

SRH-041

MIS CONTRIBUTION
TO THE WAR EFFORT
MIS, WDGS
DECEMBER 1945

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 3, E. O. 12065
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

WRM Date: 9 OCT. '79

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGES

MIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT
3 DECEMBER 1945

1 - 9

CONTRIBUTION OF THE SHIPPING SECTION
TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR (TAB-A)
10 OCTOBER 1945

10 - 21

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROJECT

PROJECT NO. 2535

DATE 3 December 1945

MIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT ←

Copy No. 3

RESEARCH UNIT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WDGS

BY OFFICER ONLY

TO DATE	FROM TO DATE	
	18 July 45	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
A. C. OF S., G-2		DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE <i>AMC</i>
DEPUTY A. C. OF S., G-2		British Empire Specialist
SECRETARIAT		Japanese Specialist
		Russian Specialist
CHIEF, POLICY STAFF		W. European Specialist
		W. Hemisphere Specialist
HISTORICAL		SUPERVISOR OF RESEARCH
PROPAGANDA		Economic
SECURITY		Military
TRAINING		Political
CHIEF, MIS		Scientific
<i>✓ Deputy</i> " "		Sociological
DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION		Topographic
SUPERVISOR SOURCE CONTROL		Who's Who
CPM		Intelligence Library
Foreign		SUPERVISOR OF REPORTS
Maps and Photos		German Military Reports
Special		Japanese Military Reports
Washington Liaison		Political and Econ. Reports
Foreign Liaison		Publications
SUPERVISOR DISTRIBUTION		DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION
Analysis		Administrative Records
Cable		Finance
Message Center		Off. Mgmt and Supply
Reading Panel		Orient'n and Instr'n
Reproduction		Personnel
Special Distribution		Translation

- ACTION
- REPLY
- COORDINATE WITH
- RECOMMENDATION
- REMARK
- INFORMATION
- NOTE
- RETURN
- SIGNATURE
- MAIL
- FILE

TITLE HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT		PROJ. NO. 2535
		DATE 3 December 1945
ORIGINATOR Colonel Gibson	SUBMITTED BY	
PREPARED BY (NAME, RANK OR GRADE, BRANCH)	HOURS	
Military Branch	66	
Economic Branch	155	
Political Branch	70	
Sociological Branch	6	
Scientific Branch	18	
Who's Who Branch	12	
Topographic Branch	6	
		TOTAL MAN HOURS 333
CHECKED BY: (BRANCH) Lt. Milton Pelec Branch	CHECKED BY: (SPECIALIST)	PAGES 9
		COPIES 7

DISTRIBUTION:

COPY 1 AND 5 ORIGINATOR
 COPY 2 BRANCH OF PRIMARY INTEREST
 COPY 3 LIBRARY
 COPY 4 SUPERVISOR OF RESEARCH
 COPY 6 SPECIALIST

REMARKS:

COPY NO. _____

Statement of Project:

To report on the contribution to the war effort made by MIS, citing specific examples of how the efficient production of intelligence gave immediate and substantial assistance to War Department agencies, field commands and other agencies using intelligence.

001

MIS Contribution to the War Effort

Presented below is a digest of material prepared by Branch and Section Chiefs on the contributions to the war effort made by units of MIS. For complete details of the functions and operations of MIS and its components, reference is made to the Histories prepared by the various Branches, which were consulted in the preparation of this Project. A realistic appraisal of the contribution of MIS would rely on the testimony of ranking War Department officers and field commanders who received intelligence from MIS and made positive use of it in planning strategy or directing operations. As a substitute for such testimony, a few examples have been cited where intelligence supplied by MIS is believed to have proved a direct aid to victory. There are additional reasons why the contribution of MIS is thinly and unsatisfactorily pictured here; namely (1) that little information is readily available on MIS activities during the years 1941-43 because of radical changes in personnel and organization that followed and (2) that, being in lowly positions and concentrating on very specialized duties, most of the contributors to this Project are not familiar with the use and effectiveness of the finished intelligence they produced or with its disposition by higher echelons.

I. GENERAL

MIS brought about a maximum exploitation of Order of Battle information and developed the use of such intelligence at all echelons throughout the United States Army. MIS began assembling intelligence on the armed forces of enemy nations shortly after the entry of the United States into the war. Late in 1942, intensive four-week courses in Order of Battle intelligence were established in Washington to train personnel for the growing military research units of MIS and for theater, task force and other field headquarters down to divisions. The personnel attached to the field headquarters insured the collection and rapid transmission of Order of Battle information—especially documents—to MIS research units. They assisted intelligence personnel of the lower commands in analyzing, interpreting and evaluating Order of Battle information for tactical purposes. MIS personnel organized theater document sections for the complete and prompt evacuation of documents and briefed combat echelons on the value of documents and the need for not destroying them or retaining them as souvenirs.

II. THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST

A. Order of Battle.

MIS had the primary responsibility for collecting and correlating Order of Battle intelligence on the Japanese ground and army air forces and for disseminating such intelligence to all Pacific theatres. Data on enemy strength and organization, plans and operations, weapons and other subjects were transmitted to the field by direct

radio channels, accompanied by appropriate MIS comment or interpretation.

In August 1944, a month prior to the landing on Peilieu, MIS informed field commanders of the complete disposition of the Japanese forces in the Palau group. Earlier the same year, the plan for the Japanese counterattack on the American perimeter at Aitape, New Guinea, was furnished in advance of the action to GHQ, SWPA. Beginning in early 1945, daily summaries of Top Secret intelligence on Japanese air activity were sent to Pacific air and naval commands for use in determining airfield targets for carrier strikes or fighter sweeps.

MIS developed intelligence on Japanese military manpower, fortifications, anti-aircraft defenses, tactical practices in jungle, island, and open warfare, and on the Japanese systems of military maintenance and supply. Reports were prepared for the War Department General Staff and for theatre commands on the supply situation at island garrisons in the Southwest Pacific. MIS sent out detailed information on Japanese plans for evacuating troops from the Eastern NEI and on the suicide boats that would be found at Formosa and in the Ryukyus.

B. Political Intelligence.

MIS provided War Department authorities with up-to-the-minute reports on political developments in the Far East and also produced special studies for the War Department General Staff and other interested agencies on numerous subjects of strategic importance. The degree to which this work assisted the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in determining war strategy is difficult to assess. However, MIS furnished estimates on the political and social cleavages in Japan and Japanese-occupied Asia to guide Allied action in promoting dissension and conflict (1) between the Japanese military and other ruling elements, and (2) between the Japanese and non-Japanese such as the Koreans.

It is also believed that an MIS analysis in June 1944 of the position of the Japanese Emperor was of distinct value in laying subsequent Allied policy on that crucial matter, and as such represented a substantial contribution to the war effort. During the last year of the war, MIS reported the growing desire for peace among influential elements in Japan and estimated the added impetus for peace which might be achieved by a clarification of Allied intentions (subsequently accomplished in the Potsdam Declaration). Unlike the war in Europe, the war against Japan came to an end not by the complete annihilation of the enemy military forces but by the political decision to surrender.

MIS prepared analyses of the Chinese political situation designed to assist policy-makers in maintaining continuous efforts to bring the Kuomintang and Yanan together or to preserve at least a balance between the contending movements, and thereby to keep China in the war until the Allies could join in full strength against Japan after Germany's defeat. Detailed reports were prepared for the War

Department on the background, strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist movement.

In the fall of 1944 MIS made a study of the deteriorating economic and political position of the puppet domains of Central China. That study recommended air operations against the Tientsin-Fukow and Peiping-Hankow railroads—operations which were later undertaken to the considerable detriment of Japanese supply lines.

C. War Industries.

MIS markedly advanced the accuracy and completeness of estimates of Japanese industrial strength, economic deficiencies and vulnerability to blockade. Basic studies were prepared for the General Staff and field commands on the following industries: coal, aluminum, railway rolling stock, salt, nitrogen, cement, and various electronic devices. In addition, summary or partial reports were made available on iron and steel, manganese and chromium, copper, chlorine, ball and roller bearings and electric motors.

The principal value of these studies lay in the assessment of the strategic and target importance of each of the key war industries. For instance, as of the spring of 1945 the aluminum industry was evaluated in terms of the possibility of air attack as follows:

(1) Due to the excess of production over calculated requirements during the preceding year, augmented by the aluminum supply in the pipeline, destruction of aluminum production facilities would not effect a level of aircraft production below rates otherwise enforceable for a relatively extended period. For this reason, the aluminum industry was reported as a relatively unprofitable target.

(2) In the event of a decision to attack the the aluminum industry, the analysis indicated a disregard for aluminum reduction facilities, as being considerably in excess of currently required capacity; and of Bayer-process alumina plants, as being of little use to the Japanese in the absence of bauxite supplies. The most vulnerable segments of the industry were clearly the alumina plants operating on shale, with emphasis on continental plants as being in a more assured position in respect to supply of shale. Information was provided on location and capacities of alumina plants known or probably operating on shale, processes utilized by each, and plant vulnerability data as inferred from such processes. [When, in July of 1945, the Japanese shipping position had so deteriorated as to enforce a suspension of shale shipments to Japan, the area for prospective attack became even more clearly circumscribed.]

An MIS report on coal set forth estimates of the production-consumption pattern (as of 1 July 1945) on each of the main Japanese islands. The amount of coal moving to Honshu exceeded 20,000,000 tons annually and constituted the greatest single load on Japan's transport system; the report accordingly demonstrated the particular significance of such strategic targets as the Kammon Tunnel complex and the Hakodate - Aomori rail ferry.

In August, just before the war ended, MIS prepared for the New Developments Division, WDSS, a report on the use of chemical flame-producing agents as a possible secret weapon for defense of the Japanese coastline. The report estimated the availability to the Japanese of calcium carbide, butane and methane.

Throughout the war Japan made strenuous efforts to purchase and copy the latest German and Italian aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft equipment, and weapons, and German electronic equipment, guided missiles and naval equipment. MIS collected and disseminated intelligence on the extent of the blockade running, both by surface ship and by submarines, in order to assist in the preparation of countermeasures against new weapons of war in the Far East. Theater commands were supplied information on shipments of strategic raw materials to the Far East. After Germany's collapse, intelligence teams sent to Germany were provided with MIS lists of possible targets where information valuable to the prosecution of the war against Japan could be found.

MIS also studied the stability and potential of the Japanese-controlled economy in Occupied China, Manchukuo, and Korea and reported current trends in the economy of Free China.

D. Industrial Targets; Bomb Damage.

MIS conducted exhaustive research on bomb targets in Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa. Descriptions, locations and other information on targets were made available by areas and by types of industrial installations. Annotated maps and mosaics prepared by MIS formed the basis for much of the material disseminated in JTG area studies. Photo interpretation and all other information on bomb damage were correlated and bomb damage reports prepared for regular dispatch to field commands. It is believed that in many important instances the MIS reports were of direct and immediate aid to air force commands in the planning of bombing operations.

E. Aircraft Production.

MIS was responsible for research on the Japanese aircraft industry and for the production of periodic estimates of Japanese aircraft production.

By making an informed guess on future developments in the industry, MIS was able to anticipate the four-engined bomber RITA some months prior to its being sighted. MIS reports on stockpiles, production

concentrations, and "bottlenecks" led to Allied bombing operations against important component factories, operations which in turn caused a sharp drop in Japanese aircraft production.

F. Oil.

MIS made a continuing analysis of Japan's over-all position in liquid fuels and lubricants, and from time to time produced estimates of oil reserves and current production. It is believed that as regards oil reserves and oil production, MIS furnished more reliable and current intelligence than did any other military or civilian intelligence agency; in 1945 MIS was given the major responsibility of preparing assessments of Japan's oil position.

Exhaustive study and reports on Japanese production of (i) high octane blending agents from butanol and iso-propanol and (ii) tetra-ethyl lead were followed by air attacks on butanol plants in Formosa and tetra-ethyl lead plants in Japan proper.

In May 1945 MIS reported to the XXI Bomber Command at Guam that the Japanese oil position was critical and that attacks on certain oil objectives might further disrupt the general economy. Reports on current intelligence and photographic interpretation assisted in target preparation when, later in the summer, aviation gasoline production and stocks were put second only to aircraft engines and urban areas on the target priority lists.

G. Ordnance and Ammunition.

MIS collected data on production and shipments of ammunition and ordnance and on the size, location and capacity of Japanese armament plants. Production estimates, together with estimates of Japanese requirements in weapons and ammunition, provided a means of assessing the war potential of the Japanese Army and also assisted in evaluating and choosing targets for air attacks.

H. Food.

MIS made a continuing study of Japan's over-all food position, attempting to estimate whether food shortages had become serious enough to bring about a collapse or diminution in Japan's war effort. Specific studies were prepared for the General Staff on the food position in potential invasion sectors, the effect of disruption of communications on Japan's inter-area food situation, and the effect of blockade and strategic bombing on total food supplies. In the summer of 1945 MIS made an analysis of the feasibility from an agricultural standpoint of destruction of the rice crop by chemical attack.

It is believed that the work of MIS on food research contributed to correct assessments of Japan's over-all economic potential; in July 1945, MIS was able to report correctly that Japan was suffering from serious food shortages.

I. Merchant Shipping.

The intelligence research on Japan's merchant shipping done by the Shipping Section of Economic Branch, together with the results of that research, are discussed in TAB A. The contribution of the Shipping Section is related in some detail not because it surpassed the work of other units of MIS but because its contribution can be more concretely demonstrated.

The Shipping Section supplied operational intelligence directly to the field commands. From October 1943 to August 1945 it sent out 936 cables on ship movements, mining, port activity, etc., about one-fourth of which were of the top classification of "urgent" or "operational priority." A great amount of this information led directly to successful attacks on Japanese convoys. The over-all strategic employment of Allied aircraft and submarines in neutralizing the Japanese merchant marine was based to a considerable extent on intelligence prepared by the Shipping Section, and the decision to undertake large-scale mining of Japan's waters sprang from an MIS estimate of the Japanese shipping position and of the amount of shipping passing through mineable areas.

J. Transportation.

MIS assembled physical descriptions and other data on the capabilities of the railroads, roads, inland waterways, ports, and commercial airways of Japan and Japanese-controlled Asia. Reports were prepared on the actual movements of commodities via railways and other land transportation routes in the Far East and via the sea routes between Japanese and continental ports.

MIS sent to the field information on the principal Japanese supply routes, in terms of gross tonnage and types of cargo. Estimates were also made available of Japan's over-all plans for imports and exports for coming months. Such intelligence proved valuable in staff planning of strategic air operations against Japan's transportation system.

Information on commodity imports obtained in June 1945 supplied the first intelligence of the abandonment of water freight transportation from Yellow Sea ports to Japan. That intelligence was immediately valuable to the operational commands in the redistribution of Allied submarines and aircraft. Intelligence on freight movements in Korea was of operational importance in the planning of air attacks against rail lines, ports and shipping in both Korea and Japan, and

in assessing the effects of the air attacks on the Japanese economy and on Japan's military reinforcement capabilities.

K. Miscellaneous.

MIS prepared studies of the military geography of areas of the Far East for the use of the General Staff, theater commands, and various committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MIS made a continuing study of Japanese propaganda patterns and psychological warfare and of the propaganda techniques of the Chinese Communists.

MIS analysed radar intercepts, collected information on radar locations, and studied Japanese jamming capabilities. Theater commands were supplied with intelligence on radar positions and alerted to possible radar activities on hitherto unsearched frequencies. Biographical data on Japanese puppets, Japanese sympathizers and foreign nationals in the Philippines, NEI, Malaya, and French Indo-China were micro-filmed and sent to the A. C. of S., G-2, SWPA together with thousands of photographs of individual suspects.

III. THE WAR IN EUROPE

A. Military Intelligence.

For the war in Europe London, and not MIS, had the primary responsibility of procuring and disseminating order of battle intelligence. However, intelligence on enemy dispositions, strength and capabilities was supplied to higher echelons of the War Department and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use in long-range strategic planning. To that extent MIS assisted in formulating the decisions which led to the invasions of Normandy and Southern France. MIS audited estimates of the German manpower potential and of German over-all casualties, and prepared reports and handbooks on German military units and senior officers, German weapons, tactics, etc. The Order of Battle handbooks were disseminated to and used by intelligence personnel in the field in all echelons of the Army. MIS prepared reports on aspects of German military morale and also developed an index showing the relationship between the number of Allied casualties and the number of German prisoners of war.

In order to keep the War Department posted on new developments in enemy warfare, MIS furnished estimates of German capabilities for producing proximity fuses, anti-aircraft guided missiles, "inflammable" gas, etc., and reported on the day-to-day use and effectiveness of the V-weapons.

B. Political and Economic Intelligence.

MIS was charged with the duty of providing broad over-all analyses of economic and political developments in Europe in order to assist in the making of high-level decisions on the conduct of the war.

MIS conducted extensive research on political and economic developments in Europe and regularly reported its findings to the President, the State and War Departments and ranking military and naval officers. For example, during the period 1942-45 a daily summary of Top Secret intelligence, which was sent to the highest policy making and planning levels of the Government, carried thousands of articles on European political and economic events. In view of the circulation of that summary and of the high degree of selectivity exercised in preparing material for presentation therein, it is believed that by itself this part of the work of MIS represented a substantial contribution to victory over Germany.

Detailed reports were published on the German attitude toward compromise peace with Russia, German attempts to sound out Anglo-American peace sentiment, German speculation over the Second Front, German progress in getting underground oil refineries into production, the maneuverings of Vichy France, German economic infiltration in Spain, the pro-Axis activities of Spanish Government leaders, and hundreds of other subjects of international and crucial importance. On the home front, an MIS analysis of the intelligence-gathering activities of the Finnish military attache's office in Washington was followed by the dismissal--at the demand of the State Department--of the attache and his assistant.

MIS provided biographical information on European personalities for the Secretary of War, State Department, SHAEF and other interested agencies. Prior to the invasion of Normandy a compilation was prepared of available data on influential French personalities, including leaders of the resistance movement. MIS supplied material on European party leaders and their sympathies to guide the Propaganda Branch, MIS, and OWI in the preparation of radio propaganda. Intelligence supplied by MIS on German agents and German sympathizers in Latin America is believed to have assisted the State Department in obtaining their internment, deportation, or arrest.

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROJECT

PROJECT NO. 2535

DATE 10 October 45

MIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT

TAB A

Cy #3

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

WDGS

CONTRIBUTION OF THE SHIPPING
SECTION TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

(Economic Branch)

1. INTRODUCTION

The initial conquests of the Japanese in 1941 and early 1942 provided them with control over far-flung areas of the Asiatic continent and the Central and Southwest Pacific Ocean. To exploit their control fully, and thereby to provide Japan with materials for the prosecution of a large-scale war, required the operation of a large merchant marine. It was natural, therefore, that the effective neutralization of that merchant marine was high on the list of Allied war objectives and that the production of intelligence on Japanese shipping was of paramount importance. The only intelligence organization in Washington which was devoted solely to the task of providing comprehensive, integrated intelligence on Japanese merchant shipping was the Shipping Section of the Economic Branch, MIS.

The contribution of the Section to the prosecution of the war is to some extent revealed in the figures on the decline of the Japanese merchant marine itself. In December 1941, the Japanese possessed a total of about 6,000,000 grt of ships of 1,000 grt or over. In spite of an acquisition of new or captured ships throughout the war totalling about 3,500,000 grt, the Japanese ended the war with only about 1,200,000 grt of ships of 1,000 grt or over. At least a fourth of those ships were useless because of damage or obsolescence, and the remaining ships were either cut off from the Empire by the tight Allied blockade or else pinned down in Empire ports by an effective net of Allied planes, submarines and mines. The strategic employment of those forces which successfully neutralized the Japanese merchant marine was based to a considerable extent on the intelligence prepared by members of the Shipping Section in 1944 and 1945.

II. SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS

The Shipping Section's task of accumulating, coordinating and disseminating information from all available sources on Japanese shipping required such specific activities as (a) preparing and maintaining currently a

basic list of Japanese merchant ships together with such pertinent data as the ships' tonnages, code numbers and international call signs; (b) maintaining a week-by-week estimate of the Japanese shipping position with subordinate estimates of new construction, losses and repair; (c) studying at various periods the traffic in and out of the ports and harbors controlled by the Japanese and the construction and repair facilities in those ports; (d) noting and reporting on as current a basis as possible the movements of Japanese convoys; and (e) observing the effects of the Allied mining program on Japanese ship movements.

The general effectiveness of the intelligence produced on Japanese shipping is indicated in a letter of 8 January 1945 in which General Marshall advised the Secretary of War:

"General Bissell tells me that there is no phase of Japanese intelligence on which we are now better posted than on merchant shipping."

Some indications of the manner in which this intelligence was used in the prosecution of the war are outlined below.

A. The Japanese Merchant Shipping Position: In March of 1944, a welter of conflicting estimates existed concerning the size of the Japanese merchant marine -- a situation which made the planning of future operations extremely difficult. A thorough study was therefore undertaken by the newly-organized Shipping Section to determine the amount of shipping of 1,000 grt or over which was available to the Japanese on 7 December 1941, the rate of construction or acquisition after that date, the amount of shipping which had been sunk since that date and the percentage of the shipping afloat which was constantly in repair.

The study was completed and a detailed report was published on 18 August 1944. Thereafter weekly estimates were published throughout the remainder of the war showing the estimated ship construction and loss during the preceding week and the current shipping position. The Shipping Section's estimate was adopted by the Navy (OP-20-3-G50) for its own use after December 1944, and it was also accepted by the British as authoritative. The information was circulated regularly to the highest local and field

levels of the War Department as well as to other cleared agencies and thus provided the basic data for all operational planning involving a knowledge of the Japanese merchant shipping position. Postwar releases by the Japanese themselves have already indicated that those estimates were substantially accurate.

Basic lists of all ships which were afloat or which had been sunk were periodically issued to field units and separate lists of Japanese tankers were also periodically distributed.

B. Mine Warfare: The decision in October 1944 to undertake large-scale mining of Japanese waters was made upon the basis of the MIS estimate of the Japanese shipping position and of the amount of shipping passing through the mineable areas. The Shipping Section furnished all of this data and, after the operation was begun, continued to supply most of the intelligence for it. Selection of the ports to be mined was based on studies by the Section of port activity. Almost daily reports of the Japanese reactions to the mining activities were made to the field. Detailed information was supplied regularly on the opening and closure of ports, casualties caused by mines, the location of swept channels through Allied minefields and sweeping methods used by the Japanese.

The program was eminently successful. During June 1945 alone a total of 74 ships aggregating 310,000 grt were sunk or damaged by mines -- more than were sunk or damaged in that month by all other agents combined. It is estimated that at least 900,000 grt of merchant shipping was sunk or damaged by mines between 27 March and 14 August 1945. In addition, most of the major harbors in Japan and Korea were closed for periods ranging from two days to two weeks at a time and the movement of vital military supplies and commodities in the Empire area was impeded seriously.

In addition a vast amount of information was collected and published on all defensive mining operations carried out by the Japanese. Details concerning the locations of the minefields and mine lines in the Okinawa area were supplied to the field commands prior to the invasion of that island; similar information on mine lines in Tsushima Strait, Tsugaru Strait and La Perouse Strait was supplied to the Navy.

C. Convoys: The Shipping Section collected and disseminated a vast amount of information on the routes, cargoes, composition and escort tactics of Japanese convoys. During all of 1945, weekly summaries of all

major convoy activity were published in order that interested agencies might be currently informed on the volume and type of convoy movements. In addition, a great amount of operational information was supplied to field units which led directly to many successful attacks. Three examples of this type of intelligence follow:

(1) In February and March 1944 the Japanese made a strong effort to reinforce Eastern New Guinea; at least four convoys were dispatched from Palau to Newak during this period. For two of the convoys, advance Army Ultra information was available to MIS and was cabled to SWPA. As a result, the largest ship (5,255grt) in one of those convoys and two of the four ships in the other convoy were sunk by Allied submarines. Successful attacks were also carried out on the other two known convoys. In late March 1945 a Japanese message was intercepted stating that the attempts to reinforce Eastern New Guinea would be abandoned.

(2) A similar attempt was made by the Japanese in late April and May 1944 to transport large elements of the 32nd and 35th Divisions from Shanghai to Northwestern New Guinea in order to provide badly needed reinforcements in that area. Advance information on the composition and scheduled noon positions of that convoy of nine transports and seven escorts was cabled to the field by the Shipping Section. As a result, the convoy was attacked by submarines and four of the transports carrying 12,304 troops and their equipment were sunk. The convoy was unable to reach New Guinea and the reinforcement effort failed.

(3) About 1 February 1945 the important Japanese convoys moving between Singapore and the Empire began to pass west of Hainan Island as an anti-submarine measure. This change from the old route east of that island brought the convoys within the operational range of the Fourteenth Air Force. From 1 February to 28 March 1945, cables concerning 26 Japanese convoys were sent to that Air Force. The convoys were composed of at least 78 merchant ships, aggregating about 234,000 grt, and about 80 escort vessels. The cables included details on the number of ships and escorts in each convoy, the size and type of those ships, and the advance schedules of the convoys, with fairly complete information on noon positions and routing instructions.

During the same two months there were Ultra reports of 35 attacks by the Fourteenth Air Force on 22 convoys

composed of about 73 merchant ships and at least 68 escorts. Most of the convoys attacked were convoys on which advance information had been sent by the Shipping Section. At least 25 ships were sunk in those attacks and a number of others were seriously damaged. The attacks were responsible to a great degree for the complete severance of the vital Singapore-Empire shipping run, and the Japanese were thus effectively deprived of most of the important oil and other supplies formerly obtained in the Southern Area.

D. Port Activity: In the early stages of the war Allied submarines were able greatly to reduce shipping activity at several of the major peace-time Japanese ports. The Japanese turned to other secondary ports and very little was known by the Allies during the first two years of the war concerning the relative importance of the various ports being used. In April 1944 the Shipping Section undertook to tabulate and analyze the shipping activity in all of the major Japanese-controlled ports. The attempt was successful: it became possible periodically to supply detailed information to the field concerning the volume and type of shipping activity at most of the ports in Japan's marine transport system as well as information on the principal shipping routes and trip times between those ports. This information, as noted above, was of great value in planning the mine warfare campaign and was also of use in the planning of strategic bombing and other operations.

E. Other Contributions: From time to time special studies of current operational importance were made by the Section. One such study was made before the invasion of Okinawa. Details were supplied to the field on the quantity of shipping which had discharged cargo at Naha, Ishigaki and Miyako during the preceding months. That information indicated that large quantities of military supplies had been sent to the Ryukyu Islands; as a result, the estimates of Japanese troop strength were increased by SWPA and the Military Branch of MIS and a better appraisal of the defenses of the area was possible than would otherwise have been the case. Similar studies were undertaken for Borneo and the Kuriles.

Prior to the entry of submarines into the Sea of Japan in July 1945, a detailed study of shipping activity in that area was sent to the JICPOA Estimate Section at Pearl Harbor. After the submarine patrol had been completed, MIS was advised from the field:

"The Japan Sea submarine campaign has pleased everyone.....Praise for the intelligence supplied both prior to and during the patrol has been unqualified and a very great portion of that is due the people in your shop who labored over the figures."

The work of the Shipping Section was in many cases merged in the intelligence produced by other units of HIS and other intelligence agencies. For example, the data on ship construction was an important factor in the estimates made by the commodities and industries units on the amount of iron and steel available to the Japanese for other uses. The periodic reports on convoy movements from Singapore and Miri to the Empire and on the Japanese tanker strength furnished a major basis for the Petroleum Section in estimating the oil and gasoline supply of the Empire. The port studies and the information on convoys and individual ship movements were frequently used by the Military Branch in estimating troop strength and in spotting the arrival of enemy units in various areas.

III. DISSEMINATION

A more complete index to the Shipping Section's contribution to the prosecution of the war than that furnished by the specific examples cited above is found in the number of cables sent to field units by the Section or prepared from its information. Appendices 1, 2, and 3 are summaries of the cabled material and provide a breakdown, respectively, by subject matter, by addressee and by order of precedence. Appendix 1, showing the number of cables by subject matter, indicates that from October 1943 to August 1945 a total of 397 cables were sent which dealt with individual ships, 233 with convoys, 179 with mines, 96 with the Japanese shipping position, 47 with ports and harbors and 39 with miscellaneous subjects.

A breakdown of cables by addressee is presented in Appendix 2. The Appendix shows that 433 cables were sent to SWPA (except Brisbane), 219 to SWPA Brisbane, 576 to Ammdel (CBI Theater), 306 to CG CenPac, CG POA and CinCPac, 109 to the 14th AF, 60 to the 20th AF, 73 to the FFAF, 48 to Chungking, 37 to Kandy and 49 to GCCS. With regard to this Appendix, it should be noted that the number of cables sent to the 14th AF does not represent all of the information sent to that headquarters; information intended for it which could be sent at a lower classification than "operational priority" was routed to Ammdel (CBI Theater) for relay to the 14th AF.

Appendix 3 furnishes a breakdown of outgoing cables by order of precedence. Of a total of 936 cables sent from October 1943 to August 1945, 259 carried the top classification of "urgent" or "operational priority". Most of the cables in those classes which were sent during the winter and spring of 1944-45 were concerned with convoy movements, primarily in the French Indo-China area. Those numbers do not present the complete picture, however, since in many cases the information on convoy movements was available sufficiently in advance to allow the field to be informed by cables of lower priority. The data of Appendix 3 are shown graphically on the accompanying chart, where the top curve represents the total number of cables sent, the next curve the total number less those classified as "routine" and the third those classified as "urgent" or "operational priority".

A summary by subject-matter of the number of articles prepared by the Shipping Section and published in the Far East Summary and Shipping and Economic Notes is presented in Appendix 4. The Appendix shows that a total of 584 articles dealing with the Japanese shipping position, convoys, mines, ports and harbors, sinkings, small boats, tankers and miscellaneous subjects were disseminated through those two publications. The contents of many of the articles were cabled before publication to appropriate field commands; their appearance in the above publications insured them wide circulation among interested agencies. Similar circulation for a large amount of detailed data was secured by sending copies of ICH runs of sinkings, port activity, ship construction and the like to the Special Security Officers in the field.

APPENDIX I
 CABLES DEALING WITH JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING
 BY SUBJECT MATTER; OCT 43 - AUG 45*

	<u>Individual Ships</u>	<u>Convoys</u>	<u>Harbor Reports</u>	<u>Mines</u>	<u>Shipping Position</u>	<u>Miscel- laneous</u>
Oct 43	3	1	1	0	0	0
Nov	3	2	0	0	0	0
Dec	4	6	2	0	2	0
Jan 44	5	4	1	0	0	0
Feb	9	7	3	1	3	0
Mar	37	9	0	2	6	0
Apr	12	7	2	0	3	0
May	20	15	1	0	0	0
June	4	4	1	0	0	0
July	7	1	1	0	0	0
Aug	7	2	2	0	0	1
Sept	12	2	1	0	6	0
Oct	6	2	2	0	8	0
Nov	5	8	1	1	5	2
Dec	18	31	1	3	5	4
Jan 45	23	20	0	8	13	7
Feb	36	36	4	27	7	6
Mar	53	50	3	36	10	9
Apr	53	13	9	46	5	8
May	23	8	2	21	7	2
June	21	1	2	5	7	0
July	24	1	6	20	6	0
Aug	12	3	2	9	3	0
TOTAL	397	233	47	179	96	39

* In many cases a single cable dealt with more than one shipping subject. Such cables are treated in this table under as many subjects as were covered by them. Hence the number of cables sent during a month is usually fewer than the sum of the figures for all subjects for that month.

APPENDIX 2

CABLES DEALING WITH JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING
BY ADDRESSEE, OCT 43 - AUG 45*


	SWPA		CCCentPac		20th		Kandy	QCCS	Miscel- laneous
	except Brisbane	SWPA Brisbane	CG POA CinC Pac	Ammdel	14th AF	AF			
Oct 43	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Nov	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Dec	10	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1
Jan 44	8	0	3	5	0	0	0	0	0
Feb	20	1	5	5	0	0	0	0	2
Mar	39	0	4	8	0	0	0	0	6
Apr	14	0	8	10	0	0	0	0	4
May	28	0	11	23	0	0	0	0	0
June	7	0	2	7	0	0	0	0	0
July	9	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
Aug	10	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	0
Sept	12	3	10	13	0	0	0	7	0
Oct	9	3	5	8	0	0	0	0	0
Nov	9	0	1	15	7	0	0	0	0
Dec	6	0	1	45	36	1	0	1	0
Jan 45	18	9	14	63	19	3	0	1	1
Feb	33	31	36	90	12	5	1	0	0
Mar	53	51	60	120	24	2	0	0	0
Apr	61	54	57	90	2	14	0	0	0
May	20	16	18	43	2	4	5	1	1
June	14	14	17	10	4	4	10	14	0
July	35	37	37	1	2	16	40	22	0
Aug	17	0	16	0	1	11	17	12	0
TOTAL	433	219	306	576	109	60	73	48	49
								37	18

*Cables sent to more than one addressee have been counted under each addressee in this table. The total number of cables sent during any month, therefore, will be less than the sum of all messages for that month represented on this table.

APPENDIX 3
 CABLES DEALING WITH JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING
 BY ORDER OF PRECEDENCE, OCT 43 - AUG 45*

	<u>Operational Priority</u>	<u>Urgent</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Routine</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Total</u>
Oct 43	0	0	2	0	2	4
Nov	0	0	1	3	0	4
Dec	0	2	6	4	0	12
Jan 44	0	1	3	6	0	10
Feb	0	4	7	13	0	24
Mar	1	19	6	26	0	52
Apr	1	3	4	16	0	24
May	3	6	12	14	0	35
June	0	3	3	4	0	10
July	0	0	2	7	0	9
Aug	0	0	1	11	0	12
Sept	0	0	1	19	0	20
Oct	0	1	1	15	0	17
Nov	4	4	1	13	0	22
Dec	30	10	1	15	1	57
Jan 45	33	3	2	13	0	51
Feb	19	12	9	81	0	121
Mar	15	33	21	78	0	147
Apr	17	4	14	97	0	132
May	10	2	8	41	0	61
June	5	2	6	21	0	34
July	9	1	9	33	0	52
Aug	2	0	3	21	0	26
TOTAL	149	110	123	551	3	936

* In compiling this table, a message sent with different priorities to two or more addressees has been given its highest priority.



APPENDIX 4

SHIPPING ITEMS APPEARING IN FES AND SEN

	<u>FES</u>		<u>SEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1945</u>	
Shipping Position	22	20	20	62
Convoys	77	20	34	131
Mining	12	73	32	117
Ports and Harbors	13	9	20	42
Sinkings	57	14	20	91
Small Boats	3	2	8	13
Tankers	10	0	6	16
Miscellaneous	27	51	34	112
TOTAL	221	189	174	584