

WAR DEPARTMENT

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE DISSEMINATION

AND

SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

1943 - 1945

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 3, E. O. 12065
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

GBS Date: 26 Dec. 1979

WAR DEPARTMENT

Regulations Governing the Dissemination
and
Security of Communication Intelligence
1943 - 1945

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

COPY NO. 159

20-100

AG 311.5 (2-4-43)OB-S-B-M

February 6, 1943

SUBJECT: Security of Radio Decryption
Intelligence

.....
:
: Auth: T. A. G.
: Initials *LEG*
: Date: 2/6/43
.....

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Ground Forces
Army Air Forces
Services of Supply
Defense Commands
Departments
Theaters of Operations
Service Commands
Base Commands
The Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area
Allied Force
The Commanding Officers,
Base Commands

1. Radio Decryption Intelligence will be transmitted only in messages devoted exclusively to such intelligence. It will not be included in messages containing other intelligence information.
2. Distribution of such information will be strictly limited.
3. One of the words: "Dexter", "Corral", or "Rabid", will be used in each message to indicate the nature of the source and to insure specially secure and limited handling.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. Ulio
J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General

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The Divisions of the
War Department
General Staff

RECORDED
INDEXED
FEB 10 1943

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

COPY NO. 155

✓ The Chief Signal Officer
(5 cys)

EO-2588

AG 311.5 (3-17-43)OB-S-B-M

March 23, 1943


SUBJECT: Security of Radio Intercept Intelligence.

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Ground Forces;
Army Air Forces;
Army Service Forces;
Defense Commands;
Departments;
Theaters of Operations;
Service Commands;
Base Commands;
The Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area;
Allied Forces;
The Commanding Officers,
Base Commands

.....
:
:Auth: T.A.G. :
:Initials: *agp* :
:Date: 3-23-43 :
:.....

Letter this office AG 311.5 (2-4-43)OB-S-B-M, February 6, 1943, subject: Security of Radio Decryption Intelligence, is amended by eliminating the term "Radio Decryption Intelligence" and substituting therefor the term "Radio Intercept Intelligence."

By order of the Secretary of War:


J. A. ULLO
Major General
The Adjutant General

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The Divisions of the War Department
General Staff

RECEIVED
MAR 24 10 20 AM '43
OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(AMERICAN)

E-3

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
A.P.O. 512.

15 May 1943

B - 389.783

Memorandum to: Commanding General, First Army,
Commanding General, Fifth Army,
Commanding General, Force 141.

Subject: Security of information derived from Field Intercept sources.

1. Reference our B - 389.783 of 11 Jan 1943, it appears that a certain amount of information is still being given away to the enemy, which he must know can only come from field interception of his signals.

The fact that we are intercepting his Plain Language and Low Grade traffic is known to the enemy, as is the fact known to us that he is intercepting ours. What is not known to him is the degree of success which we enjoy, how far we are able to make use of the material intercepted, and above all, which links, and which of his codes, yield us useful intelligence.

2. It therefore follows that it is absolutely vital to keep secret anything which reveals the results obtained from field intercept sources if the service is to continue to furnish information.

To take a concrete example, the enemy may well suspect that there is an intercept organization on his front, and do nothing particular about it; it is one of the general hazards of war, covered by his general security measures. But if he learns that the intercept organization heard the exact location of D.C.D. AREA on the night 22/23 February, a coded message, he will surely probably also alter all of his information will be lost.

3. It is possible that the enemy is responsible for the information from which any interest, and in the future, the information a limited amount of absolute

4.

[REDACTED]
([REDACTED] MOST SECRET)

a. No reference will be made in an Intelligence Summary or G-2 Report to the source of any information derived from field interception.

b. No information derived solely from field interception will be included in any Intelligence Summary or G-2 Report any of whose recipients are located further forward than Corps H.Q.

6. Information from field interception which is of operational importance will only be passed from Corps to Division in High Grade cipher marked SECRET (British: MOST SECRET I(E)) or by Liaison Officer. If it is necessary to pass this information further forward to H.Q.s not in possession of High Grade cipher, the information will, wherever possible, be disguised as an order, and in any case no mention of the SOURCE will be made.

Phrases such as "Following from Yorker", "From Y or intercept source" or "From reliable or usual source" will never be used except in messages in SECRET (British MOST SECRET I(E)) cipher.

7. With regard to para 4c, since it is now evident that phrases such as "reliable source" or similar are known to the enemy to conceal field interception information they must no longer be used. Camouflage is the only other expedient and a few examples follow to indicate the lines on which this may be achieved:-

Intelligence received.	What the Commander wishes to pass on.	How to convey it.
Attack of enemy unit in map ref. postponed for two hours.	Warn the formation or unit (Commander in the area at	Recce (or Air recce)

Enemy unit on height will withdraw to p' posn. at dusk.

ent
unit
ta
]

[REDACTED]

8. With regard to 4d it must be taken as axiomatic that every conversation in R/T is monitored by the enemy. Jargon codes are not sufficient disguise and must be regarded as the equivalent of plain language. It is therefore imperative that any information which has to be passed by R/T be so effectively disguised that the enemy cannot possibly deduce the real source from which the intelligence has been obtained. A further safeguard before using R/T is to write out beforehand what is to be said and not depart from the "script" when speaking.

By Command of General EISENHOWER

W.B. SMITH
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

K.W.D. Strong
K.W.D. STRONG,
Brigadier, G.S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

By Authority A. S. of S., G-2
date 6-21-43 ()
Initials

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Use and Dissemination of
Radio Intercept Intelligence

The Secretary of War directs:

I. That a SECRET letter substantially as follows be addressed to:

The Commanding Generals,
Army Ground Forces;
Army Air Forces;
Army Service Forces;
Defense Commands;
Departments;
Theaters of Operations;
Service Commands;
Base Commands;
The Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area;
Allied Forces;
The Commanding Officers,
Base Commands.

1. Secret letter, 16 February 1945, AG 511.5 (2-4-45) OB-S-B-M, Subject: Security of Radio Decryption Intelligence, and secret letter, 25 March 1945, AG 511.5 (3-17-45) OB-S-B-M, Subject: Security of Radio Intercept Intelligence, are hereby rescinded.

2. The value of information concerning enemy activities gained as a result of radio intercept either by traffic analysis or cryptanalysis has been repeatedly proved. Its particular importance requires that special rules be set up covering the use and the dissemination of such intelligence whether it results from traffic analysis or from cryptanalysis of radio intercept.

3. All pertinent provisions of AR 380-5, dated 28 September 1942, must be strictly complied with. Particular attention should be paid to paragraphs 3 (d), 18, 19 (a), 21, 39, 40 and 45.

4. In order to maintain the necessary degree of security for this type of information, the following additional regulations are hereby prescribed:

(a) The need for dissemination or use of this material will be determined before any distribution is made. Actual operational requirements and not academic interest will determine such need. The importance of operational use with reference to possible changes in system of enemy communication which may result therefrom must be considered. Momentary tactical advantage must be weighed against the risk of compromising the source of intelligence.

(b) Radio Intercept Intelligence will be passed on to subordinate commanders only in the form of operational directives whenever practical. When this is not practical and such intelligence must be given out to lower commanders as information, no reference to its secret source shall be made. In disseminating special intelligence to lower echelons, the quoting of exact dates, times, positions or actual names of enemy units in a manner whereby the information, if intercepted by the enemy, can be tied to the original source, is prohibited.

(c) Every effort will be made to avoid indicating any connection between source of intelligence and outcome of operations. When this intelligence forms the basis of an operation, steps should be taken for local commanders to see that the operation cannot be traced to this type of intelligence alone.

(d) Messages containing Radio Intercept Intelligence will contain no other information or intelligence. These messages will contain somewhere near the beginning, specially designated code words, such as "Dexter", "Corral", or "Rabid" to insure specially secure and limited handling.

(e) Only cryptographic systems of the highest security and of the smallest distribution will be used for transmitting this intelligence or any direct reference thereto. Whenever advisable, special cryptographic systems for the transmission of such information will be furnished by the Chief Signal Officer.

(f) Personnel authorized to handle cryptographic processing of communications of Radio Intercept Intelligence will be kept to an absolute minimum and must have G-2 clearance pursuant to provisions of letter Adjutant General's Office, 15 February 1943, AG 311.5 (2-12-43) CB-S-B-K, Subject: Identification Photographs and Policy with respect to Qualification of Personnel Authorized to Perform Duties in Connection with Secret and Confidential Cryptographic Systems of the Army, as amended by letter Adjutant General's Office, dated 8 May 1943, AG 311.5 (5-5-43) CB-S-B-M, same subject.

(g) Under no circumstances will work sheet numbers, file numbers and particularly originators' message number or message reference number be incorporated in any communication of Radio Intercept Intelligence.

(h) Great care will be exercised to destroy all evidence, in exposed locations, of intercept intelligence sources. Under no circumstances will such information be subjected to the possibility of capture.

(i) No quotations or extracts or reproductions of Radio Intercept Intelligence communications or any portion thereof shall be made except by specific authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

II. That copies of the above directed letter be furnished The Divisions of the War Department General Staff.

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General
A. C. of S., G-2

005

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ AMERICAN)

U. S. D

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS COPY No. 27.
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

B - 389/753/5

19 Jul 43

Memorandum to: Commander in Chief, 15 Army Group.
Commanding General, Fifth Army.

Subject : Security of information derived from field intercept sources.

Further to our memorandum B - 389/783 of 15 May 43.

1. It would appear that all originators of messages containing Y information have not had the contents of the above quoted memorandum brought to their notice and it is desired that this be done forthwith in respect of all formations under your command.

2. It is particularly important, now that operations have commenced, that instructions laid down for the handling of Y information be strictly adhered to if compromise of the source is to be avoided.

3. The security rules given in paras 5 and 6 of the memorandum must be complied with and in addition, it must be clearly understood that:-

- (a) Information from Y sources must be confined to those officers who are required to take action upon it and that it must never be circulated purely for information.
- (b) In no case will the texts of Y messages be reproduced in their original form; they will invariably be paraphrased or disguised.
- (c) Y information must not be included or discussed in messages concerning other intelligence or operational information except where permission has been granted by this HQ.

4. As regards para 3(c) above, the only messages in which Y and other intelligence information may be included together are the daily Intelligence Summary messages (ISUMS) passed between the Intelligence or G-2 Sections of Corps and higher formations.

5. Arrangements will at once be made by each formation HQ to ensure that the distribution of messages containing or discussing Y information which is designated as such and the ISUMS referred to above is restricted to the Intelligence or G-2 Section alone.

6. Where Y messages are received, an indication be given + correct distribution instructions be given in the first sentence of the message. The G-2 Section distribute

7. In each case the

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 26 July 1943 (WV)
Initials

26 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Security of Dexter Intelligence


1. In accordance with your oral instructions of some days ago, the following is submitted for your approval as a plan which will enable the Commanders of the Southwest Pacific Theater and of the China-Burma-India Theater to receive directly from this office enemy high level cryptographic material and information relating thereto (designated "Dexter" intelligence):

a. Special communication links have been or are about to be established for the transmission of Dexter intelligence between the War Department and the headquarters of various Commands and among such headquarters. Special security procedures and security regulations for the handling of this material have been adopted in accordance with the agreement between the War Department and the British Government Code & Cipher School. Such regulations are attached hereto as Appendix A.

b. In order to make such security regulations effective, and in conformity with our agreement with the British, an officer to be known as a "Special Security Officer" will be attached to the staff of each Commander entitled to receive Dexter intelligence or from whose headquarters Dexter intelligence may be transmitted to other headquarters or to the War Department. This Special Security Officer shall have sole charge of the receipt and transmission of all such intelligence. He shall be equipped with the most secure cipher systems, which shall be available solely to him and to subordinate officers reporting to him. Such officer shall have sole charge of bringing to the attention of the Commander intelligence received from Dexter sources and shall advise the Commander on all problems of security in connection with the receipt, transmission and handling of Dexter intelligence. Additional Special Security Officers will be attached as the need arises.


2. Approval of this project is requested. There are also attached hereto proposed radiograms advising the Theater Commanders concerned of this project.

- 3 Incls.
Incl 1 Appendix A
Incl 2 Radiogram for Gen. MacArthur
Incl 3 Radiogram for Gen. Stilwell


GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2

By order of the Secretary of War

JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff


By O. L. NELSON
Col. G.S.C., Asst. to the Deputy Chief of Staff



ADDRESS 357.05 (26 Jul 43)

005

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25 D. C.

COPY NO. 115

AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43)OE-S-B-M

HJP/med - 2B 939 - Pentagon

28 September 1943

SUBJECT: Security of Rabid Intelligence

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Ground Forces
Army Air Forces
Army Service Forces
The Commanders-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area
Allied Force
The Commanding Generals,
Defense Commands
Departments
Theaters of Operations
Service Commands
Base Commands
The Commanding Officers,
Base Commands

.....
:
:Auth: T. A. S. :
:Initials: [Signature] :
:Date: 28 Sep 43 :
:.....:

Burn
After
Reading

1. AG 311.5 (4 Feb 43)OE-S-B-M, 6 February 1943, Subject: Security of Radio Decryption Intelligence, as amended by AG 311.5 (17 Mar 43)OE-S-B-M, 23 March 1943, Subject: Security of Radio Intercept Intelligence, are hereby rescinded. Those documents will be destroyed by burning and record of destruction returned to the Office of The Adjutant General.

Burn
After
Reading

2. The designated Army term for information obtained from solving enemy cryptograms or from similar sources is "Special Intelligence." For convenience and in the interest of security, "Special Intelligence" is referred to in the attached regulations as "Rabid Intelligence."

Burn
After
Reading

3. "T/A Intelligence" is the term for information obtained by, or inferences drawn from, a study of the volume, direction, patterns and characteristics of the enemy's signal communication system and traffic, but without reading the texts of such traffic.

Burn
After
Reading

4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, has sole authority to determine which enemy cryptographic systems are of a high security classification, for the purpose of requiring that Special Intelligence derived from reading such systems shall be transmitted over special communication channels, through special

Security of Rabid Intelligence. (continued)

Burn
After
Reading

security officers, and subject to special security regulations, approved by him; and he will up-grade the security classification of any enemy cryptographic system when he deems it desirable in the interest of security. The regulations attached set forth the minimum security standards for all classes of Special Intelligence and for T/A Intelligence and will be strictly observed. Special security regulations, in addition to the regulations attached, will be applicable to Special Intelligence of the highest secrecy.

Burn
After
Reading

5. Paragraphs 1 to 5, inclusive, will be burned immediately after reading. The contents of those paragraphs will be communicated orally by the authorized holder of this document to his successor and to those others who need to be informed in order to discharge their duties.

AG 311.5 (27 Sep 45)OE-S-B-1, 28 September 1945 (cont'd)
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY REGULATIONS
FOR
RABID INTELLIGENCE

1. The extreme importance of Rabid Intelligence as a source of reliable information concerning enemy activities and intentions has been repeatedly demonstrated. It is therefore vital that complete secrecy be maintained to avoid disclosure of anything that might result in drying up this source. The enemy suspects or knows that some of his cryptographed traffic is being intercepted. What must be kept from him is the degree of success obtained, how far we are able to make use of the material intercepted and, above all, which circuits and which of his systems yield us useful information.

2. As a general rule, except in the case of officers who are directly responsible for its evaluation, the source from which any intelligence concerning the enemy is derived is only a matter of curiosity and is not of operational importance. In the interest of security, therefore, extreme care must be taken to conceal the identity of Rabid Intelligence even in documents with a limited distribution, since in modern warfare no document can be described as absolutely safe. This source should never be disclosed to those who do not need to know.

3. The paragraphs which follow set forth specific security regulations applicable to the dissemination and use of Rabid Intelligence within all commands of the Army and within the War Department. Their strict observance is essential to assure continuance of this vitally important source of information for all commands now receiving it.

4. Messages or other documents transmitting Rabid Intelligence, information based directly thereon, or any direct reference there to, will contain designated words to indicate this source and to insure especially secure and limited handling. One of these words will be buried within the body of each message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text. The words DEXTER, CONAL, AND RABID are designated for this purpose. They will not be used in conjunction with any other words disclosing or giving a clue to their significance. For example, such phrases as "Dexter reports" or "from Rabid source" will not be used.

5. Messages or other documents transmitting Rabid Intelligence will be confined to such intelligence and will never contain other intelligence, or operational information, except by authority of the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, or the Theater Commander.

6. Rabid Intelligence will be passed on to subordinate commanders in the form of operational directives whenever practicable. Such operational directives will be so worded that, if they are captured or intercepted by the enemy, he will not be able to determine the source of the intelligence upon which the order is based.

7. When Rabid Intelligence must be passed on to subordinate commanders as information, it will invariably be paraphrased, and care will be taken to avoid quoting exact dates, times, positions, places or the exact names of enemy units or ships, in order that, if intercepted by the enemy, the information may not be traced to the original source.

8. Rabid Intelligence, or any direct reference thereto, will normally be transmitted only in cryptographic systems of the highest security (i.e., Converter M-134C (SIGABA) or equivalent) and of the narrowest distribution which includes the originator and the addressees. However, in exceptional instances, where it is absolutely necessary to pass Rabid Intelligence to non-holders of these cryptographic systems, the information will be camouflaged and ascribed to some other source (e.g., reconnaissance or P.W. interrogation); only the barest essentials required for necessary action by the addressee will be given; and the information will be transmitted in the cryptographic system of the highest available security. Phrases such as "highly reliable source" or similar ones are recognized by the enemy as attempts to conceal Rabid Intelligence and they must no longer be relied upon to camouflage this source. The words DEXTER, COUAL and RABID will not be used in messages that are not cryptographed in systems of the highest security.

9. The commander will take every precaution to insure that any action taken upon the basis of Rabid Intelligence cannot be traced back by the enemy to this source. For example, appropriate land or air reconnaissance should always be undertaken whenever practicable, in such manner, and sufficiently in advance of the proposed action, so that the enemy is led to believe that such reconnaissance furnished the basis for the action. Similarly, great care must be taken in briefing airplane crews, in order that only necessary details are given them and always in a form that cannot be traced to this source. All personnel concerned in an operation should be forbidden discussion or conjecture, even among themselves, as to the whys and wherefores of the operation and the sources of information upon which it is based.

10. Personnel authorized to handle the cryptographic processing of messages transmitting Rabid Intelligence shall be kept to a minimum number and, insofar as practicable, such personnel shall be kept away from those forward areas where there is substantial risk of capture by the enemy. All such personnel must be investigated and cleared by G-2, War Department, pursuant to letter of Adjutant General's Office 15 February 1943, AG 311.5 (12 Feb 43)OB-S-B-M, Subject: Identification Photographs and Policy with respect to Qualifications of Personnel Authorized to Perform Duties in Connection with Secret and Confidential Systems of the Army, as amended by AGO Letter, dated 8 May 1943, AG 311.5 (5 May 43)OB-S-B-M, same subject.

11. No reference to Rabid Intelligence will be made in G-2 reports or intelligence summaries, war diaries, bulletins, proceedings, or other documents, however limited the circulation, without specific authority of the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, or the Theater Commander.


12. Documents containing Rabid Intelligence, including the cryptographed version of such documents, will be burned immediately after their usefulness ceases. This will normally be as soon as their contents have been absorbed by those who have to act upon them. Under no circumstances will such documents be carried on the person of recipients outside their headquarters.

13. T/A Intelligence, when it is of evident importance, will be handled and transmitted on the same level as Rabid Intelligence and will be governed by the same security regulations. Messages transmitting T/A Intelligence of evident importance will contain, near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text, one of the three designated words RAVID, COHIAL or DEXTER. Other intelligence of this nature will be classified as "Secret" and will be handled and transmitted with every precaution.

14. All communications concerning questions with respect to the interpretation or application of these regulations should be directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, through the most secure channels.

15. To preserve secrecy it is essential that the distribution of this document be limited. Its reproduction is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:



W. A. ULLO
Major General
The Adjutant General

COPIES FURNISHED:

The Inspector General
The Divisions of the War Department
General Staff

13 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Special Security Officer for the
Southwest Pacific Theater.

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That a secret security letter, substantially the same as TAB A, attached, be issued for transmittal to the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Theater.
2. That such letter be returned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, in order that it may be hand-carried to destination by the Special Security Officer for the Southwest Pacific Theater.
3. That copies of such letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.
4. That no other distribution of such letter be made without the authority of the Chief of Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

ACTION TAKEN: 14 Oct 43. Ltr. to C-in-C,
SWPA. Cys to: OPD and G-2.
bsk 2B-939

G. V. Strong
GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Concurrence
A. C. of S., OPD (*R.M.R.*)



11-5-43

35 OCT 1943
John *Ad*

011

14 October 1943

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Special Security Officer for the
Southwest Pacific Theater.

Auth:.....I.A.G.....

Initials:.....DRV.....

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.

Date:.....14 OCT 1943.....

1. The Special Security Officer for the Southwest Pacific Area is the representative of the War Department on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, in sole charge of the receipt and transmission of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and in sole charge of bringing such intelligence to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief and those senior intelligence and operations staff officers designated by the Commander-in-Chief. He will advise the Commander-in-Chief as to all problems of security in connection with the receipt, transmission, handling and use of Ultra Dexter intelligence.
2. The Special Security Officer for the Southwest Pacific Area will be designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, who will transmit to him directly all orders necessary to insure the security of Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission to and from the Southwest Pacific Area of all Ultra Dexter intelligence required. He will be attached for administration and discipline to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
3. Mission: As a representative of the War Department, the Special Security Officer for the Southwest Pacific Area will:
 - a. Be in sole charge of the receipt of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission of all such intelligence to and from the Southwest Pacific Area.
 - b. Be equipped with special cryptographic systems which shall be available solely to him and to subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers reporting to him, for the receipt and transmission of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related information. No other channels or ciphers or personnel shall be used to transmit Ultra Dexter intelligence or comments or questions in connection with such intelligence, except by specific authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
 - c. Be in sole charge of furnishing Ultra Dexter intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief and to those senior intelligence and operations staff officers designated by the Commander-in-Chief.

14 October 1943.

d. Advise the Commander-in-Chief with respect to establishing and enforcing security policies and practices concerning the production, receipt, transmission, dissemination and use of Ultra Dexter intelligence.

e. Advise the Commander-in-Chief with respect to the expeditious collection and transmission to the War Department of collateral information required for the production or evaluation of Ultra Dexter intelligence.

f. Maintain liaison with Signal Intelligence Service and with all others having access to Ultra Dexter or Rabid or T/A intelligence in the Southwest Pacific Theater.

g. Provide the War Department with Ultra Dexter or Rabid or T/A intelligence available in the Southwest Pacific Theater.

h. Maintain direct communication at all times with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff with respect to all matters concerning Ultra Dexter intelligence.

4. Communications between the Special Security Officer for the Southwest Pacific Theater and the War Department will not be discussed with nor made available to any person except by authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. This applies to all communications whether by means of special cryptographic systems or by courier pouch or otherwise.

5. The Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, will provide the Special Security Officer with a suitable office for the secure receipt, handling and storage of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related material and of his special cryptographic material and will make available communication facilities and channels for the receipt and transmission by the Special Security Officer of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related information by means of his special cryptographic systems.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area will issue such directives and assist in establishing such liaisons as may be necessary to enable the Special Security Officer to accomplish his mission.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J.A. ULIO
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls.

#1 - Cy Ltr. AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43)OB-S-B-M
14 October 1943.

#2 - Cy ltr. AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43)OB-S-B-M,
23 September


INFORMATION COPIES TO: 1. A.C. of S., Operations Division, W.D.G.S.
2. A.C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S.

BASED ON: Memo to TAG from G-2, 13 October 1943,

MID/SB EEW/ec1 71833

013

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED FILES

See: AG 311.5 (2-4-43) (1) Secret Files.
AG 312.1 (11 March 44) Secret Files
AG 360.01 (8 Jul 44). Secret Files

AG 312.1
Subj: Security of Ultra Dexter Intelligence.

(13 October 1943)

1

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

13 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Security of Ultra Dexter Intelligence.

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That a secret registered letter, in substantially the same words as TAB A, attached, be transmitted to
The Commander-in-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
The Commanding Generals *Central Pacific*
U. S. Forces in China, Burma and India, Forward Echelon
U. S. Forces in China, Burma and India, Rear Echelon
U. S. Forces in South Pacific Area


2. That copies of such letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

3. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, be furnished with a list of all registered holders of such letter.

4. That no distribution of such letter other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2, above, be made without authority of the Chief of Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

ACTION TAKEN: 14 Oct 43.
Ltr. to C-in-C, SWPA, and CG's, ACO
CBI, RE; CBI FE; SPA, CPA. CYS
to: OPD and G-2. bsk 2B-939 14 1943

G. V. Strong
GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.



FILE 15 OCT 1943

AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43)OB-S-B-M

bsk 2B-939 Pentagon

14 October 1943

SUBJECT: Security of Ultra Dexter
Intelligence.

.....
:
:Auth: T. A. G.:
:Initials: K.C.:
:Date: 14 Oct 43:
.....

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
Commanding Generals,
U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India,
Rear Echelon;
U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India,
Forward Echelon;
South Pacific Area,
Central Pacific Area.

TERMINOLOGY AND PURPOSE OF REGULATIONS

Burn
After
Reading

1. "Special Intelligence A" is the designated U.S. Army term for highly secret information obtained by intercepting and reading enemy messages which have been enciphered in cryptographic systems of a high security classification. The corresponding British term is "Special Intelligence". For convenience and in the interests of security, Special Intelligence A is referred to in the attached regulations as "Ultra Dexter Intelligence."

Burn
After
Reading

2. "Special Intelligence B" is the term used for information derived from reading enemy messages in cryptographic systems of a low security classification.

Burn
After
Reading

3. "Traffic analysis" or "T/A Intelligence" is the term used for information obtained by, or inferences drawn from, a study of the volume, direction, patterns and other characteristics of the enemy's signal communication system and traffic, but without deciphering and reading the texts of such traffic.

Burn
After
Reading

4. The security regulations hereto attached do not apply to Special Intelligence B or to T/A Intelligence. Those classes of intelligence, however, are covered by separate security regulations, and all possible precaution shall be taken in the handling and transmission thereof. Whenever possible, Special Intelligence B and T/A intelligence should be transmitted over the special channels and by special cryptographic systems provided for Special Intelligence A.

14 October 1943.

Burn
After
Reading

5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, shall have sole authority to determine which enemy cryptographic systems are of a high security classification, for the purpose of defining which ones fall within the class of Special Intelligence A; and he shall have authority to upgrade the security classification of any enemy system when he deems it desirable in the interests of security.

Burn
After
Reading

6. The extreme importance of "Special Intelligence A" as a source of reliable information concerning enemy activities has been repeatedly proved. If the enemy were to learn of the existence of this source it would probably be lost forever, and this loss would vitally affect operations on all fronts. The existence of this source may become known to the enemy from documents which may fall into his hands, from messages which the enemy might intercept, from a word which might be revealed by a prisoner of war, from any ill-considered action taken upon the basis of such intelligence or from any failure to observe proper security measures. Extreme secrecy is therefore required and the attached regulations are to be strictly observed.

7. Paragraphs 1 to 7, inclusive, will be burned immediately after reading.

UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY REGULATIONS
FOR
ULTRA-DEXTER INTELLIGENCE

1. Messages or other documents transmitting Ultra Dexter intelligence, information based thereon, or any direct or indirect reference thereto, shall contain designated terms to indicate this source and to insure especially secure and limited handling. One of these terms will be buried within the body of each message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text. The terms ULTRA DEXTER, ULTRA CORRAL AND ULTRA RABID are designated for this purpose. The designated terms shall not be used in conjunction with any words giving a clue to their significance. For example, such phrases as "from Ultra Dexter source" shall not be used. Messages transmitting Ultra Dexter Intelligence shall be confined to such intelligence and shall never contain information from any other source, except by authority of the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff. In the event information from another source is included in a message transmitting Ultra Dexter intelligence (by authority of the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff), the entire message shall be treated as Ultra Dexter intelligence and handled accordingly.

2. Ultra Dexter intelligence, information based thereon, or any reference thereto, shall be transmitted only by personnel and by means of channels and ciphers approved by the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff, and shall be delivered only to persons designated pursuant to these regulations as authorized recipients. Special Security Officers assigned to the staff of a command shall have sole charge of bringing Ultra Dexter intelligence to the attention of the Commander and shall advise the Commander on all problems of security in connection with the receipt, transmission, handling and use of Ultra Dexter intelligence. Recommendations made by such officers concerning security shall be followed.

3. Commanders authorized to receive Ultra Dexter intelligence shall restrict the distribution of such information to their senior intelligence and operations staff officers, and messages or other documents transmitting such information shall not be seen by, read to, or discussed with, any other person. The messages transmitting such information, including the cryptographed version, shall be destroyed by fire as soon as action has been taken upon them. No records of such information may be kept, except at the headquarters of the Commander or at intelligence centers designated or approved by the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff.

4. Ultra Dexter intelligence shall be passed on to subordinate commanders only in the form of operational orders. Transmission of Ultra Dexter intelligence as such to subordinate commanders is prohibited. Operational orders shall be so worded that, if they are captured or intercepted by the enemy, he will not be able to determine the source of intelligence upon which the order is based. Such orders shall not contain the exact time, date or place of an enemy operation, the exact position or name of enemy units, or the exact name of ships, revealed by Ultra Dexter intelligence.

14 October 1943.

5. If any action is to be taken upon Ultra Dexter intelligence, the Commander shall insure that such action cannot be traced back by the enemy to the source of such intelligence. A momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by Ultra Dexter intelligence unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance has also been undertaken. Names of enemy ships or units revealed by this source shall not be quoted.

6. The utmost care shall be taken in briefing airplane crews for an operation based on Ultra Dexter intelligence, so that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and only such as are essential to the success of the operation.

7. Personnel authorized to handle the cryptographic processing of communications transmitting Ultra Dexter intelligence will be kept to an absolute minimum and will be kept away from those forward areas where there is substantial risk of capture by the enemy. All such personnel will have a G-2, War Department, clearance pursuant to provisions of letter AG 311.5 (12 Feb 43)OB-S-B-H, 15 February 1943, subject: Identification Photographs and Policy with Respect to Qualification of Personnel Authorized to Perform Duties in Connection with Secret and Confidential Cryptographic Systems of the Army, as amended by letter, AG 311.5 (5 May 43)OB-S-B-H, 8 May 1943, subject same as original.

8. No reference to Ultra Dexter intelligence shall be made in any summary prepared by any command, however limited its circulation, except by specific authority of the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff. No discussion of such intelligence is permissible except between the senior officers who are immediately concerned with the action to be taken upon it. No quotations, reproductions or abstracts of messages or other documents transmitting Ultra Dexter intelligence shall be made, except by specific authority of the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff, and, except for operational orders as described above, no paraphrase of any such message shall be made without similar specific authority.

9. If it is necessary in any message to ask questions or make comments on Ultra Dexter intelligence, whether upon matters of intelligence, operations, routing or security, such message shall be transmitted only over the special channels and in the special ciphers provided for Ultra Dexter intelligence.


10. Recipients of Ultra Dexter intelligence may not under any circumstances carry on their persons outside of headquarters any message, letter or other document in which Ultra Dexter intelligence has been transmitted to them.

11. The above regulations apply to all commands of the Army and to the War Department.

14 October 1943.

12. To preserve secrecy it is essential that the distribution of this document be limited. Its reproduction is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:



J.A. ULLOA
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

COPIES FURNISHED:

A.C. of S., Operations Division, W.D.G.S.

A.C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

Initials
(1)

16 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Special Security Officer for the
China, Burma and India Theater.

MLID/SB
EEH/hot
71833

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That a secret security letter, substantially the same as TAB A, attached, be issued for transmittal to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, Burma and India (Rear and Forward Echelons).

2. That such letter be returned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, in order that it may be hand-carried to destination by the Special Security Officer for the China, Burma and India Theater.

3. That copies of such letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

4. That no other distribution of such letter be made without the authority of the Chief of Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

CG 21/21

ACTION TAKEN: 20 October 1943
Ltr. to CG's, USAF, CBI, Rear and Forward Echelons. Cys to: G-2 and OPD. bsk 2B-939 Pentagon

DISTRIBUTION complied with.
bsk 2B 939 Pentagon.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

2 copies
2 Echelons for file

cf file to A.C. of S., G-2,
H.S. H.S.
10-21-43

Concurrence
A. C. of S., OPD (JFH)

FILE OCT 21 1943



20 October 1943

SUBJECT: Special Security officer for the
China, Burma, and India Theater.

.....
: Auth: T. A. G. :
: Initials: JAG :
: Date: 20 Oct 43 :
:.....

TO: Commanding Generals,
U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India,
Rear Echelon;
U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India,
Forward Echelon.

1. The Special Security Officer for the China, Burma and India Theater is the representative of the War Department on the staff of the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in China, Burma and India, in sole charge of the receipt and transmission of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and in sole charge of bringing such intelligence to the attention of the Commanding General and those senior intelligence and operations staff officers designated by the Commanding General. He will advise the Commanding General as to all problems of security in connection with the receipt, transmission, handling, and use of Ultra Dexter intelligence.

2. The Special Security Officer for the China, Burma, and India Theater will be designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, W.D.G.S., who will transmit to him directly all orders necessary to insure the security of Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission to and from the China, Burma and India Theater of all Ultra Dexter intelligence required. He will be attached for administration and discipline to the staff of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India.

3. Mission: As a representative of the War Department, the Special Security Officer for the China, Burma and India Theater will.

a. Be in sole charge of the receipt of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission of all such intelligence to and from the China, Burma and India Theater.

b. Be equipped with special cryptographic systems which shall be available solely to him and to subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers reporting to him, for the receipt and transmission of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related information. No other channels or ciphers or personnel shall be used to transmit Ultra Dexter intelligence or comments or questions in connection with such intelligence, except by specific authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.

BASED ON: Memo to TAG from G-2, 16 October 1943.

COMPARED: bsk/Major Jensen

MID/SB FEH/hob, 71833

20 October 1943

20 October 1943

**SUBJECT: Special Security Officer for the
China, Burma and India Theater.**

Commanding General,
U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India,
Forward Echelon;

Commanding Generals,

- U.S. A. F. China Burma and India, Rear Echelon
- U.S. A. F. China Burma and India, Forward Echelon

A.C. of S., Operations Division, WDGS

A.C. of S., G-2, WDGS

CY Nos. No. of Cys.

1 1

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3 1

4-7 4

File Copy

M.R. Copy

Ditto File

8 of all

9 of all

10-13 4

****Per Instructions, G-2.**

RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ARMY SECRETARIAT
16 OCT 1943

The Special Security Officer for the China, Burma, and India Theater will be designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and will have authority to issue directly all orders necessary to insure the security of Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission to and from the China, Burma and India Theater of all Ultra Dexter intelligence required. He will be attached for duty to the U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India.

The Mission of the representative of the War Department, the Special Security Officer for the China, Burma and India Theater will:

1. Be in charge of the receipt of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission of all such intelligence to and from the China, Burma and India Theater.


2. Be equipped with special cryptographic systems which shall be available solely to him and to subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers reporting to him, for the receipt and transmission of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related information. No other channels, systems or personnel shall be used to transmit Ultra Dexter intelligence or comments or questions in connection with such intelligence, except by special authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

WAR DEPARTMENT

[Handwritten scribble]

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON



OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED FILES

Subj: Special Security Officer for the Central Pacific Area.

AG 312.1

(19 Nov 43)

①

MID/SB
EEH/bak
71833

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Special Security Officer for the
Central Pacific Area.

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That a secret security letter, substantially the same as TAB A, attached, be issued for transmittal to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area.
2. That such letter be returned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, in order that it may be hand-carried to destination by the Special Security Officer for the Central Pacific Area.
3. That copies of such letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.
4. That no other distribution of such letter be made without the authority of the Chief of Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

ACTION TAKEN: 19 Nov 43.
ltr to CG,
USAF, CenPac Area. Cys to:
G-2 & OPD, WDGS.
KLS/evh-2B-939 Pentagon.

[Handwritten Signature]

AS ATG

NOV 19 1943

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED:
AGC, 19 Nov 43.
KLS/evh-2B-939 Pentagon.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Concurrence
A. C. of S., OPD *(JMT)*

ACTION TAKEN
OPER. BRANCH A.G.O.
Off. Initials
Extension 5515
Room: 2B939
Date: 19 Nov 43

*copy returned to
A.C. of S., G-2,
and to 1, 10 Nov 43*

19 NOV 1943

(10) (11) 312.1

(19770143)

12-2-43

025

19 November 1943

SUBJECT: Special Security Officer for the
Central Pacific Area.

Auth:...../I.A.G.....

Initials: A. H. G.

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Forces,
Central Pacific Area.

Date: 20 NOV 1943

1. The Special Security Officer for the Central Pacific Area is the representative of the War Department on the staff of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area, in sole charge of the receipt and transmission of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and in sole charge of bringing such intelligence to the attention of the Commanding General and those senior intelligence and operations staff officers designated by the Commanding General. He will advise the Commanding General as to all problems of security in connection with the receipt, transmission, handling, and use of Ultra Dexter intelligence.

2. The Special Security Officer for the Central Pacific Area will be designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, who will transmit to him directly all orders necessary to insure the security of Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission to and from the Central Pacific Area of all Ultra Dexter intelligence required. He will be attached for administration and discipline to the staff of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area.

3. Mission: As a representative of the War Department, the Special Security Officer for the Central Pacific Area will:

a. Be in sole charge of the receipt of all Ultra Dexter intelligence and the transmission of all such intelligence to and from the Central Pacific Area.

b. Be equipped with special cryptographic systems which shall be available solely to him and to subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers reporting to him, for the receipt and transmission of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related information. No other channels or ciphers or personnel shall be used to transmit Ultra Dexter intelligence or comments or questions in connection with such intelligence, except by specific authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

c. Be in sole charge of furnishing Ultra Dexter intelligence to the Commanding General and to those senior intelligence and operations staff officers designated by the Commanding General.

19 November 1943.

d. Advise the Commanding General with respect to establishing and enforcing security policies and practices concerning the production, receipt, transmission, dissemination and use of Ultra Dexter intelligence. (U.S. Army Security Regulations for Ultra Dexter intelligence and for Rabid and T/A intelligence are inclosed as Tabs A & B, respectively).

e. Advise the Commanding General with respect to the expeditious collection and transmission to the War Department of collateral information required for the production or evaluation of Ultra Dexter intelligence.

f. Maintain liaison with Signal Intelligence Service and with all others having access to Ultra Dexter or Rabid or T/A intelligence in the Central Pacific Area.

g. Provide the War Department with Ultra Dexter or Rabid or T/A intelligence available in the Central Pacific Area.

h. Maintain direct communication at all times with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff with respect to all matters concerning Ultra Dexter intelligence.

4. Communications between the Special Security Officer for the Central Pacific Area and the War Department will not be discussed with nor made available to any person except by authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. This applies to all communications whether by means of special cryptographic systems or by courier pouch or otherwise.

5. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, will provide the Special Security Officer with a suitable office for the secure receipt, handling and storage of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related material and of his special cryptographic material and will make available communication facilities and channels for the receipt and transmission by the Special Security Officer of Ultra Dexter intelligence and related information by means of his special cryptographic systems.

6. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area, will issue such directives and assist in establishing such liaisons as may be necessary to enable the Special Security Officer to accomplish his mission.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General, 627
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls.

Incl. 1 - Cy ltr, AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43)
OB-S-B-H, 28 Sep 43 (Tab A).

INFORMATION COPIES TO:

- 1. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS
- 2. Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS.

BASED ON: Memo fm A.C. of S., G-2, WDGS, unclassified, 13 Nov. 43 to TAG.
COMPILED: evh/fm.

Handed to Capt. [unclear] for delivery (copy)

1943 11 23
[Circular stamp]
[Signature]
Handed to [unclear]

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET OK

By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces

15 Jan 44 *PMJ*
Date Initials

14 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHITE:


1. Information has been received at Allied Air Force, SWPA, that combined committee for "Y" Intelligence at London is issuing regulations restricting the use of "Y" Intelligence within the theater. If these restrictions are followed, we would be limited in transmitting coastal observations of aircraft directly to fighter sectors and also be restricted from bombing operations against targets discovered by "Y" Intelligence.

2. The actual effect of these regulations are not known officially but I believe General MacArthur's solution will be to use "Y" Intelligence as deemed necessary for tactical operations. It is requested that the Army Air Forces insure that properly handled "Y" Intelligence can be used for tactical operations. The application is specifically required for fighter sector operations and strikes against shipping.

Dictated but not signed before departure

E. E. BEEBE
Colonel, G.S.C.
Director of Operations,
Allied Air Force

027-A



~~SECRET SECURITY~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

19 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHITE:

Re the attached memorandum of 14 Jan 44,
addressed to you by Col. Beebe:

1. It is correct that the British Y Committee in London has proposed security regulations, covering radio intelligence, to be applicable in all theaters throughout the world. However, the British have been informed that the A. C. of S., G-2, considers these regulations inappropriate for theaters outside Europe and North Africa.

2. The British have taken no exception to the G-2 position. On the contrary, in a cable of 17 Jan 44 from the Special Branch representative in London, the principal British Security Officer is quoted to the following effect:

"He regards Pacific as entirely your baby for security and dissemination, European and Mediterranean as British baby and India as joint regime."

3. Security regulations promulgated by the War Department are already in effect in the several Pacific theaters and in CBI. Those regulations, which were approved by Gen. MacArthur prior to issuance, are embodied in 2 documents:

a. AGO letter of 28 Sept 43, subject "Security of Rabid Intelligence," of which copy No. 214 is attached for your permanent files; and

b. AGO letter of 14 Oct 43, subject, "Security of Ultra Dexter Intelligence," of which copy No. 22 is attached for your permanent files.



~~SECRET~~

4. The so-called "Rabid Intelligence" regulations cover radio intelligence in general, including information from low level operational codes and information drawn from traffic analysis, i.e., the study of the enemy's traffic according to type, volume, routing, etc.

5. The regulations covering "Ultra Dexter Intelligence" are superimposed upon the "Rabid" regulations and constitute added safeguards for intelligence derived from the enemy's most secret and most important cryptographic systems.

6. The provisions which govern the use of radio intelligence for operational purposes are

Rabid Regulations, paras 6-9

Ultra Dexter Regulations, paras 4-6.

7. Col. Beebe refers to 2 problems, (a) transmission of coastal observations of aircraft directly to fighter sectors, and (b) bombing operations against targets discovered by Y Intelligence.

8. I do not know enough about the first subject to express an opinion on how these regulations apply to it; but it might be advantageous to have the appropriate officer from the Special Branch take up this problem with whoever in the AAF would have the necessary information.

9. As to the second problem, "Rabid" regulations merely provide that

"Appropriate land or air reconnaissance should always be undertaken whenever practicable, in such manner, and sufficiently in advance of the proposed action, so that the enemy is led to believe that such reconnaissance furnished the basis for the action."

10. The "Ultra Dexter" regulations, however, contain a specific prohibition as follows:

"A momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk in compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land

targets revealed by Ultra Dexter intelligence unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance has also been undertaken."

The words "revealed by Ultra Dexter intelligence" are interpreted, of course, to mean revealed from that source and not revealed or confirmed from other sources such as, for example, a report from a submarine, or radar observations from a ship.

11. This point is very fundamental, because if the enemy once traces a specific operation to information sent in a particular cryptographic system, that system is immediately lost; and almost no single operation, however damaging to the enemy, can compensate for the loss of a major cryptographic system.

12. However, the prohibition does not prevent the Commander from disposing his forces in the light of all his information, including "Ultra"; where, for instance, he is bombing Rabaul every week, it will not prevent him from selecting the day of the week when he knows from Ultra that the greatest concentration of shipping will be likely; nor, where he has 7 harbor targets in his area to be bombed, will it prevent him from selecting them in the order in which, from what he knows from Ultra sources, the greatest damage will be done. These remarks are only the personal opinion of the writer, having no authority except as representing the views of the officer who supervised the drafting of the regulations.

13. There has been so little of the "Ultra Dexter" type of intelligence in the Southwest Pacific Theater, until very recently, that I would be fairly sure that Col. Beebe is referring to information from low level operational codes and traffic analysis. It is quite possible that he does not know of the "Ultra" source. It is noted that he refers to "Y Intelligence," which is the British term for radio intelligence exclusive of the highest level traffic, the latter being called "Special Intelligence." The relatively mild provisions of the "Rabid" regulations, which apply to the "Y" type of information, ought not to interfere with bombing operations if ordinary prudence is used to throw the enemy off the track of the source.

14. If Col. Beebe has gone back to Australia, any communication to him along the above lines would

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

probably violate the security regulations. If, therefore, it is desired to do more than inform him that the pending British proposal covers only the Eur-African Theater, and does not apply to Australia, it is suggested that you allow us to advise you on the drafting of the communication.

Alfred McCormack

Alfred McCormack,
Colonel, General Staff
Deputy Chief, Special Branch, MID.

The above letter was delivered by me to General White personally on 19 Jan 44. He read it in my presence, stated that it answered his questions, and that no reply to Col. Beebe was needed. He then handed the papers to me for disposal. Copies of regulations (enclosures) returned to Capt. Erwin

P.R. Chandler

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

13407

~~SECRET~~
file MR
Security
X message

MID/SB
FFM/rb
5510

26 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Distribution of Incoming War Department Messages containing certain code words.

1. The following code words will occasionally appear in incoming messages:

- CORRAL
- DWATER
- PEARL
- RABID
- THUMB
- ULTRA
- YORKER

2. Dissemination within the War Department of messages containing such code words, or any combination of them, is under the complete control of the A. C. of S., G-2.

3. It is requested, therefore, that in the future all incoming messages containing any of the above words be forwarded to G-2 on an "EYES ONLY" basis, and that they be given no other distribution.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

s/Reg

R. C. JACOBS, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2.


COURIER SERVICE

SENDING OFFICE
NUMBER *C-577*
DATE *FEB 28 1944*

027-F
Special Branch
File Copy
(Please return to Special Branch)
J mcl

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON
SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

AG 311.5
Subj: Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of Communication
Intelligence Concerning Weather.

OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED FILES

See: AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43) (1). Conf. Files.

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

"Security"

(29 Feb 44)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44)OB-S-B

FM/rd 2B-939 Pentagon

4 March 1944

SUBJECT: Regulations for the Dissemination
and Use of Communication Intelligence
Concerning Weather.

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: T. A. G. :
: Initials: *TAG* :
: Date: 4 Mar 44 :
:.....

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Army Service Forces
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
U. S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Forward Echelon
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Rear Echelon
U. S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations
Alaskan Department, Advance Command Post
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon

Letter AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44)OB-S-B, 2 March 1944, subject as above,
is amended by adding paragraph 3, as follows:

"3. Reproduction of this letter and inclosure hereto is prohibited."

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. Ulloa
J. A. ULLOA
Major General,
The Adjutant General

COPIES FURNISHED:

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44)OB-S-B

KDH/nb - 2B-939 Pentagon.

2 March 1944

SUBJECT: Regulations for the Dissemination and
Use of Communication Intelligence
Concerning Weather.

:::::::::::
: S E C R E T :
:Auth: T. A. G. :
:Initials hdy :
:Date: 2 March 44 :
: :::::

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces;
Army Service Forces;
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area;
The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations;
Strategic Air Forces in Europe;
U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area;
U. S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area;
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Forward Echelon;
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Rear Echelon;
U. S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations;
Alaskan Department, Advance Command Post;
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon.

1. Inclosed is a copy of Joint Letter, 19 January 1944, subject:
Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of Communication
Intelligence Concerning Weather.

2. In accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of the inclosed Joint Letter,
clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis are classified as Special
Intelligence A and the following regulations, in addition to those set forth
in the inclosed Joint Letter, are hereby prescribed:

a. Weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis includes (1)
clear weather texts, from which the source is apparent, and (2) coded
analyses and "dummy" reports, in which the source is to some extent disguised.
Extreme secrecy in the handling and use of all such intelligence, in whatever
form, is essential to prevent the enemy from learning of the existence of
this source.

b. Commanders authorized to receive clear weather texts obtained
by cryptanalysis are those to whom this letter is addressed and Air Force
and Task Force commanders when it is essential that they receive such texts.

AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44)OB-S-B

(Cont'd.)

2 March 1944.

c. Commanders authorized to receive coded analyses and "dummy" reports are those authorized to receive clear weather texts and, in addition, those subordinate commanders whose operations make it essential that they receive such analyses and reports.

d. Personnel authorized to handle the cryptographic processing of communications transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis will be kept to an absolute minimum and will be kept away from those forward areas where there is substantial risk of capture by the enemy. All such personnel will have a G-2, War Department, clearance pursuant to provisions of letter AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43)OB-S-B-M, 24 December 1943, subject: Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties.

e. Messages or other documents transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis (including clear weather texts, coded analyses and "dummy" reports), or any direct or indirect reference thereto, will contain the word HYPER to indicate the source and to insure especially secure and limited handling. The word HYPER will be buried within the body of each message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text. It will not be used in conjunction with any other words giving a clue to its significance. For example, such phrases as "from HYPER source" will not be used. Messages transmitting clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis will be confined to such texts and will never contain information from any other source.

f. With reference to paragraph 1 (h) of the inclosed Joint Letter, storage will be as prescribed in paragraph 21 b(1) of AR 380-5, 23 September 1942.

g. The regulations set forth in this letter and the inclosed Joint Letter apply to all commands of the Army and to the War Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Robert E. Dunlop
ROBERT E. DUNLOP,
Brigadier General,

Acting the Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
As listed above.

COPIES FURNISHED:

- Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS;
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS.

SECRET SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID/SB
SRG:dk
EXT 73225

MID 911

29 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Regulations for the Dissemination
and Use of Communication Intelligence
Concerning Weather.

The Secretary of War directs:


I. That a registered secret security letter substantially
as follows be sent to:

- The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Army Service Forces
- ~~The~~ Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area
- The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
U. S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Forward Echelon
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Rear Echelon
U. S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations
Alaskan Department, Advance C. P.
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon

1. Inclosed herewith is a copy of Joint Letter, dated 19 January 1944, subject: Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of Communication Intelligence Concerning Weather.

2. In accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of the inclosed Joint Letter, clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis are classified as

Amended by Letter AG 311.5 (4 Mar 44)



SECRET SECURITY

AG 311.5

(27 Feb 44)

Special Intelligence A and the following regulations, in addition to those set forth in the inclosed Joint Letter, are hereby prescribed:

a. Weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis includes (1) clear weather texts, from which the source is apparent, and (2) coded analyses and "dummy" reports, in which the source is to some extent disguised. Extreme secrecy in the handling and use of all such intelligence, in whatever form, is essential to prevent the enemy from learning of the existence of this source.

b. Commanders authorized to receive clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis are those to whom this letter is addressed and Air Force and Task Force commanders when it is essential that they receive such texts.

c. Commanders authorized to receive coded analyses and "dummy" reports are those authorized to receive clear weather texts and, in addition, those subordinate commanders whose operations make it essential that they receive such analyses and reports.

d. Personnel authorized to handle the cryptographic processing of communications transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis will be kept to an absolute minimum and will be kept away from those forward areas where there is substantial risk of capture by the enemy. All such personnel will have a G-2, War Department, clearance pursuant to provisions of letter AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43)OB-S-B-M, 24 December 1943, subject: Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties.

e. Messages or other documents transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis (including clear weather texts, coded analyses and "dummy" reports), or any direct or indirect reference thereto, will contain the word HYPER to indicate the source and to insure especially secure and limited handling. The word HYPER will be buried within the body of each message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text. It will not be used in conjunction with any other words giving a clue to its significance. For example, such phrases as "from HYPER source" will not be used. Messages transmitting clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis will be confined to such texts and will never contain information from any other source.

*See Case 311.5
Case 43) ①
conf. file*

f. With reference to paragraph 1 (h) of the inclosed Joint Letter, storage will be as prescribed in paragraph 21 b(1) of AR 380-5, dated 28 September 1942.

g. The regulations set forth in this letter and the inclosed Joint Letter apply to all commands of the Army and to the War Department.

3. Reproduction of this letter and inclosure hereto is prohibited.

II. That a copy of the inclosure hereto be inclosed with the above letter.

III. That copies of the above letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department. *General Staff*

IV. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, be furnished with a list of all registered holders of the above letter.

V. That all requests for subject letter be referred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 for approval prior to distribution.

*By order
R. L. M.
B. W.*

46 AGO
MAR 2 1944
Received

*abs
4/1/28*

Incl.

Cy. Joint Letter, dtd 19 Jan 44

Clayton Bissell
CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

*1 cc destroyed
19-1-44
1 cc returned
19-1-44*

ACTION TAKEN: 2 March 1944.

I. Ltr. to CG'S, AAF; ASF; C-in-C, SWPA; CG'S, U.S. Forces, ETO; Strategic Air Forces in Europe; USAF, CPA; USAF, SPA; USAF, CBI, Forward Echelon; USAF, CBI, Rear Echelon; USAF, NATO; Alaskan Dept., Advance C.P.; Alaskan Dept., Rear Echelon. ~~XX~~ II, III, IV, V complied with.
KDH/mb - 2B-939 Pentagon.

ACTION TAKEN: 4 Mar 44
Ltr to CGs, AAF; ASF; Cominch, SWPA; US Forces, ETO; Strategic Air Forces in Europe; USAF, CPA; USAF, SPA; USAF, CBI, Forward Echelon; USAF, CBI, Rear Echelon; USAF, NATO; Alaskan Dept, Adv Comd Post; Alaskan Dept, Rear Echelon. Cys furnished: AC/S, OPD, WDGS & G-2, WDGS.
FM/md 2B-939 Pentagon

2 MAR 1944

Acad

FILE

ACTION TAKEN

OPER. BRANCH, A.C.O.


Off. Initials

Extension 5375

Room: 2B-939

Date: 2 MAR 44

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED FILES

SEE: AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43) (1)

Subj: Security of Special Intelligence within European,
North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations.

AG 312.1

(11 March 44)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

11 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Security of Special Intelligence
within European, North African
and Middle East Theaters of
Operations.

The Secretary of War directs:

I. That a registered top secret letter
substantially as follows be addressed to:

Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Forces
The Commanding Generals,
U.S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
U.S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations
U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East

1. In order that in certain combined operations British and American recipients of intelligence resulting from the solution of high grade codes and ciphers may be bound by the same security regulations, the enclosed Security Instruction 'A', Memorandum on the Dissemination of Signal Intelligence within the British and American Forces, and the enclosed Security Instruction 'B', Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Special Intelligence, have been agreed upon for the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations.

2. Effective 1 April, 1944 the enclosed Security Instruction 'A' and Security Instruction 'B' will supersede AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43) OB-S-B-M, 14 October 1943, subject: Security of Ultra Dexter Intelligence,



within the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations and, within those Theaters, will apply to all commands of the Army.

3. The enclosed Security Instruction 'B' contains detailed regulations for maintaining the security of Special Intelligence, defined as information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade codes and ciphers or those for security reasons placed in that category. The enclosed Security Instruction 'A' is a general guide for the handling of all Signal Intelligence, including not only Special Intelligence but also lower grade Signal Intelligence.

4. The enclosed Security Instruction 'A' and Security Instruction 'B' will be distributed only over the special channels prescribed in Security Instruction 'B' for Special Intelligence and will be made available only to persons authorized to receive Special Intelligence pursuant to Instruction 'B'. All provisions of Security Instruction 'A' applicable to Signal Intelligence of lower grade than Special Intelligence (i.e., "Crypt Intelligence" and "Traffic Analysis") will be separately issued through command channels as Security Instruction 'C'.

5. Reproduction of this letter and the enclosures hereto is prohibited.

II. That a copy of each of the enclosures hereto be enclosed with the above letter and be classified "Top Secret."

III. That copies of the above letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, for delivery over special channels to the addressees, and that no copies of the above letter be distributed except over special channels through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

IV. That all requests for the above letter be referred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

ACTION TAKEN: 13 March 1944

I. Ltr. to Supreme Comdr. Allied Expeditionary Forces; CG's; USFETO: Strategic AF in Europe; USAFNATO; USAFIME; 2,3,4 complied with. /er 2B-939 Pentagon.

Clayton Bissell,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Clayton Bissell
5
1030

2 Encls.
Security Instruction 'A'
Security Instruction 'B'

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED:
AGO, 13 March 1944

5-515
23-939
13-7-44

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

873

AG 312.1 (11 Mar 44)OB-S-B

FM/md 25-939 Pentagon

15 March 1944

SUBJECT: Security of Special Intelligence
within European, North African
and Middle East Theaters of
Operations.

.....
:
: Auth: T. A. G. :
: Initials: TEO :
: Date: 15 Mar 44 :
.....

TO: Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Forces
The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater of Operations
U. S. Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations
U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East
Strategic Air Forces in Europe

1. In order that in certain combined operations British and American recipients of intelligence resulting from the solution of high grade codes and ciphers may be bound by the same security regulations, the inclosed Security Instruction 'A', Memorandum on the Dissemination of Signal Intelligence within the British and American Forces, and the inclosed Security Instruction 'B', Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Special Intelligence, have been agreed upon for the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations.

2. Effective 1 April 1944 the inclosed Security Instruction 'A' and Security Instruction 'B' will supersede letter, AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43)OB-S-B-1, 14 October 1943, subject: Security of Ultra Dexter Intelligence, within the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations and, within those Theaters, will apply to all commands of the Army.

3. The inclosed Security Instruction 'B' contains detailed regulations for maintaining the security of Special Intelligence, defined as information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade codes and ciphers or those for security reasons placed in that category. The inclosed Security Instruction 'A' is a general guide for the handling of all Signal Intelligence, including not only Special Intelligence but also lower grade Signal Intelligence.


4. The inclosed Security Instruction 'A' and Security Instruction 'B' will be distributed only over the special channels prescribed in Security Instruction 'B' for Special Intelligence and will be made available only to persons authorized to receive Special Intelligence pursuant to Instruction 'B'. All provisions of Security Instruction 'A' applicable to Signal Intelligence of lower grade than Special Intelligence (i.e., "Crypt Intelligence" and "Traffic Analysis") will be separately issued through command channels as Security Instruction 'C'.

031

13 March 1944

5. Reproduction of this letter and the inclosures hereto is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:



J. A. ULLOA
Major General
The Adjutant General

2 Incls.

#1 - Security Instruction 'A'

#2 - Security Instruction 'B'

SECURITY INSTRUCTION 'A'
M E M O R A N D U M
on the
DISSEMINATION OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
WITHIN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES.

1. Intention of Memorandum.

This Memorandum is intended to serve as a general guide to all Commanders, Intelligence Staffs, and Signal Intelligence Officers at equal levels, for dealing with the handling, dissemination and security of Signal Intelligence.

2. Nomenclature.

Special nomenclature to be used in signals and written communications dealing with Signal Intelligence is set out in Annexure (b).

3. Security.

The preservation of secrecy in the handling of Signal Intelligence is a vital factor in the conduct of the war.

If this degree of security is to be maintained, it is essential that the British and American Signal Intelligence Services should pursue the same methods at every level and in every theatre of war. Leakage at any one point may not only jeopardise the flow of intelligence in the theatre of war concerned, but also effectively dry up the source all over the world.

4. Issue of Security Instructions.

Uniform security instructions for the handling of Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis will be issued from time to time through the senior Signal Intelligence Officers serving in the relevant theatre of war or through the local Signal Intelligence Board where one has been formed.

The handling of, and cyphers used in connection with Special Intelligence are dealt with in the special instructions referred to in Para. 5 (ii).

5. Distribution

(i) The governing principle regarding the distribution of Signal Intelligence is that it will only be disclosed to those Officers who have the absolute need to know it for the proper execution of their duties.

(ii) Special Security regulations as regards Special Intelligence in the European Theater have been agreed and will be issued by British and American authorities to all concerned.

Any alterations in the regulations for the dissemination and security of Special Intelligence may only be sent to authorised recipients of such

material and over the special routes that have already been laid down, and are not to be included in documents connected with Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis.

(iii) The levels on which intelligence derived from Signal Intelligence will be disseminated are given in Annexure (a).

6. Handling of Intelligence obtained from Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis

In general the British and American Army and Air authorities have agreed that as a principle "In any action taken upon Intelligence derived from Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis and any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised, and that the codes and cyphers used for its dissemination be absolutely secure". In accordance with the above, when it is necessary in the text to specify the source, this should be done by using respectively the single words PEARL and THUMB encyphered in the text. No other reference to source should be made.

- I -

7. Cyphers to be used in signalling Crypt Intelligence

Signals containing Crypt Intelligence must always be sent as Most Secret (U.S. Secret) in special cyphers to be authorized for the purpose.

8. Cyphers to be used for signalling Traffic Analysis.

Signals containing information derived from Traffic Analysis must always be sent in the highest grade cyphers available to all addressees, but may be regarded as requiring a lower degree of security than Crypt Intelligence.

9. Exchange of results.

It has been agreed, with the approval of the Chiefs of Staff, that the British Signal Intelligence organization and the U. S. Signal Intelligence Service operating in a common theatre of war shall cooperate and exchange the results of their Signal Intelligence work without reservation, and shall make these results available to those Officers on levels as laid down in Annexure (a).

Furthermore it has been mutually agreed that the distribution of these results may not be degraded below these levels without reference to the London Signal Intelligence Board or equivalent American authority.

10. Information regarding Signal Intelligence Units employed in theatres of war

In order to carry out the above policy, the British and U. S. Military and Air Authorities have agreed to inform each other of the Signal Intelligence Units that it is proposed to employ in all theatres of war.

11. Naval Cooperation

The British Admiralty has associated itself with the foregoing arrangements and the Naval levels of dissemination are shown in Annexure (a).

LEVELS OF WHICH INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM SIG. INT'
MAY BE DISSEMINATED TO GENERAL AND INTELLIGENCE
STAFFS OF ALLIED SERVICES

Promulgation Level

Type of 'I'	British Service	American Service
-------------	-----------------	------------------

COMBINED ALLIED FORCE

SPECIAL

Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces
 Chief of Staff
 Senior Staff Officers (G-2) Intelligence
 " " " (G-3) Operations
 " " " (G-5) Plans
 Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces
 and his Senior Staff Officer or C.O.S.
 and his Senior Intelligence Officer.

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief,
 their Senior Air Staff Officers
 and Senior Air Intelligence
 Staff Officers.

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief,
 their C.O.S. and Senior Air
 Intelligence Staff Officers.

Air Officers commanding Air
 Forces or Commands, their
 Senior Air Staff Officers, and
 Senior Air Intelligence Officers.

Air Division Commanders,
 Chief of Staff Air Division,
 and Senior Air Intelligence
 Officers.

Additional Staff Officers as may be specially authorized by the
 Commander-in-Chief.

G.H.Q. A.H.Q. or ARMY GROUP HQS.

SPECIAL

Commander
 C.O.S.
 Principal Staff Officer
 Intelligence
 Principal Staff Officer
 Operations
 Principal Staff Officer
 Plans

Commander
 C.O.S.

G-2.

G-3.

G-5.

G.S.C.I. (I) (a)
 G.S.O.I. (I) (s)

O.C. Intelligence Branch, G-2,
 Signal Intelligence Officer.

Air Force Commander
 Senior Air Staff Officer
 Senior Intelligence Officer R.A.F.

Air Force or Division Commander.
 C.O.S. (A.F.)
 A-2. (A.F.)

Additional Staff Officers as may be specially authorized by
 the Commander.

Promulgation Level

Type of 'I'

British Service

American Service

ARMY HDQRS

SPECIAL	Army Commander	Army Commander
	C.O.S.	C.O.S.
	G.S.O.1. (I)	G-2
	G.S.O.1. (Ops)	G-3
	Additional I Officers as specially authorized by Army Commander.	Additional G-2 Staff Officers as specially authorized by Army Commander.
	Air Force Commander	Air Force Commander
	Senior Air Staff Officer	C.O.S. (A.F.)

IN THE EVENT OF A CORPS OR TASK FORCES OR AIR FORCE GROUPS (U.S. WINGS) OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY, AN ARMY GROUP COMMANDER MAY BE GIVEN SPECIAL AUTHORITY FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE FOLLOWING:

SPECIAL	Corps Commander	Corps Commander
	E.G.S.	C.O.S.
	Principal Staff Officer (I)	G-2.
	" " " (Ops.)	G-3.
	Group Commanders R.A.F.	Wing Commanders (A.F.)
	Senior Air Staff Officer	C.O.S. A.F. Wing
	Senior Intelligence Officer.	A-2. Wing.

NAVAL COMANDS

SPECIAL Naval Commanders-in-Chief.
Force Commanders and selected Flag Officers, and their Senior Staff Officers specially authorized by them.

CRYPT AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS All recipients of 'Special'; all Intelligence Officers in all Headquarters higher than Corps or Group (U.S. Wing) and in addition:

CORPS HDQRS

Corps Commander	Corps Commander.
E.G.S.	C.O.S.
G.S.O.2. Intelligence	G-2
G.S.O.2. Operations	G-3.
All Intelligence Officers	All G-2 Intelligence Officers
Air Intelligence Officer	Air Officer.
Additional I Officers as authorized by Corps Commander.	

NON-CLASSIFICATION FOR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE
STUDY OF FOREIGN SIGNALS.

Item (c) concerning Special Intelligence must not under any circumstances be disclosed to any person not aware of the existence of this source. See Promulgation Levels in Annexure (a).

<u>Terms to be employed.</u>	<u>Short Title.</u>	<u>Definition.</u>
(a) Signal Intelligence	Sig.Int.	Comprises (a) the interception of all enemy and neutral communications and radio transmissions, and their solution; (b) the Intelligence resulting therefrom, and the preparation of such Intelligence in a useful form.
(b) Y Service Radio Intelligence Service	Y (Br.) R.I. (Amer.)	The Organisation responsible for the interception of all enemy and neutral radio transmissions including the operation of D/F services.
	<u>Code Word.</u>	
(c) Special Intelligence	Ultra	Intelligence resulting from solution of high grade codes and cyphers or of those for security reasons placed in this category.
(d) Crypt Intelligence	Pearl	Intelligence resulting from solution of low and medium grade codes and cyphers unless placed in the special category above.
(e) Traffic Analysis	Thumb	Intelligence obtained from a study of radio traffic and D/F bearings.

Reference item (b): It is important to note that the expression 'Y' is restricted to the above definition.

Reference item (c): This now supersedes and takes the place of all previous code names such as Sirdar, Swell, etc.

Reference items (d) and (e): These code words will be changed from time to time as may be considered necessary.

Group Commanders R.A.F.
Senior Air Staff Officer.
Senior I. Officer

Additional Staff Officers as
authorized by Group Cmdrs. R.A.F.

Air Division Commanders.
C.O.S. Air Division
Wing Commanders (A.F.)
C.O.S. A.F. Wing,
A-2. Wing.

Additional Staff Officers as
authorized by Air Division
or Wing Commanders.

THESE INSTRUCTIONS CANCEL PREVIOUS REGULATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT

REGULATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE SECURITY

OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

I DEFINITION

Special Intelligence is the agreed name for the resultant most secret information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade codes and cyphers, or those for security reasons placed in this category.

II IDENTIFICATION

All messages dealing with Special Intelligence whether containing the actual information or summaries, appreciations, queries and comments thereon, are to be identified by the code word ULTRA. All other code names (e.g. SIRDAR, ZYMOTIC) are therefore cancelled by these instructions.

III VALUE

Information from Ultra can be regarded as reliable and action may be taken upon it in accordance with the security instructions given hereunder.

IV SECURITY

1. General

Preservation of the source of Ultra information is of the utmost importance in the conduct of the war. This consists of preventing the development of suspicions on the part of the enemy that his communications are being read, thereby giving him no cause to change his cryptographic and signals security system. If from any document that might fall into his hands, from any message that he might intercept, from any word that might be revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action based upon Ultra information, the enemy were given cause to believe that his communications were not adequately safeguarded against the interception which he knows to be employed against him, he will effect changes which will deprive us of the immediate knowledge of his operations and strategy. The loss of this information would vitally affect operations on all fronts.

The source and contents of Ultra messages are to be disclosed only to those officers and their staffs who for the proper execution of their duties have the absolute need to know such information.

2. Authorized Recipients

The number and level of officers authorized to receive Ultra is severely restricted.

In Ministries and Departments - to those staff officers for whom the Minister or Head of Department considers the information is vital to the proper execution of their duties.

In Operational Commands, G.H.Qs. or A.H.Qs. - to those officers holding the following posts:

British Service

American Service

COMBINED ALLIED FORCE

Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces
Chief of Staff

Senior Staff Officers (G-2) Intelligence
" " " (G-3) Operations
" " " (G-5) Plans

Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces,
his Senior Staff Officer or C.O.S. and
his Senior Intelligence Officer.

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief
their Senior Air Staff Officers,
and Senior Air Intelligence Staff
Officers.

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief,
their C.O.S. and Senior Air
Intelligence Staff Officers.

Air Officers Commanding Air
Forces or Commands, their Senior
Air Staff Officers and Senior
Air Intelligence Officers.

Air Division Commanders,
Chief of Staff Air Division
and Senior Air Intelligence
Officers.

Additional Staff Officers as may be specially authorized by the Commander-in-Chief.

G.H.Q. A.H.Q. or ARMY GROUP HQS.

Commander
C.O.S.
Principal Staff Officer
Intelligence
Principal Staff Officer
Operations
Principal Staff Officer
Plans

Commander
C.O.S.
G-2
G-3
G-5
O.C. Intelligence Branch, G-2
Signal Intelligence Officer
Air Force or Division Commander
C.Q.S. (A.F.)
A-2., (A.F.)

G.S.O.1(I) (a)
G.S.O.1(I) (s)
Air Force Commander
Senior Air Staff Officer
Senior Intelligence Officer
R.A.F.

Additional Staff Officers as may be specially authorized by the Commander.

Army Commander
 C.O.S.
 G.S.O.1.(I)
 G.S.O.1.(Ops)
 Additional I Officers as
 specially authorized by Army
 Commander
 Air Force Commander
 Senior Air Staff Officer

Army Commander
 C.O.S.
 G-2
 G-3
 Additional G-2 Staff Officers as
 specially authorized by Army
 Commander
 Air Force Commander
 C.O.S. (A.F.)

In the event of a Corps or Task Force or Air Force Groups (U.S. Wings) operating independently an Army Group Commander may be given special authority for Ultra to be disseminated to the following:

Corps Commander
 E.G.S.
 Principal Staff Officer (I)
 " " " (Ops)
 Group Commanders R.A.F.
 Senior Air Staff Officer
 Senior Intelligence Officer

Corps Commander
 C.O.S.
 G-2
 G-3
 Wing Commanders (A.F.)
 C.O.S. - A.F. Wing
 A-2 Wing

NAVY COMMANDS

Naval Commander-in-Chief,
 Force Commanders and selected
 Flag Officers and their Senior
 Staff Officers specially
 authorized by them.

3. Regulations to be Applied to Authorized Recipients.

All officers who are authorized to receive Ultra must be properly initiated into the nature of the source and briefed regarding the security regulations. They must read these regulations and sign a form stating they have done so and fully understand the penalties for infringement of the secrecy acts both during and after the war.

Special Liaison Units (S.L.U.) are attached to each Operational Command or Headquarters authorized to receive Ultra. They are responsible for the secure handling of Ultra and the general carrying out of these security regulations. They hold the special cyphers in which Ultra is transmitted and are the unit through which all Ultra messages must be passed.

Initiation and briefing in operational areas should be carried out either by the Senior Special Liaison Unit Officer, or a Staff Officer of equivalent rank of Brigadier.

In cases where Operational Commanders consider that additional officers to those specially enumerated in paragraph 2 should be authorized recipients of Ultra, they must apply through the Special

Liaison Units to Washington or London over Ultra routes, giving reasons for the request.

Where individual officers holding posts which entitle them to Ultra at Operational Commands are changed, the Commander making the change must personally guarantee the new holder as a reliable recipient. The new holder can then be initiated and briefed without reference to London or Washington.

If an officer relinquishes a post which has entitled his access to Ultra, he automatically forfeits his right to see this material and will sign an undertaking to this effect.

When officers who have had an intimate knowledge of Ultra material leave these posts it is highly undesirable that they should be transferred to posts which might involve capture by the enemy.

Authorized recipients of Ultra may not under any circumstance show, read, or discuss Ultra messages or their contents, with any other person of any service unless they are satisfied that such persons are also authorized to receive it.

Up to date lists of named authorized recipients must be kept in Ministries, Departments, Commands and G.H.Qs., where Ultra is received. It is the duty of the Special Liaison Units to keep these lists at Operational Commands and Commanders must therefore keep the Special Liaison Units informed of the names of all officers on their staffs who are authorized to receive Ultra.

The names and posts of all authorized recipients and any changes should be forwarded promptly by the Special Liaison Units to London or Washington, in order that complete lists of all authorized recipients may be maintained at London and Washington on a current basis.

4. Dissemination of Ultra

A. To Ministries, Departments, Commands, G.H.Qs., and A.H.Qs., both at Home and Overseas.

Original dissemination of Ultra must be carried out by a centralized disseminating authority.

Dissemination to the authorized recipients shown in paragraph 2, must in all cases be:

(i) over specially authorized routes,

(ii) in specially authorized cyphers, which must either be one time tables or special settings of a machine cypher which is agreed as secure by the cryptographic experts of both the United Kingdom and the United States of America,

except in the following cases when Ultra may be disseminated in plain language within the U.K. or within the country of origin, provided it is not 'occupied' or enemy territory.

- (a) over teleprinters, only if teleprinters are completely secure and cannot be tapped by unauthorized personnel,
- (b) over telephones, only if scramblers are used,
- (c) by safe hand of officer over reasonable distances and under circumstances unlikely to involve disaster,
- (d) Ultra material sent overseas by bag or pouch must be encyphered unless the route is completely secure and handling arrangements at either end are confined to properly authorized personnel.

Note 1. Special Maintenance engineers should be employed for the teleprinter circuits. Teleprinters and their staffs should be segregated from general teleprinter rooms and access to them forbidden to unauthorized persons. They should preferably form part of a special section responsible for the safe dissemination of all Ultra material in the Ministry, Department or Command.

Note 2. Bags and pouches should not be sent:

- (a) by air over routes which might incur forced landings in neutral or enemy territory,
- (b) by sea on routes which might involve capture by the enemy.

B. To Operational Commands Overseas

Normally Ultra messages affecting both higher and lower formations who are authorized recipients, are sent direct from the disseminating centre to each formation concerned.

The specially authorized routes referred to above consist of W/T or cables and normally Special Communication Units (S.C.U.) in direct W/T communication with the disseminating centre, are attached to Operational Commands. S.C.U. are also attached to static Headquarters, unless a completely adequate alternative communication system is available. Special Liaison Units are responsible for the safe delivery of decyphered Ultra messages to authorized recipients at the Command or Headquarters to which they are attached.

C. Intercommunication between Ultra Recipients.

Intercommunication between recipients on matters which in any way concern Ultra material, whether in the form of queries, comments, summaries or appreciations, must be over the authorized Ultra routes and unless transmitted in accordance with the exceptions in paragraph 4. A. must be sent in the special Ultra cyphers either through the original disseminating centre or the S.L.U.

D. Further Dissemination by Recipients.

If any recipients consider that any original Ultra message should have a further distribution to that already given, they must not retransmit direct but must refer the request to the original disseminating centre or S.L.U. who will undertake the further distribution to other authorized recipients as required. They will also inform any other interested recipients of the further action taken.

E. S.L. Units in H.M. Ships.

It is physically impossible and also undesirable to have S.L. Units attached to the Staff of all Flag Officers. There are in addition a number of instances where the method of application of these regulations is not applicable to naval usage. The Admiralty, therefore, retain their own Ultra service to all naval units.

5. Employment of Material

Any action based upon Ultra information which is taken by a Commander must be so camouflaged that the action itself cannot lead the enemy to the conclusion that it is based on Ultra Intelligence alone.

Momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source.

No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by Ultra, unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance has also been undertaken.

When Ultra information is to be used by a Command as a basis for action to be taken by a subordinate command which is not an authorized recipient, the information when passed to the subordinate command must be translated into terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the enemy the origin of the order could not be traced back to Ultra information, e.g., orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an enemy operation, or the name of any ship revealed by Ultra. Such operational orders if transmitted by W/T must be in high grade cyphers.

The utmost care is to be taken when briefing pilots for an operation based on Ultra information that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and only such as are essential to the success of the operation.

6. Summaries, Appreciations and Papers

When Ultra material is prepared in the form of a summary, appreciation or paper, these automatically become subject to the

same security regulations concerning dissemination, distribution, handling and use, as the Ultra material itself, except:

- (i) Where the information has also been received from other sources.
- (ii) Order of Battle information which may be included in normal secret documents after a suitable lapse of time during which it is reasonable for the enemy to suppose that the information could have been obtained by other means.

It is therefore evident that in order to avoid undue restrictions on information from other sources, such information should not be mixed with Ultra unless this is absolutely necessary.

7. Safety

No original Ultra message, and only such records as cannot give any clue to the nature of the source, may be kept at any Operational Headquarters below that of an Army Group.

It is the duty of the Special Liaison Units to keep an accurate log of all copies of messages delivered to Commands and in the case of formations below the level of Army Groups, to retrieve and destroy them.

The number of hours during which the Commanders may retain Ultra messages depends on their proximity to the enemy, but destruction should normally take place as soon as the necessary action has been taken.

Recipients of Ultra at Operational Commands may not under any circumstances carry on their persons or despatch outside their Headquarters, Ultra messages which have been delivered to them.

It is the responsibility of the Commander to whom the Special Liaison Units are attached to see that Special Liaison Units are never required to go within probable risk of capture by the enemy.

It is the responsibility of the Senior Officer of Special Liaison Units to destroy all in clear Ultra messages, cypher pads and material, should he consider the situation warrants such action.

Special measures are to be taken to ensure that all Ultra material whether at Ministries, Departments, Home or Overseas Commands, is at all times so carefully handled and kept that no unauthorized person can obtain access to it and that it is properly destroyed at the earliest practicable moment.

Note: Records will normally be kept at production centres which will be able to produce back messages if required.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

11 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Security of Signal Intelligence
Within European, North African
and Middle East Theaters of
Operations.

The Secretary of War directs:

I. That a registered top secret letter substantially as follows be addressed to:

Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Forces
The Commanding Generals,
U.S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
U.S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations
U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East

1. In order that in certain combined operations British and American recipients of Signal Intelligence may be bound by the same security regulations, the enclosed Security Instruction 'C', Memorandum on the Dissemination of Signal Intelligence within the British and American Forces, has been agreed upon for the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations.

2. Effective 1 April 1944, the enclosed Security Instruction 'C' will supersede AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43) OB-S-B-M, 28 September 1943, subject: Security of Rabid Intelligence, within the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations and, within those Theaters, will apply to all commands of the Army.

3. Reproduction of this letter and the enclosure ~~hereto~~ is prohibited.

II. That a copy of the enclosure hereto be enclosed



with the above letter and be classified "Top Secret."

III. That copies of the above letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department, *Lin Staff* and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department *Lin Staff*.

IV. That all requests for the above letter be referred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, for approval prior to distribution.

Clayton Bissell
Clayton Bissell,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2

Enclosure:
Security Instruction 'C'

ACTION TAKEN: 13 March 1944.
I. Ltr. to SC, Allied Expty Forces;
CG, USAFETO: CG, USAFINATOUSA: CG, USAF,
LE: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe;
II. Complied with. III. Cys. furnished as
indicated. IV. to be Complied with...
CJM/sr-2B4939 Pentagon.

ACTION TAKEN	
OPER. BRANCH A.G.O.	
Off. Initials	
Extension	5378
Room:	2B-939
Date:	15 Mar 44

15 MAR 1944

Act

047

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

COPY NO. 105

AG 312.1 (11 Mar 44)OB-S-B-M

CJM/sr-2B-939 Pentagon.

15 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Security of Signal Intelligence
Within European, North African and
Middle East Theaters of Operations;

.....
:
: Auth: T. A. G. :
: Initials: *TAM* :
: Date: 15 Mar 1944 :
.....


TO: Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Forces;
The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater of Operations;
U. S. Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations;
U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East;
Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

1. In order that in certain combined operations British and American recipients of Signal Intelligence may be bound by the same security regulations, the enclosed Security Instruction 'C', Memorandum on the Dissemination of Signal Intelligence within the British and American Forces, has been agreed upon for the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations.

2. Effective 1 April 1944, the inclosed Security Instruction 'C' will supersede letter, this office, AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43) OB-S-B-M, 28 September 1943, subject; Security of Rabid Intelligence, within the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operations and, within those Theaters, will apply to all commands of the Army.

3. Reproduction of this letter and the inclosure is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:


J. A. ULIS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Security Instruction 'C'

COPIES FURNISHED:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS (Special Branch)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS.

MEMORANDUM
on the
DISSEMINATION OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
WITHIN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES

1. Intention of Memorandum

This Memorandum is intended to serve as a general guide to all Commanders, Intelligence Staffs, and Signal Intelligence Officers at equal levels, for dealing with the handling, dissemination and security of Signal Intelligence.

2. Nomenclature

Special nomenclature to be used in signals and written communications dealing with Signal Intelligence is set out in Annexure (b).

3. Security

The preservation of secrecy in the handling of crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis is a vital factor in the conduct of the war.

If this degree of security is to be maintained, it is essential that the British and American Signal Intelligence Services should pursue the same methods at every level and in every theater of war. Leakage at any one point may not only jeopardize the flow of intelligence in the theater of war concerned, but also effectively dry up the source all over the world.

4. Issue of Security Instructions

Uniform security instructions for the handling of Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis will be issued from time to time through the senior Signal Intelligence Officers serving in the relevant theater of war or through the local Signal Intelligence Board where one has been formed.

5. Distribution

(i) The governing principle regarding the distribution of Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis is that it will only be disclosed to those Officers who have the absolute need to know it for the proper execution of their duties.

(ii) The levels on which intelligence derived from Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis will be disseminated are given in Annexure (a)

6. Handling of Intelligence obtained from Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis

In general the British and American Army and Air Authorities have agreed that as a principle "In any action taken upon Intelligence derived from Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis and any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised, and that the codes and cyphers used for its dissemination be absolutely secure." In accordance with the above, when it is necessary in the text to specify the source, this should be done by using respectively the single words PEARL and THUMB encyphered in the text. No other reference to source should be made.

7. Cyphers to be used in signalling Crypt Intelligence

Signals containing Crypt Intelligence must always be sent as Most Secret (U. S. Secret) in special cyphers to be authorized for the purpose.

8. Cyphers to be used for signalling Traffic Analysis.

Signals containing information derived from Traffic Analysis must always be sent in the highest grade cyphers available to all addressees, but may be regarded as requiring a lower degree of security than Crypt Intelligence.

9. Exchange of results

It has been agreed, with the approval of the Chiefs of Staff, that the British Signal Intelligence organization and the U. S. Signal Intelligence Service operating in a common theater of war shall cooperate and exchange the results of their Signal Intelligence work; without reservation, and shall make these results available to those Officers on levels as laid down in Annexure (a)

Furthermore, it has been mutually agreed that the distribution of these results may not be degraded below these levels without reference to the _____ or equivalent American authority.

10. Information regarding Signal Intelligence Units employed in theaters of war.

In order to carry out the above policy the British and U. S. Military and Air Authorities have agreed to inform each other of the Signal Intelligence Units that it is proposed to employ in all theaters of war.

11. Naval Cooperation.

The British Admiralty has associated itself with the foregoing arrangements and the Naval levels of dissemination are shown in Annexure (a).

LEVELS ON WHICH INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM CRYPT INTELLIGENCE AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MAY BE DISSEMINATED TO GENERAL AND INTELLIGENCE STAFFS OF ALLIED SERVICES

Promulgation Level

British Service	American Service
-----------------	------------------

COMBINED ALLIED FORCE

Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces
 Chief of Staff
 Senior Staff Officers (G-2) Intelligence
 " " " (G-3) Operations
 " " " (G-5) Plans
 Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces
 and his Senior Staff Officer or C.O.S.
 and his Senior Intelligence Officer.

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief,
 their Senior Air Staff Officers,
 and their Senior Air Intelligence
 Staff Officers

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief,
 their C.O.S. and Senior Air
 Intelligence Staff Officers.

Air Officers commanding Air Forces
 or Commands, their Senior Air
 Staff Officers, and Senior Air
 Intelligence Officers

Air Division Commanders,
 Chief of Staff, Air Division,
 and Senior Air Intelligence
 Officers.

Additional Staff Officers as may be specifically authorized by the Commander-in-Chief.

G.H.Q. A.H.Q. or ARMY GROUP HQORS

Commander
 C.O.S.
 Principal Staff Officer
 Intelligence
 Principal Staff Officer
 Operations
 Principal Staff Officer
 Plans

Commander
 C.O.S.
 G-2
 G-3
 G-5
 O.C. Intelligence Branch, G-2
 Signal Intelligence Officer

G.S.O.1. (I) (a)
 G.S.O.1. (I) (s)

Air Force Commander
 Senior Air Staff Officer
 Senior Intelligence Officer R.A.F.

Air Force or Division Commander
 C.O.S., (A.F.)
 A-2, (A.F.)

Additional Staff Officers as may be specifically authorized by the Commander.

ARMY HQORS

Army Commander
C.O.S.
G.S.O.1. (I)
G.S.O.1. (Ops.)
Additional I Officers as specifically
authorized by Army Commander

Air Force Commander
Senior Air Staff Officer

Army Commander
C.O.S.
G-2
G-3
Additional G-2 Staff Officers
as specifically authorized by
Army Commander.
Air Force Commander
C.O.S. (A.F.)

All Intelligence Officers in all Headquarters higher
than Corps or Group (U.S. Wing), and in addition:
CCORPS HQORS.

Corps Commander
B.G.S.
G.S.O.2. Intelligence
G.S.O.2. Operations
All Intelligence Officers
Air Intelligence Officer

~~Additional I Officers as
authorized by Corps Commander~~

Corps Commander
C.O.S.
G-2
G-3
All G-2 Intelligence Officers.
Air Officer

CORPS OR TASK FORCES OR AIR FORCE GROUPS (U. S. WINGS)
OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY

Corps Commander
B.G.S.
Principal Staff Officer (I)
Principal Staff Officer (Ops.)
Group Commanders R.A.F.
Senior Air Staff Officer
Senior Intelligence Officer

Corps Commander
C.O.S.
G-2
G-3
Wing Commanders (A.F.)
C.O.S. A.F. Wing.
A-2, Wing.

NAVAL COMBAND

Naval Commanders-in-Chief
Force Commanders and selected
Flag Officers and their Senior
Staff Officers specially
authorized by them.

MISCELLANEOUS

Group Commanders R.A.F.
Senior Air Staff Officer
Senior I Officer
Additional Staff Officers as
authorized by Group Commanders,

Air Division Commanders
C.O.S. Air Division
Wing Commanders (A.F.)
C.O.S. A.F. Wing.
A-2, Wing.
Additional Staff Officers as
authorized by Air Division or
Wing Commanders

NOMENCLATURE FOR ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE
STUDY OF FOREIGN SIGNALS.

<u>Terms to be employed</u>	<u>Short Title</u>	<u>Definition.</u>
(i) Signal Intelligence	Sig. Int.	Comprises (a) the interception of all enemy and neutral communications and radio transmissions, and their solution; (b) the Intelligence resulting therefrom, and the preparation of such Intelligence in a useful form.
(ii) Y Service Radio Intelligence Service	Y (Br.) R.I. (Amer.)	The organization responsible for the interception of all enemy and neutral radio transmissions including the operation of D/F services.
<u>Code Word</u>		
(iii) Crypt Intelligence	Pearl	Intelligence resulting from solution of low grade codes and cyphers unless placed in a special category.
(iv) Traffic Analysis	Thumb	Intelligence obtained from a study of radio traffic and D/F bearings

Reference item (ii): It is important to note that the expression 'Y' is restricted to the above definition.

Reference items (iii) and (iv): These code words will be changed from time to time as may be considered necessary.

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 380.01 (8 Jul 44)OB-S-B

FM-2B-939 Pentagon

10 July 1944

SUBJECT: Security Regulations for Special Intelligence. ::::::::::::::::::::

TO: The Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
The Commanding Generals,
U.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Theater Headquarters
U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
U.S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon

:
: Auth: *[Signature]*
: Initials: *[Signature]*
: Date: 10 Jul 44
: ::::::::::::::::::::

1. In order that the handling and dissemination of Special Intelligence by U.S. and British forces in theaters of operations in the Pacific and Asia may be governed by the same security regulations, the inclosed Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Special Intelligence have been agreed upon for those theaters.

2. The inclosed Regulations will become effective in each theater in the Pacific and Asia upon a date to be prescribed by the War Department. The date will vary for different theaters in order that certain provisions will not become mandatory until necessary preliminary arrangements have been made which will permit them to be carried out. On the effective date for each theater, the inclosed Regulations will supersede letter, AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43)OB-S-B-M, 14 October 1943, subject: Security of Ultra Dexter Intelligence, with respect to such theater and will apply to all commands of the Army within such theater.

3. The inclosed Regulations will be distributed only over the special channels prescribed therein for Special Intelligence and will be made available only to persons authorized to receive Special Intelligence pursuant to the inclosed Regulations.

4. Reproduction of this letter and its inclosure is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[Signature]
J. A. ULIO
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Regulations

REGULATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE SECURITY
OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

1. DEFINITION. Special Intelligence is the designated term for highly secret information obtained by intercepting and reading enemy messages which have been enciphered in cryptographic systems of a high security classification.

2. GENERAL. The extreme importance of Special Intelligence as a source of reliable information concerning enemy activities and intentions has been repeatedly proved. Preservation of this source requires that the enemy be given no reason to suspect that his communications are being read. If from any document which might fall into his hands, from any message he might intercept, from any word revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action taken upon the basis of such intelligence, the enemy were given cause to believe that his communications are not adequately safeguarded against the interception which he knows to be employed against him, he would effect changes which would deprive us of knowledge of his operations on all fronts. Extreme secrecy is therefore required and these regulations are to be strictly observed.

3. CODE WORD FOR SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. All messages or other documents transmitting Special Intelligence, information based thereon, or any direct or indirect reference thereto, will contain the code word Ultra to indicate the source. When transmitted by wire or radio, the word Ultra will be buried within the body of the message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text.

4. AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS. The levels upon which Ultra may be disseminated, and the number of officers at any level authorized to receive it, are severely restricted, as follows:

a. Ultra will not be made available to staffs below the level of Army or equivalent Air Force formations, except that (1) Ultra may be passed in the form of operational orders to lower formations, as provided in paragraph 9(c) below, and (2) in exceptional circumstances making it imperative, the Commander-in-Chief of the Theater may authorize Ultra to be passed to lower formations down to the level of divisions or equivalent Air Force formations if they are operating independently, but only in strict accordance with paragraph 6 below and only if the physical security of the receiving headquarters is assured.

b. Within headquarters authorized to receive Ultra, it may be made available only to officers holding the following posts:

- (1) Commander and his Deputy
Chief of Staff and his Deputy
Senior Intelligence Staff Officer
Senior Operations Staff Officer

Senior Planning Officer) At Army Group
Senior Signal Officer) or
Senior Signal Intelligence Officer) higher level

(2) Additional intelligence and operations staff officers absolutely necessary for its handling and use, as specifically authorized in each instance pursuant to paragraph 8(b) below (except that in the case of formations below the level of Army or equivalent Air Force formations, no recipients may be authorized in addition to Commander, Chief of Staff, and senior intelligence and operations staff officers).

c. No officer will be entitled to receive Ultra solely by reason of the post which he holds.

5. DISSEMINATING AGENCY WITHIN EACH THEATER. All Ultra produced or received within any theater will be transmitted to a single agency which will be charged with responsibility for disseminating the intelligence derived from such Ultra to authorized recipients over authorized channels. Within any theater of combined U.S.-British operations (a) such agency will include both U.S. and British personnel who will be jointly responsible for dissemination to British and U.S. recipients, or (b) where it is considered desirable, there may be separate U.S. and British* agencies which will be responsible for dissemination to British and U.S. recipients, respectively. In the latter event, such separate agencies will cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in order to avoid duplication of effort in the collation, evaluation and dissemination of Ultra, to obviate the necessity of separate transmissions of Ultra from production centers to each such unit, and to permit wherever possible the use of common communication facilities and cryptographic systems for the receipt and transmission of Ultra messages.

6. SPECIAL SECURITY PERSONNEL, CHANNELS AND CIPHERS FOR ULTRA
(SEE DIAGRAM ATTACHED).

a. Approval of Channels. Except in strict accordance with paragraph 10(a) below, Ultra Intelligence, information based thereon, or any reference thereto, will be transmitted only by personnel and by means of channels and ciphers approved, in the case of U.S. commands, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, or, in the case of British commands, by the chairman of the Signal Intelligence Board London.

b. Special Security Personnel. Special Security personnel, to be known as Special Security Officers (S.S.O.) will be attached by the A.C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S., to each U.S. headquarters entitled to receive Ultra, and like personnel, to be known as Special Liaison Units (S.L.U.), will be attached by the _____ to each British headquarters entitled to receive Ultra. Such personnel for purposes of administration and discipline will be subject to theater control. They will hold special cryptographic systems, or special settings of machine ciphers, for the transmission of Ultra and will have sole responsibility for (1) the decryptographing of all Ultra messages received at the headquarters to which they are attached and the safe delivery of the decryptographed texts to authorized recipients and (2) the cryptographing of all Ultra messages sent from such headquarters. They will also advise recipients at such headquarters regarding security in the handling of Ultra and the carrying out of these regulations.

c. Communications Personnel. Where necessary to provide for the prompt transmission of Ultra messages, special communications personnel will be attached to disseminating centers and operational headquarters and will be responsible for maintaining direct radio communications between such centers and headquarters.

d. Special Security Representatives. The _____ may designate, for each theater having British headquarters authorized to receive Ultra, an officer, with such assistants as may appear desirable, who will represent the _____ on all matters involving the security, transmission and exchange of Ultra and who, except for administration and discipline, will supervise all British special signal intelligence security personnel within such theater. The A. C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S., may designate, for each theater having U.S. headquarters authorized to receive Ultra, an officer, with such assistants as may appear desirable, who will represent the War Department in all matters involving the security, transmission and exchange of Ultra and who, except for administration and discipline, will supervise all U.S. special security personnel within such theater. Such officers and their assistants will be attached to theater headquarters for administration and discipline only.

e. Use of Courier, Bag or Pouch. Except as specifically authorized pursuant to paragraph 6(a), Ultra material may be transmitted by courier or by bag or pouch only if (a) the route is completely secure and does not pass over enemy, enemy-occupied or neutral territory, or the material is enciphered in an approved cryptographic system, and (b) the handling arrangements at both ends are confined to personnel authorized pursuant to paragraph 6.

7. CLASSIFICATION OF ENEMY CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS. The A. C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S., in the case of U.S. commands, and the _____ in the case of British commands, will have sole authority to determine which enemy cryptographic systems are of a high security classification, for the purpose of defining which ones fall within the class of Special Intelligence, and will have authority to upgrade the security classification of any enemy system when desirable in the interests of security. Such classifications and any changes therein will be forwarded from time to time as they are made to Theater Commanders over the special channels provided pursuant to paragraph 6.

8. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO RECIPIENTS.

a. Briefing. Before Ultra is made available to any authorized recipient, he will first be properly initiated into the nature of the source and briefed regarding the security regulations, and will sign a form stating that he has read and understands the regulations and will comply therewith. Briefing will be carried out either by the senior S.S.O. or S.L.U. officer or, if no such officer has been designated, by the senior intelligence staff officer or such other officer as the Commander may designate.

b. Additional Recipients. In the event that a Commander considers it essential that any officer in addition to those specifically enumerated in paragraph 4(b) (1) should be authorized to receive Ultra, he will make application through the S.S.O. or S.L.U. to the War Department, in the case of a U.S. recipient, or to the _____ in the case of a British recipient, giving reasons for the request. When an officer who is not already an authorized recipient is assigned to a post which entitles him to Ultra, a similar application will be made, unless the Commander making the assignment personally guarantees that such officer is a reliable recipient.

c. Relinquishment of Post. If an officer relinquishes a post which has entitled him to receive Ultra, he automatically forfeits his right to see such material and will sign an undertaking to that effect. In such a case it is highly undesirable

that the officer be transferred to any post which will subject him to the risk of capture by the enemy.

d. Discussion with Non-recipients. No authorized recipient of Ultra will under any circumstances show or read any Ultra material to, or discuss it with, any person of any service unless he is satisfied that such person is also authorized to receive such material.

e. Lists of Recipients. The S.S.O. or S.L.U. at each headquarters which receives Ultra, or, if no such officer has been designated, an authorized recipient designated by the Commander, will maintain on a current basis a list of all persons at such headquarters authorized to receive Ultra and will transmit over Ultra channels to the disseminating agency the names and posts of all authorized recipients and any changes therein. The disseminating agency will transmit this information over Ultra channels to the _____ in the case of British recipients and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 War Department General Staff in the case of U.S. recipients.

f. Communication between Ultra Recipients. Communication between recipients on matters which in any way concern Ultra, whether in the form of queries, comments, summaries or appreciations, will be transmitted only over the Ultra channels authorized pursuant to paragraph 6 hereof. If any recipient considers it essential that any Ultra should receive distribution additional to that already given, he will not transmit it directly but will request the S.S.O. or S.L.U. to arrange for the additional distribution.

9. EMPLOYMENT OF ULTRA.

a. Action Based on Ultra. Any action based upon Ultra must be so camouflaged that the action itself cannot lead the enemy to the conclusion that it is based on Ultra. Momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by Ultra unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance or other suitable camouflage measures have also been undertaken.

b. Briefing of Pilots. The utmost care is to be taken, when briefing pilots for an operation based on Ultra information, that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and then only such as are essential to the success of the operation. In no event

will the source of such information be disclosed, and whenever practicable the information will be attributed to some other source. The risk of capture makes it imperative that these provisions be strictly observed.

c. Orders to Subordinate Commands. When Ultra furnishes the basis of action to be taken by a command which is not authorized to receive Ultra, the information when passed to the subordinate command must be translated into terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the enemy the origin of the order could not be traced back to Ultra. Such orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an enemy operation, or the name of any ship or tactical unit revealed only by Ultra. Such operational orders if transmitted by radio must be in high grade cryptographic systems.

10. SUMMARIES, APPRECIATIONS AND PAPERS.

a. Restriction on Use of Ultra. Any summary, report estimate, appreciation or other paper based upon or including information from Ultra sources automatically becomes subject to the same security regulations concerning dissemination, distribution, handling and use, as the Ultra material itself, unless

(1) the information has also been received from other sources, or

(2) the information relates to Order of Battle and (a) sufficient time has elapsed to make it reasonable for the enemy to assume that the information was obtained from other sources known by the enemy to be available to us, and (b) the Theater Commander has specifically authorized such information to be so included.

In any case, the source of such information shall not be disclosed.

b. Avoiding Restrictions on other Intelligence. In view of the above, it is evident that, in order to avoid subjecting information not from Ultra sources to the special security requirements for Ultra, such information should not be mixed with Ultra except when absolutely necessary.

c. Intelligence Records, War Diaries, etc. No information from Ultra sources, and no reference thereto, shall be included in any intelligence journals or logs, war diaries or other similar records.

11. SAFETY OF ULTRA MATERIAL.

a. Retention of Ultra Material. No Ultra material, and only such records as cannot give any clue to the nature of the source, may be kept at any operational headquarters below Army Group. It is the duty of the S.S.O. or S.L.U. to keep an accurate record of all copies of messages delivered to any headquarters and, in the case of formations below the level of Army Group, to retrieve and destroy them. The number of hours during which Commanders may retain Ultra messages depends on their proximity to the enemy, but destruction should normally take place as soon as the necessary action has been taken.

b. Physical Handling of Ultra Within Headquarters. Special measures will be taken to insure that all Ultra material is at all times so handled and kept that no unauthorized person can obtain access to it. Recipients of Ultra at operational commands may not under any circumstances carry on their persons, or dispatch outside their headquarters, Ultra messages which have been delivered to them. Ordinarily, Ultra may be received, discussed or worked upon only in a room which is reserved for that purpose alone and to which no person who is not authorized to receive Ultra has access. When it is impossible to set aside a room exclusively for this purpose, a room or other segregated place shall be provided which Ultra recipients may use periodically, or when required, for reading, discussing or otherwise using Ultra. When circumstances require that a commander or other recipient receive or discuss Ultra at any other place, every precaution shall be taken to insure that no unauthorized person shall see such material, that such discussion does not take place within the hearing of any unauthorized person, and that the Ultra material is retained only for the minimum period of time necessary for reading and discussing it.

c. Safety of Special Security Personnel. It is the responsibility of the commander to whom special security personnel are attached to see that they are never required to go where they would be subjected to the risk of capture by the enemy.


d. Destruction of Ultra Material. It is the responsibility of the senior S.S.O. or senior S.L.U. officer attached to any headquarters to destroy all messages and documents containing Ultra and all special cryptographic material, should he consider the situation warrants such action.

12. SECURITY OF REGULATIONS AND CODE WORD. These regulations shall be transmitted only over channels authorized for the transmission of Ultra and shall be made available only to persons authorized to receive Ultra. The meaning of the code word Ultra shall not be disclosed to any person not authorized to receive Ultra.

FLOW OF ULTRA WITHIN A THEATER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS
(see Regulations, paragraph 6)

OUTSIDE THEATER

WITHIN THEATER



- (a) U.S. and British cryptanalysis organizations may be combined when situation permits.
- (b) May be separate U.S. and British disseminating agencies when situation requires.
- (c) As authorized pursuant to regulations.
- (d) Includes D.M.I. India and Australia.

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D.C.

AG 380.01 (2 Nov 44)OB-S-B

CJM/lq 2E-939 Pentagon.

2 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Security Regulations for Special Intelligence.

.....
:
:Auth: T. 146 65.
:Initials: [Signature]
:Date: 2 Nov 44.
:.....

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas.

1. Reference is made to letter this office, 10 July 1944, AG 380.01 (8 Jul 44)OB-S-B, subject as above.

2. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of letter referred to above, the effective date of the Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Special Intelligence will be 10 November 1944 in the India-Burma Theater and the Pacific Ocean Areas.

3. Reproduction of this letter is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[Signature]
Adjutant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 380.01 (15 Nov 44)OB-S-B

CDM/rnd 2B-939 Pentagon

15 November 1944

SUBJECT: Security Regulations for Special Intelligence.

TO: Commanding General, U. S. Forces China Theater.

:::::::::::::::::::::
: ~~TOP SECRET~~ :
: Auth: T. A. G. :
: Initials: *TAG* :
: Date: 15 Nov 44 :
: :::::::::::::::::::::::

1. Reference is made to letter, this office, AG 380.01 (8 Jul 44) OB-S-B, 10 July 1944, subject as above.
2. In accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of the letter referred to above, the effective date of the Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Special Intelligence will be 23 November 1944 in the China Theater.
3. Reproduction of this letter is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:

T. A. G.
Adjutant General

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 311.5 (15 Nov 44)OB-S-E-M

FM/md 23-939 Pentagon

16 November 1944

SUBJECT: Security Regulations for Pearl
and Thumb Intelligence.

.....
:
; Auth: T. A. G. :
: Initials: *K. C.* :
: Date: 16 Nov 44 :
:.....

TO: The Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area
The Commanding Generals,
U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
U.S. Forces India-Burma Theater
U.S. Forces China Theater
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon

1. Effective upon receipt of this letter, United States Army Security Regulations for Rabid Intelligence, reference letter AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43)OB-S-E-M, 28 September 1943, subject: Security of Rabid Intelligence, are superseded by the inclosed Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence.

2. This letter and its inclosure will be made available only to persons authorized to receive Pearl and Thumb Intelligence pursuant to the inclosed Regulations.

3. Letter, AG 311.5 (27 Sep 43)OB-S-E-M, 28 September 1943, subject: Security of Rabid Intelligence, will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

4. Reproduction of this letter and its inclosure is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Edward F. Witsell
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Brigadier General
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl.
As listed above.

REGULATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE
SECURITY OF PEARL AND THUMB INTELLIGENCE

1. Scope and Purpose. These Regulations are designed to safeguard the following types of intelligence:

a. Crypt Intelligence: Information resulting from the solution of enemy codes and ciphers, unless such information has been placed in a special category for which separate regulations have been issued.

b. Traffic Analysis: Information resulting from (1) the analysis of enemy radio traffic, short of cryptanalysis; and (2) the operation of direction finding equipment.

2. Security. The extreme importance of Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Analysis as sources of reliable information concerning enemy activities and intentions has been repeatedly proved. Preservation of these sources requires that the enemy be given no reason to suspect the degree of our success in acquiring such intelligence. If, from any document which might fall into his hands, from any message he might intercept, from any word revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action taken upon the basis of such intelligence, the enemy were given cause to believe that his communications are not adequately safeguarded against the interception which he knows to be employed against him, he would effect changes which would deprive us of knowledge of his operations on all fronts. Extreme care is therefore required in order to preserve the security of such intelligence from all unauthorized persons, and these Regulations are to be strictly observed.

3. Code Words. All messages or other documents transmitting Crypt Intelligence or Traffic Analysis or any reference thereto will contain a code word to indicate the source and to insure handling in accordance with these Regulations. The code word for Crypt Intelligence is PEARL; the code word for Traffic Analysis is THUMB. In transmissions by wire or radio, the appropriate code word will be enciphered in the text.

4. Security of Code Words. The meaning of the code words Pearl and Thumb shall not be disclosed to any person not eligible under these Regulations to receive Pearl and Thumb Intelligence. It shall be the responsibility of every person eligible to receive Pearl and Thumb Intelligence to take all possible precautions to preserve the secrecy of the code words.

5. Classification. All Pearl and Thumb Intelligence will be classified SECRET.

6. Authorized Recipients.

a. The levels upon which Pearl and Thumb Intelligence may be

disseminated, and the officers at any level eligible to receive it, are restricted. The governing principle is to limit dissemination only to those who have absolute need of the information for the execution of their duties.

b. Except as otherwise provided in these Regulations, Pearl and Thumb Intelligence will not be made available below the level of Corps or, in the case of Air Force formations, below the level of Group (British) or Wing (U.S.).

c. Within headquarters authorized to receive Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, it may be made available only to officers holding the following posts:

- (1) Commander and his Deputy
Chief of Staff and his Deputy
All Intelligence Officers
Senior Operations Staff Officer
Senior Planning Staff Officer
Senior Signal Officer
Signal Intelligence Officers

- (2) Additional officers absolutely necessary for its handling and use within such headquarters, as specifically authorized in each instance by the Theater Commander who shall satisfy himself as to the necessity therefor and as to the reliability of the individuals concerned.

- (3) In exceptional circumstances making it imperative, the Theater Commander may authorize the passing of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence to commands below the levels prescribed in subparagraph b above, but only if the physical security of the receiving headquarters is assured.

d. Persons eligible to be recipients of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence in accordance with the foregoing provisions must be thoroughly briefed in these Regulations before such intelligence is actually made available to them.

7. Transmission and Handling.

a. Messages containing Pearl or Thumb Intelligence or any reference thereto will be transmitted only in cryptographic systems specifically authorized for that purpose. For U.S. forces such authorization will be by the Theater Commander; for British forces such authorization will be by the Chief Signal Intelligence Service Officer in the respective theater.

b. Documents containing Pearl or Thumb Intelligence, including cryptographed versions of such documents, will be burned immediately

after their usefulness ceases. At headquarters below Army level, this will normally be as soon as their contents have been absorbed by those who have to act upon them. Such documents will not be carried on the person of a recipient outside his headquarters, except as dictated by absolute necessity.

c. In order to avoid subjecting to these Regulations intelligence having less stringent security requirements, such intelligence should not be included in the same documents with Pearl or Thumb Intelligence, except when absolutely necessary.

8. Operations Based on Pearl or Thumb Intelligence. Commanders will take every precaution to insure that any action taken upon the basis of Pearl or Thumb Intelligence cannot be traced by the enemy to this source. For example, appropriate land or air reconnaissance should be undertaken whenever practicable, in such manner, and sufficiently in advance of the proposed action, so that the enemy is led to believe that such reconnaissance furnished the basis for the action; and orders directing such reconnaissance, as well as any other operational orders based on Pearl or Thumb Intelligence, must never contain precise names, dates, times or other details known only through these sources, and must be dispatched in high grade cryptographic systems. Similarly, great care must be taken in briefing airplane crews, in order that only necessary details are given them and always in a form that cannot be traced to this source.

9. Exceptions to Restrictions on Dissemination. It is recognized that, from time to time, special circumstances will require that persons not eligible under these Regulations to become recipients of Pearl or Thumb Intelligence may yet require information derived therefrom for the proper performance of their duties. Accordingly, the following exceptions to the restrictions embodied in these Regulations are authorized:

a. In Wire or Radio Messages: When, in the judgment of the Theater Commander, circumstances require that conclusions based on Pearl or Thumb Intelligence be passed to commands or personnel other than those provided for in paragraph 6 above, such conclusions may be so passed, subject to the following rules:

(1) The code words Pearl or Thumb will not be used but the classification SECRET will be retained;

(2) The conclusions will be so stated as to give no indication whatever of the source. Special care must be taken in this respect with Pearl Intelligence to avoid any apparent relation between the statement of conclusions and the content of the enemy message on which the conclusion is based; to this end no exact strength figures, times, or other precise details that have appeared in an enemy message will be included.

(3) Messages containing such conclusions will always be sent

in the cryptographic system of highest security available.

(4) The message will always include the express stipulation that the conclusions may be used by the recipient only as the basis for operational orders and shall not be given further dissemination.

b. In Orders of Battle, Summaries, Appreciations and Other Documents: When, in the judgment of the Theater Commander, circumstances justify the inclusion of conclusions derived from Pearl or Thumb Intelligence in any order of battle, summary, appreciation or other similar document the distribution of which is not restricted to the commands and personnel provided for in paragraph 6 above, such conclusions may be so used, subject, however, to the following conditions:

(1) The code words Pearl or Thumb will not be used, but the classification SECRET will be retained;

(2) The conclusions will be so stated as to give no indication whatever of the source (see sub-paragraph a (2) above);

(3) The further dissemination of such conclusions beyond the document in which they are thus permitted to appear will be prohibited.

10. Personnel Handling Pearl or Thumb Intelligence.

a. Personnel whose duties include cryptographing, transmitting, filing, or handling messages or other documents required by these Regulations to contain the words Pearl or Thumb will be kept to the minimum number necessary.

b. Before undertaking their duties, such personnel will be carefully briefed, to insure an understanding of the content and importance of these Regulations.

c. The handling of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence will be restricted to commissioned personnel insofar as possible, but

(1) enlisted personnel may perform the necessary cryptographic duties involved in the transmission of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence provided they have the normal security clearance required by their respective services, and provided the requirements of sub-paragraphs a and b above are observed;

(2) when any officer who is a recipient of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence shall require enlisted personnel to assist him in the handling of such material, and when their duties do not include the cryptographing of messages, he may make application to the Theater Commander for permission to use such personnel and such permission may be granted upon the personal guaranty of the officer requesting such permission as to the reliability of such

personnel, and subject to the undertaking of such officer thoroughly to brief such personnel in these Regulations before any such use shall be made of their services.

11. Personnel Producing Pearl or Thumb Intelligence. Nothing in these Regulations shall be construed to prohibit signal intelligence personnel directly engaged in the production of Pearl or Thumb Intelligence from having access to such intelligence to the extent necessary for the proper performance of their respective duties.

12. Questions Concerning Regulations. All questions with respect to the interpretation or application of these Regulations which cannot be disposed of by the Theater Commander should be directed by him, through the most secure channels, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department or the


13. Distribution of Regulations. To preserve secrecy it is essential that the distribution of this document be limited to those who require it in order to safeguard the security of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence.

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON

SECRET



OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED FILES

See: AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43) (1). Ccnf. Files.

SECRET

"Security"

AG 311.5
Subj: Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of Communication
Intelligence Concerning Weather.

AG 311.5

(29 Feb 44)

0

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

23 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

SUBJECT: Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of
Communication Intelligence Concerning Weather. ✓

311.5 T.S.

The Secretary of War directs:

I. That a Top Secret letter substantially as follows be sent
to:

*Travel
Am
d S*

- The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Army Service Forces
- The Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
- The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
U. S. Forces, India-Burma Theater
U. S. Forces, China Theater
Alaskan Department, Advance Command Post
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon

1. The inclosed Regulations for the dissemination and use of communication intelligence concerning weather have been agreed upon between the War Department and the Navy Department and are effective herewith.

2. Letter, AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44) OB-S-B, 2 March 1944, subject as above, is hereby superseded and will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.


3. This letter and its inclosure will be made available only to persons authorized to receive communication intelligence concerning weather pursuant to the inclosed Regulations.

4. Reproduction of this letter and its inclosure is prohibited.

II. That 75 numbered copies of the above mentioned letter be delivered to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, for distribution by him, and that no additional copies of the letter be distributed without his express authorization.

*1. Inclosed
Regulations*

*23-1
311.5
Jorden
Ca
23-1
311.5*



ACTION TAKEN: 6 Apr 1945.
I. Addressees as indicated.
II. 75 cys of ltr. furn. G-2 for distribution.
FM/er 2B-939 Pentagon.

ACTION TAKEN	
OPER. BRANCH, A.G.O.	
Off. Initials	
Room: 5515	CLAYTON BISELL
Date: 6 Apr 1945	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

FILE 6 APR 1945
John Weckerling

JOHN WECKERLING
Frigadier General, G
Deputy A.C. of S., C.

083

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D.C.

COPY NO 2

AG 311.5 TS (23 Mar 45)OB-S-B-M

FM/er 2B-939 Pentagon

6 April 1945

.....
:
: Auth: T. A. S. :
: Initials: *KEA* :
: Date: 6 Apr 45 :
.....

SUBJECT: Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of
Communication Intelligence Concerning Weather.

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Army Service Forces
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
The Commanding Generals,
U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
U.S. Army Forces, India-Burma Theater
U.S. Forces, China Theater
Alaskan Department, Advance Command Post
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon.

1. The inclosed Regulations for the dissemination and use of communication intelligence concerning weather have been agreed upon between the War Department and the Navy Department and are effective herewith.

2. Letter, AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44)OB-S-B, 2 March 1944, subject as above, is hereby superseded and will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

3. This letter and its inclosure will be made available only to persons authorized to receive communication intelligence concerning weather pursuant to the inclosed Regulations.

4. Reproduction of this letter and its inclosure is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl.
Regulations.

J. A. Ulloa
J. A. ULLOA
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

REGULATIONS FOR THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING WEATHER

1. Scope and Purpose. These Regulations are designed to safeguard weather intelligence derived from cryptanalysis. The governing principle is to limit dissemination to those who have absolute need of the information for the execution of their duties and to prohibit the use of such intelligence in any manner which may lead the enemy to believe that his weather codes are being read.

2. Code Word. All messages or other documents transmitting weather intelligence derived from cryptanalysis will contain the code word MANX to indicate the source and to insure handling in accordance with these Regulations. In transmissions by wire or radio the word MANX will be buried in the body of the message and cryptographed as part of the text.

3. Security of Code Word. The meaning of the word MANX shall not be disclosed to any person not eligible under these Regulations to receive MANX intelligence. It shall be the responsibility of every person eligible to receive MANX to take all possible precautions to observe the security of this code word.

4. Classification. MANX will be classified Top Secret.

5. Levels of Dissemination.

a. Except as provided in paragraph 5d below, MANX will not be disseminated below the level of Air Force.

b. In normal circumstances the Weather Section of the Air Force concerned will produce a map analysis, without any indication of source, which will be passed down to United States Wing or British Group levels. If the map is based upon or contains any MANX, no matter how disguised, such map analysis will be passed in one-time pad or high grade machine cipher regardless of method of transmission. Wings or Groups will then add their local observations and issue forecasts. Map analyses as issued by Air Forces will carry no indication of the source and will not be classified below Confidential.

c. It shall be permissible for the senior weather officers down to United States Wing or British Group levels to be indoctrinated in MANX so that they may better appreciate the map analyses issued to them.

d. In exceptional circumstances, such as special operations, MANX may be made available down to United States Wings or British Groups, provided that such dissemination has been specifically authorized by the Theater Commander in each instance.

e. Forecasts or conclusions derived in whole or in part from map analysis are to be issued to flying personnel and other unindoctrinated persons only in such form as to give no indication whatever of the source. Such forecasts and conclusions can then be disseminated in the normal manner.

6. Personnel Handling MANX.

a. At any recipient headquarters MANX shall be restricted to the minimum number of selected and named officers and non-commissioned officers (or other persons specifically authorized by the Theater Commander or officer designated by him) necessary for its processing and use.

b. Cryptographic personnel whose duties involve enciphering or deciphering messages containing MANX will be kept to the minimum number necessary.

c. No person shall have access to MANX until he has been fully indoctrinated in these Regulations and has signed an oath identical with that attached heretc.

d. Personnel who have had access to MANX will be kept away from forward areas or missions where there is a substantial risk of capture.

7. Methods of Handling MANX.

a. MANX shall be used and plotted in specific offices to which unindoctrinated persons shall not have access while MANX is exposed or being used. Documents containing MANX shall not be taken outside such offices.

b. Reproduction of documents containing MANX and the distribution to any person not authorized to receive MANX in accordance with these Regulations is prohibited.

c. Documents containing MANX will be destroyed by burning immediately after their usefulness ceases. At operational headquarters such destruction will normally be within 48 hours of receipt. Maps on which MANX is plotted will normally be destroyed by burning within 15 days of plotting, except that one complete set of weather maps containing MANX may be maintained as long as necessary within each theater at an authorized headquarters to be designated by the theater commander.

d. MANX will not be included in war diaries, mission reports, summaries, or similar documents, however limited the circulation.

8. Transmission of MANX. Messages containing MANX will be passed only in one-time pad or high grade machine cipher, regardless of method of transmission.

9. Operations Based on MANX. Commanders will take every precaution to insure that any action taken upon the basis of MANX cannot be traced by the enemy to this source.

10. Questions Concerning Regulations. All questions with respect to the interpretation or application of these Regulations which cannot be disposed of by the theater commander should be directed by him, through the most secure channels, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

(Date)

I, _____, having been indoctrinated in MANX, fully understand the importance of maintaining the security of such information and do hereby solemnly swear that I will not now or hereafter discuss the existence or contents of such information with persons who are not authorized recipients, and will do so then only to the extent demanded by the performance of my duties which necessitate my being a recipient.

So help me God.

(Name)

Sworn before me this date

(Attesting Officer)

088

E-3

26 December 1944.

Subject: Instructions governing the handling and dissemination of ULTRA produced or received in the Southwest Pacific Area.

To : Director, Central Bureau.

Officer in Charge, Special Security Officers (US))
Officer in Charge, Special Liaison Unit (British)) For Information.
Major John R. Thompson

1. In order that the handling and dissemination of Special Intelligence by United States and British forces in theaters of operations in the Pacific and Asia may be governed by the same security regulations, the United States and British authorities have agreed to certain common regulations. These regulations have been promulgated to this theater by the War Department in letter dated 10 July 1944, file AG 380.01 (8 July 1944) OP-S-B.

2. All ULTRA produced or received within the Southwest Pacific Area will be transmitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, General Headquarters who is charged with the responsibility for disseminating the intelligence derived from such ULTRA to designated recipients over authorized channels. Dissemination will be limited to those authorized recipients who are operationally interested in each individual item of intelligence.

3. Special Security personnel to be known as Special Security Officers (SSO) will be attached by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of the War Department General Staff to each United States headquarters entitled to receive ULTRA and like personnel to be known as Special Liaison Units (SLU) will be attached by _____, to each British headquarters entitled to receive ULTRA.

The duties of SSO and SLU personnel are prescribed by joint agreement between the United States and Great Britain to be as follows:

SSO

"They will hold special cryptographic systems, or special settings of machine cyphers, for the transmission of ULTRA and will have sole responsibility for (1) the decryptographing of all ULTRA messages received at the headquarters to which they are attached and the safe delivery of the decryptographed texts to authorized recipients and (2) the cryptographing of all ULTRA messages sent from such headquarters. They will also advise recipients at such headquarters regarding security in the handling of ULTRA and the carrying out of these regulations."

4. The following instructions will govern the handling of Special Intelligence produced by Central Bureau or received by it from other crypte-

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graphic centers.

a. Central Bureau will deliver all Special Intelligence to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, General Headquarters. While Central Bureau remains in Brisbane, such delivery will be effected to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Rear Echelon General Headquarters, Brisbane.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 will determine the Commanders to whom each item of Special Intelligence will be disseminated and will determine the method and priority of transmission. He will then deliver the messages to the Special Security Officer or to the Special Liaison Unit for transmission in accordance with the regulations quoted in paragraph 3 above.

5. Central Bureau will maintain technical liaison with other cryptographic agencies by direct transmission and receipt of messages which are not classified as ULTRA. All messages of this nature which are classified as ULTRA will be delivered to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, General Headquarters, who will effect their transmission through approved ULTRA channels.

6. The Chief Signal Officer, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, will make available at an appropriate location the following facilities for Special Security Officers designated to transmit Special Intelligence produced by Central Bureau and delivered to them by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, General Headquarters.

a. Access to the appropriate cypher facilities for ULTRA encyphering and decyphering as above indicated.

b. Secure storage of cryptographic cyphers.

c. Appropriate and secure office space.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

070-B

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D.C.

AG 311.5 (4 Aug 45)OB-S-B

CDM/mjm 2B-939 Pentagon

6 August 1945

SUBJECT: Security Regulations for PINUP Intelligence.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific;
Commanding Generals,
U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces;
U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific;
U. S. Forces China Theater;
U. S. Forces India-Burma Theater;
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon.

.....
:
: Auth: T. T. G.
: Initials: [Signature]
: Date: 6 August 1945:
:.....

1. Effective upon receipt of this letter, Regulations for Maintaining the Security of Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, reference letter, AG 311.5 (15 Nov 44)OB-S-B-M, 16 November 1944, subject: Security Regulations for Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, are superseded by the inclosed Regulations for Maintaining the Security of PINUP Intelligence.

2. This letter and its inclosure will be made available only to persons authorized to receive PINUP Intelligence pursuant to the inclosed Regulations.

3. Letter, AG 311.5 (15 Nov 44)OB-S-B-M, 16 November 1944, subject: Security Regulations for Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

4. Reproduction of this letter and its inclosure is prohibited.

By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl.
Regulations.

Edward F. Witsell
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General.

REGULATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE
SECURITY OF PINUP INTELLIGENCE

1. Scope and Purpose. These Regulations are designed to safeguard the following types of intelligence:

a. Crypt Intelligence: Information resulting from the solution of enemy codes and ciphers, unless such information has been placed in a special category for which separate regulations have been issued.

b. Traffic Analysis: Information resulting from the study, short of cryptanalysis, of enemy communication networks, communication procedure, cryptographic procedure, and call signs coupled with the use of D/F and other technical aids.

c. Plain Language: Information resulting from translations of enemy plain language traffic and abbreviated plain language intercepted on enemy military circuits. Commercial plain language traffic is excluded from the above definition.

2. Security: The extreme importance of Crypt Intelligence, Traffic Analysis and Plain Language as sources of reliable information concerning enemy activities and intentions has been repeatedly proved. Preservation of these sources requires that the enemy be given no reason to suspect the degree of our success in acquiring such intelligence. If, from any document which might fall into his hands, from any message he might intercept, from any word revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action taken upon the basis of such intelligence, the enemy were given cause to believe that his communications are not adequately safeguarded against the interception which he knows to be employed against him, he would effect changes which would deprive us of knowledge of his operations on all fronts. Extreme care is therefore required in order to preserve the security of such intelligence from all unauthorized persons, and these Regulations are to be strictly observed.

3. Code Word. All messages or other documents transmitting Crypt Intelligence, Traffic Analysis or Plain Language or any reference thereto will contain a code word to indicate the source and to insure handling in accordance with these Regulations. The code word for Crypt Intelligence, Traffic Analysis and Plain Language is PINUP. In transmissions by wire or radio, the code word will be enciphered in the text.

4. Security of Code Word. The meaning of the code word PINUP shall not be disclosed to any person not eligible under these Regulations to receive PINUP Intelligence. It shall be the responsibility of every person eligible to receive PINUP Intelligence to take all possible precautions to preserve the secrecy of the code word.

5. Classification. All PINUP Intelligence will be classified
SECRET.

6. Authorized Recipients.

a. The levels upon which PINUP Intelligence may be disseminated, and the officers at any level eligible to receive it, are restricted. The governing principle is to limit dissemination only to those who have absolute need of the information for the execution of their duties.

b. Except as otherwise provided in these Regulations, PINUP Intelligence will not be made available below the level of Corps or, in the case of Air Force formations, below the level of Group (British) or Wing (U.S.).

c. Within headquarters authorized to receive PINUP Intelligence, it may be made available only to officers holding the following posts:

- (1) Commander and his Deputy
Chief of Staff and his Deputy
All Intelligence Officers
Senior Operations Staff Officer
Senior Planning Staff Officer
Senior Signal Officer
Signal Intelligence Officers

(2) Additional officers absolutely necessary for its handling and use within such headquarters, as specifically authorized in each instance by the Theater Commander who shall satisfy himself as to the necessity therefor and as to the reliability of the individuals concerned.

(3) In exceptional circumstances making it imperative, the Theater Commander may authorize the passing of PINUP Intelligence to commands below the levels prescribed in subparagraphs b and c above, but only if the physical security of the receiving headquarters is assured.

d. Persons eligible to be recipients of PINUP Intelligence in accordance with the foregoing provisions must be thoroughly briefed in these Regulations before such intelligence is actually made available to them.

7. Transmission and Handling.

a. Messages containing PINUP Intelligence or any reference thereto will be transmitted only in cryptographic systems

specifically authorized for that purpose. For U.S. forces such authorization will be by the Theater Commander; for British forces such authorization will be by the Chief Signal Intelligence Service Officer in the respective theater.

b. Documents containing or referring to PINUP Intelligence should be addressed only to authorized recipients by name or appointment and marked on inner cover "to be opened by addressee only." Such documents, including cryptographed versions, will be burned immediately after their usefulness ceases. At headquarters below Army level this will normally be as soon as their contents have been absorbed by those who have to act upon them. Such documents will not be carried on the person of a recipient outside his headquarters, except as dictated by absolute necessity.

c. In order to avoid subjecting these Regulations intelligence having less stringent security requirements, such intelligence should not be included in the same documents with PINUP Intelligence, except when absolutely necessary.

8. Operations Based on PINUP Intelligence. Commanders will take every precaution to insure that any action taken upon the basis of PINUP Intelligence cannot be traced by the enemy to this source. For example, appropriate land or air reconnaissance should be undertaken whenever practicable, in such manner, and sufficiently in advance of the proposed action, so that the enemy is led to believe that such reconnaissance furnished the basis for the action; and orders directing such reconnaissance, as well as any other operational orders based on PINUP Intelligence, must never contain precise names, dates, times or other details known only through these sources, and must be dispatched in high grade cryptographic systems. Similarly, great care must be taken in briefing airplane crews, in order that only necessary details are given them and always in a form that cannot be traced to this source.

9. Exceptions to Restrictions on Dissemination. It is recognized that, from time to time, special circumstances will require that persons not eligible under these Regulations to become recipients of PINUP Intelligence may yet require information derived therefrom for the proper performance of their duties. Accordingly, the following exceptions to the restrictions embodied in these Regulations are authorized:

a. In Wire or Radio Messages: When, in the judgment of the Theater Commander, circumstances require that conclusions based on PINUP Intelligence be passed to commands or personnel other than those provided for in paragraph 6 above, such conclusions may be so passed, subject to the following rules:

(1) The code word PINUP will not be used but the classification SECRET will be retained;

(2) The conclusions will be so stated as to give no indication whatever of the source. Special care must be taken in this respect with Crypt Intelligence to avoid any apparent relation between the statement of conclusions and the content of the enemy message on which the conclusion is based; to this end no exact strength figures, times, or other precise details that have appeared in an enemy message will be included.

(3) Messages containing such conclusions will always be sent in the cryptographic system of highest security available.

(4) The message will always include the express stipulation that the conclusions may be used by the recipient only as the basis for operational orders and shall not be given further dissemination.

b. In Orders of Battle, Summaries, Appreciations and Other Documents: When, in the judgment of the Theater Commander, circumstances justify the inclusion of conclusions derived from PINUP Intelligence in any order of battle, summary, appreciation or other similar document the distribution of which is not restricted to the commands and personnel provided for in paragraph 6 above, such conclusions may be so used, subject, however, to the following conditions:

(1) The code word PINUP will not be used, but the classification SECRET will be retained;

(2) The conclusions will be so stated as to give no indication whatever of the source (see sub-paragraph a (2) above);

(3) The further dissemination of such conclusions beyond the document in which they are thus permitted to appear will be prohibited.

10. Personnel Handling PINUP Intelligence.

a. Personnel whose duties include cryptographing, transmitting, filing, or handling messages or other documents required by these Regulations to contain the word PINUP will be kept to the minimum number necessary.

b. Before undertaking their duties, such personnel will be carefully briefed, to insure an understanding of the content and importance of these Regulations.

c. The handling of PINUP Intelligence will be restricted to commissioned personnel insofar as possible, but

(1) enlisted personnel may perform the necessary cryptographic duties involved in the transmission of PINUP Intelligence provided they have the normal security clearance required by their respective services, and provided the requirements of sub-paragraphs a and b above are observed:

(2) when any officer who is a recipient of PINUP Intelligence shall require enlisted personnel to assist him in the handling of such material, and when their duties do not include the cryptographing of messages, he may make application to the Theater Commander for permission to use such personnel and such permission may be granted upon the personal guaranty of the officer requesting such permission as to the reliability of such personnel, and subject to the undertaking of such officer thoroughly to brief such personnel in these Regulations before any such use shall be made of their services.

11. Personnel Producing PINUP Intelligence. Nothing in these Regulations shall be construed to prohibit signal intelligence personnel directly engaged in the production of PINUP Intelligence from having access to such intelligence to the extent necessary for the proper performance of their respective duties.

12. Questions Concerning Regulations. All questions with respect to the interpretation or application of these Regulations which cannot be disposed of by the Theater Commander should be directed by him, through the most secure channels, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

13. Distribution of Regulations. To preserve secrecy it is essential that the distribution of this document be limited to those who require it in order to safeguard the security of PINUP Intelligence.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID/SB
SRG:dk
EXT 73225

MID 911

29 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Regulations for the Dissemination
and Use of Communication Intelligence
Concerning Weather.


The Secretary of War directs:

I. That a registered secret security letter substantially
as follows be sent to:

The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Army Service Forces
~~The~~ Commander-in-Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area
The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
U. S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Forward Echelon
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Rear Echelon
U. S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations
Alaskan Department, Advance C. P.
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon

1. Inclosed herewith is a copy of Joint Letter, dated 19 Jan-
uary 1944, subject: Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination
and Use of Communication Intelligence Concerning Weather.

2. In accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of the inclosed Joint
Letter, clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis are classified as



Amended by Letter OY 311.5 (4 Mar 44)

*(46)
OY 311.5
107 (Mar 44)*

Special Intelligence A and the following regulations, in addition to those set forth in the inclosed Joint Letter, are hereby pre-
scribed:

a. Weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis includes (1) clear weather texts, from which the source is apparent, and (2) coded analyses and "dummy" reports, in which the source is to some extent disguised. Extreme secrecy in the handling and use of all such intelligence, in whatever form, is essential to prevent the enemy from learning of the existence of this source.

b. Commanders authorized to receive clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis are those to whom this letter is addressed and Air Force and Task Force commanders when it is essential that they receive such texts.

c. Commanders authorized to receive coded analyses and "dummy" reports are those authorized to receive clear weather texts and, in addition, those subordinate commanders whose operations make it essential that they receive such analyses and reports.

d. Personnel authorized to handle the cryptographic processing of communications transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis will be kept to an absolute minimum and will be kept away from those forward areas where there is substantial risk of capture by the enemy. All such personnel will have a G-2, War Department, clearance pursuant to provisions of letter AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43) OB-S-B-M, 24 December 1943, subject: Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties.

*See AG 311.5
AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43) OB-S-B-M
AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43) OB-S-B-M*

e. Messages or other documents transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis (including clear weather texts, coded analyses and "dummy" reports), or any direct or indirect reference thereto, will contain the word HYPER to indicate the source and to insure especially secure and limited handling. The word HYPER will be buried within the body of each message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text. It will not be used in conjunction with any other words giving a clue to its significance. For example, such phrases as "from HYPER source" will not be used. Messages transmitting clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis will be confined to such texts and will never contain information from any other source.

f. With reference to paragraph 1 (h) of the inclosed Joint Letter, storage will be as prescribed in paragraph 21 b(1) of AR 380-5, dated 28 September 1942.

g. The regulations set forth in this letter and the inclosed Joint Letter apply to all commands of the Army and to the War Department.

3. Reproduction of this letter and inclosure hereto is prohibited.

II. That a copy of the inclosure hereto be inclosed with the above letter.

III. That copies of the above letter be furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

IV. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, be furnished with a list of all registered holders of the above letter.

V. That all requests for subject letter be referred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 for approval prior to distribution.

*Revised
R.H.M.
B.K.
J.H.A.*

*1 cc destroyed
4/1/44*

46 AGO
MAR 2 1944

Received *obs*
4/1/44

Incl.

Cy. Joint Letter, dtd 19 Jan 44

Clayton Bissell
CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

ACTION TAKEN: 2 March 1944.
I. Ltr. to CG'S, AAF; ASF; C-in-C, SWPA; CG'S, U.S. Forces, ETO; Strategic Air Forces in Europe; USAF, CPA; USAF, SPA; USAF, CBI, Forward Echelon; USAF, CBI, Rear Echelon; USAF, NATO; Alaskan Dept., Advance C.P.; Alaskan Dept., Rear Echelon. ~~XX~~ II, III, IV, V complied with.
KDH/mo - 2B-939 Pentagon.

ACTION TAKEN: 4 Mar 44
Ltr to CGs, AAF; ASF; Cominch, SWPA; US Forces, ETO; Strategic Air Forces in Europe; USAF, CPA; USAF, SPA; USAF CBI, Forward Echelon; USAF, CBI, Rear Echelon; USAF, NATO; Alaskan Dept, Adv Comd Post; Alaskan Dept, Rear Echelon. Cys furnished: AC/S, OPD, WDGS & G-2, WDGS.
FM/md 2B-939 Pentagon

2 MAR 1944

FILE

Acid

ACTION TAKEN
OPER. BRANCH, A.C.O.
OFF. INCH.
3-375
Form: 2B-939
Date: 27 March 44

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 311.5 (29 Feb 44)OB-S-B

KDH/mb - 2B-939 Pentagon.

2 March 1944

SUBJECT: Regulations for the Dissemination and
Use of Communication Intelligence
Concerning Weather.

:
:Auth: T. A. G.
:Initials TAG
:Date: 2 March 44
:*****

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces;
Army Service Forces;
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area;
The Commanding Generals,
U. S. Forces in the European Theater
of Operations;
Strategic Air Forces in Europe;
U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area;
U. S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area;
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Forward Echelon;
U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India,
Rear Echelon;
U. S. Army Forces in the North African
Theater of Operations;
Alaskan Department, Advance Command Post;
Alaskan Department, Rear Echelon.

1. Inclosed is a copy of Joint Letter, 19 January 1944, subject:
Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination and Use of Communication
Intelligence Concerning Weather.

2. In accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of the inclosed Joint Letter,
clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis are classified as Special
Intelligence A and the following regulations, in addition to those set forth
in the inclosed Joint Letter, are hereby prescribed:

a. Weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis includes (1)
clear weather texts, from which the source is apparent, and (2) coded
analyses and "dummy" reports, in which the source is to some extent disguised.
Extreme secrecy in the handling and use of all such intelligence, in whatever
form, is essential to prevent the enemy from learning of the existence of
this source.

b. Commanders authorized to receive clear weather texts obtained
by cryptanalysis are those to whom this letter is addressed and Air Force
and Task Force commanders when it is essential that they receive such texts.

2 March 1944.

c. Commanders authorized to receive coded analyses and "dummy" reports are those authorized to receive clear weather texts and, in addition, those subordinate commanders whose operations make it essential that they receive such analyses and reports.


d. Personnel authorized to handle the cryptographic processing of communications transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis will be kept to an absolute minimum and will be kept away from those forward areas where there is substantial risk of capture by the enemy. All such personnel will have a G-2, War Department, clearance pursuant to provisions of letter AG 311.5 (15 Dec 43)OE-S-B-M, 24 December 1943, subject: Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties.

e. Messages or other documents transmitting weather intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis (including clear weather texts, coded analyses and "dummy" reports), or any direct or indirect reference thereto, will contain the word HYPER to indicate the source and to insure especially secure and limited handling. The word HYPER will be buried within the body of each message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text. It will not be used in conjunction with any other words giving a clue to its significance. For example, such phrases as "from HYPER source" will not be used. Messages transmitting clear weather texts obtained by cryptanalysis will be confined to such texts and will never contain information from any other source.

f. With reference to paragraph 1 (h) of the inclosed Joint Letter, storage will be as prescribed in paragraph 21 b(1) of AR 320-5, 23 September 1942.

g. The regulations set forth in this letter and the inclosed Joint Letter apply to all commands of the Army and to the War Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:


ROBERT E. DUNSLOP,
Brigadier General,

Acting the Adjutant General.

1 Incl.

As listed above.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS;
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS.

