

JAPAN'S SURRENDER MANOEUVERS

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JAPAN'S SURRENDER MANOEUVERS

As a sequel to the recent series of Summaries on "Russo-Japanese Relations" (the last on 7 August, as PSIS 400-26), there will be included herein a summary of available traffic regarding termination of those relations, as well as events leading up to and immediately following the surrender of the Japanese Empire to the United States and her allies.

As previously noted, since 13 July Foreign Minister Togo had been pressing Ambassador Sato at Moscow to arrange an interview with Foreign Commissar Molotov regarding a reply to Japan's proposal for Prince Konoye's peace mission to Moscow. Molotov had left Moscow for Potsdam on 14 July, and Sato, dealing in the interim with Vice Commissar Lozovsky, had found the latter bafflingly non-committal regarding Russia's attitude.

The day after the first atomic bomb was dropped, Togo sent the following "Very Urgent" despatch to Sato:

"The situation is becoming more and more pressing, and we would like to know at once the explicit attitude of the Russians. So will you put forth still greater efforts to get a reply from them in haste?"¹

On the same day, 7 August, Sato informed Togo of a note just received from Molotov (who had recently returned to Moscow), saying that the latter would be able to see Sato at 1700 on the 8th.²

¹Spec. 022, 7 August 1945, Tokyo-Moscow.

²Spec. 023, 7 August 1945, Moscow-Tokyo.

Okamoto at Stockholm (in which Sato reported that he and his staff were well and receiving good treatment).³

The latest available message from Sato is the following, forwarded in plain language from Stockholm to Tokyo on 15 August:

"We may yield once to force, but what can conquer the strength of spirit? So long as that remains our people is not destroyed. The future may be dark, but let us bind up our wounds, keep back our tears, and face with good cheer the task which comes next: to devote ourselves body and soul to the restoration of our nation. Sato".⁴

Although apprised by the Moscow radio* on 8 August (Moscow time) and by actual attack some hours later, the Japanese Foreign Office apparently received its first formally official notice of Russia's entry into the war, on 10 August, when, in an interview probably unique in the annals of war, Foreign Minister Togo upon receiving the Russian declaration, handed to Soviet Ambassador Malik a copy of Japan's surrender proposal already prepared, in fact, already sent to Moscow via the Swedish Government. Togo's account of this interview reads in part as follows:

".....he read to me a statement concerning the Soviet Union's endorsement of the Potsdam Declaration and the existence of a state of war with Japan. This statement was the same as the

* Explaining the declaration of war, a Soviet High Command broadcast from Khabarovsk on 9 August charged violation of the Neutrality Pact; recounted the aggressions of Japan, in which she "has always been very wolf-like"; and delivered a scathing indictment of Japan's "right-wing Imperialists who are destroying the interests of the people". (H-201352).

³ Spec. 052, 12 August 1945, Tokyo-Moscow.

⁴ H-201583, 15 August 1945, Stockholm-Tokyo.

one made to Ambassador Sato by Molotov, as broadcast over the radio.*

I said in reply, 'It is very strange that the Soviet Union should declare the existence of a state of war without replying to our request for its good offices in restoring peace.'

The Ambassador replied that the position of the Soviet Union was clearly set forth in the government's declaration, etc.

I then informed the Ambassador of the contents of the Imperial Government's note, given in my circular 648 (10 August), and presented him with a copy of the English text, saying that we had already arranged to have the note transmitted to the Soviet Government through the Swedish Government, but that we desired him also to transmit it to his government, if he had no objections.

The Ambassador said that he had no authority to receive our proposal, but that he would agree to send it on, on his personal responsibility and on condition that there was no difficulty about transmitting it to his government".⁵

Before leaving the subject of Russo-Japanese relations, it is of interest to note the manner in which Russia terminated those relations.

In order to be legally absolved from existing obligations of her Neutrality Pact with Japan, two courses were open; one of them representing, in a sense, the old era in international relations, and the other, the new, inaugurated when the Charter was agreed on at San Francisco. Actually she chose both courses. In the High Command broadcast's repudiation of the Pact through charges of violation by Japan of its provisions, she used the old method. But for the formal and official cancellation of the Pact, her wording

* See Appendix A for text of declaration of war.

⁵ Spec. 034, 10 August 1945, Tokyo-Circular (Stockholm).

of the war declaration handed to Japan (mention of the Allied ultimatum*
-- and Russia's "obligation" to comply with Allied requests that she join
in the war), indicates that she prefers to operate under the Charter.
(Under Article 103 of the Charter: "In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and any other international obligations to which they are subject,
their obligations under the Charter shall prevail".)

*
See Appendix B for text.

At 0847 Tokyo time on 10 August (2347 on 9th, Z-time), the Japanese Foreign Ministry transmitted to its Legations in Switzerland and Sweden a Japanese text of Japan's surrender offer. The Foreign Office stated that an English text also would be sent.⁶

At 1020 Tokyo time, the Foreign Ministry sent the following further despatch to the Minister at Bern and Stockholm:

"In accordance with the will of the Emperor, who is desirous of saving humanity from the catastrophe of war, the Imperial Government decided to request that the intentions of the Imperial Government be transmitted to the principal belligerent countries.....and also to transmit the gist of this directly to the Soviet Government through the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo. In this connection, it is requested that the Minister in Switzerland inform at once the United States Government and the Government of China and that the Minister in Sweden inform Great Britain and Soviet Russia, and that the countries to which you are respectively accredited lend their assistance in obtaining an immediate answer.

Please wire back the results at once.⁷

At 1145 Stockholm time (1045 Z), Japanese Minister Okamoto, not having received the promised English text from Tokyo, delivered his own translation of the Japanese version to Swedish Foreign Minister Uden for transmission to the Soviet and British Governments. According to Okamoto's account of the interview, Uden asked whether the phrase about maintaining the prerogatives of the Emperor meant that there would be "no changes in the State's governing system or no change in the position of His Imperial Majesty". Okamoto replied that, although he had had no explanation of the

⁶Special 26, 10 August 1945.

⁷Special 24 and 25, 10 August 1945.

matter, he felt that "the words include both interpretations". Unden stated in conclusion that Sweden considered it a great honor to have received such a request and would "try to extend her good offices at once".⁸

At 1955 Tokyo time (the same day - 10 August), Foreign Minister Togo sent a further message to the Legations at Berne and Stockholm, advising them that the English text of the surrender offer was the "legal text", and that "we are handling the Japanese version as the translation and are correcting it" to conform to the English version.⁹

Fifteen minutes later (2010 Tokyo time), Togo finally transmitted the following English text: (An identical text was broadcast by Domei at 2035 Tokyo time.)

"In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to bring about an absolute termination of hostilities with a view of saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese Government asked several weeks ago the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace vis-a-vis the enemy powers. Unfortunately, these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the Japanese Government, in conformity with the august wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end to the untold sufferings entailed by war as quickly as possible, have decided upon the following:

The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on 26th July 1945 by the heads of the Governments of the United States,

⁸Special 29 and 33, 10 August 1945; Dip. Sum. #1233 and #1234, 10 and 11 August 1945.

⁹Special 35, 10 August 1945.

Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.

The Japanese Government hope sincerely that this understanding is warranted and desire keenly that an explicit indication to that effect will be speedily forthcoming.¹⁰

At 2345 Tokyo time (10 August), the revised Japanese version was sent out. A translation of that version departs slightly from the official English text in a few cases where the English text cannot be considered an exact translation.¹¹

At 1800 Berne time (10 August), Minister Kase at Berne handed the English text to the Swiss "Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs" (presumably Walter Stucki, Chief of the Division of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Political Department) and asked him to communicate it to the Governments of the United States and China. At exactly the same time Minister Okamoto at Stockholm delivered the official English text to the Swedish Foreign Ministry.¹²

Also on 10 August, Togo (as Greater East Asia Minister) advised his representatives in Manchukuo, China, Indo-China, Thailand and Burma that, because of "various foreign and domestic circumstances", the Japanese

¹⁰ Special 31, 34, 37, 40, 49, 10 August 1945.

¹¹ Special 37, 10 August 1945.

¹² Special 38, 10 August 1945; Special 41, 10 August 1945.

surrender offer had been made to the Allies.¹³ The following day he added that the "circumstances" referred to "of course include the problem of the atomic bomb".¹⁴ Also on the 11th, he instructed his representatives to pass on the news to the governments to which they were accredited. In concluding this message, he added that he had not yet "received the agreement of the Army and Navy on this matter".¹⁵

On 11 August the Greater East Asia Minister also sent a separate message to Ambassador Yamamoto in Bangkok, in which he referred to the Thai-Japanese Treaty of Alliance (of 21 December 1941), binding each country not to make a separate peace or armistice, and went on to say:

"Please convey (to the Thai Government) a message to the effect that not only have we pledged a (word missing) peace, but we are of the opinion that, in meeting such a situation, the position of Thailand and naturally the other countries in Greater East Asia will receive special consideration. Therefore, since we intend that the Thai Government as well to devise whatever measures are deemed suitable, we have no objection to the necessary overtures being begun immediately in concert with Japan. It is, as always, Japan's heartfelt desire that Thailand preserve until the last its status as the leading independent country in East Asia."

On the 12th, Yamamoto replied that he had not yet communicated the surrender news to the Thai because of his fear that the Army officials would object, and asked Tokyo to "get the approval of the Army and Navy

¹³Dip. Sum. #1237, 14 August 1945; H-201347.

¹⁴Dip. Sum. #1237, 14 August 1945.

¹⁵Dip. Sum. #1237, 14 August 1945; H-201340.

as quickly as possible in regard to these representations".¹⁶

At 2324 Berne time on 11 August, Minister Kase at Berne forwarded to Tokyo the Four Power reply* to the Japanese surrender offer. He stated that "the United States Government is now awaiting an immediate reply to this note".¹⁷ From Stockholm, Minister Okamoto reported that an English official there had handed an identical note to the Swedish Foreign Office.¹⁸

Although Kase had informed Togo that the United States Government was "awaiting an immediate reply", the first word forthcoming was by way of a Domei broadcast (40½ hours later) at midnight Tokyo time, 13 August, as follows:

"Tokyo authoritatively disclosed official text Allied reply to Japanese Government's message was received in Tokyo today Monday through Swiss Legation which functioning in Karuizawa (repeat Karuizawa, summer resort)."¹⁹

*See Appendix C for text.

¹⁶Dip. Sum. #1237, 14 August 1945.

¹⁷Special 45, 46, 47, 11 August 1945.

¹⁸Special 51, 12 August 1945.

¹⁹Special #63, 13 August 1945.

In a 12 August despatch to Tokyo quoting press reaction to the surrender proposal, Minister Okamoto at Stockholm stated:

"Since yesterday the BBC and other enemy broadcasts have stated that the United Nations accepted conditionally the Japanese proposal". He concluded with a triumphant "It must be noted that they used the word 'accept'."²²

After the entire civilized world had waited anxiously through Sunday and Monday (12 and 13 August) for the reply that would mean so much, a break in the vigil came on Tuesday when hawk-eyed newsmen at Berne reported that the Japanese Legation there had received a long despatch from Tokyo. This hope proved illusory, however, as the Legation later announced that the despatch did not contain the news awaited by the world. Perhaps one of the finest pieces of irony of the war, it contained a lengthy presentation of the case of the Awa Maru, together with an itemized statement of indemnities totalling exactly 227,286,600 Yen, and a demand that the

²²Special #58, 12 August 1945.

United States make prompt settlement! Further, the Japanese Government wanted to be informed of the method and execution of a severe punishment not only of the commander of the submarine which sank the Awa Maru, but of "those persons who were in a position to give orders to and supervise him".²³

Note: An item of 30,370,000 for cargo did not indicate whether the value of the munitions scheduled for shipment on this hospital ship was included. The above total figure did not include the value of the ship, as this is to be replaced in kind.

At 2010 Swiss time on 14 August (nearly three days after the Four Powers' note had been despatched from Berne to Tokyo), Japanese Minister Kase at Berne delivered in writing to the Swiss Political Department for transmission to Washington the following statement:

"Communication of the Japanese Government of 14 August 1945, addressed to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

With reference to the Japanese Government's note of 10 August regarding their acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and the reply of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, sent by American Secretary of State Byrnes under the date of 11 August, the Japanese Government have the honor to communicate to the Governments of the Four Powers as follows:

His Majesty the Emperor has issued an Imperial Rescript regarding Japan's acceptance of the Provisions of the Potsdam Declaration.

His Majesty the Emperor is prepared to authorize and ensure the signature by his government and the Imperial General Headquarters of the necessary terms for carrying out the provisions of the

²³H-201511, 14 August 1945, Tokyo-Berne

Potsdam Declaration. His Majesty is also prepared to issue His Commands to all the military, naval and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations, to surrender arms, and to issue such other orders as may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for the execution of the above-mentioned terms."

This long-awaited acceptance by Japan of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, was the result of a decision made by the Emperor some time on 14 August despite repeatedly expressed opposition by the Army and Navy.²⁵ At midnight on the same day there was issued an Imperial Rescript, which was broadcast by the Emperor personally the following day at noon, Tokyo time.²⁶ The text of the rescript is given in a Tokyo Circular despatch as follows:

"We, the Emperor, in view of world conditions and the present situation of Japan, hereby announce to you our loyal subjects that in our profound anxiety to bring an end to this state of affairs by some extraordinary measure we have instructed the Japanese Government to accept the Joint Declaration of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

In conformity with the precepts handed down by our Imperial ancestors we have always striven for the welfare of our subjects and for the happiness and welfare of all nations. That is precisely why we declared war against Great Britain and the United States. It was out of our anxiety to preserve the confidence of the Empire and maintain the stability of East Asia that we took this step. It was not our intention to infringe on the sovereignty of other nations or to carry out acts of aggression against their soil.

²⁵Special #70, Tokyo Circular.

²⁶Special #100, Tokyo Circular.

However, the war has now lasted for four years and despite the valor of our land and naval forces, despite the (2 groups missing) of our heroic dead and despite the (words missing), the situation has not taken a turn for the better and neither has the aspect of the world situation taken a more favorable turn.

What is more, the enemy has employed its outrageous bomb and slaughtered untold numbers of innocent people. The damage is incalculable.

Accordingly, to continue the war under these circumstances would ultimately mean the extinction of our people and the utter destruction of human civilization.

Under these circumstances, how were we to save the millions of our subjects or (justify ourselves?) to the spirits of our Imperial ancestors?

It was this which led us to have the Imperial Government comply with the Joint Declaration.

We must express our regrets to our Allies who have fought alongside us for the emancipation of East Asia.

We are now thinking of our subjects who met an untimely death (3 groups missing) warriors, and of those they have left behind. We also feel deeply for the welfare of those who have suffered great losses in the pursuit of victory and those who have lost their livelihoods.

We are aware that the Empire is now confronted with unparalleled distress and fully know how you our subjects feel. However, by patiently enduring the tide of events, however difficult it may be, we will open the way for peace for generations to come.

By maintaining our national structure, we shall encourage you our loyal subjects in your singleness of purpose. We are ever with you. If you should now become agitated and create needless complications thus making difficulties for each other, you would only infringe the principles of morality and lose the respect of the world. We therefore earnestly warn you against such agitation.

Let us therefore face the long road ahead of us as one united nation in firm (3 groups missing) to the Throne and in full confidence in the indestructibility of our Divine Land, and let us resolve to bend all our energies to future reconstruction, let us be strong in our moral principles and firm in our ideals.

My subjects, let us carry forward the glory of our national structure and let us not lag behind in the progress of the world.

Submit, ye, to Our Will!"²⁷

Note: If the authors of Japan's surrender note (sent four days earlier) also composed this remarkable document, they appear to have forgotten that it was therein admitted that Japan had asked for peace (via Russia) "several weeks" before the "outrageous bomb" was heard of.

With the war already lost, Kase at Berne advised Togo on 8 August of the "golden opportunity to call forth the sympathy of the world" as well as to expose the fiendish brutality of "the leaders of America (who) are nothing more than devils with the faces of men". However, (after filing violent protest the next day), Togo and his peers found further use for this remarkable bomb with the uncanny faculty of singling out "old men, women, children, shrines, Buddhist temples, schools, hospitals", etc., -- it is to be used as a convenient and welcome explanation of the loss of the war. (A possibly fairly accurate description of the effects of the bomb is given in Appendix D.)

On 15 August, Minister Kase at Berne advised Tokyo that he had been informed by the Swiss Government that according to the American Secretary of State, "the Imperial Government's communication of the 14th was recognized as a full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and of the reply of the Four Powers made under date of the 11th".

At 0233 (EWT) the same day, Kase transmitted to Tokyo in English plain text the following orders issued by the Four Powers:

"You are to proceed as follows:

1. Direct prompt cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

²⁷ Special #73 and #100, both 14 August 1945

2. Send emissaries at once to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power to enable him and his accompanying forces to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.
3. For the purpose of receiving such surrender and carrying it into effect, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (sic) has been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and he will notify the Japanese Government of the time, place and other details of the formal surrender.^{*29}

Later the same day, Domei broadcast in English:

"Imperial order to all Japanese armed forces to cease fire is expected soon upon completion of procedure. Meanwhile enemy warships and other vessels are warned against entering Japanese home-waters so as to avoid untoward incidents."³⁰

A still later broadcast from Tokyo (at 1216 EWT) stated:

"Flash -- Imperial Headquarters: The Imperial Order to every branch of the forces (words missing) but before it took full effect a part of the Japanese Air Forces is reported to have made attack on the Allied bases and fleets in the south. While the Imperial Headquarters are trying their best to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, the Allied fleets and convoys are again requested not to approach Japanese home waters until cease-fire arrangements are made."³¹

On 15 August Minister Kase was instructed by Tokyo to request the Swiss Government to communicate to the Four Powers certain representations

²⁹Special #78, 15 August 1945.

³⁰H-201586, Domei broadcast.

³¹Special #83, 15 August 1945; FE Sum. #512, 15 August 1945.

which would be forthcoming in a supplementary despatch. "These representations are absolutely no more than a statement of our wishes, and they are not presented as conditions for the acceptance of the Declaration, but they are vitally important in order to make smooth the coming delicate and difficult task of carrying into effect the actual terms of the Joint Declaration. (Our requests are particularly necessary in terms of our internal political situation* also. This is for your information.) Please explain carefully the Imperial Government's anxiety to the Government to which you are accredited also and request their good offices toward the carrying out of our wishes."³²

A few minutes after the above despatch had been sent, Togo further instructed Kase as follows:

"In view of the very delicate situation in our country, please ask the good offices of the Government to which you are accredited in preventing any publication of the representations..and the other side's reply."³³

Apparently Togo (or the new Foreign Minister Shigemitsu***) was troubled by indecision as to what would be best to wish for, as the "statement of wishes" did not arrive at Berne until the following day.³⁴

*Underscoring supplied.

** On the 15th, Premier Suzuki "collected the resignations of his Cabinet Ministers for presentation to the Throne".
Frupac - 171104 August.

³²Special #82, 15 August 1945.

³³Special #80 and #81, 15 August 1945.

³⁴Special #99, 16 August 1945.

At 1800 Berns time, 16th Kase handed them to the Swiss for forwarding.

They read as follows:

"The Japanese Government would like to be permitted to state to the government of America, Great Britain, China and Soviet Union what they most earnestly desire with reference to the execution of certain provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. This may be done possibly at the time of the signature, but fearing that they may not be able to find an appropriate opportunity, they take the liberty of addressing the governments of the Four Powers through the good offices of the government of Switzerland.

1. In view of the fact that the purpose of occupation as mentioned in the Potsdam Proclamation is solely to secure the achievement of the basic objectives set forth in the said Proclamation, the Japanese government sincerely desire that the Four Powers, relying upon the good faith of the Japanese government, will facilitate discharge by the Japanese government of their obligations as to forestall any unnecessary complications. It is earnestly solicited that:

- (A) In case of the entry of Allied fleets or troops in Japan proper the Japanese Government be notified in advance so that arrangements can be made for reception.
- (B) The number of the points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies for occupation be limited to minimum number, selection of the points be made in such a manner as to leave such a city as Tokyo unoccupied and the forces to be stationed at each point be made as small as possible.

2. Disarming of the Japanese forces being a most delicate task, as it involves over three millions of officers and men overseas and having direct bearing on their honor, the Japanese Government will of course take utmost pains. But it is suggested that the best and the most effective method would be that under the command of His Majesty the Emperor the Japanese forces are allowed to disarm themselves and surrender arms of their own accord, disarming of the Japanese forces on the continent be carried out beginning on the front line and in successive stages.

In connection with the disarming it is hoped that Article 35 of the Hague Convention will be applied and the honor of the soldier will be respected, permitting them, for instance, to wear swords.

Further, the Japanese Government be given to understand the Allies have no intention to employ disarmed Japanese soldiers for compulsory labor. It is sincerely hoped that shipment and transportation facilities necessary for the evacuation of the soldiers to their homeland will be speedily provided.

3. Since some forces are located in remote places difficult to communicate the Imperial Order, it is desired that reasonable time be allowed before the cessation of hostilities.

4. It is hoped that the Allies will be good enough quickly to take necessary steps or extend us facilities for the shipment of indispensable foodstuffs and medical supplies to Japanese forces in distant islands and for the transport of wounded soldiers from those islands.³⁵

Two days later, 18 August (1136-Z), Minister Kase was able to forward to Tokyo the Four Power reply to the above "wishes", together with the assurance that they would be kept secret and unpublished as requested.³⁶

³⁵ Special #86 and 87, 15 August 1945; Special #97, 16 August 1945.

³⁶ Special #106 and #108, 18 August 1945.

Attention is invited to the fact that (reminiscent of the time when Japanese diplomats prolonged peace parleys at Washington while the Japanese Navy was already enroute to Pearl Harbor), on Friday, 10 August, when the Japanese Foreign Office informed the governments of the Four Powers of Japan's readiness to "accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration..with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler", it did not have the consent of the Army and Navy to send any such message.

Although Foreign Minister Togo's motive probably was to stall for precious time in which to obtain agreement of the militarists (possibly combined with a last faint hope that the "understanding" in the note might cause disagreement amongst the Four Powers), the fact remains that when the note was sent, the Army and Navy were definitely opposed to its terms. In a Southern Army Staff order at 1400 the following day (11 August), Field Marshal Terauchi, referring to an Imperial Army Headquarters order, stated:

"The plans of the Southern Army* have changed in no way whatever.

Each Army under our command and jurisdiction, in no way confused or blinded by scheming propaganda, will establish

* A Staff message from Tokyo to Singapore on 17 August stated that "His Imperial Highness, Prince Kanin No Miya Haruhito, in order to transmit the Imperial will in accordance with Imperial Order, has deigned to go to the Southern Area. His scheduled movements are: 17 August leave Tokorozawa 0900." (Army Special J-021, 17 August 1945.) On the same day (17th), Terauchi ordered the Southern Army to obey the Imperial Orders in full. (Jap. Army Special J-024-DI)

a unified and firmly united military discipline, and will go ahead to strengthen its war preparations more and more."³⁷

On 14 August, in a joint order from the Navy Vice Minister and the Vice Chief, Naval General Staff (the latter a suicide two days later), the Navy's attitude was stated to be a "firm determination to prosecute our holy war to the last man.....although it is expected that the enemy's war of stratagem will create many complications (in regard to the 10 August note), we will not be taken in by them and wish everyone to carry out his duties to the very end in a thorough manner".³⁸

On 12 August, it was stated in a (personal) circular despatch from the Vice-Chief, General Staff, that "the Imperial Army and Navy are resolutely determined to continue their efforts to preserve the national structure (kokutai) (2 groups missing), even if it means their destruction." Continuing, this official stated:

"You are well aware of the fact that as a final move toward the preservation of the national structure (kokutai), diplomatic negotiations have been opened. The Army, however, with the determination stated in the previous paragraph is striving to carry on the national policy. Unless the fore-mentioned condition is fulfilled, we will continue the war to the bitter end.

In this connection there may be peace propaganda offensives and all sorts of reports in every country, but carrying on the fight

³⁷Special J-009, _____ 151716 August 1945.

³⁸GZ #3412-H-DI, 141100 August 1945.

without let-up, you are to keep what we have said in mind.³⁹

In a similar order, issued at 1620, 11 August, the Chief of the General Staff added:

".....in order to preserve the national policy and to defend our Imperial soil, the Imperial Army and Navy shall by no means return the sword to the scabbard, even though this should mean the total annihilation of the armed forces of the entire nation.All units, with the above-mentioned determination of the Empire in mind, will insure that the fighting morale is maintained at all costs...."⁴⁰

According to a despatch on 12 August from an unidentified originator (apparently a Tokyo Postal Official -- whose despatches in the past regarding inner circle doings have often been confirmed by other sources), a meeting of the Supreme War Council which started at 1500 on the 9th, finally broke up at 0400 on the 10th (Togo's note to the Four Powers was despatched at 0647). The Army and Navy were believed to have held out for the following points:

- "(1) No change in the national structure.
- (2) The Imperial Family shall not be made to bear responsibility for the war, and the Imperial system shall be maintained.
- (3) The enemy (shall not have?) troops occupy Japan proper."⁴¹

On 15 August, the following AInav was sent by the Navy Minister:

"I respectfully submit a report on the events which led to the Empire's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.

³⁹Special #55, 12 August 1945.

⁴⁰Army Special J-010-DI.

⁴¹H-201398 and Special #61, both 12 August 1945.

With regard to this matter, several meetings were held by the Supreme War Guidance Council and by all the _____, during which it was studied from all possible angles. No agreement could be reached.

The entire matter, therefore, was laid before the Imperial Council (at which members of the Supreme War Guidance Council, members of the Imperial Headquarters and others were present). Still no unanimity of opinion could be obtained.

Finally, it was brought to the Emperor's attention for his decision. His, and only his,* decision was to the effect that from the standpoint of the Empire's future, the only thing to do was to accept the Potsdam Declaration on condition that the structure of the nation be left intact.

He went on to say that he desired to have not even one person to make any subversive moves in the name of reconstruction. The Emperor said that he fully realized that for the High Command to order the laying down of arms is a pill too bitter to swallow. However, this must be done in order to preserve our nation, he explained. He further said that he was ready to do anything and urged us to do our best.

We who were present fully realized the extent of his determination and could not hold back the tears that welled up.

The Emperor then told us that he was ready personally to talk to the Army and Navy if necessary. Both I and the Minister of War expressed our thanks. At the same time we stated that we would issue the orders ourselves** and would not trouble him to do so. We advised him that we would assume the duty

* Underscoring supplied. Cabinet resignations were collected on the 15th. Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni received an Imperial command to form a new Cabinet 16 August, and completed its formation the next day. The Navy Minister was retained. (GA #3481-H, 17 August 1945.)

** The War Minister's suicide shortly after the meeting may have been the reason for the Emperor's later decision to broadcast personally to the Army and Navy at noon on the 15th.

of controlling and maintaining order within our respective departments.

These were the events which led to the decision. I therefore order that all concerned be advised of the above. At the same time, as the Emperor directed in his radio broadcast on this the 15th, maintain order within all units so as to prevent our nation's being forced to go back to the very beginning of its history.

These are the Emperor's wishes, and the Emperor can best be served by obeying these orders. #42

A supplementary Aina sent the next day (16 August) repeated the above admonitions to obey the Emperor, and included the following:

"Since the outbreak of the conflict all hands have bent every effort toward attaining the goal of the holy war. In spite of this, however, the fortunes of war were not with us.....Words cannot be found to express our humiliation and it can only be borne when we are convinced of its temporary nature....." #43

Shortly before the Emperor's broadcast, Japanese Ambassador Tani in Nanking sent to Tokyo the following "summary of a telegram from Sō Shireikan (almost certainly the Commander of the China Expeditionary Army, General Okamura) to the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff":

"Even if the present prerogatives of the Emperor are recognized, who will guarantee this if we disarm and demobilize?"

The limitation of our sovereignty to the home islands only will reduce us to the time when the race of Yamato was thirty million people. The existence of seventy million people absolutely requires that we have Formosa, Korea and (South Manchuria?).

⁴²GZ-3489-H 172307 August 1945; GZ-3489-H 172307 August 1945.

⁴³GZ-3474-H 171711 August 1945; Special #59, 13 August 1945.

Such a disgrace as the surrender of several million troops without fighting is not paralleled in the world's military history, and it is absolutely impossible to submit to the unconditional surrender of a million picked troops, in perfectly healthy shape, to the Chungking forces of defeated China.....⁴⁴

However, at 0500 on the 17th, the above commander was reported to have issued an order to the North China Army to "cease fire". The order stipulated that the units if attacked might take appropriate measures.⁴⁵

Eleven hours after the emperor's broadcast, the Army General Staff at Tokyo sent the following message to the 8th Flying Division (top Army air command in Formosa):

"You are to see to it that the air forces cease positive action against Okinawa. Be sure to transmit this to Air Flotilla 29 (top naval air command in Formosa)."

(Note: Air Flotilla 29 had scheduled a large-scale attack against the Okinawa area for the 16th. This operation was "suspended" however, three hours before the above staff order.)⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Special #76, 15 August 1945; Dip. Sum. #1238, 15 August 1945.

⁴⁵ Dip. Sum. #1241, 18 August 1945; H-202057-01, 17 August 1945.

⁴⁶ FE. Sum. #513, 16 August 1945.

An example of numerous indications in Ultra traffic, that certain of Japan's leaders fail to grasp the full significance of their surrender or to comprehend the fact that Japan has become already a conquered nation, is seen in invitations which have been extended since the surrender, to "important leaders and their families" of the satellite governments throughout the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, to take sanctuary in Japan. Great East Asia Ministry representatives have been instructed to "discuss this with the Army officials and take appropriate measures".⁴⁷

Concerned regarding a public display of this attitude, Minister Kase sent the following from Berne on 17 August:

"According to reports in this country's newspapers, Radio Tokyo has on several recent occasions broadcast to front-line troops that the conclusion of peace was due to a shortage of material and failure in the war of science, but that this was only a temporary condition. This news has attracted considerable attention in this country and, particularly, in America and Britain. For example, the Daily Mail and Manchester Guardian have carried (unfavorable) editorials....."

We can pass off these broadcasts as an explanation to the soldiers at the front and to the general public. However, at present, when the Imperial Government's every action has become the object of world attention, we should be especially circumspect in public statements made by organs of opinion to the outside. In order absolutely to avoid doing anything to irritate needlessly, we must exercise more rigorous control."⁴⁸

A Greater East Ministry Circular on 14 August ordered its representatives to so "guide" Japanese citizens as to enable them "to face all

⁴⁷Dip. Sum. #1241, 18 August 1945.

⁴⁸H-202067, 17 August 1945; Dip. Sum. #1241, 18 August 1945.

hardships and witness the renewal of fighting spirit over the long period of the future".⁴⁹

The unrepentant attitude of the leaders who have brought Japan to its present straits, even though fearing internal disorders, is seen in a Cabinet decision reflected in the following directive of 15 August regarding "the direction of all public opinion":

"Domestic public opinion will be directed in such a way as to support the unification of the whole people and to prepare for the difficulties we will face (in?) maintaining our national structure. Following are the details:

- A. Emphasis will be placed on the fact that our basic problems at present are to carry out the Imperial Will, to support our national structure to the very end, to work towards the unification of _____ public sentiment, and with such unification, to face the present unprecedented national calamity as best we can.
- B. Since the nation is facing such a disaster, we must emphasize especially the necessity of realizing that the people share the responsibility completely; and we must bow down to our Emperor, thank Him, and express our _____. We must face any situation in order that the spirit of our national soul may be carried through safely.
- C. Emphasis should be put on the fact that, in order to meet the problems of the future, we must be ready to bear difficulties greater than war, and push forward to the _____ of the Empire.
- D. It should be stressed that (blanks) the present situation, if countryman were to offend countryman, or if economic, social, or moral disturbances were to be caused, it would lead to the destruction of the nation.
- E. Communistic and revolutionary social statements are to be dealt with effectively.

⁴⁹Special #68, 14 August 1945.

*Underscoring supplied.

- F. Since things have turned out as they have, general anger, grief and criticism are to be allowed. However, any theorizing concerning opposition to the Cabinet Decision and continuation of the war, as well as statements upsetting national unity, will be handled effectively.
- G. Arguments assigning responsibility for the war to the Government, the Army, or other quarters, will be treated suitably.*
- H. Any statements recommending direct action, or statements full of desperation, will be suitably controlled.⁵⁰

The toll of reported suicides of high Japanese officials has reached only three** to date. The first of these was War Minister Korechika Anami, who according to the Tokyo radio, disemboweled himself in the traditional manner on 14 August (after the momentous meeting on that day,

*Underscoring supplied.

** Not including Japanese Minister Chiba (interned in Turkey), who shot himself and wife to death more than a week before the surrender. Ambassador Kurihara announced the motive to be a determination to return to Japan even "as a disembodied spirit",⁵¹

⁵⁰ H-201712, 15 August 1945.

⁵¹ H-200904, 04 August 1945.

when the Emperor insisted on surrender). (Note: On 3 August, in a despatch urging surrender, and which he implored be shown to the Supreme Council for the Conduct of the War, and reported to the Emperor, Ambassador Sato had scored War Minister Anami for his boast two months earlier that he would destroy the enemy on the sea and at the water's edge. Sato remarked that evidently a "miscalculation" was made [Paragraph 4 of the Joint Ultimatum had referred to the "unintelligent miscalculations" of the self-willed militaristic advisers].)

The next reported suicide, that of Lieutenant-General Okamoto at Berne, occurred about twelve hours after the Emperor's surrender broadcast. In a despatch to the Chief of Staff, Okamoto stated:

"At this time, aware that the guilt I have incurred in the faulty fulfillment of the grave responsibilities once laid upon me (especially as Head of G-2 under the Attaché in Germany and as Liaison Officer, merits an infinitely heavier punishment than a single death, in token of apology, I end my existence.

With awful reverence, I pray for the tranquillity of the Imperial Household, and beseech my countrymen to set about the task of building a new Japan with unyielding perseverance. (It is now 1600, the 15th of August 1945. I salute my Imperial Commander.)"⁵²

Some fifteen hours after the Emperor's broadcast, according to Tokyo radio, Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff and organizer of the kamikaze units, committed suicide. In a message addressed to the "spirits of the Special Attack (kamikaze) units, he said his death was an effort "to make atonement to the souls of my

⁵² Jap. Mil. Att. D-10772-DI, 16 August 1945.

former subordinates and to their bereaved families". He urged the survivors to do their utmost "for the revival of the Japanese race and for world peace".

A Tokyo despatch of 20 August discloses that, after the Emperor's decision was made, the above Vice Admiral Onishi conferred with War Minister Anami and it was arranged between them that Onishi would obtain an interview with Prince Tagatsu*, and Anami with Prince Hakasa*, to enlist the support of the two princes for continuation of the war. At the ensuing interviews both officials were rebuked; "whereupon -- there was no recourse but suicide".^{52a}

Typical of the seemingly ingrained duplicity of high Japanese officials, of which there many examples in Japanese diplomatic traffic, is a message sent on 11 August by Foreign Minister Togo to Minister Kase at Berns. With the surrender note in Allied hands, and knowing that funds would soon be frozen in Switzerland (he had already had trouble with large-scale transactions there), he apparently suddenly remembered that three months earlier Kase had suggested the advantages to be gained through improved world opinion, if the Royal Family should make a contribution to the Red Cross. Togo was also uncomfortably aware of the fact that Dr. Junod (Red Cross) was visiting Japanese-held territory to

*Unidentified.

^{52a} H-202375, 20 August 1945, Tokyo-Taihoku.

report on conditions in prison camps. Accordingly, on 11 August he instructed Kase to make a donation of ten million francs from Yokohama Specie funds in Switzerland "in the name of the Imperial Government, for the ordinary activities of the Red Cross". "In view of the urgency of the general situation", Togo desired that Kase act "with the greatest possible speed". Togo added: "I am informing Dr. Junod of this donation by letter, under date of 7 August. Please note."⁵³

The following day, Togo ordered Minister Morishima at Lisbon to "convert as much as possible of the deposit holdings of your office into ready cash, and take all the necessary precautions in connection with its safe keeping".⁵⁴

On 15 August, Kase informed Tokyo that he had that evening received from the Swiss Foreign Ministry a note from the American Government. The note, as transmitted by Kase, ordered the Japanese Government to immediately instruct its diplomatic and consular offices in neutral countries to surrender custody of all property and archives to representatives of Allied Powers.⁵⁵

The following day Togo advised his representatives in Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Eire and Afghanistan as follows:

"Inasmuch as this demand is not covered by any of the stipulations of the Potsdam Declaration which we have

⁵³H-201390, 11 August 1945.

⁵⁴Special #53, 12 August 1945.

⁵⁵Dip. Sum. #1239, 16 August 1945; Special #88, 89, 15 August 1945; #93, 96, 16 August; #102, 17 August #90, 15 August; #114, 19 August.

accepted, the Imperial Government cannot agree to this demand of the United States Government.....⁵⁶

In a reply on the 17th, Morishima at Lisbon suggested that the "best course, under the circumstances, would be either to give in to the American demand or to inform them that we should like to discuss the question again after the Allied Army Commander arrives in Japan".⁵⁷ He was overruled, however, on 19 August, by Shigemitsu (who had returned as Foreign Minister, in the new Cabinet). Shigemitsu thought it "absolutely necessary in view of the general situation to carry out promptly the legitimate demands of the Four Powers and to oppose their unreasonable demands by giving detailed explanations, and, by making our position clear, to solicit their reconsideration."⁵⁸

Meanwhile, Okamoto in Stockholm, thought "it would be foolish to allow the 1,500,000 yen (in his account) to pass into enemy hands". He "therefore, decided after careful consideration, to place 300,000 of this amount in safekeeping" in the form of advance allowances to 20 of his staff members. He doubted whether there would be any way of hiding the balance and feared that ultimately he would be obliged to surrender it.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Special #34, 15 August 1945; Special #110.

⁵⁷Special #101, 17 August 1945; H-201492.

⁵⁸Special #113, 19 August 1945.

⁵⁹Special #105, 17 August 1945; Dip. Sum. #1242, 19 August 1945.

(The Naval Attaché there had withdrawn his account of half a million kronen [\$115,000.].)

A later despatch from Kase at Berne (18 August), indicates that he had withdrawn what he could and "divided the funds up and entrusted them to office chiefs and officials". He added, however, that "if the other side should really start from false conjectures and bring pressure upon us, I think it may be necessary at last to make everything clear".⁶⁰

On 10 August Kojiro Kitamura, Yokohama Specie Bank representative in Switzerland, withdrew 5,000,000 Swiss francs (approximately \$1,150,000) from a safe deposit box of the Banque Nationale Suisse and sealed the money in a suitcase; he arranged to have the bag turned over "to a Swiss citizen on the faculty of the University of Basel", who, "as soon as the situation settles down", was to transfer the money "to the Legation safe" in Berne. (Dip. Sum. #1242).

On 18 August the Foreign Office ordered diplomatic representatives in Thailand and Indo-China to transfer title of certain military supplies and foodstuffs to private organizations. Other items (which had been bought locally with military script) were to be sold. "Furthermore, since we are afraid the enemy may decide to confiscate the factories, etc., under Army administration, we would like you to take steps in order to transfer the title to as much equipment as possible from the Army Administration to industrial firms doing business of a civilian nature and entirely apart from military. Please be extremely circumspect in your handling of these

⁶⁰ Special #115, 18 August 1945.

transactions in order that the enemy will not be able at some later date to call them into question.⁶¹

A Japanese Army of 16 August (the Army and GEA Ministry were to issue a similar order), provided that:

"As the intentional destruction of establishments, equipment, etc., and the scuttling of ships, will have a tremendous influence on future payment of indemnities, it is requested that unless specially ordered such actions be strictly avoided."⁶²

The following exceptions "specially ordered" have been noted:

All Naval Schools:

"All papers relating to prisoner _____ and interrogation (particularly those such as the ones published in December 1944 which refer to interrogation of American pilot prisoners), and confiscated _____, together with this despatch are to be immediately and positively disposed of in a manner that will offer the enemy no pretext."⁶³

Base Force #11:

"Dispose (by burning) of material taken from shot-down enemy aircraft."⁶⁴

Tenth Area Fleet:

"Expedite making complete disposal of the following equipment so as to leave no traces:

- Type-1 fighter bomber
- Type-3 (torpedo) war-head
- Mark-2, Model 2 Radar."⁶⁵

⁶¹Special #112, 18 August 1945; FruPac-181604-DISC-DI, August.

⁶²Frupac-160216-Disc, August.

⁶³Frupac-170920-Disc, August.

⁶⁴Fruetf-170440-Disc, August.

⁶⁵GZ#3564-H- 190608-Disc, August.

Base Force #23:

"Burn all 6 radio transmitter-receiver sets."⁶⁶

Base Force #9 (South Sumatra):

"Immediately destroy in such a manner that nothing remains...:

Type-1 bomb primer

Type-3 radar (JEGD?)⁶⁷

Singapore Base Force:

"Equipment and stores as yet not disposed of...."⁶⁸

The previously mentioned mental attitude of certain Japanese officials, which permits them to ignore the cold fact of what is virtually unconditional surrender and to look on the present negotiations as merely preparatory to the signing of a treaty is seen further in a circular directive issued on 19 August, in which Ambassador Tani at Nanking refers to certain "Japanese nationals who are not aware of the circumstances.... and are obsessed with the hallucination that they are about to be driven out" (of China); Tani directs that they be assured that "their safety will be protected by the Japanese forces".⁶⁹

An "Imperial Mandate" of 17 August states:

"In a situation such as the present cessation of hostilities, the ending of fighting and the surrender of arms to the enemy by an order from the highest authority in our land will no doubt raise problems in the field of international

⁶⁶Frupac-180644-Disc, August 1945.

⁶⁷Frupac-191448-Disc, August 1945.

⁶⁸Fruef-181959-182003-Disc, August 1945.

⁶⁹H-202267, 19 August 1945.

law, but Japan for its part, regardless of how the enemy may handle the problem, will certainly not regard (our soldiers) as prisoners....."70

From Stockholm, Minister Okamoto on 18 August sent the following interesting message:

"In examining the recent situation, one finds a strong tendency on the part of both the Soviet Union and China to avail themselves of the Empire's distress to assume a very bitter attitude. The attitude of the Soviet Union is particularly dangerous. For our part, I think we have no choice for the future but to swallow our resentment and make use of England and the United States, especially the United States, (Reports that Grew will (be given?) an important job connected with Japan are worth noticing,)^{*} to hold China in check and obstruct the Soviet Union, devoting ourselves at the same time to the speedy cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of a treaty of peace.

Speech and behavior in Tokyo which is likely to irritate the British and Americans should be avoided just now. For example, the enemy has been violently aroused by Tokyo reports claiming that Japan has been defeated only temporarily, or that Japan is 'morally' undefeated and will fight again for Greater East Asia. Moreover, and I say this with the greatest trepidation, even the Imperial Rescript included a good deal of reproach, and this seems to have aroused in British and American opinion, a passionate demand that the people of Japan be made to feel in their hearts the fact of defeat.

I realize that public statements just now must be made with an eye to the problem of domestic tranquillity, but I think it vitally important that full and prudent consideration be given to repercussions in the outside world."71

⁷⁰Jap. Army Special J-020-DI, 21 August 1945; GZ#3697-H-211618 August 1945.

⁷¹H-202118, 18 August 1945.

^{*}Underscoring supplied.

On the same day, the Naval Attache¹ at Stockholm sent a message of the same tenor as the above, to the Navy Vice Minister and Vice Chief, Naval General Staff.⁷²

Majestically aloof and unmoved by this atmosphere of desolation, however, the Tokyo Bureau of Supplies and Accounts on the same day issued an Alnav as follows:

"Military equipment which is destroyed through emergency measures along with the ending of the war, must be accounted for on (the proper) expenditure forms."
(Note: Presumably the usual number of copies will be required.)⁷⁴

⁷²GZ#3657-H-DI, August 1945.

⁷⁴GZ#3704-H- [] August 1945.

the reaction of the American Minister to Afghanistan (Cornelius Engert) is reported by Japanese Minister Shichida as follows:

"At 1700 on the 14th, I went to see the American Minister.

The Minister said, "As one American who cherishes the kindest feelings towards Japan," I am truly sorry to meet you on this day of your trouble. Allow me to express (my sympathy?). If there is anything you wish, please let me know.'

I replied, 'I have had no instructions from my government, so I have called today simply to hear what you may have to say to me.'

The Minister said, 'I expect to return home on the 17th. I imagine that it will be necessary for you to get in touch with us after that on matters connected with your Legation, so I must introduce you to the man who will be Acting Minister.'

Saying this, he called in a man who seemed to be Second Secretary, introduced him, and had him join our conversation.

He then said, 'There is one thing more. I have had orders from Washington instructing me to ask the Afghan Government to stop payment on your Legation's bank deposits, and I feel, personally, that I should not wish to carry these instructions out without letting you know.'*

*Underscoring supplied.

I asked, 'Would this prohibition result in making it impossible to pay money even to (the Afghans?)'.

The Minister said, 'I cannot state definitely that the measure will be interpreted as prohibiting (three groups missing) outside the country.'

I said, 'A considerable sum in Swiss currency has just now arrived at the bank, in my name,* to be used for payments to the Postal Department. This settlement must be made without delay.'

'In that case', the Minister said, 'I shall make my representations to the Afghan authorities after this payment has been completed.'**

I then asked whether he had received any orders from Washington about the position of our Legation.

He replied, 'That will be settled by the surrender terms. Nothing is being said just now.'

I thanked him for the confidential information he had given me and took my leave." (H-202837)

* This had been sent by Minister Kase at Berne in his aforementioned efforts to evade the Allied demand.

** Underscoring supplied.

It seems clear from the foregoing that although, as Sato puts it, Japan "has been singed by the fire", certain of her political leaders, stubbornly persisting in their efforts to split the technical hair which separates the terms of the Potsdam Declaration from "unconditional surrender", have created in their minds the fiction that this is just another treaty (differing from former ones only in that the terms of this one may have to be honored). Their success in creating this state of mind is reflected by the fact that while the world waited 20½ hours for an "immediate reply" to the Four Powers' note, they followed their devious custom (frequently noted in their negotiations with Russia) not only of palpable falsehood (regarding time of receipt of the note) but of using the device of injecting at the last moment a new element that might influence the bargain -- in this case, while we waited they presented us with a peremptory demand for Awa Maru indemnities totalling 227,370,000 Yen, and punishment of our naval officers.

With regard to leaders of the Army and Navy, there seems little doubt that many of the former and some of the latter, though knowing that the war was lost, would have followed blindly the code which (as one of them said) "required them to die for the Emperor but not to live for him". It is likewise probable that others who voiced equally vehement protests against capitulation, did so merely to satisfy their professional pride. In either case, the persistent refusal to agree to acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration relieved them of the burden of responsibility for

the decision to end the war. As the Navy Minister significantly, if reverently, pointed out, the decision was the Emperor's -- "His, and only His".

With regard to responsibility for losing the war, the people have been told that they are to share this burden amongst themselves. Whether their already bowed shoulders are strong enough or willing enough to assume this burden is not yet known, even to Japan's leaders.

When on 15 August the Emperor, deigning to address his subjects in person, gave divine utterance to the fallacy that Japan entered the war for the ultimate "welfare of all nations" but had been obliged to end it because the rest of the world had turned evilly against her and were bent on her extinction, he planted in the fertile soil of preconditioned minds a seed that will take deep root.

In the guileless minds of millions, it will grow because of simple faith. In the minds of the guilty, it will flourish because it will be carefully nurtured in order to assuage, if not a conscience, an all-consuming pride that has been outraged by the Americans' devilish cunning and material resources, which have deprived the "Divine Land" of its rightful victory.

In the case of the former, the seed will grow unless and until crowded out by the germination of healthier seeds which may be planted during the forthcoming period of occupation; and in the latter, it will not only grow but flourish unless and until cut down by public war guilt trials.

If allowed to continue to grow in either case, it can be expected never to bear other than bitter fruit, however long that may take to ripen.

APPENDIX A

(Washington Post, 9 August - U.P. text of the Moscow radio announcement of the Russian declaration of war on Japan):

On August 8, Foreign Commissar to the USSR Comrade Molotov received Japanese Ambassador Sato and in the name of the Soviet government made to him the following statement for transmission to the government of Japan:

After the rout and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan remained the only great power which still stands for continuation of war.

The demand of the three powers, United States, Great Britain and China, of July 26 this year for unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan. Thus, the proposal made by the Japanese government to the Soviet Union for mediation in the Far East war has lost all foundation.

Taking into account Japan's refusal to capitulate, the Allies approached the Soviet government with a proposal to join in the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the period until the finish of war to decrease the number of casualties and contribute toward the most speedy restoration of peace.

True to its obligation as an ally, the Soviet government accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined the declaration of Allied powers of July 26 this year.

The Soviet government considers this policy of hers is the only means capable of bringing nearer peace, to deprive the peoples of further sacrifices and sufferings, and give the Japanese people the opportunity to rid themselves of those dangers of destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to accept unconditional surrender.

In view of the above stated, the Soviet government declares as from tomorrow -- that is, August 9 -- the Soviet Union will consider herself in a state of war against Japan.

APPENDIX B

POTSDAM DECLARATION OF 26 JULY 1945.

(Text as appearing in Washington Post, 27 July)

"1. We, the President of the United States, the President of the national government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agreed that Japan shall be given the opportunity to end this war.

"2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blow at Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

"3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan.

"The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the land, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people.

"The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will (underscored) mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

"4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by these self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

"5. The following are our terms: We will not deviate from them; there are no alternatives: we shall brook no delay.

"6. There must be eliminated for all times the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

"7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

"8. The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

"9. Japanese military forces after being completely disarmed shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

"10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.

"The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech and religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

"11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the payment of just reparation in kind, but not those industries which will enable her to rearm for war.

"To this end access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

Assurances Demanded

"12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

"13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."

APPENDIX C

Four Power Reply To Japanese Surrender Proposal

(As given in Special #45 and #46, both 11 August)

"With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation but containing the statement -- with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler -- our position is as follows: From the moment of surrender the authority of the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and shall issue his commands to the Japanese Military, Naval, and Air Authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations and to surrender their arms and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety as directed where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

The ultimate form of government of Japan shall in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

The Armed Forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved."

APPENDIX D

EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

On 13 August the Japanese Navy Bureau of Military Affairs sent to the Japanese Naval Attaches in Switzerland and Portugal the following account of the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima; (There was no indication in the message that it was sent for propaganda purposes.)

1. Two or three B-29's came in at a high altitude and dropped near the center of the city three of what appeared to be bombs attached to parachutes. Since all three were of identical structure, it is supposed that two of them were concerned with detonating apparatus. The bomb exploded at an altitude of 500 meters.
2. The whole city was illuminated by a yellowish light and people on the ground became aware of a great heat in the atmosphere. At the same time residential buildings collapsed and subsequently caught on fire. Pine trees were split and some straw roofs were set on fire simultaneously with the explosion, but, since most of the fires occurred several dozen minutes after the explosion, we believe the fires were also due to carelessness in the demolished buildings.
3. Effects of the bomb blast: Within 500 meters, human intestines were laid bare and eyeballs pulled out, and even at 2,000 meters there were deaths from the bomb concussions but people in long reinforced trenches were safe. Within two kilometers, bodies were stark naked, there were deaths from burns, and wooden constructions within four kilometers were half-destroyed.
4. Effects of the thermic rays: Almost everyone within four kilometers suffered burns, but even at seven kilometers slight burns were received. The majority of these occurred only on the side which was exposed to the flash of the explosion (word missing) in the parts exposed to the high radiation temperature. The effect on vegetation was comparable to that on human beings. Even at seven kilometers, parts of the branches and leaves have withered.

5. There is practically no defense measure.**

* An Army intelligence message of 9 August stated that "It is necessary that shelter trenches be covered. Underground rooms are suitable. There were comparatively few shelters destroyed. Those in shelters two kilometers from the center were not (seriously injured)." "40% of the people of Hiroshima are dead or wounded."

References:

H-200710; GZ#3281- -142136 August 1945; Special #27, #32, #42 and #72; FE. Sum. #507, #508, #509 and #512.