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RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
(28 July-6 August 1945)

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RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
(22 July-6 August 1945)

As noted in recent Summaries, the Japanese Government has been waiting anxiously since 13 July (the day prior to Molotov's departure for Potsdam) for Soviet approval of a proposal to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as Special Envoy of the Emperor "to solicit Russia's good offices in bringing the war to an end", also "to negotiate details concerning the establishment of a cooperative relationship between Japan and Russia". (Although Russia of course was not to know it, Foreign Minister Togo's idea was "to strengthen the ground for negotiations with England and America", in other words to play the Russians against the Anglo-Americans and through resultant friction salvage as much as possible in terminating a war now officially recognized as lost.)

Worried about possible developments at the Potsdam Conference, and thinking to take advantage of the short adjournment when Churchill and Attlee would be in England, Togo on 25 July urged Ambassador Sato to proceed, "if necessary, to a place of the Russians' choosing in order to obtain an interview with Molotov". Sato was to "make it clear that the despatch of the special envoy would permit Stalin to acquire the reputation of an advocate of world peace; and further, that Japan is prepared to meet fully the Russian demands in the Far East". Finally, Sato was "to inform them that, in the event the Soviet Government remains indifferent to our request, we will have no choice but to consider other courses of action".¹

¹H-198547, 25 July, Tokyo-Moscow.

Togo's message, however, didn't reach Sato for three days* (28 July), by which time the Conference had re-convened. Noting this fact in his reply, Sato continued:

"... You say that I am to request the good offices of the Soviet Union, and that if the Soviet Union shows a cold attitude, it will make it inevitable to consider other ways and measures; and you feel that we might get a satisfactory arrangement by either flattering the Soviet Union or taking her down. However, in view of the general state of affairs, such an approach would seem to me to be lacking in soundness."

Adverting then to Captain Zacharias' recent broadcast to Japan, in reference to which, Togo had stated that, although "it is impossible for us to accept unconditional surrender...it is our idea to convey to them that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter", Sato continued:

"The American spokesman spoke firmly for an unconditional surrender, but he certainly hinted that if we were to accept this, in actual practice the terms would be toned down and indeed if we take this sort of meaning from it, we have the situation I expressed in my wire of 20 July.

Although I don't know to what extent the radio broadcast of Naval Captain Zacharias is authoritative, the principle enunciated by him that Japan will be able to reap the benefits of the Atlantic Charter differs from the attitude taken toward Germany before the capitulation of that nation. Germany was denied any right to partake in the Charter. While, in considering the reasons for the

*Comment was made in PSIS 400-22, 21 July (Page 5), of delay in the receipt by Sato at Moscow of messages from Tokyo -- cases in which we intercepted the messages as much as two days before Sato received them. [] further instances have since been noted -- particularly "Very Urgent" and "Extremely Urgent" messages (although this type now forms much of the traffic).

"refusal toward Germany, no reasons appear for the present softening attitude toward Japan, there is the difference that we have no objection to the idea of restoration of world peace on the basis of the Charter. This raises the question as to whether the Imperial Government has already accepted disarmament, and whether, apart from the sending of the Special Envoy, somehow or other when a representation is made, notification shall be given at the outset that we will consent to disarmament. There is a similar question about prior recognition of the independence of Korea."²

When on 26 July the United States, Great Britain and China emerged from the hushed consulting chamber at Potsdam to announce that the patient, Japan, had only one chance to live -- and that depended on a quick operation -- Foreign Minister Togo realized with a sinking feeling that the silence of Russia, his chosen family doctor, could mean only agreement. Wanting, but unable, to believe that the Russians were not "aware in advance" of the Joint Ultimatum, Togo was "deeply concerned as to whether this was related to Japan's proposal, i.e., whether the Russian Government communicated the latter to the English and Americans, and as to what attitude the Russians will take toward Japan in the future." In a "Very Urgent" despatch of 28 July, Togo advised Ambassador Sato that Japan was adopting a policy of careful study of the Joint Ultimatum. Sato was instructed to "have an interview with Molotov as quickly as possible, and bearing this in mind, drive home the ideas" set out in Togo's despatch of 25 July (see page 1 of this Summary).³

With regard to circumstances attending issuance of the Joint Ultimatum, Sato was of the opinion that "the matter of sending a special envoy which was

²Spec. -011, 29 July, Moscow-Tokyo.

³Spec. 007, 28 July, Tokyo-Moscow.

first broached to the Russians on the 13th, was communicated at once to the American and English leaders at Potsdam....that it was decided to make the present joint declaration in order to make clear the attitude of America, England and china in response to this". In his despatch of 30 July, Sato continued as follows:

"...The important point in the problem related to the above is that in their Joint Declaration, America and England have demanded Japan's immediate unconditional surrender and that they have stated clearly that they have no intention of softening the terms stated in the Declaration. If it is to be apprehended that Stalin was completely unable to influence the intentions of America and England on this point, the fact is that he will be unable to accept the matter of a special envoy proposed by us. However much we may exert ourselves to prevent his going into the war, and further, even though we exalt Stalin as an advocate of world peace, we shall have no particular success. If we are to try to make America and England moderate, there is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to avoid (Russia's) participation in the war. Moreover, on the morrow of Japan's surrender Stalin will bring full and heavy pressure on America, England and China with regard to Manchukuo, China and Korea, and will proceed in the hope of encompassing his own demands. Since he actually possesses the real power, it is to be surmised that there is no necessity for him now, of his own free will, to make a treaty with Japan." Your way of looking at things and the actual condition in the Eastern Area may be seen as being absolutely contradictory.

Furthermore, it is worthy of note that Ewatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, has stated that he is opposed to the tendency of the Joint Declaration to show greater leniency toward Japan than the United Nations have shown Germany..." (BBC on 30th)⁴

Echoing Sato's views regarding the joint ultimatum, Minister Kase at Berne

*Underscorings supplied.
⁴ Spec. 013, 30 July, Moscow-Tokyo.

on 29 July informed Togo that "there can be little doubt that Stalin was aware of the contents of this Proclamation and knew that it was to be publicized....it also stands to reason that he probably did not raise any objection to it....Assuming this to be so, I am inclined to believe the Soviet Union has already reached an understanding with both China and the Anglo-Americans regarding the settlement of East Asiatic problems. (From the point of view of Soviet-Anglo-American relations, this probably gave the Anglo-Americans some inkling of the limits of Soviet penetration in East Asia.)...Accordingly, I now think that it is quite likely that, depending upon our reaction to this 3-Power Proclamation, the Soviet Union may itself confront us with some sort of recommendation of its own".

In discussing the ultimatum, Kase pointed out "the striking divergence from the attitude shown toward Germany, as no summons framed in these terms, outlining certain concrete conditions and even adding certain definite guarantees was ever directed at the Germans". He thought the following points particularly worthy of note:

- (a) "No reference is made to the Imperial House of our National Structure;
- (b) Japanese sovereignty is recognized;
- (c) A Japanese domain is recognized in which Japanese sovereignty holds sway. (In other words it seems to me that this Proclamation provides a basis on which we carry on our national life in consonance with our national structure which the Japanese race is now protecting with its very life's blood.)
- (d) While the term "Unconditional Surrender" is used, I definitely have the impression that it is meant to refer to the Japanese Army and not to the Japanese people or Japanese Government. There are indications that aside from this point -- which seems

~~TOP SECRET~~

"to have occasioned a great deal of thought on their part — they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various other points."*

- (e) The Proclamation states that after the Japanese forces are disarmed the Japanese people will be given an opportunity to lead a peaceful and productive life."⁵

On 30 July Sato again trudged dutifully to the Foreign Commissariat where, against his better judgment, he repeated Togo's prepared sales talk regarding Konoye's mission, and in the best Fuller-Brush-Han manner stressed an added inducement — "there may be various requests and suggestions on the part of the Russian Government...and I understand that the Prince will be empowered to negotiate on these matters". Losovsky, however, was non-committal.

Just before leaving, in a vain attempt to elicit some comment indicative of Russia's attitude, Sato remarked: "What I fear is that the 3-Power Joint Declaration may prevent good offices of the Russian Government for which Japan hopes". But as Losovsky was not to be drawn out, Sato was obliged, once again, to return home empty-handed, while he pondered Losovsky's reply -- to the effect that:

"Since both Stalin, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Foreign Commissar Molotov are in Berlin, it is inevitable that it will take some time before you receive an answer. Unfortunately nothing has been settled yet."⁶

*Underscoring supplied.

⁵H-199392, 29 July, Berne-Tokyo.

⁶Spec. 012, 30 July, Moscow-Tokyo.

~~TOP SECRET~~

In reply to Sato's message of 30 July (quoted earlier in this Summary), Foreign Minister Togo sent the following "Very Urgent" despatch on 2 August: (In view of the import of this message it is quoted in full.)

"I have been fully apprised of Your Excellency the Ambassador's views by your successive wires, and I am well able to understand them as the opinions of the Ambassador on the spot. However, it should not be difficult for you to realize that although with the urgency of the war situation in the Pacific, our time to proceed with arrangements for ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland* is limited, on the other hand, it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at one stroke. At present, in accordance with the Imperial Will, there is unanimous determination to ask the good offices of the Russians in ending the war, to make concrete terms a matter between Japan and Russia, and to send Prince Konoye, who has the deep trust of the Emperor, to carry on discussions with the Russians (word missing) it has been decided at any rate to send a special envoy in accordance with the views of the highest leaders of (this ?) government, and along with this (decision ?) we are exerting ourselves to gather together the views of all quarters regarding concrete terms. (Under the circumstances there is a disposition to make the Potsdam 3-Power Declaration the basis of our study concerning terms.) (Note: See Appendix for Joint Ultimatum terms)

Accordingly, the most urgent task which now confronts us is to persuade the Soviet Government to accept the mission of our special envoy. His Majesty, the Emperor, is most profoundly concerned about the matter and has been following developments with the keenest interest. The Premier and the leaders of the Army are now concentrating all their attention on this one point.**

*Togo's despatch of 25 July (quoted in PSIS 400-23, 2 August) instructed Sato to stress the fact that Japan has gone first to the Russians; to point out the opportunity for Stalin to "acquire the reputation of an advocate of world peace"; to "inform them that in the event the Soviet Government remains indifferent to our request, we will have no choice but to consider other courses of action"; to make clear "that we are prepared to meet fully the Russian demands in the Far East". In this despatch Togo also stated that while "unconditional surrender" was still unacceptable, "it is our idea to convey to them that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter".

**Underscoring supplied.

"I, therefore, particularly urge you to consider these circumstances, and while I can appreciate the cogency of the views you have expressed, I must nevertheless, urge you to continue to do your utmost to rouse the enthusiasm of the Soviet Government and persuade it to accept our mission.

Whatever happens, if we should let one day slip by, it might have (results ?) lasting for thousands of years. Consequently, if the Soviet Government should reply in the negative, I urge you to do everything possible to arrange another interview with Molotov at once. Try to persuade him (by using the arguments ?) outlined in my despatch of 25 July* and do your best to induce the Soviet Government to reconsider the matter, and furnish us with an immediate reply.**7

Sato received Togo's above despatch on 3 August.** In an "Extremely Urgent" reply, sent the same day, he informed Togo that he would attempt to have a conference with Molotov immediately upon the latter's return to Moscow, but "unfortunately" he was unable to feel confident regarding the outcome. Repeating his earlier warnings regarding lack of "concrete terms", he was doubtful "whether the Russians will from the beginning, without making an issue of it, politely refuse, or whether, asking presentation of (terms ?) of a concrete proposal, as a prerequisite to their consent to the sending of an envoy, they will at length come around to lending their good offices". "Even if by good fortune they accepted the sending of an envoy without making such a prerequisite", and Japan were finally to decide on her attitude during the course of the conferences, Sato was "completely unable to guarantee that the negotiations would not be inconclusive or that they might not break down

*Underscoring supplied.

**Intercepted by us at 1507/Z, 2 August.

7Spec. 015, 2 August, Tokyo-Moscow.

unavoidably in mid-career*.

Sato continued as follows:

"With regard to the decisions of the Potsdam Conference announced on the 3rd, there is happily a total absence of statements relating to (decisions ?) concerning Japan. Therefore, I have the feeling that, at least on the surface, Russia is still maintaining an attitude of (non-intervention ?) in the Far Eastern War. It may be judged that since Stalin's policy was immovable, the leaders of America and England perforce handled the problem of Japan in the form of a Joint Declaration of the three countries concerned -- America, England and China, making clear the attitude of the three countries and urging final consideration upon Japan. If this is anywhere near the truth, then Russia's attitude would seem to be somewhat favorable to us."

Nevertheless, it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Joint 3-Power Declaration and then engage in conversations with our special envoy. In the final analysis, we will have to determine our own attitude toward the 3-Power Declaration, and, equipped with a concrete proposal for the ending of the war, on this basis seek the good offices of the Russians? That is naturally the right thing to do, and will surely meet with the approval of all. Of course, in obedience to the counsel contained in the instructions of your wire, I have spoken to Lozovsky about the mission of our special envoy, as I indicated in my wire of 30 July, but if we solicit the Russian authorities to find out what they have in mind, I think that it will turn out exactly as I have indicated above.

In order that an end to the war might be brought about before the enemy makes a landing on our mainland as you suggested in your wire, the days are being numbered, and this causes me to feel very deeply the pressure for time. Much as I regret to say it, this is the natural conclusion to which we must come at this time when we have lost the mastery of the air and the command of the sea."

Only two months ago, as I remember, the War Minister made a report at the special meeting of the Diet, stating that if the enemy attempted to invade the mainland, he would be utterly destroyed, first on the sea, and then on the land at the water's edge. This month it has been definitely demonstrated that there is no longer any ground for war intelligence of that kind. Evidently a miscalculation** was made.

*Underscoring supplied.

**Paragraph 4 of the Joint Ultimatum referred to the "unintelligent calculations" of the self-willed militaristic advisers.

"As we are about to contend with an enemy who has accumulated a great deal of experience in landing operations, and since we will try to defend ourselves with such meager material, we cannot (deny?) that in the final analysis it is only a question of time when, after we have again made innumerable sacrifices, we will have to surrender. And if things come to such a pass, it will be absolutely necessary to avoid any situation in which the ill will of the people would focus itself upon the government and the military, extending its evil influence even to the Imperial House."**

I cannot cease hoping that the Government and the military will not neglect this crucial hour, but, assuming full responsibility, will fix upon a concrete plan for the ending of the war and have the special envoy bring it along with him. Otherwise, this special envoy, sent at great pains, will inevitably have to return with empty hands, and I fear that the results obtained would be worse than if he had not been sent at all.*8

"As we now think of it, the conversations held between Hirota and Malik during June not only failed to produce any concrete results, but I fear that they may rather have served to place difficulties in the way of the present problem of sending a special envoy. In those conversations, the Russians recognized the gravity of the situation as they looked upon Japan's proposal; but now, since the matter of this special mission follows immediately upon those conversations, it will in all probability be difficult for them to avoid the conclusion that, following in general the same line, our present proposal is very little different from the previous one.

While I do not know how you dealt with the suggestions made in my wire of 20 July,** the urgency of the present crisis no longer permits delay. For this reason, while I would be truly very grateful to you for the trouble, I implore you to report this to the Throne with all the energy at your command.* Furthermore, I wish that you would give the leaders in the Supreme Council for the Conduct of the War an opportunity to read this also. In this way I earnestly hope that this may contribute to the stimulation of a final determination on the part of our Empire.*8

*Underscoring supplied.

** In this despatch (quoted in PSIS 400-23, 2 August), Sato made a critical analysis of Japan's foreign policy in the past, and suggested "thoroughgoing reforms" after the war -- "by placing our Government on a more democratic basis and by destroying the despotic bureaucracy, we must try to raise up again the real unity between the Emperor and his people".

*8 Spec. 018, 3 August, Moscow-Tokyo.

On 4 August, Sato sent the following further despatch to Togo:

"Regardless of whether we are able to get the good offices of the Russian Government for the termination of the war, the fact is undeniable that the 3-Power Declaration of 26 July already provides a basis for ending the Greater East Asia War. Therefore, if Russia assumes the role of mediator, it is already settled that action will have to be carried out on this basis. I feel that the statement in parentheses in your despatch of 2 August* is an extremely suspicious one, since it shows that you are disposed at least to make the 3-Power Declaration the basis for study of our conditions.

(As suggested in ?) Minister to Switzerland Kase's despatch of 29 July, if one compares the terms for the handling of Germany as decided upon at the recent 3-Power Conference at Potsdam, it would not be far-fetched to surmise that a certain amelioration would be possible. Moreover, if Japan's resolution to seek peace is communicated to the United Nations even one day sooner, the degree of amelioration will be (affected ?) to that extent, whereas if there is dilly-dallying by government and military in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes and she will not be able (to avoid ?) following the road to ruin.

Even though there may be some amelioration, it is already clear in advance as to what the peace terms will be, even without looking at the example of Germany, and we must resign ourselves beforehand to (giving up ?) a considerable number of war criminals. However, the state is (now on the verge of ?) ruin, and it is entirely inevitable that these war criminals make the necessary sacrifice to save their country as truly patriotic warriors. ...**9

On 26 July Japanese Envoy Ken Harada at the Vatican relayed to Tokyo various items of encouragement culled from the American and British press. Among other things, he cited views expressed by President Hutchins of the

*("Under the circumstances there is a disposition to make the Potsdam 3-Power Declaration the basis of our study concerning terms.")

** Underscoring supplied.

⁹Spec. 20, 4 August, Moscow-Tokyo.

University of Chicago, and Senators Capehart and White, and quoted an article by Raymond Moley to the effect that there was more and more support for a soft peace in Washington, "future relations with Russia making it necessary to leave Japan strong, that is to say, to permit her to occupy certain areas". Harada believed that "this recent change in the tone of American and British public opinion still seems to be confined to a minority, but it is a tendency which will bear watching..". He was of the opinion further that "English business men, possessing huge vested interests in the Far East, are nationally very unwilling to see America destroy Japan completely, for they fear an anti-British trend in China after the war, and an increase in Russia's influence".

Harada also reported the gratuitous counsel offered to the Allies by Italian Count Sforza who, "writing in a Roman newspaper on 5 July, argued that the national spirit of the Japanese is such that it would be the height of foolishness to make an issue of the national structure (i.e. Imperial House)".¹⁰

From Berne, the Japanese Naval Counselor forwarded to Tokyo on 20 July a message from Shintaro Ryu (representative of the newspaper Asahi and reportedly a friend of Prince Konoye), in which the latter reiterated his views (PSIS 400-22, 21 July) that the United States wished to end the war with Japan in order to forestall Russian intervention in the Far East. Ryu concluded that "after the Potsdam Conference this last golden opportunity will be lost forever."¹¹

¹⁰H-198988, 26 July, Vatican (via Berne) to Tokyo.

¹¹Dip. Sum. #1222, 30 July.

When, as and if Russia decides to terminate the existing formality of relations with Japan, the old charge of "helping Germany" will probably figure prominently, in order to dispose legally of the Neutrality Pact (valid until 24 April 1946); but it is not improbable that a current controversy will be used as the igniting spark.

One of the disputes which has been active recently concerns La Perouse (Soya) Strait (between Sakhalin and Hokkaido), which has long been a danger spot in Russo-Japanese relations (PSIS 400-18, 2 July). Use of this strait by Russian vessels proceeding to or returning from the Pacific, has been attended by navigation hazards which on several occasions in the past have resulted in ships going aground; but has been necessary because of refusal of the Japanese Navy to permit transit of the safer passage, Tsugaru Strait, farther south (between Hokkaido and Honshu); and has occasioned much wrangling regarding Japanese discontinuance of certain lights, as well as reluctance to allow Russian ships to take refuge in Aniwa Bay (on South Sakhalin) while awaiting ice-breakers.

To this already unpleasant factor in Russo-Japanese relations, have been added two new elements -- the mining of La Perouse Strait, and the sinking (on 13 June) of the Russian ship "Transbalt" in this passage. Although Tokyo radio ascribed the sinking to "the act of an American submarine*", since no Japanese submarines had been in that area at the time",**

*The U.S. Submarine Spadefish reported sinking a large ship at the approximate position and time of the Transbalt sinking.

**In Vladivostok on 15 July, a group of Russians in uniform, professing to be Transbalt survivors picked up by the Japanese, stated that their SOS was answered by a Japanese warship, and "a Japanese submarine in the vicinity stood by, ready to help". (H-197298)

Foreign Minister Togo on 29 June observed that "the Russian Government has not entirely renounced its suspicions of Japan" in connection with the sinking.

Russia has not officially charged Japan with the sinking of the Transbalt; nor on the other hand has she thanked her for rescuing 94 members of the crew, but instead complained of Japan's tardiness in the rescue.

On 25 July, during an interview with Sato, Vice Foreign Commissar Lozovsky served official notice on Japan that in the view of the Russian Government the mining of La Perouse Strait "constitutes a violation of international law, and could result in heavy damage to the Russians since the channel left for Russian ships is narrow (and) there is danger to their navigation in case of fog, etc."

In replying, Sato attempted to minimize the danger. He added that, although appreciating the necessity of giving consideration to the safety of Russian ships, "Japan is constrained by the exigencies of the war". To this, Lozovsky retorted: "Indeed, if Japan is in such a situation as this, we must certainly demand a guaranty of safety for the navigation of Russian ships". Sato promised to answer this statement as soon as he could receive a reply from Tokyo.¹²

¹² H-197298, 17 July, Vladivostok-Tokyo; H-198742, 26 July, Moscow-Tokyo; Dip. Sum. #1220, 28 July; PSIS 400-22, 21 July.

Ambassador Sato at Moscow continues to report the flow of Soviet military strength to the East as observed by Japanese couriers. In a despatch dated 28 July, he reported that during a recent journey (apparently taking about 8 days) the couriers counted 381 eastbound military trains. "The things noticed among the weapons loaded on these military trains were 9,800 automobiles, 60 tanks, 200 (self-propelled ?) cannon, 220 airplanes (of these, 180 assault planes and 40 bombers), 450 anti-tank guns, 89 rocket guns, 300 barges for crossing streams, 83 pontoon bridges. In addition, 170,000 troops and 2,900 horses were observed."

"On the Manchouli branch line there was very brisk shipment of munitions, and 45 eastbound munitions trains were seen. The impression was received that they were re-enforcing troops on the Outer Mongolian frontier."

"It appears that present eastbound munitions shipments have reached the maximum capacity of the Siberian Railway. Everywhere they observed construction of sidings and expansion of old facilities."¹³

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H-199656, 28 July, Moscow-Tokyo.

The most prominent feature of the developments reflected in this Summary, is the magnetic effect of the 3-Power Joint Ultimatum, which has polarized the views of "all quarters" in Japan -- including the Emperor, the Premier and the leaders of the Army -- with regard to terminating the war. Although not yet agreed on the method (except that there is "unanimous determination to ask the good offices of the Russians"), "there is a disposition" to make the Joint Ultimatum the basis of a study -- possibly in the hope (or determination) of finding in its terms a sufficiently effective emollient for the tortured pride which still rebels at the words "unconditional surrender".

With regard to Russo-Japanese relations, Japan is in the increasingly uncomfortable position of the pursuing female who has been left "waiting at the church" for a marriage of her own arranging, while the chosen bridegroom consorts alarmingly, if discreetly, abroad. Sato, although grasping tightly the very slender straw of hope that "at least on the surface, Russia is still maintaining an attitude of non-intervention", considers it "absolutely unthinkable" that in the event of accepting the Konoye mission Russia would ignore the terms of the Joint Ultimatum. Although Togo continues poised to follow what Sato once counselled as a course of desperation -- "to fly into the arms of Russia", he blindly refuses to accept the possibility that Russia might not be there to catch him. What course will be taken in the latter event, probably no one in Japan yet knows. But if conditions in Japan have reached or are approaching a state to justify Sato's surprising

admission and warning of the possibility of a revolt of the populace against its leaders, "extending its evil influence even to the Imperial House", it may be assumed that a definite move of some kind will not be long delayed.

A P P E N D I X

Excerpts from Joint Ultimatum of 26 July
(as quoted in Washington Post, 27 July)

- (5) The following are our terms: We will not deviate from them: There are no alternatives: We shall brook no delay.
- (6) There must be eliminated for all times the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
- (7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
- (8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
- (9) Japanese military forces after being completely disarmed shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
- (10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.

The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies, among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech and religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

- (11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the payment of just reparation in kind, but not those industries which will enable her to rearm for war.

To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

~~TOP SECRET-ULTRA~~