

**RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS  
(June, 1945)**

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(June, 1945)

Introduction

As Russo-Japanese relations appear to be nearing the end of an epoch, and as the past will play its part in shaping the future, it seems appropriate now to glance briefly at the history of past relations and at the underlying factors which gave them their character.

Russia's past foreign policy in the East may be summed up roughly as defense of her Far Eastern territory bordering on the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas, and the securing of an ice-free outlet to the Pacific, preferably via the Yellow Sea.

Japan's foreign policy was more involved. From the base elements of pride and covetousness, transmuted by political alchemists into the fine gold of a "Divine Mission", came the original basic policy, contained in the two simple words: "Conquer barbarians (foreigners)". By evolution this became the "Continental Policy" (conquest of Asia via Korea and Manchuria), and eventually, the "Tanaka Memorial" (world domination).

It is immediately obvious that the two policies are incompatible, and that they must clash in Manchuria and/or Korea. Thus it has been the course of their diplomatic relations through the years, unimpeded by friendship, reflecting fairly accurately the relative military strength and international position of the two countries at any given



time, the only distortion being that caused by domestic politics.

When in 1875, Japan (then only 22 years emerged from the chrysalis of the cocoon opened by Commodore Perry) traded her questionable rights in Sakhalia for cession by Russia of full sovereignty of the Kuriles, she was making good use of a trial flight of her newly found wings. It was not that Japan then coveted any bleak, forbidding northern areas, but Russia must be gradually pushed to the west - if allowed to become strong in the East she would be a threat to realization of the 300-year old dream of a drive through Korea and Manchuria for the conquest of China.

Seeing that threat become stronger through Russian activity in Korea and Manchuria, Japan could not afford delay, and brought on her war with China (1894-95), emerging with Formosa and Kwantung (southernmost part of Manchuria) and the "independence" of Korea. Forced by the combined diplomatic pressure of Russia, France and Germany to turn Kwantung back to China, Japan resentfully watched this area become a leasehold of Russia, who developed thereon the ice-free port of Dairen (Dalny) and the fortifications of Port Arthur. Korea, thus flanked by Russian strength (Port Arthur to the northwest and Vladivostok to the northeast), became to Japan "a dagger pointed at her heart", whereupon she began her war with Russia (1904-05).

Again victorious, Japan began to see her "Divine Mission"



more clearly. By the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 4, 1905) she received recognition of her "paramount interest" in Korea (annexed five years later); the lease of coveted Kwantung (later extended by China to 99 years); together with Russian improvements thereon including railroad and coal properties; full sovereignty of South Sakhalin (south of the 50th parallel); and certain fishing rights (specified by treaty of 1907).

Only nine years later (1914), Japan was to see her traditional enemy embroiled in World War I; then in a revolution that was to doom the Czarist regime. Availing herself of the golden opportunity, Japan under guise of intervention with the Allies, seized Eastern Siberia and North Sakhalin - but was forced to withdraw several years later upon pressure of the United States and her Allies.

Diplomatic relations were first established between Japan and the present Soviet Government in 1925 (Treaty of Peking). By terms of the treaty, Japan wrested from the then weak Soviet state fishing rights and the coal and oil concessions of North Sakhalin, which until 1944, when the coal and oil concessions were cancelled, were a source of friction and recriminations.

Little more than six years later, <sup>(1931)</sup> Japan invaded Manchuria, whence began a series of border incidents, culminating in a full scale battle at Nomonhan in 1939. Confronted with an undeclared war which both sides, having other plans, did not want to continue,

Japan and Russia eventually concluded the 5-year Neutrality Pact in 1941. When Japan signed the Pact, she had definite knowledge that Hitler intended to attack Russia, and she had no intention of honoring her pledge to remain neutral. Her failure to do so, led to Russia's notice of abrogation on 5 April, 1945. This failure (a violation of Article 2) gives Russia a sound basis for complete repudiation of the Pact at will, without waiting for it to expire ten months hence.

Since abrogation notice was given on 5 April, relations between Russia and Japan have deteriorated rapidly, the principal characteristic being a war of nerves waged by Russia with such success that by 1 June, when the attached Summary begins, the Japanese Foreign Office had adopted a "policy of obsequiousness based on fear".



Current Russo-Japanese Relations  
(June, 1945)

After the heavy raids of late May which left most of Tokyo's Ministry buildings badly battered and burned out\*, Foreign Minister Togo, alarmed at the increasing tempo of the war and fearful that Russia might seize the opportunity to intervene, possibly by means of a border incident,<sup>1</sup> instructed Ambassador Sato at Moscow (1 June) to "miss no opportunity to talk to the Soviet leaders, as it was a matter of extreme urgency that Japan should not only prevent Russia from entering the war but should also induce her to adopt a favorable attitude toward Japan". Meanwhile at Tokyo ex-Premier Hirota\*\* would confer with Soviet Ambassador Malik and, keeping a close watch on Soviet tendencies, "try to lead the Russians along" the lines desired by the Japanese.<sup>2</sup>

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\*A Greater East Asia Ministry Circular of 1 June, describing incendiary damage and makeshift measures for office space, included the following: "We are negotiating with a view to transferring the capital altogether". (On the same date a Tokyo broadcast to western North America asserted that the Government would remain in Tokyo "even if the metropolis is reduced to ashes".) (DS-#1181-19 June)

\*\*Koki Hirota was Ambassador to Russia (1930-32); Foreign Minister (1933-36 and 1937-38); Premier (March 36-February 37 - when the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed.) Last September Russia stalled Japanese efforts to send Hirota as Special Envoy to Moscow apparently in connection with a peace move. Ambassador Grew regarded Hirota as a "moderate".

<sup>1</sup>H-186883, 21 May, Tokyo-Moscow; H-186243, 21 May Tokyo Circular; Dip Sum #1159, 28 May.

<sup>2</sup>A-188568, 1 June, Tokyo-Moscow; Dip Sum #1166, 4 June.



Togo's despatch, however, found Sato in no receptive mood. Depressed of late (since abrogation of the Neutrality Pact), and lacking the irrepresible elan with which formerly he built air castles as he glowed in the "warmth of Molotov's personality". Sato has grown weary of these interviews, from which, despite the "atmosphere of perfect cordiality", he has always come home empty-handed. After mulling it over for a week he ventured in a long despatch to Togo (8 June) to offer his "humble opinions as to the critical situation".

Over and above the expected maintenance of neutrality, Sato had "absolutely no hope" of the possibility of Russia's showing the desired "favorable attitude" toward Japan. Although "sounded out time and time again, Russia had avoided becoming deeply involved in Russo-Japanese relations" because of her relations with America and England. The fact that she gave notice of abrogation of the Neutrality Pact was proof of lack of interest in strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. If "in the near future the possibility of a worsening of Russo-American relations becomes clear, possibly that will be another matter".

Continuing, Sato recalled that relations with Russia "have followed a thorny path since the October revolution (1917)..... at no time was there any basic improvement.....and finally there was

the armed clash at Homonhan". Then came the Neutrality Pact, and it was barely possible to maintain this "even when Russia was still at war with Germany". Also, there must not be overlooked "the fact that the Russian people, elated by victory, are disposed, as Russians, to feel that the Portsmouth Treaty is a humiliation in Russian history".

While promising to do what little he could, Sato hoped and prayed that Foreign Minister Togo would "sound out the Russian views in Tokyo from a special standpoint...and find an opening of some sort".

Turning then to the war situation, Sato proceeded to paint a macabre picture of Japanese cities following each other, one by one, to the grave - with such distant centers as Harbin and Hsinking in Manchukuo closing the funeral procession as soon as American heavy bombers could be based on Okinawa. However well justified his views, the despatch held scant comfort for the Foreign Office.

While claiming still to hold the view "that by continuing the war against the two countries, America and England, to the last, Japan should be able to succeed in making them lose heart", Sato admitted his anxiety as to Japan's ability to maintain the power to wage war:...and "to continue hostilities, once the means of resistance

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\*Manchurian-Mongolian border incident in 1939. According to the press, Japan suffered nearly 20,000 casualties.



have been crushed, is something not to be thought of in a modern war...if in the near future even Manchukuo, Japan's only rear supply base, must also come under the power of enemy planes, Japan would be in the predicament of losing her last hope of maintaining the power to make war".

Moreover, "if by some remote chance" Russia should intervene by force of arms, "there would be no hope at all of saving the Empire's future...since it is clear as day that the Red Army is superior (to the Japanese) on all points;...unfortunately the Imperial Army now in Manchukuo" is completely unable to oppose them".

Sato concluded that in the event of Russian entry into the war:

"Japan would have no choice but to come to a decision quickly, fly into her arms, and resolving to eat dirt, to put up with all sacrifices, in order to save the national structure."<sup>3</sup>

Continuing down the same lane of thought, Sato, three days later, sent a long despatch to Togo, beginning as follows:

"What is the meaning of the phrase 'unconditional surrender'? There are virtually no precedents from history to provide the answer to this question. With the hope of discovering the significance and scope of the phrase as defined in the minds of the United Nations' leaders, I have drawn up a statement of my observations on the 4-Power Declaration (with regard to Germany)".

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<sup>3</sup>WIS 16 June estimate of Japanese troops in Manchukuo, 870,000; North China, 320,000.

<sup>3</sup>H-189921, 8 June, Moscow-Tokyo; Dip Sum #1173, 11 June.



Proceeding then in a lengthy summary of various 4-Power statements issued on 5 June, Sato made such points as the following:

- (a) "The United Nations do not take the customary course of administering the occupied area through negotiations with the central government of the defeated Power...they issue order unilaterally.
- (b) The occupation of Germany...is a real and true occupation...but is not what you might call a 'simple occupation' since there is also preparation for alienation of (German) territory.
- (c) (After noting the provisions dissolving all armed forces including the SS, SA and Gestapo, and the provisions requiring military, industrial and other facilities to be held in good condition at the disposal of the Allies): "These points show the absolute completeness of unconditional surrender".<sup>4</sup>

On the 22nd, Sato sent a further despatch to the Foreign Minister. He noted that, despite preparations for another Big-3 Conference, "Russia's attitude toward us is still friendly and she has not failed in courtesy;...there is no change whatever in the attitude toward us of officials of the Foreign Office as compared with the past".\* Sato pointed out as significant, that the Russians had recently (a) repatriated from Germany more than 260 Japanese nationals by way of Siberia, and (b) authorized the removal from Soviet territory of certain fishery products (valued at 4 million yen) which they had formerly threatened to confiscate. Although

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\*An indication that this courteous attitude is limited to the Foreign Office is seen in a complaint made by Sato on 29 May that "there are many Soviet citizens acting in a very hot-headed manner...we have heard of 23 instances of young Army officers and others making insulting remarks to Japanese women residents...and I am sorry to say, these are not the (worst?) instances".

<sup>4</sup>Dip. Sum. #1175, 14 June.



these indications were favorable, nevertheless, care would be needed, "in anticipation of the 3-Power Conference".<sup>5</sup>

Apparently ex-Premier Hirota has not yet progressed far in his planned talks with Soviet Ambassador Malik at Tokyo, for, on 25 June, Foreign Minister Togo addressed Sato as follows:

"I am very grateful that you were able to obtain at your 29 May interview with Foreign Commissar Molotov some sort of commitment as to the continuance of Russia's neutrality.\* The views you have expressed (to the effect that Japan cannot expect to improve relations with Russia) are also more or less reasonable and I too feel that it will be most difficult to effect any sudden turn in our relations with Russia.

"In view of the urgency of our situation, however, it is our pressing duty to make a desperate effort at this time to obtain more favorable relations than mere neutrality. (Needless to say, we are prepared to make considerable sacrifices in this connection.) We must seize every opportunity to attain this objective and I ask for even greater efforts on your part for our country's sake.

"I have discussed the details of this with Minister Morishima.\* (Sato's right-hand man, who is shortly to return to Moscow).<sup>6</sup>

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\*Sato advised Togo after this interview that in response to his discussion of abrogation of the Neutrality Pact and his hope that "no important change" would take place in relations, Molotov had stated: "You already know Russia's answer on this point. The Soviet Union does not believe that its notification with respect to the Neutrality Pact has brought about any change in the existing situation". (When the two above-quoted sentences are read together, there is an affirmative connotation. However, careful study of Molotov's original statements when giving notice of abrogation indicates that "Russia's answer" is the second above-quoted sentence, and if analysed does not necessarily mean what Sato and Togo seem to think. The mere fact that notification hasn't changed the "existing situation" has no significance, for it was the unsatisfactory nature of the "existing situation" which caused the notification.)

5H-193052, 22 June, Moscow-Tokyo; Dip. Sum. #1188, 26 June.

6H-193081, 25 June, Tokyo-Moscow; Dip. Sum. #1188, 26 June;

H-181212, 14 June, Tokyo-Moscow.



A third-party interest in the improvement of Russo-Japanese relations is disclosed by recent traffic, from which it appears that Subhas Chandra Bose, leader of the "Indian Provisional Government", who is now in Bangkok, has been giving much thought to a plan to bring about a "Soviet-Japanese coalition" and at the same time to enlist Soviet support for his movement. The latest developments are as follows:

- (a) On 10 June the Japanese Delegate to the Bose regime reported that Bose had recently repeated a prior request that the Japanese Government "use its good offices in establishing contacts between the Indian Provisional Government and the Soviet Union".
- (b) On 24 June, Foreign Minister Togo forwarded to Ambassador Sato a message which Bose wanted to have "secretly" communicated to Meghnam Saha,\* Professor of Physics at the University of Calcutta, who was in Moscow for the International Scientific Congress. In the message, Bose asked Saha to do his best "to arouse the sympathy of the Russian Government toward the fight for Indian independence", adding that "this should not be difficult, since the Russians recognize that they undoubtedly must break with England sooner or later".<sup>7</sup>

Despatches through middle June indicate no abatement in the previously reported flow of Soviet military strength to the East. In addition to reports of the arrival of artillery at Blagoveshchensk (on Siberian side of Amur River - NNE of Harbin) - "every month

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\*Saha, an eminent Indian scientist, is a member of Ghandi's Indian Nationalist Congress but is not known to have any connection with the Bose group.

<sup>7</sup>Dip. Sum. #1188, 26 June.



there are trains carrying 80 to 90 heavy guns<sup>8</sup>; and a "considerable increase in the number of troops" at Vladivostok, as well as a strengthening of the general air defense and shore battery set-up there; a 20 June report from Ambassador Sato relayed the following observations of two couriers who recently made the trips from Manchouli to Moscow and had maintained an 18-hour daily watch.

During the period 9-16 June, a total of 166 eastbound military trains were seen. They were estimated to have been carrying about 120,000 troops as well as military equipment including self-propelled guns and rocket guns, 1600 trucks, 30 tanks (apparently American) and a number of "Joseph Stalin" heavy tanks. In addition, 250 eastbound tank-cars were observed.<sup>8</sup>

Should Russia decide to attack Japan, she will not have a prolonged search for the conventional casus belli. The main body of a suitable bill of indictment is already seen in impressive charges made by the Soviet press and radio during the past three months. All that is needed is the igniting spark, and these can be drawn at will from the arrogant Japanese Army, the unyielding Navy and the officious and truculent police, all of whom have been the despair of the Japanese Foreign Office in its efforts to propitiate Russia.

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<sup>8</sup>Dip. Sum. #1172, 10 June  
Dip. Sum. #1179, 17 June  
Dip. Sum. #1185, 23 June

A minor incident, but indicative of the Army arrogance, happened recently on a Tokyo suburban train on which a group of Soviet Embassy staff members were among the passengers. One of the Russians was smoking a cigarette, when suddenly a Japanese Army officer knocked it out of his hand, berating him for such utter disregard of the "No Smoking" sign - this despite the fact "all the other passengers were smoking without taking the slightest notice of the sign".<sup>9</sup>

Regarding the Japanese Navy, three recurring grievances are the following:

- (a) Refusal to accede to Russian requests for permission to use Tsugaru Strait (between Hokkaido and Honshu) during the winter months. (Ice hazards farther north make it probable that security of transit through this strait will be included in Russia's post-war aims.)<sup>10</sup>
- (b) Wrangling regarding Soviet use of LaPerouse (Soya) Strait (between Sakhalin and Hokkaido), resumption of lighthouse operation, refuge in nearby Aniwa Bay. (Japanese mining of this passage (ordered for May and June) creates another possible source of dispute.)<sup>11</sup>
- (c) Espionage by Japanese "fishing" vessels in Soviet waters. (The Soviet Courts recently confiscated one of these.)<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>H-185090 - 3 May, Tokyo-Moscow.

<sup>10</sup>Dip. Sum. #1069, 27 February et al.

<sup>11</sup>Dip. Sum. #1069, 27 February et al.

<sup>12</sup>H-180854, 25 April and H-182854/55, 25 April, Moscow-Tokyo; H-183069, 3 May, Moscow-Tokyo; DS., 31 August and DS #1135, 4 May.



Regarding the officiousness and truculence of the Japanese police, many instances have been reported in traffic. One of the most recent, and potentially the most dangerous, is the previously mentioned case of the "arbitrary and barbarous" arrest and imprisonment of Sergei, Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in Japan. Bearing a diplomatic passport, he was planning to visit Patriarch Alexei at Moscow.

Informing the Soviet Embassy that Metropolitan Sergei was "under investigation" on suspicion of having violated the National Defense Laws, the Japanese offered the gratuitous insult of stating that he was considered to be a White Russian, since there was no evidence that he possessed Soviet citizenship "except that the Soviet Embassy so stated". Although the Metropolitan was arrested on May 13th, and the Soviet Embassy made two demands for his "immediate release", he was still in prison a month later.<sup>13</sup>

Another of the current worries of Sato and Togo is the possibility that the Soviet Government might lay claim to German interests in the Far East.

Sato recently expressed concern regarding the problem of German ships seized by the Japanese, in the light of the 5 June 4-Power Declaration with respect to Germany.

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<sup>13</sup>Dip. Sum. #1175, 14 June.



In a recently available despatch of 17 May, Togo (as G.E.A. Minister) was concerned regarding a Greater East Asia report from Shanghai that a reporter for the local "Russian Daily News" asked, "presumably at the suggestion of Tass", whether German agencies in Shanghai would be transferred to authorized representatives of the Red Army "inasmuch as all German property, installations and agencies have passed to the control of the Supreme Command of the Red Army by virtue of Germany's surrender". Togo cautioned G.E.A. representatives at Nanking and Shanghai that it was "necessary closely to observe activities of the Russian agents at your place". On the 20th, Nanking counselled that "a very delicate issue might arise", and Japan should "as soon as possible complete the transfer of ownership of property we deem essential through purchase or some other method". On 29 May, Minister Horiuchi (Nanking) further recommended that the German broadcasting station IGRS in Shanghai be turned over to the Chinese to avoid complications should the Russians demand the station while still in Japanese hands.<sup>14</sup>

A "border incident", Foreign Minister Togo's most dreaded bete noire, was reported on 8 June by Ambassador Yamada in Kiating.

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<sup>14</sup>Dip. Sum. #1178, 16 June.



It appears that on 2 June, twenty-four "Manchukooan spies" who were being trained by the Japanese military Intelligence, mutinied, killing three of their instructors, whereupon they seized arms and ammunition, and escaped. Although a punitive expedition two days later caught up with them in the neighborhood of Wei-tzu-kou (- a border town -) eight of the fugitives made good their escape across the Siberian border by boarding a Soviet vessel on the Usuri River; while on the vessel they joined the crew members in firing at the punitive force, which did not return the fire. Several hours later, another Soviet vessel crossed the river in the vicinity, picked up three more of the fugitives and seized a boat belonging to the police before returning to Russian territory.

Japanese Army officials thought it "almost certain that this incident resulted from Russian scheming", since, in addition to the above facts, Russian vessels had (a) "been jamming our radio communications" since about 1 June, and (b) continued to hover in the vicinity after having picked up the fugitives.<sup>15</sup>

Several interesting despatches from Sweden disclose that the Japanese Legation at Stockholm, far removed from the Pacific conflict, is in the midst of a little war of its own. Ironically, the subject of the dispute is peace.

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<sup>15</sup>Dip. Sum. #1179, 17 June.



On 18 June, both Minister Okamoto and Naval Attache Mishina addressed despatches to Tokyo regarding the "machinations" of the Military Attache, Major General Onodera,\* who is reported to have attempted to negotiate peace talks with the Allies. The initial contact was said to have been Eric Erickson;\*\* then, via Prince Carl and an associate of his, the suggestion reached the Swedish Foreign Minister, who "flatly refused...to handle backdoor scheming of this sort".

Minister Okamoto complained to Tokyo that he had not received a reply to a despatch sent a month earlier on the same subject. Referring to recent press and radio reports of Japanese peace negotiations in Stockholm, he stated:

"There are signs that the Attache may have been making use of other foreigners in addition to Erickson and even one of the Japanese here. As I see it (the Attache's purpose) was to steal a march on the Foreign Ministry at this important juncture and get all the credit. The unreasonable way in which things have been done already reveals a glimpse of the cloven hoof. Please find out how the Government proposes to handle this sort of Army scheming, and let me know. A dual diplomacy at this time would be disastrous."

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\*In March, Onodera was gathering intelligence on Russia, using Finnish and Esthonian agents, and in close touch with the head of a Finnish resistance group, Colonel Hallamaa (believed to be Henrik Reino Hallamaa, former chief of Finnish cryptographic service and close collaborator with the Japanese in cryptanalysis), who was then planning to send radio-equipped agents into Russia.

\*\*Eric Erickson, Swedish oil man, who, according to recent press despatches, obtained information for the Allies on German oil production. Available information has contained no other reference to contact between Onodera and Erickson.



Minister Okamoto went on to recommend that "in the light of these facts", it would be best for Japan "simply to ignore the revelations of the newspapers here, without issuing any special denial". (Domei issued an emphatic denial the following day.)<sup>16</sup>

Whatever Onodera's "machinations" may have been, and whatever the reason for the Foreign Minister's silence, on 24 June the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff instructed Onodera as follows:

"As we have said before, Japan is firmly determined to prosecute the Greater East Asia war to the very end. There is a report, however, to the effect that some Japanese official stationed in Sweden is making peace overtures to America. That is demagoguery pure and simple, and if you have any idea as to the source of those reports please inform us."<sup>17</sup>

Although not bearing immediately on current Russo-Japanese relations, several recent reports recall Ambassador Sato's previously reported estimate of demands that would be made by Russia should Japan ask her services as mediator. Two of the points involved were:

- (a) Settlement of the question of the disposition of Korea.
- (b) Incorporation of Inner Mongolia into Outer Mongolia.<sup>18</sup>

On 11 June, the Chief of Police Section of the Korean Government General, informing Tokyo of serious recent outbreaks in Korea, stated that:

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<sup>16</sup>CGZ #4615-G-GI, 18 June; Dip. Sum. #1183, 21 June;  
Dip. Sum. #1187, 25 June.

<sup>17</sup>Dip. Sum. #1189, 27 June.

<sup>18</sup>H-183459, 9 May, Moscow-Tokyo.



"...with the presence of revolutionary doctrine both inside and outside Korea, the increasing violence of subversive activities among the people, enemy propaganda tactics, the situation is becoming grave..even those with marked pro-Japanese leanings...foresee the inevitable defeat of the Empire and apparently believe that the future fate of Korea and her people will be placed, without any alternative, in the hands of the Soviet and of America.<sup>19</sup>

With regard to Inner Mongolia, or rather Mengchiang (created by the Japanese in 1937 - including Inner Mongolian Chahar and northern Suiyuan as well as parts of North China provinces of Hopei and Shansi), Japanese Minister Yasato at Kalgan reported on 5 June that he had succeeded in persuading the President (Mongol Prince Teh Wang) to postpone the question raised by the latter regarding revision of the state's basic law. He also advised Teh Wang that hopes for "Mongolian independence" could not be fulfilled immediately. (A Chinese intelligence report forwarded by the American Embassy in Chungking indicates that Teh Wang recently sent special emissaries to negotiate with the Government of Outer Mongolia.)<sup>20</sup>

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Summarizing the above, it is seen that with regard to Russia, the flow of her military strength to the East continues; that should she find it convenient to use an "incident" at any time, the tinder is ready at hand. Of passing mention, is the opening of a small

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<sup>19</sup>H-191221, 11 June, Keijo-Tokyo; Dip. Sum. #1182, 20 June.

<sup>20</sup>Dip. Sum. #1181, 19 June.



back door to India, should she have matters to take up in that direction.

With regard to the Japanese Foreign Office, the urgent matter of "improving relations" is being passed back and forth between Foreign Minister Togo and Ambassador Sato, neither one knowing just what to do about it. Although "prepared to make considerable sacrifices in this connection", Togo seems reluctant, possibly through fear of the military, to take the dreaded step of broaching to the Russians a proposal that, once made, would be irrevocable and might, like the opening of a dam, release a torrent of other demands which might otherwise be held back.

Possibly not more significant than of Sato's present overwrought state, are the contradictory conditions of his seeming confidence that Russia does not at present intend to intervene; and his sheer, hypnotic fear of Russia, that instead of repelling would attract him to "fly into her arms". Paradoxically, although the latter course would be one of desperation, it could conceivably, through unavoidable friction between Russia and the Anglo-Americans, prove to be her best course.

With regard to the Japanese Army, although the General Staff is, as previously reported, inclined to "view with alarm" the possibility of Russia's entry, the 24 June despatch to Military Attache Onodera at Stockholm indicates that it "is firmly determined to prosecute the Greater East Asia War to the very end."