

THE CHUNGKING - YENAI CONTROVERSY

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THE CHUNGKING - YENAN CONTROVERSY

- I -

The present controversy between the Chinese National government at CHUNGKING and the Communist party at YENAN is a continuation of the struggle that first came into prominence in the early '20's. After General CHIANG KAI SHEK had successfully led the expeditionary force against the recalcitrant Northern war lords, succeeded in establishing a Central government and declared NANKING the national capital, the government decided to expel the Soviet Advisor General GALEN and purge the KUCO MIN TANG of communists owing to, "subversive activities," which resulted in the bloody clash of 1927.

By July of 1927, those Communists who had survived the purge, started an intensive campaign of expansion and armed resistance to the central government and later set up a communist capital at JUIKING in western KIANGSI province where they had concentrated.

* In December 1922 Moscow's special envoy to China Mr. A. A. JOFFE met Dr. SUN YAT SEN to discuss the subject and in January 1923 a joint statement was issued declaring in part: "Conditions do not exist in China for successful establishment of a communist or soviet system - - China's needs are to establish national unity and in this she has the sympathy and support of the U.S.S.R.

** Also known as General BLUECHER - was in command in SIBERIA during the Russo-Japanese incidents at NOMONHAN and CHANG KU FENG in 1938-39.

*** Nationalist party (KUCO-nation, MIN-peoples, TANG-association or party) originated by Dr. SUN YAT SEN CIRCA 1895 as the Regeneration Society (HSIN-regenerate, CHUNG-China, HUI-Society) which after several evolutions overthrew the MANCHU dynasty and founded the Chinese Republic.

**** In January 1924 the KUCO MIN TANG had reached an understanding with the embryo Chinese Communist party - permitting them to join the KUCO MIN TANG which they agreed to do on an individual basis.

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During the following years, CHIANG KAI SHEK's Nationalists and the so called, "AMERICAN CLIQUE," were making unprecedented progress - North and South were fairly firmly united and the Central government at NANKING, daily gaining in strength, had committed the country to democracy and succeeded in gaining the support and recognition of the Western powers - had unified and stabilized the, "currency mess," reduced the cost of, and popularized mass education and gained customs autonomy - all of which resulted in prestige and strength for the KUO MIN TANG.

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In the meantime the communists were being relentlessly pursued and harassed by the National armies in a campaign of extermination. It was here that they developed their famous guerilla tactics, and to counteract the government campaign of education and democracy, they carried out communistic indoctrination and agrarian reform (mainly seizure of land and redistribution to the peasants) and established fairly good liaison with Soviet Russia as well as other foreign Communists. They learned the most effective methods of gaining popular support and creating partisan movements in which they attained considerable success in many rural areas - especially those in which the people had been reduced to the extreme poverty, as is known only in the Orient, by a succession of calamities in the form of floods, droughts, depredations of bandits and war lords plus absentee landlordism and usury of the money lenders. The Communists also benefited (and still continue to benefit) from both solicited and unsolicited

support on the part of various intellectual and quasi-political groups - in no way communistic but for most part sincere reformists who saw the crying need for betterment of the peoples' condition.

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This period also saw increased political pressure and aggression on the part of Japan - the invasion of SHANTUNG province and publication of the "TANAKA MEMORIAL" - It also saw considerable controversy within Japan itself as to the method to be used in subjugating China. The Liberals (capitalists and industrialists) advocated a long-time policy of economic penetration and control. The military clique wanted action and immediate military occupation of China as a vassal state and ultimately a part of the Empire - They feared the soft policy of the Capitalists would take too long and China, daily gaining in strength and support of the Western powers, was bringing the danger of frustrating their plans or at least making them extremely expensive. They therefore took matters into their own hands and stepped up the policy to keep China weak and in turmoil - by supporting this war lord and opposing that - manufacturing incidents here and there - employment of the famous "DOIHARA" ("the Lawrence of Manchuria") tactics and finally the, "Manchurian Incident," of 18th Sept. 1931 which gave Japan full control of the Northeast provinces (Manchuria) and hegemony over North China.

After the immediate effects of the "Manchurian Incident" had somewhat cooled down - there was a change of method by Japan. She had been the subject of almost universal condemnation and further, the occupation of MANCHURIA, creating as it did, more common border with the U.S.S.R., resulted in a growing series of incidents - thus accenting

the, "growing strength and menace of Soviet Russia." The opportunity was seized by the Liberals in Japan - who immediately expanded their policy of economic penetration - however not without military support.

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During the above mentioned period (Paragraph IV) the Chinese Communists also gained greatly in strength and number. They had been all but surrounded and were close to extermination in their KIANGSI stronghold, but succeeded in breaking out and making their famous, "Long Trek," to SHENSI (the present headquarters). They also had a new slogan: "Drive the Japanese out of China and regain the Northeast provinces," which won large numbers of patriots to their side.

In the meantime the KUO MIN TANG and its' AMERICAN CLIQUE were not having altogether smooth sailing. Their efforts for cultural progress and economic strength, the anti-communist campaign and their counting on support of the Western powers against Japan, which was not forthcoming, plus the serious party split between NANKING and CANTON factions of 1931-32, had left their position weakened and they started to lose considerable support to the Communists who were advocating: "Continue the military struggle with Japan" - "Give the country to the people (i.e. divide the land and redistribute wealth in order to create patriotism and incentive to fight) and build a peoples' army."

* There was much less than unity within the party itself. Against the policy of the American Clique were such prominent patriots as WANG CHING WEI (later Jap puppet president of occupied China) who saw only partition of China into foreign spheres of influence and ultimate reduction to the status of, "another India," in the Western powers' policy - they advocated cooperation with Japan in an, "Asia Bloc," or even union with Japan as the only hope for China.

Immediately on settling in SHEENSI, the Chinese Communists had instituted a local Soviet government - seized and divided the land and enlarged their activities in propaganda and education of the masses in their area - expanding steadily strength and numbers. The Central government, due partly to pressure from certain intellectuals and democratic reform groups, had eased up their punitive condition against the Communists and started on intensive counter-propaganda and rehabilitation program including indoctrination schools for the thousands of captured young communists. The situation more or less remained in this status until mid 1936 - when the Japanese encroachment in the North was growing with alarming speed. The Communists appealed to the Central government for a complete cessation of the punitive campaign. Delegates were sent to HANKING and at the ensuing plenary session of the executive committee, (approximately equivalent - National Congress) in February 1937 a resolution was passed recommending cooperation with the Communists under certain specified conditions which were accepted by YENAN, and thus a

* The National government published the following four conditions of the resolution to which the Communists agreed:

1 - Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the united command of the nation's armed forces.

2 - Dissolution of the so called, "Chinese Soviet Republic" and similar organizations and unification of governmental power in the hands of the Central government.

3 - Absolute cessation of Communist propaganda and acceptance of the "Three peoples' principles."

NOTE: The "three peoples' principles as expanded by Dr. SUN YAT SEN are - 1 - MIN TSU-Nationalism - as opposed to clanism and fuedalism. 2 - MIN CHUAN-peoples' rights - or government by the people - based on Cromwell's revolution, in England in the 17th century and the American revolution in 1776. 3 - MIN SHEEN-peoples' livelihood-social security measures - capital and food production control etc. Close associates of the late SUN YAT SEN state that the 3-principles idea was based on SUN's admiration for Abraham Lincoln and his, "Of the people, by the people, for the people."

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reconciliation ensued. After the Japanese had embarked on open warfare on 7th July 1937, something approaching harmony between the two parties was achieved and on 22nd September 1937, the Communist party made a declaration to the Nation, stating that; in the interest of the Nation the Communist Party was prepared to discontinue its policy of attempting to overthrow the KUO MIN TANG; that it would cause the Chinese Soviet government to cease to exist; and that the former Red Army was now re-organized into the 8th Route Army under control of the National Military Council.

As the war progressed it was apparent that neither side kept to the agreement, however all evidence shows the greater failing was on the Communist side, particularly after the German-Soviet pact. By the time of "PEARL HARBOR," and the United States' entry in the Asiatic war in December 1941, there had already been several clashes between Central government troops and Communist troops, the most serious of which was the clash with the new 4th Route army in January 1940.

During recent years Soviet Russia has not openly supported the Chinese Communist party with much more than occasional "moral support." Most of the party adherents and a good few members claim it has no connection with MOSCOW and is really an "Agrarian Reform," party. This is not true of - and there is no doubt that - the top leaders MAO TSE TUNG, CHOU EN LAI, and CHU TEH and the high ranking party officers are true Communists who have the aspiration and intention to overthrow the present government and set up a Soviet government over all China.

There is also no doubt that there is some sort of understanding between the Soviet government and the YENAN leaders and a certain amount of liaison does not exist between YENAN and MOSCOW

It also appears self-evident that at present, Soviet Russia could not gracefully support YENAN against CHUNGKING openly and it would not be to her best interests to do so for the reasons:

- (a) It would violate the Chinese-Russian non-aggression pacts of 1928 and 1937.
- (b) It would violate the Russian-Japanese Neutrality Pact, unless the Chinese Communists stopped fighting Japan - in which case it would bring Russia and the United States in direct conflict.
- (c) Invite criticism and a storm of popular protest from the Allies, particularly U. S. and Britain and affect allied support of Russia in Europe.
- (d) The position, capabilities and intentions of the Chinese Communists is not yet clear to MOSCOW - who well knows that much of YENAN's strength and support is derived from Chinese idealists and patriots whose sole aim is "agrarian reform, democratic government," and the recovery of lost Chinese territory - which all may well conflict with Russia's plans - and these people would then drop YENAN like the proverbial "hot brick," leaving Russia supporting a more or less lost cause - or at least a small minority.

It is also evident that Japan is very much interested in Soviet Russia's position vis a vis the YENAN-CHUNGKING controversy. In a dispatch from the Japanese Foreign Minister to SATO in MOSCOW on the subject in July 1944, he states:

"The Soviet Union has already stated clearly that she has no interest in China's internal problems - - - looking at the matter in terms of past history, it is impossible to deny

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the (fact of) relationship between Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R. and even the Soviets' (present) China policy is quite clear. As far as we are concerned our best plan - - - is to try to neutralize the situation as much as possible in China - - To tone down as much as possible - our opposition to the Chinese masses and even the CHUNGKING army and the Communist Army would be in conformity to our over-all policy.*1

Interesting light is thrown on the philosophy of some of the Chinese Communist leaders by the rumors current in mid 1944, of the possibility of a Russo-Japanese alliance. There are several dispatches available, including the above, indicating that the Japanese Foreign Office favored such a move.

* On 6 Oct. 1944 SHIGEMITSU sent to BERLIN: "According to [redacted] information, we have received from the YEMAN area - the YEMAN government keeps the Soviet government fully informed of all its activities through its representative in MOSCOW and is continually asking MOSCOW for orders and directives." (Jap Dip. #144883)

1 Jap. Dip. #130769

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which the so-called Chinese Communist Party holds, but would not be a mere childlike - in case a situation arose within at a solely correct party. At the same time Chiang Kai-shek is in view of the fact that America's progress was employed various methods is cyber - defining the relations between the and XIX

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It is quite evident that the Chinese government's refusal to grant further concessions to the Communists is based on fear that the Chinese Communist party will not be content to be a mere political party - but to establish a Chinese Soviet government over the Nation. These fears are readily confirmed by CHUNGKING's frank statements as well as their propaganda line.

The CHUNGKING government claims, and it is no doubt a fact, that by far, the great majority of the Chinese people have no desire for a Soviet form of government.

What is considered to be an accurate summary of CHUNGKING's opinions was reported by a competent Chinese observer (apparently to a staff member of the Japanese Embassy in NANKING) last November during

Jan. Dip. #141504.

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the peace moves instigated by Japan and forwarded to TOKYO with the comment: "This man is a serious scholarly person and I think what he has to say comes pretty close to the truth." The report in part follows:

"People on the CHUNGKING side generally expect Japan to lose the G.E.A. war - - however the leaders from CHIANG KAI SHEK on down are not necessarily optimistic. Anticipating distress in China after the rout of Japan there are persons who, in their hearts hope for a rational settlement of the China-Japan incident. However CHIANG KAI SHEK will never go ahead or express any opinion of his own (on this?) but it is his practice in every case to come to a decision after awaiting the development of events and getting the backing of his subordinates. Since the war too has essentially moved along as a thing determined upon by CHIANG in conformity with the popular view, so peace too must likewise be based on the arousing of popular opinion and consent of the people - - - The fact that the Americans have recently taken an attitude of vigorous support of YENAN is not merely a stratagem by means of which that faction will be used temporarily in carrying out the war, rather it is based on - - - serious study of the real power of YENAN and the recognition that now and in the future the political power of YENAN in China cannot be ignored. Furthermore with regard to American-Russian relations, while there are those who expect they will ultimately come into collision, upon looking at American newspapers and magazines - - - one finds numerous articles to the effect that the U. S. must act in concert with Russia for the maintenance of world peace. When one compares this with the time the U. S. hated the Communist party it seems like another age. On the other hand since Russia intends to make utmost use of American strength in her post-war rehabilitation - - the two countries must not fail to follow the road to cooperation. As for internal conditions of the CHUNGKING regime - - - the absolutism of the KUO MIN TANG has been gradually alleviated and in its evolution the regime is following a course toward realization of democracy - such a result should become fully evident in about a year - - indeed while such a situation does exist it is premature to expect the immediate emergence of a third powerful political party. For the present the KUO MIN TANG and the Communists will continue to be the focal points and politically to match swords

with one another - however for all that it is not thought relations between them will reach the point of head on collision (civil war). In the final analysis, the educated class generally all want (justice?) within the country and manifest vigorous opposition toward civil war. The view of this educated class that they should hold the balance of power between the two parties and exercise a powerful (influence?) is a phenomenon meriting full attention in CHUNGKING today."

There does exist a possibility for compromise on most of the points of contention. While not a few KUO MIN TANG and Peoples Political Council (Congress) members are bitterly anti-communistic on ideological grounds a possible majority of the party believe that with establishment of the various projected reforms and adoption of the constitution, the party could keep most, or at least sufficient of the people on their side to reduce the communist opposition to a minor position.

There is no doubt that foreign, particularly United States's pressure, both official and popular, has forced the National Government

* (Jap Dip #149672 - 6 Nov. 1944) NOTE: The man responsible for the report, YANG CHIH CHENG a student of international affairs and is considered to be a clear headed individual with no particular "bone to pick." The views expressed are substantially those observed in China last autumn. As indicated in the report - the Generalissimo's decisions are governed largely by the views of his "cabinet," whose opinions, in turn are largely formed through relation to and close association with the educated class in general; i.e. lesser officials; scholars, professors, businessmen - about 75% of whom obtained part of their education in the United States and which has varying degrees of influence on their thinking.

** Such a member is PAUL YU PIN (Roman Catholic Bishop). The U. S. Naval Attache reported on 3rd Feb. '45 "coalition government proposal was attacked by Bishop PAUL YU PIN's YI SHIH PAO (Daily Press) which described coalition as a "spoils system."

to make unprecedented concessions to the Communists however, all evidence indicates there is slight hope of real cooperation, and in fact, the progress of the war is acting more toward creating conditions for a major conflict rather than for reconciliation; the complete disbanding of, or complete control of the Communist Party's army, is one which would be tantamount to destruction of the Communists' strength and bargaining power. On the other hand, as long as the Communists keep an army loyal only to their party and maintain military occupation of territory, especially territory newly liberated from Japanese occupation, the Central government fears that the Communists would eventually attain sufficient strength and control sufficient facilities to wage a full scale civil war after the Japanese are finally expelled from the continent.

There is no indication that the Communists will ever consent to give up control of their army; or intend to give up, without a struggle, control over territory they have won from the Japanese or from which the Central government's troops have withdrawn. They are also making every effort to obtain support for their political and moral position from Soviet Russia and the United States by judicious use of propaganda and sympathizers wherever they are in contact.

*** Typical of several _____ dispatches on this subject is the following remark contained in a Japanese report to Tokyo: "Anglo-American pressure on the Chungking authorities has become increasingly stiff - - and since the Chinese Communists' attitude has become increasingly severe they have become extremely perturbed." (Jap Dip #143990 - 3 Oct. 1944)

5 H-176274 - 2 Feb. 1945.

6 H-176274 - 24 February 1945.

The secondary major point of contention; the amount of active participation the communists would have in a coalition government, is one more recently prominent and is a direct result of Anglo-American pressure plus independent political reform group's agitation against the Kuo Min Tang with the resultant strengthening of YenAn's position. It was not one of the, "indispensable" conditions to collaboration unanimously decided, by the Communists at the time of former Vice-President Wallace's visit to Chungking in June 1944. The Japanese Foreign Minister took cognizance of this situation in an intelligence report last October with the remarks:

"As a result of the gradual concessions being made by Chungking, the relations between the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communists are not quite as strained as they have been in the past; however, a favorable turn which public opinion both at home and abroad has been taking toward the communists, they now feel their new strength and are stubbornly refusing to compromise on domestic issues. They are maintaining their local military and political authority intact and at the same time are planning to participate in the Central Chungking government. The Chungking government is still insisting that it is impossible to carry out far reaching political changes during a war and is still emphasizing the necessity for a unified military command."*

7 Jap Dip #144883 - 6 Oct. 1944.

The probability of full cooperation or anything more than a temporary expedient of surface reconciliation may be summed up in the Japanese view point which is typical of that currently being expressed by practically all third parties: "Any such thing as real collaboration between the Kuo Min Tang and the Communists is completely impossible."

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In the meantime, Chungking taking the characteristic Chinese view, is steadily making preparations behind the scenes, with which it intends to thwart the Chinese Communists' program for expansion, particularly any plans they have for taking over control of key cities and the large seaports during or after expulsion of the Japanese. It is worthy of note that Japan is cognizant and at least tacitly approves some of Chungking preparations. Ambassador TANI at NANKING in a report on the 20th February to Tokyo on the status of the peace moves (instigated by Japan August 1944) reports, "clashes between the Chungking and Communist armies continue everywhere," and Chungking General KU CHU TING, had "secretly proposed to the Nanking (puppet) government - - a joint defense against Communism and suggested that suppression of the Communist Army in the area around Nanking and Shanghai be carried out in cooperation with the Nanking government." TANI points out, "while this joint defense against communism has no true connection with the Japan-China problem, it is one step toward contact and collaboration with

8 Jap Dip #145872 - 9 Oct., Dip Sum. #1066 - 24 Feb. 1945 et al.

* There has been considerable intelligence from various sources, that large groups of Communist regular and irregular troops have been concentrated in the vicinity of Canton, HongKong, Nanking, Peking and Shanghai - awaiting opportunity to gain control of the cities.

** Commander of Chungking - 3rd war zone.

Chungking. Although one cannot say this is a start toward general peace,⁹ it is of considerable significance."

It is also more or less well known that Chungking preparations (vide supra) also have the support of many puppet officials in the occupied areas, who believe they will for the most part not be considered, "QUISLINGS," by the Central government, but may expect harsh treatment at the hands of the communists, should the latter take control. In respect to this, TANI reports to Tokyo that, "influential persons" in the Nanking (puppet) government were in touch with Chungking and "therefore there appears to be no anxiety about the occupation of Shanghai by the Chungking forces," on the other hand, "if the communists' army was to occupy the city, there would be no way out - - - and there is considerable apprehension on that score."¹⁰

It has indeed, long been an open secret that the majority of the puppets, particularly the minor officials, have Chungking's direct approval and that Chungking's policy has been to encourage persons of known good character, basically loyal, to remain in office under Japanese occupation - rather than to have opportunists or rascals who may sincerely cooperate with the Japanese for selfish reasons and personal benefit. A recent illustration in the case of a major official, is available in the appointment

9 Dip. Sum. #1066 - 24 February 1945.

10 Jap. Dip. K-169126.

of WANG YIN T'AI as President of the North-China Political Council. An entirely credible report from the French Charge MARGERIE in PEKING *learned from a member of WANG's "immediate entourage," reveals that "the very firm attitude WANG YIN T'AI has always taken toward the occupation authorities, has brought him marks of esteem and even explicit encouragement from the Chungking leaders," and that he had "been asked by them in an unequivocal manner to accept the appointment - because these duties should not be entrusted to a corrupt official - - - - and it is desired in Chungking to make a stand against the Communists." MARGERIE also mentions, "the support which WANG is receiving from the Nanking (Jap Puppet) government is a significant factor in the struggle being constantly waged by the latter against YenAn.

* The N.C.P.C. governs all of North China and the chairman is practically equivalent to a President of North China. Originally it was entirely separate from Central China where WANG CHING WEI was President. For approximately the first two years of occupation the Japanese sponsors held out for a separate independent state in the North - - but were finally persuaded to amalgamate under a central government at Nanking with WANG CHING WEI as President.

CONCLUSION

The present internal status in China may be summed up with the statements:

1. That the underlying causes of the Chungking-Yenan controversy do not allow a complete settlement.
2. That this however, does not preclude a minimization of interference with the Chinese-Anglo-American war effort which may be affected by continuation of reform within the Chungking government and military body and the judicious use of pressure on the part of the Anglo-Americans.
3. That all the conditions for a civil war in China, either before or after the conclusion of the Japanese war, definitely exist, and that it is to a great extent in the hands of Soviet-Russia and the Anglo-Americans whether this will be a minor or major conflict.
4. That the enormous and unique influence of foreign, particularly American, public opinion on both the domestic and foreign policy of China is a factor that cannot be lost sight of; but this influence will be gradually diminished upon the final adoption of the constitution and the institution of popular franchise.