

THE CHUNGKING-YENAN CONTROVERSY
CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

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- I -

The Chinese National (central) Government's relations with the Chinese Communist Party received it's impetus on the road to the current crisis when the Communist armies increased their infiltration and deployment into potentially strategic areas in anticipation of an Allied landing on the Coast of China in which they hoped to collaborate with the Allied forces and thus force international recognition.

A report from the Japanese ambassador in HSINGKING mentioned that according to intelligence, on 21-22 June between three and four thousand Chinese Red troops having entered JEHOL province, were advancing toward WU CHIH SHAN and according to a captured document, the 11, 12, and 13th armies with 346,500 effectives* were planning to invade JEHOL and LIAONING. The plans called for the establishment of bases in those areas by the end of September.** On 11 July TSINAN reported to TOKYO that the YENAN army which had been repulsed by the Japanese forces during May, had succeeded in escaping with the bulk of the army intact and were, "continuing to carry out the destruction of the CHUNGKING forces", in that area and that according to (as yet unconfirmed) intelligence, YANG KOO FU, Commander of (blank) war zone (communist) had ordered one of his area commanders to capture the internment camp at WEHSIEN and liberate the 1,500 ANGL0-AMERICAN internees***

*H-195351, H.I.S. estimates of CHINESE RED forces in this area gives 64,000 regulars and 630,000 militia. Many of these would be ill armed and ill trained mercenaries.

**Dip Sum. #1202.

***H-197092, 11 July 1945.

The Chinese Communist party has long had agents busy in the Northwestern provinces working amongst the large Chinese Mohammedan populations in an effort to recruit converts by utilizing the Mohammedan group's aspirations for autonomy and otherwise creating further alienation from the Central Government. A Japanese intelligence despatch from TAIYUAN to TOKYO on 18 July reports;

"The Chinese Communist Party has continued its activities with the customary persistence.....pushing its activities against the ORDOS (Inner Mongolian Tribes) in the Northwest,.....apparently intending (or hoping) to coordinate operations with the advancing Soviets from the West. The Reds were also taking steps to win over the Mohammedans in the Northwest and had sent their, 'Chief political fomentor', to organize infiltration."

They were utilizing Mohammedan temples as bases of operations to spread propaganda and stir up feeling against CHUNGKING with the theme "that the Mohammedans are being discredited and victimized by an unjust force, and that the Mohammedans were a minority which is being victimized". To further these ends the Reds had organized Mohammedan Mutual Assistance Societies and Mohammedan Youth Movements and had started to issue propaganda publications from these organizations.*

These various activities of the Communists and movements of their armed forces have been closely watched by the National government who were not slow to take such counter-measures as they thought necessary, or were in a position to take.

This was apparently inspired by a report he had received from the field, to

*H-198771.

the effect that the CHUNGKING 59th Division had attacked in the CHUN HUA -
HSI AN area and that, "for three days they have been battling fiercely".

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This event and similar incidents together with the fact that during recent months both Free and Occupied China were rife with rumors of an impending Allied invasion of the Coast, accents the fact that the Chinese Communists were accelerating their efforts to turn such an event to their utmost advantage by forcing the invading forces to accept them as collaborators and therefore entitled to support and recognition as co-equals of the National government forces. This was also recognized by the Japanese as is evidenced from a despatch on 31 July from TSI HAN to TOKYO, reporting on the then current incident and stating in part:

"with the wildly circulating rumors of landing in SHAN TUNG by UNITED STATES forces, the struggles of the YERAN and CHUNGKING factions tends to become more pronounced.it looks as though the Communists army were scheming to welcome the landing AMERICANS alone".

Mention is also made of the Communists disposition of their forces and their evident plans for the isolation of TSINGTAO and TSIHAN and that, "provision is being made for a route connecting the central SHANTUNG war area and the HOPEH-SHANTUNG-HONAN war area, and to make it possible to provide reinforcements for an AMERICAN landing".*

- II -

When the probability of an ALLIED landing was dissipated by the SOVIET declaration of war and the first Japanese peace bid, the Communists lost no time in adjusting their plans to allow for the new situation and took steps

* H-200185.

toward the occupation and control of extensive areas and strategic centers by effecting the surrender of Japanese and Puppet forces. A Japanese intelligence despatch on 14 August reported an Army estimate of 100,000 Eighth Route Army Guerillas assembled and planning to occupy TAIYUAN (strategically located capital of SHAN HSI). On the same day another Japanese message from SHANGHAI quoted a YENAN news agency despatch of 11 August stating that the Communist Chief CHU TEH had issued orders to his principal units to deploy and advance into MANCHURIA and INNER MONGOLIA, giving specific orders to the various units for the occupation of CHAHAR, JEHOL, SHANSHI, SUIYUAN, LIAOWING, SHANTUNG and KIRIN (CHI LIN). The units were admonished; "In carrying out this mission, the forces of liberation shall overcome all difficulties from their paths of advance. They shall ruthlessly crush all resistance (from any source?)", in addition CHU TEH was instructed, "To order all units under his command to disarm the Japanese forces".* (Presumably all those they may meet during the advance).

The National government in CHUNGKING immediately and loudly condemned the Communists' action and on 12 August CHIANG KAI SHEK instructed the Communist Chief to remain in his present position and never again to take independent action. At the same time he broadcast to the Japanese High Command in CHINA that if the Japanese forces, "Should surrender their armies to any other groups other than the duly authorized forces of the National government, that JAPAN would be held responsible".**

*H-201830, SHANGHAI/TOKYO.

**H-201830, SHANGHAI/TOKYO.

At least some elements in the National government were becoming not a little worried over the turn that events had taken. If the National Government were unable to deploy its forces in time to effect surrender of the Japanese armies ahead of the Communists, the situation would indeed become grave.

The communists "views", as reported in a Japanese intercept, amount to the perennial Communists' demand that the Communist party be allowed participation in a coalition government and at the same time maintenance of their private army and more or less recognition as a co-equal sovereign government. The, "gist", of the demands as reported in a Japanese despatch to Tokyo are, quote:

1. After the CHUNGKING government and the (Communist) High command have accepted the surrender of the Japanese and puppets they are to confer with the Communists before making any treaties or agreements.
2. All anti-Japanese Peoples Armed Forces (i.e. Communist troops, militia and guerrillas) of the liberated and occupied areas are to receive the surrender of the Japanese troops surrounded by them, collect and (store?) their arms, send their own representatives and take part in the enemy surrender to the United Nations; after which they are to elect their own representatives to carry out policies and have the right to take part in the peace conference and the United Nations conference with regard to JAPAN.
3. As a means to check internal strife, it is necessary that both the KUO MIN TANG and the Communist armies accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet armies.
4. To be carried out; organization of a unified government..... setting up a unified democratic government. The abolition of special agencies.....recognition of the anti-Japanese armies of the popularly elected government in the liberated areas and the evacuation of Government troops in these areas. The liberation of political prisoners.....etc.* etc.

* Jap Dip. H-202606, SHANGHAI/TOKYO.

On the same day (16 August) the Japanese in NANKING reported to TOKYO that both Generalissimo CHIANG and the Communist Chief CHU TEH had (on the 15th) broadcast instructions to the Japanese CINC in CHINA to surrender. The Japanese versions of both broadcasts are substantially the same as those publicly announced. The text follows:*

ORDERS FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG

1. The Japanese government has proclaimed unconditional surrender.
2. The Japanese army high command will order at once, local armies to suspend all military operations, will send representatives to YU SHAN and will receive orders from HO YING SHAN and will receive orders from HO YING CHIN commander in chief of the Central army. *(garbled in dispatch)*
3. After the suspension of hostilities, the Japanese army will keep their arms and equipment for a short time and continue the present state of affairs, maintaining local order and communications, pending instructions from Commander HO.
4. All ships and airplanes are to be kept in their present locations but ships on the YANGTZE are to be massed in ICHANG and SHA HSI.
5. Installations and arms are not to be demolished.
6. With regard to the execution of the above orders, the commander in chief and local commanders will assume equally personal responsibility and will answer to CHIANG KAI SHEK, supreme commander of the war zones in CHINA.

*H-201942, NANKING/TOKYO.

ORDERS FROM COMMUNIST GENERAL CHU TEH

1. The Japanese government has proclaimed unconditional surrender.
2. You are to order all units under your command to cease operations and to surrender upon receiving orders from the 8th route army (Communist) for the restoration of CHINA and the anti-Japanese columns in South CHINA, with the exception of the units which are surrounded by the KUO MIN TANG army.
3. With regard to the surrender, you are to send representative to FOU PING.....under orders from General SHIMOMURA SADA. Orders are to be received from General LIU EN SHIH(?). (blanks) will send representatives to contact you at T'IKEN CH'ANG the place of the NEW FOURTH ARMY, and you will receive orders from General CHIH KI (blanks) For CANTON, representatives should be appointed in KUSHU and should be sent to the TU TAN area under the KU NAN anti-Japanese columns. Arrangements will be made for them to receive orders from General TSENG SHANG.
4. The Japanese armies in North, East, Central and South CHINA with the exception of those surrounded by the KUO MIN TANG army will keep their arms and material for the time being. They are to receive orders from the 8th route army, the RINZAI army and the anti-Japanese columns in South China, pending the acceptance of surrender by our army.
5. All ships and airplanes in North and East China are to remain in the place where they now are, but ships along the coast respectively at LIEN UN CHIANG, TSING TAO, WEINAI WEI and TIEN ESIN.
6. Installations and arms are not to be demolished. Moreover, YENAN in the name of CHU TEH, through the ANGLO-AMERICAN ambassadors (blanks) anti-Japanese Peoples Forces under the command of (blanks) YENAN to the mother country will accept the surrender of the Japanese army (16th area army) which is now surrounded by a method prescribed by the UNITED NATIONS and stipulations (blanks) by radio. After your arms and material have been surrendered, you will be held responsible for carrying out all rules and regulations (blanks).

- III -

The Central Government, in its determination to nullify the Communists' action, were making every effort to speed the process of occupation and were paving the way in advance by adopting an increased conciliatory attitude toward the Japanese and Puppets in order to insure their cooperation in opposing the Communists. A SU CHOW report to TOKYO states in part:

"On the 16th JEN YUAN TAO, again received orders from Generalissimo CHIANG appointing him commander of the NANKING Advanced Forces. On the same day he again issued a proclamation to the military and civilians.....that he intended to deal with the Japanese forces in a fair and decent manner."*

A report from PEKING mentioned that, on the 16th, Committee chairman WANG** stated he intended to do everything in his power to maintain public order and bring about closer cooperation between the Chinese and the Japanese civilian and military police, and that, "North China definitely must not be turned over into the hands of the Communists".*** From HANKOW, word was sent that a CHUNGKING army commander had effected a coup d'etat and appointed various underground and local officials in charge of all agencies and bureaus.****

* H-202628, 19 August 1945.

** Wang Yin Tai, President of the North China Political Council has had an understanding with Chungking since his appointment to that post.

*** Special 103.

**** H-202891.

Meanwhile the Communists were taking every possible step to gain control of territory and increase their bargaining power. According to a Japanese intelligence report from TSINAN, CHU TSH ordered the units under his command to make sure of the bases in every part of North China. He specifically commanded them to seize the PO HAI districts, and in order to control the (population?) of the principal cities, to capture the strategic communication and transportation centers.*

During this period, the situation in the principal strategic centers may be seen from the flood of Japanese reports resulting from their own confusion and apprehension. There had been isolated but significant clashes between the National Government units (including puppet and Japanese garrisons supporting them) and Communist advance units.

CANTON

CANTON reported that CHUNGKING, "Detached forces, Advance-troops, and Storming parties", had been gradually infiltrating into the surrounding areas and in addition, "there were reports of penetration by Communist forces. All in all, the situation does not allow for any optimism".

However, the CHUNGKING forces had subsequently entered the City and were taking control of all Chinese organizations and had informed the South China Army (Japanese) that their aim was merely to guard against the activities of local Communist rebels and insure public order; "and the Japanese army had agreed".**

*H-202449.

**H-202754.

SHANGHAI

SHANGHAI-SHOCHOW area,

was by this time, with the assistance of the Japanese and puppet garrisons, pretty well in the hands of the National government parties. There were still fairly strong Communist forces around the perimeters of some of the cities but the probability of a major clash was fast dissipating.

NANKING

TANI reported from WUHU that elements of the Communists' New Fourth Army had broken into the outskirts of NANKING on the 17th and 18th and had fired machine guns and the garrison had fired a few warning shots in return. CHUNGKING agents and underground forces had already started to set up control over the civil and public agencies and had declared their primary objective was to prevent the occupation of NANKING by the New Fourth Army and they were not anticipating any opposition from the Japanese military.*

SHANTUNG

In SHANTUNG, however, the Communists are known to have been concentrating and strengthening their position for the past two years and Governor HO SU YUAN had announced on the 17th that his troops were ready to enter TSINAN (provincial capital and communications center) and TSINGTAO (the major seaport) and accept the Japanese surrender in SHANTUNG. YENAN had

*H-202978, H-302655.

broadcast that there was already fairly large scale fighting in the vicinities of CHEFOO, WEI HAI WEI, TSI NAN, and TSDING TAO and by 1st September CHEFOO was in the hands of the Communists. A Japanese despatch from TSINAN on the 20th reported that:

"The Imperial army and the Communists were confronting each other.....I HSIEN is being surrounded by the 8th Route ArmyCommunist troops are advancing up the railroad..... South of TSINAN..... The army (Japanese and Puppet) is endeavoring to increase its strength."**

A further report on the same day showed more confusion. The Japanese were then mainly concerned with the protection of Japanese nationals and surrendering only to duly authorized CHUNGKING forces and were taking such steps as organizing vigilante committees and militias to oppose the Communists. They had received information that the railroad had been blown up near CHOU HSIEN and the city itself had been captured by a force of 20,000 Communists and that they had seized control of part of the TSINAN-PUKOW railroad and had already entered TSINAN and were massing near KUSHAN to the North. The report concluded; "The Japanese army is cooperating with CHANG CHING YUEH's army. We understand that this CHUNGKING army hopes to take TSINAN".*** By the 3rd September advance units and National government officials had entered TSINAN and although, "TSINAN is still surrounded by Communist forces" who were overwhelmingly superior in numbers, the city was reported quiet.****

** H-202605.

*** H-202549.

**** H-204519.

However, it is extremely probable that this is partly due to the current negotiations in Chungking.

TIENTSIN-PEKING

TIENTSIN reported, on the 19th and 20th, several clashes with "YENAN Bandits", around the outlying districts, in which the Communists had succeeded in cutting off communications for short periods.* Collateral information indicates the Communists have comparatively strong forces in this area, which have apparently not yet been able to coordinate their strength for a showdown.

TAIYUAN

There had been considerable fear expressed that TAIYUAN (capital of SHANSHI) would easily fall into the hands of the Communists but a despatch from TANAKA on the 20th of August indicated that he apparently had confidence that the National (and puppet) forces would be able to maintain control.**

SHIYUAN

The communists had apparently succeeded in considerable penetration into SHIYUAN province, but as yet were not in a position to make a concerted drive and were confining their operations to small scale raids presumably in order to obtain arms and ammunition and destruction of communications in order to oppose the advancing Government forces. A Japanese despatch from

*H-202548.

**H-203054.

KUEI SUI (capital city) stated in part:

The rampages of the Communist bandits are still as widespread as ever. The Army (Japanese) here is rapidly leading the forces of YEN HSI SHAN (Chungking Government) to this place and will try to insure public order.*

- IV -

In the interim, Communist leader MAO, no doubt realizing that the Government forces, with Allied assistance and support, (plus Japanese and Puppet cooperation) were out-manoeuvring him at every turn, finally replied to CHIANG on 22 August to the effect that he would send his deputy, CHOU EN LAI to CHUNGKING for a conference. CHIANG however, sent a third invitation on the 24th requesting that MAO himself come** and now, with the wind completely taken from his sails by the SINO-SOVIET treaty, MAO graciously accepted the Generalissimo's invitation and finally arrived in CHUNGKING accompanied by the UNITED STATES ambassador, General HURLEY.

*H-203529.

** It is not clear whether the suggestion, that Ambassador HURLEY lend his good offices as a "go-between", was sent to YEMAN by CHIANG on the 24th or later, or by the ambassador himself at the instigation of, or with CHIANG's approval.

CONCLUSIONS

An examination of the known facts of the controversy does not allow a conclusion that this meeting, regardless of the heavy influence of the UNITED STATES ambassador, will come close to effecting a permanent settlement. An overall analysis of some eighteen months of Ultra traffic plus reliable collateral information does however, indicate that the current meeting in CHUNGKING* will result in, accelerating the projected reforms within the National government, concrete and definite progress toward the institution of democratic constitutional government by wider representation from the major political parties, a minimum of tax and agrarian reform with plans for its extension and definite plans toward the institution of popular franchise (or limited franchise). These steps would be acceptable to China's allies and at the same time would act to effect the popular support of the Chinese Communist Party to an extent where it would, in time, be reduced to a position, approximating that of the Communist party in the UNITED STATES.

From MAO's point of view, he could claim a, "Moral Victory," by taking or claiming full credit for the above mentioned government reforms thus saving face and at the same time insuring continued support from his

*It would appear that the danger of any large scale fighting between the two parties will be averted by the Communists realization of the hopelessness of their position (including armed strength) vis a vis the National government with its democratic (if not anti-Communistic, then un-Communistic) allies and its, "ace in the hole", in the shape of the SINO-SOVIET treaty.

adherents. Available information at this time does not allow an estimation that this would be sufficient inducement for MAO to agree to the disbanding of his so-called, "private army". (The New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army) which will be an absolute requisite to anything like a settlement of the controversy and full participation of the party in the government, pending a popular vote.