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*SRH-042*

THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

IN

CAMPAIGN OF WESTERN EUROPE

PREPARED BY

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

OF

HEADQUARTERS THIRD U. S. ARMY

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 3, E. O. 12065  
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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*An excellent report. Circulation should also include Intelligence Div. and one copy filed in the office of the SSA Historian (SPSIS-1, Capt. Mc Gracken)*

*MR*

*Plans + Policy Group should see at least section beginning on p. 53.*

*W. J. E.*

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I. OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

A. ORGANIZATION OF SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES.

(1) ALL SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES (CORPS SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANIES) WERE ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED AS PRESCRIBED BY T/O & E 11-500, 1 JULY 1943, WITH AN AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF EIGHT OFFICERS AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE ENLISTED MEN. SEVERAL WEEKS AFTER ACTIVATION, THE 3253RD, 3254TH, 3255TH, AND THE 3256TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES WERE MOVED TO WINCHAM HALL, ENGLAND (K-19), IN ORDER THAT THESE COMPANIES MIGHT COLLABORATE ON COMMON PROBLEMS OF TRAINING AND SUPPLY. AT A LATER DATE EACH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY WAS ATTACHED TO A CORPS WITH WHOM IT WOULD WORK IN THE FIELD, AND AS THE VARIOUS CORPS WERE COMMITTED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS, THE RESPECTIVE CORPS COMPANIES WOULD ACCOMPANY THEM REMAINING WITHIN A FEW MILES OF CORPS HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER THAT CLOSE LIAISON COULD BE EFFECTED BETWEEN THE COMPANIES AND THE CORPS G-2.

(A) AFTER THE USUAL TRAINING PROGRAM IN BURTON BRADSTOCK, ENGLAND, THE 3253RD SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY LEFT FOR OMAHA BEACH IN FRANCE, ARRIVING ON 12 JULY 1944. THE COMPANY WAS ATTACHED TO XV CORPS AND REMAINED WITH THIRD ARMY UNTIL 21 SEPTEMBER 1944 WHEN IT MOVED UNDER THE COMMAND OF SEVENTH ARMY.

(B) THE 3254TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY WAS ACTIVATED AT MARBURY HALL, CHESHIRE, ENGLAND (K-19) ON 19 APRIL 1944. THE OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY WERE BEGUN IMMEDIATELY AFTER ACTIVATION; HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT ON AN ENTIRE COMPANY

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BASIS UNTIL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY ON 2 JULY 1944. PRIOR TO THAT TIME OPERATIONS CONSISTED OF A GENERAL TRAINING PROGRAM AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL TEAM OPERATIONS. A FEW INTERCEPT POSITIONS WERE ESTABLISHED IN JUNE AT LYME REGIS, ENGLAND WITH THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS UNIT CONTROLLING THE INTERCEPT OF NETS AND PREPARING THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. ON JUNE 29 THE COMPANY ARRIVED IN FRANCE WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF SUPPLYING TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE TO VIII CORPS.

(C) EFFECTIVE 8 MAY 1944 THE 3255TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY WAS ACTIVATED AT MARBURY HALL, CHESHIRE, ENGLAND. THE UNIT HAS BEEN WITH XII CORPS SINCE ITS ACTIVATION EXCEPT FOR BRIEF PERIODS IN ITS EARLY DAYS WHEN IT WAS ASSIGNED TO ARMY SO THAT ACTIVITIES OF THE COMPANY AS WELL AS THE REMAINDER OF THE SERVICE COMPANIES COULD BE CONTROLLED AND CORRELATED BY ARMY HEADQUARTERS. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM THE COMPANY WAS CONCENTRATED AT LYMINGTON, ENGLAND (U-71), AND DEPARTED TO OMAHA BEACH ON 12 AUGUST 1944. THUS, THE UNIT ARRIVED IN THE COMBAT ZONE READY TO BECOME OPERATIONAL ON THE NINETY-EIGHTH DAY AFTER ITS ACTIVATION IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE.

(D) ACTIVATED ON 5 MAY 1944 AT WINCHAM HALL, CHESHIRE, NORTHWICH, ENGLAND, THE 3256TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY WAS ENGAGED IN A SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND FIELD PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS UNTIL 7 AUGUST WHEN THE COMPANY WAS COMMITTED AT COURVILLE-SUR-HUISINE, FRANCE (T-23). EXCEPTING FOR TEMPORARY ATTACHMENT TO III CORPS DURING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE, THE COMPANY HAS ALWAYS SERVICED XX CORPS.

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(E) THE 3259TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY CAME INTO EXISTENCE ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1944 UNDER XIII CORPS. TRAINING IN RINGWOOD AND LYMINGTON, HANTS, AND DARTFORD, KENT (Q-99) IN ENGLAND EQUIPPED THE UNIT FOR ITS FIRST ACTION UNDER III CORPS ON THE FIRST U. S. ARMY FRONT ON 14 FEBRUARY 1945, AND AFTER THE LIQUIDATION OF THE BUHR POCKET, IT WAS TRANSFERRED WITH THE III CORPS TO THIRD ARMY, WHERE IT REMAINED UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

(F) AT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON 8 MAY 1945, THE FOLLOWING CORPS COMPANIES WERE WITH THE THIRD ARMY: 3250TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY UNDER V CORPS WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO THIRD ARMY FOR THE LAST THREE WEEKS OF THE WAR; THE 3255TH AND 3256TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES WHICH SERVED UNDER THIRD ARMY DURING PRACTICALLY THE ENTIRE CAMPAIGN WITH XII AND XX CORPS RESPECTIVELY; AND THE 3259TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY UNDER III CORPS. THE 3254TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY ATTACHED TO VIII CORPS ALSO SPENT MUCH TIME UNDER THIS COMMAND, ALTHOUGH DURING THE LAST WEEKS OF THE WAR IT WAS WITH FIRST ARMY.

(2) 118TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY.

THE 118TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY WAS ACTIVATED ON 20 APRIL 1942 AT FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS BASED ON T/O 11/77 WHICH WAS LATER SUPERSEDED BY T/O & E 11-500, 1 JULY 1943, AS AMENDED BY CHANGE NO. 1, DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1943. AFTER EXTENSIVE TRAINING ON MANEUVERS THE COMPANY ARRIVED IN ENGLAND IN JANUARY 1944. AT THE DIRECTION

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OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS UNITED STATES ARMY, THE INTELLIGENCE COMPANY, LATER ASSIGNED TO THE THIRD ARMY, BEGAN INTERCEPTING GERMAN MILITARY TRAFFIC ON 26 APRIL AT DARTFORD, KENT, BETWEEN LONDON AND THE CHANNEL. DURING THE NEXT SIX WEEKS THE PRACTICE TRAFFIC OF THE ENEMY INDICATED CERTAIN TROOP MOVEMENTS TO AND ALONG THE ATLANTIC WALL, AND ALSO REVEALED RADIO CHARACTERISTICS LATER USED IN IDENTIFYING AND LOCATING GERMAN UNITS IN THE FIELD. ON 1 JUNE, THE COMPANY, THEN SERVING 21ST ARMY GROUP, MOVED TO A POINT ON THE ENGLISH COAST JUST ACROSS THE CHANNEL FROM THE CHERBOURG PENINSULA WHERE IT COVERED ENEMY RADIO ACTIVITY DURING THE INVASION AND PART OF THE BUILD-UP PERIOD GAINING SLIGHT INTELLIGENCE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE. ON 15 JULY THE UNIT ARRIVED IN FRANCE AND PROCEEDED TO THE VICINITY OF THE THIRD ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO WHOM IT SUPPLIED INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN.

B. RADIO INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES.

1. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.

(A) CORPS LEVEL

ALTHOUGH THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES WERE ORIGINALLY ORGANIZED ALONG IDENTICAL LINES, EACH, AFTER BEING COMMITTED, ADOPTED NEW METHODS OF PROCEDURE, AND CHANGED THE BASIC ORGANIZATION TO FIT SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL NEEDS. THIS REPORT IS DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO SHOW THE ORIGINAL COMPOSITION OF THESE UNITS, BUT ALSO TO POINT OUT THEIR MAJOR DIFFERENCES. THE COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT ARE THE 3253RD, 3254TH, 3255TH, AND 3256TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES; ALTHOUGH THE 3255TH

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AND 3256TH COMPANIES WERE THE ONLY ONES TO BE ASSIGNED TO THIRD ARMY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CAMPAIGN, THE OTHERS WERE ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS UNDER THIS COMMAND.

RADIO INTERCEPT: THE NORMAL RADIO INTERCEPT SECTION CONSISTED OF AN INTERCEPT OFFICER AND FROM FORTY TWO TO FORTY SIX OPERATORS WHO WERE DIVIDED INTO TRICKS COMPOSED OF A TRICK CHIEF (CONTROL CHIEF) AND A NUMBER OF MEN DETERMINED BY THE TRAFFIC LEVEL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE OPERATORS WORKED IN HO 17'S AND HO 27'S MOUNTED ON 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS; THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TRICK CHIEFS VARIED WITH THE COMPANY INVOLVED; THE 3256TH EMPLOYED A TRICK CHIEF FOR EACH TRUCK BUT BOTH THE 3253RD AND 3254TH COMPANIES USED ONE MAN TO CONTROL AN ENTIRE INTERCEPT SHIFT. IN THE 3255TH THE USE OF AN INTER-COMMUNICATION SYSTEM BY WHICH THE IA SECTION COULD CONTACT THE INDIVIDUAL OPERATORS ENTIRELY ELIMINATED THE NEED FOR TRICK CHIEFS. THE AVERAGE WORKING DAY FOR THE INTERCEPT SECTIONS WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE SHIFTS WITH THEIR TIMES AND SET ALLOCATIONS AS FOLLOWS: 0001-0800, EIGHT SETS; 0800-1600, 15 SETS; 1600-2400, FIFTEEN SETS.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TRICK CHIEF, WHETHER HE WAS IN CHARGE OF THE ENTIRE SHIFT OR OF A SINGLE TRUCK, WERE TO CONTROL THE INTERCEPTION OF NETS, CHECK FREQUENCIES, AND IN GENERAL TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE RADIO OPERATORS AND THE IA SECTION. THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING FOR NETS.

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WAS ONE WHICH ESPECIALLY DEMANDED CONTROL BY A SINGLE SOURCE; THE 3254TH CONTROL WAS ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF A HOME CONSTRUCTED MONITORING BOARD CHANNLED TO EACH OPERATING POSITION WHEREAS THE 3256TH SIMPLY SUBMITTED A SEARCH LIST OF KNOWN PRIORITIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL OPERATORS; THESE WERE COMPILED BY ALL RADIO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES BY THE IA SECTION ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE GERMAN THREE DAY FREQUENCY CYCLE. THIS LATTER METHOD GREATLY MINIMIZED THE TIME SPENT IN RECORDING NETS OF NO IMMEDIATE VALUE, AND THUS INSURED THAT THE MAJORITY OF ENEMY UNITS ACTIVELY ENGAGED ON THE FRONT IN QUESTION WOULD BE COVERED. AS A FURTHER AID, LISTS OF FIXED CALL SIGNS AND PECULIARITIES OF PROCEDURE WERE ALSO KEPT AVAILABLE AT EACH SET.

IN REGARD TO THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE WORK, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE SUPER-PRO RECEIVER TENDED TO SUPPLANT THE SCR 342 AND 344, HAVING BEEN ADJUDGED AS MORE ADAPTABLE TO INTERCEPT REQUIREMENTS. EACH TRUCK WAS USUALLY EQUIPPED WITH ONE HIGH FREQUENCY SET CONNECTED TO AN APPROPRIATE ANTENNA. FOR BOTH HIGH AND LOW FREQUENCY WORK, ANTENNAE OF VARYING CHARACTERISTICS WERE EXPERIMENTED WITH BY THE INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES: THE HORIZONTAL DIRECTIONAL TYPE PROVED TO BE THE MOST POPULAR WITH THE 3255TH, BUT THE 3253RD COMPANY ON THE OTHER HAND PREFERRED THE "L" SHAPE ANTENNA.

SPEAKING IN TERMS OF GENERAL OPERATING PROCEDURE IT SHOULD BE MENTIONED HERE THAT THE INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY

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TRAFFIC BY THOSE COMPANIES EMPLOYING THE LEAP FROG METHOD OF MOVING WAS RARELY INTERRUPTED. WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION WARRANTED, ADVANCE PARTIES TO DIVISION AND FORWARD HEADQUARTERS WERE SENT OUT AND THE PROXIMITY TO THE ENEMY LINES PROVED REASONABLY PROFITABLE AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE EXTREMELY TACTICAL LOW GRADE TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED BY THE 3255TH AND 3256TH FORWARD ECHELONS.

SINCE CONTINUOUS WAVE INTERCEPTION WAS NOT THE SOLE FUNCTION OF AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE ON HAND OPERATORS CAPABLE OF COPYING GERMAN VOICE TRAFFIC; THESE RADIO TELEPHONY OPERATORS WERE PART OF THE INTERCEPT PERSONNEL IN THE 3255TH COMPANY, BUT IN THE 3256TH THEY WERE FURNISHED BY THE IA SECTION. THE TYPE OF TRAFFIC OBTAINED BY THIS SOURCE WAS COMPARATIVELY LOW IN VOLUME, AND THAT WHICH WAS INTERCEPTED ORDINARILY PROVED TO BE OF LOCAL TACTICAL VALUE. RADIO TELEPHONY PERSONNEL WERE ALSO EMPLOYED IN THE VHF (VERY HIGH FREQUENCY) EXPERIMENTS WHEN SMALL TEAMS WERE SENT UP CLOSE TO THE FRONT EQUIPPED WITH HIGH FREQUENCY INTERCEPT SETS. THE RESULTS OBTAINED IN THESE CASES, AS WELL AS IN THE ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPT GERMAN VOICE TRAFFIC ON THE MEDIUM FREQUENCIES FROM SIMILARLY ADVANCED POSITIONS, WERE FAIRLY GOOD IN SO FAR AS THE MECHANICS OF INTERCEPTION WERE CONCERNED, BUT THE INTELLIGENCE GAINED THEREFROM WAS NOT OF FAR REACHING VALUE.

DIRECTION FINDING: OPERATIONS OF THE DIRECTION FINDING TEAMS IN THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES WERE FOR A LONG TIME

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HAMPERED BY TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVING EQUIPMENT. THE SCR 503 RECEIVERS PROVED TO BE INADEQUATE AS LONG AS THE FRONT REMAINED FLUID AND EVEN ON A COMPARATIVE STATIC FRONT THE DIRECTION FINDING SITES HAD TO BE RELATIVELY CLOSE TO THE ENEMY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY RESULTS. LATER IN THE CAMPAIGN THE EQUIPMENT WAS SUPPLEMENTED AND MODIFIED BY INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES, AND AS A RESULT MARKED IMPROVEMENTS WERE APPARENT. THE FINAL SET USED BY THE 3254TH COMPANY WAS AN SCR 555 WITH AN IMPROVED ANTENNA LOOP AND AN SCR 244 AS A RECEIVER, THE LATTER GIVING A WIDER NULL BUT BETTER RECEPTION. THE 3256TH COMPANY UTILIZED GERMAN EQUIPMENT FOUND AT A SIGNAL DEPOT IN ST. MENEHOULD, FRANCE, BUT THIS TOO WAS EFFECTIVE ONLY AT SHORT RANGE.

GENERALLY, EACH COMPANY HAD TWO AND SOME TIMES THREE TEAMS DEPENDING ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION; ONE WAS ALWAYS LOCATED AT THE COMPANY SITE AND THE OTHER OR OTHERS AT SOME FORWARD POSITION. THE CONDITIONS OF THE ROADS, THE AVAILABILITY OF WATER AND RATIONS, THE MAINTENANCE OF RADIO AND POWER EQUIPMENT AT THE ADVANCED LOCATIONS, AND THE NECESSITY OF WIRE COMMUNICATION BEING INSTALLED FOR THE MOST PART BY CORPS SIGNAL BATTALIONS--ALL THESE FACTORS HAD A DIRECT BEARING ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE DIRECTION FINDING PLATOON.

CONTROL OF DIRECTION FINDING STATIONS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY VARIOUS METHODS. THE 3253RD COMPANY PLACED A DIRECTION FINDING MAN DIRECTLY IN THE RADIO TRUCKS AND ACTED AS A LIAISON BETWEEN THE INTERCEPT AND THE DIRECTION FINDING SEC-

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TIONS. THE 3254TH COMPANY ON THE OTHER HAND SET ASIDE ONE OPERATOR WHOSE DUTY IT WAS TO PIPE SIGNALS TO THE LOCAL DIRECTION FINDING STATION FOR RE-PIPING TO THE ADVANCED SITES.

IN SPITE OF ALL THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED DIRECTION FINDING RESULTS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES WERE UNIFORMLY GOOD DURING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE, THE CLEANING OUT OF THE SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE, AND THE BATTLE OF THE RHINE. EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AS A CONFIRMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE GAINED THROUGH OTHER MEANS CONSISTENTLY PROVED VALUABLE.

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS: THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION (1A PLATOON) WAS COMMONLY DIVIDED INTO TWO MAIN GROUPS, TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND CRYPTANALYSIS DEPARTMENTS; ORIGINALLY THE SECTION HAD A COMPLEMENT OF TWELVE MEN, BUT THIS NUMBER WAS LATER AUGMENTED BY PERSONNEL FROM OTHER PLATOONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC NEEDS. PERHAPS MORE APPROPRIATELY REFERRED TO AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION TEAM, THE SECTION HAD FOUR PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS: THE ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING OF INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY RADIO NETS; THE CRYPTANALYSIS OF ENEMY LOW GRADE CODES AND CIPHERS; THE DETERMINING OF GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE NECESSARY FILES ON ENEMY UNITS, PERSONALITIES, CODE NAMES, AND OTHER NECESSARY DATA TO ACHIEVE THIS END; LASTLY, THE COMPILING OF STATISTICS ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE WORK TO AID IN THE IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE TRAFFIC.

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THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT USUALLY CONSISTED OF FOUR TRAFFIC ANALYSTS WHOSE DUTIES WERE READING LOGS AND SEARCHING THE FILES IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE CURRENT ENEMY UNITS. THERE WAS A MAN DESIGNATED TO KEEP ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION INCLUDING PERSONALITY FILES, BREAKDOWN OF ENEMY UNITS, SITUATION MAPS, AND ALL SUCH PERTINENT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM G-2 REPORTS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND OTHER RELIABLE SOURCES. ONE OF THE ANALYSTS COORDINATED THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM ANALYSIS AND DIRECTION FINDING FOR SUBMISSION TO THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OFFICER FOR FINAL APPROVAL; THAT WHICH WAS OF IMMEDIATE TACTICAL IMPORTANCE WAS RELAYED TO CORPS G-2 AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE FINISHED PRODUCT WAS DISPATCHED TO ALL OTHER INTERESTED AGENCIES.

TWO TRANSLATORS AND TWO CRYPTANALYSTS COMPRISED THE CRYPTANALYSIS DEPARTMENT WHOSE PROVINCE WAS THE BREAKING OF ALL TYPES OF LOW GRADE TRAFFIC AND THE EXAMINATION OF ALL MEDIUM GRADE FOR POSSIBLE COMPROMISES. WHEN TELETYPE COMMUNICATION WAS AVAILABLE, RAW TRAFFIC (LOW GRADE) WAS EXCHANGED WITH THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THIRD ARMY. IN SOME CASES THE MEN OF THIS DEPARTMENT WERE CALLED ON TO INTERROGATE PRISONERS THOUGHT TO BE OF IMPORTANCE TO RADIO INTELLIGENCE WORK, TO SERVE AS RADIO TELEPHONY OPERATORS, AND TO PROCESS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS DESTINED FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. IN THIS DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS IN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IT SOON CAME ABOUT THAT EACH MAN, ALTHOUGH TRAINED FOR A SPECIFIC POSITION, BECAME CAPABLE OF HANDLING A VARIETY OF DUTIES.

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THE PLOTTING OF DIRECTION FINDING BEARINGS WAS USUALLY DONE BY SOME MEMBER OF THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE MENTIONED THAT MUCH BETTER RESULTS WERE OBTAINED FROM ASSIGNING A CERTAIN MAN TO THAT DUTY. MOST OF THE COMPANIES WERE RESTRICTED IN THEIR USE OF SITUATION MAPS AND OVERLAYS BY THE LACK OF SPACE IN THE HOUSING UNITS. WHEN THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE 3256TH COMPANY MOVED INDOORS, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO EXPLOIT FURTHER THE RESULTS OF DIRECTION FINDING IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORDER OF BATTLE PICTURE. IN THIS COMPANY THE DIRECTION FINDING MAN, IN ADDITION TO HIS PRIMARY DUTIES, MAINTAINED AN OVERLAY ON A 1:25000 MAP SHOWING THE BREAKDOWN TO BATTALION LEVEL OF ALL ENEMY UNITS ON THE CORPS FRONT; THIS MAP ALSO INCLUDED THE DIRECTION FINDING BEARINGS OF THE PRECEDING DAY AS WELL AS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OF THE SAME KIND EXTRACTED FROM REPORTS OF OTHER RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS. WHEN IT WAS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A LARGE NUMBER OF BEARINGS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES ON ANY SPECIFIC UNIT, A SPECIAL OVERLAY OF THAT FORMATION'S AREA WAS MADE, THUS AFFORDING A CLOSER CHECK ON ITS MOVEMENTS.

AS A FINAL COMMENT ALL OF THE WORK DONE IN EVALUATING INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC WAS CHanneled TO ONE PRINCIPAL DESTINATION, THE DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT WHICH SERVED AS A COMPLETE RECORD OF THE DAY BY DAY RADIO INTELLIGENCE RESULTS. THE FORM OF THE REPORT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

(I) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY; (II) DECODES AND TRANSLATIONS;

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(III) TECHNICAL SUMMARY OF NETS HEARD; (IV) MESSAGE COUNT AND SET ALLOCATION; (V) DIRECTION FINDING BEARINGS; (VI) CODE IDENTIFIERS AND CIPHER VALUES.

(B) ARMY LEVEL

THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY AT ARMY LEVEL NATURALLY DIFFERED IN SEVERAL RESPECTS FROM THE CORPS' AGENCIES; APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE SIZE OF THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY, THE ARMY UNIT HAD SEVERAL ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS, CHIEF AMONG WHICH WAS THE COORDINATION OF THE WORK DONE AT LOWER LEVELS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION THERETO.

RADIO INTERCEPT: ASIDE FROM THE DISPARITY IN NUMBERS BETWEEN THE INTERCEPT SECTION OF THE ARMY COMPANY AND THAT OF THE CORPS (THE FORMER MAINTAINING SOME TWENTY TWO MEN ON EACH SHIFT) THERE WERE FEW MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES. CERTAIN MINOR POINTS NOT MENTIONED BEFORE WERE COMMON TO INTERCEPT WORK AT ALL ECHELONS.

DURING TIMES OF HEAVY RADIO ACTIVITY IT WAS FOUND BEST TO HAVE AT LEAST TWO INTERCEPT OPERATORS ON RANDOM SEARCH, WHO WOULD SCAN THE DIAL UNTIL AN ENEMY NET WAS HEARD. THE FREQUENCY AND CALL SIGNS WERE THEN GIVEN TO ONE OF THE OTHER OPERATORS AND THE SEARCH WAS CONTINUED FOR OTHER NETS.

WHEN AN ENEMY NET WENT OFF THE AIR, OR WHEN THE OPERATOR, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, COULD NO LONGER HEAR THE TRANSMISSIONS, THE SPOT CHECKING PRACTICE WAS USED. THIS MEANT THAT THE OPERATOR WOULD GO ON SEARCH, RETURNING TO THE FREQUENCY EVERY

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FIFTEEN MINUTES.

IN ORDER TO INSURE GOOD COPY OF MESSAGES, IMPORTANT FOR THE CRYPTANALYTIC WORK, NETS WERE FREQUENTLY DOUBLE BANKED; SINCE THIS MEANT THE ASSIGNING OF TWO OR MORE OPERATORS TO COVER THE SAME TRAFFIC, IT WAS NATURALLY MORE EASILY DONE AT ARMY LEVEL, WHERE MORE MEN WERE AVAILABLE. IN ANY GIVEN CASE, THE NECESSITY OF DOUBLE BANKING WAS DETERMINED BY THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS CONTROL MAN WITH THE ONE EXCEPTION, THAT IT WAS A STANDING RULE TO DOUBLE BANK ALL THREE LETTER TRAFFIC AND PLAIN TEXT.

IN THE CASE OF VOICE TRANSMISSION THE HANDLING OF PLAIN TEXT IN THE ARMY COMPANY OCCASIONALLY INVOLVED USE OF THE DICTAPHONE, THE RECORDING BEING SENT TO THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION. IN CERTAIN URGENT CASES, THE VOICE SIGNAL WAS PIPED BY TELEPHONE DIRECTLY TO A TRANSLATOR IN THAT SECTION.

WHEN THE ARMY AGENCY INITIALLY WENT INTO OPERATIONS, THE INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING CONTROL MAN OCCUPIED DIFFERENT HOUSING UNITS AND WERE LINKED BY TELEPHONE. IT WAS LATER DECIDED THAT THE WORK OF THESE TWO SECTIONS COULD BE BETTER COORDINATED IF THEIR CONTROL CHIEFS OPERATED IN THE SAME UNIT AND SIMULTANEOUSLY RECEIVED DIRECTIONS FROM THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION.

DIRECTION FINDING: THE SIZE OF THIS SECTION AND THE EXISTENCE IN THE ARMY COMPANY OF A WIRE SECTION TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO OPERATE AS MANY AS THREE

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OUTSTATIONS; LATER, RADIO CONTROL WAS USED AND PROVED MORE PRACTICABLE THAN IN THE CORPS COMPANIES. AS A GENERAL RULE, THE LENGTH OF THE BASE LINE BETWEEN THE OUTSIDE STATIONS WAS FORTY MILES WITH LAND LINE COMMUNICATIONS, AND SIXTY MILES WITH RADIO. AS ALREADY MENTIONED, IT WAS FOUND BEST TO HAVE THE DIRECTION FINDING CONTROL MAN WORK CLOSELY WITH THE INTERCEPT TRICK CHIEF, BUT ASIDE FROM THESE POINTS, THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE INVOLVED IN TAKING ANY GIVEN BEARING DID NOT DIFFER GREATLY FROM THE METHODS USED BY THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS: THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE ARMY COMPANY ALSO DIFFERED IN ONLY A FEW RESPECTS FROM THAT AT THE LOWER LEVEL; OF COURSE, SINCE THIS SECTION WAS LARGER, BEING COMPOSED OF TWENTY NINE MEN AND THREE OFFICERS, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THE WORK OF THE VARIOUS SUB-SECTIONS TO A FINER POINT OF DETAIL AND TO ACT AS A COORDINATOR OF THE RESULTS OBTAINED ON THE CORPS' FRONT.

AS THIS LATTER FUNCTION BECAME MORE AND MORE IMPORTANT, IT BECAME NECESSARY TO CREATE A SPECIAL SECTION IN THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY TO ACT IN LIAISON WITH CORPS, FLANKING ARMIES, AND ARMY GROUP; INFORMATION WAS THUS ROUTED MORE EFFICIENTLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY UP AND DOWN THE LINE.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, IN MANY CASES, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEND CERTAIN DATA DOWN TO CORPS LEVEL DIRECTLY AND ONE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY COMPANY WAS TO SEE THAT THE SIGNAL SERVICE UNITS RECEIVED WHATEVER EXTRACTS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS INFORMATION IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DISSEMINATE.

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TO FURTHER THIS END AND TO ACCOMMODATE THE LARGE INFLUX OF THE MANY DIFFERENT REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS, IT WAS NECESSARY AT ARMY LEVEL TO CREATE ANOTHER SUB-SECTION WITHIN THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS PLATOON KNOWN AS THE INCOMING DOCUMENTS SECTION; THE PURPOSE OF THIS MINIATURE MESSAGE CENTER WAS TO REGULATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL INCOMING AND OUTGOING MATERIAL AND TO KEEP THE NECESSARY EXTENSIVE FILES AND RECORDS.

IN THE MATTER OF INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING CONTROL, THE TECHNIQUES WERE THE SAME AS THOSE USED BY THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES, EXCEPT THAT THE ARMY COMPANY WAS NATURALLY EXPECTED TO CONCERN ITSELF WITH ALL CORPS' FRONTS AND EVEN WITH SOME UNITS CLOSE TO THE ARMY ZONE OF ADVANCE IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN MOVEMENT. THE PARTICULAR METHOD OF ESTABLISHING CONTROL GENERALLY FOLLOWED ONE OF THOSE ALREADY OUTLINED, THAT OF DISTRIBUTING EACH DAY A LIST OF THE DESIRABLE FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS TO THE CONTROL CHIEFS OF THE OTHER SECTIONS.

SINCE THE CRYPTANALYTIC SECTION AT ARMY WAS LARGER THAN THAT AT CORPS, IT WAS SOON FOUND THAT IN MANY CASES RAPID TRANSMISSION OF TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED AT THE LOWER LEVEL TO THIS SECTION ACCELERATED THE EVENTUAL BREAKING OF IT. A TELETYPE NET INVOLVING THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES PROVIDED THE NECESSARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AND PROVED FAIRLY PRACTICAL.

IN THIS, AS IN ALMOST EVERY CASE, THE GREATER MANPOWER IN THE ARMY TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION MADE POSSIBLE MUCH MORE

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DETAILED FILES AND RECORDS OF ALL KINDS; AS A RESULT, INTELLIGENCE COULD BE INTERPRETED ON A WIDER BASIS. WHEN THE DATA AT ARMY LEVEL ITSELF WAS INSUFFICIENT, THE ARMY COMPANY WAS ABLE TO HAVE RECOURSE TO ARMY GROUP, OR, IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, TO SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS UNITED STATES ARMY. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT WHEN A SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY SUDDENLY FOUND ITSELF CONCERNED WITH NEW GERMAN UNITS BECAUSE OF A RE-ALLOCATION OF CORPS ZONES; IN ALL PROBABILITY, THE ARMY COMPANY HAD ALREADY BEEN INTERCEPTING TRAFFIC FROM THESE UNITS, BUT IF NOT, THE ABOVE MENTIONED CHANNELS FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION WERE OPEN. IT CAN BE READILY SEEN, THEREFORE, THAT THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY WAS, IN ALMOST EVERY RESPECT, ESSENTIALLY A LARGER SCALE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY WITH FAR MORE EXTENSIVE FUNCTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS SIZE AND POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION OF A FIELD ARMY.

2. COMMUNICATION SET-UP OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES  
(SEE ACCOMPANYING DIAGRAM)

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES EMPLOYED MOST OF THE KNOWN MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. EACH COMPANY MOBILE RADIO TEAM OPERATED A SUB-STATION OF A NET WITH THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY AS CONTROL. THE ARMY COMPANY ITSELF HAD A LATERAL RADIO LINK WITH ITS CORRESPONDING UNIT IN FLANKING ARMIES, AND OF COURSE WAS PART OF THE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP RADIO INTELLIGENCE NET.

IN THE SIGNAL SERVICE UNITS RADIO CONTACT WITH DIRECTION

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FINDING OUTSTATIONS DID NOT PROVE TO BE QUITE AS SATISFACTORY (IN COMPARISON WITH WIRE LINES) AS AT ARMY LEVEL. FOR COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE COMPANIES THEMSELVES TELEPHONE NATURALLY WAS USED, BUT THERE WERE SOME VARIATIONS IN THE DETAILS OF ITS USE; THE 3255TH COMPANY AND THE 110TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY HAD THEIR SYSTEMS SO ARRANGED THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL OPERATOR AND TRUCK CHIEF COULD COMMUNICATE SEPARATELY WITH THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SECTION, BUT IN THE 3256TH COMPANY DIRECT COMMUNICATION EXISTED ONLY BETWEEN THE TRUCK CHIEFS IN EACH TRUCK AND THE IA INTER-COMMUNICATION OPERATOR.

A TELETYPE NET WAS OPERATED FOR A LONG TIME INVOLVING THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES, THE ARMY COMPANY, AND THIRD ARMY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE CHIEF PURPOSE HERE WAS THE EXCHANGE OF RAW TRAFFIC, AND, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THIS MEANS WAS EMPLOYED TO SEND TRAFFIC BACK TO THE COMPANY PROPER FROM ADVANCE TEAMS. WHEN THE TELETYPE LINES WERE IN GOOD ORDER, THIS WAS BY FAR THE QUICKEST, EASIEST, AND MOST SECURE MANNER OF EXCHANGING INFORMATION. DURING CERTAIN PERIODS THERE WAS A TELETYPE LINE BETWEEN ARMY GROUP AND THE 110TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY OVER WHICH RAW TRAFFIC AND ITEMS OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION WERE TRANSMITTED.

TELEPHONE WAS NATURALLY WIDELY USED. BOTH ARMY AND CORPS AGENCIES COMMUNICATED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE G-2 SECTIONS BY THIS MEANS AND IN ADDITION THE FORMER ALWAYS HAD A DIRECT LINE TO THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OFFICE AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

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




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THIS LATTER CIRCUIT WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY A DIRECT TELETYPE LINE TO PROVIDE PRINTED CONFIRMATION OF ANY INFORMATION RELAYED TO G-2 BY TELEPHONE. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS FURTHER EXISTED BETWEEN THE ARMY COMPANY AND ARMY GROUP, FLANKING ARMIES, AND THE SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES IN THIRD ARMY. WHENEVER A TELEPHONE OR TELETYPE LINE PASSED THROUGH ONE OR MORE SWITCHBOARDS, A JARGON CODE WAS USED, EXCEPT IN THE TELETYPE TRANSMISSION OF RAW TRAFFIC.

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C. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN NORMANDY THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS TO INCREASE THE VALUE OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WAS ASCERTAINED. DURING THE FIRST FEW WEEKS AFTER THE INITIAL LANDING, LITTLE WAS DONE IN THIS DIRECTION BECAUSE THE STATIC LINE PREVENTED THE CAPTURE OF DOCUMENTS IN ANY QUANTITY. AFTER THE ST. LO BREAKTHROUGH ADVANTAGE WAS TAKEN OF AN INCREASED NUMBER OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS WHICH NECESSITATED A SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTION, SO THAT THIS INFORMATION COULD BE EXPEDITIOUSLY DISSEMINATED. CORPS' G-2 FIRST ANALYZED ANY DOCUMENTS IN SEARCH OF FACTS PECULIAR TO ITS OWN WORK, THEN PASSED ALL SIGNAL DOCUMENTS ON TO THE CORPS' SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES FOR ANALYSIS. ANY INFORMATION OF VALUE WAS IMMEDIATELY EXTRACTED AND THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WAS SENT TO ARMY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHERE IT WAS PHOTOGRAPHICALLY REPRODUCED AND DISTRIBUTED TO SERVICE COMPANIES UNDER THIRD ARMY COMMAND, FIRST, SEVENTH, AND NINTH AMERICAN ARMIES AND TWELFTH ARMY GROUP. CODE NAMES, CODE AND CIPHER KEYS, FREQUENCY AND CALL SIGN ALLOCATIONS, MAPS WITH ENCODED TERRAIN FEATURES AND PLACE NAMES, MAP COORDINATE CODES AND GRID SYSTEMS, AND THE GERMAN METHODS OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CONSTITUTED INFORMATION OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. OVER THREE HUNDRED SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS REQUIRING SOME EIGHT HUNDRED PAGES WERE REPRODUCED AND DISSEMINATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN. TO SUPPLEMENT THIS INFORMATION SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE NOTES WERE PUBLISHED AND DIS-

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TRIBUTED WHEN DOCUMENTS RECEIVED WERE PARTICULARLY CURRENT, OR WHEN ONLY EXTRACTS FROM LENGTHY DOCUMENTS WERE OF VALUE. ENEMY UNITS WERE OFTEN IDENTIFIED THROUGH CODE NAMES CONTAINED IN DOCUMENTS, AND ENCODED TRAFFIC WAS FREQUENTLY EASILY READ DUE TO THE CAPTURE AND DISSEMINATION OF DOCUMENTS, DIAGRAMS, AND GERMAN SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS. DURING AUGUST IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CAMPAIGN, INTELLIGENCE COMPANIES WERE ABLE TO FOLLOW THE MOVEMENT OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION FROM NON-INDICATOR CIPHER KEYS CAPTURED FROM THIS UNIT. NUMEROUS EXAMPLES COULD BE CITED TO JUSTIFY THE WORK REQUIRED IN MAINTAINING A SMALL DOCUMENTS EVALUATION, REPRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION SECTION.

D. PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONS

IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ALL AVAILABLE RADIO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PW INTERROGATIONS WERE MADE FREQUENTLY. DURING THE CAMPAIGN THE VARIOUS PW CAGES WERE VISITED AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE WITH PW AUTHORITIES THAT SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED WHEN ROUTINE SCREENING INDICATED THAT A PW MIGHT POSSESS INFORMATION OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE. IN MOST INSTANCES THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PW'S HAD ALREADY BEEN SECURED THROUGH OTHER SOURCES, HOWEVER, ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS ALWAYS SERVED AS A CONFIRMATION. FREQUENTLY PW'S WERE INTERROGATED SOON ENOUGH AFTER CAPTURE TO OBTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVE FREQUENCIES AND

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MORE FACILITY AND ACCURACY.

E. ALLIED MONITORING

MONITORING OF RADIO NETS OF UNITS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THIRD ARMY BEGAN TWENTY FOUR HOURS AFTER THE

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THIRD ARMY BECAME OPERATIONAL. MONITORING OF NETS WAS AIMED TO SERVE A TWOFOLD PURPOSE: PRESERVATION OF SECURITY IN RADIO TRANSMISSIONS AND CORRECTION OF PROCEDURE VIOLATIONS TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF NET OPERATORS. FACILITIES FOR MONITORING WERE EXTREMELY LIMITED, AND DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY AND THE CORPS SERVICE COMPANIES WERE NEITHER DESIGNED FOR NOR TRAINED FOR MONITORING OF AMERICAN NETS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS AND A MONITORING AGENCY FOR ANALYSIS OF LOGS AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONS WAS A PROBLEM OF TRAINING PERSONNEL AND CONTINUAL REVISION OF METHODS.

THE 113TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY WAS DIRECTED TO MAKE AVAILABLE FOUR RECEIVERS AND NECESSARY PERSONNEL FOR OPERATION OF THE SETS, AND EACH OF THE CORPS SERVICE COMPANIES WAS ORDERED TO MAINTAIN TWO RECEIVERS FOR MONITORING. MONITORING ASSIGNMENTS WERE GIVEN DIRECTLY TO THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY RECEIVERS, BUT THE CORPS SERVICE COMPANIES WERE DIRECTED BY THE CORPS SIGNAL OFFICER, AND WERE GIVEN ASSIGNMENTS DIRECTLY BY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ONLY IN EMERGENCIES WHICH COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY DUE TO RECEPTION DIFFICULTIES OR PRIORITY INTERCEPT MISSIONS.

MISSIONS WERE ASSIGNED FOR PERIODS OF THREE TO FIVE DAYS DEPENDING ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE NET. IT WAS NECESSARY TO COORDINATE THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED BY THE CORPS SIGNAL OFFICER TO THE CORPS SERVICE COMPANIES AND THOSE ASSIGNED BY SIGNAL

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INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY IN ORDER TO AVOID DUPLICATION. SERIOUS VIOLATIONS WERE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY BY PHONE OR DIRECT TELETYPE TO SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WHICH IN TURN IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE UNIT CONCERNED. CORPS SERVICE COMPANIES ALSO DIRECTLY REPORTED SERIOUS VIOLATIONS TO THE UNIT CONCERNED, OTHERWISE MAKING NO ANALYSIS OR REPORTS, BUT FORWARDED LOGS TO SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FOR ANALYSIS. THE FAST MOVING SITUATION OF THE NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN NECESSITATED MOVING THE TRANSMISSION SECURITY SECTION OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY OPERATIONAL AREA TO INSURE DIRECT SUPERVISION OF MONITORING. DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1 AUGUST TO 31 NOVEMBER 1944, THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISPOSITION OF THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY AND THE FRONT LINES ALLOWED RECEPTION OF ONLY CORPS AND ARMY NETS. ONLY RARELY COULD DIVISION NETS BE HEARD SUFFICIENTLY FOR ACCURATE RECORDING. CORPS SERVICE COMPANIES COULD REACH ONLY DIVISION NETS. LACK OF RECEIVERS AND MOBILE TEAMS TO MOVE FORWARD TO MONITOR LOWER ECHELON NETS RESULTED IN THE FRONT LINE UNIT NETS RECEIVING PRACTICALLY NO SERVICE OTHER THAN UNIT SELF-MONITORING. CORPS AND ARMY NETS WERE CONTINUALLY UNDER CLOSE SUPERVISION. LATER IN THE CAMPAIGN SEVERAL MOBILE TEAMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE THIRD ARMY FROM TWELFTH ARMY GROUP, WHICH GREATLY IMPROVED THE SECURITY OF THE THIRD ARMY NETS. TWO DAYS AFTER V-E DAY, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP RECALLED THE COMPLETE DETACHMENT COMPRISING THE THIRD ARMY MONITORING TEAM AND THUS

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LEFT THE COMMAND WITH NO FACILITIES FOR EFFECTIVE MONITORING. THE END OF THE WAR EFFECTED A DECREASE IN VOLUME OF TRAFFIC AND TERMINATED THE SENDING OF CLASSIFIED MESSAGES IN THE CLEAR DUE TO TACTICAL NECESSITY. TWO WEEKS AFTER V-E DAY THE NETS WERE GENERALLY SECURE ENOUGH TO BE VULNERABLE ONLY TO LONG RANGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS BY A COMPETENT HIGH LEVEL SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. IT IS DOUBTED THAT ANY SUCH GERMAN UNIT IS OPERATING TODAY.

## II. TECHNICAL HISTORY

DURING THE PRE-INVASION PERIOD, THE ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS WAS FAIRLY WELL FIXED, WITH A KNOWN AND SYSTEMATIC METHOD OF ASSIGNING CALL SIGNS. THIS LATTER CHARACTERISTIC, WITH THE AID OF THE BASIC GERMAN CALL SIGN BOOK, FIRST PARTIALLY RECONSTRUCTED AND LATER CAPTURED, MADE IDENTIFICATION OF NETS RELATIVELY EASY AND USUALLY QUITE DEPENDABLE. PRACTICE TRANSMISSIONS FROM COASTAL AREAS AND A LITTLE FARTHER INLAND EMPLOYED THE EXPECTED MEDIUM GRADE (NON-INDICATOR) AND A GREAT DEAL OF LOW GRADE TRAFFIC. ENCODED LOW GRADE TRAFFIC OF THE GERMAN ARMY WAS FOR THE MOST PART BASED ON THE USE OF THE HEERESSIGNALTAFEL (ARMY SIGNAL LIST); THE STRUCTURE OF THIS CODE WAS FAIRLY WELL DEFINED: A FIXED LIST OF FIVE HUNDRED TRIGRAMS WERE SET AGAINST BASIC VOCABULARIES SUITED TO THE PARTICULAR NEEDS OF THE VARIOUS UNITS. WHEN BOTH THE CODE GROUPS AND VOCABULARY (IDENTS) WERE ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED, THE SYSTEM WAS SAID TO BE A ONE PART CODE OR ALPHABETICAL BASIC. TABLES WERE DISTRIBUTED WITH EACH

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SUCH ALPHABETICAL CODE TO PROVIDE FOR THE DAILY REARRANGEMENT OF THE TRIGRAM LIST; THE RESULTANT TWO PART CODE, CAPABLE OF BEING CHANGED PERIODICALLY, WAS THUS FAR MORE SECURE THAN THE COMPLETELY ALPHABETICAL ONE PART TYPE. A DIFFERENT TYPE OF THREE LETTER CODE USING MANY MORE THAN THE FIVE HUNDRED GROUPS IN THE "HST" LIST, AND CONSEQUENTLY MORE DIFFICULT TO READ, WAS WIDELY USED BY CERTAIN UNITS MANNING PERMANENT INSTALLATIONS ALONG THE FRENCH COAST; A MORE SECURE TYPE OF CODE, IT WAS CHANGED MONTHLY. FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT, IT WAS FOUND THAT INTERCEPTION IN THIS PERIOD WAS UNIFORMLY GOOD AND THE GERMAN SIGNALS SUFFICIENTLY STRONG. DIRECTION FINDING, HOWEVER, WAS HAMPERED BY DISTANCE AND THE DISPROPORTIONATELY SHORT BASE LINES OF STATIONS IN ENGLAND.

AFTER THE INVASION THE COASTAL CODES BEGAN NATURALLY TO DISAPPEAR. FURTHERMORE, THE USE OF ONE CODE WITH A FREQUENTLY CHANGING MONOALPHABETIC SYSTEM FOR THE ENCIPHERMENT OF SPECIAL INSERTS (SUCH AS PLACE NAMES) BECAME COMMON WITH CERTAIN UNITS, PARTICULARLY THE 21 PANZER DIVISION FROM WHOM INTELLIGENCE WAS THUS DERIVED ON D-DAY ITSELF.

HINTS OF THE NEW AND EXTREMELY SECURE GERMAN SYSTEM, RASTERSCHLUESSEL, APPEARED EARLY IN JUNE, AND SCATTERED MESSAGES WERE FIRST INTERCEPTED IN AUGUST. SIMILARLY, EARLY IN THE CONTINENTAL CAMPAIGN ALLIED RADIO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES BECAME AWARE OF THE ENEMY'S INTENTION TO FORSAKE HIS KNOWN AND METHODOICAL CALL SIGN ALLOCATION SYSTEM FOR A MORE RANDOMIZED ASSIGNMENT. THESE TWO DEVELOPMENTS ULTIMATELY CAME ABOUT;

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THE RANDOMIZING OF CALL SIGNS WAS INSTITUTED 1 NOVEMBER 1944, AND BY THE 15TH OF FEBRUARY 1945, RASTERSCHLUESSEL, AFTER HAVING BECOME MORE AND MORE PREVALENT THROUGHOUT THE WINTER, FINALLY SUPPLANTED NON-INDICATOR TRAFFIC.

THE CHANGE IN THE GERMAN CALL SIGN SYSTEM BROUGHT GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAKING UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS, AND IN ESTABLISHING DAILY NET CONTINUITY. SOME WERE, AT BEST, TENUOUS; OTHERS, AS IN THE CASE OF SEVERAL NETS OF 11 PANZER DIVISION, BECAME ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. THE CALL SIGN BOOKS PREVIOUSLY USED BY THE GERMANS (THE "E" AND "F" BOOKS) WERE STILL EMPLOYED, BUT IN A MUCH LESS SYSTEMATIC FASHION. THE METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT, HOWEVER, VARIED SOMEWHAT WITH THE UNIT, AND CONSEQUENTLY, CERTAIN FORMATIONS LIKE 10 SS PANZER DIVISION (FRUNDSBERG), 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION, AND 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION, WHICH RETAINED A SORT OF VAGUE CONSISTENCY IN THEIR ALLOCATIONS, WERE MANY TIMES CAPABLE OF BEING THUS IDENTIFIED.

THE SHIFT IN EMPHASIS IN ANALYTIC PROCEDURES WAS TOWARD IDENTIFICATION OF NETS ON THE BASIS OF SCATTERED BITS OF TYPICAL PROCEDURE; KNOWN PERSONALITIES AND PLACE NAMES MENTIONED IN WHATEVER PLAIN LANGUAGE WAS TRANSMITTED, OR IN ENCODED TRAFFIC WHEN BROKEN; TYPES OF CODES USED; FIXED CALL SIGNS, WHEN, AND IF, SUCH SECURITY VIOLATIONS OCCURRED; AND FINALLY, DISCERNIBLE PATTERNS IN THE VARIOUS FREQUENCIES USED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

IN GENERAL, THEREFORE, THE NEW CHANGES BROUGHT INCREASED

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DEMANDS FOR MORE SETS OF RECORDS, AND THE ALREADY EXISTENT ONES BECAME MORE DETAILED. ALL OF THE ITEMS JUST MENTIONED WERE PREVIOUSLY USED AS CORROBORATING POINTS IN MAKING AN IDENTIFICATION. ONE OF THE MOST EXTENSIVE FILES THAT WAS NATURALLY A NECESSITY TO ANY RADIO INTELLIGENCE WORK WAS THOROUGH AND UP-TO-DATE DATA ON THE ORGANIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL GERMAN UNITS. THIS INCLUDED LISTS OF IDENTIFIED PERSONALITIES AND INFORMATION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE VARIOUS FORMATIONS (PERSONALITIES AND REFERENCES TO UNITS BY NUMBER FREQUENTLY OCCURRED IN TRAFFIC). THE FLUIDITY OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION, AS DETERMINED BY MODERN MOBILE WAR, ALSO MADE IT NECESSARY TO HAVE ON HAND ADEQUATE DATA PERTAINING TO UNITS NOT ON THE FRONT (AND EVEN, IN SOME CASES, TO INTERCEPT THEIR TRAFFIC) BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUD- DEN MOVES. THIS DATA, OF COURSE, INCLUDED MAPS (AND IT MIGHT BE MENTIONED HERE, THE FREQUENT USE BY THE ENEMY OF ARBITRARY OR UNKNOWN GRID REFERENCES CREATED YET ANOTHER FILE OF INFORMATION TO BE KEPT BY THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCY). THIS GREAT SCOPE OF THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS' AREA OF CONCERN BROUGHT FORTH A NEED, TOO, FOR A MEANS OF TRANSMITTING INTELLIGENCE TO THE PROPER PLACE; AS A RESULT THERE WAS A SPECIAL SECTION CREATED IN THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY AT ARMY LEVEL DESIGNED TO ACT IN LIAISON WITH CORPS, FLANKING ARMIES, AND ARMY GROUP.

INSOFAR AS TYPES OF GERMAN LOW GRADE TRAFFIC WERE CON-

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CERNED, IT HAS FOUND THAT THE USE OF PLAIN LANGUAGE BY THE GERMANS WAS, AS WAS EXPECTED, FAIRLY COMMON DURING ANY PERIODS WHEN THEY WERE SUSTAINING SEVERE PRESSURE, AND THIS PRACTICE BECAME EVEN MORE WIDESPREAD AS THE WAR PROGRESSED. ARTILLERY UNITS TALKED IN THE CLEAR QUITE FREQUENTLY WHEN GIVING OBSERVATIONS. ARTILLERY OF 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION (GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN) WERE EVEN CHARACTERIZED TO SOME EXTENT BY THEIR USE OF PLAIN LANGUAGE INSERTS IN ENCODED MESSAGES. ARTILLERY, TOO, WAS THE MOST FREQUENT EMPLOYER OF SIMPLE LETTER FOR NUMBER SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS USED FOR THE ENCIPHERMENT OF MAP COORDINATES.

ON THE WHOLE, THE USE OF THE "HST" TYPE OF CODE WAS FAIRLY COMMON THROUGHOUT THE WAR, BUT CERTAIN FORMATIONS MADE THE GREATEST USE OF IT. 130 PANZER LEHR, WITH A NON-ALPHABETICAL BASIC, 3 PANZER DIVISION, WITH ITS LONG SPELLER MESSAGES, 116TH PANZER DIVISION, WITH ITS LITTLE TRICK OF USING MANY VARIANTS FOR A SINGLE PLAIN TEXT VALUE, AND SEVERAL OTHER UNITS WERE AMONG THE MAJOR FORMATIONS EMPLOYING THE REGULATION GERMAN FIELD CODE, INADVERTANTLY PRODUCING UNIT CHARACTERISTICS. THE NON-HST CODES THAT DID PERSIST AFTER THE COASTAL INSTALLATIONS WERE OVER-RUN WERE FOR THE MOST PART USED BY FLAK FORMATIONS; THESE WERE FOUND ON THE AIR UP TO THE LAST WEEKS OF THE WAR. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL DIFFERENT CODE LISTS COMPOSED OF TRIGRAMS WHOSE COMPOSITION SUGGESTED THEIR MEANING; THESE WERE THE SO CALLED SEMI-SELF EVIDENT LISTS.

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IT BECAME READILY SEEN, THEREFORE, THAT ARTILLERY GROUPS WERE AMONG THE MOST PROLIFIC CONTRIBUTORS TO INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM GERMAN LOW GRADE TRAFFIC; THE OTHER MAJOR TYPES TO WHICH ALLIED RADIO INTELLIGENCE WAS MOSTLY INDEBTED WERE THE PANZER AND PANZER GRENADIER DIVISIONS, ESPECIALLY THE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS THEREOF. SEVERAL OF THESE, NOTABLY 130 PANZER LEHR AND 3 PANZER GRENADIER AS ALREADY INDICATED, FAITHFULLY USED "NST" CODES THAT WERE BROKEN CONSISTENTLY UP TO THEIR FINAL DISSOLUTION. THE PRACTICE OF USING A DAILY CHANGING TWO PART CODE, BY MEANS OF A RECIPROCALLY MATTED COLUMN PLAYING ON ONE BASIC LIST, WAS NOT AS COMMON AS EXPECTED. THE TWO UNITS JUST MENTIONED DID EMPLOY THIS METHOD DURING THE LATE WINTER, HOWEVER, AT WHICH TIME CAPTURED RECIPROCAL TABLES PROVED INVALUABLE. GERMAN INFANTRY DIVISIONS WERE, GENERALLY SPEAKING, NOTABLY UNPRODUCTIVE FROM A RADIO INTELLIGENCE VIEWPOINT, PROBABLY BECAUSE THEIR LESS MOBILE NATURE LENT ITSELF MORE READILY TO WIRE COMMUNICATIONS.

ALL UNITS OF THE GERMAN ARMY USED, AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, CODE NAMES FOR PERSONALITIES, UNITS AND EVEN FOR VARIOUS AND SUNDRY ITEMS OF WAR MATERIEL. TO READ TRAFFIC CONTAINING SUCH REFERENCES IT WAS ALMOST INVARIABLY NECESSARY TO HAVE CURRENT CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. IT IS NOT OUT OF PLACE TO MENTION HERE THAT CAPTURED DOCUMENTS PERIODICALLY PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLES IN ALL PHASES OF THE WORK; MANY TIMES, AFTER



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RANDOM CALL SIGNS CAME INTO BEING, CAPTURED FREQUENCY AND CALL SIGN TABLES WERE THE SOLE MEANS OF IDENTIFYING CERTAIN NETS. EVEN WHEN NOT DIRECTLY USED, ALL CAPTURED RECORDS WENT INTO THAT ALL IMPORTANT BACK-LOG OF INFORMATION MENTIONED EARLIER, AND THUS BECAME AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN INTERPRETING FUTURE INTELLIGENCE.

AS A FINAL COMMENT, IT MIGHT BE ADDED THAT THERE WERE MANY LITTLE BITS AND SCRAPS OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ENCOUNTERED IN THE COURSE OF THE WAR; THERE WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, SEVERAL ISOLATED CASES OF MISCELLANEOUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS EMPLOYED BY THE GERMANS: A BIGRAM CODE BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYED BY V-1 LAUNCHING SITES, A "JARGON" CODE CONSISTING ENTIRELY OF CODE NAMES, A SIMPLE TRANSPOSITION BOX USED BY 2 SS PANZER DIVISION (DAS REICH) IN FEBRUARY 1945. ALL OF THESE WERE RELATIVELY MINOR ASPECTS OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE WORK. THOUGH INTERESTING, THE INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM SUCH MEANS WAS NOT OF THE SAME MAGNITUDE AS THE NORMAL AND MORE RELIABLE PROCESSES OF CLOSELY FOLLOWING CERTAIN NETS DAY AFTER DAY, CONSTANTLY USING DIRECTION FINDING, AND READING THE TRAFFIC WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

### III. INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES THAT WERE LATER TO BECOME PART OF THIRD ARMY BEGAN OPERATIONS APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS BEFORE THE INVASION OF FRANCE. DURING THIS PERIOD PRACTICE TRAFFIC OF ENEMY UNITS WAS INTERCEPTED IN

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ENGLAND AND CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE OF THE ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE WAS GAINED. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE ITSELF THE PERIOD WAS VALUABLE IN REVEALING RADIO CHARACTERISTICS LATER USED AS A MEANS OF ANALYZING GERMAN TRAFFIC IN THE FIELD.

IN FRANCE, BEFORE THE THIRD ARMY BECAME OPERATIONAL, THE 118TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY AND THE 3254TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS. THE PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THIS PERIOD, AS DURING THE ENTIRE CAMPAIGN, CAME LARGELY FROM GERMAN ARMORED UNITS, AND AS EARLY AS D-DAY ITSELF, RECONNAISSANCE TRAFFIC OF THE 21 PANZER DIVISION WAS INTERCEPTED ON THE ENGLISH SIDE OF THE CHANNEL INDICATING THE FORMATION'S COMMITMENT IN THE CAEN (U-73) SECTOR. LATER, AFTER THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS HAD MOVED TO FRANCE, THE PANZER DIVISIONS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE, 2 SS PANZER DIVISION (DAS REICH) PROBABLY PROVING TO BE THE MOST INFORMATIVE OF ALL. ON 26 JULY A DECODE OF A FUEL AND AMMUNITION REPORT FROM THIS UNIT REVEALED NO SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION. BEGINNING WITH THE COMBINED VII AND VIII CORPS ATTACK ON 27 JULY, THE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS BEGAN TO GIVE A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALLIED GAINS. PREVIOUS TO THE BEGINNING OF THIS HISTORIC ATTACK, 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION HAD BEEN INTERMITTENTLY ACTIVE, AND ON 13 JULY TRAFFIC INDICATED THAT THE INTEREST OF THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF THIS DIVISION WAS CENTERED IN THE AREA OF PONT HEBERT (T-46). ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, IT YIELDED LITTLE INTELLIGENCE DURING THIS PERIOD BECAUSE IT HAD NOT BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST AMERICAN FORCES.

HEADLINE NEWS ON 31 JULY CAME WITH THE DISCLOSURE THAT

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2 SS PANZER DIVISION HEADQUARTERS WAS LOCATED AT MONTBRAY (T-43), AND ON THE SAME DAY THE NEED OF AMMUNITION BY THE DIVISION'S ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS EXPRESSED IN TRAFFIC OF THAT FORMATION. THROUGHOUT AUGUST THE PANZER AND PANZER GRENADIER DIVISIONS CONTINUED TO BE THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE. FORMATIONS SUCH AS 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION, 116 PANZER DIVISION, 9 SS PANZER DIVISION (HOHENSTAUFEN), 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION (GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN), 2 SS PANZER DIVISION (DAS REICH), AND 10 SS PANZER DIVISION (FRUNDSBERG) REPRESENTED THE REAL BACKBONE OF THE GERMAN ARMY, AND SIMILARLY WERE THE MOST ACTIVE FROM A RADIO STANDPOINT. ON 5 AUGUST AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF ACTIVITY, 2 SS PANZER DIVISION INDICATED ITS INTEREST IN THE AREA OF LE MENIL TOYE (T-51), AND ON THE SAME DAY ENTERED INTO RADIO LIAISON WITH 2 PANZER DIVISION. IT WAS FAIRLY DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED THAT THE 2 PANZER ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS OPERATING ALONG THE SOURDEVAL (T-61) - TINCHEBRAY (T-72) ROAD. ONE IMPORTANT BIT OF INTELLIGENCE TO COME FROM A SOURCE OTHER THAN THE ABOVE MENTIONED APPEARED ON 7 AUGUST WHEN THE 268 INFANTRY DIVISION REPORTED THE AMERICAN ATTACK ON GUINGAMP (R-61) WHILE CORROBORATIVE DIRECTION FINDING GAVE THE GUINGAMP AREA AS THE LOCATION OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THIS DIVISION IN THE PATH OF THE VIII CORPS ADVANCE ACROSS THE BRITTANY PENINSULA. ALTHOUGH THE CAMPAIGN IN BRITTANY WAS NOT COVERED EXTENSIVELY BY RADIO INTELLIGENCE

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AGENCIES, (THE 3254TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY HAVING MOVED EAST WITH THIRD ARMY HEADQUARTERS), FROM TIME TO TIME TRANSMISSIONS WERE HEARD FROM THE BELEAGUERED GARRISONS LIKE ST. MALO (S-71) AND BREST (V-99).

BY 10 AUGUST, WHEN THE GROUND-WORK FOR THE FALAISE (U-13) POCKET WAS BEING LAID, THE TACTICAL SITUATION HAD SO SHIFTED THAT MOST THE JUST MENTIONED PANZER DIVISIONS WERE ON THE LEFT FLANK INSTEAD OF DIRECTLY ON THE THIRD ARMY FRONT. 10 SS PANZER DIVISION HAD SOME ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF TINCHEBRAY (T-72), AND AT LEAST ONE SUB-UNIT OF 2 SS PANZER DIVISION WAS PLACED BY DIRECTION FINDING IN THE GENERAL AREA OF T-91. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY SIMILAR EVIDENCE PLACED THE COMMAND POST OF THE ENGINEER BATTALION AND THE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION SOMEWHAT TO THE NORTHWEST OF ALENCON (Z-38). IN THE SAME GENERAL VICINITY 21 PANZER DIVISION MADE ITS APPEARANCE, AS RECONNAISSANCE TRAFFIC INDICATED PATROLLING AS FAR SOUTH AS AVRON (Y-95), AND TWO OTHER ELEMENTS WERE PLACED IN A WIDE AREA SOUTHWEST OF FALAISE (U-13). THROUGH THE 15TH OF AUGUST CONSTANT EXAMINATION OF THE TRAFFIC OF THESE ARMORED DIVISIONS INDICATED NO MAJOR MOVE OF ARMOR TO THE THIRD ARMY FRONT. DIRECTION FINDING AT THAT TIME WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT AT LEAST THE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF PANZER LEHR WERE MOVING TO THE EAST. AT THIS POINT CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED A SHRINKAGE OF BATTALION STRENGTH OF THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT

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WHICH LED TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE FIRST BATTALION HAD BEEN ABSORBED BY THE THIRD. LIKE THE PANZER LEHR, 2 SS PANZER DIVISION ALSO BEGAN OFFERING EVIDENCE OF AN EASTWARD MOVE AS THE FALAISE GAP MATERIALIZED. THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE MONTH DIRECTION FINDING WAS ABLE TO FOLLOW THE ROUTE OF THE 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION AS IT MOVED EAST FROM THE FALAISE (U-13) - ARGENTAN (U-21) GAP: NORTH OF THE SEINE, THEN FURTHER EAST PASSING NORTH OF PARIS (S-24) AND FINALLY AWAY FROM THE THIRD ARMY FRONT.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS OF 21 PANZER DIVISION ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST PROVIDED THE HIGHLIGHT OF ACTIVITY TO THAT DATE GIVING EXTENSIVE REPORTS ON THE SITUATION AT THE SOUTH END OF THE FALAISE GAP. 2 PANZER DIVISION WAS MENTIONED AS "THE LEFT FLANK NEIGHBOR", AND TANKS OF THE 9 SS PANZER DIVISION WERE REPORTED IN LACOURBE (U-11) AND MONTGAROULT (U-11). THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OF THIS GROUP SHIFTED THE FOLLOWING DAY TO AN AREA EAST OF FALAISE AND CONTINUED THEIR CONVENIENTLY DETAILED REPORTS INDICATING THAT IT WAS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL UNITS COVERING THE WITHDRAWAL EAST FROM THE GAP TO THE SEINE. BY 19 AUGUST, 2 SS PANZER DIVISION HAD PROBABLY MOVED EAST TOWARDS LISIEUX (P-35). ON 21 AUGUST THE CHIEF INFORMANT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION, 21 PANZER RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION, HINTED AT THE POSSIBLE POSITION OF 272 INFANTRY DIVISION ON ITS NORTHERN FLANK. INCREASING ACTIVITY FROM THE 16 INFANTRY DIVISION GAVE

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EVIDENCE OF A LINK ON THE 20TH OF AUGUST WITH THE 235 INFANTRY DIVISION AND DIRECTION FINDING TENDED TO PLACE SOME ELEMENTS OF THE FORMER NORTH OF THE LOIRE RIVER.

ALONG THE LINE OF GENERAL ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION RELATING TO A PREVIOUS TACTICAL SITUATION, SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, TOGETHER WITH CAPTURED DOCUMENTS VALID FOR 25-27 JULY, SHOWED GRENADIER REGIMENTS 943, 916, AND THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF THE 352 INFANTRY DIVISION TO BE OPERATING IN KAMPFGRUPPE KENTNER, ALONG WITH THE ELEMENTS OF 30 SCHNELLE BRIGADE AND GRENADIER REGIMENT 897 OF THE 266 INFANTRY DIVISION. THE PRESENCE OF OST BATTALION 11/899 INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THIS KAMPFGRUPPE WAS ALSO SUGGESTED BY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH INDICATED THE MENTION OF THIS BATTALION IN THE TRAFFIC OF THE 7TH OF AUGUST. CERTAIN TECHNICAL INFORMATION REFERRING TO THE 899 INFANTRY REGIMENT WAS DERIVED FROM A DOCUMENT BELONGING TO 351 INFANTRY DIVISION, THUS INDICATING THE TACTICAL GROUPING OF THESE TWO DIVISIONS--351 AND 352 INFANTRY DIVISIONS--AT LEAST FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE 11TH TO THE 20TH OF JULY. FURTHER INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED AT THE SAME TIME IN REFERENCE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF BATTERIES IN THE 185 ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF THE 85 INFANTRY DIVISION AND THE 3RD BATTALION OF PANZER ARTILLERY REGIMENT 130 OF PANZER LEHR.

BY 23 AUGUST DIRECTION FINDING WAS ABLE TO RENDER FAIRLY GOOD EVIDENCE THAT MOST OF THE 16 INFANTRY DIVISION WAS SOUTH OF THE LOIRE, ALTHOUGH ON 20 AUGUST THE SAME MEANS HAD GIVEN

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THE INDICATION THAT SOME ELEMENTS WERE NORTH OF THE RIVER. ASIDE FROM THE FAIRLY REGULAR INTERCEPTION OF KAMPFGRUPPEN NORD, SUEB, AND WITTE OF THAT FORMATION TOGETHER WITH SCHNELLE ABTEILUNG 608, THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM LOW GRADE TRAFFIC WAS AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL UNTIL ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER.

MEDIUM GRADE SOURCES, HOWEVER, PROVIDED A GREAT DEAL OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM THE PERIOD FROM 27-30 AUGUST WHEN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS PERMITTED THE READING OF 9 PANZER DIVISION'S NON-INDICATOR TRAFFIC. IN THE FIRST DAY OF THAT PERIOD IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE DIVISION SUPPLY HEAD-QUARTERS WAS LOCATED AT JAIGNES (S-55) AND THE EXISTENCE OF KAMPFGRUPPEN BECKER AND SCHMITT WAS MADE KNOWN. FROM CAPTURED RADIO DIAGRAMS IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DIVISION HAD UNDER ITS COMMAND, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, 129 REGIMENT OF 48 INFANTRY DIVISION. REGIMENT VON GLASSOW AND SICHERUNGS REGIMENT 190 WERE LOCATED ON 28 AUGUST ALONG AND SOUTH OF THE RIVER MARNE IN THE AREA OF LAGNY (S-34) AND CHANGIS-SUR-MARNE (S-35). SOME ELEMENT OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION, POSSIBLY 11 PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT, WAS KNOWN TO HAVE ESTABLISHED A RADIO LINK WITH A SUB-UNIT OF 130 PANZER LEHR. KAMPFGRUPPE BECKER ON 27 AUGUST WAS ORDERED UNDER THE COMMAND OF 207 HEERES FLAK BATTALION, THE LATTER KNOWN TO BE ATTACHED TO 9 PANZER DIVISION. DURING THESE INFORMATIVE FOUR DAYS THE CURRENT MLR'S WERE EXTENSIVELY REPORTED BY

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THIS UNIT. BY THE 28TH THE INFORMATION THUS OBTAINED INDICATED A FAIRLY DEFINITE RETREAT IN A NORTHEASTERLY DIRECTION FROM PARIS WITH REGIMENT VON GLASSOW OFFERING STIFF RESISTANCE IN THE AREA OF COURTRY (S-24). ON THE SAME DAY AN AMMUNITION AND FUEL DUMP WAS LOCATED, 9 PANZER DIVISION MADE KNOWN ITS LACK OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT, AND THE KAMPFGRUPPEN OF THE FORMATION WERE TOLD TO TRY TO LINK UP WITH THE 348 INFANTRY DIVISION. THE DIVISION IB (SUPPLY) HAD MOVED BY THE 20TH OF AUGUST TO CHEVREGNY (N-90), AND LATER IN THE DAY THE DIVISION GAVE ITS LOCATION AS LAISCOUST (N-91). REGIMENT WAS SEEN TO BE STILL UNINFORMED AS TO WHERE ITS LINKAGE WITH THE 348 INFANTRY DIVISION WAS TO TAKE PLACE. ON THAT SAME DATE THE SICHERUNGS REGIMENT 190 WAS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF SOISSONS (S-97). THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE LAST DAY OF THIS PERIOD WAS THE LOCATION OF 9 PANZER DIVISION COMMAND POST AT PARONY LE BOIS (O-03) AND THE LOCATION OF THE SUPPLY DEPOT AT ADMINISTRATIVE HEADQUARTERS AT LA HERIE (O-34), AS THE DIVISION CONTINUED TO FALL BACK TOWARDS THE EAST.

AUGUST 30 BROUGHT THE INTRODUCTION OF ONE OF THE SEVERAL DIVISIONS TO BE MOVED FROM ITALY TO REINFORCE THE GERMAN ARMIES IN FRANCE. FIRST RADIO INTELLIGENCE CONTACT WITH 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WAS MADE ON THAT DAY, AND IN SUBSEQUENT RECONNAISSANCE TRAFFIC THE GENERAL AREA WAS DETERMINED TO BE SOMEWHAT SOUTH OF NANCY (U-81) AROUND

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RICHARD-MENIL (U-80). THE INTELLIGENCE STORY WAS VAGUE UNTIL 18 SEPTEMBER WHEN PATROLS OF THIS DIVISION BECAME MORE TALKATIVE IN REPORTING THE ADVANCE OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM THE MEUSE RIVER LINE UP TO THE AREA NORTHEAST OF NANCY AND SOUTHEAST OF METZ (U-85). ON 18 SEPTEMBER THIS FORMATION REPORTED ELEMENTS OF THE 553 INFANTRY DIVISION AS BEING LOCATED AT MOULIN (U-91). DURING THIS PERIOD OF 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION'S ACTIVITY THERE WERE FREQUENT AND EXCEEDINGLY USEFUL REPORTS ON ALLIED ACTIVITY AND ON THE GERMAN MLR'S. ON THE 18TH ONE OF THE REGIMENTS OF THE DIVISION WAS REPORTED AS REORGANIZED INTO A KAMPFGRUPPE WITH ONE BATTALION IN LANDREMONT (U-82), THE SUPPLY UNIT NORTHEAST OF SERRIERES (U-82), AND ANOTHER REGIMENT WAS PLACED IN THE AREA OF FAULX (U-82). USEFUL ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION CAME ON THE 18TH WHEN A PATROL LOCATED IN COIN LES CUVRY (U-84) REPORTED THAT THE DIVISION ON ITS RIGHT WAS 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION. ON 20 SEPTEMBER, AFTER THE MENTION OF A KAMPFGRUPPE TOELKE INDICATED THIS FORMATION'S PRESENCE IN THE XII CORPS' ZONE OF ADVANCE, RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS OF 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WENT ON TO REPORT A DIVISION COMMAND POST (POSSIBLY THAT OF 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION) AT PELTRE (U-85) AND DELIVERED THE INTERESTING INFORMATION OF AN IMPENDING GERMAN ARMOR-INFANTRY COUNTERATTACK AROUND POURNCY (U-84).

ANOTHER PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION, THE 15TH, CONTRIBUTED ITS BIT OF INTELLIGENCE ON 21 SEPTEMBER BY DETAILING A SUPPLY

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ROUTE RUNNING GENERALLY ON THE MAIN ROAD FROM SAARBOURG (Q-51) TO CROISMARE (Q-10). THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 553 INFANTRY DIVISION WAS REPORTED BY 103 RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION ON 23 SEPTEMBER AND THE DIVISIONAL SUPPLY WAS REVEALED TO BE IN NOMENY (U-83). SEPTEMBER 23 WAS ALSO NOTED FOR THE LOCATION OF SEVERAL COMMAND POSTS, 1/115 OF 15 PANZER GRENA-DIER DIVISION AT MANONCOURT (U-83) AND THE 1119 REGIMENT 553 INFANTRY DIVISION IN JEANDELAINCOURT (U-92). ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE AT THIS TIME SEEMED TO BE REACTING VERY STRONGLY TO OUR ATTACKS NORTHEAST OF NANCY AND TO THE EAST OF NOMENY. SPECIAL CONCERN WITH THE NECESSITY OF KEEPING OPEN THE ESCAPE GAP IN THE AREA OF LEYR (U-92) WAS NOTED. THE EXISTENCE OF THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION 553 WAS REPORTED ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 24 AND THEIR TASK INDICATED. ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION CONTINUED TO DRIBBLE IN WITH THE LOCATION OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST OF 1119 INFANTRY REGIMENT AT FERME LASFRANCS (U-82) THE FOLLOWING DAY, AND REINFORCEMENTS WERE SAID TO BE ARRIVING IN THE AREA OF ARRAYE-LE-HAN (U-92). THE STORY TOLD BY 103 RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS, MLR'S, AND UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS WAS CARRIED ON THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF SEPTEMBER. ABOUT 25 SEPTEMBER GOOD EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT 11 PANZER DIVISION WAS EAST AND NORTHEAST OF NANCY ON XII CORPS FRONT, AND, AS USUAL, DURING ALL OF THIS TIME 130 PANZER LEHR HAD BEEN ACTIVE ON THE AIR BUT WITH NO SENSATIONAL RESULTS FROM AN INTELLIGENCE STANDPOINT. THE HIGH-

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POINT OF THE MONTH'S SPOT INTELLIGENCE CAME ON THE EVENING OF 28 SEPTEMBER AT 1815 HOURS WHEN A RECONNAISSANCE PATROL ANNOUNCED THAT BATTALION "SCHNEIDER" WOULD ATTACK ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING AT 0600 IN THE VICINITY OF FORET DE GREMMERCY (Q-02) TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ITS LEFT NEIGHBOR. AS THE RECONNAISSANCE TRAFFIC REPORTED THE NEXT DAY, THIS ATTACK WAS REPULSED. FURTHER ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED FROM THIS SAME SOURCE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS OF THE 73RD REGIMENT OF THE 19 INFANTRY DIVISION WERE ATTACKING IN THAT AREA TO AID THE HARD PRESSED GERMAN FORCES.

THE 2ND DAY OF OCTOBER MAY BE DESIGNATED AS THE END OF THIS HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE PERIOD OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE. THE 103 RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION REPORTED THE EXISTENCE, IN THE SECTOR OF THE FORET DE GREMMERCY, OF THE FOLLOWING FORMATIONS: 1, 11/1125 REGIMENT AND 559 FUSILIER BATTALION OF 559 INFANTRY DIVISION, 11/73 REGIMENT OF 19 INFANTRY DIVISION (IN RESERVE, PROBABLY AT JALLAUCOURT (Q-02) AND AT LEAST PART OF AN ASSAULT BATTALION, ADK 1.

THE FIRST EIGHT DAYS OF OCTOBER WERE CHARACTERIZED BY AN EXTREMELY LOW LEVEL OF RADIO ACTIVITY DURING WHICH TIME THERE WAS GOOD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BELIEF THAT AT LEAST ELEMENTS OF 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THEIR FORMER SECTOR ON THE FRONT. WITH THE SINGLE EXCEPTION OF THE RAILROAD GUN INCIDENT (THE 280MM GUN DELIVERING HARRASSING FIRE ON THE THIRD ARMY FRONT)

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WHEN RADIO INTELLIGENCE WAS ABLE TO PREDICT THE TARGETS AND TIME OF FIRING SEVERAL HOURS IN ADVANCE, THE MONTH OF OCTOBER MAY BE WRITTEN OFF AS DEVOID OF INTELLIGENCE.

ACTIVITY ALONG THE STATIC MOSELLE FRONT CONTINUED AT A LOW LEVEL THROUGHOUT MOST OF NOVEMBER. ON THE 8TH OF THAT MONTH, HOWEVER, 21 PANZER DIVISION RETURNED TO ACTION ON THE XV CORPS FRONT IN THE VICINITY OF MONCOURT (Q-11). CONSTANT TRAFFIC OF THIS FORMATION INDICATED A CERTAIN NORTHWARD MOVEMENT OF ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION. ARTILLERY TRAFFIC FROM THE 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS PROLIFIC AROUND THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER BUT NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTING. ON THE 12TH OF THE MONTH AN ACTIVE RADIO NET OF 21 PANZER RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION WAS HEARD AND CONFIRMED THE EXPECTED NORTHWARD MOVE BECAUSE THE PRESENCE OF AT LEAST ELEMENTS OF THAT FORMATION AND OF 106 PANZER BRIGADE WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE THIRD ARMY FRONT IN THE VICINITY OF Q-14 - Q-15. THE FOLLOWING DAY ADDITIONAL REPORTS ANNOUNCED THE APPEARANCE IN THE LINE OF 118TH REGIMENT OF 36 INFANTRY DIVISION; THE LOCATION OF 38 PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT OF 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WAS GIVEN AS THE RIGHT FLANK OF 11/192 PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT OF 21 PANZER DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF Q-25. AMERICAN PRESSURE AROUND METZ STIMULATED GERMAN UNITS TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT SECTOR AND 21 PANZER RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION ON 18 NOVEMBER INVESTIGATED WHAT WAS CALLED "THE SOUTHERN ROUTE OF WITHDRAWAL". APPARENTLY SOME ELEMENTS OF 17 SS

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PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WERE INVOLVED. THE SAME DAY SAW 11 PANZER DIVISION IN A DIFFERENT SECTOR WITHDRAWING NORTHEAST IN THE GENERAL AREA OF SAARQUEMINES (Q-53). THREE DAYS LATER RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF 11 PANZER DIVISION WERE EMPLOYED TACTICALLY IN THE GENERAL AREA OF Q-33. ABOUT THIS TIME 21 PANZER DIVISION DIED UP AS AN INFORMATIVE SOURCE, BUT HINTS OF THE RETURN OF ANOTHER ARMORED DIVISION TO THE FRONT WERE DROPPED; 130 PANZER LEHR RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION WAS PROBING IN THE GENERAL AREA BETWEEN RIMSDORF (Q-53) AND BITCHE (Q-75). THE FORMATION CONTINUED ITS INTEREST IN THIS SECTOR UNTIL 26 NOVEMBER WHEN THE TRAFFIC INDICATED ITS AREA OF CONCERN TO BE FURTHER EAST ALONG THE NORTH FLANK OF XV CORPS' ADVANCE. DURING THE REMAINDER OF NOVEMBER BOTH THE 11 PANZER DIVISION AND 21 PANZER DIVISION CONTINUED THEIR UNEVENTFUL OPERATIONS IN THEIR ALREADY MENTIONED AREAS. AROUND THIS PERIOD, TOO, CERTAIN ISOLATED GROUPS WERE HEARD BROADCASTING FROM METZ. BY THE FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER MANY INDICATIONS OF 130 PANZER LEHR'S WITHDRAWAL TO THE EAST HAD APPEARED AND CONFIRMATORY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC DECODES ARRIVED WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE DIVISION WAS TO MOVE NORTH TO AN ASSEMBLY AREA. DURING THE FIRST HALF OF DECEMBER, THIRD ARMY FRONT WAS RELATIVELY QUIET, BUT RADIO INTELLIGENCE WAS ABLE TO ASSIST IN THE LOCATION OF 11 PANZER DIVISION IN XII CORPS' ZONE OF ADVANCE BEFORE GROUND CONTACT TOOK PLACE ON 4 DECEMBER, AND, ON 14 DECEMBER, TO DIS-

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COVER, AGAIN PRIOR TO GROUP CONTACT, THE SHIFT OF ELEMENTS OF 21 PANZER DIVISION BACK TO XV CORPS FRONT FROM THE XII CORPS' ZONE. ALL DURING THE ABOVE MENTIONED PERIOD, RADIO CONTACT INDICATED THAT THE GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN DIVISION, ESPECIALLY THE ARTILLERY ELEMENTS THEREOF, WAS OPPOSING OUR ADVANCE IN THE SAARGUEMINES SECTOR; ON ONE PARTICULAR OCCASION, A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF ONE MLR WAS INTERCEPTED AND DECODED. DESPITE THIS WORK, HOWEVER, THE PERIOD SINCE THE FIRST OF OCTOBER, WHEN 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION QUIETED DOWN, WAS COMPARATIVELY INACTIVE. IT REMAINED FOR THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER TO USHER IN THE VON RUNDSTEDT OFFENSIVE AND THE CONSEQUENT UPSWING IN PRODUCTIVE TRAFFIC.

THE AREA OF COMMITMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THIRD ARMY SHIFTED TO THE NORTH WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE VON RUNDSTEDT OFFENSIVE, AND AGAIN 130 PANZER LEHR BEGAN THE RADIO ACTIVITY FROM THAT SECTOR. ON DECEMBER 21 RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF THAT FORMATION INDICATED THEIR PRESENCE IN AND CONCERN WITH THE GENERAL AREA OF BASTOGNE (P-55). SHORTLY AFTER THIS, 5 PARA DIVISION BEGAN A PERIOD OF EXTREME PRODUCTIVITY DURING WHICH THEY TRANSMITTED CONTINUALLY IN PLAIN LANGUAGE REPORTING ON THE EFFORTS MADE BY AMERICAN FORCES TO STEM THE GERMAN ADVANCE. IN THE SECTOR NORTH OF THE SURE RIVER ON III CORPS FRONT TRAFFIC FROM THIS FORMATION INDICATED THAT IT WAS BEING SEVERELY PUNISHED BY OUR ATTACKS. THE ABSENCE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS WAS SEVERAL TIMES REPORTED IN ITS ENCOUNTER WITH THE AMERICAN

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4TH ARMORED DIVISION DRIVING TO RELIEVE THE ENCLOSED GARRISON IN BASTOGNE. ON 29 DECEMBER 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WAS PLACED BY GOOD DIRECTION FINDING RESULTS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF P-66. ANOTHER GROUP WHICH HAD ITS RADIO INTELLIGENCE INTRODUCTION DURING THIS PERIOD WAS 706 ARTILLERY CORPS (CHQ). DIRECTION FINDING HERE AGAIN PLACED ELEMENTS OF THIS FORMATION ON 30 DECEMBER IN WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS EAST AND WEST OF THE BASTOGNE SALIENT.

THE MONTH OF JANUARY, DURING WHICH THE BULGE COLLAPSED, REPRESENTED THE HIGHLY FRUITFUL PERIOD FOR RADIO INTELLIGENCE. THERE WERE FIVE PANZER DIVISIONS INITIALLY DISCOVERED IN NEW LOCATIONS BY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. CHIEF AMONG THESE WAS 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WHICH MOVED EAST OF BASTOGNE ON 12 JANUARY, NORTH TO VII CORPS FRONT ON 14 JANUARY, AND THEN STILL FURTHER EAST TO HACHVILLE (P-76) ON 17 JANUARY. 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION WAS DISCOVERED SHIFTING EAST TOWARD XII CORPS' FRONT ON THE 16TH OF THE MONTH JUST BEFORE IT WAS CONTACTED IN THE DIEKIRCH (P-84) SECTOR. ON 28 JANUARY ELEMENTS OF THE DAS REICH DIVISION WERE IDENTIFIED AT PELM (L-28). ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN RECURRENT PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS THAT THIS FORMATION HAD GONE TO THE RUSSIAN FRONT, THESE ELEMENTS WERE CONTACTED AS PREDICTED, A FEW DAYS LATER. DESPITE THE NATURAL CONCERN WITH THE LUXEMBOURG-BELGIAN FRONT, THIRD ARMY'S RADIO INTELLIGENCE WAS ABLE ON THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY TO REPORT THE EXISTENCE OF 21 PANZER DIVISION

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AND 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION ON XV CORPS' FRONT, FAR TO THE SOUTH IN SEVENTH ARMY'S AREA. 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD IN THE ROLE OF A RELIABLE INFORMER REPORTING MLR'S OF THEIR OWN FORMATION, THE STRENGTH OF GERMAN ANTI-TANK EMPLACEMENTS IN THE AREA OF FLANIZOULLE (P-46), AND VARIOUS OTHER DATA. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, THE TRAFFIC YIELDED INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITS OTHER THAN THE DIVISION ITSELF. ON 14 JANUARY, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMAND POST OF 1128 REGIMENT OF 560 INFANTRY DIVISION WAS REVEALED TO BE AT THE NORTHEAST EXIT OF DINEZ (P-46); THE COMMAND POST OF RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION ITSELF WAS LOCATED ON 17 JANUARY IN HACHIVILLE. OTHER SCRAPS OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO SPECIFIC LOCATIONS INCLUDED THE PINPOINTING OF THE 766 ARTILLERY CORPS (GHQ) ON TWO DIFFERENT OCCASIONS: ON 15 JANUARY IT WAS LOCATED AT BRACHTENBACK (P-66) AND EXACTLY ONE WEEK LATER HAD MOVED TO KOXHAUSEN (P-95). BY THE LAST WEEK IN JANUARY GERMAN RADIO ACTIVITY WAS ON THE DOWNGRADE ONCE AGAIN WITH ONLY THE ALREADY MENTIONED ELEMENTS OF 2 SS PANZER DIVISION (PROBABLY 4 SS PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT) ACTIVE TO ANY DEGREE AS THEY DETAILED THE PREPARATIONS FOR AN INTENDED MOVE, PRESUMABLY TO THE EASTERN FRONT.

AS THE CRISIS OF THE BULGE PASSED, THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD WAS CHARACTERIZED CHIEFLY BY THE ALMOST COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF GERMAN ARMOR FROM THE THIRD ARMY FRONT, WITH

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A RESULTING DECLINE IN INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM ENEMY RADIO TRAFFIC. PAINSTAKING ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND GOOD DIRECTION FINDING, HOWEVER, ENABLED RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO KEEP 11 PANZER DIVISION IDENTIFIED AND LOCATED DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE MONTH (WHEN GROUND CONTACT WAS OFTEN INCONCLUSIVE) IN A WIDE AREA AROUND SAARBURG (L-11). DURING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME PERIOD, IT WAS FURTHER POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE PRESENCE OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF 130 PANZER LEHR IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AREA OF BITBURG (L-15) AGAIN WHEN GROUND SOURCES COULD NOT REACH THAT FAR BEHIND THE LINES. SOME SCRAPS OF INFORMATION, MOREOVER, WERE GAINED FROM 766 ARTILLERY CORPS (GHQ), THEN ON FIRST ARMY FRONT, AND FROM THE BADLY BEATEN 5 PARA DIVISION. ON 16 FEBRUARY THAT FORMATION'S SUPPLY AND REPAIR DEPOT WAS DETERMINED TO BE IN SALM (L-27), DIRECTLY IN THIRD ARMY'S ZONE OF ADVANCE.

DIRECT CONFIRMATION OF THE TRANSFER OF ONE GERMAN PANZER DIVISION TO THE EASTERN FRONT WAS OBTAINED THROUGH THE INTERCEPTION AND READING OF ENCIPHERED TRAFFIC PASSED BY 21 PANZER DIVISION ON 17 FEBRUARY WHEN ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA OF GORLITZ (B-08) WAS ESTABLISHED. THIS STANDS AS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL SUCH INSTANCES, WHEN RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WERE FORCED TO EXTEND THEIR INTEREST FAR BEYOND AN ARMY ZONE BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING FLUIDITY AND COMPRESSION OF THE BATTLE FRONTS.

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DURING THE LATTER PART OF FEBRUARY THE VARIETY OF MISCELLANEOUS TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED AND THE OVERALL LOW LEVEL OF RADIO ACTIVITY REFLECTED THE GRADUAL DISINTEGRATION OF GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS AND THE COMMITMENT OF MISCELLANEOUS LOW ECHELON UNITS WITH LITTLE OR NO RADIO EQUIPMENT. THE TACTICAL SITUATION FROM THEN ON WAS AT NEARLY ALL TIMES ONE OF EXTREME FLUIDITY. THE DESPERATE PLIGHT OF A FLAK FORMATION OPERATING SOUTH OF TRIER (L-22) WAS DETAILED IN PLAIN LANGUAGE ON 1 MARCH, AS THE 10TH ARMORED DIVISION SWEEP TOWARD THAT CITY, AND THIS FRAGMENT OF INTELLIGENCE MAY BE CONSIDERED AS CHARACTERISTIC OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE IN THE SUBSEQUENT THREE OR FOUR WEEKS. THERE WERE MANY SUCH ISOLATED BITS AND PIECES OF INFORMATION OBTAINED; THE COMMAND POST OF WHAT WAS PROBABLY THE 537 FLAK BATTALION WAS ESTABLISHED ON 3 MARCH TO BE IN SCHLEICH (L-33); THE REAPPEARANCE ON THE FRONT OF A RAILROAD GUN AND THE TRACING OF ITS SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT ABOUT 9 MARCH; A DETAILED REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE RHINE BRIDGES AROUND MAINZ (M-35) ON 18 MARCH; AND FREQUENT MESSAGES OF DESPERATION FROM UNITS FACING ENVELOPMENT IN THE CRUMBLING LINE OF THE RHINE PALATINATE. NUMEROUS FLAK FORMATIONS WERE IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR, THESE HAVING BEEN COMMITTED AS ARTILLERY UNITS. AROUND 5 MARCH THE ALLIED ADVANCE WEST OF PELM (L-28) AGAIN RENDERED THE POSITION OF 5 PARA DIVISION UNTENABLE; IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE DIVISION'S AXIS OF WITHDRAWAL WAS FROM GONDELSHEIM (L-18) TOWARD PELM AND THAT, AS USUAL, IT WAS SUFFERING FROM LACK OF INFORMATION.

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TRAFFIC FROM FIRST ARMY FRONT SERVED TO KEEP EVERYONE WELL INFORMED ON THE SITUATION THERE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE LOQUACIOUS RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS OF 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION WERE SENDING MOST OF IT. THERE WERE THE USUAL DETAILED REPORTS AS THEY INVESTIGATED THE REMAGEN BRIDGE-HEAD AREA, AND, ON 20 MARCH, A PROJECTED ATTACK IN THE WALFELD (F-83) - OBERPLEIS (F-83) AREA. REGIMENT 958 OF 363 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION (PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED THERE) WAS COMPROMISED.

THE NEAR CONVERGENCE OF THE WESTERN AND EASTERN FRONTS, CONSEQUENT UPON THE SMASHING DRIVES OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES DEEP INTO GERMANY IN THE MONTH OF APRIL, RESULTED IN A MUCH MORE FREQUENT INTERCEPTION OF GERMAN UNITS FACING THE RUSSIAN FORCES. IT WAS NATURALLY OF INTEREST TO KEEP INFORMED ON THESE UNITS, BECAUSE MOST OF THEM WERE CAPABLE OF BEING QUICKLY SHIFTED TO THE WEST. TRAFFIC IN THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL FROM 9 SS-PANZER RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION INDICATED THAT FORMATION WAS OPERATING ALONG THE DANUBE WEST AND NORTHWEST OF VIENNA, AND ON 20 APRIL, 21 PANZER RECONNAISSANCE WAS REPORTING FROM AN AREA SOUTHEAST OF BERLIN (Z-75). ON THE LAST DAY OF THE MONTH, THERE WAS GOOD EVIDENCE THAT 10 SS PANZER DIVISION AND THE FUHRER ESCORT DIVISION WERE ACTIVE AROUND CUNNERSDORF (A-11).

ONE INFORMATIVE UNIT ON THE FRONT WAS AGAIN THE GERMAN 5 PARA DIVISION WHICH ON 10 APRIL GAVE SPECIFIC AND EXTEN-

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SIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE STATUS OF BRIDGES IN THE VICINITY OF LUTJENHAUSEN (C-73), ANNOUNCING THAT IT HAD LOST CONTACT WITH ITS "RIGHT NEIGHBOR", AND RECORDING THE "DISENGAGEMENT" OF GERMAN TANKS IN THAT AREA. ANOTHER WELL KNOWN FORMATION, 11 PANZER DIVISION, REAPPEARED ON 26 APRIL ON XII CORPS FRONT IN THE AREA OF ROSSHaupt (P-43) AND REVEALED ITS ASSOCIATION WITH AN ENGINEER BRIGADE WHOSE COMMAND POST WAS GIVEN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY AS BRAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA (P-44).

INTERMITTENTLY THROUGHOUT THE MONTH RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WERE ABLE, THROUGH DIRECTION FINDING, TO TRACE THE WITHDRAWAL BEFORE PRESSURE OF ELEMENTS OF THE 2 PANZER DIVISION, ONE OF THE OTHER PANZER DIVISIONS THEN ON THIRD ARMY FRONT.

IN TWO INSTANCES INTERCEPTED MESSAGES INDICATED THE GERMAN INTENTIONS TO DEFEND ALONG A RIVER LINE--EARLY IN THE MONTH, ALONG THE FULDA, NEAR KASSEL (C-20), WHERE AN ENEMY OBSERVATION BATTALION REPORTED ON GERMAN TANKS MOVING IN--AND LATER IN THE MONTH, ALONG THE ISAR, WHERE "ALL ARTILLERY AND EVEN FLAK" WAS TO BE USED, WITH SOME INDEPENDENT UNITS SUBORDINATED TO 38 SS ARTILLERY REGIMENT "FOR THE PURPOSE OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF FIRE."

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GERMAN RECOGNITION OF THE AMERICAN UNAGGRESSIVE INTENTION, IN PART OF THE 11 PANZER DIVISION SECTOR, WAS REVEALED IN MESSAGES REPORTING THAT

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AMERICANS "ARE NOT PUSHING FURTHER" AND ARE RINGING TOWNS WITH TANKS AS "SECURITY".

THE CRUMBLING OF ENEMY OPPOSITION ALSO ENABLED THE BAVARIAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT, IN THE MUNICH (V-85) AREA, TO GET ON THE AIR AND BROADCAST FROM THAT SS STRONGHOLD TO AMERICAN HELD GERMANY MANY ITEMS OF BOTH TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE: THE WILLINGNESS OF THE PEOPLE AND SOME OF THE SOLDIERS IN LINZ (V-88) TO SURRENDER, THE CLEARING OF TANK BARRIERS FROM CERTAIN BAVARIAN HIGHWAYS TO FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF AMERICAN TROOPS, THE "CAPTURE" OF CERTAIN TOWNS TO BE TURNED OVER TO THE AMERICANS, THE ASSEMBLY POINT FOR JAPANESE DIPLOMATS FLEEING GERMANY, THE ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY THE WAFFEN SS OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE AND PARATROOPERS, THE PREPARATION OF A STATEMENT ABOUT HITLER'S HEROIC DEATH IN BERLIN, THE RUSSIAN ENCOURAGED REVOLTS AGAINST GERMANS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE AIMS OF THE BAVARIAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT, AND THE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW GERMAN NAVAL PERSONNEL AND THE SOLDIERS POCKETED IN THE ATLANTIC PORTS AND ISLANDS SHOULD SURRENDER. THIS INFORMATION, PLUS MUCH OF LESSER IMPORTANCE, WAS GAINED BY 29 APRIL.

BY THE END OF APRIL, THE ENTIRE TACTICAL SITUATION HAD BECOME SO FLUID THAT INTERCEPTION OF TRAFFIC FROM OTHER ARMY AREAS WAS QUITE COMMON AND EVEN SOMETIMES NECESSARY. UNITS ON FIRST AND SEVENTH ARMY FRONTS (PARTICULARLY 130 PANZER LEHR AND 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION,

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INTERCEPTED EARLIER IN THE MONTH IN THE BUNR POCKET) WERE FREQUENTLY HEARD, AND ON ONE OCCASION ARTILLERY TRAFFIC OF 11 PARA CORPS ARTILLERY FROM THE FIRST CANADIAN FRONT WAS READ. IN MANY INSTANCES, MOREOVER, THE REPORTS ON OUR OWN ADVANCES, GIVEN IN THE GERMAN TRAFFIC, WERE THE QUICKEST AND MOST RELIABLE MEANS OF OBTAINING C-3 INFORMATION, SO CONFUSED WAS THE PICTURE AT TIMES.

THEN IN THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR, THE CO-MINGLING OF THE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN FRONTS BROUGHT THE EXPECTED SHIFT OF SOME PANZER DIVISIONS INTO THE AMERICAN ZONE OF ADVANCE. DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN MAY, BY THE COORDINATED USE OF DIRECTION FINDING AND READING OF TRAFFIC, RADIO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WERE ABLE TO DISCOVER THE MOVEMENT OF ELEMENTS OF THE 2 SS PANZER DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF LINZ (V-88) AND 9 SS PANZER DIVISION ON XX CORPS' FRONT. DURING THAT SAME CLIMATIC PERIOD, SIMILAR MEANS INDICATED THE DEPLOYMENT OF 11 PANZER DIVISION AND 2 PANZER DIVISION ON THE FLANK OF XII CORPS, RANGING FROM THE P-51 SQUARE TO U-99, SOUTHWEST OF PILSEN (L-24).

EXCEPT FOR THE RADIO REPORTS FROM PRAGUE (L-78), DESCRIBING THE POST-SURRENDER FIGHTING THERE AND REQUESTING ALLIED HELP, THE REAL FUNCTIONS OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS ENDED WITH THE GERMAN CAPITULATION. BEFORE 9 MAY, HOWEVER, ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC, IN PLAIN LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE PROCESS OF SURRENDER, WAS INTERCEPTED FROM ITALY AND FROM NORTHERN GERMANY, AS ACK 10 AND ACK 14 BEGAN TO PUT AWAY THE TOOLS OF WAR. EXTENSIVE MONITORING OF ALL THE SURRENDER

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NETS WAS CARRIED ON WELL INTO THE SUMMER; THE TRAFFIC WAS ALL SENT IN THE CLEAR AND WAS CONCERNED WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS CONNECTED WITH THE DISBANDING OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES. AS OF 15 JULY NO REAL EVIDENCE OF CLANDESTINE RADIO COMMUNICATION HAD COME TO LIGHT, AND THE FUNCTION OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE IN THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE DATE OF SURRENDER MAY BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN CHIEFLY PRECAUTIONARY.

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#### IV. CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTIONS

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN FAULTS FOUND WITH RADIO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THIRD ARMY DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF WESTERN EUROPE:

1. THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AT ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS HAD A PURELY TECHNICAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS AT ARMY AND CORPS LEVEL.
2. THE TYPE OF TRAFFIC THAT THE ARMY AND CORPS RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS WERE PERMITTED TO PROCESS WAS NOT OF HIGH ENOUGH GRADE COMMENSURATE TO THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE INFORMATION MUST BE EMPLOYED.
3. THE TRAINING, PARTICULARLY IN VOICE INTERCEPTION, WAS INADEQUATE.
4. THE DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT WAS NOT SUITABLE.
5. THE ABSENCE OF A PROPERLY TRAINED SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN THE G-2 SECTION OF CORPS AND ARMY WAS EVIDENT.
6. A PROVISION IN THE T/O & E FOR THE ARMY SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANIES SHOULD BE MADE TO INCLUDE MESSAGE CENTER PERSONNEL.
7. INADEQUATE WIRE TEAMS AT CORPS SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES HANDICAPPED COMMUNICATIONS FOR DIRECTION FINDING AND OTHER OPERATIONAL NECESSITIES.
8. THE INTERFERENCE OF ROUTINE HOUSE-KEEPING DUTIES WITH



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NECESSARY OPERATIONS AT TIMES CONFLICTED WITH SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS.

9. THE ABSENCE OF A DEFINITE OPERATIONS OFFICER IN COMPLETE CHARGE OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMPANY OCCASIONALLY CAUSED CONFLICT IN AUTHORITY IN VARIOUS OPERATIONAL SECTIONS.

THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE FOR FUTURE PLANNING OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE IN TACTICAL SITUATIONS.

1. THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER EACH ARMY SHOULD BE ORGANIZED INTO A BATTALION WITH SMALL COMPANIES OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME SIZE AS THE PRESENT SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY (RADIO INTELLIGENCE) AT CORPS LEVEL, AND WITH A LARGER COMPANY, SOMEWHAT LARGER THAN THE PRESENT RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY, AT ARMY LEVEL ALONG WITH THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS. THIS WOULD MORE EASILY PERMIT THE SHIFT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AS THE SITUATION WARRANTED, AND WOULD ALSO GIVE A MUCH CLOSER AND MORE FLUID RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VARIOUS UNITS WORKING ON THE SAME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN THE ARMY. PERSONNEL COULD BE CHANGED, WITHIN THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, TO BOLSTER WEAK OR INCAPABLE TEAMS TO INCREASE THEIR EFFICIENCY.

2. AT CORPS LEVEL THE PRIMARY MISSIONS SHOULD BE TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE FROM LOW GRADE TRAFFIC, THAT IS PLAIN TEXT, AND LOW GRADE CIPHER AND CODE SYSTEMS; THE SECONDARY MISSION SHOULD BE TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE FROM MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC.

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AT ARMY LEVEL THE PRIMARY MISSION SHOULD BE MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC WITH THE SECONDARY MISSION OF LOW GRADE TRAFFIC.

IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC WILL BE BROKEN AT CORPS LEVEL, HOWEVER, CORPS UNITS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ATTEMPT TO HANDLE SUCH TRAFFIC, ESPECIALLY WHEN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS GIVE THEM THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPROMISE THE ENEMY MATERIAL. LOW GRADE TRAFFIC IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO CORPS, IS OF SLIGHTLY LESS VALUE TO ARMY FROM THE TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, AND IS OF NO VALUE TO ARMY GROUP. MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC WOULD BE OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE TO THE ARMY COMMANDER IF IT WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. BY PROPERLY ORGANIZING THE ARMY CRYPTANALYSTIC SECTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PLATOON MUCH SUCCESS WOULD BE REALIZED FROM ATTEMPTS ON THE ENEMY'S MEDIUM GRADE SYSTEMS.

3. PERSONNEL WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE SPOKEN LANGUAGES OF THE ENEMY MUST BE TRAINED IN RADIO TELEPHONY INTERCEPTION. THESE VOICE INTERCEPT OPERATORS SHOULD HAVE AN EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTRICACIES OF VHF AND MEDIUM FREQUENCY RADIO TELEPHONY OPERATIONS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO TAKE A SOLDIER WHO IS A GOOD RADIO OPERATOR AND EXPECT HIM TO BECOME A FLUENT LINGUIST IN A SHORT TIME, AND NEITHER IS IT EXPECTED THAT A GOOD LINGUIST AND RADIO OPERATOR WILL MAKE A SUITABLE RADIO TELEPHONY OPERATOR. SPECIFIC TRAINING MUST BE DEVISED TO MAKE RADIO TELEPHONY OPERATORS COMPLETE AND SEPARATE FROM CONTINUOUS WAVE OPERATORS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERCEPTION.



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4. ON THE WHOLE, THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDED THE COMPANIES FOR OPERATIONS WAS ADEQUATE; HOWEVER, THE MAJOR FAULT WAS IN DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT. IT IS NECESSARY THAT EACH CORPS COMPANY BE EQUIPPED WITH TWO DIRECTION FINDING SETS WHICH CAN QUICKLY BE PUT INTO OPERATION, AND SENSITIVE AND ACCURATE ENOUGH TO OBTAIN A SHARP BEARING ON STATION TRANSMITTERS UP TO FIFTY MILES AWAY. THIS MOBILE EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO AS TO PROVIDE THE PERSONNEL WITH FACILITIES FOR BOTH RADIO AND WIRE CONTROL OF DIRECTION FINDING.

THE EQUIPMENT FOR THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE TWO MOBILE DIRECTION FINDERS OF THE SAME TYPE AS THAT RECOMMENDED ABOVE; HOWEVER, IN ADDITION, THE ARMY COMPANY SHOULD HAVE THREE SEMI-FIXED DIRECTION FINDERS. THESE MUST BE CAPABLE OF TAKING ACCURATE BEARINGS ON TRANSMITTERS UP TO TWO HUNDRED MILES AWAY. THERE SHOULD LIKEWISE BE, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES FOR WIRE AND RADIO CONTROL.

BOTH TYPES OF DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT SHOULD COVER A FREQUENCY BAND FROM APPROXIMATELY 500 KILOCYCLES TO 6000 KILOCYCLES. AT CORPS LEVEL THERE SHOULD ALSO BE ONE EASILY PORTABLE DIRECTION FINDING SET FOR VHF WORK.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE SCR 291 WITH ONLY SLIGHT MODIFICATION OF THE SCR 255 (MOUNTED IN A THREE QUARTER TON WEAPONS CARRIER OR IN A TRAILER) WOULD BE VERY SATISFACTORY FOR THE MOBILE SET, AND THAT SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE SCR 504 WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR VHF.

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6. A COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON MUST BE INCORPORATED INTO THE ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE WIRE, RADIO, MESSENGER, AND MESSAGE CENTER FACILITIES TO COORDINATE ALL RADIO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE ARMY. THE ARMY COMPANY WOULD ACT AS THE NET CONTROL STATION IN THE TELETYPE AND RADIO NETS, WOULD SORT AND DELIVER TRAFFIC TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, AND DISTRIBUTE REPORTS GOING UP THROUGH CHANNELS AS WELL AS THOSE COMING DOWN. EXTREME CARE MUST BE EXERCISED BY THE PERSONNEL DOING THIS WORK AS THE MATERIAL HANDLED IS OF AN EXTREMELY SECRET CLASSIFICATION.

7. A WIRE TEAM SHOULD BE PROVIDED CORPS SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANIES ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN WIRE COMMUNICATION TO TWO DIRECTION FINDING TEAMS LOCATED ON A BASE LINE OF APPROXIMATELY UP TO TWENTY FIVE MILES. THIS TEAMS' FIRST FUNCTION, OF COURSE, SHOULD BE TO INSTALL AND MAINTAIN COMPANY LOCALS, LINES TO CORPS, AND DIRECTION FINDING STATIONS.

8. IF POSSIBLE, A PLATOON FOR THE PURPOSE OF GUARD AND OTHER COMPANY DUTIES SHOULD BE ATTACHED OR ASSIGNED TO EACH UNIT. BECAUSE OF THE MENTAL STRAIN OF THE WORK BEING DONE BY THE OPERATIONAL SECTIONS OF THE COMPANY, A GREAT LIFT COULD BE GIVEN TO A MAN'S WORKING EFFICIENCY IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE PROSPECT OF PULLING GUARD AFTER A FULL TRICK, OR OF BEING TAKEN OFF A SET IN ORDER TO DO SOME FATIGUE DETAIL. IT IS QUITE DIFFICULT CALLING A MAN ESSENTIAL AT HIS JOB ONLY TO PUT HIM ON KP THE FOLLOWING DAY.

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V. ANNEX: HISTORY OF MAJOR GERMAN UNITS INVOLVED IN  
RADIO INTELLIGENCE:

- A. 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION
- B. 11 PANZER DIVISION
- C. 2 PANZER DIVISION
- D. 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

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RADIO INTELLIGENCE:

- A. 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION
- B. 11 PANZER DIVISION
- C. 2 PANZER DIVISION
- D. 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

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130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION

THE STORY OF 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION, AS SEEN FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE, IS ONE OF INTERMITTENT PRODUCTIVE PERIODS, INTERRUPTED BY GREAT BLANK SPACES WHEN THE DIVISION HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THE FRONT OR WAS OUT OF CONTACT ALTOGETHER. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, TOO, THAT SUCH A RESUME AS THIS, WRITTEN AT ARMY LEVEL, IS CHIEFLY DRAWN FROM THE RESULTS OF LOW GRADE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS; MUCH OF THE PERTINENT PART OF THE UNIT'S CONTRIBUTION TO RADIO INTELLIGENCE IS CONTAINED IN THE DECIPHERMENTS OF ITS MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC.

THE INITIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RADIO NETS OF PANZER LEHR PRECEDED THIRD ARMY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO THE CAMPAIGN, FOR THE MIDDLE OF JULY IN NORMANDY BROUGHT THE ATTENTION OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO BEAR ON THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THIS FORMATION. THE FIRST REAL INFORMATION CAME FROM DIRECTION FINDING (A MEANS OFTEN EMPLOYED AGAINST THE DIVISION TO GREAT PROFIT THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN), WHEN ON 25 JULY, ELEMENTS OF THE PANZER JAEGER BATTALION WERE SPOTTED APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES NORTHEAST OF MARIGNY (T-46) AND THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, FROM SIMILAR EVIDENCE, WAS CONCLUDED TO BE ROUGHLY IN THE SAME AREA. FROM THEN UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER, THE INTELLIGENCE GLEANED FROM PANZER LEHR WAS LARGELY THE TRACING OF ITS GENERAL EASTWARD MOVE BY PERSISTENT DIRECTION FINDING.

BY 30 JULY SOME DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS HAD DROPPED BACK A

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LITTLE TO THE VICINITY OF TESSY (T-54), WITH ALL THE VARIOUS SUB-UNITS ACTIVE ON THE AIR. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BREAK-THROUGH PUSHED THE FORMATION STILL FURTHER BACK AND ON 2 AUGUST ONE SCRAP OF INTELLIGENCE WAS DISCOVERED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 1ST BATTALION HEADQUARTERS WAS AT CHAMPEON (Y-87), 6 MILES NORTH OF MAYENNE (Y-77). DIRECTION FINDING ON 6 AUGUST GAVE INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE SOUTHWARD SHIFT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS, BUT UNTIL THE 13TH OF THE SAME MONTH THE LOW LEVEL OF THE DIVISION'S RADIO ACTIVITY DID NOT LEND ITSELF TO ANY FURTHER CONCLUSIONS.

ON 13 AUGUST IT BECAME APPARENT THAT RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS WERE PROBING TO THE EASTWARD AS THE "FALAISE GAP" BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE, THE DIVISION HAVING BEEN FORCED BACK TO THE NORTH BY THIRD ARMY'S SWING SOUTH AND EAST. IT MAY BE MENTIONED HERE THAT THE RADIO ACTIVITY OF THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION WERE CLOSELY WATCHED AT THIS TIME, FOR, OF COURSE, THE WORK OF RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS INDICATED, AS A GENERAL RULE, THE ANTICIPATED AREA OF CONCERN OF THE ENTIRE FORMATION. THE EXPECTED DRIFT EASTWARD TOOK SHAPE AND, ON 18 AUGUST, THERE WAS SOME SLIGHT EVIDENCE OF A BATTALION COMMAND POST HAVING BEEN LOCATED AT CHATEAU CHAMPREMONT (Z-28). THE DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS, AS LOCATED BY THE DIRECTION FINDERS, WERE RATHER WIDELY SEPARATED, SOME DEEP IN THE POCKET AND OTHERS JUST NORTHEAST OF THE ARGENTAN (U-21) CORNER. THE 19TH OF AUGUST SAW THE RECONNAISSANCE GROUPS PRETTY DEFINITELY MOVING EAST TO LISIEUX (Q-58), AND ON 24 AUGUST,

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901 PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT, ON FAIRLY GOOD EVIDENCE, WAS LOCATED ON THE EAST BANK OF THE SEINE, SOMEWHAT NORTHWEST OF PARIS. AN EVENT OF TACTICAL IMPORTANCE WAS NOTED ON 27 AUGUST, WHEN THE 1ST BATTALION OF 901 PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE ESTABLISHED A RADIO LINK WITH SOME UNKNOWN ELEMENT (POSSIBLY 11 PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT) OF 9 PANZER DIVISION. RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS GAVE EVIDENCE OF A GRADUAL MOVE TO THE SOUTHEAST OF PARIS AND REVEALED SOME OF THE OTHER UNITS WITH WHICH THE DIVISION WAS WORKING, INQUIRING ABOUT THE AREA OF THE 277 INFANTRY DIVISION AND CALLING FOR THE COMMANDER OF WHAT WAS CONCLUDED TO BE THE 48 INFANTRY DIVISION. WITH ITS ELEMENTS, OR BETTER, ITS REMNANTS, STILL IN CONTACT, 130 PANZER LEHR'S RADIO ACTIVITY KEPT RADIO INTELLIGENCE INFORMED OF ITS GENERAL EASTERLY PATH, AND, ON 30 AUGUST, SUPPLY ELEMENTS WERE IDENTIFIED IN MONTIGNY (O-90), ABOUT FIVE MILES SOUTHWEST OF STENAY (P-10). THE DIVISION BY THIS TIME WAS SCATTERED AND BADLY MAULED, YET KEEPING UP AN APPEARANCE OF ACTIVITY ON THE AIR; ALL THROUGH THIS PERIOD, TO THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER, IT WAS NEVER POSSIBLE TO BE SURE OF ITS STRENGTH.

THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER SAW REMNANTS OF 130 PANZER LEHR DEPLOYED IN A SOMEWHAT ELONGATED POSITION NORTH OF VERDUN (U-26) AND JUST SOUTH OF THE BELGIAN BORDER. A COMBAT GROUP "HAUSER" WAS NOW KNOWN IN THE DIVISION. ON 5 SEPTEMBER TRAFFIC FROM RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS EMPLOYED A MAP SYSTEM, THE REFERENCES IN WHICH GAVE INDICATIONS OF A SHIFT OF INTEREST TO THE NORTH. THE FOLLOWING DAY, RESULTS OF DIRECTION FINDING PUT THE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION HEAD-

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QUARTERS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF BASTOGNE (P-55), NEAR THE BOUNDARY OF FIRST AND THIRD ARMIES.

AT THIS POINT, ONE OF THE ALREADY MENTIONED "BLANK SPACES" OCCURS IN THE THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF PANZER LEHR, FOR, AFTER OPERATING A SHORT WHILE ON FIRST ARMY FRONT AND THEN RETIRING FROM CONTACT, THE DIVISION'S NEXT APPEARANCE ON THE AIR WAS MADE ON THE 25TH OF NOVEMBER; A FAIRLY COMPLETE OVERHAULING AND REFURBISHING HAD, OF COURSE, TAKEN PLACE BEFORE THE FORMATION KNOWN AS 130 PANZER LEHR COULD GO INTO THE LINE. THIS TIME, THE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AS USUAL WERE MUCH IN EVIDENCE, REPORTING ON THE THEN STABILIZED FRONT RUNNING SOUTH, ROUGHLY ALONG THE GERMAN BORDER; THE AREA OF CONCERN IN THIS REAPPEARANCE WAS AROUND SARRE-UNION (Q-53), SHIFTING LATER, TO THE EAST AND NORTH-EAST BETWEEN RIMS DORF (Q-53) AND BITCHE (Q-75). DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS WERE PLACED BY DIRECTION FINDING ALONG THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN XII AND XIV CORPS, SO THAT ONCE AGAIN PANZER LEHR WAS STRADDLING THE FENCE BETWEEN TWO ARMIES, SEEMINGLY ITS FAVORITE POSITION. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY NET WAS LOCATED BY SIMILAR MEANS ON 27 NOVEMBER IN A GENERAL AREA NORTHEAST OF BITCHE, BUT BY 3 DECEMBER A SHIFT IN POSITION TO THE NORTHEAST WAS INDICATED WHEN THIS SAME GROUP APPEARED SOMEWHAT SOUTH OF PIRMASSENS (Q-96). THE SIMILAR AND SUSPICIOUS WITHDRAWAL TO THE EAST OF RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS AT THE SAME TIME WAS CAUSING SOME SPECULATION, WHEN INFORMATION GAINED FROM THE HIGHER GRADE TRAFFIC PASSED

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BY THE FORMATION INDICATED THE PROSPECTIVE MOVE OF THE DIVISION TO THE NORTH TO AN ASSEMBLY AREA. THE MOVE OCCURRED AND AGAIN THE UNIT DRIFTED AWAY FROM THIRD ARMY FRONT AND THEM OFF THE AIR.

THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES RESUMED CONTACT WITH THEIR OLD ACQUAINTANCE ON 21 DECEMBER WHEN, ONCE AGAIN, THE VOICES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS WERE HEARD DELINEATING THE GERMAN ADVANCES OF THE VON RUNDSTEDT OFFENSIVE. THEIR PARTICULAR AREA OF INTEREST WAS THE SECTOR TO THE WEST OF BASTOGNE (P-55). TRAFFIC AT THIS TIME INDICATED THAT KUNZ WAS PROBABLY THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE DIVISION. THE FORMATION'S RADIO ACTIVITY WAS FAIRLY EXTENSIVE FOR THE SIX WEEKS AND RELATIVELY PRODUCTIVE OVER THAT PERIOD; 130 PANZER LEHR WAS APPARENTLY IN GOOD STRENGTH.

ON 24 DECEMBER A REPAIR UNIT OF THE DIVISION WAS LOCATED TO THE EAST OF BASTOGNE AT P-80; ELEMENTS OF 130 PANZER WERE THEN DEPLOYED BOTH TO THE EAST AND TO THE WEST OF BASTOGNE; FOR SEVERAL DAYS, DIRECTION FINDING TURNED UP ONE UNIDENTIFIED GROUP IN THE P-46 SQUARE AND ANOTHER WELL TO THE EAST IN THE P-78 SQUARE. FOR THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF JANUARY, A STATION IN THE SUPPLY NET WAS KNOWN TO BE JUST NORTHEAST OF CLERF (P-86). ON THE 11TH AND 12TH OF THE MONTH THREE OTHER STATIONS (OF WHOM POSITIVE IDENTIFICATIONS NEVER COULD BE MADE) WERE LOCATED BY GONIOMETRY; ONE NORTH OF ORTHO (P-47); ANOTHER, JUST SOUTH OF HACHVILLE (P-76); AND THE THIRD IN THE GENERAL AREA SOUTHWEST OF HOUFFALIZE (P-67).

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INCREASING ALLIED PRESSURE BROUGHT THE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS FORWARD AGAIN ON 16 JANUARY AS THEY MOVED OVER ON TO XII CORPS' SECTOR TO THE SOUTH AND EAST OF HOUFFALIZE; THE RADIO REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE VICINITY OF NOVILLE (P-56) WAS THE CENTER OF ATTENTION.

AFTER A SLIGHT MOVE EASTWARD BY AN UNIDENTIFIED PART OF THE DIVISION ON 18 JANUARY, THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE AS OF 20 JANUARY SHOWED PANZER LEHR ONCE AGAIN WIDELY DEPLOYED; ONE ELEMENT WAS AS FAR WEST AS UFLINGEN (P-77), AND ANOTHER AS FAR EAST AS HASBORN (L-46). BY 23 JANUARY SOME REAR ECHELON GROUPS OF THE DIVISION HAD COME TO REST IN THE AREA OF BITBURG (L-15). ON THE SAME DAY INTEREST OF THE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION HAD EXTENDED AS FAR SOUTHEAST AS KARLSHAUSEN (P-95). TWO DAYS LATER, HOWEVER, HINTS OF A POSSIBLE EASTWARD MOVEMENT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE ADMINISTRATION FORCES APPEARED. ON THE 27TH AN UNIDENTIFIED SUB-UNIT GAVE ITS LOCATION AS ABOUT TWO MILES SOUTH OF BLEIALF (P-98), SHOWING A RETREAT TO THE EAST. FURTHER INDICATIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORMATION FROM THE LINE CAME ON 1 FEBRUARY, WHEN A DIVISIONAL ELEMENT WAS LOCATED NEAR ROHL (L-14), SOUTH OF BITBURG, AND ABOUT TWELVE TO FIFTEEN MILES BEHIND THE LINES. APPARENTLY THE DIVISION WAS ASSEMBLING IN THAT GENERAL VICINITY. FURTHER, AND FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, FINAL CONFIRMATION OF THIS CAME ON 3 FEBRUARY, WITH THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE PANZER ENGINEER BATTALION IN THE SAME AREA, AND THE DIVISION, NOW TOTALLY OUT OF GROUND CONTACT, WAS PRESUMABLY RETIRED TO A RESERVE STATUS.

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ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY 130 PANZER LEHR, AFTER A MINIMUM OF RADIO ACTIVITY, FINALLY WAS NO LONGER IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR BY THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS UNTIL ITS REAPPEARANCE ON FIRST ARMY FRONT, WHEN A FEW SCATTERED TRANSMISSIONS WERE INTERCEPTED. ON 25 MARCH THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS PICKED UP, DIRECTING FIRE ON LESCHIED (F-73), AND AGAIN ON THE 26TH THIS SAME ELEMENT WAS HEARD EXPRESSING ITS INTEREST IN THE SECTOR AROUND WEYERBUSCH (F-83). SUCH WERE THE LAST FLEETING ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN THIS FORMATION AND THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE. 130 PANZER LEHR WAS THEN ON ITS FINAL MARCH INTO THE RUHR POCKET, AS THE AMERICAN ARMIES ENCIRCLED THE GERMAN FORCES IN THE WEST, AND BY THE MIDDLE OF APRIL, 1945, THE DIVISION NO LONGER EXISTED.

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CONTINUED TO CONFIRM THE PRESENCE OF THE DIVISION ON THE SOUTHERN PART OF THIRD ARMY FRONT.

UP TO THE END OF OCTOBER THERE EXISTED TECHNICAL <sup>what?</sup> METHODS OF IDENTIFYING THIS DIVISION EACH TIME IT WAS HEARD ON THE AIR. IN NOVEMBER, HOWEVER, THERE WAS A GENERAL REVISION OF RADIO PROCEDURE IN THE GERMAN ARMY DESIGNED TO IMPROVE RADIO SECURITY, AND THESE METHODS BECAME OBSOLETE. FROM THIS TIME FORWARD, IT BECAME QUITE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY 11 PANZER NETS, AND THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY MANY OCCASIONS WHEN THESE NETS WERE INTERCEPTED BUT NOT IDENTIFIED.

AFTER THE DECLINE OF ACTIVITY AROUND MID-OCTOBER, THE DIVISION WAS NOT IDENTIFIED AGAIN ON THE AIR UNTIL MID-NOVEMBER, WHEN ITS INCREASED RADIO ACTIVITY WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE THIRD ARMY OFFENSIVE. ON 15 NOVEMBER 21 PANZER DIVISION WAS TO CONTACT THE RIGHT FLANK OF A UNIT, PROBABLY THE 105 PANZER BRIGADE. THROUGHOUT THE LAST PART OF NOVEMBER AND THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF DECEMBER RADIO CONTACT WITH 11 PANZER WAS MAINTAINED, AND FREQUENT DIRECTION FINDING RESULTS CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF THE DIVISION ON THE CENTRAL PART OF XII CORPS' FRONT. MENTION OF PLACE NAMES LOHR AND MUNSTER, BOTH IN THE Q-33 SQUARE, ON 15 NOVEMBER, WAS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE AREA IN WHICH THE DIVISION WAS OPERATING. DIRECTION FINDING TRACED A SLOW WITHDRAWAL NORTHEASTWARD, AND ON 16 DECEMBER, PLACED ELEMENTS IN THE Q-66 SQUARE. THIS PERIOD OF ACTIVITY WAS ALSO QUITE FRUITFUL IN YIELDING MEDIUM GRADE DECODES.

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11 PANZER DIVISION

ALTHOUGH 11 PANZER DIVISION USED RADIO COMMUNICATION EXTENSIVELY DURING THE WHOLE OF THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN, THEIR USE OF THIS MEDIUM WAS MARKED BY EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD SECURITY. NOT UNTIL THE VERY LAST STAGES OF THE BATTLE OF GERMANY WAS THERE ANY REAL INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE BREAKING OF LOW GRADE CODES OR CIPHERS OF THIS FORMATION. FROM LATE SEPTEMBER TO EARLY DECEMBER 1944, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION GAINED FROM THE DECIPHERMENT OF MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION, BUT THESE DECIPHERMENTS ARE NOT NOW AVAILABLE AT ARMY LEVEL AND THEREFORE THE DATA CONTAINED THEREIN CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN A HISTORY WRITTEN HERE.

FOR A LONG TIME BEFORE 11 PANZER DIVISION WAS DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR, THIRD ARMY RADIO INTERCEPT WAS FOLLOWING AN UNIDENTIFIED FORMATION IN ITS DAY TO DAY RADIO ACTIVITY; LATER INTERCEPT PROVED THAT THIS WAS 11 PANZER DIVISION. THIS FORMATION WAS FIRST HEARD ON 13 JUNE 1944; ON 29 JUNE DIRECTION FINDING CONFIRMED BRITISH INDICATIONS THAT THE UNIT WAS IN THE LA ROCHELLE-POITIERS AREA (T-33) - (U-47) IN WESTERN FRANCE OUTSIDE THE BATTLE ZONE.

TOWARD THE END OF AUGUST THE FORMATION WAS AGAIN HEARD, INCREASING RADIO ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE. BY DIRECTION FINDING FROM THE VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS COVERING THAT FRONT, THESE RADIO NETS WERE DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED AS BEING IN THE ZONE OF SEVENTH ARMY'S ADVANCE TO THE NORTH. THEY HAD BEEN FOLLOWED FROM

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THE LA ROCHELLE-POITIERS AREA TO THE FRENCH SOUTHEASTERN COAST, AND THEN NORTHWARD IN THE FACE OF THE SEVENTH ARMY PUSH. SINCE THIS WAS THE KNOWN ROUTE OF THE 11 PANZER DIVISION, IT WAS STRONGLY SUSPECTED THAT THE RADIO NETS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE 11 PANZER DIVISION. DURING THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE DIVISION'S RADIO SECURITY WAS SO GOOD THAT THERE WAS NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF THIS IDENTIFICATION UNTIL AFTER MID-SEPTEMBER, WHEN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS PROVED CONCLUSIVELY THAT ALL THE ABOVE MENTIONED RADIO NETS BELONGED TO THIS UNIT.

AS THE DIVISION MOVED NORTH AND CAME CLOSER AND CLOSER TO THIRD ARMY ZONE, THE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED INCREASED. THROUGHOUT SEPTEMBER QUITE A LARGE AMOUNT OF THIS UNIT'S MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON THE SEVENTH ARMY FRONT.

ON 24 SEPTEMBER, TECHNICAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING DIRECTION FINDING, INDICATED THE SHIFT OF ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION NORTHWARD FROM SEVENTH ARMY TO THIRD ARMY FRONT. SIMILAR EVIDENCE DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS CONFIRMED THIS SHIFT OF THE BULK OF THE DIVISION INTO THE THIRD ARMY AREA, AND ON 28 SEPTEMBER, ACCURATE DIRECTION FINDING PLACED ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF DIEUZE (Q-22). THROUGHOUT EARLY OCTOBER THE OVER-ALL TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED FROM THE DIVISION WAS VERY HEAVY. ALTHOUGH NO INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE VERY MINIMUM OF LOW GRADE TRAFFIC, ARMY GROUP RADIO INTELLIGENCE WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS PERIOD IN DECIPHERING THE MEDIUM GRADE. DIRECTION FINDING DURING THIS PERIOD

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AND DIRECTION FINDING IN THE LAST DAYS OF APRIL PLACED ELEMENTS IN L-00, P-02, AND Q-28 MAP SQUARES, ALL ON THE NORTHEASTERN OR LEFT FLANK OF THIRD ARMY WHICH WAS DRIVING SOUTH AT THIS TIME. MANY MORE PLACE NAMES AND DIRECTION FINDING BEARINGS WERE OBTAINED IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF MAY, INDICATING THE SAME GENERAL LOCATION OF DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS RELATIVE TO THIRD ARMY. THE LAST RADIO CONTACT ON 4 MAY SHOWED ELEMENTS TO BE LOCATED SOUTHWEST OF PILSEN (L-04).

ON 8 MAY LAST MENTION OF 11 PANZER DIVISION IN GERMAN MILITARY TRAFFIC OCCURRED WHEN AN ELEMENT OF 2 SS PANZER DIVISION ANNOUNCED THAT 11 PANZER WAS SURRENDERING.

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RADIO CONTACT WITH 11 PANZER DIVISION WAS LOST IN MID-DECEMBER. PRACTICALLY ALL GERMAN MILITARY TRAFFIC IN THE LAST WEEKS OF DECEMBER AND IN JANUARY CAME FROM UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE, AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY THAT RADIO INTELLIGENCE ONCE AGAIN BEGAN TO IDENTIFY ELEMENTS OF THE 11 PANZER ON THE AIR. ON 27 JANUARY AN ARTILLERY ELEMENT OF THE DIVISION MENTIONED THE TOWN OF TRASSEN (L-10) IN THE SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE, AND DIRECTION FINDING IN THE EARLY PART OF FEBRUARY CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF THE DIVISION IN THIS SECTOR. FURTHER STEPS TAKEN TO INCREASE RADIO SECURITY IN THE GERMAN ARMY BROUGHT ABOUT A CHANGE IN MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC, SO THAT ALTHOUGH MEDIUM GRADE ACTIVITY WAS FAIRLY HEAVY IN THIS PERIOD, NOT A SINGLE MESSAGE PASSED COULD BE READ. DIRECTION FINDING ON THE 3RD AND 12TH OF FEBRUARY SHOWED THE PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF SAARBURG (L-11).

BY THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY CONTACT WITH THE RADIO NETS OF THE DIVISION AGAIN WAS LOST, AND DURING MOST OF THE DRIVE ACROSS GERMANY THEY REMAINED UNIDENTIFIED. ALTHOUGH BITS OF ACTIVITY WERE OCCASIONALLY NOTED, THERE WAS NOTHING OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST UNTIL 26 APRIL. THEN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, LOW GRADE TRAFFIC OF 11 PANZER DIVISION WAS BROKEN; IT CONTAINED REFERENCES TO TOWNS ON XII CORPS' FRONT, INCLUDING ROSSHaupt AND GROSS KONREUTH IN THE P-43 AND P-35 SQUARES RESPECTIVELY. ACTIVITY OF 27 APRIL REFERRED TO PLACES IN THE P-43 AND P-53 SQUARES,

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SOME ELEMENTS TO VIII CORPS' FRONT.

ARTILLERY UNITS OF THE DIVISION, FROM THE 74 PANZER ARTILLERY REGIMENT, WERE PERIODICALLY ACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE FIRST WEEK IN AUGUST, AND, ON THE 5TH OF THAT MONTH, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THEY WERE OPERATING ALONG THE SOURDEVAL - TINCHEBRAY (T-61) - (T-72) ROAD. ANOTHER SCRAP OF INTELLIGENCE APPEARED ON 9 AUGUST WHEN AN UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT OF THE DIVISION WAS FOUND TO BE SOMEWHAT NORTHEAST OF LE FRESNES PORET (T-61); DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THIS MONTH THE DIVISION AS A WHOLE WAS SITUATED ON THE LEFT FLANK OF THIRD ARMY WITH THE REST OF THE GERMAN ARMOR.

AFTER 20 AUGUST 2 PANZER DIVISION WAS IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR BY THIRD ARMY INTERCEPT UNITS ONLY RARELY FOR AN EXTREMELY LONG PERIOD. THE FORMATION WAS HEARD ON 27 AUGUST, AND AGAIN BRIEFLY ON 21 SEPTEMBER; FROM RADIO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM LOW GRADE TRAFFIC IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW THE DIVISION FARED IN THE FALAISE GAP. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH 2 PANZER WAS COMMITTED EARLY IN THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE AND ENGAGED DURING MOST OF THIS PERIOD, THE DIVISION WAS STILL NOT IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR; IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT HERE THAT, BY THIS TIME, THE CHANGE IN THE ENEMY'S RADIO METHODS HAD MADE THE TASK OF NET IDENTIFICATION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY IN A CASE SUCH AS THIS, WHEREIN THE FORMATION HAD NOT BEEN HEARD FOR QUITE A LONG TIME PREVIOUS TO THE CHANGE.

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2 PANZER DIVISION

RADIO CONTACT WITH THE GERMAN 2 PANZER DIVISION BEGAN EARLY, OVER A MONTH BEFORE D-DAY, BUT THE FORMATION IN SUBSEQUENT ENCOUNTERS DID NOT LIVE UP TO EXPECTATIONS FROM A RADIO INTELLIGENCE STANDPOINT, SINCE IT WAS NEVER THE SOURCE OF ANY CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE OVER A LONG PERIOD. THE CHIEF FACTOR IN THIS ARIDITY WAS THE FACT THAT THERE WERE LONG MONTHS DURING WHICH THE DIVISION WAS NOT EVEN IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR.

THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OPERATING FROM ENGLAND, INTERCEPTED PRACTICE TRAFFIC OF 2 PANZER DIVISION AS EARLY AS 28 APRIL; DIRECTION FINDING AT THIS TIME CONFIRMED OTHER SOURCES IN LOCATING THE DIVISION IN THE ARRAS-AMIENS (H-40) - (N-15) SECTOR. SINCE THIS WAS ALL PRACTICE TRAFFIC, LITTLE OTHER INTELLIGENCE WAS GAINED; FROM THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE TRANSMISSIONS, HOWEVER, IT WAS KNOWN THAT 2 PANZER WAS ON MANEUVERS DURING THE THREE DAYS FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE NINETEENTH OF MAY, BUT DURING THE TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO D-DAY THE FORMATION WAS SUSPICIOUSLY SILENT.

BY 18 JUNE THE DIVISION WAS BACK ON THE AIR WITH A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY; DIRECTION FINDING AGAIN HAD SOME SUCCESS IN LOCATING THE FORMATION IN THE AREA OF VILLERS BOGAGE (T-85). THE UNIT'S RADIO ACTIVITY SOON SAGGED TO A LOWER LEVEL, HOWEVER, AND THERE WAS LITTLE TO BE LEARNED THAT WAS WORTH REPORTING UNTIL 28 JULY WHEN DIRECTION FINDING INDICATED A SLIGHT WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF

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IN SOME CONFUSION BEFORE ALLIED ATTACKS FROM THE SOUTH, AND, ON THAT DAY, REPORTED ITSELF IN BEUX (U-94), COMPLAINING OF ITS LACK OF AMMUNITION. LATER, THE UNIT REVEALED ITS PLANS TO MOVE NORTHWEST NEAR PONTROY (U-94). THE FOLLOWING DAY ANOTHER ELEMENT APPEARED TO BE WITHDRAWING TOWARD BAZONCOURT (Q-75). THEN, AFTER A SILENCE OF SIX DAYS, A NET THAT SEEMED TO BE THE 7TH BATTERY OF THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS PLACED BY DIRECTION FINDING IN THE AREA JUST EAST OF METZ (U-85); THIS TIME THE UNIT REPORTED THAT IT WAS WELL-STOCKED WITH AMMUNITION AND SPENT MOST OF ITS TIME REPORTING ON THE PROGRESS OF A GERMAN COUNTERATTACK IN THAT SECTOR.

FROM THIS DATE ON, FOR THE NEXT WEEK, THE FORMATION'S RADIO ACTIVITY WAS ONCE AGAIN ON THE DECLINE, REFLECTING ITS EASTWARD MOVEMENT AFTER THE METZ ENCIRCLEMENT. ON 24 NOVEMBER THE III BATTALION WAS HEARD GIVING SITUATION REPORTS AND THE POSITION OF ONE FORWARD OBSERVER WAS GIVEN AS THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF DIEFENBACH-LES PUTTELANGE (Q-35). THEN ANOTHER QUIET PERIOD FOLLOWED UNTIL 9 DECEMBER, WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS NOW OPERATING AROUND SARREINSMING (Q-55), ORDERING FIRE ON THAT TOWN AND SEVERAL OTHERS NEARBY; THIS WAS THE MAIN AREA OF CONCERN OF 17 SS ARTILLERY REGIMENT (AND PRACTICALLY THAT OF THE WHOLE DIVISION) FOR THE NEXT MONTH, AFTER WHICH IT ONCE AGAIN FADED AWAY INTO SILENCE.

DURING THIS TIME, HOWEVER, A MODERATE AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE WAS DERIVED FROM BOTH ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE

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ON 28 FEBRUARY, HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN CALL SIGN ALLOCATIONS REVEALED IN SOME CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, IT WAS DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED THAT A GROUP OF 2 PANZER DIVISION NETS HAD BEEN HEARD IN THE PERIOD 21-28 FEBRUARY, BUT THEY WERE UNIDENTIFIED AND THERE WAS NO RELIABLE DIRECTION FINDING ON THEM. ANOTHER LONG PERIOD OF BARRENNESS FOLLOVED AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE END OF MARCH THAT TRAFFIC WAS AGAIN INTERCEPTED FROM THIS GERMAN UNIT, AND THEN ONLY BRIEF BITS WERE OBTAINED.

ON 5 APRIL A LITTLE MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION ON THE DIVISION WAS GAINED WHEN DIRECTION FINDING INDICATED SOME ELEMENTS TO BE ON THE SOUTHERN PART OF THIRD ARMY'S ZONE OF ADVANCE, IN A GENERAL AREA EAST AND SOMEWHAT SOUTH OF FULDA (H-31). A FEW DAYS LATER, SOME INTELLIGENCE WAS GAINED FROM MEDIUM GRADE TRAFFIC, WHEN ON 12 APRIL, A STRENGTH REPORT FROM A SUPPLY COMPANY WAS DECODED; THE REPORT INCLUDED THE MENTION OF THE TOWN OF MODSCHIEDEL (O-56), CONFIRMING THE GENERAL AREA GIVEN BY DIRECTION FINDING A FEW DAYS EARLIER. SUPPLY ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION CONTINUED TO BE HEARD THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF APRIL; FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE TRAFFIC A SUPPLY DETACHMENT AND A SIGNAL BATTALION 38 WERE INVOLVED BUT NO SPECIFIC DETAILS IN REFERENCE TO THESE TWO UNITS WERE OBTAINED. THE LAST TRANSMISSIONS OF 2 PANZER DIVISION WERE INTERCEPTED ON 5 MAY AND AT THAT TIME DIRECTION FINDING LOCATED IT IN THE PILSEN (L-24) AREA; A FEW DAYS LATER, CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES PUT AN END TO THE UNPRODUCTIVE QUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE FROM THIS FORMATION.

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17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

THIS DIVISION WAS NEVER REALLY FOLLOWED IN ITS RADIO ACTIVITY PRIOR TO D-DAY; FIRST REAL EXPERIENCE WITH IT BEGAN ON 15 JUNE, WHEN THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE IDENTIFIED IT IN THE CARENTAN-MONTEBOURG (T-38) - (C-38) AREA; THE TRAFFIC LEVEL, HOWEVER, WAS LOW, AND LITTLE INTELLIGENCE WAS GAINED. BY 20 JUNE AT LEAST PART OF THE FORMATION WAS KNOWN TO BE OPERATING IN THE AREA OF ST. LO (T-46). BY 8 JULY INTEREST HAD SHIFTED VERY SLIGHTLY TO THE NORTHEAST AROUND VILLERS BOCAGE (T-65), ACCORDING TO DIRECTION FINDING RESULTS. DURING THE MONTH RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY FROM THE DIVISION BEGAN TO PICK UP, AND ON THE 27TH OF THE MONTH TRAFFIC FROM THIS SOURCE INDICATED THAT SOME DIVISION ELEMENTS, POSSIBLY EVEN DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, WERE APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES NORTH OF CERISY LA SALLE (T-35), SHOWING NO APPRECIABLE CHANGE IN THE AREA OF CONCERN. DURING THIS WHOLE PERIOD THE TRAFFIC WAS USUALLY MEDIUM GRADE, AND LITTLE INTELLIGENCE COULD BE DERIVED AT LOW GRADE LEVEL.

UNTIL 13 AUGUST 17 SS PANZER WAS LITTLE HEARD ON THE AIR, REFLECTING POSSIBLY ITS SOMEWHAT DISASTROUS ENCOUNTERS; ON THAT DAY, SLIGHT ACTIVITY SEEMED TO POINT TOWARD THE RESURRECTION OF SOME ELEMENTS, BUT THEN IT ONCE AGAIN FELL INTO COMPLETE SILENCE AS FAR AS THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE WAS CONCERNED, AND WAS NOT AGAIN IDENTIFIED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER.

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FIRST RADIO CONTACT WITH THE DIVISION AT THIS TIME CAME INDIRECTLY WHEN TRAFFIC FROM RECONNAISSANCE GROUPS OF 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION, OPERATING ALONG THE MOSELLE RIVER, REVEALED THAT, ON 12 SEPTEMBER, "AN ENEMY BRIDGEHEAD HAD BEEN REMOVED BY SS REGIMENT 37", ONE OF THE KNOWN REGIMENTS OF THE GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN DIVISION. EIGHT DAYS LATER, ON THE 20TH OF THE MONTH, ANOTHER PATROL AGAIN GAVE INFORMATION BELIEVED TO RELATE TO THE FORMATION IN QUESTION, WHEN THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN "SS DIVISION" WAS REPORTED TO BE IN PELTRE (U-25). THE DIVISION ITSELF WAS IDENTIFIED ON THE AIR ONCE OR TWICE DURING THIS TIME BUT THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE CONTINUED TO COME FROM 3 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION'S RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS, AS THE LATTER, ON 30 SEPTEMBER, COMMENTED ON THE LOCATION OF 11/37 REGIMENT IN THE SILLEGNY (U-84) AREA.

BY 13 OCTOBER, AN ARTILLERY NET, BELIEVED TO BELONG TO THE 17 SS PANZER WAS BEING HEARD AND ON 9 NOVEMBER WAS FINALLY IDENTIFIED. ARTILLERY ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION WERE OPERATING IN THE PATH OF THE ALLIED ADVANCE AROUND ST. JURE (U-83), USING RADIO TO DIRECT FIRE AND MAKE THEIR NECESSARY SUPPLY AND AMMUNITION REPORTS. ONE NET, KNOWN TO BE "ARTILLERY GROUP MAGLER" (POSSIBLY OF BATTERY SIZE) WAS LOCATED IN ALEMONT (U-94) ON 9 NOVEMBER; MENTION WAS MADE BY THIS UNIT OF "ARTILLERY GROUP GUSE", BELIEVED AT THAT TIME TO BE THE CAPTAIN GUSE WHO WAS THEN A BATTALION COMMANDER IN THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT.

ON 10 NOVEMBER THE GROUP UNDER MAGLER WAS FALLING BACK

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IN SOME CONFUSION BEFORE ALLIED ATTACKS FROM THE SOUTH, AND, ON THAT DAY, REPORTED ITSELF IN BEUX (U-94), COMPLAINING OF ITS LACK OF AMMUNITION. LATER, THE UNIT REVEALED ITS PLANS TO MOVE NORTHWEST NEAR PONTOY (U-94). THE FOLLOWING DAY ANOTHER ELEMENT APPEARED TO BE WITHDRAWING TOWARD BAZONCOURT (Q-25). THEN, AFTER A SILENCE OF SIX DAYS, A NET THAT SEEMED TO BE THE 7TH BATTERY OF THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS PLACED BY DIRECTION FINDING IN THE AREA JUST EAST OF METZ (U-85); THIS TIME THE UNIT REPORTED THAT IT WAS WELL-STOCKED WITH AMMUNITION AND SPENT MOST OF ITS TIME REPORTING ON THE PROGRESS OF A GERMAN COUNTERATTACK IN THAT SECTOR.

FROM THIS DATE ON, FOR THE NEXT WEEK, THE FORMATION'S RADIO ACTIVITY WAS ONCE AGAIN ON THE DECLINE, REFLECTING ITS EASTWARD MOVEMENT AFTER THE METZ ENCIRCLEMENT. ON 24 NOVEMBER THE III BATTALION WAS HEARD GIVING SITUATION REPORTS AND THE POSITION OF ONE FORWARD OBSERVER WAS GIVEN AS THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF DIEFENBACH-LES PUTTELANGE (Q-35). THEN ANOTHER QUIET PERIOD FOLLOWED UNTIL 9 DECEMBER, WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT WAS NOW OPERATING AROUND SARREINSMING (Q-55), ORDERING FIRE ON THAT TOWN AND SEVERAL OTHERS NEARBY; THIS WAS THE MAIN AREA OF CONCERN OF 17 SS ARTILLERY REGIMENT (AND PRACTICALLY THAT OF THE WHOLE DIVISION) FOR THE NEXT MONTH, AFTER WHICH IT ONCE AGAIN FADED AWAY INTO SILENCE.

DURING THIS TIME, HOWEVER, A MODERATE AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE WAS DERIVED FROM BOTH ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE

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ELEMENTS. ON 11 DECEMBER, THE LATTER ALSO REVEALED ITS CONCERN WITH THE SECTOR AROUND REINHEIM (Q-58), SUGGESTING A SHIFT OF INTEREST SLIGHTLY TO THE NORTHEAST. THE BLIES RIVER BRIDGEHEAD WAS MADE BY THE ALLIES IN THE AREA NORTHEAST OF SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) AND THIS, IN GENERAL, WAS THE SECTOR IN WHICH THE AFOREMENTIONED ELEMENTS OF 17 SS PANZER WERE OPERATING. A WEEK LATER, ON 17 DECEMBER, AFTER A STEADY FLOW OF TRAFFIC REVEALED NO CHANGE IN POSITION, ONE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL GAVE ITS POSITION AS RUDENHEIM (Q-66), REPORTING HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE ON THE FLANKING UNIT TO THE LEFT (BELIEVED TO BE 11 PANZER DIVISION) AND ON "REGIMENT LEHMANN", WHICH WAS PROBABLY A MISTAKEN REFERENCE TO "BATTALION LEHMANN" OF 37 SS PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENT.

AFTER THIRD ARMY'S SHIFT TO THE NORTH, RADIO INTELLIGENCE CONTINUED TO INTERCEPT SOME TRAFFIC FROM THIS FORMATION, OPERATING ON WHAT THEN BECAME XV CORPS' FRONT, BUT BY THE END OF JANUARY THE SLIGHT VOLUME OF TRAFFIC AND MEAGER INTELLIGENCE DERIVED NO LONGER WARRANTED ANY EXTENSIVE EFFORTS ALONG THAT LINE. IT WAS NOT UNTIL 12 APRIL, THEREFORE, THAT 17 SS PANZER ONCE AGAIN BECAME A LIVE ISSUE, AND THEN ONLY A TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS POSSIBLE. TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED FROM AN ARTILLERY SUPPLY ELEMENT, LONG SUSPECTED OF BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE FORMATION, REQUESTING THE "AGREEMENT OF 17 SS DIVISION" ON AN UNSPECIFIED MATTER; THIS ELEMENT WAS KNOWN TO BE IN THE AREA OF SCHWABACH (S-28). NOTHING FURTHER OF ANY IMPORTANCE WAS EVER OBTAINED, HOWEVER, EXCEPT THAT SOME SUB-UNITS WERE HEARD SPORADICALLY DURING

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APRIL AND BY THE END OF THAT MONTH THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT  
WAS LOCATED BY DIRECTION FINDING ON III CORPS' FRONT. THE  
DECLINE IN THE DIVISION'S RADIO ACTIVITY THAT BEGAN IN  
JANUARY, THEREFORE, NEVER REALLY STOPPED AND DURING THE  
LAST MONTH OF THE WAR 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION,  
AS FAR AS RADIO-INTELLIGENCE WAS CONCERNED, DID NOT EXIST.

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AUTH: ADM CIR 7 90CT 44

INIT:

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 45

APO 483, U. S. ARMY  
18 SEPTEMBER, 1945

HISTORICAL RECORD

1 JANUARY, 1945 TO 1 SEPTEMBER, 1945

THE FOLLOWING IS A CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 3325 SIAM COMPANY.

*by info and monitoring*  
THE TRAINING SCHEDULE INITIATED DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER WAS BEING CONTINUED DURING THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. THIS SCHEDULE CONSISTED OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING WITH UNIT TRAINING TO FOLLOW.

ALTHOUGH ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO TRANSFER MEN WHO HAD NEITHER APTITUDE NOR INTEREST IN ANY OF THE TRAINING AND TO PROVIDE EITHER TRAINED REPLACEMENTS OR MEN WITH APTITUDE FROM REPLACEMENT DEPOTS NO SUCCESS WAS EXPERIENCED ALONG THIS LINE. THE MAJORITY OF THE PERSONNEL WHO LEFT THE ORGANIZATION WERE EITHER PLACED ON DETACHED OR TEMPORARY DUTY WHICH RESULTED IN ADDED WORK FOR THE PERSONNEL SECTION. IN JANUARY, 1945, APPROXIMATELY 170 REPLACEMENTS WERE RECEIVED FROM THE 19TH REPLACEMENT DEPOT FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS. A CAREFUL SURVEY OF THE MEN REVEALED THAT THEY WERE NEARLY ALL LIMITED SERVICE PERSONNEL AND SUFFERING FROM COMBAT FATIGUE. VERY FEW OF THE MEN WERE ADAPTABLE FOR TRAINING AND THIS WAS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE UNIT WAS FORBIDDEN TO ACCEPT LIMITED SERVICE MEN IN OTHER THAN HEADQUARTERS AND ARMY PLATOONS. EVENTUALLY NEARLY ALL OF THESE MEN WERE TRANSFERRED FROM THE UNIT TO REPLACEMENT DEPOTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

IN JANUARY, 1945, ALL OF THE LIAISON OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT WERE PLACED ON TEMPORARY DUTY WITH HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAKING ORIENTATION TRIPS TO VARIOUS UNITS THEN IN ACTION AGAINST THE GERMANS. THIS TRIP INCLUDED VISITS TO THE AND THE 3151 SIGNAL INFORMATION AND MONITORING COMPANY THEN IN OPERATION WITH THE SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY. EARLY IN FEBRUARY, 1945, THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND TWO OF THE SIGNAL CORPS PLATOON OFFICERS ALSO MADE AN IDENTICAL ORIENTATION TRIP TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND TWO MORE OF THE SIGNAL CORPS PLATOON OFFICERS LATER THE SAME MONTH. THIS TRIP PROVIDED MANY OF THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS WHICH HAD HITHERTO BEEN UNANSWERED AND PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE PLANS FOR THE COMING OPERATIONAL PHASE.

JUST PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF UNIT TRAINING THE AUGMENTATION WAS APPROVED TO ADD SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION DETACHMENTS TO OPERATE BELOW DIVISION LEVEL. THESE PATROLS CONSISTED OF ONE OFFICER, TWO RADIO OPERATORS, TWO CODE CLERKS AND ONE DRIVER ALONG WITH A HALF-TRACK MOUNTING AN SCR 193 AND A TRUCK 1/4-TON 4x4 PER PATROL ON THE BASIS OF ONE PATROL FOR OPERATION WITH EACH DIVISION AND ARMORED DIVISION PLATOON AND ONE PATROL IN RESERVE AT HEADQUARTERS FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS TO BE ASSIGNED BY ARMY HEADQUARTERS. IT FURTHER



PROVIDED AN ADDITIONAL LIAISON OFFICER, DRIVER AND TRUCK 1/4-TON 4x4 FOR OPERATION WITH EACH CORPS PLATOON AND ARMY PLATOON. THE OFFICER PERSONNEL FOR THE PATROLS WERE FURNISHED BY THEATER HEAD-QUARTERS AND THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL FROM THIS ORGANIZATION. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE COMPANY WAS REDUCED AS A RESULT OF A WAR DEPARTMENT LETTER DEACTIVATING ONE CORPS PLATOON, TWO DIVISION PLATOONS AND ONE ARMORED DIVISION PLATOON. THE PERSONNEL FROM THE DEACTIVATED PLATOONS WERE UTILIZED IN FILLING UP EXISTING SHORTAGES IN OTHER PLATOONS AND IN FORMING PATROLS.

UNIT TRAINING WAS BEGUN IN MARCH UTILIZING WHAT TRAINED PERSONNEL WHO WERE AVAILABLE. PROBLEMS WERE RUN ON A DAILY BASIS WITH A PORTION OF EACH PLATOON AND PATROLS PARTICIPATING. ACTUAL TACTICAL SITUATIONS WERE SET UP ON THE OPERATIONS MAP AND ALL LIAISON OFFICERS WERE BRIEFED PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PROBLEM. PLATOONS WERE EMPLOYED FROM A DISTANCE OF THIRTY TO FIFTY MILES FROM THE NET CONTROL STATION AND PASSED TRAFFIC MADE UP BY THE LIAISON OFFICERS ACCOMPANYING EACH PLATOON. THE PROBLEMS RAN FOR THREE DAYS WITH A ONE OR TWO DAY BREAK IN BETWEEN FOR REORGANIZATION AND CRITIQUES.

CONCLUSIONS - LESS THAN A MONTH COULD BE DEVOTED TO UNIT TRAINING AND ALL PERSONNEL WERE NOT ABLE TO PARTICIPATE THEREIN. STRESS WAS PLACED ON ACCURACY RATHER THAN ON SPEED WHICH WAS LATER PROVED TO BE NECESSARY IN OPERATIONS. A UNIT OF THIS TYPE SHOULD HAVE A LONG PERIOD OF UNIT TRAINING WHICH SHOULD BE VERY FLEXIBLE AND SUBJECT TO UNEXPECTED INTERRUPTIONS AND CHANGES IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF PLATOONS AND PATROLS.

ON 26 MARCH, 1945, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND AN ADVANCE PARTY OF OFFICERS LEFT ENGLAND FOR THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY TO MAKE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE MAIN PARTY. DURING THIS TIME THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVES WHICH WERE TO GOVERN THE OPERATION OF THE COMPANY WERE DRAWN UP AND SUBMITTED TO THE ARMY COMMANDER FOR APPROVAL.

THE MAIN PARTY ARRIVED AT FRANKFURT, GERMANY, ON 10 APRIL, 1945, AND WAS BILLETED THERE FOR FOUR DAYS. ALL OFFICERS WERE BRIEFED ON THEIR COMING MISSIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES WHICH WOULD BE IN EFFECT AFTER THE UNIT WAS DEPLOYED.

DURING THE STAY AT FRANKFURT THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT WAS DRAWN FOR THE ADDITIONAL DUTIES MENTIONED:

14 TRUCKS 1/4-TON 4x4 - THESE TRUCKS WERE REQUESTED IN ORDER TO SET UP AND OPERATE A SCHEDULED DAILY MESSENGER SERVICE ON THE BASIS OF ONE TRUCK PER PLATOON.

3 HALF-TRACKS, M2A1 WITH RADIO SET SCR-399 FOR USE BY THE THREE ARMORED DIVISION PLATOONS. THE ORIGINAL REQUISITION WAS FOR TRUCKS, 2 1/2-TON WITH HO-27'S BUT NEITHER THE VEHICLES NOR THE HOUSINGS WERE AVAILABLE FOR ISSUE AT THE TIME.

3 3/4-TON WEAPONS CARRIERS W/12-VOLT IGNITION SYSTEMS WITH RADIO SETS SCR-193 IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PATROLS OPERATING WITH ARMORED DIVISION PLATOONS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE PLATOONS.

13 MACHINE GUNS, CAL. .50 FOR MOUNTING ON ALL HALF-TRACKS.



THESE REQUISITIONS WERE APPROVED AND THE EQUIPMENT READY TO BE DRAWN SHORTLY AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE MAIN BODY.

THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS COVER THE FORMATION AND OPERATION OF THE 3325 SIAM COMPANY. HEADQUARTERS AND ARMY PLATOONS OPERATED TOGETHER AND MORE OR LESS AS ONE PLATOON, UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND IN THE FUTURE WILL BE IDENTIFIED AS COMPANY HEADQUARTERS. HEADQUARTERS PLATOON WAS CONTROLLED BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER WITH LT. WILLIAM P. RANKIN, 01638327, OVER THE ARMY PLATOON.

THE THREE CORPS PLATOONS WERE RECOGNIZED AS C1, C2, AND C3, RESPECTIVELY. LT. ROY L. SHOEMAKER, 01640942 WAS OVER C1; LT. JOHN C. FARNUM, 01644210, HAVING C2; AND LAST BUT BY NO MEANS LEAST, LT. OMER D. MCKASSON, 01640728 WITH C3.

THE SIX DIVISION PLATOONS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

|                      |          |     |
|----------------------|----------|-----|
| LT. HARLEY W SMITH   | 01644103 | D-1 |
| LT. HAROLD WILLIAMS  | 01646113 | D-2 |
| LT. ORMAN L. HICKS   | 01636037 | D-3 |
| LT. WILLARD FREER    | 01640469 | D-4 |
| LT. JAMES C. CONRADS | 01648918 | D-5 |
| LT. JOHN W. JACOBSON | 01634924 | D-6 |

THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS CONTROLLED THE ARMORED DIVISION PLATOONS:

|                          |          |      |
|--------------------------|----------|------|
| LT. PERRY J. STEGMEIR    | 01641827 | AD-1 |
| LT. VIRGIL J. WENNERGREN | 01017396 | AD-2 |
| LT. SIEGFRIED B ROLLAND  | 01646911 | AD-3 |

IT MAY BE WISE TO NOTE THAT THE THIRD DIVISION PLATOON AND THE SECOND ARMORED DIVISION PLATOONS REMAINED IN ENGLAND WITH THE UNTRAINED PERSONNEL FOR TRAINING, AND DUE TO OUR LATE COMMITMENT TO ACTION, WERE NEVER USED IN COMBAT. THESE TWO PLATOONS JOINED THE COMPANY IN JULY, 1945.

RADIO WAS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, USING THE SCR 188 AT ARMY OF THE NET CONTROL STATION AND AT DIVISION FOR SUBORDINATE STATIONS. THE ARMORED DIVISION PLATOONS USED THE SCR 399 AS THEY NEEDED A MORE MOBILE SET. THE SCR 193 WAS USED IN SEPARATE NETS OF DIVISION TO PATROLS AT LOWER UNITS. THE SCR 399 WAS A SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTE FOR ALL SCR 188'S.

MESSENGER SERVICE WAS A NECESSITY, DIVISION MAKING A TRIP TO CORPS BY NOON OF EACH DAY AND RETURNING BEFORE DARK. CORPS MESSENGER LEFT HIS UNIT EARLY IN THE AFTERNOON AND REACHED ARMY BEFORE DARK, RETURNING TO CORPS THE NEXT MORNING DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. THE MAIL, SIGNAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, AND OTHER PAPER WORK WAS HANDLED BY THIS MEANS. AN EFFICIENT MESSENGER SERVICE WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.

SIAM HEADQUARTERS WAS UNABLE TO GET A DROP ON THE ARMY TELETYPE SWITCHBOARD. IF THIS COULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ADDED MEANS AT LEAST TO EACH OF THE THREE CORPS PLATOONS. AS IT WAS, TELETYPE WAS USED ONLY WITH A DIRECT LINE BETWEEN THE SIAM COMMUNICATIONS ROOM AND THE SIAM STAFF OFFICER AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS.



TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION WAS GOOD FROM ARMY TO CORPS BUT NOT AT ALL RELIABLE BY DIRECT LINE TO DIVISIONS. THIS MEANS WAS NEVER USED FOR TACTICAL TRAFFIC AND SELDOM FOR OTHER TYPES.

ALL ELEMENTS WERE DEPLOYED FROM FRANKFURT, GERMANY ON THE 14TH OF APRIL, 1945. ASSIGNMENTS AND HISTORY OF EACH PLATOON DURING OPERATIONS FOLLOW:

AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, HEADQUARTERS AND ARMY PLATOONS OPERATED AS ONE. THEY JOINED AT THE THIRD U S ARMY HEADQUARTERS AT HERSFELD ON THE 14TH OF APRIL 1945, AND FOLLOWED THEM THROUGHOUT THE WAR. COMMUNICATIONS WAS OPENED ON THE 15TH OF APRIL, 1945.

LEFT HERSFELD ON THE 16TH FOR WEIMAR, WHICH WAS A WILD GOOSE CHASE AS ARMY DID NOT MOVE, AND RETURNED TO THE ORIGINAL LOCATION ON THE 17TH. ON 22 APRIL, 1945, WE MOVED TO ERLANGEN AND OCCUPIED AN OLD GERMAN MILITARY QUARTERS. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STAY AT ERLANGEN WERE THE FREQUENT VISITS BY "BED CHECK CHARLE," A GERMAN PLANE ON A MISSION FLIGHT DOING STRAFING ON A SMALL SCALE.

EARLY 2 MAY, 1945, WE MOVED TO REGENSBURG AND TOOK OVER A MANSION TWO KILOMETERS OUT OF TOWN. WE HELD DOWN THIS LOCATION TILL THE WAR ENDED.

C-1 PLATOON WAS ASSIGNED TO THE VIII CORPS, LEAVING FRANKFURT ON THE 14 APRIL, 1945, AND REPORTED IN AT RUDOLSTADT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. RETURNED TO ARMY ON THE 17TH, ONE VEHICLE BEING STRAFED ENROUTE - NO CASUALTIES.

ASSIGNED TO II CORPS ON 20 APRIL 1945, REPORTED ON ON THE 21ST APRIL AT NEUSTADT, ON DAY OF RADIO SILENCE AND BEGAN OPERATIONS ON THE 23RD APRIL.

LEAVING NEUSTADT ON THE 24TH APRIL, 1945, MOVED TO SCHWABACK FOR TWO DAYS AND MOVING TO BEILGRIES ON THE 26TH APRIL, 1945. MOVED TO MAINBURG ON THE 29TH APRIL, THENCE TO DORFEN ON 2 MAY, 1945. LEFT DORFEN ON 9 MAY FOR NEW ASSIGNMENT TO V CORPS AT PILSEN, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, REPORTING IN SAME DAY. THE WAR IN EUROPE OVER, REPORTED IN TO HEADQUARTERS AT REGENSBURG ON THE 12TH MAY, 1945.

C-2 PLATOON BEING ASSIGNED TO XX CORPS REPORTED IN ON THE 15TH APRIL, 1945, AT WEIMAR AND BEGAN OPERATIONS. MOVED ON TO BAMBURG ON THE 17TH, THENCE TO POMERSFELDEN ON THE 18TH FOR A FOUR DAY STAY. FROM POMERSFELDEN TO HERSBRUCK ON THE 22D APRIL FOR FOUR MORE DAYS AND ON TO BURGLINGENFELD ON THE 26TH, BURGLINGENFELD TO REGENSBURG ON THE 28TH APRIL, TO ADLEDORF ON THE 2D MAY, 1945 AND TO ST MARTIN, AUSTRIA ON THE 4TH MAY WHERE WE STAYED OUT THE WAR. REPORTED IN TO REGENSBURG ON 12 MAY, 1945.

C-3 PLATOON WAS ASSIGNED TO OPERATE WITH XII CORPS HEADQUARTERS, BEGAN OPERATIONS ON THE 15TH APRIL, 1945, AND CONTINUED UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR. OPERATIONS WERE NORMAL, INTERRUPTIONS BY "BED CHECK CHARLE" WERE OCCASIONAL.

THE D-1 PLATOON WAS ASSIGNED TO 90TH INFANTRY DIVISION, MOVED TO LOBENSTEIN, 211 MILES FROM FRANKFURT, ON THE 15TH APRIL AND ESTABLISHED COMMUNICATION WITH ARMY. FOLLOWED THE 90TH DIVISION



UNTIL 5 MAY, 1945. AN UNUSUAL INCIDENT WAS THE SHOOTING OF A GERMAN WINDOW PEEPER AT WUNSIEDEL. ON 5 MAY, 1945, WAS ASSIGNED TO THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND REPORTED IN AT BISCHOPPREUT, HOLDING THIS TOWN TILL THE END OF HOSTILITIES, REPORTING BACK TO REGENSBURG ON THE 12TH MAY, 1945.

SECOND DIVISION PLATOON KNOWN AS D-2 STARTED OFF WITH THE 76TH INFANTRY DIVISION. STAYED WITH THE 76TH DIVISION TWO (2) DAYS AND WAS ORDERED BACK TO HEADQUARTERS ON THE 18TH OF APRIL. ON THE 21ST APRIL, 1945, WE MOVED OUT ON OUR NEW ASSIGNMENT TO THE 99TH DIVISION LOCATED AT LANGENZENN. OPERATIONS HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY ALL THE WAY THROUGH. STAYED WITH THE 99TH UNTIL THE 8TH MAY, THEN MOVED TO THE 1ST DIVISION, V CORPS. MOVE WAS USELESS AS WAR WAS OVER AND WE MOVED TO REGENSBURG ON THE 12TH MAY, 1945.

D-4 OPERATIONS BEGAN WITH THE 80TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT GERA ON THE 15TH APRIL, 1945. ON THE 21ST APRIL WE HAD A REASSIGNMENT TO THE 86TH DIVISION, THEN TO THE 65TH DIVISION ON THE 5TH MAY, 1945, HOLDING THIS TO THE END OF HOSTILITIES. REPORTED IN TO REGENSBURG ON THE 12TH MAY, 1945.

D-5 SPENT ALL THEIR TIME, 15 APRIL, 1945, TO V-E DAY WITH THE 26TH DIVISION MOVING 17 OUT OF THE 27 DAYS. ON THE 21ST APRIL OUR (D-5) PATROL WAS SENT TO THE 80TH DIVISION TO REPLACE D-4.

D-6 PLATOON WAS ASSIGNED TO THE 71ST INFANTRY DIVISION, BEGAN OPERATIONS ON THE 15TH APRIL AND CONTINUED WITH THAT UNIT UNTIL THE 12 TH MAY WHEN THEY RETURNED TO HEADQUARTERS AT REGENSBURG.

ARMORED DIVISION PLATOON NUMBER 1 (AD-1) BEGAN OPERATIONS ON THE 16TH APRIL WITH THE 6TH ARMORED DIVISION, WERE RELIEVED ON THE 17TH APRIL DUE TO THIRD ARMY REORGANIZATION, REPORTED BACK TO HEADQUARTERS. ON THE 21ST APRIL WERE ASSIGNED TO THE 13TH ARMORED DIVISION, REPORTING ON THIS DATE AND FINISHING OUT THE WAR WITH THIS UNIT.

AD-3 BEGAN OPERATIONS WITH THE 4TH ARMORED DIVISION. ON THE 20TH APRIL WE WERE ORDERED TO THE 65TH INFANTRY DIVISION STAYING WITH THEM UNTIL THE 4TH MAY, THENCE BACK TO THE 4TH ARMORED DIVISION UNTIL THE END OF THE WAR, THEN REPORTED BACK TO SIAM HEADQUARTERS.

UPON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REASSEMBLING OF THE COMPANY IT WAS REORGANIZED ON A BATTALION BASIS, WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION AND THREE GROUPS, A, B, AND C RESPECTIVELY. THIS REORGANIZATION WAS TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING.

THE ENTIRE COMPANY MOVED FROM REGENSBURG ON THE 22D OF MAY, 1945, TO ROSENHEIM, BAVARIA. HERE WE WERE LOCATED IN AN OLD GERMAN MILITARY CAMP WITH NOT TOO BAD A SETUP. THE CAMP, LATER NAMED "CAMP GOULETTE", CONTAINED MANY THIRD ARMY SIGNAL UNITS AND WAS ORGANIZED INTO WHAT IS KNOWN AS THE "THIRD ARMY SIGNAL ATTALION (PROV)."

AFTER A FEW DAYS OF ORGANIZATION AND WORK AT THE NEW CAMP 'PS WERE TAKEN ON A NEW TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THIS COMPANY.



3250 Sig Serv Co., Unit Log for Jan 1945

Limbourg, Belgium

8 Jan 45

"B" rations with fresh apples. 75 messages from 25 nets intercepted; 11 D/F bearings. Message Center reported 43 messages with 263 groups, 128 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

9 Jan 45

An abundance of snow. Laundry day. Sgt Lynaugh left for the States on the 30 day rotation plan; had served overseas 35 months. 72 enemy messages taken, 19 nets, 6 D/F bearings. Message Center reports 40 messages, 504 groups, 143 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

10 Jan 45

T/A reports an unusual incident in that no enemy nets were heard from 0200 to 1000 hours. SCR-555 again in operation. 83 enemy messages, 30 groups, 19 D/F bearings. 53 messages from Message Center, 433 group count, 119 telephone calls. Plenty of buzz bomb activity. Bundles of mail for a change.

Limbourg, Belgium

11 Jan 45

Excellent meals although the company is suffering somewhat from dysentery which is being checked by the Medics. Movies again. 71 enemy messages, 17 nets, 6 D/F bearings, 50 messages handled, 437 group counts, 166 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

12 Jan 45

Motor Pool functioning excellently despite very cold weather. Mess section also doing an excellent job with "B" rations, served fresh eggs today. 56 messages handled, 446 group counts, 96 telephone calls, 92 enemy messages, 25 nets, 5 D/F bearings.

Limbourg, Belgium

13 Jan 45

All sections very busy but no unusual occurrences. Message Center reports 57 messages, 383 group counts, 153 telephone calls. T/A reports 102 messages, 28 nets, 33 D/F bearings.



WITHIN THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE, 1945, RADIO FIELD NETS WERE IN OPERATION, GIVING TRAINING TO RADIO OPERATORS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MEN. RADIO CODE SCHOOL WAS COMPLETED BY THE 1ST OF JULY AND WAS PUT INTO OPERATION IMMEDIATELY. PROGRESS AT THESE SCHOOLS WAS MUCH BETTER THAN THAT MADE IN ENGLAND EIGHT MONTHS PREVIOUSLY BUT ALL WAS DISCONTINUED UPON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN JAPAN. EVERYONE WANTS TO GO HOME.



UNIT LOG FOR JANUARY 1945

Limbourg, Belgium

1 Jan 45

Usual routine duties. T/A reports 102 messages taken, 20 nets heard - no D/F. Message Center reports 23 messages, 346 code groups, 197 telephone calls. Some ack-ack and strafing near by.

Limbourg, Belgium

2 Jan 45

No unusual activity; air activity slight but consistently present. QM supplies issued. T/A reports 110 messages taken, 30 nets, no D/F. Message Center reports 32 messages, 438 groups, and 209 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

3 Jan 45

65 sleeping bags were issued by the supply section to EM. The names of the lucky men were drawn from a hat. Also a few overshoes were given out. 110 messages were reported by T/A from 30 nets. No D/F. From Message Center there were 32 messages with 438 groups and 209 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

4 Jan 45

No unusual activity. T/A reports new code broken, 107 messages taken, 23 nets heard, no D/F. Message Center had 38 messages, 228 groups, 138 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

5 Jan 45

Regular routine activities. Rumors of furloughs. Message Center had 38 messages, 367 group count, 108 telephone calls. T/A reports 124 messages, 24 nets, no D/F.

Limbourg, Belgium

6 Jan 45

There was some enemy air activity and some robot bombs over. Message Center reported 28 messages handled of 297 groups, and 96 telephone calls. T/A reports 123 messages intercepted on 36 nets; no D/F.

Limbourg, Belgium

7 Jan 45

Sunday church services were held. Movie in afternoon. 108 messages intercepted, 21 nets, 11 D/F bearings. 39 messages with 323 groups and 141 telephone calls handled by Message Center.



3250 Sig Serv Co, Unit Log for Jan 1945.

Limbourg, Belgium 14 Jan 45

Today the Red Cross girls treated us to coffee and doughnuts. T/A reports 139 enemy messages, 18 nets, 31 D/F bearings. Message Center reported 56 messages, 1060 group counts, 157 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium 15 Jan 45

T/A section reports the functioning of a new service whereby a division teletypes radio intelligence to us for further operation. German reports concern of gas, oil, liquor shortage. 128 enemy messages, 25 nets, 37 D/F bearings, 67 messages handled, 1330 group counts, 173 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium 16 Jan 45

Usual routine business. Message Center reports trouble with jeep. Mess Section still delivering excellently prepared "B" rations. 61 messages handled, 706 group counts, 163 telephone calls, 107 enemy messages, 21 nets, 32 D/F bearings.

Limbourg, Belgium 17 Jan 45

FX rations dispensed: 1 cigar, 2 candy bars, 1 can of juice, 2 packages of cookies per individual. 124 enemy messages, 28 nets, 18 D/F bearings, 54 messages handled, 1002 group counts, 117 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium 18 Jan 45

"Maywine" (the 113th S.R.I. Co) has moved into this area where they were once previously located. 123 enemy messages, 27 nets, 18 D/F bearings, 48 messages, 344 group counts, 78 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium 19 Jan 45

Message Center filled sandbags and used them to barricade their large windows. 34 messages handled, 179 group counts, 93 telephone calls, 82 enemy messages, 23 nets, 9 bearings.

Limbourg, Belgium 20 Jan 45

Established a new guard post and installed a telephone to it. T/A reported 80 enemy messages, 20 nets, 21 D/F bearings. Message Center reported 42 messages handled, 255 group counts, 181 telephone calls.



3250 Sig Serv Co, Unit Log for Jan 1945.

Limbourg, Belgium

21 Jan 45

T/A section reports record day in D/F bearings (89), and also obtained a "fix" for the first time. 96 enemy messages, 34 nets heard. Message Center reports 58 messages, 701 group counts, 168 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

22 Jan 45

Set up new antenna system for VHF. Several visiting officers made an examination of our installation. Message Center reports 53 messages, 389 group counts, 167 telephone calls. SIS net still out. New authority book in effect. T/A reports 105 enemy messages, 25 nets, 80 D/F bearings.

Limbourg, Belgium

23 Jan 45

Routine business. Message Center reported 43 messages handled, 285 group counts, 185 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

24 Jan 45

Radio Repair section working on a mobile intercept truck, and also installing SCR-284 in the Headquarters jeep. 48 messages handled, 366 group counts, 166 telephone calls. Our first day of D/F testing with our own transmitter, mounted in a jeep, roving the highways and transmitting with Intercept D/F'ing. The transmitting unit titled, "Valid Roving."

Limbourg, Belgium

25 Jan 45

"Valid Roving," out again but no results as yet. Radio silence in the SIS net. Message Center reports 34 messages, 438 group count, 165 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

26 Jan 45

Our new VHF team was dispatched today. The installation of the SCR-284 in the jeep was completed today. Message Center reported 50 messages, 223 group counts, and 85 telephone calls.

Limbourg, Belgium

27 Jan 45

Operations as usual. Message Center reported 49 messages, 200 group counts, 163 telephone calls.







August 16

[REDACTED]

Liaison established with 118th Sig Co, the Third Army Radio Intelligence unit. Intercept and traffic analysis sections began operations at 0800 hours. No DAI published.

August 17

Unit left Le Mans and moved to bivouac area 5 miles north of Fontaine. Established an SOP of moving unit in two echelons to permit continuous operations. The second echelon departs from old location after sufficient time has elapsed during which the first echelon set up and began operations. No DAI published.

August 18

DAI: Nothing to report.

August 19

DAI: Nothing to report.

August 20

DAI: Nothing to report.

August 21

The company moved from Fontaine to Chevilly.

DAI: Kampfgruppe Lehr of the 16 Inf was in contact with an unidentified element of the 255 Inf Div. Also heard were Hecke elements of 103 Pz Lehr Div and 21 Pz Div.

August 22

DAI: Reception from 16 Inf Div, 17 SS Pz Gren Div and 103 Pz Lehr Div provided no intelligence.

August 23

The company moved from Fontaine to Villevoques.

DAI: 2 SS Pz Div showed more than usual activity. Other "old friends" heard but no intelligence gleaned.

August 24

DAI: Questionable W/F puts Kampf Gruppe Sud, of the 16 Inf Div in line St Amand En-Pusaye/Dunzy/Bremery.

August 25

The company moved from Villerocques to Villroy.

DAI: No intelligence derived from traffic of 25 Inf div, 130 Pz Lehr Div and 2 SS Pz Div.

August 26

DAI: One W/F line bearing places Hecke patrol elements of 130



Pz Lehr S.G. of Troyes. There was continued activity from combat groups North, Middle and South of the 16 Inf Div.

August 27

DAH: The 9th Pz Div made appearance for first time on our intercept.

August 28

The company moved from Villroy to Palis.

DAH: Movement prevented full coverage of 24 period. Little of interest picked up.

August 29

DAH: 130 Pz Lehr still active. The 10 Pz Div not previously heard, provided some traffic.

August 30

DAH: Day marked by continued inactivity of 16 Inf Div and increased activity of 115 Pz Div. W/T bearings on 1st Bat of 130 Pz arty reg indicates possible location of this unit on a line thru semoine (E-320150) Chalons sur Marne (E-540150) Souain (E-586700).

August 31

The company moved from Palis to Sompuis.

DAH: A larger number of units were heard than usual and this marked the most noteworthy part of the period.

At the close of the period elements opposite XII Corps were:

- 29 PGR of 15 PGD.
- 104 PGR of 15 PGD.
- 751 AA REGT
- 85 Eng Bn
- Asst Bn AOK 1
- Eng Ptn, AOK 1
- 127 IV 48 ID
- 709 Home Guard Bn.

Section III - Statistical Summary

Total number of sets in operations:

|           |                |         |
|-----------|----------------|---------|
| Intercept | 1600Z to 2400Z | 10 sets |
|           | 2400Z to 0700Z | 10 sets |
|           | 0700Z to 1800Z | 10 sets |
| W/F       | 2400Z to 2400Z | 1 set   |



~~SECRET~~

Traffic totals:

| <u>T/I</u> | <u>P/I</u> | <u>R/S</u> | <u>N/I</u> | <u>W/S</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| 10         | 7          | 1          | 816        | 0          | 834          |

Total messages rendered intelligible 9  
Total W/F bearings taken 12  
Total W/F bearings reported in DAK 4  
Total personalities reported 2

*Walter M. Prozdjak*  
Walter E. Prozdjak  
Capt., Sig. C.  
Commanding.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3255th SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY  
APO 403  
US Army

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY - OCTOBER 1944

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION  
SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS  
SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255th Signal Service Company near Nancy (US30110) covers the inclusive period from 1 to 31 October 1944. During this period of operations the unit was assigned Third United States Army and attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff Officers with whom close liaison was established were:

|                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Third U.S. Army SIS Officer | - Major Charles W. Flint     |
| XII Corps Signal Officer    | - Colonel Alfred A. Anderson |
| XII Corps G-2               | - Colonel John C. Claybrook  |

3. The duties of the officers of 3255th Signal Service Company were as follows:

|                           |                                |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Company Commander         | - Capt Walter M. Drozdiak      |
| Supply and Motor Officer  | - 1st Lt William E. Bateman    |
| Intercept Officer         | * 1st Lt Blaine H. Heinzelman  |
| Goniometric Officer       | - 1st Lt George R. Leonard III |
| Traffic Analysis Officers | - 1st Lt Joe Francis           |
|                           | 2d Lt David M. Olds            |
|                           | 2d Lt Albert J. Brunck         |
|                           | (assigned 19 October 1944)     |
| Communications Officer    | - 2d Lt Herbert K. Kaphart     |

4. During this period activity in XII Corps was somewhat static because of our buildup of forces and supplies and the enemy's digging in to defensive positions. Radio Intelligence was limited because of probable availability to the enemy of landlines in a static position within previously developed communication nets. Elements active during the period on XII Corps front were:

11 Pz Div  
559 Gren Div  
533 Gren Div  
3 Pz Gren Div (In reserve)

With frequent contact established on the Corps periphery with 17 SS Pz Div and 48 Gren Div.



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SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

2 October 1944

DAR: Place names mentioned in traffic of 105 Recon Bn of 3 Pz Gr Div revealed concentration of recon activity in the northeast corner of the Q02 sector.

3 October 1944

DAR: Traffic picked up from 105 Recon Bn located the CP of the Fus Bn at a RR crossing at Frennes.

4 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

5 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

6 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

7 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

Prime set up at Amancee U-9319. Second at Moncel Sur Saïlle Q-0218 lines were run to EF for control. Existing French underground cable was used to second.

8 October 1944 to 23 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

23 October 1944

DAR: Activity centered around an artillery net judged to be operating on the XII Corps front. From decodes and clear text picked up the following information about the net was derived:

- 1) Installation consists probably of a single heavy piece
- 2) Network consists of a control station at firing position and advance control post, and three forward observation posts.
- 3) 12 shots fired between hours of 222345 and 230530. Corps shell reports from Pont A Mousson area coincide with above time of activity.



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23 October 1944 (cont'd)

4) Sombriere D/F locates gun position and observation posts within rectangle Jossieux (U-9629), Lucy (Q-0738), Delma (Q-0132), Chateau Salins (Q0923).

5) Personalities Bader and Klubmann previously reported in this Arty Bat were mentioned again today.

24 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

25 October 1944

DF's moved to cover norther portion of Corps sector. Prime DF located at Armaucourt U-9425. Second at Gramercy Q-0123. Lines were installed to both DF's with assistance of Corps Sig Bn.

DAR: Nothing to report.

26 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

27 October 1944

An additional SCR 503 was acquired and installed at Lixieres U-8829 and named Terry. Field wire line was run to Terry from Prime and was a relatively weak talking circuit, at times not being useable at all.

DAR: Nothing to report.

28 October to 31 October 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

31 October 1944

DAR: Traffic from 21 Pz Div, until now fairly inactive, mentioned Pettonville (V-2693), Reclenville (V-2694), Ogeviller (V-2595), and personality Kielhorn (Possibly Lt. Keilhorn, 21 Recon Bn)

SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Total number of sets in operation:

|                                      |
|--------------------------------------|
| Intercept - 1600Z to 2400Z - 16 sets |
| 2400Z to 0700Z - 7 sets              |
| 0700Z to 1600Z - 18 sets             |
| DF - 2400Z to 2400Z - 2 sets         |



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Traffic totals: <sup>+</sup>

| T/L | P/L | R/S | H/I | M/S | Total |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 133 | 133 | 104 | 978 | 0   | 1343  |

Total messages rendered intelligible: 193  
Total DF bearings taken : 776  
Total DF bearings reported in DAR : 318  
Total personalities reported : 45

*Walter M. Drozdak*  
WALTER M. DROZDAK  
Capt., 3255 Sig/Sy Co.  
Commanding

<sup>+</sup> ~~SECRET~~



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3255 SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY

APO 403  
US ARMY

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY - NOVEMBER 1944

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION  
SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS  
SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255th Signal Service Company covers the inclusive period of 1 November to 30 November 1944. During that period of operations this unit was assigned to the Third United States Army and attached to XII CORPS.

2. Staff officers with whom close liaison was established were:

Major Charles W. Flint - Third US Army SIS Officer  
Colonel Alfred A. Anderson - XII Corps Signal Officer  
Colonel John H. Claybrook - Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,  
XII CORPS.

3. The duties of the officers of the 3255th Signal Service Company were:

Captain Walter M. Drozdiak - Company Commander  
1st Lt. William H. Bateman - Supply and Motor Officer  
1st Lt. Blaine H. Heinzelman - Intercept Officer  
1st Lt. George R. Leonard III - Goniometric Officer  
1st Lt. Joe Francis - Traffic Analysis Officer  
2nd Lt. David M. Olds - Traffic Analysis Officer  
2nd Lt. Albert J. Brunck - Traffic Analysis Officer  
2nd Lt. Herbert N. Kephart - Communications Officer

SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

The first half of the month of November was characterized by the completion of the build-up preparatory to crossing the Moselle River and the taking of that part of the Maginot Line to the east of it. Enemy radio traffic was curtailed, possibly due to the availability of previously established and developed ground wire communications nets. Concurrent with the commencement of the XII Corps advance considerable tactical low grade traffic was intercepted, particularly from the 130 Panzer Lehr, 11 Panzer, 36 Infantry, and 21 Panzer Divisions. At the opening of the period,



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enemy elements opposite the XII Corps were:

559 Infantry Div  
48 Infantry Div  
11 Panzer Div  
361 Infantry Div  
1431 Ft Inf Bn  
1151 Arty Bn GHQ

1 November

XII Corps CP located in Nancy, and the 3255th Signal Service Company also located there. (U-830110).

DAR: Nothing to report.

2 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

3 November

The company acquired an SCR-255, which it installed at Amancee (U-9319). This gave 3 SCR-503's on approximately a 10 miles base line about 3 miles from the front line, plus this SCR-255, located near a division CP.

DAR: Nothing to report.

4 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

5 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

6 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

7 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

8 November

The VHF experimental truck moved forward today to Landremont. Personnel included: Lt. Olds, 5 men from this company, 4 men from the 118 SRI Company.

DAR: A unit believed to be the 21 Panzer Division mentioned

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8 November Cont'd

DAR: Bezange Le Petit (Q-1815) and Moncourt (Q-1814).

9 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

11 November

DAR: 2 nets, possibly of the 11 Recon Bn/11 Pz Div, mentioned fighting around Hanncourt (Q-0535), Riche (Q-1933). A 3rd net, of the same organization, mentioned arty activity southwest of hill 162, suggesting the possibility of a German counterattack.

12 November

The VHF experimental truck returned today. Intelligence derived was negligible. It was found that German linguists serving as R/T operators would require training in radio procedure and German order of battle before they would be able to work with any degree of efficiency.

DAR: A unit passing traffic characteristic of the 21 Panzer Div mentioned towns north of the XII Corps sector in the Q-15 and Q-14 sectors.

13 November

DAR: General - The 21 Pz Recon Bn passed considerable traffic today mentioned the following:

118 Inf Rgt/36 Inf Div  
38 Rgt/17 Pz Gr Div  
Grimminger - Known as the CO of the II Bn/192 Pz Rgt/21 Pz Div.  
Captain Kurz - Known also in the 192 Rgt  
Watermann - Probably in the 21 Pz Div  
192 Pz Rgt - In a msg of 131056, "Einhit Kurz" was located in Berlize (Q-0152)  
118 Inf Rgt - In a msg of 131325 was located 2 km west of sector 27.  
Unidentified Unit - A msg intercepted at 131026 indicated that German arty was located at a road fork 1 km southwest of Villers Sur Nied (Q-1236) ready to fire.

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14 November

DAR: General - The 21 Pz Div was less active than on the previous day, only readable place name was Crehange (q-5225).

Unidentified unit - An arty unit, possibly of Battalion size mentioned infantry fighting in Meclueves (u-9350), and arty fire in the Bois de Mann (U -9946) Le Houvre woods was also mentioned (u-9744).

15 November

The company moved from Nancy to Chateau-Salins (q-100255) .

DAR: General - (from the 118 SKI Co) elements of the 11 Panzer Div were told to contact their neighbor on the right.

Unidentified arty - Gave observation reports on allied attack on Bincheville (q-1743), and requested harrassing fire 1 Km south of that town.

16 November

DAR: General - The 21 Pz Recon Bn mentioned a Feldersatz Bn (Filed replacement battalion) near hill 243 in the second line of defense. Grenadier rgts 165 and 118, and several battle lines, located with reference to an unknown checkpoint map system.

Personalities--

Wenzel -- known in arty unit, possibly of the 17 SS PZ Gr Div.

Rosendahl--Possibly of the 21 Pz Div.

17 November

DAR: Nothing to report.

18 November

DAR: XII Corps Zone - Nothing to report.

XX Corps Zone - 21 Pz Recon Bn mentioned numerous towns in the 4-04 and 4-05 areas. Luck, C.O. of the 125 PGR, and Kurz, connected with the 192 PGR, were also mentioned. There was also evidence of an attempted German withdrawal from the area east of Metz. At 181350, the 21 Pz Recon Bn was trying to learn from the "neighbor of the right" where the "southern route of withdrawal is", and stated that they intended to mine the road from Fouligny (q-1056) to Zimmingen (q-1559) if this neighbor on the right was no longer in need of it.

19 November

DAR: A D/F fix from the 118 SKI co today placed elements of the 11 Pz Div in the q-0452 area, slightly farther east than the 22 elements D/F'd yesterday. The personalities Keppler and Guttmann were mentioned; both unidentified.



20 November

The company was reorganized effective Sept 4 1944 in accordance with T/O and E 11-500, dated July 1, with changes. General order number 34, HQ, XII Corps.

DAR: Noticeable today was the absence of traffic identifiable with the 11 Pz Div. This was also the second day of radio silence for the 21 Pz Div.

21 November

DAR: The 11 Pz Div was heard again today. The 21 Pz Div continued silent. 11 Pz Div - probable identification of the 11 Bn/1553 artz r t in the Q-33 area. Towns mentioned were Insweiler and Munster.

22 November

DAR: The 21 Pz still silent. 11 Pz Div - Boehm, possibly of KG Boehm, was mentioned in pl in language on one net identified with th 11 Pz Div.

23 November

DAR: General - considerable tactical traffic was passed today by an unidentified unit, mentioning towns in the area east of Chateau-Salins in the Q-53, 52, 53, 54 and 71 areas. 21 Pz Div - the 21 Pz Recon bn w s heard again today passing tactical traffic. No town names were mentioned.

24 November

The company moved to Morshausen (Q-20372) from Chateau-Salins. 3 D/F positions were installed - Prime at Gros-Tenquin, Second in the company area, Terry near Zarbeling (Q-2332).

DAR: An unidentified unit reconnoitering the area in which the newly arrived 130 Pz Lehr is operating continued to pass tactical traffic today, mentioning towns farther east than yesterday. Towns mentioned were in the Q-42, 43 and 73 areas. 11 Pz Div - D/F by the 118 SRI Co locates an element of this unit at Q-4652 today.

25 November

DAR: 130 Pz Lehr Div - the unit reconnoitering this div's area passed considerable tactical traffic again today.

MIR's given were: 1. Ingeweller (Q-8130), Weiterweiler (Q-7620), Neuwiller (Q-7625). south to the Vosges Mountains.  
2. Fromuhl (Q-6634), Hinsbourg (Q-6734), Luetzelstein (Q-62).  
3. Drulingen (Q-6030), Sieviller (Q-6127), Ottviller (Q-6229).  
4. Struth (Q-6552), Petersbach (Q-6550), Asswiller (Q-6231).



25 November

Towns reported occupied by the Allies:

Kerbholz (Q-6333)  
Veckersviller (Q-5927)  
Finstingenwald (Fenetränge Forest)  
Other towns in the Q-53 and Q-63 areas were also mentioned.

11 Pz Div-- Reconnaissance messages, signed by "Horn", possibly Major Horn of the 608 GHQ Engineers, attached to the 11 Pz Div, reported on activity in Fenetränge (Q-4727), Baerendorf (Q-5226), Burgenwald, and Ohlingen. This net also passed considerable medium grade traffic as well as plain language, but its identification with the 11 Pz Div is still only tentative.

26 November

DAR: General -- The net reported on the 130 Pz Lehr Div sector mentioned towns a little farther east today, in the Q-83, 74, and 75 areas.

11 Pz Div -- Passed some tactical traffic today, reporting on an "attack south of 241".

17 SS PZ GR DIV -- A plain language arty net of the Div was active, reporting on its own arty fire, and on small formations of allied inf and tanks. Kunz and Krenhke were mentioned.

27 November

The Director, SIS, ETOUSA requested a report on wire communications for control of D/F, possibly for forwarding to Army communications Service, Washington, as this office had expressed interest in our system of D/F control.

DAR: 130 Pz Lehr Div - The 130 Pz Recon Bn mentioned several towns in the Q-72, 82, 73, 83 areas. D/F from the 118 SRI CO placed an administrative net of this Div in the Q-64 area.

11 Pz DIV -- Less medium grade, and no low grade, heard today.

17 SS PZ GR DIV -- The same arty net heard yesterday today mentioned Kunz (Forward Observer, probably of the III Bn/17 SS AR), and Captain Krenhke (CO CT Krenhke/37 SS PGR).

Unidentified net -- A net active the past three days today mentioned Puttelange (Q-1450-).



28 November

DAR: 130 Pz Lehr Div -- Mentioned towns in the Q-82 and 83 areas.

462 Inf Div -- Remnants of this Div, trapped in the Metz area, resorted to plain language, reporting no contact, and that they were sending blindly. Gutmann mentioned.

Unidentified R/T Net -- (R/T is usually used for short distances only)-- This net indicated confusion in receiving rations, and also mentioned the appearance of allied scouts and infantry. Personalities were: Hofsaess, Moritz, Rodde, and Walqmann.

Unidentified net -- The same net that mentioned Puttelange yesterday today mentioned Ellweiler (Q-4053) and Quebenhouse (unloc).

29 November

DAR: 130 Pz Lehr Div -- Concurrent with Allied pressure in its sector, this Div passed considerably more tactical traffic than usual, mentioning towns in the Q- 54, 74, 83, 73, and 83 areas.

462 Inf Div -- The station trapped in the Metz area reported today at 1740 that Fort Wuertemberg had fallen and gave last greetings to all.

Unidentified net 1. Referred to an Army Ordnance Depot at Mainz (WM -3856), and "A" reserve echelon depot at Kirrberg (WM-3090), where new oxygen containers were to be drawn and old type ones turned in.

Unidentified net 2. This arty net gave targets and reported on shots fired. Also gave an MLR, probably in its sector, as: Gisengen (Q-65), a height east of 203, east of 209 to 211. The personality Bauer was mentioned.

Unidentified net 3. Mentioned Helmschrott and Mittermeire: both unidentified.

30 November

DAR: The 130 Pz Lehr Div was silent for the first time in 7 days.

Several personalities were mentioned on 3 unidentified nets:

Pichelweiler (net 1).  
Sgt Schwessner (net 2)  
Zity (net 3)  
Wendel (net 3)  
Oblt Jahn (net 3)  
Lt Ratke (net 3).

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Elements facing the XII Corps at the end of the period were:

- 17 SS PZ GR DIV
- 130 PZ LEHR DIV
- ELTS 25 PZ GR DIV
- 1151 ARTY BN
- 48 INF DIV
- ELTS 11 PZ DIV
- 361 INF DIV REM
- 347 INF DIV ELTS

SECTION III -- STATISTICAL SUMMARY

|                                |     |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| N/I message intercepted .....  | 15  |
| T/L messages intercepted.....  | 507 |
| P/L messages intercepted.....  | 332 |
| R/S messages intercepted.....  | 153 |
| D/P messages intercepted.....  | 6   |
| E/S messages intercepted.....  | 24  |
| LISC messages intercepted..... | 214 |

TOTAL MESSAGES INTERCEPTED.....1261

Total msgs rendered intelligible.....413

D/F shots reported.....277

SET ALLOCATION:

|                |    |
|----------------|----|
| 1500z to 2400z | 15 |
| 2400z to 0700z | 6  |
| 0700z to 1500z | 15 |

*Walter M Drozdak*  
 Walter M. Drozdak  
 Capt. Sig. C  
 Commanding

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3255th SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY

APO 403

US Army

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY - DECEMBER 1944

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255th Signal Service Company near Morhange (Q2037) and Sarralbe (Q4844) France and Kirchberg (P8515), Luxembourg covers the period from 1 to 31 December inclusive. During this period of operations the unit was assigned to Third United States Army and attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff Officers with whom close liaison was established were:

|                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Third U.S. Army SIS Officer | - Major Charles W. Flint     |
| XII Corps Signal Officer    | - Colonel Alfred A. Anderson |
| XII Corps G-2               | - Colonel John C. Claybrook  |

3. The duties of the officers of the 3255th Signal Service Company were as follows:

|                           |                                |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Company Commander         | - Capt Walter M. Drozdiak      |
| Supply and Motor Officer  | - 1st Lt William H. Bateman    |
| Intercept Officer         | - 1st Lt Blaine H. Heinzelman  |
| Goniometric Officer       | - 1st Lt George R. Leonard III |
| Traffic Analysis Officers | - 1st Lt Joe Francis           |
|                           | 2d Lt David M. Olds            |
|                           | 2d Lt Albert J. Brunck         |
| Communications Officer    | - 2d Lt Herbert N. Kephart     |

4. During the first part of this period XII Corps pushed across Lorraine to the Siegfried Line. Radio Intelligence was effective against Panzer units contacted on the front and artillery units in the Siegfried Line. During the latter part of the period XII Corps carried on an essentially static operation against Volks Grenadier Divisions in the southern shoulder of the enemy "bulge" in Luxembourg. Radio Intelligence was sharply limited against these units although considerable information was gained from enemy formation on the more active sectors of the front.

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Elements active on XII Corps front at the beginning of the period were:

17 SS Pz Gren Div  
11 Pz Div  
150 Pz Lehr Div  
25 Pz Gren Div  
36 Infantry Div

SECTION II NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1 December 1944 Company at Morhange France (Q206372)

DAR: 11 Pz Div: Thk D/F placed Elts of 11 Pz Div in Q5566 area; a shot on another net placed it along southern XII boundry. Some medium grade was passed.

130 Pz Lehr Div: passed just enough traffic to indicate it is still on the air. No tactical traffic was passed.

German Radio Intelligence Net: A probable German R/I unit sent plain text messages in connection with operation of their D/F.

21 Pz Div: passed tactical traffic today. Personalities Gerling and Arnold mentioned.

2 December 1944

DAR: Nothing to Report

3 December 1944

DAR: XII Corps Front—17 SS Pz Div; 7 SS Pz AR was active today, reporting their own surprise fire on Pfaffenburg (Unloc); target areas #1, 42, and 43; and on one or more farm houses. Enemy (Allies) observed at east exit from Schoenbruch (Q2680).

IX Corps Fron—Unidentified artillery unit; mentioned towns Schwemlingen (Q1797), Weiler (Q1 96), and Buedingen (Q1495).

4 December 1944

DAR: Unidentified artillery unit: an unidentified unit, probably of Bn size, today reported on towns in XII Corps sector. It reported at 0414324 that the Germans must retreat and that the enemy (Allies) were at 041252 in Farschweiler (Q3955), Louparshouse (Q4154), Puettelange (Q4150) Bois De Louparshouse (Q4154), Bois De Rodenberg (Unloc) Guebenhausen (Q4233), and in front of Metzging (Q4356). At 041445 the exit from Metzging was reported still in German hands. At 141257 it gave its position as exit from Hundling (Q4556) and at 041403 an order was given to move the OP west of Hundlingen. A later message said the Bn was firing on Diebling (Q4657) by map because of poor observation.

5 December to 7 December 1944

DAR: Nothing to Report

7 December 1944

DAR: XX Corps Front: at 1145 today the radio station at Fort Alvensleben in Metz announced that the front was capitulating due to lack of radions and ammunition, signed, Vogel.

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8 December 1944

Company moved to Sarralbe France (Q483442).

DAR: Unidentified Unit: Passed tactical traffic of a reconnaissance nature mentioning Saareinsing (Q55).

9 December 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 December 1944

DAR: XII Corps Front: 17 SS Pz Div: A recon unit of the 17 SS Pz Div, apparently under control of Wahl (previously identified as CO of the 33th Regt) passed tactical traffic using an unidentified 2-figure reference-point system.

11 December 1944

DAR: Unidentified Artillery Unit: mentioned firing on the following towns:

Bauerwald (Q5558)  
Grand Bois (Q5556)

Possibly 17 SS Pz Div Gren: mentioned "position Reinheim" (Q5960).

12 December 1944

DAR: 17 SS Pz Div: Traffic was heavy today, mainly of a tactical nature.

17 Rcn Bn: Continued to use check-point reference system.

17 SS A R: Net 1: Fire was ordered on Bliesebersingen (Q5958) at 1200A. Mention was made of communications with Wahl (Co of 1 7SS Rcn Bn).

Net 2: 1315A: Mentions infantry activity at Frauenberg (Q5659) and Bliesebersingen and states that personnel and cargo trucks are on the road from Neunkirchen (Q5558) to Frauenberg and from Sarreinsing (Q5454) to Viesing-Ferne (Q5756).

Frauenberg.

1340A: 8th Battery ordered to fire on

1510A: OP reports noise of fighting from Habkirchen (Q5558) and Bliesmenen (Q5561). Requests fire on Bliesebersingen road triangle and Frauenberg.

1620A: Mention made of impending move of CP.

13 December 1944

DAR: General: A unit believed to be 42 Flak Rgt appears to have been committed as straight artillery and to be working with 17 SS Arty Rgt in XII Corps Zone. Probably Flak Rgt 42; mentioned German Arty fire on: Bliesebersingen (Q5958), Frauenberg (Q5649), Hannweiler (Q5058), and Bauerwald (Q5558).

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13 December 1944 (cont'd)

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17 SS Pz Div

17 SS Rcn Bn: Continued to pass tactical traffic using check point reference system.

17 SS AR: OP net requested 60 rounds of surprise fire on the southwest edge of the Bahnholz Woods (Q5860).

14 December 1944

DAR: General: 17 SS AR and 42 Flak Rgt continued to pass tactical traffic. It may be significant that today there was intercept of their weather reports. It is possible that this is for other than the regular medium caliber artillery action. One more thing of interest was mentioned by the same unit of phosphorous shells (either theirs or ours).

15 December 1944

DAR: 17 SS Pz Div

17 SS AR: Reported Bliesenbersingen (Q5758) and an unidentified hill in enemy (Allied) hands and communications out with an unidentified unit. Reference was made to CT representatives in region of Reinheim (Q5960) at 0250.

42 Flak Rgt: Reported that our tanks were in region of Welferdingen (Q4957) at 1100 and showed an interest in Kreuzberg (Unid) in region of forest of Bliesgerwiller (Q5360), possibly requesting fire there.

Units outside XII Corps Zone: D/F today tends to confirm movement of 21 Pz Div toward VI Corps Zone.

16 December 1944

DAR: General Summary: Unidentified unit gave coordinates of B 134: right 52380 up 70100 (map scale 1/25000), but system used unknown. Also reported B 65 occupied by the enemy, and that enemy was laying a smoke screen. Finally reported B 23 and B 25 to have fallen, and B 60 as having been encircled.

17 SS Pz Div: Artillery unit mentioned harrasing fire on Reinheim (Q5960). Recce unit mentioned 37 Rgt and stated that 44 occupied by the enemy, and also the area 2 kilometers southeast thereof. Another patrol reported their position as 78 at 0900.

Pro 42 Flak Rgt: Reported detouring around Lehrpass area on way to front, and signed Winkler (Poss Co 8th Bty, 17 SS Pgd).

17 December 1944

DAR: 17 SS Pz Div:

17 SS AR: Mentioned Reinheim (Q6060), Gersheim (Q6261) and Bannholz (Q5860).

11 Pz Div: It was reported that Ct Lehmann has communication with 11 Pz Div. It was further reported that Lehmann has no communication with the neighbor on the right, therefore it appears that 11 Pz Div is south of Ct Lehmann.

18 December 1944

DAR: 17 SS Pz Div: 17 SS Pcn Bn: Traffic has been declining steadily for the past few days. At 1150 a control of a net gave its position as Rubenheim (Q6264). Mentioned firing at Lehmann.



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18 December 1944 (cont'd)

17 SS AR: At 1245 A there was an interest in Lohhof Ferme (Q6061) Area.

17 SS Elts (Poss command net): 15 tanks reported at Hill 350 (Poss Q 5660). At 0858 clear text forbidden; signed Fick (Co 17 SS Pgr Div). Artillery formation working with 17 SS: A ctivity in Breiterwald (Q5662) and Buchholz (Q5662).

11 Pz Div: Fair D/F on one net tends to confirm 11 Pz Elts in southern XII Corps front.

19 December 1944

DAR:General: of possible significance today was the complete silence of 17 SS Ar fire command net.

17 SS Rcn Bn: at 0715A reconnaissance elt gave its CP as Rubenheim (Q6164); also mentioned Lehmann, Gersheim (Q6261) and Buchwald (Q5662) mentioned.

Unidentified Nets: At 182010 there was reference to a belt of mine on the road 50 meters behind an unlocated road fork and 400 meters west of something (groups garbled).

20 December 1944

DAR:General: Reduced traffic again today.

17 SS Rcn Bn: Enemy (Allies) sighted in Buchenwald (Q6332) at 0845A.

21 December 1944

DAR: Nothing to Report.

22 December 1944

DAR:General: 17 SS Rcn Bn and a Bn of 42 Flak Rgt heard from rear intercept position at Sarralbe.

23 December 1944

Company enroute to Kirchberg, Luxembourg (P852155)

24 December 1944

DAR: An unidentified unit (possibly 5 Para Div) indicated that things were not going so well in its sector when at 1435 it was stated that the sector must be held at the cost of the last man and earlier, at 1407, when there was concern over what was wrong at the Bigonville (P6164) mill.

Another unidentified unit reported at 1345 that the enemy (Allies) were finally settled in northeastern edge of Seiterwald (unlocated).

25 December 1944

DAR: Poss 5 Para Div: A unit believed to be the 5th Para Div passed tactical traffic today indicating several German retreats in its sector. At 1048 an order was issued to change position and evacuate "castle". At 1132



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25 December 1944 (cont'd)

a second order directed that strong points be built and held "this time". The enemy (Allies) was reported at point 488, and at 1522 the question of where the Allies had broken through was asked. Further reports on the unfavorable German situation in this sector were: 1) at 1102 "mortar and bazooka ammunition expended". 2) at 1046 "no communication with 2d Bn". 3) At 1109 "no reserves available for attack."

The only other thing of interest was an order to reenforce the bicycle platoon.

26 December 1944

DAR: XII Corps Front: An artillery unit requested fire on the southern part of Bardorf (LO037) at 0850. At 1230 a subordinate unit was ordered to request fire only when the situation was urgent.

5 Para Div: Intercepted messages continued to indicate a general break-down of this unit's location. At 0034 it was reported that there were no longer any personnel from the 14th and 15th companies with Capt. Berneicke (unidentified). At 1347 Capt. Kitze, CO of 11/15 Para Rgt was ordered to lead a counterattack himself: "The enemy must be hurled back".

27 December 1944

(P4164) DAR: 1 Volks Artillerie Korps: Elements mentioned Lavacherei

28 December 1944 to 30 December 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

30 December 1944

DAR: 5 Para Div: Tactical traffic passed concerning their (enemy) mortar fire. Personalities mentioned:

Lt. Felmann  
Lt. Reet  
Lt. Mueller  
Mertins (CO 5 Para PI Bn)  
Berneicke (CO 1/15 Para Rgt.)

31 December 1944

DAR: Nothing to report.

Elements active against XII Corps at the close of the period were:

79 VG Div  
212 VG Div  
278 VG Div

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SECTION III STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Total Number of Sets in Operations:

Intercept - 1600Z to 2400Z - 15 sets  
            2400Z to 0700Z - 5 sets  
            0700Z to 1600Z - 14 sets  
  
D/F - 2400Z to 2400Z - 2 sets

Traffic totals:

| T/L | P/L | R/S | N/I  | D/P | E  | Total |
|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|----|-------|
| 677 | 323 | 273 | 2035 | 49  | 48 | 3395  |

Total messages rendered intelligible: 544  
Total DF bearings taken : 558  
Total DF bearings reported in DAR : 279  
Total personalities reported : 95

*Walter M. Drozdian*  
WALTER M. DROZDIAN  
Capt., 3255 Sig Sv Co.  
Commanding

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~~SECRET~~  
3255th Signal Service Company

APO 403  
US Army

9 May 1945

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY APRIL 1945

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION  
SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS  
SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255th Signal Service Co in Germany covers the inclusive period of 1 to 30 April 1945, during the period of operations the unit was assigned Third United States Army and attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff officers with whom close liaison was established were:

|                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Third U.S. Army SIS Officer | - Major Charles W. Flint     |
| XII Corps Signal Officer    | - Colonel Alfred A. Anderson |
| XII Corps G-2               | - Colonel John W. Claybrook  |

3. The duties of the officers of 3255th Signal Service Company were as follows:

|                           |                                |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Company Commander         | - Capt Walter M. Prozdak       |
| Supply and Motor Officer  | - 1st Lt William E. Bateman    |
| Intercept Officer         | - 1st Lt Blaine H. Heinzelman  |
| Goniometric Officer       | - 1st Lt George H. Leonard III |
| Traffic Analysis Officers | - 1st Lt Joe Francis           |
|                           | - 1st Lt David L. Olds         |
|                           | - 2nd Lt Albert J. Brunck      |
| Communications Officer    | - 1st Lt. Herbert W. Kephart   |



SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

The month of April witnessed the final drive across Germany to a junction with the Red Army leading to the inevitable capitulation of the Wehrmacht. Radio traffic for the month was generally light due probably to the fact that the enemy front was rapidly disintegrating into small elements and remnants. The bulk of the intercept intelligence derived by this company was yielded by Panzer units on the TUSA front, notably the 11th, the 2nd, and 11th Pz Divisions. At the opening of the period enemy units opposing the XII Corps were:

- 11 Pz Div
- Elms 156 Inf Div
- Elms 159 Inf Div

1 April

XII Corps Cpt and 325th Signal Service Co. located in Offenbach (M-756664)

DAR: Nothing To Report.

2 April

DAR: Nothing To Report.

3 April

The company moved from Offenbach to Lauterbach (M-174285)

DAR: Nothing To Report.

4 April

DAR: An unidentified enemy unit reported an allied crossing of the Fulda river south of Kassel (C-2284).

5 April

DAR: Nothing To Report.

6 April

DAR: The 9 SS Pz heard in brief activity.



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7 April

The Company moved from Lauterbach to Vacha (M-610491).

DAR: Nothing to report.

8 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

9 April

The Company moved from Vacha to Preissigacker (M-878212).

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 April

DAR: The 5th Para. Div. mentioned an allied advance east of Goettingen (C-5230), and reported German artillery firing on American positions from Herzberg (C-84). Traffic of the 700 Volks Art Korps operating in the Ruhr pocket, was also intercepted.

11 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

12 April

DAR: The 11th Pz Div located one of its units in Steinwiesen (C-6594) as of April 11. The 17th SS Div revealed its intention of erecting road blocks at 4 points in the S-25 and S-26 sectors.

13 April

DAR: The Company moved from Preissigacker to Hirschendorf (J-256110).

DAR: An unidentified unit reported allied tanks crossing the autobahn bridge at Gera (K-0503).

14 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

15 April

The Company moved from Hirschendorf to Breitenloh (O-530889).

DAR: Nothing to report.

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16 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

17 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

18 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

19 April

DAR: An unidentified unit on the XII Corps front described action centering around Kirchenlamitz (P-0181), ordering that fire be requested only when the Allies moved from there to the attack. The 14 Light Observation Bn was also heard mentioning towns on the 1st Army front.

20 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

21 April

The Company moved from Breitenloh to Bayreuth (0-750560).

DAR: Messages intercepted from the Russian front mentioned places on the A-07 and A-27 sectors.

22 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

"fix" 3rd W/F team established within the company making possible bearings on enemy radio installations.

23 April

DAR: An unidentified unit sent periodic situation reports concerning targets in the A-24 and A-34 sectors. The 3th SS Pz Div was heard in brief activity mentioning towns in the P-32 block north of Vienna.

24 April

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The Company moved from Bayreuth to Grafenwohr (P-001326).

DAR: The breaking of a cipher sequence revealed activity on the part of an unidentified unit on the XII Corps front centering around towns in the P-32, P-33, and P-43 sectors.

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25 April

DAR: An unidentified unit detailed artillery activity in the area of Kuencheureuth (P-2569).

26 April

The Company moved from Grafenwohr to Fromberg (U-185916).

DAR: A net, possibly an element of the 11th Pz Div, mentioned several towns around the Czechoslovakian border, in the P-33, P-35 and P-45 sectors.

27 April

DAR: The possible elements of the 11 Pz Div reported 26 April continued transmissions concerned with towns in the same general area.

28 April

DAR: The 11 Pz unit reported the preceding 2 days today mentioned towns in the P-51 and U-69 areas.

29 April

The Company moved from Fromberg to Vicchtach (U-756657).

DAR: Messages from the possible 11 Pz Div unit revealed a slight movement to the east. Another unit (unidentified) reported the evacuation of the town of Hradec in Czechoslovakia at either P-50/P-77 or P-50/c-28 without Allied pressure. The 14th Light Observation Bn was also located in the Chemnitz-Dresden area.

30 April

DAR: Signs of disintegration of the 11th Panzer Div were revealed in messages passed advising German soldiers who wanted to surrender to advance with white flags, and that the burgemeister of Schuettarschen (p-6719) had directed all cameras, field glasses, and weapons to be turned in. The 14 Light Observation Bn was again located in the Chemnitz-Dresden area and the 9th Pz Div was still reported active in the Vienna sector.

At the close of the period elements opposite XII Corps were:

11 Pz Div  
Elm 413 Mob Div  
Reg 2 Pz Div  
Elm 2 SS Pz Div.



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SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Total number of sets in operation:

|           |                  |         |
|-----------|------------------|---------|
| Intercept | — 1600z to 2400z | 15 sets |
|           | 2400z to 0700z   | 6 sets  |
|           | 0700z to 1600z   | 15 sets |
| D/F       | — 2400z to 2400z | 2 sets  |

traffic totals:

|     |     |     |     |     |      |       |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-------|
| T/L | P/L | R/S | N/I | M/S | Misc | Total |
| 615 | 520 | 800 | 173 | 28  | 1    | 2149  |

|                                       |     |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| Total messages rendered intelligible: | 378 |
| Total D/F bearings taken:             | 20  |
| Total D/F bearings reported in DAR:   | 13  |
| Total personalities reported:         | 129 |

*Walter M Drozdak*  
WALTER M. DROZDIK  
Capt., Sig. C.  
Commanding

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3255th SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY  
APO 405  
US Army

9 March 1945

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY \* FEBRUARY 1945

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION  
SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS  
SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255th Signal Service Co in Luxembourg covers the inclusive period of 1 to 28 February 1945. During the period of operations the unit was assigned Third United States Army and attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff officers with whom close liaison was established were:

Third U.S. Army SIS Officer - Major Charles W. Flint  
XII Corps Signal Officer - Colonel Alfred A. Anderson  
XII Corps G-2 - Colonel John C. Claybrook

3. The duties of the officers of 3255th Signal Service Company were as follows:

Company Commander - Capt Walter M. Drozdiak  
Supply and Motor Officer - 1st Lt William H. Bateman  
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Traffic Analysis Officers- 1st Lt Joe Francis  
1st Lt David M. Olds  
2d Lt Albert J. Brunck  
Communications Officer - 1st Lt Herbert N. Kephart

SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

Radionintelligence was limited during the period by two factors. XII Corps was opposed during the first half of the period mainly by Volks Grenadier units known to use little radio and during the entire period, units opposite XII Corps were entrenched in the Siegfried defenses. At the opening of the period, enemy elements opposite XII Corps were:

212 V. G. Division  
352 V. G. Division  
276 V. G. Division  
130 Pz Lehr Division (in reserve)

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During the period 766 GHQ Volks Artillerie Korps was traced to XII Corps front through place names.

1 February 1945

Headquarters XII Corps located in Luxembourg City. 5255th Signal Service Company located Kirchberg (P852155).

DAR: Nothing to report.

2 February 1945

Mobile DF section, having had difficulty in operating due to the new procedure of control by radio, is improving slowly.

DAR: Nothing to report.

3 February 1945

Attempt made to get a frequency above 3000 kc for DF radio, but none available. Present communication range limited to 15 kilometers.

DAR: Nothing to report.

4 February 1945

Intercept team went forward to Bettendorf and went into operation at 1600 hours. Cable to Diekirch was available for teletype, but due to the situation north of that town, it was difficult to keep the field wire line from Diekirch to Bettendorf operating.

DAR: Nothing to report.

5 February 1945

Teletype to forward team in operation at 1900 hours.

DAR: Nothing to report.

6 February 1945

PW of 130 Pz Lehr Div revealed a frequency used by that unit, but monitoring thereof yielded no signals.

DAR: Nothing to report.

7 February 1945

DAR: Element of 766 GHQ Artillerie Korps at 1530, mentioned fire on Gerdenhaf (unlocated) and unknown number of kilometers west of Schmidt.

8 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

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9 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

11 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

12 February 1945

DAR: There is RI evidence that 766 VAK, last identified on VIII Corps front is now on XII Corps front. At 121411, Capt Koerner was ordered to go to Dockendorf (L0848) immediately, and at 121111 it was reported that there was a sack of mail in Binsfeld (L2652) for the unit.

13 February 1945

Artillery fire knocked down poles holding field wire to forward team, requiring replacement of such wire.

DAR: Nothing to report.

14 - 16 February 1945

Lt Carpenter visited forward team. QRM on sets is very high during the day.

DAR: Nothing to report.

17 February 1945

G-2 was called on three personalities mentioned, all of which were in 21st Pz according to files. According to information received, the unit had gone to eastern front.

DAR: Nothing to report.

18 - 25 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

26 February 1945

DAR: XII Corps front: Nothing to report.

First Army front: At 261153 an unidentified unit reported traffic from Binsfeld toward Durw (F1545 and F1246 respectively). Tanks and trucks were reported in Beimen (unid). At 261211 German tanks and trucks were reported from Rommelsheim (F1644) to Bubenheim (F1643).

5255th Signal Service Co moved to Waldbillig, Luxembourg yesterday.

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27 February 1945

DAR: An unidentified unit (artillery) on XII Corps front appeared on the air tonight for the first time, requesting permission to fire on road from Bitburg (L133535) to Mattenheim (L140586). It was also interested in Puetzhoeh (L140567) and Kockelberg (L140583). Note—This unit may be the same unit that was around Duren (First Army front) yesterday. The same cipher sequence (code) was used. Further, the unit around Duren was heard only once—yesterday—and the unit heard on XII Corps front was not heard before today.

28 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

Headquarters XII Corps located at Fels (P9152). 3255th Signal Service Company located at Waldbillig (P957340).

At the close of the period elements opposite XII Corps were:

9 V. G. Division  
2 Pz Division  
560 V. G. Division  
212 V. G. Division  
Army Weapons School 7  
Kampf Gruppe Koch  
Kampf Gruppe Haberkamp

SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Total number of sets in operation:

Intercept - 1800Z to 2400Z - 15 sets  
                  2400Z to 0700Z - 8  
                  0700Z to 1600Z - 15  
  
DF - 2400Z to 2400Z - 2 sets

Traffic totals:

| T/L | P/L | R/S  | N/I | M/S | Total |
|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|
| 532 | 400 | 1064 | 153 | 60  | 2209  |

Total messages rendered intelligible: 472  
Total DF bearings taken: 47  
Total DF bearings reported in DARs: 12  
Total personalities reported: 89

*Walter M. Drozdzak*  
WALTER M. DROZDZAK  
Capt, Sig C  
Commanding

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3255th SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY  
APO 405  
US Army

9 March 1945

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY \* FEBRUARY 1945

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SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS  
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Intercept team went forward to Bettendorf and went into operation at 1600 hours. Cable to Diekirch was available for teletype, but due to the situation north of that town, it was difficult to keep the field wire line from Diekirch to Bettendorf operating.

DAR: Nothing to report.

5 February 1945

Teletype to forward team in operation at 1900 hours.

DAR: Nothing to report.

6 February 1945

PW of 150 Pz Lehr Div revealed a frequency used by that unit, but monitoring thereof yielded no signals.

DAR: Nothing to report.

7 February 1945

DAR: Element of 766 GHQ Artillerie Korps at 1330, mentioned fire on Gerdenhof (unlocated) and unknown number of kilometers west of Schmidt.

8 February 1945

DAR: Nothing to report.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

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10 February 1945

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11 February 1945

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212 V. G. Division  
Army Weapons School 7  
Kampf Gruppe Koch  
Kampf Gruppe Haberkamp

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Total number of sets in operation:

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2400Z to 0700Z - 6  
0700Z to 1600Z - 15

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Traffic totals:

| T/L | P/L | R/S  | N/I | M/S | Total |
|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|
| 532 | 400 | 1084 | 155 | 80  | 2209  |

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Total personalities reported: 89

*Walter M. Drozdak*  
WALTER M. DROZDIK  
Capt, Sig C  
Commanding

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3255 Signal Service Company  
APO 403  
US ARMY

Unit Operational History - - March 1945

- Section I - Introduction
- Section II - Narrative of Operations
- Section III - Statistical Summary

Section I - Introduction

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255 Signal Service Company in Germany covers the inclusive period of 1-31 March, 1945. During this period of operations the unit was assigned to Third US Army and attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff officers with whom close liaison was established were:

Third US Army SIS Officer - Maj Charles W. Flint.  
XII Corps Signal Officer - Col. A. S. Anderson.  
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 - Col J. H. Claybrook.

3. The duties of the officers of the 3255 Signal Service Company were as follows:

|                           |   |
|---------------------------|---|
| Company Commander         | - Capt Walter E. Droydiak   |
| Supply and Motor Officer  | - 1st Lt William E. Bateman   |
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| Traffic Analysis Officers | - 1st Lt Joe Francis<br>1st Lt David W. Olds<br>2nd Lt Albert J. Brunck |
| Communications Officer    | - 1st Lt Herbert N. Kephart   |

During this month XII Corps troops were pushing East out of Luxembourg and later southeast. The units opposing XII Corps were mainly Volks Grenadier Div but the 2 Pz, 11 Pz, and 6 SS Mountain divisions were also contacted. Intelligence on these latter units was at times the only information available to G-2. Towards the end of the period the situation resembled the breakthrough period in northern France, when the armor punched 30-50 miles a day and the company moved just about every third day making communications, especially to the army EI company, difficult.

Section II - Narrative of Operations

1 March

Forward intercept truck moved to Messerich. Prime D/F located at Biltburg with 11 Rgt. Arrangements made with Maj Newman, DSO of 5th Div, for direct telephone circuit between Prime and forward intercept truck and for a simplex over their board for teletype to the company. In future, D/F and forward intercept truck will

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Move with Divand Regt.

DAR: The artz unit which was reported at Sund Bittburg (L-133535) on 27 Feb apparently continued its move southward and today was being attacked by our tanks at the southwest edge of Triert (L-210290). Reported destroying four tanks. It is believed to be a flak unit committed as field arty.

2 March

Ernzen reconnoitered for next bivouac area.

DAR: Nothing to report.

3 March

Meeting at SIS Third Army to discuss new T/O's and T/E's.

DAR: Nothing to report.

4 March

Company moved from Waldbillig, Luxembourg to Ernyen, Germany.

DAR: XII Corps front: Nothing to report.

XX Corps front: an unidentified arty unit disclosed that German artillery would fire on the road between Lampaden (L-2527) and Pellingen (L-2320) until 2400 tonight. American fire was mentioned on road between Hengenburg (L-2713) and Schendorf (L-2620).

VIII Corps front: 5 Para Div reported on American tanks around Buedesheim (L-2680).

5 March

Forward intercept truck moved up to 5th Inf Div CP area near Messerich (L-110490). 1 simplex circuit made available by corps signal officer for teletype and tele phone back to the Traffic Analysis section at the company cp. Forward team established near fwd intercept truck with direct telephone circuit between the two for monitoring and D/F control.

DAR: XII Corps front: Nothing to report.

VIII Corps front: 15 Para Div at 1235 and element of this unit reported that the enemy had succeeded in breaking through in battalion strength, and had nearly reached the heights. At 1335 the question was asked if hill Amelbusch (unloc) was occupied by the enemy.

9 March

Established 3rd D/F team in cp area with direct wire to TA. Since the return to wire control and monitoring for D/F, a steady increase in productivity and efficiency has been noted.

DAR: XII Corps front: at 1130 an unidentified unit ordered 3 battalies of fire on Orenhofen (L-2245) where there were enemy tanks and armored reconnaissance cars. Corps G-2 notified immediately.

1st Army III Corps front - an unidentified unit at 1627 reported the following towns enemy occupied: Morenhoven (F-4530) at 1330; Muettingheim (unloc) at 1330; Flerzbim (F-4727) at 1230; and that the enemy had reached the northwestern part of Weimbach (F-4426) was said to have been in enemy hands since 1700.

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7 March

DAR: Unidentified units mentioned towns in Cologne area (1st Army front). Another unidentified unit at 2747 reported it would try to fight its way out and requested enemy (allied) situation south of Aar River between Aarwender (F-5416) and Bodendorf (L-3318) - signed Oblt Teeper.

8 March

New bivouac area reconnoitered at Esslingen.  
DAR: Nothing to report.

9 March

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 March

Moved to Esslingen, Germany. Strict rules laid down for the civilian population in town. D/F teams brought into company area in anticipation of early move.  
DAR: Nothing to report.

11 March

DAR: Ssg at 1020 probably directed all batteries which fired on Luxembourg city 1st night to move to Birningen (Q-4891) (XX Corps front) Unidentified arty ordered fire on was in I-44 block, some new personalities mentioned. G-2 was called for information concerning identifications in 272 VEG. no luck.

12 March

Jump team - intercept and D/F went to new area at Mayen to keep continuous operation until rest of company moved later.  
DAR: Nothing to report.

13 March

Company moved to Katzenberg (suburb of Mayen).  
DAR: Nothing to report.

14 March

No Teletype available from corps to 118th - only radio link which is not secure enough. 324 Sig Ser Co is only 3 1/2 miles away. We will continue our courier runs.

DAR: Poss 243 V: G. Div street fighting reported in Cues (L-5246) - Field Replacement Bn had been alerted and already in Cues. The penetration was reportedly due to failure of anti-tank men. Unid arty located two of its positions one at Buchholz (L-3579) and one at Blankenrath (L-6960). 7th Batt also located: 800 meters NE of Windhausen (L-333730). Unid unit located 10th company at Marxburg castle in Branbach (L-9486). They were worried there and prepared for demolition.

15 March

DAR: Kampfgruppe Scherba requested an assignment.



15 March

Schrerba known in 634 Bn/766 VAK.

Unidentified arty ordered fire on towns in general area of F-63.

16 March

DAR: Prob 2 Pz. Southward drive of 4th Armored Div disrupted communications and cut off elements. Unit of Bn size ordered to swing south and cross Rhine and to move to Bad Schwalbach (M-2472) where tank commander awaited with 2nd echelon at 161715.

At 161425 - msg stated Mainz-kastel (M-3957) bridge was still passable. The Kempten-ruedeshein (M-1453) bridge reported destroyed and the emergency bridge at Niederwallerf (M-3060) would soon be passable.

Lots of traffic from Remagen Reidgehead area -- requests for fire mainly.

Note: This was the first information G-2 had on these bridges. As a result of this msg (and also probably other things) 4th Armored Div temporarily slowed its drive toward Ruedeshein and drove toward Mainz bridge. The Air Corps was alerted for traffic toward Wedewalln bridge and later destroyed many vehicles on roads leading to it.

17 March

Simmern reconnoitered for new bivouac area.

DAR: Arty Bn -- probably of 74 Arty Rgt 2 Pz Div still trying to cross Rhine to assembly area at Bad Schwalbach (2472). Original route became impassable and more southerly route through Mannheim (M-50) was directed at 272902. Urgent request for strength enroute batteries was sent. These were given at 17214:

|            |         |           |        |         |
|------------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| 1 Batt --- | 2 O's - | 29 Nco's- | 84 EM. | 10 guns |
| 2 Batt --- | I O. -  | 14 NCO'S- | 40 Em. | 6 guns  |

Note: XII Corps G-2 reported this was the first indication of where 2 Pz Div east of Thine would be employed.

18 March

Forward Jump Team sent to Simmern. Had good bivouac near Orphanage but it had been reserved for someone else - so found a spot in town.

DAR: Nothing to report.

19 March

2nd D/F station set up in company area - with wire control. Prime to leave in morning and have radio control.

DAR: Nothing to report.



S. [REDACTED]  
20 March

Prime D/F located Southeast of Bad Kreuznach (L-105368). Letter of commendation sent from 12th A.G. to this company through Corps Signal Section.

DAR: Elements of 103 Pz AA/3 Py Gr D. gave locations at Sand (F-7035) and Sassenberg (F-7332) reported communication with 958 Rgt/363 V.G.D on its left at 1527.

21 March

Bad Kreuznach reconnoitered for new bivouac area.

DAR: 103 Py AA/3 PGD - reported on situation in Remagen Bridgehead. One CP given in northern part of Kuenzenholz and later 8 Km west of suechtersheid. Another element located at Sassenberg Hill (F-7332).

22 March

Unit moved to Bad Kreuznach.

DAR: Nothing to report.

23 March

DAR: Nothing to report.

24 March

DAR: Nothing to report.

25 March

2 "E" machines received from 26 Div. One contained pamphlet Rasterersatzverfahren (substitute for "R" traffic).

A captured document claimed Germany Operators were too timid about our D/F. Cited Captured documents from 8th U.S. Army proving we do not use D/F very extensively or well.

DAR: Nothing to report.

26 March

Jump Team set up in Mannheim. Some captured documents giving Freq's and C/SS for March. Also an A.W. grid for Disseldorf-Mainz.

DAR: Nothing to report.

27 March

2 P.W.'s turned into 6th Armored Div P.W.E. 4 truckloads of refugees taken to collection point.

DAR: Nothing to report.

28 March

Msgs phoned to G-2 included arty targets, enemy tank concentrations, indications of evening's lack of gas.



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28 March

DAR: 11 Pz. units caught by 4th Armored spearheads south of retreat requested, and Nieder-Bessingen (G-8116) given. Position later given at Guidel (G-6905) indicating the main line of retreat between those two towns.

Note: This msg was broken out and given to G-2 within 30 minutes after intercept and Corps liaison reported 500 vehicles were successfully attacked by air as a result of this msg.

29 March

Jump Team moved to Offenbach.

DAR: 42 Flak Bgt. interested in Weinhelm (V-6805) Corps reported approximately 50 motor vehicles destroyed by air from our information on 11 Pz line of retreat.

30 March

Company moved to Offenbach.

DAR: Nothing to report.

31 March

DAR: Nothing to report.

3 PzG. recee code (a speller) broken within 75 minutes after initial intercept.

### SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

#### TRAFFIC TOTALS

| T/L | P/L  | R/S  | N/I | R/P | Misc | TOTAL |
|-----|------|------|-----|-----|------|-------|
| 878 | 1033 | 1096 | 121 | 39  | 30   | 3197  |

D/F bearings reported 121  
Messages rendered intelligible 1212

#### SET ALLOCATION

1600z to 2400z 15  
2400z to 0700z 6  
0700z to 1600z 15  
D/F --- 1-3 sets (varied with situation)

*Walter M. Drozdak*  
Walter M. Drozdak  
Capt., Sig. C.  
Commanding.



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3255th Signal Service Company

AGO 403  
US Army

9 May 1945

UNIT OPERATIONAL HISTORY APRIL 1945

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION  
SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS  
SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. This report of combat operations of the 3255th Signal Service Co in Germany covers the inclusive period of 1 to 30 April 1945, during the period of operations the unit was assigned Third United States Army and attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff officers with whom close liaison was established were:

|                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Third U.S. Army S/S Officer | - Major Charles W. Flint     |
| XII Corps Signal Officer    | - Colonel Alfred A. Anderson |
| XII Corps G-2               | - Colonel John W. Claybrook  |

3. The duties of the officers of 3255th Signal Service Company were as follows:

|                           |                                |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Company Commander         | - Capt Walter M. Drozdiak      |
| Supply and Motor Officer  | - 1st Lt William E. Bateman    |
| Intercept Officer         | - 1st Lt Elaine H. Heinzelman  |
| Goniometric Officer       | - 1st Lt George H. Leonard III |
| Traffic Analysis Officers | - 1st Lt Joe Francis           |
|                           | - 1st Lt David M. Olds         |
|                           | - 2nd Lt Albert J. Brunck      |
| Communications Officer    | - 1st Lt. Herbert W. Kephart   |



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SECTION II - NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

The month of April witnessed the final drive across Germany to a junction with the Red Army leading to the inevitable capitulation of the Wehrmacht. Radio traffic for the month was generally light due probably to the fact that the enemy front was rapidly disintegrating into small elements and remnants. The bulk of the intercept intelligence derived by this company was yielded by Panzer units on the TUSA front, notably the 116th, the 2nd, and 11th Pz Divisions. At the opening of the period enemy units opposing the XII Corps were:

11 Pz Div  
Elms 156 Inf Div  
Elms 159 Inf Div

1 April

XII Corps CP and 325th Signal Service Co. located in Offenbach (M-756664)

DAR: Nothing To Report.

2 April

DAR: Nothing To Report.

3 April

The company moved from Offenbach to Lauterbach (M-174285)

DAR: Nothing To Report.

4 April

DAR: An unidentified enemy unit reported an allied crossing of the Fulda river south of Kassel (C-2204).

5 April

DAR: Nothing To Report.

6 April

DAR: The 9 SS Pz heard in brief activity.

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7 April

The Company moved from Lauterbach to Vacha (K-610491).

DAR: Nothing to report.

8 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

9 April

The Company moved from Vacha to Preissigacker (K-878212).

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 April

DAR: The 5th Para. Div. mentioned an Allied advance east of Goettingen (C-5230), and reported German artillery firing on American positions from Herzberg (C-84). Traffic of the 760 Volks Art Corps operating in the Ruhr pocket, was also intercepted.

11 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

12 April

DAR: The 11th Pz Div located one of its units in Steinwiesen (C-6594) as of April 11. The 17th Div revealed its intention of erecting road blocks at 4 points in the S-25 and S-26 sectors.

13 April

DAR: The Company moved from Preissigacker to Hirschendorf (J-256110).

DAR: An unidentified unit reported Allied tanks crossing the autobahn bridge at Gera (K-0503).

14 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

15 April

The Company moved from Hirschendorf to Breitenloh (O-530889).

DAR: Nothing to report.

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16 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

17 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

18 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

19 April

DAR: An unidentified unit on the XII Corps front described action centering around Kirchenlamitz (P-0181), ordering that fire be requested only when the Allies moved from there to the attack. The 14 Light Observation Bn was also heard mentioning towns on the 1st Army front.

20 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

21 April

The Company moved from Breitenloh to Bayreuth (0-750560).

DAR: Messages intercepted from the Russian front mentioned places on the A-07 and A-27 sectors.

22 April

DAR: Nothing to report.

3rd W/F team established within the company making possible "fix" bearings on enemy radio installations.

23 April

DAR: An unidentified unit sent periodic situation reports concerning targets in the P-24 and P-34 sectors. The 9th SS Pz Div was heard in brief activity mentioning towns in the P-32 block north of Vienna.

24 April

DAR: The Company moved from Bayreuth to Grafenwohr (P-001326).

DAR: The breaking of a cipher sequence revealed activity on the part of an unidentified unit on the XII Corps front centering around towns in the P-32, P-33, and P-43 sectors.

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25 April

DAF: An unidentified unit detailed artillery activity in the area of Muenchenreuth (P-2569).

26 April

The Company moved from Grafenwohr to Fromberg (U-185916).

DAF: A net, possibly an element of the 11th Pz Div, mentioned several towns around the Czechoslovakian border, in the P-33, P-35 and P-45 sectors.

27 April

DAF: The possible elements of the 11 Pz Div reported 26 April continued transmissions concerned with towns in the same general area.

28 April

DAF: The 11 Pz unit reported the preceding 2 days today mentioned towns in the P-51 and U-69 areas.

29 April

The Company moved from Fromberg to Vicchtach (U-756657).

DAF: Messages from the possible 11 Pz Div unit revealed a slight movement to the east. Another unit (unidentified) reported the evacuation of the town of Hradec in Czechoslovakia at either P-50/P-77 or P-50/c-28 without Allied pressure. The 14th Light Observation Bn was also located in the Chemnitz-Dresden area.

30 April

DAF: Signs of disintegration of the 11th Panzer Div were revealed in messages passed advising German soldiers who wanted to surrender to advance with white flags, and that the burgemeister of Schuettarschen (p-6719) had directed all cameras, field glasses, and weapons to be turned in. The 14 Light Observation Bn was again located in the Chemnitz-Dresden area and the 9th Pz Div was still reported active in the Vienna sector.

At the close of the period elements opposite XII Corps were:

11 Pz Div  
Sln 413 Mob Div  
Reg 2 Pz Div  
Sln 2 SS Pz Div.

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SECTION III - STATISTICAL SUMMARY

**Total number of sets in operation:**

|           |                  |         |
|-----------|------------------|---------|
| Intercept | — 1600z to 2400z | 15 sets |
|           | 2400z to 0700z   | 6 sets  |
|           | 0700z to 1600z   | 15 sets |
| D/F       | — 2400z to 2400z | 2 sets  |

**traffic totals:**

|     |     |     |     |     |      |       |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-------|
| T/L | P/L | B/S | N/I | M/S | Misc | Total |
| 615 | 520 | 800 | 173 | 28  | 1    | 2149  |

|                                       |     |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| Total messages rendered intelligible: | 378 |
| Total D/F bearings taken:             | 20  |
| Total D/F bearings reported in DAR:   | 13  |
| Total personalities reported:         | 129 |

*Walter M Drozdiak*  
WALTER M. DROZDIAK  
Capt., Sig. C.  
Commanding

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3255 Signal Service Company

APO 403

US Army

Unit Operational History - May 1945

- Section I - Introduction  
Section II - Narrative of Operations  
Section III - Statistical Summary

Section I

1. This report on operations of the 3255 Signal Service Company in Germany covers the period 1 May to 12 May 1945. During this period the company was assigned to the Third US Army and Attached to XII Corps.

2. Staff officers with whom close liaison was established were:

Third US Army SIS Officer - Maj C.W. Flint.  
XII Corps Signal Officer - Col A.A. Anderson.  
Asst chief of Staff, G-2,  
XII Corps - Col J.H. Claybrook.

3. The duties of the officers of the 3255 Signal Service Company were as follows:

Company Commander - Capt Walter M. Drozdak  
Motor and Supply Officer - 1st Lt William H. Bateman  
Intercept Officer - 1st Lt Blaine R. Heinzelman  
Geometric Officer - 1st Lt George R. Leonard III  
Traffic Analysis Officers - 1st Lt Joe Francis  
1st Lt David M. Olds  
2nd Lt Albert J. Brunck  
Communications Officer - 1st Lt Herbert N. Kephart

Section II - Narrative of Operations

During the early part of the period the XII Corps was attacking into Austria in the direction of Linz. Later the Corps axis of advance changed to North East into Czechoslovakia with Prague as the objective. The enemy offered little large scale resistance. Battered remnants of several divisions and numerous small battle groups were contacted. The 2 1/4 Pz Div had elements on the south flank. The entire 11 Pz Div surrendered to the corps during the period. Radio activity included an abnormally large amount of plain language as communications became confused among the crumbling units of the enemy. Much high echelon traffic, having to do with surrender terms principally, was intercepted. The 9 1/2 Pz Div was heard and gave place names in the XII Corps front. The divisions did not come into physical contact with the corps. Enemy units opposite the Corps at the beginning of the period were:

11 Pz Div  
2 1/4 Pz Div  
Numerous small battle groups



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1 May

Two German radio trucks filled with German signal equipment were found at Zwiessa. Equipment was inspected and 4 D/F sets were found complete except for receivers. Intend to try SCR 342 as the receiver for the D/F loop.

DAR: XII Corps front: 9 1/2 Pz Div - the most important radio intelligence derived today was the apparent shift of the 9 1/2 Pz Div from the Russian front (Vienna sector) to XII Corps front. One of the nets in the division mentioned:

Wallern (Q-5053)  
Schmiding (Q-3041)  
Grainet (Q-3439)  
Breyberg (Q-23)  
Kreuzberg (Q-2643)

Another net (reconnaissance) reported Hauzenberg (Q-3322) occupied by allied troops.

Prob 11 Pz Div: Reconnaissance nets continued to report on progress in the same sector as yesterday - Schilligkau (P-5914) area. Rindl (Korytany) at (P-5914) was reported to be the farthest point the allies had reached.

2 May

DAR: XII Corps front: 9 1/2 Pz Div - Late last night (at 2225) a message ordered all reconnaissance patrols to return to Melk 6-49/w-8, east of Vienna. Several messages followed early this morning reported on towns XII Corps has occupied. At 0914 the last report was given, and the nets went off the air. In view of this it appears that the reconnaissance units which moved from the Russian front to XII Corps front were not accompanied by other elements of 9 1/2 Pz Div. Why 9 1/2 Pz Div reconnoitered XII Corps front yesterday and early this morning is a matter of conjecture.

2 1/2 Pz Div - this div was heard, messages were garbled and no indications of locations given.

Prob 11 Pz Div - There was a reference to "second Company" and to Ausilian (P-9102).

3 May

Unit moved from Viechtach (U-75657) to Neudorf (Q-172435), leaving Viechtach at 0800, arriving Neudorf 1300.

DAR: Nothing to report.

4 May

Prime D/F team moved forward to Vic Freyang; Second to vic Tittling. Radio control used. Terry remained in company area - wire control. Two bearings obtained.

DAR: General - an unidentified unit inquired if Salzburg (Z-924) was already occupied by the enemy (allied), and the answer stated that it could not be immediately established, as apparently the only disturbance was in the center of the town.

XII Corps front - 2 1/2 Pz Div - a message at 1115 stated that prisoners would be exchanged at 1230 and that the truce would then be lifted. At 1150, instructions were given to prepare a roadblock in Meggenhoffen (V-4567) and it was reported that the 16th Co. was at Gspoltshofen (V-4572).

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5 May

Communications for period 0200 4 May to 0200 5 May:

Radio - in 0001; in 1300.  
Telephone: O.K.  
Teletype: in 0001; out 1530; in 1850.

Both D/F stations on radio control. Prime established at Freyung (Q-260398); Second at Tittling (Q-115295). Two bearings obtained; one reported in the DAR.

DAR: XII Corps front - unidentified unit mentioned Freistadt (O-49/Z-8517). Message of interest: German High Command. A message signed by Keitel, supreme commander armed forces staff, directed complete obedience and discipline, and stated that other orders would follow.

6 May

Communications from 0200 5 May to 0200 6 May:

Radio: in 0300; in 0100  
Telephone: O.K.  
Teletype: out 1530; in 1850

One D/F bearing obtained; one reported in DAR. Very quiet.  
DAR: Nothing to report.

7 May

Communications from 0200 6 May to 0200 7 May:

Radio: in at 1300 and 0100  
Telephone: O.K.  
Teletype: in 0002; out 1410; 2034.

Only one D/F station operating - the one in the company area. The two mobile teams remained in company area servicing their trucks and equipment. Three bearings obtained; two reported in DAR.

DAR: Nothing to report.

8 May

Communications from 0200 7 May to 0200 8 May:

Radio: in 0001  
Telephone: O.K.  
Teletype: in 0001; out 0030; in 0600; out 1500; in 1540.

Only one D/F team in operation. It is in the company area. Other equipment cleaned and given whatever maintenance required. Lt Bateman and Lt Kephart left for Regensburg on reconnaissance for new and final company area - a westward movement. Operations reduced.

DAR: Nothing to report.

THE WAR IN EUROPE IS OVER!

9 May

DAR: Nothing to report.

10 May

DAR: Nothing to report.

11 May

DAR: Nothing to report.



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12 May

DAR: Nothing to report.

At the end of the period, 12 May, all enemy units in the Corps zone had surrendered, or were attempting to surrender.

Section III - Statistical Summary

Number of sets in operations:

|                            |         |
|----------------------------|---------|
| Intercept - 1500Z to 0100Z | 15 sets |
| 0100Z to 0700Z             | 6       |
| 0700Z to 1600Z             | 15      |
| L/F 1600Z to 1600Z         | 2       |

Traffic totals:

| <u>T/L</u> | <u>P/L</u> | <u>R/S</u> | <u>N/I</u> | <u>M/C</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| 103        | 191        | 173        | 48         | 0          | 525          |

Total number of messages rendered intelligible - 109  
Total number of D/F bearings taken - 7  
Total number of D/F bearings reported in DAR: - 3  
Total personalities reported - 54

*Walter M. Drozdak*  
Walter M. Drozdak  
Capt., Sig. C.  
Commanding.

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Some of the  
the 1/2 x 1/2  
1/2 x 1/2

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