

SRH-040

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

JULY 1945

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 3, E. O. 12065  
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

NR3 Date: SEPT. 13/

SRH-040

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

JULY 1945

SELECTED ITEMS PREPARED BY MIS, WAR DEPARTMENT  
FOR THE ATTENTION OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

16 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

*Sew*

Further Peace Move Developments: As previously noted, on 14 July Ambassador Sato advised Tokyo that Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lozovsky had sent word that "because of the departure of Stalin and Molotov" for Berlin, a reply about Konoye's trip would "be delayed". On 15 July Tokyo transmitted the following to Sato: "Please inform us at once as to when Stalin and Molotov left". Later on the 15th Sato replied: "It appears that Stalin and Molotov left Moscow for Berlin on the evening of the 14th. Therefore, so far as I can surmise, in spite of the fact that they probably had at least a half day remaining before their departure they avoided making any reply other than the tentative statement that they were delaying their answer. Judging from this the Russians must have wished to avoid making a hasty reply, on a matter which could have such serious consequences, without making a complete study of the situation. As a result, it appears doubtful that we will be able to obtain a prompt reply.

"The following are four probable reasons for the hesitation of the Russians in this matter: (1) They are uncertain as to whether the Emperor's message on the termination of the war

signifies that the actual mission of the Special Envoy will involve the submission of a concrete plan for ending the war. (2) They fear that Japan may not propose unconditional surrender or terms approximating unconditional surrender, or make a specific proposal, but that she may actually intend to request Russian assistance in order to obtain a so-called 'negotiated peace'. In such an event it would be very difficult for them to approve our request. (3) They do not wish to benefit Japan at the expense of their relations with the United States and Great Britain at a moment when cooperation among the three countries is needed more than ever. (4) Since Far Eastern problems will inevitably come up for discussion both inside and outside the meetings of the Big Three, they believe that it is necessary to make sure of the agreement of the British and Americans on the question of the Special Envoy before they give a definite reply one way or the other. Perhaps Stalin believes, therefore, that it will be impossible to determine the Soviet attitude until he has informed the British and American authorities of the recent Japanese communication and has learned their views.

"In connection with the 'negotiated peace' mentioned in subparagraph (2) above, we must remember that the Americans and



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-3-

the British - and particularly the former - have always opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty by means of negotiation in regard to both the European and Pacific Wars. Moreover, since Russia herself insisted upon the unconditional surrender of Germany and, spurring the British and Americans on to the opening of the Second Front, finally defeated Germany with their cooperation, it can be seen that it will be extremely difficult to obtain the support of the Soviet Union for any proposal concerning the negotiation of a peace treaty.

"In the long run, leaving aside Japan's sincere desire for the termination of the war, I believe that she has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely approximating thereto. I would like to point out, however, that even on the basis of your recent messages I have obtained no clear idea of the situation which existed prior to those messages. Nor am I clear about the view of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war. Moreover it has been my understanding that, in case it were finally decided to bring the war to an end, it would be necessary to obtain a new formal resolution which would be sufficient to overrule the decision

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-4-

reached at the Council held in the Imperial Presence last June 8th, but this has not been done.\* Now, if the Special Envoy does not bear concrete terms as mentioned in subparagraph (1) above, I fear lest he be dispatched with the approval of the Russians only to achieve unsatisfactory results in the end.

"Please consider the facts presented in this wire as well as in my earlier wires and, if the decision is finally made to dispatch the Envoy, I sincerely pray that a resolution be passed in the Cabinet Council to have the Envoy carry a concrete plan for the termination of the war."

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\*Councils "in the Imperial Presence" have been held only rarely in the last 40 years and are apparently for the purpose of determining the most important long range policies for the Japanese Nation.

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004

17 July 1945

BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE PEACE MOVE

On 29 June ex-Premier Hirota gave Soviet Ambassador Malik in Japan a written proposal that Japan and Russia conclude a treaty of non-aggression and 'mutual assistance on problems involving the maintenance of peace in East Asia' and stating Japan's willingness to (1) arrive at an agreement providing for neutralization of Manchukuo, obligating Japan to withdraw her troops from there after the end of the war and both countries to refrain from interfering in Manchukuo's internal political affairs, (2) renounce Japan's fisheries rights in return for a supply of oil, (3) discuss any matter which the Russians would like to bring up. On 30 June and again on 9 July Foreign Minister Togo instructed Ambassador Sato to try to see Molotov before the Berlin Conference and find out the Russian reaction to Japan's proposal.

On 11 July Togo sent Sato the following "extremely urgent" message:

"Since we are secretly giving consideration to termination of the war in view of the pressing situation confronting Japan both at home and abroad, you are not to confine yourself [in talking to Molotov] to the objective of a rapprochement between Russian and Japan but are to sound out the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia with regard to ending the war as well.

'As for our proposal to pledge mutual support in the maintenance



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of peace over a long period, it is to be done in conjunction with sounding out Russia's attitude toward Japan. In connection with the abrogation of the fishery rights we will seek Russia's favor through amendment of the Portsmouth Treaty. Note also the fact that we will consent to discuss other matters and will meet Russia's wishes on a broad scale. Accordingly while through the negotiation of Hirota with Malik we naturally wish the establishment of a treaty, these negotiations are also intended to sound out to what extent it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war. Therefore, we should like to know the views of the Government on this with all haste, and since this is a matter about which the Imperial Court also is tremendously concerned, please have an interview with Molotov, notwithstanding the fact that T. V. Soong may still be there, and bearing the above facts in mind, attempt to find out their views and reply at once.

'While there is no question of your adroitness, in this conference with the Russians please be careful not to give the impression that our plan is to make use of the Russians in ending the war'.

Later the same day Togo sent Sato the following additional message: 'Although the situation is as stated in the last part of our [preceding wire], it would appear suitable to make clear to the Russians

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our general attitude with regard to termination of the war. Therefore, please explain, together with the content of our [preceding] wire, that 'as far as we are concerned, we consider maintenance of peace in East Asia to be one aspect of the maintenance of world peace. Japan, in the proposal for the ending of the war, has absolutely no idea of annexing or holding the territories occupied as a result of the war, out of concern for the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace'. Please reply at once as to how Molotov answers this.

'Furthermore, we should like you to have the interview with Molotov in a day or two'.

On 10 July Sato discussed the Hirota proposal with Vice Commissar Lozovsky but with inconclusive results. As of that day Sato did not expect to be able to see Molotov before the Berlin Conference.

On 12 July Foreign Minister Togo sent Sato the following additional instructions regarding the approach to the Russians: 'I have not yet received a wire about your interview with Molotov. Accordingly, though it may smack a little of attacking without sufficient reconnaissance, it has seemed to me that it would be appropriate to go a step further on this occasion and inform the Russians before the opening of the Three Power Conference of the Imperial Will concerning the ending



of the war. We should like you therefore to present this to Molotov; 'His Majesty, who [words missing] fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender in the Greater East Asia war, the Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the motherland. His Majesty is deeply reluctant to have any further blood lost among people on both sides and it is his desire, for the welfare of humanity, to restore peace with all possible speed'.

'The will of the Emperor as expressed above arises not only from his benevolence towards his own subjects but from his concern for the welfare of humanity in general. It is his private intention to send Prince Konoye to your place as Special Envoy and have him take with him a letter from the Emperor containing the above statements. Please inform Molotov of this and get the consent of the Russians to having the party enter the country. ( I shall telegraph names of party later.) Now, though it would be impossible to have this delegation get to your place before the big men in Moscow leave for the Three Power Conference, we must arrange for a meeting immediately after their return, so we should

like to have the trip made by plane if possible. Please try to arrange for a Soviet plane to go as far as Manchouli or Tsitsihar\*.

Togo's next message to Sato, also sent on 12 July, reads as follows: "Reference our 893 [conveying the Emperor's message] please ask them to keep absolute secrecy with regard to [word missing] of this matter. While your adroitness is not in question, this is for your information\*.

The next day (13 July) Togo sent the following to Sato: "Foreign Minister Togo summoned Ambassador Malik on [date uncertain] recognizing that it would be proper to [word missing] as follows on matter of sending Special Envoy, but because Malik was confined at home by illness, he had Ando, head of Political Affairs Bureau, visit his sick bed. After stating that His Imperial Majesty [two words missing] with regard to terminating the war, he said that Your Excellency [was also to communicate with the Russian Government regarding desire to have Prince Konoye go to Moscow as personal representative of the Emperor], but that we should also like to have Malik provide us with facilities for communicating this. Malik promised to wire his government at once\*.

Meanwhile Sato succeeded in seeing Molotov on 11 June<sup>4Y</sup> but at the time of the conference had not yet received Togo's instructions to find out if Russia would help Japan make peace. Sato's account of the conference



follows: "Yesterday, 10 July, immediately after my talk with Lozovsky I requested a one hour interview with Molotov. During the afternoon of 11 July, I received a reply that I was expected at 5 o'clock. I accordingly went to see him at that time. I began by thanking Molotov for giving me this opportunity to see him in spite of the pressure of business under which he must be laboring just before his departure for the Berlin Conference. Molotov replied; 'I learned yesterday of your particular request to see me, so I have made time for our interview although I am busy'. We then talked as follows on the matter of the Hirota-Malik conversations;

" Sato; 'As Your Excellency the Commissar is already aware, an exchange of views has been carried on between Hirota and Malik at Gora. At that time Hirota expressed a number of ideas, and again on 29 June he presented Malik with a proposal embodying [word missing] of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government would like to know the views of the Russian Government on this matter at once. This is a matter which I learned about only after conclusion of the conferences and it is a plan in which I have had no part; consequently I am not the person directly responsible, but since the aims of the Japanese Government are simple and clear, I hope for furtherance and improvement of Russo-Japanese relations. I would be very happy if Your Excellency could inform

me in any fashion as to the views of the Russian Government on this matter. I talked about this with Lozovsky yesterday, but I consider it desirable to bring it up again today'.

'Molotov: 'As to this matter of which you spoke, there has only been a brief telegram from Malik; he will probably send details by mail. When we receive his detailed report, I think that the content and character of the Hirota proposals will become entirely clear. Since up to today we have received only a short report, I should like to let it go until I have received a clear impression of the aims of the Japanese proposal'.

'Sato: 'Hirota's statement is concise and clear and furthermore, even though Your Excellency has so far received only a short report, I think it would be possible for you to understand it fully. What the Japanese Government seeks is, in a word, the establishment of relations of lasting friendship between Japan and Russia and cooperation in maintenance of permanent peace in East Asia, and if, in the interest of these goals, it were possible to make some sort of treaty between the two countries, it might extend even to a treaty of non-aggression between them. Moreover the Japanese Government, in order to facilitate realization of the above goals, proposes making Manchukuo neutral, withdrawing after the war, and guaranteeing inviolability and respect for sovereignty by both



Japan and Russia. Also, Hirota mentioned the abolition of fishing rights in exchange for a supply of oil, and ended up by stating that the Japanese Government would study any other problems which the Soviet Government might bring up. I can understand the fact that you are now awaiting a complete report but, since Hirota's proposals are rather unusual, it is not difficult to understand their urgency. Hence, if the Soviet authorities agree to study the matter on this brief, I would appreciate an answer to that effect either to Hirota or to myself'.

"Molotov: 'Did Your Excellency take any personal part at the outset in this matter?'

"Sato: 'I took no direct part in it. The details of the proposals are as I have stated, but the purpose of the Japanese Government was decisive, and I too am in sympathy with it. Hence, I hope that the Soviet Government also will indorse this "idea" '.

"Molotov: 'We shall study the Japanese proposal most carefully and determine our views. Since a complete report should arrive soon from Malik, I should like to include it also'.

"Sato: 'In that case, I should like to continue our conversation again after you get back from the Conference'.

"Molotov: 'By that time we will probably be in possession of Malik's report'.

'The conference ended with the above, and I departed. The time



taken was about 20 minutes. Moreover Molotov stated nothing definite with regard to the Three Power Conference except that it was supposed to begin sometime around the 15th.

The next day, still before receiving Togo's instruction regarding getting Russia to help Japan make peace, Sato sent the following to Tokyo; "I received your number 885 [urging Sato to see Molotov] just before my conference with Molotov. I did my best to consider thoroughly the gist of your communication. However, with regard to the matter of the Hirota-Malik conversations, Lozovsky stated that the Soviet Government had not finished its investigation, and Molotov said that he was waiting for Malik's complete report, after which time the matter would be studied, and he would give his answer. The attitude of both persons was consistent in that they showed no enthusiasm whatsoever. It appears that we were unable to obtain a foothold. Viewed impartially, the fact that the Russian attitude was quite normal and that we need not consider it particularly strange has been anticipated by successive [word missing] and through my own observations. One must admit that, in relation to the close relationship of the Anglo-Americans, the fact that the Americans, the English and the Russians have managed the present united front in increasing measure since the San Francisco Conference and that they view our requests in the same light are matters which cannot be looked upon as favorable. Moreover under present circumstances with the war centering around the [Japanese]

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-10-

mainland one cannot view Russian hesitation as anything but natural. In their eyes the very existence of Japan is now in the greatest of danger with no possibility of change, and they consider at this time of crisis Japan will be unable to withstand a new American offensive. Moreover, they even believe that they hold complete power of life and death over Japan by their own [word missing]. The attitude of Malik and important Russians who are in touch with us has not yet [two words missing] and I have seen no signs of arrogance. However, one need not be surprised that having won a great victory, in their own minds they harbor [word missing] deeply rooted convictions. Your proposal that Japan and the Soviet Union cooperate to maintain peace in East Asia as well as the whole question of neutralization of Manchukuo are both based on the assumption that Japan and Manchukuo will continue to exist. Assuming this to be fact, these problems might naturally come up for consideration. However if, as I have just stated, we should for a moment assume that the very existence of Japan has become problematical as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we can easily see that the whole foundation on which our offers are based is shattered as far as they are concerned. Furthermore by trying to force rapprochement with the Soviets on the basis of your proposal [three words missing] the Japanese Government will itself have given a blow to faith in the future of its own country. It need not

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be added that this fact will not escape the attention of important figures in the Soviet government. In short I cannot help but feel that the end result of negotiation with the Soviet Government on the basis of these offers will be that our own uneasiness will be made glaringly apparent, the self-confidence of the Soviet Government will be even further aroused, and she will thus be less inclined than ever to accept our proposition. From the Soviet point of view for her to do anything at this time to improve Japanese-Soviet relations, which in any event have no real basis, would only mean an immediate rupture in Soviet-American relations, so that it seems quite clear, as far as I am concerned, that she will find it impossible to accept our offer. I firmly believe that any attempt to reach rapprochement with the Soviet Union at this time when our war situation is so grave is bound to end in failure and disappointment. In view of the present military situation and from your own point of view it may be difficult for you [three words missing]. However it requires no particular sagacity in military matters to foresee this danger. In view of this it is <sup>1</sup>will that we should devote our every effort to making Russia stand fast. Therefore if we succeed in that, to that extent we shall be able to guarantee our existence; beyond that there is no alternative but to attempt to work out our own destiny by our own efforts. Indeed such an idea as that of winning Russia over to our side, even to the point of making her desert her own

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-12-

allies, is nothing but panning our hopes on the utterly impossible. People generally have not in the past been fully informed as to relations between Russia and Japan or about the present world situation. While it is not unreasonable to raise [two words missing] hope at once, in the present state of Russo-Japanese relations our demands must remain utterly incapable of acceptance".

On 12 July, after receiving instructions from Togo on Russian help toward making peace but before receiving the wire containing the Emperor's message, Sato sent the following message to Togo: 'I realize your instructions involve basic sounding out of the Russians on the possibility of using them for ending the war. According to my frank opinion, it is no exaggeration to say that the Russians are not attracted to the proposals [submitted by Hirota] and that there is no hope of their meeting our terms. As I have explained before, these proposals run completely counter to their foreign policy. Moreover, were I to try to find out to what extent the Russians could be used in ending the war on the basis of these proposals, it should be clear from my report of the Molotov interview that I would be unable to achieve my purpose. Furthermore the sort of explanation set forth in your wire [giving instructions on getting the Russians to help Japan make peace] can be considered nothing more than academic fine phrases. As for considering 'maintenance of world peace',

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since the Anglo-Americans may be about to wrest the power to maintain peace in East Asia from the hands of the Japanese, and now that even the Japanese mainland has been reduced to such a critical state, it is indeed unfortunate that Japan is no longer in position to be responsible for peace throughout East Asia. Furthermore you state that 'Japan has not the slightest intention of annexing or keeping in its possession territories [occupied during the war]'. Now the fact is that we have already lost Burma and the Philippines, and even Okinawa, which is at the very tip of our Empire, has fallen into enemy hands. How much effect do you expect our statements regarding non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on Soviet authorities? As you are well aware, Soviet authorities are extremely realistic and it is extremely difficult to persuade them with abstract arguments. We certainly will not convince them with pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality. When I spoke to Molotov about the proposal made by Hirota, he hardly [three words missing] and merely made a non-committal reply. If the Japanese Empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our own minds to terminate the war. Unless we do so, there is absolutely no point in sounding out the views of the Soviet Government. At this time when the enemy is stepping up its air raids at an ever increasing pace, how much reserve strength does Japan have left for carrying on the war? Is there



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-14-

any sense in continuing the war no matter how many hundreds of thousands of our able-bodied men and no matter how many millions of our city populations are sacrificed? Since I have no accurate information about the present state of our military production, I am not in position to reach any definite conclusions about these vital problems, not to mention the fact that I have learned that positive plans were resolved upon at a conference in the Imperial Presence during the early part of June. Assuming that the course of war since that conference has brought us to real extremity, then indeed the Government should make the great decision. Once that resolve is taken, there may perhaps be some hope of setting the Soviet Government into motion and getting it to give its good offices towards terminating the war. But there can be no doubt that the result which faces us in that event will be virtually equivalent to unconditional surrender. I have expressed my views very frankly above, and I fear I must apologize for the unceremoniousness of my words. Nevertheless, though I am filled with thoughts of fear and heartbreak [?] at the knowledge that [?] even the Imperial Court [two words missing] is concerned in this, we must face the facts of the international situation without flinching, and I have therefore reported those facts as they are. I send this telegram in the belief that it is my first responsibility to prevent the

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harboring of illusions which are at variance with reality. I beg your indulgence'.

On 13 July Sato sent the following: "Your wire containing the Emperor's message was received at 0100 on 13 July just after my interview with Molotov. Although the date of his departure for Berlin is drawing extremely close, I shall do my best to fulfill your instructions. If by any chance I cannot possibly get an interview, I will convey the Emperor's wishes before the departure of Molotov for the Three Power Conference". Later on 13 July Sato sent the following: "I immediately asked for an interview with Molotov but I received a reply to the effect that he simply could not manage it and wished me therefore to communicate any matters of importance to Lozovsky. I therefore went to see Lozovsky at 5 P. M. on the 13th, having translated into Russian the Imperial instructions of your 893 [the Emperor's peace message], I included them in a confidential letter from me addressed to Molotov. I presented this to Lozovsky and asked him to convey it to Molotov at once. In this letter I also communicated His Majesty's private intention of sending Prince Konoye of which you speak in your wire. I requested the agreement of the Soviet Government to the Prince's coming and I asked that the Russians provide an airplane and other facilities. [The conversation then



proceeded as follows: 7

'Sato: 'I should like the Soviet Government to bear particularly in mind the fact that the present Special Envoy will be of entirely different character from the Special Envoy I have discussed with Molotov three times in the past; this time the Envoy will be sent at the particular desire of His Majesty. The Japanese Government wishes to know of the Soviet Government's agreement to this with all speed and even if simply an agreement in principle. So I should like to have an answer before the departure of Molotov if that is possible. We wish to arrange things so that the Special Envoy can meet with Soviet authorities as soon as possible after their return from Berlin'.

'Lozovsky: 'To whom in the Soviet Government is the Japanese Emperor's message addressed'?

'Sato: 'The message communicates His Majesty's private intentions and is not addressed to anyone in particular. However we should like to have Molotov communicate it to Mr. Kalinin, head of the Soviet Union, and to Mr. Stalin'.

'Lozovsky: 'I can understand that the Japanese Government is in some haste about this matter and I should like to meet your desire for speedy reply. But some members of the Government are supposed to be leaving this very night so it will really be impossible to make any

reply before the departure of Molotov'.

'Sato: 'We shall have to think about making preparations for the Special Envoy's party. If we are too late to get a reply before Molotov's departure, then I should like you, if possible, to get in touch with Berlin by telephone or the like and give us an answer'.

'Lozovsky: 'I shall certainly try to do so and in any event will forward your letter to Molotov without loss of time'.'

The same day Sato sent the following thoughts on the plan for sending Konoye as Special Envoy: 'I imagine that the Russians will agree at the present time to the sending of the Special Envoy but it is difficult to say anything until we actually get a reply. However, in the event the Russians agree, it is entirely out of the question that the function of the Special Envoy should stay within the limits of sounding out the extent to which we might make use of the Russians in ending the war, as proposed in your 890 [Togo's first instructions] or that he should be limited to an abstract exposition such as is suggested in your 891 [containing the suggestion that Japan would give up all territories occupied during the war]. I kneel in veneration before the exalted solicitude of His Majesty for restoration of peace, as conveyed in your 893, and I resign myself to his will with deep feelings of awe, but if the proposal of the Japanese Government brought by the Special Envoy at the particular desire of His Majesty goes no further than we have gone in the past, if it is to be a



proposal lacking in any concreteness [beyond] abstract words, then we shall uselessly disappoint the expectation of authorities in this country and more than that we shall generate feelings of dissatisfaction at the Japanese Government's lack of good faith, and thus bring evil even upon the Imperial Household. I feel very serious anxiety about this point. It is my firm conviction that, once having resolved to send a special and important envoy on a long trip, he can have no function except to propose an armistice and peace. The Russians may understand His Majesty's desire for peace on the basis of what I tell them. But they may ask for further information on the ground that the function of the Envoy himself is not clear. The Envoy can of course let us know details after his arrival, but if the Russians ask I may have to give them an explanation in advance about the precise nature of the Envoy's mission. Please reply at once. Originally I thought it best to call this point to your attention before carrying out your instructions, but it was very close to Molotov's departure and I had no time to wire you so I handled the matter as I have previously reported. However in view of the immense importance of the actual substance of the proposal to be brought by the Special Envoy I think I too shall give the matter my special attention and send a later wire submitting my views'.

Early on the morning of the 14th Sato sent Tokyo a further report as follows: 'In the dead of night on the 13th, Generalov, head of the



Japanese Section of the Foreign Commissariat, sent the following verbal message to me from Lozovsky: 'Because of the departure of Stalin and Molotov, a reply will be delayed. Therefore, please understand'.'

On 15 July Togo sent the following to Sato: 'Please inform us at once as to when Stalin and Molotov left'. Later on the 15th Sato replied: 'It appears that Stalin and Molotov left Moscow for Berlin on the evening of the 14th. Therefore, so far as I can surmise, in spite of the fact that they probably had at least a half day remaining before their departure they avoided making any reply other than the tentative statement that they were delaying their answer. Judging from this the Russians must have wished to avoid making a hasty reply, on a matter which could have such serious consequences, without making a complete study of the situation. As a result, it appears doubtful that we will be able to obtain a prompt reply.'

'The following are four probable reasons for the hesitation of the Russians in this matter: (1) They are uncertain as to whether the Emperor's message on the termination of the war signifies that the actual mission of the Special Envoy will involve the submission of a concrete plan for ending the war. (2) They fear that Japan may not propose unconditional surrender or terms approximating unconditional surrender, or make a specific proposal, but that she may actually intend to

request Russian assistance in order to obtain a so-called 'negotiated peace'. In such an event it would be very difficult for them to approve our request. (3) They do not wish to benefit Japan at the expense of their relations with the United States and Great Britain at a moment when cooperation among the three countries is needed more than ever. (4) Since Far Eastern problems will inevitably come up for discussion both inside and outside the meetings of the Big Three, they believe that it is necessary to make sure of the agreement of the British and Americans on the question of the Special Envoy before they give a definite reply one way or the other. Perhaps Stalin believes, therefore, that it will be impossible to determine the Soviet attitude until he has informed the British and American authorities of the recent Japanese communication and has learned their views.

'In connection with the 'negotiated peace' mentioned in subparagraph (2) above, we must remember that the Americans and the British - and particularly the former - have always opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty by means of negotiation in regard to both the European and Pacific wars. Moreover, since Russia herself insisted upon the unconditional surrender of Germany and, spurring the British and Americans on to the opening of the Second Front, finally defeated Germany with their cooperation,



it can be seen that it will be extremely difficult to obtain the support of the Soviet Union for any proposal concerning the negotiation of a peace treaty.

"In the long run, leaving aside Japan's sincere desire for the termination of the war, I believe that she has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely approximating thereto. I would like to point out, however, that even on the basis of your recent messages I have obtained no clear idea of the situation which existed prior to those messages. Nor am I clear about the view of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war. Moreover it has been my understanding that, in case it were finally decided to bring the war to an end, it would be necessary to obtain a new formal resolution which would be sufficient to overrule the decision reached at the Council held in the Imperial Presence last June 8th, but this has not been done. Now, if the Special Envoy does not bear concrete terms as mentioned in subparagraph (1) above, I fear lest he be dispatched with the approval of the Russians only to achieve unsatisfactory results in the end.

"Please consider the facts presented in this wire as well as in my earlier wires and, if the decision is finally made to dispatch the Envoy, I sincerely pray that a resolution be passed in the Cabinet Council to have the Envoy carry a concrete plan for the termination of the war."

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-22-

On 16 July Sato sent the following reply to Togo's request of 15 July for information as to when Stalin and Molotov left Moscow;

"There has been no announcement here about the departure of Stalin and the others so we can hardly be sure of the time but a word uncertain, either "Paris" or "London" broadcast said that he had apparently left by train on the night of the 14th and a similar broadcast this morning, the 16th, said that Truman and Churchill had arrived in Berlin during the night of the 15th but that Stalin had not yet arrived and was apparently traveling by train. Since Stalin entertained T. V. Soong at a dinner party on the evening of the 13th, I rather thought he might leave by train early on the morning of the 14th (Lozovsky had said 'some members of the Government are to leave tonight or early tomorrow morning'), but actually it seems to have been on the evening of the 14th or later. Also please see the first part of my number 1392." Sato's 1392, quoted above, stated "It appears that Stalin and Molotov left Moscow for Berlin on the evening of the 14th . . . ]"

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18 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

Togo rejects suggestion that Japan surrender unconditionally;

On 17 July Foreign Minister Togo sent Ambassador Sato the following:

"Re your [15 July message in which Sato stated that he believed that Japan had "indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely approximating thereto".] and preceding:

"1. The difficulty in the present situation of strengthening the ties of friendship between Japan and Russia or in making effective use of Russia in bringing about the conclusion of the war has from the outset been apparent but the situation is such that we have no recourse but to try to do so. Consequently not only is it difficult for us to be satisfied with keeping Russia from entering the war against Japan but we are negotiating on the basis of our decision to recognize their wishes on a broad scale in order that we may solicit their favor the more for ourselves in accord with our wire number 890 [Togo's first instructions to Sato on the peace move]. Hence negotiations to strengthen Russo-Japanese amity are necessary as a [? sounding board ?] to solicit Russia's sincere good offices in bringing the war to an end and also in strengthening the ground for negotiations with England and America. Furthermore without stopping at sounding out Russia's attitude in regard to ending the war we must solicit her to use her sincere good offices.

\*2. Not only the [?] directing powers [?] but the Government as well is convinced that our war strength still [?] can deliver [?] considerable blows to the enemy, but since this does not necessarily enable us to feel an absolutely secure peace of mind we are maintaining our strength against an enemy who will attack repeatedly. If today America and England were to recognize Japan's honor and existence, they would put an end to the war and save humanity from participation in the war, but if they insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, Japan is unanimous in its resolve to wage a thorough going war. The Emperor himself has deigned to express his determination. Hence we have made this request of the Russians, but we are not seeking their mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender. Please bear this point particularly in mind. It is extremely vital that we obtain as speedily as possible the Russian's reply and consent in regard to sending [?] two words missing, presumably "Prince Konoye" [?] so please endeavor through Lozovsky to get this done'.

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Note: The above was received direct from Arlington Hall, rather than from MIS as is customary, to avoid the delay inherent in that procedure.



20 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

1. Sato insists that Japan's peace offer should not be conditional; On 13 July Ambassador Sato dispatched the following message No. 1416 to Tokyo;\*

\*Reference two of your No. 913 [Togo's 17 July message which rejected the idea of unconditional surrender but left the door open for terms which would 'recognize Japan's honor and existence'.]. As for the reports from me contained in my No. 1992 [Sato's message of 15 July in which he stated that he believed that Japan 'has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely approximating thereto'.] and other [related?] wires, it goes without saying that [Two groups missing. MIS suggests that

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\*This message was received by Arlington Hall with a number of mutilations; it is possible that a better version will be received, in which event it will be reported.

they may be "in suggesting" unconditional surrender or terms closely approximate thereto. Two groups missing. HIS suggests that they may be "I am not" excluding the question of preserving our national honor. As for the matter of our national honor, it goes without saying that if we make to the Russians the proposals in your wires, we must endeavor to do it in such fashion as to make the strong impression that they are the positive demand of Japan's millions. Although I have no fear that you misunderstood what I had to say in the last part of my No. 1343\*, I am saying this for your information.

\*Reserving the matter of maintenance of national honor, I think that, since in the long run it is already a question of unconditional surrender or conditions amounting to that, we must absolutely not make conditions. With regard to your captioned wire, after giving it careful study I should like to [?wire?] my humble opinions further.\*

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\*No. 1343 is clearly written but the message bearing that number is utterly irrelevant. The number 1343 apparently was inserted in error by a Japanese code clerk.



2. Reply of Soviet Government to Sato's memorandum of 13 July: The following is the text\* of a 19 July message from Moscow to Tokyo;

\*Reference my wire No. 1385 [in which Sato reported his interview with Lozovsky on 13 July at which he presented a translation of the Japanese Emperor's peace plea to Lozovsky and asked him to obtain Russian sanction of Konoye's proposed peace mission]. I received a personal letter from Lozovsky, the content of which is as follows:

'I have the honor to inform you at this writing that I have received your letter dated 13 July and the Japanese Emperor's message. In the name of the Soviet Government I have the honor to call to your Excellency's attention the fact that the intentions expressed in the Japanese Emperor's message are general in form and contain no specific proposals. It is the Soviet Government's view that the mission of Prince Konoye the Special Envoy, is in no way made clear [word or words missing] and hence it is impossible for the Soviet Government to give a definite reply to the Japanese Emperor's message or in regard to the Special Envoy, Prince Konoye,

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\*Received directly from Arlington Hall.

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mentioned in your letter dated 13 July. I address my respects to your Excellency.

• 18 July, 1945, Moscow.

• 'Lazovsky [7to?] Sato, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Russia.' •

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21 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

1. Sato Comments on Russian Note: Following is the text\* of a 19 July message from Sato in Moscow to Tokyo:

\*Very urgent - reference my wire No. 1417 [Sato's message transmitting the Russian Government's reply to the Emperor's message and Sato's note regarding the proposed visit of Prince Konoye to Moscow] it is extremely regrettable that the Soviet Government has expressed its disapproval of the plan for dispatching a Special Envoy, on the grounds that the mission of such an envoy had not been made concrete. However, this again confirms my humble opinion, as given in wires No. 1386, [A 13 July message in which Sato stated, "It is my firm conviction that, once having resolved to send a special and important envoy on a long trip, he can have no function except to propose an armistice and peace. The Russians may understand His Majesty's desire for peace on the basis of what I tell them. But they may ask for further information on the ground that the function of the Envoy himself is not clear."] and No. 1392, [A 15 July message in which Sato stated, ".... Japan .... has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely approximating thereto."] that we have no alternative but to present the Russians with a concrete plan.

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\*Received direct from Arlington Hall.

I have given consideration to the views outlined in (2) of your wire No. 913, [Togo's 17 July message rejecting the idea of unconditional surrender] but it is nevertheless hard to deny that the powers that be in Japan are out of touch with the atmosphere prevailing here. Moreover, it can already be surmised, on the basis of their rejection of the plan in question, that we cannot thus accomplish the desired objective of winning over the Russians.\*

Note: According to a "Radio Tokyo" broadcast heard by FCC and reported by the Associated Press, the Japanese Cabinet met on 20 July Tokyo time. "Problems of the day" was the title given the conference by the broadcast, but the only problems specifically mentioned were air and warship attacks.

2. More from Japanese Naval official in Berne on peace negotiations:\* As previously reported in the Diplomatic Summary, Captain Nishihara, the Japanese Counselor for Naval Affairs in Berne, advised the Navy General Staff in Tokyo during the first week of June that Allen Dulles, OSS representative in Berne, had proposed that a "discussion" between Japan and the United States be held in Switzerland and that a Japanese Admiral be flown from Tokyo for that

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\* Reported as Part II of the Diplomatic Summary for 20 July.



purpose. Nishihara further stated that he believed the proposal was "quite trustworthy and carries full faith."

A 6 July message from Nishihara has now been received which indicates that the Navy General Staff sent Nishihara a reply expressing its "misgivings" because of the "possibility of a good deal of strategem in the other party's proposal" and ordering Nishihara to make no reply to Dulles. Nishihara, however, states that "exacting investigation" has revealed "no trace of enemy strategem", and goes on to make the following points:

a. "On or about 20 May - before the proposal was made to us [on 23 and 25 May] - Dulles asked Washington for instructions as to the advisability of trying to get in touch with the Japanese Naval Officials in Switzerland. About 10 June, after we had been approached indirectly, Washington replied that 'in principle it approved; no objections.' On two subsequent occasions we were told that the other party's preparations were completed and were asked whether a reply had come from Tokyo. However, in obedience to your orders, we made no reply."

b. "Next, Dulles returned to Washington at the President's request, probably for various preliminary arrangements, remaining there from 15 to 25 June, returning to Berns on the 26th."



TOP SECRET  
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-4-

[According to the go-between,] Dulles had [words uncertain, probably "encouraging news"] tempered with seriousness. He frankly recognized the danger of Russia becoming involved and had hopes for an early end to the war.\*

g. "The other party, in view of the war situation, seems dumbfounded at our obstinate silence. While we cannot be sure that some enormous ruse is not involved, [we believe that] there is too much encouraging news, frankness and sincerity for this to be an enemy stratagem."

In conclusion, Nishihara appears to ask the Tokyo authorities to reconsider or at least to send him any information they might have pointing to an enemy trick.

On 14 July Nishihara advised Tokyo that Dulles had recently left Berne to take up his duties in Germany but before going had made arrangements in Berne so that Nishihara could get in touch with him.

Note: On 19 June Chinese Minister Liang in Berne reported that, as one peace maneuver, the Japanese there had arranged for "a certain Swiss" to inquire of Paul Blum of the American Legation what the Anglo-American peace terms might be. After Foreign Minister Togo had sent to Minister Kase in Berne an intercept of Liang's message, Kase denied the truth of the Chinese report, and commented: "According to our investigations, Blum is a subordinate of Dulles, who is searching out our activities."

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[According to the go-between,] Dulles had [words uncertain, probably "encouraging news"] tempered with seriousness. He frankly recognized the danger of Russia becoming involved and had hopes for an early end to the war."

c. "The other party, in view of the war situation, seems dumbfounded at our obstinate silence. While we cannot be sure that some enormous ruse is not involved, [we believe that] there is too much encouraging news, frankness and sincerity for this to be an enemy stratagem."

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-5-

3. Latest Japanese Comment on Possibility of Allied Landing

on China Coast: The intelligence circulars issued by the Japanese Army General Staff have been commenting with some regularity on the possibility of an Allied landing on the China coast. The circular of 15 April noted indications pointing to a landing "some time in June or later," and the "Ten Day Intelligence Report" of 14 June stated that "we will have to be strictly on our guard after the end of June against Allied moves on the China coast."

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16

The most recent "Ten Day Intelligence Report", dated 14 July, includes the statement: "At present we can see no signs of any enemy operations against the China coast in connection with the new maneuvers in the Pacific."

4. Dutch Plan for Annexation of German Territory: Last March Dutch Foreign Minister Van Kleffens reminded General DeGaulle and Foreign Minister Bidault that his country had reserved the right to claim German territory to compensate for the devastation resulting from the flooding of Holland and stated that in his opinion that zone claimed might extend beyond the Ems River to the former boundary of Oldenburg, leaving Wilhelmshaven to Germany but "under Dutch guns".

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According to a 16 July Czechoslovak message from London to Prague - the author is not indicated - the Dutch Government "is now making definite decisions with regard to the annexation of German"

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3. Latest Japanese Comment on Possibility of Allied Landing on China Coast: The intelligence circulars issued by the Japanese Army General Staff have been commenting with some regularity on the possibility of an Allied landing on the China coast. The circular of 15 April noted indications pointing to a landing "some time in June or later," and the "Ten Day Intelligence Report" of 14 June stated that "we will have to be strictly on our guard after the end of June against Allied moves on the China coast."

The most recent "Ten Day Intelligence Report", dated 14 July, includes the statement: "At present we can see no signs of any enemy operations against the China coast in connection with the new man-  
euvers in the Pacific."

TOP SECRET  
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-6-

territory\* despite opposition of Prime Minister Schermerhorn to annexation. The message states that, according to "confidential" information, Foreign Minister Van Kleffens has prepared a plan whereby the Dutch-German boundary would run from North to South as follows;

a. East of the Frisian Islands [the eastern group now belongs to Germany];

b. Slightly to the west of Wilhelmshaven, then along the Ems River to Meppen and Lingen, passing close to Münster and extending southwestward to Wesel;

c. From Wesel along the Rhine to Neuss, thence to the old frontier at a point (not located) north of Aachen, thus giving Krefeld and München Gladbach to Holland.

Note: The Dutch proposal presumably leaves Meppen and Lingen, both on the east bank of the Ems, to Germany; it is not clear whether Wesel and Neuss would also be left to Germany.

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22 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

*LCW*

1. Sato analyzes Japan's situation and continues to urge immediate surrender: On 20 July Ambassador Sato sent the following message to Foreign Minister Togo:

"No. 1427. Strictly Secret. Reference your No. 913.\*

"After careful reflection I am transmitting my views without reserve.

"1. It is reported that since 14 July the American task force, which has become active in northern waters, has approached and shelled the Kamaishi, Muroran, and Mito areas and that carrier planes have been preventing communication [by rail ferry] between Hokkaido

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\* Togo's 913 was the message of 17 July in which he told Sato that, if the Anglo-Americans "insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese are unanimous in their resolve to wage a thorough going war," and instructed Sato to "please bear particularly in mind that we are not asking the Russian mediation for anything like unconditional surrender."

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and the mainland [Honshu] and have also sunk a number of ships. In contrast - according to enemy reports - counter-measures taken by both our Air Force and Navy have approached the non-existent. I think that this unfortunately demonstrates clearly the decline of our fighting power, and, if the same tendency continues, the activity of the enemy fleet will become [even more] bold as time goes on. The enemy has publicly thrown down the gauntlet to the Japanese Navy and indeed has even gone so far as to broadcast boldly the names of the powerful ships in the raiding task force and of their commanders.

"2. Moreover, enemy air raids from bases in the Marianas, Okinawa, and Iwo are already reaching every part of the Japanese mainland almost daily. The great cities have been reduced to ruins. In addition to attacks on munitions plants, storehouses, etc., they have begun bombing even medium and small cities which are being wiped out one after another.

"In addition, it has become clear that our air defenses have declined in effectiveness since the start of the B-29 raids, and it must be concluded that the enemy has gained mastery of the air.

"3. It is clear that, once control of the air has fallen into enemy hands, our war situation will deteriorate at an accelerated pace. That control, once lost, is almost impossible to regain in the



absence of outside aid. Therefore, there will be no means of rescue and only increasing trouble for Japan except as she may hope for the production of [?munitions?] in Manchukuo. [?But I do not see how?] Manchukuo's industries can avoid heavy bombing, especially since the enemy is planning even now to send heavy planes from Okinawa against this area in the near future.

"4. I naturally do not know whether there will be an enemy landing on the Japanese mainland, but I would not want to go so far as to say that this will not occur. Judging from the thoroughness of the enemy's landing operations on Leyte, I believe that - even though geographical conditions are different - we must indeed be ready for an invasion.

"Just as we can assume that the enemy will one day attempt a landing, it is also clear what Russia will do after our fighting strength has been destroyed.

"The enemy, in order to accomplish the destruction of Japan's fighting power, [?is not only bombing our?] productive facilities, bombarding our shores, etc., but will also attempt to deprive our people of the very means of subsistence. The enemy must already be fully aware of the food difficulties in our country and of the importance of this autumn's harvest to the maintenance of our war strength. Consequently, we cannot overlook the possibility that

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-4-

attempts will be made to destroy our crops when the time comes for their harvest. For example, the enemy may well ascertain when the rice fields throughout Japan are dry in preparation for harvest and devise a scheme for reducing these fields to ashes in one fell swoop."

Note: Rice fields in Japan are normally drained three or four weeks before harvesting. The stalks are cut when still green and are then left in the fields to dry for about a week before being threshed. The harvest period ranges from mid-September in the northern districts to late November in the south, but the bulk of the crop is harvested in October.

By late July, in most Honshu paddies, the young rice plants have been transplanted and are standing in about three inches of water. Until the paddies are drained, the crop is therefore highly vulnerable to chemical attack. "He will naturally regard this as one of our weak points of which he can take advantage.

"If we lose this autumn's harvest, we will be confronted with absolute famine and will be unable to continue the war. Furthermore, the Empire stripped of its air power will be able to do

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-5-

nothing in the face of the situation and will be at the enemy's mercy.

"5. In my message of 8 June, I pointed out that it would be unthinkable for us to continue the war once our fighting strength had been destroyed.\* In the absence of Supreme Orders, our Imperial Army and the people as a whole will not, of course, lay down their arms until the last mile has literally been reached. Nevertheless, all our officers, soldiers, and civilians - who have already lost their fighting strength because of the absolutely superior incendiary bombing of the enemy - cannot save the Imperial House by dying a

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\* This is the message in which Sato stated that, if Russia were to embark on a course of "positive intervention" in the Pacific War, "we would have no choice but to reach a decision quickly and, resolving to eat dirt and put up with all sacrifices, fly into her arms in order to save our national structure".

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glorious death on the field of battle. When we consider how the Emperor's mind must be disturbed because seventy million people are withering away, we must recognize that the point of view of the individual, the honor of the Army and our pride as a people must be subordinated to the wishes of the Imperial House. I have therefore come to the conclusion that there is nothing else for us to do but strengthen our determination to make peace as quickly as possible and suffer curtailment.

"6. As for the making of peace proposals, I myself had felt that the best way to do this would be to send a special envoy to Moscow as you have already stated. Unfortunately, however, this idea has met with the disapproval of the Russian authorities and we are therefore faced with the necessity of finding some other expedient.

"Once we decide to make peace, we must resign ourselves to severe peace terms and have an armistice treaty concluded as quickly as possible by the military representatives of both sides; any sacrifices beyond that will also have to be accepted.

"The one condition we must insist upon in concluding a peace treaty is the safeguarding of our national structure i. e., maintenance of the Imperial House. As I said in my message of 18 July, we



must impress very strongly upon the enemy that this is an absolute requirement on our part.\* A possible course of procedure is to exclude this issue from the peace terms on the ground that it is a domestic problem. In that case, however, we would have to convoke something like a Constitutional Assembly in order to make a show of consulting the voice of the people - and in such an Assembly we could hardly expect complete absence of persons, such as the extreme Leftists, who would openly oppose the maintenance of the national structure. Moreover, the convocation of such an Assembly would in itself conflict with our own Constitution. But, as we are about to run into a catastrophic situation, we will have to furnish some proper solution of the problems of coping with adverse opinion.

"On the other hand, it is difficult to predict whether the enemy would agree to the foregoing procedure. If, however, it were decided - because of the suffering of the people - to give up the Imperial Family, our national structure would have undergone a grave change in the eyes of the World.

"7. The peace proposal which I advocate means the acceptance of the enemy's conditions, provided our national structure is maintained. So long as we keep our national structure, we will have preserved a minimum of honor as well as existence for the state, and

\* Reported in 20 July 1945 "Magic" Political Extracts.

this I think would be consistent with the ideas expressed in your messages of 17 July [that there could be no peace "unless the Anglo-Americans were to have regard for Japan's honor and existence"]<sup>7</sup>.

"8. Japan may be said to be standing literally at the crossroads of destiny and - although the people who have continued the fight can close their eyes in good conscience, having given of their patriotism in full measure - our country is on the verge of ruin. While it is a good thing to be loyal to the obligations of honor up to the very end of the Greater East Asia War, it is meaningless to prove one's devotion by wrecking the State. I must therefore insist that we are required to bear every sacrifice for the existence of the State.

"Since the Manchurian Incident Japan has followed a policy of expediency. When it came to the East Asia War, we finally plunged into a great World War which was beyond our strength. As a result, we have now reached the point where we have no [word missing], no assured production and are confronted with the danger that even Honshu will be trampled under foot. I think that we should acknowledge the inescapable and fundamental obligations of chivalry and resolve as quickly as possible to lay down our arms to save the State and its people.



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-9-

"We may surmise what the peace conditions will be by looking at the example of Germany; our people will have to pant for a long time under the heavy yoke of the enemy. Nevertheless, the fate of the State is dependent upon this, and after some decades we shall be able to flourish as before. The Government will surely choose this road, and I pray ceaselessly that the solicitude of His Imperial Majesty may be put at rest even one day sooner.

"Immediately after the war ends, we must carry out thorough going reforms everywhere within the country. By placing our government on a more Democratic basis and by destroying the despotic bureaucracy, we must try to raise up again the real unity between the Emperor and his people. We must also recognize that another cause for the evils we have drawn upon ourselves today lies in the fact that even before the Manchurian Incident there were those who showed contempt for diplomacy and indifference toward international relations.

"Moreover, since postwar Japan will be buffeted by the waves of the usual international relationships and will experience difficulty in extricating herself from adverse situations, I believe that in the future we must so realign our political structure as to give greater attention to foreign affairs.

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046

"Ever since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, our foreign policy has been a complete failure. The whole trouble was that, once we had aligned ourselves with Naziism, the World was divided into two camps - pro-Axis and anti-Axis. It is therefore essential that this mistake be recognized in the future and that there be a fundamental reorientation in our foreign policy.

\*9. After the Imperial Rescript containing a declaration of war was promulgated, it was naturally the duty of the whole country to devote itself to the prosecution of our war objectives, and I too have simply put forth my humble efforts as required. However, since we have been reduced to the situation which now confronts us, I think it necessary that we weigh the sacrifices which the continuation of the war must involve.

"We should, however, give a fair hearing to the argument that "if the enemy actually carries out a landing, we will concentrate all our strength on a counterattack and will thus bring about his disillusionment". I understand from your 17 July message\* that the Government and the Military are convinced that we will still be able to give the enemy a considerable shock with our war strength. I too would find it possible to hope for this if we had not completely lost control of the air and of the sea. Unfortunately we have now

\*Reported in 18 July 1945 "Magic" Diplomatic Extracts.



~~TOP SECRET~~

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-11-

fallen into such a state that we cannot repulse the raids carried on day after day by the enemy fleet and air force, and our production installations are being destroyed one by one. Now that we are being scorched with fire, I think it becomes necessary to act with all the more speed.

"Even though our Army should take control over the people and their possessions, that would in no way correct the disparity of military strength between the two sides and, as far as the volunteer units are concerned, it is clear that they will be unable to [word missing] in the face of modern weapons. Thus if we were to fight for every foot of ground after the enemy's invasion of the Japanese mainland and reaffirm our fighting spirit, we would inevitably be forced to yield the sword at the end and by that time the whole Imperial Domain would have been overrun by the enemy army. The fact that sovereignty of the State will pass to the hands of the occupying nation has been indicated by the example of Germany.

"I have no longer any hope of attaining our original objectives. Our ability to take advantage of the momentum of the past to continue our resistance even to a slight degree has suddenly come to an end, and we are already in a position where we are not the equal

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of the enemy. To preserve the life of hundreds of thousands of people who are about to go to their death needlessly, to save seventy million of my comrades from the misery that is facing them, and to preserve the existence of our nation, I have no other desire than to drink the bitter cup of [this] decision to prevent annihilation of our State.

"I am presenting these statements, fully aware that they are not in accord with the treasured communication from His Majesty. I confess that my offense is tremendously great, but I have taken such a stand because I believe that this is the only way to save our country. If I am criticized as an advocate of defeatism, I will just have to put up with it, and I will gladly face any other accusations.

"The above are my views which I have given without reserve. To say anything more would be mere repetition. I beg you to understand that it was only my patriotic convictions that caused me to speak in this way of my own free will. My unceasing prayer is that you will not conclude that what I have said has resulted from an excessive [two or three words missing]."

2. Further messages from Togo: Two messages sent by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato on 21 July deal with Prince Konoye's intended mission and the official Japanese attitude toward a



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-13-

proposal of unconditional surrender. The first of those dispatches reads:

"No. 931. Very Urgent. Re your wires No. 1417 and No. 1418.\*

"Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government. In this regard he will set forth positive intentions, and he will also negotiate details concerning the establishment of a cooperative relationship between Japan and the Soviet which will be the basis of Imperial diplomacy both during and after the war.

"Please make the above representations to the Soviets and

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\* Sato's No. 1417 was the message of 19 July in which he forwarded Lozovsky's note stating that, because of the absence of "specific proposals", it was impossible for the Soviet Government to give a definite reply to the Emperor's message proposing Prince Konoye's trip.

No. 1418 was the message of 19 July in which, commenting on Lozovsky's letter, Sato said that "We have no alternative but to present the Russians with a concrete plan".

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-13-

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POL  
31

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-14-

work to secure their concurrence in the sending of the Special Envoy.

"Please understand especially my wire No. 932 which is quoted below."

Togo's message No. 932, also sent on 21 July, reads as follows:\*

"With regard to unconditional surrender (I have already been informed of your No. 1416)\*\* we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will entail much more bloodshed, if the enemy demands unconditional surrender the whole country as one man will pit itself against him in accordance with the Imperial Will.

"It is in order to avoid arriving at such a state of affairs that, at this time and through the good offices of Russia, we are seeking to reach a peace which is not so-called unconditional

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\*Received directly from Arlington Hall.

\*\*No. 1416 was the message of 18 July in which Sato in effect urged unconditional surrender, provided that the "national structure", i.e. the Imperial House, should be preserved.

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051

surrender. It is necessary that we exert ourselves so that this idea be finally driven home to the Americans and the English.

"Thus, under these circumstances, not only is it impossible to request the Russians to lend their good offices in obtaining a peace without conditions, but it would also be both disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms. Consequently, we hope to deal with the British and Americans after first having Prince Konoye transmit to the Russians our concerted intentions as expressed by the Imperial Will, and then holding conversations with the Russians in the light of their demands in regard to East Asia.

"In view of the fact that this is a grave [word missing] which will decide the fate of the nation, please request the Russians to give a full explanation of their reply, as presented in your wire No. 1417\* so as to make sure that we grasp its real meaning.

"The Government's responsibility in this case rests in advising that a Special Envoy be sent, and [?it is limited to this fact?]. The Envoy, however, will be sent as a special emissary

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\*No. 1417 contained Lozovsky's letter of 18 July refusing to receive the Special Envoy because the scope of his mission was not clear.



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-16-

representing the Imperial Will as it is directed toward mundane affairs in particular. Hence if necessary please make both points clear to them. Please also bear in mind the necessity of sufficiently impressing upon them that Prince Konoye enjoys the confidence of the Imperial Court and holds an outstanding position in the political circles of our country.

"Since it is not absolutely necessary, please avoid stating in writing what is said in my caption wire No. 931 [quoted above].

"We are aware of your views as stated in your wire No. 1427 [Item No. 1 of this issue of Extracts] but a decision of the Cabinet Council has been rendered concerning my caption wire. Please, therefore, continue your efforts."

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053

23 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

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(11)

1. More messages from Japanese Naval Official in Berne concerning peace negotiations: The recently reported 6 July message from Captain Nishihara, Japanese Counselor for Naval Affairs in Berne (21 July '45 "Magic" Extracts), assured Tokyo that the alleged proposal made by OSS Representative Allen Dulles in the latter part of May for a "discussion" between Japan and the United States was in good faith and contained "no trace of enemy strategem".

In a message of 16 July Nishihara now states that the go-between in this affair had a talk with Gero Von Gaevernitz - described as Dulles' "private secretary", an American citizen of German origin, and a close friend of the go-between since 1940 - just before Von Gaevernitz accompanied Dulles to his new post in Germany in July.\* The message appears to quote Von Gaevernitz substantially as follows:

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\* Von Gaevernitz worked closely with Dulles in the negotiations for the surrender of the German forces in Italy.



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"With the turn in the war situation, the government and people of Japan face critical times which may affect Japan's national structure. This matter was apparently discussed when Dulles returned to Washington in June in response to Truman's summons. It appears that the United States leaders are of the opinion that the Japanese national structure is not to be upset. However, in view of the necessity of consulting with Great Britain and China, no secret agreement or communication appears possible at the present time. Although discussions between Dulles and General Wolff with regard to the surrender of German forces in North Italy extended over a period of several months, the negotiations advanced as far as the signing [on 29 April] without Hitler's cognizance. Furthermore, although the surrender terms were ostensibly unconditional, covertly they contained mitigating conditions. Dulles has absolute confidence in the maintenance of security [about the proposed peace talks]. He has exclusive use of a plane, so that if Japan has any request to make he can return to Switzerland at once. In this [words missing]

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is cooperating, in the strictest secrecy, to the limit of his ability."

In conclusion, Nishihara states that he will send his own opinions on Von Gaevernitz' statements in a separate message. That message, dated the 17th, reads substantially as follows:

"Since I did not participate directly, I could not perceive the atmosphere of the conversation, but apparently the other party was straightforward, and during the conversation Von Gaevernitz boldly set forth the American views, such as the following:

"a. [Words missing] of future Russian-American relations, for the time being the United States finds it advantageous to cooperate with Russia and is fully confident that Russia will hold fast to the United States.

"b. If things progress in their present fashion, Japan will ultimately be torn asunder just as Germany is now. The populace will probably be reduced by half as a result of the difficult struggle for life and of food shortages.

"c. American military and business men have



complete self-confidence about the war against Japan and the people are cheerfully supporting the government policy in a sporting frame of mind.

Among the politicians many are of the opinion that the outcome of the war against Japan is already evident and the earlier it ends the better.

"Dulles, who is cognizant of such circumstances, has the instance of [the surrender of German forces in] Northern Italy to his credit. It is his desire, if possible, to establish a liaison channel between Japan and the United States and to bring about peace quickly.

"There is no information to indicate that the proposal is a stratagem of the United States. I believe, rather, from such points as the other party's telegraphic request for the permission of his Government, that the thing was started in a casual [i.e., unofficial] fashion by individuals.\*

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\*Nishihara reported in his 6 July message that "on or about 20 May Dulles asked Washington for instructions as to the advisability of trying to get in touch with the Japanese Naval officials in Switzerland," and that "about 10 June" - after the alleged proposal for "discussion" had been made to a member of Nishihara's staff - Washington replied that "in principle it approved; no objections".

"Consequently, I believe that, without breaking off our liaison along the present line, it is absolutely necessary for the sake of Japan to open, no matter how the war situation develops - a new channel. I would like to know your opinion. One plan might be to furnish them information on American prisoners of war in Japan and they in turn might give us information on the status of our military leaders who were in the Philippines; in that way secret liaison could be maintained insofar as it was not deleterious to State policy and military operations. I am fully aware of the delicate aspects this matter involves at home. I would like to do something about this, but only in accordance with your instructions, so please reply immediately."

2. Japanese awareness of peace rumors: On 18 and 19 July Foreign Minister Togo and Ambassador Sato exchanged messages on the subject of the current rumors in the Allied press of a Japanese peace move. The messages give factual accounts of radio news broadcasts, without adding comment or opinion, and reveal no worry about the security of Japanese communications.

Togo's message No. 919, marked "extremely urgent" and sent



to Sato on 18 July, reads as follows: "A Montevideo shortwave broadcast at 0800 on the 17th reported that a foreign affairs commentator on an English newspaper had said that Stalin was going to bring a Japanese peace offer to Truman and Churchill.

"An Australian ABC shortwave broadcast at 0645 on the 18th stated that Washington correspondents [?had reported?] that the United Nations were preparing surrender terms for Japan, and that this report, although unconfirmed, was well grounded. The conditions were said to be as follows: dissolution of the Air Force; dismantling of heavy industries and shipyards capable of producing arms and warships; withdrawal from the occupied areas. If Japan were to agree to these terms, the United Nations would not occupy the Japanese Home Islands, but would simply maintain a small military force to guarantee fulfillment of the surrender terms. The United Nations would permit Japan to maintain her own system of government. The possibility of Japan's carrying on a large-scale war in the future would be [word missing]. Civilian use of coal, iron, fuel, etc., would be kept under control.

"This for your information."

Sato's reply on 19 July, No. 1422, reads as follows:

"Reference your No. 919. According to what we have heard

here, BBC at 2045 Greenwich Time on the 18th reported that there was a rumor that Stalin had taken a Japanese peace proposal to Berlin, while in Washington Grew stated that as yet there had been no peace proposal from the Japanese. In addition the BBC comment [word in English] at 0800 on the [date uncertain] declared that at the present Berlin Conference a policy of extreme control of news had been established, and that the fact that rumors that Stalin would discuss a Japanese peace proposal at Berlin, etc., were current, was in the last analysis because of the extreme secrecy invoked."

On 21 July Sato had the following additional report to make on the subject of the peace rumors: \* "No. 1433. I assume there is [?not?] the least connection between the rumors that the Japanese are advocating peace negotiations as given in [your wire No. 919] and my wire No. 1422 [both quoted above] and the recent question of a Special Envoy. However, since the Big Three were [already] conferring on the 17th one cannot be sure whether the Russian reply of the evening of the 18th given in my wire No. 1417 [containing Lozovsky's rejection of the Japanese request for an envoy because the purpose was not clear] was the result of a discussion by the Three Parties. Even if this is not the case one is

\* Received directly from Arlington Hall.



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-8-

forced to believe that the English and American authorities will be told during the Conference that we had proposed sending an envoy prior to the Three Power Conference.

"Reports concerning the Conference obtained from the Russian [press and radio] are very meager but apparently the Conference is continuing in an atmosphere of very friendly relations, and the three leaders hold frequent private meetings. Hence I believe that even though we are not aware of the development of any dissatisfaction in Russia's relations toward Japan, we will have to be exceedingly cautious."

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24 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

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1. Japanese Minister in Stockholm advocates negotiated peace: The latest Japanese diplomat to come out in favor of negotiating for peace on the most favorable terms possible is Suemasa Okamoto, Japanese Minister in Stockholm.

Okamoto sets forth in a 21 July message the views to which he has "inexorably been led." He admits that "we . . . miscalculated and belittled the enemy's actual strength, and . . . are now in the midst of an impossible, unreasonable war which has made practically the whole world our enemy," begs Tokyo to "consider the welfare of the Imperial Family and the future of our nation," and urges that Japanese diplomacy seize every possible opportunity to find a way of saving "our fatherland." The Minister points out that there is little likelihood of a split between the Russians and the Anglo-Americans for "several years," notes the "grim fact" that "everything will be decided on the basis of relative war strength," and goes on to make substantially the following observations:

a. Some American circles have recently shown an inclination to make the terms of unconditional surrender as



lenient as possible and thus bring about an amicable settlement as soon as possible. Although it cannot be assumed that such a point of view is endorsed at this time by American public opinion as a whole, it does indicate that there are some Americans who are tired of the war and wish to see it speedily terminated. Furthermore, all classes of people in the United States have clearly been alarmed by the losses suffered in the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and are wondering about continuing such sacrifices.

b. If the United States, which has always been the most implacable enemy of Japan, should take up with the British at the Berlin Conference the question of more lenient terms for Japan, the British would certainly be in agreement.

c. If Russia sincerely intends to undertake the task of mediation,\* and if there is any possibility of her being able to curb Anglo-American demands and bring about an amicable settlement, Japan should allow Stalin to go ahead.

d. In view of the fact that the Japanese people have been thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that any thought

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\* Okamoto has probably not been informed by Tokyo of the current efforts to obtain Soviet mediation.

of peace is to be immediately rejected as defeatism, public opinion in Japan may prove a grave obstacle to any attempt to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, it may be necessary to consider petitioning the Emperor to take steps to decide the matter by issuing an Imperial Order.

2. Japanese peace talks in Berne: In a message of 21 July, Japanese Minister Kase in Berne has sent to Tokyo an account of conversations on the subject of peace possibilities held in Basel on 10, 13 and 16 July between Kojiro Kitamura (representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank and a Director of the Bank of International Settlements), a member of Kitamura's staff, and one Doctor Per Jacobsson (a Swede who at least until recently has been an official of the Bank of International Settlements).\* While at times obscure, the message appears to indicate that:

a. Jacobsson has been anxious to promote peace negotiations between Japan and the United States. On 10 July he seems to have told the two Japanese bankers that the matter had been discussed (presumably by him) with one Shea, whom he described as a protege of Allen Dulles.

\* The message is reported in full in the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of 23 July 1945.



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-4-

In the 16 July conversation with the Japanese, Jacobsson stated that he had talked to Dulles himself.

b. On 10 and 13 July the two Japanese emphasized the importance of ascertaining the United States' intentions toward the Japanese Imperial House. At the 16 July meeting, in this connection, a "statement" by Undersecretary Grew was discussed, and Jacobsson apparently argued that the statement implied the Imperial House would not be destroyed and that Mr. Grew was a friend of Japan.

c. After the conversations with Jacobsson, Kitamura was not hopeful of obtaining assurances with respect to the Imperial House or of arranging a conference of the belligerents.

Note: (i) Both Japanese Minister Kase and Kojiro Kitamura have in recent months urged Tokyo to make peace. There is no evidence that either of them is aware of any peace talks being carried on by Captain Nishihara, the Japanese Naval Counselor in Berne.

(ii) The "statement" by Mr. Grew discussed at the 16 July meeting was presumably his public statement of 10 July which dealt with the subject of Japanese peace feelers and in which he

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said, in part:

"Japanese militarism must and will be crushed. The policy of this government has been, is, and will continue to be, unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender does not mean, as the President pointed out in his message of June 1, the destruction or enslavement of the Japanese people. The President stated this very specifically on 8 May, when he said in answer to the question, 'Just what does unconditional surrender of the Armed Forces mean for the Japanese people?' 'It means the end of the war. It means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought Japan to the present brink of disaster. It means provision for the return of soldiers and sailors to their families, their farms, their jobs. It means not prolonging the present agony and suffering of the Japanese in the vain hope of victory.' The policy of this government has been, is, and will continue to be, unconditional surrender as defined by the President in these statements."



26 July 1945

"MAGIC" DIPLOMATIC EXTRACTS

SCM

1. Sato to see Lozovsky on 25 July: On 24 July Ambassador Sato sent the following message to Tokyo:

"Your wire No. 932 [sent on 21 July] was received on the 22nd, but No. 931 [also of the 21st] arrived today, the 24th. Therefore, after giving careful thought to the way in which I shall present this to the Russians, I intend to communicate it at an interview with [Vice Commissar] Lozovsky tomorrow, the 25th."

Note: No. 931 was the message in which, after receiving Sato's report of Lozovsky's letter of the 18th, Foreign Minister Togo instructed the Ambassador (i) to try again to get the Russians to receive Prince Konoye as a "Special Envoy" and (ii) to represent that Konoye himself would bring the concrete proposals which the Russians desired to have. Togo's No. 932, which was sent immediately afterwards but which Sato received first, discussed the same subject, reiterated the official attitude toward "so-called unconditional surrender", and included the statement, "We are aware of your views as stated in your wire No. 1427 [the long and impassioned peace plea of 20 July], but a decision of the Cabinet Council has been rendered concerning my preceding wire".

2. Opinions of Japanese Minister Kase on peace discussions in Switzerland: As previously noted, on 21 July Japanese Minister Kase sent to Tokyo a long account of three recent conversations in Basel between two Japanese officials of the Bank of International Settlements, Kitamura and Yoshimura, and Doctor Per Jacobsson (formerly also of that bank) who claimed to be in contact with Allen Dulles of the OSS.

Now available is the following additional report on the subject which Kase had sent the day before:

"1. At present Lt. General Okamoto Military Attache in Berne<sup>7</sup> and I are basically of the same opinion,\* and at the

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\* On 18 July Okamoto sent a long message to the Chief of the Japanese General Staff, a rare addressee, in an unusual cryptographic system which is not readable. On the following day Kase advised Tokyo that he would inform them of the "subject" of Okamoto's wire and would transmit "details and particulars" on the 20th. Although no message so described has been received, it is possible that Kase's messages of 20 and 21 July about the peace talks contained the promised "details and particulars".



initiative of Kitamura and Yoshimura, who are officials of the Bank of International Settlements, the intentions of the United States were sounded out through a neutral colleague of theirs. I report herewith [the results of those conversations] and place [the matter] before the Government. It is my desire to contribute something to the making of the great decision.

"I have expressed the same sentiments to the Lt. General on my own responsibility and on the basis of my own judgment. Secretary Yosano [one of the members of the "liaison mission", headed by Okamoto, which was sent to Europe by Tokyo in the spring of 1943] is in complete disagreement. Members of my staff below [secretary] Tsoruoka know nothing whatever about this matter . . . .

"There is the risk that this is tied up with a strategy of the other side. Moreover, it is necessary that we do nothing through indiscretion that indicates weakness and, in addition, we must be at pains to preserve secrecy.

"2. I presented for your information my views regarding the development of the crisis in my wire of 14 May [in which Kase urged that Japan seek a negotiated peace in order to avoid extinction]. There has been no change in those views even today.

I leave the ultimate decision solely up to the Government; however, if the decision is made, I shall watch subsequent conditions in order to discover a method of proposing negotiations. I am rather inclined to believe that the best plan lies in having a long straightforward talk with the other side. I state this for your information."

Kase adds that in subsequent messages he is forwarding biographical material about Jacobsson and Dulles and then concludes as follows:

"Kitamura thinks that we should words missing, particularly Jacobsson's thoughts and impressions after his conference with Dulles, and that Dulles is to be recognized as certainly one of the best channels at present. Therefore, please read carefully my message about the Jacobsson talks; it is based entirely on Kitamura's memorandum (which is being kept in strict custody)."

Note: Kase's subsequent messages, giving biographies of Dulles and Jacobsson, merely outline their careers and the posts they have held; in Dulles's case, Kase states that, when he was in Berne "in the capacity of Special Adviser to the American Minister", the United States Government "paid great attention to his opinions".



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-5-

3. Greece to recognize Italy as an anti-Tito move: On 17 July the Greek Foreign Ministry sent out to its embassies in London and Washington and to its representative on the Advisory Council in Rome a circular which, after noting past Italian overtures for speedy reestablishment of Greco-Italian relations and early American advice that they be reestablished, continued with the following points:

a. The Greek Government felt that the Italian proposals were not acceptable because it suspected their sincerity and was "unable to ignore the lively anti-Italian sentiment of the Greek people". The main consideration against the Italian proposals, however, was the desirability of "avoiding in every way any action which could be construed by Tito as directed against him, thus calling forth still closer rapprochement between him and Albania and Bulgaria". The United States and Great Britain approved those views in conversations which Foreign Minister Sophianopoulos held in Washington and in London.

b. "However, the status of Greece has not been honored by Tito as it should have been; nor has it prevented Tito

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3. to recognize \_\_\_\_\_ as an \_\_\_\_\_ move: On  
17 July the \_\_\_\_\_ sent out to its embassies in  
London and Washington and to its representative on the  
\_\_\_\_\_ a circular which, after noting past \_\_\_\_\_  
overtures for \_\_\_\_\_ relations  
and early American advice that \_\_\_\_\_ continued  
with the following points:

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a. The \_\_\_\_\_ Government felt that the \_\_\_\_\_ proposals  
were not acceptable because it suspected their sincerity and  
was "unable to ignore the lively \_\_\_\_\_ sentiment of  
the \_\_\_\_\_ people". The main consideration against the  
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way any action which could be construed \_\_\_\_\_"

thus calling forth still closer rapprochement  
\_\_\_\_\_ The United States  
and Great Britain approved those views in conversations which  
\_\_\_\_\_ held in Washington and in  
London.

b. "However, the status of \_\_\_\_\_ has not been honored  
by \_\_\_\_\_ as it should have been; nor has it prevented \_\_\_\_\_"

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-6-

from establishing relations with Bulgaria, or recognizing Enver Hoxhas' government in Albania, or openly proclaiming, a few days ago, his enmity toward our country." Nothing can now be gained by delaying restoration of relations with Italy, while, "on the contrary, the pushing of the question may check Tito's onslaughts - particularly if we bear in mind the restlessness which has always been inspired [in Yugoslavia] in the past by the rumor of a possible understanding between ourselves and Italy".

c. Reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Italy will not be allowed to affect Greek reparations claims against her; "and it would also be necessary to have as a positive presupposition and Italian declaration not only concerning the Dodecanese but also supporting our desire to annex Northern Epirus".

d. "Foreign Minister Sophianopoulos [in New York] is requested to telegraph us immediately if he agrees with our views, as we hope, so that we can transmit immediate instructions on the matter to our representative in Rome."

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from establishing relations with \_\_\_\_\_ or recognizing  
\_\_\_\_\_ government \_\_\_\_\_ or openly proclaiming,

a few days ago, \_\_\_\_\_ Nothing can  
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\_\_\_\_\_ onslaughts - particularly if we bear in mind the rest-  
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the past by the rumor of a possible understanding between  
ourselves and \_\_\_\_\_

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will not be allowed to affect \_\_\_\_\_ reparations claims against  
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presupposition and \_\_\_\_\_ declaration not only concerning  
the \_\_\_\_\_ but also supporting our desire to annex  
\_\_\_\_\_

d. \_\_\_\_\_ [in New York] is  
requested to telegraph us immediately if he agrees with our  
views, as we hope, so that we can transmit immediate instructions  
on the matter to our representative

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PART II

"MAGIC" FAR EASTERN EXTRACTS

Japan - Eight new divisions: a. Eight new divisions (the 141st, 142nd, 145th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, 157th, and 316th) have been identified in Japan, bringing the total of active divisions now carried there by MIS to 36 (including one armored division). The following Table gives a breakdown of divisions in Japan by Area Army Sector and the changes effected by the new identifications:

<u>Area Army Sector</u>	<u>Total identified Active Divisions</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Estimated strength</u>
Fifth (Hokkaido)	1	0	100,000
Eleventh (North Honshu)	3	+2	175,000
Twelfth (N. Central Honshu)	9	+3	560,000
Thirteenth (Central Honshu)	3	+1	200,000
Fifteenth (S. Central Honshu)	3	+1	200,000

(Table - concluded)

<u>Area Army Sector</u>	<u>Total identified Active Divisions</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Estimated strength</u>
Unidentified (West Honshu)	3 or 4*	0	190,000
Unidentified (Shikoku)	4 or 3*	0	150,000
Sixteenth (Kyushu)	10	/1	525,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>/8</b>	<b>2,110,000**</b>

\* One division (the 205th) is either in Shikoku or West Honshu.

\*\*The total figure includes 10,000 for units carried unlocated in Japan.

Note: a. One of the 8 divisions (the 316th) has been identified from a direct reference in a 5 July message. The other 7 divisions have been identified from operational code names and numbers appearing in messages sent over the past four months; their numerical designations are not definitely known, but MIS has tentatively assigned numbers to them on the basis of a regular



numbering pattern which the Japanese apparently have followed.

b. At about the beginning of March, when a program of rapid expansion apparently began, the Japanese are believed to have had in Japan proper a total of 11 active divisions and 14 depot divisions. Of the 25 additional active divisions which have since appeared in Japan, 4 are veteran divisions brought from Manchuria and 21 are divisions organized in Japan itself. The 21 divisions organized in Japan appear to fall into two categories:

(1) Fourteen divisions in the series 141 - 147 and the series 151 - 157 -- one formed in each of the 14 Divisional Districts in Japan. All fourteen probably were formed by the end of May and available messages indicate that they are regular triangular divisions.

(2) Seven divisions with numbers in the 200's and 300's. Little information on the make-up of these divisions is available, although at least one (the 205th) appears to be triangular. As yet there is no evidence that they are anything other than regular divisions. It is to be expected that divisions in the 200's and 300's will continue to be

identified.

c. It thus appears that of the 36 active divisions identified in Japan, 15 are veteran divisions and 21 have been formed since about the beginning of March. The 14 divisions (141 - 147 and 151 - 157) formed from depot divisions, however, may well have had a considerable amount of training, since the depot divisions from which they were formed had not in any instance produced an active division since July 1944. Little is known of the state of training of the remaining 7 divisions, since their method of formation is not known, but it is probable that they have had comparatively little training, at least as divisions.



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-11-

PART III

LATE INFORMATION

Togo urges Sato to see Molotov during Conference adjournment: Following is text of Parts 1, 2 and 3 of 5-part message No. 944 sent "extremely urgent" from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato on 25 July.\* Parts 4 and 5 are not readable at present.

\*Reference my wire No. 932.\*\*

\*1. The matter in question is naturally related very closely to the course of the Big Three Conference. Since Churchill

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\* Received direct from Arlington Hall.

\*\* Togo's No. 932 was the message of 21 July in which he said that despite Sato's various messages unconditional surrender was completely out of the question and that Japan hopes to avoid such a situation by talking with the Russians before approaching the Anglo-Americans.

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-12-

and Atlee are scheduled to return to England, it is said that the Conference will be adjourned for a short while. Consequently I would like you to take advantage of this opportunity and proceed, if necessary, to a place of the Russians' choosing in order to obtain an interview with Molotov and explain to him the intentions of the Japanese Government. Even in the event that it is impossible for Molotov to arrange a meeting, your request for an interview will at least go a long way to impress upon him our determination in this matter."

"2. [At the time of the interview?] please endeavor to get the Russians to form a positive attitude on this matter. Stress the fact, as indicated in my successive wires, that Japan has gone first to the Russians with its request for mediation. Make clear that the dispatch of the Special Envoy would permit Stalin to acquire the reputation of an advocate of world peace, and, further, that we are prepared to meet fully the Russian demands in the Far East (see the end of Part [2] of my wire No. 932). Finally, inform them that, in the event that the Soviet Government remains indifferent to our request, we will have no choice but to consider other courses of action.

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"3. Furthermore, as you are aware, in Britain and the United States, especially in the latter, various discussions are taking place at present regarding the meaning of the demand on Japan for unconditional surrender. In studying the speech of the 'American spokesman', it appears that he said that in principle they are formally insisting to the end upon unconditional surrender but that if Japan accepts it quickly they are prepared to mitigate the conditions. For example on the 19th, Navy Captain Zacharias (he is on the staff of the Office of War Information but he broadcast to Japan as a 'spokesman' of the United States Government) said that Japan has two alternatives: The first is to submit to a dictated peace after being destroyed; the other is to make unconditional surrender and receive the attendant benefits stipulated in the Atlantic Charter. We believe that these are not merely to be viewed as simple-minded strategic propaganda but are calculated to lead us on." [End of part 3 of the message, the last part readable at this time.]

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