the "cessation of hostilities" (which the Emperor benevolently decreed to "prevent the utter destruction of human civilization") merely preliminary to a treaty limited strictly by the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Further evidence of this tendency is found in numerous recent messages of which the following two are typical:

Two weeks after the surrender (24 August), Vice Chief of Staff Imai, reporting on a meeting with Allied leaders regarding the surrender of General Okamura's China Expeditionary Army, complained that, "among the Chinese representatives there were those who tried to assume the air that China is a victor".³

On 2 September (three weeks after the surrender), the Commander of the North China Area Army, complaining of the "illegal advance of the Soviet Mongolian Army", stated that he had issued orders to "use military force for self-defense" if this "illegal" advance continued past Chinwangtao (China

²H-204237

³H-203372

side of Manchurian border).⁴

On 8 September the Japanese Navy Bureau of Military Affairs issued the following order:

- "(1) Koryu (midget submarines), Kairyu (small surface craft, Shinyo (suicide crash boats) and Kaiten (suicide torpedoes) in Naval ports are to be rendered non-operational in accordance with previous orders. Furthermore, the running-gear of the Kaiten is to be thrown away.
- (2) The Koryu, Kairyu, Shinyo and Kaiten in zones (to be specified later) not to be occupied by the U. S. Navy will have one part of their steering-gear or other principal related gear disassembled, in addition to that previously ordered. Kaiten are to be handled in such a way that they will be made completely non-operational for all time. However, they are not to be destroyed."⁵

On 6 September the same Command ordered that steps were to be taken to convert gradually all Naval District, Guard District and Fleet Security Units to "Peace Preservation Units", lightly armed with sidearms or clubs. All weapons except sidearms were to be turned in and "stored in various places under adequate guard".⁶

Commenting on the Japanese attitude toward defeat, Minister Morishima at Lisbon informed Tokyo on 22 August that, to judge from press reports, press opinion in Europe and America is "extremely unfavorable" to Japan because of the belief that Japan fails to realize that she has been defeated or is

⁴H-204563

⁵FE. Sum. #536.

⁶FE. Sum. #535.

responsible for the war. Morishima goes on to analyse -- with some degree of accuracy -- Allied opinion of Japanese national psychology, and expresses the fear that the Allies, in addition to enforcing the punitive clauses of the Potsdam Declaration, will extend their activities to "abstract matters, interfering not only with meetings, associations, broadcasting and the like, but even with education". Morishima then continues:

"Turning to the consideration of our own position in the face of all this -- quite apart from the necessity for a fundamental reorganization -- our first task will be to shorten the period of military occupation."*

On the other hand, when we consider how what started as a purely local North China incident developed under the pressure of external conditions.....and when we consider the results of frequent Cabinet downfalls, there will be a number of questions to which the Japanese people must devote serious reflection.

To judge from the trend of American public opinion....., if military occupation is to be brought to an end after a short period, it will be necessary for the whole Japanese nation to look defeat squarely in the face. Minimum conditions will be realization of the expression of the will of the people, freedom of opinion, meeting and association through the establishment of a responsible Cabinet system, and the holding of a general election at the earliest possible moment."⁷

(Note: In one of his messages urging Japan to surrender, dated 20 July, Ambassador Sato at Moscow stated:

"Immediately after the war ends, we must carry out thoroughgoing reforms everywhere within the country. By placing our Government on a more democratic basis and by destroying the despotic bureaucracy, we must try to raise up again the real unity between the Emperor and his people.")

*Underscoring supplied.

⁷Dip. Sum. #1253; H-203541.

On the day following Morishima's advice, Shin Sakuma, former Minister in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin (who has been waiting in Stockholm for a Russian transit visa since last October) sent the following message to Tokyo:

"According to the Potsdam Declaration...the democratization of Japan is one of the demands which the Anglo-Americans are to make of us. However, the democracy which Roosevelt and Churchill had in mind is quite different from the democracy which we used to consider such a thorn in the flesh of our country, and is an extremely realistic conception of democracy which is thought to be quite compatible with our national structure.

Accordingly, I think that after signing the surrender terms it might be expedient for our Government to take the initiative in engaging prominent Anglo-American scholars and politicians to act as advisors on democracy."#3

On the following day (24 August), Minister Kase at Berne also gave Shigemitsu the benefit of his "views", which include the following points:

Although so far the Allies have not been "unreasonable", it must be expected that henceforth they will adopt a much firmer attitude than the Japanese have been inclined to expect. However, they probably will not strip Japan of everything as they did Germany.

* On 27 August, Kase at Berne recommended employment by Tokyo of a Swiss engineer, Richard A. Kempin, who lived in Japan from 1937-40, understands Japanese psychology; and "believes he could be of use in relations with the American authorities." Kase thought "it might be a good move" to make use of this man's technical experience, and "at the same time use him in more confidential activities aimed at the alleviation of American terms, or the like".

On 4 September, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu informed Kase that the suggestion had been studied, "but we wish to consider it a little later, when we see the situation stabilizing itself to some extent". (H-203411; H-204513)

⁸ Dip. Sum. #1249; H-202972

The Japanese must now dedicate themselves to the task of upholding the National Structure and preserving the independence of the Imperial Government. However, any impression that Japan is engaging in a passive sort of opposition will furnish the Allies with an excuse for "putting our country completely at the disposal of their selfish desires". "Therefore our best policy at this particular time* is to keep our voluntarily given word, to demonstrate a cooperative attitude and, so long as it is possible, to avoid provoking the Allies."

Kase referred then to "certain things about the complexion of the new Cabinet which have caused the world to doubt the sincerity of Japan's new policy and which may only serve to aggravate Japan's trouble"; adding that in expressing the above views, which were not his alone but represented the general impression of Japanese abroad, he did not mean to imply that Japan should "abjectly comply with every Allied demand". On the contrary, any reasonable claims should be made directly and frankly to the United States, the leading Power among the Allies. One of the reasons for preserving the autonomy of the Japanese Government was to enable it to make such demands.

Kase further counselled that Japan must make a serious effort to acquaint the world with the critical economic situation which she now faces, particularly as regards food and clothing. Furthermore, Japan's news despatches for foreign consumption should convince the world of the sincerity of the Japanese Govern-

*Underscoring supplied.

ment; and to achieve that end the Domei* news agency should be strengthened and placed under the direct control of the Foreign Office.⁹

Two days later, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu sent the following interesting reply to Kase:

"I find your reports on trends in Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union and on views held in those countries with respect to Japan most valuable. I hope that you will continue your efforts along these lines."¹⁰

From Stockholm, Minister Okamoto on 29 August reported that although the people of England and America were deeply shocked** at the use of the atomic bomb, "of which on the whole they disapprove," "the deep-seated suspicion of Japan on the part of the enemy makes it appear that rather severe measures will be taken". Okamoto was of the opinion that Japan should "make use of enemy

* U.S. press reports of 15 September indicate that Domei, after a suspension by the Allied Supreme Command was restricted to news for internal consumption and warned against further distortion of facts. Four days later, the paper Asahi was reported suspended temporarily for continuing inflammatory articles regarding the atomic bomb and others belittling U.S. accounts of atrocities.

Upon Domei's restriction to distribution of news inside Japan, Okamoto at Stockholm suggested that this be circumvented as follows:

- (a) Have announcements made exclusively for home consumption, and have the Anglo-American news agencies carry those announcements.
- (b) Have Anglo-American newsmen write stories on the bomb damage and thus create a powerful impression abroad. (DS #1272; H-206060; H-206066; H-206004)

** Quoting various press criticisms of the bomb, Okamoto said: "It appears that in England certain churches on Thanksgiving Day refused to hold celebrations, deploring the use of the atom bomb....also, many Swedes have sent me letters expressing sympathy for Japan".

⁹ H-203258; H-203250, H-203298; Dip. Sum. #1252; H-206004.

¹⁰ Dip. Sum. #1252; H-203258; H-203298.

"public opinion on the subject of the atomic bomb; since it is difficult to justify the heavy damage and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, there is an opportunity by making use of the Diet, the radio and various other means to play on enemy weakness by skillfully emphasizing the extreme inhumanity of the bomb".* Okamoto thought also that Japan should "expose the bad faith of Russia, with whom (Japan) had neutral relations, in ignoring Japan's request to mediate for peace and in entering the war".¹¹

Two weeks later, Okamoto reported to Tokyo a conversation had with the Swedish Assistant Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter told him "confidentially" that the American Minister (Johnson) was "fair and a man of judgment and probity, but that, as for American anger and bad feeling toward Japan, he has said that because of the Pearl Harbor incident and Japan's barbarous treatment of many prisoners, the American feelings will not readily soften and they would like Japan treated with thoroughgoing sternness".

To this, Okamoto made the stock Japanese reply:

"As for the Pearl Harbor attack's having been a treacherous act,, the American Government had made propaganda and twisted the truth, in order to stir up a warlike spirit on the part of the people. Pro-China Roosevelt's diplomacy toward Japan put her into a predicament where she had no choice but finally to take up arms. This point was one which Littleton let slip out while he was (British) Production Minister, and it aroused a great furor in America. Also, by the American inquiry into responsibility for Pearl Harbor recently, was it not true that the war (situation?) had become clear?*" (H-205362)

*Underscoring supplied.

¹¹Dip. Sum. #1255; H-203830.

A Foreign Office circular of 13 September to Stockholm, Lisbon and Berns recounted U.S. press comments on effects of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and an alleged statement of Brigadier General Farrell of the investigating group, to the effect that "so horrible a weapon must never be used again".* The Foreign Office continued:

"All these reports have been sent abroad by Domei in full detail. To what extent have they been carried by the newspapers and other media at your place?

Since the Americans have recently been raising an uproar about the question of our mistreatment of prisoners, I think we should make every effort to exploit the atomic bomb question in our propoganda...^{11a}

In circular despatches of 3 and 4 September, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, commenting on the course of the Allied occupation, stated that "up to the present time, we feel that the measures taken for disarmament and the subsequent measures taken, at least by the American and Chungking authorities, have been comparatively reasonable and appropriate to the practical situation..... Although there have been a number of unfortunate acts on the part of individual American soldiers, nothing insuspicious on a large scale has occurred".¹² (Shigemitsu had earlier requested the Papal Nuncio in Japan, in view of his personal knowledge of America, "to recommend to the troops who occupy Japan a sympathetic

* American press despatches on the findings of the preliminary survey of Hiroshima contain no such statement by General Farrell.

^{11a} R-205729.

¹² Dip. Sum. #1261 and #1264.

"(understanding) of the situation because of the enormous differences in race, culture, mentality and sentiment; it would be desirable for the Americans in their own interest as well, to leave it to the Japanese Government, which today is truly sincere, to deal with the people according to its successful traditional methods".¹³

On 6 September, Shigemitsu advised the Legations at Berne, Lisbon and Stockholm that "since we have received no orders whatsoever from the Allied Supreme Commander regarding code communication,* it will be our policy to continue to use the remaining cipher machines and code books. (We are making preparations so that we can dispose of the cipher machines and code books at any time)".¹⁴

With regard to communications in China, the Japanese Army ordered the discontinuance of secret codes. As of 14 September the Embassy at Hanking, intended to use them "a little longer (to) test the attitude of the Chinese authorities". As this "test" resulted in a Chinese Army order prohibiting the use of secret codes after the 17th, the Embassy stated that, as previously

* A 26 August message from the Southern Army (Hq. Saigon) advised subordinate commands that "there is no need to answer any enemy interrogation regarding cryptographic materials.....be very sure to conceal absolutely the organization of the Army crypto systems and code procedure." (FE. Sum. #534)

¹³Dip. Sum. #1262.

¹⁴Dip. Sum. #1261; H-20469.

arranged with the Japanese Army, a "brevity code" had been deposited with the Chinese authorities and would be used in the future. (DS. #1272; H-206063)

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Alarmed that Japan had "recently been subjected to an intensive atrocity campaign concerning Japanese mistreatment of prisoners...(which) would appear to have a natural connection with the question of war criminals", Shigemitsu on 10 September instructed his diplomatic representatives at Berns, Stockholm, Lisbon and Zurich to "pay particular attention to reports of this type" and keep him constantly informed. Reports on the trials of war criminals in Germany were to be covered mainly by Berne and Zurich.¹⁶

The Japanese Navy too, evidences a sudden interest in the welfare of prisoners. An Almay of 27 August ordered that "every favor in protection and privilege be accorded the prisoners...after hostilities cease". Fairly exuding the milk of human kindness, the Navy Commander at Makassar on 30 August depicted in glowing terms the conditions at prisoner camp "Peaceful Land" at Macassar. Loath to leave this tropic paradise* (which was pervaded "with a feeling of mutual harmony" between the prisoners and the "picked troops of the Imperial Army"), the prisoners had "asked that arrangements be made for them not to be transferred to Java". "After hostilities ceased" the "fully-equipped former Japanese Naval Hospital" had been transferred to the camp, and "thanks to the great quantity of medicines, clothing and food, the prisoner patients show favorable progress daily". The message mentioned that 152 of the prisoners at

*There are numerous indications in traffic that the Japanese have a tendency to become so entangled in their own propaganda that they believe it themselves. This Navy Commander too, appears either to have brought some of his own stock or to be considering Japan's long-range program, for on 1 September he requested the Southern Area Commander to "inquire into Celebes living conditions and consider the possibility of Japanese remaining there to engage in peaceful occupations..." (FE. Sum. #531)

¹⁶H-205085; Dip. Sum. #1265.

the camp were hospital patients, suffering mainly from pellagra, beri-beri, dysentery and tuberculosis.¹⁷ (Note: Three days earlier the Naval Base Force Commander at Makassar ordered the elimination of "all traces of chemical warfare materials...and dum-dum ammunition".)¹⁸

A recent press despatch quoted one of Japan's leaders as voicing the opinion that the Allies should be guided by the Golden Rule, now that hostilities have ceased. This belated recognition of moral ethics is seen also in a despatch to Tokyo on 4 September from Ambassador Tani (now at Shanghai), reporting an interview had in Nanking on 29 August with Shao Yu-lin, Political Counselor to the Chungking Army. Discussing the matter of extradition of Nanking Puppet leader Chen, who, accepting a Japanese Government offer of asylum, fled to Japan (and was reported by Domei, apparently falsely, as a suicide), Tani told Shao:

"If you could only put yourself in our place for a moment, I am sure you would be glad to meet us halfway. While the Chinese may demand that the Japanese turn over this person, there should be some way of adjusting the matter without causing the Japanese undue embarrassment....."*

Although we may have to agree that Chen is a political offender within the national limits of China, he does not, as I see it, come under the so-called war-criminal clause of the Potsdam Declaration* or the Articles relating thereto.¹⁹

*Underscoring supplied.

¹⁷FE. Sum. #530.

¹⁸FE. Sum. #523.

¹⁹H-204775; Dip. Sum. #1265.

A somewhat distorted version of the Golden Rule, however, is seen in a 10 September despatch from Morishima at Lisbon, who believes that Japan has "adequate grounds" for putting Churchill and President Truman on the war criminal list in view of their "decision at the Potsdam Conference to use the bomb", as "it stands to reason that if those who have violated the regular laws of warfare are to be punished, no distinction should be drawn between victors and vanquished". (DS. #1271)

A Japanese tendency of late to have a fine regard for the legal aspect of matters, has resulted in the complete disapproval by the Embassy at Nanking of the surrender document which General Okamura was ordered to sign on 9 September. Among the defects listed regarding this instrument of surrender are the following:

- "(a) Chungking had drawn it up one-sidedly.
- (b) Article 3 and those following are full of stock phrases and are not always exact.
- (c) There are no words mentioning His Majesty, the Emperor. Furthermore, the phrase 'in obedience to the orders of the Japanese Government', unless there is a legitimate authorization from the point of view of domestic law, will have absolutely no validity."

"As the matter of overall political and administrative guidance in the occupied area" was up to the Japanese Army Commander, the Embassy did not intend to take up with Chungking the matter of revising the document which "had already been signed formally", but felt that it should be suggested to General MacArthur.

(H-206063)

Current Problems:

Judging from the large volume of diplomatic despatches on the subject, Japan's most immediate problem (aside from her internal situation) is the evacuation from occupied countries of Japanese troops and civilians, and their "welfare and protection" while awaiting shipping facilities. From all quarters come expressions of fear that the native populace will "take advantage" of the plight of the unfortunate Japanese nationals who, forced to evacuate the homes and public buildings (which they had confiscated "following upon the heels of the Army"), are now beset with shortages of food and housing as they attempt "group-living" while awaiting evacuation.

The Greater East Asia office at Tsinan, in a report of 24 August, stated that "some quarters believe evacuation will require two to four years",** and expressed serious fears about how the Japanese in collection areas would be protected over such a period, commenting in part:

"At present, the Japanese (North China) Army is indulging in some highly wishful thinking."* It hopes to work out an arrangement with Chungking whereby, on the pretext of maintaining order, it will be able to (continue protecting Japanese) residents for a rather long period of time.*20

*Later reports indicate that there have been remarkably few "incidents".

**Underscoring supplied.

²⁰H-203397; Dip. Sum. #1251.

A Southern Army (Hq. Saigon) despatch to Tokyo on 4 September, requesting "negotiations to obtain the Allied Armies' promise to return all officers and men of the Southern Army to Japan", stated that, "since this is the only ray of hope for a million officers and men of the Southern Army, there is some fear that if it is not accomplished some unfortunate incident might occur within our Army".²¹

In a despatch a week earlier, this Army Command urged that "the following be provided for without fail:

1. That disarmament be carried out under the authority of the Japanese Army Supreme Command.
2. That Japanese military personnel be permitted to wear swords (bayonets).
3. That the Japanese Army be not conscripted for labor.
4. That the necessary minimum of armament for the preservation of military discipline and public order be approved.
5. That personnel safety be guaranteed.²²

In despatches of 7 September the G.E.A. representative at Tainan and the Japanese Consul at Peking voiced the alarm and "bitter disappointment" of Japanese nationals at "the Domei wire concerning the refusal of the Allies to assign ships". Piously citing "humanitarian spirit on the part of the Japanese Government (which, 'braving all difficulties'), provided shipping space on three different occasions" for the exchange of American and British nationals (as proven by the American expression of "regret for the Awa Maru incident"), these despatches

²¹FE. Sum. #531 and #534.

²²FE. Sum. #526.

requested Tokyo to enlist the aid of the Swiss Government, the Red Cross and the Vatican.²³

A Tokyo Circular two days later gave a pessimistic picture of the situation. Although the Government had been diligently "negotiating" as best it could with the Allies for shipping space, it had met with no success. The Circular continues:

"Therefore, the only thing we can do is to supply our needs out of such shipping as we possess ourselves. (It is true that we are allowed to repair ships and build new ones, but with the difficulties about getting materials we cannot expect any great results very soon.) Even if we divert some of the 440,000 tons of shipping which is at present seaworthy* to evacuation service, by cutting down on our allocation of ships for the transport of food, fuel, etc., to Japan (of which there is urgent need), it would require a few dozen months to complete the evacuation.... (For example, if we used 280,000 tons of shipping, it would take 44 months.)*

Consequently, what you will have to do locally is to pick out certain suitable occupations such as agriculture, industry, etc.,.... and have them stick it out until ships can be sent.

I trust that you will appreciate the inevitability of this, and I wish you to get in close touch with the military authorities, and to provide as much assistance as you can as quickly as you can for those Japanese nationals who face imminent group assembly...²⁴

An 11 September despatch from Nanking in reply to the above Circular, requested that Tokyo "negotiate once more with the Allied authorities for the loan of several hospital ships", as "it may be presumed that 10% of the 400,000 Japanese nationals in China are sick or invalid.....furthermore, the local Army has

²³ H-205225; H-205623; Dip. Sum. #1268.

²⁴ H-205080; 204720.

*Underscoring supplied.

on its hands about 70,000 sick or wounded soldiers and is racking its brains over what to do with them...^{*25}

Resourceful Ambassador Tani at Shanghai, however, came up with a solution to the shipping problem. Reporting that, "the Chinese here are wallowing in a sort of arrogant pride and their language toward the Japanese is quite insulting", he saw the likelihood of serious incidents if the disarmed Japanese troops were kept in Shanghai for a long period; and suggested that a "speedy and amicable solution" would be to impress Chungking with the gravity of the problem, affecting as it did the Chinese guarantee of the maintenance of peace and order, and "to have China negotiate with the U.S.A. for the loan of ships and then divert them" to the Japanese!^{*26}

On 9 September the Japanese Ambassador (or GEA representative) at Bangkok, although puzzled as to the "true significance of stipulations" of the Allied Army representative in Siam, which provided for the release of interned residents and the turning back of municipal-owned property confiscated after the outbreak of hostilities, felt that he should "strive to do what (he could) to alleviate conditions". He urged Tokyo to "impress thoroughly upon MacArthur" the reasons why conditions in Bangkok were "entirely different from those in a military area",

*Underscoring supplied.

²⁵H-205520

²⁶H-205004; H-204479; H-202729; H-204563; H-203535; H-205071;
Dip. Sum. #1250.

and to "arrange for the attentive official discipline needed in the special consideration by Allied officials toward the protection of residents and respect for municipal-owned property. He further wanted arrangement made whereby he would be able "to negotiate with the representative of the Allied Army".²⁷

In a further despatch three days later, this official reported that the Japanese military authorities, feeling that after disarmament they should be "dealt with generously as surrenderers and not treated as prisoners of war", had become "quite strong in their condemnation..of the extremely high-handed attitude" of the British members of the Allied Mission at Bangkok, and asked that appeals be made to General MacArthur and the International Red Cross.

Another pressing problem of the Japanese Government is the situation in Northern Korea and Manchuria, where the plight of disarmed troops and Japanese resident nationals (about two million of the latter in Manchuria) has been worsened by the "illegal acts" of the Russian Army. It appears, according to Shigemitsu, that "the Russian Army has declared that it will assume all administrative powers, interpreting Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration as having extinguished Japanese authority in Korea", and has even gone so far as to "have been making speeches on the street corners to the effect that all Japanese property in Korea belongs to the Korean people".²⁸

²⁷H-205142; H-205689.

²⁸H-205229; H-205132; H-205087; H-205015; H-203520; H-203358.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu has recently sent several long despatches to his Ministers in Sweden and Switzerland on this subject. In one dated 10 September, addressed to Okamoto in Stockholm with an information copy to Kase in Berne, he relayed detailed reports of violence and disorganization in those areas (almost all of which had already been communicated to General MacArthur). He continued:

"The numerous requests made by the Japanese Government to the United Nations Supreme Commander relative to restraining the Russian Army from illegal acts...have up to the present been without effect. In the last analysis Supreme Commander MacArthur seems to have done no more than to represent the United Nations in accepting the surrender."* For example, it seems that he is giving no orders with regard to Russian behavior on the South Manchurian Railway.

Therefore, the Japanese Government attempted to have the Swedish Charge in Tokyo negotiate with Soviet Ambassador Malik but Malik refused on the ground that he had no authority. A request was also made for the good offices of the International Red Cross through Dr. Junod, but he said that the Red Cross was not on particularly good terms with Russia, and accordingly he was disposed to do nothing but gather information.

Since the local situation is one which does not permit of even a day's delay, the Japanese Government..has again demanded that the United Nations Supreme Commander meet the situation properly,* and also intends to work on the Russians through various channels, such as the Swedish Government and the International Red Cross.

Will Your Excellency explain our distress to the Government to which you are accredited,...and ask that it exert its good offices toward having the Russian Government issue the necessary orders at once to the local military authorities...." (In a despatch to Berne on the same day, Shigemitsu directed Kase to ask the Red Cross to dispatch representatives to Manchuria and North Korea.)²⁹

*Underscoring supplied.

²⁹ Dip. Sum. #1268; #1253.

Minister Okamoto at Stockholm, however, does not appear to have had much success. In a despatch to Shigemitsu on 12 September he reported in part as follows:

"...the (Swedish) Vice-Minister's Assistant said that since in essence protection of interests could be done only with the consent of the country concerned, if the Russian Government persisted in refusing this, it would, unfortunately, be difficult for Sweden to do anything.

I replied that the views of the Japanese Government were clearly set forth in the document, and that since Russia was replying as though Japan were not a sovereign country, we could by no means let this slide.* As to the actual problem, since we could not ignore Russia's violent behavior in Manchukuo and North Korea,* we should like our representations in this matter communicated to Moscow at once..*30

(Note: Since the surrender, Japan has been "negotiating" unsuccessfully to have Sweden represent her interests in Russia and Russian occupied territory. According to the Swedish Foreign Minister, a Russian note on the subject points out the following:

"Japan's surrender has completely altered her international standing, and..since all questions concerning Soviet interests in Japan would now be handled by the Allied Supreme Command, the protection by a third country of Japanese interests in the Soviet Union has lost its basis; accordingly, the treatment of Japanese residents in Russia would be handled unilaterally.**"

Shigemitsu however, informed Okamoto that the Japanese Government was not in agreement with the Russian view, and "holds that until a treaty of peace is drawn up and diplomatic and consular relations are restored there continues to be a need for the belligerent countries mutually to acknowledge the protection of interests through a third country". In view of this, Okamoto was directed to ask the Swedish Government again to convey to Russia Japan's stand.

*Underscoring supplied.

³⁰ H-205651; Dip. Sum. #1268.

Japanese hopes for further favors from Sweden received a set-back however upon receipt by the Swedish Foreign Office of a report from Tokyo that a Swedish Legation employee had been arrested, tortured and starved -- "the indignation of the Swedish Government was beyond words". Okamoto said that if true this was "very unfortunate indeed...the things done by the gendarmes are truly distressing" 31

31

Dip. Sum. #1267; H-204813; H-205049; H-205059; H-204711;
H-205145; H-205146; H-205147; H-201809; H-202319; H-205522;
Dip. Sum. #1270; H-204259; H-204902; H-205806.

Another matter which has caused the Japanese Government much concern since the surrender, is the financial and political status of its diplomatic and consular representatives in Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Afghanistan, Eire and the Vatican.

Anticipating a freezing of funds abroad, the Foreign Office on 12 August issued the following directive: "Convert as much as possible of the deposit holdings of your office into ready cash and take all the necessary precautions in connection with its safe-keeping".³² Later, the Foreign Office tacitly approved of elaborate schemes proposed by the officials abroad for concealment of the amount and whereabouts of their funds, and specifically ordered the destruction of financial archives held in the Legation at Berne (which included its own records and those of former Missions in Germany, etc.).

Apparently reversing this policy* (of Togo), Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in a despatch to Berne on 8 September** referred to the difficulty of concealing funds "in the long run" and advised that "the idea is to answer any Allied demand for an explanation by giving a truthful account of the funds divided up (among individual staff members)". Two days earlier the Yokohama Specie Bank advised

*It is not known whether or not this sudden reversal of policy was caused by the disclosure of the breaking of the Japanese code. Numerous insinuations in the press after publication of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's findings on 29 August, were followed by Drew Pearson's "now it can be told" column on 8 September.

**Apparently convinced at last that the "cessation of hostilities" was here to stay, Shigemitsu on the same day issued the following Circular: "Along with the conclusion of the war, the Day of Observing Great Victory (perhaps 18 September-Manchuria invasion) has been discontinued."
(H-205328)

³²Jap. Dip. Spec. #53; H-204172; H-203455; H-204020.

its Berns representative as follows:

"It is our policy to respond to any United Nations investigations of the Bank here with clear answers and with no effort to conceal the facts. Therefore, please adopt the same attitude in Switzerland."³³

On 16 August, Foreign Minister Togo, in reply to a despatch from Kase in Berns, to the effect that "the enemy (the United States Government) had sent a demand to the Japanese Government through the Government of Switzerland on some pretext or other" that all property and archives of diplomatic establishments abroad to delivered into their hands";³⁴ directed Kase to reply as follows:

"Inasmuch as this demand is not covered by any of the stipulations of the Potsdam Declaration which we have accepted, the Imperial Government cannot agree" to this demand of the United States Government..³⁵

On 24 August, Minister Kase advised Tokyo as follows:

"From now on, the Empire's diplomacy will be devoted entirely to armistice negotiations with the Allies.....if it is the intention of the Allies to sever our diplomatic relations with neutral countries, then the matter touches the question of the autonomy of the Imperial Government, and I think their demand should be opposed as strongly as possible..."³⁶

Echoing this sentiment, Morishima at Lisbon and Okamoto at Stockholm felt

*Underscoring supplied.

³³Dip. Sum. #1266; H-204574; H-201562; H-205733; H-205058.

³⁴Spec. #96; #89; #88; #115; H-203290; H-205433; Dip. Sum. #1261.

³⁵Spec. #93; #94; #101; H-204762; H-204761.

³⁶H-203258; H-203250; H-203298; Dip. Sum. #1252.

that it would not be advisable "to tolerate this extraordinary situation",*
and that Japan should "insist upon the fact that this unreasonable demand was
inadmissible under international law."³⁷

The matter of impounding archives and property came to an issue at Kabul, Afghanistan, on 27 August, when, according to Minister Shichida, an Allied diplomatic delegation (headed by the American Chargé d'affaires) called on him to enforce the Allied demand. Shichida informed the delegation that in compliance with a recent order from the Japanese Foreign Office he was in no position to accept the demand, and "further, it was to be borne in mind that the relations between Japan and the Allies would be finally settled by the Peace Agreement of 2 September".* He stated, however, that he would ask his Government for instructions and would be obliged if the Allies would wait until he had received a reply. According to Shichida's account:

"....at that point the Soviet Ambassador who was also present, stated that the Allies intended to carry out their demands at once. He went on to say that I seemed to have the mistaken notion that the Japanese Government would enjoy a position of independence after the occupation by the American forces."*

Actually, he said, it was very unlikely that I would receive any instructions once the forces of occupation had taken all necessary measures. He therefore demanded that I sign the memorandum, (and) the American Chargé endorsed this position. I insisted that it would be impossible for me to do so, (whereupon) the Chargé said he would have to ask the Afghan Government to cooperate..."

* Underscoring supplied.

³⁷ H-204958; H-203290; Spec. #105; H-203379; H-204504.

Shichida felt that any appeal he might make to the Afghan Government would be useless "in view of the recent attitude of that Government"; he therefore agreed to a compromise proposal made by the British representative, that the memorandum be signed "under protest as a result of coercion by the Allied representatives". (The delegation then placed under seal the archives and approximately U. S. \$30,000.)³⁸

Along with other current problems, the Japanese Navy, rather surprisingly, is confronted, like the Allies, with the problem of priority in demobilization. The following directive was embodied in a Bupers Alnav of 14 September:

"Careful consideration will be given to see that men in the following classes are demobilized first:

- (1) Persons qualified to return to positions of public leadership.
- (2) Persons qualified in agriculture and forestry, the marine products industry, transportation and communications, mining, stock raising and the building industry.
- (3) Scientists.
- (4) Qualified linguists.³⁹

³⁸ H-204238; H-204284-5; H-204302; H-204260; H-204958.

³⁹ FE. Sum. #539.

Although the last of Japan's previously reported plans to create friction between the Allies went hopelessly awry when Russia entered the war, recent traffic indicates that the Japanese Government has not given up the idea, and intends to exploit fully whatever opportunities may present themselves.

On 28 August the Japanese diplomatic representative at Shanghai reported that, "Among foreign circles here the view is widely held that it would be most fair to restore the old concessions or to make Shanghai an international city under international control".⁴⁰

In the opinion of Ambassador Tani at Nanking, expressed in a despatch to the Greater East Asia Ministry on 25 August, "The soberminded intelligentsia (Chinese) expect that, subsequent to the withdrawal of the Japanese Army, China will be faced with a difficult situation, with civil war and Russian aggression developing as a result of the collision between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, and with China turned into a colony under the domination of the United States".⁴¹

In a despatch to Tani on the same day, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu expressed the belief that, "Although Chungking has now won the objectives for which she has fought, and although she ranks as a victorious power alongside of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, I am sure that she is well aware of the fact that her future will not be easy and that she will ultimately

⁴⁰ H-203760.

⁴¹ H-204024; H-203373.

"come to realize the necessity of a coalition with Japan".⁴²

In despatches to Tokyo on 26 and 30 August, Ambassador Tani included the following:

"When the Japanese Government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the Nanking Government lost the prop of its existence. Then, when it voluntarily dissolved itself, this office, generally speaking, lost its partner.....

We are guiding the establishments under our jurisdiction to the best of our ability and are striving to realize the desired results...at the same time we are exercising caution....

The (Japanese) Consular Police force in China will probably not be permitted to continue its existence because of the cancellation of extra-territoriality rights; therefore at about the time of the time of the transfer of the Army's weapons, these Consular Police will act as plain clothes soldiers.* As for the arms and ammunition in the police station, these are not to be surrendered to the Chinese (unless unavoidable -- in which case they will be surrendered on receipt of full compensation)."

Continuing, Tani requested that Shigemitsu see what he could do with the Supreme Allied Command regarding the status of the Embassy establishments in China.⁴³

In reply, Shigemitsu informed Tani that although "the surrender document and general orders stop at prescribing the basic principles and the outline for carrying out the surrender...we believe that even if Headquarters negotiates with Allied authorities, the application of the general orders will be rather strict". With regard to disarmament of the Consular Police, Shigemitsu stated

* Underscoring supplied.

⁴² H-204491; H-204382.

⁴³ H-203471.

that Allied General Order No. 1 (which exempted police in Japan from disarmament) did not apply to Consular Police. However, "it was not fair" that the latter be classed with "the Japanese people in general". "As the Allied authorities' treatment of us from a practical standpoint has been diverse," we believe there is room for consultation separately with Chungking on this point".⁴⁴

However, it appears that an attempt to by-pass the Supreme Allied Command and negotiate separately with Chungking was not successful. According to a despatch from Tani on 8 September, the Japanese Chief of Staff at Shanghai "met with the Chungking Army Political Counselor secretly on the evening of the 6th, in order to have a friendly talk without the interference of the American Army representative".* In giving an account of the meeting, Tani stated:

"On that occasion (the Chungking representative) said that 'the authority of MacArthur's Supreme Headquarters is extremely great and it is almost impossible for Chungking even to state an opinion in regard to the decisions of that Headquarters. For Chungking to fail to solicit MacArthur's opinion would be a matter of great moment.'

'Thus', he said, 'while China may to some extent present strong representations to England and France; in the case of the United States it is absolutely impossible for her to do so.'....."

Tani continued:

"Even though we deal with the (Chungking) Vice Commander in this area, it is quite evident that he will not solicit our views on any question of real significance. In the final analysis everything will have to be decided at the negotiations between Your Excellency and MacArthur....."⁴⁵

*Underscoring supplied.

44H-204991.

45H-205004.

Tani urged as "absolutely vital" that Tokyo "set up (in Shanghai) some definite organization with a name of its own, which can act as a permanent agency in carrying on negotiations with the Chungking Government (or with 3rd Powers)..... The important point is that if we leave this decision up to MacArthur we will place ourselves in the unfortunate position of having MacArthur meddle in everything* from now on.." (H-206069)

Further attention to the possibility of friction between the Allies is seen in a despatch to Tokyo from the Greater East Asia representative at Amoy on 29 August, which quotes a Chinese colonel as saying that "for the most part, China has been placed within the sphere of the influence of the United States; Great Britain has almost no real power. Moreover, it appears that Anglo-American relations are unexpectedly tense, and American antipathy toward Great Britain is great".⁴⁶

In one of his frequent "spy reports" from Stockholm, Minister Okamoto on 22 August, indicates that he has not abandoned his long-sustained theory of the certainty of an eventual rift between Russia and the Anglo-Americans. After noting that the tone of recent Moscow broadcasts "is identical with what it was when they were demanding a 'hard peace' for Germany", he expresses the following

*Underscoring supplied.

⁴⁶H-205006.

opinions:

"The Soviet Union apparently has no idea of maintaining Japan as a buffer state between England and the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviet plan for Japan seems to be to impose very harsh terms, making Japan's economic life very difficult and creating internal disorder, to take advantage of these difficulties in order to work for the expansion of Communist strength, and thus to bring Japan into the Soviet sphere of influence. Accordingly, they are strongly opposed to any Anglo-American inclination to make the terms lenient, and they are particularly on the lookout for any secret talks between Japan and the Anglo-Americans.....

With the end of the war against Japan, the British and Americans will no longer find it necessary to submit to the Russians in everything.... In particular, East Asia is far more important to the Americans than Europe, so it appears that the British and Americans might oppose the Russians very firmly (if their respective demands fail to agree).

It is clear from Foreign Minister Bevin's speech that the British Labor Party will follow the old foreign policy, and it is worth noticing that he indirectly criticised the Soviet Union's Balkan policy.....⁴⁷

Continuing on this theme, Okamoto in a later "spy report" (8 September), stated:

"With the end of the war against Japan, the British and the Americans have begun a diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union. Even on the question of handling Germany, the idea is raised in some quarters in England and America that it would be foolish to destroy Germany's highly-developed industry^{*†} and make her into an agricultural nation

* Underscoring supplied.

† The Washington Post on 14 September quoted Mr. Knudsen (General Motors) as expressing an opinion to this general effect.

⁴⁷ H-202779.

Okamoto appears to believe that "the keynotes of Soviet policy in the face of this British and American diplomatic offensive" are as follows:

- "(1) To get as great a harvest as possible from the military occupations in Europe and East Asia.
- (2) To avoid any overt clashes with England and the United States, especially the latter, to make formal concessions when necessary, and to play for time.
- (3) Under skilful 'camouflage' to make use of internal social and political tension and unrest, and to strengthen the influence of pro-Soviet elements, the Communist Party, and the radical factions.
- (4) To make use of national liberation movements in opposition to British and American imperialism, mainly in Asia....."⁴⁸

(Note: With his typically Japanese sublime faith in the rectitude of the "Divine Land", Okamoto has dismissed, if he ever considered it, the possibility of any relation between the Soviet demand for a "hard peace" and Japan's record of aggressions in the past forty years -- "in which", as the Soviet radio termed it, "she has always been very wolf-like".)

⁴⁸
H-205087.

Miscellaneous:

Of possible interest as an example of the mental world in which some Japanese dwell (or would so have others believe), there is included here the following elegiac tribute to General Tojo on the occasion of his recent suicide attempt. In a plain language intercept of 11 September (origin unknown), it was attributed to Tojo's bodyguard, apparently a somewhat incoherent Japanese Boswell.

"There is a certain depth of dignity in the thoughts of the General, which is beyond comprehension by us. He was the type of man who, while working in the garden, would receive guests graciously.

Especially after the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript announcing the end of the war, it seems that he was particularly desirous that the Imperial forces maintain absolute discipline, and he was greatly concerned that no incidents would arise that might harm the prestige of the Imperial forces. If certain sections of the military fanatically continued the war, it would be in disobedience of orders and contrary to the Imperial wish, and it would go down in history as the second Nanagi incident. Nothing will be gained by it.

I can see even now the dignified image of the General after he became advisor to the Emperor, replying for two and three hours to questions put to him by all ranks of young officers.

He, who has assumed all the responsibility for the East Asia War possible for man to bear, mentioned that his advice to the Emperor goes hand in hand with his office as Premier and that it was his duty to assume the entire responsibility for this Holy War upon himself and not partial responsibility as the commander of one area force.

There is a certain dignity that cannot be pushed aside in this farmer-like man who recently has been reading the memoirs of famous generals, and, covered with dirt and perspiration, was awaiting this fateful day raising tomatoes, eggplants and corn all over his garden. It indeed reflects the purity and serenity of the later life of this man.⁴⁹

⁴⁹GZ #5183-H-111852 September.

(Note: It would appear from the above that we have grossly misjudged this venerable old son of the soil. Standing now in grace (and corn), he forms an inspiring picture as he faces the setting sun with an equanimity born of confidence that "history will vindicate" him and marred only by regret that the Holy War did not succeed.)

Conclusion


The composite picture formed by the foregoing despatches indicates that the Japanese leaders whose views are therein reflected*, have adopted the creed (sanctioned by the august words of the Imperial Rescript) -- that, while striving unselfishly to ensure the "emancipation and stability of East Asia", to the ultimate "happiness and welfare of all nations", Japan was set upon and forced into war by a conniving and wilful America who with her Allies and the "outrageous bomb" succeeded in interrupting this noble task.

Although occupied for the present with problems of repatriation and political and economic readjustment, these leaders are ever mindful of their obligation to "tread the road back to the revival of the glories of the Japanese Empire".

The first step on the road back will be to rid the "Divine Land" of the foreigners and "MacArthur's meddling" -- to accomplish which it will be necessary to put to use the inbred Japanese ability to respond to every mood and wish of the Allied Command, and, chameleon-like, reflect the desired qualities of sincerity, cooperation, etc.

Further progress may be expected through employment of a cunning (worn sharp with use) with which they will pierce the "enemy weaknesses" (short memories; gullibility; lack of vindictiveness; the cupidity of some of their financial and industrial leaders; the attitude of their "Old China Hands";

*Excepting only Ambassador Sato at Moscow and former Minister in Berlin Shin Sakuma (now in Stockholm), whose expressed views (on pages 4 and 5 respectively) do not indicate a tendency to self-delusion.



China's need of technicians (who will know how to be ingratiating); divergence of aims of Allied nations; and the always reliable bogey of Communism).

Thus, "bearing the unbearable and enduring the unendurable", spurred on by the rankling of injured pride and sustained in their "singleness of purpose" by unshakeable belief in the righteousness of their cause, they will proceed -- determined, in the pursuance of their shining goal, never again to "lag behind in the progress of the world".