

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

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(Introduction)

1. Past events have shown, and all available traffic tends to confirm that Sino-Soviet relations revolve around two main points, namely: (a) Soviet Russia's plans and intentions for territorial expansion and/or political control in Asia, particularly regarding territory to which China claims sovereign rights, (b) Soviet Russia's plans and intentions for political control within the Chinese Government by either supporting the Chinese Communist party to such an extent as to force a coalition pro-Russian government or abetting a complete revolution and sovietizing of all China.
2. As will be seen in this paper, points (a) and (b) are the subject matter of practically all available traffic touching on Sino-Soviet relations. Regarding point (b), and whether or not, or to what extent at present Yanan (the Chinese Communists) is under control of or in accord with Soviet Russia will, in view of the dearth of relative material or concrete evidence, have to be viewed in the light of the record:
3. Much (and probably most, if it could be accurately determined) of the current agitation and propaganda within free China for a coalition government and closer cooperation with Yanan stems from Chinese intellectuals, most of whom are Liberals or, "left of Center", minded. These persons have absolutely no official or unofficial connection

with either YEKAN or MOSCOW. Some are KUO MIN TANG members, some members or ex-members of the P.P.C. (Peoples Political Council - The Chinese Parliament or House of Commons), or members, officers or founders of one or more of the 50 odd other political parties in China, varying in politics from the almost extreme left to extreme right.¹ Their aims are two, which are so closely interrelated that one cannot be placed before the other. 1) More vigorous prosecution of the war against Japan including making any reasonable concessions to either YEKAN or the Allies, particularly the United States, necessary to that end. 2) Reform of the existing government, eliminating corruption, nepotism, and immediate institution of democratic procedure i.e.; constitutional government and representation of all major parties etc.

4. Outside of the policy and demand for more voice in the government and more rapid reform, particularly agrarian, the principal conflict between the communists and the Kuo Min Tang had been the latter's soft policy toward, and the appeasing of Japan since the MUKDEN incident

¹Typical and one of the largest is the "DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE", which is itself a coalition of 20 odd minor parties—It's officers and supporters some of the best known and most respected people in China such as: Dr. Lo Lung Chi, former PPC member, Dr. Mei Yi Chi, president of National Tsing Hua University (largest in pre-war China) frequently called the "Abe Lincoln" of China, Dr. Pan Kuang Tan, (Quentin Pan) professor of Psychology and one of top in Chinese education, and Dr. Huang Chien Chung another top in education activities and at present a PPC member (although he has twice recently submitted his resignation to the PPC, as of 1 April 1945, the Generalissimo had refused to accept it).

(18 September 1931) resulting in the loss of MANCHURIA. Among other incidents it was the Kuomintang's delay in fighting to regain Manchuria which led to the kidnapping of the Generalissimo in 1936. The recovery of MANCHURIA has long been the battle cry of both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang group. It was effectively used as a rallying point in unifying the country and inspiring patriotism in the provinces, and was the background for renewal of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937. The recovery of MANCHURIA is the ultimate objective of the Kuomintang and the "Man in the Street", in China today. Indeed, any peace that did not include the recovery of MANCHURIA would in the Chinese mind amount to the loss of the war. They believe and it is no doubt true, that they could have concluded hostilities with Japan almost any time after 1939 or 1940 by renouncing claim to MANCHURIA and recognizing the state of MANCHUKUO. If it is, as traffic shows almost all third parties believe,² Soviet Russia's intention to make territorial claim to MANCHURIA³ plus possibly the MONGOLIAS and Chinese TURKISTAN (Hsin Chiang), then this would be in direct conflict with one of YENAN'S principal avowed objectives and one of their most effective arguments in gaining popular support.

²Harbin/Tokyo H-177192,

Tokyo H-185998, Stockholm/Tokyo H-177750.

Peking/

I

A On the 5th of January 1945 the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, reported to Tokyo that on 4th January he protested to Molotov on an article appearing in the Government organ IZVESTIA. The article was in criticism of the Chungking's Government's non-cooperative attitude with the Chinese Communists and pointed out that this non-cooperation was the reason China continued to suffer defeats from Japan while the Japs themselves were being defeated in every other theatre of war. The article stated further:

"The ruinous policy of the reactionaries in Chungking has still not been done away with, while against this the, 'All China Patriotic Association', 'The Progressive Society', and all other liberal and democratic leaders influential in China cry for national unity and the building of a democratic nation for carrying on an unrestricted war of emancipation."⁴

B That Sato was making a poorly concealed attempt to get information on what connection Soviet Russia has with the Chinese Communists is apparent from the following amazing misstatement⁵ of facts to Molotov:

"The Japanese Government was very pained to see the outbreak of the war with the Chungking Government-- which was then the Nanking Government in 1937, however, it was not long before she discovered that her real enemies were the Anglo-Americans who were standing behind China. We therefore felt that if

⁴See Paragraph 2 of Introduction

⁵H-182921; etal.

Chungking would only cease fighting against us as a sort of a vanguard for the Anglo-Americans, there would be no further need for us to fight against her, however, the Chinese Communists saw in the clash between China and Japan, an excellent opportunity to bring about a union between Chungking and Nanking, (?) (Yenan) and therefore called for a united anti-Japanese front. It was at this point that Japan was forced to clash with the Chinese Communists."

"If the Chinese Communists should discontinue their war against us we would not feel any further necessity to fight them. We have been fortunate enough to be able to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union which is the spiritual center of the Communist Party. I therefore cannot see why we should not be able to obtain similar results in the case of our relations with the Chinese Communists."

C Molotov denied any relations with the Chinese Communists in the following reply:

"The Soviet Government adopts an attitude of non-interference in the China Question and has no relationship with the Chinese Communists. There is a Communist Party and a Communist Army in China. Indeed it is a self-styled Communist Party but whether these individuals are genuine communists is a matter of doubt to me." (H-160424) (5 January, Sato-to-Tokyo.)

D In contradiction of Molotov's statement is the report on 18th December from the Japanese Ambassador in Hsingking to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow stating that Soviet Consul Petrov in Dairen had been in contact with 2 Chinese "Wireless Spies" from Chinese Communist Headquarters, Yenan, who had "infiltrated", to Dairen in mid 1942 and he (Petrov) was working with them. The spies were arrested and

had confessed.⁶ They further admitted that about 30 Chinese Communists from Yen-an had entered Manchuria but at present were mostly inactive awaiting a revolt in Manchuria or a Soviet-Japanese War.⁷⁻⁸

II

There is considerable evidence that the

⁶A confession obtained by the Japanese may not necessarily be the truth. Also it is not definitely established whether the Yen-an Spies were in radio contact with Yen-an or Chita (Siberia).

⁷Previous incidents indicate it is quite possible the Chinese Reds may have come to Manchuria on an exploratory mission with the hope of establishing relations between Yen-an and Moscow and contacted Petrov to that end.

⁸Dip Summary #1092, 22 March;
18 December 1944

H-157796

⁹H-170430

Soviet Government is courting White Russians in Manchuria¹⁰ regarding which the Japanese are highly concerned and which last November evoked Shigemitsu to advise Hsingking:

"There has recently been a marked tendency among the White Russians in Manchukuo to be pro-Soviet and Soviet activities directed at the White Russians have become more vigorous."¹¹

In January Minister Nishi reported the Chief of a Japanese military intelligence unit in Harbin stated:

"It would be a good thing to repatriate all the White Russians—if the Soviet authorities would take them back."¹²

E The charge gives further evidences in the same dispatch that Sino-Soviet relations are deteriorating with the following:

"During our last meeting, the foreign minister (Chinese) told me that relations between the countries were better than ever before; but this can hardly be correct. The Soviets have not yet given an affirmative reply with reference to the Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow and although Chungking recently proposed that Sun Fo should be sent to Moscow, no reply has been received to this proposal either. The truth of the matter is that the Chinese Government's desire for a reapproachment with the U.S.S.R. has not been welcome by Moscow."

¹⁰H-175670--Harbin-to-Moscow, 30 March.

¹¹Dip Summary #1078, 8 March.

¹²Dip Summary #1078, 8 March etal.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

C

According to information recently received Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Budyenny made a tour of inspection in central Siberia in December. The Chinese are aware of this and believe the Soviets will occupy Mongolia and even advance into Yenan to assist the Communists; They (the Chinese) have therefore strengthened their forces in the province of Shensi. This is completely denied in the foreign minister's statements.

The statements cannot be supported by current traffic, the bulk of information in fact contradicts this conclusion and points to a definite Sino-Soviet Rapprochement.

*On 19th April the U.S. Naval Attache¹ in Chungking reported the arrival there of Soviet Ambassador Petrev and indicated the beginning of a period of closer Sino-Russian relations. On 15th May the Chungking foreign office issued a propaganda directive to the effect: That the arrival of the New Russian Ambassador should be made the occasion for the expression of friendly sentiments in regard to Russia. (E-185299)

III

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that Sino-Soviet relations are rapidly reaching a stage where discussions may soon be held. There can further be little doubt these discussions rather than military cooperation, will be principally concerned with point (a) stated in Paragraph 1 of the introduction and which is meant to include such Russian interests as the Kwantung leased territory, the North Manchurian and Chinese Eastern Railways and the future status of Korea.*

*Although nothing can be found indicating what demands Soviet Russia will require from China or what maximum concessions China would make without a clash. Being based on several years close contact with Chinese official, military and intellectual circles. It would not be mere speculation to assume the U.S.S.R.'s minimum requirements will be along the following lines:

1. Either resumption of the Kwantung lease or establishment of Dairen as a free port plus Soviet naval base rights at Port Arthur.
2. At least 50% ownership and control of the strategic Manchurian railroads--especially those in which Russia formerly held interests.
3. Either an independent status for possibly both Mongolias but certainly Outer Mongolia or a position as mediator in settling Sino/Mongolian relations plus possibly disarming of Outer Mongolia and some border revision.
4. Either definite commercial (economic) concessions in Manchuria, Mongolia and possibly China proper--or long term commercial treaties giving the U.S.S.R. favorable position plus possibly either free trade with Manchuria and Mongolia or special tariff consideration.

5. Reversion to the U.S.S.R. of all former, "Imperial Russian", properties plus extradition rights over both Red and White Russian residents in China. Suppression of anti-Red propaganda and generally friendly attitude on the part of China.

Likewise the present Chinese attitude indicates that all the above points may be conceded without a clash. It is believed the present government could make such concessions without loss of control or too great a "loss of face", however, item 3 (above) may prove difficult for peaceful settlement.

In return for these or any additional or similar concessions the Chinese will no doubt demand absolute non-interference in settling what she considers her purely domestic problem, i.e. the Chinese Communist Question and there is little doubt that the settlement of this question is intended to result in complete elimination of the Yen-an group (Red die-hards) and armies as a threat to the republican government (Kuo Min Tang possibly liberalized and including some minority party representation).

It may be taken for granted that China's concessions or demands to the U.S.S.R. will be in direct proportion to the amount of support; economic, political and moral, that she receives from the other Allies particularly the U.S.—this is the collective opinion of the "people" (Government circles—intellectuals—commercial interests and the man in the street) of China today.