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RADIO INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II

Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas

January, 1943

Approved:

Respectfully submitted:

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PREFACE

It has been the purpose of this study to display the role of radio intelligence in the military operations in the Pacific Ocean area in World War II. The problem has been approached through a study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by CinCPac to his subordinate commands. When available, the similar dispatches originated by these subordinate commands have been included. This approach has been dictated by the volume of the information supplied by radio intelligence and has in turn dictated the form of this history.

Each volume of this history covers a period of one month and has three parts. The first section is a summary of the contributions of radio intelligence for the month as a whole. The second division contains a daily chapter outlining these contributions in greater detail. The third part is an appendix which is the source for all statements made in the preceding two sections of the volume. This appendix in turn has a tri-partite division: under each of the quoted radio intelligence dispatches originated by CinCPac and the other Pacific commands are listed the sources of this intelligence and the results of any action known to have been taken on this information. It will be seen, therefore, that the appendix forms the bulk of every volume.

There are several limitations to this report. Much of the information obtained from radio intelligence has been of strategic importance rather than of immediate tactical value and it has not been possible with the material available to evaluate this phase of radio intelligence.

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As a consequence it has been impossible to show any resultant action for a great deal of the intelligence sent out by the American commands. The importance of such intelligence in long range planning should not be underestimated, however. Similarly, it has been impossible to trace a resultant action when such action has been purely negative in character. Only fairly immediate, positive action can be claimed accurately to be the result of a specific item of radio intelligence. Any discrepancy with actual fact has been in the direction of understatement rather than its opposite.

Another important gap in this story is the relation of radio intelligence to submarine warfare in the Pacific. In this field the contribution of radio intelligence has been most outstanding. However, this is to be the subject of a separate study and is touched upon only incidentally in these volumes.

A final difficulty has been imposed by the absence of a complete file of radio intelligence dispatches originated by commands subordinate to CinCPac. ComSoPac, for example, ~~was a~~ had access to almost all the radio intelligence that CinCPac had and because of the nature of his command probably originated more intelligence dispatches than CinCPac did. Yet only those ComSoPac intelligence dispatches which included CinCPac as an info addressee were available for this study. It is not too much to say that without these missing dispatches from ComSoPac,

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and from ComSoWesPac as well, a complete picture of the role of radio intelligence in the Pacific phase of World War II cannot be obtained. Yet even the limited material available indicates how important that contribution has been.

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SUMMARY
JANUARY 1943

The struggle for Guadalcanal continued through January, 1943, although the final decision there was not far off. As in December, the Japanese relied chiefly upon submarines and destroyers to carry supplies and reinforcements to their garrison there.

There were four known runs of the "Tokyo Express" in January. The first of these was made by ten destroyers on the night of January 2. Radio intelligence had yielded no warning that this supply attempt was pending and these ships were discovered only accidentally by planes en route to bomb the Japanese base at Buin. In the ensuing attacks upon the enemy ships by American planes and torpedo boats, two of the destroyers were sunk and two or three others damaged. Yet the Japanese apparently were successful in landing supplies and reinforcements on this occasion.

Radio intelligence had disclosed that Japanese planes were scheduled to raid American positions on Guadalcanal on the night of January 2 and the Commanding General on Guadalcanal was advised of this by ComSoPac in a dispatch at 1321 GGT on January 2 (0021 January 3, local time). This warning, however, could not have reached Guadalcanal much before the raid was over, for the attack began at 2200 local time on January 2 and lasted until 0120 January 3. The raid was made by three enemy planes which appeared singly over the field and dropped their bombs, which did very little damage. This raid probably was intended to divert

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attention from the ten destroyers which ran from Buin to Guadalcanal on this night or to so damage the airstrip that aerial interception of the destroyers would be impossible.

The next known run of the "Tokyo Express" was on the night of January 10. On this occasion, the first notice that a supply attempt was underway was the report of a coastwatcher that eight destroyers had left Faisi on a southeasterly course late in the afternoon of January 10. Radio intelligence contained only general indications of a run by the "Tokyo Express", as ComSoPac informed ComNavActSolomons. One destroyer was believed sunk and one or two damaged when PT boats intercepted this force off Cape Esperance. Radio intelligence confirmed damaged to at least one destroyer in this engagement. Two PT boats were lost.

A greater part was played by radio intelligence in the interception of the next attempt by the Japanese to run supplies to Guadalcanal by destroyers. At 1650 L (-11) on January 13 ComSoPac informed the American commands on Guadalcanal that a run of the "Tokyo Express" on the night of January 13 was a possibility. This warning was based upon an analysis of recent traffic which indicated only that preparations were underway for reinforcing Guadalcanal. About an hour and a half later ComSoPac advised the same addressees that one or more enemy destroyers were scheduled to sail from Guadalcanal on the 14th. This intelligence, derived from decrypted messages, implied a run of the "Tokyo Express" on January 14th, for our control of the air over Guadalcanal precluded an enemy destroyer's staying in port there for anything more than a brief nocturnal

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visit. Moreover, this implication was supported by the findings of traffic analysis reported earlier.

The events of the following day proved the accuracy of this intelligence. An "Express" run was made by nine destroyers, five of which were believed to be of the large TERUTSUKI class, which probably accounts for their identification in some of the sighting reports as light cruisers or cargo vessels. These ships left Faisi at 1545 L (-11) on January 14, according to a coastwatcher, and were sighted off Vella Lavella at 1640 L (-11). As these destroyers approached Guadalcanal, they had the protection of darkness, which made an air attack on the ships impossible, but a night search plane tracked the convoy in as far as Savo Island and another night plane succeeded in hitting one of the destroyers with a 500 lb. bomb. As the enemy ships passed between Savo Island and Cape Esperance shortly after midnight, they were intercepted by thirteen PT boats in a severe electrical storm. Three of the destroyers were hit by torpedoes launched by the PT boats and later two burning ships were observed retiring from the scene. The PT boats escaped undamaged from an attack by a Japanese plane, but one PT boat was damaged when it grounded on a reef. At daybreak the enemy destroyers, still nine in number, were sighted off Santa Isabel as they withdrew toward Shortland and a series of air attacks upon them was begun which resulted in hits upon two more of the destroyers and near misses on three others. The final reports on this engagement showed damage to three to five enemy destroyers and the destruction of thirty enemy planes at a cost of eight American planes.

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Damage to at least four enemy destroyers was confirmed by radio intelligence.

One other run of the "Tokyo Express" was made in January. This occurred on the night of January 26. As early as January 23 CinCPac, basing his warning upon the associations noted in current traffic studies, had stated in the daily intelligence bulletin that Japanese surface vessels might soon attempt again to run supplies and reinforcements to Guadalcanal. Again on January 25 CinCPac warned of indications in traffic analysis that the "Tokyo Express" was forming for another supply attempt. Preparations for an interception of these vessels were instituted and at 2220 L (-11) January 26 a search plane sighted seven destroyers and a cruiser on course 180° 95 miles from Guadalcanal. An aerial attack upon these ships was impracticable before dawn, but two bombing attacks upon this force were made by a single plane. No hits were made, however. Contact with this force was then lost and never re-established. These ships either put in at the Russells or turned back at once after the unsuccessful bombing attacks by the American plane.

There were indications in traffic analysis that enemy submarines were contacting the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal throughout January. Occasionally, supplies found floating off the enemy-held coast offered more tangible evidence that submarines were reaching Guadalcanal. Considerable supplies and even reinforcements probably reached Guadalcanal via these submarines for their interception remained a difficult job. In one respect, at least, this task was even more difficult than it had been in the preceding month for fewer specific schedules for these supply

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trips were intercepted in January. Radio intelligence did disclose that an Item class submarine was due at Kamimbo on the night of January 13 with important codes and this was mentioned in CinCPac's intelligence bulletin originated at 0257 GCT on January 13 and in two dispatches on the same day from ComSoPac to the authorities in the Guadalcanal area at 0235 and 0625 GCT. Despite this advance warning, this submarine escaped interception.

Radio intelligence was more successfully acted upon later in January when it was learned through that source that submarines were scheduled to arrive at Kamimbo on the nights of January 26, 27, and 29. This intelligence was the substance of a dispatch from ComSoPac to the American commands concerned at 2351 GCT January 25. CinCPac in his intelligence bulletin on the following morning warned that a submarine was due at Kamimbo on the evening of January 27. An anti-submarine patrol was instituted around the northwestern tip of Guadalcanal upon receipt of this intelligence but no submarine was intercepted on the night of January 26. It was learned later that the I-2, which was the submarine scheduled to arrive at Kamimbo on January 26, had been obliged by bad weather to postpone her trip for a day. Early on the morning of January 28 this submarine, by its own account, was intercepted by Allied destroyers and subjected to a prolonged attack and search but apparently made off without damage. The I-17, which also made a trip to Guadalcanal on January 27, was attacked en route by Allied planes but she too was not damaged. The I-1 which made the run on the night of January 29 was not so fortunate. Heavily loaded with troops and supplies, the I-1

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was encountered off Cape Esperance by two New Zealand corvettes. The I-1 was forced to the surface by depth charges and then rammed and beached near Kamimbo, where she was later salvaged. Many valuable documents were taken from the I-1.

Traffic analysis indicated that submarines also were being used to transport supplies and reinforcements to eastern New Guinea in January, as in the preceding month, and at least one enemy submarine was sighted while thus engaged at the mouth of the Mambare River north of Buna. The only known attempt in January by surface vessels to carry troops and materiel to eastern New Guinea on an important scale from bases in the Bismarks was a convoy which reached Lae on January 7. The interception of this convoy is discussed below.

While making every effort to stave off defeat on Guadalcanal in January, the Japanese endeavored to strengthen their bases in the middle and northern Solomons and in New Guinea. These efforts were reflected in radio intelligence. The month of January saw the development of another important Japanese base in the central Solomons. This base was in the Vila-Stanmore Plantation area on the southeastern side of Kolombangara Island. Aerial reconnaissance in the latter part of December had disclosed that the Japanese were using this area as a staging point for supplies and reinforcements en route to nearby Munda from the Shortland district. The appearance early in January of the 5th Pioneer Unit as an addressee in traffic addressed to Kolombangara Island suggested further development of the base at Vila. Some clue as to the nature of this new construction at Vila-Stanmore was seen in mid-January in the association in intercepted traffic of Kolombangara with the Japanese airbase on Ballale

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Island. This association was interpreted as a possible indication that an airbase was under construction on Kolombangara. This interpretation was verified a few days later by aerial photographs which clearly showed an airstrip to be under construction in the Vila area. On the night of January 23, American surface units bombarded this region in an attempt to retard this construction, but the development of this base continued with little interruption.

Simultaneously, the Japanese were developing a base of lesser importance at Wickham Anchorage on Vangunu Island southeast of New Georgia. Traffic analysis indicated that a Japanese garrison was stationed at Wickham and from time to time ships and troops were sighted there by our planes. Toward the close of January there were signs in radio intelligence of other bases at nearby Rendova Island and in the Russell Islands.

In mid-January there was some indication that another airbase in the northern Solomons was under construction. Radio intelligence disclosed that the 101st Pioneer Unit was engaged in construction work at Airbase #958 in the Shortland area. While this base might have been that at Ballale, it was equally possible that the development of a new base and airfield was underway. Activity at Buin on Bougainville also was reported to be increasing in January.

Through traffic intelligence a number of enemy lookout posts in the Solomons were located. Such posts were believed to exist on Matzungan Island in Queen Carola Harbor at Buka, on Stirling Island south of Shortland, on Vella LaVella, at Cape Alexander on Choiseul Island,

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and possibly at Ramada and Visu-Visu Point on New Georgia.

In the New Guinea area, traffic intelligence indicated that Kaimana and Manokwari in western New Guinea had been occupied by the Japanese. The scheduled arrival of the 24th Pioneer Unit at Ambon on February 16 suggested that further airbase construction might soon be underway in that general area. According to an intercepted message, the Japanese were giving close attention to the fortification of this region where, with Australia as a jumping-off point, the Allies might be expected to stage their long awaited offensive. Japanese apprehension of an Allied attack on Timor was expressed frankly in one intercepted message. Bali, the Tanimbar Islands, and Waingapu on Sumba Island were receiving primary consideration in the defense plans of the Japanese for this area. Furthermore, the northern entrance to Surabaya was mined defensively and closed to traffic.

It was known that jurisdiction over these various enemy airbases in the southeastern theatre was divided between the Japanese Army and Navy. The establishments at Newak, Madang, Lae, Salamaua, and Casmeta were primarily Army controlled in November of 1942, while those at Buna, Kavieng, Vanakanau, and Lakunai were under joint Army and Navy supervision and the Navy expected at that time to build a base of its own northeast of Lae. Jurisdiction over the bases in the Solomons had not been agreed upon yet.

Radio intelligence disclosed the existence of several other enemy airfields during January. Airbases were indicated to exist on Pagan Island in the Marianas, Io Jima in the Volcano Islands, Eniwetok, and at Ocean Island. The detailed construction specifications for a field

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on Ocean Island were found in an intercepted message dated September, 1942, and it was concluded, not illogically, that its construction would be nearing completion at this time. This intelligence was supported by aerial reconnaissance reports late in January which listed airfields at Tarawa, Nauru, and Ocean Islands. However, further reconnaissance photographs in February failed to show any sign of an airstrip on Ocean Island. The original plans for an airbase there apparently had been abandoned and the earlier intelligence report was retracted in February.

The enemy's attention in January to the developing of these bases was not viewed as any indication that he had abandoned the offensive for the month of January saw cumulative signs in radio intelligence that the Japanese were preparing to mount an offensive in the southeastern theatre. As early as January 3 CinOPac stated in the daily intelligence bulletin that a renewal of action in the southern theatre was imminent. This warning was based upon an analysis of current traffic which pointed out an intensification of repair, fitting out, and training of Third Fleet units (carriers), a reorganization of the Southern Army, and troop movements southward from the Empire. The movement of troops into the southeastern theatre during January frequently was detected through radio intelligence and, while associations noted in the traffic of early January suggested that some troops were being moved from Singapore and Batavia to Ambon and Keepang, most of the troops sent to the southeastern area in January apparently were drawn from northern China and the Empire. It was reported in the intelligence bulletin for January 4 that the former liner HEIYO Maru with many troops aboard was scheduled to sail from

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Yokosuka on January 7 or 8 to arrive at Truk on January 15. The departure of this transport from Japan was delayed until January 10 but most of these troops never reached Truk for the HEIYO Maru was sunk by the U.S.S. WHALE on January 17 with heavy loss of life.

Another convoy of three ships, probably with troops aboard, was known to be due at the western entrance to Palau on January 16.

An extensive movement of troops from Tsingtao in northern China to Palau was disclosed by an intercepted message late in February. This movement, involving at least five convoys, was to continue through February. Palau was to serve as a distributing point for these troops. The position of Palau as a center for convoy routes became marked during January.

Where in the southeastern war theatre the anticipated Japanese offensive was to be staged remained a matter of conjecture throughout the month. It seemed a logical assumption that this offensive would be directed toward the recapture of either Guadalcanal or eastern New Guinea. With the discovery through traffic analysis on January 8 of the existence of a force intended to reinforce New Guinea, commanded by ComCruDiv 18 and involving surface and air support forces, it appeared that New Guinea was to be scene of the offensive. At this same time a "Commander RAT (Milne Bay) Occupation Force" began to appear in intercepted traffic in association with the reinforcement force. This suggested that the enemy drive might be aimed at the Milne Bay area in eastern New Guinea. The cause of this flurry in traffic from the New Guinea area proved to be a convoy carrying troops and supplies from Rabaul

to Lae. This force, consisting of a light cruiser, four destroyers, and five merchant ships, already had been under attack for several days before this intelligence appeared in the CinCPac bulletin. This interception, which cannot then be attributed to radio intelligence, began shortly after the convoy was sighted off the southern coast of New Britain on January 6. Despite repeated aerial attacks on this convoy in which one transport was sunk off Casmeta, the remaining ships reached Lae on January 7. Two more transports probably were sunk by our planes as the convoy unloaded its cargo throughout January 8. The remaining ships withdrew that night but were subjected to further aerial assault for the next two days on their return voyage to Rabaul. Two American submarines took up the attack on January 10, and, though one of the submarines was sunk by the convoy's destroyer escorts, the other submarine succeeded in sinking two more of the merchant ships. The sinking of one ship and the damaging of another of this convoy were confirmed by radio intelligence, which also disclosed that the enemy's loss of life had been high in this attempt to reinforce Lae. The Japanese also lost 83 planes in this encounter, and 36 others were probably downed.

Whether the enemy's plans had been misinterpreted or whether his heavy losses in this attempt to reinforce Lae had disrupted these plans, at any rate the offensive in New Guinea did not materialize. However, additional troops were brought to New Guinea throughout January. The bulletins on January 15 and 16 contained the intelligence that two Army transports, escorted by a destroyer and a subchaser, were scheduled to reach Wewak on the morning of January 18 from Rabaul. On January 16,

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the U.S.S. TRITON sank one of these transports and damaged the other and also one of the escort vessels. The Japanese were more successful in their reinforcement attempts in mid-January when some 10,000 men of the 20th Army Division were brought from Palau to Wewak, perhaps because radio intelligence had afforded no indication that this move was under-way until after its conclusion. Additional units of the 20th Division were expected to reach Wewak in February.

As January progressed, there were mounting indications in radio intelligence that the expected Japanese offensive would take place instead in the Solomons with the probable purpose of retaking Guadalcanal. After the middle of the month a succession of convoys left Truk and Rabaul for Shortland Island with troops whose ultimate destination was believed to be Guadalcanal. The first of these convoys were reported in CinCPac's daily bulletin on January 17 in which it was stated that two marus, escorted by a minesweeper, had left Rabaul on January 16 to arrive at Shortland at 1400 L (-11) on the 18th, while from Truk three marus had sailed on January 15 to arrive at Oesa Island near Shortland at 0400 L (-11) on the 20th. The second of these convoys was intercepted by the U.S.S. SWORDFISH on January 19 east of Bougainville and one of the transports was sunk. Dispatches intercepted in connection with this sinking confirmed the suspicion that these ships were carrying troops.

The next intelligence bulletin contained the information that another convoy, consisting of 4 ships and one destroyer, had left Truk on January 17 and was scheduled to arrive at Shortland on the morning of January 22. This convoy was attacked by American planes off Bougainville on January

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21 but low clouds prevented accurate bombings and the ships escaped from this attack without damage. However, later that day one of the transports was sunk when the U.S.S. GATO attacked the convoy.

Another troop movement from Truk to Shortland was reported in the bulletin for January 20. It was known that three marus with two escort vessels had left Truk on January 19 and were due at Shortland at 0700 L (-11) on the 24th. These ships were attacked not long after leaving Truk by the U.S.S. SILVERSIDES and two of the transports were sunk.

The bulletin for January 21 carried news of additional troop movements from Truk. A convoy of six marus had left that port on January 20 for Rabaul where these ships were scheduled to arrive at 1000 L (-11) January 24 via Steffen Strait.

Still another convoy with troops aboard left Truk in January. Shortland was considered the probable destination of these three ships which left Truk on the morning of January 28. The sailing of this convoy was reported in CinCPac's daily intelligence bulletin on January 29.

This influx of troops into Shortland pointed directly to an offensive in the Solomons shortly. Guadalcanal appeared to be the enemy's logical objective. CinCPac warned that a series of "Tokyo Express" runs from Shortland to Guadalcanal might begin on January 20 as these convoys reached Shortland or that these troops might be moved from Shortland to Guadalcanal in a single large-scale landing attempt involving large transports. However, except for the seven destroyers and one cruiser which were intercepted on the night of January 26, there were no known landing attempts on any scale at Guadalcanal for the duration of January.

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A large scale offensive in the southeastern theatre undoubtedly would see employed enemy forces considerably larger than those involved in these occasional supply runs to Guadalcanal. Therefore, since indications of such an offensive continued through January, in estimating the intentions of the Japanese, it was important to have an accurate knowledge of the whereabouts of their major fleet commands and units. In this regard, radio intelligence continued to be of great value. The several fleet commands were located from time to time chiefly through traffic analysis. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet thus was placed at Truk on January 6, 25, and 28; the Commander of the Second Fleet possibly near Rabaul on January 2 but in the vicinity of Truk on January 6, 19, 25, and 30; and the Commander of the Third Fleet possibly in the Empire on January 10 but at Truk on January 25. Traffic intelligence placed the Commander of the Fourth Fleet near Truk on January 6, 25, and 28, and the Fifth Fleet Commander in the upper Kuriles on January 27. While the Commander of the Eight Fleet was believed to be at sea in the southern area in the CHOKAI early in January, this command probably was shorebased at Rabaul throughout most of the month, as traffic analysis indicated on January 4 and 18. The Commander of the Submarine Force similarly was placed at Truk on January 6, 18, and 25. A concentration of commands at Truk late in January was apparent and significant in view of the current indications that the Japanese were about to launch a counter-offensive in the Solomons.

Traffic intelligence uncovered a new enemy Army command in January. This was the 8th Area Army Command with headquarters at Rabaul. Through

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this post a centralized Army command for the southeastern theatre was established. Traffic intelligence also showed the 25th Army to be in the Malay-Indies area where a general increase in activity was observed, and the 8th Army Division at Batavia in January. Late in January the Japanese 19th Army was noted in association with the southeastern area for the first time and there was evidence, too, that Army paratroops were now stationed in this theatre.

Information on the disposition of the enemy's carriers is of particular importance in anticipating the direction of an enemy thrust. At the beginning of January the locations of the Japanese combatant carriers were not known, but traffic analysis indicated that CarDiv 1 less the SHOKAKU, which was known to be undergoing repairs in Japan at this time, was approaching Truk from the north. The arrival of the ZUIKAKU at Truk on January 4 confirmed this analysis. It was learned later from intercepted messages that the ZUIKAKU had sailed from Japan on December 31 and that both the SHOKAKU and the ZUIHO had remained in Japan. On January 8 signs were noted that the ZUIKAKU had left Truk.

Traffic intelligence early in January afforded some reason to believe that some units of the Third Fleet would appear shortly in the Solomons, but such a move did not develop. An upper air sounding from Greenwich Island on December 30 was considered a possible indication that an enemy carrier was in the vicinity and an American submarine did report sighting a carrier east of the Admiralties on January 6 but this ship probably was an auxiliary planetender. It was estimated in the intelligence bulletin on January 3 that the combatant carriers were at Truk but a fix on a

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carrier near Yokosuka was obtained on the same day. A few days later traffic analysis suggested that several carriers might be operating in Empire waters. From time to time these carriers were noted in association in traffic with the Empire, Jaluit, Rabaul, and Truk areas.

Except, then, for the known presence of the SHOKAKU at Yokosuka and the arrival of the ZUIKAKU at Truk on the 4th, the whereabouts of the enemy's combatant carriers remained uncertain until mid-January. On January 13, Dog Fox fixes placed the ZUIKAKU and the ZUIHO in Empire waters, and, since the repairs to the SHOKAKU were not scheduled for completion before January 15, it appeared to be a safe assumption that all three carriers of the 1st Division were near Japan at this time. At this same time a ship of the 2nd Division, believed to be the HITAKA, also was located in Empire waters by a Dog Fox fix. Meanwhile, the association of the Third Fleet with the southern area became marked. This association grew and it became apparent that units of the 2nd Carrier Division were those involved. The arrival of the HAYATAKA at Truk on January 19 after covering the movement of elements of the 20th Army Division from Palau to Wewak about January 17 explained this association.

In mid-January it was estimated that the SHOKAKU had rejoined the fleet upon the completion of her repairs and, on the day after the arrival of the HAYATAKA at Truk, traffic analysis uncovered signs that the 1st Carrier Division had left the Empire. These ships, less the SHOKAKU, arrived at Truk with the new battleship MUSASHI on January 23, having left Japan on the 18th or 19th. This, then, left the HITAKA and the SHOKAKU in Empire waters and the other combatant carriers at Truk with

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no indication of their having left there before January 29.

The fate of the carrier RYUJO, long in doubt, was settled in January by an intercepted message dated November 10 in which this carrier was deleted from the official Navy List. It was learned later that this ship had been sunk in the Solomons in August, 1942 while supporting an attack on American positions on Guadalcanal.

Except for the OTAKA which, despite some indications of her being in Japan at the beginning of January, apparently remained at Truk during January for repair of the damage incurred in her torpedoing on December 12, 1942, the auxiliary carriers remained in ferry service in January, shuttling between the Empire, Truk, and Rabaul. Radio intelligence from time to time during January revealed their locations. The UNYO was estimated to be at Truk at the beginning of the month after bringing planes to that base from Java in December. The UNYO apparently left Truk for Japan early in January for traffic analysis placed her near Saipan en route northward on January 7. This carrier was reported to be due soon at Truk again at the close of January.

The CHUYO passed through Truk on January 14 en route to Japan and was estimated through traffic analysis to be in Empire waters on January 26.

A possible auxiliary carrier was indicated by traffic intelligence to be in the Truk-Rabaul area on January 18.

Considerable information on the other major units of the Japanese fleet was supplied in January by radio intelligence. The battleship YAMATO, flagship of the Combined Fleet, was located at Truk on January

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4 by traffic analysis and the MUSASHI arrived there on January 23. Another intercepted message disclosed that all Japanese battleships' main battery directors now had an elevation of approximately 40°. Traffic routing placed the light cruiser KATORI at Truk on January 10 and the heavy cruiser MAYA in the Empire. A few days later the heavy cruiser HAGURO was reported to have left Truk. It was known that this latter vessel had sailed from Sasebo for Truk on November 27 upon completion of her repairs. The heavy cruiser TOME, after her departure from Truk on January 19, figured prominently in intelligence reports in January in connection with the diversionary activity in the Gilberts-Marshalls area discussed below. The heavy cruiser ATAGO and the light cruiser NAGARA arrived at Truk on January 25, at which time the light cruiser ASHIGARA was reported to be near Java and the 9th Cruiser Division near Wewak. The NAGARA then sailed for Rabaul, where she arrived on January 28. The light cruiser KASHII was placed near Singapore by traffic routing on January 27. On January 29, the light cruiser NATORI was believed to be at Makassar after being damaged in an air attack at Ambon on January 21. From Makassar the NATORI moved to Singapore in company with the light cruiser KINU and the minelayer AOTAKA, arriving January 31. It was reported, too, that the light cruiser KUMA had replaced the ISUZU, of similar type, in the 16th Cruiser Division in November, 1942 when the ISUZU took the place of the JINTSU as flagship of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. From an intercepted dispatch it was learned that the light cruiser YURA had been sunk by American planes off Santa Isabel Island on October 25, 1942. The presence of the CHOKAI's planes at Kavieng on January 26 was a possible indication that that ship was in the vicinity at that time.

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Of the enemy's auxiliary cruisers, or surface raiders, there was little information in January. It was reported that the HOKOKU Maru had been sunk prior to December 5, 1942, at which time this ship was deleted from the War Organization List. This vessel had been operating as a raider in the Indian Ocean. The armament of two other auxiliary cruisers was disclosed by an intercepted message. These two ships, the KIYOSUMI Maru and the AIKOKU Maru, were equipped with 5.5" guns, 25 mm twin mount machine guns, 50 cm. torpedoes, and two planes. Another intercepted message had disclosed that the area south of 25° South Latitude and west of 108° East Longitude in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific the area south of the Equator and east of 120° West Longitude had been assigned for the operations of German and Italian surface raiders. The American commands concerned were advised by ComSoPac in a dispatch on January 23 that a possible auxiliary cruiser was scheduled to appear in Kula Gulf on January 24 and a tanker on the 23rd. These ships were the NOSHIRO Maru and the #2 TOA Maru. On the following day, January 24, a tanker en route to Vila on Kula Gulf was unsuccessfully attacked by a search plane and two subsequent strikes sent to attack this ship were obliged by bad weather to abandon their mission. This tanker is believed to have been that mentioned in ComSoPac's dispatch, her original scheduled delayed a day. On January 31, when this tanker was en route to Munda with the abovementioned auxiliary cruisers, she was set afire and sunk by American planes.

Several other enemy auxiliary naval vessels were located through radio intelligence in January. The minelayer ITSURUSHIMA was located

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near Waigeo Island off the western tip of New Guinea on January 23 and a cable laying vessel was detected near Rabaul late in January. Traffic intelligence placed the SENDAI Maru, a seaplane tender, near Shortland Island on January 4.

Radio Intelligence in January also revealed the tactical organization of the Japanese fleet as of October, 1942. This organization, believed at the time still to be in effect, placed the Striking Force under the Third Fleet Commander, the Advance Force under the Second Fleet Commander, the Support Force probably under the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, the Reinforcement Force under the Eighth Fleet Commander, the Base Air Force under the Commander of the 11th Air Fleet, and the Advance Expeditionary Force (submarines) under ComSubFor. The disbandment of the enemy's 6th Destroyer Squadron and the 19th Minelayer Division in July, 1942 also was reported.

In January radio intelligence disclosed that the transfer of Air Flotilla 24 from the Marshalls to the Empire had been completed and Air Flotilla 22, its successor in the Marshalls, was observed through traffic analysis to be conducting extensive exercises in that area around January 10. It also was noted that a detachment of this latter flotilla was stationed on Nauru Island along with a detachment of Air Group 755. There were some signs in January that Air Flotilla 25 might soon be transferred to the northern area. The Japanese Army was believed to have jurisdiction over aircraft operating in the western New Guinea area, and Wewak in northern New Guinea was expected to receive additional fighter planes at the end of January. Toward the close of January, there were

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indications that carrier planes were being based at shore establishments in the Solomons. This was an added sign that an offensive in that area was imminent.

The latter part of January witnessed a diversionary effort by the Japanese on the eastern perimeter of their Pacific holdings. The nature of this diversion was not fully understood until early in February, but, amid the mounting indications that an offensive was being prepared in the southeastern theatre, the diversionary character of this activity was recognized from the outset.

The first indication of any extraordinary activity being underway in this theatre was the appearance of submarines in the Marshalls, detected through traffic analysis, around January 18. On the following day, the cruiser TONE departed from Truk and a few days later this ship appeared in traffic in the Marshalls, where with other forces there she was an addressee of several intelligence reports.

At the same time, a heavy increase in radio traffic was noted in the Marshalls, undoubtedly connected with the activity which had brought the TONE and several submarines there. The Gilberts, too, apparently were involved in this unknown activity and traffic analysis indicated that concentrated air searches were underway in the Marshalls, where the auxiliary seaplane tender SHINKOKU Maru and an unusual number of marus appeared to be operating. In the CinCPac intelligence bulletin on January 25 there appeared a warning that this activity might be a prelude to a searaid by the cruiser TONE and ComSoPac on the same day warned all forces in the South Pacific of the imminent possibility of an offensive from the

direction of the Marshalls-Gilberts. On the next day, January 26, American bases south of Hawaii, and particularly Canton Island, were alerted against a raid and a daily aerial patrol of the Howland-Baker area was instituted.

In the meantime, as early as January 24th a submarine had been located by a Dog Fox fix north of Canton Island. Further fixes in this area were obtained on succeeding days, which necessitated a rerouting of ships proceeding to Canton from Oahu, and on January 27 an enemy submarine, the I-8, made a reconnaissance of Canton Island. Three days later the I-8 and another submarine shelled Canton Island. On the same day it was reported that extensive air searches from Makin and Nauru had been ordered for the period January 29 to February 12. The purpose of all this activity obviously was to draw American forces from areas more directly threatened.

While these events were transpiring in the Marshalls-Gilberts area, the repeated indications in January that an enemy offensive in the Solomons was being prepared were pointed up by the appearance of the expression "'Ke Gou' Operations" in intercepted traffic. The units and forces addressed in dispatches concerning this operation were all currently operating in the Solomons, from which it appeared a logical assumption that this offensive would be staged in that theatre, probably at Guadalcanal.

While no decrease in the number of submarines engaged in supplying Guadalcanal had been anticipated in January, an increase in the number of enemy submarines engaged in offensive warfare in the waters about

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Guadalcanal had been predicted early in January on the basis of traffic analysis and, in apparent support of the Japanese offensive expected soon in the Solomons, enemy submarines were known to be concentrating south and southeast of Guadalcanal toward the close of January in an effort to cut American supply lines to that island. As many as ten submarines, operating on two known lines of deployment, were known to be involved in this operation and there was some evidence that enemy bombers would search the same area on January 30. Most of these submarines had departed for this operation very recently from Truk, as radio intelligence disclosed. The departure of two submarines for the south was reported in the intelligence bulletin on January 21, five more on the following day, and two in the bulletin for the 25th.

With the discovery, through radio intelligence, that a task force under the Commander of the Second Fleet was scheduled to sail from Truk on January 30, the anticipated enemy offensive in the Solomons appeared to be about to begin.

A great deal of the information supplied through radio intelligence in January was unrelated, of course, to the anticipated enemy offensive. In addition to the above mentioned convoy and troop transport movements radio intelligence threw considerable light on the movement of other enemy merchant shipping in January. The contribution of radio intelligence in this regard is presented in a far more complete and detailed fashion in a special report on submarine warfare in the Pacific, but occasionally information of this nature was included in the CinCPac daily intelligence bulletin and in other "Ultra" dispatches originated by CinCPac and other commands. For instance, the January 7 intelligence

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bulletin carried the information that a maru had left Truk that day with a cargo of mines and anti-submarine nets for Shortland Island. This cargo never reached Shortland, however, for this ship, the YOSHINOKAWA Maru, was torpedoed and sunk on January 9. An unidentified ship was reported to be due at Wewak on February 1. On January 14, CinCPac sent ComSubPac the gist of an intercepted Truk harbor schedule which showed that three ships were to arrive at Truk and depart a few hours later on January 14 and that another ship was due there on the same day. One of the three ships was the auxiliary carrier CHUYO.

The movements of several former Japanese liners were reported, too. It was known that the TATSUTA Maru was scheduled to leave Singapore on January 14 for Hongkong from whence, arriving the 18th and departing on the following day, she was to sail for Nagasaki with many war prisoners. The ASAMA Maru also returned to Japan in January, leaving Truk on the 19th and arriving at Yokosuka on the 24th with many passengers. The KAMAKURA Maru, beginning a trip to the Indies, was reported to be due at Osaka on the 30th after leaving Yokosuka on the preceding day.

Intercepted dispatches showed considerable tanker traffic at Miri in North Borneo. The scheduled calls of two large tankers, the NISSHIN Maru and the #2 NISSHIN Maru, at Miri were reported in the intelligence bulletin on January 22. While the call of the #2 NISSHIN Maru subsequently was cancelled, the NISSHIN Maru was found moored at Miri on February 8 by the U.S.S. TROUT and torpedoed. Though this tanker did not sink, the Japanese were obliged to tow her to Singapore for repairs. Another tanker, the SHIRETOKO, on January 26 was reported due at Jaluit on the 30th from

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Truk. The SHIRETOKO was attacked en route by the U.S.S. WHALE on January 25 but escaped serious damage and proceeded to Jaluit.

Radio intelligence in January supplied other information concerning the enemy's submarines. It was known that some of these craft were equipped to carry planes. There was reason to believe, too, that submarines leaving Tokyo Bay en route southward customarily proceeded on a course to the east of the islands which extend from the bay's mouth. From this source, too, it was learned that in October Japanese submarines had been stationed at Indispensable Reef south of Guadalcanal to fuel scouting planes operating in that area. Another intercepted message outlined the disposition of the enemy's submarines during the action in the Solomons on October 26, 1942. A renewal of midget submarine operations about Guadalcanal was indicated as probable by traffic analysis and intercepted messages in mid-January confirmed their use there as freight carriers. Additional information on specific submarines showed the I-31 arriving at Truk on January 4 and the I-27 leaving Penang for Surabaya on January 27. It was disclosed, too, that three submarines had left Penang on December 5 for patrols in the Arafura Sea and the 14th Submarine Division was found to be operating in the Malay area in January.

Many sighting reports from enemy planes were intercepted in January. A number of these were passed on by CinCPac to the American commands most directly concerned. On January 4, two such intercepted reports were sent to ComSoFac. The subject of these reports was Task Force #67 which had been assigned the mission of bombarding the enemy base at Munda on the night of January 4. The sighting of this force by an enemy plane just south of

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Guadalcanal at 2330 GCT January 3 was the subject of a dispatch from ComAirSoPac to ComSoPac at 040122 January. No attack was made upon this force until the morning of January 5 as these ships were returning from Munda. At about 042400 CinCPac advised ComSoPac that a Japanese patrol plane had sighted American units southwest of Guadalcanal at 0920 L (-11) January 5 (2220 GCT January 4). Sixteen minutes after this sighting, ten Japanese dive bombers made an attack in which a direct hit was scored upon HMNZS ACHILLES and near misses on the U.S.S. HONOLULU.

On the same day as this attack, CinCPac sent to ComSoPac a dispatch containing a resume of intercepted enemy sighting reports of an American force southwest of Rennell Island originated between 1200 and 1300 I (-9) January 5. This force was Task Force #64. These sightings were not followed by an attack, however.

On the next day, January 6, an enemy plane's report on the sighting of an American aircraft carrier southwest of San Cristobal Island was passed to ComSoPac by CinCPac.

The bombing of the Vila-Stanmore area on Kolombangara on the night of January 23 produced a number of sighting reports from enemy planes. These intercepted reports were the subject of three dispatches on January 23 from CinCPac to ComSoPac and all task force commanders in the South Pacific. The American force was sighted before it had passed San Cristobal and was trailed past the Russells, but, like the force that bombarded Munda earlier in January, Task Force #67 was not attacked until it had started back for its base after the bombardment. Three groups of planes approached these ships at 0420 L (-11) January 24 but were held off by accurate radar

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controlled fire. One plane was shot down and the others withdrew at dawn.

At 1815 L (-11) on January 29, CinCPac informed ComSoPac, on the basis of intercepted sighting reports, that enemy planes were trailing an American force south of San Cristobal Island. These ships were Task Force #18 which was covering a convey en route to Guadalcanal. That night, enemy planes launched a series of torpedo attacks against this force and were successful in disabling the CHICAGO, which was then taken under tow. An intercepted Japanese message which claimed the sinking of one battleship in this engagement was addressed to ComSoPac by ComNavActSol at 290846Z January. This reference must have been to the disabling of the CHICAGO. At 1055 L (-11) January 30, CinCPac warned ComSoPac that a Japanese plane was trailing an American unit south of Guadalcanal. This ship was the crippled CHICAGO, then under tow. Late in the afternoon of January 30, Japanese planes again attacked the CHICAGO and sank her at 1644 L (-11). One of the CHICAGO's escorting destroyers was damaged in this attack.

Yet another contact report was sent to ComSoPac by CinCPac at 312351Z January. This contact, of unknown type, was made south of San Cristobal at 0945 L (-11) February 1.

A considerable amount of incidental intelligence was obtained through radio intelligence in January. Palau and Fais were seen to be important sources of phosphates for the Japanese. It was learned, too, that Japanese destroyers screening sorties of important naval units sometimes laid down a precautionary barrage of depth charges and orders were intercepted directing Japanese shipping to rely increasingly upon zig-zag tactics as an anti-submarine measure. A report on the available plane strength at

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Buin and Rabaul on January 21 also was intercepted and the main channels in use at Truk were known from intercepted messages. It was known, too, that the Japanese were experiencing an acute shortage of shipping along the China coast, but a considerable amount of shipping was noted in the Carolines in early January.

On January 8 and 9 an unusual number of weather reports were detected by traffic analysis to be emanating from Guadalcanal but the significance, if any, of this increase was not understood. Earlier in January Rabaul had been observed requesting weather reports from stations in the New Guinea-New Ireland area. At least thrice in January intercepted weather reports from Kiska were sent to Task Force #8.

Enemy operations in the northern area in January consisted chiefly in the supplying of the bases at Attu and Kiska. Radio intelligence supplied considerable information on these operations. On December 30, 1942, CinCPac had mentioned in his daily intelligence bulletin that a convoy of two or three ships was en route to Kiska. On January 1, CinCPac informed ComTaskForce #8 that the Japanese had stationed a weather ship at 47 North Latitude 160 East Longitude for the benefit of two ships en route to Kiska and one bound for Attu. The ships en route to Kiska proved to be the convoy mentioned on December 30. Further evidence, derived from radio intelligence, that Kiska and Attu were expecting convoys very shortly was sent to ComTaskForce #8 on January 4. On the following day American planes sank one of the two ships bound for Kiska with six 500 lb. bomb hits. This ship was the transport MONTREAL Maru of some 5000 tons. The ship en route to Attu was sunk on January 6 a few miles off that island by a weather plane. This ship was identified later by captured documents as

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the KOTOHIRA Maru.

The stationing of a weather ship between Japan and the Aleutians was mentioned again in the intelligence bulletin on January 9, this time at 40 North Latitude 168 East Longitude. This was interpreted as an indication that another convoy was en route to Kiska. Again, on January 14, indications in current traffic of convoy movements toward the Aleutians were reported in the intelligence bulletin and in a dispatch on that date Task Force #8 was notified by CinCPac that Kiska was preparing for the arrival of a ship on January 15. Although two task forces were sent out to intercept this vessel, no contact was established and this ship had not reached Kiska yet on January 16. Meanwhile, there were signs that as many as three ships with an escort might be involved. Another message dated January 16 from Kiska to this force in which further preparations for the arrival of these ships were made was intercepted and its contents sent to Task Force #8 on that date. On January 18 two newly arrived vessels were sighted in Kiska Harbor, but poor weather foiled an air strike against these ships which probably were those reported en route to Kiska in the dispatches mentioned above.

An abnormal increase in traffic volume in the northern area about January 27 suggested that new convoys to that area were underway. Two days later ComTaskForce #8 was informed by CinCPac that at least two marus were en route to the northern area and on January 30 this command was told that these two ships were approaching Kiska and had been directed to enter prior to 1900 GCT at which time American planes usually appeared over Kiska. These ships were expected to arrive at Kiska on January 30 or 31. On the following day CinCPac sent further arrival instructions and the anchorage

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assignments at Kiska found in an intercepted message sent to these two vessels by the authorities at Kiska. Although two task forces were stationed on the approaches to Kiska to intercept these ships, they were never sighted. Captured documents show that one of these ships, the SAKITO Maru, with the KIMIKAWA Maru had arrived at Attu on January 31 and that the other ship, the ASAKA Maru, had reached Kiska on February 4. Among other ships reported to be operating in northern waters in January were the destroyers WAKABA and NUMAKAZE, the minelayers ISHIGAKI and KUNAJIRI, and the TEIYO Maru and the #2 TOKO Maru.

A number of new weather stations also were discovered in January through traffic intelligence. One of these stations was in the northern area and for a time it was believed to be in the Semichi Islands. This suggested that Semichi had been occupied by the Japanese, but a later analysis of the traffic of this period indicated that these weather reports had been originated at Attu and not in the Semichis. When American troops landed in the Semichis after the recapture of Attu, no indication that the Japanese had occupied these islands was found. Captured documents disclosed that Japanese forces had launched upon this project several times but had withdrawn before its successful conclusion. Other weather stations located in January were at Waingapu on Sumba Island and on Christmas Island.

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It was reported in the bulletin that the enemy's combatant carriers still were unlocated, although there was some indication in traffic studies, confirmed a few day's later, that Carrier Division One without the SHOKAKU was approaching Truk from the north.¹ The auxiliary carriers OTAKA and UNYO, engaged in ferry duty, were known to have been respectively at Yokosuka and Truk on December 31.² The UNYO's call at Java in November was explained by the intelligence that the UNYO on December 14 had arrived at Truk from Surabaya with a load of Army fighter planes, similar to Zeros, which then were flown from Truk to the Bismarks. A reason to believe that another carrier was near Kapingimarangi (Greenwich) Island was seen in a weather report from that island. Since this island rarely originated weather reports and was nearly always associated with the Third Fleet in its infrequent appearances in traffic, this report, an upper air sounding of interest only to aircraft, was considered an indication that a carrier was in the vicinity.³ Rabaul also was observed to be manifesting considerable interest in weather in requesting weather reports from all stations in the New Guinea-New Ireland area.⁴ In the northern theatre weather

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1. II, #291, Item 1 and II, #294, Item 5.
 2. II, #291, Item 5 and I, ComSoPac Dispatch 180632 December, 1942.
 3. II, #291, Item 2.
 4. II, #291, Item 3.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

reports were expected to begin shortly from a weather ship currently enroute to a station southeast of Horomushiro and the arrival of a convoy at Kiska was expected shortly.⁵

The positions of seven enemy submarines, located by Dog Fox fixes, also were reported in the bulletin.⁶ One of these positions, 10 South Latitude 161 East Longitude, was astride the American supply lane to Guadalcanal. Upon receipt of this fix, a daily aerial anti-submarine patrol of this area and a temporary rerouting of shipping were instituted.

The Commander of Task Force #8 was notified in a separate dispatch of the stationing of a weather ship southeast of Horomushiro. This intelligence was believed to be closely related to the reported departure of two supply ships for Kiska and one for Attu.⁷ Two of these ships were sunk in Aleutian waters early in January.⁸

5. II, #291, Item 6.

6. II, #291, Item 4.

7. II, CinCPac Dispatch 010229 January, 1943.

8. II, CinCPac Dispatch 041951 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 2, 1943

The intelligence items in this day's bulletin were derived in great part from analyses of current traffic rather than from decryption intelligence. On the basis of these analyses, an increase in enemy submarine activity in the vicinity of the Solomons was predicted and attempts to supply the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal by submarines were expected to continue.¹ The same sources disclosed increased activity at the Japanese base at Buin on Bougainville and an unusual amount of shipping in the Carolines.² The appearance of a new weather station in the Aleutians also was noted.³ This station was estimated to be either on Attu or the Semichi Islands. A later review of the traffic of this period indicated that this station was located on Attu. On the basis of traffic intelligence it also was believed that the Commander of the Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI in the southern theatre at this time.⁴ While the whereabouts of the enemy's combatant carriers remained unknown, there were indications that the auxiliary carrier OTAKA was about to depart for the south with planes for the 21st and 26th Air Flotillas.⁵ The positions of eight enemy submarines, all in the southeastern theatre, were reported from Dog Fox fixes.⁶

1. II, #292, Item 1.
2. II, #292, Items 1 and 5.
3. II, #292, Item 7.

4. II, #292, Item 4.
5. II, #292, Item 6.
6. II, #292, Item 3.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

The only item in the bulletin based upon decryption intelligence was a report that the Japanese were experiencing a critical shortage of shipping along the China coast.⁷

ComSoPac in a dispatch to Guadalcanal on this date warned that several waves of enemy bombers were scheduled to bomb American positions on Guadalcanal between 2200 and 0230 L (-11) on the night of January 2-3. This raid probably was nearly over before ComSoPac's warning arrived. A few bombs were dropped but no damage was reported. This attack probably was designed to divert attention from ten destroyers that attempted to run supplies to Guadalcanal that night, or to preclude aerial interference with the convoy by damaging the airstrip.⁸

7. II, #292, Item 2.

8. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 021321 January, 1943.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 3, 1943

An intensification of repair, fitting out, and training activities involving Third Fleet units, the formation of a Southern Army with headquarters at Palao or Surabaya, and signs of troop movements from the Empire to Saipan and the Solomons prompted a warning in the bulletin of mounting indications that an enemy offensive in the southern theatre, probably in the Solomons, was imminent. The nature of these indications were not disclosed but several other items in the bulletin appeared to support this conclusion. The Commander of the Advance Force was believed to be near Rabaul and, while the precise whereabouts of the Japanese combatant carriers were not known, some carriers were estimated to be near Truk with the probable intention of moving southward into the Solomons.¹ This estimate was confirmed a short time later by the intelligence that the ZUIKAKU and possibly another carrier were scheduled to reach Truk on January 4.² There also were indications that a central Army command for the southeastern theatre had been set up. This command was known as the Eighth Area Army Command with headquarters at Rabaul.³

The bulletin also listed bearings on ten enemy submarines in the southeastern area.⁴ It was also recorded that escort vessels accompanying major units on sorties from their bases sometimes dropped depth charges periodically as a purely precautionary measure.⁵

1. II, #293, Item 2.
 2. II, #293, Item 5.
 3. II, #293, Item 1.

4. II, #293, Item 3.
 5. II, #293, Item 4.

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For the first time in a number of days the bulletin contained definite intelligence on the location of at least one of the enemy's combatant carriers -- the ZUIKAKU, possibly accompanied by the ZUIHO, was known to be due at Truk on January 4, along with the submarine I-31.¹ This intelligence confirmed recent indications in traffic analysis that the First Carrier Division, less the SHOKAKU, was enroute south from Japan and that carrier units were in the vicinity of the Carolines.² Another carrier was placed near Yokosuka by a Dog Fox fix.³

Fixes also yielded the positions of four submarines in the southeastern sector and it was disclosed that some Japanese submarines were constructed to carry a small scouting plane in the conning tower.⁴

The bulletin also contained the news that the transport HEIYO Maru was scheduled to depart from Yokosuka on January 7 or 8 to arrive at Truk on the 15th. The departure of this ship apparently was delayed until January 10 but on the 17th she was sunk northeast of Truk with great loss of life by the U.S.S. Whale.⁵

The other intelligence items in the bulletin were more of an incidental character. An airfield on Pagan Island in the Carolines was reported and an air establishment of some sort was suspected to exist on

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| 1. II, #294, Item 5. | 3. II, #294, Item 6. |
| 2. I, #288, Item 5; II, #291, Item 1;
II, #293, Item 2. | 4. II, #294, Items 6 and 2.
5. II, #294, Item 1. |

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

Iojima in the Bonins.⁶ Attention was called to the disbandment of the 6th Destroyer Squadron and the 19th Minelayer Division in July of 1942 and to the discovery that the main armament directors on enemy battle-ships now possessed a maximum elevation of about 40 degrees.⁷

The bombardment of Munda on the night of January 4 by Task Force 67 was reflected in a number of intercepted sighting reports from enemy planes, two of which were the subject of dispatches addressed to ComSoPac on this date by CinCPac and ComAirSoPac.⁸ Although this force was sighted on the morning of January 4, it was not attacked until the morning after the bombardment as it withdrew from the scene. At this time, enemy planes scored near misses on the cruiser HONOLULU and knocked out a gun turret on H.M.N.Z.S. ACHILLES.

CinCPac also addressed a dispatch based on radio intelligence to Task Force #8 on this date in which Kiska and Attu were reported to be awaiting the arrival of convoys.

The vessels expected at Kiska and Attu apparently were those of whose movement northward Task Force #8 had been apprised in earlier dispatches from CinCPac.⁹ These ships proved to be the MONTREAL Maru, the

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6. II, #294, Item 1.
 7. II, #294, Items 3 and 4.
 8. II, ComAirSoPac Dispatch 040122 and CinCPac Dispatch 042181 January, 1943.
 9. I #289, Item 2 and II, CinCPac Dispatch 010229 January, 1943.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

NITIBI Maru, and the KOTOHIRI Maru. The MONTREAL Maru was sunk as she approached Kiska on January 5 by American bombers and the KOTOHIRI was sent to the bottom on the following day when she was intercepted near Attu by a weather plane. Both ships were estimated at 5000 tons and appeared to be heavily loaded when attacked.¹⁰

10. II, CincPac Dispatch 041951 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 5, 1943

Although the whereabouts of the enemy's combatant carriers remained undisclosed, except for the SHOKAKU at Yokosuka and the ZUIKAKU at Truk, the continued association of Third Fleet units with Rabaul and forces in the southeastern area suggested that at least a part of the Third Fleet soon would arrive in the Solomons, possibly presaging offensive action there.¹ Traffic analysis also indicated that submarines and surface vessels had resumed their attempts to run supplies to Guadalcanal. This evidence was seen in traffic which reflected such an attempt by ten destroyers on the night of January 2. Although American planes and torpedo boats intercepted these ships, the Japanese are believed to have landed supplies and reinforcements on Guadalcanal in this attempt.²

It was reported further in the bulletin on the basis of current traffic studies that the battleship YAMATO, flagship of the Combined Fleet, was at Truk and the Commander of the Eighth Fleet ashore at Rabaul.³ There was evidence too that the Japanese had established a base at Wickham Anchorage on Vangunu Island southeast of New Georgia in the Solomons.⁴

1. II, #295, Items 1 and 2,
2. II, #295, Item 3.

3. II, #295, Items 6 and 8,
4. II, #295, Item 7.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

From Dog Fox fixes were obtained the positions of eight Japanese submarines in the Marshalls-Gilberts and the New Guinea-Solomons Areas.⁵

The bulletin also took cognizance of indications that convoys were expected shortly at both Kiska and Attu.⁶

CinCPac in a dispatch to ComSoPac and the leaders of the South Pacific task forces on this date summarized a series of intercepted sighting reports from an enemy plane believed to be trailing an American force southwest of Guadalcanal on the morning of January 5.⁷

5. II, #295, Item 4.

6. II, #295, Item 5.

7. II, CinCPac Dispatch 050611 January, 1943.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 6, 1943

In spite of recent indications that the Japanese were preparing to mount an offensive in the Solomons soon, that area was reported to be unusually quiet on January 5, except for air searches which may have been prompted by the sighting by an enemy plane of an American carrier southeast of Guadalcanal on the morning of January 6 of which CinCPac informed ComSoPac in a separate dispatch.¹ However, a movement of troops toward the southeastern theatre was seen in indications that Army units were moving to Kospang and Ambon from Singapore and Batavia.² The SENDAI Maru, a seaplane tender, was believed to be in the northern Solomons and bearings were obtained on six submarines in the southeastern theatre.³

The bulletin also noted changes in the assignments of several Japanese cruisers, effected in the previous November, as a result of which the KUMA had replaced the ISUZU in the 16th Cruiser Division when the latter ship became flagship of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron in place of the JINTSU.⁴ From captured documents it was learned that destroyers of the TAKANAMI class were equipped to carry 18 depth charges and 16 torpedoes.⁵

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| 1. II, #296, Item 5 and CinCPac Dispatch
060131 January, 1943 | 3. II, #296, Items 2 and 4. |
| 2. II, #296, Item 1 | 4. II, #296, Item 3. |
| | 5. II, #296, Item 6. |

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 7, 1943

While the whereabouts of a majority of the enemy's combatant carriers continued uncertain, it was announced in the bulletin that an American submarine, the U.S.S. SARGO, had sighted a Japanese carrier east of the Admiralties on January 6.¹ There is reason to believe, however, that the SARGO had mistakenly identified an auxiliary aircraft tender as a carrier. The departure from Rabaul on January 7 of a vessel carrying mines and anti-submarine nets to Shortland also was reported.² This ship was sunk by a submarine on January 9 while enroute to Shortland. A total of eleven enemy submarines in the southeastern theatre were located through Dog Fox fixes.³

The bulletin also contained several items of incidental intelligence. A considerable amount of enemy shipping was observed to be calling at Fais Island for cargoes of phosphates.⁴ Destroyers of the TAKANAMI class were known, from captured documents, to have reached a maximum trial speed of 35 knots and Japanese lookout posts were suspected at the following points in the Solomons: Cape Alexander, Stirling, Vella La-Vella, Matsungan Island, Visu Visu Point, and Ramada.⁵

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- 1. II, #297, Item 4.
 - 2. II, #297, Item 1.
 - 3. II, #297, Item 3.
 - 4. II, #297, Item 2.
 - 5. II, #297, Items 5 and 6.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 8, 1943

The intelligence items in the daily bulletin again were derived in most part from traffic analysis instead of deciphered messages. It was estimated from the routing of current traffic that the Commanders of the Combined, Second, and Fourth Fleets and of the Third Battleship Division were at or near Truk. The Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force also was believed to be at Truk.¹

There was only scant information in the bulletin concerning the enemy's carriers. It had been known for sometime that the SHOKAKU was in Japan undergoing repairs which were not expected to be completed until the middle of January.² Traffic intelligence now indicated that several other carriers were near the Japanese mainland and there was some sign in the routing of current traffic that the ZUIKAKU had left Truk. With the exception of the auxiliary carrier UNYO, which was believed to be at Saipan enroute to Japan, the other carriers remained unlocated.³

An analysis of current traffic from the Solomons disclosed a continued association of submarines with the enemy garrison on Guadalcanal which was considered an indication that submarines still were

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1. II, #298, Item 2.
 2. I, #284, Item 3.
 3. II, #298, Items 1 and 7.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

engaged in supplying those troops.⁴ Dog Fox fixes on seven enemy submarines in the southeastern theatre were reported.⁵ Weather reports believed to be emanating from the Semichi Islands in the Aleutians also were noted and afforded ground for concluding that the enemy had occupied that island, a conclusion disproved later.⁶

The bulletin also outlined the positions of the enemy's submarines during the battle southeast of Guadalcanal on October 26, 1942. This information was obtained from a captured document.⁷

On this day, January 8, CincPac sent an intercepted weather report from Kiska to Task Force #8. Such information doubtless was of value in planning strikes against that base.⁸

4. II, #298, Item 3.

5. II, #298, Item 4.

6. II, #298, Item 5 and III, CincPac Dispatch 190255 February, 1943.

7. II, #298, Item 6.

8. II, CincPac Dispatch 080051 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 9, 1943

It was stated in the bulletin that a Japanese offensive in eastern New Guinea was expected shortly. This conclusion was reached through traffic analysis which indicated the existence of a force organized to reinforce the enemy's hold on eastern New Guinea. From the associations of this force in current traffic Milne Bay was considered a possible staging point for this offensive.¹ In actuality, a reinforcement of the Japanese forces in eastern New Guinea already was underway. A ten ship convoy had been sighted south of New Britain on January 6 and for five days thereafter these ships were subjected to repeated aerial attacks as they moved to Lae, unloaded there, and returned to Rabaul. At least four transports are believed to have been sunk in these attacks and direct hits and near misses did unknown damage to other ships. Two of the transports were sunk by a submarine, the U.S.S. GRAMPUS, which joined the attack on January 10. Another American submarine, the U.S.S. ARGONAUT, participated in the attacks but was lost to enemy action. A total of 83 enemy planes were shot down and 36 others probably destroyed. It was the movement of this convoy that had generated the intercepted traffic upon which the expectation of an enemy offensive in New Guinea had been based. On the other

1. II, #299, Item 3.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

hand, it was known from an intercepted dispatch that the Japanese were apprehensive of an Allied raid on Timor.²

A study of the day's traffic disclosed an unusual number of weather reports emanating from Guadalcanal.³ Other weather reports were expected soon from a weather ship which the Japanese were stationing southwest of Kiska for the benefit of convoys to that island.⁴

Again it was noted in the bulletin that enemy submarines still were supplying the Japanese bases at Guadalcanal and Buna. This deduction was made from the persistent association of these bases with submarines in current traffic.⁵

The bulletin carried no new intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers, but the positions of four Japanese submarines, obtained from Dog Fox fixes, were listed.⁶ It was also observed that the Japanese 25th Army was addressed in the Malay area.⁷

2. II, #299, Item 2.
3. II, #299, Item 1.
4. II, #299, Item 4.

5. II, #299, Item 8.
6. II, #299, Items 5 and 6.
7. II, #299, Item 7.

CHAPTER

JANUARY 10, 1943

Once more the information in the bulletin was obtained almost in its entirety from traffic intelligence. In connection with the anticipated enemy operation in eastern New Guinea mentioned in the previous day's bulletin, the enemy force in question now was identified as the RAT Occupation Force. RAT was believed to be the area designator for Milne Bay. Whether this implied a new attempt to seize that area or was merely a title carried over from the last attempt was not known. This command currently was associated with operations in the vicinity of Lae and Salamaua, with Army and Navy air groups in the Rabaul - Lae area, and with airborne troops, of which there were now signs in the southern theatre.¹

News of the enemy's carriers remained negligible. They were observed only by association in the Empire, Jaluit, Truk, and Rabaul areas.² The cruiser MAYA was reported to be in the Empire and fixes on six enemy submarines were listed.³

The unusually heavy weather traffic from Guadalcanal noted in the previous day's bulletin was observed to continue through January 9.⁴ Traffic analysis also revealed that Air Flotilla 22 was engaged in extensive air exercises in the Marshalls.⁵

1. II, #300, Items 2 and 3.
2. II, #300, Item 4.
3. II, #300, Items 6 and 7.

4. II, #300, Item 1.
5. II, #300, Item 8.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

The only intelligence in the bulletin derived from decryption of an intercepted dispatch listed the carrier RYUJO as sunk prior to November 10, at which time it was deleted from the official Navy List.⁶

This carrier was sunk by Allied planes in the Solomons while engaged in a bombing attack on American positions there in late August, 1942.

ComNavAct Solomons on this date was apprised by a coastwatcher of the departure of an eight destroyer "Tokyo Express" from Faisi and immediately notified ComSoPac to this effect. The latter replied that current radio intelligence afforded only general evidence of such a run. It appears, then, that in this instance the credit for the interception of this run of the "Tokyo Express" belongs to the coastwatcher.⁷

6. II, #300, Item 5.

7. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 101031 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 11, 1943

The bulletin again was devoted chiefly to intelligence obtained through traffic analysis. Submarines were observed to be associated with the enemy base at the mouth of the Mambare River north of Buna and it was suggested that this might be a point of supply for the Japanese troops in that area.¹ This intelligence was substantiated several days later when a submarine and a number of enemy troops were sighted at the mouth of the Mambare River.

At Guadalcanal the reappearance of midget submarines in traffic from that area presaged a renewal of their operations in that vicinity.² An enlarged volume of traffic from the Malay - East Indies area bespoke an increase in the tempo of activity there as well.³

The locations of the enemy's carriers remained obscure but traffic routing indicated that the Commander of the Third Fleet (the carrier fleet) still was in the Empire.⁴ Similarly, the 5th Pioneers were located at Kolombangara and fixes on five enemy submarines were reported.⁵

The final item in the bulletin listed the major armament of the enemy's Takanami class destroyers to be six 12 cm. guns in three

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1. II, #301, Item 1.
 2. II, #301, Item 3.
 3. II, #301, Item 2.

4. II, #301, Item 5.
5. II, #301, Items 4 and 6.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

turrets. This information was obtained by interrogation of a prisoner of war and reopened the question of the identity of a four turreted "mystery ship" recently photographed in the Solomons.⁶

6. II, #301, Item 7.

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Authority

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 12, 1943

The intelligence contained in this day's bulletin was limited to that derived from traffic analysis. By traffic routing the cruiser KATORI was located at Truk and the Eighth Army Division at Batavia.¹ The whereabouts of the enemy's carriers still eluded detection, but two enemy submarines in the southeastern theatre were located by Dog Fox fixes.² From a study of traffic circuits and associations it was concluded that the southeastern area remained the center of Japanese interest for the time being.³

The bulletin also carried an outline of the tactical organization of the Japanese Fleet during the preceding October which was believed to be still effective.⁴ According to this report, the Japanese Striking Force was under the Commander of the Third Fleet, the Advance Force subordinate to the Second Fleet's Commander, the Support Force probably under the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, the Reinforcement Force led by the Eighth Fleet's Commander and the Base Air Force by the Commander of the 11th Air Fleet. The Advance Expeditionary Fleet, composed of submarines, was placed under the Commander of the Submarine Force.

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1. II, #302, Items 1 and 2.
 2. II, #302, Items 2 and 4.
 3. II, #302, Item 3.
 4. II, #302, Item 5.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 12, 1943 (Continued)

CinCPac on January 12 sent another intercepted weather report from Kiska to Task Force #8.⁵ Another dispatch based on radio intelligence from Commander of Task Group #8.5 ordered a submarine to search in the vicinity of Attu for units of the Japanese 5th Fleet.⁶ This search appears to have been fruitless.

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5. II, CinCPac Dispatch 120145, January, 1943.
 6. II, Commander Task Group 8.5 Dispatch 121940 January, 1943.

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Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 13, 1943

The bulletin for this day carried the information that specific areas in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans had been set apart for the operations of German and Italian surface raiders. The limits of these areas were defined.¹

The intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers was much less definite. Observed activity on the carrier-base frequencies in the Empire area suggested the presence of some carriers in that region but intercepted traffic associated the carriers with the southern war theatres.²

Although special coverage was given to enemy circuits in the northern area, no unusual activity was noted in that area.³

The positions of five enemy submarines were listed in the bulletin, all in the Solomons - New Britain area.⁴ Associations noted in current intercepted traffic indicated that submarines still were engaged in supplying the enemy garrison on Guadalcanal.⁵ CincPac in the bulletin and ComSoPac in another dispatch to the American Commands in the Guadalcanal area warned that an enemy submarine was

1. II, #303, Item 1.
2. II, #303, Item 2.
3. II, #303, Item 5.

4. II, #303, Item 4.
5. II, #303, Item 3.

CHAPTER

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

expected at Kainbo on the night of January 13.⁶ This submarine was known to be carrying important codes and intended to evacuate certain personnel from Guadalcanal. Despite these warnings, this submarine appears to have escaped detection on this mission.

In another dispatch to Guadalcanal on this date, ComSoPac stated that enemy surface craft might attempt to land reinforcements there on the night of January 13 or in the near future. This dispatch was followed shortly by another in which ComSoPac reported that one or more enemy destroyers were scheduled to leave Guadalcanal on January 14.⁷ Since by this time no enemy destroyers dared remain at Guadalcanal during the day, this intelligence implied a run of the "Tokyo Express" on January 14. This report was duly substantiated on that date when nine destroyers were seen to leave Faisi by a coastwatcher at 1545 L (-11). Although the convoy was shadowed by a plane all the way to Guadalcanal, the approach of darkness prevented an aerial assault in force upon the destroyers. However, a search plane succeeded in hitting one of the vessels with a 500 pound bomb during the night.

6. II, #303, Item 3 and ComSoPac Dispatches 130235 and 130625 January, 1943.
7. II, ComSoPac Dispatches 130550 and 130625 January, 1943.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

The approach of the destroyers to Guadalcanal was favored not only by the darkness but by the cover afforded by a tropical electrical storm. However, as the convoy passed between Cape Esperance and Savo Island it was set upon by thirteen PT boats which had been stationed there to intercept the Japanese ships. In this encounter, three destroyers were hit by torpedoes. Despite attacks by an enemy plane, only one PT boat was damaged and that by grounding on a reef.

Dawn brought the aerial strike which nightfall had precluded and the destroyers were hit again as they withdrew to the northeast. Two more destroyers were hit, near misses were scored on three others, and eleven planes of the convoy's aerial cover were downed at the cost of seven American planes.

On the afternoon of January 15, this convoy was attacked again by American planes which made no hits on the vessels but destroyed twelve more enemy planes. A third group of planes was sent after this convoy a short time later but was unable to locate the target. A final accounting showed that the Japanese had suffered hits on from three to five destroyers and had lost thirty planes against an American loss of eight planes in this run of the "Tokyo Express".

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 14, 1943

The daily bulletin contained intelligence of a diversified character. Palau's importance as a central point on convoy routes and as a source for phosphates and bauxite was pointed out.¹ It was noted, too, that a convoy of three ships was due at the western entrance to Palau on January 16.² There was reason to believe from associations noted in intercepted traffic from the northern area that another convoy was enroute to the Aleutians from Horokanishiro.³ The movements in the near future of the TATSUTA Maru also were known; that transport was scheduled to leave Singapore on January 14, to arrive four days later at Hongkong from whence she was to depart on the following day with a load of war prisoners for Nagasaki.⁴ It was reported, also, that the Northern Channel at Surabaya had been mined and closed to traffic.⁵ In addition, fixes on three Japanese submarines were listed.⁶

For the first time in several days, there was positive information concerning the Japanese combatant carriers. Of Carrier Division 1, the SHIDAKU was expected to be ready for action again soon, and the ZUIKAKU and perhaps the ZUIHO were located in the Empire by fixes.

1. II, #304, Item 1.
2. II, #304, Item 5.
3. II, #304, Item 7.

4. II, #304, Item 4.
5. II, #304, Item 6.
6. II, #304, Item 2.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

The whereabouts of the 2nd Carrier Division was less certain; traffic headings indicated that one unit of this division was at Kure. However, the Third Fleet (carriers) continued to be associated with the southern theatre.⁷

CinCPac on this date dispatched two other messages based on radio intelligence. The first to ComSubPac advised the latter of the movements of enemy shipping at Truk on January 14.⁸ The second dispatch informed Task Force #8 that Kiska apparently was awaiting the arrival of a ship at some time after 1300 GCT January 15. Two task groups were dispatched to intercept this vessel, but the ship appears to have eluded detection.⁹

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- 7. II, #304, Item 3.
 - 8. II, CinCPac Dispatch 141317 January, 1943.
 - 9. II, CinCPac Dispatch 141843 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 15, 1943

It was reported in the bulletin that the Japanese had established a base on Kolombangara Island in the Solomons. The association of this new base with the enemy's air base on Ballale Island suggested that the Kolombangara base might include an airstrip as well.¹ This interpretation of this association proved to be correct for aerial photographs taken a few days later disclosed the existence of an airstrip under construction near Vila. This area was bombarded by United States surface vessels on the night of January 23 but the development of this base continued apace.

The association of Carrier Division Two with the southern theatre remained prominent and the arrival at Truk on January 14 and departure therefrom on the same day of the auxiliary carrier CHUYO also was noted.² The auxiliary cruiser HOKOKU Maru, a surface raider, was listed as sunk prior to December 5.³ It was known, too, that during the previous October Japanese search planes had been refueled by fuel-carrying submarines at Huon Island northwest of New Caledonia.⁴

The bulletin announced further that two Army transports were scheduled to reach the Japanese base at Wewak on the morning of December 18.⁵ In addition, the positions of four enemy submarines were reported.⁶

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1. II, #305, Item 2.
 2. II, #305, Items 3 and 1.
 3. II, #305, Item 6.

4. II, #305, Item 5.
5. II, #305, Item 7.
6. II, #305, Item 4.

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Authority

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 16, 1943

There were several items relative to the enemy's network of air-bases in the daily bulletin. The jurisdiction of the enemy's air bases in the southeastern theatre was reported to be divided between the Army and Navy. Newak, Lae, Madang, Salamana and Gasmata were listed as under Army control; Buna, Kavieng, Lakunai, and Vanakanau under joint control. Jurisdiction over the bases in the Solomons had not been decided yet in November, from which time this intelligence dated, but it was known that the Navy planned to construct its own base northeast of Lae.¹ There was reason to believe, too, that an airbase was under construction at Eniwetok.² Another air base, #958, was known to be under construction at Shortland by the 101st Pioneers, but it was not yet determined whether this was the airbase at Ballale or a new one.³

The other items in the bulletin dealt with the movements of enemy ships. It was reported that the repairs to the heavy cruiser HAGURO had been completed and that that ship had left Sasebo for Truk on November 27. This ship is believed to have left Truk on January 15 for an unknown destination.⁴ The two transports bound for Newak which were mentioned in the previous day's bulletin were reported to have as escorts a destroyer and a subchaser. This convoy was successfully attacked on January

1. II, #306, Item 1.
2. II, #306, Item 7.

3. II, #306, Item 6.
4. II, #306, Item 4.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

16 by the U.S.S. TRITON, which sank one of the transports and possibly damaged one of the escorts and the other transport.⁵ The bulletin also gave the positions of three enemy submarines, as obtained from Deg Fox fixes.⁶ Aside from the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet in the Empire, according to traffic analysis, there was no other intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers.⁷

In reply to a request from ComSoWesPac, CinCPac on this date listed all enemy cruisers believed sunk since the outbreak of war.⁸

In another dispatch, CinCPac informed Task Force #8 that Kiska evidently was expecting the arrival of a convoy very shortly. Two days later, two newly arrived vessels were observed in Kiska harbor. An air strike against these ships was undertaken immediately but failed because of bad weather.⁹

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- 5. II, #306, Item 5.
 - 6. II, #306, Item 2.
 - 7. II, #306, Item 3.
 - 8. II, CinCPac Dispatch 160831 January, 1943.
 - 9. II, CinCPac Dispatch 161957 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 17, 1943

The bulk of the intelligence in this day's bulletin concerned three enemy convoys. The first of these was believed to be approaching Kiska. Kiska's preparations for the arrival of this convoy constituted the only intelligence concerning it.¹ More detailed information was possessed about the other two convoys, both of which had Shortland Island as their destination. And both, presumably, were carrying troops believed to be destined for Guadalcanal. The first of these, consisting of two marus escorted by a minesweeper, left Rabaul on January 16th and was expected to reach Shortland via the west channel at 1400 L (-11) January 18. The other convoy, three marus and a destroyer, sailed from Truk on January 15 and was scheduled to arrive at Oema Island at 0400 L (-11) January 20. This last convoy was attacked off Bougainville by the U.S.S. SWORDFISH on January 19, 1943 and one of the transports, the MYOHO Maru, was sent to the bottom. The suspicion that this convoy consisted of troop transports was confirmed by intercepted dispatches at the time of the sinking of the MYOHO.²

It was also reported that enemy submarines still were associated with Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, which indicated that submarines probably were engaged in carrying supplies to Guadalcanal.³ Dog Fox fixes on two enemy submarines were listed.⁴

1. II, #307, Item 1.
2. II, #307, Item 5.

3. II, #307, Item 6.
4. II, #307, Item 2.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

The light cruiser YURA was reported sunk off Santa Ysabel Island on October 25 and the recently photographed "mystery" ship now was estimated to be a destroyer of the TERUTSUKI class.⁵

5. II, #307, Items 3 and 4. See also Item 5, CincPac Bulletin #270, December 11, 1942 and Item 7, CincPac Bulletin #301, January 11, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 18, 1943

Another convoy for Shortland Island from Truk was reported in the daily bulletin. This convoy of four ships escorted by one destroyer had departed from Truk on December 17 and was due at the northern entrance to the Shortland area on the morning of January 22. Like the convoys mentioned in the previous day's bulletin, this convoy was thought to be carrying troops to bolster the enemy's garrison on Guadalcanal. Knowledge of these three convoys gave rise to the speculation that the Japanese might be planning a large scale landing attempt at Guadalcanal soon.

This third convoy bound for Shortland was sighted off Cape Friendship, Bougainville, by an American search plane and seven fortresses were dispatched to attack it. Unfortunately, the planes found the target obscured by clouds which interfered with the runs of the bombers and made accurate bombing impossible. These ships did not all reach Shortland unscathed, however, for the U.S.S. GATO succeeded in sinking one of the transports, the KENKON Maru. It was apparent from the intercepted messages concerning this sinking that these vessels were carrying troops, as suspected.¹

1. II, #308, Item 3.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)

The bulletin was relatively short; there were only two other items. One of these reported submarines in the Kavieng and Marshalls areas by Dog Fox fixes, and the other was an estimate of the current locations of the enemy's carriers.² The ZUIKAKU, SHOEAKU, and ZUIHO were believed to be near Japan but the carriers of the Second Division were unlocated, though associated with the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul. The auxiliary carriers CHUYO, OTAKA, and UNYO were estimated to be engaged still in ferry work between Japan and the southern theatres.

2. II, #308, Items 1 and 2.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 19, 1943

It was reported in the bulletin that the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, and the Commander of the Submarine Force were at Truk. The Staff of the Eighth Fleet, however, was estimated still to be shore-based at Rabaul.¹

Of the movements of the enemy's warships themselves there was little specific information, aside from the known presence of the cruiser TONE near Truk.² Movements of fleet units in the Empire, Solomons and Truk areas were detected through traffic analysis, and the same source indicated that an auxiliary carrier might be in the southern area and a unit of Carrier Division Two approaching Truk from the south.³ The positions of the other carriers were estimated to be unchanged from the previous day's bulletin. Continuing efforts to supply the Japanese on Guadalcanal by submarine were seen in the persistent association of submarines with Guadalcanal. This deduction was confirmed a few days later by the discovery of additional supplies floating off Tassafaronga.⁴ The positions of three enemy submarines were reported from fixes.⁵

The bulletin also carried some valuable intelligence concerning the movements of enemy shipping. The South, North, and Otta Island Channels were reported to be most frequently used at Truk.⁶ It was known, too, that southbound enemy submarines generally passed to the east of the chain of islands off Tokyo Bay.⁷

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1. II, #309, Item 6.
2. II, #309, Item 8.
3. II, #309, Items 2 and 3.
4. II, #309, Item 1.

5. II, #309, Item 5.
6. II, #309, Item 4.
7. II, #309, Item 7.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 20, 1943

The bulletin contained intelligence that still another convoy was enroute to Shortland Island from Truk. With two escorts, three marus were known to have departed from Truk on January 19 and to be due at Shortland at 0700 (local time) on the 24th. This was ^{the} fourth such convoy reported in four days. These convoys were believed to be carrying troops, a suspicion confirmed by intercepted traffic attendant upon the sinking of several of the ships in these convoys by American submarines. Several destroyer "Express" runs to Guadalcanal or a possible large-scale landing attempt with larger ships were expected, therefore, to be launched from Shortland in the near future. There were actually four transports in this convoy but only two reached Shortland, for these vessels were attacked by the U.S.S. SILVERSIDES shortly after leaving Truk and the NEIU Maru and the SURABAYA Maru were sent to the bottom.¹

The bulletin carried other information. The Japanese liner ASAMA Maru with many passengers was reported to be enroute from Truk to Yokosuka where she was to arrive on January 24th.² A detachment of Air Flotilla 22 was detected at Nauru by traffic intelligence, which source also disclosed the presence of the Commander of the Second Fleet at Truk.³ The presence of enemy submarines near the Marshall Islands also was noted

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1. II, #310, Item 2 and #311, Item 1.
 2. II, #310, Item 7.
 3. II, #310, Items 4 and 5.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

and suggested that the enemy might be reorientating the disposition of his submarines in accord with some new strategic plan.⁴ Fixes on four enemy submarines were listed, all in the southeastern theatre.⁵

There was also positive information concerning the enemy's carriers. The Second Carrier Division now was at Truk where it had arrived on January 19. This intelligence confirmed the report in the preceding bulletin that a unit of the 2nd Carrier Division was approaching Truk from the south.⁶ News of the First Division was less definite; these carriers were estimated to be in the Empire still and the SHOKAKU was believe to be nearly ready to rejoin the division there after her lengthy stay in dock for repairs.⁷

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4. II, #310, Item 6.
 5. II, #310, Item 3.
 6. II, #309, Item 3.
 7. II, #310, Item 1.

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 21, 1943

Convoy intelligence continued to occupy an important place in the bulletin with the report that a group of six vessels had left Truk on January 20 for Rabaul where they were to arrive at 1000 (local time) January 24 via Steffen Strait.¹ It also was announced that the U.S.S. SILVERSIDES had scored five hits on three ships in the convoy enroute from Truk to Shortland Island reported in the preceding bulletin. Although the SILVERSIDES had not been able to observe the results of these hits, it later was learned that two ships of this convoy were sunk. These vessels were the MEIU Maru and the SURABAYA Maru.²

The bulletin contained no new information on the Japanese carriers, but the positions of two enemy submarines were listed and it was reported that two other enemy submarines had departed from Truk on January 19 enroute south.³

It also was disclosed that the Japanese had commenced a study of the defenses of the East Indies and proposed to make Bali, the Tanimbar Islands, and Waingapu on Sumba Island key defense areas.⁴ There was evidence, too, that the enemy had occupied Manokwari in New Guinea.⁵

1. II, #311, Item 2.

2. II, #311, Item 1 and #310, Item 2.

3. II, #311, Item 3.

4. II, #311, Item 5.

5. II, #311, Item 4.

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 22, 1943

The daily bulletin was devoted chiefly to the movements of enemy warships and merchant vessels. The only information on the enemy's carriers was the possibility that the First Carrier Division had left the Empire. This deduction was made from an analysis of current traffic and was confirmed two days later by the arrival of these ships at Truk on January 23. The Second Carrier Division, which had arrived at Truk on January 19, was estimated to be there still.¹ The cruisers ATAGO and NAGARA were stated to be en route to Truk and from that port five enemy submarines were known to have departed on patrols on January 16 and 17.² Another submarine was located in the Solomons by a Dog Fox fix. The Eighth Cruiser Division, which had left Truk on the same day that the 2nd Carrier Division arrived there, now turned up in the Marshalls-Gilberts area, according to traffic analysis, and was linked with some unknown activity there to which radio intelligence reports were being addressed by the Japanese.³

The arrival and departure dates at Miri, North Borneo, of two large tankers, the NISSHIN Maru and the #2 NISSHIN Maru, were given. The call of the latter tanker at Miri subsequently was cancelled, but the other tanker stopped at Miri as scheduled and while anchored at

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1. II, #312, Item 2.
 2. II, #312, Items 3 and 4; #314, Item 3.
 3. II, #312, Item 5.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 947022

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CHAPTER

JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

Hiri on February 8 was torpedoed by the U.S.S. TROUT. Although the NISSHIN Maru did not sink after this attack, she had to be towed to Singapore for repairs.⁴

The final item in the bulletin concerned the construction of an airfield on Ocean Island by the Japanese. The size and location of several proposed landing strips were stated in great detail in an intercepted message dated September 9, 1942.⁵ The bulletin predicted completion of this field in the near future and a week later sightings of a field at Ocean Island were reported. However, further photographic reconnaissance failed to disclose any indications of an airstrip there.⁶

4. II, #312, Item 1.

5. II, #312, Item 6.

6. III, #321, Item 8 and #335, Item 7.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 23, 1943

Traffic analysis supplied a majority of the intelligence items in the daily bulletin. It was known from this source that the enemy was maintaining a lookout station at Cape Alexander on the northern tip of Choiseul Island, and that an unusual amount of traffic was emanating from the Marshall Islands.¹ Similarly, there were indications that Japanese surface vessels soon might attempt again to run supplies to Guadalcanal.² The bulletin also listed fixes on two enemy submarines.³

The only new information concerning the enemy's carriers also was derived from traffic analysis. The SHOKAKU was believed to have been at Kure on January 21, but the locations of the other units of the First Carrier Division were unknown. The Second Carrier Division last was noted to be arriving at Truk on January 19 and was believed to be there still. Of the auxiliary carriers the UNYO and CHUYO were not located but the OTAKA was estimated to be undergoing repairs at Truk of the damage suffered when she was torpedoed on December 12. It was observed that the Staffs of both the Second and Third Fleets were associated currently with practically all the traffic from the southern theatre and that a unit associated with the Third Fleet was in the northern Solomons.⁴

1. II, #313, Items 2 and 4.
 2. II, #313, Item 5.

3. II, #313, Item 6.
 4. II, #313, Item 1.

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CHAPTER

January 23, 1943 (Continued)

From decrypted traffic it was known that the long-heralded transfer of Air Flotilla 24 from the Marshalls to the Empire had been completed at last and that many enemy tankers were taking on cargoes at Miri in North Borneo.⁵ The armament of the surface raiders KIYOSUMI and AIKOKU also was reported from a similar source.⁶

CinCPac in three dispatches on this date informed ComSoPac and the commanders of the South Pacific task forces that enemy planes were trailing an American force near Guadalcanal. This force proved to be Task Force #67, which was on its way to bombard the Vila-Stanmore area on Kolombangara. However, no attack on this force was made until after the bombardment.⁷ Enemy planes attempted to strike this force as it withdrew but were held off by accurate radio controlled fire. One enemy plane was shot down.

A dispatch from ComSoPac on this date notified the American commands in the Solomons that an enemy tanker and auxiliary cruiser were expected to arrive in Kula Gulf on January 23 and 24 respectively. On January 24, a search plane attacked an enemy tanker en route to Vila

5. II, #313, Items 3 and 7.
6. II, #313, Item 8.
7. II, CinCPac Dispatches 230231, 230856
23056 January, 1943.

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

on Kolombangara but no hits were scored and further attacks failed because of bad weather. This tanker probably was the one of which ComSoPac had given notice. A few days later, January 31, this tanker was sunk by American planes when it was intercepted while en route to Munda with the same auxiliary cruiser.⁸

8. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 230028 January, 1943.

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 24, 1943

There was positive and recent information on the enemy's carriers in the bulletin for this day. It was reported that the HAYATAKA was now at Truk after escorting the ships carrying a part of the 20th Army Division from Palau to Newak around January 17.¹ This intelligence on the recent movements of the HAYATAKA explained the persistent association of the Third Fleet with the southern theatre since mid-January and identified the unit of Carrier Division Two which was reported to have arrived at Truk from the south on January 19.² The other carrier of the Second Division, the HITAKA, was estimated from fixes to be in the Empire undergoing repairs. Of the First Carrier Division, the ZUIKAKU and the ZUIHO, with the battleship MUSASHI and Destroyer Division 10, were known to have arrived at Truk on January 23 from Japan, and the SHOKAKU was believed to be refitting still at Kure. There was some indication that the Commander of the Third Fleet was aboard the ZUIKAKU.³ The unexplained flurry of activity in the Marshalls noted in the previous day's bulletin was observed to continue. An unusual amount of activity in the northern area was noted.⁴ This was interpreted to be an indication of convoy movements between Japan and the Aleutians as intercepted messages later proved.⁵

1. II, #314, Item 2.
2. II, #303, Item 2; #304, Item 3;
#305, Item 3; #309, Item 3;
#310, Item 1.

3. II, #314, Item 3.
4. II, #314, Items 4 and 6.
5. II, CinCPac Dispatches
260217, 301903 and 312035
January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 94770220

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

The bulletin also contained some intelligence on enemy submarines. Three Iton class submarines were reported to have departed from Penang on December 5 for patrols in the Arafura Sea.⁶ In addition the positions, obtained by Dog Fox fixes, of five other submarines were listed.⁷ One of these fixes was in the Baker-Canton area.

6. II, #314, Item 5.
7. II, #314, Item 1.

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Authority *ND 947022*

CHAPTER

JANUARY 25, 1943

The unexplained presence of the cruiser TONE in the Gilberts-Marshalls area was responsible for a warning in the daily bulletin that the TONE might soon make a sea-raid.¹ Extensive air searches in the eastern Marshalls also were reported and the aircraft tender SHINKOKU Maru and many marus were noted to be in this area.²

Several other cruisers were located. The ASHIGARA was believed to be near Java and the Ninth Cruiser Division was known to be operating still in the vicinity of Wewak. A mineslayer, the ITSUKUSHIMA, was reported to be near Waigeo Island off northwestern New Guinea.³

The number of submarines whose positions, as detected by Dog Fox fixes, were listed increased to six in this bulletin.⁴ Except for one in the Howland-Baker area, all of these fixes were in the southeastern theatre. It was disclosed, too, that two Item class submarines had gone south from Truk on January 23.⁵ It was stated further that enemy submarines still were supplying Guadalcanal and that another run of the "Tokyo Express" appeared to be imminent.⁶ This supply attempt was made on the following night.⁷

1. II, #315, Item 1.
2. II, #315, Item 2.
3. II, #315, Item 8.

4. II, #315, Item 5.
5. II, #315, Item 6.
6. II, #315, Item 7.
7. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 252351
January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

CHAPTER

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

There was no new intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers but there were indications that the Japanese Army had jurisdiction over aircraft operating in western New Guinea.⁸

There were two dispatches based on radio intelligence from ComSoPac on this date. In the first of these the the American commands in the South Pacific area were warned of the possibility of an enemy offensive on January 27. The appearance of a cruiser and an aircraft tender in the Marshalls-Gilberts area seems to have precipitated this concern.⁹ The other dispatch notified ComAirSoPac and the Commanding General on Guadalcanal of the probable arrivals of supply submarines at Kamimbo on January 26, 27, and 29.

Alerted by the warnings in CinCPac's bulletin and ComSoPac's dispatch, the authorities at Guadalcanal instituted measures to effect and interception of any submarine or surface vessels that might attempt to reach Guadalcanal on the nights of January 26, and 27. It was a run of the "Tokyo Express" that was intercepted. A force of seven destroyers and one cruiser was sighted about 100 miles from Guadalcanal just before dusk. Nightfall made impossible an aerial assault upon

8. II, #315, Items 3 and 4.

9. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 252312 January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

ND 947022

CHAPTER

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

this convoy, although a single plane vainly attempted two bombing runs. However, this appears to have been sufficient to induce the convoy to turn back or to take refuge in the neighboring Russell Islands for no further contact was made with the convoy.

A submarine was intercepted on the night of January 29. ComSoPac had warned that a submarine might attempt a landing on that night. This submarine, the I-1, was carrying troops to Guadalcanal when it was intercepted off Cape Esperance by two New Zealand corvettes who depth-charged it to the surface and then rammed and beached it.

The I-2 which was scheduled originally to arrive at Kamimbo on the night of January 26 postponed her trip for a day because of weather conditions. By her own report, the I-2 was sighted north of Guadalcanal and subjected to a prolonged but ineffectual attack by enemy destroyers. The I-17, scheduled to reach Kamimbo on January 27, was equally fortunate in escaping undamaged from an air attack while enroute to Guadalcanal.¹⁰

10. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 252351 January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 26, 1943

The bulletin announced that an enemy offensive was imminent. This prediction was based upon references to "KE Operations" in current intercepted traffic. The associations noted in traffic analysis offered the only clue as to where this offensive would be staged and these pointed to the New Guinea-Solomons area.¹ Perhaps related to this intelligence was the concentration of commands noted at Truk. These included the Commanders of the Combined, Second, Third, Fourth and Submarine Fleets.² It was reported, too, that the cruisers NAGARA and ATAGO had arrived at Truk on January 25 and both carrier divisions were estimated to be there still.³ To meet the threat of the offensive toward which this and other current intelligence pointed ComSoFac disposed his task forces between New Caledonia and the Solomons.

In the Marshalls-Gilberts area, the association of the cruiser TONE with units and commands in this area continued and the tanker SHIRETOKO was expected to arrive at Jaluit on January 30 from Truk.⁴ The SHIRETOKO was damaged on January 26 by the U.S.S. WHALE but was able to continue her voyage.

1. II, #316, Item 7.
 2. II, #316, Item 8.

3. II, #316, Items 8 and 9.
 4. II, #316, Items 4 and 5.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

The bulletin further reported that troops from Tsingtao, China were en route to Palau and that the KAMAKURA Maru would leave Yokosuka on January 29 to arrive next day at Osaka.⁵ Fixes on three enemy submarines also were listed. One of these was north of Canton Island.⁶

In separate dispatches on this date, CinCPac warned of the possibility of an enemy raid on one of the islands south of Oahu, probably Canton. This warning was prompted by the still unexplained and continuing flurry of activity in the Marshalls mentioned in the daily bulletin for the preceding several days. The air defenses of Canton were bolstered by the dispatch to that base of six additional planes and a daily aerial patrol of the Howland-Baker area was instituted at once, although a visual reconnaissance of the Gilbert Islands on January 26 had found little shipping and no undue activity there. A submarine had been Dog Foxed in the Canton area for several days too. This raid occurred on January 30 when Canton Island was shelled by an enemy submarine.⁷

In another dispatch Task Force #8 was informed of evidence that two more ships were en route to Attu from the Empire.⁸

5. II, #316, Items 3 and 6.
6. II, #316, Item 2.

7. II, CinCPac Dispatches 262151 and 262213 January, 1943. See also CinCPac Bulletin #319, Item 9.
8. II, CinCPac Dispatch 260217 January, 1943.

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Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

The January 26 intelligence bulletin contained two other items not yet mentioned. It was reported that traffic analysis indicated that submarines were engaged in carrying supplies to enemy forces in New Guinea and the appearance of a supply submarine at Kamimbo on the evening of January 27 was predicted.⁹ This latter information had been sent to the authorities at Guadalcanal a few hours earlier by ComSoPac.¹⁰

9. II, #316, Item 1.

10. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 252351 January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 27, 1943

Again the bulletin carried a warning that Canton or some other Allied base south or east of the Gilbert Islands might be attacked soon by an enemy force which might include the cruiser TONE, known to be in the Marshalls-Gilberts area.¹ Aside from an estimate that the CHUYO was in Japan and still engaged in ferry duties, there was no news of the enemy's carriers, but fixes were obtained on two vessels northeast of Midway and fixes on four submarines were listed, among which again was one in the Baker-Canton area which had been appearing for the past several days.²

An extension of the enemy's system of bases was observed in indications that new bases were under construction at Wickham Anchorage, Russell Islands, and at Kaimana in southwest New Guinea.³ The scheduled arrival of the 24th Pioneers at Ambon from Sasebo on February 16 portended new airbases in western New Guinea.⁴

The bulletin also listed a number of enemy ships known to be operating in the northern area. These were the destroyers WAKABA and NUMAKAZE, the minelayers ISHIGAKI and KUNAJIRI, and the ASAKA Maru, TEIYO Maru, and #2 TOKO Maru.⁵

1. II, #317, Item 1: CinCPac Dispatches 262151 and 262213 January 1943.
2. II, #317, Items 3 and 4.

3. II, #317, Item 6.
4. II, #317, Item 5.
5. II, #317, Item 2.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)

In another dispatch on this date an enemy submarine patrol line of three to eight submarines southeast of Guadalcanal was reported to the American commands on that island by ComSoPac.⁶ Inasmuch as an American convoy consisting of four transports were en route to Guadalcanal from Noumea at this time, it is interesting to speculate whether this concentration of submarines at this particular time and place might not indicate that the security of this transport operation had been compromised. An alternative explanation of this deployment of enemy submarines is that it constituted a part of those movements of the Japanese at this time which were interpreted to indicate that an enemy offensive in the Solomons was imminent.

6. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 272337 January, 1943.

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 28, 1943

There were several items of intelligence concerning enemy submarines in the bulletin for this day. A new attempt by the Japanese to cut American supply lines to Guadalcanal was forecast. To this end, enemy submarines were expected soon to deploy along a line southeast of Guadalcanal.¹ In addition, it was reported that the I-27 had left Penang for Singapore on January 27.² Fixes on four enemy underseas craft also were listed.³ In combatting American submarines, enemy shipping was expected to rely increasingly on zig-zag tactics.⁴

The only news concerning the enemy's carriers was that the auxiliary carrier UNYO, on ferry duty, was due soon at Truk with Destroyer Division 7.⁵

The other items in the bulletin dealt with diverse matters. New Japanese weather stations were reported on Christmas Island and Waingapu (Sumba).⁶ On Rendova Island in the Solomons an artillery or AA unit appeared to have been established.⁷ There was evidence that the planes of the cruiser CHOKAI had been ashore at Rabaul on January 26 and that the 25th Air Flotilla might be preparing to operate in the northern area soon.⁸

1. II, #318, Item 1.
2. II, #318, Item 2.
3. II, #318, Item 2.
4. II, #318, Item 8.

5. II, #318, Item 3.
6. II, #318, Item 5.
7. II, #318, Item 4.
8. II, #318, Items 6 and 7.

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 29, 1943

The bulletin for this day carried an estimate of the locations of the enemy's carriers.¹ The SHOKAKU and the HITAKA were thought to be in Empire waters, while the ZUIKAKU, the ZUIHO, and the HAYATAKA were believed to be at Truk. At Truk also was the auxiliary carrier, OTAKA, undergoing repairs. Still ferrying between Truk and the Empire were the UNYO and the CHUYO.

A warning again was issued of submarines south and southeast of Guadalcanal, especially in the area between longitudes 159-20 and 160-40. Seven enemy submarines were located through fixes.² It was also reported that an enemy submarine had reconnoitered Canton Island. Subsequent events were to show that this reconnaissance was the prelude to a shelling of Canton by two submarines on January 30. One of these submarines was the I-8 which had been Dog Foxed in the vicinity for several days previous.³

The departure of another convoy of three ships from Truk on the morning of January 28 was reported, too. The destination of this convoy was not known but Shortland Island appeared to be a logical guess.⁴

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1. II, #319, Item 4.
 2. II, #319, Item 3.
 3. II, #319, Item 9.
 4. II, #319, Item 6.

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Authority NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

Several enemy commands and units were located. The Commanders of the Combined and Fourth Fleets were estimated to be at Truk, and the Commander of the Fifth Fleet in the upper Kuriles on January 27th.⁵

A new association noted in current traffic linked the 19th Army with the Bismark Area and it was known similarly from an analysis of intercepted traffic that a part of the 755th Air Group was stationed at Nauru.⁶ Traffic intelligence also placed the light cruiser KASHII near Singapore.⁷

A warship of similar type, the NATORI, was reported to be proceeding to Makassar or already there after being hit by Allied bombs at Ambon on January 21. An American submarine unsuccessfully attacked the escorted NATORI on January 23 on her way to Makassar.⁸

A number of dispatches based upon radio intelligence were originated on this day. Earliest of these was one in which CinCPac notified ComSoPac that enemy planes were trailing an American force south of San Cristobal. This was Task Force #18. Less than two hours after CinCPac's warning was sent, this force was attacked by torpedo planes and the cruiser CHICAGO was left dead in the water. The damaged cruiser was taken under tow but the ship and her escort were kept under constant surveillance by enemy planes. Another of their sighting reports was

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5. II, #319, Items 2 and 8.
 6. II, #319, Items 5 and 7.
 7. II, #319, Item 10.
 8. II, #319, Item 1.

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

intercepted later and sent to ComSoPac by CinCPac along with a warning that ten enemy submarines were deploying along two lines south and southeast of Guadalcanal. On the following morning the enemy planes renewed their attacks and succeeded in sinking the CHICAGO and damaging a destroyer.⁹ A report of an enemy plane concerning the hits on the CHICAGO was intercepted and became the subject of a dispatch from ComNavActSol to ComSoPac.¹⁰

In another dispatch, ComSoPac notified the American commands in the South Pacific that the area southeast of Guadalcanal would be patrolled by enemy submarines on the night of January 29 and that enemy bombers were expected to carry out an aerial search of the same area on the morning of January 30.¹¹

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9. II, CinCPac Dispatches 290715 and 292355 January, 1943.
 10. II, ComNavActSol Dispatch 290846 January, 1943.
 11. II, ComSoPac Dispatch 291748 January, 1943.

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Authority *nnn 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~CHAPTERJANUARY 30, 1943

Most of the items in the bulletin were devoted to reporting the movements of enemy ships. It was known that the light cruiser KINU and minelayer AOTAKA were arriving at Singapore on January 31 from Makassar as escorts for a damaged ship. The disabled cruiser NATORI, it was recalled, had proceeded to Makassar a few days earlier after being damaged by Allied planes at Ambon. Therefore it seemed very probable that it was the NATORI which the KINU and AOTAKA were escorting to Singapore. Later intelligence confirmed this assumption.¹ Another light cruiser, the NAGARA, was reported to have arrived at Rabaul from Truk on January 28.² A cable laying vessel was known to be near Rabaul, too.³

An estimate that the Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet was at Truk on January 27, constituted the only information about the enemy's carriers in the bulletin.⁴

The movements of several other ships were disclosed. The previously announced call at Miri of the large tanker #2 NISSHIN Maru now was reported cancelled and an unidentified vessel was listed as due at Wewak at 0900 L (-11) February 1 from Truk.⁵ A number of convoys from Palau to Wewak, Rabaul, and possibly Hollandia were forecast for the near future.⁶

1. II, #320, Item 2.
2. II, #320, Item 10.
3. II, #320, Item 8.

4. II, #320, Item 1.
5. II, #320, Items 4 and 5.
6. II, #320, Item 9.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

nnd 947022

CHAPTERJANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

CinCPac's warning to ComSoPac that ten enemy submarines were operating south and southeast of Guadalcanal in an effort to cut the American supply lines to that island was repeated in this bulletin.⁷ It also was made known that the Japanese were transporting ammunition to Lae from Rabaul via submarine and fixes on six enemy underseas craft in the southeastern theatre were listed.⁸

Radio intelligence supplied the subject matter of two dispatches issued by CinCPac on this date. In the first of these, Task Force #8 was informed that enemy vessels were approaching Kiska and that they had been ordered to enter the harbor prior to 1900 GCT at which time American planes usually appeared over Kiska. These ships were expected to arrive on January 30 or 31. In another dispatch on the following day based upon the same source, CinCPac sent further details from the anchorage instructions given to these enemy vessels.⁹ These ships eluded interception by the American task forces dispatched to intercept them, one of the vessels arriving at Attu on January 31 and the other at Kiska on February 4.

In the second dispatch, CinCPac advised Canton Island that until February 12 the Japanese were conducting air searches from Makin Island to a distance of 800 miles in the arc from 090 to 120 degrees true.¹⁰

7. II, #320, Item 5.

8. II, #320, Items 6 and 7.

9. II, CinCPac dispatches 301902 and 312035 January, 1943.

10. II, CinCPac Dispatch 302037 January, 1943.

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

CHAPTER

JANUARY 31, 1943

Much of the bulletin was given over to intelligence concerning the enemy's air branch. It was reported that extensive air searches from Nauru and Makin Islands were planned for the period from January 29 to February 12. The area within the arc from 90 to 120 degrees true to a distance of 800 miles from Makin was to be covered by the search planes from that place. The planes based at Nauru were to search to a distance of 600 miles through an arc from 160 to 230 degrees true. These searches seem to have been ordered in connection with the presence of an Eastern Diversion Force in the eastern Mandates. The purpose of this force now appears to have been to divert the attention of American forces in the South Pacific from the simultaneous evacuation of Guadalcanal.¹ The announcement that the Commander of the Second Fleet had sortied from Truk at 1100 L (-11) on January 30 suggested instead that an offensive in the southeastern sector might be imminent for in the past sorties of this command he had been accompanied by a task force.²

That carrier planes were being based in the Solomons also was reported. This step strengthened the belief that the Japanese were preparing to mount an offensive.³ This too was the only carrier information contained in the bulletin. An intercepted report on the number and types of planes available to the enemy on January 21 at Buin and Rabaul was included in the bulletin.⁴ Wewak's defenses were expected to be bolstered

1. II, #321, Item 1.
 2. II, #321, Item 9.

3. II, #321, Item 2.
 4. II, #321, Item 4.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *no 947022*

CHAPTER

JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

on January 31 with the arrival of a flight of Army fighter planes to be followed shortly thereafter by units of the 20th Army Division from Palau.⁵ It was mentioned, further, that airfields at Tarawa, Ocean, and Nauru islands had been sighted by reconnaissance planes.⁶ However, additional photographs of Ocean Island taken a few weeks later disclosed no indication of the existence of an airstrip there.⁷

The other items in the bulletin listed the positions of five enemy submarines, as detected through Dog Fox fixes, and disclosed that the 14th Submarine Division was operating in the Malay area.⁸ It was also noted that two enemy marus were expected to reach Kiska on the morning of January 31 or February 1, local time.⁹

A number of dispatches based upon radio intelligence were originated on this day. The information on the sortie of the Commander of the Second Fleet from Truk with its implied threat to the Solomons area was sent by CinCPac to ComSoPac and by the latter to the American task forces and bases in the South Pacific. As events were to show, however, the mission of this force was not offensive but to cover the evacuation of Guadalcanal.¹⁰

6. II, #321, Item 8.
7. III, #335, Item 7.
8. II, #321, Item 6.

9. II, #321, Item 5.
10. II, CinCPac Dispatch 310235
January, 1943.

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Authority *ND 947022*

CHAPTER

JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

In two other dispatches CinCPac informed Canton Island of a fix upon an enemy submarine in that vicinity and ComSoPac and the commanders of the South Pacific task forces of an intercepted sighting report by an enemy plane southeast of Guadalcanal.¹¹

11. II, CinCPac Dispatch 311951 and 312351
January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

PREFACE TO APPENDIX

The Appendix contains the sources of all statements made in the Summary and Chapters. The arrangement of the Appendix in general is self-explanatory but attention is called to one of the principles upon which the quoted material has been selected. All available translations of every intercepted dispatch quoted have been included in order that the contributions of all the radio intelligence units might be shown impartially and because these translations sometimes differ substantially. These several translations are listed chronologically according to their time of transmission. The same policy has been adopted in regard to traffic intelligence. A comparison of date-time groups will show which of the several translations were available at the time when the American dispatch based on this intelligence was originated. The messages themselves are quoted as found in the files except for minor corrections of form and typographical errors.

The three radio intelligence units have used several designators. The unit at Washington from time to time has been represented by NAN, NEGAT, NSS, and WASHINGTON; that at Melbourne (formerly in the Philippines) by BAKER, BELCONNEN, MELBOURNE, T2W, and more recently by FRIMEL; the unit at Pearl Harbor by HOW, HONOLULU, NPM, and PRUPAC.

Action reports have been included after only those intelligence items to which some positive and fairly immediate action can be traced.

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Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 1, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #291

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMSWPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

010231 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The whereabouts of the enemy's combatant carriers remained unknown, but there was some indication that the First Carrier Division minus the SHOKAKU might be approaching Truk from the north.

No. 1-a:

COMBATANT CVS STILL UNLOCATED X SLIGHT INDICATIONS HOWEVER THAT PROBABLY CARDIV 1 LESS SHOKAKU MAY BE APPROACHING TRUK FROM THE NORTH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

From the associations among the addressees of an intercepted message, it appeared that a carrier unit or units of the Third Fleet was expected at Truk shortly.

No. 1-b:

At 1510-30th CINC 4th Fleet (SEYA 0) originated despatch to CofS 3rd Fleet (MOHE 7), info 4th Harbor Affairs Bureau (KIOSI), Comdr. 41st Guard Division (NETIME - at Guam), Comdr. 21st Air Group Truk (IROKE), CofS Combined Fleet (KUA 1), and 11th Air

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JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (continued)

Fleet (RAHE 7), Fleets 105 Air Arsenal Truk (RIHATU), carrier or cardiv (SUWA 6), plus unident (RIKOSU) followed by _____ CofS 61st.

Association tends to indicate provisions are being made for arrival at Truk of carrier unit of Third Fleet. SUWA 6 appeared in several other despatches, including 3rd, 4th and 8th Fleets, which further suggests presence of carrier in southern area.

(T2W-310920-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 54).

* * *

CinC 4th Fleet (SEWA 6) addressed a despatch at 1510-30th to Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet, information to-

- Truk Harbormaster (KISOI)
- 41st Guard Division (NETINE)
- 19th Air Group (IROKE)
- Chief of Staff Combined Fleet (KUA 17)
- Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet (RAME 7)
- 105th Air Arsenal (RIHATU)
- Unidentified (SUWA 6)
- Unidentified (RIKOSU)

_____ "Chief of Staff of 61-----"

This despatch has all the appearance of arranging for the arrival of 3rd Fleet unit(s) at Truk.

The unidentified SUWA 6 seen above is very prominent in traffic and may be another unit in addition to RIWA 7 also moving south.

(HYPO-31-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 51).

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

The arrival of the ZUIKAKU and possibly the ZUIHO at Truk on January 4 evidenced the correctness of this interpretation. See Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

#294, January 4, 1943.

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JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

An unusual weather report from Greenwich Island was noted.

No. 2-a:

GREENWICH ISLAND SENT ONE UPPER AIR SOUNDING ON 30TH WHICH IS UNUSUAL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This report from Greenwich was considered unusual because that island seldom sent weather reports. The rare appearances of Greenwich in traffic generally had been in association with the Third Fleet, hence this report of interest to aircraft, was considered an indication of the presence of a Third Fleet carrier in that area.

No. 2-b:

030030 December, 1942 (approx)

From: MIERFU (Greenwich Islands Weather Station)
To : KISEU

(Sending upper air sounds taken approx 030030th).

COMMENT [redacted] - Unit sending message had very ruff /sic/ "Maru" note and used commercial and Navy procedure.

(HYPO-30-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 30, 1942, p. 93).

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Authority no 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-c:

In reference to the 3rd Fleet interest in air activity, a weather report was intercepted from Greenwich Island on the 30th. This is mentioned because Greenwich is not an integral part of the weather net as evidenced by the very infrequent appearance of any weather from that station. Only three reports have been copied from that station since 1 October. The report yesterday was upper air data and probably the result of a balloon sounding. It was therefore made by and for air units.

Greenwich Island has been seen very little in despatches but in practically all appearances association with the 3rd Fleet has been marked. This occurrence of an isolated weather report of interest to aircraft from a station previously seen only in association with 3rd Fleet may be taken to indicate the arrival of carriers in the area.

(HYPO-31-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 94).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Rabaul was observed to be requesting weather reports from the New Guinea-New Ireland area.

No. 3-a:

RABAUl CALLING FOR WEATHER REPORTS FROM ALL STATIONS
NEW GUINEA NEW IRELAND AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was drawn from an analysis of current traffic.

No. 3-b:

Very little traffic in this area concerned operations. Rabaul is calling for weather reports from all stations in the New Guinea-New Ireland area including Salamaua.

(HYPO-31-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 103).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes were reported on seven enemy submarines.

No. 4-a:

SUBS PLACED BY DF X 5 NORTH 154 EAST X REST SOUTH AND EAST X 09152 X 02159 X 07159 X 04157 X 10161 X 13155

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 4-b:

D/F Fixes for December 31, 1942.

NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6645	152 E 09 S	1530-30
NARAE	Sub	13220	159 E 02 S	2305-30
NARAE	Sub	13220	159 E 07 S	2356-30
NARAE	Sub	13220	157 E 04 S (Buka Area)	0518-31

(HYPO-31-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 30, 1942, p. 66a).

The source of the other fixes has not been ascertained.

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The position of the submarine reported at 10 South Latitude 161 East Longitude was considered sufficiently menacing to American supply lines to Guadalcanal to call out a daily aerial patrol over this area. A temporary rerouting of shipping also

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

was necessary.

No. 4-g:

From: CTF 62 012125 January, 1943
 To : CTU Operational Priority
 Info: ALL TFC SOPAC
 ASP TULAGI-GUADALCANAL
 CINCPAC

IN VIEW OF ORANGE SUB DOG FOXED AT 10 SOUTH AND
 161 EAST CTF 62 RECOMMENDS GRANT BE ROUTED NORTH
 AND EAST SAN CRISTOBAL

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 1, 1943).

No. 4-d:

From: CTF 62 012130 January, 1943
 To : COMGEN GUADALCANAL Operational Priority
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMAIRSOPAC

REQUEST DAILY ANTISUBMARINE PATROL BY AIRCRAFT IN
 VICINITY DOG FOXED ORANGE SUB POSITION 10 SOUTH
 161 EAST UNTIL THIS SUB HAS BEEN ELIMINATED X CTF
 62 SENDS X PASS TO COMADNAV BASES

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 2, 1943).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

The auxiliary carriers OTAKA and UNYO were estimated to be at Yokosuka and Truk respectively, both engaged in ferrying aircraft. The UNYO had arrived at Truk from Surabaya on December 14 with a load of Army fighter planes, which subsequently were flown to Rabaul.

No. 5-a:

BELIEVE OTAKA AT YOKOSUKA ON 31ST AND UNYO AT OR ARRIVING TRUK SAME DAY X BOTH ENGAGED IN FERRYING PLANES X UNYO ON RECENT TRIP FROM SURABAYA TO TRUK (ARRIVED THERE 14 DEC) CARRIED ARMY TYPE 1 FIGHTERS WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY FLOWN TO BISMARCK AREA ON 18 DECEMBER X THIS TYPE 1 FIGHTER IS BELIEVED SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO THE ZERO

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The OTAKA's presence in Empire waters was disclosed by the following sources.

No. 5-b:

A despatch from BuAer to OTAKA, info CofS Combined Fleet, CofS Yokosuka, and #2 Air Arsenal was delivered to Truk by Tokyo at 21 hours 30th, indicating OTAKA probably in Empire.

(NSS-301645-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 30, 1942, p. 114).

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Authority NOV 94 7022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-g:

311140 December, 1942

J.C.S.

Serial 767

KASUGA Maru will proceed direct and RIZAN Maru will depart today at 1500 and proceed alone to Nagoya. Comdr. Yokosuka Naval Base.

(NPM-312142-December-DI)

[Ed. note: The OTAKA was named the KASUGA Maru before her conversion to an auxiliary carrier].

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 130).

* * *

311140 December, 1942

Serial 767

From: RUSUSU
To : NUSINE

From Yokosuka Naval District Chief of Staff.

The KASUGA Maru will proceed direct and the RIZAN Maru will depart at 1500 today independently for Nagoya.

(NES-041745-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1942, p. 124).

An anchorage assignment was evidence that the UNYO was expected very soon at Truk.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-d:

311800 December, 1942

Serial 690

From: Garbled originator
 To : ISA 7 (Unident)
 Info: SITAE (Unident)
 OWI 68
 HOE 8 (Staff 8th Fleet)
 SOE 18 (Staff Major Command)

Anchorage are designated as follows:

1. (UNYO) is to anchor at point bearing 245 degrees distance 2900 meters from 230 feet or meter peak on Harushima Island.
2. Blank Maru is to anchor at point bearing 180 degrees distance 500 meters from UNYO.
3. In view of conditions there is no objection to some variations in actual anchorages.

COMMENT: Harushima is Moen Island at Truk.

(NSS-311846-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 44).

The purpose of the UNYO's trip to Java in November was disclosed by the following message.

No. 5-e:

221325 November, 1942

From: No originator
 To : NURA 1 (Unident)
 HIRU 9 (Unident)
 Info: IBHE 8 (SubForce)
 SAI 8 (11th Air Fleet)
 KASO 3 (4th Fleet)
 TERU 8 (Tokyo Radio)

Serial 549

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-e: (continued)

From CinC Combined Fleet.

Captain of UNYO [redacted] with UNYO [redacted] and Des-
Div 7 (less 1 DD) will proceed as quickly as possible
to Soerabaya to transport to PT (Truk) the Army air
force which is being transferred to RR (Rabaul) and
which will load at Soerabaya the last day of November
and (first day?) of December. Unit to be transported
consists of 4 Squadron wings of Type 1 fighters total-
ing 49 planes 36 reserve planes and 300 men.

COMMENT: This explains journey of UNYO to Soerabaya.

(NSS-302158-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 30, 1942, p. 91).

This translation clarified an earlier trans-
lation by Honolulu.

221325 November, 1942

From: Blank
To : RARA 1
HIRU 91
Info: AHE 0
SIA 0
SASO 3
TERU 8

Concealed unknown originator:

Some unit (less something) under command of the
Captain of blank ship will as soon as possible
embark the Army air force (Kokubutai) which is
to move up to Rabaul (Type One fighters 0 - 59
and 300 personnel; 36 of some type of plane) and
transport them as far as Truk.

(NFM-230302-November-DI)

(GI Date File, November 22, 1942).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

These planes carried to Truk by the UNYO were those which were reported in flight between Truk and Rabaul on December 18. See ComSoPac Dispatch 180632 December, 1942. The UNYO's trip to Java was noted in Item 4 of CinCPac Bulletin #261, December 2, 1942; Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #264, December 5, 1942; and Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #271, December 12, 1942.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The stationing of a weather ship southeast of Horomushiro and the imminent arrival of a convoy at Kiska were reported.

No. 6-a:

JAP WEATHER SHIP BEING SENT TO 47 N 160 E X CONVOY
EXPECTED KISKA FROM HOROMUSHIRO ANY TIME NOW

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See CinCPac Dispatch 010229 January, 1943 in
which this information was sent to Task Force #8.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 1, 1943GINCPAC BULLETIN #291 / British Addresses 7

From: GINCPAC
 To : NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 CINC EASTERN FLEET
 ACNB
 NZNB

010351 January, 1943
 Priority

TYPE 1 ARMY FIGHTERS CARRIED FROM JAVA TO TRUK FIRST HALF
 DECEMBER BY UNYO X THESE PLANES LATER FLEW TO NEW BRITAIN
 ON 18TH X APPEARANCE OF THIS FIGHTER SIMILAR TO ZERO X
 ZYMOTIC X GINCPAC 291 X BEARINGS ON SUBS X DOWN UNDER BY
 EAST X 02159 X 10161 X 09152 X 13155 X 04157 X 07159 X
 ALSO 154 EAST 5 NORTH X EXPECT CONVOY AT KISKA FROM HOR-
 OMUSHIRO VERY SOON X UNYO EITHER AT TRUK OR ARRIVING SOON
 X OTAKA IN YOKOSUKA DECEMBER 31ST X BOTH DOING PLANE
 CARRYING WORK X WEATHER MARU GOING TO 160 EAST 47 NORTH X
 RABAUUL ASKING FOR REPORTS ON WEATHER FROM NEW IRELAND
 NEW GUINEA AREA X ONE UPPER AIR SOUNDING FROM GREENWICH
 ISLAND NOTED 30TH RATHER OUT OF THE ORDINARY X SOME IN-
 DICATION THOUGH SLIGHT THAT POSSIBLY 1ST CARRIER DIVISION
 MINUS SHOKAKU ARRIVING TRUK SOON FROM JAPAN X HOWEVER
 CONSIDER ALL COMBATANT CARRIERS REMAIN UNLOCATED

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 1, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 010229(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Commander of Task Force #8 was informed that a weather ship was being stationed southeast of Horomushiro coincident with the departure of two vessels for Kiska and one for Attu with Army supplies.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : CTF 8

010229 January, 1943
Priority

HERES ZEAL FROM CINCPAC X A WEATHER SHIP GOES TO 47 NORTH 160 EAST ON 1 JANUARY EAST LONGITUDE X LAST TIME THIS MARU DID THIS CONVOYS OF 2 AND 3 MARUS WENT TO ATTU AND KISKA RESPECTIVELY X THIS TIME 2 MARUS SLATED FOR KISKA 1 FOR ATTU CARRYING ARMY SUPPLIES

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 1, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The weather ship's position was known from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 2

From: Blank originator
To : KAUME (KAIHO Maru)
Info: 7 info addres

301720 December, 1942
Priority

From Captain of TAMA.

The KAIHO Maru will leave here on 1 January and [go] to the vicinity of 47 N 160 E and observe and report the weather and generally patrol the area. On 10 January it will depart from its station and return to Kateaka Bay.

(NSS-301745-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 30, 1942, p. 110).

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Authority *and 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 1, 1943 (Continued)

The two ships reportedly bound for Kiska were the MONTREAL Maru and the NITTEI Maru which were the subject of Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #289, December 30, 1942. The source of the intelligence concerning the ship bound for Attu is not known.

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The MONTREAL Maru was sunk off Kiska and the ship bound for Attu near that island on January 5 and 6 respectively. See CinCPac Dispatch 041951 January, 1943.

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #292

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

020245 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

An increase in offensive operations of enemy submarines about the Solomon Islands was forecast but no decrease in the enemy's efforts to run supplies to Guadalcanal was anticipated. An unusual amount of shipping in the Carolines also was noted.

No. 1-a:

INCREASED SUB ACTIVITY SOLOMON AREA EXPECTED X
 CONTINUED SUPPLY TO GUADALCANAL SEEN X HEAVY MARU
 TRAFFIC IN CAROLINES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These conclusions were drawn from an analysis of current traffic.

No. 1-b:

Traffic lead normal for 31st with submarine commands continuing prominent especially those associated with Guadalcanal activities plus [redacted] 1st and 2nd Transportations Groups which suggests continued use of submarines as transport.

(T2W-010728-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 52).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-g:

Two abnormal situations were observed in the traffic of January 1st; namely, an unusually heavy amount of submarine activity in the Solomons, and a greater than usual amount of ship movements (principally maru) in the Marianas-Carolines area.

(HYPO-1-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 8).

No. 1-d:

The remaining submarine activity appears to be additional attempts to reinforce Guadalcanal, although Guadalcanal forces were not mentioned in several reports from ComSubFor. This latter may indicate diversion of some units from Guadalcanal reinforcing duty for assignment to scouting tasks.

(HYPO-1-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 58).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 2-a:

JAPS BELIEVED PINCHED FOR SHIPPING AT LEAST
ALONG CHINA COAST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch from Tokyo stated as much.

No. 2-b:

From: Tokyo
To : Canton

23---- December, 1942

Serial 063

The TOZAN Maru is leaving Bangkok on January 23
bound for Canton. We are terribly pinched for
shipping and it will probably be difficult for
us to allot you any more.

(NSS-312325-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 188).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

Bearings on eight enemy submarines were obtained by the Dog Fox method.

No. 3-a:

SUBS SHOWN AT X 10161 X 08150 X 01152 X 07155 X
X 03147 X 04152 X 06156 X 05150 X ALL SOUTH AND
EAST BY BEARINGS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

D/F Fixes for January 1, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ.</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6645	161E, 10S	1816-31
NARAE	Sub	6645	150E, 08S	1625-31
NARAE	Sub	6645	149E, 08S	1642-31
NARAE	Sub	13220	152E, 01S	2333-31
NARAE	Sub	13220	152W, 01S	2046-31
NARAE	Sub	13220	155E, 07S	0040-31
NARAE	Sub	13220	147E, 03S	0505-1
EKA 8	Sub	13220	152E, 04S	0455-1
NARAE	Sub	13220	156E, 06S	0600-1
NARAE	Sub	13220	150E, 05S	0640-1

(HYPO-1-January-TT)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 1a).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Commander of the Eighth Fleet was reported to be at sea in the southern area on his flagship, the CHOKAI.

No. 4-a:

CINC 8TH FLEET AT SEA SOUTHERN AREA IN CHOKAI

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This Command was located through traffic analysis.

No. 4-b:

At 2145 Rabaul called 8th Fleet (MOHORE), MIMUROSAN Maru (NUKEKA), unidentified (REMAKI) and (ROWA Ø) on 5370 to deliver message to info addressees CINC 8th Fleet (MOHORE 4) and unident (ROEA Ø) of despatch from staff unident (YUA 98) or (MAA 98) originated at 1408-30th which was action to staff unknown (NERU 78) and additional info addressees chief of staff unident (HOWA Ø7), CofS 8th Fleet (HORU 7) and (NUMAUKU). Indication that Cinc 8th Fleet is at sea in CHOKAI contained in service message from 42nd Guard Division (FURATO) to (AKESA) at 1800-30th requesting check on Staff 8th Fleet's message 301327. Rabaul broadcast this for CHOKAI. Appears Chief of Staff 8th Fleet is not with Cinc.

(NBS-311547-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 114).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

The enemy's base at Buin appeared to be growing in importance.

No. 5-a:

BUIN BASE ACTIVITY INCREASING

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Buin's new importance was reflected in traffic associations.

No. 5-b:

At 2100 30th Rabaul called Buin to deliver message to Staff of AirFlot 26, info unident (TAME 4), originated by unknown staff (WEN 18). This appears to locate Staff AirFlot 26 on Bougainville. NERU 78 who originated from Buin may therefore be Air Flotilla 26. At 2018 Rabaul called Buin to deliver Rabaul's message 301702 to (garbled HAKU 7 may be Sasebo 6th Special Landing Force HUKUYU) and staff (NERU 7). Buin Base is apparently assuming more importance.

(NSS-311530-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 85).

No. 5-c:

Unidentified heading associated

[REDACTED] (Comdr. 31st Air Group), Staff officer Shinada (NENOKU), and Buin Air Base (KIWAFU). Assuming 31st Air Group is correct it would indicate this air group now operating from Buin Air Base probably connection increased air support in Munda-Gudalcanal area.

(T2W-011142-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 49).

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nnd 947022

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The auxiliary carrier OTAKA was reported about to leave Japan to ferry planes to the 21st and 26th Air Flotillas in the southern theatre, but of the combatant carriers there was no further information.

No. 6-a:

OTAKA BELIEVED READY DEPART JAPAN WITH PLANES FOR 21 AND 26 AIRFLOTS IN SOUTHERN THEATRE X.....
NO ADDITIONAL DATA ON COMBATANT CVS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was based upon an analysis of current traffic.

No. 6-b:

BuAer (SUKUNE) addressed a despatch to unident (YURI 4) information to a long list of activities in the 8th Fleet area and the OTAKA (RESARI) at 1155-30th. Probably indicates a ferry trip for the OTAKA to the Rabaul area.

(HYPO-31-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 95).

No. 6-c:

Bureau Aeronautics originated dispatch at 155Z the 30th to Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet (YURINE), info Chief of Staff Combined Fleet (KISIMA), Commanders AirFlots 21 (UKIKE) and 26 (SUTAWI), Air Arsenal #2 (KAKITU) #105 (RIHATU) and #108 (TUHOYA), unident air commands (KINEYA) and (MOORE)

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-c: (continued)

plus OTAKA (RESARI) and unident (REMAMU). Association of OTAKA in this heading suggests this ship might be ferrying planes and equipment from Empire to southern area for AirFlots 21 and 26.

(T2W-010728-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 39).

In Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin #291, January 1, 1943 the OTAKA was located at Yokosuka through traffic analysis, but on January 20 the carrier damaged on December 12, 1942 by an American submarine was identified as the OTAKA. After this attack, the OTAKA succeeded in reaching Truk and probably remained there throughout January for repairs. See Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #313, January 23, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were indications that the enemy had established a weather station in the Aleutians.

No. 7-a:

APPEARS TO BE A NEW WEATHER STATION IN HIGH NORTH PROBABLY ON SEMICHI OR ATTU ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Weather reports from this new station revealed its existence.

No. 7-b:

A newcall (HANITA) appeared on December 31st in the Kurile Islands area sending weather reports. From available information, it is believed that this new station is located on Semichi Island (S.E. of Attu) or on Attu. Simultaneously with the appearance of this new weather station, a new weather code is being used in this area. The appearance of new weather stations in the north emphasizes the prospect of increasing Japanese interests and flying operations there.

(HYPO-1-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 70).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

In Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin #298, January 8, 1943 additional indications of an enemy weather station in the Semichis were reported. However, later evidence indicated that Attu and not the Semichis was originating these weather reports. See CinCPac Dispatch 190255 February, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 2, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #292 /British Addressee/

From: CINCPAC
To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
ACNB
NZNB

020359 January, 1943
Priority

WIRELESS SHOWS SUBS SOUTH BY EAST X 05150 X 07155 X 10161
X 06156 X 03147 X 01152 X 04152 X NO NEW INFO ON COMBATANT
TYPE CARRIERS X ZYMOTIC X BULLETIN 292 X LOOK FOR MORE SUB
ACTIVITY SOLOMON THEATRE AND EXPECT GUADALCANAL SUB SUPPLY
OPERATIONS CONTINUING X CHOKAI IN BISMARCK AREA AT SEA WITH
8TH FLEET COMDR ABOARD X OTAKA THOUGHT SOON TO LEAVE JAPAN
FOR RABAUL ZONE WITH PLANES CONSIGNED TO AIRFLOTS 21 AND 26
ABOARD X CAROLINES SHOW MUCH MARU TRAFFIC X NEW WEATHER
STATION PROBABLY ON ATTU OR SEMICHI ISLAND X INCREASE IN
ACTIVITY AT SHORTLAND X SIGNS OF SHIPPING STRINGENCY AT
LEAST UP AND DOWN COAST OF CHINA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943COMSOPAC DISPATCH 021321(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Commanding General at Guadalcanal was informed that Japanese heavy bombers in several waves were scheduled to bomb Guadalcanal on the night of January 2.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC 021321 January, 1943
To : COMGEN AT GUADALCANAL Urgent

FROM COMSOPAC X ULTRA INDICATIONS HEAVY BOMBERS
DUE GUADALCANAL BETWEEN 2200 LOVE (-11) 2ND AND
0230 LOVE 3RD X 3 IN 1ST WAVE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS
SHORTLY AFTER

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 2, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The plans for this attack were disclosed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 2

From: YURO 64 021430 January, 1943
To : KIYU 61
HAFU 41
EU 91
MEYU 31 (Kavieng)
TATUSU (Guadalcanal Def. Force)
Info: TAHASO (25th or 26th AirFlot)
NSI 98

At 1600 3 heavy bombers followed shortly after by more take off from Vunakanau to attack Guadalcanal arriving about 2000. Attack will continue until 0030. 2 of these planes refuel and rearm at Buka during this time.

(NPM-021144-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 80).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

* * *

From: YURO 04
 To : KIYUBI
 HAFU 41
 EUGI
 MEYU 31 (Kavieng)
 TATSUSU (Guadal. Def. Force)
 Info: TAHA 50 (25th or 26th AirFlot)
 NSI 90

021430 January, 1943

Today (the 2nd) three attack planes of this force will take off from Vunakanau Air Base (Rabaul) between 1600 and 16???. After 2000 they will bomb Guadalcanal. Two of the planes will then land at Buka after 2200. One plane is scheduled to return to Vunakanau Air Base after making reconnaissance over Guadalcanal for thirty minutes.

(HYPO-2-January-DI)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

A light raid was reported at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal on the night of January 2. A few bombs were dropped but no damage was reported.

No. 3

From: SENAV CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF SOPAC
 COMGEN FIRST MARINE

022133 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

3 ENEMY PLANES OVER CACTUS FIELD, SINGLY, FROM 2200 L UNTIL 0120 L X FEW BOMBS DROPPED X DAMAGE NOT YET KNOWN

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 3, 1943).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

This raid was made probably to divert attention from a "Tokyo Express" run that was made that night. Possibly it was hoped so to damage the Guadalcanal airfield that aerial interception of the convoy would be impossible.

Unlike the major runs of the "Tokyo Express" in the preceding month, this run of the "Express" escaped prior detection by radio intelligence and apparently was discovered accidentally by American planes en route to bomb the enemy's base at Buin. This convoy of ten destroyers was sighted in time to permit an interception by planes and torpedo boats which resulted in the sinking of two of the destroyers and the damaging of two or three others. Despite these losses, it is believed that the enemy succeeded in landing supplies and reinforcements on Guadalcanal that night.

The air raid lasted from 2200 L January 2 to 0120 L. Since ComSoPac's dispatch was sent at 0021 L January 3, his warning could not have arrived much before the conclusion of the attack.

No. 4

The only other important effort by the Japanese to reinforce Guadalcanal during this period was on the night of 2-3 January by 10 destroyers. At 1426, 2 January, these were attacked by 5 B-17's which dropped 40 500 pound bombs; no hits. At 1800, 2 January, 9 SBH with fighters attacked these DD's off Munda, hitting 2 of them. One of the damaged destroyers was last seen burning badly and believed sinking.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 2, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4 (continued)

The remaining 8 proceeded to Guadalcanal where they were attacked by 11 motor torpedo boats, 6 of which gained firing position and obtained 1 hit on 1 destroyer and 3 probable hits on 2 others. Enemy planes bombed the motor torpedo boats without damaging them. Destroyers threw overboard many watertight drums and boxes of ammunition and food. After daylight all supplies in sight were destroyed by our surface craft. A dawn strike group could not locate the retiring destroyers, but 8 were later sighted by a search plane near Faisi.

(Operations in Pacific Ocean Areas, 1942; Solomon Islands Campaign from Fourth Battle of Savo, 30 November, 1942, to Munda Bombardment, 4-5 January 1943. Report by CinCPac dated March 9, 1943, p. 5).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 3, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #293

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

030345 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The creation of an 8th Area Army Command with headquarters at Rabaul was reported.

No. 1-a:

8TH AREA ARMY COMMAND APPEARS TO BE ESTABLISHED WITH HEADQUARTERS AT RABAU.

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This new command appeared as an addressee in intercepted traffic.

No. 1-b:

The Comdr 8th Area Army (DAI HATI HOMET GUN) is addressed at Rabaul. Suggests that central Army command for SE area has been established.

(HYPO-2-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 77).

The Chief of Staff of the 8th Area Army already had been observed in intercepted traffic.

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JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-c:

[redacted] #8 Area Army Chief of Staff (DAI HATI HOUNEN SATI) appeared frequently on the 21st in Rabaul traffic.

(HYPO-22-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 20, 1942, p. 65).

No. 1-d:

Staff Officer Shimada (NENOKU) apparently still in Solomons as dispatch headings continue to associate this officer with [redacted] CofS 8th Area Army, CofS Combined, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets, AirFlots 21 (HAN 9) and 26 (TAME 8) plus Buin addresses NAME 68 and WINO 62. This officer at 0705 19th addressed dispatch to [redacted] Staff 252 Air Group and Staff AirFlot 26 info WINO 62 (at Buin), which suggests part of 252nd Air Group at Buin Air Base.

(T2W-200756-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 22, 1942, p. 78).

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JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Definite intelligence on the location of the enemy's combatant carriers still was lacking, but there was some evidence that the Advance Force might be near Rabaul and a renewal of action in the southern theatre appeared imminent.

No. 2-a:

LOCATION COMBATANT CVS DOUBTFUL X BEST ESTIMATE IS TRUCK AREA WITH INTENTION OF PROCEEDING LATER TO SOLOMONS X THERE IS A SLIGHT INDICATION THAT COMDR ADVANCE FORCE (CINC 2ND) MAY BE NEAR RABAU X GOOD INFORMATION IS SCANTY AT PRESENT BUT SIGNS POINT TO RENEWAL ACTION SOUTHERN THEATRE BEFORE LONG X PROBABLY IN SOLOMONS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

There was some indication in current traffic headings that carriers might be near the Carolines.

No. 2-b:

Several despatches from the 1st Combined Communication Unit at Rabaul were in 5 numeral code and went to only 3 major fleet commanders: Combined, 2nd, and 3rd. Additional addressees were Saipan, Truk, Jaluit, and Palao RI stations, Tokyo D/F and RI Headquarters. The only conclusion to be reached from this type of heading is that the despatches are direction finder and radio intelligence summaries of Marianas-Carolines, and the inclusion of 3rd Fleet Staff suggests that carriers are in or are expected in the area.

(HYPO-1-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 27).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-c:

WAFUSA (tentative carrier) originated long 2-part dispatch at 2250-31st to Tokyo (YAYUKI) and Kure (WITOME) Personnel Bureaus, CinC 3rd Fleet (TEMAMI), and Comdr. CarDiv (NERE). Rabaul sent 1 part of this to Tokyo for delivery to Personnel Bureaus with delivery already indicated to CinC 3rd Fleet and CarDiv Comdr., which suggests these two commands already in Rabaul area or at least not in Empire, however might be in routing as last definite indications placed CinC 3rd Fleet at Kure.

(T2W-020705-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 88).

No. 2-d:

A so far unexplained association of 19th Air Group with 3rd Fleet and Carolines escort units was observed today, suggesting that 3rd Fleet units are ferrying planes for 19th Air Group.

(HYPO-1-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 30).

These indications were soon confirmed for from the intercepted message quoted under No. 5-b, CinCPac Bulletin #294, January 4, 1943 it was learned that the ZUIKAKU and possibly another carrier were scheduled to arrive at Truk on January 4.

The Advance Force was addressed in a dispatch at Rabaul, indicating its presence in that vicinity.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-e:

Advance Force (ROKE 85) specifically addressed at Rabaul in 5N no-originator dispatch 020723, action 43rd Guard Div at Palao, info ROKE 85 and WAWO 45 (unident).

(HYPO-2-January-TI)

(T.I. Summary, January 2, 1943, p. 5).

A study of current traffic also suggested the possibility of renewed action in the southern theatre in the near future.

No. 2-f:

Consideration of following current as yet unrelated indications:

1. Rather obvious intensification of repair, fitting out, replenishment and training 3rd Fleet units which have composed the spearhead of previous offensive moves, notably against Midway.
2. Apparent formation or reorganization of Southern Army which through recent appearance of calls associated that command and their compromise by address [redacted] is apparently a new organization with headquarters at Palao.
3. Very unusual association 65 Guard Division at Wake with Gou Army Force in Solomons and,
4. Indication of possible further troop movements from Empire to Saipan which was one of the jumping off points for Midway campaign. Suggests preparations are in progress for formation of a strong striking force to be used either to counter future Allied offensive moves or to carry out further offensive action against Allied bases. No definite indication of objectives as yet.

(T2W-300945-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 30, 1942, p. 8).

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JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-g:

No originator despatch at 1713 30th was addressed to unident (HAREE) followed by _____ Chief of Equipment Bureau (ISOMU) and Chief of General Staff Southern Army (NATUTE). Surabaya sent this to Tokyo for delivery to all except Chief of General Staff Southern Army for whom delivery was indicated which suggests headquarters this army might be as far south as Surabaya. Other Army traffic associated transport groups at Shortland and CofS Troop Transportation Group (Senpakuheidan) at Rabaul. This suggests further movement troops into Solomons but destination not indicated.

(T2W-310850-December-TI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 91).

No. 2-h

At 1018 2nd, 1st Combined Communication Unit (EHA 5) addressed two parter to Naval General Staff, Intelligence Section (ONI 59), Tokyo D/F Control (WENI 8), Yokosuka Communication Unit (IKE 6), Chichijima (IKE 8), Palao (WOFU 4), Truk (OMU 3), Jaluit (ISI 1), Singapore (SUWO 8), Saigon (HORO 9), Ambon (WIMA 9), Saipan (HUFU 2), unidents (METE 5, TIHA 5, RAHA 2, HANI 5, MOYU 2), info CofS Combined Fleet (YAKE 89), Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet (YAWO 49), CofS 3rd Fleet (REWO 49). Unident calls are probably communication units with possible exception of MOYU 52. This is very unusual address for 1st Combined Communication Unit, and inclusion of 2nd and 3rd Fleets in address suggests that these commands directly involved in coming operations.

(NSS-021020-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 147).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes were obtained on ten enemy
underseas craft.

No. 3-a:

SOUTH AND EAST DOG FOX POSITS SUBS X 01156 X
05149 X 12152 X 01151 X 01157 X 05153 X 12156
X 04148 X 08153 X 06162

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 3-b:

D/F Fixes for January 2, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	155-30E, 00-30S	2038-1
NARAE	Sub	5350	149 E 05 S	1552-1
NARAE	Sub	5350	152 E 12 S	1648-1
NARAE	Sub	5350	151 E 01 S	1625-1
NARAE	Sub	5350	158 E 01 N	2135-1
NARAE	Sub	13220	156 E 01 S	2245-1
NARAE	Sub	13220	N. Kavieng Area	0135-2
NARAE	Sub	13220	153 E 05 S	2350-1
NARAE	Sub	5300	156 E 12 S	1500-1
RUMA-7	Sub	13220	148 E 04 S	0545-2
NARAE	Sub	13220	153 E 08 S	0600-2
NARAE	Sub	5300	162 E 05-45S	0938-2

(HYPO-2-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 36a).

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JANUARY 3, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-a:

JAP DESTROYERS IN THE PAST KNOWN TO HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES AS PRECAUTIONARY EXPEDIENT WHILE SCREENING A TASK FORCE DURING SORTIE AT TRUK X EACH DD DROPPED ONE EACH TEN MINUTES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The source of this information is not known. These tactics may have been observed by an American submarine or they may have been ordered or reported in an intercepted dispatch. The following message reveals that similar precautionary measures were taken at Balikpapan.

No. 4-b:

From: NARAE
To : RIE 8
MONA 8
UNA 8

141046 October, 1942

Info: IE 80 (4th Fleet)
UYA 90
WENI 5

From C.O. ASHIGARA.

ASHIGARA departing Palao at 1500 on (14 or 15) Oct. for Balikpapan. Arrives channel entrance 1000 on 18th. Requests defensive depth charge barrage prior to arrival.

(NPN-061154-January-DI)

(D.T.B. December 6, 1942, p. 43).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 3, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #293 /British Addressee/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

030631 January, 1943
 Priority

LOCATION 3RD FLEET UNITS REMAIN PROBLEMATIC X TRUSTWORTHY
 INFORMATION NOW SCARCE BUT SOME SIGNS INDICATE COMING OPER-
 ATIONS MOST LIKELY IN SOLOMONS WITH CARRIERS ENROUTE SOUTH
 FROM JAPAN AND NOW MAY BE NEAR TRUK X ZYMOTIC BULLETIN 293
 FROM CINCPAC X ARMY IN SOUTHERN SPHERE THOUGHT UNDER AN 8TH
 AREA ARMY COMMAND SET UP AT RABAU X DOWN UNDER BY LAST SUB
 POSITS ACCORDING TO BEARINGS X 04148 X 01156 X 06162 X 12156
 X 01157 X 05153 X 08153 X 01151 X 12152 X 05149 X ENEMY DES-
 TROYERS ON SCREENING DUTY OF TASK FORCES DURING SORTIE AT
 TRUK KNOWN AT ONE TIME TO HAVE EMPLOYED PRECAUTIONARY DROP-
 PION OF DEPTH CHARGES USING 10 MINUTE TIME INTERVAL X AD-
 VANCE FORCE COMDR (2ND FLEET COMDR) SLIGHTLY INDICATED
 RABAU VICINITY

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

134

JANUARY 4, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #294

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMSWPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

040139 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 1-a:

JAPS HAVE AIRFIELD PAGAN ISLAND IN MARIANAS GROUP
X ALSO AIR ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME SORT SUSPECTED
IOJIMA (SULPHUR) ISLAND IN BONINS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The existence of an airfield at Pagan was
disclosed by an intercepted message.

No. 1-b:

021520 January, 1943

From: YARI 6 (Unident)
To : HEWO 6 (Unident)
HOMA (57th Air Base Tenian)
IYU 6 (Truk Air)
HEHO 1 (Unident - land)
FUTE 7 (Unident - land)

From Commander 252nd Air Group, transporting.

1 plane of 252nd Air Group transporting arrived Pagan
airfield 1700L Will depart tomorrow the 3rd for
Tenian.

(NSS-021400-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 39).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

An air establishment at Iojima was indicated in the heading of an intercepted dispatch.

No. 1-g:

Inclusion of Iojima (TURUTU) in line-up of addreses including action address 108th Air Arsenal (TUHOYA), info addressees 2nd Air Arsenal (SAKITU), BuAer Tech. Off. (TUUKA), Tokyo War Plans (NIETU), unidentified (SUYANE) and Iojima (TURUTU), may indicate a new air arsenal at that place.

(HYPO-2-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 141).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was evidence that some enemy submarines were equipped to carry a small scout plane.

No. 2-a:

SOME SUBS CARRY SPECIAL SMALL TYPE ZERO SCOUT PLANE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from the following dispatch.

No. 2-b:

151221 November, 1942

From: No originator
 To : SUKUNE (Gen. Affairs Div. Naval Tec. Det.)
 Info: SUFUNI (21 Air Arsenal)
 YAHOKO (11 Air Arsenal)
 SAKITH (Kiska 2nd Air Depot)

From CinC 6th Fleet.

The three small type Zero scouting planes for use of the 6th Fleet will be assigned to [redacted] (two I boats) and I-21 [redacted]. Please order pilots to these ships and send three reserve planes to Truk immediately.

(NSS-021912-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 100).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The disbandment of the 6th Destroyer Squadron and the 19th Minelayer Division in July of 1942 was announced.

No. 3-a:

19TH DIVISION (MINELAYERS) DISBANDED IN JULY X
DESRON 6 ALSO DISBANDED DURING JULY

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The following intercepted messages disclosed the disbanding of these two units.

No. 3-b:

080930 July, 1942

Serial 121

From: MON 3 (CinC 4th Fleet)
To : SOTU 9 (South Seas Force)
Info: MIRU 5 (CinC 11th Air Fleet)
MORO 2 (ComAirFlot 24)
NIRI 6 (ComAirFlot 25)

South Seas Force Operation Order #247.

When DesRon 6 is disbanded on (10 July) the Captain of the Yubari will be designated as Comdr. #1 Escort Unit.

Commander Support Force will have Yubari proceed to RR (Rabaul) and make preparations for next period operations.

(NSS-011516-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 15).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-a:

031830 July, 1942

From: YAMA 404 (CofS 4th Fleet)
To : MIYORE (1st Sect. Nav. Gen. Staff)
Info: NERE 66 (Comdr. 19th Division)

I have heard that the 19th Division is to be disbanded on 10 July. Inasmuch as I have not received formal verification, details are unknown to me. At present the 19th Division is carrying out operations in the Lae area and is scheduled to arrive Truk on the 12th. If it is disbanded on the 10th the necessity of shifting the flag would be very inconvenient from the viewpoint of operations. Therefore request that the division be disbanded after 15 July.

(NSS-021941-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 38).

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NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCENo. 4-a:

MAIN BATTERY DIRECTOR ELEVATION TO APPROX 40
DEG ON ALL JAP BATTLESHIPS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was obtained from an inter-
cepted message.

No. 4-b:

061150 July, 1942

Serial 947

From: TIMURA (Naval Technical Dept)
To : MIMOA (Kure Arsenal)
RESU (Combined Fleet)
TAYOI

BatDiv 3, CarDiv 3, BatDiv 1 and BatDiv 2 in the
order named will at the earliest practical oppor-
tunity accomplish the following alterations to
their fire control installations:

1. Change the elevation angle of the fwd and aft
main battery directors to approximately 35 degrees
as our (your) Navy Yard Plan.

2. Alter the main battery range finders so as to
provide for an angle of elevation of approximately
40 degrees.

3. Expedite the completion of the work to be done
ashore. Forces afloat will designate availability
periods for installations.

4. Cost will be charged to special disbursements
section of the budget under "Ship", blank, "ordnance",
"light and power".

(NSS-012230-January-DI)

(GI Date File, July 6, 1942).

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JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The arrival at Truk of a submarine and one or two carriers was reported.

No. 5-a:

ZUIKAKU INDICATED ARRIVING TRUK FROM NORTH X
ZUIHO MAY BE IN COMPANY X I-31 ARRIVING TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The arrival of these units at Truk was scheduled in the following dispatch.

No. 5-b:

031645 January, 1943

From: SOE 16
To : Commander Truk Address
Commander #3 TAMASONO Maru

Tomorrow the 4th the following vessels will enter port (Truk): 0600 I-31, course 312 via South Channel. 1430 ZUIKAKU, course 226 North Channel. 0730 ASAHI Maru through Kitashima (Pis II. Channel). 1400 AKITSU Maru same as for ASAHI Maru. 1433 ships BUKO Maru, #2 KYUYO Maru, and KIRISHIMA Maru on course 255 via South Channel.

(NSS-031651-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 37).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The safe arrival of the submarine I-31 at Truk on January 4 was disclosed in a later dispatch.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-g:

From: TUMI 8
 To : SEYA 2
 MOSA 5
 KIMI 3
 REITI
 Info: NOHI 7
 RONU 1
 HAKO 5
 KEKO 5
 TOSO
 KAREHA
 AYA 96
 SINU 7
 ETO 4
 AYA 75
 KUYAWO 5
 KENU 5

061310 January, 1943

04594

I-31 arrived Truk January 4.
 I-8 arrived Truk January 6.
 I-24 left on patrol January 3.
 I-10 left on patrol January 5.
 I-? left on patrol January 6.
 Sub left on patrol January 6.

(NPM-February 19-DI)

(D.T.B. February 19, 1943, p. 34).

The arrival of the ZUIKAKU at Truk was confirmation of recent indications that one or more units of the 1st Carrier Division had departed from the Empire for the south. See Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin #288, December 29, 1942; Item 4 of CinCPac Bulletin #290, December 31, 1942; Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #291, January 1, 1943. Two intercepted messages deciphered several weeks later disclosed that the ZUIKAKU had sailed from her base in Japan on December 31. The ZUIHO and the SHOKAKU remained in Japan where the

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

latter was undergoing repairs.

No. 5-d:

260933 December, 1942

36370

From: NOTA 5
 To : NAO 0 (Combined Fleet)
 WIKA 4 (2nd Fleet)
 MAWE 9 (4th Fleet)
 KUMO 6 (SubForce)
 TAWI 4 (Unident)
 TETA 4 (Southeastern Area Force)
 KOTA 2 (Unident Comm. Officer)
 HIKA 60 (Comm. Officer 4th or 8th Fleet)
 Info: KUHAYO (Guadalcanal Operations Force)

From CinC 3rd Fleet. Striking Force OpOrd #33.

1. CinC 3rd Fleet in ZUIKAKU [] with first section of DesDiv 16 [] will depart blank 27th for PT (Truk) via Yokosuka.
2. [] (unident ship) after leaving Yokosuka on 30 December will join up with this force.

(NSS-211550-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 46).

No. 5-e:

311108 December, 1942

3585

From: Blank
 To : YOTO 9-7
 SATO 1-5 (Combined Fleet)
 AYA 60-93 (Major Command)
 RIMI 90-73
 HAKI 2-1
 IWI 8-0
 Info: HEHI 3-4 (4th Fleet)

ZUIKAKU, DesDiv 16 less [], and YUKIKAZE departed Yokosuka.

(NPM-281058-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 117).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-f:

291553 December, 1942

27400

From: No originator
 To : SAYO 27 (CofS Combined Fleet)
 SATU 47 (2nd Fleet)
 TORI 87 (4th Fleet)
 FUKA 16 (Unident)
 Info: MIYO 5 (Unident)
 YATA 4 (Unident)
 ERI 99 (Unident)
 YUYO 5 (Unident)
 TIWE 1 (Unident)
 WAHO 3 (Unident)
 REMO 2 (Unident)
 TESE 2 (Unident)
 ATA 5 (Unident)

From CinC 3rd Fleet.

CarDiv 1 [redacted] less ZUIHO [redacted] and SHOKAKU
 [redacted] DesDiv 18 [redacted] less 1st Section plus
 AKATSUKI [redacted] will proceed to Truk according to
 the following schedule:

Request that suitable screen be provided.

- 1 January (? 21182) [redacted]
 1100 leave Yokosuka.
 1300 5 miles blank degrees from [redacted]
- 2 January.
 1600 15 miles 110 degrees from [redacted]
 1800 blank miles 275 degrees from [redacted]
 2000 115 miles(?) 260 degrees from [redacted]
- 3 January (? 82639) [redacted]
 2000 pass between Agrigan and Pagan.
- 4 January (? 24927) [redacted]
 0630 30 miles east of Murillo.
 1030 North Channel.

(NSS-312005-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 31, 1943, p. 25).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes disclosed the positions of four enemy submarines and a carrier.

No. 6-a:

ONE UNKNOWN CV DOG FOXED NEAR YOKOSUKA X SUBS BY BEARINGS X SOUTH AND EAST X 04152 X 00155 X 06158 X 08152

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 6-b:

D/F Fixes for January 3, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	152 E 04 S	0025-2
NARAE	Sub	13220	158 E 06 S	0541-3
NARAE	Sub	13220	155 E 00	0412-3
NARAE	Sub	5300	152 E 08 S	1200-3

(HYPO-3-January-TI)

(D.T.B January 2, 1943, p. 52b).

No. 6-c:

Bearings on TORE 3, who is associated with tentative carrier (MEWI 9), placed him in the Yokosuka area.

(T.I. Summary, January 3, 1943, p. 2).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

The departure of a transport from Yokosuka on January 7 or 8 to arrive at Truk on January 15 was reported.

No. 7-a:

HEIYO MARU WITH BIG LOAD OF _____ LEAVES
YOKOSUKA 7 OR 8 JANUARY ARRIVES TRUK 15TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The movements of the HEIYO Maru were disclosed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 7-b:

311930 December, 1943

Serial 412

From:	HITISE	(Naval Transp. Sect.)
To :	MITIME	(Yokosuka CofS)
	NISEU 6	(C.O. HEIYO Maru)
Info:	HASUKO	(CofS Maizuru Dist.)
	SIKEKE 30	(CofS 4th Fleet)
	HONORA 30	(CofS 8th Fleet - SE Force)
	RATONA 30	(CofS 2nd Sea Escort Force)
	NIHIMU	(Yokosuka Area Transp. Sect.)
	ORUTE	(Yokohama Area Transp. Sect.)
	FUTEWI	(Rabaul Local Transp. Sect.)
	NOYUWI	
	HAWINO	
	KIKUMU	

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Authority

nnd 947022

The movements of HEIYO Maru as scheduled in Transp. Section Serial 369 is cancelled. She is to operate as follows: Depart Yokosuka on 8 January with the following personnel and cargo:

For Rabaul about 300 men for [sic] Yokosuka Naval District, about 450 men from Takakuwa Industries, about 200 tons of ammunition and 800 cubic meters of provisions from Yokosuka Naval District, 3 cubic

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-b: (continued)

meters of URYULLED [sig] seed and other cargo from Takakuwa Industries.

For Truk about 850 men of the 4th Civil Engineers Section, about 1800 cubic meters of provisions from Yokosuka Naval District and about 500 cubic meters from the South Seas Administration.

Arrive Truk 15 January, depart 20 January.
Arrive Rabaul 23 January, depart 28 January.
Arrive Yokosuka 6 February.

(NSS-312032-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 149).

* * *

311930 December, 1942

Serial 412

From:	HITISE	(Tokyo Transp. Sect)
To :	MYTIME	(Yokosuka CofS)
Info:	HASUO	
	SIKEKE	(4th Fleet)
	HONONU	(Sou. Area Fleet)
	RATONA	(2nd Escort Force)
	NIITIMU	(Yokosuka Area)
	ORUTE	(Yokohama Transp. Sect.)
	FUTEWI	(Rabaul Transp. Sect.)
	NOYUMI	(Truk Transp. Sect.)
	HAMINO	(4th C.E. Sect)
	KIKUMU	(4th Nav. Const. Div.)

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 Authority *ND 947022*

Transportation Section SMS #3--9. Operate as follows:

Arrive Yokosuka 8 January. Load following:

300 troops for Rabaul from Yokosuka Naval Station.
 450 troops for Rabaul from Malsuru Naval Station.
 2 passengers from Takakuwa Sangyoe.
 850 passengers for Truk from 4th Civil Engineers.
 200 tons of ammunition and 800 cubic meters of provisions for Rabaul from Yokosuka Naval Station.
 Silkworm eggs, etc, 3 cubic meters from Takakuwa Sangyoe for Rabaul. 1800 cubic meters of provisions

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-b: (continued)

from Yokosuka Naval Station 500 cubic meters of provisions from Nayoonoo for Truk.

Arrive Truk 15th. Depart 20th.
Arrive Rabaul 23rd. Depart 28th.
Arrive Yokosuka 6th February.

(HYPO-31-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 147).

* * *

311930 December, 1942

Serial 412

From:	HITISE	(Navy Transp. Sect.)
To :	MITIME	(CofS Yokosuka)
	NISEU	6 (HEIYO Maru)
Info:	HASUKO	(CofS Maizuru)
	SIKEKE	3 (4th Fleet)
	HOMORA	3 (8th Fleet)
	NIHIMU	(Yokosuka Area Transp.)
	ORUTE	(Yokohama Area Transp.)
	FUTSWI	(Rabaul Area Transp.)
	NOYUMI	(Truk Transp.)
	HAMIMO	(4th Civil Engineers)
	KIKUMU	(Tokyo Branch 4th Civil Engineers)

Schedule for HEIYO Maru promulgated Transportation Section 355 is cancelled. Her schedule is as follows: Depart Yokosuka 8 January carrying about 300 military personnel for Rabaul (Yokosuka Naval Base), 450 personnel (Maizuru Naval Base), 2 civilians (Takakuwa Industry), 850 civilians for Truk (4th ??), 2,000 tons ammunition for Rabaul, 800 cubic meters food (Yokosuka Naval Base), 3 cubic meters dried rice, etc (Takakuwa Industry), about 1800 cubic meters food for Truk (Yokosuka Naval Base), and 5,500 cubic meters food (South Seas Office).

Arrive Truk 15th. Depart ??th. Arrive Rabaul 23rd. Depart 28th. Arrive Yokosuka 6 February.

(TZW-010503-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 1, 1943, p. 32).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The HEIYO Maru's departure from Yokosuka for Truk apparently was delayed until January 10. She was torpedoed and sunk by the American submarine WHALE on January 17 at 10-15 N, 150-21 E.

No. 7-g:

201300 January, 1943

Serial 024

From: RATON (BUKA Maru - YAMASHIRO Maru - ASAYAMA Maru)
 To : SIKEKE 30 (4th Fleet)
 TEKISU (2nd Sea Escort Force)
 Info: KONANU 30 (Combined Fleet)
 SONBUKU (5th BaseForce)
 KIOSI (4th Harbor Affairs Bureau)

1. HEIYOO Maru torpedoed at 1400 17th and appeared to be sinking.
2. 0300 17th, survivors rescued in estimated position 10-30 N. 151 E.
3. According to despatch from AKATSUKI, 12 boatloads of survivors are drifting in position 10-55 N., 150-45 E. There are many survivors among them I shall proceed to their assistance but it will be dark before I can arrive there. According to survivors' information, an enemy submarine continued to reappear in the vicinity of the life boats on the 19th and 20th, thus making it dangerous to approach them (or I will not approach them). I will arrive at the scene of the disaster at 0700 21st. In order that I may assist the survivors request that you immediately dispatch anti-submarine assistance and a rescue vessel (or vessels).

4. HEIYOO Maru sank at 1900 17th.

(T2W-201850-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 81).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)No. 7-g: (continued)

* * *

202300 January, 1943

Serial 024

From: RATON (ASAYAMA Maru)
 To : SIKEKE 30 (CofS 4th Fleet)
 TEKISU (Surface Escort Unit #2)
 Info: KONARA 30 (CofS in Bako Area)
 KIOSI (Truk Harbor Affairs Sect)
 SONEKU (5th Base Force Saipan)

1. It appears that the HEIYO Maru was torpedoed at 1400 January 17th and sank.
2. 317 men from the HEIYO Maru have been rescued. Position 10-30 North 151-00 East.
3. According to signal from the AKATSUKI, she sighted 12 drifting boats loaded with many men from HEIYO Maru at 10-55 North 150-45 East. We are proceeding to pick up the men but as it is night and according to the statement of men rescued they sighted submerged enemy submarine on the 19th and the 20th it is too dangerous to approach them. We are scheduled to arrive at the scene of the disaster at 0700 on the 21st and rescue the remaining men. In relation to which we would like to have sent from the base rescue vessels and further aid in maintaining anti-submarine precautions.

The HEIYO Maru sank at 1900 January 17th.

(NSS-202333-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 38).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)No. 7-c: (continued)

* * *

202300 January, 1943

Serial 024

From: HERAN
 To : SIKIKE 30 (4th Fleet)
 TEKISU (2nd Escort Force)
 Info: KOWARA 30 (In Bako Area)
 KTOSI (Truk Harbor Master)
 SONE 4

(HOW's copy not so good but following is gist of the loss of the HEIYOO)

1. The HEIYOO Maru was attacked with torpedoes at 1400 17th January and was in a sinking condition.
2. Three hundred seventeen (317) were rescued position 10-30 N, 151-00 E. (Several blanks). In position 10-55 N, 150-45 E, a dozen boats with quite a few survivors were sighted.
3. According to one report received, there was a submerged enemy submarine in the vicinity, and precaution is necessary. I expect arrive on the scene (?) to assist in the rescue at 0700-21st. (possibly 0500). Request you despatch patrol craft as well as a rescue vessel at once.
4. HEIYOO Maru sank at 1900 17th January.

(HYPO-20-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 90).

No. 7-d:

12 April 1943 - Today I heard how the HEIYO Maru was sunk from a man who told me the story in a very detailed fashion. It seems that the ship left on January 10 and was sunk on the 17th by

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-d: (continued)

an enemy submarine. It swallowed six torpedoes and sank after four hours. Of the 2500 men aboard about 900 were left. They met up with ASAMA Maru and communicated by wireless.....I hear the ASAMA was also hit. The big passenger liner seems almost surely to have been sunk.

(JICPOA #3607)

(GI Ship File, HEIYO Maru).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #294 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

040321 January, 1943
 Priority

6TH SQUADRON DESTROYERS AND 19TH DIVISION (MINELAYING) DIS-
 BANDED IN JULY X AIRFIELD ON PAGAN ISLAND (MARIANAS) X SUB-
 PECT SOME SORT OF AIR ESTABLISHMENT AT IOJIMA ISLAND (BONINS)
 X ZYMOTIC X 294TH FROM CINCPAC X MAXIMUM ELEVATION MAIN ARMA-
 MENT DIRECTORS AND RANGE FINDERS RECENTLY CHANGED TO APPROX-
 IMATELY 35 AND 40 DEGREES RESPECTIVELY X ITEM-31 ARRIVING
 TRUK X DOG FOX PLACES SUBS X SOUTH AND EAST X 06158 X 00155
 X 08152 X 04152 X HEIYO MARU CARRYING LARGE NUMBER PASSEN-
 GERS DEPARTS YOKOSUKA 7TH OR 8TH FOR TRUK ARRIVING 15 JAN-
 UARY X SPECIAL SMALL TYPE ZERO SCOUT PLANES BEING USED BY
 SOME ENEMY SUBS X ZUIKAKU ARRIVING TRUK X BELIEVED ZUIHO MAY
 BE ALSO ENROUTE

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JANUARY 4, 1943

COMAIRSOPAC DISPATCH 040122

(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSoPac was notified that an enemy plane had reported sighting an American force off San Cristobal on the morning of January 4.

No. 1

040122 January, 1943
Urgent

From: COMAIRSOPAC
To : COMSOPAC
Info: CTF 62
CTG 62.6
COMTF 64 AND 67
SR. AVIATOR AT GUADALCANAL
COMGENCACTUS

MOST SECRET X ROGER ITEM UNCLE COMTASKFOR 16 SAYS
ORANGE PLANE REPORTED A BLUE FORCE LAT 10-50 LONG
161-30 AT 2330 GCT

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 4, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This contact report was analyzed in the following dispatch from Washington.

No. 2

A series of two most urgent and one very urgent aircraft reconnaissance reports originated by 2 SOSI TOSI 2 and 5 NOYU 2 0830 and 0835 January 4th. One with time of origin 0830 with following text: "040900 MUSUMUSU MUSU NAGORI YAYAYAMEMEME 10 KE NAGORI YIYOYAKE (or KIYOYAKE) NAGORI IYOMORE NAGORI 0830".

This has the appearance of a contact report which has been given a date time group and some additional text by the probable reoriginator 5 NOYU NOYU 2.

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

Two of the dispatches doubleheaded for info to Guadalcanal Operations Force (WISE WISE 6). Only copies received were intercepted on Tokyo UTU transmission at 0945, 0948 and 1010 giving no indication of area of origin but info addressee Guadalcanal Operations Force points to Solomons.

(NSS-040310-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 74).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

This force sighted by the Japanese was Task Force #67, a part of which bombarded the Japanese base at Munda on the night of January 4. No attack was made on this force by the Japanese until the morning of January 5 on its return from Munda. See CinCPac Dispatch 042101 January, 1943.

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JANUARY 4, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 041951

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Information on weather and convoy movements in the Aleutians was addressed to Task Force #8.

No. 1

041951 January, 1943

From: CINCPAC
To : CTF 8

Routine

TODAYS ULTRA CINCPAC SENDS X KISKA SAYS WEATHER FOR 4TH SHOULD IMPROVE X INTENDS LIGHT NIGHT COURSE BEACONS X THEREBY ANTICIPATES CONVOY ARRIVAL X ATTU IS ALSO EXPECTING CONVOY ARRIVAL HAVING REQUESTED SUCH INFORMATION

(CinCPac "Utmost Secret" Dispatch File, January 4, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from intercepted messages.

No. 2

041040 January, 1943

From: NARAE
To : NIHAHI (NITTEI Maru)
AUKU
Info: ROMURU 7
TEYARI 3
KIWAHO (5th Fleet)

Serial 065

From Staff #51 Base Force.

Weather conditions vicinity of Kiska. Rain, wind 33 meters per second, visibility 5000 meters. There are indications that weather will improve. Will light night course beacon today.

(NPM-042108-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 116).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

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JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

* * *

041040 January, 1943

Serial 065

From: NARAE
To : NIHAHI (NITTEI Maru)
AUKU
Info: ROMUSE 7 (Comdr. Tran. Authority Northern
Empire)
MAYARI 3 (Comdr. in Ominate Def. Force)
KINARO KIRPHO 29 (Staff 5th Fleet)

From 51st Base Detachment Staff:

Weather in the vicinity of Kiska: rain, wind velocity 33 meters, visibility 5000 meters. There are indications that the weather will moderate. We will light the beacons on the course between KANO and HIKA.

COMMENT: Meanings of KANO and HIKA not clear but it is believed that these indicate grid positions between which navigational aids will be lighted to facilitate the safe passage of NITTEI Maru and another vessel.

(NSS-042243-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 114).

No. 3

041305 January, 1943

OOOI

From: TUYARE (Ominate Area Defense Force)
To : URUKU (Unident)

Please inform us of scheduled date and time of arrival at Attu Island.

(NSS-040845-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 120).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The ships expected at Kiska and Attu apparently were those mentioned in Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #289, December 30, 1942 and in CinCPac Dispatch 010229 January, 1943.

On January 5, a heavily loaded 5000 ton ship was intercepted and bombed as it approached Kiska. Six 500 pound bomb hits resulted in the sinking of this ship which later was identified as the MONTREAL Maru, a transport.

On the following day, a vessel of similar size heading for Attu was sighted and sunk by a weather plane with two 500 pound bombs three miles from Attu. The debris of this vessel, later known to be the KOTOHIRA Maru, was sighted next day by American planes.

No. 4

From: KODIAK
To : COMINCH
CINCPAC
Info: COMGEN ADC

060450 January, 1943
Routine

ADEPS PASS TO COMINCH AND CINCPAC X ENEMY AK THREE THOUSAND TONS, APPROACHING BOODLE DISCOVERED AND TRAILED BY CATALINA NOON TODAY X THREE B-25'S BOMBED AND LEFT SHIP BURNING IN APPROXIMATE POSITION LAT. 53 DEGREES NORTH LONG. 173 DEGREES EAST X TRAILING CATALINA REPORTS SHIP SANK X LIBERATOR (WEATHER PLANE)

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)No. 4 (continued)

SCORED ONE DIRECT HIT, TWO NEAR MISSES AT ONE HOUR
GCT 6TH ON ANOTHER ENEMY SHIP TYPE NOT YET REPORTED
LAT. 53 DEGREES NORTH LONG 173-10 EAST X COMGEN ADC
BY HAND

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 6, 1943).

No. 5

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMINCH

061915 January, 1943
Priority

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OF AIR ATTACKS REPORTED IN
MY (CTF 8) 060450 X AK SUNK BY B-25'S IN DECK LEVEL
ATTACK WAS 5,000 TONS HEAVILY LOADED WITH AA BOW
AND STERN X CATALINA MADE CONTACT LAT 52-40 NORTH
LONG 178-15 EAST AT 052130 AND TRAILED UNTIL SHIP
SANK AT 060136 LAT 52-40 LONG 178-15 X 2 500 POUND
BOMB HITS BY EACH OF 3 B-25'S AT 060105 ALL PLANES
RETURNED X 1 B-25 REQUIRING ENGINE CHANGE X CONSEN-
SUS' OPINION SHIP RESEMBLED YOSHIDA MARU X ATTACK BY
WEATHER PLANE WAS ON 5,000 TON HEAVILY LOADED AK
3 MILES OFF SHORE APPROACHING HOLTZ BAY X 2 HITS
WITH 500'S X SHIP LEFT BURNING AND SINKING X COMGEN
ADC HAS BY HAND

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 6, 1943).

No. 6

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMINCH
Info: GG ADC

072235 January, 1943
Priority

.....WEATHER PLANE AND CATALINA SEARCHES IN CLOSE
RECONNAISSANCE ATTU SEMICHIS AGATTU ANCHITRA ALL
NEGATIVE EXCEPT 1 MILE OFF HOLTZ BAY 2 LARGE AREAS
OF FLOATING LUMBER OIL DRUMS AND DEBRIS

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 7, 1943).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7

Extracts from: Memorandum - Japanese Shipping Aleutians.

These documents also furnish material for more positive identification of ships encountered in this area.....The ship sunk north of Kiska on January 5, previously identified from the pilots' reports as possibly the YOSIDA Maru, was the MONTREAL Maru. The ship sunk north of Attu January 5th, which had been identified as possibly of the YOSIDA Maru Class, was the KOTOHIRA Maru.

(JICPOA R.S. 5795, May 31, 1943 in GI Ship File, MONTREAL Maru).

No. 8

Extracts from: Enemy Documents, Captured Attu, "An Officer's Diary".

This evening there was a report that KOTOHIRA Maru which was on her way to Attu, has been sunk 5 miles off the coast of Attu. Survivor, 2 or 3 men. Transport ship, MONTREAL Maru, has been missing. Up to today at the North Pacific - (1) BORNEO Maru went aground at Kiska. (2) CHERIBON bombed and went aground at Attu. (3) URAJIO Maru lost near Kiska. Total of 4 ships lost and one missing. One submarine has been sunk and great damage has been inflicted upon our force. Our transportation has become more and more acute.

(JICPOA R.S. 6716, June 26, 1943 in GI Ship File, MONTREAL Maru).

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JANUARY 4, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 042101 (Believed in error, probably about 042400)

(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSoPac and the commanders of the South Pacific Task forces were informed that an enemy patrol plane had reported a contact with an American unit or units on the morning of January 5.

No. 1

042101 (042400?) January, 1943
Priority

From: CINCPAC
To : COMSOPAC
ALL TP COMS SOPAC

ULTRA HERES CINCPAC X A JAP PATROL PLANE AT 0720 1 (-9) REPORTED BLUE CONTACT AT 10-00 SOUTH 159-20 EAST X TYPE CONTACT UNKNOWN HERE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 4, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The contact report follows:

No. 2

Air Contact - 5-0720 plane 5 NOYU 3 sent enciphered contact report giving plain grid position _____ which is near 10-00 S 159-20 E. This was followed by other tactical despatches from 5NOYU3 all readdressed to Sub-Force and Guadalcanal Operations Force.

(HYPO-5-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 64).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)No. 3

Contact report by Tokyo (MOSETE) to all major commands (NNAHA). 050720 NUTE Nigori MAHAMA/ NUNUNU 20 Nigori NOHOYU (7 NATI 1). Grid 159-40 to 160 E, 10-20 to 10-40 S. Meaning of rest of message not known.

(NSS-050800-January-TI)

(D.T.E. January 5, 1943, p. 44).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The American force sighted by this enemy patrol plane was Task Force #67 returning from the bombardment of Munda. Sixteen minutes after this plane's report, the American force was attacked by ten enemy dive bombers. HMNZS ACHILLES suffered a direct hit and near misses were scored on the HONOLULU.

No. 4

Bombardment was completed at 0150. The force retired at 30 knots, the "Black Cats" searching ahead with radar until dawn. Fighters from Guadalcanal arrived over the formation by 0700.

The remainder of Task Force 67, HONOLULU (Rear Admiral Tisdale), ACHILLES, COLUMBIA, LOUISVILLE, DRAYTON, LAMSON and NICHOLAS maneuvered during the night, joining the bombardment group at 0900, 5 January southwest of Guadalcanal.

The 2 groups made contact at 0845 and were steaming in company at 10-15 knots, recovering and launching planes, when at 0936, just south of Cape Hunter, Guadalcanal, about 6 of an enemy force of

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4

10 dive bombers attacked. The planes got 3 near misses on HONOLULU and a near miss and 1 hit on ACHILLES, putting turret 3 out of action, killing or wounding 21 men. Fighters shot down 4 planes. Gunfire, mostly on targets going away, accounted for 1 and possibly 2 planes.

(Operations in Pacific Ocean Areas, 1943, Solomon Islands Campaign from Fourth Battle of Savo, 30 November, 1942, to Munda Bombardment, 4-5 January, 1943. Report by CinCPac dated March 9, 1943, p. 9).

No. 5

Task Force 67 carried out its scheduled bombardment of Munda between 1400 and 1430Z-4. 2 PBV's over the area reported thorough coverage from the west tip of Munda Point to the northeast of the runway and 4 fires started. On the retirement the force was attacked by 10 Jap dive bombers and about 15 zeros. At 2240Z-4 four F4F's from Guadalcanal intercepted and shot down 4 and possibly 6 VB's; our planes were damaged but returned to the field. No. 3 turret on the ACHILLES was hit and put out of action. Six members of the crew were killed and 7 wounded.

(CinCPac War Diary, January 5, 1943, p. 1).

No. 6

From: TF 67
To : COMSOPAC
Retransmitted
From: COMSOPAC
To : CINCPAC
050405 January, 1943
Operational Priority

TRIED FOR 1 HOUR AND 20 MINUTES TO CLEAR THE FOLLOWING BY RADIO GUADALCANAL AND NOUNEA ON 3 SEPARATE FREQUENCIES WITH NO RESULTS X "042345 X NIGHT BOMBARDMENT MUNDA SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE X NO OPPOSITION X CATALINA REPORTS RESULTS FINE X

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 4, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6 (continued)

EXPENDED 2800 ROUNDS 6 INCH X 1300 ROUNDS 5 INCH
ALL IN TARGET AREA X TASKFORCE 67 ORIGINATOR RE-
PORTS WITH REGRET THAT IN ATTACK BY ABOUT 5 JAP
DIVE BOMBERS SOUTHWEST OF GUADALCANAL AT 0935 L
(-11) 5TH NUMBER 3 TURRET ACHILLES HIT AND OUT
OF ACTION 6 KILLED 7 WOUNDED X OTHER BOMBS MISSED
X OBSERVED 2 JAPS SHOT DOWN BY CACTUS FIGHTERS"
X LATER INFO: ACHILLES TURRET PADLY HIT BUT FOL-
LOWING FROM CAPTAIN MANNERGH QUOTE "OUR FIGHTING
VALUE IS ONLY SLIGHTLY REDUCED AND OUR FIGHTING
TEMPER GREATLY INCREASED" X QUOTED DESPATCH ALSO
SENT TO TULAGI BY PLANE BECAUSE OF REFUSAL OPER-
ATORS TO ANSWER UP

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 5, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *DDP 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 5, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #295

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDINS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

050235 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

Current intelligence on the locations of the enemy's combatant carriers was summarized.

No. 1-a:

SHOKAKU IN YOKOSUKA NAVY YARD ZUIKAKU AT TRUK X
 OTHER COMBATANT CVS UNLOCATED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

It was noted in Item 3 of CinCPac Bulletin #284, December 25, 1942 that the repairs on the SHOKAKU were expected to confine that ship to the Yokosuka Navy Yard until the middle of January. The arrival of the ZUIKAKU at Truk on January 4 was mentioned in Item 5 of the bulletin (#294) for that day.

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NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

At least a part of the Third Fleet was expected soon in the Solomons:

No. 2-a:

BELIEVE 3RD FLEET OR PART THEREOF WILL APPEAR IN SOLOMON AREA BEFORE LONG

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This deduction appears to have been based upon the following findings in traffic analysis.

No. 2-b:

Further, the several inclusions of the 3rd Fleet in the day's traffic from Rabaul points to the arrival of carriers in the area.

(NSS-032043-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 42a).

No. 2-c:

Prominence of 3rd Fleet and associated units continued, coincident with the activity on the frequencies noted above. However, the type of traffic handled on these channels appeared to be largely that exchanged between air bases plus units of CarDiv 2, whereas traffic involving the 3rd Fleet Staff was intercepted only on the major broadcasts. No definitely routed despatches were observed today, and the best estimate of 3rd Fleet Staff's location remains Saipan area on the 1st and 2nd. If this is correct it places probable CarDiv 1 within a few days distance of the Solomons.

(HYPO-3-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 28).

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-d:

NEHO 3, who reported the 7 planes over Fauro, at 1500-4th addressed HATU 3 (tentative CarDiv 1) and unidentified TIRI 2, info Chief of Staff 8th Fleet (KEKA 59).

This, depending on the accuracy of the identification, places CarDiv 1 in the Solomons.

(T.I. Summary, January 4, 1943, p. 5).

No. 2-e:

The old lineup of 2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet plus Combined and SubForce in Rabaul radio intelligence traffic, as noted recently, plus the definite association of 3rd Fleet with southeastern area forces in recent traffic, is believed a good indication that another attempt in force to change the trends of action in that sector is imminent.

(HYPO-3-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 44).

No. 2-f:

Rabaul call was originator of important traffic on 3 January and it appears that CinC 8th Fleet must again be ashore at Rabaul. At 0815 he addressed all force commanders Outer South Seas Force, info Combined Fleet, 3rd Fleet, Air Flotilla 26, a major command WIKO 2 which must be 2nd Escort Force by elimination, unidentified MEKO 2 (and an important task force call during the action of 14 November) and probable air group ONU Ø. At 0826 he addressed exactly the same line up less the aircraft units. At 0914 one action to sub unit SEMI 1, info Combined and unident fleet CofS MIHO 8, Air Flotilla 26, and unknown IKO 74.

At 1200 he addressed five unidentified calls NISU 9, SUKO, WINA TINA 3, ROWI 1 and NIYA 5 (the last two of which are closely associated with the Commander

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-f:

2nd Fleet Task Group (RETO 4) suggesting that all 5 are destroyers or destroyer division, info Combined and 2nd Fleets, Air Flotilla 26, and 8 unidentified including WIKO WITO 2 and MBKO 2.

At 2118 he addressed CofS 2nd Fleet (HOTO 6) who was Commander Striking Force on 14 November, the two possible destroyer divisions HIYA 5 and ROWI 1 of the 2nd Fleet Task Group (RETO 4) info CofS Combined and unidentified ROWU 2.

All of these messages were of low precedence indicating planning rather than operational texts. It is considered important to note that the command calls appearing in these despatches include the originators of the tactical directives in the battle of 14 November plus well identified Third Fleet calls which have been notably absent from traffic in the southern area for some time. They are recapitulated with their probable administrative meanings and apparent tactical character of 14 November; HOTO 6 (CinC 2nd, Commander Striking Force), MERO 2 (Com. blank, Commander Reinforcement Force), RETO 4 (ComDesRon, Commander Convoy Escort). While these calls may be purely tactical and indicate the function of the addressees rather than that they are the same forces which engaged in the operations of 14 November, the conclusion is indicated that a convoy, reinforcement, and possibly a striking group are being formed. Further, the several inclusions of 3rd Fleet in the day's traffic from Rabaul points to the arrival of carriers in the area.

(NSS-032043-January-TI)

(D.F.B. January 3, 1943, p. 42).

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was evidence that both submarines and surface ships had resumed their attempts to supply and reinforce Guadalcanal.

No. 3-a:

RENEWED SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT ATTEMPTS AT GUADALCANAL BY SURFACE SHIPS AS WELL AS BY SUBS SUSPECTED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Indications that such attempts were being made were found in analyses of current traffic which reflected the run of the "Tokyo Express" on the night of January 2. See ComSoPac Dispatch 021321 January, 1943.

No. 3-b:

Considerable operational traffic involving division SOMI 1 appeared during day and evening 2nd. This division plus flagship IRO ϕ of that division were associated with Buin (SONOSO), Munda (NEKIYO), Guadalcanal (HOKOME), and SeaplaTenDiv 11 (MOYU 3). IRO ϕ was in direct communication with CinC 11th Air Fleet on 7910 kcs which might have been for the purpose of requesting or directing air support for vessels which appear to be enroute from Buin to Munda or Guadalcanal. Part of this air support consists of float planes since Rekata Air Base (SUNONE) appeared in connection this activity. Further indication at destination SONI 1 was noted in sighting reports of torpedo boats in Savo Island area which was passed of info to SONI 1.

(T2W-030720-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p.69).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-c:

Operational traffic clearly indicates a task group operating in southern Solomons on 3rd. This 2nd Fleet task group (SOMI 2-alternate RETO 4) is definitely the same command that escorted the convoy to Guadalcanal on the night of 14 November resulting in the ultimate beaching and destruction of four vessels. It is also very probably the same group of ten destroyers that were attacked by our B-17's on the 2nd. Destination appeared to be Guadalcanal judging from most urgent reports from Guadalcanal which were addressed to this group at 0405, 0940, and 1115 on the 3rd, although since these reports undoubtedly dealt with movements of our aircraft from Guadalcanal, the mission of this group may have been directed further north. There were no other direct associations between the commander of this group and commands on Guadalcanal which would have been expected unless a landing and retirement were completed prior zero hours 3 January. Rabaul message to this group info NAGAURA (ARATI) at 1024, suggests damage to vessels of the group since NAGAURA has been associated with salvage operations in the past. There were definite associations of submarine calls with the surface task group, probably to inform the subs of the operations in progress or to coordinate their activities. Comdr. Rabaul Area Air Force (RASU 81) addressed despatch 1220 the 3rd to Outer South Seas Force, info to Combined and 2nd Fleets, Second Fleet Task Force (RETO 1) and unidentified (WIF 11, IKO 74, and TENA 7) indicating arrangements for air coverage and tending to confirm identification of the task group as one from 2nd Fleet.

(NSS-031804-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 40).

No. 3-d:

In connection with Guadalcanal, it was noted in the 28 December Summary that Mitsuo (HOMOME) again commenced originating traffic out of Guadalcanal and it was surmised that he had been absent conferring with his superiors regarding the situation there. Resumption of surface forces in this area indicates

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-d: (continued)

that some strategy has been evolved to attempt to relieve or reinforce the Guadalcanal Japs.

(HYPO-3-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 71).

No. 3-e:

Reappearance of Guadalcanal as active operating area on 2 January and continued prominence of 3rd Fleet in traffic represent the two outstanding features of recent traffic.

Based upon similarity to past performance it would appear that a task force made an attack upon Guadalcanal or that a reinforcement force attempted a landing there during the night of 3-4 January. No plain language or abbreviated procedure developed, however.

(HYPO-3-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 45).

No. 3-f:

Subs associated with Buin (SONOSO) on 4 January. Also an urgent sub message without originator was sent action SubRon (KANE 3 Comdr. is at Rabaul), info all Comdrs. Guadalcanal Operations Force, Guadalcanal Communications Base and 1st Section Naval Staff, suggesting continued contact with Guadalcanal by submarines.

(NSS-041924-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 85).

No. 3-g:

Comdr "B" SubForce was active today and was frequently addressed at Rabaul by specific routing indicating that he has just arrived there. At 1048-3rd the Chief of Staff SubForce (RAYA 8) addressed Comdr. "B" SubForce (ISU 5) info to "B"

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g: (continued)

SubForce, Chief of Staff Combined Fleet (NAWI 9), Chief of Staff 8th Fleet (UNA 3), 11th Air Fleet and Guadalcanal (TATUSO). This is another indication of resumption of submarine relations with Guadalcanal.

(HYPO-4-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 98).

No. 3-h:

Comdr. of SubDiv ISSU 5 was shown by specific routing at Rabaul (WOKO 6) on 3rd and association with Guadalcanal Defense Force (TATUSO) suggests ships that division scheduled depart for Guadalcanal with supplies for Orange forces.

(T2W-050100-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 84).

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes were obtained on eight enemy submarines.

No. 1-a:

SUBS BY DOG FOX X NORTH AND EAST X 06161 X 08168
X 06164 X SOUTH BY EAST X 08159 X 05160 X 07157 X
06152 X 01148

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-b:

D/F Fixes for January 4, 1943.

MARSHALLS-GILBERTS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub?	4706	161 E 06 N	1138-4
NARAE	Sub	5300	168 E 08 N	1140-4
NARAE	Sub	5300	164 E 06 N	1310-4

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

NARAE	Sub	5300	159 E 08 S	1737-3
NARAE	Sub	5300	Rabaul Area	1822-3
NARAE	Sub	13220	160 E 05 S	0332-4
NARAE	Sub	13220	157 E 06-30 S Rekata Bay	0455-4
NARAE	Sub	5300	152 E 05-30 S	1007-4
NARAE	Sub	5300	147 E 01 S	1210-4
NARAE	Sub	5300	150 E 01 S	1254-4

(HYPO-4-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 12c and 38d).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 5-a

SUPPLY ACTIVITY TO ATTU AND KISKA CONTINUING

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was based upon the intercepted messages from which was derived the subject matter of CinCPac Dispatch O41951 January, 1943 and these sources are quoted thereunder.

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The battleship YAMATO was estimated to be at Truk.

No. 6-a:

YAMATO PROBABLY AT TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The YAMATO's presence at Truk was detected by traffic analysis and a Dog Fox fix.

No. 6-b:

At 1030 4th Jaluit Fleet Expenditures and Accounts Officer (ESETO-YUSORU) originated dispatch in JN 25D addressed to Battleship YAMATO's Expenditures and Accounts Officer (UWIMO-YUSORU), info Combined Fleet (KISIMA 73). This was broadcast by Truk to Guadalcanal Operations Force. Broadcast may be only for Combined Fleet but is also possible that YAMATO is in the Mandates area also since Jaluit is addressing her.

(NBS-040830-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 41).

No. 6-c:

The Combined Fleet Flagship is shown to be in Truk by direction finder bearings. She was heard on the operating frequencies of 3957-7915 kes.

(HYPO-4-January-TI)

[Ed. note: The YAMATO at this time was flagship of the Combined Fleet]

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 58).

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were indications that the Japanese had established a base at Wickham Anchorage on Vangunu Island southeast of New Georgia.

No. 7-a:

WICKHAM ANCHORAGE (NEW GEORGIA GROUP) INDICATED AS ORANGE BASE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The appearance of this base as an addressee in current traffic disclosed its existence.

No. 7-b:

CofS Cou Army Force (SEYOMA) addressed one dispatch to Wickham Garrison Force. This is first known appearance of Wickham in traffic headings.

(T2W-020741-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 2, 1943, p. 63).

No. 7-c:

At 1439 January 3rd Rabaul addressed Commander Wickham (?) (UITOKUBAMU) Base, info Staff 11th Air, commander sub unit (SEMI 1), Rabaul Weather observer (FUSAWA), and garbled FUMIKA.

(N88-032122-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 76).

No. 7-d:

"Commander Wickham Base" appeared on the 3rd and 4th in traffic.

(HYPO-5-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 77).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

A few days earlier, four ships discovered at Wickham were successfully attacked by American planes. Thereafter a considerable number of Japanese were reported in the Wickham area, strengthening the belief that the enemy was establishing a base there.

No. 7-a

040320 January, 1943
Operational Priority

From: RDO EFATE
To : COMSOPACFOR
Info: CONGENARMYFORCESSOPAC
CINCPAC
ALL TFC SOPAC

ANALYSIS SCOUTS AND OTHER REPORTS INDICATE 4 SHIPS SUNK WICKHAM ANCHORAGE AREA INCLUDING CL OR LARGE DD X FOUR LOADED BARGES DESTROYED ON BEACH OLEANDA X FLOTSOM CONCENTRATED RATIONS ETC IN CASED LARGE SEALED TINS LITTERING SURROUNDING SHORES X MUCH IN GOOD ORDER X ABOUT 200 JAPS AT WICKHAM ANCHORAGE COASTLINE MAINLAND X 100 MORE TO NORTHEAST WITH DUGOUTS 200 YARDS FROM SHORE AT 158-03-20 LONG X 40 ON WICKHAM ISLAND X TWO BARGES STILL OPERATING PROCEEDING TO SEA EACH NIGHT X DO NOT APPEAR TO BE EVACUATING REFUGEES

(CinCpac Chronological Dispatch File, January 4, 1943).

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JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Commander of the Eighth Fleet was thought to be ashore at Rabaul.

No. 8-a:

SUSPECT 8TH FLEET COMMAND NOW ASHORE AT RABAU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis suggested this location.

No. 8-b:

Rabaul call was originator of important traffic on 3 January and it appears that CinC 8th Fleet must again be ashore at Rabaul.....

(NSS-032043-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 42).

No. 8-c:

Rabaul Radio continues to originate a high volume of traffic, the nature of which indicates that the radio call is being used to mask the identity of a major commander. Due to the consistent non-appearance of the 8th Fleet Command in the headings and to these headings being all of 8th Fleet Command believe that command is now shore-based at Rabaul.

(HYFO-4-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 72).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

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JANUARY 5, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #295 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
ACNB
NZNB

050601 January, 1943
Priority

WITH EXCEPTION ZUIKAKU AND SHOKAKU COMBATANT CARRIER LOCATIONS
NOT KNOWN X ZYMOTIC X SIGNS POINT TO APPEARANCE 3RD FLEET
UNITS NEAR SOLOMONS SHORTLY X 295TH FROM CINCPAC X 8TH FLEET
COMMAND SUSPECTED OF BEING ASHORE IN RABAU X NORTH BY EAST
SUB POSITS X 08168 X 06161 X 06164 X SOUTH BY EAST X 07157 X
01148 X 08159 X 06152 X 05160 X ALL BY BEARINGS X YANATO
BELIEVED AT TRUK X JAP BASE INDICATED AT WICKHAM ANCHORAGE
IN NEW GEORGIA GROUP X ATTEMPTS REINFORCE AND SUPPLY GUADAL-
CANAL USING BOTH SUBMARINES AND SURFACE VESSELS SUSPECTED X
SUPPLY SHIPS CONTINUE TO KISKA AND ATTU

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 5, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 050611(A) INTELLIGENCE

The intercepted reports of an enemy search plane trailing an American force on January 5, were sent to ComSOPac and the commanders of the South Pacific task forces.

No. 1:

From: CINCPAC
To : COMSOPAC
ALL TF COMSOPAC

050611 January, 1943
Urgent

FOLLOWING FROM ZEAL SOURCES: 1200 ENEMY SEARCH PLANE REPORTS CV YORKTOWN CLASS BUT GIVES NO POSITION X 1210 ANOTHER UNREADABLE REPORT FROM SAME PLANE X 1215 SAME PLANE REPORTED ANOTHER FORCE 158-05 EAST 13-20 SOUTH X 1220 SAME PLANE REPORTS CV AND LARGE CRUISERS (POSSIBLY CRUDIV) X 1220 THE PLANE SAID STANDEY FOR ATTACK X 1230 MUNDA AIR BASE ISSUED ORDER QUOTE DANGER CEASE FIRING X STRONG INTER-FERENCE X TRANSMISSION SHORT WAVE X ENEMY SURFACE SS SIGHTED UNQUOTE X 1240 SAME SEARCH PLANE SENT ANOTHER UNREADABLE CONTACT REPORT X 1255 THIS PLANE SENT QUOTE RETIRE UNQUOTE BUT RECEIVING UNIT NOT INDICATED.

(CinCPac "Utmost Secret" Dispatch File, January 5, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These reports were intercepted.

No. 2

At 1100 on 5th unidentified OSI 6 addressed long operational priority to unident airplane calls 180811 8081 2. This was doubleheaded for information to Tokyo Communication Office (SUNIME). These planes have been very active in reporting apparent contacts in operational system to Guadalcanal Operations Force. Summary of reconnaissance

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 5, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

reports by planes: ISOSI1 at 1200, 1210, 1215, 1220, 1245, 1255, addressed urgent operationals to Guadalcanal Operations Force.

(NSS-050745-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 61).

No. 3

5-1200-Plane ISOSI2 reported sighting some of our forces, no positions. This went to the Guadalcanal Operations Force.

5-1215-Another report from ISOSI2 using plain language position HARULAKE or 13-20S 158-05E. Then followed a series of [] despatches at intervals of about 15 minutes until around 1530 when he apparently either lost contact or was shot down.

(T.I. Summary, January 5, 1943, p. 2).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

Task Force #64 was the subject of these intercepted sighting reports. The Commander of this task force reported to ComSoPac that his ships were being shadowed by enemy planes but apparently no attack developed from these sighting reports.

No. 4

From: CTF 64
To : COMSOPAC
TF COMDRS SOPAC
Info: COMAIRSOPAC

050335 January, 1943
Urgent

AM BEING TRAILED BY 4 JAP PLANES MY POSITION LAT 13-23
SOUTH LONG 158-10 EAST MY COURSE 070

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 5, 1943).

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JANUARY 6, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #296

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMSWPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

060315 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Indications of Japanese troop movements eastward through the Dutch East Indies were noted.

No. 1-a:

ARMY UNITS BELIEVED MOVING FROM SINGAPORE AND BATAVIA TO AMBON AND KOEPANG

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This movement of troops was detected by traffic analysis.

No. 1-b:

Considerable increase in Army traffic on 2nd. Association of Comdr. 48th Anchorage at Koepang and Comdr. Branch Section 48th Anchorage at Ambon with Headquarters 3rd Shipping and Transportation Section at Singapore suggest movements of Army units from Singapore to Ambon and Koepang. Comdr. 16th Army and Comdr. Osame Composite Division (SIYUCAN) were shown specifically at Batavia and association these commands with Ambon (WIMA 9) suggests possible movement additional forces from Batavia to Ambon area. Palao Army (HONBU) was associated with Comdr. 14th Force Tokyo Eastern Army in

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b:

one message and with Ujina Army, 4th Transportation Group at Rabaul, plus 6168 Akatsuki Force at Takao and Keelung in other traffic.

(T2W-031038-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 129).

No. 1-c:

Associations continue between Ambon (SUAMI), 48th Anchorage at Keepang, and 3rd Shipping and Transportation Group at Singapore in Army traffic.

(T2W-050830-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 169).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The seaplane tender SENDAI Maru was reported to be near Shortland.

No. 2-a:

SENDAI MARU (XAV) IN SHORTLAND AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted sighting report from the SENDAI Maru disclosed her location.

No. 2-b:

The SENDAI Maru (MOHORE) made the following report which was broadcast by Rabaul:

HIHIHI.6.MUMU.JU" in 1430 (MOHORE).
"6 enemy planes headed for Ruin".

Obviously this places the SENDAI Maru in the Ruin area.

(HYPC-4-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 97).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The cruiser KUMA was known to have replaced the ISUZU in Cruiser Division 16 when the ISUZU was substituted for the JINTSU as flagship of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron.

No. 3-a:

KUMA ASSIGNED 16TH DIVISION IN LIEU OF ISUZU LATTER PART NOVEMBER X ISUZU ASSIGNED DESRON 2 REPLACING JINTSU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A study of intercepted traffic yielded this intelligence.

No. 3-b:

Research [redacted] reveals that as of last November the organization of CruDiv 16 was: KINU, NATORI, KUMA.

KUMA was assigned this division about 1st of October and at same time ISUZU was removed from division and assigned to DesRon 2, presumably as flagship.

(NSS-042132-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 8).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

Six enemy submarines were tracked by Dog
Fox fixes.

No. 4-a:

SUBMARINES BY DF X 07163 X 05161 X 07164 X
09160 X JAN 3RD POSITIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY RE-
PORTED X 10155 X 19161 X SOUTH AND EAST FOR ALL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 4-b:

D/F Fixes

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	5300	163 E 07 S	1719-4
NARAE	Sub	13220	161 E 05 S	0127-5
NARAE	Sub	5300	164 E 07 S	1051-5
NARAE	Sub	5300	160 E 09 S	1222-5

D/F Fixes not previously reported for 3 January, 1943.

NEWI 7	Sub	5300	155 E 10 S	1440-3
NINU 8	Sub	13220	161 E 19 S	0643-3

(HYPO-5-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, pp. 72a and 72c).

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NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCENo. 5-a:

NO NEW INFORMATION ON CARRIERS X SOLOMONS UNUSUALLY QUIET ON 5TH EXCEPT FOR AIR SEARCHES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The calm in the Solomons was reflected in the intercepted traffic.

No. 5-b:

Due to concentration on the Solomons area, less traffic was received from other areas; however, what traffic was intercepted from those areas appeared to continue normal. In the Solomons two points were outstanding: the abnormal increase in aircraft search activity, undoubtedly occasioned by the apparent sighting of U.S. forces south of Guadalcanal, and the unusual quietness of enemy submarine and surface forces. A large amount of high precedence tactical traffic was observed but was confined almost entirely to aircraft and air commanders.

(HYPO-5-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 63).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

These air searches probably were the result of the sightings reported in CinOPac Dispatch 050611 January, 1943.

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The torpedo and depth charge armament of destroyers of the TAKANAMI class was reported.

No. 6-a:

TAKANAMI CLASS DESTROYER CARRIES 18 DEPTH CHARGES AND 16 TORPEDOES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from a captured document and not from radio intelligence.

No. 6-b:

TAKANAMI carried 16 type 93 torpedoes. No mention made as to mounts on board, but some of the torpedoes were kept as spares outside of tubes. 18 type 95 depth charges.

(From captured file of TAKANAMI Engineer Officer)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 14).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 6, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #296 British Addressees

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

060311 January, 1943
 Priority

DURING NOVEMBER ISUZU PLACED IN 2ND DESTROYER SQUADRON IN LIEU
 OF JINTSU X KUMA REPLACED ISUZU IN 16TH DIVISION X ZYMOTIC X
 BULLETIN 296 X SUBS BY BEARINGS X 16407 X 16105 X 16009 X
 16307 X NEXT 2 FOR 3 JAN X 16119 X 15510 X ALL ARE EAST AND
 SOUTH X CONVERTED SEAPLANE TENDER SENDAI MARU NEAR SHORT-
 LAND X NOTHING NEW CONCERNING CARRIERS X ARMY UNITS THOUGHT
 UNDERWAY FOR KOEPANG AND AMBON FROM BATAVIA AND SINGAPORE X
 16 TORPEDOES AND 18 DEPTH CHARGES CARRIED BY NEW TAKANAMI TYPE
 DESTROYER X WITH EXCEPTION AIR SEARCHES SOLOMONS APPEARED VERY
 QUIET ON 5TH

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 6, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 060131

(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSoPac and commanders of the South Pacific task forces were informed that a Japanese plane had sighted an American carrier southeast of Guadalcanal.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC 060131 January, 1943
To : COMSOPAC Priority
ALL TF COMS SOPAG

ZEAL HX DASH CINCPAC X JAP AIRCRAFT SIGHTED BLUE CARRIER AT 0905 ITEM (-9) X POSITION GARBLED SHOWS 11 SOUTH 161 EAST LONGITUDE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 6, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The contact report of the enemy plane follows:

No. 2

060905 Plane 5 NOYU 3 (same plane or sector which made report yesterday of sightings near Guadalcanal) reported contact in grid KEMOMO 2 KE (161-18 E, 11-08 S).

(HYPC-6-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 85).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 7, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #297

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMSWPAC
ALL TP COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS

070345 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A shipment of mines and anti-submarine nets was reported to be enroute from Rabaul to Shortland.

No. 1-a:

MARU DEPARTED RABAU ON 7TH FOR SHORTLAND CARRYING MINES AND ANTISUBMARINE NETS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The departure of this ship and its cargo were revealed by an intercepted message.

No. 1-b:

061122 January, 1943

Serial 653

From: KARE YN (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
To : NUTUE 6
Info: TEB 3 (Shortlands)
YASU 1 (Rabaul Area Defense Force)
NUYA 7

From Commander Outer South Seas Force.

Outer South Seas Force OpOrd #4.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b: (continued)

YOSHINOKAWA Maru is to depart Rabaul on January 7th and proceed to Shortland Island and undertake the transporting of mines and anti-submarine nets consigned to 1 EG (1st Defense Force). Upon completion she is to return to Rabaul.

(NSS-061014-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 66).

* * *

From:	KARE	1	061122 January, 1943
To :	WUTUE		
Info:	TEE	3	
	ASU	1	
	NUYVA		

From Outer South Seas Force Commander. Outer South Seas Force Dispatch Order #4.

The YOSHINOKAWA Maru is to leave Rabaul the 7th for Shortlands, returning to Rabaul as soon as the mines (?) and anti-submarine nets for 1 GB (1st Base Force at Buin) have been unloaded (?).

(T2W-061130-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 67).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

This shipment never reached Shortland, for the YOSHINOKAWA Maru was torpedoed and sunk on the morning of January 9.

No. 1-c:

090510 January, 1943

From:	UNNU	(39th Patrol Boat)
To :	WONI	2
	SAYA	8

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-g: (continued)

While carrying out sound detection and search after the torpedo attack on the YOSHINOAWA Maru, discovered a surfaced submarine at 0330 bearing 40 degrees to port distance 6000 meters. Opened fire at 3500 meters. Submarine submerged immediately and although we dropped depth charges results are unknown.

Towing of YOSHINOAWA Maru was attempted by KISARAGI Maru but was impossible because of heavy leaking. At 0500 crew was taken aboard the KISARAGI Maru with 8 dead and 10 wounded (2 seriously wounded). She sank at 0507. We will now head for Shortlands.

(NPM-100826-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 9, 1943, p. 21).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

Fais Island in the Carolines was known to be an important source of phosphate for the enemy.

No. 2-a:

JAP SHIPS OFTEN CALL AT FAIS ISLAND (WESTERN CAROLINES) FOR LOADING PHOSPHATE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was found in a great many intercepted messages. The following two dispatches were chosen at random.

No. 2-b:

311830 December, 1942

Serial 416

From: HITISE
 To : TEITE (IKUSHIMA Maru)
 NSOTE (Kure Comdt)
 Info: Palao Local Transp. Office;
 CofS 4th Fleet
 CofS 2nd Surface Escort Unit
 Yokkaichi Area Transp. Section

Reference Transportation Section Serial 225.

When IKUSHIMA Maru completes unloading at Fais, she is to take on a full load of phosphate rock, about 4000 (numeral 4 garbled - could be 8000) tons, and proceed to Yokkaichi.

(NSS-311502-December-DI)

(D.T.B. December 31, 1942, p. 145).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-c:

051700 January, 1943

Serial 019

From: KUMURE 3
 To : HITISE (Naval Transp. Section)
 NSOTE (Kure Commandant)
 KUTONA 30
 Info: HITIME (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
 ESII (Chief of Staff Ominato)
 NOYUMI (Truk Area Transp. Unit)
 SOHITE (Palao Local Transp. Office)
 MOYORA 30

At 1700-05 January, departed Fais with a load of
 4630 tons phosphate.

(NSS-051702-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 41).

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Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of eleven enemy underseas craft were reported from Dgo Fox fixes.

No. 3-a:

DOG FOX PLACES SUBS. SOUTH BY EAST X 09157 X 08165
X 06152 X 15157 X 10155 X 07160 X 07156 X 03149 X
03156 X 04154 X 05153

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 3-b:

D/F Fixes for January 6, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	156-45 E 08-45 S	1346-06
NARAE	Sub	6385	165 E 08 S	1200-06
NARAE	Sub	6385	152 E 06 S	1244-07

(HYPO-7-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 83).

No. 3-c:

NARAE submarine fix on 5300 kilocycles at 1051Z
5th going to Jaluit 14-40 S., 157 E.

(T2W-060152-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 39).

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Authority DD 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-d:

On 5300 kilocycles at 12122 5th submarine NARAE
working Jaluit DFD at 10 S., 155 E.

(T2W-052241-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 41).

No. 3-e:

D/F Fixes for January 6, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CELL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
RENI 3	Sub?	5300	160 E 07 S	1610-05
NARAE	Sub	13220	156 E 07 S	0535-06
NARAE	Sub	6385	149 E 03-30 S	1056-06
NARAE	Sub	13220	156 E 03 S	2300-05
NARAE	Sub	6385	154 E 04 S	1247-06
NARAE	Sub	6385	153 E 05-15 S	0904-06

(HYFO-6-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 36a).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

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JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

An unidentified carrier was sighted by an American submarine east of the Admiralties on January 6, but there still was no new intelligence on the enemy's carriers.

No. 4-a:

CARRIER DATA NO CHANGE X IDENTITY OF CARRIER
SIGHTED BY SUBMARINE AT 2-34 SOUTH 148-50 EAST
AT 1500 L (-11) 6TH ON SOUTHERLY COURSE UN-
KNOWN

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This carrier was sighted by the U.S.S. SARGO.

No. 4-b:

From: SARGO
To : CTF 42

060815 January, 1943
Operational Priority

YOUR 15 KNOT MARU SERIAL 9XB IS FLEET CV WITH 1
DD X POSITION AT 1500 L (-11) 2-35 S, 148-50 E X
COURSE SOUTH SPEED 17½ KNOTS X RADICAL ZIGS X
LOST CONTACT IN HEAVY RAIN X ATTEMPTING TO INTER-
CEPT AT SOUTHERN POINT OF MY AREA

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 6, 1943).

No. 4-c:

Sighting report by SARGO coupled with collateral
information indicates AKITSU Maru (SINAE) to be
fleet CV. Now in Rabaul area.

(T2W-070731-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 39).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

The SARGO was stalking the AKITSU Maru, an auxiliary aircraft tender, when she sighted this vessel. This ship was in the approximate scheduled position of the AKITSU Maru and in all probability was that ship. The identification of the vessel as a carrier was made at the extreme range of 10,000 yards and at that distance an aircraft tender, possibly with planes on her decks, easily might be mistaken for a carrier. The SARGO was unable to confirm this identification by further sightings. It should be mentioned, however, that some units of the Third Fleet were expected to move toward the Solomons at this time and most of these units were unlocated. See Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #295, January 5, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCENo. 5-a:

TAKANAMI CLASS LARGE DESTROYER HAS MAXIMUM TRIAL
SPEED OF 35 KNOTS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was obtained from a captured
document.

No. 5-b:

TAKANAMI PROPELLER SPEED DATA.

MAX. RPM DURING HR.	AVERAGE RPM FOR THE HR.	DISTANCE RUN DURING THE HR.
.....
307	300.3	33.0
299	288.1	33.0
307	303.2	33.5
338.5	339	33.8
327	316.3	34.5
327	322.8	34.9

(Captured Document-January 6).

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 23f).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

The locations of a number of enemy lookout stations in the Solomons were reported.

No. 6-a:

LOOKOUT STATIONS INDICATED AT CAPE ALEXANDER STIRLING VELLA LAVELLA AND MATZUNGAN ISLANDS X ALSO POSSIBLY AT VISUVISU POINT AND RAMADA X ALL ABOVE IN SOLOMONS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from both traffic analysis and decryption of intercepted messages.

No. 6-b:

Lookout stations are located at: Cape Alexander; Stirling Island; Vella LaVella Island; Matzungan.

(T.I. Summary, January 5, 1943, p. 3).

No. 6-c:

As revealed by an [redacted] address, there is a lookout station on Ramada Island (east coast of New Georgia Island) in Solomons:

(HYPO-4-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 100).

No. 6-d:

From: NEKIYO (Munda)
To : SAWAI (Unident)
TIHANA (Unident)
Info: SONOSU (Ruin)

011800 January, 1943

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 7, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-d: (continued)

Mostly unreadable but mentions Ramada and Visuvisu
(both in New Georgia Island) - date 2nd.

(T2W-040133-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 4, 1943, p. 106).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 7, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #297 British Addressees

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

070545 January, 1943
 Priority

IN SOLOMONS LOOKOUT STATIONS INDICATED ON VELLA LAVELLA
 MATZUNGAN AND STYRLING ISLANDS ALSO CAPE ALEXANDER X
 POSSIBLY ALSO AT RAMADA AND VISUVISU POINT X ZYNOTIC X
 35 KNOTS IS MAXIMUM TRIAL SPEED TAKANAMI TYPE NEW DES-
 TROYER X BULLETIN 297 X SUBS SOUTH AND EAST BY BEARINGS X
 03156 X 09157 X 07156 X 10155 X 08165 X 07160 X 05153 X
 06152 X 15157 X 04154 X 09149 X VESSEL LEFT RABAU JAN 7TH
 CARRYING ANTI-SUBMARINE NETS AND MINES TO SHORTLAND X SUB
 SIGHTED CARRIER ON COURSE SOUTH AT APPROX 149 EAST 2-30
 SOUTH 6 JAN X IDENTITY UNKNOWN HERE X NO OTHER INFO CARRIERS
 X CONSIDERABLE SHIPPING TO FAIS ISLAND IN WESTERN CAROLINES
 FOR PHOSPHATE.

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 8, 1943GINCPAC BULLETIN #298

From: GINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMSOPAC
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

080409 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The disposition of the enemy's carriers remained uncertain, except for the SHOKAKU which was undergoing repairs in Japan, as reported earlier. There was some sign, however, that other carriers were in Empire waters and that the ZUIKAKU had left Truk.

No. 1-a:

SLIGHT INDICATION ZUIKAKU MAY HAVE DEPARTED TRUK X CARRIER LOCATIONS LESS SHOKAKU (EMPIRE NAVY YARD) REMAIN UNKNOWN BUT SOME INDICATIONS AT LEAST PART OF CARRIER STRENGTH STILL IN EMPIRE WATERS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was obtained from traffic analysis.

No. 1-b:

On 5 January carrier and base frequency 3810 (average) was active. Carrier (KENI 5) transmitting messages originated by himself and unknown UNI 2 to ONI 2 (flagship YAMA 9) and division call (KAMU 3)

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b: (continued)

addressed to Staff 3rd Fleet (TOMU 25) shown specifically to be at Sasebo (URO 6), KAMU 3, YAHA 9, HITAKA or Kisaratsu Air Group (NONI 5) and staff unident (MAHA 75) shown specifically at Sasebo and probably 3rd Fleet. All idents are class D from Com-14 and based on previous appearance on this circuit except 3rd Fleet Staff (TOMU 25) which is confirmed and NONI 5 which appears good for HITAKA. DF position of Marshalls heard placed in Empire waters with KENI fixed at 39 North 141 East by composite of bearings on 24 December and 5 January - which is obviously of doubtful value. Single line _____ on tentative HITAKA (NONI 5) passes through Wakkanai and Japan sea.

Single line from Hawaii on YAKA 9 passes through Chichijima and Takao. Confirming the 3rd Fleet character of these calls is message from Division Commander (YAHA 9) shown at Sasebo (URO 6) at 1733 January 5th addressed to CofS 3rd Fleet (TOMU 29), info BuAero, carriers? (KERO 4 - SASI 1). Identification of Sasebo (URO 6) looks poor in this case. Estimate from all this that at least one and possibly two carriers are in Empire waters with Staff 3rd Fleet at Sasebo or on board vessel in Empire waters. Believe activity involves plane movements and that some, at least, of the calls mentioned are air groups.

(NSS-051530-051525-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 117).

No. 1-c:

A dispatch time 06-1420 from tentative carrier (AWI 8) who used YAHA 9 on 6 January and was specifically addressed care of calls tentatively identified as Sasebo (URO 6 and KIYA 0), addressed BuAero, the ZUIKANU (AE 6) plus several unidentified calls for action, and 3rd Fleet (HEMI 37), Yokosuka Air Arsenal #2, and Yokosuka Military Stores (TUBUTE) plus 2 unidentified calls, for information. Delivery on Tokyo broadcast gave no clue to location of the ZUIKANU, but the continued association of 3rd Fleet units with

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-c: (continued)

BuAero, Yokosuka Air Arsenal and air bases on the 5910 KC channel, makes it appear that the main carrier strength is still in Empire waters.

(HYPO-7-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 80).

No. 1-d:

At 070026, Truk transmitted to Tokyo a no originator message action to ZUIKAKU (AE 6) and garbled RATARE. Routing here indicates ZUIKAKU has departed Truk. Routing is not always reliable.

(NSS-062312-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 57).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 6, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The major commands believed to be in the Truk area were listed.

No. 2-a:

BELIEVE CINC COMBINED COMMA COMDRS 2ND, 4TH, BATDIV 3 (HARUNA AND KONGO) AND COMSUBFOR ALL AT OR NEAR TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These commands were located by the routing of current traffic.

No. 2-b:

Tokyo routed traffic for CofS Combined, 2nd, 4th and Sub Fleets to Truk on 6 January. On 5 January routing from Saipan to Truk for CofS Combined, 2nd and 4th Fleets but not for 3rd Fleet CofS.

(NSS-061555-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 60).

No. 2-c:

Personnel message from Tokyo at 1532 6th was delivered to Truk for CofS 2nd Fleet, info CombatDiv 3 (HONTA).

(NSS-061810-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 58).

No. 2-d:

SATO A, identified as Cinc Combined Fleet, by 2-station DF fix placed at Truk at 0730Z-6th.

(T2W-061530-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 6, 1943, p. 53).

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JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was reason to believe that submarines were still supplying the enemy garrison on Guadalcanal.

No. 3-a:

SUBMARINE SUPPLY ACTIVITY GUADALCANAL PROBABLY CONTINUING

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The following item derived from traffic analysis suggested this conclusion.

No. 3-b:

Comdr. of subdiv ISSU 5 was shown by specific routing at Rabaul (MORO 6) on 3rd and association with Guadalcanal Defense Force (TATUSU) suggests ships that division scheduled depart for Guadalcanal with supplies for Orange forces.

(T2W-050100-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 5, 1943, p. 84).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of several enemy submarines were listed.

No. 4-a:

SUBS DOG FOXED 05154 SOUTH AND EAST X 04157 X 03147 X
07158 X 04155 X 07167 X 04153

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 4-b:

D/F Fixes

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	157-30E 03-45S	0241/7
NARAE	Sub	13220	147 - E 03 - S	2215/7
HAKU 4	AirFlt	7915	157-30E 07-30S Munda	1944/6
MIHO 5	11th AirFlt	11340	154 - E 05 - S	0423/7
KERIG 6	11th AirFlt	8850	155 - E 04 - S	0831/7
NARAE	11th AirFlt	7915	167 - E 07-30S Shortlands	0737/7

MARIANAS-CANOLINES

NARAE	Sub	6385	153-30E 03-45S	1632/6
-------	-----	------	----------------	--------

(HYPO-7-January-TI)

[Ed.note: It will be noted that four of these fixes are on air groups instead of submarines. These fixes are believed to have been included in the bulletin by error/.

(D. T. B. January 6, 1943, pp. 116a and 61a).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was new evidence that the Japanese had established a weather station in the Semichi Islands in the Aleutians.

No. 5-a:

SOME EVIDENCE ORANGE OCCUPYING SEMICHI ISLANDS (ALEUTIANS) AND SENDING WEATHER THEREFROM

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The source of this intelligence is not known, probably an intercepted weather report. A later analysis of traffic of this period disclosed that these weather reports were emanating from Attu instead of Semichi. The error had arisen from a mistaken identification of the Attu call as Semichi. There is no positive evidence that the Japanese ever maintained a weather station in the Semichis, and American troops landing there after the reoccupation of Attu found no indication of any occupation of these islands, although captured documents revealed that the Japanese had made several attempts. See CinCPac Dispatch 190245 February, 1943.

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JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The disposition of the enemy's submarines during the action on October 26, 1942 was given.

No. 6-a:

ON 26 OCTOBER JAPS NOW KNOWN TO HAVE FORMED SUBS ON LINES CALLED XRAY AND YOKE X XRAY LINE WAS FROM 12-40 SOUTH 165-20 EAST TO 12-20 SOUTH 162-40 EAST X YOKE LINE FROM 14-40 SOUTH 162 EAST TO 14-40 SOUTH 159-40 EAST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from a captured document.

No. 6-b:

252105 October, 1942
Page 344
Radio

From: Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet
To : All Commanders-in-Chiefs
All Commanders of "KA" Operations Force
Info: Chief of Staff, 17th Army
Chief of Naval General Staff

Combined Fleet Operations Order #354.

1. The Army plans to penetrate the Guadalcanal airfield tonight at 1900. An enemy warship force is expected to appear in the southeast off the Solomons on the 26th.
2. The Combined Fleet will intercept and attempt to destroy the enemy force on the 26th.
3. All forces will, in addition to previous orders, operate as following:
 - a. Supporting forces according to direction of commanders.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

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JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

- b. Base Air Force: attack enemy fleet.
- c. Advance Expeditionary Force: make "X" deployment line (KO I RI OO) to (KE RI RA OO) and "Y" deployment line (KE YO N OO) (KE MAN OO) and attack enemy warships. Withdraw supply (or fuel carrying) submarines from "HYUON" Island.
- d. The Outer South Seas Force and forces cooperating with the Army will proceed after control of airfield is ascertained.
- e. Air patrol carry out search for enemy with 2 flying boats within radius of 120 miles centered at (KO SA KI OO). Cease patrol of "T" patrol area as of "Y" Day.

(Captured Document)

(GI Date File, October 25, 1942).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

The auxiliary carrier UNYO was estimated to be at Saipan enroute to Japan.

No. 7-a:

UNYO POSSIBLY IN SAIPAN AREA RETURNING JAPAN

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The UNYO's whereabouts was detected by traffic analysis.

No. 7-b:

At 1946-06 on 5375 kcs Saipan called FUSA 2 (tentatively identified as UNYO) and 2 unidentified KENANO and TIKOI. UNYO call was taken from dispatch of 31 December which assigned anchorage for that vessel at Truk and is considered fairly reliable. This indicated the UNYO probably with 2 escort vessels is currently in Saipan area probably returning to Empire.

(T28-070734-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 18).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 8, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #298 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

080345 January, 1943
 Priority

LINE XRAY FROM 165-20 EAST 12-40 SOUTH TO 162-40 EAST 12-20 SOUTH X LINE YOKE FROM 162 EAST 14-40 SOUTH TO 159-40 EAST 14-40 SOUTH X JAP SUBS KEHE DEPLOYED ON ABOVE TWO LINES ON OCT 26 X ZYNOTIC X CINCPAC 298 X SUBS SOUTH AND EAST BY USUAL METHOD X 07158 X 04157 X 07167 X 03147 X 04153 X 04155 X 05154 X ZUIKAKU POSSIBLY HAS LEFT TRUK X A FEW SIGNS THAT SOME ENEMY CARRIERS MAY STILL BE IN JAPAN WATERS X HOWEVER WITH EXCEPTION SHOKAKU IN YOKOSUKA NAVY YARD POSITIONS CARRIERS NOT KNOWN X UNYO THOUGHT NEAR SAIPAN ON WAY BACK HOME X APPEARS LIKELY JAPS ARE IN OCCUPATION OF SEMICHI ISLANDS IN THE ALEUTIANS X CONSIDER SUB SUPPLY ATTEMPTS AT GUADALCANAL STILL BEING UNDERTAKEN X COMBINED 2ND 4TH AND SUBFLEET COMDES PLUS 3RD DIVISION BATTLESHIPS (COMPOSED OF KONGO AND HARUNA) THOUGHT IN TRUK LOCALITY

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 8, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 080051(A) INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted weather report from Kiska was sent to the Commander of Task Force #8.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : CTF 8

080051 January, 1943
Routine

ULTRA FOR CTF 8 FROM CINCPAC X KISKA SENT WEATHER SEVENTH AT THREE HOURS GCT IN NON-METEOROLOGICAL SYSTEM LEADING COLOR TO BELIEF CONVOY ENROUTE HIS PLACE X BAROMETER APPROX 744 AT 47 N 158 E CENTER OF LOW MOVING EAST NORTH EASTERLY 40 KILOMETERS X IN EASTERN AREA WIND NORTH NORTHWEST VELOCITY 3 METERS X SEA CALM VISIBILITY 40 KILOMETERS X CALM INSIDE HARBOR

(CinCPac "Utmost Secret" Dispatch File, January 8, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The intercepted report follows.

No. 2

071400 January, 1943

073

From: NARAE
To : TAYOKE
YOKESA
NETU 6 (703rd Air Group)
ROHAKU
Info: MES IRE 1 (DD in DesDiv 21)
KANI 1

Originated by CofS 51st Base Force.

Weather report for noon 7th January. Barometer approximately 748 at 168 E., 49 N. Center of low

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 8, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

moving east 40 kilometers. In eastern area wind in north north west velocity 3 meters. Sea calm, visibility 40 kilometers. Calm inside harbor. (Rest garbled).

(HYPO-January-DI)

(D. T. B. January 7, 1943, p. 68).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #299

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMSOPAC
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

090315 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

An increase in the number of weather reports from Guadalcanal was noted.

No. 1-a:

UNUSUAL NUMBER WEATHER REPORTS SENT BY GUADALCANAL ON 8TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These reports were intercepted.

No. 1-b:

TATUSU (Guadalcanal) originated weather reports at 0400, 0600, 0800, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 on 8th in 3-kana code. Ordinarily one such weather dispatch originated daily.

(NSS-061406-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 117).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(Continued) JANUARY 8, 1943

Item 2

INTELLIGENCE (A)

The Japanese were known to be apprehensive of an Allied attack on the island of Timor.

No. 28

UNCORROBORATED EVIDENCE WAS EXPECTED AN ATTACK IN TIMOR

SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE (B)

This anxiety was expressed in an intercepted

message.

No. 29

Serial 2
JANUARY 8, 1943
14-1

(Portuguese Minister)

From: Tokyo
To: Lisbon

(States in part that Japanese expect an attack in Timor at any moment and the military commanders desire to maintain the greatest secrecy concerning the number of troops in Portuguese territory and the movements of Japanese ships).

(NSA-07310-January-DI)

(D.T.R. January 8, 1943, p. 123).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was believed that the enemy might undertake an offensive in eastern New Guinea soon, possibly in the Milne Bay area.

No. 3-a:

EXPECT OFFENSIVE ACTION IN EASTERN NEW GUINEA SHORTLY X VERY SLIGHT INDICATION THAT MILNE BAY REGION MIGHT BE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ENEMY PLANS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This conclusion was based upon traffic analysis.

No. 3-b:

At 2147 the 7th, Staff Sixth Air Attack Force addressed [redacted] Commander Lee Air Base, Force Commander YONE 69, Staffs CruDiv 18 and 11th Air Fleets tending to confirm indications of operations in New Guinea area by CruDiv 18 and unknown force YONE 6.

(NSS-071925-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 48).

No. 3-c:

A force is organized and possibly now operating to reinforce eastern New Guinea, as evidenced by urgent intelligence dispatch from 1st Combined Communication Unit to [redacted] Lee Reinforcement Force, all Commanders or Staff Officers of unidentified REAO 66, information Naval Intelligence, originated at 2303 January 8th. Fact that this is [redacted] [redacted] system and is not classified most urgent leads to deduction this operation may be scheduled for 9 January.

(NSS-081603-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 113).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

218

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-d:

HMA 1, who is believed the same
"RAT Occupation Force", addressed much the
same addressees as yesterday. Among his addressees
were:

"Comdr. forces awaiting transportation"
(SEMPAKU HEIDANTEU)

"Comdr. 'GO' Operations Force"

"8th Fleet Command"

"Lae Air Base"

The latter addressee was a constant information
addressee in his dispatches today suggesting that
he may have part of shore based aircraft there. No
evidence is yet at hand to determine the composition
of this force beyond the 6th and 12th Air Groups
mentioned.

(HYPO-8-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 94).

No. 3-e:

Estimate ComCruDiv 18 (KIHA 4) on 8 January in
tactical command of expedition to reinforce New
Guinea involving Army convoy, surface and air
support forces, the latter type supplied by Navy
6th Air Attack Force, and Army 12th Composite Air
Wing and 6th Air Division. Commander GO Force
(AAAY) at Rabaul is in charge of Army units. An
additional force, YONO 6, is involved but character
is undetermined. Possibly 2 landing points are in-
volved withawton [sic] with ComCruDiv 18 supporting
one and Force Comdr. YONO 6 the other. Force
Comdr. HMA 10 (MUKA 89 on 7 January, WEMI 30 on
6 January) is finally located on New Guinea re-
laying traffic via Lae Air Base to Rabaul, pos-
sibly this is Pirsch (Harbor) Defense Force who
has been known to receive traffic via Lae. This
force Comdr. has been addressing ComCruDiv 18, 11th
Air Fleet and 8th Fleet three days in high prece-
dence operational traffic. On the 8th, for the 1st
time, he addressed Comdr. troop (?) convoy (SEMPAKU
HEIDANCHO) also Comdr. 6th Airborne Troops

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-a: (continued)

(? -- HOKUHICOMEI DANCHO KG). Note that this is not the same expression we are reading as 6th Air Division (HIKO RONU SHIDAN) while the interpretation of this phrase as airborne troops may be inaccurate it seems to parallel the expression for "shipborne" troops (SEMPAKU HEIDAN).

(NSS-081747-081752-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 104).

See also Item 3, CinCPac Bulletin #300, January 10, 1943.

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The reinforcement force detected in the above analyses had already been under attack for several days before this bulletin was issued. This force, composed of one light cruiser, four destroyers, and five merchant ships and enroute to Lae with supplies and troops from Rabaul, first was sighted off the south central coast of New Britain on January 6. There is no evidence, however, that radio intelligence played any part in this interception. Despite a strong fighter escort, these ships underwent repeated aerial attack enroute to Lae and one transport was reported sunk off Gasmata. The remaining ships reached Lae on the afternoon of January 7 and continued unloading through the following day in the face of numerous aerial

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Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

assaults which resulted in the probable sinking of two more transports.

These attacks were continued on January 9 and 10 as the convoy retired toward Rabaul and additional hits and near misses were scored. American submarines joined in the attacks on January 10 and accounted for two more of the merchant ships, but the U.S.S. ARGONAUT was lost to enemy action in this battle. A total of 83 enemy planes were claimed as destroyed and 36 listed as probable in the attacks upon this convoy.

No. 3-f:

From: MACARTHUR
To : AGWAR
COMGENHQDEPT
Info: CINCPAC

071046 January, 1943
Urgent

OPERATION REPORT FOR PERIOD 1300 GCT 5 TO 1300 GCT 6
.....ACTION: AIR: NORTHEASTERN AREA: (1) RECONNAISSANCE SIGHTED AN ENEMY CONVOY CONSISTING OF 2 LIGHT CRUISERS, DESTROYERS AND 4 MEDIUM TRANSPORTS STRONGLY ESCORTED BY FIGHTERS OFF THE SOUTH CENTRAL COAST OF NEW BRITAIN PROCEEDING WEST SOUTHWEST X ATTACKS WERE STRONGLY INTERCEPTED X IN SUBSEQUENT STRIKES BY B17'S B24'S B26'S AND P38'S 2 POSSIBLE HITS AND NUMEROUS NEAR MISSES WERE SCORED X DURING THE DAY 2 TYPE ZERO FIGHTERS WERE DESTROYED 11 TYPE ONE FIGHTERS DESTROYED 4 TYPE 1 FIGHTERS PROBABLY DESTROYED AND 4 DAMAGED X (2) 1 B24 UNABLE TO LOCATE ENEMY CONVOY NIGHT JANUARY 6-7 BOMBED GASMATA AIRDRUME CAUSING A LARGE OIL FIRE X(7) HUDSONS AND BEAUFORTS TOOK OFF FROM MILNE BAY TO ATTACK CONVOY STOPPED BY WEATHER.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 7, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *and 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g:

From: COMSOWESPAC 080545 January, 1943
 To : ALL TF COMS PACFLT Priority
 CINCPAC
 ALL TF COMS SOWESTPAC

DESPITE CONTINUOUS AIR ATTACK BY OUR FORCES ENEMY SUCCEEDED IN PUSHING A CONVOY INTO LAE UNDER STRONG AIR COVER FURNISHED BY ZEKES AND OSCARS PROBABLY OPERATING FROM GASMATA AND LAE AIRDRONES X JAPS CONVOY ARRIVED AT DESTINATION ABOUT 1400 L 7TH X CONSIDER ONE TRANSPORT DEFINITELY SUNK OFF GASMATA AND ONE OTHER PROBABLY SUNK NEAR LAE OTHER VESSELS MAY HAVE BEEN DAMAGED X OUR AIRCRAFT TOOK HEAVY TOLL OF INTERCEPTING ENEMY FIGHTERS.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 8, 1943).

No. 3-h:

From: MACARTHUR 081152 January, 1943
 To : COMGENHAFDEPT Urgent
 Retransmitted:
 From: COMGENHAFDEPT
 To : CINCPAC

.....THE ENEMY CONVOY SIGHTED OFF SOUTH COAST OF NEW BRITAIN ON JANUARY 6TH ENROUTE TO LAE WAS REPEATEDLY ATTACKED BY B17'S B24'S B26'S CATALINAS HUDSON P38'S AND P40'S X 7 DIRECT HITS AND NUMEROUS NEAR MISSES RESULTED IN THE SINKING OF 2 TRANSPORTS AND THE PROBABLE SINKING OF ANOTHER X 16 ENEMY FIGHTERS SHOT DOWN 7 PROBABLE AND 9 DAMAGED X 1 OF OUR AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN 1 MISSING X (2) 7 P38'S ESCORTED BY 8 P38'S WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE CONVOY AND BOMBED ALTERNATE TARGET LAE AIRDRONE.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 8, 1943).

No. 3-i:

From: COMSOWESPAC 090625 January, 1943
 To : CINCPAC Priority
 ALL TF COMS SOWESPAC
 ALL TF COMS PAC

.....AIR RECCE YESTERDAY REPORT NIL ENEMY SHIP SIGHTING EXCEPT VICINITY LAE X 6 SHIPS OF JAP CONVOY DEPARTED

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-1: (continued)

THIS MORNING LAST SIGHTED 0930 L (-11) 9TH POSITION 6-50 SOUTH 148-15 EAST COURSE 40 SPEED 12 X FROM CONFLICTING REPORTS NOW ESTIMATE THAT CONVOY ORIGINALLY CONSISTED OF 1 CL & DD AND 5 MERCHANT TYPES X 1 TRANSPORT SUNK SOUTH AREA ALL OTHER SHIPS REACHED DESTINATION X 2 TRANSPORTS SUNK OR SEVERELY DAMAGED AT LAE X PROBABLE THAT CONSIDERABLE SUPPLIES AND POSSIBLY TROOPS WERE LANDED.....

(CinPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 9, 1943).

No. 3-1:

From: MACARTHUR
 To : CHIEF OF STAFF ND
 Info: COMGENHQDEPT
 Retransmitted:
 From: COMGENHQDEPT
 To : CINCPAC

090835 January, 1943
 Priority

.....NEW GUINEA: LAE: ENEMY CONVOY CONSISTING 1 LIGHT CRUISER 3 DESTROYERS 3 TRANSPORTS UNLOADING THROUGHOUT JAN 8; PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 3 TRANSPORTS 5000 TONS EACH, 11 LANDING BARGES IN OPERATION; 1 LIGHT CRUISER BELIEVED DEPARTED TO SOUTH EARLY MORNING JANUARY 8.....AIR X NORTH EASTERN AREA: (1) THE ENEMY CONVOY WHICH ARRIVED LAE EVENING JANUARY 7 WAS CONTINUOUSLY ATTACKED DURING JAN 8 BY B24'S, B17'S, B26'S, B25'S WITH FORMATIONS OF P38'S AS COVER; 3 DIRECT HITS SEVERAL NEAR MISSES CLAIMED ON TRANSPORTS, 1 REPORTED SUNK AT JETTY, ANOTHER BADLY DAMAGED OFF SHORE; 17 ENEMY FIGHTERS DESTROYED IN COMBAT, 11 PROBABLES AND 14 DAMAGED X 2 ALLIED AIRCRAFT MISSING X (2) 11 RAAF BEAUFIGHTERS STRAFED BARGES, BOATS AND SUPPLIES ON BEACH LAE; GROUNDED ZEBOS ON AIRDROME STRAFED, 1 DESTROYED 1 DAMAGED X (3) 13 A-20'S SCORED BOMB HITS ON 5 OR 6 TRUCKS OF SUPPLIES AND ON A 6000 TON CARGO VESSEL.....

(CinPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 9, 1943).

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Authority

nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-k:

From: MACARTHUR
 To : COPS WAR DEPT
 COMGEN HANDEPT

100845 January, 1943
 Priority

Retransmitted:
 From: COMGENHANDEPT
 To : CINCPAC

.....ALLIED OPERATIONS: ADDITIONAL REPORT JANUARY 8:
 (1) ENEMY SHIPPING LAE ATTACKED DURING AFTERNOON BY
 3 B26'S, 3 B24'S, 7 B17'S WITH P38 COVER; PROBABLE
 HIT 1 TRANSPORT, DIRECT HIT 1 BARGE X OPERATIONS
 JANUARY 9: LAE AIRDRONE SUPPLY DUMPS AND BEACHES
 TRANSPORT ATTACKED DURING DAY AS FOLLOWS: (2) 6
 PAO'S WITH 12 PAO'S COVER DIVE BOMBED TRANSPORT
 SCORING 2 HITS 3 NEAR MIS. ES; SUPPLY DUMP ON SHORE
 FIRED, BURNING WITH MORINGS [sic] FLAME AND BLACK-
 SMOKE X (3) 4 B17'S SCORED 4 HITS ON TRANSPORT,
 EXPLOSIONS FOLLOWED AND SHIP LEFT BLAZING X (4)
 8 B26'S CAUSED 2 LARGE FIRES IN JETTY AREA X (5) 1
 B24, RESULTS UNOBSERVED X (6) 6 PAO'S ESCORTED 12
 PAO'S SECURED 6 HITS TRANSPORT ALSO 2 BOMBS AMONG
 10 FIGHTERS MALAHANG STRIP X (7) 12 B25'S SCORED
 HITS ON TRANSPORT AND ALONG SHORE, STARTING FIRES
 IN WOODS VOCCO POINT X (8) 11 A-20'S BOMBED AND
 STRAFED LAE AIRDRONE STARTING SEVERAL FIRES BUILDINGS
 AND STRAACH AREA; 1 ZERO SHOT UP ON GROUND X ENEMY
 CONVOY EAST LAE ATTACKED DURING JANUARY 9 AS FOLLOWS:
 (9) 4 B17'S NIL HITS X (10) 1 B24 SCORED 2 NEAR
 MISSES ON TRANSPORT X (11) 4 B24'S 1 NEAR MISS STERN
 OF TRANSPORT APPARENTLY NIL DAMAGE ALTHOUGH TRANS-
 PORT STOPPED.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 11, 1943).

No. 3-l:

From: COMSOPACFOR
 To : ALL CTF SOWESPACFOR
 ALL CTF PACFLT
 CINCPAC

110516 January, 1943
 Priority

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-1: (continued)

AIRCRAFT MORNING 10TH REPORTED 8 VESSELS EAST CAPE JACQUINOT BAY RETIRING FROM LAE X CATALINA CLAIMS HIT 1 AP AND BEAUFORTS 2 TORPEDO HITS ON CRUISER NIGHT 09-10 X ONE SHIP IN CONVOY DESCRIBED AS KAKO CLASS CRUISER.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 11, 1943).

No. 3-a:

From: MACARTHUR
To : CHIEF OF STAFF WD
Info: COMENHANTDEPT
CINCPAC

110804, January, 1943
Priority

SOWESTPAC AREA REPORT OF OPERATIONS FOR PERIOD 1300 GCT/9 TO 1300 GCT/10.....SOLOMON SEA: ENEMY CONVOY REPORTED 1 CRUISER, 2 DESTROYERS 3 TRANSPORTS 90 MILES EAST NORTH EAST GASMATA 2030 GCT/9; 2 ENEMY DESTROYERS COVERED BY 6 FIGHTERS 34 MILES GASMATA..... ALLIED OPERATIONS: DELAYED REPORT JANUARY 9: 1 B24 BOMBED CONVOY SOUTH GASMATA SCORING DIRECT HIT WITH 100 LB BOMB ON TRANSPORT; INTERCEPTION BY 11 ENEMY FIGHTERS, OF WHICH 2 SHOT DOWN.....OPERATIONS JANUARY 10: RAAF CATALINAS ATTACKED CONVOY DURING NIGHT; 1 HIT 250 LB BOMB 1 FORWARD HATCH OF TRANSPORT STARTING SMALL FIRE X B17'S SCORED 1 VERY NEAR MISS 500 LB BOMB ON TRANSPORT IN CONVOY OFF JACQUINOT BAY X 1 B24 ON ARMED RECONNAISSANCE UNSUCCESSFULLY BOMBED DESTROYER SOUTH EAST GASMATA; INTERCEPTED BY 6 ZEROS, OF WHICH 1 DESTROYED, 1 PROBABLE X 1 B24 BOMBED FINSCHAFEN STRIP, NEWAK AND MADANG; 1 DIRECT HIT ON BUILDING MADANG X B25'S ATTACKED SUPPLY DUMPS AND A/A POSITIONS LAE; BOMBS DROPPED ALONG TERRACE, 1 BUILDING BLOWN UP, 2 LARGE FIRES VISIBLE 40 MILES, PROBABLY FUEL STARTED X 11 RAAF BEAUFIGHTERS STRAFED LAE AIRDRONE DESTROYING 1 GROUNDED FIGHTER AND SILENCING M/G POSITION X 1 B24 ATTACKED BEACHED TRANSPORT AT LAE; NIL HITS X (10) NOW KNOWN FROM DELAYED REPORTS ADDITIONAL 36 ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED, 20 PROBABLE, DURING RECENT LAE CONVOY OPERATIONS, GIVING FINAL ASSESSMENT ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED DURING PERIOD 6/9 JANUARY INCLUSIVE AS 81 DESTROYED, 36 PROBABLE; FIGURES INCLUDED 4 DESTROYED, 7 PROBABLE

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-m: (continued)

BY GROUND STRAFING, BUT DO NOT INCLUDE 2 FIGHTERS REPORTED DESTROYED IN PARAGRAPH 1, PART 2 OF THIS REPORT X DELAYED REPORT JANUARY 9: 5 RAAF BEAUFORTS ATTACKED CONVOY SOUTH GASMATA DURING EVENING; 1 TORPEDO HIT ON WARSHIP REPORTED, RESULTS NOT KNOWN; 2 BEAUFORTS MISSING X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 11, 1943).

No. 3-n:

From: CTF 42
 To : COMSOPAC
 COMSOMESPAC
 Info: COMSUBSOMESPAC
 COMINCH

190731 January, 1943
 Routine

COMTASKFORCE 42 SENDS WITH REGRET X ARGONAUT OVERDUE AND CONSIDERED SUNK IN ACTION 10 JANUARY X WHILE OPERATING IN AREA SOUTHEAST NEW BRITAIN BETWEEN 5-15 AND 6 DEGREES SOUTH AND WEST OF LONGITUDE 153-50 DEGREES EAST INTERCEPTED JAP CONVOY RETURNING RABAU FROM LAE X US ARMY PLANE REPORTED OBSERVING ABOUT 1100 (-11) 10TH OFF GASMATA 2 JAP DESTROYERS WITH 5 OTHER SHIPS AND 1 DESTROYER HIT BY TORPEDO EXPLOSION X OBSERVED THAT AFTER DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK SUBMARINE SURFACED AND DESTROYERS CIRCLED AND FIRED INTO HER WITH DIRECT HITS X LATER INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES INDICATES THIS OCCURRED AT POSITION 5-40 SOUTH 152-02 EAST WHICH WAS IN ARGONAUT AREA WHEREAS FIRST REPORTED POSITION WAS OUTSIDE AND CONSIDERABLY TO WESTWARD X FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO CONTACT ARGONAUT BY RADIO WAS FOLLOWED BY DIRECTIVE RETURN BRISBANE X NOT HAVING BEEN LOCATED BY SEARCHES AND NOT HAVING ARRIVED SHE IS NOW CONSIDERED OVERDUE AND TO HAVE GONE DOWN FIGHTING X AT 1400 (-11) THAT AFTERNOON GRAMPUS SANK 2 TRANSPORTS SAME CONVOY

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 19, 1943).

Messages intercepted later threw further light on the composition of this convoy and, with captured documents, confirmed the sinking of at least one ship of this convoy and the damaging of another. A high loss of life aboard this convoy also was indicated.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-g:

140721 January, 1943

25882

From:	YAMU	8	(Rabaul)
To :	YCU	6	(Combined Fleet)
	MBTE	1	
	TCU	6	
Info:	TOSI	72	
	HOMU	8	(2nd Fleet)
	WOYU	5	(3rd Fleet)

From Commander Outer South Seas Force.

Operations Report #1 (Lae Transportation Operations).

The New Guinea Escort Force (DesDiv 17 and the MAIKAZE) departed Rabaul on 4 January with the convoy of Army transports: Blank Maru [redacted], NICHIRYU Maru [redacted], GLYDE Maru [redacted], Blank Maru [redacted].

(Commencing on January 7 blank participated).

With an air close screen, followed the south coast of New Britain and headed for Lae. At 0830 on January 6, two enemy B24 type planes made contact and on that day a total of 19 large planes attacked before nightfall.

GI COMMENT: ComSoesPac reported sinking one 12,000 ton AP and 2 smaller ones between Arawa and Lae, between about 0700 and dark on the 6th, apparently this convoy. GLYDE Maru is 5498 tons.

(NFM-111442-February-91)

(D.T.B. February 11, 1943, p. 36).

No. 3-p:

100613 January, 1943

From:	SUMO	8	(Buna Air)
To :	HAMO	8	(11th Air Fleet)
	REKA	0	(8th Fleet)
	NUYOTO		(Rabaul)
	WENOSITE		
Info:	HINU	7	(26th AirFlot)

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-p: (continued)

1. At 0145 BRAZIL Maru received direct bomb hit in #3 hold which started small fire. Extinguished almost immediately. Only slight damage.
2. 5 H17a carried out bombing attack on convoy between 0440 and 0540. No damage.

(NFM-281558-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 28, 1943, p. 65).

No. 3-q:

101530 January, 1943

From: TINE OO
To : NIYOTO 1 (Rabaul)

From: Comdr. Ozaki of BRAZIL Maru.
To : Captain of Shipping (Group).

1. It is requested that 8 launches and 30 stretchers be despatched to the BRAZIL Maru as soon as the destroyers enter port at 1900 to land the casualties which they have picked up.
2. Wish you would take the trouble to expedite arrangements, after contacting the Army and Anchorage Chiefs, for handling the hospitalization, etc., of the patients who were picked up after the landing of blank Regiment from destroyers.
3. The blank personnel and the injured picked up by blank destroyers are as follows:

TANIKAZE	10	(wounded 9)
URAKAZE	28	(wounded 19)
HAMAKAZE	35	(blank)
ISOKAZE	43	(blank)
MAIKAZE	71	(wounded 4)

The blank of the Shipping Force is scheduled for tomorrow morning.

(NFM-300946-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 29, 1943, p. 54).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-r:

081412 January, 1943

From: KUHA 4
 To : HA 42 (8th Fleet)
 ATE 52 (11th Air Fleet)

IMA 42 (Combined Fleet)

At 1225, 8 B-25's, 5 P-38's and 5 twin engined fighters heavily bombed the landing field and the group of transports. The MYOOKOO Maru was hit aft by a small bomb and is running aground.

2 Zeros and 2 launches destroyed by fire.

(NPM-291046-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 29, 1943, p. 52).

* * *

100840 January, 1943

From: SUMO 8 (Buna Air)
 To : WAMO 8 (11th Air Fleet)
 REKA 4 (8th Fleet)
 Info: KIKA 2

At 0740 enemy sub attacked convoy, position KEKUTU 36 (approx 152 E, 05-40 S), firing 5 torpedoes (4 exploded prematurely) with no damage.

Destroyers carried out depth charge attack. MAIKAZE sank sub.

(NPM-281558-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 28, 1943, p. 66).

An interesting reconstruction of the interception of this convoy was made by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Southwest Pacific Area Allied Air Forces Headquarters using both Japanese and Allied sources. This account follows:

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g:

Enemy Information on the Lae Convoy.

Information from enemy sources throws some light on the large convoy of enemy vessels which visited Lae early in January. There appear to have been 10 vessels in the operation - 5 transports and 5 destroyers. The transports were:

CLYDE	MARU	-	5,498	tons
BRAZIL	MARU	-	5,860	tons
MYOKO	MARU	-	5,081	tons
NICHIRYU	MARU	-	5,447	tons
CHIFUKU	MARU	-	5,857	tons
			<u>27,743</u>	tons

Following is a summary of new information, compared with Allied reports of a month ago. This information comes from four different sources, and each of these of course is as liable to error as any individual's account will be. This summary is merely a first attempt at reconstruction; for the complete picture it will be necessary to wait for more details. Times given in enemy sources are assumed to be "L" time, and have been altered to "I" below.

JAPANESE SOURCES

ALLIED INFO.

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------|
| 3 Jan - Troops boarded CHI-FUKU, BRAZIL, MYOKO, CLYDE, and NICHIRYU Maru's at Rabaul. | |
| 4 Jan - "Departure postponed another day". | |
| 5 Jan - Convoy of 5 ships, escorted by 5 destroyers and 1 squadron of aircraft left Rabaul for Lae. | |
| 6 Jan - 1100 - Sighted by single reconnaissance plane. | 1040 - B-24 reported convoy, of |

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NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-g: (continued)

JAPAN SOURCES

ALLIED INFO.

- 6 Jan - 1200 - Bombed by Lockheed heads and Boeings. 1040 - (continued)
Dog fights overhead. Heavily bombed and strafed. 20 men on deck of CHIFUKU Maru wounded after being strafed by Lockheed(s). Aircraft also strafed front part of officer's room, on this vessel. 1700 - P-38's attacked convoy south of Gasmata.
- 6 Jan - NICHIRYU Maru in flames. 0337L/7 - Catalina obtained direct hit on large transport
Sank. 700-800 men aboard killed. 3rd Bn. 102 Inf. Regt. was aboard this ship. 0840L/7 - Vessel sank about 125 miles east of Lae
- 7 Jan - 1200 - One ship set on fire as result of air raid. Otherwise no damage. 1410 - 9 ships sighted and attacked. Decks strafed by P-40's, and many killed. Merchant vessel damaged in earlier attacks seen sinking by the stern.
1500 - Arrived at Lae. Attacked continually even after landing, and men were bombed and strafed on ship and shore by Lockheed fighters. Landed in large MLC, one Bn at a time owing to air attacks. Went straight into jungle to avoid losses. One witness reports 3 dead 30 wounded in his unit. 1530 - P-38's, B-25's, B-26's, strafed and bombed. 1550 - Ships off Lae, 1 vessel listing badly "lying on its side".

A-20's and Beau-
fighters strafed
decks, barges
and shores.

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JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g: (continued)

JAPAN SOURCES

ALLIED INFO.

8 Jan - Enemy aircraft active. Suffered heavy casualties and lost much equipment during landing operations. Some units bivouacked at Puepan, one kilometer southeast of Lae.

1300 - Sighted 4 warships, 3 transports. Ships remained all day unloading, the warships patrolling outside.

1430 - B-25's obtained good hit on a transport. It "appeared to buckle amidships".

9 Jan - Enemy aircraft active. Considerable damage to troops near shore.

0300 - (approx). Convoy left Lae.

0927 - 2 AP, 3 warships, 73 miles east of Lae.

1900 - 2 AP, 5 warships near Gasmata.

10 Jan - Received signal that officer commanding troops on NICHIRYU Maru was rescued.

It would appear from this evidence that the enemy convoy was, in fact, made up of 10 vessels, - 5 merchant ships and 5 destroyers. It is established that NICHIRYU Maru was lost en route, but the identity of the other vessels sunk or damaged remains obscure, even though later enemy information may clarify this. The ship set afire by our aircraft on 7 January would appear to be the one seen sinking as the convoy came in to Lae, and which has been considered probably sunk. Unfortunately, the information does not supply the name of this ship. The third vessel thought to have been sunk was not hit seriously till 1430L/8, by which time our witnesses would have been in the jungle or at Salamaua. Photographic interpretation, however, identifies her as MYOKO Maru.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g: (continued)

Much of the confusion in convoy sightings concerned the warships. Nearly every report described one or more of them as light cruisers. If the above is correct, pilots possibly mistook the big new Japanese destroyers for cruisers.

The merchant vessels were originally reported in sizes ranging from 3,000 to 12,000 tons. The above report indicates that all were medium freight transports of 5-6,000 tons.

All reports at the time stressed the damage done by aircraft during actual landing operations. The enemy sources confirm this. They are evidence also of casualties caused by strafing, and personnel lost when the first transport sank. Incidentally, if the number lost on NICHIRYU Maru is taken as typical of the number carried aboard each vessel, perhaps 3,200 men were landed at Lae.

Finally, one witness reports that the officer commanding was safely rescued after NICHIRYU Maru sank. After bringing the other transports to Lae, one of the warships was seen leaving the harbor in the direction from which the convoy had come.

This warship probably went to the scene of the sinking, and may have been the vessel which picked up the commanding officer of the Regiment.

(Headquarters Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Summary #77, p. 13-15).

Several captured Japanese diaries have afforded eyewitness accounts of the interception of this convoy en route to Lae.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-t:

-
- 2 Jan '43 Name of embarkation vessel is CHIFUKU Maru.
- 3 Jan '43 Boarded CHIFUKU Maru at 1300 and proceeded towards Lae in New Guinea. Though I do not expect to survive, I am quite cheerful and indifferent. Ship entered Rabaul and anchored for the night. Unlike most nights there were no enemy bombings. Slept well.
- 4 Jan '43 Too late to sail. In Rabaul for the whole day. From 1400, 13 others and myself went on duty as air observers.
- 5 Jan '43 In the early dawn, enemy Boeing(s) came and bombed despite violent cross firing from our A/A and MGs. It is learned with deep regret that our plane(s) which tried to pursue the enemy were shot down.
 At 1100, 10 enemy Boeing and Consolidated planes came over and bombed. No enemy planes were brought down although our planes gave chase.
- 6 Jan '43 Weighed anchor at 1200.
 Enemy planes have been pursuing us since morning. Our plane(s) gave chase. It is not certain whether we have brought down any or not.
 At 1600, enemy bombers, escorted by Lockheed fighters, bombed us. Although there were no direct hits, we were strafed by the fighters. Two were killed and over ten wounded. Enemy plane(s) followed us the entire night dropping flares.
 NICHIRYU was torpedoed. It slowed down while on fire. We fear it has sunk.
- 7 Jan '43 Pursued by enemy planes the whole night. Night and day enemy bombings have become more and more active despite the continuous air cover given by our fighters. Bombs come down likemine and explode around the ships. At 1400, took over air observation duty from 2nd Lieut. Yoshikawa. During my watch, we were heavily bombed by Consolidated and North American bombers and strafed by Lockheeds. Arrived at Lae at 1600. Enemy planes bombed us shortly before arrival. Despite the constant attack of our fighters, enemy planes carry out their dreadful bombings on as large a scale as they prefer.
 Landed at 1630. Immediately engaged in unloading freight. Work continued at night.

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JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-t: (continued)

- 8 Jan '43 Enemy planes concentrated on bombing unloaded material. Dive bombing attacks were carried out. Bombs exploded near us while we were hiding in the dense forest. How many times I have been prepared to die! This is the first time we have had such an experience. However, we are quite steady and our desire to overcome the enemy at all costs increases. From the arrival of the transport unit until landing, there was only one casualty in my unit.
- 9 Jan '43 Most of the 3rd Bn was lost at sea, those saved amounting to only about one tenth of the original strength. Five ships left Rabaul out of which the NICHIRYU was sunk. Today the MYOKO Maru met with disaster. It is a great sacrifice. I wonder if the remaining three ships will be able to return to Rabaul safely.....

(Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Ocean Area, Current Translations #29, dated April 28, 1943, ATIS No. 355).

No. 3-u:

5 January 1943.

Since we boarded a ship from Kokopo on the 2nd afternoon, there has been incessant enemy bombing. The worst took place on the 5th when we were in Rabaul Harbour on the CLYDE Maru. Two enemy B Type 12 Boeings appeared over Rabaul to carry out bombing attacks. A/A guns fired in reply. Our planes also took to the air gallantly in defiance. Unfortunately, one of our planes was brought down. This was very disappointing. Another air-raid siren sounded unexpectedly about 1030. Again 8 or 9 enemy Boeings carried out bombing attacks in formation. There was intensive fire from our A/A and high-angle batteries from the land, destroyers and the convoy. Like eagles swooping down for their prey, the bombers dropped their bombs among the convoy. Under the intensive fire of our batteries, enemy planes, gallant as they were, finally retired. A small flight of 2 or 3 of our planes took off in pursuit. It was regrettable that they were outnumbered and one of our planes was alleged to have been brought down into the sea.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-2: (continued)

It was indeed a great pity for our planes to make such a sacrifice. While shedding tears of indignation, (I) looked menacingly toward the direction in which the enemy disappeared.

At 1430, convoy sailed from Rabaul towards Lae in New Guinea. At 1530, received a tremendous shock from a terrific explosion. Submarine alarm was sounded.

Depth charges were dropped into the sea from our destroyers and subchasers. Sounds of depth charges shook the entire ship. Even after 1600 hrs., the submarine(s) apparently had not been dispersed. (When leaving Rabaul, as many as 7 enemy submarines were reported to be lurking in the direction of our journey. This turned out to be true). We were now in a place where, it was said, a certain BUTAI had been lost (written until 1600 hrs.).

6 January.

At 0900 hrs., several tens of bombers in formation suddenly appeared with additional planes following. How inspiring it was when they turned out to be our own planes! Two Boeings appeared at 1000, but withdrew after a short while. At 1400, 5 Boeings attacked. Five bombs dropped to the starboard of the CLYDE Maru without inflicting any damage. They were finally dispersed by intensive fire from the convoy.

As a result of a dog fight with our planes, one enemy plane was seen escaping to the north, trailing smoke.

Enemy planes appeared for the third time at 1510. With a Boeing leading, more than 10 light bombers which looked like fighters began to attack the convoy. However, they were repulsed after 30 minutes by the fire from batteries aboard the convoy and the activities of 8 of our own planes.

Aboard NICHIRIN Maru, one of this convoy, 2 were killed and 8 wounded.

7 January.

At 1900 hrs. yesterday, enemy plane(s) commenced dropping flares. Soon afterwards, bombing of the convoy was

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-g: (continued)

carried out. Several tens of enemy planes coming in rapid succession made their intensive attacks which were utterly indescribable. Because of the attack, troops had to spend the entire night on deck in full uniform. According to the roll call at 0430 hrs this morning, there were some casualties in the convoy.

As a result of direct hit(s) made by enemy bombs, the NICHIRIN Maru was set ablaze and finally sank.

Our convoy consisted of 5 transports escorted by 5 destroyers. With one sunk, only 4 transports left.

After 0500 hrs, enemy planes again made severe attacks. One enemy Boeing strafed our ship as a result of which a member of the inf gun was wounded in both legs. Two Boeings which attempted to strafe our ship were promptly shot down. The battle is now continuing.

1210 hrs., 7th. After 30 minutes, enemy planes which engaged in bombing and strafing diverted their attack towards the stern of the CLYDE Maru, resulting in 4 being severely wounded. Again and again, enemy planes made their attacks upon the CLYDE Maru. Fire in the No. 5 hold was finally put out through the excellent work of the men.

7 January bivouacked in the vicinity of Lae.

8 January.

At 0635 hrs. About 100 enemy planes, consisting of heavy and light bombers and fighters made bombing and strafing attacks upon our temporary bivouac area (2 1/2 km from the landing place). The attack was so intense that not a single space was available to conceal ourselves. Our A/A batteries were silent while 10 or 15 of our planes appeared. It was difficult to say what happened to them. One enemy plane burst into pieces just above us. It was reported that some enemy parachute BUTAI landed in the vicinity of our billeting ground. Since landing from our ships, we had not even time to take a nap.

11 January.

Left for Lae billeting ground at 1500 hrs on 11 January.

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JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-u: (continued)

Arrived at Lae at 1630. From Lae, by means of MLC, travelled about 20 miles to a place called Salamaua. Salamaua (in the vicinity of Markham River) was the 2nd operational base since our landing in New Guinea. From here, it was said, we would head towards Wau. There were torrential rains when we left Lae.

(Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Ocean Area, Current Translations #37, dated May 17, 1943, pp. 42-44. ATIS #428, Diary belonging to Leading Private Ouchi Toshio, member of Reg. HQ Amn HAN-WAU Area).

No. 3-v:

The other day 4 transports and 4 destroyers arrived. They entered the harbor at 1500 on 7 January. The transports were: BRAZIL Maru, CHIFUKU Maru, MYOKOO Maru, and GLYDE Maru. The destroyers were: ---- (T.N. Torn), ISOKAZE, NUMAKAZE, and HANAKAZE. Ashes and the personal effects of Tsukada, Futami, and Murata (T.N. rest destroyed) were sent by ISOKAZE----(T.N. Page Torn). They carried out heavy bombing, but only sent up high spouts of water and failed to hit any of our ships. They only made the Lae Sea muddy.

Under the barrage from the transports and destroyers a dog fight started. It was a glorious sight. The MLC crew, as a forlorn hope, continued their debarkation work. My crew was saved, but fragments (page 2) continually fell into the MLC. Day and night, the enemy planes numbered 68.

On the 7th, I continued my work safely. On the 8th, early in the morning, the enemy planes came again. At 1410 a bomb was dropped on No. 3 ship, MYOKO Maru, near the lower part of the funnels. It destroyed the engine and rendered the ship impossible to navigate. Five Army members of the crew were wounded, but none was killed. At the time, my MLC had just left the MYOKO Maru. Everyone's face was black and covered with soot from the funnel, but no one was injured.

On the same day, at 1630, an MLC from Salamaua was sunk by a bomb, but the crew was saved. An Army MLC was strafed and sunk in the vicinity of the wharf.

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~~TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-y: (continued)

At about 2000 on the 9th, 3 merchant ships and 4 destroyers left Lae. I am late in mentioning the fact, but the total of all branches is approximately 5000 persons and some of the navy were 85th Signal TAI. IKEDA TAI (HQ personnel) No. 3 ----- (T.N. illegible - Page Torn), all numbering about 60....

(Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Ocean Area, Current Translations #36, dated May 16, 1943, p. 15. Torn pages of a letter, undated, addressed to personnel of Mubo No. 1 Fl. from "Mikajima" - Garrison Hill, Wau).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The stationing of a weather ship southwest of Kiska was reported.

No. 4-a:

WEATHER MARU TO GO TO 48 NORTH 168 EAST TO MAKE OBSERVATIONS FOR KISKA X MAY BE FOR BENEFIT OF CONVOY EXPECTED KISKA SOON

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch yielded the intelligence concerning the weather ship and its position.

No. 4-b:

071245 January, 1943
176

From: NARAE
To : TAYONA 30 (CofS 5th Fleet)
Info: KAUME (KAHO Maru)
SUKASA 2 (Comdr. SHENKOTSU Maru)
IWANA (Tokyo Weather, Navy Weather Sect.)

From Chief 1st Section Naval Staff Imperial Headquarters.

In order to make first hand observations on the low pressure area passing vicinity of Kiska Island we want a weather observation boat stationed in vicinity of 48 North 168 East.

(NSS-080020-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 123).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of four enemy submarines were reported from Dog Fox fixes.

No. 5-a:

SOUTH AND EAST SUB POSITS BY DF X 07159 X 03159 X
10157 X 11152

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 5-b:

D/F Fixes for January 8, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	159 E 07-30S	1600/7
NARAE	Sub	13220	159 E 03S	2120-7
NARAE	Sub	6385	157 E 10S	1226/8
HAFU	Sub	6385	152 E 11S	1307/8

(HYPO-8-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 29c).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The whereabouts of the enemy's combatant carriers continued to be obscure.

No. 6-a:

INFO ON CVS REMAINS INDEFINITE

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The 25th Army was believed to be in the Malay-Indies area.

No. 7-a:

25TH ARMY APPARENTLY IN MALAY INDIES AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis disclosed the location of the 25th Army.

No. 7-b:

A dispatch from unknown NOMO 9 in Southwestern Area to unknown UME 8, info 1st Section Naval Staff, CofS Combined Fleet and Southwest Area Fleets, Singapore and Sabang Bases, Southern Army, 25th Army and garbled Army-All Chiefs of Staff shown in care of Singapore on Maru SUMOMO and some unidentified calls.

(NSS-071925-January-TI)

(D. T. B. January 7, 1943, p. 112).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)Item 8(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that Buna and Guadalcanal still were being supplied by submarines.

No. 8-a:

INDICATIONS SUB SUPPLY ACTIVITY AT BOTH GUADALCANAL AND BUNA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These indications were found in an analysis of traffic.

No. 8-b:

Continued use of submarines for transportation of supplies to troops in New Guinea area suggested by associations of Buna Base (KAWANI) with B Sub Force (TOSA 5), ComSubForce (OTO 4) and other submarine commands in dispatch at 24 hours 6th.

(TZW-January-070705-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 50).

No. 8-c:

Comdr. Guadalcanal Defense Force (TATUSU) originated dispatch at 1515 6th to B Submarine Force, info 8th Fleet (NUNA 8) and [redacted] Staff of 8th Combined Special Landing Force which suggests units of the landing force possibly scheduled for movement to Guadalcanal using submarines of B SubForce as transports.

(TZW-070818-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 7, 1943, p. 59).

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~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 9, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8-d:

B Submarine Force (KMO 7) continues association with Guadalcanal in traffic headings.

(T2N-080850-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 110).

No. 8-e:

The traffic intelligence picture remains materially unchanged on the ninth. Highlights are increased submarine activity associated with the supply of Guadalcanal, and continued tactical traffic of high precedence from the New Guinea area.

(HYFO-9-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 78).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 9, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #299 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

090615 January, 1943
 Priority

WEATHER SHIP BEING SENT TO POSIT 168 EAST 48 NORTH X VERY
 LIKELY BECAUSE OF CONVOY THOUGHT SOON TO ARRIVE KISKA X
 ZYMOTIC X INTELLIGENCE 299 FROM CINCPAC X LOCATION CARRIERS
 CONTINUES OBSCURE X BUNA AND GUADALCANAL SUPPLY OPERATIONS
 BY SUBS STILL THOUGHT PROBABLE X GUADALCANAL SENT NUMEROUS
 WEATHER REPORTS JANUARY 8TH X 25TH ARMY BELIEVED TO BE IN
 INDIES DASH MALAY THEATRE X SUBS PLACED EAST BY SOUTH ACCORD-
 ING TO BEARINGS X 15710 X 15907 X 15211 X 15903 X RATHER
 INDEFINITE INDICATIONS THAT ENEMY MAY STILL BE CONSIDERING
 REGION AROUND MILNE BAY IN HIS PLANS X AN OFFENSIVE ACTION
 SOON ON EAST COAST OF NEW GUINEA IS EXPECTED X JAPS POSSIBLY
 EXPECT ALLIED ATTACK ON TIMOR

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 10, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #300

From: CINCPAC
COMINCH
COMSOPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMSOPAC
COMNAVH
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

100241 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The number of weather reports originating at Guadalcanal continued to be unusually large for a second day.

No. 1-a:

MANY WEATHER REPORTS ORIGINATED AT GUADALCANAL ON 8TH AND 9TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from traffic analysis.

No. 1-b:

TATUSU (Guadalcanal) originated six (perhaps five, or one badly garbled) weather reports January 9th. Normally originates one weather report. January 8th six were originated. The same group (flying conditions ?) appeared the 8th and 9th, last used October 19th to 22nd.

(NSS-091537-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 76).

See also Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #299, January 9, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was some indication that Japanese air borne troops were being stationed in the southern theatre.

No. 2-a:

ARMY AIR BORNE TROOPS SUSPECTED IN SOUTHERN THEATRE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An analysis of current traffic yielded these indications.

No. 2-b:

Unident MUKA 8 originated operational traffic commencing at 0220 and lasting throughout the day to [redacted] Gen Army Force, Comdr. 12th Composite Air Division and Comdr. 6th Air Troop Division plus 8th Fleet (NAME 3), 11th Air Fleet (KERI 6) and unident HIHO 5. MUKA 8 appears to be identical with NEMI 3 who originated this type traffic on 6th and appeared to be at Truk. One instance noted where dispatch of this type was passed for info to Lae (SIKO 0) and Gasmata (TIRI 8). Associations plus volume of traffic suggests movements airborne troops to Rabaul area for use in Solomons or New Guinea areas.

(T2W-080937-January-TI)

(D. T. B. January 8, 1943, p. 106).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-c:

Force Comdr. ROMA 10 (MUKA 89 on 7 January, WEMI 30 on 6 January) is finally located on New Guinea relaying traffic via Lae Air Base to Rabaul. Possibly this is Finsch (Harbor) Defense Force who has been known to receive traffic via Lae. This force Comdr. has been addressing ComCruDiv 18, 11th Air Fleet and 8th Fleet three days in high precedence operational traffic. On the 8th, for the 1st time, he addressed Comdr. troop (?) convoy (SEMPAKU HEIDANCHO) also Comdr. 6th Airborne Troops (?) (ROKUHIKOHEI DANCHO KG). Note that this is not the same expression we are reading as 6th Air Division (HIKO ROKU SHIDAN). While the interpretation of this phrase as airborne troops may be inaccurate it seems to parallel the expression for "shipborne" troops (SEMPAKU HEIDAN).

(NSS-081747-081752-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 10A).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The existence of an enemy Army command designated the Milne Bay Occupation Force Commander was reported. The import of this title was not known, but it possibly foreshadowed another attempt by the Japanese to occupy Milne Bay in eastern New Guinea. At this time this command was associated with operations in the Lae and Solomons area. He was also linked by traffic analysis with paratroop units and Army and Navy air units in that theatre.

No. 3-a:

THERE IS A QUOTE MILNE BAY OCCUPATION FORCE UNQUOTE COMDR X WHETHER THIS SIGNIFIES ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT MILNE BAY SOON OR MERELY A CARRY OVER TITLE FROM LAST MILNE BAY OCCUPATION ATTEMPT IS NOT KNOWN YET X THIS COMMANDER AT PRESENT APPEARS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH PRESENT OPERATIONS AROUND LAE AND SALAMAUVA ALSO WITH ABOVE SUSPECTED ARMY AIR BORNE TROOPS PLUS ARMY AND NAVY AIR GROUPS IN RABAU-LAE AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was gathered from traffic analysis.

No. 3-b:

Throughout 8th activity in Lae area continues involving Army 12th Composite Air Wing, Comdr. Gou Army Force, CruDiv 18 (KURA 4), Lae Air Base (INI 6), Lae Reinforcement Force (YONO 6 ?) and unident HOMA 1. HOMA 1 is apparently same as KURA 8 of 7th

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-b: (continued)

which was reported as being compromised for RAT (Milne Bay) Occupation Force, however nothing further has been noted which would tend to substantiate the identification. Sulumi (YARO 2) also appears to be taking part in these operations probably as base for aircraft involved. It is rather interesting to note that evidence of this operation appeared in traffic headings only after operations had been started. This might continue to be the case so long as Orange vessels are based so near scene of operations.

(T2W-090835-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 86).

No. 3-c:

The unidentified commander MUKA 8 reported yesterday as being active and addressing the 6th Air Corps (?) (ROKU MIKOU HEIDAN) and 12th Composite wing (HITO PUTA MIKOU SIYUDAN) was identified today by a compromise when an operator asked for the identity of the call. This commander is the Comdr. RAT Occupation Force (TEI EE NARU KOURIYAKU BUTAI).

While the exact location of the area RAT is not certain it is believed to be in or close to the Milne Bay area of New Guinea. Comdr. RAT Occupation Force has been addressing the above mentioned two air groups, the 8th Fleet Staff and 11th Air Fleet Staff plus an unidentified call HIHO 5.

Direction finder positions place him in the New Britain area by poor fixes.

(HYFO-2-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 16).

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-d:

Research on the call _____ believed to be RAT Occupation Force, shows that call associated with MU Campaign Force on December 17th, when the Madang-Newak Operations were underway. For that reason, it follows that the call itself may belong to an RA area commander who is currently in command of RAT Occupation. The impression gained from the preceding analysis is that a large scale landing is being attempted on eastern New Guinea with Army commands chiefly involved and Naval units limited to destroyers and submarines and possibly part of CruDiv 18, air coverage being furnished by Army forces and part of AirFlot 26.

(HYPO-9-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 81).

No. 3-e:

Commander RAT Occupation Force continued stream of urgent traffic on 9 January with addressees in varying combinations including Staff 8th, 11th Air Fleets, Staff CruDiv 18 (ISA 3), Commander 6th Air Attack Force, Lae Air Base, Commander 12th Composite Air Wing (Army), Commander 6th Air Troops (?) (Army), Commander 1st Air Attack Force (?) (NOMI A) and unidentified TURE 2. In one urgent _____ at 1655, 8th Hospital at Rabaul was addressed suggesting evacuation of wounded or plea for pills. CruDiv 18 (ISA 3) was silent in contrast to preceding day.

(NAS-091537-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 77).

See Item 2 above and Item 3 of CinCPac Bulletin

#299, January 9, 1943.

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

See Item 3 of CinCPac Bulletin #299, January 9, 1943. The operation indicated to be underway in

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

the above analyses was an attempt by the Japanese
to reinforce their Iae garrison.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)Item A(A) INTELLIGENCE

While the enemy's carriers remained unlocated, these ships were associated in intercepted traffic with the Empire, Rabaul, Truk, and Jaluit areas.

No. 1-a:

CV INFO PRACTICALLY NIL WITH ASSOCIATIONS IN EMPIRE RABAUl TRUK AND JALUIT AREAS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These associations were detected in an analysis of intercepted traffic.

No. 1-b:

FUNE 6 may be CarDiv 2 as he is indicated aboard HITA 9 who appeared on CarDiv 2 frequency of 6825 on 28 October. If above is checked by further study, then CarDiv 1 and CarDiv 2 Commanders are in Empire area.

A dispatch from Tokyo personnel addressed to Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet (UMANE) went to KINSEI and REIYU for information. This was broadcast by Rabaul. The latter two calls may be 3rd Fleet units in the Rabaul area.

(HYPO-8-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, pp. 144 and 145).

No. 1-c:

At 2043-7th Tokyo Personnel Bureau (YAYUKI) originated dispatch to CofS 3rd (RIMORI) and 8th (METUTO) Fleets, info NORESI (identified by station H as CarDiv 2). Routing of dispatch was confusing but

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)No. 4-c: (continued)

at 0715-8th Rabaul sent it to unident TOWO Ø on 7910 kilocycles for delivery to garbled call HINERE 1 and also apparently for NORESI 2 which if latter call identified correctly would indicate presence of 3rd Fleet unit or units in Rabaul area.

(T2W-080927-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 111).

No. 4-d:

On the 7th Tokyo Personnel Bureau addressed CofS 8th Fleet (METOTO) and CofS 3rd Fleet (RIMORI), information ComCarDiv 2 (NORESI). This is considered tentative evidence that part at least of CarDiv 2 is operating under the tactical command of CINC 8th Fleet, probably for participation in the recent New Guinea operations and possibly for those which appear imminent there. On the 8th, a transmission of the above dispatch indicated that CofS 3rd Fleet was at Truk, and ComCarDiv 2 at Jaluit. This latter routing is not understood and may have been in error.

Activity on the Empire carrier training circuits of 5910 and 3818 Kcs points to the continued presence of one or more carriers in home waters.

(HYPO-9-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, pp. 57 and 119).

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
 JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The carrier RYUJO was reported to have been sunk prior to November 10. The fate of this carrier had been in doubt for several weeks.

No. 5-a:

NOW CONSIDER RYUJO SUNK PRIOR 10 NOVEMBER

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The doubts concerning the RYUJO appeared to be resolved by the deletion of that vessel from the enemy's warship list in November, 1942.

No. 5-b:

180008 November, 1942

From: HARAE
 To : NEYO/ (All major commands)

From Navy Minister.

As of 10 November delete FURUTAKA and RYUJO from the Man-of-War List.

(N33-081929-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 10).

A message deciphered several weeks later disclosed that the RYUJO had been sunk late in August 1942 by Allied planes while she was engaged in an attack on American positions in the Solomons.

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~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-c:

290732 August, 1942

85842

From: NATE 1
 To : RITIRA
 HOSUME
 Info: TORERU

Originator Commander Striking Force.

Striking Force Battle Report #1.

1. The RYUJOO, while engaged in bombing "RX" (Solomons) area, was attacked by a large number of planes between 1355 and blank 30, and broke into flames and listed 20 degrees. As a result of fires and list, was unable to navigate. At 1800, in position 06-10 S, 161-20 E, the ship sank.

2. The Captain and blank persons were rescued (?) by [redacted] and placed aboard [redacted] (TOOEI Maru) and [redacted] (TOOHOO Maru).

3. Planes shot down - 23. Landed in water (personnel rescued) 19 fighters, 2 torpedo planes. 3 fighters and 3 torpedo planes exploded. One torpedo plane landed at Rabaul.

(NPM-232112-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 23, 1943, p. 45).

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JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The heavy cruiser MAYA was estimated to be in the Empire.

No. 6-a:

MAYA PROBABLY IN EMPIRE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The source of this intelligence has not been determined.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of six enemy submarines located by Dog Fox fixes were listed.

No. 7-a:

SUBS BY DF X 08160 X 08149 X 03154 X 02162 X 03150 X 07161 X ALL SOUTH AND EAST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 7-b:

D/F Fixes for January 9, 1943

NEA GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	159-45E 8-30S	1659
TURE	Sub	7915	149 - E 7-45S	2003
NARAE	Sub	13220	154 - E 03 - S	2350/8
SONOSO	Bain	5370	162 - E 02 - S	1053
	Comm. Base			
NARAE	Sub	5370	150 - E 03 - S	1724
NARAE	Sub	6385	161 - E 7-30S	0838

(HYPO-9-January-TI)

(D. T. B. January 8, 1943, p. 8).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)Item 8(A) INTELLIGENCE

Air Flotilla 22 was reported to be engaged in wide-scale exercises in the Marshalls.

No. 8-a:

AIRFLOT 22 CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE EXERCISES IN MARSHALLS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These exercises were reflected in current traffic.

No. 8-b:

Air circuits continue to be very active both in the Empire and in the Southern Islands. Air Flot 22 in the Marshalls was very active on 7110 kas and the dispatches intercepted have the prefix "ENSHU" indicating that air maneuvers are now in progress in the Marshalls. Probably a shake-down for Air Flot 22 which has recently relieved Air Flot 24 in that area.

(HYPO-8-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 13).

No. 8-c:

The exercise communications of Air Flot 22 aircraft in the Taroa area continue unabated.

(HYPO-9-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 26).

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JANUARY 10, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #300 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
ACNB
NZNB

100425 January, 1943
Priority

LARGE SCALE AIR EXERCISES BEING CARRIED OUT IN MARSHALLS BY
22ND AIRFLOT X BULLETIN 300 X ZIMOTIC X WIRELESS PLACES SUBS
X 08149 X 03150 X 08160 X 03154 X 07161 X 02162 X ALL SOUTH
BY EAST X MAYA BELIEVED IN JAPAN X SUSPECT ARMY HAS AIR BORNE
TROOPS IN SOUTHERN AREA X GUADALCANAL SENT LARGE NUMBER WEATHER
REPORTS BOTH ON 8TH AND 9TH X KYUJO NOW CONSIDERED SUNK X A
QUOTE COMDR MILNE BAY OCCUPATION FORCE UNQUOTE IS ASSOCIATED
AT PRESENT WITH THE OPERATIONS AROUND HUON GULF X THE ABOVE
ARMY AIR BORNE TROOPS AND NAVY AND ARMY AIR GROUPS IN HUON
GULF VICINITY ARE ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH THIS COMDR X WHETHER
THIS SIGNIFIES A NEW MILNE BAY ATTEMPT SHORTLY OR NOT IS UN-
KNOWN X THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THE TITLE HAS REMAINED IN EX-
ISTENCE SINCE THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT MILNE BAY X CARRIERS HAVE
BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE EMPIRE AREA JALUIT TRUK AND RABAU
DURING PAST FEW DAYS X INFO TOO VAGUE FOR DETERMINING THEIR
POSITIONS

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JANUARY 10, 1943

COMSOPAC DISPATCH 101031

(A) INTELLIGENCE

This dispatch was sent by ComSoPac as a reply to a message from ComNavact Solomons in which the latter had advised ComSoPac that a run of the "Tokyo Express" was underway and ordered an interception by PT boats. ComSoPac stated that radio intelligence yielded only general indications of a run by the "Tokyo Express".

No. 1

100732 January, 1943
Urgent

From: COMNAVACT SOLOMONS
To : COMNAVACT TULAGI
Info: COMDR CVS SQUADRON
COM MTB RON
CIG 62.9
COMSOPAC
CINCPAC

TOKYO EXPRESS EIGHT DD'S RUNNING EARLIEST ARRIVAL
ESPERANCE MIDNIGHT X TOMMIES INSTRUCTED CLEAR AREA
EAST IINGA POINT BY 2300 L (-11) X STATION STRIKING
FORCE OF ADDITIONAL FOUR PT'S OFF COAST ESPERANCE
TO ARULIGO AND FOUR FROM TASSAFARONGA TO DOMA AT
DISCRETION COM MTB RON X SEC IN AIR CONTINUOUSLY
23 L UNTIL DAYLIGHT X ESCORT DD'S REMAIN IN READINESS
IN HARBOR

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 10, 1943).

No. 2

From: COMSOPAC
To : COMNAVACTSOL
Info: ALL SHIPS GUADAL
RAINBOW AREA
CINCPAC

101031 January, 1943
Operational Priority

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *npd 947022*

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

YOUR 100732 X GENERAL ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFIC ZEAL
INFO IS IN AGREEMENT X FEEL SURE ESPERANCE TOKYO
EXPRESS TONIGHT

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 10, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The eight destroyers which comprised this run of the "Tokyo Express" were sighted by a coastwatcher at 0700 GCT, January 10th shortly after they had departed from Faisi. ComNavAct Solomons sent his message at 0732 GCT. In view of the latter's knowledge that eight destroyers were making the run while ComSoPac declared that there was no specific information from radio intelligence concerning this run, it must be concluded that ComNavAct Solomons' dispatch was based upon the coastwatcher's report, which therefore must have constituted the first information concerning this run of the "Tokyo Express". Hence, in this case the resultant interception in which one destroyer is believed to have been sunk, another damaged, and another possibly damaged, is not attributable to radio intelligence.

No. 3

Late on the afternoon of 10 January a coastwatcher sighted 8 destroyers north of New Georgia headed southwest. Aircraft could not strike before dark.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3 (continued)

PT boats, however, met the enemy force off Esperance shortly after midnight. A PBV operating with them directed the boats to 1 enemy group and illuminated with flares. Of the 10 PT boats in the area 6 fired a total of 21 torpedoes getting 2 hits on 1 destroyer, 1 on a second, and possibly 1 on a third. The first was possibly sunk. Two PT boats were sunk.

At daylight about 250 drums of supplies floating in the water were destroyed. A large oil slick existed in the area of the engagement. The morning airplane search sighted 4 destroyers retiring about 120 miles from Henderson Field but aircraft striking forces failed to make contact. In mid-afternoon 3 destroyers, 1 trailing oil, were sighted 60 miles from the Shortlands.

(Solomon Islands Campaign, from 6 January, 1943 through Vila Bombardment, 23-24 January, 1943. Report by CinCPac dated March 19, 1943, pp. 3 and 4).

No. 4

From: COMSOPAC
To : CINCPAC
Info: ALL TFC SOPAC
COMSOWSPAGFOR
NZNB

110621 January, 1943
Priority

TOKYO EXPRESS RAN DOWN TO ESPERANCE AGAIN NIGHT OF 10TH X 8 DD'S WERE 30 MILES OUT FAISI AT 1600 GCT THAT DAY ON HEADING EAST SOUTH EAST X PRELIMINARY REPORT INDICATES WE LOST 2 PT'S IN MID-NIGHT ACTION BUT TORPEDO HITS SCORED ON AT LEAST 1 DD AND 1 OTHER CMA APPEARED TO BE CRUISER OR AP BUT PROBABLY DD AT 0627 L (-11) 11TH & DD'S WERE IN THE ALLEY SOUTH BY EAST OF NORTHWEST ISABEL HEADING BACK TO BASE

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 11, 1943).

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Authority *npd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

Radio intelligence confirmed damage to at least one destroyer on this occasion.

No. 5

102340 January, 1943

From:	NIMO	40	(SubFor)
To :	REKA	0	(8th Flt)
	ETA	61	(NGS, 1st Section)
Info:	TINE	155	("KA" OpFor)
	TATUJU	1	(Guadal Defense Force)

6th Guadalcanal Transport Force urgent battle report.

Arrived Esperance (Empennsu) at 2300 and are conducting landing operations. 1 direct hit on HATSUKAZE by enemy planes and torpedo boats but she is able to navigate under her own power. Maximum speed attainable, 18 knots. Under escort of ARASHI, KANAKAZE and TOKITSUKAZE. She is headed for RXE (Shortlands) via central route.

(NFM-020756-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 1, 1943, p. 44).

No. 6

110500 January, 1943

From:	TORO	92	
To :	BAHA	8	(Comb. Flt)
	NARO	3	(2nd Flt)
	MARO	3	(3rd Flt)
	IHA	8	(8th Flt)
	SOKE	71	(DesRon)
	RATE	51	(DesRon 2)

On 10 January at 2247, the HATSUKAZE bearing 190; distant 7.5 miles from Savo Island was attacked by two enemy torpedo boats. One torpedo a direct hit in the wardroom. The second, third and fourth

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NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 10, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6 (continued)

compartments are flooded. The steering gear, the gyro-compass, the entire communications system and the director system are damaged. Still investigating the damage. At present escorted by the ARASHI and the TOKITSUKAZE and heading toward RIE (Shortland) speed 18 knots. Request coverage.

Personnel killed, 8; seriously wounded, 15 (?); lightly wounded, including officer, 8.

(NFM-301042-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 30, 1943, p. 41).

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JANUARY 11, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #301

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSWPAC
ALL TF COMDBS PAC
OPNAV
COMSOPAC
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

110245 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The mouth of the Mambare River near Buna was suggested as the probable landing point for submarines endeavoring to supply the Japanese in the Buna area.

No. 1-a:

LIKELY THAT SUBS ARE CONTACTING ENEMY FORCES AT MOUTH OF MAMBARE RIVER NORTH OF BUNA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The association of submarines with the Mambare area was observed in intercepted traffic.

No. 1-b:

Operations in Solomons on 8th January appeared to involve principally units of the B SubForce, there being a rise in volume of sub traffic and several associations of sub commands with Guadalcanal, Mambare Base Comdr., and others unidentified.

(NSS-061840-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 102).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-c:

Concealed originator at 1200-8th addressed message to Comdr. B SubForce (YUFU 7), [redacted] Comdr. Mambare Base, plus unident RINI 7 and NCHO 4, info CofS 8th Fleet (AHA 0), SubForce (MOBU-MOYU 9) and 11th Air Fleet (ATE 5), Comdr. 8th Base Force (HIRO 0) plus unident KUHA-TUHA 4 and YOKE 3. Apparently efforts are still being made by submarine to contact Orange forces at mouth of Mambare River.

(T2W-090839-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 60).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

A few days later a sub was sighted off the mouth of the Mambare River where a concentration of enemy troops was noted.

No. 1-d:160745 January, 1943
Priority

From: MACARTHUR
To : COMGENHANDDEPT
CHIEF OF STAFF WAR DEPT
Retransmitted:
From: COMGENHANDDEPT
To : CINCPAC

PERIOD 1300 GCT-14 TO 1300 GCT-15 SOMESPAC AREA
REPORT OF OPERATIONS NEW GUINEA: MAMBARE DELTA:
LARGE NUMBER JAPANESE REPORTED CONCENTRATED ON
ISLAND NORTHWEST OF MOUTH X PROBABLE SUBMARINE
SIGHTED 1450 GCT-13.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 16, 1943).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 2-a:

INCREASED ACTIVITY NOTED IN MALAY - NEI AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This increased activity was reflected in the traffic volume of that area.

No. 2-b:

Traffic volume shows increase suggesting continued and concentrated efforts to assemble men, equipment and material for major operational moves. Activity in this southwestern area (DEI-Malay) shows increase.

(HYPO-10-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 123).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

A renewal of midget submarine operations in the vicinity of Guadalcanal appeared imminent.

No. 3-a:

RENEWED ACTIVITY BY MIDGET SUBS SUGGESTED BY REVIVED ASSOCIATIONS WITH GUADALCANAL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Associations noted in current traffic gave rise to this conclusion.

No. 3-b:

[redacted] Chiyoda Base Comdr., unident UIWI 1 (indicated at Guadalcanal (SUKETE) and which may be a tender for midget subs), info Guadalcanal (TAYUSU), Combined Fleet, SubFor and unidents was addressed by Rabaul call ONU 2, which is probably a cover-up call as much traffic to various addressees is being sent by this originator. Chiyoda Base is associated with midget subs and suggests renewed attempts to use them in Guadalcanal area.

(HYPO-10-January-TI)

(D. T. B. January 10, 1943, p. 70).

The following message intercepted several days later indicated that the Japanese were employing midget submarines as freight-carriers at Guadalcanal.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

271

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-a:

21140 January, 1943

From: TAMOI (Chiyoda Base Guadalcanal or
22nd Detached Comm. Unit Guadalcanal).
To: [redacted] CinC 2nd Sub Force
CinC Advance Force
Commanding Officer T-20
Info: 2nd Sub Force Chief Staff
8th Area Army Chief Staff
17th Army.

From Commander "B" (?)

5 freight carrying midget subs, Chief Petty Officer
Yoshitada Goloo.

1. At 1837 (both boats) hugging the coast grounded
at the landing point.
2. Unloading completed at 2345 having taken 4 hours
35 minutes.
3. The freight carrying midgets were towed by small
motor landing craft and at double zero thirty were
scuttled in 40 meters of water 1000 meters from
blank.

(TAM-241227-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 86).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Several enemy underscas craft were located.

No. 4-a:

SUBS BY DF X SOUTH AND EAST X 07161 X 01155 X
04156 X 11157 X 04152

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-b:

D/P Fixes for January 10, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	161 - E 07-30S	1558/09
NARAE	Sub	13220	155-30E 05-30S	0134
NARAE	Sub	13220	155 - E 04 - S	0510
NARAE	Sub	6385	161-15E 07 - S	1118/10
NARAE	Sub	6385	157 - E 11 - S	1232/10
NARAE	Sub	6385	156 - E 10-30S	1321/10
ONU 2	Sub	6385	151-45E 04 - S	1642/09

(HYPO-10-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 44a).

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Authority *AND 947022*

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

While there still was no definite intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers, there was a slight indication that the Commander of the Third Fleet was in the Empire.

No. 5-a:

STILL UNABLE GIVE CV LOCATIONS X CINC 3RD FLEET FROM ONE PIECE EVIDENCE SHOWN IN EMPIRE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic routing suggested that the Commander of the Third Fleet was in the Empire.

No. 5-b:

CinC 3rd Fleet remains in Empire by traffic routing.

(NPM-10-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 117).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The 5th Pioneers (naval construction corps) was observed to be on Kolombangara Island in the Solomons.

No. 6-a:

5TH PIONEERS BELIEVED ON KOLOMBANGARA ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis disclosed the presence of this outfit on Kolombangara.

No. 6-b:

The #2 Convoy (at Bain) addressed Chief of #5 Construction Force on Kolombangara Island and Commander #15 Field AA Unit, Munda Detachment, suggesting the impending arrival of reinforcements.

(HYFO-9-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 82).

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Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Information concerning the armament of the enemy's TAKANAMI class destroyers was given. This information was obtained from a prisoner of war and is not radio intelligence. The question of the identity of an enemy ship recently photographed in the Solomons was thrown open again upon the receipt of this information.

No. 7-a:

LATEST POW REPORTS INDICATE TAKANAMI CLASS DD HAS 6 12 CM GUNS IN THREE TURRETS WITH ONLY 1 TURRET FORWARD X IF TRUE THE 4 TURRET VESSEL CURRENTLY CALLED TAKANAMI CLASS DD REVERTS TO FORMER STATUS OF MYSTERY SHIP

See also Item 5 of CinCpac Bulletin #270, December 11, 1942 and Item 4 of CinCpac Bulletin #307, January 17, 1943. In the latter reference the "mystery ship" was identified as a destroyer of the TERUTSUKI class.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 11, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #301 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

110323 January, 1943
 Priority

PRISONERS INSIST TAKANAMI CLASS NEW DESTROYERS HAVE ONLY 3
 TURRETS 1 FORWARD 2 AFT EACH HAVING 2 12 CENTIMETER GUNS X
 CINCPAC 301 X FOLLOWING ZYMOTIC X NO RELIABLE JAP CARRIER
 LOCATIONS AVAILABLE X CINC 3RD MAY BE IN HOME WATERS X
 EXPECT RENEWAL MIDGET SUB ACTIVITY GUADALCANAL AREA X
 ENEMY SUBS STILL ATTEMPTING CONTACT FRIENDLY FORCES AT
 MAMBARE RIVER NEW GUINEA X BY D/P JAP SUBS LAT SOUTH LONG-
 ITUDE EAST X 04156 X 07161 X 04152 X 11157 X 05155 X IN-
 CREASSED INTEREST BY ORANGE SHOWN IN MALAY-NEI AREA X 5TH
 PIONEERS WORKING ON KOLOMBANGARA ISLAND NEW GEORGIA

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 12, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #302

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMSOPAC
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

120213 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The 8th Army Division was reported to be at
 Batavia.

No. 1-a:

ARMY 8TH DIVISION IN BATAVIA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This Army unit was observed to be an addressee
 in an intercepted dispatch sent to Batavia.

No. 1-b:

During late evening 9th, Ambon Communications Unit
 addressed at least 3 despatches to
 Ujina Shipping Board Comdr. at Kure, Soerabaya
 Anchorage Comdr. at Soerabaya, Batavia 40th Anchor-
 age Comdr., Batavia 8th Division Army at Batavia,
 3rd Sea Transport Staff at Singapore, and 18th
 Anchorage Comdr. at Koepang.

(NSS-100555-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 120).

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 Authority *and 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 12, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The KATORI, a light cruiser, was known to be at Truk but information concerning the enemy's carriers continued to be lacking.

No. 2-a:

KATORI AT TRUK X CVS UNLOCATED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic routing disclosed the KATORI's presence at Truk.

No. 2-b:

Traffic for KATORI being sent to Truk for delivery at 2000 10th January.

(NSS-102110-TI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 25).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 12, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 3-a:

INDICATIONS SOUTHEAST AREA HOLDS MAIN INTEREST OF
JAPS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This conclusion was based upon an analysis of
current traffic.

No. 3-b:

Other despatches associating Third Fleet calls with
8th and 11th Air Fleets as well as 4th Fleet, plus
continued addressing of Radio Intelligence infor-
mation from First Combined Communication Unit (at
Rabaul) to Combined, Second and Third Fleets, Palao,
Saipan, Truk and Jaluit Radios, Tokyo D.F. Control
and Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff
makes it apparent that the southeastern area con-
tinues to hold the main interest of the Japs.

(HYPO-11-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 11, 1943, p. 149).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 12, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of two enemy submarines were given.

No. 4-a:

DCG FOX SHOWS SUBS X 5 SOUTH 152-30 EAST X 7
SOUTH 157-30 EAST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-b:

D/F Fixes for January 11, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAB	Sub	13220	152-30E 05-15S	110229
NARAB	Sub	13220	157 - E 07 - S	110029

(HYPO-11-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 39b).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 12, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The tactical organization of the Japanese Fleet in October was outlined.

No. 5-a:

DURING OCTOBER JAP FLEET TACTICAL ORGANIZATION AS FOLLOWS X STRIKING FORCE UNDER COMAND 3RD FLEET X ADVANCE FORCE UNDER COMDR 2ND FLEET X SUPPORT FORCE PROBABLY UNDER CINC COMBINED X REINFORCEMENT FORCE UNDER CINC 8TH FLEET X BASE AIR FORCE UNDER COMDR 11TH AIR FLEET X ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (SUBMARINES) UNDER COMSUBFOR X SUSPECT THAT SAME TACTICAL ORGANIZATION EXISTS TODAY

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The precise source of this intelligence is not known. In all probability it was gathered from a study of intercepted messages originated during the month of October.

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NOV 947022

JANUARY 12, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #302 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
ACNB
N2NB

120305 January, 1943
Priority

CHANGE WORD ORANGE IN YESTERDAYS BULLETIN TO JAPANESE X
CINCPAC 302 X ZYNOTIC X FOLLOWING TACTICAL ORGANIZATION KNOWN
TO HAVE EXISTED IN OCTOBER VERY LIKELY STILL IN EFFECT X AD-
VANCE FORCE UNDER 2ND FLEET COMDR X STRIKING FORCE UNDER 3RD
FLEET COMDR X SUPPORT FORCE (PROBABLY COMMANDED BY COMBINED
FLEET CINC) X BASE AIR FORCE DIRECTED BY COMDR 11TH AIR FLEET X
REINFORCEMENT FORCE SUBORDINATE TO 8TH FLEET COMDR X ADVANCE
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (SUBMARINES ON SCOUTING MISSIONS) LEAD
BY COMMANDER SUBMARINES X BEARINGS GIVE SUBS LOCATED SOUTH
BY EAST X 05152 X 07157 X KATORI NEAR TRUK X JAP PARAMOUNT
INTEREST BELIEVED REMAINS IN SOUTHEASTERN THEATRE X CARRIERS
NOT LOCATED X 8TH ARMY DIVISION AT BATAVIA

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 12, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 120145

(A) INTELLIGENCE

CinCPac sent a report on the weather at Kiska
to Task Force #8.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : TF 8

120145 January, 1943
Routine

REAL WEATHER FROM KISKA FROM CINCPAC X 18 HOURS
GGT THE 11TH X WIND NORTH NORTH EAST 30 KNOTS X
HEAVY DRY SNOW X PRESSURE 1003.6 MILLIBARS X TEMP
28 FAHRENHEIT X TEN TENTHS STRATUS NIMBUS CLOUDS
AT 1500 FEET X SNOW DURING PAST HOUR AND INDI-
CATIONS OF MORE X NO BREAKS IN CLOUDS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This report was derived from an intercepted
weather report originated at Kiska.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 12, 1943

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 8.5 DISPATCH 121940

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Units of the enemy's 5th Fleet were reported to be in the Aleutians.

No. 1

From: CTG 8.5
To : S 18

121940 January, 1943
Urgent
(Handle as OP)

ULTRA X AT JACK BOOT TODAY THERE ARE INDICATIONS ENEMY UNITS 5TH FLEET PRESENT X INVESTIGATE HOLTZ BAY X SARAKA BAY X CHICHAGOF HARBOR X JAPONSKI ISLAND

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 12, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The source of this intelligence has not been ascertained.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943GINGPAC BULLETIN #303

From: GINGPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMSOPAC
 COMNAVBUR
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

130257 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was reported that German and Italian surface raiders had been assigned operating areas in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

No. 1-a:

GERMANY AND ITALY GIVEN FOLLOWING AREAS IN INDIAN AND SOUTH PACIFIC OCEANS FOR OPERATIONS X PRESUMABLY FOR SURFACE RAIDERS ALTHOUGH DISTINCTION NOT CLEAR IN INDIAN OCEAN X INDIAN X SOUTH OF 25 SOUTH AND WEST OF 108 (QUESTION) EAST X SOUTH PACIFIC X SOUTH OF EQUATOR AND EAST OF 120 WEST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This was known through an intercepted message.

No. 1-b:

27132) October, 1942

28125

From: NARAE
 To : WETI 58
 Info: SATO 58 (Combined Fleet)
 YOSISU 1 (AIKOKU Maru)
 WITAKE 2 (HOKOKU Maru)
 NASI 02
 KUHI 98
 KURE 78

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (continued)

From ONGS.

We have agreed with our allies as to the division of operating areas in the Indian Ocean areas as follows:

- 1. Our allies will cover that part south of 25° south latitude and west of (108 ?) degrees east longitude.
- 2. German and Italian auxiliary cruisers assigned operating areas in the South Pacific from the equator south, east of 120 degrees west longitude.
- 3. German and Italian auxiliary cruisers will be proceeding to [redacted] for operations.

(NFM-111816-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 11, 1943, p. 11).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The locations of the enemy's carriers remained unknown. There were remote indications that some of them might be in the Empire but in traffic they continued to be associated with the southern theatre.

No. 2-a:

CARRIERS REMAIN OBSCURE X VAGUE IMPRESSION PART AT LEAST ARE NEAR EMPIRE HOWEVER DEFINITE ASSOCIATIONS WITH SOUTHERN THEATRE HAVE BEEN NOTED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The only information concerning the carriers was derived from traffic analysis.

No. 2-b:

Carrier-base frequencies 3815-5910 Kcs were active in the Empire region with 11 different calls, all unidentified, appearing. The continued activity of these channels is believed an indication that preparations for departure of some carriers are not yet completed.....

Association of SOKE 7 (tentative DesRon 3) and unidentified TORO 9 with both Guadalcanal Operations and, as noted in Empire comments, with Combined, Second, Third and Eighth Fleets, is another clue to probable destination of the carriers.

(HYPO-11-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 11, 1943, pp. 21 and 99).

It was learned later that the HAYATAKA was covering a troop movement to the southern theatre at

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

this time, which explained the carrier associations with this theatre noted in current traffic. See Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was evident that enemy submarines were continuing to supply the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal. One such supply run was known to be scheduled for the night of January 13.

No. 3-a:

SUB SUPPLY OPERATIONS GUADALCANAL CONTINUE X
PREDICT ONE FOR NIGHT OF 13TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These supply operations were reflected in analyses of recent traffic.

No. 3-b:

Good increase in Army traffic over Navy circuits on 8th involving Army units at Guadalcanal and Buin, transportation groups, and Comdr. Gou Force. Guadalcanal Defense Force (IATUSU) very active with traffic to Comdr. Gou Force, "B" SubForce Comdr. (YUFU 7) at Rabaul, and Staff 8th Combined Special Landing Force (KAKUSI). Associations seem to indicate another attempt to reinforce units on Guadalcanal. This is further noted in appearance of surface units IRO 3 and SOMI 9 which were very active in last reinforcement attempt that area. Submarines I-16 (RONE 3) and I-17 (YAFU 6) appear also to be actively involved in these associations.

(TZB-090835-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 87).

No. 3-c:

Some additional operations from calls not identified but apparently in Solomons area plus several aircraft reconnaissance reports from the same area totaled to an unusually high volume of priority

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-g: (continued)

traffic in kana code. During the day there was considerable administrative traffic in which sub and air activities were closely associated. The [redacted] transport command at Rabaul appears to be closely identified with sub reinforcements of the Guadalcanal forces. There are indications that an attempt to bring further supplies and equipment by this method is in the making, a conclusion which is further supported by the presence of the "B" SubForce in today's traffic.

(NSS-101921-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 11, 1943, p. 74).

No. 3-d:

#2 Communication Detachment on Guadalcanal (TAIMO 3) originated a most urgent to [redacted] Baker SubForce at 2110 January 12th. This despatch appeared on Truk (UTU) 37 minutes from time of origin. A later transmission of this same message by Tokyo used the call USA 3, [redacted]

[redacted] compromising it as the Baker SubForce. This possibly concerns night landing operations from subs.

(NSS-121520-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 92).

See ComSoPac Dispatch 130235 January, 1943 concerning the intelligence that an enemy submarine was due at Guadalcanal on the night of January 13.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

Several enemy submarines were located by Dog
Fox fixes.

No. 4-a:

SUBS LOCATED BY DOG FOX SOUTH AND EAST X 10154 X
04149 X 06158 X 06152 X 08152

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 4-b:

D/F Fixes for January 12, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6995	154 - E 10 - S	1850/11
UTO 1	Sub	7915	149-30E 04 - S	1950/11
NARAE	Sub	13220	158 - E 05-30S	0240/12
NARAE	Sub	6995	160-30E 11-30S	1140/12
HEMI 5	Sub(?)	7915	152 - E 05-30S	0620/12
NARAE	Sub	6995	158 - E 08 - S	1311/12

(HIFO-12-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 11, 1943, p. 8).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

No unusual activity was noted in the Kurile-Aleutian area.

No. 5-a:

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN KURILE ALEUTIAN AREA APPEARS NORMAL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This statement was based upon the findings of traffic analysis.


No. 5-b:

Traffic file heavy for day.....Due to the special extra coverage being given northern circuits there was more traffic than usual from this area. This increased amount of intercepts from the north failed to show anything unusual and no particular excitement was indicated.

Special coverage of the northern area produced more traffic than usual but nothing seen much worthy of comment. The Third Convoy Control Office at Otaru and the Comdr. #30 Anchorage are still being addressed by an anonymous originator. The usual traffic passes between the patrol units and Gminato Defense Force. A new call (NMI 1) is being addressed along with Cinc 9th Fleet by a NARAE originator but no indications as to its identity. Activity at Kiska appeared to be normal with the usual Army and weather traffic being handled. Kiska is also sending traffic suspected of being radio intelligence.

(HYPO-12-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, pp. 67 and 107).



~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #303 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
ACNB
NZNB

130455 January, 1943
Priority

SLIGHT INDICATIONS PERSIST THAT AT LEAST PART OF 3RD FLEET IS NEAR JAPAN X ALSO CERTAIN ASSOCIATIONS THIS FLEET WITH SOUTHEASTERN ZONE X ZIMOTIC X INTELLIGENCE 303RD CINCPAC X SUBS BY BEARINGS X 16011 X 15410 X 15808 X 15806 X 14904 X 15206 X ALL EAST BY SOUTH X SUBMARINES STILL SUPPLYING FORCES GUADALCANAL X AREA EAST OF 120 WEST AND SOUTH OF EQUATOR PLUS SOUTH OF 25 SOUTH AND WEST OF 108 (QUERY) EAST RESERVED FOR ITALIAN AND GERMAN RAIDER OPERATIONS X BY RAIDER IS PRESUMED SURFACE RAIDER AT LEAST IN CASE OF SOUTH PACIFIC X BUT NOT CLEAR IN CASE OF INDIAN OCEAN X NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY NOTED NORTH PACIFIC

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JANUARY 13, 1943

COMSOPAC DISPATCHES 130235 AND 130625

(A) INTELLIGENCE

American forces in the Guadalcanal area were warned that an enemy submarine carrying important codes was due at Kamimbo on January 13.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC 130235 January, 1943
To : CACTUS RINGBOLT AREA Operational Priority
Info: CINCPAC

COMSOPAC REENCYPHERS HIS 122137 XX ONE OF THE IJIM CLASS SUBS ACCORDING TO ZEAL ARRIVING KAMIMBO TODAY OR TONIGHT X BELIEVE CARRYING IMPORTANT NEW CODES

A few hours later ComSoPac reported that the submarine of which he earlier had warned was scheduled to evacuate certain personnel from Guadalcanal.

No. 2

From: COMSOPAC 130625 January, 1943
To : COMGEN Operational Priority
GUADALCANAL
SENAV
COMNAVBASE
Info: CINCPAC
ALL TF COMS SOPAC

THE I BOAT DUE GUADALCANAL TODAY XX ZEAL XX IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART TODAY WITHDRAWING CERTAIN PERSONNEL XX ONE OR MORE DD DUE TO SAIL FROM GUADALCANAL ON 14TH XX NO INDICATION OF HOUR

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from intercepted dispatches.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3

101110 January, 1943

From: YAYO 6 (Rabaul)
 To : TAMOI (Unident)

From CofS 8th Fleet.

1 copy [redacted] is being forwarded in submarine I-16 which will arrive Kaniho on 13th January. The person responsible will go and receive them direct and will report when they have been received.

[redacted]

(T2#-12115-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 55).

No. 4

122128 January, 1943

From: NENU 5
 To : MUHI 1 (Unident shown at Chiyoda Base TAMOI)
 Info: USA 3 (B SubForce c/o Rabaul Rdo CMA Ø)
 UIWI 8 (Guadalcanal Address)
 HANO 4 (Combined Fleet)
 SETO 7 (Unident)
 YONO 2 (Connected Subs)

Advance Expeditionary Force OpOrd 253.

Chiyoda Base Personnel turn over present duties to 84th Guard Division suitably and return Truk either by submarine on 13th or destroyer on 14th.

(T2#-130200-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 49).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 4 (continued)

* * *

122128 January, 1943

From:	REMU	5	
To :	MURK	76	(Tamol)
Info:	USA	36	
	CHA	2	
	UIWI		
	SETO	3	
	YORO	6	
	HAKO	0	

OpOrd 253.

Withdraw Chiyoda personnel temporarily assigned to 84 Defense Force, and despatch them to Truk using submarine departing 13th and destroyer on 14th.

(NFM-130250-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 50).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The I-16 appears to have escaped detection on her mission to Kanimbo with codes on the night of January 13.

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JANUARY 13, 1943

COMSOPAC DISPATCHES 130550 AND 130625

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The American Commands at Guadalcanal were notified that the enemy might attempt to land supplies on Guadalcanal on the night of January 13.

No. 1

From:	COMSOPAC	130550 January, 1943
To :	COMGEN CACTUS	Operational Priority
	SENAV CACTUS	
Info:	CINCPAC	
	ALL TF COMS SOPAC	

ULTRA SOURCES NOT SO PROLIFIC AT PRESENT BUT SOME SUGGESTIONS ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS FOR GUADALCANAL AT EARLY DATE XX COULD BE ANOTHER EXPRESS TONIGHT

A short time later ComSOPac reported evidence that one or more destroyers were scheduled to leave Guadalcanal on January 14.

No. 2

From:	COMSOPAC	130625 January, 1943
To :	COMGEN GUADALCANAL	Operational Priority
	SENAV	
	COMNAVBASE	
Info:	CINCPAC	
	ALL TF COMS SOPAC	

THE I BOAT DUE GUADALCANAL TODAY XX ZEAL XX IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART TODAY WITHDRAWING CERTAIN PERSONNEL XX ONE OR MORE DD DUE TO SAIL FROM GUADALCANAL ON 14TH XX NO INDICATION OF HOUR

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The indications that such an attempt might be made on the night of January 13 were indirect. Traffic analysis suggested only that the "Tokyo Express" would run soon.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 3

At 1200-12th Guadalcanal (TATUSU) addressed one in operational system to Guadalcanal Operations Force (KUHAYO) and Staff SeaplanDiv 11 (SIMID 29). At 1400-12th Guadalcanal (TATUSU) addressed same type despatch to Guadalcanal Operations Force (KUHAYO) and CofS 11th Air Fleet (SOMI 03). Usual addressee on this particular type despatch is Guadalcanal Operations Force only and inclusion of 11th Air Fleet in one, and SeaplanDiv 11 in the other suggests possibility of someighting or movement of Allied units in which these air activities would be interested. At 1300-12th blank originator addressed a priority _____ to Guadalcanal (TATUSU), Staff AirFlot 26 (SIFI 0), Staff Outer South Seas Force (RESA 90), Staff 11th Air Fleet (SEMI 90), Staff unident YOMI 50. Staff Officer Shimada was specifically addressed in care of Munda Defense Force (NEKIYO). At 1055, 1230 and 1400 12th unident MOYOKU addressed most urgent despatches in operational system to CofS 8th Fleet (NOMI 03), CofS 11th Air Fleet (SOMI 03), All Force and Detachment Comdrs. ashore and afloat of unident NNA 79, all Force and Detachment Comdrs. ashore and afloat of 6th Air Attack Force (NOYA 69), all Force and Detachment Comdrs. ashore and afloat of Reinforcement Force (URE 49), All Force and Detachment Commanders ashore and afloat of Rabaul Area Air Force (MAHI 39), Rabaul Area Weather Station (TOHI 8), Buin Base (UE 90), Munda Defense Force (NEKIYO). Inclusion of Reinforcement Force and use of suffix for all commanders suggests important activity either underway or in preparation for reinforcement of Guadalcanal.

COMMENT: URE \emptyset _____ apparently was force of destroyers which made Replenishment attempt at Guadalcanal on 11 December.

(NSS-121000-121010-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 82).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

The intelligence that destroyers were leaving Guadalcanal on January 14 was more positive. These destroyers were to evacuate the Chiyoda Base Personnel.

No. 4

122128 January, 1943

From:	NENU	5	
To :	MUHI	1	(unident shown at Chiyoda Base TAMOI)
Info:	USA	3	(B SubForce care of Rabaul Radio ONA Ø)
	UIMI	8	(Guadalcanal Address)
	HAKO	4	(Combined Fleet)
	SETO	7	(unident)
	YONO	2	(Connected subs)

Advance Expeditionary Force OpOrd 253.

Chiyoda Base Personnel turn over present duties to 84th Guard Division suitably and return Truk either by submarine on 13th or destroyer on 14th.

(T2W-130200-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 49).

* * *

122128 January, 1943

From:	NENU	5	
To :	MURI	76	(Tamoi)
Info:	USA	36	
	ONA	2	
	UIMI		
	SETO	3	
	YONO	6	
	HAKO	Ø	

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4 (continued)

Blank OpOrd 253.

Withdraw Chiyoda personnel temporarily assigned to 84 Defense Force, and despatch them to Truk using submarine departing 13th and destroyer on 14th.

(NFM-130250-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 50).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The next run of the "Tokyo Express" was made on the night of January 14 and these apparently were the destroyers reported in the intercepted messages above to be leaving Guadalcanal on that date, as Com-SoPac had warned in his second dispatch above. This attempt to land supplies was made by a force of nine destroyers, five of which were believed to be of the large TERETSUKI class. The size of these latter vessels probably was responsible for early reports that the convoy included light cruisers and cargo vessels. This force was observed by a coastwatcher to leave Faisi at 1545 L (-11) on January 14 and was reported off Vella La Vella at 1640 L (-11). Night-fall precluded an air strike on the convoy, but a night search plane tracked the enemy force as far as Savo Island and another plane scored a direct hit with a 500 lb. bomb on one of the destroyers.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

Meanwhile, thirteen PT boats had been stationed between Cape Esperance and Savo Island to intercept the enemy convoy. Despite the handicap of a severe electrical storm which greatly reduced visibility, the PT boats established contact with the enemy shortly after midnight (local time). In the ensuing attacks three destroyers were hit by torpedoes. Although an enemy plane attempted to bomb the PT boats, no damage was inflicted. However, one PT boat was damaged by grounding on a reef. During the night, two burning ships were reported to be withdrawing from the area.

Air assaults upon the convoy began at dawn on January 15. At 0635 L (-11), the nine destroyers were sighted off Santa Isabel Island as they withdrew toward Shortland Island. An hour later, 15 Dauntless dive-bombers escorted by 12 Wildcats and 4 Cobras struck the convoy. Two destroyers were hit and near misses scored on three others. The bombers' escorts prevented interference with the bombers by the convoy's aerial cover and shot down eleven Zero planes. Seven American planes were missing after this action. The nine destroyers were sighted twice again that morning

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)(C) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

as they retired to the northeast. Two of the vessels appeared to be crippled but were still afloat and underway. At 1545 L, 9 B17's accompanied by 4 Cobras, 4 Warhawks, and 6 Lightnings attacked five of these destroyers north of Vella Lavella. The enemy ships passed through this attack without damage but 12 float bi-planes were shot down. Another strike was sent out to follow up this attack but was not able to locate the enemy force. The final tally for this run of the "Tokyo Express" was three to five destroyers of the "Express" damaged and thirty enemy planes downed at a cost of eight American planes.

No. 5

From: HDO EPATE
 To : COMSOPACFOR
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMGENARMY FORCES SOPAC

140758 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

AT 140540 GCT 9 DD SIGHTED AT 7-25 SOUTH 156-30
 EAST COURSE EAST BY SOUTH XX AT 140345 GCT 4 DD
 AND 3 AK OR CL LEFT FAISI ON SOUTHEAST COURSE

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 14, 1943).

No. 6

From: CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: COMSOPAC
 CINCPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC
 COMGENSOPAC

140627 January, 1943
 Urgent

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 6 (continued)

NINE DD LAT 07-25 SOUTH LONG 156-30 EAST AT 1610
LOVE (-11) X COURSE EAST BY SOUTH, HIGH SPEED X
REPORT RECEIVED FROM CW AT 1720 LOVE

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 14, 1943).

No. 7

From: SENAV CACTUS
To : CCHAIRSOPAC
Info: CINCPAC
COMSOPAC
COMGENSOPAC
ALL TFC SOPAC

150045 January, 1943
Operational Priority

LAST NIGHTS BLACK CAT OPERATIONS X CAT 1 AT 2250 L
(-11) SIGHTED 5 DD 3 AK LAT 08 DEG 20 MINS LONG 158
DEG 20 MIN EAST X TRACKED FORCE TO SAVO AND VERI-
FIED COMPOSITION X AT 0030 L (-11) SAW 2 SHIPS BURN-
ING AT CAPE ESPERANCE X FOLLOWED UP CHANNEL TO 65
MILES SHIPS STILL BURNING BUT PROCEEDING ABOUT 20
KNOTS X LOST CONTACT WITH THESE VESSELS AND SEARCHED
CHANNEL TO 100 MILES THEN OUT OVER TO BEKATA BAY X
REMAINED THAT AREA 0145 TO 0215 L (-11) X RECEIVED NO
AA TROUBLE 2 PLANES WERE IN AIR CIRCLING CAT DURING
THIS HALF HOUR PERIOD X CAT 2 PICKED UP 5 DD IN 2
COLUMNS OF 2 AND 3 16 MILES NORTHEAST OF RUSSELLS
X DROPPED 4 500 POUNDERS FROM 2000 FEET AT 0038 L
(-11) X 1 HIT AND 2 NEAR MISSES ON 1 SHIP X START-
ED FIRE X SAW 2 MORE DD'S BETWEEN RUSSELLS AND SAVO
AT 0100 L (-11) X BELIEVE SHIPS WERE LEAVING CACTUS
AREA BUT UNCERTAIN OF COURSE X THIS WAS LAST CON-
TACT X GOT LOST BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER AND WOUND
UP 100 MILES SOUTH OF CACTUS X LANDED 0845 L (-11)
X CAT 3 TOOK OFF AT 2240 LANDED 0010 L (-11) MECHAN-
ICAL TROUBLE

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

No. 8

From: SENAV AT GUADALCANAL 142026 January, 1943

NINE ENEMY DD LAT 8 DEGREES 09 MINS LONG 158 DEGREES
42 MIN EAST COURSE 240 SPEED 20 AT 0635 L

(C.I.C. Operational Dispatch File, January, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *DD 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 9112335 January, 1943
Urgent

From: SENIOR AVIATOR CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: CINCPAC
 CCFMAN
 COMSOPAC
 COMGENSOPAC
 COMSOWSPACFOR
 ALL TP COMDRS SOPAC

15 DAUNTLESS ESCORTED BY 12 WILDS AND 4 COBRA AT-
 TACKED 9 ENEMY DD'S AT 0735 L (-11), LAT 08-00
 SOUTH LONG 157-45 EAST X SHIPS ON COURSE 300 TRUE
 SPEED 30 KNOTS, 2 COLUMNS IN LINE, 1 COLUMN OF 5
 TENITSUKI CLASS OTHER COLUMN CONSISTED OF SMALLER
 VESSELS X EACH COLUMN MADE 180 DEGREE TURN OUT
 BOARD X ONE OLD TYPE DESTROYER SUNK BY 3 HITS,
 NEAR MISS ON 2ND SHIP THIS CLASS X ONE NEAR MISS
 ON EACH OF 3 TENITSUKI CLASS X RELEASES MADE AT
 1000 FEET VISIBILITY EXCELLENT X AA HEAVY X JUST
 PRIOR ATTACK ABOUT 12 LAND ZEROS SIGHTED BETWEEN
 DAUNTLESS AT 10,000 FEET AND GRUMMANS AT 16,000 X
 OUR FIGHTERS ATTACKED, PREVENTING ATTACK ON DIVE
 BOMBERS X 8 ZEROS DESTROYED, SOME OF WHICH WERE
 TYPE 2 X ONE DAUNTLESS LANDED IN WATER X 2 COBRAS,
 3 WILDCATS MISSING X 1 GRUMMAN PILOT, WOUNDED,
 PARACHUTED LONGA ROADS, RESCUED

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 14, 1943).

No. 10

From: COMSOPAC
 To : CINCPAC
 Info: COMSOWSPAC
 ALL TP COMDRS SOPAC
 NZNB

150716 January, 1943
Priority

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ND 947022

FIRST OF 2 FROM COMSOPAC X AGAIN LAST NIGHT (14TH-
 15TH) TOKYO EXPRESS RAN DOWN TO CACTUS BUT SO FAR
 DETAILS LACKING X FIRST REPORT TIMED 1545 L (-11)
 14TH WHEN 4 DD 3 CL OR AK LEFT SOUTHEAST FROM
 FAISI X AT 1640 L 9 DD'S WERE SEEN BY WATCHER 11
 MILES NORTH HIS POST NORTHWEST VELLA LAVELLA X
 COURSE EAST BY SOUTH HIGH SPEED X 1300 L SEARCH

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 10 (continued)

PLANE CONTACTED 5 SHIP FORCE BETWEEN RUSSELL ISLAND SEPARATELY REPORTED 2 AK'S EASTERN OF DD'S X LAST REPORT RECEIVED WHEN SAME FORCE WAS 40 MILES FROM LUNGA STILL GOING IN XX EARLY 15TH OUR AIR SPOTTED 9 DD'S RETIRING UP THE SOLOMONS ALLEY AND BY 0745 L SBD'S HAD BEEN SEEN TO SCORE 1 HIT EACH ON 2 DESTROYERS X SURFACE FORCE WAS THEN IN MANNING STRAIT

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

No. 11

From: SENAV CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPACFOR
 Info: ALL CTF SOPAC
 CINCPAC
 CGFMAN
 COMSOPAC
 COMGENSOPAC

150231 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

FROM 20,000 BL7 ON PHOTO MISSION IN FAISI ESCORTED BY 5 WARHAWKS 5 LIGHTNINGS SIGHTED 2 LARGE DD'S STOPPED X 1 POSSIBLY SMOKING BEING CIRCLED BY 3 DD'S AT 0845 L (-11) POSITION 07 DEG 54 MINS 158 DEG 08 MINS X SHIPS GOT UNDER WAY WHEN PLANE PASSED OVER MAKING ABOUT 6 KNOTS ON COURSE 300 TRUE X SIGHTED 4 DD'S ABOUT 50 MILES NORTHWEST OF FIRST GROUP ON WAY UP TO FAISI AND SAME SHIPS ON RETURN X LAST POSITION SECOND GROUP, 07 DEG 22 MIN S 156 DEG 55 MIN E AT 0950 L (-11) COURSE 300 SPEED THIRTY FIVE KNOTS X LAST POSITION DAMAGED DD 07 DEG 45 MIN S 157 DEG 45 MIN E AT 1015 L (-11) COURSE 300 SPEED 6 KNOTS X AA RECEIVED FROM BOTH GROUPS SHIPS AND LAND BATTERIES FAISI AREA

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

No. 12

From: SENAV CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMSOPAC
 COMGENSOPAC
 SOPAC TF COMS
 RDO ESPIRITU SANTOS
 COMSOMESPAC
 COMGEN FMAN

150001 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

206

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 12 (continued)

A AND B SEARCHES FULL COURSE AND COVERAGE, NEGATIVE
X C SEARCH FULL COURSE 95 PER CENT COVERAGE X AT
0745 (-11) SAW 2 DD'S LAT 07 DEGREES 20 MINUTES
SOUTH LONG 157 DEGREES 40 MINUTES EAST COURSE 305
DEGREES SPEED 15 X AT SAME TIME AND POSITION SAW
7 DD'S ON COURSE 125 SPEED 20 CHANGING COURSE CON-
TINUALLY AND APPEARED TO BE HEADING BACK TO HELP
2 DD'S X 7 DD'S WERE FIRST SEEN 10 MILES NORTHWEST
OF OTHER 2 X B SEARCH 60 PER CENT COURSE AND COVER-
AGE X WITNESSED BOMBING BY SBD'S X BELIEVED 2
DD'S HIT X SAW SBD CREW IN RUBBER BOAT LAT 8 DEGREES
15 MINUTES SOUTH LONG 158 DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST X
NATIVE CANOE IN VICINITY X D SEARCH FULL COURSE AND
COVERAGE X NO ACTIVITY REKATA BAY X WITNESSED BOMB-
ING BY SBD'S X SAW 1 HIT ON EACH OF 2 SHIPS AND 1
NEAR MISS X SEARCHES TODAY IN ACCORDANCE MY NEW
SEARCH PLAN DETAILS OF WHICH ARE IN HANDS COMAIR-
SOPAC

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

No. 13

From: SENAV CACTUS
To : COMAIRSOPAC
Info: ALL TF COMSOPAC
CINCPAC

15000 January, 1943
Operational Priority

9 B17'S ESCORTED BY 4 COBRAS & WARHAWKS 6 LIGHTNINGS
DROPPED 72 500 POUND BOMBS ON 5 DD LATITUDE 07-15
SOUTH LONGITUDE 156-30 EAST AT 1540 L (-11) X NO
DAMAGE TO ENEMY X 12 FLOAT BIPLANES WERE SHOT DOWN,
8 BY P40'S, & BY P39'S X 2 NAGOYA ZERO REFUSED TO
ATTACK X NO OTHER JAP PLANES SEEN X FORTRESSES FLEW
AND BOMBED AT 13,000 FEET, COBRAS AT 14,000, WAR-
HAWKS 19 AND LIGHTNINGS 25,000 NAGOYAS OUT CLIMBED
LIGHTNINGS FROM 25,000 TO 28,000 X ALL PLANES RE-
TURNED XX ENEMY CONTINUED ON COURSE 300 DEGREES X
AA WAS LIGHT

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

307

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 14

From: RDO GUADALCANAL
To : COMAIRSOPAC
Info: CONGEN FMAW
COMSOPAC
RDO ESPIRITU SANTOS
CONGENSOPAC
CINCPAC
ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC

151210 January, 1943
Operational Priority

12 DAUNTLESS ESCORTED BY 7 WILDCATS 6 COBRAS WERE UNABLE LOCATE 5 DESTROYERS PREVIOUSLY BOMBED BY B17'S AND ATTACKED AK REPORTED MY 150753 X TWO HITS FOUR VERY NEAR MISSES X LAT 07-45 SOUTH LONG 157 EAST X TIME 1745 (-11) X DAUNTLESS PILOTS STATE SHIP 3000 TONS X THIS SHIP SEEN BURNING AND DEAD IN WATER BY A FORTRESS 1820 (-11) X 1 DD WITH AK NOT HIT X 12 TYPE 2 ZEROS WERE PREVENTED FROM ATTACKING BOMBERS BY GRUMMANS WHO DESTROYED 7 X ONE WILDCAT MISSING X OTHER PLANES RETURNED X DESTROYER REPORTED MY 142335 BELIEVED NOT SUNK BUT IT AND ONE OTHER BADLY DAMAGED X PILOT WHO PATROLLED LUNGA ROADS THIS MORNING SHOT DOWN 3 ZEROS NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

No. 15

From: COMSOPAC
To : CINCPAC
Info: COMSOPAC
ALL TF COMSOPAC
NZNB

160741 January, 1943
Priority

ON NIGHT OF 14TH-15TH RIF EXPRESS HAD 9 FAST SHIPS PROBABLY MADE UP AT LEAST 5 TERUTSUKI LARGE DD'S X DURING APPROACH FEB HIT 1 DD WITH 500 POUNDER AND OFF ESPERANCE PT'S CLAIM TORPEDO HITS ON 2 X AFTER DAYLIGHT 15TH 9 DD'S OFF NORTHEAST NEW GEORGIA HIT BY 15 DIVE BOMBERS X RESULT WAS SEVERE DAMAGE 1 DD DAMAGE TO ANOTHER X DURING ACTION ONE VF DOWNED 11 LAND ZEROS WE LOST 7 PLANES X AT 1545 L (-11) SAME

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 15 (continued)

DAY 5 OUR FORCES ATTACKED 5 OF THESE SHIPS MIDWAY VELLA AND NORTHWEST CHOISEUL SCORED NO HITS BUT FIGHTER ESCORT DESTROYED 12 FLOAT BIPLANES X A SECOND STRIKE SENT AFTER SHIPS UNABLE CONTACT BUT CAUGHT 3000 TON AK ESCORTED BY DD JUST NORTH OF VELLA (NO CONNECTION TOKYO EXPRESS) X AK WAS HIT TWICE AND PAF'S SHOT DOWN 7 TYPE 2 ZERO'S TO LOSS 1 WILDCAT XX AT END OF ADVENTURE: 3 TO 5 WARSHIPS ORIGINAL EXPRESS DAMAGED 1 SEVERELY X AK LEFT BURNING AND DEAD IN WATER X 30 LESS PLANES FOR TOJO X OUR LOSSES 8 PLANES

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 16, 1943).

No. 16

On 14 January 9 destroyers were seen enroute to Guadalcanal too late for daylight air strike. A night search plane sighted "5 DD and 3 AK" at 2250, 14 January, about 90 miles from Esperance and tracked the force to Savo, verifying its composition. Another plane sighted 1 group of 5 and another of 2 destroyers. During the night it hit a destroyer with a 500 pound bomb.

Visibility was low with "intense rain and lightning" between Savo and Esperance where 13 PT boats were stationed to intercept the enemy. Between 0015 and 0200, 15 January, 9 of the boats made contact with a total of 6 destroyers and 1 large vessel identified as a CL. They fired 17 torpedoes making 1 hit on each of 3 destroyers. One or more enemy planes dropped bombs on 3 PT boats. None of the boats were hit by bomb or gunfire, but 1 ran on a reef and was damaged. For an hour after the action a Catalina followed 2 burning ships retiring at 20 knots. The next morning an extensive oil slick was observed northwest of Savo Island.

The retiring enemy force was attacked east of New Georgia at 0735, 15 January, when 15 dive bombers from Henderson Field hit 2 destroyers. An hour later a

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 16 (continued)

BL7 enroute to FAISI saw 2 large destroyers stopped with 3 others circling. Another group of 4 destroyers was proceeding at high speed 50 miles to the northwest.

(Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, 1943; Solomon Islands Campaign, from 6 January, 1943 through Vila Bombardment, 23-24 January, 1943, Report by CinCPac dated March 19, 1943, p. 4).

Damage to at least four enemy destroyers on this run of the "Tokyo Express" was confirmed by radio intelligence.

No. 17

161000 January, 1943

12271

From:	No originator	
To :	KEI	1 (11th Air Fleet)
	MRN	8
	RAME	1
	EHE	2
Info:	HII	4 (2nd Fleet)
	TUKI/JUKI	6 (3rd Fleet)
	TURA	5 (SeaplatenDiv 11)
	YUN	0 (Base Force #8)
	SENA	7 (SubForce)
	EMISE	(Commander 17th Army)

(Sketchy in spots).

From Commander Reinforcement Forces. Reinforcement Force Operation Report.

Part 2. The URAKAZE, AKITSUKI, and ARASHI of the Reinforcement Force were bombed by 2 enemy planes at 2230 on January 14 when in position to westward of Savo Island. The URAKAZE was blanks (something about speed). The other ships were engaged with enemy PT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *npd 947022*

JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)

No. 17 (continued)

boats between 2248 and 2330 and drove them off. The Transportation Force arrived anchorage at 2300 (several blanks) and anchored 2350. The blank upon completion of blank at 0530 15th in position KE blank HO 00 were engaged by 15 shipboard bombers, 2 of which were shot down and 2 (probably) destroyed. 3 hits were received and the blank was unable proceed, the MAIKAZE taking her in tow (at 1045 repairs were effected and she was able proceed under her own power). TANIKAZE, URAKAZE and TAMAKAZE blanks damage blanks. DesDiv 17 was caused return to port while the others escorted blanks. At 1340 were engaged with 9 B17's and at 1540 with 1 B17. In order to rescue the crew of patrol plane the blank and the KUZOSHIO were (ordered that duty ?) and picked up 4 men. Arrived Shortlands 1830.

/Ed.note: The damaged ship taken under tow was the destroyer ARASHI/.

(T2W-280756-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 70).

* * *

161000 January, 1943

12271

From:	No originator	
To :	MEM	8
	RAME	1 (Combined Fleet)
	EHE	2 (8th Fleet)
	KEI	1 (11th Air Fleet)
Info:	HII	4 (2nd Fleet)
	TUKI	6 (3rd Fleet)
	TURA	5 (R Area Air Force)
	YUN	Ø
	SEWA	7 (SubRon)
	EMISE	(Addressed at Guadal. 20th, asctd. Army Commands, Air Commands)

From Commander Reinforcement Force. (2 garbled groups - may be Battle Report).

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Authority AND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 13, 1943 (Continued)No. 17 (continued)

1. The Reinforcement Force was west of Savo Island at 2230. The URAKAZE [redacted], AKITSUKI [redacted], and ARASHI [redacted] were attacked by 2 enemy planes. There was something (possibly damage) to the URAKAZE. Some part of the force engaged 3 torpedo boats from 2248 to 2330 and drove them off. The transport unit made its way into the anchorage (OHIO) at 2300 and seeing nothing (possibly of the enemy) anchored at 2350, and completed landings at 0025. At 0530 on the 15th in position ? KENINO # were engaged by 15 carrier borne bombers. Shot down 2 and blank two of these. Blank received hits and could not make weigh [sic]. The MAIKAZE assigned to tow. (From 1045 to 19 blank able to make weigh [sic]). The URAKAZE and HAMAKAZE were damaged by near misses. DesDiv 17 ordered to return and the remainder to escort blank. We were engaged at 1340 by 9 B17's and at 1540 by blank B17's. The KUROSHIO and [redacted] were ordered to pick up the crew of 1 patrol plane which was shot down as a result of the above attack. They picked up 4 and returned at 1830.

(NFM-11-February-DI)

(D. T. B. February 11, 1943, p. 38).

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nnd 947022

JANUARY 14, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #30A

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSWPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMSOPAC
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

140215 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Attention was called to Palau's importance as a convoy center and as a source of phosphates and bauxite.

No. 1-a:

PALAU IMPORTANT NOT ONLY AS FOCAL POINT ON CONVOY ROUTES BUT ALSO DUE LARGE TRAFFIC IN PHOSPHATES AND BAUXITE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A great many intercepted messages and traffic intelligence reports could be quoted in support of this conclusion. A few of the current indications of Palau's importance along the lines suggested follow.

No. 1-b:

The 43rd Guard Division at Palau is very active with traffic to all ships in the Palau area. This suggests

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (continued)

that there are many movements of ships in the Palao area at the present time.

(HYFO-12-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 40).

No. 1-c:

The Palao Army originator HONRU has been very active over the past few days addressing various Army units and the #4 Convoy Office at Rabaul. Today's traffic showed an increase in such traffic. In one on the 7th the following were addressed:

- Akatsuki Force #2942 at Manila
- Akatsuki Force #6168 at Takao
- Akatsuki Force #2941 at Shanghai
- Akatsuki Force #2944 at Singapore
- Akatsuki Force #6168 at Moji and Fusan
- Ujina Army
- #4 Convoy Office at Rabaul

Other despatches were the usual ones. Evidently Palao Army is controlling the western end of the convoy route and is charged with the procurement of the reinforcements for the Rabaul area.

(HYFO-8-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 157).

No. 1-d:

122020 January, 1943

491

From:	HITISE	(Naval Trans. Section)
To :	SOHTE	(Palao Local Trans. Office)
Info:	RIMUYO	30 (CofS 4th Fleet)
	TEKISU	30 (CofS #2 Sur. Escort Unit)
	MITIME	(CofS Yokosuka)
	NSKNI	(Kure Trans. Section)
	OHUTE	(Yokohama Area Trans. Section)
	TIESE	(SAN FRANCISCO Maru)
	SOHTE	(Palao Local Trans. Office)

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-d: (continued)

The SAN FRANCISCO Maru will cancel loading phosphorous ore according to Naval Transportation Section Serial 337. After loading all available bauxite ore (?) at Palao please have it return to Niihama. Inform us of the amount of bauxite ore (?) on board the KIRIKAWA Maru.

(NSS-121835-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 140).

* * *

122020 January, 1943

491

From: HITISE (Tokyo Transp.)
To : SOHTE (Palao Local Transp.)
Info: RIMUYO (4th Fleet)
MITIME (Yokosuka C/S)
TEKISU (2nd Surface Escort Force)
NSENI (Kure Transp.)
ORUTE (Yokosuka Transp.)

With reference to Transportation SMS #337, SAN FRANCISCO Maru will cancel loading of phosphate ore and instead will load bauxite at Palau. Report amount of bauxite on hand after loading the KIRIKAWA Maru.

(NFM-122358-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 141).

* * *

122020 January, 1943

491

From: HITISE (Navy Transport Sect.)
To : SOHTE (Palao Transport Sect.)
Info: RIMUYO 3 (4th Fleet)
TEKISU 3 (2nd Escort Force)
MITIME (CofS Yokosuka)
NSENI (Kure Transp.)
ORUTE/OVCTE (Yokohama Transport.)
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (SAN FRANCISCO Maru)
SOHTE (Palao Transport.)

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-d: (continued)

Arrange for the SAN FRANCISCO Maru to cancel loading phosphate rock in accordance with Transportation Office SMS #337 and after loading all bauxite remaining at Palao to return to Niihama. Wish to be informed of bauxite remaining after KIRIKAWA Maru has finished loading.

(T2W-130037-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 142).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of three enemy submarines were listed.

No. 2-a:

SUBS BY DOG FOX X SOUTH AND EAST X 07159 X 05159
X 04160

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 2-b:

D/P Fixes for January 13, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE Sub 6995	159 - E	07 - S	1519/12
NARAE Sub 13220	158-30E	05-30S	2342/12
NARAE Sub 13220	160 - E	04 - S	0600/13

(HIF0-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 50a).

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Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Four of the enemy's carriers were estimated to be near Japan.

No. 3-a:

CARRIER DATA X SHOKAKU DUE OUT OF NAVY YARD SOON X ZUIKAKU AND PROBABLY ZUIHO IN SOUTHERN EMPIRE BY FAIRLY GOOD DOG FOX X POSIT CARDIV 2 UNCERTAIN BUT ONE SHIP AT LEAST PROBABLY NEAR EMPIRE X HOWEVER REGULAR ASSOCIATION 3RD FLEET WITH SOUTHERN THEATRE CONTINUES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

It was known some weeks earlier from an intercepted dispatch that the repairs on the SHOKAKU would be completed about the middle of January. See Item 3, CinCPac Bulletin #284, December 25, 1942.

The other known carrier locations were derived from Dog Fox fixes and traffic analysis.

No. 3-b:

The call list in effect on the 13th is the list originally used October 26th and has yielded some excellent identifications for units active on the carrier circuits of 5910 and 7040 kcs. The ZUIKAKU (EME 8) was by D/F in the general Nagoya area. A tentative ZUIHO (KUA 4) was in 34N 140E [redacted] 2 units or commands using calls KAA 1 and RASO 8 on 7040 kcs were being worked directly by ZUIHO and each bore 245 from Dutch Harbor [redacted] No other bearings were obtained. The Dutch Harbor bearing passes well clear of the Empire through the Marianas, but too much reliance cannot be placed on them. The authenticity of the 2 carriers calls (EME 8 and KUA 4) is considered good. The ident of EME 8 as ZUIKAKU was made from captured documents.

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JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

The presence of a bonafide 3rd Fleet flagship call in Empire waters is not certain, however.

(HYPO-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 106).

No. 3-c:

Carrier to base frequency 5910 kilocycles active on 13th of January.

D/F lines from west coast United States show ZUIKAKU (class A - EME 4) and HITAKA (class C - NIKI 1) in general Empire area, with no bearings ZA to fix latitude of positions as yet.

Frequency averaged as 4275 [redacted] was carrying traffic for ZUIKAKU (EME 4) from unidentified YASO 5. [redacted] failed to record transmitting and receiving station calls. Frequency reported is probably 4255, old CruDiv 5 frequency.

(NSS-131655-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 102).

No. 3-d:

Traffic routing indicated CofS 3rd Fleet (MARD 33) is in Empire. TEMAMI (3rd Fleet) continues to appear prominently in administrative traffic and associated with Empire addressee particularly at Kure. Traffic headings suggest one 3rd Fleet unit now in Kure is scheduled to depart for southern area with aircraft for AirFlot 26 (NIYAI).

(T2W-121015-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 132).

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Authority AND 947022

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-e:

A call (NIKI 6) previously identified as a vessel in Cardiv 2 and believed to be the HITAKA was observed on 3815 kcs at 132100 fixed in the general Empire area by D/F. HITAKA was working WEKI 7 (unident) and WORA 1, identified tentatively as as HITAKA but which looks better for Cardiv 2 from past appearances. WORA1 (Cardiv 2 ?) is by D/F in the general Nagoya area in the vicinity of ZUIKAKU.

(HYPO-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 104).

No. 3-f:

CofS Combined Fleet at 130922 sent a dispatch of moderate length to CofS 11th Air Fleet, info CofS 3rd Fleet, ComCardiv 2 (TOME 5), Kure Comdt., CofS 1st Section of Navy Staff of Imperial Hdq., and unident HITI 5 which may be a carrier in Cardiv 2.

The implication of this dispatch is that a Cardiv 2 unit is being ordered to leave or to delay departure from Kure. The inclusion of 11th Air Fleet suggests that the carrier (?) may be ferrying a load of planes south.

(HYPO-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 105).

No. 3-g:

CofS Combined Fleet at 0922-13th addressed CofS 11th Air Fleet, info CofS 3rd Fleet, Cardiv 2 (TOME 5), Kure Comdt., Chief of 1st Section Naval Staff, and unident HITI 5. Rabaul call (8th Fleet ?) at 1201 addressed Cardiv 2 (TOME 5), unidents RAN 1 and MUWA 7, info CinCs Combined, 3rd, and 11th Air Fleets, Comdr. 8th Base Force, Chief of Naval General

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g: (continued)

Staff, and unknown HEKI 6 and MUI 8. CarDiv 2 association with southeast area is pronounced, although no identified carrier call appears in the area. One instance of routing to Truk for ZUIKANU appeared at 1840-13th but DF does not support this routing. ZUIKANU called collective MORA 1 to deliver to Air Group RATEE with separate delivery indicated to HITAKA (MIKI 6), ComCarDiv 2 (TOME 5), Communication Officers Combined and 2nd Fleets, and YUN/RAN 1. Traffic in general appears low and indicates little action.

(NSS-131900-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 96).

No. 3-h:

The 3rd Fleet Staff is now appearing regularly with 8th Fleet and 11th Air Fleet staffs in the headings of Solomons area traffic.

(HYPO-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 62).

This association of the Third Fleet with the southern theatre was explained by later intelligence which indicated that the HAYATAKA at this time was providing air cover for a movement of troops between Palau and New Guinea. See Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943.

An intercepted message translated several months later afforded further evidence that the ZUIHO and ZUIKANU were in the Empire area on January 13, as indicated by the above mentioned fixes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-i:

060748 January, 1943

85774

From:	No originator		
To :	TANU	7	(ZUHO)
	ARI	8	(Cardiv or carrier)
	KIYA	Ø	(Cardiv 1 Base)
	NUHO	2	(Kagoshima Base)
Info:	HEMI	36	(3rd Fleet)
	TAKO	Ø	(HETAKA)
	KIYA	Ø	
	HUMI	7	(HOSHØ)
	HOSA	9	

From [redacted] (unit commander).

1. On 12th January at 1300 blank arrives (Yokosuka ?) thence will depart.
2. ZUHO join ZUIKAKU by 0800 13th of January.

(NPH-180821-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 17, 1943, p. 59).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Japanese transport TATSUTA Maru, was reported to be leaving Singapore on January 14 for Hongkong, arriving on the 18th. The vessel then was scheduled to leave Hongkong for Nagasaki on the 19th with prisoners of war.

No. 4-a:

TATSUTA MARU LEAVES SINGAPORE 14TH ARRIVES HONGKONG 18TH X TAKES ON MANY ALLIED POW AT HONGKONG AND DEPARTS 19TH FOR NAGASAKI

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The schedule of the TATSUTA Maru was disclosed by several intercepted messages.

No. 4-b:

071345 January, 1943

447

From:	HITLSE	(Naval Transp. Section)
To :	ROMONU	(CofS Sasebo)
	KINUNA	(TATSUTA Maru)
Info:	MAUSO	(Unident)
	SUKUNI	30 (CofS China Area Fleet HQ)
	BUKUNI	30 (CofS 1st High Seas Escort For.)
	TANABU	30 (CofS 1st Southern Exp. Fleet)
	MUNAME	(Macassar Transp. Section)
	TAHINO	(Singapore Transp. Office)
	TIHOMO	(Sasebo Local Transp. at Mike)
	HANUHO	(Nagasaki)

Movements of the TATSUTA Maru from January 14th on will be as follows:

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JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4-b: (continued)

Depart Singapore 14th January; arrive Neriban (?) January 18th.

Depart 19th with cargo 1200 prisoners for Nagasaki; arrive Nagasaki 22nd January.

Depart 23rd January, arrive Sasebo January 23rd.

(NSS-080040-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 155).

* * *

071345 January, 1943

447

From: Blank originator

To : LINUNA (TATSUTA Maru)
ROMONU (CofS Sasebo)

Info: (8 addressees mostly transportation sections)

Sailing schedule of TATSUTA Maru subsequent to 14th as follows:

Leave Singapore 14th, arrive Hongkong 18th, departing 19th. Arrive Nagasaki 22nd with 1200 prisoners of war. Leave 23rd, arriving Sasebo same day.

(TZ-080701-January-BI)

(D.T.B. January 8, 1943, p. 138).

No. 4-c:

080040 January, 1943

447

From: HITISE

Movements of TATSUTA Maru: Departs Singapore 14th, arrives Hongkong 18, departs 19 with 1200 prisoners for Nagasaki due 22.

(NSS-09155-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 9, 1943, p. 126).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 11, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4-d:

121730 January, 1943
215

(Heading completely missing due interference)

The TATSUTA Maru scheduled to enter Hongkong the 18th and depart the 19th arriving in Nagasaki the 22nd, will transport a large number of Army prisoners (1200 men) from Hongkong to Nagasaki. Instructions in this matter will be given to Army authorities later.

(NS3-122046-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 138).

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JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was announced that a convoy of three ships was scheduled to arrive at Palau on January 16.

No. 5-a:

THREE SHIP CONVOY WILL ARRIVE PALAU USING WESTERN ENTRANCE 16TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The movements of this convoy were revealed by intercepted orders to its anti-submarine escort.

No. 5-b:

121242 January, 1943

From:	MOYURA	4	(43rd Guard Division)
To :	REHIKU	3	(#1 GANGES Maru)
	YUNUSU		
Info:	UHI	33	(Combined Fleet)
	NUTUHI	5	
	MUHI	26	(Tokyo RI)
	MINI	5	(DesRon 3/AIB)
	MEWI	43	(4th Fleet)

Commanding Officer #1 GANGES Maru in command that vessel and #1 KIHOO Maru after escorting army convoy bound for Manila as far as North 9-10 130-00 East and handing it over to the PI Force (if rendezvous cannot be effected the convoy will steam on independently), will return to port carrying out anti-submarine patrol ahead of 3rd Transport Unit of First Transportation (JUZAN Maru, SHINKYOO Maru, and SHIKI-NAMI). Speed 9 knots. Passing through North 8-50 East 135-45 at about 0100 16th and North 7-50 East 134 at about 0700 same date. Entering via the West Channel.

(T2W-121450-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, p. 170).

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Authority *DD 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-b: (continued)

* * *

121242 January, 1943

250

From:	MOYURA	4	(Comdr. Guard Div. 13)
To :	REHIKU	3	(Comdg. Officer #1 GANJITSU Maru)
	YUNUWU	4	(Unident)
Info:	MEMI	8	(Unident)
	UHI	88	(CofS Combined Fleet)
	MIHI	87	(Comdr. Cardiv)
	MUHI	61	(All Comdrs. in Chief and All Major Unit Comdrs. Spec. Duty Group Naval Section)
	NUYUHI	5	(Unident)

The Captain of the #1 GANJITSU Maru, in command of the #1 GANJITSU Maru and the #1 KIKO Maru, after escorting the Army convoy destined for Manila as far as 09-10 North 130 East, and turning it over to the Philippine Force (in cases where surface escort is impossible, ships are to proceed independently), will return carrying out advance anti-submarine guard for the #1 and #3 Transport Units, (the JUZAN Maru and the SHINKYO Maru), lead ships, speed 9 knots. On the 16th about 1 hour these units will pass through position 133-45 E, 08-50 N. About 7 hours they will pass through position 134 E. 07-40 N. and enter port from the West Channel.

(N33-121548-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 12, 1943, pp. 171 and 172).

* * *

121242 January, 1943

JML

250

From:	SIYURA		
To :	REHI	4	
	YURANE		
Info:	UHI	3	(Combined Fleet)
	MUHI	2	
	RATUHI		
	KIHI	3	(Cardiv, same as TITA 2)

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Authority *nmD 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-b: (continued)

The Commanding Officer of the #1 GANGES Maru will take command of the #1 GANGES Maru and the KIHO Maru and escort the Army convoy bound for Manila as far as 9-10 N. 130-00E. After turning the convoy over to the PI Force (in case rendezvous is not made, they will proceed independently), will carry out anti-sub patrol in the path of #3 Convoy of 1st Transportation Force (JUZAN Maru, SHINKYO Maru, and SHIKINAMI). Speed 9 knots. Will pass through following points:

At about 0100 Jan. 16, 8-50 N. 133-45E.

At about 0700, 7-50 N. 134-00E.

Will enter from the West Channel.

Reply requested.

GI COMMENT: Note HYPO agrees with NSS on 1st point, disagrees on 2nd, agrees with T2W on 2nd point, disagrees on 1st.

(HYPO-13-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 22).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The #1 GANJITSU Maru was torpedoed and sunk with one of the Army transports which she was escorting north on January 14, prior to rendezvousing with the above mentioned ships enroute to Palau.

No. 5-c:

141130 January, 1943

055

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Authority *AND 947022*

From:	YUNUSU	1	
To :	MOYURA	1	(Comdr. 43 Guard Div.)
Info:	KIU	3	
	MOKE	7	
	NOU/BAU	9	
	NUTISU	8	
	KOU	63	(CofS 4th Fleet)

~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-c: (continued)

At 1130 January 14, position 09-00 N. 130-50 E. #1 GANJITSU Maru and blank #3 KANISEN or BINSEN (?) (may be ship #3 in convoy) were torpedoed and sunk. We are engaging the enemy.

(NSS-141057-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 55).

* * *

141130 January, 1943

Serial 055

From:	YUNUSU	1	
To :	MOYURA	1	(Guard Div. 43)
Info:	KIU/KOU	3	
	MOKE	7	
	NEMU/NAU	9	
	KOU	6	
	NUTISU	8	

At 1130 in position 130-50 E. 9 N. the #1 GANJITSU Maru and the 3rd vessel were torpedoed and sunk. We are attacking.

141330 January, 1943

Serial 056

We are attacking and engaged in rescuing survivors. At present we have 9 wounded from GANJITSU and about 50 from the SDIRAHA Maru.

(TZ-141310-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 46).

* * *

141130 January, 1943

055

From:	YUNUSU		(6th Base Force)
To :	MOYURA		(43rd Guard Div.)
Info:	KIU	3	
	MOKE	7	
	NAU	9	
	KOU	6	
	NUTISU		

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-c: (continued)

At 1130 in position 130-50 E. 9-00 N. the #1 GANJITSU Maru and #3 ship (?) were sunk by torpedo attack. We are engaging [submarine].

(NFM-141906-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 67).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

The closing to traffic of the North Channel at Surabaya suggested that the channel had been mined.

No. 6-a:

BELIEVE NORTH CHANNEL TO SURABAYA MINED KNOWN TO BE CLOSED TO TRAFFIC

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The closing of the channel was revealed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 6-b:

121900 January, 1943

180

From:	TONO	3	
To :	NEWS		(All Ships 2nd So. Exp. Flt.)
	KIE	30	(ComDesDiv 17)
	NEWS		(Address Comdrs. Army Anchorages at Batavia, Surabaya, and Singapore)
	NTISU		(Staff 25th Base Force)
	NAHI	5	(Unident)
	KAE	7	(Unident)
	TEMI	5	(Unident)
	RITO	9	(Unident)
	NIMI	5	(Unident)
	SATO	4	(Unident)
Info:	FUHI	6	(Tentative Combined Flt.)
	WOYA	3	(Unident)
	REE	7	(Unident)

In spite of the fact that navigation in Surabaya North Channel has been forbidden due to frequent appearance of enemy submarines in vicinity of #1 Buoy, there have been cases of vessels sustaining

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Authority

nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)No. 6-b: (continued)

torpedo attacks in the channel. All vessels entering or leaving Surabaya are enjoined to strictly observe routings by this force.

(T27-131325-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 187).

* * *

121900 January, 1943

180

From:	TOASA	30	(Staff blank)
To :	TIMEMA		(So. Exp. Fleet #2)
	Enciphered	All	Ships
	KIE	30	
	TEWI	50	
	NAHI	50	
	RITO	90	
	KAE	70	
	HIMI	50	
	SATO	40	

[redacted] Comdr. Army Anchorages at Singapore and Surabaya

	WILSO	29	(Staff So. Exp. Fleet #1)
	FUHI	40	(Staff So. Exp. Fleet #2)
	REE	70	

Despite the closing of Surabaya North Channel to navigation due to the recent appearance of an enemy submarine near #1 Buoy, a ship passing through this channel has been subjected to torpedo attack.

Desire all ships entering and leaving Surabaya to follow strictly the course prescribed by this unit.

(N33-131540-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, pp. 120 and 121).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)No. 6-b: (continued)

* * *

121900 January, 1943

180

From: MINA 3
 To : NE (all vessels) NE
 KIE
 NAHI
 KAB
 TEWI
 RITO
 NIMI
 SATO
 NE (C.O. Singapore & Surabaya Anchorages) NE
 Info: NTISD (25th Base Force)
 MOYA 3 (1st So. Exp. Fleet)
 FUHI 1 (2nd So. Exp. Fleet)
 RBE 7

Recently the North Channel to Surabaya was closed to traffic on account of the vicinity of O (?) buoy being infested with enemy submarines. In spite of this channel being closed there have been cases of vessels proceeding through it without authorization and being attacked by torpedo fire. Vessels entering and departing Surabaya will request this force maintain strict anti-sub patrol (?).

(NFM-13-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, pp. 127 and 128).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that a convoy was enroute from Horomushiro to the western Aleutians.

No. 7-a:

SOME SLIGHT INDICATION CONVOY FROM HOROMUSHIRO MAY BE ENROUTE WESTERN ALEUTIANS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An analysis of current traffic indicated that a convoy might be proceeding toward the Aleutians.

No. 7-b:

Traffic volume and associations indicate an increase in convoy or shipping activities (in the Ominato-Horomushiro area). The Number 3 Convoy Comdr. is in association with 5th Fleet CofS.

(NSS-111611, January-TI)


(D.T.B. January 11, 1943, p. 123).

No. 7-c:

Little activity aside from Army was noted from Kiska. Some fleet units appear to be in the area but these are units which are normally operating in the high north and are probably DesRon 1 vessels. Destroyer MESIRE of DesDiv 21 is escorting maru (MISAU) and is also closely associated with Kiska-Attu Army command KIPIKE (5 dispatches), and Kiska Base Force which suggests that the convoy of troops to Kiska from Horomushiro Anchorage which has been indicated recently may be underway.

(HYFO-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 83).



~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)

In CinCPac Dispatches 141843 and 161959 January
Kiska was reported to be preparing for the arrival of
several ships.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943CINCPAG BULLETIN #304 [British Addresses]

From: CINCPAG
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

140555 January, 1943
 Priority

FAIR DOG FOX BEARINGS PLACE ZUIKAKU AND PROBABLY ZUIHO IN SOUTHERN JAPAN WATERS X SHOKAKU SHOULD SOON BE OUT OF YOKOSUKA NAVY YARD X CARDIV 2 UNLOCATED BUT FAIR CHANCE EITHER HITAKA OR HAYATAKA ALSO IN JAPAN AREA X ZYMOTIC X 304TH CINCPAG INTELLIGENCE X ASSOCIATION 3RD FLEET WITH SOUTHERN AREA STILL CONTINUES X CONVOY POSSIBLY ENROUTE KISKA AREA FROM HORO-MUSHIRO X TATSUTA MARU DEPARTS SINGAPORE 14TH ARRIVES HONGKONG 18TH PICKING UP MANY POW AND LEAVING 19TH ENROUTE NAGASAKI X NORTH CHANNEL AT SURABAYA CLOSED TO TRAFFIC X THIS CHANNEL POSSIBLY MINED X PALAU VERY IMPORTANT TO JAPS AS STOPOVER FOR CONVOYS TO TRUK AND RABAUL FROM NEI AND PHILIPPINES ALSO CONSIDERABLE TRAFFIC IN BAUXITE AND PHOSPHATES X 3 SHIP CONVOY ARRIVES PALAU VIA WEST CHANNEL 16TH X EAST AND SOUTH SUB POSITS BY BEARINGS X 15905 X 16004 X 15907

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Authority

NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 111317(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSubPac was notified of the movements of several enemy ships into and out of Truk on January 14.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : COMSUBPAC
Info: CTF 42

111317 January, 1943
Operational Priority

INDICATIONS X ZRAL X 3 ENEMY VESSELS ENTER TRUK BY SOUTH CHANNEL AT 1400 JANUARY 14 AND LEAVE BY NORTH CHANNEL AT 2100 X ANOTHER VESSEL WILL ENTER BY SOUTH CHANNEL AT 1500 X TIMES PROBABLY MINUS 9 BUT MAY BE GCT

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A Truk harbor schedule for January 14 yielded this intelligence. It should be noted that one of these vessels was the auxiliary carrier CHUYO.

No. 2

140640 January, 1943

From: FUSI 20 (Unident)

At 14 hours today, the CHUYO, MURASAME, and URANAMI will enter port via South Channel.

At 15 hours today, #17 FUKUSEI (course 195, after 18 hours 15 blank) will enter via South Channel. At 21 hours today, CHUYO, MURASAME, and URANAMI are scheduled to depart via North Channel.

(N33-141121-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 63).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

* * *

140610 January, 1943

From:	FUSI	20	
To :	NNOSO	9	(Truk Area)
	NANOE	5	
	HASIA	4	
	HEYU	9	(21st Air Group)
	MUUN	1	(SubChaser Div.#1)
	NUUKO	3	(ATAKA Maru)
Info:	NOU	4	
	NOSI	20	(2nd Fleet)
	KISOSI	3	(4th Harbor Affairs Truk)

Today 14 January at 1400 the CHUUYOO (CHUYO), MURASAME, and URANAMI will enter through the South Channel. On 15 January (?) (several blanks follow). At 1800 course 157 degrees departing via the South Channel. At 2100 the CHUUYOO, MURASAME and URANAMI expect depart North Channel.

(HYPO-14-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 59).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 141843(A) INTELLIGENCE

Task Force #8 was notified that Kiska was expecting a ship on the night of January 15.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : TF 8

141843 January, 1943
Priority

TODAYS ULTRA CINCPAC SENDS X KISKA EXPECTING ARRIVAL OF MAHU COMMENCING 13 HOURS GCT 15TH IS LIGHTING ROUTE BEACON ALSO STARTS SWEEPING SKY WITH SEARCHLIGHT EVERY HALF HOUR STARTING 17 HOURS GCT

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

That a vessel was expected at Kiska at that time was apparent from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 2

130910 January, 1943

From: NARAE (Concealed identity)
To : KARENU (Garbled call)
TAMUKE (HICHIYO or URJIO Maru)
YOKESA (Garbled call)

From Commander of the 51st Communication Unit.

Blank from 22 hours on the 5th of January the route beacon will be lighted. From 2 hours on the 16th of January we will sweep the sky every 30 minutes with the Matsugashima searchlight.

(NSS-131700-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 25).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 14, 1943 (Continued)(C) REPORT OF ACTION

Two task forces were dispatched to intercept this maru but no contact appears to have been established.

No. 3

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMGEN ADC
COMINCH
COMNORWESTSEAFRON
COMWESTSEAFRON
COMGEN WDC

151910 January, 1943
Priority

NIGHT OF 14TH-15TH 1 CL AND 2 DD'S SEARCHED NORTH OF BOODLE TO DESTROY MARU EXPECTED X 1 EACH CL AND CA WITH 3 DD'S SIMILAR MISSION SOUTH OF BOODLE WHILE CONTINUING TO COVER FORMULA

Ed.note: Boodle and Formula are the code words for Kiska and Attu respectively.

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

No. 4

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMINCH
COMGEN WDC
COMNORWESTSEAFRON
ADC

190650 January, 1943
Priority

.....RALPHIGH WITH 2 DD'S DETROIT, INDIANAPOLIS 3 DD'S SEARCHED NORTH AND SOUTH OF BOODLE RESPECTIVELY 14TH TO 16TH INCLUSIVE WITHOUT RESULTS X RALPHIGH SIGHTED BOODLE SEARCHLIGHT 7 TO 8 HOURS W (PLUS 10) 15TH AND 16TH.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 19, 1943).

The vessel or vessels expected at Kiska at this time apparently arrived safely for two newly arrived ships were sighted in Kiska harbor on January 18. See CinCPac Dispatch 161959 January, 1943.

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Authority

NDD 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #305

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

150241 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The CHUYO, an auxiliary carrier, was noted to have called at Truk on January 14.

No. 1-a:

CHUYO ARRIVED AND DEPARTED TRUK ON 14TH X DESTINATION UNKNOWN PROBABLY JAPAN

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The CHUYO was one of the ships of whose movements at Truk CinCPac had informed ComSubPac on January 14th. See CinCPac Dispatch 141317 January, 1943. The estimate that the CHUYO was proceeding to Japan upon leaving Truk was confirmed by messages deciphered a fortnight later which outlined the schedule of the CHUYO on this trip.

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Authority *nnD 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b:

101410 January, 1943

85983

From: Blank
 To : MINE 1-2
 Info: TARI 0-1 (Combined Fleet)
 MUKEYO 4
 TEKU 8-2 (3rd Fleet)
 AYO 3-7 (4th Fleet)
 REKA 0-1 (8th Fleet)
 REWE 74-95
 KIYO 6-0 (Sub Unit)
 RUYO 7-9
 RENE 0-1
 SAKITU (2nd Air Arsenal Yokosuka)
 OHO 7-9
 NEHO 3-7
 KASE 7-9
 HUNE 0-1

From ComDesRon 4.

In company with DesDiv 2 less 2 ships and blank less
 ISONAMI and [redacted], I departed Truk. In accordance
 Advance Force OpOrd #118 am providing screen for
 UNYOO and blank for CHUYOO. Blanks.

January 12 Kavieng. Blanks.

January 15 Many blanks.

Truk many blanks.

Arrive Yokosuka.

(NPM-281218-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 68).

* * *

101400 January, 1943

From: Blank originator
 To : MINE 1
 Info: TARI 0 (Combined Fleet)
 KEYO 4 (2nd Fleet)
 TEKU 8 (3rd Fleet)
 AYO 3 (4th Fleet)
 REKA 0 (8th Fleet)

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~~SECRET~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b: (continued)

RAWE	79
KIYO	6 (Chief of Naval General Staff)
RUYO	7
RENE	Ø
SIKITU	
OHO	7
NEHO	3 (4th Base Force)
KASE	7

From ComDesRon 4.

I will depart PT (Truk) at 1500 with DesDiv 2

[redacted] less SAMIDARE [redacted] and ISONAMI [redacted]

In accordance with Advance Force Operation Order # [redacted] will participate in screening CHUYO. Schedule of the CHUYO, MURASAME [redacted], and URANAMI [redacted] will be:

At 0600/12th January bearing 12 degrees, blank kilometers from Kavieng. At about 1200 on the 13th January arrive PT. Depart PT by blank channel at about 1700 on the 13th. At 1200 on the 14th arrive at Saipan [redacted]. After taking on supplies at PS (Saipan) depart at 0600 on the 16th and arrive Yokosuka [redacted] early morning of the 20th.

[redacted] (is OP)

(NSS-051937-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 5, 1943, p. 100).

* * *

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Authority ND 947022

101410 January, 1943

85983

From:	Blank	
To :	MINE	1
Info:	TARI	Ø (Combined Fleet)
	MUKEYO	4
	TERU	8 (3rd Fleet)
	AYO	3 (4th Fleet)
	REKA	Ø (8th Fleet)

~~SECRET~~
JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (Continued)

REWE	74
KIYO	6 (Sub Unit)
HUYO	7
REHE	Ø
SAKITU	(2nd Air Arsenal Yokosuka)
OHG	7
NEHO	3
KASE	7
HUNE	Ø

From ComDesRon 4.

I will depart Truk at 1500 with DesDiv 2 less SAMIDARE and MURASAME and DesDiv 19 less ISONAMI and blank DD [redacted].

Pursuant to Advance Force OpOrder #118 [redacted] will engage in screening CHUUYOO. Schedule of the CHUUYOO, MURASAME and URANAMI as follows:

At 0600 12th bearing 15 degrees distant 200 [redacted] kilometers from Kavieng.

At about 1200 13th arrive Truk. Depart Truk at about 1700, 13th. At 1200 14th arrive Saipan. Depart Saipan at 0000 16th after loading fuel and arrive Yokosuka early morning 20th.

(HYPO-5-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 5, 1943, p. 102).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was evidence that the enemy had established a base on Kolombangara Island, which earlier had been reported to be a staging point for supplies and reinforcements destined for Munda. The association of this new base in current traffic with the air base at Ballale suggested that this base might also be an air base.

No. 2-a:

ENEMY HAS A BASE ON KOLOMBANGARA X ASSOCIATION WITH BALLALE AIR BASE TENDS TO INDICATE MAY BE AN AIR BASE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The existence of the new base and its association with Ballale were disclosed by traffic analysis.

No. 2-b:

Nothing of an extensive operational nature is indicated in the traffic from this area. The activity of the previous 24-48 hours appears to have settled down to air and sea patrolling forces. The few high precedence dispatches may be reports of sightings. Air base activity is prominent suggesting intensive efforts to strengthen the air forces in this area. It is believed that an air base is under construction on Kolombangara Island. The theory back of the intensified air activity may be to provide a strong air force which will provide

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-b: (continued)

cover for a future, large scale movement of convoys and fleet units, as well as an offensive striking force to harass Allied attacking and occupation units.

(HYPO-10-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 10, 1943, p. 67).

No. 2-c:

Some most urgent traffic from MOYOKU on Guadalcanal (suspected of being Todoroki) went to a call (RAKI 3) tentatively identified as a striking force or surface squadron, plus Solomons major commanders and [redacted] Ballale Base Commander and Kolombangara Base Commander. The striking force ident is very weak and is in no way derived from captured documents, but is probably DesRon 3. The import of these dispatches is not clear.

(HYPO-13-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 55).

No. 2-d:

Guadalcanal lookout (MOYOKU) addressed the high commands in the area and several unidents plus [redacted] Ballale and Kolombangara Base Comdrs.

(NSS-131849-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 35).

No. 2-e:

[redacted] Ballale and Kolombangara Bases were noted in messages originated by unident MOYOKU (on Guadalcanal) and are apparently assuming more importance in Solomons.

(TZW-141057-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 108).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-f:

Staff Officer Todoroki (MOYOKU) addressed short operational type most urgent despatch 1500 January 14th to All Force and Detachment Commanders of SubRon NUTE 19 and of 11th Air Fleet, CofS of 8th Fleet and unident RIKI 93, NENIYO, KENI 2, ROYU 6 and WEW0 19, [redacted] Kolombangara Base and Ballale Base.

(NSS-141031-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 89).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

A few days later, these indications of an airfield on Kolombangara Island were confirmed by aerial photographs of the Vila area.

No. 2-g:

From:	RADIO GUADALCANAL	220038 January, 1943
To :	COMAIRSOPAC	Operational Priority
Info:	CINCPAC	
	CGFMW HONOLULU	
	COMSOWESTPACFOR	
	ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC	
	COMGENSOPAC	
	COMSOPAC	

B SEARCH AT 0730 L (-11) FROM ALTITUDE OF 6,000 FEET OVER VILA PLANTATION REPORTS POSSIBLE AIRFIELD HERE RUNNING NORTHWEST SOUTHEAST CLARING 300 FEET BY 5,000 WITH CLEARING FOR TAXI STRIP AND LARGE SQUARE AT NORTHWEST END X TREES HAVE BEEN FELLED BUT NOT CLEARED AWAY X COURSE OF COVERAGE 90%

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Authority *ND 947022*

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 22, 1943).

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-h:

From: SENAV CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: ALL TFC SOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOWESTPAC
 CGFMAW HONOLULU
 COMGENSOPAC
 CINCPAC

220659 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

H SEARCH 95% OF COURSE FULL COVERAGE. CONFIRMS LANDING STRIP ON VILA PLANTATION ABOUT 3,000 FEET LONG WITH MOST PALMS CUT OUT NOT SURFACED X CAME DOWN TO 1000 FEET AND TOOK OBLIQUES X ENCOUNTERED QUITE A BIT OF LIGHT AA.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 22, 1943).

No. 2-i:

From: SENAV CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: ALL TFC SOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOWESTPAC
 CGFMAW HONOLULU
 COMGENSOPAC
 CINCPAC

221323 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

OBLIQUES OF VILA PLANTATION REVEAL RUNWAY ALMOST COMPLETELY CUT OUT OF COCONUT PLANTATION WITH TAXIWAYS WELL UNDERWAY INLAND FROM VILA POINT 1 AND $\frac{1}{2}$ MILES X STRIP RUNS FROM NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST X COPY OF PRINTS BEING FORWARDED TO COMAIRSOPAC
) THIS DATE X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 22, 1943).

The Vila area was bombarded on the night of January 23 by an American task force in an attempt to retard the development of this base and airfield.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *and 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-j:

From: COMSOPAC
 To : CTF 11
 CTF 63
 CTF 67
 Info: COMGEN CACTUS
 ALL TP COMSOPAC
 CTF 42
 CTF 65
 CINCPAC
 COMSOWESPAC
 PLATTE
 HUGHS
 FANNING

191022 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

PART ONE OF FOUR PARTS X COMSOPAC OPERATIONS PLAN 2-43 X VILA AND STANMORE PLANTATIONS ON KOLOMBANGARA ISLAND ARE STAGING POINTS FOR BARGES AND OTHER SMALL VESSELS CARRYING SUPPLIES ENROUTE TO MUNDA, SUPPLY AND STORAGE BASE AND REFUELING POINT, POSSIBLY SEAPLANE AND FLOAT PLANE BASE, POSSIBLY 4,000 TROOPS BASED THERE X DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF MUNDA AIRFIELD CONTINUOUS X ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY AIRMAIL TO ACTION ADRES X GENERAL TASK X THIS FORCE WILL PULVERIZE VILA-STANMORE BASES BY BOMBING AND BOMBARDMENT AND WILL DESTROY JAP MUNDA AIR STRENGTH ATTEMPTING TO DENY OUR ATTACK ON ABOVE BASES X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 19, 1943).

No. 2-k:

..... Aircraft from Guadalcanal frequently attacked Munda, causing some damage but not seriously hindering Japanese aircraft operations from this field or its progressive development. During the month not only did enemy shipping to Munda increase but Vila-Stanmore on Kolombangara Island nearby became a staging point for Munda. Evidence that it was also under development as an air base was verified by photographs on 22 January showing a 6000 foot runway 90% cleared. On 19 January Commander South Pacific Force initiated an operation to bombard Vila-Stanmore on the night of 23-24 January.

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JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-k: (continued)

Task Force 67 was again designated to furnish the bombardment group composed of NASHVILLE (Rear Admiral Ainsworth), HELENA, and the 4 destroyers NICHOLAS, DE HAVEN, RADFORD and O'BANNO. They were supported by the remainder of Task Force 67 (HONOLULU, ST. LOUIS, and 4 destroyers), by shore based aircraft, and by Task Force 11 (Rear Admiral Ramsey) operating southeast of Rennell Island while SARATOGA air group based on Henderson Field.

Radar equipped Catalinas, "Black Cats", which were of considerable assistance in the Munda bombardment, again operated with the firing force. While on a harassing mission over Munda on the night of 22-23 January, these planes carrying the ship's spotters made a familiarization flight in preparation for the following night's operations.

Task Force 67 departed Espiritu Santo on 22 January and proceeded to the west of Guadalcanal. At 1045, 23 January, 8 fighters from Guadalcanal arrived over the force, then southwest of San Cristobal Island. At about this time an enemy search plane sighted the force and with other enemy planes, despite the fighter coverage, shadowed Task Force 67 until sunset. Fighter director in NASHVILLE frequently vectored fighters towards the enemy planes but without success.

Task Force 11, composed of SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, and 5 destroyers, left Noumea on 21 January to transport the carrier's air group to Guadalcanal. At about dawn, 23 January, 66 of the 80 planes on board were launched and proceeded to Henderson Field. The force was then southeast of Rennell Island in about 13 S, 162 E.

From dawn until mid-afternoon of 23 January, planes from Henderson Field repeatedly attacked Munda air field runway and revetments seeking to neutralize the field during the ensuing bombardment that evening.

~~SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-k: (continued)

Friendly fighters left Task Force 67 at 1840, 23 January. In a few minutes the Japanese shadowing plane approached within visual range and at this time undoubtedly sent in a position report. The enemy probably considered that our force was again heading for Munda. Supporting this belief were the movements of Task Force 67, which at 1900 changed course from 310° to 290°, and of the "Black Cat" assigned for screening. Arriving just before sunset, the plane set a course for Munda until after dark.

At 1900 Task Force 67 was just southwest of Russell Island. After sunset clouds increased rapidly into a complete overcast so that the night was very dark. At 2000 the bombardment group changed course to the north into New Georgia Sound. The support group retired to the south and entered Tulagi the following morning.

The enemy shadowing plane had retired or had been lost before 2000. At about 0014, 24 January, however, with the objective less than 2 hours away, 3 enemy planes showing lights appeared over the bombardment group. These were at first thought to be the Black Cat spotting planes. They challenged repeatedly with a large white signal light. After nearly an hour, during which no answer was sent, the planes went on their way. While they were near, two of our destroyers almost gave away the force's identity by asking the Task Force Commander over voice radio whether the planes were friendly.

Unknown to the approaching force, 1 destroyer and 1 AK had arrived off Vila during the evening. They had been attacked enroute by Guadalcanal planes, which claimed damage to both ships. A coastwatcher later reported that the ships reached their destination.

After reaching Kula Gulf, O'BANNON and NICHOLAS swept ahead of the formation for enemy ships with negative results. O'BANNON then proceeded to the northwest approaches of Kula Gulf to cover the firing group. She rejoined at about 0300 as the force rounded New Georgia Island on retirement.

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Authority DD 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-k: (continued)

At 0155 communication was established with the spotting planes and at 0200, on schedule, NASHVILLE opened fire in assigned area, ranges 11,000 to 13,000 yards. HELENA opened fire at 0202. The ensuing bombardment went off as planned, destroyers firing after the cruisers. Evidence of damage was greater than at Munda, there being some severe fires and frequent explosions from fuel and ammunition dumps.

At the beginning of the bombardment spotting planes reported an enemy ship of unknown size and type (later determined to be a destroyer) escaping through the strait south of Vila. Planes later saw an AK and a small ship leaving the area. The destroyer and AK arrived at Faisi the following morning.

Ships expended 2044 rounds of 6", mostly High Capacity, and 1721 rounds of 5" with only minor material casualties. Battery performance was excellent.

There is a possibility that the Japanese destroyer present off Vila may have launched torpedoes before retiring, though some evidence indicates that it was still approaching Vila from the West when bombardment commenced, and retired at once before getting into position to launch. One ship's report states that "the usual torpedo wake was reported by several observers during the bombardment." Some reversed their story the next day, others were still confident of having seen one or more wakes.

Enemy aircraft were quick to close the bombardment group as it retired from Kula Gulf. At about 0300 a green aircraft flare burst over Kolombangara Mountain. From that time on planes shadowed our ships, dropping red, white and green flares and white float lights apparently to mark the formation's course.

At about 0419, 3 groups of enemy aircraft consisting of from 6 to 20 planes were picked up astern, apparently directed by the shadowing planes. These twice attempted to close the formation as if to attack but were driven off by accurate radar controlled fire. RADFORD is credited with destroying 1 of the planes, tracked in and shot down without being seen until it crashed. Near dawn the enemy aircraft retired. Not

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-k: (continued)

long afterwards 5 P-38's from Guadalcanal arrived as fighter patrol.

The bombardment group reached Tulagi without further event, there joined the remainder of Task Force 67, fueled destroyers, and returned to Espiritu Santo, leaving 4 destroyers at Tulagi as a striking force.

At 0520, 24 January, in order to restrict enemy air operations, B-17's from Guadalcanal dropped bombs on Munda Air Field. Fires and explosions were still visible at Vila. Later the SARATOGA Air Group of 24 VXB, 17 VTB and 18 VF took off from Henderson Field and bombed Vila-Stanmore. That afternoon the air group, less 2 VF damaged operating on Henderson Field, were landed on board SARATOGA southeast of Rennell Island, and Task Force 11 returned to Noumea.

Our ships had hardly ceased bombardment before the Japanese undertook repair of damage and replacement of material. Three cargo ships reached Vila during the evening of 24 January. Numerous other ships followed on subsequent days. Construction of the air base continued at a rapid pace, seemingly little interrupted by the bombardment. The field was completed and aircraft were operating from it by early February

.....

(Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, 1943; Solomons Islands Campaign from 6 January 1943 through Vila Bombardment 23-24 January 1943. Report by CinCPac dated March 19, 1943).

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Authority *AND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

A close association of Carrier Division 2 with the southern theatre was noted.

No. 3-a:

CARDIV 2 APPEARS MAINLY CONCERNED WITH SOUTHERN THEATRE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This association was noted in an analysis of current traffic.

No. 3-b:

CofS Combined Fleet at 0922-13th addressed CofS 11th Air Fleet, info CofS 3rd Fleet, Cardiv 2 (TOME 5), Kure Comdt., Chief of 1st Section Naval Staff, and unident HITI 5. Rabaul call (8th Fleet?) at 1201 addressed Cardiv 2. (TOME 5), unident RAN 1 and MUWA 7, info CinCs Combined, 3rd, and 11th Air Fleets, Comdr. 8th Base Force, Chief of Naval General Staff, and unknown HEKI 6 and MUI 8. Cardiv 2 association with south-east area is pronounced, although no identified carrier call appears in the area. One instance of routing to Truk for ZUIKAKU appeared at 1840-13th but DF does not support this routing. ZUIKAKU called collective WORA 1 to deliver to Air Group RATEE with separate delivery indicated to HITAKA (MIKI 6), ComCardiv 2 (TOME 5), Communication Officers Combined and 2nd Fleets, and YUN-RAN 1. Traffic in general appears low and indicates little action.

(NSS-131900-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, pl. 96).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-c:

Unusual association in two Army despatches both originated by [redacted] Comdr. #1 Transportation Group addressed to Comdr. #2 Transportation Group, Comdr. Troop Transportation Group, unidentified RIKOSU, plus AHA 02 (CofS 8th Fleet in despatch originated on 8th). Both passed for information Comdr. CarDiv NERE on 13th. Association suggests Army troop movements with air cover furnished by carrier based planes. Location not definite but 1st and 2nd Transportation Groups believed in Solomons-Rabaul area.

(TZW-131245-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 109).

No. 3-d:

Rabaul (or 8th Fleet under Rabaul cover) originated a despatch 131201 to CarDiv 2 (TOME 5), unidents RANI and MUWA 7 for action, and info to Combined Fleet (MONO 8), 3rd Fleet (MITI 9), Navy Minister (SISUMA) and unidents NOKI 4, RETU 2, HEKI 9, and MUI 8.

Another despatch 132113 went to approximately the same lineup but calls for Combined Fleet, 3rd Fleet and unident RARU 4 were modified with [redacted] prefix indicating "Executive Officer". RERO 24 (8th Base Force Comdr.) was included and is probably the same as garbled RETU 2 in above message 131201.

In despatch 131754 originated by 11th Air Fleet (RUKI 64) the action addressees were CarDiv 2 (TOME 5), 8th Fleet (WDWA 64) and unidents RANI 4 and MUNO 8. Another despatch 141103 from unident YAMU 8 went to unidents SOTI 4, and RIKI 3 and info 3rd Fleet (TARO 62). This was sent by Rabaul to Jaluit and Truk.

Various despatches while contributing little toward locating the cardivs and 3rd Fleet units do tend to show some association between the activities in the New Guinea-Solomons area and the 3rd

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-d: (continued)

Fleet. It appears, however, that there is insufficient association to warrant an assumption that 3rd Fleet units are in the New Guinea-Solomons area or approaching that area. Unless extraordinary means are exercised to cover up the movements of the 3rd Fleet, clear or signs should appear which will aid in radio intelligence.

(HYPO-14-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 2).

This association of the 2nd Carrier Division with the southern theatre was explained a few days later when it was learned that at least one unit of this carrier division, the HAYATAKA, was engaged at this time in covering the movement of the 20th Army Division from Palau to Newak. See Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes were obtained on four enemy submarines.

No. 4-b:

SUBS BY DOG FOX SOUTH AND EAST X 03155 X 02154
X 12161 X 00153

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-b:

D/F Fixes for January 14, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	153 E 00	0021-14
TEMU 8	SubForce	13220	154 E 02 S	2100-13
	7/ or Sub			
NARAE	Sub	13220	155 E 03 S	0046
NARAE	Sub	6995	161 E 12 S	1637-13

(HYPO-14-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 26a).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE


There was evidence that Huon Island, north of New Caledonia, had been used in October by the Japanese as a fueling base for scouting planes. The fuel was brought in by submarines.

No. 5-g:

NOTED THAT HUON ISLAND (APPROX 18 SOUTH 163 EAST) USED BY JAPS IN OCTOBER AS REFUELING RENDEZVOUS FOR SCOUTING PLANES OBTAINING FUEL FROM SUBMARINES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The precise source of this intelligence is not known. It is possible that this conclusion was based upon the intercepted message quoted under Item 6 in CinCPac Bulletin #298, January 8, 1943. This message disclosed that fuel-carrying submarines had been stationed at Huon Island in October, 1942.



~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

The auxiliary cruiser HOKOKU Maru, a raider in the Indian Ocean, was believed to have been sunk prior to December 5.

No. 6-a:

CONSIDER XCL HOKOKU MARU FORMERLY OPERATING AS RAIDER IN INDIAN OCEAN SUNK SOMETIME PRIOR TO DECEMBER 5TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Deletion of the HOKOKU Maru from the Japanese Naval Organization List on December 5 was considered evidence of its loss.

No. 6-b:

051226 December, 1942

Serial 645

From: NARAE (Concealed identity)
To : MAMI 69 (Unidentified call)

(Unable read solidly)

(Contains several proposed corrections to and deletions from Wartime Organization List most of which have been given in previously reported despatches. Recognizable exceptions follow:)

Delete HOKOKU Maru [redacted] from War Organization list.

Disband: [redacted] (SubDiv 14 ?).

(Then proceeds to reassign 4 subs, apparently those then contained in division being disbanded, to other divisions. 1 goes to SubDiv 7, others unknown).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

NEGAT COMMENT: This HOKOKU Maru is the auxiliary
cruiser.

(NSS-131720-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 24).

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JANUARY 15, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Two Army transports were reported to be due at Wewak on the morning of January 18,

No. 7-a:

LOOK FOR ARRIVAL WEWAK DURING MORNING OF 18
JANUARY OF 2 ARMY TRANSPORTS FROM GENERAL
DIRECTION OF DUROUR (AUA) ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin #306, January 16, 1943, for the full development of this intelligence.

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 15, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #305 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 RCNB

150431 January, 1943
 Priority

ARMED MERCHANT CRUISER HOKOKU MARU SUNK PRIOR TO 5 DECEMBER X
 THIS VESSEL BELIEVED TO HAVE OPERATED AS RAIDER IN INDIAN
 OCEAN SUBSEQUENT TO 1 AUGUST X ZYMOTIC X CINCPAC BULLETIN
 305 X SUBMARINES SOUTH BY EAST ACCORDING TO DOG FOX X 00153
 X 02154 X 03155 X 12161 X CARDIV 2 ASSOCIATION WITH SOUTHERN
 AREA PRONOUNCED X CHUYO NEAR TRUK X PREDICT ARRIVAL WENAK
 OF TWO ARMY TRANSPORTS MORNING OF 18TH FROM GENERAL DIRECTION
 OF AVA (DUROUR) ISLAND X SOME INDICATION A BASE ON KOLOMBAN-
 GARA CONTEMPLATED OR ALREADY BEGUN X THIS POSSIBLY AN AIR
 BASE X DURING OCTOBER JAPS BELIEVED TO HAVE USED HUON ISLAND
 (OFF NORTHERN NEW CALEDONIA) FOR SCOUT PLANES TO REFUEL FROM
 SUBMARINES

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #306

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

160339 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

A division of jurisdiction over the enemy's air bases in the southern theatre was reported with the intelligence that a new air base northeast of Lae was planned.

No. 1-a:

JURISDICTION OF VARIOUS AIRBASES IN SOUTHERN AREA AS OF LATTER PART NOVEMBER FOLLOWS X ARMY JURISDICTION MAINLY X WEWAK MADANG LAE SALAMAUVA GAS. HATA X JOINT NAVY ARMY X BUNA KAVIENG VUNAKANAU LAKUMAY X AT ABOVE TIME JURISDICTION IN SOLOMONS LEFT FOR SETTLEMENT AT LATER DATE X NAVY INDICATED THEN AS INTENDING TO BUILD AN AIRBASE NORTHEAST OF LAE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from an intercepted dispatch.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b:

201052 November, 1942

38505

From: NARAE

Part I of III

From: IHQ

The question of Army Navy control of air bases at
etera is still under discussion here but we have
arrived at the following so far:

1. Kavieng, Rabaul, Vunakanau, Buna Bases shall
be for joint Army-Navy use.
2. Lae, Salamua, Wewak, Surumi?, Madang Bases
shall be principally Army.
3. In the Solomons it is a matter largely of new
construction and each case will be decided upon
at the time.
4. The Navy will construct its own air base north-
east of Lae.

(NPH-142252-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 107).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes on three enemy submarines were listed.

No. 2-a:

SUBS SOUTH AND EAST BY USUAL METHOD X 04156 X
07148 X 03149

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 2-b:

D/F Fixes for January 15, 1943.

SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6995	148 E 07 S Lae Area	1211-15
NARAE	Sub	13220	149 E 03 S	0357-15
NARAE	Sub	13220	156 E 04 S Buka Area	0547-15

(HYPO-15-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p.67b).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was no new intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers, but the Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet was believed to be in the Empire.

No. 3-a:

OTHER THAN 3RD FLEET CHIEF OF STAFF BEING INDICATED IN EMPIRE NO NEW INFO ON CARRIERS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This Third Fleet officer was located by traffic analysis.

No. 3-b:

An association in despatch originated by ROMEI

at 1058/12th addressed 61st Air Arsenal (RENWPU), 2nd Air Arsenal (SAKITU), and Staff CarDiv HIRAME, info AirFlot 26 (NIYAI), and Staff member Chinkai Defense Force (RENII). Traffic on 11th suggested carrier or carriers might be used to transport planes and equipment to AirFlot 26 in Buin-Rabaul area. Above heading suggests these aircraft and supplies may be drawn from groups attached to China Area Fleet and 61st Air Arsenal which is believed located at Takao, ^{OR} Sana. Traffic routing suggests Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet (IMI 03) in Sasebo area and CarDiv HIRAME in Kure area.

(T2W-131113-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 13, 1943, p. 97).

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 Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-g:

A despatch from concealed originator (possibly Combined Fleet at Truk?) went for action to Tokyo Personnel (YAYUKI) and info Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet (MITI 93) and 2 unidents RAWA 2 and ME? 03. Prior delivery was indicated to the last 2 addressees and since the despatch went from Truk to Tokyo it appears that Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet is in the Empire.

(HYPO-14-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 4).

No. 3-d:

CofS 3rd Fleet (WEFU03) addressed specifically in care of Yokosuka (KIRO 1), as Ominato believed incorrect from study(?) of available material.

(NSS-141800-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 146).

No. 3-e:

The Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet (WEFU 03) was addressed at KIRO 1 on the 14th. Previous identification of this call was for Ominato but this is believed in error. Very few appearances of this call makes it difficult to check but the indications are that it is Yokosuka (Belcomen says Sasebo), so we have the Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet definitely at either Sasebo or Yokosuka.

(HYPO-15-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 155).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was announced that the HAGURO, a heavy cruiser, had left Sasebo for Truk on November 27 upon completion of repairs. On January 15 the HAGURO was believed to have left Truk for an unknown destination.

No. 4-a:

REPAIRS TO HAGURO COMPLETED AND VESSEL SAILED FROM SASEBO NOV 27TH ENROUTE TRUK X SHIP BELIEVED TO BE HAGURO DEPARTED TRUK DESTINATION UNKNOWN OF 15 JAN

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was obtained from two intercepted dispatches.

No. 4-b:

131435 November, 1942

From: IKA 8 WOKA 5

48117

Originator ComCruDiv 5

1. The MYOKO, (NACHI ?) are only ships (of division) prepared to proceed at present. It appears that the HAGURO repairs will be completed on the 26th or 27th.

2. CruDiv 5 will depart Sasebo on the 27th, and arrive at Truk on (in December).

(NPM-142256-January-DI)

Ed. note: At this time Cruiser Division 5 consisted of the MYOKO and the HAGURO

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 162).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4-g:

141630 January, 1943

From: FUSI 2 (Base Force #4)
To : HAIKAI (Unident)
MUUN 8 (SubChaser Div. 58)
RIMEME 3 (Minesweep #8)
NUUKO 3 (Unident)
HEYU 9 (Unident)
Info: RUMU 5 (4th Fleet)
KIOSI 7 (Harbor Affairs Bureau #4)
NOSIKO 0 (Unident)

(Sketchy translation).

Tomorrow 15th at 0700 submarine I-11 (several blanks) and SHIRETOKO at 1400 ?, course 245°, escorted by Minesweep #8, enter by North Channel. At 0700 "A" Convoy of Army transports (3 ships) after passing through Kirishima Channel 180° blank destroyers escorting. At 1400 blank Maru (course 210) will leave by south channel. At 1400 cruiser HAGURO? and destroyer SAMIDARE will leave by North Channel.

(T2W-150521-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 37).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The two transports reported to be bound for Wewak in the previous day's bulletin (Item 7, CinCPac Bulletin #305, January 15, 1943) now were reported to be escorted by a destroyer and a sub-chaser.

No. 5-a:

THE 2 TRANSPORTS EXPECTED WEWAK 18TH WILL BE ESCORTED BY 1 SUBCHASER PLUS 1 DD

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch disclosed that these transports were escorted.

No. 5-b:

141200 January, 1943

Serial 150

From: No originator

To : YOKIHO (Movement Report Office)

ROHIU 7 (Combined Fleet)

NETUTO 2 (8th Fleet)

TIRETA (8th Base Force)

HIROU 6 (Unident)

EYAKE (Unident)

Info: SAHAMU (Commandant Yokosuka)

HOROSO (Commandant Kure)

TIARA (Unident)

KEYONA (HAKUZAN Maru)

KUYOKA 1 (Resident Nav Officer So. Seas)

ROHARI 4 (CruDiv 8)

From #2 ABG.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-b: (continued)

In accordance with this force "SNB" despatch #14, the MAKINAMI and #34 SubChaser will escort the Army transports #13 HAKUTETSU Maru and HOAKE Maru departing Rabaul noon the 14th and arriving Wewak on the morning of the 18th. The following points will be passed through:

Depart Rabaul noon 14th. Noon 15th 2-407 South 149-207 East. Noon 16th 0-20 South 146-20 East. Noon 18th 1-15 South 143 East. 0800 18th arrive Wewak.

(T2W-141254-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 128a).

* * *

141200 January, 1943

Serial 150

From: MIYOTO (Rabaul)
 To : YOUURO
 ROHIU 7(Combined Fleet)
 HIROU 6(Major command)
 METUTO 2(8th Fleet)
 EROKE 1(Sub Force)
 TIRETA 5(8th Base Force)
 Info: SAHAMU (Yokosuka Comdt.)
 KUYOKA (So.Seas Archipelago R.N.O.)
 HOROSO (Kure Comdt.)
 ROHA ?
 OTINA
 TIARASE
 KIYANA
 TOINA (DesRon 3)

From #2 AGB Commander.

Pursuant to this force SNB Operation Order #14, the MAKINAMI in command and SubChaser #34 or #24 will escort Army transport #13 HAKUTETSU Maru and OAKE Maru departing Rabaul at 1200, 14 January and scheduled to proceed Wewak morning of 18 January, via following route:

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-b: (continued)

1200 14 Jan. depart Rabaul.
 1200 15 Jan. S.
 1200 16 Jan. S 00-20 E 146-20
 1200 17 Jan. S 01-05 E 143-00
 0800 18 Jan. arrive Newak.

(NPM-141318-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 122).

The Outer South Seas Force Operation Order #14 mentioned in the above dispatches was deciphered a fortnight later.

No. 5-c:

121453 January, 1943

From: ONA [redacted] (Rabaul) 97150
 To : [redacted] Comdr. RC Area Defense Force
 MASU 82
 HOSA 7
 Info: MANI 1
 WATO 7 (Southeastern Area Fleet)
 FUSHI 1 (4th Fleet)
 KOHI 8 (2nd So. Expeditionary Fleet)
 KEE 4 (SubForce)
 KIEU 4
 MISA 9
 SISUMA (Chief of Nav. Gen. Staff)
 MOWI 57 (Outer So. Seas Force)

From Commander Outer South Seas Force. OpOrd #14.

1. Blank temporarily assigned "RC" Area Defense Force.
2. Commander "RC" Area Defense Force, in command of the MAKINAMI [redacted] and [redacted], depart Rabaul blank arriving Newak January 18th (about) escorting two Army transports (with 16 landing barges on board). Upon completion this duty resume regular employment.

(NPM-032342-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 3, 1943, p. 59)1

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Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)(C) REPORT OF ACTION

It is believed that this convoy was that attacked by the U.S.S. TRITON on January 16. One of the transports was sunk and the other damaged by direct hits along with one of the escorting vessels.

No. 5-d:

From: COMSOWSPAC
To : COMINCH
Info: CINCPAC
COMSUBPAC

280927 January, 1943
Routine

FROM PEARL TRITON ARRIVED ADOBE 26 JANUARY X EXPENDED 23 TORPEDOES SANK 18,000 TONS DAMAGED 14,000 TONS X THIS NEWS NOT RELEASED TO PRESS X16 JANUARY IN 01-39 SOUTH 148-20 EAST ATTACKED CONVOY 2 LOADED AK'S WITH 3 OR 4 ESCORTS X GOT 2 HITS FOR 3 ON 7,000 TONNER CONSIDERED SUNK 1 POSSIBLE HIT FOR 2 ON 4,000 TONNER WITH 1 ADDITIONAL POSSIBLE ON SAME SHIP OR ON ESCORT X MARU PROBABLY SANK X INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THIS CONVOY WAS PROBABLY MOAKE MARU, NUMBER 13 HAKUTETO, DESTROYER MAKINAMI AND NUMBER 34 PC EN-ROUTE WEWAK.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was known that a construction battalion was working on an air base in the Shortland area, but whether this was the base at Ballale or a new base was not known.

No. 6-a:

NUMBER 958 AIR BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION SHORTLAND VICINITY BY 101ST PIONEERS X THIS MAY BE AT BALLALE OR POSSIBLY A NEW BASE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was contained in an intercepted message.

No. 6-b:

142125 January, 1943

Serial 672

From:	YAMU	8 (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
To :	EMU	50 (Staff AirFlot 26)
Info:	KOSI	8 (Staff Jaluit Base For.6)
	TUHI	5 (KIYOKAWA Maru)
	INO	5 (C.O. YAMAFUKU Maru)

From Staff 8th Fleet.

Barracks are being erected at Shortlands by 101 Pioneer Unit and one section needs to be speeded up for #958 Air Base. Desire that the unloading of the YAMAFUKU Maru at Buin be expedited and that 2/3rds of Pioneer Detachment be assigned to #958 Air Base.

(NSS-142324--January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 14, 1943, p. 70).

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Authority *AND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

* * *

142125 January, 1943

Serial 672

From: YAMU 8 (Rabaul)
To : EMU 5 (Solomons Island Defense Force)
Info: KOSI 8 (SeaplaneDiv 11)

From Chief of Staff 8th Fleet.

Of the work in hand by the 101st Pioneer Unit in connection with the construction of living accommodations at Shortland, some of the work at Air Base #958 is urgent. Request that the working of the YAMAFUKU 7 Maru's cargo at Buin be expedited and that about 2/3 of the Pioneer Force personnel be despatched and put to work at Base #958.

(T2W-150124-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 74).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was reason to believe that an air base was under construction at Eniwetok Island.

No. 7-a:

CONSTRUCTION LAND AIR BASE ON ENIWETOK SUSPECTED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This suspicion was aroused by an intercepted message, which unfortunately was partially garbled.

No. 7-b:

150830 January, 1943

From:	SIYUMA	(Brown Island 4th Civ. Eng.)
To :	HAMINO	(4th Civil Eng.)
Info:	KIRUMU	(Tokyo 4th Naval Constructor)
	SIKKEE	3 (4th Fleet)
	TIRESU	7 (AirFlot 22)
	NAFUI	9 (Base Force #6)
	RIMUTI	(Kwajlein 4th Civ. Eng.)

Today completed first phase of the construction of LHWX Base.

(T2W-150630-January-DI)

Ed. note: Brown is an alternative name for Eniwetok/.

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 29).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #306 [British Addressee]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

160511 January, 1943
 Priority

CHIEF OF STAFF 3RD FLEET BELIEVED IN JAPAN X OTHERWISE NO
 FURTHER INFO CONCERNING CARRIERS X LAND AIRBASE CONSTRUCT-
 ION SUSPECTED AT ENIWETOK X ZIMOTIC X #101 PIONEERS BUILD-
 ING #958 AIRBASE IN SHORTLAND AREA X WHETHER THIS IS BALL-
 ALE AIR BASE OR NOT IS UNKNOWN X CINCPAC 306 X 1 DESTROYER
 AND 1 SUBCHASER ESCORTING 2 ARMY TRANSPORTS MENTIONED YES-
 TERDAYS BULLETIN X HAGURO REPAIRS COMPLETED AND SHIP DEPART-
 ED SASEBO 27 NOVEMBER FOR TRUK X BELIEVED DEPARTED TRUK JAN-
 UARY 15TH FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATION X SUBS SHOWN X 07148 X
 03149 X 04156 X ALL SOUTH BY EAST ACCORDING TO DOG FOX X
 FOLLOWING SHOWS SOUTHERN THEATRE AIR BASE JURISDICTION AS
 OF LATE NOVEMBER X JOINT ARMY NAVY X LAKUNAI VUNAKANAU
 KAVIENG BUNA X PRINCIPALLY ARMY X SALAMAUA LAE GASHATA
 MADANG WENAK X JURISDICTION IN SOLOMONS UNDECIDED AT ABOVE
 TIME X NAVY INTENDED TO CONSTRUCT AIR BASE NORTHEAST OF
 LAE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 160831(A) INTELLIGENCE

This dispatch constituted a reply to a message
from ComSoWesPac.

No. 1

From: COMSOWESPAC 151100 January, 1943
To : CINCPAC Deferred
V OPNAV

WILL APPRECIATE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE OF JAP HEAVY
AND LIGHT CRUISERS NOW REMAINING IN SERVICE

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 15, 1943).

ComSoWesPac was given a list of Japanese cruisers
sunk since the outbreak of war.

No. 2

From: CINCPAC 160831 January, 1943
To : COMSOWESPAC Deferred
Info: V OPNAV

HEAVY CRUISERS CONSIDERED SUNK X MIKUMA AT MIDWAY X
KAKO BY S-44 AUGUST 10TH OFF SIMBRI ISLAND NEAR
KAVIENG X FURUTAKA BY GUNFIRE OFF SAVO ISLAND 10-11
OCTOBER X KINUGASA PRIOR 15 DECEMBER BUT LOCATION
OR CAUSE UNKNOWN POSSIBLY SUNK 25 OCTOBER OFF YSABEL
ISLAND X YOUR 151100 X LIGHT CRUISERS X YURA SUNK
OFF YSABEL ISLAND BY B-17'S AT 1710 (-11) OCTOBER
25 X CRUISER MINELAYER OKINOSHIMA SUNK MAY 5TH AT
TULAGI X NO INFO ANY OTHER CA OR CL SUNK OTHER THAN
ABOVE ALTHOUGH POSSIBILITY EXISTS ESPECIALLY IN
CASE OF LATTER X EXPERIENCE HERE INDICATES OWN FORGES
INADVERTENTLY OVERESTIMATE DAMAGE INFLICTED

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 16, 1943).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These sinkings were reported in earlier intelligence dispatches as they became known and were confirmed. Therefore, the sources of the intelligence contained in this summary will not be quoted again here.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 161959(A) INTELLIGENCE

Task Force #8 was informed of the contents of an intercepted message from Kiska where a convoy apparently was expected shortly.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : TF 8

161959 January, 1943
Operational Priority

ZEAL ORIGINATING CINCPAC X KISKA AT 8 HOURS GCT 16TH ANNOUNCES INTENTION TO LIGHT HIS BEACONS QUOTE TONIGHT AND EACH NIGHT UNQUOTE SUBSEQUENT TO 13 HOURS GCT AND TO USE HIS SEARCHLIGHT AFTER 17 HOURS ALSO GCT X WEATHER REPORTS INDICATE HIS ANTICIPATION ARRIVAL 3 SHIP CONVOY X ESCORT BELIEVED SMALL MIGHT BE A LIGHT CRUISER PLUS A DD BUT CRUISER NOT STRONGLY SUGGESTED.

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The intercepted message follows:

No. 2

161410 January, 1943

From: NARE
To : TAMUKE (MICHIO or URAJIO Maru) Serial 084
YOKESA (Garbled and another garbled call)

From Staff 51st Base Force.

Today and each night we will light beacons about 2200. Use your searchlight after 0020.

(NSS-161652-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 16, 1943, p. 106).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

* * *

161410 January, 1943

Serial 084

From: NARAE
To : TANUKE
YOKESA
KARAKO (FUJIKAZE Maru)
Info: Blank

From Staff 51st Base Force.

Today, the same as yesterday, shall light route beacons at 2200. Shall use searchlights from 0200.

(HYPO-16-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 16, 1943, p. 105).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

On January 18 (local time) two recently arrived ships were observed in Kiska harbor. These probably were the ships mentioned in the above dispatch from CinCPac. An air attack on these vessels was ordered immediately but bad weather frustrated the attack and took a toll of seven of the American planes.

No. 3

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMINCH
COMGEN WDC
COMNORWESTSEAFRON
ADC

190650 January, 1943
Priority

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

AIR SEARCHES WESTERN ALEUTIANS 18TH ABOUT 50 PERCENT COMPLETE X ARMY WEATHER PLANE SIGHTED

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 16, 1943 (Continued)No. 3 (continued)

THREE RECENTLY ARRIVED SHIPS BOODLE HARBOR AT
1330 W (PLUS 10) X ATTACK GROUP LAUNCHED FROM
LONGVIEW CONSISTING 6 HEAVIES 4 MEDIUMS 6
LIGHTENINGS X NO INFO RESULTS

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 19, 1943).

No. 4

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMINCH
COMNORWESTSEAFRON
COMWESTSEAFRON
COMGEN WDC

200648 January, 1943
Priority

RECENTLY ARRIVED SHIPS BOODLE 2 INSTEAD 3 (MY 190650)
ALL BUT 5 LIBERATORS OF ATTACK MISSION ON 18TH TURNED
SHORT OF BOODLE X 2 MEDIUMS 1 HEAVY MECHANICAL TROUBLE
X REMAINDER RECALLED DUE WEATHER X 5 LIBRATORS FOUND
WEATHER CLOSED IN AT OBJECTIVE X INCREASINGLY BAD
WEATHER LONGVIEW RESULTED ONLY 1 LIBERATOR GETTING
ONTO FIELD, CRASHING IN DOWN WIND LANDING WITHOUT
INJURIES TO CREW BUT WRECKING 2 P-38's X OF REMAINDER
4, 1 REACH GOLD BAY, 1 CRASHED ON GREAT SITKIN (CREW
RESCUED BY HULBERT) ANOTHER MAY HAVE CRASHED GREAT
SITKIN AND 1 REPORTED TO HAVE CRASHED AND BURNED ON
CAPE ADAGDAK ADAK

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 20, 1943).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #307

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TP COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

170347 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that Kiska was expecting the arrival of a convoy.

No. 1-a:

EXPECTING CONVOY AT KISKA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was the substance of CinCPac Dispatch 161959 January, 1943 and its sources are quoted thereunder.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of two enemy underseas craft were reported.

No. 2-a:

SUB AT 145 EAST 3 SOUTH AND ANOTHER IN SHORTLAND AREA BY DOG FOX

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 2-h:

D/F Fixes: for January 16, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	7915	Shortlands Area	0730-16
NARAE	Sub	3957	145-30 E 03-30 S	1120-16

(HYPO-16-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 59a).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The sinking of the Japanese light cruiser YURA was announced.

No. 3-a:

YURA BOMBED AND SUNK OFF SANTA ISABEL NORTHEAST COAST ON OCTOBER 25TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The fate of the YURA was learned from a belated decipherment of an intercepted message.

No. 3-b:

270212 October, 1943

From: No originator
 To : FIHI 9 (Combined Fleet)
 KENU 3 (8th Fleet)
 SATO 2
 KIKO 8 (URANAMI)
 YOKO 8 (2nd Fleet)
 NARE 5
 SIMI 9

(4 part battle report from concealed ComDesRon 4 in his role of Commander of 2nd Attack Unit of Outer South Seas Force. Reports being attacked several times about 1510-25 October by B-17's and fighters and continues as follows:)

2. Damage sustained nil.

A. YURA [] hit by 5 bombs which started great fires which could not be controlled. (Lists number killed and wounded but numbers are garbled).

B. [] unident ship) sustained 1 direct hit and 2 near misses. Blank out of action.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

C. SAMIDARE suffered considerable damage from one near miss (more dead and wounded).

D. DesRon 4 Staff casualties: 1 dead, 2 wounded. Sunk the YURA in 08-15 S 159-35 E, and after taking survivors on ships of DesDiv 2 withdrew to north of Guadalcanal. At 0000 on 26th shifted my flag from blank (garble) to [redacted] (unident DD) and sent [redacted] back to RR (Rabaul) with YURA survivors (or casualties).

(NSS-150741-16-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 65).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

The unidentified type of enemy warship recently photographed in the Solomons now was believed to be a destroyer of the TERUTSUKI class.

No. 4-a:

THE FOUR TURRET MYSTERY SHIP FORMERLY CALLED TAKANAMI CLASS DESTROYER NOW BELIEVED TO BE TERUTSUKI CLASS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This unidentified ship was known from photographs to have four gun turrets. From prisoners of war it was learned that the TERUTSUKI class of Japanese destroyers had four turrets while the TAKANAMI class had only three.

No. 4-b:

120450 December, 1942
Routine

From: COMSOPAC
To : CINCPAC
Info: COMSOWESPAC
ALL CTF SOPAC

CINCPAC 110245 X VARIOUS POW HAVE IDENTIFIED 4 TURRET DD AS TERUTSUKI CLASS X TAKANAMI CLASS 3 TURRETS X REF ONI SUMMARY OF TYPES DATED NOVEMBER 20 PAGE 7 X BELIEVE DD 109-113 ARE THE FORMER MYSTERY SHIPS X GREATER TONNAGE AND 2 MORE GUNS THAN LISTED IX 114-118 SMALLER TAKANAMIS X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 12, 1943).

See also Item 7 of CinCPac Bulletin #301,

January 11, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Two convoys carrying reinforcements for the Japanese army on Guadalcanal were expected to reach Shortland Island shortly.

No. 5-a:

MINESWEEPER AND TWO MARUS DEPARTED RABAU 16TH TO ARRIVE SHORTLAND VIA WEST CHANNEL AT 1400 LOVE 18TH X THREE MARUS ESCORTED BY ONE DESTROYER LEFT TRUK ON 15TH FOR SHORTLAND AREA X WILL ARRIVE NORTHWEST OF OEMA ISLAND AT 0400 LOVE 20TH X SUSPECT SHIPS ARE ARMY TRANSPORTS CARRYING TROOPS ULTIMATELY DESTINATED GUADALCANAL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intercepted dispatches disclosed the movements of these convoys.

No. 5-b:

151500 January, 1943

Serial 560

From:	KISA	80	(Unident)
To :	URE	6	(Unident)
	SEMI	2	(Connected subs)
Info:	MOHI	7	(Staff SE Area Fleet)
	TOE	8	(Staff 8th Fleet)
	NAMAU		(Comdr. Kavieng Sea Def. For.)
	NATIRE		(Minesweeper #22)
	MITUTA		(Unident)
	MOREKO		(Harbor Affairs Section #8 Rabaul)

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NAGAURA and MITSU Maru escorted by Minesweeper #22 will leave RR (Rabaul) at 14 hours January 16 and are scheduled to arrive at western entrance to RRE (Shortland) at 12 hours on 18, after passing through the following points:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-b: (continued)

2 miles off Cape St. George at 21 hours January 16. 07-02 S., 154-32 E., at 5 hours January 18.

Please give consideration in regard to precautionary measures.

(NSS-151121-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 114).

* * *

151205 January, 1943

From: KISA 80 (Staff 8th Base Force)
 To : URE 60
 SEMI 20 (SeaplanDiv 11)
 Info: 6 others including Staff 8th Fleet and Rabaul Seaplane Base.

NAGAURAMATSU Maru escorted by Minesweep #22 departs Rabaul 1400-16th. Pass 2 miles off Cape St. George at 2100. Pass through 7-02 S, 154-32 E at 0500-18th, and arrive west entrance Shortlands 1200. Please arrange arial cover (keikai).

(F2W-151155-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 110).

* * *

151250 January, 1943

Serial 560

From: KISA 80 (8th Base Force)
 To : URE 60 (Unident)
 SEMI 20 (SubRon)
 Info: MOHI 70 (CinC So. East Area Flt.)
 TOE 80 (8th Flt. F.S.)
 MITUTA (Rabaul area)
 MORUKO (8th Harbor Affairs, Rabaul)
 NUMAU 1 (Rabaul Seaplane Base)
 NATIRE (Minesweep #22)

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-b: (continued)

The NAGAURA and the MITSU Maru, escorted by Minesweeper #22 depart Rabaul 1400 on 16 January and are scheduled to proceed Shortland via point 2 miles off St. George's Cape at 2100 16 January and point S 7-04, E 154-32 at 0500 18 January, arriving west entrance Shortland at 1200, 18 January. Request arrangements for (sub) patrol.

(HYPO-15-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 111).

No. 5-a:

151345 January, 1943

Serial 380

From:	Blank		
To :	URB	6	(Unident)
Info:	NUMI	2	(Unident)
	MIYUG		(2nd Transport Control Officer)
	TEIYOO Maru		(In garbled call)
	MONU	4	(Special group, Naval Section of Imp. Hdqtrs)
	KISA	8	(Base Force #8)
	HANI	9	(11th Air Fleet)
	NOMI	3	(2nd Fleet)
	WOYA	9	(8th Fleet)
	MAHI	1	(Unident)
	MASU	7	(Combined Fleet)
	KIMI	1	(Unident)

#6 Transport "A" Convoy (TEIYOO Maru, MIYOOHO Maru, #1 SHINSUI Maru, escort ship SIGURE under the command of the 2nd Transport Commander embarked in TEIYOO Maru) departed Truk at noon today the 15th for Ballale. Scheduled arrive at 0500 20th January
Noon position:

16th 4-50 North 153-16 East.
17th 2-04 North 154-34 East.
18th 1-15 North 156-10 East.
19th 4-38 South 156-01 East.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-g: (continued)

At 0100 20th at Point A (6-30 South 156-10 East) the convoy will change course to 26 degrees. At repeating at 2 hours will pass through point bearing 33 degrees 3 miles from north tip of Oema Island. At 0500 will enter harbor via northern entrance.

(T.M.-152348-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 15, 1943, p. 112).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The U.S.S. SWORDFISH on January 19, 1943, sank one of three marus escorted by two destroyers east of Bougainville. This convoy was that scheduled to arrive at Shortland at 0400 L (-11) January 20.

No. 5-d:

From: COMSOPAC 200845 January, 1943
 To : CINCPAC Priority
 Info: COMAIRSOPAC
 COMSOWESPAC
 NZNB

SWORDFISH REPORTS 2 HITS ON MARU IN ESCORTED CONVOY 85 MILES NORTH OF TONOLEI YESTERDAY AFTERNOON

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 20, 1943).

The victim of the SWORDFISH was the MYOHO Maru.

Intercepted dispatches confirmed the suspicion that these ships were carrying troops.

No. 5-g:

From: NORA 88 191515 January, 1943
 To : NOKI 8
 WONE 98
 TARA 1
 NOI 5
 ENE 7

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Authority

NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-e: (continued)

On 19 January at 1435 the MYOHOO Maru received attack from enemy submarine, sustained one direct hit. Impossible to navigate and am drifting. Our position: 156-20 E., 5-38 S.

(HYPO-13-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 13, 1943, p. 31).

No. 5-f:

191549 January, 1943

From: NORA 88 (Combatant Ship at Guadalcanal)
To : NOI 5 ("R" Area Air Force)

Are engaged in rescuing Army personnel of MYOHOO Maru. Request despatch of air escort. Position 156-20 East, 05-38 South.

(HYPO-3-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 3, 1943, p. 76).

* * *

191549 January, 1943

From: NORA 8 (Comdr. DesDiv 27)
To : NOI 5 (SeaplatenDiv 11)

In connection with the rescuing of Army personnel aboard the MYOHO Maru, please send air cover at once. Position 156-20 E., 5-38 S.

(NSS-082347-May-DI)

(D.T.B. May 8, 1943, p. 49).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-g:

191830 January, 1943

Parts 1 and 2 of 3

From:	NORA	88 (Combatant ship at Guadalcanal)
To :	KIN	11 (All Flagships Combined Fleet)
	AME	11 (4th Fleet)
	WEME	7
	WOHE	7
	WAA	52
	TUA	8
	TARA	1 (2nd Convoy)
	NOI	52 ("R" Area Air Force)
Info:	EHE	72
	TUME	1
	MUWA	2
	KURU	9

Part 1

At 1430, the NYOOHO Maru, #2 ship of a convoy of #6 Shipping Group, position KETOTU 45, received torpedo attack by enemy submarine. Two torpedoes fired of which one exploded prematurely, and one made direct hit in (stern?). We immediately carried out depth charge attack expending 21 charges. Results uncertain.

Part 2

Blank ordered to rescue of personnel. At 1815 picked up all drifting blank persons. The rescued personnel: Army Transport Force Commander and 862 men including 6 dead, 77 missing; the ship's Captain and 87 men, 1 missing; Naval passengers, 35, the entire group.

(NPM-301106-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 30, 1943, p. 43).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-g: (continued)

* * *

191830 January, 1943

From:	NORA	88	(Combatant ship or at Guadalcanal)
To :	KIN	11	(All Flagships Combined Fleet or collective exempting RAWA 5)
	AME	11	(4th Fleet)
	WESE	7	
	WOHE	98	(Guadalcanal Reinforcement or Commander 11 DD's--Dec. 12)
	WAA	52	(SubForce)
	TUA	8	
	TARA	1	(2nd Ocean Convoy)
Info:	NOI	52	("H" Area Air Force)
	EHE	72	(26th AirFlot)
	TOME	1	
	MUWA	2	
	KURU	9	

3. Engine room blank and blank compartment(s) of MYOOHO Maru are flooded. She has a tremendous list to port and cannot navigate. Is drifting. At present there is no fear of her sinking. We will immediately overtake "A" Convoy and blank Shortland.

4. Due to trouble with 1 of her circulation pumps, the maximum speed the SHIGURE can make to Bissu(?) is 24 knots.

(HYPO-30-March-DI)

GI COMMENT: See NPM 301106 March for paragraphs 1 and 2.

(D.T.B. March 30, 1943, p. 42).

* * *

191830 January, 1943

From:	NORA	8	(DesDiv 27?)
To :	KIN	1	(All CofS Combined Fleet)
	AME	7	(CofS 4th Fleet)
	WOHE	98	(Comdr. Reinforcement Force)
	WAA	52	(SubForce)
	KETUA	8	
	TARA	1	(Ocean Convoy #2)

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Authority NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-g: (continued)

Info: NOI 52 (SeaplatenDiv 11)
 EHE 72 (Comdr. AirFlot 26)

Part two of three(?)

2. At 1815, the rescue of all personnel adrift was accomplished. The Commander of the force embarked and 862 men (6 died) were rescued, 72 were missing. The Captain and 87 of the crew, except for 1 man missing, and the entire party of naval passengers (35 men) were also rescued.

NEGAT COMMENT: This message refers to the sinking of the MYOHO Maru.

(NSS-082358-May-DI)

(D.T.B. May 8, 1943, p. 51).

No. 5-h:

200330 January, 1943

From: WASIMU 6
 To : TUKI 8
 Info: WENE 3
 ROWO 8 (8th Fleet)
 EPU 8 (SeaplatenDiv 11)
 WIKI 1 (AirFlot 26)
 NSI 5 (SubDiv 2 unit)
 TAYU 4

MYOCHOO Maru is sinking gradually by the stern. No hope of towing blanks. Although 1 landing barge and 3 boats are drifting, unable to sight personnel.

(NPM-041126-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 4, 1943, p. 47).

The Senior Aviator at Guadalcanal had been apprised of the scheduled arrival of this convoy at Ballale on the morning of January 20 by ComAir-

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-h: (continued)

SoPac in the following dispatch. There is no record of an air attack on this convoy, however.

No. 5-i:

From: COMAIRSOPAC 190537 January, 1943
 To : SENAV CACTUS Urgent
 Info: COMSOPAC
 CTF 42

4 SHIPS INCLUDING TANKER DUE BALLALE MORNING 20TH
 XX ESTIMATED ROUTE IN MY 161419 X LOCATE AND RE-
 PORT POSITION TO CTF 42 DIRECT ATTACK IF PRACTIC-
 ABLE X 12 P-38 AUXILIARY TANKS ENROUTE VIA SCAT
 ETA 1800 L (-11) TODAY

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 19, 1943).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that enemy submarines still were carrying supplies to Guadalcanal.

No. 6-a:

JAP SUBS CONTINUE ASSOCIATION GUADALCANAL SUPPLY MISSIONS SUGGESTED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The continued association of submarines with Guadalcanal was seen in traffic analysis.

No. 6-b:

Staff Officer Todoroki (NOYOKU) continued his activity with _____ despatches addressed for action to SubRon (TUI 10), Munda Defense Force (NEKIYO), Bismark Area Defense Force (OKI 60), 6th Air Attack Force (ISO 70) 5th Air Attack Force (SITI 40), Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet (KEI 11), Chief of Staff 8th Fleet (EHE 21), _____ "Kolombangara Base Commander" and "Ballale Base Commander" and two unidentified. All these despatches carry highest precedence.

(HYPO-16-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 16, 1943, p. 80).

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Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 17, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #307 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

170555 January, 1943
 Priority

CONVOY OF 3 SHIPS UNDER ESCORT 1 DESTROYER DEPARTED TRUK 15TH
 TO ARRIVE SHORTLAND AREA VIA EAST ENTRANCE 20TH PROBABLY ARMY
 TRANSPORTS WITH REINFORCEMENTS FOR GUADALCANAL X ZENOTIC X
 307 FROM CINCPAC X 2 MARIUS ESCORTED BY 1 MINESWEEPER LEFT
 RABAU 16TH ARRIVING THROUGH WEST CHANNEL SHORTLAND 18TH X
 INDICATIONS CONVOY EXPECTED KISKA X DOG FOX PLACED SUBMARINE
 3 SOUTH 145 EAST X ALSO ONE NEAR SHORTLAND X BELIEVE SUBS
 STILL BEING USED AT GUADALCANAL FOR SUPPLY WORK X LIGHT
 CRUISER YURA SUNK 25 OCTOBER OFF NE COAST OF SANTA YSABEL
 ISLAND BY AERIAL BOMBS X NOW APPEARS THAT 4 TURRET MYSTERY
 SHIP IS THE TERETSUKI CLASS DESTROYER INSTEAD OF TAKANAMI
 CLASS X

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #308

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSVPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

180211 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

Current intelligence on the enemy's carriers was summarized. No change in the known disposition of these carriers was noted since the preceding summary in Item 3 of CinCPac Bulletin #304, January 14, 1943.

No. 1-a:

ESTIMATE ZUIKAKU SHOKAKU ZUIHO IN EMPIRE WATERS X CARDIV 2 UNLOCATED BUT ASSOCIATION 11TH AIR FLEET IN RABAUl NOTED X CHUYO OTAKA AND UNYO BELIEVED EN-GAGED IN FERRYING PLANES FROM EMPIRE SOUTH.

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from traffic analysis.

No. 1-b:

Best carrier estimates are ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU and ZUIHOO in Empire Area, HITAKA and HAYATAKA (JUN-YOU) unlocated. A call tentatively identified thru association [] as ComDesRon 10 (AI 5) on 16 January was heard on 3957 kcs (Solomons-SE area night frequency), by D/F [] in the general Solomons area.

(HYPO-17-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 17, 1943, p. 8).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-g:

11th Air Fleet addressed at least 2 despatches to the well identified CarDiv 2 call (TOME 5), and some command using Rabaul cover included 3rd Fleet in several headings.

The association between 11th Air Fleet and CarDiv 2, previously mentioned, in one case 11th Air Fleet addressing CarDiv 2 (TOME 5) with no other addressee, may mean that CarDiv 2 is assigned for operations under 11th Air Fleet Command, or may mean duty as plane ferries between the Empire and southeastern area.

(HYPO-17-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 17, 1943, p. 86).

The CHUYO, OTAKA, and UNYO, all auxiliary carriers, had been engaged in ferrying aircraft during December and early January. There appears to have been no indication that their duties had been changed.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCENo. 2-a:

POOR DOG FOX PLACES SUBS NEAR KAVIENG AND IN
MARSHALLS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 2-b:

D/P Fixes for January 17, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	Kavieng area	2145-16
NARAE	Sub	6610	N.E. of Solomons	1050-17

(HYPO-17-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 16, 1943, pp. 12b and 60d).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

Another convoy was reported to be enroute to Shortland Island. Like the convoys reported on the previous day, this convoy was believed to be carrying reinforcements for the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal. The convergence of these troop transports upon Shortland Island possibly presaged a new offensive by the Japanese at Guadalcanal.

No. 3-a:

THERE ARE NOW TWO CONVOYS ENROUTE SHORTLAND DIRECT FROM TRUK X FIRST CONVOY WAS MENTIONED IN YESTERDAYS BULLETIN COMPOSED OF THREE SHIPS ARRIVING OFF OEMA ISLAND ON 20TH X ANOTHER CONVOY OF FOUR SHIPS WITH ONE DESTROYER ESCORTING DEPARTED TRUK 17 JANUARY AND ARRIVING NORTH ENTRANCE TO SHORTLAND AREA MORNING OF 22ND X BOTH CONVOYS ARE SUSPECTED OF CARRYING TROOPS WHOSE ULTIMATE DESTINATION MAY BE GUADALCANAL X SUGGESTS POSSIBLE ANOTHER LARGE SCALE LANDING ATTEMPT MAY BE SCHEDULED SOON AFTER 22 JANUARY X JUDGING FROM NUMBER SHIPS INVOLVED PERHAPS NO TRANSFER TO DESTROYERS AT SHORTLAND CONTEMPLATED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence of this new convoy was obtained from an intercepted dispatch.

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-b:

171705 January, 1943

Serial 374

From:	Blank	
To :	RAMU	2 (Solomons Defense Force)
Info:	NUHA	21 (Combined Fleet)
	EFU	41 (2nd Fleet or 3rd Fleet)
	KUMA	91 (8th Fleet)
	NIWO	01 (11th Air Fleet)
	MIKE	61
	SIWASO	(WE OIKAWA Maru WE)
	MIKE	1 (Rabaul Radio)
	HITE	85 (1st NGS)
	FUNI	68
	WEPU	68
	RIKOSH	
	WEWE	(Transport Commander)
	RUFU	30 (Rabaul Radio)
	WEWE	(#2 Convoy Commander)
	MIMTORO	(Shortland or Buin Radio)
		(11th Seaplane Tender Division)
	WEWE	(Composite Airwing #6)
	RUFU	8 (Rabaul Radio)
	MIU	21 (4th Fleet CofS)

#6 Transport "B" Convoy (OIKAWA Maru, KENKON Maru, KYOKUSEI Maru, PANAMA Maru and escort vessel SHIRAYUKI) under command of #3 Convoy Control Commander on the OIKAWA Maru (DAI 3 UNKO SHIKIKAN) departs PT (Truk) for RXE (Shortland) at 1400 17th January.

Noon positions:

18th 04° 18' North 152° 40' East.
 19th 01° 10' North 153° 40' East.
 20th 01° 30' South 155° 50' East.
 21st 04° 30' South 156° 30' East.

At 0000 the 22nd in position 06° 08' South 156° 30' East on course 215°. At 0500 arrive northern entrance to RXE (Shortland).

(NPM-171916-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 17, 1943, pp. 57 and 58).

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 Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-b: (continued)

* * *

171708 January, 1943

Serial 374

From:	RUHANE	(Possible garble for RUHA Ø, unident)
:	MIU	78 (CofS 4th Fleet)
To :	RAMU	7 (Solomon's Defense Force)
Info:	HUHA	78 (CofS Combined Fleet)
	SPU	38 (CofS 2nd Fleet)
	KUMA	29 (CofS 8th Fleet)
	NIWO	98 (CofS 11th Air Fleet)
	MIKE	48 (CofS Southeast Area Fleet)
	SIWASO	(Unident Ship's name?)
	MIKE	8 (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
	HITE	61 (Naval Gen. Staff First Section)
	FUNI	46 (Unident)
	WEFU	46 (Unident)
	RIKOSU	(Army address assoc. with Guadal- canal Reinforcement)
	Blank	(Commander Shipping Group)
	REFU	Ø (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
	Blank	(Commander #2 Convoy)
	MIHORO	(Shortlands)
	Blank	(CofS ? # sijipir [Cruiser?] Div.)

(This is heading for HOW's 171916, we have same text and positions).

(NSS-181514-January-DI)

GI COMMENT: 171916 pertains to convoy moving from Truk to Shortlands.

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 84).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

ComAirSoFao informed the Senior Aviator at Guadalcanal of this convoy in the following dispatch:

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-a:

From: COMAIRSOPAC
To : SENAV CACTUS
Info: COMSOPAC
CTF 42

190547 January, 1943
Urgent

CONVOY 5 SHIPS LEFT TRUK 17TH INCLUDES 2 AK'S 1
LARGE MARU X PASSES THROUGH FOLLOWING POINTS X
1400 L(-11) 21ST LAT 04-30 SOUTH 156-30 EAST
0200 L(-11) 22ND LAT 06-08 SOUTH 156-30 EAST
THENCE ON COURSE 215 TO ARRIVE SHORTLAND NORTHERN
ENTRANCE 0700 L (-11) 22ND X CONDUCT SEARCH 20TH
SECTOR 321-339 ORIGIN CACTUS RADIUS 800 USING 3
FORTRESSES CALLS 7 OR 9 V 40 X COVER REGULAR
FORTRESS SECTORS ALSO X CONDUCT ADDITIONAL SEAR-
CHES AS NECESSARY TO LOCATE ON 21ST X REPORT CON-
TACTS DIRECT TO CTF 42 X ATTACK WHEN AND IF
PRACTICABLE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 19, 1943).

This convoy bound for Shortland Island from
Truk was sighted by an American plane northwest
of Cape Friendship on Bougainville Island on Jan-
uary 21. Seven fortresses were sent from Guadal-
canal to attack this convoy but low clouds ob-
scured the target and no hits were made.

No. 3-d:

From: COMSOPAC
To : CINCPAC
Info: ALL TF COMS SOPAC
COMSOWSPAC

210743 January, 1943
Priority

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *nnd 947022*

AT 0930 L (-11) TODAY 21ST FAR SEARCHING PORT
FROM CACTUS SAW SIX NIP SHIPS 103 MILES NORTH
BY WEST CAPE FRIENDSHIP X CONVOY COMPOSED 2 DD'S
4 AK'S WAS HEADING 240 SPEED 15 HAD LONE PLANE
COVERING WHICH ATTACKED B-17 X AT 1145 SAME CON-
VOY WAS 5-14 SOUTH 155-40 EAST HEADING 120 TRUE
WITH ONE DD NOT THERE.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 21, 1943).

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-a:

From: RDO QUADALCANAL 212000 January, 1943
 To : COMAIRSOPAC Operational Priority
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMSOPAC
 CGFMAW
 COMGENSOPAC
 ALL CTF SOPAC

7 FORTRESSES ON STRIKE AGAINST ONE DD 4 AK LAT 6 DEGREES 12 MIN SOUTH LONG 155 DEG 50 MIN EAST COURSE 160 DEG SPEED 4 TO EIGHT KNOTS AT 1810 L (-11) X DUE TO CLOUD CONDITIONS BAD BOMBING RUNS RESULTED, ONLY TWO PLANES DROPPING AND MISSES WERE WIDE X DID NOT ATTEMPT A SECOND RUN BUT CONTINUED TO MUNDA PLANES BECAME SEPARATED X 4 FORTRESSES INCLUDING ONE WITH ENGINE TROUBLE RETURNED TO BASE, 2 WITH THEIR BOMB LOADS X OF THE REMAINING 3, 2 BOMBED MUNDA WITH 15 500 POUNDERS FROM 10,000 FEET WITH UNOBSERVED RESULTS X THE THIRD FORTRESS OF THIS LATTER GROUP SIGHTED 2 AK'S IN KULA GULF BETWEEN NEW GEORGIA AND KOLOMBANGARA X MADE RUN BUT CLOUDS OBSCURED TARGET X ON A SECOND RUN TARGET WAS COMPLETELY OBSCURED AND PLANE RETURNED WITH BOMBS X BLACK CAT M SEARCH FULL COURSE AND COVERAGE NEGATIVE X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 21, 1943).

Shortly after this unsuccessful aerial assault upon the convoy, a submarine, the U.S.S. GATO, attacked and succeeded in sinking one of the transports, the KENKON Maru.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *nnd 947022*No. 3-f:

From: SITA 68 211935 January, 1943
 To : YORI 0 (2nd Escort Force)
 TOME 4
 TERI 3 (1st So. Exp. Fleet)
 YUNE 37
 RUM 6
 OSE 4

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-f: (continued)

Info: NKA 00 (Combined Fleet)
 KUKA 30 (11th Air Fleet)
 SAHO 11 (8th Fleet)

At 0608 we received an attack of 6 B-17's bearing 338 degrees, 28 miles from Oema Island with no damage. (Several blanks). At 1615 the #4 ship, KENKON Maru, received a direct hit in engine room by a torpedo fired at short range from an enemy submarine on the port beam. A huge fire enveloped the entire ship. We are at present engaged in rescue of personnel. Good prospects for rescuing most of them.

(NPM-222042-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 22, 1943, p. 35a).

No. 3-g:

220040 January, 1943

From:	SARE	76
To :	MERE	4 (11th Air Fleet)
	OTO	06
	RIKO	1
Info:	NAWI	2 (SeaplanDiv 11)
	IHI	1 (AirFlot 26)
	SEHI	8 (DesRon)(DesRon 10 "D")
	YOE	3
	NAKO	8 (Combined Fleet)

(Continuing story of KENKON Maru).

1. Situation on rescue. At 1920 the AKIKAZE and at 1955 2 landing barges of the Kieta Guard Force arrived and completed rescue operations at 2115. The Regimental Commander and 740 personnel (among which were 2 dead, 50 slightly wounded, and 29 missing) were saved as was the entire crew (including 6 slightly and seriously wounded.) 45th Regimental colors safe.

2. At approximately 2130 the fire in the KENKON Maru caused her magazine to explode and she was drifting beyond all help. After conferring, we fired 6 salvos into her and saw her sink. Arrived Shortlands 0035.

(NPM-722118-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 22, 1943, p. 35b).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *npd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-h:010411 January, 1943
RoutineFrom: COMSOWESPAC
To : COMINCH
Info: CINCPAC

FROM VICINITY EAST OF BOUGAINVILLE GATO RETURNED
BRISBANE 26 FEBRUARY X 21 JANUARY NORTH BOUGAIN-
VILLE STRAIT MADE LATE AFTERNOON ATTACK ON 4
SHIPS ESCORTED SOUTHBOUND CONVOY. 2 TORPEDOES
MISSED LEADING SHIP BUT 1 OF 2 FISH HIT 2ND AP
OF 8700 TONS X AFTER COUNTER ATTACK TARGET SEEN
BURNING FIERCELY 4 HOURS LATER, CONSIDERED DES-
TROYED.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, March 1, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 18, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #308 /British Addressee/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

180317 January, 1943
 Priority

IN ADDITION TO THREE SHIP CONVOY ARRIVING SHORTLAND FROM TRUK ON 20TH ANOTHER CONVOY OF 4 VESSELS DEPARTED TRUK ON 17TH AND WILL ARRIVE SHORTLAND ON MORNING OF 22ND X SUSPECT BOTH CONVOYS CARRY TROOPS AND THAT ANOTHER LARGE SCALE ATTEMPT TO LAND REINFORCEMENTS UPON GUADALCANAL AFTER 22 JANUARY MAY BE CONTEMPLATED X NUMBER OF TRANSPORTS INVOLVED MAY INDICATE TROOPS TO BE CARRIED GUADALCANAL WITHOUT TRANSFER TO DESTROYERS X ZYMOTIC X CINCPAC INTELLIGENCE 308 X SUBS SHOWN BY POOR BEARINGS IN MARSHALLS AND CLOSE TO KAVIENG X CARDIV 2 SEEN ASSOCIATED WITH 11TH AIR FLEET AT RABAU X CARDIV 1 ESTIMATED IN JAPAN X OTAKA UNYO AND CHUYO THOUGHT FERRYING AIRCRAFT SOUTHWARD FROM JAPAN PORTS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority nm 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 19, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #309

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

190315 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was evidence that enemy submarines were continuing to carry supplies to the Japanese garrison at Guadalcanal.

No. 1-a:

AT GUADALCANAL SUBS CONTINUE SUPPLY OPERATIONS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A close association of submarines with Guadalcanal was noted in traffic analysis.

No. 1-b:

"B" SubForce (ANI 1) still continues close association with activities at Guadalcanal.

In despatch at 0729-17 Detached Comm. Unit #2 (TAMOI) on Guadalcanal originated despatch to CofS 6th and 8th Fleets, plus "B" SubForce, info CofS Combined Fleet. Association would suggest that subs of "B" SubForce are still being used as supply or transport units between Rabaul and Guadalcanal.

Headquarters of "B" SubForce are indicated as at Rabaul.

(T2W-180857-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 93).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-c:

Solomons area showed no operational traffic on 18th and relatively small amount of air activity. The reinforcement force (believed to be KETA 6) was inactive although addressed in Guadalcanal reports. The "B" Sub Force (RURI 8) was a prominent addressee and at least 2 SubDivs (AWE 7) and (NINO 6) were active in traffic. An unknown unit commander (IEA 9) for whom traffic was sent to Guadalcanal (SUTETE) on one occasion originated hourly weather reports to all force commanders Guadalcanal Operations Force, and all force commanders of an unknown group (YUO 5). What this latter organization can be is not yet clear.

(NSS-181714-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 121).

No. 1-d:

Practically all of the activity of Guadalcanal Base and Staff Officer Toderoki concerned submarines, and that was below par.

(HYPO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 107).

A few days later there was tangible evidence that supplies still were reaching the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal.

No. 1-e:

From: COMSOPAC
 To : CINCPAC
 Info: ALL TF COMS SOPAC
 COMSOWESPAAC

210743 January, 1943
 Priority

.....BARRELS FOUND FLOATING OFF TASSAFARONGA TODAY
 INDICATE NIPS STILL SLIPPING THROUGH TO SUPPLY THEIR
 FORCES.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January, 21, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

Fleet unit movements in the Solomons, Truk, and Empire areas were reflected in current traffic.

No. 2-a:

CERTAIN SIGNS IN SOLOMONS EMPIRE AND TRUK AREAS OF MOVEMENT BY FLEET UNITS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An analysis of current traffic suggested this conclusion.

No. 2-b:

The outstanding frequency with which the Navy Minister and Chief of General Staff calls (formerly called Tokyo Movement Report Office) appear in dispatches from concealed originators plus inclusion of major commanders is a strong indication that major movements of fleet units are taking place in the Empire, Truk area, and Solomons. (Land based) air groups also appear to be moving and reshuffling but lack of goodidents makes the picture very indefinite.

There is no evidence, however, to indicate that a major operation is imminent. The main carrier strength does not appear to have left the Empire as yet, although one or 2 units may have done so.

(HYPO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 106).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The only new intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers placed a possible unit of the 2nd Carrier Division near Truk on January 17 and an auxiliary carrier in the southern theatre.

No. 3-a:

CARRIER ESTIMATE NO CHANGE EXCEPT ONE XCV POSSIBLE NOW IN SOUTHERN AREA AND AN INDICATION THAT A CARDIV 2 UNIT WAS NEARING TRUK ON 17TH FROM THE SOUTH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch disclosed the location of a unit of Carrier Division 2. The approach of this unit to Truk was also detected in traffic intelligence.

No. 3-b:

181730 January, 1943

From: No originator
 To : MOTA 6 (Unident)
 WIO 28 (Garble)
 Info: MUHO 8 (Unident)
 WEKU 8 (Unident)
 NAO 38 (CafS Combined Fleet)
 KIMO 9
 NORI 2
 MUO 8

53511

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ND 947022

From ComCarDiv 2.

Blanks 0500 position 6-15 N. 151-25 E. Course 20. Speed 24.

COMMENT: Unable get date or positive identity of unit whose position is being reported but seems

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-b: (continued)

likely that it is flag or some other ship of
CarDiv 2.

(NSS-181654-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 48).

No. 3-c:

No originator dispatch at 1519-18th addressed
Staff CarDiv 2 (TAKU 43) specifically at or
in care of Truk (HAKU 3). During morning of
18th this command was indicated by routing as
between Rabaul and Truk and above routing
suggests movement is toward Truk.

(TZW-200848-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 75).

No. 3-d:

Concealed originator at 1342 18th addressed
dispatch to Kure Radio (TUNAYU), info Staff
ComCarDiv (2 NORESI) and 3rd Fleet (UMANE)
plus Tokyo Comm. Officer (SUNIME). At 1840
Rabaul on 3955 kcs passed this dispatch to
KITI 3 (garbled) for further delivery to Staff
CarDiv 2, indicating ComCarDiv 2 and at least
one carrier is probably somewhere between
Truk and Rabaul.

KITI 3 also accepted traffic for TAKU 4 which
would suggest latter call as CarDiv 2. Unident
NARI 3 was closely associated with TAKU 4 and
might be DesDiv 61.

(TZW-190658-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 32).

Traffic analysis suggested the presence of an
auxiliary carrier in the southern area at this time.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-a:

TOKE 5, previously identified as a cardiv, is shown in the Truk-Rabaul area and in constant association with the 8th Fleet. The ident as a cardiv is open to some suspicion, although TOKE 5 may be a single carrier, or XCV, the latter preferred at this writing inasmuch as 3rd Fleet Staff is not often addressed with TOKE 5 as it would be if a combatant unit or cardiv were involved.

(HYPO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 112).

Later intelligence showed that this unit of Carrier Division 2 was the HAYATAKA, which arrived at Truk on January 19 after covering the movement of troops of the 20th Army Division from Palau to Wewak. See Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #310, January 20, 1943 and Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943.

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JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The channels used by the Japanese at Truk were listed.

No. 4-a:

FOLLOWING CHANNELS AT TRUK KNOWN TO BE IN USE X SOUTH X NORTH X NORTH ISLAND (PIS) X OTTA ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The use of these channels was observed in intercepted harbor schedules from Truk. A typical harbor schedule indicating that these channels were in use at this time is quoted here.

No. 4-b:

From:	TOU	49
To :	INCE	1
	YASONO	
	WINUHA	5
	YOWTU	7
	RIMAME	7
	MATONE	9
	KEUHO	4
	MUST	7
	HEKE	6
	NAU	48
Info:	EFU	42
	KIOSI	1
	NATE	79

171700 January, 1943

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 947022

Tomorrow the 18th entering port via Otashima Channel:

0800 #2 TENYOU Maru, blank Maru, and #1 TUMI Maru, course 075 degrees.

1000 TOKUREI Maru, after leaving port course 075 degrees. 1100 HEIGHUU Maru, from point "A" passes thru Kimishima Channel.

~~TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY~~

JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4-b: (continued)

1100 SANYOO Maru, two destroyers, course 205. 1200 ATUCHI Maru, course 75 degrees, enters via South Channel. 1500 blank entered via North Channel.(?) 1400? HIKARI Maru? 1500 KOEI (or TOEI) Maru pass through the Kimishima Channel. Both will leave port via the South Channel.

(NPM-180314-January-DT)

(D.T.B. January 17, 1943, p. 34).

See also Item 8 below for further examples.

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JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of three enemy submarines were reported.

No. 5-a:

SUBS PLACED BY D/F X SOUTH AND EAST X 05153 X 02154 X 02149

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 5-b:

D/F Fixes for January 18, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	154 E 02 N	0008-18
NARAE	Sub	6610	153 E 05-15 S	1028-18
NARAE	Sub	6610	148-45 E 02 S	1415-18

(HYPO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 17, 1943, p. 50a).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSubFor and several fleet staffs were located.

No. 6-a:

COMBINED FLEET STAFF CHIEF OF STAFF 2ND FLEET AND COMSUBFOR BELIEVED AT TRUK X STAFF OF 8TH FLEET STILL APPARENTLY BASED ASHORE RABAU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from traffic analysis.

No. 6-b:

Traffic routing places Chief of Staff Second Fleet at Truk. ComSubForce is there by D/F and traffic routing. Combined Fleet Staff is believed at Truk.....

8th Fleet Staff continues ashore at Rabaul using that radio station as a cover for originating operation orders to local defense forces and submarines.

(HYPO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, pp. 60 and 108).

No. 6-c:

Routing of traffic indicates CinC Combined (YURAH), 2nd (BOINO), and 4th Fleets (RIMUYO), plus ComSubForce (YARESA) still in Truk area.

(T2W-180849-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 54).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The customary course of enemy submarines proceeding south from Tokyo Bay was reported.

No. 7-a:

JAP SUBS PROCEEDING SOUTHWARD FROM YOKOSUKA AREA BELIEVED NORMALLY PASS TO EASTWARD OF CHAIN OF ISLANDS STRETCHING SOUTH FROM TOKYO BAY

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch disclosed the route followed by an enemy submarine out of Tokyo Bay.

No. 7-b:

From: J C S

Friendly submarine departs Tokyo Bay this afternoon proceeding south, and passing to the eastward of the island chain.

From Yokosuka Naval District.

(NPM-181336-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 142).

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)Item 8(A) INTELLIGENCE

The cruiser TONE was known to be in the vicinity of Truk.

No. 8-a:

TONE NEAR TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The departure of the TONE from Truk was known to be scheduled for January 19.

No. 8-b:

181750 January, 1943

Serial 179

From: NANONO (Staff Base Force 4 Truk)
 To : IJU (Carbled)
 ITATA (Destroyer in Escort Force or escort vessel)
 KURUKO (ASAMA Maru)
 SENITO (YUNAGI)
 MAIHE (I-16)
 RUMSU (NIPPON Maru)
 _____ (Captain of MEIU Maru)

OSIRA

TERARI

Info: Combined Fleet Staff
 Commander Air Group 21 Truk
 Staff 4th Fleet

Departures.

Submarine I-19 at 181700 from North Channel (course 51 degrees).

19th: 0800 from South Channel Convoy C (the MYO Maru and 3 other ships escorted by SubChaser #11 and #2 CHOAN Maru) through Kimishima Channel on course blank degrees.

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~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)No. 8-b: (continued)

1200 ASAMA Maru (through point "A" escorted by the YUNAGI, course δ degrees).

1630 CruDiv 8 (less CHIKUMA) from North Channel, course of 45 degrees.

Arrivals.

1600 ARASHI from South Channel.

1900 NIPPON Maru from North Channel (course 110°)

(NSS-182355-January-DI)

Ed. note: At this time Cruiser Division 8 consisted of the TONE and the CHIKUMA.

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 52).

* * *

181750 January, 1943

Serial 179

From:	NANONO	29	(4th Base Force)
To :	SIISU		(HAGOROME Maru)
	ITATA		(Maru, Palao Area)
	KUKEKO		
	SENITO		(YUNAGI)
	OSIRA	7	
	NAUME		(I-16)
	TERARI		
	RUMBU		(NIPPON Maru)
	WE		(MEIU Maru Captain)
Info:	MISIME	29	(Hongkong Area)
	IRONE	3	(21st AG at Truk)
	SEWIHI	29	(4th Fleet)

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At 1700 today, the 18th January, I-19 is scheduled to depart from the North Channel and proceed on course 54 (or 51) degrees.

At 0800 tomorrow the 19th January "C" Convoy, including the MEIU Maru and 3 other ships, will proceed on course 75 (or 15) degrees after passing Kimishima Channel. #411 (or 111) SubChaser and #2 CHOAN Maru will be escorting.

JANUARY 19, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8-b: (continued)

At 1200 the ASATSU Maru (will depart) from the South Channel and after passing point "A" will proceed on course 0 degrees, YUNAGI escorting.

At 0630 CruDiv 8, less the CHIKUMA, will depart from North Channel and at 1600 ARASHI will put into port from the South Channel.

At 1900 the NIPPON Maru is scheduled to enter port from the North Channel on course 110 degrees.

(NPM-190214-190216-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 51).

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~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 19, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #309 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 AGNB
 NZNB

190401 January, 1943
 Priority

DATA ON CARRIERS X ESTIMATE NO CHANGE LOCATION CARDIV 1 X
 1 AUXILIARY CARRIER POSSIBLY IN SOUTHERN AREA X SOME IN-
 DICATION UNIT OF CARDIV 2 APPROACHING TRUK FROM SOUTH ON
 17TH X SUBS DEPARTING TOKYO BAY AREA FOR SOUTH ARE BELIEVED
 TO PASS TO EASTWARD OF IZU-SULPHUR ISLAND CHAIN X ZYMOTIC X
 BULLETIN #309 X IN ADDITION TO NORTH AND SOUTH CHANNELS AT
 TRUK ENEMY USES OTTA ISLAND AND NORTH (PIS) ISLAND CHANNELS
 X CHIEF OF STAFF 2ND FLEET COMDR SUBMARINES AND COMBINED
 FLEET STAFF INDICATED AT TRUK X MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FLEET
 UNITS INDICATED IN TRUK JAPAN AND SOLOMONS ZONES X SUB
 SUPPLY ACTIVITY GUADALCANAL STILL BEING CARRIED OUT X DOG
 FOX PLACES SUBS X 02154 X 05153 X 02149 X ALL SOUTH AND EAST
 X TONE IN TRUK VICINITY X 8TH FLEET STAFF APPEARS STILL
 SHORE BASED REBAUL

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 19, 1943

COMAIRSOPAC DISPATCH 190537

This dispatch is quoted under No. 5-1, Item
5 of CinCPac Bulletin #307, January 17, 1943.

COMAIRSOPAC DISPATCH 190547

See No. 3-c, Item 3 of CinCPac Bulletin #308,
January 18, 1943.

COMSOPAC DISPATCH 192303

See No. 2-f, Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #310,
January 20, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 20, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #310

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TP COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 IANT, CARIB, GULF

200225 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The enemy's 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions
 were located.

No. 1-a:

CARDIV 2 ENTERED TRUK 19TH X CARDIV 1 STILL ESTI-
 MATED IN EMPIRE X SHOKAKU PROBABLY NOW REJOINING
 FLEET

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The scheduled arrival of the 2nd Carrier Division
 at Truk on January 19 was known from an intercepted dis-
 patch.

No. 1-b:

181730 January, 1943

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(This is revised translation of no originator
 message previously reported in NEGAT's 18165A).

From Cardiv 2.

In view of the fact that enemy submarines are appear-
 ing off the North Channel at Truk, this division will

~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (continued)

proceed as follows, in entering port tomorrow the 19th.

At 0500 in 06-15N. 151-25E., course 20, speed 24. Arriving South Channel at 0800.

COMMENT: Wording indicates that this is all of present CarDiv 2 administrative organization, including plane guards.

(NSS-190100-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 50).

* * *

181730 January, 1943

53511

From:	Blank originator	
To :	MOTA	8
	WIO	91
Info:	MUHO	1
	WERU	1
	NAC	41
	KIMO	0
	NOSO	9
	MUC	1

From ComCarDiv 2.

In view of enemy submarine activity off the Northern Channel at Truk, am changing entrance plans for tomorrow, 19 January. At 0500 from 6-15N. 151-25E. will proceed on course 20 speed 24, and arrive off the Southern Channel entrance at 0800.

(NYFO-21-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 39).

It was learned later that it was the HAYATAKA of the 2nd Carrier Division that returned to Truk on January 19 after covering the movement of troops of

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~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 20, 1943

the 20th Army Division from Palau to Newak. See Item 2 of CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943.

Traffic analysis indicated that Carrier Division 1 was still in the Empire and that the SHOKAKU, her repairs completed, was ready for action again.

No. 1-c:

Chief of Staff Third Fleet (MEMU 8) was specifically addressed at Kure on the 17th. There is some evidence that Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet is at Truk, possibly shore based. Bearings on a CarDiv 1 or Third Fleet flagship (probably ZUIKAKU) on the 18th place that ship in the southeast Honshu area.

(HYPO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 160).

No. 1-d:

Possible carrier SUHISI at 8 hours 16th originated dispatch to CofS 3rd Fleet (UMANE) and unident NERAYU, info CofS Kure (NSOTE), Kure Military Stores Section (NAOTU), Kure Navy Yard Ordnance Section (OIMURE KI UKE) and Kure address OUNWI-MUNAI.

SUHISI was reported in summary for 16th as possibly being enroute Kure or Sasebo but association in this heading suggests movement from Sasebo to Kure.

NERAYU is fairly well established as being carrier and heading of above dispatch suggests SHOKAKU is possibility.

(T2W-180913-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 146).

In Item 3 of CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943 the arrival at Truk on January 23 of the 1st Carrier Division less the SHOKAKU was reported. These carriers had sailed from Japan on January 18 or 19.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The departure of yet another convoy from Truk for Shortland strengthened the expectation of renewed landing attempts at Guadalcanal very shortly.

No. 2-a:

A THIRD CONVOY ARRIVES SHORTLAND 0700 L (-11) 24TH DIRECT FROM TRUK HAVING DEPARTED 19TH X MADE UP OF 3 MARUS WITH 2 ESCORTS X THE ARRIVAL CONVOYS MORNINGS 20TH 22ND AND 24TH LEADS TO ASSUMPTION EITHER TOKYO EXPRESS WILL RUN NIGHTS OF THESE DATES OR LARGE SCALE ATTEMPT USING TRANSPORTS IS PLANNED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The departure of another convoy for Shortland Island was disclosed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 2-b:

190910 January, 1943

396

From:	TARA	2	(2nd Convoy)
To :	NOKI	8	(Guadalcanal Operations Force, Solomon Defense Force)
Info:	MANO	2	
	TIHE	7	(Rabaul Comm.)
	RIKOSU		
	MOHORO		
	SIRA	41	(Major command)
	TIHE	31	(2nd Fleet)
	SUSO	31	(4th Fleet)
	WOWA	31	(11th Air Fleet)
	SIISU	.5	(HAGOROMO Maru)
	KATOYU	2	(1st Nav. Sect.)
	IKUTA	8	(MIRU Maru)
	ISO	71	(4th Fleet)
	TASO	98	(21st Air Group, Truk)

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~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-b: (continued)

Convoy "C" consisting of the NEIU Maru, blank, SURABAYA Maru, and SINAI Maru departed Truk 19 January at 0800 to arrive RXE (Shortland) 0500 24 January. SubChaser #11 and #2 CHOOAN (?) Maru will escort the above named vessels as far as 01-00S. 156-00S. where escort duties will be turned over to other vessels.

Noon positions follow:

19 January	07-00 North	152-10 East
20 January	04-12 North	153-45 East
21 January	01-25 North	155-15 East
22 January	01-42 South	156-00 East
23 January	04-56 South	156-00 East

For information to the C.O. Army embarked (?) #2 Convoy, Commodore and Chief of Staff #6 Air (HIKOO SHIDAN).

(NPM-191334-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 80).

* * *

190910 January, 1943

396

From:	TARI	Blank	(Garbled)
To :	NOKI	8	(Solomons Defense Force)
	MANO	2	(Unident)
Info:	TINE	7	(Rabaul Comm. Unit)
	TASO	98	(Air Group 19)
	RIKOSU		(Army Addressees Guadalcanal)
	MIHORU		(Shortlands)
	SIRA	41	(CofS Southwestern Area Fleet)
	TINE	31	(CofS 4th Fleet)
	WOWA	31	(CofS 11th Air Fleet)
	KATOYU		(Nav. Sec. Imperial Hdqts.)

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nnd 947022

Information Comdr. Shipping Group, Comdr. #2 Convoy, CofS #6 Air Division.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-b: (continued)

"C" Convoy (MEIU Maru, SOMETONO Maru, SOERABAYA Maru and SINAI Maru) departed Truk at 0800 19th and is supposed to arrive Shortlands 5 hours 24th. SubChaser #11 and #3 CHOAN Maru will escort the above named vessels as far as 01-00 S 156-00 E (escort relief point).

Noon positions:

19th	152-10 East	7-00 North
20th	153-45 East	4-12 North
21st	155-15 East	1-25 North
22nd	156-00 East	1-52 South
23rd	156-00 East	4-56 South

(NSS-191451-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 51).

No. 2-c:

19TH JANUARY X CONVOY 4
 SHIPS DUE SHORTLAND ISLAND AT 2000 GMT 23RD AFTER
 LEAVING TRUK AT 2300 GMT ON 18TH X MEIU MARU
 SOERABAYA MARU SINAI MARU AND ONE OTHER X ESCORT
 NUMBER 11 ANTI SUBM. RINE VESSEL AND NUMBER 2 CHOAN
 MARU TO POSITION 01-00 SOUTH 156-00 EAST X NOON
 POSITIONS LOCAL TIME FROM 19TH TO 23RD AS FOLLOWS
 07 NORTH 152-10 EAST 04-12 NORTH 153-45 EAST 01-25
 NORTH 155-15 EAST 01-42 SOUTH 156-00 EAST 04-58
 SOUTH 156-00 EAST

(CincPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 20, 1943).

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JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

This convoy was attacked by the U.S.S. SILVER-SIDES shortly after its departure from Truk. Two of the transports, the MEIU Maru and the SURABAYA Maru, were sent to the bottom.

No. 2-d:

21 Dec. 42 - APs MEIYU (8000 T) and SURABAYA (2000 T) Marus, 2 U/I APs and 1 SC transported 2500 troops MOOSUNG to TRUK via Formosa and Palau.

20 Jan. 43 - MEIYU and SURABAYA Marus sunk by sub off Truk enroute to Rabaul.

(Source: ComSoPac POW Interrogation Reports #357, 358, 359, 360, and 361. Dtd. 10 Aug. 44 - JICFOA R. S. #37129, GI Ship File, MEIU Maru)

No. 2-e:

22 Dec. 42 - MEIU Maru (8000 T) departed Shanghai. Sunk off Truk on 20 Jan. 43. Single stack steam driven. Armed with 75 mm (?) A/A gun on stern and bow.

20 Jan. 43 - SURABAYA Maru (AP - sunk off Truk by sub torpedo. (4000 T) (One POW claims 6 to 7000 T) Single stack. A/A gun fore and aft. CHOAN Maru (Navy Special Service Ship), (3000 T), former passenger ship. Shallow draft, broad beam. A/A guns fore and aft. One MG atop bridge. Estimated speed 18 knots. Carried no cargo or passengers. Was in convoy with MEIU and SURABAYA Marus. Personnel, equipment, rations, and supplies were split up and assigned to various ships to prevent loss or shortage in one branch, in case of sinking. IMGs, rifles, and GDs were tied to planks so that weapons could be saved in case of sinking.

(Source: ComSoPac POW Interrogation Reports #352, 353, 354, 355, 356. Dtd. 3 Aug. 44. JICFOA R.S. #36448, GI Ship File, SURABAYA Maru).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

These sinkings were confirmed by radio intelligence as well.

No. 2-f:

211506 January, 1943

From:	ROSE	67	
To :	WA	2	(11th Air Fleet)
	HUO	5	
Info:	ARI	30	(Combined Fleet)
	TOME	40	(4th Fleet)
	YORI	Ø	(2nd Escort Force)

Completed rescue operations at 1400. Rescued personnel (in following order):

Army Warrant Officer and above; Petty Officer and men; Members of crew.

#2 CHOAN Maru: 109; 2,587; 126.
ASAGUMO and SubChaser #11; 9; 340; 22.

The MEIU Maru shipped water in the #1, #2, #3 holds, the engine room and the coal bunker, and her bow has sunk up to her chain locker. Cannot navigate under her own power. Am investigating her condition.

(HYPO-13-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 13, 1943, p. 22).

No. 2-g:

211646 January, 1943

From:	ROSE	67	
To :	HNO	20	
	MAO	52	
Info:	ARI	3	(CofS Combined Fleet)
	TOME	4	(CofS 4th Fleet)

At 1400 the work of rescuing the personnel was finished. The number of personnel is listed in the following order:

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-g: (continued)

Army warrant officers and above; Army noncoms and men, and seamen.

The CHUAN Maru took: 109, 2587, 125. The ASAGUMO and SubChaser 11 took: 9, 310, 22. The MEIU Maru's holds #1, 2 and 3 and the bunker are flooded. She is sunk as far as the anchor on the bow. She cannot move by herself. The condition of the inside of the ship is in process of investigation.

(NSS-091901-May-DI)

(D.T.B. May 9, 1943, p. 1).

No. 2-h:

251609 January, 1943

From:	UYO	30	(Southeastern Area Fleet)
To :	NIRI	40	(Combined Fleet)
	YONE	80	(4th Fleet)
Info:	SOO	10	(8th Fleet)

Arrange to transport to RR via convenient shipping the Army personnel who met with disaster on the #6 C-Convoy (consisting of MEIU Maru and SURABAYA Maru). Furthermore, if suitable shipping is not available, Army transports are scheduled to be sent.

LOCAL COMMENT; RR is Rabaul (GD).

(NEGAT-070256-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 6, 1944, p. 93)

ComAirSoPac and the Commanding General on Guadalcanal already had been informed of this convoy in the ensuing dispatch from ComSoPac. However, apparently the only contact with this convoy was made by the SILVERSIDES.

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Authority

NND 947022

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-i:

From: COMSOPAC 192303 January, 1943
To : COMAIRSOPAC Routine
COMGEN GUADALCANAL
Info: CINCPAC
ALL TF COMS SOPAC

STILL ANOTHER TRUK TO SHORTLANDS ESCORTED CONVOY
OF 3 OR 4 SHIPS X ZEAL X DEPARTED TRUK 10 HOURS
L (-11) 19TH X 1400 L (-11) POSITION ON 22ND X
1-42 SOUTH 156 EAST X SAME TIME ON 23RD X 4-46
SOUTH 156 EAST X ARRIVE SHORTLANDS 0700 L (-11) 2
24TH

Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #311, January 21,
1943 is a summary of the results achieved by the
SILVERSIDES in this action.

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Authority *DD 947022*

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox positions of four Japanese underseas craft were listed.

No. 3-a:

SUBS DOG FOXED SOUTH AND EAST X 0415L X 09158 X 11160 X ANOTHER IN VICINITY MUNDA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 3-b:

D/F Fixes for January 19, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6610	160-E 11-S	1701/18
NARAE	Sub	6610	158-E 09-S	1626/18
NARAE	Sub	6610	151-E 04-S	1037/19
NARAE	Sub	6610	Munda Area	1135/19

(HYFO-19-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 122b).

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JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-a:

A DETACHMENT OF AIRFLOT 22 APPARENTLY NOW STATIONED AT NAURU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was obtained from traffic analysis.

No. 4-b:

A detachment of the 22nd AirFlot is apparently stationed on Nauru Island as indicated by an [redacted] address today.

(HYFO-19-January-II)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 21).

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Second Fleet Command was believed to be at Truk.

No. 5-a:

CINC 2ND FLEET INDICATED AT TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from an analysis of current traffic.

No. 5-b:

Two despatches from CinC 2nd Fleet were transmitted by Truk to Tokyo for Empire addressees indicating that CinC 2nd Fleet is still in Truk area. By virtue of the fact that these despatches were sent under his own call they are of administrative nature.

(HYPO-19-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 38).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

The recent appearance of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the Marshalls drew comment.

No. 6-a:

APPEARANCE SUBS IN MARSHALLS MAY PORTEND NEW STRATEGIC DISPOSITION ENEMY SUBS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The presence of submarines near the Marshalls was suggested by traffic analysis, and a Dog Fox fix was obtained on one of these submarines.

No. 6-b:

Very little activity was observed. One submarine (unspecified originator) was in the southern Marshalls by D/F and was shown by traffic analysis to be proceeding to Jaluit.

(HEFO-18-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 32).

No. 6-c:

18th January reports from the Rabeul and Jaluit intelligence centers were addressed to two completely new commands, NIO 8 and TAYO 6. Based entirely on the fact that both types of reports were broadcast by Jaluit on sub frequencies it is suggested that these two newcomers may be submarine collective calls and this may imply a new strategic disposition of subs.

(NSS-181444-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 98).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-d:

The 2nd new addressee (NID 8) intelligence traffic on 18th January was an info addressee of a no-originator dispatch originated at 20 TVCLAM [sic], action to CinC 4th Fleet, info CinCs 2nd, 3rd, 8th, and 6th Fleets, unknown HUSE 3 (should be CinC Combined Fleet if the latter is not the originator), and Comdr. Base Force #6. It appears that there may be two special groups operating in or from the Marshalls, with one of them definitely a sub unit (TAYO 6).

(NSS-181824, January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 15).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The departure of the transport ASAMA Maru from Truk for Yokosuka on January 19 was announced.

No. 7-a:

ASAMA MARU DEPARTED TRUK 19TH TO ARRIVE YOKOSUKA 24TH X MANY PASSENGERS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The schedule and cargo of this vessel were found in an intercepted message.

No. 7-b:

191405 January, 1943

From: No originator
To : TIND 9 (Unident)
YAI 51 (CofS Yokosuka)
Info: Eight others

413

Part 1. ASAMA Maru departed Truk for Yokosuka at 1200 19th scheduled arrive 1000 24th.

Destroyer YUNAGI will escort her until 0600 21st to point 16-45 N, 149 E.

Noon positions:

20th	12-17 North	151-32 East
21st	16-14 North	148-07 East
22nd	23-42 North	144-00 East
23rd	29-35 North	140-50 East

Part 2. Passengers: military personnel 408, others 1115.

865 cubic meters of cargo.

(T2N-191348-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 48).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *and 947022*

JANUARY 20, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-b: (continued)

* * *

191105 January, 1943

113

From: Blank originator
 To : YAI 51 (SubFor)
 TINO 9
 Info: NIHIMU (Yokosuka Transp.)
 SIRA 41 (Haj. command)
 TIHE 31 (2nd Fleet)
 SARA 55 (Sub Unit)
 ASO 4
 YURU 58
 KUBU 05
 ISO 71 (4th Fleet)
 MOYUMI (Truk Transp.)
 MUNA 6

The ASAMA Maru at 1200 January 19 departed PT (Truk) for HAA (Yokosuka); scheduled to arrive at 1000 January 21. The destroyer YUNAGI will act as direct escort until 0600 January 21 to position 16-45 N, 149-00 E.

Neon positions:

20th	12-17 North	151-32 East
21st	18-14 North	148-07 East
22nd	23-42 North	144-00 East
23rd	29-35 North	140-50 East

408 enlisted men aboard, 35 (?) passengers.

865 cubic meters stores.

(HM-C-19-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 34).

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 Authority *AND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 20, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #310 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

200335 January, 1943
 Priority

A THIRD CONVOY ENROUTE DIRECT FROM TRUK TO SHORTLAND X COM-
 POSED OF 3 SHIPS DEPARTED TRUK 19TH WILL ARRIVE SHORTLAND
 MORNING OF 24 JANUARY X ALSO SUSPECTED OF BRINGING DOWN TROOPS
 DESTINED FOR GUADALCANAL X EXPECT DESTROYERS WILL EITHER TRY
 TO RUN THESE TROOPS INTO GUADALCANAL NIGHTS OF 20TH 22ND AND
 24TH OR A LARGE SCALE ATTEMPT USING TRANSPORTS TO BE MADE X
 ZYMOTIC X INTELLIGENCE 310 BY CINCPAC X CARDIV 2 ARRIVED TRUK
 19TH X CARDIV 1 ESTIMATED IN JAPAN WITH SHOKAKU COMING BACK
 INTO SERVICE AGAIN X CINC 2ND FLEET APPARENTLY AT TRUK X DE-
 TACHMENT OF AIRFLIT 22 BELIEVED NOW STATIONED AT NAURU X ASAMA
 MARU LEFT TRUK 19TH BOUND YOKOSUKA WHERE WILL ARRIVE 24TH X
 SUBS IN MARSHALLS MAY INDICATE NEW STRATEGIC PLAN OPERATION X
 BY JOG FOX SUBS PLACED SOUTH BY EAST X 11160 X 09158 X 04151 X
 ANOTHER NEAR MUNDA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 21, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #311

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

210247 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A successful attack by the U.S.S. SILVERSIDES upon a convoy bound for Shortland Island was announced.

No. 1-a:

SILVERSIDES CLAIMS 5 HITS IN 3 SHIPS OF CONVOY BOUND SOUTH OUT OF TRUK X RESULTS UNKNOWN X BELIEVE THIS TO BE CONVOY SCHEDULED ARRIVE SHORTLAND MORNING OF 24 JANUARY

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The U.S.S. SILVERSIDES reported this success in the following dispatch.

No. 1-b:

From: SILVERSIDES
To : CTF 7
Retransmitted:
From: CTF 7
To : CINCPAC

201425 January, 1943
Priority

3 HITS INTO BIRCH MENTIONED YOUR ELBOW X LOADED AND ESCORTED AND 5 HITS INTO 3 BIRCHES YOUR SUBURB X HUNTS PREVENTED OBSERVATION RESULTS X CHASED RAMROD

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (continued)

QD BUT NOT SIGHTED X GOT 1 SPRUCE IN POSITION
DESCRIBED LEGEND X RSVN (4 NORTH 154 EAST)

COMMENT: Birch - Tanker
Beech - Freighter
Spruce - Submarine

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 20, 1943).

It was learned later that the five hits of the
SILVERSIDES had sunk two ships of this convoy, which was
that reported in Item 2, CinCPac Bulletin #310, Jan-
uary 20, 1943.

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JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was known that on January 20 a convoy of six vessels had left Truk for Rabaul.

No. 2-a:

STILL ANOTHER CONVOY OF 6 MARUS LEFT TRUK 20TH FOR RABAU. WHERE WILL ARRIVE 1000 L 24TH VIA STEFFEN STRAIT

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The composition, schedule, and course of this convoy were revealed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 2-b:

200940 January, 1943

122

From:	ROTE	6	(2nd Sea Escort Force)
To :	TAU	0	("R" Area Defense Force)
	TUNI	1	
Info:	KATOYU		(Imp. Hdqts. 1st Sect. NGS)
	NISHIHI	6	(#12 SubChaser)
	WISHE		(MIIKE Maru Captain)
	RINOSU		(Army address associated Guadalcanal Relief)
	YONI	51	
	YUKASE		(Truk address)
	TEYAO		
	IBOKE		(21st Air Group at Truk)
	NAY	91	
	MOSI	2	(Combined Fleet)
	NOFU	01	(2nd Fleet)
	RATE	51	(8th Fleet)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

Information addressees: Comdr. troops embarked, #2 Convoy Comdr., CofS #6 Air Division.

The 6th "D" Convoy (TAIHEI Maru, KAMO Maru, SHINRYU Maru, MAKASAR Maru, blank SAI Maru, NAURA Maru, and MIIKE Maru) departed Truk at 1800 29th of January for

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-b: (continued)

Rabaul. The MIKE Maru separates and proceeds singly (?) at position 07-00 N. 152-10 E. and is scheduled to arrive Rabaul at 1700 22nd. "D" Convoy is scheduled to arrive Rabaul 0800 24th January. Commander #31 SubChaser Division in command of SubChaser #12 and #2 CHONO Maru will escort as far as turning over escort duty point 00-23N. 152-10E.

Noon positions:

MIKE Maru

20 January	Point J.	
21 January	01-10 North	152-10 East
22 January	04-30 South	151-50 East

"D" Convoy

20 January	Point J.	
21 January	03-44 North	153-10 East
22 January	00-20 North	153-10 East
23 January	Steffen Strait	

(NFM-201502-January-DI)

GI Positions for 21st and 22nd changed to 152-10 E. by a correction for originator.

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 138).

* * *

200940 January, 1943

422

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Authority *ND 947022*

From:	ROTE	8	
To :	TAU	0	
	TUNI	1	(Solomons Area Defense Force)
Info:	OATOYU/KATOYU		(1st Sect. Nav.Gen.Staff)
	NOYU	61	(2nd Fleet)
	RATE	5	(8th Fleet)
	NISHIHI	8	(SubChaser #12)
	BIKOSU/RIKOSU		(Army address Guadalcanal)
	YONI	51	
	YUKASE		(#2 CHONO Maru)
	TEYANO		(Master MIKE Maru)
	IROKE	3	(Air Group 21)
	Uno	91	(4th Fleet)

JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-b: (continued)

- (1) MIIKE Maru - 20 Jan. Point "J".
 21 Jan. 1-10 N. 152-10 E.
 22 Jan. 4-30 S. 151-50 E.
- (2) "D" Convoy - 20 Jan. Point "J".
 21 Jan. 3-44 N. 153-10 E.
 22 Jan. 00-20 N. 153-10 E.
 23 Jan. Steffen Strait

COMMENT: No times these positions given.

GI COMMENT: These positions are 1200 (-9).

(T2W-201640-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 140).

* * *

200940 January, 1943

122

From:	ROTE	8	(#2 Escort Force)
To :	TAU	0	(Rabaul Area Defense Force)
	TUHO	1	(Garbled)
Info:	KATOYU		(1st Section NGS, IHQ)
	MOSE	2	(CofS Combined Fleet)
	RATE	51	(CofS 8th Fleet)
			(Capt. MIIKE Maru)
	YUYASE		(#2 CHOKO Maru)
	IROKE	2	
			(And several others)

1. The MIIKE Maru will pass through the following positions (may be noon positions):

20 January	Point "J"
21 January	01-10 North 152-10 East
22 January	04-30 South 151-50 East

2. Convoy "D" will pass through the following positions (may be noon positions):

20 January	Point "J"
21 January	03-44 North 153-10 East
22 January	00-20 North 153-10 East
23 January	Steffen Strait

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Authority

ND 947022

JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-b: (continued)

(NSS-202251-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 143).

* * *

200910 January, 1943

422

From:	ROTE	7
To :	TAU	0
	TUNI	
Info:	KATOYU	
	NISHIHI	7
	RATE	5
	NOYU	6
	RIKOSU	
	YUKASE	
	YONI	51
	TEYAHU	
	IBOTE	3
	UWO	91

To Commander Shipping Group, Comdr. #2 Convoy, Chief of Staff #6 AirDiv, #6 Transport.

"D" Convoy (TAIHEI Maru, KAMO Maru, TEIRYU Maru, SHINRYU Maru, MACASSAR Maru, MIURA Maru (garbled), #7 SBI Maru, and the MIIKE Maru) left Truk at 0800 on the 20th for Rabaul. The MIIKE Maru will proceed alone from "J" Point (07-00N. may be 05-00 N. 152-10 E.) and is scheduled to arrive at 1700 on the 22nd. The "D" Convoy is scheduled to arrive at 0800 on the 24th. The Comdr. of SubChaser Division 31 will take command of SubChaser #12 and the #2 CHOKO Maru, and escort the above convoy as far as 00-23 N. 152-10 E. (escort relief point). Noon positions: (message evidently is in two or more parts.)

(NSS-231054-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 84).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was no new intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers but two enemy submarines were located by Dog Fox fixes and two others were known to be enroute south from Truk.

No. 3-a:

NOTHING NEW ON CARRIERS NOTED X SUBS SOUTH AND EAST ACCORDING USUAL METHOD X 12154 X 08156 X 2 OTHERS KNOWN DEPARTED TRUK 19TH ENROUTE SOUTHWARD

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 3-b:

D/F Fixes January 20, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAB	Sub	6610	156 E 08 - S	0830/20
NARAB	Sub	7915	154 E 11-30S	0746/20

(HYPO-20-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 48a).

The departure of two submarines from Truk was known from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 3-c:

191400 January, 1943

From: NANONO 29 (Staff Base Force #4)
To : Usual list of addressees

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-c: (continued)

(Fragmentary and garbled. Recoverable parts indicate that at 1630-19 the submarine I-13 on course 10 degrees blank at 1530 the submarine I-18 (course 160 degrees) will leave the harbor via South Channel).

(NS9-192057-January-01)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 60).

* * *

191400 January, 1943

From:	NANONO	2	(4th Base Force)
To :	MUUN	8	(#58 SubChaser Div.)
	IROKE	7	(21st Air Group)
	HALSA	3	(Unident)
	NWOSO		(Unident)
	ISASU	6	(Unident)
	1 garbled		(Unident)
Info:	RIMUYO	2	(4th Fleet)
	KOSI	5	(4th Harbor Affairs)
	ROKONO	2	(Unident)
	NERIKE		(Unident)
	RUSOTA		(Unident)

Today the 19th of January, at 1630 submarine blank course 1 blank \emptyset , after 60 miles 170, will leave by South Channel. At 1700 I-18, course 180, will leave by South Channel.

(T24-200025-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 61).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)Item A(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that the Japanese had occupied Manokwari in New Guinea.

No. A-a:

EVIDENCE MANOKWARI IN DUTCH NEW GUINEA EITHER OCCUPIED BY JAPS OR SOON WILL BE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These signs were found in traffic analysis.

No. A-b:

CofS Gou Army Force (SEYOMA) originated several high precedence messages to CofS 17th Army (NORARU) and CofS Oki Division (OKISIJUDAN).

Northern Sector Guard Force (HOBUKUEISUBUTAI) and Comdr. that force were both addressed in care of 25th Base Force (NTISO) on 16th. This base force not as yet definitely located, however Ambon handles traffic and mention of Northern Sector Guard Force suggests location might be Manokwari or Hollandia.

(T2W-190704-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 4).

No. A-c:

On 15th a Tokyo address (KROU) addressed a dispatch to "Manokwari Despatched Force" in New Guinea.

(HYFO-19-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 68).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Japanese were known to be erecting defenses in the East Indies.

No. 5-a:

JAPS STUDYING DEFENSE OF NETHERLANDS INDIES & EXPECT FORTIFICATIONS IN BALI, TANIMBAR ISLANDS AND AT MAINGAPU ON SUMBA ISLAND TO BE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch disclosed the area on which the Japanese were concentrating their defenses in this theatre.

No. 5-b:

181610 September, 1942

82136

From: SAHA 5
 To : ROYA 895
 RAMU 795
 Info: WAMA 33 (Yokosuka #1 S.L.F.)

From CofS 2nd Southern Exp. Fleet.

We must go thoroughly into the matter of Joint Army-Navy action in connection with the fortification of strong points in the Tanimbar Islands, Sunda (?) Is., etc. Discussions are in progress regarding our part in the programs with the Staffs of the 16th Army and the 48th blank.

Locally the locations requiring primary consideration are considered to be: Maingapu, Tanimbar Is., Bali, blanks.

(NFM-200236-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 19, 1943, p. 116).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 21, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #311 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HQ-105 OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

210441 January, 1943
 Priority

EVIDENCE SHOWING ENEMY CONCERNED OVER FORTIFICATION OF STRONG POINTS IN TANIMBAR AND SUMBA ISLANDS AND PERHAPS OTHERS X PRIMARY CONSIDERATION TO BE GIVEN TO FORTIFYING MAINGAFU, TANIMBAR ISLANDS AND BAIL X XYNOTIC FROM CINCPAC X NUMBER 311 X CONVOY OF 6 SHIPS DEPARTED TRUK 20 JANUARY SCHEDULED ARRIVE RABAUl MORNING OF 24TH VIA STEFFEN STRAIT X 2 SUBS LEFT TRUK HEADED SOUTH ON 19TH X OTHER SUBS ACCORDING TO BEARINGS EAST BY SOUTH X 15412 X 15608 X NO NEW INFORMATION REGARDING CARRIERS X EVIDENCE OF JAP TROOPS EITHER AT OR SCHEDULED TO GO MANOKWARI (NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA) X US SUB SOUTH OF TRUK CLAIMS DAMAGE CONVOY ENROUTE SOUTH X POSSIBLY ONE SUB ARRIVE SHORTLAND 24TH

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #312

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 CONSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

220325 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The large tankers NISSHIN Maru and #2 NISSHIN Maru were expected to call at Miri in North Borneo in February.

No. 1-a:

NISSHIN MARU ARRIVES MIRI NORTH BORNEO 7 FEB DEPARTS 11 FEB X NUMBER 2 NISSHIN MARU ARRIVES AND DEPARTS SAME PLACE 14 AND 17 FEB X BOTH TANKERS AROUND 17000 TONS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The extant sources do not agree with the schedules given in the above intelligence. These sources indicate that the NISSHIN Maru was scheduled to arrive at Miri on February 4 and to depart on February 8. On the other hand, the call of the #2 NISSHIN Maru at Miri was scheduled for the dates reported in the bulletin but a later intercepted message disclosed that this tanker would arrive at Miri on February 7 and depart on the 11th. However, the call of the #2 NISSHIN Maru at Miri was cancelled a few days later.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b:

161935 January, 1943

Serial 528

From: RUKO blank (Unident)
 To : KIMESA 2 (NISSHIN Maru)
 ORUTE (Yokohama Area Transp. Sect.)
 Info: WAY 11 (CofS #1 South. Exp. Fleet)
 ORUTE (Yokohama Area Sect. Transp.)
 NIHIMU (Yokosuka Area Transp.)
 RAHINU (Singapore Transp. Office)

Schedule of NISSHIN Maru after January 21, is as follows:

Depart Yokohama January 21, arrive Yokosuka 21st.
 Depart Yokosuka January 22 after taking on about
 600 tons of fuel oil, subsequently entering convoy.
 Arrive Miri February 4th, depart February 8th for
 Yokohama with full load of heavy oil (about 20,000
 kiloliters). Arrive Yokohama February 21.

(NIS-172205-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 18, 1943, p. 131).

No. 1-g:

192335 January, 1943

Serial 542

From: HITISE (Navy Transport.)
 To : MITIME (CofS Yokosuka)
 WIMIN (#2 NISSHIN Maru)
 Info: TAJARU 30 (CofS 3rd South Exp. Fleet)
 MOSEYO 30 (CofS 1st Sea Escort Force)
 TAHINU (Singapore Area Transport.)
 NAHANE (Osaka Transport.)
 RAYUSU (Yokkaichi Transport.)
 NSENI (Kure Transport.)
 ORUTE (Yokohama Transport.)

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *ND 947022*

Operation schedule #2 NISSHIN Maru from 26th January as follows:

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-g: (continued)

Depart 29th with about 10,000 tons ordinary fuel oil for Kure. Arrive Kure 31st January, depart 3rd February (join convoy), arrive Miri 14th February and depart 17th with capacity load crude oil, about 20,000 kiloliters, for Yokohama.

(T2W-200605-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 195).

No. 1-d:

202300 January, 1943

Serial 546

From: HITISE (Tokyo Transp.)
 To : NITIME (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
 WIMIN (#2 NISSHIN Maru)
 Info: KURARE 30 (1st Southern Exp. Fleet)
 TAHI 5
 MAHANE
 MOSEYO (1st High Seas Escort Force)
 RAYUSI
 NSENI (Kure Transp.)
 ORITE (Yokosuka Transp.)

In accordance with Transportation Serial #542-0 the #2 NISSHIN Maru will operate as follows:

(Order of columns: Place Names, Arrival, Departure, Cargo). Depart blank 26 January, (several garbles concerning cargo). Arrive Miri (Borneo) 7 February. Depart 11 February for Empire fully loaded with about 20,000 kiloliters of crude oil.

(NPM-211058-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 101).

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

The call at Miri of the #2 NISSHIN Maru was cancelled later. See Item 4, CinCPac Bulletin #320, January 30, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)(C) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

The NISSHIN Maru, however, called at Miri and on February 8, as she lay at her moorings, was struck by a torpedo fired by the U.S.S. TROUT. The NISSHIN Maru then was towed to Singapore for repair of the damage inflicted by the TROUT.

No. 1-g:

From: COMSOWESPAC 270640 February, 1943
 To : COMINCH Routine
 Info: CINCIPAC
 COMSUBPAC

SOUTH CHINA SEA WAS SCENE OF TROUT'S LAST PATROL X RETURNED FREMANTLE 25 FEBRUARY X EXPENDED 14 TORPEDOES.....

7 FEBRUARY OFF RUTONY BORNEO FIRED 3 TORPEDOES IN NIGHT PERISCOPE ATTACK IN 17,600 TON AO NISSHIN MARU MOORED BOW AND STERN IN SHALLOW WATER X USED LOW SPEED FISH RANGE 5,000 X HEARD EXPLOSIONS AND ATTEMPTED SURFACE BUT ACCURATE GUNFIRE FROM TARGET FORCED TROUT TO DIVE X TARGET POSSIBLY DAMAGED.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, February 27, 1943).

No. 1-f:

From: NINI 6 081956 February, 1943
 To : TUEWA
 KAMONI 2
 Info: IHA 0
 SINIEO-SINITO
 SI 9 (Garbled)

1. On the 8th at 1620 while at Miri the NISSHIN Maru received a torpedo in the port side aft.
2. While on patrol Minesweeper #7 at 1658, bearing blank distance point 5 miles from Baramu Light House sighted a periscope, and conducted a depth charge attack with unknown results.

(NSS-090017-May-DI)

(D.T.B. May 8, 1943, p. 73).

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Authority *ndd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-g:

From: NARAE 132015 February, 1943
 To : TOYUE
 NSENI (TPN Sect. Chief) Serial 284
 Info: MUFUKI
 KINTE 8

From CofS, #1 Surface Escort Force.

Have arranged to tow the NISSHIN Maru to Singapore with the #2 KASUGA Maru (departing Singapore 14 February).

(NPN-131426-February-DI)

GI COMMENT: NISSHIN Maru known to be in this area, but course for towing to Singapore not known.

(D.T.B. February 13, 1943, p. 145).

No. 1-h:

081822 June, 1943

From: HIKATI (Singapore Transp. Office) 12770
 To : KEUHO (Vessel in Hongkong area May 4)
 Info: MUNE
 MOTIKA (Yokosuka Naval Base CofS)
 YAKUUA
 HITISO (Empire Navy Yard)

On May 21 NISSHIN Maru entered #1 Dock.

1. Outline of damage: Received a torpedo hit in forward powder magazine on port side. The after peak tank, the powder magazine and #3 blank are shipping water. In the outer skin, extending from 20th frame forward and from water line to keel, is a hole 12 meters long and 9 meters high. In outer skin on starboard side is a hole 13 meters long and 1 meter high. (Remainder not clear).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This is 1st part of 3-parter. 2nd part not received by HYPO. Characters for NISSHIN are "SUN" and "NEW".

(HYPO-140044-September-DI)

(D.T.B. September 13, 1943, p. 136).

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Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The 2nd Carrier Division was estimated to be at Truk still while it was considered possible that the 1st Carrier Division had departed from the Empire.

No. 2-a:

SCANTY CARRIER INFO BUT CONSIDER AN EVEN CHANCE CARDIV 1 MAY HAVE DEPARTED FROM EMPIRE WATERS X ESTIMATE CARDIV 2 STILL AT TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis suggested that Carrier Division One might have left the Empire.

No. 2-b:

Nothing of importance was seen in 3rd Fleet traffic for the 20th. This may be due to lack of idents on 3rd Fleet and 3rd Fleet units and also may be due to radio silence maintained while underway, if such is the case. The 3rd Fleet was included as info address-ee in despatches to Navy Minister and to Tokyo BuPersonnel.....

No aircraft activity was noted in the Empire area. This may be attributed to adverse weather conditions or if the previous plane activity was connected with the 3rd Fleet, this may bear out departure of 3rd Fleet units from the Empire.

(HYPO-20-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, pp. 172 and 173).

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JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-g:

Activity on the 3815-5910-7049 carrier-base frequencies has dropped to a low level in the past few days and the 3rd Fleet Staff is included with Combined, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets in the traffic originated in the Solomons. This has appeared on the 20th and 21st of January, with calls for 3rd Fleet being fairly good idents. Again this may be due to active participation of D.R. 10 (a 3rd Fleet unit) rather than an indication that the carriers will immediately be associated with Solomons operations.

The definite association of CarDiv 2 with 11th Air Fleet, as noted on 13 January, and Belconnen's comments on delivery of CarDiv 2 traffic to Truk area, brings this CarDiv into close touch with the SE area.

Lack of activity on the carrier-base channels may indicate departure of the main 3rd Fleet units from the Empire. Close coverage of the main Empire shore net has not disclosed any locations of Fleet units so far.

(HYPO-21-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 5).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

Carrier Division One arrived at Truk on January

23. See Item 3, CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The position of an enemy submarine was reported along with the intelligence that a total of five submarines had left Truk on patrol on January 16 and 17.

No. 3-a:

SUB AT 8 SOUTH 138 EAST BY DF X ON 16TH AND 17TH
5 SUBS KNOWN DEPARTED TRUK ON PATROL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The enemy submarine was located by a Dog Fox fix.

No. 3-b:

D/F Fixes for January 21, 1943.

NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6610	158 E 08 S	1627

(HYPO-21-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 94c).

The departure of the submarines from Truk was disclosed by an intercepted message.

No. 3-c:

171206 January, 1943

From: No originator 21010
 To : YOKOHU (Movement Report Office)
 PURO 6 (Combined)
 Info: MAKE 6
 RUPU 3 (Rabaul)
 SAHAMU (Yokosuka Naval District)

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JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-g: (continued)

ROSI 2
SESI 2

From blank Unit Commander.

Part 1.

Submarines arrived Truk as follows:

Blank and blank _____ 15th. I-7 on 16th.
Blank (23301) and I-4 on 17th.

Part 2.

Submarines departed Truk for their stations as follows:

I-1, I-2 and blank _____ on 16th.
I-17 and blank (27333) on 17th.

(12W-210229-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 35).

* * *

171206 January, 1943

From: No originator
To: YOKURO
FURO 6
Info: MAKE 0
RUFU 3
ROSI 2
SESI 2
SAHAMU

21010

From [] Sub Unit Commander.

Part 1.

Submarines arrived Truk as follows:

15th [] (sub).
16th [] (sub).
17th [] (sub).
17th Garbled

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-c: (continued)

Part 2.

Submarines left Truk on patrol as follows:

16th		(I-2).
16th		(I-1).
17th		(I-17).
17th		(sub).

(NPM-241306-January-DI)

(D.T.B., January 24, 1943, p. 38).

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was reason to believe that the heavy cruiser ATAGO and the light cruiser NAGARA were en route to Truk.

No. 4-a:

NAGARA AND ATAGO BELIEVED PROCEEDING TO TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This conclusion was based upon an intercepted message.

No. 4-b:

210655 January, 1943

From: Unknown originator
 To : NAN QTH 4 (Garble)
 MOMO 4 (Unident)
 NUO 2 (Unident)
 TAMO 5 (Unident)
 AMO 30 (Unident)
 YANE 3 (Unident)
 Info: HATA 0 (Unident)
 KENO 0 (Unident)

49778

From Commander Advance Force. OpOrd #125.

Captain of NAGARA [] is to replace Captain (?) of ATAGO. This should be accomplished while en route Truk.

COMMENT: Our copy has 3 key groups missing or garbled so that translation is of questionable accuracy but that both NAGARA and ATAGO are, or soon will be, en route Truk, is clear.

(NSS-212204-January-DI)

(B.T.S. January 21, 1943, p. 10).

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Authority AND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)No. 4-b: (continued)

* * *

210655 January, 1943

40778

From: Blank
 To : NOTU 4
 WEO 4
 NUO 5
 TAO 8 (11th Air Fleet)
 AMO 7
 YAFU 9
 Info: MAME 1
 KIMO 2

From Commander Advance Force. Advance Force OpOrd #125.

C.O. NAGARA upon joining up with the ATAGO and [redacted] assume tactical command for the duration of the cruise to Truk only.

(NPM-230502-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 39).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

These ships reached Truk apparently without incident on January 25. See Item 9, CinCPac Bulletin #316, January 26, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

Cruiser Division 8 appeared to be involved in some unknown activity in the Marshalls.

No. 5-a:

CRUDIV 8 POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY NOTED IN GILBERT MARSHALL AREA PAST 2 DAYS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The departure of Cruiser Division 8 from Truk on January 19 was noted in Item 8, CinCPac Bulletin #309, January 19, 1943. The current association of this division with the Marshalls area was observed in an analysis of traffic.

No. 5-b:

This is second recent occurrence of delivery of intelligence reports to forces in the Marshalls. At 0021 January 20, unidentified air group HOWO 21 addressed an urgent message to Commander Air Group 802 (MAHA 42), info CofS Combined Fleet (AMU 48), 4th Fleet (TIWO 18), 3rd Fleet (ROWO 18), and 11th Air Fleet (ISI 68), 1st Air Attack Force (SUYO 31), 2nd Air Attack Force (ISI or NSI 21), and 6th Air Attack Force (YOKU 61).

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Something seems to be going on in the Marshalls, possibly continued search for U.S. submarine.

(NSS-202039-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 41).

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
TOP SECRET ULTRA

JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-g^P

At 1352 Staff Base Force 6 (NAFUI 29) addressed Commander Gilberts Defense Force (EKISU 1), info Staff CruDiv 8 (OSIRA 29).

We have no check on identification of OSIRA as CruDiv 8 except that it appears very good in 4th Base Force message at 1750 January 18th reporting departure of CruDiv 8 from Truk on 19 January. If this is CruDiv 8, it must be bound for the Marshalls-Gilberts area.

(NSS-202054-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 51).

No. 5-d:

Staff CruDiv 8 (OSIRA 29) appeared as an info addressee of Staff 6th Base Force message to unident WEFU 65 and RIKEMA, Commanders Air Group 952, Guard Div. 67, Jaluit Sea Defense Force, Yokosuka 6th Special Landing Force, Makin Detached Force, Gilberts Defense Force, IKUTA Maru, KATORI Maru, info Staffs 4th Fleet, CruDiv 8 and AirFlot 22.

Unident Commander KAHA 22 who was furnished intelligence report by radio intelligence center at Rabaul at 0054 January 20 was an info addressee of a despatch from Commander (?) Air Group (HONO 05) at 1744 January 20 to CinC 11 (garbles) Commanders (garbles) info 6th Base Force, Kwajalein, Combined and 4th Fleets and unident NAFU 2. Also at 1037 January 20 Staff SubForce addressed sub WOFU 3 info staff unident KAHA 23.

Consider it possible that if OSIRA is CruDiv 8, KAHA 2 may also be CruDiv 8. Consideration of the intelligence report at 0054, the aircraft message at 1744 and the SubForce message at 1037 and 6th Base Force message at 1352 suggests the possibility that ComCruDiv 8 and another "SENTAI" Commander may be enroute to the Marshall-Gilberts Area.

(NSS-202156-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 52).

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JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-e:

211956 January, Jaluit sent an intelligence report to Chiefs of Staff Combined and 4th Fleets, sub unit (NUTU 1), 1st Combined Comm. Unit Div. Intel. and WOKA 2, info AirFlot 22.

Although our supposition that CruDiv 8 is proceeding to the Marshalls may be incorrect (being based entirely on ident of OSIRA as CruDiv 8) there is positive indication that a new force of "SENTAI" rank (BatDiv, CruDiv, CarDiv, DesRon, SubRon or AirFlot) is concerned with RI in the general Marshalls area.

(NSS-212124-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 36).

No. 5-f:

In connection with previously reported associations of CruDiv 8 with Marshalls-Gilberts area, the ident of the call in question (OSIRA) as CruDiv 8 is further strengthened by message at 1514 20 January from Tokyo Bureau Personnel (YAYUKI) to CofS 3rd Fleet, info OSIRA. It is normal in such personnel messages for the action and info addresses to be in the same organization. CruDiv 8 is known to be a part of 3rd Fleet.

(NSS-212224-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 34).

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JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A description of an airfield believed to be under construction on Ocean Island was given.

No. 6-a:

ESTIMATE COMPLETION SOON FIGHTER FIELD ON OCEAN ISLAND X FIELD BELIEVED COMPOSED OF 2 STRIPS EXTENDING ON BEARINGS 120 AND 90 DEGREES RESPECTIVELY X SIZE FORMER NOT KNOWN X LATTER BELIEVED 3400 BY 320 FEET X FIELD LOCATED NEAR NORTH CENTRAL PART OF ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was found in an intercepted dispatch.

No. 6-b:

090445 September, 1942

Serial 67752

From: WIMA 6 (Flag of Air Div. 24)

Report on Ocean Island Air Base Project.

1. Although some difficulties appear (now under consideration by the branch office of the 4th Civil Engineers) it appears entirely practicable to construct a fighter plane base on Ocean.

2. Proposals:

(A) Location of field: In the north central section of the island, including the village of Puakonikai.

(B) Runways:

- (aa) Axis 90° 1050 meters by 100 meters.
- (bb) Axis 120° length (less than 1000 meters) width?

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)No. 6-b: (continued)

- (c) (Unreadable).
- (d) (Unreadable).

2nd part of message:

- (a) (Some construction details, leveling of elevations, etc).
- (b) (Handling of stores, details, mentions drift and necessity for providing vehicles, etc, for land transportation).
- (c) For the security of the project, blank required. Will need 2000 men and equipment. After their arrival estimated time required for completion is 4 months.

(NPM-202208-202212-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 34).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The existence of an airfield on Ocean Island appeared to be confirmed by a later report that reconnaissance planes had sighted an airstrip there. See Item 8 of CinCPac Bulletin #321, January 31, 1943. But in Item 7 of CinCPac Bulletin #335, February 14, 1943 it was stated that further reconnaissance photographs of Ocean Island disclosed no airfield on Ocean Island. The construction of the airfield indicated in the above intercepted dispatch apparently had been postponed or abandoned altogether.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
 JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

CINCPAC BULLETIN #312 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

220413 January, 1943
 Priority

FIVE SUBMARINES DEPARTED TRUK FOR STATIONS DURING PERIOD 16-17TH X FIGHTER FIELD CONTEMPLATED FOR OCEAN ISLAND IN SEPTEMBER MAY BE ABOUT COMPLETED X SITUATED NORTH CENTRAL PART OF ISLAND WITH TWO STRIPS WHOSE AXIS ARE 90 AND 120 DEGREES RESPECTIVELY X DIMENSIONS FORMER 3400 BY 320 FT. X LATTER UNKNOWN X CARRIER INFORMATION PRACTICALLY NIL X ESTIMATE CARDIV 2 STILL AT TRUK X VAGUE INDICATIONS CARDIV 1 MAY HAVE LEFT JAPAN WATERS X ZIMOTIC BY CINCPAC X BULLETIN #312 X SUB APPEARS EAST AND SOUTH BY BEARINGS AT X 15808 X NISSHIN MARU ARRIVES WIRE 7 FEB AND DEPARTS 11 FEB X NISSHIN NUMBER 2 REACHES SAME PLACE 14 FEB AND LEAVES 17 FEB X BOTH BIG TANKERS X BELIEVE ATAGO AND NIAGARA ENROUTE TRUK X SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH MARSHALLS GILBERTS X CRUDIV 8 POSSIBLY INVOLVED

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 23, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #313

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TP COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

230305 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

This item contained a summary of recent intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers.

No. 1-a:

LOCATIONS CVS VAGUE X SHOKAKU BELIEVED AT KURE ON 21ST X REMAINDER CARDIV 1 NOT LOCATED X CARDIV 2 LAST SEEN ENTERING TRUK ON 19TH X OTAKA BELIEVED DAMAGED 12 DECEMBER AND THOUGHT AT TRUK NOW X UNYO AND CHUYO UNLOCATED X BOTH 3RD AND 2ND FLEET STAFFS LATELY ARE ASSOCIATED PRACTICALLY ALL TRAFFIC PERTAINING TO SOUTHERN AREA X SOME INDICATION A UNIT ASSOCIATED 3RD FLEET IN AREA JUST NORTH OF CENTRAL SOLOMONS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The majority of this intelligence is a repetition of intelligence items from earlier bulletins and their sources therefore will not be repeated here. Traffic analysis placed the SHOKAKU at Kure on January 21.

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JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b:

SHOKAKU apparently still undergoing repairs at Kure and arrangements are probably being made for aircraft replacements to be furnished by air group KAKEA.

(TZW-220842-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 114).

Traffic analysis also disclosed the close association of the Staffs of the 3rd and 2nd Fleets with the southern area.

No. 1-c:

Overall traffic volume has been considerably above normal for the past several days and appears to have increased even more during the past 48 hours. The Solomons-Rabaul-Truk area furnished the bulk of the traffic although a considerable amount of air traffic came out the Marshalls. Submarine activity has been low up to the time of this writing. 2nd and 3rd Fleet Staffs are seen in almost everything pertaining to the southern theater.

(HYPO-22-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 13).

The presence of a Third Fleet unit in the north central Solomons also was detected by an analysis of current traffic.

No. 1-d:

NONU 1 (completely unidentified but is a large fleet unit, possibly a carrier) was seen in several despatches associated with the Solomons area. NONU 1 was working with Truk directly on the 22nd and at 22-1600 worked NAWI 5 (Unidentified--but near Shortlands). NONU 1 used 3957-7915 kcs which

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-d (continued)

is normally used by major commanders and fleet units. By D/F NONU 1 was in an area of 5 to 6 degrees South and 157 to 160 East (4 stations). NAWI 5 appears to be permanently at Shortlands (?) and is associated with air. In October NAWI 5 addressed "All ships having aircraft" and was once associated with units on the 7040 kcs carrier channel on October 24th. A despatch at 22-1230 from a concealed originator was addressed to CinC 3rd Fleet for action and to NUMATO(?) and MAE 9 (idents) plus NONU 1 (above) for information. This was sent directly to Truk on 3957 kcs by the originating ship using general call NARAE, showing prior delivery to NONU 1. Bearings are poor due to weak signals, but the unit was indicated in the same general areas as NONU 1. This despatch was of abnormal length.

Lack of identified associates of the above units prevents proper analysis, but all present indications point to important units associated with the Third Fleet in the area north of the central Solomons:

(HYPO-22-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 80).

On January 20, _____ a message from the Captain of the OTAKA in which he described the damage suffered by the OTAKA in an attack by an American submarine on December 12, 1942. See Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin #284, December 25, 1942.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-c1 (continued)

At 1200 Unident. SAVA 1.
At 1600 Ramada Lockout.
At 1800 Vella LaVella Lockout.

(NSS-221755-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 53).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The transfer of Air Flotilla 24 from the Marshalls to the Empire appeared now to be completed.

No. 3-a:

AIRFLOT 24 COMPLETED MOVE TO EMPIRE FROM MARSHALLS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A dispatch to this effect was intercepted.

No. 3-b:

141100 January, 1943

From: ROMU 32 (ComAirFlot 24)
To : ROMA 6 (11th Air Fleet)
Info: KIMU 83 (CofS Combined Fleet)
RIMA 7

Reference FBG*Order (?) # blank.

Air Attack Force #4 has completed move to Empire.

*Base Air Force.

(NCS-221445-January-DI)

[Ed. note: The #4 Air Attack Force is the 24th Air Flotilla]

(D.T.B. January 3, 1943, p. 146).

* * *

141100 January, 1943

83556

From: ROMU 3 (24th AirFlot)
To : ROMA 6 (11th Air Fleet)
Info: KIMU 83 (Combined Fleet)
RIMA 7

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

Reference 11th Air Fleet OpOrder #1.

4th Air Attack Force shift of duty to Japan completed.

(NPM-222326-January-DI)

(D:T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 109).

It had been reported earlier that Air Flotilla 22 was replacing Air Flotilla 24 in the Solomons, but the new location of the latter air group was not known at that time. See Item 4 of CinCPac Bulletin #276, December 17, 1942 and Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #282, December 23, 1942.

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ND 947022

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

Item A

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Air traffic in the Marshalls was noted to be unusually heavy.

No. A-a:

MARSHALLS ACTIVE WITH AIR TRAFFIC

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This unusual activity was reflected in traffic analysis.

No. A-b:

Intensified coverage on Marshall weather circuits produced an apparently larger volume of Marshall traffic than usual.

(HYPO-21-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 17).

No. A-c:

Overall traffic volume has been considerably above normal for the past several days and appears to have increased even more during the past 48 hours. The Solomons-Rabaul-Truk area furnished the bulk of the traffic although a considerable amount of air traffic came out the Marshalls.....

(HYPO-22-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 13).

No. A-d:

Air bases and base-aircraft communications were operating at a high level with Taroa as the controlling activity. D/F fixes on several planes indicated that most of the Taroa base to plane activity was confined to the immediate area.

(HYPO-22-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 32).

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JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that enemy surface vessels soon might attempt again to run supplies to Guadalcanal.

No. 5-a:

TOKYO EXPRESS MAY RUN AGAIN VERY SOON.

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An analysis of current traffic suggested the imminence of a supply attempt.

No. 5-b:

Numerous aircraft reconnaissance contact reports noted on 19th. Some were passed to 4th Fleet (AME 19) and 6th Base Force (TIN 89) which indicated planes were operating in Marshalls or Gilberts areas. Some were also associated with Solomons area and times of origin suggest reconnaissance prior to operations of surface units or Reinforcement Force between Buin and New Georgia-Guadalcanal.

(T2W-200848-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 20, 1943, p. 26).

No. 5-c:

Traffic mostly administrative on 20th January. Submarine and air prominent with B SubForce still closely associated Guadalcanal. Operational traffic in considerable volume from Solomons area involving Reinforcement Force (YAYU 1) and DesRon 10 (HAKE 1). Rabaul on 7910 was communicating with Flagship DesRon 10 delivering traffic for Reinforcement Force. Latter included as action addressee in traffic from Staff Communication Officer

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 22, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-g: (continued)

Todoroki (NOYOKU) on Guadalcanal between 0400 and 1000. D/F fix indicates HAKE 1 approximately 75 miles southwest of New Georgia at 0300 20th. Unidentified WASTI 6 also originated operational traffic until 1800 20th January associated with Solomons area. Addressees included RX (Solomons) Area Defense Force (TUNI 1) AirFlot 26 (WIKE 5), SeaplanDiv 11 (EFU 1), 8th and 11th Air Fleets, HITSU Maru (MITUTA), plus unidentified MOHARE.

(TZW-210903-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 56).

No. 5-d:

The observer (Todoroki?) on Guadalcanal sent a large file of short despatches to usual addresses. These were apparently reports of U.S. plane movements, and the increase in this type of traffic coupled with other air activity on the part of the enemy may indicate another "Tokyo Express" run.

TSUGARU (KINASU) was radio guard for Salamaua on the 22nd; the latter apparently was experiencing communication difficulties.

"Vella LaVella" was associated with 11th Air Fleet and Rabaul Air Units.

(HYPO-22-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 84).

No. 5-r:

There was, otherwise, relatively minor operational activity noted in the area. At 0729 Chief of Staff 11th Air or Southeastern Area Fleet (MERE 40) addressed Guadalcanal (TATUSU), OKI Chief of Staff, info Todoroki on Guadalcanal, Comdr. Reinforcement Force (RAMI 67), B SubForce (MOKO 9),

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-a: (continued)

Chiefs of Staff Combined and 8th Fleets, and GOC Force? suggesting arrangements for future supplying of Guadalcanal by both subs and destroyers.

(NSS-221755-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 53).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes on two enemy submarines were listed.

No. 6-a:

SUBS BY DOG FOX SOUTH AND EAST X 00161 X 04157

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 6-b:

D/F fixes for January 22, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	157 E 04 S	0006-22
NARAE	Sub	6385	161 E 00-15 S	1429-22

(HYPO-22-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 50a).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was observed that enemy tankers frequently called at Miri in North Borneo.

No. 7-a:

CONSIDERABLE TANKER TRAFFIC TO MIRI NOTED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intercepted messages disclosed the heavy tanker traffic at this port. The following messages are typical:

No. 7-b:

From: NARAE
To : HASUSU
RUMARU 3
Info: RAWANE 30
TAHIRA
MOSEYO 30
MOTUWI
MORMI

211400 January, 1943

Serial 651

Pursuant to Transp. Section SMS #111957 the KUNZAN Maru will cancel her trip to Singapore and load to capacity (about 4500 kiloliters) with crude oil at Miri for Japan. Advise expected time arrival at Miri.

(NPM-212258-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 102).

* * *

211400 January, 1943

Serial 551

From: HITISE (Navy Transp. Section)
To : HASUKO (CofS Mairuru)

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)No. 7-b: (continued)

	RUMARU	3	(Unident)
Info:	NUWANE	30	(3rd So. Exp. Fleet)
	TAHINU		(Singapore Transport.)
	MOSEYO	30	(1st Sea Escort Force)
	MONMI		(Takao Transport.)

Cancel KUNZAN (or KUNHAN) Maru's trip to Singapore directed by Transport. Section Serial 111957. Instead she will take full load at Miri of about 4000 kiloliters of crude oil for Japan.

(T2W-220002-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 133).

* * *

211400 January, 1943

Serial 551

From:	HITISE		(Naval Transp. Section)
To :	HASUKO		(Maizuru Dist. Cofs)
	RUMARU	3	
Info:	NUWANE	30	(Cofs 1st So. Exp. Fleet)
	TAHINU		(Singapore Transp. Office)
	MOSEYO	30	(Cofs 1st Surface Escort Force)
	MONMI-MOUMI		(Takao Transp. Section)

Cancel the sailing of the KUNZAN Maru to Singapore ordered in Transportation Section SMS #111957. Instead the KUNZAN Maru is to take on a full cargo of crude oil at Miri for Japan (about 4000 kiloliters). Answer as to when you expect to arrive at Miri.

(NSS-220115-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 130).

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NND 947022

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-c:

21200 January, 1943

Serial 559

From: HITISE
 To : ROMO 5
 NAHOTE 5
 TIMOHO
 Info: MOSEYO 30 (1st High Seas Escort Force)
 KURARE 30 (1st So. Exp. Fleet)
 TAHOA 8
 TIHOMO (11th Spec. Base Force Saigon)
 TAHIRA

Revision of schedule.

ATAGO Maru departs Sasebo 25 January. Arrives Miri 1 February. Will take aboard about 8500 kiloliters of crude oil for Japan mainland.

(NPM-220948-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 103).

No. 7-d:

212240 January, 1943

Serial 562

From: NAO 2
 To : SINE 1
 MOETE (SEIAN Maru)
 Info: WIKU 4
 YOMO 5
 WOHO 6
 TAHEMU (Singapore Transp.)

With reference to Transportation SMS #505 the schedule of SEIAN Maru is changed as follows:

After unloading at Singapore proceed to Miri and load to capacity with crude oil for the Empire (about 4500 kiloliters).

(NPM-220944-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 105).

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JANUARY 21, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-a:

212300 January, 1943

Serial 560

From: HITISE (Tokyo Transp.)
 To : SEHIMU (KOZUI Maru)
 SINE 1
 Info: WIKU 4
 HEKA 3
 WOHO 6
 TAHINU (Singapore Transp.)

In accordance with Transportation SMS #106 the KOZUI Maru after completion of unloading at Singapore will revise her schedule to go to Miri (Borneo) and load there about 7500 kiloliters of crude oil to be taken to the Empire.

(NPM-220944-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 106).

* * *

212300 January, 1943

Serial 460

From: HITISE
 To : SINEKO ? 01 (Carbled)
 SEHIMU 3 (KOZUI Maru)
 Info: HEKA 30 (CafS 1st So. Exp. Fleet)
 WIKU 4 (Southwest Convoy Force)
 TAHINU (Singapore Transp. Office)
 JOHO-WOHO 6

Reference Transportation Section Serial 16.

The schedule of KOZUI Maru has been changed as follows:

After completion of unloading at Singapore she will proceed to Miri and take on a full load of crude oil for Japan (about 7500 kiloliters).

(NSS-221031-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 112).

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JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The armament of two enemy surface raiders was reported.

No. 8-a:

KIYOSUMI AND AIKOKU (SURFACE RAIDERS) EQUIPPED WITH 5.5 GUNS AND 25 MM TWIN MOUNT MACHINE GUNS X HAVE 2 PLANES EACH ONE OF WHICH IS TYPE ZERO RECONNE PLANE X OTHER TYPE UNKNOWN X ALSO CARRY 50 CM TORPEDOYS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material was derived from a message intercepted in the preceding July.

No. 8-b:

311900 July, 1942

SP-09161

From:	NOSAI	(Tokyo Navy Minister)
To :	YAI	11 (D.E.I. or So. Exp. Force)
Info:	OSE	88 (Combined Fleet)
	IME	91 (SubFor)
	TUA	99 (HOKOKU Maru-Special Cruiser)
	SUHA	55 (AIKOKU Maru)
	YAKO	88 (KIYOSUMI Maru)

The AIKOKU Maru, HOKOKU Maru, and the KIYOSUMI Maru will have the following work done by the 101st Repair Section and the 101st Air Station:

1. Install bases for 25mm twin mount machine guns near the location of the 7mm machine guns on both sides of the aft part of bridge. Move the 7mm machine guns to a suitable location. Equip with the necessary ammunition stowage, telephones and firing order signals, et cetera. Based on six 25mm twin mount machine guns the following equipment will be sent later on the HEIAN Maru.

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8-h: (continued)

18 ammunition boxes to go beside the guns, 11,760 rounds common cartridges, 3,840 rounds tracer cartridges. Depending on its condition use captured armament. (2 boxes each ship(?) of 40mm before single mount machine guns). Do not fire official tests until you are ready.

2. Rebuild the storage facilities to hold about 300 rounds of 14 centimeter ammunition and 40 50 centimeter torpedoes, (facilities for either type 95 or the 6th year type).

3. Moreover, in the vicinity of the plane you now carry, arrange to carry a type zero reconnaissance seaplane mark 11 (reserve plane).

4. After consultation with blank suitably camouflage the stack and mast.

5. If possible complete the work on the following dates: AIKOKU Maru, HOKOKU Maru by the last day in August, KIYOSUMI Maru by 20th September.

6. Each ship after departure report on the condition of the work done.

7. Expenses are to be charged to the following general accounts: Ships, Ordnance, Navigation, Electrical, Aeronautics.

(NSS-212354-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 10).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #313 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTR OTTAWA
 ACNB
 WZNB

230331 January, 1943
 Priority

OTAKA BELIEVED TO BE CARRIER ATTACKED BY SUB ON 12 DEC X CON-
 siderable damage inflicted but ship arrived TRUK 21 DEC WHERE
 BELIEVED TO STILL BE X ZYMOTIC X CINCPAC 313 X SURFACE RAIDERS
 AIKOKU AND KIYOSUMI CARRY 5.5 INCH GUNS (NUMBER UNKNOWN) AND
 6 25 MM TWIN MOUNT MACHINE GUNS ALSO HAVE 50 CM TORPEDOES X 2
 PLANES ABOARD X 1 IS TYPE ZERO RECON RECON PLANE X TYPE OF OTHER
 PLANE UNKNOWN X SUBS DOG FOXED EAST AND SOUTH X 15704 X 16100
 X SHIFT OF AIRFLOT 24 TO JAPAN FROM MARSHALLS COMPLETED X
 MANY OILERS VISIT MIRI X CONSIDERABLE AIR TRAFFIC IN MARSHALLS
 X LOOKOUT STATION NOTED X CAPE ALEXANDER (NORTH END CHOISEUL
 ISLAND) X JAPS POSSIBLY PREPARING FOR ANOTHER DESTROYER REIN-
 FORCEMENT RUN TO GUADALCANAL X SHOKAKU PROBABLY AT KURE X
 OTHER CARRIERS NOT LOCATED X A UNIT CONNECTED 3RD FLEET POS-
 SIBLY IN AREA NORTH OF CENTRAL SOLOMONS X BOTH 2ND AND 3RD
 FLEET STAFFS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED FORCES OPERATING IN SOUTHERN
 THEATRE

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JANUARY 23, 1943

COMSOPAC DISPATCH 230028

(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSoPac informed the American commands in the vicinity of Guadalcanal that a tanker and auxiliary cruiser were scheduled to arrive in the Munda area on the 23rd and 24th of January respectively.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC
To : ALL TFC SOPAC
 CONGEN CACTUS
Info: CINCPAC
230028 January, 1943
Operational Priority

VAGUE ZEAL INDICATIONS THAT POSSIBLE TANKER MAY ARRIVE MUNDA-KULA GULF AREA 23RD AND POSSIBLE AUXILIARY CRUISER (NOSHIRO MARU) ON 24TH

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 23, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted message supplied this intelligence.

No. 2

220721 January, 1943

From: NOEO
To : NENOKU (Staff Officer Shimada)
Info: YOYUHO (#3 TOA Maru)
 KUMI 1 (8th Fleet)
 TETO 9 (4th Fleet)
 IHI 3 (AirFlot 26)
 TASA 3 (AirFlot 25)
 HOSORU
 TEWI 6
 NOKOSO
 EMOWA

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FB 9 (Base Air Force) Order #25.

The officer in general charge Munda will have the Inekawa Force, which is guarding the 4th Engineer

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

blanks, return to Rabaul on the #3 TOA Maru and the NOSHIRO Maru, which are scheduled to anchor at RWN (unident) on 23rd and 24th respectively.

(TZW-221715-January-DI)

Ed. note: RWN later was identified as Kolombangara. The tanker is believed to have been the #2 TOA Maru instead of the #3 TOA Maru.

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 51).

* * *

220721 January, 1943

Serial 039

From:	NOE	8	
To :	NENOKU		(Staff Officer Shimada)
Info:	YOYAO		(Maru)
	HOSOKU		(Maru)
	TEWI	6	
	NOKO	9	
	KUMI	1	(8th Fleet)
	ENOWA		
	IHI	31	(AirFlot #26)
	TASA	3	(21st AirFlot)

11th Air Fleet OpOrder #125.

The Munda blank group in 4th Engineers detachment will return to Rabaul via the #2 TOA Maru to be at (RWN) Anchorage 23 January and via the NOSHIRO Maru to be at (RWN) Anchorage 24 January.

(NPM-222238-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 65).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

On January 24 a search plane unsuccessfully bombed an enemy tanker enroute to Vila on Kolombangara. Bad weather foiled two subsequent attempts to attack this vessel. It is probable that this tanker was the

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)(G) REPORT OF ACTION (continued)

one of which ComSoPac gave notice in this dispatch. It should be noted, however, that that tanker was due at Kolombangara on January 23.

No. 3

From: COMAIRSOPAC 250606 January, 1943
 To : COMSOPAC Priority
 Info: ALL TFC SOPAG
 GOMSONESPAC
 CINCPAC

AT 1530 L (-11) 24TH SEARCH PLANE DROPPED FOUR BOMBS ON A JAP TANKER EN ROUTE TO VILA BUT ALL FOUR MISSED X SUBSEQUENT SBD AND TBF STRIKE DISPATCHED AGAINST THIS TARGET ENCOUNTERED BAD WEATHER TURNED BACK TO CACTUS.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 25, 1943).

This tanker, the #2 TAG Maru, was sunk a few days later, by American planes which intercepted this ship on her way to Munda with the NOSHIRO Maru.

No. 4

312330 January, 1943

15146

From: NENOKU (Staff Officer Shimada)
 To : NOKA-NKA 4 (8th Fleet)
 Info: SAYO 2 (Combined Fleet)
 SUMO 5 (Southeastern Fleet)
 HOO 8 (R Area Defense Force)
 TUSE 8 (AirFlot 21 ?)
 SATA 5 (RX Area Defense Force)
 YOO 6 (SeaplanDiv 11)

From 8th Combined Special Landing Force. Operation Report #9.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)No. 4 (continued)

Blank of Headquarters, port of Kure #6 Special Landing Force and #2 TOA Maru (blank-NOSHIRO Maru ? and SubChaser #30) while enroute Munda Air Base at 1617, grid position blanks. Wave blanks. Damage sustained #2 TOA Maru 1 bomb and 1 torpedo. (Rest unreadable).

(T27-090614-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 9, 1943, p. 83).

No. 5

311836 January, 1943

From: HORIRE 2 (KIYODORI)
 To : SATA 5 (2nd So. Exp. Fleet)
 HKA 4 (8th Fleet)
 NENOKU 3 (Staff Officer Shimada)
 Info: MIFUNO 1

Shortly after 1600 bearing 130, distant 4 miles from east coast of Vella LaVella, #2 TOA Maru received torpedo and bomb attack from enemy planes. Shipped water up to chain locker. As she could not navigate, this ship took off 60 laborers but no cargo. She is almost sunk. Will attempt to land at Kolombangara Air Base during the night.

(NPM-020722-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 1, 1943, p. 51).

No. 6

#2 TOA Maru was bombed by enemy planes at Kolombangara about 0400 February 1, 1943, was set afire and sunk.

OS COMMENT: By D.I., #2 TOA Maru was beached and abandoned at Kolombangara after this bombing. She was listed as a 6,800 ton XAP.

(Extracted from translation of captured document, JICPOA Item No. 3223, November 22, 1943).

(GI Ship File, #2 TOA Maru).

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JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7

The large cargo vessel which was attacked in Vella Gulf on 31st January grounded on a reef off Gizo Island and subsequently slipped off into deep water and sank on 4th February. Before it sank, the coastwatcher salvaged small arms, miscellaneous gear, papers, paybooks, diaries, handbooks etc. The ship was the "TOA Maru" of 6,700 tons.

G.I. COMMENT: Probably the #? TOA Maru.

(Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, Wellington, New Zealand, Intelligence Summary Issue #51. CinOPac Routing Slip No. 1260).

(GI Ship File, #2 TOA Maru).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 23, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCHES 230231, 230856 and 232056(A) INTELLIGENCE

In these dispatches CinCPac advised ComSOPac and the commanders of all task forces in the South Pacific that enemy planes were tracking an American task force near Guadalcanal.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC 230231 January, 1943
To : COMSOPAC Priority
ALL TFC SOPAC

ZEAL CINCPAC GIVES X JAP PLANE REPORTS BLUE FORCE AT NINE HOURS ITEM (-9) IN POSIT 11-10 SOUTH 161-10 EAST

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 23, 1943).

No. 2

From: CINCPAC 230856 January, 1943
To : COMSOPAC Operational Priority
ALL TFC SOPAC

FROM CINCPAC X ZEAL X REPORTS FROM JAP PLANES APPARENTLY INDICATE SHADOWING UNITED STATES FORCE THRU FOLLOWING POSITIONS X 11-05 SOUTH 161-10 EAST AT EIGHT FIFTY FIVE X 10-25 SOUTH 159-25 EAST AT THIRTEEN HOURS X 9-25 SOUTH 158-13 EAST AT SIXTEEN FORTY X ALL TIMES MINUS NINE

(CinCPac "Utmost Secret" Dispatch File, January 23, 1943).

No. 3

From: CINCPAC 232056 January, 1943
To : COMSOPAC Urgent
ALL TFC SOPAC

ULTRA CINCPAC SENDS X AT 0230 ITEM ORANGE UNIT MADE CONTACT REPORT GIVING POSIT 08-10 SOUTH 158-10 EAST

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 23, 1943).

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Authority *and 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A summary of the intercepted reports of these enemy planes follows:

No. 4

Tactical traffic from the Solomons area took a sharp uprising at 0855-23rd with an aircraft contact report in an area south of the Solomons. This report started a flood of tactical traffic involving both air and submarine units which is now very heavy. It is clearly indicated that a search plane made contact with an Allied force in 11-05 S., 161-10 E. at 0855 and that force was then shadowed by planes of the "R" Area Air Force who relieved each other on station. Up to the present 4 planes have been "on watch". They are furnishing a constant flow of information to Rabaul and CinC 8th Fleet. The last readable grid position on this force was sent at 1640 when a position of 09-25 S., 158-13 E. was sent.....

Previously mentioned was the sighting and trailing of an Allied force to the southward of the Solomons in 11-05 S., 161-10 E. at 0855-23rd.

Plane 3 SAKO 2 continued trailing unit 1015-23rd.

Plane 3 SAKO 3 arrived on scene at 0915 when he sent his first message. At 0920 he gave the position as 160-50 E., 11-10 S. He sent a despatch about every 15 minutes until his last one at 1300 when he gave the position as 159-35 E., 10-25 S. There appears to be a gap here until 1640 when:

Plane 0 TOE 3 sent his first despatch giving grid position 158-13 E., 09-25 S. He continued trailing until 1930 when he sent an urgent despatch to Rabaul.

Plane 9 TEYA 1 took over at 1905 and sent his first despatch.

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NND 947022

JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4 (continued)

From the series of positions it is apparent that the force sighted was proceeding in a northwesterly direction. As this is written, it appears that other planes are being sent out from Shortland and Wanda bases.

The early contacts above were apparently not heeded immediately or they were too vague to give much information for the reaction to these did not appear until about 1230 when directives began to appear from submarine commanders, 11th SeaPlaneDiv, and 11th Air Fleet.

(HYPO-23-January-TI)

(D.T.P. January 23, 1943, pp. 18 and 133).

No. 5

Plane 8 YUSU 2 appears to have been on the job from as early as 0000 (-9) to 0200 when he made his last report. His reports appeared to have been sent to RAHE Ø, identified as 11th Air Fleet. Included were several grid positions, as follows:

0030-24th 157-10 E 08-05 S
0130-24th 157-45 E 07-50 S

At 0230 7 YUSU (which may be a garble or incomplete call) sent grid position 158-10 East 08-10 South.

At 0141 KUI 2 (Shortlands Air Base) sent "RI RI" to 8 YUSU 2 and at 0200 "TU 5U 5U" plus 4 kana groups. This appears to be a directive for 8 YUSU 2 to return to his base, which may be Shortlands.

8 YUSU 2's report at 0045 was sent at 0134 by RAHE Ø (11th Air Fleet) to plane 9 TEYA. At 0100 9 TEYA 1 was first seen on the air with 4 kana report and again at 0250 and 0330.

Plane 4 MANI 1 which appeared first at 0110 sending to SITY 8 (Navieng Air Base) appeared again at 0400, 0410 and 0415. He sent no position reports and possibly did not sight our forces.

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JANUARY 23, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5 (continued)

At 0430 plane 1 HFSK sent a grid position of 158-30 E. 08-10 S.

At 0555 TWA 73 identified as desdiv or desron sent a sighting report "1 B-17 sighted grid position 152-30 E. 06-30 S."

Plane 4 MAF 1, which is not the same as 4 MAMI 1, sent two 4 kana reports at 0550 and 0700.

Plane 1 KENA 1 sent reports to Kavieng and 11th Air Fleet at 0835, 1040, and 1530.

Gaps in plane reports show from 0835-1040-1230-1525.

Plane 4 WAHT 1 appeared first at 1230, then at 1617, 1710, 1830 and 1925. Addressed 11th Air Fleet and Rabaul. No indication as to base from which operating. Also included plane 6 TURE 1 in address, which was later seen addressed by TAME 5 (Unident) and HON 8 (Rabaul). 6 TURE 1 was not heard on the air.

(HYPO-25-January-TT)

(D.T.R. January 24, 1943, pp. 94-96).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The American force sighted by these enemy planes was Task Force #67 on its way to bombard the Vila-Stanmore area on Kolombangara. However, no attack was made on the task force until after the bombardment. As this force was returning from Kolombangara, three groups of enemy planes at about 0420 (-11) January 24 approached to attack the formation but were held off by accurate radar controlled fire. At least one enemy plane was shot down and the others withdrew at dawn. Part C of Item 2, CinCPac Bulletin #305, January 15, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943GINCPAC BULLETIN #314

From: GINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, GARIB, GULF

240321 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of five Japanese overseas craft
 were reported.

No. 1-a:

ACCORDING TO DOG FOX SUBS INDICATED SOUTH AND EAST
 X 07156 X 12162 X 11160 X PLUS ONE IN BAKER DASH
 CANTON ISLAND AREA X AND ANOTHER NEAR 20 NORTH 160
 WEST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 1-b:

D/F Fixes for January 23, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	160 E 11 S	1620-22
NARAE	Sub	13220	162-15 E 12-15 S	2050-22
NARAE	Sub	13220	156 E 01-30 S	2140-22

(HYPO-23-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 91c).

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JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-c:

D/F Fixes for January 24, 1943.

NORTHERN AREA

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	159-45 W 19-50 N	1834-23

(HYPO-24-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 132a).

No. 1-d:

D/F Fixes for January 23, 1943

Not previously reported.

MARSHALLS-GILBERTS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	175 W 02 S	1421-23

(HYPO-24-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 21a).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The submarine reported to be in the Baker-Canton area remained there for several days. On January 27, it made a reconnaissance of Canton Island and on January 30 shelled that island. See Item 9, CinCPac Bulletin #319, January 29, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

The transfer of the 20th Army Division from Palau to Wewak was reported to be underway and it was known that the HAYATAKA had participated in this movement before returning to Truk on January 19.

No. 2-a:

PART AT LEAST OF 20TH ARMY DIVISION BROUGHT TO WEWAK AROUND 17TH FROM PALAU X HAYATAKA COVERED THIS MOVEMENT AND RETURNED TRUK ON 19TH WHERE ASSUMED TO BE NOW

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The transfer of this division to Wewak was disclosed by the ensuing intercepted dispatches.

No. 2-b:

131201 January, 1943

83500

From:	SQI	5 (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
To :	RAN	1
	TOME	5 (CarDiv 2)
	MUWA	7
Info:	MON	0 (Combined Fleet)
	NOKI	4 (11th Air Fleet)
	MITI	9 (3rd Fleet)
	SISUMA	(Chief of Nav.Gen.Staff)
	RETU	2 (Garbled call)
	HEKI	6
	MUOIVUI	8

(Following incomplete version, but have exhausted possibilities of further recoveries for time being).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-b: (continued)

Blank Transportation operation, except as prescribed in NTF Operation Order 13, will be carried out in accordance with following details:

1. Task Organization.

<u>TASK FORCE</u>	<u>TASK FOR. CDR.</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>
(A) Transp. Force	ComCruDiv 9	"C" Transp. Force less AIKOKU Maru KAYOSUMI Maru KIYOKAWA Maru UKIKISHIMA Maru
(B) Support Force	ComCarDiv 2	CarDiv 2 less HITAKA, DesDiv 9 less blank, plus MURASAME, SAMIDARE.
(C) R. Area Defense Force	Comdr. Special Base Force #27	TAKIGUMI [redacted] [redacted] plus 2 transports.

2. Outline of movements.

(A) Transportation Force will leave PP (Palau) and proceed to RZN (Wewak) under the direction of the Comdr. of the 20th Army Division (blanks).

(B) Support Force will proceed to the area to the north? of RZN (Wewak) on 17 January and operate as directed by its Comdr. (Rest is blanks).

NSS COMMENT: NTF equals Southeast Area Fleet.

(NSS-232215-232228-January-DI)

(D.T.R. January 23, 1943, p. 77).

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JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-b: (continued)

* * *

131201 January, 1943

B3500

From: SOI 5 (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
 To : RANI 7
 TOME 5 (CarDiv 2)
 MUWA 7
 Info: MON 0
 MOKI 4
 MITI 9 (3rd Fleet)
 SISUMA (Naval Minister)
 RETU 2
 HEKI 6
 NUI 8

OpOrd #18.

In addition to the orders contained in NTF OpOrd #13 the following is directed for the Wewak Transportation Operation.

1. TASK ORGANIZATION

Task Group
Commander
Composition
In that order

A. TRANSPORT GROUP

ComCruDiv 9
 KYOSIME Maru
 Blank [redacted]
 KIYOKAWA Maru
 Blank [redacted]
 Blank [redacted] (5 Marus)

B. COVERING FORCE

ComCarDiv 2
 CarDiv 2 (Less HITAKA)
 DesDiv 19 (Less [redacted] DD)
 Plus MURASAME and [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-b: (continued)

C. "GR" Rabaul Defense Force
2 AX 1 DD etc.

2. MOVEMENTS OF EACH GROUPA. TRANSPORTS

Depart Palae as soon as practicable and under the protection of the advance forces of this fleet proceed to Wewak and carry out disembarkation.

B. COVERING FORCE

During the whole of January 17th remain to the northward of Wewak to cover this operation. Task Group Commander act at his discretion to fulfill the mission.

C. Completely unreadable.
January 14th.

(HYPO-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 80).

No. 2-c:

141503 January, 1943

30724

From: No originator
To : UMA 83 (11th Air Fleet)
Info: NUFU \emptyset
KATQYU (1st Nav. Section)
WRFU (Garbled)

From Commander 9 Sentai.

Inasmuch as the 20th Division Base is being (has been) shifted to FOXN (Wewak) it is desired that that division establish liaison with the blank Combined Landing Force? (0856) immediately via this force blanks.

(T2W-230703-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 87).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-c: (continued)

* * *

141503 January, 1943

30724

From: No originator
 To : UMA 83 (CofS 11th Air Fleet)
 NUFU 03 (CofS Combined Fleet)
 KATOYU (1st Section Nav. Section IHQ)
 WEFU 6

From ComCruDiv 9.

With reference to fact that the disembarkation point of the 20th Division has been changed to ROKN (Guadalcanal), that division has received no order concerning this. It is requested that such order be passed to them at once via this unit.

COMMENT: This refers to an operation scheduled for 17 January. We hold one of the 2nd Echelon operational orders unit dated thirteenth.

Expect to be able give fair summary within few hours. Principal forces involved are ComCarDiv Two and CarDiv less HITAKA plus about 6 DD's, and ComCruDiv 9 leading convoy of undetermined composition carrying 20th Division.

(NSS-231805-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 88).

The return of the HAYATAKA to Truk on January 19 was noted in Item 1, CinCPac Bulletin #310, January 20, 1943.

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

A report on the conclusion of this transport operation was intercepted later.

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-d:

241010 January, 1943

09804

From: No originator
 To : HOSO 6 (Combined Fleet)
 HOWA 9 (Southeast Area Fleet Flagship)
 Info: KUTESE (Civil Eng. Office at blank)
 TUI 20
 NTINTI 54 (1st Sect. Nav. Gen. Staff)
 AHGSI (2nd Sect. Gen. Staff Imp. Hdqts)
 SEWA 90 (CofS 4th Fleet)
 KOME 10 (CofS SubForce)

From ComCruDiv 9.

Completed C-1 Transportation Operation. Transported 9500 men of 20th Division, including Division Headquarters, 80 blank, and 120,000 (rounds of ammunition?) (including that carried by the AIKOKU Maru).

GI COMMENT: Refers to transporting 20th Division to Newak.

(NSS-012215-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 1, 1943, p. 56).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The locations of the enemy's principal carriers were estimated.

No. 3-a:

HAYATAKA RETURNED TRUK ON 19TH WHERE ASSUMED TO BE NOW X GROWING SUSPICION THAT HITAKA AT PRESENT UNDERGOING REPAIRS IN JAPAN X SHOKAKU ESTIMATED KURE FITTING OUT X ZUIKAKU ZUIHO WITH NEW BATTLESHIP MUSASHI AND DESDIV 10 KNOWN TO HAVE ARRIVED TRUK 23RD FROM EMPIRE X BELIEVE 3RD FLEET COMDR IN ZUIKAKU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

For the source of the intelligence concerning the HAYATAKA and the SHOKAKU see Item 2 above and Item 1, CinCPac Bulletin #313, January 23, 1943 respectively. The HITAKA had been Dog Foxed in the Empire area for some time but positive intelligence concerning her whereabouts continued to be lacking.

It was known from an intercepted dispatch that the ZUIHO and the ZUIKAKU had reached Truk on January 23. An analysis of traffic indicated that the Third Fleet Commander was aboard the ZUIKAKU.

No. 3-b:

221530 January, 1943

From:	TOE	05 (Staff 2nd Sea Escort Force)
To :	KEUHO	2 (Unident)
	NUUKO	3 (ATAKA Maru)
	WANANO	4 (SubChaser Div. #58)
	NNOSO	5 (Unident)
	INOE	3 (Unident)
	RUNU	9 (#19 Air Group)

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-b: (continued)

Info: HINU 90 (Unident)
KIOSI 3 (4th Harbor Affairs)

Tomorrow 23rd January. Arrivals:

Early morning:

#7 (or 8) KIKU Maru, course 105.

1300:

MUSASHI, ZUIKAKU, ZUIHOO, DesDiv 10, and YUKIKAZE,
course 180.

Departures:

1000:

#2 UNYOO Maru, course 305.

All entering via North Channel.

(T2W-230035-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 38).

No. 3-c:

Coincidental with ZUIKAKU arrival Truk traffic for
CinC 3rd Fleet now being routed to Truk indicating
that command in ZUIKAKU.

(T2W-230118-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 22, 1943, p. 40).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

Messages later showed that these ships
had sailed from Japan on January 18 or 19 and had ar-
rived at Truk as scheduled on January 23.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-d:

181402 January, 1943

From: Unknown originator
 To : NAO 64 (Tokyo Comm. Unit)
 NOTU 74 (Kure Comm. Unit)
 HAKU 04 (4th Comm. Unit-Truk)
 TIHO 13 (Combined Fleet)
 Info: MASE 5 (DesDiv 10)
 RENE 04 (MUSASHI)
 MOSE 54 (JINTSU)
 SIWE 04 (ZUIHO)
 SOTU 5 (YUKIKAZE)

29189

From Chief of Staff, 3rd Fleet.

Desire that ZUIKAKU [redacted] MUSASHI [redacted]
 ZUIHO [redacted] JINTSU [redacted] DesDiv 10
 and YUKIKAZE [redacted] after leaving Kure Communi-
 cation Zone on 19th rely on Tokyo and Truk Communi-
 cation Unit broadcast channels.

(NSS-152157-May-DI)

(D.T.B. May 15, 1943, p. 59).

No. 3-g:

231420 January, 1943

From: Concealed originator
 To : SIU 1 (Navy Minister)
 HEMU
 ORO 99 (Major command)
 URO 19 (11th Air Fleet)
 PUWO 59
 Info: HOKB 0
 RUMA 5
 RITMA 7

01304

From CinC 3rd Fleet.

CarDiv 1, less SHOKAKU, arrived Truk.

(NPM-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 7, 1943, p. 26).

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NND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-a: (continued)

* * *

231420 January, 1943

01304

From: Unknown originator
 To : SIU 1 (Navy Minister)
 HEMU 3 (Navy Minister)
 URO 19 (Blank Fleet Commanding Officer)
 ORO 99
 FUWO 59
 Info: HOKE 8
 ROYU 5 (Garbled)
 ROYU 7 (Garbled)

From CinC 3rd Fleet.

CarDiv 1 less SHOKAKU plus JINTSU and DesDiv 10 arrived Truk.

GI COMMENT: Translation corrected by NSS 071236.

(NSS-020841-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 2, 1943, p. 30).

* * *

231420 January, 1943

01304

From: Unknown originator
 To : SIU 9 (Navy Minister)
 EMU 1 (Chief of Nav. Gen. Staff)
 ORO 39 (Secretariat Yokosuka Nav. Station)
 URO 29 (Secretariat Kure Nav. Station)
 FUWO 29 (Secretariat Sasebo Nav. Station)
 Info: HOKE 8 (1st Fleet)
 RUMA 2
 RUMA 6 (3rd Fleet)

From Commander in Chief, 3rd Fleet.

CarDiv 1 [redacted] less SHOKAKU [redacted] MUSASHI
 [redacted] JINTSU [redacted] and DesDiv 10 [redacted]
 arrived PT (Truk).

(NSS-041547-May-DI)

(D.T.B. May 4, 1943, p. 36).

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JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A flurry of activity in the north suggested that a convoy might be underway for the Japanese held Aleutians.

No. 4-a:

ABNORMAL ACTIVITY NORTHERN AREA THAT MAY MEAN CONVOY MOVEMENT STARTED TO WESTERN ALEUTIANS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This activity was reflected in current traffic.

No. 4-b:

Traffic volume in Northern Area was high on 22nd January. A large portion of this file originated at Kiska in Army-Navy cipher, addressed to CinC 5th Fleet and unident REKO β . Army Transportation and Convoy Headquarters were prominent in Army Ciphers, Horomushiro Anchorage, 3rd Convoy Comdr., Attu Anchorage Comdr., and Watanabe Force at Otaru appearing in several messages. Traffic in Navy Cipher did not appear to be abnormal.

(NSS-222104-January-TI)

(D.T.R. January 23, 1943, p. 142).

No. 4-c:

Kiska was also very active in radio direction finder despatches to Tokyo.

The Chief of Staff Ominato sent a despatch on the 21st which indicates the movement of a convoy from that region, direction uncertain. It associates the Comdr. of #1 Transport Group at Ukjina with the Comdr. Sonozaki Anchorage at Otaru.

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JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4-g: (continued)

The Army command (KITIKI) at Kiska sent a string of despatches to a unit of DesDiv 21 (MESSIRE) information to Semichi Island, unidentified OTAKA, #30 Anchorage". These despatches were sent to Tokyo by Kiska for delivery to the destroyer unit. These despatches are taken to indicate the northward movement of troop reinforcements destined for Kiska.

(HYPO-23-January-TT)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 140).

Under CinCac Dispatches 260217 301903 and 312035 January, 1943 are quoted intercepted messages which show that convoy movements to the Aleutians from Japan were underway at this time, as the above analyses of current traffic suggested.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was known that three enemy submarines had departed from Penang on December 5 for patrols in the Arafura Sea.

No. 5-a:

SUBS ITEM 162, 156 AND 166 DEPARTED PENANG FOR ARAPURA SEA ON 5 DEC

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was obtained from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 5-b:

141523 December, 1942

95374

S.P. 51600-29

From: NARAE (Concealed identity)
 To : RIHA 39
 YOWO 99
 OVO 21
 HAWO 80
 ERO 30
 UFU 70
 WEMA 20
 HIHA 6
 ERO 70
 KOKU 46
 ETEYU
 SOYU 5
 TOKU 8

From: ComSubDiv.

The I-165 and I-166 of this division will proceed to Arafura Sea over following route:

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-b: (continued)

Depart Penang 5 December. (Rest blanks. Long list of garbled noon positions, which are no longer of sufficient importance to dig out).

NSS COMMENT: Since the middle of November, an organization designated as "Southwestern Force Detachment?" consisting of I-162, I-165, I-166, and an unidentified Maru has been operating in the Arafura-Timor Sea Area, under command of Com-Subdiv 30.

(NSS-230024-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 164).

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JANUARY 24, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The unexplained renewal of activity in the Marshalls was reported to be continuing.

No. 6-a:

MARSHALL ACTIVITY CONTINUES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis indicated a continuance of this flurry.

No. 6-b:

Traffic very heavy with the outstanding feature that the Marshalls area and the 4th Fleet Staff are now furnishing far more than their usual amount of traffic.....

While it is true that an increased coverage of the Marshalls area has produced more traffic from this area than usual, yet the despatches above were copied on major circuits, hence are not the result of the increased coverage. They indicate a degree of activity not normally seen from the Cinc Fourth Fleet. This indicates that the Inner South Seas Area (Mandates) is assuming a new importance, most likely due to a new concentration of ships and air units in this bailiwick.

(HYPO-23-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, pp. 17 and 47).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 24, 1943CINCPAG BULLETIN #314 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

240323 January, 1943
 Priority

UNKNOWN ACTIVITY IN MARSHALLS CONTINUES X 3RD FLEET COMDR IN
 ZUIKAKU PLUS ZUIHO, MUSASHI AND DESTROYER DIVISION 10 ENTERED
 TRUK FROM JAPAN ON 23RD X ZYMOTIC X 314TH FROM CINCPAC X
 SHOKAKU ESTIMATED AT KURE X CARDIV 2 UNLOCATED BUT AT TRUK
 ON 19TH (HITAKA MAY BE IN JAPAN NAVY YARD) X ACTIVITY NOTED
 KURILE ALEUTIAN AREA X POSSIBLY INDICATIVE CONVOY MOVEMENTS
 X BEARINGS PLACE SUBS EAST BY SOUTH X 16011 X 16212 X 15602
 X ONE NEAR 20 NORTH 160 WEST AND ANOTHER IN CANTON-HOWLAND
 ISLANDS VICINITY X SUBMARINES ITEM 162, 165 AND 166 LEFT
 PENANG 5 DECEMBER FOR ARAFURA SEA X AT LEAST PART OF 20TH
 ARMY DIVISION BELIEVED MOVED TO WENAK AROUND 17TH FROM PALAU
 WITH COVER FOR OPERATION PROVIDED BY HAYATAKA

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #315

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSVPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

250213 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The presence of the heavy cruiser TONE in the Gilbert - Marshall area suggested the possibility of offensive action by that vessel shortly.

No. 1-a:

POSSIBILITY SEA RAID BY TONE SUGGESTED BY ADDITIONAL INDICATIONS THAT CRUISER ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES GILBERT MARSHALLS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The presence of the 8th Cruiser Division less the CHIKUMA (that is, the TONE) in the Marshalls, suggested earlier in Item 5 of CinCPac Bulletin #312, January 22, 1943, appeared to be confirmed now by traffic analysis.

No. 1-b:

A confirmation of Washington's assumption that Cru-Div 8 is in the Marshalls-Gilberts area is found by analysis of traffic on January 19th and November 7th. Without going into details as to the foundations

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b: (continued)

for the statement, good indications were found that CruDiv 8 (TO 8) less the CHIKUMA (FUKI 1) is operating in the Marshalls-Gilberts area, with signs pointing specifically to the Gilberts area.

(HYPO-24-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 22).

No. 1-c:

Rabaul while in communication with Detached Com. Unit #2 (TAMOI) gave info address of despatch of which date and time group missed [redacted] as including all Comdrs. Base Air Force, Chiefs of Staff Combined and 4th Fleets, Comdr. 6th Base Force at Jaluit, Navy Vice Minister and Vice Chief Naval General Staff, plus ComCruDiv 8 (HATI-SEN-TAIKIKI), which confirms previous indications by definitely associating CruDiv 8 with Marshalls area. No apparent reason as yet for this unusual team up and no indications noted as yet that this CruDiv is accompanied by other units.

(TZM-240710-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 27).

No. 1-d:

At 1300 23 January a concealed identity (NARAB) called Jaluit on 8610 kcs to deliver a dispatch addressed to Chief of Naval General Staff, Minister of the Navy, CinC's Combined Fleet and 3rd Fleet, info CinC's 2nd Fleet and 4th Fleet, and Commander Base Force #6. The originator is certainly no minor unit in the Marshalls, and the headings indicate he is an important unit of 3rd Fleet. From previous indications, suggest originator is ComCruDiv 8.

(NSS-232146-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 39).

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JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-e:

Nothing to add to Washington's comments on tentative CruDiv 8 activity in the Marshall-Gilberts area. If the TONE is indeed in this area, the presence of at least one submarine in the vicinity of US convoy routes as a scout may be preliminary to surface raids.

These might be for nuisance value, or, in view of the presence of Third Fleet Staff plus 4 fairly definite carriers in the Truk area, to decoy US forces away from the area of a projected major operation.

(HYPO-25-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 18).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were indications of extensive air searches in the Marshalls where considerable shipping was noted. An auxiliary aircraft tender also was believed to be in the Marshalls.

No. 2-a:

CONCENTRATED AIR SEARCHES UNDERWAY EASTERN MARSHALLS
 X SUSPECTED XAV SHINKOKU MARU NOTED IN SAME AREA X
 UNUSUAL NUMBER MARUS DETECTED MARSHALLS SECTION

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic intelligence yielded this information.

No. 2-b:

The _____ traffic originating in the Marshalls-Gilbert area apparently represents bonafide aircraft reconnaissance brought on by increased U.S. sub activity in this area, by increased Orange movements into this area, or by both.

.....

Aircraft activity in this area [Marshalls] is up considerably and does not appear to be of the drill or exercise type. If important convoys or fighting craft are being moved into this area it appears obvious that air patrol activities would increase.

(HIPO-24, January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, pp. 6 and 24).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-c:

A general message was routed by Tokyo to Jaluit for delivery to 15 Marus.

(HYPO-23-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 48).

No. 2-d:

The SHINKOKU Maru was heard on 8550 kcs working Ruetto and sending a kana dispatch NR 273 addressed to Staff 11th Air Fleet. The SHINKOKU's use of 8550, which is used primarily by air units, and her association with air activities brands her as an aircraft auxiliary vessel of some sort. A bearing of 252 from HOW places her in the Marshalls area.

(HYPO-24-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 23).

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JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

New information on the enemy's carriers was
lacking.

No. 3-a:

NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING CARRIERS

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)Item 4(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was believed that the Japanese Army had jurisdiction over aircraft operating in the south-eastern Indies.

No. 4-a:

ARMY POSSIBLY HAS JURISDICTION AIRCRAFT OPERATING WESTERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Army control was suggested by an analysis of current traffic.

No. 4-b:

Dispatch at 1945 20th of January (probably from concealed Comdr. 24th Base Force) was addressed for info to CofS Combined Fleet (AMU 4), Comdr. 25th Base Force (NTLJO), detachments 24th Base Force at Saumlaki (HINTU), Dobe (TIKHA), Babar ? (OHIRI), Watauri ? (MESTOSO), and unident OHOTU (location by D/F on line between Darwin and Flamingo Bay in Dutch New Guinea), plus [redacted] 12th Air Division (Army).

In this association it is suggested that aircraft operating in southeastern zone EI might come under jurisdiction of Army command.

(T2W-221011-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 104).

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JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes were obtained on six enemy submarines.

No. 5-a:

SUBS BY DOG FOX SOUTH AND EAST X 12155 X 07166 X
07162 X 07158 X 01162 X ALSO ONE AT ZERO ONE NORTH
ONE SEVEN FOUR WEST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 5-b:

D/F Fixes for January 24, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub 6385	166	- E 07 - S	1648/23
NARAE	Sub 6385	162	- E 07 - S	1700/23
NARAE	Sub 13220	162	- E 07 - S	2110/23
NARAE	Sub 6385	162	- E 07 - S	0850/24
NARAE	Sub 13220	162	- E 01 - N	0345/24
NARAE	Sub 6385	158	- E 07-308	1310/24
NARAE	Sub 6385	174	- W 01 - N	0755/24

(HYPO-24-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, pp. 75a and 21b).

The source of the fix at 12 S. 155 E. is not known.

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JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The departure of two submarines from Truk for the south on January 23 was reported.

No. 6-a:

ITEM 25 AND 26 LEFT TRUK ENROUTE SOUTH ON 23RD

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The departure of these submarines was disclosed by intercepted dispatches.

No. 6-b:

230715 January, 1943

From:	AMA	12	
To :	WANAMO	6	(HAGOROMO Maru)
	MUUN	4	(SubChaser Div. #58)
	MOYO	4	(Truk)
	NNO30	9	
	YOHU	3	
Info:	NIYU	62	(2nd Fleet)
	OSI	7	

Today 23-1600: Departures through South Channel.

Submarine I-25, after passing through Kimishima Channel, course 162.

Submarine I-26, after passing through Kimishima Channel, course 122.

(T28-26014, January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 57).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-g:

231700 January, 1943

From: KESONE 5
To : NINITA (Truk)

23rd. South Channel. 0800. 1 destroyer blank
(entered?).

1100. Submarines I-25 and I-26 departed.

Nothing else to report.

(T2W-240358-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 49).

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JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were signs that enemy submarines still were carrying supplies to Guadalcanal and some evidence that surface vessels soon might make the attempt.

No. 7-a:

BELIEVE SUBS STILL CONTACTING GUADALCANAL. X ALSO SOME SIGNS TOKYO EXPRESS FORMING

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from traffic analysis which disclosed a continuing association of enemy submarines with Guadalcanal.

No. 7-b:

On 22nd very little activity was noted Guadalcanal area, however Staff Officer Todoroki (MOYOKU) sent his usual short operational messages and some of these prefixed urgent.

Submarines continue close association with Guadalcanal.

(T2W-230946-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 106).

No. 7-c:

Sub unit NEHA 1 originated most urgents at 1930 and 2108 to Combined Sub Force, Comdr. sub unit MAKE 43, info Guadalcanal Operations Force.

(N55-231710-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 109).

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Authority *AND 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-d:

High precedence traffic from submarines continues after midnight 23-24 January. "B" SubForce still is on 3955 kcs, transmitting direct to Guadalcanal Operations Force.

(NSS-231645-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 116).

No. 7-e:

#2 Surface Escort Force is appearing in Truk traffic and it appears likely that another run of the "Tokyo Express" may be in the offing.

(HYPO-23-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 57).

No. 7-f:

From the associations in these despatches it appears that units of DesRon 3, DesRon 10, CarDiv 2, 2nd Escort Unit and probably some 2nd Fleet units are preparing for another try at reinforcing Guadalcanal.

(NSS-241124-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 114).

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

The "Tokyo Express" made a run on the night of January 26. See ComSoPac Dispatch 252351 January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The heavy cruiser ASHIGARA was known to be near Java, the mine-layer ITSUKUSHIMA near Waigeo Island off New Guinea, and Cruiser Division 9 near Newak.

No. 8-a:

ASHIGARA NEAR JAVA X ITSUKUSHIMA NEAR WAIGEO IS X
CRUDIV NINE OPERATING NEWAK AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The ASHIGARA was located by traffic routing, the other vessels by intercepted dispatches.

No. 8-b:

The ASHIGARA (CA) is indicated by service despatch sent to Soerabaya by Tokyo in the Soerabaya area.

(HYPO-24-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 147).

No. 8-c:

Tokyo sent service despatch 2027 on 24th January to Soerabaya for delivery to ASHIGARA (INETA).

(NSS-250143-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 146).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *nnd 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8-d:

231140 January, 1943

OO1

From:	NARAE		
To :	TAMIKU		(Garbled call)
	KIRO	90	(Unident)
	EKE	8	(Unident)
	MANO	9	(#23rd Base Force)
	ERO	1	
	EFU	4	

From Captain of the ITSUKUSHIMA.

1 blank drifting mine discovered blank (130-38 East 0-34 South).

It has been disposed of.

(NSS-210400-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 88).

* * *

231140 January, 1943

OO1

From:	NARAE		
To :	TANOKI		(All Merchant Vessels)
	WIRO	9	
	EKE	8	
	MANO	9	
	ERO	1	
	UFU	4	

From C. O. ITSUKUSHIMA.

1 floating mine (type 93) was sighted and disposed of in Sagewin Straits (130-48E, 0-34S).

(T2W-240649-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 145).

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8-d: (continued)

* * *

231110 January, 1943

001

From: NARAE
 To : TANOKU (All Ships)
 MIRO 9 (2nd So. Exp. Fleet)
 NIKE 9
 KERO 1
 UFU 4

From Commanding Officer ITSUKUSHIMA.

A floating mine was discovered in the Sagami Straits at 130-48 East 00-54 South (type 93) and disposed of.

(NPH-241358-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 87).

No. 8-e:

242037 January, 1943

From: Blank originator
 To : WAKI 3-1
 MEA 20-08 (Combined Fleet)
 SUA 60-78 (So. East Area Fleet)
 HOUR 00-88 (8th Fleet)

(Fragment: ComCruDiv 9 is still concerned with weak transport duties and mentions air coverage).

(NPH-242006-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 119).

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *and 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #315 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 AONB
 NZNB

250359 January, 1943
 Priority

SUBMARINES ITEM 25 AND 26 DEPARTED TRUK 23RD FOR SOUTH X
 ZEMOTIC X CINCPAC BULLETIN 315 X AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN SOUTH-
 EASTERN NETHERLANDS INDIES POSSIBLY UNDER JURISDICTION ARMY
 COMMAND X SUBS LOCATED BY BEARINGS X SOUTH AND EAST X 01162
 X 12155 X 07158 X 07162 X 07166 X 1 AT 01 NORTH 174 WEST X
 MORE INDICATIONS CRUISER TONE MAY BE OPERATING IN OR FROM
 MARSHALL GILBERT THEATRE X POSSIBLY RAIDING OPERATIONS X AIR
 SEARCH FROM MARSHALLS INTENSIFIED X SHINKOKU MARU (AIRCRAFT
 TENDER QUESTION) ALSO SHOWN IN SAME AREA X CONSIDERABLE MOVE-
 MENT SHIPPING TO MARSHALLS SEEN X SUBMARINES CONTINUE SUPPLY-
 ING GUADALCANAL X SOME SENS SURFACE REINFORCEMENT ATTEMPT
 MAY BE MADE GUADALCANAL SHORTLY X ASHIGARA VICINITY SURABAYA
 X CARRIER INFORMATION UNCHANGED X CRUIDIV 9 STILL ACTIVE WENAK
 SECTOR X ITSUKUSHIMA VICINITY WAIGEO ISLAND

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943COMSOPAC DISPATCH 252312(A) INTELLIGENCE

ComSOPAC warned American forces to be on the alert against enemy action on January 27. The recent appearance of the cruiser TORE and the aircraft tender SHINKO Maru in the Marshall-Gilbert area and the recent flurry of unexplained activity there prompted this warning.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC
 To : ALL TFC SOPAC
 ALL SHIPS AND BASES SOPAC
 COMGEN SOPAC
 COMGEN FMAC
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMINCH
 COMSOWESPAC

252312 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

POSSIBILITY EXISTS ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION ON 27 JANUARY X INDICATIONS WHILE VAGUE INVOLVE GRU DIV 8 AND ASSOCIATED XAV'S X MARSHALL-GILBERT AREA APPEARS INVOLVED ALSO X BE ALERT X ZEAL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See Item 5, CinCPac Bulletin #312, January 22, 1943; Item 6, CinCPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943; and Item 1, CinCPac Bulletin #315, January 25, 1943.

This diversionary activity in the Marshall-Gilberts area was climaxed on January 30 when two Japanese submarines shelled Canton Island. See Item 9 of CinCPac Bulletin #319, January 29, 1943.

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943

COMSOPAC DISPATCH 252351

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Commanding General on Guadalcanal and Com-
AirSOPAC were advised of indications that enemy sub-
marines were scheduled to arrive at Kamimbo on January
26, 27, and 29.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC
To : COMGEN CACTUS
COMAIRSOPAC
Info: CINCOPAC
COMSOMESPAC

252351 January, 1943
Priority

JAP SUBS X ULTRA X MAY ARRIVE KAMIMBO WITH SUPPLIES
ON 26TH, 27TH AND 29TH X TIME OF ARRIVAL ON 27TH IN-
DICATED AS 1945 L (-11)

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was drawn from the ensuing
dispatches.

No. 2

231603 January, 1943

81980

From:	KEHA	7	(Rabaul Comm. Unit)
To :	NUU	93	(Comdr. Baker SubFor)
	TATUSU	1	(Comdr. Guadalcanal Comm. Base)
	YANI	6	(Seaplane TenDiv. 11)
	KARE	1	(8th Base Force)
	REFU	0	(AirFlet 20)
	TEU	9	(Unident)
	KAFU	4	(ComSubRon 3)
Info:	NUU	9	("B" SubFor)
	MAKE	4	(Sub Unit)
	ESI	80	(CofS SubFor)
	RLSI	80	(CofS 8th Fleet)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

(Unable read all details but is from Capt. of I-17 and outlines operation of I-17 enroute Kamimbo with food supplies. Scheduled arrive Kamimbo at 1754 on 27th. Message is for info Cofs 17th Army and Comdr. #1 Shipping Group).

(NSS-250131-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 89).

* * *

231803 January, 1943

From:	KEHA	7	(Rabaul)
To :	NUU	93	("B" SubForce)
	ATAUSU	1	
	YAN I	67	(SeaPlatDiv 11)
	REPU	08	(26th AirFlot)
	MAKE	19	(Collective Rabaul Area)
	ATEU	93	
	KAFU	43	(SubRon 3)
Info:	NUU	93	(SubForce)
	MAKE	44	(Sub Unit)
	ESI	80	(SubForce)
	HISI	80	(8th Fleet)

From Captain blank Sub (05862 R).

Information Cofs 17th Army, Commander blank Shipping Group.

Will transport provisions to Kamimbo as follows:

Depart Rabaul 24 January (many blanks - grid positions) expect arrive Kamimbo via blank route at 1745 27 January.

(HYPO-26-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 78).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3

250824, January, 1943

From: KIKU 2
 To : TAMOI (2nd Comm. Det. at Kamimbo)

The sending of men by the I-2 Submarine on the 26th, the I-17 Submarine on the 27th, and the I-1 Submarine on the 29th will be stopped.

COMMENT: Refer to NAN's 250434.

(NFM-250804-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 122).

* * *

250824, January, 1943

From: Staff (?) Guadalcanal Operations Force
 To : Chiyoda Base Guadalcanal
 2nd Comm. Det. at Kamimbo

The evacuation of personnel by the submarines I-2 on the 26th, I-17 on the 27th, and the I-1 on the 29th is cancelled.

(HM-O-25-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 98).

* * *

250824, January, 1943

From: No originator
 To : KIKU 22

The 26th blanks. The sending back to Japan of the crews of Submarine I-17 and I-1 is cancelled.

(NBS-251353-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 99).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

ND 947022

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

In view of the warning from radio intelligence that enemy submarines and possibly surface vessels (see Item 7 in the bulletin for January 25) would attempt to run supplies to Guadalcanal on the night of January 26, measures designed to effect an interception were placed in operation.

No. 4

260451 January, 1943
Operational Priority

From: COMNAVACTSOL
To : ALL SHIPS CACTUS RINGBOLT
Info: COMAIRSOPAC
COMSOPAC

THIS IS A REINFORCEMENT OF MY 260446 SENT TO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN ANOTHER SYSTEM X HAVE RECEIVED REPORT THAT JAP SUBS MAY ARRIVE KAKIMBO ABOUT 1945 L. (-11) TONIGHT WITH SUPPLIES X COMBINE SWEEP 25 DIRECTED AT 1500 PROCEED IN COMPANY WITH MOA AND UPON ARRIVAL KAKIMBO AREA ESTABLISH ANTI SUB PATROL NORTHWEST TIP OF GUADALCANAL FROM COUGHLAN HARBOR TO TIBALE X AT DARK PROCEED LUNGA AND TAKE POSITIONS IN SCREEN IF FLOATING SUPPLIES ARE FOUND IN WATER RECOVER IF PRACTICABLE OTHERWISE DESTROY X IF EXPRESS RUNS RETIRE TO WEST AND SOUTH OF GUADALCANAL X FRIENDLY NEW ZEALAND SLOOP NOW AT TALEVO POINT X COM MTRON FLOTTILLA STATION TOTAL 4 PT'S TONIGHT 2 FROM CAPE ESPERANCE TO SAVO X 2 FROM CAPE ESPERANCE TO DOMMA X COM PCS PATROL ENEMY COAST FROM 2300 TO 0200 X ASSUME CIG 62.7 WILL RELIEVE TULGI ENTRANCE PATROL AT DARK AND FURNISH PURVES BAY PATROL IN ACCORDANCE COMSOPAC 180002 X COMTASGROUP 67.5 SEND FLETCHER AND RADFORD ABOUT DARK TO MAKE ANTI SUB SWEEP TO EASTWARD OF KOKIMBONA THRU LENGU CHANNEL AND UPON HIS RETURNING SWEEP LUNGA LENGU UNLOADING AREA PRIOR DAYLIGHT 1 DD

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *nmD 947022*

~~SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 4 (continued)

PROCEEDING WITH BOMBARDMENT MISSION AS ORDERED IN SEPARATE DESPATCH X COMTASKGROUP 67.5 ARRANGE FOR RELIEF OF ENTRANCE PATROL DAYLIGHT NOYSAL TULAGI RETIREMENTS X TASKUNIT 62.4.7 ARRIVE EAST END LENGU 0500, 3 ARS 1 AP AND 3 DD X CORVETTE ESCORTING LCT ENROUTE FROM BEAUFORT BAY VIA EAST END GUADALCANAL TO LUNIA ETA ABOUT NOON

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 26, 1943).

At 2220 (local time) on January 26, seven enemy destroyers and one cruiser were reported 95 miles from Guadalcanal on course 180. This force was believed to be carrying supplies to Guadalcanal. Although darkness precluded any large scale air attack on the convoy, one plane made two bombing attacks during the night but scored no hits. The convoy then either turned back or put in at the Russell Islands and no further contact with it was established.

No. 5

From: PL 2 FLT 75

261120 January, 1943

To : GUADALCANAL

Priority

Retransmitted:

From: COMAIRSOPAC

To : ALL SHIPS SOPAC AREA

ALL COMBENS SOPAC IS. BASES

Info: CINCPAC

COMSOWESPAC

7 ENEMY DESTROYERS 1 CRUISER POSITION 8-30 158-44
COURSE 180 SPEED 30 X I AM TRAILING ENEMY

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 26, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6

From: COMSOPAC
To : CINCPAC
Info: ALL CTF SOPAC
COMSOWESPAC
RZNB

270707 January, 1943
Priority

HERE'S DAILY DOPE FROM COMSOPAC ALL TIMES L (-11) X
AT 2230 LAST NIGHT 26TH 1 NIP CRUISER 7 DD'S WERE
BOWLING DOWN THE ALLEY 95 MILES FROM CACTUS X 1 OF
OUR CATS MADE 2 BOMBING ATTACKS THESE SHIPS CLAIMS
NEAR MISS ON 1 FROM 1400 FEET BUT LOST CONTACT X
NO REPORT EXPRESS ARRIVING CACTUS X MAY HAVE TURNED
BACK OR RUN INTO RUSSELS XX ANOTHER BLACK CAT CAUGHT
2 SURFACED SUBS 2220 OFF BURAKU ISLAND WEST OF RUSSELS
DROPPED SINGLE BOMB FROM LOW ALTITUDE RESULTS UNOBS-
SERVED

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 27, 1943).

No. 7

From: SENAV CACTUS
To : COMAIRSOPAC
Info: CINCPAC
COMSOPAC
COMSOWESPAC
COMFLAW
COMINTSOPAC
ALL TF COMSOPAC

262155 January, 1943
Operational Priority

M SEARCH MADE ONLY 1 CIRCUIT OF COURSE FULL COVERAGE
X RETURNED BASE AFTER BOMBING SUBMARINES, MY 261343 X
BLACK CAT 3 RETURNED BASE 0050 L (-11) X NEGATIVE
EXCEPT FOR INFORMATION CONTAINED MY 261131 X BOTH
CATS RELOADED WITH BOMBS HELD READY ALL NIGHT FOR
ATTACK ENEMY SURFACE FORCES X BLACK CAT 2 MADE CON-
TACT 7 DD'S 1 CA X CONTACT REPORT REBROADCAST FOX
SCHEDULE BY RADIO GUADAL X DROPPED 4 500 POUND BOMBS
IN 2 ATTACKS 2315 L (-11) GOT ONE NEAR MISS ON ENEMY
SHIP FROM 1400 FEET X PERMANENTLY LOST CONTACT WITH
FORCE AT 2330 L (-11) X BELIEVES FORCE TURNED BACK X

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7 (continued)

CAT NUMBER 4 CONTACT REPORTED UNIDENTIFIED SHIP AT
OLLO L (-11) BEARING 270 DISTANCE 60 REBROADCAST X
SEARCH OTHERWISE NEGATIVE

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 26, 1943).

A more successful interception occurred on the night of January 29 when the enemy submarine I-1, while carrying troops and supplies to Guadalcanal, was intercepted by two New Zealand corvettes off Cape Esperance. Depth charges forced the I-1 to the surface and she was then rammed by one of the corvettes. The submarine finally was beached near Kamimbo.

No. 8

From: COMNAVAGTSOL
To : COMSOPAG
Info: CINCPAC
COMINCH

292342 January, 1943
Operational Priority

DURING NIGHT JANUARY 29TH-30TH LOCAL OFF CAPE ES-
PERANCE NEW ZEALAND CORVETTES KIMI AND MOA DESTROYED
IN SURFACE ENGAGEMENT LARGE TYPE 4 INCH GUN SUBMARINE
CARRYING TROOPS X SUBMARINE CUTTED AND BEACHED NEAR
KAMIMBO BAY, GUADALCANAL X 1 OFFICER PRISONER X 3
INJURED ON KIMI X KIMI BOW AND ASDIC GEAR DAMAGED
SO THAT SHIP CANNOT CONTINUE PRESENT OPERATIONS AND
WILL REQUIRE REFIT X KIMI IS SEAWORTHY AND CAN MAKE
9 KNOTS

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

No. 9

In another submarine contact on the evening of 29 January, 2 of 4 New Zealand corvettes, operating out of Tulagi since December, were on patrol off north-western Guadalcanal. At 2115 KIMI picked up a submarine at 3000 yards and conducted 2 excellent depth

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *DD 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)No. 9 (continued)

charge attacks which forced the enemy submarine to surface. KDWI opened fire and rammed 3 times. MOA assisted with gunfire and completed the chase after KDWI was damaged by ramming. The submarine had landing craft secured on deck. "Soldiers with full packs jumped overboard but were not seen to surface". At 2320 the submarine stranded on a reef with her bow out of water. Her navigator, who was wounded, was picked up by MOA next morning. This submarine is the I-1 which we are now attempting to salvage and from which valuable documentary information was obtained.

Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, 1943. Solomon Islands Campaign-Fall of Guadalcanal, Period 25 January to 10 February, 1943. Report by CinCPac dated April 17, 1943, p. 10).

No. 10

30061A January, 1943

33689

From: TANOI (2nd Det. at Kamimbo 1-12)
To: NUBATU (SubForce Flagship)

Info: RATAYO 30 (11th Air Fleet)
NAOYO 30 (8th Fleet)

From C.O. of I-1.

Engagement report.

At 1900 was attacked by 2 torpedo boats and 2 (planes) abandoned landing of provisions and submerged. While running submerged was disabled by 2 depth charges or bombs and forced to surface.

At 1920, further attacked and sunk at 2120 in position 1 kilometer north of blank (Kamimbo?).

Captain killed. 47 survivors now at Kamimbo.

(NFM-010248-February-51)

(D.T.B. January 31, 1943, p. 69).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *nm 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

The I-2 postponed her trip to Guadalcanal from January 26 to the 27 because of bad weather. This submarine was detected while running submerged off Guadalcanal by American warships. Despite a sustained attack and search by these ships, the I-2 apparently escaped damage.

No. 11

262201, January, 1943

From:	WAMA	55	(7th SubDiv)
To :	HUTE	1	
	SINO	05	(SubRon)
	TATUSU	1	(Guadalcanal Defense Force)

As result of bad weather I-2 has postponed operation until tomorrow, 27th (January).

(HYPO-12-March-91)

(D.T.B. March 12, 1943, p. 57).

No. 12

261237 January, 1943

23693

From:	NARAS		
To :	YANE	0-3	(Equiv. to NE 10 L 16 SF or)
	SUSE	32-41	(Jaluit Comm. Unit)
	KANE	62-91	(R Area SubFor)
Info:	MESE	4-2	(Combined Operations Force)

From C. O. I-2.

On 26 January at blank 20 in position KENO blank (approx. long. 159-30) attacked or observed enemy cruiser, etc. Received (blank) attack 2 bursts but

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Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 12 (continued)

sustained no damage. Until 0730 was hunted by enemy destroyers.

GI COMMENT: Guadalcanal 271236 reported submerged enemy SS at 9-00 S, 159-28 E.

(NFM-262234, January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 108).

* * *

281237 January, 1943

23693

From:	NARAE		(Nerk)
To :	YANE	Ø	(SubForce)
	SUSE	3	(A SubForce ?)
	KANE	6	(B SubForce)
Info:	MISE	4	(Guadalcanal Operations Force)

From ComSubDiv 7.

At 0230 28th, in position (HO blank) 159-20 ?, the I-2 while running submerged (blanks) enemy cruiser (more blanks). I-2 was attacked with 2 depth charges (?) but sustained no damage. Until 0730 sustained continuous destroyer attack.

(T26-290643-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 54).

The following submarine sighting reports may have concerned the I-2.

No. 13

From:	PL 1 FLT 75	271234 January, 1943
To :	RDO GUADALCANAL	
Retransmitted:		
From:	RDO GUADALCANAL	
To :	ALL SHIPS - BASES SOPAC AREA	

SIGHTED SUBMARINE LAT 08-56 LONG 158-40 SUBMERGED

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 27, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 14

From: PL 1 FLT 75
To : GUADALCANAL
Retransmitted:
From: GUADALCANAL
To : ALL SHIPS - BASES SOPAC

271236 January, 1943
Urgent

SUBMERGED ENEMY SUBMARINE LAT 09-00 LONG 159-28

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 27, 1943).

The I-17 apparently held to her original schedule but was attacked enroute to Guadalcanal by Allied planes. Like the I-2, she appears to have escaped unharmed from these attacks.

No. 15

262234 January, 1943

53393

From: No originator
To : N70 5 (Unident)
WAMA 5 (Unident)
WTFB 2 (Unident)
Info: 7 addrees including SubForce, 8th, & 11th Air Flts.

From Captain I-17.

Blank sustained attack from enemy flying boat in position 158-20-40 East, 8-20-40 South.

COMMENT: Blank garbled looks like date or time. Numeral giving exact minutes latitude and longitude not recovered.

(T26-291552-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 53).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *nnd 947022*

JANUARY 25, 1943 (Continued)

No. 15 (continued)

* * *

262234 January, 1943

53393

From: No originator
 To : SINO 36 (SubRon)
 WAMA 6 (SubDiv 7)
 WTE 1 (Sub)
 Info: NUKE 52 (SubForce)
 MOYU 321
 NONI 87 (R Area Defense Force)
 REMA 97
 ESSI 7
 SINO 3 (SubRon)

Originator C. O. I-7.

Have been closely pursued by seaplanes (position NENI blank) (long.) since 2230.

(NFM-310810-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 73).

The above attack on the I-17 probably was that reported in the following dispatch.

No. 16

From: SENAV CACTUS
 To : COMAIRSOPAC
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMSOPAC
 COMGENSOPAC
 COMSOWESPAC
 ALL TF COMSOPAC
 COMGEN FMAW
 ESPIRITU SANTOS

261343 January, 1943
Operational Priority

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *ND 947022*

BLACK CAT LOCATED 2 SUBMARINES ON SURFACE 8 DEG 56 SOUTH 158 DEG 49 EAST 2230 L (-11) X DROPPED 1 500 POUNDER FROM 1000 FEET X RESULTS NOT OBSERVED X SUB SUBMERGED

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 26, 1943).

JANUARY 26, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #316

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMBPNPAC
ALL TF CMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

260313 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The arrival at Kamimbo of a submarine with supplies on the evening of January 27 was forecast. It was also noted that submarines were engaged in similar missions to eastern New Guinea.

No. 1-a:

PREDICT ARRIVAL OF A SUPPLY SUB KAMIMBO ON EVENING 27TH X ALSO SIMS SUBS BEING USED SUPPLY WORK EASTERN NEW GUINEA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The intercepted messages from which the intelligence concerning the submarine at Kamimbo was derived are quoted under ComSoPac Dispatch 252351, January, 1943.

Traffic analysis also disclosed a close association of submarines with both Guadalcanal and eastern New Guinea.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-b:

There were no other associations with any Guadalcanal activity except for 3 sub messages involving use of A and B SubForces and Guadalcanal (TATUSU). Apparently the only contact with Guadalcanal contemplated at present time is by submarines.

(NSG-241904-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 104).

No. 1-c:

2 dispatches originated by Detached Communication Unit #2 (TAMOI) on Guadalcanal on 24th. 1st at 0546 addressed to Comdr. "B" SubFor, info "B" SubFor plus Staffs 8th Fleet and SubFor. 2nd at 1142 addressed Commanding Officer of I-20, Comdr. Advanced Expeditionary Force, and Comdr. 2nd Submarine Force, info 2nd Submarine Force collective, CofS 8th Area Army, and CofS 17th Army. Headings indicate submarines used for supplying Army forces on Guadalcanal and I-20 involved in these operations.

(T2W-251115-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 86).

No. 1-d:

Short operational dispatch at 0325/24th was addressed SubFor (TIHI 7), unident KUMA 96, info 11th Air Fleet (HES0 1), plus Guadalcanal Operations Force (HDI 1).

Dispatch later pass to Salamua (NEAFU) for info suggesting submarines may be operating New Guinea area possibly supplying units there.

(T2W-251050-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 96).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ND 947022

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of three enemy submarines were listed.

No. 2-a:

DOG FOX SUBS PLACED 2 NORTH 170 EAST 11 SOUTH 161 EAST 2 SOUTH 156 EAST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 2-b:

D/F Fixes for January 25, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	13220	156-E 01-30S	0450/25
NARAE	Sub	6385	161-E 11 - S	1255/25

(HYPO-25-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 73b).

No. 2-c:

D/F Fixes for January 25, 1943. Not previously reported.

MARSHALLS-GILBERTS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6610	170 W 02 N Between Palmyra and Howland.	1340/25

(HYPO-26-January-TI)

/Ed.note: The longitudinal reading of 170 East in the bulletin is an error for 170 West/.

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 9c).

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JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The Dog Fox fix on a submarine between Palmyra and Howland Islands resulted in a rerouting of two American ships proceeding to Canton Island from Oahu.

No. 2-d:

From: COMHAWSEAFRON 252310 January, 1943
To : LAWRENCE PHILLIPS Priority
Info: GINCPAC

DIVERT FROM PRESCRIBED COURSE IMMEDIATELY TO PASS THROUGH A POSITION BEARING 360 DEGREES 360 MILES FROM ROUTE POINT M X THENCE PROCEED DESTINATION VIA POINT M ELIMINATING ROUTE POINT L X ENEMY SUBMARINE REPORTED IN LAT 01-30 NORTH 170 WEST AT 1338 GCT JANUARY 25 X EXERCISE UTMOST VIGILANCE

No. 2-e:

From: COMHAWSEAFRON 262114 January, 1943
To : USS CROWN BLOCK Priority
Info: GINCPAC

YOUR ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS MODIFIED FOR OUTWARD VOYAGE ONLY X FROM ROUTE POINT N PROCEED TO A POSITION 090 DEGREES 90 MILES FROM POINT P THENCE DIRECT TO DESTINATION X AT 1338 GCT JANUARY 25 AN ENEMY SUB WAS REPORTED IN LAT 01-30 NORTH LONG 170 WEST X TAKE PRECAUTIONS

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was known that enemy troops were being sent to the Mandates from northern China.

No. 3-a:

TROOPS FROM TSINGTAO ENROUTE PALAU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The schedule for this transportation operation was intercepted.

No. 3-b:

231713 January, 1943

43880

From:	Blank originator	
To :	NOWIFI	9 (KIYOSUMI Maru)
	WITUKE	(GOKOKU Maru)
	EAST	6
	KENO	0
Info:	MOYU	90 (GofS Combined)
	AHA	64 (1st Sect. Naval Staff)
	AHA	68 (Secretary of major command)
	OTE	50
	MERO	7
	URO	10
	FUWO	50
	SUU	50

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Part I - From Commander Hei Operation Transp. Force.

Hei Transportation Force OpOrd # blank.

1. Hei #3 Transport Operations are scheduled as follows:

A. Point of departure - Tsingtao [redacted]; Disembarkation point (?) - PP (Palau).

B. Blanks. In accordance with Transportation Forces Operation Order #3, AIKOKU Maru [redacted] is detached

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

from #2 Transportation Unit and will operate independently (?). UKISHIMA Maru _____ detached from #3 Transportation Unit and assigned #2 Transportation Unit.

C. Schedule in order of date of arrival (?), loading date, date of departure and number of days under-way (?).

#1 Transp. Unit: February 2 (?)
February 2, 3, or 4
About 6 days

#2 Transp. Unit: January 26
January (?) 27, 28
About 7 days

#3 Transp. Unit: February 7
February 6, 7
About 7 days

#4 Transp. Unit: February 10
February 11, 12
About 9 days

AIKOKU : February 26
February 27, 28
About 6 days

Schedule of loading operations may be changed by the commanders of units or vessels. (COMMENT: this last rather doubtful).

(NSS-2/0511-January-DI)

(D.F.B. January 25, 1943, p. 63).

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JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

* * *

231713 January, 1943

43880

From: Blank originator
 To : NUSI 7
 NOKATI 9
 KE-ORE
 NITURE
 HOTE 8

Info: MAYU 90
 OTEKA 0
 RISI 90
 UTE 10
 FUNO 50
 SUU 50
 WOFU 26
 KUTE 8
 HIRO 7
 AHA 64
 AHA 68

Originator Commander "C" Transport Force, "C" Transport Force OpOrd #281.

C-5 Transport schedule fixed as follows:

Port of departure , enroute Palau.

A. In accordance with "C" Transportation Force OpOrd #2107, the AIKOKU Maru is detached from #2 Group. The UKESHIMA Maru is detached from #3 Transport Group and placed in #2 Transport Group.

B. Blanks.

- 1 parenthesis loading.
- 1 parenthesis departure date.
- 1 parenthesis estimated time of trip.

(NFM-270618-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 37).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-c:

231713 January, 1943

53495

From: Blank originator
 To : KOTO 5 (Man-o-war or Maru)
 KASAMU 6 (Comdr. Outer South Seas For.)
 NASIRE (SEICHO Maru)
 UTE 5
 RAMU 7
 Info: NOU 50 (CofS Combined)
 TUFU (CofS 8th Fleet)
 UHO 10 (CofS 11th Air)
 HNU 20
 SUU 50
 FUKO 50
 WOFU 26

Blank Maru and #2 Transportation Unit will blanks and confer with the Aqly and Tsingtao Special Base Force following which they will carry out the first part of Hei #3 Transportation Operation.

COMMENT: The term "Hei Goo Yusoo Butai" has been translated "Hei Operation Transportation Force" rather than "C Transportation Force" as in NEGAT's previous despatch on this subject. In NEGAT's 231720 change "Support" to read "Transportation Unit".

(NSG-240511-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 9).

* * *

231713 January, 1943

53495

From: Blank originator
 To : KOTO 5 (Maru in Saipan area, Maru
 TEKISU, or warship)
 UTE 5-2
 NENOMESKUNAHIRA 66
 HEIKO U YUTO TAI

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 3-a: (continued)

Info:	KASAMU	6	(Outer So. Seas Force)
	RAMU	7-6	
	NASIRE	3	(Passenger-Commerce Raider Maru SEIHO, spec. cruiser on 18520)
	NOU	50-28	
	NMU	20-08	
	TUU	00-88	
	SUU	50-28	
	UHO	50-28	
	URO	0-8	
	WOU	26-07	
	TUHA	20-08	
	AHA	64-74	(Major command)
	MARO	7-6	(2nd or 3rd Fleet)
	KUTE	8-5	(Singapore)

#1 Transport Group: 1 February loading
2 and 3 February departure
6 days transit

#2 Transport Group: 27th loading
28th departure
7 days transit

#3 Transport Group: 6th loading
7th departure
7 days transit

#4 Transport Group: 10th loading
11th departure
12th departure
9 days transit

AIKOKU Maru : 24th loading
28th departure
6 days transit

Each group commander or ship will blank if sailing date is changed as a result of delay in loading.

Blank Maru and #2 Group will load Army and blank islands material at

(NPM-270813-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 2).

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JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-d:

Army traffic normal. _____ Tintou (Tsingtao)
addressed Commander Branch Shipping Office at Palsao
which is some further indication of withdrawal
Army units from China for uses in other areas.

(T2W-260745-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 150).

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JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The cruiser TONE continued in its association with the Gilbert-Marshall area.

No. 4-a:

CRUISER TONE STILL ASSOCIATED WITH GILBERTS MARSHALLS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The continued presence of the TONE in the Gilbert-Marshall area was indicated by traffic analysis.

No. 4-b:

.....CruDiv 8, possibly in close company with an unidentified sub unit (?), proceeded from Truk to Gilberts apparently without intermediate stop. This move was considered of considerable importance, judging from amount of intelligence sent specifically to the units underway. Purpose of this movement not indicated.

(NSS-242332-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 17).

No. 4-c:

The call EJU 86 was twice associated with CofS 3rd Fleet in NARAB originator messages of 25th, tending to confirm the identification. 2nd Air Attack Force appears to issue a report of day's reconnaissance about 1700 and has included ComCruDiv 8 as an info addressee since 20 January. At 1645 on 25th, Tarea Air addressed unident NAME 8, info ComCruDiv 8 (EJU 8) and ComAirFlot 22 (ROMO 3). There is a slight suggestion from this that CruDiv 8's operations are, or will be, to the north of Jaluit's latitude on the supposition that Tarea is reporting results of air search to CruDiv 8.

(NSS-252200-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 27).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

558

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-1:

The call MOYU 9 is more likely to be CofS Combined Fleet as YOHASU 30 is better for CofS 11th Air Fleets. The absence of ComCruDiv 8 from these reports tends to confirm a current indication that ComCruDiv 8 is in the Gilberts area, as call sign compromise reported yesterday by Melbourne definitely shows CruDiv 8 to be in the Marshalls-Gilberts general area.

(HYPO-January-26-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 29).

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Authority *nm 947022*

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The SHIRETOKO, a tanker, was announced to be due at Jaluit on January 30 from Truk.

No. 5-a:

TANKER SHIRETOKO ENROUTE TRUK TO JALUIT TO ARRIVE 30 JANUARY

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The movements of this tanker were disclosed by an intercepted message.

No. 5-b:

231530 January, 1943

From:	SOFU-SOU	9	
To :	ISASU	3	(C. O. SubChaser #10)
	HITHA	1	
	RINO	5	
Info:	SOTE	80	(CofS 2nd Fleet)
	KINO	0	(CofS Combined Fleet)
	TINA	50	(CofS 4th Fleet)
	HEND	1	(Base Force #6)
	TITUMA	3	(Comdr. Guard Div. #62)
	AURATO	2	(Comdr. Guard Div. #A)

The Caroline Area Defense Force Operation Order #27.

1. The SHIRETOKO on January 24 at 0700 will leave PT (Truk), and will arrive at PY (Jaluit) Northeast Channel on January 30th at 0900. The following points will be passed:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POINT</u>	<u>PLACE</u>
1730	26th	A	158-57 E 08-40 N
1900	27th	B	161-30 E 08-30 N
0600	30th	C	169-25 E 06-23 N

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-b: (continued)

2. #10 SubChaser Captain, under direction of the SHIRETOKO Captain, will provide close escort from PT (Truk) to Point B.

(NSS-232326-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 63).

* * *

231520 January, 1943

From:	SOFU	9	
To :	LSASU	3	(HAGOHOMO Mara)
	HIHA	1	
	RIO	5	
Info:	SOTS	80	
	KIHO	00	
	HEHO	1	
	FURATO	2	(42nd Guard Force)
	YITUMA	3	(62nd Defense Force)
	TIHA	50	

Caroline Area Defense Force Radio OpOrd #27.

1. The SHIRETOKO departs (PP) Palau 24 January at 0700 and on the 31st 0900 arrives at the (Northern ?-? Hoppoo?) Channel. Blank positions:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POINT</u>	<u>FLAG</u>
1730	26th	A	06-40 N 158-57 E
1500	27th	B	—30 N 161-30 E
0600	30th	C	06-23 N 169-25 E

SubChaser #10 (will escort ?) from P? to Point B.

(HIPO-23-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 23, 1943, p. 65).

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Authority *NOO 947022*

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
 JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-b: (continued)

* * *

231520 January, 1943

From:	SOFU	9	(Base Force #4)
To :	ISASU		(SubChaser #10)
	HIHA	1	
Info:	SOTS	8	(2nd Fleet)
	KINO	0	(Combined Fleet)
	TIHA	5	(4th Fleet)
	HEHO	1	(Southern Force ?)
	FURATO		(Guard Division 42)
	TITUMA		(Guard Division 62)

Caroline Area Defense Force OpOrd 27.

1. SHIRETOKO will leave Truk at 0700-24th and arrive Jaluit NE Channel 0900-30th January. Points through which she will pass are:

TIME	DATE	POINT	PLACE
1730	26th	A	8-40 N 158-57 E
1500	27th	B	8-30 N 161-30 E
0600	30th	C	6-23 N 169-25 E

2. C.O. SubChaser #10, acting under orders C.O. SHIRETOKO, will escort the latter as far as Point "B".

(T27-240432-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 24, 1943, p. 45).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The SHIRETOKO was attacked while enroute to Jaluit from Truk but appears to have escaped serious damage. This attack was made by the U.S.S. WHALE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 5-c:

260200 January, 1943

13285

From: ISASU 9
 To : NANONO 4
 SASIKI 5 (Pioneer Force #12)
 NISIKO 3

48267X Engagement Report #2 (?).

At 2305 on 25 January in position 8-03N, 156-17E
 SHIRETOKO () blanks escort blanks 1500 meters
 to port observed blanks opened fire blanks results
 unknown. Some difficulty blanks. Continuing
 cruise stand by the SHIRETOKO.

(NFM-150702-March-DI)

(D. T. B. March 15, 1943, p. 18).

No. 5-d:

From: TU 7.2.8 (WHALE) 270830 January, 1943
 To : COMSUEPAC Priority

TANKER SYOYO DAMAGED AT 1600 25TH AT SFPX 3032 (8-30
 NORTH 156-32 EAST) HEADING EAST OR SOUTHEAST.....

(GinPac Chronological Dispatch File, February 27, 1943)

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was known that the KAMAKURA Maru was departing Yokosuka on January 29 to arrive at Osaka on the 30th.

No. 6-a:

KAMAKURA MARU DEPARTS YOKOSUKA 29 JANUARY FOR OSAKA
ARRIVING 30TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The schedule of the KAMAKURA Maru was disclosed by an intercepted message.

No. 6-b:

232050 January, 1943

572

From: RAMU 6 (Naval Transp. Sect.)
To : Usual addressees

Schedule of KAMAKURA Maru after Jan. 29th is as follows:

<u>PLACE</u>	<u>ARRIVE</u>	<u>DEPART</u>	<u>LOAD</u>
Yokohama	—	Jan. 29	For Southwestern Area about 620 men and 2255 cubic meters of cargo.
Osaka	Jan. 30	Feb. 1	For Southwestern Army 1 man and about 1220 cubic meters of cargo.
Kure	Feb. 2	Feb. 3	For Southwestern Area about 140 men and about 1 cubic meter of cargo.
Sasebo	Feb. 5	Feb. 6	For Southwestern Area Army, 750 men.
Takeo (or Bako)	Feb. 12	Feb. 13	—
Balikpapan	Feb. 17	Feb. 20	For Japan, suitable no. of personnel and suitable amount of cargo. Also load to capacity with fuel oil.

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(N83-241718-January-DI)

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

* * *

232050 January, 1943
572

From:	RAMUHA		(Garble)
To :	ORO	90	(CofS blank - garble)
	AHOSE		(KAMAKURA)
Info:			(Addrees. CofS 2nd So. Exp. Flt.)
			(#23 Base Force)
			(Makassar Transp. Sect.)
			(Balikpapan Transp. Sect.)
			(Combined Flt.)
			(Yokohama Army Transp. Sect.)
			(Osaka Transp. Sect.)
			(Kure Transp. Sect.)
			(Sasebo Transp. Office)
			(Singapore Transp. Office)

Ship movement schedule follows; read in 4 columns:

<u>ARRIVAL</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DEPARTURE</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
Feb. 1	Makassar	Feb. 25	Available goods and personnel; fuel oil to capacity.

1. A regular transportation route has been opened from this port to the Southwestern Area.
2. Heads of Transportation Sections will notify Transportation Department of all cargo and personnel to be loaded on ships bound for Japan.

(NSS-250334-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 137).

* * *

232050 January, 1943

572

From:	RAMU	(Unident)
To :	AHOSE	(KAMAKURA Maru)
	OHUTE	(Yokohama Transp.)
	ORO	(Unident)

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 Authority *nnd 947022*

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

Info:	WAMA/WANA		(2nd So. Exp. Flt.)
	INUMO		(Balikpapan Transp.)
	MUN/ME		(Makassar Transp.)
	USI	8	(1st So. Exp. Flt.)
	ORUTE		(Yokohama Transp.)
	NAHANE		(Osaka Transp.)
	NSENI		(Kure Transp.)
	TIHMO		(Sasebo Transp. at Miike)
	MONMI		(Takao Transp.)
	MUSUKI		(Manila Transp.)
	HINU		(Singapore Transp.)
	MAKO/MAWO	901	(Unident)
	SEKE	4	(Unident)
	RASI	308	(Unident)
	NARO	4	(Unident)
	NOHO	7	(Unident)

Part 1

KAMAKURA Maru's movements subsequent to 29th January are as follows:

29th January depart Yokohama with about 620 persons and about (?) 2255 cubic meters cargo for Southwest Region.

30th January arrive Osaka. Depart 1st of February having loaded 1220 cubic meters and 1 person for Southwest Region.

Arrive Kure 2nd and depart 3rd having loaded 1040 persons and 1 cubic meter cargo for Southwest Region.

Arrive Sasebo 5th and depart 6th with about 750 persons for Southwest Region.

Arrive Takao (or Bako) 9th and depart 10th.

Part 2

Arrive Manila 12th and depart 13th.

Arrive Balikpapan 17th, depart 20th with personnel and cargo for Japan as convenient. Fueled to capacity.

Arrive Makassar 21st and depart 25th with personnel and stores for Japan as convenient.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

Arrive Singapore 1st March. Take on stores and personnel as convenient. Fuel to capacity.

1. Beginning with voyage a regular service in Southwest Area will be inaugurated.

2. Heads of local Transport Departments of various places in Southwest Region are requested to inform the Transportation Department in advance of personnel and stores for Japan they intend to load on ships of this regular service.

(T2F-250346-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 122).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

An enemy operation in the southeastern sector appeared to be in the offing but as yet no details were known.

No. 7-a:

ENEMY IS PLANNING AN OPERATION HOWEVER OBJECTIVE AND TIME UNKNOWN X ASSOCIATIONS LEAD TO BELIEF TO BE IN NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS THEATRE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

There were indications of a forthcoming operation in the findings of traffic analysis.

No. 7-b:

A new plan of operations by Jap Command is indicated in concealed originator dispatch at 1900-24th action to CofS SubFor., Comdr. SubRon (KUNA 93), probable DesRon Comdrs. (NERU 8 and YUA 6), "All Air Force Comdrs. of KE Operations", info "B" SubForce SubRon (KUSA/KUNA 9), Staff 8th Fleet, Staff unident HAI 22 (not 3rd, 4th, 8th, or 11th Air), unident SENRH, Comdr. NUTI 16, and "All Ship's Commanding Officers" (KANGHO), and "All Major Unit Comdrs." (SHIREIKANS of KE Operations).

This message was broadcast to "B" SubForce by Jaluit at 2146 and by Tokyo at 2308 indicating originator is in southern area, possibly at Jaluit. It will undoubtedly answer on Rabaul and Truk broadcasts and time relations should indicate whether this operation has its inception in the Marshalls or SE Area. However since all identified units associated in heading of this dispatch are currently operating in Solomons, believe this operation must concern this area.

(N38-241832-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 66).

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 7-c:

This is the first time that KE GOU SAKUBEN HUTAI has appeared and only in this one dispatch which, however, was intercepted many times. If "KE GOU" Force is meant, this is a _____ error of the originator. In view of the "MU GOU" Force associated with the Newak-Madang operation, the "KE GOU" may be a bonafide designation for a scheduled campaign, which, by association with the Solomon's air forces (AirFlots 21 and 26), Solomons SubFor ("B" SubFor), 4th Fleet, and 8th Fleet, seems aimed at least as far east as Guadalcanal.

(HYPO-25-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 41).

No. 7-d:

Message at 1900-24th with no originator was addressed to SubFor (YOTI 63), RE Area Defense Force (NEBU Ø), unidentified KUNA 93 and YUA 6, plus: "Cdrs. All KE Operation Air Force" (KEGOU SAKUBEN KAKU KOUKUU BUT ILLIKI), information "B" SubForces (NAKI Ø), Staff 8th Fleet (KAA 5), and 11th Air (HAI 2) Fleet, unident HUTI 16 and garbled "KEGOU SAKUBEN GOKU KA SIM" (questionable Comdra All "KE" Operation Fleets).

This is first appearance of "KE" Operation. Area involved not clear beyond mention of "RI" Area Defense Force at Buin and indications that submarines are prominently involved.

(T2W-251105-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 93).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

It was probably this intelligence, combined with other indications that an enemy offensive in the Solomons was about to commence, that induced ComSoPac to issue the following operation plan.

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JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-a:

271145 January, 1943
Operational Priority

From: COMSOPAC
 To : CTF 11, 16, 63, 64, 67
 CTU 66.1.5
 Info: CTF 62, 65, 69, 18
 CTU 62.9, 62.8
 COMSTRONSOPAC
 PD NOUMEA
 COMSOWESPAC
 CINCPAC
 COMINCH
 COMNAVACTSOL
 COMGEN GUADALCANAL
 PD AT ESPIRITU SANTO

COMSOPAC OPERATION PLAN 4-43 X INDICATIONS OF JAP
 MOVEMENT IN STRENGTH TOWARD SOUTHERN SOLOMONS X
 ALSO POSSIBLE MOVEMENT TO TAKE CANTON ISLAND XX
 GENERAL TASK X THIS FORCE WILL DESTROY JAP FORCES
 ADVANCING TOWARD THE SOUTHERN SOLOMONS XX TASK FORCE
 11 REAR ADMIRAL RAMSEY SARATOGA SAN JUAN SAUFLEY
 MC CALL MAURY CASE DEPART NOUMEA 2300 GCT JANUARY
 27TH PROCEED ARRIVE VICINITY POINT A 1500 GCT 29TH
 X TASK FORCE 16 REAR ADMIRAL SHERMAN ENTERPRISE
 SAN DIEGO MORRIS HUGHES MUSTIN RUSSELL ELLET DE-
 PART BUTON 0400 GCT JANUARY 28TH PROCEED ARRIVE
 VICINITY POINT B 0800 GCT THE 29TH X TASK FORCE
 63 VICE ADMIRAL FITCH SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT CACTUS
 BUTON X TASK FORCE 64 REAR ADMIRAL LEE WASHINGTON
 WORTH CAROLINA INDIANA SALCH FANNING DUNLAP CUMMINGS
 DEPART NOUMEA LOCAL DAYLIGHT JANUARY 28TH PROCEED
 ARRIVE VICINITY POINT D 0800 GCT THE 29TH X TASK
 FORCE 67 REAR ADMIRAL AINSWORTH NASHVILLE HELENA
 HONOLULU ST LOUIS DRAYTON LAMSON REID OBANNON
 DEPART BUTON 0600 GCT JANUARY 28 PROCEED ARRIVE
 POINT F 0800 GCT THE 29TH X TASK UNIT 66.1.5 CAP-
 TAIN IHRIG CIMARRON GRIDLEY DEPART NOUMEA 0400 GCT
 JANUARY 30TH PROCEED ARRIVE POINT G 0800 GCT THE
 31ST XX PARAGRAPH X COORDINATE EFFORTS TO DESTROY
 JAP SEARCH AND SNOOPER PLANES X FURTHER DIRECTIVES
 LATER X REFERENCE POINTS A LAT 16 DEGS 30 MINS
 SOUTH LONG 157 DEGS EAST BOG LAT 16 SOUTH LONG 159
 EAST E LAT 15-30 SOUTH LONG 161 EAST F LAT 14-30
 SOUTH LONG 162 EAST G LAT 19 SOUTH LONG 161 EAST XX
 LOGISTICS FUEL IN BATTLE SHIPS CARRIERS CRUISERS

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-a:

CIMARRON BUTON NOUMEA HAVANNAH, OTHER OILER TO
SEA AS REQUIRED XX COMMUNICATIONS AS IN MY OPER-
ATION PLAN 2-43 THIS OPERATION PLAN 4-43 EFFECTIVE
ON RECEIPT X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 27, 1943).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *and 947022*

~~SECRET~~
JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions were believed still to be at Truk and the Commanders of the Combined, Second, Third, Fourth and Submarine Fleets were estimated to be in the same vicinity.

No. 8-a:

CARDIV 1 (LESS SHOKAKU) AND CARDIV 2 (LESS HITAKA) THOUGHT STILL AT TRUK X ESTIMATE 2ND 3RD 4TH SUBFOR AND COMBINED FLEET COMDRS TRUK AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was based upon an analysis of current traffic.

No. 8-b:

An operational dispatch at 1540-24th from unident HIMO 9 was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet (YURAH), 2nd Fleet (RETOKU), 8th Fleet (RATAYO) plus ComCarDiv 2 (NORSSI), info tentative CruDiv (KEMHI), tentative ACBA (MAYURA), and Newak Defense Force (TIUA 6).

At 1729-24th no-originator dispatch was addressed to ComCarDiv 2 (NORSSI), tentative ComCarDiv 1 (TUYUWA), CofS Combined Fleet (ROHIU), 8th Fleet (NAOTO), 11th Air Fleet (NIROU), plus 8th Base Force (TIRETA).

Originator latter dispatch possibly CinC 3rd Fleet. Heading appears to definitely associate carriers with Rabaul - Newak Area. Routing suggests CarDivs 1 and 2 still Truk Area on 24th.

(T2W-251040-January-TI)

(D. T. S. January 25, 1943, p. 45).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8-c:

Combined, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Fleets and ComSubFor still indicated in Truk, or Truk Communication Zone.

(HYPO-25-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 42).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)Item 9(A) INTELLIGENCE

The arrival at Truk on January 25 of the heavy cruiser ATAGO and the light cruiser NAGARA, accompanied by a destroyer, was reported.

No. 9-a:

ATAGO AND NAGARA PLUS 1 DD ARRIVED TRUK 25TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was gathered from the following intercepted dispatch.

No. 9-b:

241600 January, 1943

From:	WINO	9	(Unident)
To :	SUTENI	3	(#3 TAMAZONO Maru)
	MUUN	2	(HAGOROMO Maru)
	KEUHO	2	(Unident)
	NOERI	4	(Unident)
	INOE	3	(Unident)
	KEKINE	7	(Unident)
Info:	RIHE	3	(Combined Fleet)
	NAKI	9	(2nd Fleet)
	YUKI	2	(3rd Fleet)
	HNO	9	(4th Fleet)
	KIA	2	(Unident)

Tomorrow 25th: Departures from North Channel:

0130 MAMIYA, TI blank YOO Maru (course 280, escorted by HATIZUKE).

Departure from South Channel:

1100 TSURIMI (after passing through Kinishima Channel course 120, escorted by blank IJOO Maru).

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~~SECRET~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 9-b: (continued)

Entry from South Channel:

1100 KUNIKAWA Maru (course 305 passing through
Imidhisa Channel).

Enter from North Channel:

1400 HAGARA, ATAGO, OOHAMI (course 145).

(T2W-250238-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 54).

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~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 26, 1943

GINCPAC BULLETIN #316 [British Addressee]

From: GINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HQ-19 OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

260131 January, 1943
 Priority

NAGARA AND ATAGO ARRIVED TRUK 25TH X ESTIMATE BOTH CARRIER DIVISIONS ONE AND TWO (LESS SHOKAKU AND HITAKA) ALONG WITH CINC COMBINED AND COMDRS 2ND, 3RD, 4TH AND JUFLEET IN TRUK VICINITY X GINCPAC BULLETIN 316 X ZYNOTIC X ENEMY PREPARING FOR AN OPERATION BUT OBJECTIVE AS YET UNKNOWN X PROBABLY IN SOLOMONS NEW GUINEA THEATRE X TONE STILL ASSOCIATED MARSHALLS GILBERTS X OILER SHIRETOKO ARRIVING JALUIT 30TH X SUBS ARE STILL SUPPLYING GUADALCANAL X ALSO PROBABLY BEING USED IN EASTERN NEW GUINEA FOR SUPPLY WORK X SUBS EAST BY SOUTH USUAL METHOD X 15602 X 16111 X ANOTHER 2 NORTH 170 EAST X TROOP MOVEMENT TSINGTAO TO PALAU NOTED X KANAKURA MARU TO LEAVE YOKOSUKA 29TH ARRIVING OSAKA 30 JANUARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943GINGPAC DISPATCH 260217(A) INTELLIGENCE

Task Force #8 was apprised of enemy ship movements toward the Aleutians.

No. 1

From: GINGPAC
To : CTF 8

260217 January, 1943
Priority

ULTRA X INDICATIONS A MARU CARRYING SOMETHING TO ATTU AND KISKA X ALSO MAIL ABOARD ASAKA MARU WHICH DEPARTED 25TH JANUARY X PORT OF DEPARTURE NOT INDICATED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 2

251607 January, 1943

006

From:	NITOMA		(Ominato Address)
To :	ONE	29	(Staff Kiska Base Force)
	RAHOSU	29	(Staff assoc. with 5th Fleet)
Info:	RS	2	(ASAKA Maru)
	ITARI	4	(TEIYO Maru)
	MOSOMO	1	(#2 TONO Maru)
	KANIRE	71	(Pers. 5th Fleet)
	TUYARE	7	
	RUMIKA	6	
			2 garbled calls

Mail addressed to ISHIGAKI, KUNAJIRI, WAKABA, NUMAKAZE, #2 TONO Maru and the TEIYO Maru of the Kiska-Attu Force has been placed aboard the ASAKA Maru which left here January 25. Receive the foregoing mail at either Kichiwabara Bay or Kiska.

(NSS-251951-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 120).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NDD 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

* * *

251607 January, 1943

006

From:	NITOMA		(Ominate Address)
To :	OEKE	29	(Kiska Base Force)
	RAHOSU	09	
Info:	MAYARI	6	(In Ominate Defense Force)
	KAMIKI	6	
	TETUNE	3	
	TUYARE	7	(In Ominate Defense Force)
	RESIHO		(Patrol Ship)
	ITARI		(TEIYO Maru)
	MOSOMO	1	
	KANIRE	71	(5th Fleet)

(Message in bad shape. Speaks of something being sent to Attu and Kiska on the TEIYOU Maru, as well as mail which was sent on the ASAKA Maru departing 25th).

(NFM-252038-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 111).

It is obvious that CinCPac's dispatch was based upon the Honolulu translation which was the first to reach him. See also CinCPac Dispatches 301903 and 312035 January, 1943.

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JANUARY 26, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCHES 262151 AND 262213

(A) INTELLIGENCE

American bases south of Hawaii were alerted against a diversionary raid by enemy forces.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : COMGENHAWDEPT
COMHAWSEAFRON

262151 January, 1943
Operational Priority

CONSIDER LIKELY A DIVERSIONARY RAID WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS DIRECTED AT OUTLYING ISLAND TO SOUTH OF OAHU (CANTON INDICATED) X HEAVY CRUISER TONE HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED IN MARSHALLS GILBERTS AREA X PLANES FROM THOSE AREAS CARRYING OUT INTENSIVE SEARCHES X BE ON THE ALERT

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 26, 1943).

No. 2

From: CINCPAC
To : COMSOPAC
COMGEN SAMOA

262213 January, 1943
Operational Priority

COMGEN HAWAIIAN DEPT AND COMHAWSEAFRON HAVE BEEN WARNED THAT A DIVERSIONARY RAID ON AN OUTLYING BASE SOUTH OF HAWAII IS CONSIDERED POSSIBLE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS X CANTON IS INDICATED AS LIKELY SPOT X CRUISER TONE ASSOCIATED MARSHALLS GILBERTS X PLANES THOSE AREAS MAKING ACTIVE RECONNAISSANCE X RECOMMEND COMGEN SAMOA ALERT BASES UNDER HIS COMMAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This warning was based upon the unexplained presence of the aircraft tender SHINKOKU and the cruiser TONE, accompanied by several submarines, in the Gilberts-Marshalls area.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)No. 3

Submarine RO-40 was addressed in association with Guadalcanal sub operations on 25 January. In connection operation order ? for (KE) Operations reported in OpNav 24-1832, this message was handled by shore stations as follows:

Jaluit to Tokyo, 2124-24th; Jaluit to subs 2146-24th; Truk broadcast, 2310-24th; Rabaul broadcast, 0117-25th. The time relation would indicate that this dispatch originated in Jaluit area. However, the previous comment that since all identified calls in the address are in the Solomons, the operation probably involves that area is further supported by ident of Staff 11th Air Fleet as the unknown info fleet addres HAI 22. The unexplained voyage of CruDiv 8, possibly with a submarine unit, to the Marshalls-Gilberts Area coupled with the apparent location of the originator of subject (KE) OpOrd in the Marshalls suggests the possibility of a diversionary raid somewhere east or south of the Marshalls. Note D/F posit of submarine at 01 N, 174 W on 25th as reported in HOW number 251822.

(N33-251504-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 13).

No. 4

Nothing to add to Washington's comments on tentative CruDiv 8 activity in the Marshalls-Gilberts area. If the TONE is indeed in this area, the presence of at least one submarine in the vicinity of U.S. convoy routes as a scout may be preliminary to surface raids.

These might be for nuisance value, or, in view of the presence of Third Fleet Staff plus 4 fairly definite carriers in the Truk area, to decoy U.S. forces away from the area of a projected major operation.

(HYPO-25-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 18).

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~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

See also Item 5, CincPac Bulletin #312, January 23, 1943; Item 1, CincPac Bulletin #314, January 24, 1943; Item 1, CincPac Bulletin #315, January 25, 1943; and ComSoPac Dispatch 252312 January, 1943.

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

Six planes were dispatched at once to augment the aerial defenses of Canton Island and a daily patrol of the Howland-Baker area was instituted.

No. 5

From: CINC PAC
 To : PALMYRA

272147 January, 1943
 Priority

FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ X CANTON HAS BEEN ALERTED AGAINST POSSIBLE RAID AND IS BEING REINFORCED TODAY WITH 6 CATS WITH TORPS.....

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 27, 1943).

No. 6

From: COMAIRPAC
 To : CANTON, FAIRWING 2 DET

280031 January, 1943
 Priority

Retransmitted:

From: COMAIRPAC
 To : CFAW 2
 CINC PAC
 CHSP COMENHNDPT

CANCEL MY 251330 OCTOBER X FAIRWING 2 DETACHMENT AT CANTON ISLAND DESIGNATED TASK GROUP 9.1 CONDUCT ROUTINE PATROL OPERATIONS TO WESTWARD AS PRACTICABLE NORMALLY REMAINING EAST OF LONGITUDE 180 X OBSERVE HOWLAND BAKER AND OUTLYING ISLANDS PHOENIX GROUP X CONDUCT SPECIAL SEARCHES AND ATTACK ENEMY UNITS AS REQUIRED X IN ACCORDANCE VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS CINC PAC COMBATANT ARMY AND NAVAL AIR UNITS BASED ON CANTON ARE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SENIOR AVIATOR PRESENT OF EITHER SERVICE

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 28, 1943).

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~SECRET~~ (U)
JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7

From: CO PATRON 79
 COMFLAIRWING 2
 To : COMFLAIRWING 2
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMAIRFPAC

290735 January, 1943
 Routine

AIR RECCE HOWLAND BAKER NO ACTIVITY X WILL COVER
 DAILY WITHOUT FURTHER REPORT UNLESS CHANGE OCCURS

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

As early as January 24, an enemy submarine had been
 Dog Foxed in the Baker-Canton area and was considered
 a part of the suspicious activity in the Gilberts-Mar-
 shalls area which induced CinCPac to issue this warn-
 ing. This submarine remained in the Baker-Canton area
 for several days and on January 27 conducted a recon-
 naissance of Canton Island which it bombarded on Jan-
 uary 30. See Item 9, CinCPac Bulletin #319, January
 29, 1943.

A visual reconnaissance of the Gilbert Islands,
 ordered probably because of the current unexplained
 enemy activity in the Gilberts-Marshalls area, had
 found no undue amount of shipping there on January 26
 and no explanation of the mysterious activity detected
 through radio intelligence.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 26, 1943 (Continued)

No. 8

From: CINCPAC
 To (FOR COMGENHAWDEPT)
 To : CHIEF OF STAFF WAR DEPT
 COMGEN SOUTH PACIFIC

300455 January, 1943
 Priority

VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE OF GILBERT ISLANDS BY FLIGHT FROM GANTON COVERED ISLANDS TAMANA, APAMAMA, MAIANA, TARAWA, AND BERU ON JANUARY 26. ASIDE FROM SMALL BOATS IN VARIOUS APAMAMA AND TARAWA LAGOONS, THE SOLE SHIP SIGHTED WAS LARGE AK IN LAGOON AT TARAWA; ON THIS SHIP WERE DROPPED 7 BOMBS EACH 500 LB, SCORED 1 HIT SHIP'S STERN ALSO SOME CLOSE MISSES. IN SW PART OF TARAWA IS LANDING STRIP LENGTH ABOUT 7000 FEET; NO OTHERS SEEN, FLYING LOW SAME VICINITY WERE 4 ZEKES WHICH OFFERED NO COMBAT: ONLY OTHER AIR-CRAFT SEEN WAS LARGE PLANE PARKED NEAR THE STRIP (TO WDOSA AND COMGENSOPAC FROM HDCCS) PARA ON TAMANA IS BIG CAMP (POSSIBLY MILITARY) ABOUT MILE AND ONE HALF LONG: ON SAME ISLAND AND BERU ALSO APAMAMA ARE SEVERAL OTHER CAMPS OR VILLAGES PARA PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN OF THE 5 ISLANDS MENTIONED, FURTHER INFORMATION WHEN INTERPRETED.

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 30, 1943).

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Authority

NDD 947022

JANUARY 27, 1943

GINCPAC BULLETIN #317

From: GINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMSFPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FRON COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

270355 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

An enemy raid on some American base south of Hawaii appeared to be imminent.

No. 1-a:

INDICATIONS ENEMY POSSIBLY PLANNING RAID SOON AT OUTLYING AIRBASE BETWEEN HAWAII AND FUJI X APPEARANCE OF CRUISER TONE IN MARSHALL GILBERT AREA POSSIBLY FOR THIS PURPOSE X CANTON ISLAND MOST LIKELY OBJECTIVE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See GINCPac Dispatches 262151 and 262213 January, 1943 in which American commands in the area concerned were warned of this possibility.

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JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The minelayers ISHIGAKI and KUMAJIRI, the destroyers WAKABA and NUMAKAZE, and the ASAKA, TEIYO, and #2 TOKO Maru were known to be in northern waters.

No. 2-a:

NUMAKAZE WAKABA KUMAJIRI ISHIGAKI ASAKA MARU TEIYO
MARU AND NUMBER 2 TOKO MARU INDICATED IN NORTHERN
AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See No. 2, GINCPac Dispatch 260217 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The only carrier news was an estimate of the position of the auxiliary carrier CHUYO.

No. 3-a:

CHUYO BELIEVED IN EMPIRE WATERS STILL CARRYING OUT PLANE FERRYING DUTY X OTHERWISE NO NEW INFORMATION ON CARRIERS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This estimate was based upon traffic analysis.

No. 3-b:

CHUYOO (XCV - NETU 8) is indicated in the Empire and is associated with Yokosuka Air Arsenal #2 plus 3rd Fleet and 11th Air Fleet, suggesting that CHUYO is continuing to ferry planes to the southern bases.

(HYPO-26-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 151).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)

Item A

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A number of Dog Fox Fixes were reported.

No. 4-a:

DF PLACES 2 UNKNOWN SHIPS NEAR 32 NORTH 172 EAST ON
 25TH X SUBS PLACED BY USUAL METHOD SOUTH AND EAST X
 30167 X 09163 X 35155 X ALSO 2 NORTH 169 WEST

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 4-b:

By _____ D/F fix at 2300 25 Jan. unident (TAKA 4)
 was in position 32 N. 172 E. Unident (TIRI 2) on
 same frequency was in approximately the same position
 or somewhat further north.

(NSS-261554-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 12).

No. 4-c:

D/F Fixes for January 26, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6385	167 - E 29-30S	1720/26
NARAE	Sub	6385	Solomons - New Guinea	1529/25
NARAE	Sub	5300	162-30E 08-30S	1412/26
NARAE	Sub	6385	155 - E 35 - S	1712/25

(NYFO-26-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 64a).

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~~TOP SECRET~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)No. 4-1:

D/F Fixes for January 26, 1943

GILBERT-MARSHALLS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
SEFU ø	Sub(?)	13220	169 W 02 N	0655/26

(HYPO-26-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 25, 1943, p. 9a).

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~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

New enemy airbases in the western New Guinea area were foreshadowed by the scheduled arrival of a naval construction battalion at Ambon on February 16.

No. 5-a:

ARRIVAL 24TH PIONEERS AT AMBON ON 16 FEBRUARY MAY POSSIBLY PRESAGE AIRBASE CONSTRUCTION WESTERN NEW GUINEA AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The movement of this labor unit was disclosed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 5-b:

252030 January, 1943

585

From:	HITISE		(Naval Transp. Section)
To :	REFUNO		(Maru - In c/o Osaka Transp. Sect.)
	RINE	20	
Info:			(Osaka Transp. Sect.)
			(Sasebo Transp. Office)
			(Ambon Transp. Office)
			(Cdr. 25th Base For., Batavia)
			(GKF major commands)
	HIRI/RIRI		
	SOKA	8	
	OTU	5	
	NTI	9	(Garbled)
	HANNE		(Garbled)

Operations for the ASAKAZE Maru from January 2:

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)No. 7-b: (continued)

Depart Osaka that day, arrive Miike 29, leave next day with coal, 1000 tons; reach Sasebo 30th and leave February 6th with about 500 members of the #24 Pioneer Outfit, about 6500 cubic meters of Pioneer materials, 2 landing barges; arrive Ambon 16th.

1. After the 16th, these items to be unloaded at places designated by GKF Comdr.

2. There will be further operations orders when this assignment has been carried out, so report to the Transportation Section Chief the day scheduled for completion of the assignment.

(NSS-260208-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 130).

* * *

252030 January, 1943

385

From:	HITISE		(Tokyo Transp. Section)
To :	HIA	20	
	KOHU	17	
	NAHANE		(Osaka Transp. Section)
Info:	NTISO		(Base Force #25)
	SASE	80	
	HIRI	20	(Major command)
	SOKA	80	
	OSEK	5	
	NTI	9	
	NAHANETI		(Osaka Transp. Section)
	HOMOU		
	HIM		

Schedule of ASAKAZE Maru from January 27th:

Depart Osaka 27th, arrive Miike 29th. Depart 30th, take 1000 tons bunker coal. Arrive Sasebo 30th. Depart 6th, take Pioneer Unit #24, 6500 cubic meters of Pioneer materials and 2 landing boats. Arrive Ambon 16 February.

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)

No. 5-b: (continued)

1. After that land at a place to be designated by GIN Combined Exp. For. (GKF).
2. Concerning detail after completion of duty, inform Transportation Section of estimated date.

(HFM-261016-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 129).

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~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was evidence that Kaimana on the south coast of western New Guinea had been occupied by the Japanese and continued signs that the enemy had bases at Wickham Anchorage on Vangunu Island and on Russell Island.

No. 6-a:

BASES INDICATED AT WICKHAM AND RUSSEL ISLAND X
 KAIMANA (SOUTH COAST WESTERN NEW GUINEA) OCCUPIED
 BY JAPS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was drawn from the following sources.

No. 6-b:

Most of the operational traffic seemed to be associated with escort activities except for an occasional dispatch involving submarines. A movement report dispatch from concealed originator at 1030 25th was addressed to Movement Report Office (YOKURO), Cinc Combined Fleet (YUBAHA), and 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet (HOIKE), plus Comdrs. 24th Base Force (UNERA or UREHA) and 25th Base Force (BTISO), info Comdr. AirPlot 23 (UNASE), unident OHSTU 2 and HONAU 4, plus [redacted] Comdr. Detached Unit at KAIMANA (southwestern New Guinea).

This apparently refers to a detachment of 24th Base Force and is first noted mention of Orange forces at that place.

(T2W-260735-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 103).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)No. 6-c:

Wickham Base Commander seems to be appearing more often in traffic lately associated with bases at Munda and Buin and is apparently assuming more importance than base in Solomons.

(T2N-260710-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 101).

No. 6-d:

250814 January, 1943

27620

From: NOSE 3 (Rabaul Comm. Unit)
 To : 8th Comb. Special Landing Force
 Info: ComDesRon 3
 11th Air Fleet
 Combined Fleet
 Comdr. Guadalcanal Comm. Base
 Comdr. #1 Detached Comm. Unit Guadalcanal

Outer South Seas Force Operation Order #35.

Add following to my Operation Order #34.

Comdr. #8 [redacted] (Comb. Special Landing Force ?) will send 2 blank to Russel Base. In communicating with Kamimbo Base they will use 6000 kcs, [redacted] blank and following call signs:

Russel Base - KITATE (BRO)
 Kamimbo Base - TMOI (HOTI)

Calls in parenthesis will be used after blank date.

(N88-252100-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 81).

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 Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #317 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

270539 January, 1943
 Priority

2 VESSELS IN VICINITY 172 EAST 32 NORTH ON 25TH BY LOG FOX X
 EXPECT RAID SOON ON UNKNOWN ALLIED BASE EAST OR SOUTH OF GIL-
 BERTS PROBABLY CANTON ISLAND X BELIEVE CRUISER TONE INVOLVED X
 ZYNOTIC X INTELLIGENCE 317 BY CINCPAC X NO ADDITIONAL INFOR-
 MATION CARRIERS EXCEPT CHUYO PROBABLY IN JAPAN AND STILL EN-
 GAGED IN AIRCRAFT FERRYING WORK X BEARINGS SHOWN SUBS EAST AND
 SOUTH X 15535 X 16309 X 16730 X ANOTHER 169 WEST 2 NORTH X
 INDICATIONS OF JAP BASES IN RUSSELL ISLANDS AND AT WICKHAM
 ANCHORAGE X 24TH PIONEERS SCHEDULED ARRIVE AMBON 16TH FEB FROM
 SASERO X SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS UNKNOWN BUT CONSIDER AIRBASE
 CONSTRUCTION WESTERN NEW GUINEA A POSSIBILITY X DETACHMENT
 JAP TROOPS NOTED AT KAIMANA ON SOUTH COAST WESTERN NEW GUINEA
 X MINELAYERS ISHIGAKI, KUNAJIRI, DESTROYERS WAKABA, NUMAKAZE
 PLUS ASANAMARU TEIYO MARU AND #2 TOKO MARU INDICATED IN NORTH-
 ERN WATERS

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *AND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943COMSOPAC DISPATCH 272237(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Guadalcanal commands were informed that enemy submarines currently were operating southeast of Guadalcanal.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC
 To : COMGEN CACTUS
 COMNAVBASE CACTUS
 Info: COMSOPACFOR
 CINCPAC

272237 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

ORANGE SUBMARINE PATROL LINE OPERATING IN AREA SOUTH-EAST OF GUADALCANAL X ZEAL X AT LEAST 3 SUBS POSSIBLY 7 OR 8

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 28, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted message revealed the positions of these submarines.

No. 2

181816 January, 1943

56556

From: MIU 8 (SubForce)
 To : ONE 3
 Info: SISUMA (Chief of Naval Gen. Staff)
 HOO 10

Advance Expeditionary Force OpOrder # blank.

1. The I-11, I-25, and I-32 are hereby organized into the "A" SubForce. As soon as Hank (I-3 ? or 4 unident subs) and I-26 have completed transporting food supplies they will be assigned to blank.

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Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

2. "A" SubForce depart PT (Truk) immediately and operate in the area to southeast of Guadalcanal to prevent enemy from reinforcing that island. Be on deployment line "A" by dawn of [] - January date). Blanks seek out and destroy enemy shipping blanks.

NEGAT COMMENT: Message gives both ends of deployment line "A" but unable recover as yet. Possible that I-26 and the 3 or 4 unident subs are also to be assigned to "A" SubForce, yet looks more like they are moving elsewhere. We continue work on this one.

(NSS-270650-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 75).

* * *

181816 January, 1943

66556

From: MIKU 8-6
 To : ONE 3-0
 Info: KOO 10-89
 SISUMA (Naval Minister)

Advanced Expeditionary Force OpOrd blank.

1. [] (I-11), [] (I-25), [] (I-32), are assigned newly organized KOO (A) SubForce. Commander of same shall be ComSubRon 3.

[] (sub) in [] [] (sub), [] (sub), [] (I-26), after completion one trip transporting provisions also assigned said force.

2. Above depart Truk at once and proceed to the area south of Guadalcanal to harass enemy reinforcements. Deployment until dawn of [] (date) shall be on 2 lines (Koo and Otsu) (each between unrecovered grid positions).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

Maintain close liaison with friendly air forces with the objective of destroying enemy surface forces.

(NFM-281116-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 72).

Further work on this message by the Honolulu and Washington units clarified the positions of these submarines.

Further work on MIKU 8's January 181816-66556.

Look at N33 270650 and NFM 281116.

1 end of KO line grid position KEHO blank (approximate longitude 159-30 East). Other end of KO line unrecovered but may be KEHO blank or KEFU blank (longitude 158-50 or 157-50). OTSU line extends from KEMA blank to KEMU blank (longitude 159-30 East to 160-30 East).

Blanks may be MI 55 and MU 55 respectively. This would make OTSU line extend from 159-30 East 9-50 South to 160-30 East 9-30 South.

(NFM-292216-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 63).

* * *

Dope herewith on submarine deployment lines "A" and "B" in NAN's 292101 and HON's 292216.

Have succeeded in getting following fairly good latitudes for one end of each line. Agree with HON's rough longitudes which are repeated here for clarity. Line "A" runs from 11-30 S and 158 E to blank latitude and 159-50 E.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)No. 2 (continued)

We note that line "A" fails to satisfy one condition of basic operations order, namely that operations are to be in area SE of Guadalcanal. Value for "Southeast" used here is unmistakably accurate, nevertheless, unless there has been some change in grid coordinate since November when some longitude values fit perfectly in reports of movements on known course at known speed between grid positions and places identified by HOW, then longitudes as given are approximately correct.

End of "A" line appearing first in text is KENOMO. Easternmost end of "B" line is KENUMU.

(NSS-302342-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 129).

The precise limits of these submarine deployment lines finally were recovered in March from a captured document.

From I-1 Captured Document.

Reference MIKU 8 on 18 January 1816-66556 in JN 25.

Limits of "A" line 157-42 East 11-17 South and 159-28 East, same latitude as above, boats along this line (left to right) Items I-11, I-32, unreadable, I-18, I-16, I-25, I-26.

"B" line 160 East 11 South -- 160-20 East 10-20 South from west to east, I-17, I-76, I-2, I-1.

(NFM-092346-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 9, 1943, p. 30).

See also ComSofac Dispatch 291748 January, 1943.

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Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 27, 1943 (Continued)(C) REPORT OF ACTION

Four escorted American transports were en route to Guadalcanal from Noumea at this time. This deployment of enemy submarines off Guadalcanal might indicate a compromise of the security of this transport operation or it may have been a part of the movements which were considered at the time to indicate that a Japanese offensive in the Solomons was about to break.

No. 3

From: CTF 62 270016 January, 1943
 To : NAVBASE GUADALCANAL Priority
 COMSOPAC
 CINCPAC
 ALL TP COMDRS SOPAC
 ALL SHIPS PRESENT CACTUS-
 RINGBOLT AREA

TASK UNIT 62.8 (4 AP'S AND 4 DD'S) DEPARTED NOUMEA 1900 GCT JANUARY 26 ENROUTE CACTUS TO ARRIVE LUNGA POINT AREA AT 1830 GCT JANUARY 29 X ROUTED WEST OF NEW CALEDONIA AND EAST AND NORTH SAN CRISTOBAL X TASK UNIT WILL PASS THROUGH POINT Q LATITUDE 12-30 SOUTH LONGITUDE 163 EAST AT 2100 GCT JANUARY 28 X

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 27, 1943).

See also ComSoPac Dispatch 291748 January, 1943.

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #318

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDES PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVY
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

280233 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

Enemy submarines were reported to be deploying southeast of Guadalcanal in an effort to interrupt American supply lines to that island.

No. 1-a:

BELIEVE SEVERAL SUBS WILL SOON BE DEPLOYED ON A LINE SOUTHEAST OF GUADALCANAL WITH OBJECT OF PREVENTING SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS REACHING THAT PLACE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See ComSOPac Dispatch 272237 January, 1943.

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)Item 2(A) INTELLIGENCE

Dog Fox fixes on four enemy undersea craft were listed with the intelligence that another submarine had departed from Penang for Singapore on January 27.

No. 2-a:

SUBS BY BEARINGS X NORTH AND WEST X 02169 X SOUTH AND EAST X 10158 X 06157 X 05158 X ITEM 27 DEPARTED PENANG ENROUTE SINGAPORE ON 27TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 2-b:

D/F Fixes for January 27, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub ?	3957	157E 07S	1553/26
NARAE	Sub	5300	158E 10S	1640/26
NARAE	Sub	5300	158E 04-30S	1832/26
NARAE	Sub	5300	Solomons Area	0835/27

(HYPO-27-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 120).

No. 2-c:

D/F Fixes for January 27, 1943

BAKER-HOWLAND

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Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-c: (continued)

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6610	169 N 02 E	1545/27

(HYPO-28-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 8).

No. 2-d:

271805 January, 1943

236

From:	NARAE		(Concealed identity call)
To :	AHE	82	(Staff SubForce)
	RIN	22	(Staff #1 South. Exp. Fleet)
	NEKI	5	
	SOTE	8	(Penang Repair Sect. 101)
	TAKI	56	
	NEI	56	(Comdr. connected subs)
			Penang Seaplane Scouting Squadron
	HEHE	8	(Collective Singapore)
Info:	NIITU		(#8 TAMA Maru, SubChaser #562)
	HEA	5	
	KINOYO	46	
	HEYO/HEYO	4	
	WE	9	

From Captain of I-27.

1. Submarine I-27 will proceed as follows to Singapore:

2000, 27th. Depart Penang.
 0800, 28th. Arrive 1 Fathom Bank.
 1930, 28th. Arrive Keppel.

2. Will establish identity with all friendly forces.

(HSS-271841-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 185).

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *nm 947022*

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-d: (continued)

* * *

271805 January, 1943

236

From:	NABAS	
To :	AHE	74 (SubFor)
	RIN	44 (1st Exp. Force)
	SOTBO	(Rpr. Sect. #121, Penang Branch)
	[REDACTED]	Penang blanks
	TAKI	5
	NPI	15 (Connected submarines)
	REHE	7 (Singapore)
Info:	KII	47 (SubForce)
	ITSA	1 (Address at Yokosuka)
	NOYOH	48 (Singapore Guard or Air Group)
	HEI	3
	WEHE	6
	MSB	85

From Captain I-27.

1. I-27 will proceed to Singapore as follows:

2000, 27th. Depart Penang.
 0600, 28th. 1 Fathom Bank
 1930, 28th. Expect to arrive Keppel.

2. We will show all recognition signs.

(NFM-272106-January-01)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 183).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)Item 3(A) INTELLIGENCE

The only carrier intelligence concerned the current movements of the auxiliary carrier UNYO.

No. 3-a:

ONLY NEW INFO REGARDING CARRIERS IS THAT UNYO AND DESDIV 7 EXPECTED TRUK VICINITY SHORTLY X ENGAGED IN PLANE TRANSPORT

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 3-b:

261115 January, 1943

02007

From:	No originator	
To :	MIKE	3 (2nd Fleet)
	BIU/MIU	6
Info:	HARO	5
	WENU	0
	ROYOMA	(Yokosuka)
	NSI	95
	FURO	3
	RINI	9
	YONI	75
	KUKS	7

Combined Fleet Operation Order #464.

1. (Unreadable).

2. Commanding Officer of the UNYOO, in command of UNYOO TO, DesDiv 7 and [redacted] will carry out blank transportation as previously ordered and also in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Naval Section SMS #201.

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

3. Comdr. Advance Force will have DesDiv 6, less HIBIKI, proceed to Truk where it will temporarily come under command of Commanding Officer of UNYOO and (carry out escort duty?).

(T27-271152-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 62).

* * *

26115 January, 1943

02007

From:	Blank originator	
To :	NIKE	3 (Comdr. Advance Force)
	NIU	6 (UNYO)
Info:	HARO	5
	MEMU	0
	ROYONA	
	NSI	95
	FURO	3
	RINI	9
	YONI	75
	REYU	9
	KUKE	7

From CinC Combined Fleet. Combined Fleet OpOrd #464.

1. Revise Combined Fleet OpOrd #462 as follows:

Blanks. Strike out "HIBIKI", change paragraph #4 and #5 to paragraph #6.

2. Commanding Officer of UNYOO assume command of:

UNYOO
DesDiv 7

and as previously ordered carry out transport duties ordered in Naval General Staff SMS #201.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

3. Comdr. Advance Force send DesDiv 6 less the HIBIKI to Truk to report temporarily to the Commanding Officer UNYOO for duty connection escort.

(NFM-280832-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 64).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)Item A(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were indications of an artillery or anti-aircraft unit on Rendova Island.

No. A-a:

ARTILLERY OR AA UNIT BELIEVED ESTABLISHED RENDOVA ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The presence of such a unit on Rendova was indicated in an intercepted message.

No. A-b:

130600 January, 1943

87813

From:	TUHE	7
To :	HATI	5
	SIFI/SBOI	1
	HORU	7
	[REDACTED]	GOU-BUTAI SATI
Info:	SORU	2
	KATOYU	
	MON	6
	HABE	5
	KATI	4

(Unreadable except mentions Rendova Island in connection with landing some artillery or AA unit).

(T2W-270548-January-DI)

(D. T. B. January 27, 1943, p. 92).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Two new enemy weather stations were listed.

No. 5-a:

NEW WEATHER STATIONS AT CHRISTMAS ISLAND AND
WAINGAPU (SUMBA)

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis indicated the existence of
these stations.

No. 5-b:

Much weather traffic but little other activity. WX
/weather/ stations now are in operation in Christmas
Island and at Waingapu.

(HYPO-27-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 194).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 947022

~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There were indications that the 25th Air Flotilla soon might be transferred to the northern area.

No. 6-a:

AIRFLOT 25 POSSIBLY TO OPERATE IN NORTHERN AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This information was derived from an analysis of current traffic.

No. 6-b:

A no-originator dispatch at 2200-26th intercepted on Oninato broadcast was addressed to garbled HIEKA information to Chief of Staff 5th Fleet, Chief of Staff 1st Fleet ? (NORAN), all Comdrs. Northern Force (RUYUTE 78), Chief of Staff Yokosuka, and 25th Air Flot (INI 3). The latter was placed in Empire area (vicinity 138 E - 33 N) by D/F. This indicates that the 25th Air Flot, or part of it, is to operate with the Northern Force but at present is in Empire.

(HYPO-27-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 142).

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Authority *AND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

The planes of the cruiser CHOKAI appeared to be shorebased at Kavieng on January 26.

No. 7-a:

CHOKAI PLANES INDICATED ASHORE AT KAVIENG ON 26TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic routing disclosed this intelligence.

No. 7-b:

January 26th at 1106 Rabaul (cover for CinC 8th Fleet ?) addressed unident (ERO 3), info 108th Air Arsenal, unident (HANI 3), and Comdr. CHOKAI Aircraft in care Kavieng (Akece Nigori How Item Nigori) (NUMAU).

At 1200 Kavieng (NUMAU) addressed KIYOKASA Maru, unident air activity (IMIRI), info CHOKAI and Staff 8th Fleet. Apparently CHOKAI's planes are shore based at Kavieng.

(H33-261711, January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 116).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)Item 8(A) INTELLIGENCENo. 8-a:

JAP SHIPPING EXPECTED TO RELY ON INCREASE IN ZIG-ZAGGING AS PROTECTION AGAINST OUR SUBMARINES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Instructions to this effect were intercepted.

No. 8-b:

271130 January, 1943

HM Broadcast

332

The number of ships which have received torpedo attacks and suffered damage through not zig-zagging is great. Up to the present the following results have been clearly established:

Of 50 ships which received torpedo attacks while not zig-zagging, 43 were definitely hit. Of 15 ships which received torpedo attacks while zig-zagging, 7 were definitely hit.

From Imperial Headquarters (Navy Section).

(NSS-271253-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 4).

No. 8-c:

271810 January, 1943

332

From: Unknown originator
To : Unknown addressees

From Navy Section.

Change of course angle in zigzag movements must be increased and it is necessary that they be executed in the following manner:

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943 (Continued)No. 8-c: (continued)

1. In areas where there is suspicion that submarines may be operating (especially near capes, entrances to harbors and bays, and prominent light-houses), proceed in zigzags of short intervals.
2. In areas where there is a possibility that enemy vessels may be encountered proceed in zigzags of long intervals. Also, along the course of the long-interval zigzags, make smaller changes of course.

(NSS-271841-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 5).

No. 8-d:

(This remainder of reading quoted OPNAV 271841).

Many ships have suffered torpedo attack and damage owing to failure to zig-zag. Out of 50 ships which have been attacked by torpedo while failing to zig-zag 43 have been hit. Out of 15 ships attacked by torpedo while zig-zagging 7 have been hit.

(T2W-280715-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 9).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 28, 1943CINCPAG BULLETIN #318 /British Addressee/

From: CINCPAG
 To : CINC EASTERN FLINT
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACHB
 NZNB

280345 January, 1943
 Priority

TO COMBAT SUBMARINE MENACE JAPS EXPECTED TO RELY MORE ON
 GREATER USE OF ZIGZAGGING AT LEAST IN DANGEROUS WATERS X
 PLANES OF CRUISER CHOKAI SHOREBASED AT KAVIENG ON 26TH X
 ZIMOTIC X CINCPAG 318 X ITEM 27 LEFT PENANG 27TH FOR SINGA-
 PORE X WEATHER STATIONS NOW OPERATING AT WAINGAFU AND CHRIST-
 MAS ISLAND X UNYO WITH DESTROYER DIVISION 7 ENGAGED TRANS-
 PORTATION AIRCRAFT X BELIEVE WILL BE IN TRUK ZONE SOON X DOG
 FOX PLACES SUBS SOUTH BY EAST X 06157 X 10158 X 05158 X NORTH
 AND WEST X 02169 X THESE SUBS BELIEVED SOUTHEAST OF GUADAL-
 CANAL ACTING TO INTERCEPT REINFORCEMENTS X NOTHING NEW NOTED
 REGARDING COMBATANT CARRIERS X BELIEVE AA UNIT OR ARTILLERY
 LANDED RENDOVA ISLAND X INDICATIONS AIRPLOT 25 MAY OPERATE
 IN NORTHERN WATERS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #319

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSOPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SHA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

290221 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1(A) INTELLIGENCE

The light cruiser NATORI was estimated to be at Makassar after undergoing an aerial attack in the East Indies in which this ship was damaged.

No. 1-a:

NATORI HIT AND DAMAGED BY ALLIED AIRCRAFT NEI AREA
 X NOW ENROUTE TO OR AT MAKASSAR

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted message disclosed that the NATORI had been hit.

No. 1-b:

211630 January, 1943

15865

From: HARAE		
To : TANESI		(Garbled)
	SINE	12 (Unident)
	NURE	7 (Combined Fleet)
	MAHU	6 (Unident)
Info: UTU		19 (All Cdrs, ashore & afloat Makassar)
	HEKA	30 (1st So. Exp. Flt. CofS)
	SOTEO	(Penang Branch Repair Sect. #101)
	TIMO	9 (Unident)
	SAKU	5 (Unident)

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 1-b: (continued)

(Is a two part battle report from concealed Com-CruDiv 16. Unable read but is report of bombing of CruDiv 16 ships by 3 B24s date and time unrecovered. Amount of damage also unrecovered but included considerable damage to NATORI).

Message excerpt follows: "NATORI can make maximum speed of 16 knots. She is scheduled to depart for (?) IM (Makassar) about 1900 today".

(NSS-272131-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 177).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The NATORI is believed to have been the cruiser hit in an Allied raid on Ambon on January 21.

No. 1-c:

From: MACARTHUR
 To : COMGENHANDDEPT
 Retransmitted:
 From: COMGENHANDDEPT
 To : CINCFAO

220755 January, 1943
 Priority

QUEEN 8571-22ND OPERATIONS REPORT SOWESPAC AREA PERIOD 1300Z-20 TO 1300Z-21.....3 B24S ATTACKED SHIPPING IN AMBON HARBOR X CRUISER HIT AND SET ON FIRE.....

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 22, 1943).

The NATORI's trip to Makassar was not without incident, for on January 23 the NATORI was attacked by the U.S.S. TAUTOG but escaped without further injury.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)No. 1-d:

231015 January, 1943

From: UMA 5 (NATORI)
 To : NATE 8 (Spec. Base Force 23)
 YANI 40 (2nd So. Exp. Fleet)
 WEMA 8 (Palao)
 NUU 7 (CruDiv 16)
 Info: KATOYU (Imperial Hdqts. Nav. Staff
 1st Section)

Received torpedo attack (4 torpedoes) at 1012. Position 05-42 S, 120-35 E.

AOTAKA is pressing attack.

(NFM-031410-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 3, 1943, p. 139).

No. 1-c:

From: COMSOPAC
 To : COMINCH
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMSUBPAC

030615 February, 1943
 Routine

PATROL BANDA SEA AREA COMPLETED BY TAUTOG RETURNED
 FREMANTLE 30 DECEMBER X.....NEXT DAY IN SAME LOCATION
 /January 23, Salier Strait/ MISSED WITH FOUR FISH
 SURFACE AND AIR ESCORTED NATORI CLASS CRUISER
 SPEED 22 COURSE SOUTH.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, February 3, 1943).

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 Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Two fleet commands were located.

No. 2-a:

COMDR 4TH AND CINC COMBINED FLEETS BELIEVED AT TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was based upon traffic analysis.

No. 2-b:

CinC and CofS Combined Fleet, and CofS 4th Fleet indicated at Truk.

(HYPO-28-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 52).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *no 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The positions of seven enemy submarines were listed with a renewed warning of submarines south and southeast of Guadalcanal.

No. 3-a:

DF LOCATES SUBS NORTH AND WEST X 02170 X SOUTH AND EAST 11161 X 08165 X 01157 X 10160 X 07163 X 10159 X SUBS MAY BE SOUTH AS WELL AS SOUTHEAST OF GUADALCANAL X AREA BETWEEN LONGITUDES 159-00 AND 160-10 BELIEVED TO CONTAIN SUBS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 3-b:

D/F Fixes for January 28, 1943

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	5300	163 E. 08 S.	1126/28
NARAE	Sub	5300	161 E. 11 S.	1138/28
NARAE	Sub	5300	160 E. 10 S.	0858/28
NARAE	Sub	5300	159 E. 10 S.	1239/28
NARAE	Sub	5300	165 E. 08 S.	1803/27
NARAE	Sub	5300	162 E. 08 S.	1700/27
NARAE	Sub	13200	157 E. 01 N.	2116/27
NARAE	Sub	5300	163 E. 07 S.	0858/28

BAKER-NOWLAND

NARAE Sub 5300 170 W. 02-30N. 0834/28

(HYPO-28-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, pp. 89d and e).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-c:

From approximately 1800 to 2340 numerous sub bearings were taken and several fixes were obtained ranging from 159 E 10 S to 163 E 08 S. From this it appears that subs may be concentrating at the southeastern end of the Solomons group awaiting movement of our surface units into this area.

(HYPO-25-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 8).

Further work upon an intercepted message, earlier deciphered in part, indicated that submarines were south of Guadalcanal. See ComSofac Dispatch 27237 January, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)Item A(A) INTELLIGENCE

The whereabouts of the enemy's carriers were estimated.

No. A-a:

ESTIMATE SHOKAKU IN EMPIRE X HITAKA PROBABLY EMPIRE X ZUIKAKU ZUIHO AND HAYATAKA LAST SEEN AT TRUK WITH NO INDICATION DEPARTURE NOTED X OTAKA BELIEVED AT TRUK DAMAGED X UNYO AND CHUYO THOUGHT STILL ENGAGED PLANE FERRYING BETWEEN EMPIRE TRUK AND NEW BRITAIN

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This item is a summary of recent intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers. Since no new information is introduced, the sources of this intelligence, which are listed under earlier bulletins, will not be repeated here.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)Item 5(A) INTELLIGENCE

A unit of Air Group #755 was known to be stationed at Nauru.

No. 5-a:

DETACHMENT AIR GROUP 755 NOTED AT NAURU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Traffic analysis yielded this information.

No. 5-b:

[redacted] "Comdr. #755 Air Group, Nauru Detachment" was addressed by NUMAYU 1 with Staff 11th Air Fleet as info addressee. The dispatch was sent by Shotto to YONEMI (unident) for delivery to the [redacted] address. NUMAYU has appeared in this area regularly for some time and is constantly associated with air units. This would imply that it is a maru equipped to transport aviation fuel and supplies.

(HYPO-28-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 24).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

The departure of a three ship convoy from Truk on January 28 was announced. Shortland Island was considered a possible destination.

No. 6-a:

3 SHIP CONVOY LEFT TRUK MORNING 28TH X UNKNOWN DESTINATION PROBABLY SHORTLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted Truk harbor schedule revealed the departure of this convoy.

No. 6-b:

271740 January, 1943

From:	KIA	14	(4th Base Force ?)
To :	NANAKE	3	(SubChaser Div. 57)
	ROSERE		
	TUNE	1	
	WANANO		(SubChaser Div. 58)
	HAISA		
	INOE		(KINOO Maru)
	WEKUNE/KEKUNE		
Info:	UKI	24	(Combined Fleet)
	ESO	94	(2nd Fleet)
	HSTI	44	(4th Fleet)
	FUA	95	

Tomorrow 28th, departures South Channel:

0800, Army convoy: TAIYUU Maru, TAFU blank Maru, and blank Maru, escorted by SubChaser 10, course 180.

Departures North Channel:

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

0500 Minesweep #8 (course 280).

1200, ANDO Maru, escorted by #2 TAKUNAN Maru, course 85.

Arrivals North Channel:

Before daylight, TORISHIMA Maru, TAKASAGO Maru (specially equipped subchaser).

Arrivals South Channel:

1500 KUNISHIMA Maru, escorted by SubChaser #12, course 90.

(T2W-280142-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 46).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)Item 7(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Japanese 19th Army was observed to be associated in current traffic with the southeastern area.

No. 7-a:

19TH ARMY ASSOCIATED BISMARCK AREA FOR FIRST TIME

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This association was noted in traffic analysis.

No. 7-b:

Of possible importance was concealed originator despatch at 1154, 28th, action to All blank of unident SUMO 199, All Commanders unident NONE 24, info 1st Section Naval Staff, Chiefs of Staff Combined, 8th and unident Fleets, Air Group 3 (TINITA), unident RASORE, NATUTE, BTEXU, and [redacted] Chief of Staff 19th Army. This message seen only on Tokyo broadcast, and may, therefore, have originated there. Believe this is first appearance of 19th Army with southeast area.

(NSS-281600-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 109).

No. 7-c:

28th, at 1154, no-originator message addressed to unidentified SUMO 199 and NONE 24, information 1st N. G. S., Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet (NOKA 2), 8th Fleet (SOSE 4), 11th Air Fleet (YANE 5), Chief of Staff Southern Army (NATUTE), Air Group (BTEXU) at Koepang, unident TINITA, RASORE, plus [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 7-g: (continued)

Chief of Staff 19th Army (HTTO KIU GUN SANFOU TEU).
First time 19th Army associated with Dutch East In-
dies area suggesting new army units recently indicated
arriving in or enroute to southwestern area plus
those already there are to be incorporated under
command of Comdr. 19th Army.

(T2W-291054-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 143).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

No. 8-a:

COMDR 5TH FLEET APPARENTLY NEAR UPPER KURILES ON
27TH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The source of this intelligence is not known.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

Item 9

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was disclosed that an enemy submarine had reconnoitered Canton Island.

No. 9-a:

SUB RECONNOITERED CANTON ISLAND

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The submarine's report was intercepted. The translations of Melbourne and Washington were at variance in some details with that of Honolulu.

No. 9-b:

242300 January, 1943

12491

From:	NARAE		
To :	TINO	9	(22nd Air Flot)
Info:	KUA	8	(Combined Fleet)
	KOME	1	(Sub Force)
	NTI	5	(Chief Naval General Staff)

I-8 reporting reconnaissance of blank blank N (Kana) Island.

1. Blank level ground or sea calm. Did not observe blank. Because of blank did not approach. At 0100 23rd something about the moon, weather clear. When approaching from the westward noticed seaplane base anchorage. The gun range would be 5,000 meters.

2. The landplane field in the northwest blank of the island. Saw 2 blank and 1 small type plane. Observed much night activity on the air field.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)No. 9-b: (continued)

HOW COMMENT: I-8 reported a position of 4-10 North 171-25 East on the 18th. Submarine D/F'd in Howland - Canton area on January 25. Collateral information appears to fit Canton Island.

(NFM-262238-262242-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 26, 1943, p. 3).

No. 9-c:

271200 January, 1943

22339

From:	UA	8	(Taroa)
To :	NUME	4	(Combined Fleet)
Info:	MOKI	22	(Guadalcanal Operations Force)
	MIRA	9	(4th Fleet)
	MINE	0	
	HEHE	1	
	KUN	1	
	SERA	3	(Tokyo)
	ASD	5	
	YOSO	3	(Jaluit)
	MAHE	6	(Imieji)

Mentions in Part 2 of 2 parts:

3. I-8 made reconnaissance of Canton etc., and mentions enemy blank blank disposition.

4. Refers to 22nd AirDiv air patrol connection with CruDiv 8.

(NFM-272154-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 27, 1943, p. 18).

* * *

271200 January, 1943

22339

From:	UA	8	(Taroa)
To :	NUME	4	(Combined Fleet)

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Authority *nnd 947022*

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)No. 9-c: (continued)

Info:	MOKI	22	(Guadalcanal Operations Force)
	MIRA	9	(4th Fleet)
	MINE	Ø	
	HEHE	1	
	KUN	1	
	SERA	3	(Tokyo)
	ASO	5	
	YOSO	3	(Jaluit)
	MAHE	6	(Imieji)

Part 2 of 2.

(B) On 24th at 0815 in grid position blanks 1. large enemy plane blanks.

(C) Otherwise no enemy activity observed.

3. I-8 after shelling AC (Canton Island) at 2230 on 23rd withdrew to an area about 250 miles northwest (?) of AC where it is now on patrol against enemy vessels.

4. Received utmost cooperation in matter of arranging reconnaissance by AirFlot 22 and screening by 6th Base Force in connection with CruDiv 8 operations (?) plan (?).

NEGAT COMMENT: Note that HYPO translation gives "reconnaissance" to Canton instead of "shelling" in paragraph 3. HYPO version certainly more logical but our copy gives code group [redacted] in this suit positive "shelling" confirmed by comparison with Deskon 2 Communication Log. Mystery is deepened by fact that I-8 in making this report on Canton Island (see COM. 1A 262238 and 262242) used [redacted] group in describing an action which he reports having carried out. "Northwest" in paragraph may be "southwest". [redacted] Cannot definitely state that CruDiv 8 operations referred to in paragraph 4 are in future instead of already completed but former appears most probable. Part 1 of this dispatch is:

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)No. 9-g: (continued)

From: No originator
 To : RAME 4 (Combined Fleet)

Mentions reconnaissance of AEB (Baker) and AB (Howland Islands) by 1 flying boat and says "bombed what appears to be blanks on Baker Island. Does not appear that airfield on Howland is useable". Also mentions "sortie" from PY (Jaluit) at 2300 on 23rd. Word used for "sortie" (SHITSUKEKI) is one that so far we have noted is used only when ship or force is going out on an attack mission.

End NEGAT Comment.

(NSS-282213-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 16)

* * *

271200 January, 1943

22339

From:	UA	8	(Taroa)
To :	NUME	4	(Combined Fleet)
Info:	MOKI/MOKO	22	(Ath Fleet)
	SUHE	0	(1st Comb. Comm. Unit)
	ASD	5	(Truk)
	MOSO	3	(Jaluit)
	KUN/KNUN	1	
	SERA	3	
	MAHE	6	

(Paragraphs 1 and 2 unreadable).

3. The I-8 [] and the blank [] after shelling Canton Island (AC) at 2230 on 23rd (date garbled) have been stationed in the vicinity of 250 miles east of Canton Island to attack enemy shipping (KANSEN).

4. (Unreadable but mentions CruDiv 8 as possibly cooperating with AirFlot 22 in patrolling and with Base Force 6 in guard duties - KEIKAI).

(T2W-011056-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 1, 1943, p. 5).

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~~SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 9-a: (continued)

* * *

271200 January, 1943

22339

From:	UA	8	(Taroa)
To :	NUME	4	(Combined Fleet)
Info:	MOKI/MOKO	22	(4th Fleet)
	SUHE	0	(1st Combined Comm. Unit)
	ASO	5	(Truk)
	YOSO	3	(Jaluit)
	KUN/KNUN	1	
	SEPA	3	
	MAHE	6	

(This one is for more complete translation of message reported in T2W 011056. See NSS 282206 and 282213).

(The I-8 is only submarine mentioned in paragraph 3. Believe position to which I-8 withdrew is southwest of Canton).

(NSS-012030-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 1, 1943, p. 7).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

This reconnaissance proved to be a prelude to a shelling of the island by the I-8 and another submarine on January 30.

No. 9-d:

From: CANTON
 To : COMGENHAWDEPT
 Retransmitted:
 From: COMGENHAWDEPT
 To : CINCPAC

310150 January, 1943
 Priority

111-31ST CANTON SHELLED BY 2 SUBS FROM 1545 TO 1612
 OCT 30 JAN WITH APPARENTLY 5 AND 1/2 INCH SHELLS 3
 HITS IN PANAIR HOTEL AREA WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN
 THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE X NO DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS AND

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~~SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)No. 9-d: (continued)

NO CASUALTIES X 2 HITS ON TAYLOR X FIRE NOT RETURNED X DETAILED REPORT AND SHELL FRAGMENTS FOLLOW BY AIR PERIOD REQUEST THIS BE GIVEN NO PUBLICITY X NO WORD HERE ON LOCATION OF SS GROWNBLOCK OR LAWRENCE PHILLIPS X REQUEST 50 AIR PLANE DEPTH BOMBS 325 POUND X REPORT RECEIVED AT 2220 GCT 30 JAN STATES SUBMERGED SUB SIGHTED BY PBY AT 1 DEGREE NORTH 178 DEGREES WEST X REQUEST 2 BRACKET FUSE SETTERS 75 MM GUN

(CincPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

The I-8 was sighted by an American scouting plane from Canton a few hours after the attack but apparently the submarine escaped without damage.

No. 9-e:

310800 January, 1943

From:	SINE	9	(Jaluit)
To :	UYO	2	(Outer South Seas Force)
	TEO	77	(4th Fleet)
	HUHU	77	(Combined Fleet)
	HIMO	57	(SubForce)
	HONE	7	(Base Force #6)
	HITA	6	(1st Combined Com. Unit)
	TOHO	7A	(Imp. Hdqts., Navy Staff)
Info:	NOTA	7	
	MOSE	Ø	(AirFlet 22)

An observation plane from Canton (1V6) apparently spotted the I-8, for it sent the following plain language dispatch to Canton: "0730 have sighted what looks like a sub submerging. Am circling".

(HYFO-6-April-DI)

(D.T.B. April 6, 1943, p. 1).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

A submarine had been located by radar, sighted, and bombed two miles off Canton on the day preceding the shelling of the island.

No. 9-f:

From: CANTON
To : COMGEN HANDEPT
Info: FORT DIRECTOR
PEARL - INTERCEPT

300100 January, 1943
Priority

SURFACE CRAFT BELIEVED SUB PICKED UP BY RADAR 2 MILES OFF SOUTH SHORE 291000 GCT X P-39 DROPPED 1 BOMB AFTER FLEETING VISUAL CONTACT X RESULT UNKNOWN

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 30, 1943).

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JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

Item 10

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The light cruiser KASHII was reported to be near Singapore.

No. 10-a:

KASHII NEAR SINGAPORE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This estimate was based on traffic routing.

No. 10-b:

Traffic for KASHII (HUNAO) routed from Tokyo to Singapore on 27th January.

(NSS-271504-January-TI)

(D. T. B. January 27, 1943, p. 193).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #319 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

290415 January, 1943
 Priority

ACCORDING TO DOG FOX SUBS SOUTH AND EAST X 07163 X 11161 X
 10160 X 10159 X 08165 X 01157 X WEST BY NORTH X 17002 X SUBS
 MENTIONED YESTERDAY AS SOUTHEAST OF GUADALCANAL NOW BELIEVED
 TO BE OPERATING MORE TO SOUTH RATHER THAN SOUTHEAST X PART OF
 AIRGROUP 755 AT NAURU X ZYMOTIC X BULLETIN 319 FROM CINCPAC X
 CANTON ISLAND RECONNOITERED BY SUBMARINE X KASHII IN SINGA-
 PORE ZONE 27TH X COMDR 5TH FLEET BELIEVED NEAR HONOMUSHIRO
 27 JANUARY X SHOKAKU STILL ESTIMATED IN JAPAN X NO INFO OTHER
 COMBATANT CARRIERS BUT NO SIGNS NOTED THEY HAVE LEFT TRUK X
 ARMY CONVOY 3 SHIPS DEPARTED TRUK MORNING 28TH X DESTINATION
 UNKNOWN BUT ESTIMATED TO BE SHORTLAND X CRUISER NATORI DAMAGED
 BY B24S PRIOR 22 JAN IN NBI AREA X NOW BELIEVED AT MAKASSAR X
 CINC COMBINED AND COMDR 4TH FLEETS APPARENTLY AT TRUK X 1ST
 ASSOCIATION 19TH ARMY WITH SOUTHEAST AREA NOTED

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JANUARY 29, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 290715

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The position reports of enemy planes trailing an American task force were sent to ComSOPac.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : COMSOPAC

290715 January, 1943
Priority

ULTRA X JAP TRAILING PLANE AT 1125 (-9) REPORTED POSITION 11-30 SOUTH 161-30 EAST AND AT 1415 (-9) RELIEVING PLANE REPORTED POSITION 11-10 SOUTH 161-30 EAST

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

These reports were intercepted.

No. 2

6 KIRO 3 at 1125 included grid position YAYA IBKE or 161-28 East 11-28 South.

At 1415 plane 9 TATO 2 included grid position YAMO 2 SIKE (161-28 East 11-08 South) indicating northerly movement of force being shadowed.

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 100).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

These planes were shadowing Task Force #18 south of Guadalcanal. On the evening of January 29, Japanese planes carried out a series of torpedo attacks on this task force and succeeded in disabling the CHICAGO, which was then taken under tow. On the following day, the enemy planes returned to the attack and sank the CHICAGO and damaged a destroyer.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)No. 3

From: GTF 18
 To : COMSOPAC
 Info: CINCPAC
 COMINCH

310438 January, 1943
 Routine

THIS FORCE LESS SUNANNEE SANDAMON CHENANGO FRAZIER
 BEADE SUBJECTED TO NIGHT TORPEDO BOMBER ATTACK LAT
 10-36 SOUTH LONG 160-19 EAST X ATTACK BEGUN 0822 Z/29
 AND CONTINUED UNTIL 1135 Z/29 X INTERMITTENT RADAR
 CONTACTS HOSTILE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED THROUGHOUT NIGHT
 X CHICAGO TORPEDOED TWICE IN ENGINEERING SPACES
 STOPPED DEAD IN WATER IMMEDIATELY TAKEN IN TOW BY
 LOUISVILLE NEXT DAY BY NAVAJO X 0336 Z/30 CHULSERS
 LESS CHICAGO PLUS CHEVALIER TAYLOR PROCEEDED HAVAN-
 NAH IN ACCORDANCE COMSOPAC INSTRUCTIONS LEAVING
 CHICAGO IN TOW NAVAJO WITH WALLER LAVALLETTE CON-
 WAY EDWARDS SANDS PROCEEDING BUTTON APPROXIMATE
 SPEED OF ADVANCE 6 KNOTS XX PARA XX MATERIAL DAMAGE
 AS OF 0336 Z/30 2 TORPEDO HITS IN CHICAGO X CASUAL-
 TIES OFFICERS 4 KILLED 2 WOUNDED MEN 21 KILLED 21
 WOUNDED X ATTACK INTRODUCED NEW EMPLOYMENT OF MARKING
 FLARES, FLASHING FLOAT LIGHTS, MARKER PLANE X DE-
 TAIL REPORTS FOLLOW

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

No. 4

From: COMSOPAC
 To : CINCPAC
 Info: COMSOPAC
 NZNB

310605 January, 1943
 Priority

.....ENEMY PLANES SANK CHICAGO 1644 L 30TH SOUTH-
 EAST GUADALCANAL WHILE SHIP UNDER TOW RESULT AIR
 DAMAGE EVENING 29TH.....

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
JANUARY 29, 1943

COMNAVACTSOL DISPATCH 290846

(A) INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted enemy plane report claiming the sinking of an American battleship was sent to ComSoPac.

No. 1

From: COMNAVACTSOL
 To : COMSOPAC
 Info: CINCPAC

290846 January, 1943
 Operational Priority

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ORANGE AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTED AT 2010 (-11) QUOTE CONTINUING TORPEDO ATTACK 1 BATTLESHIP BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SUNK UNQUOTE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This report was intercepted.

No. 2

291800 January, 1943
 Plain Language

From: Plane 8 ARE 1

Torpedo attack continuing. Appears that one battleship blew up and sank.

(N39-291345-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 61).

* * *

Reboul Radio transmitted in plain language to Guadalcanal Operations Force at 1806 the following report from plane 8 ARE 1 timed 1700 today. "Still pressing torpedo attack. 1 battleship appears to have blown up and sunk".

(T27-291313-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 89).

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Authority *nnd 947022*

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

* * *

At 291800 plane 8 ARE 1 sent a garbled plain language which was not well translatable here but which Washington reports as: "Torpedo attack continuing. Battleship (?) blew up and sank".

(HYPO-29-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 102).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

See CinCPac Dispatch 290715 January, 1943. This is a report of an attack on Task Force #18 south of Guadalcanal. The reported sinking was premature; the cruiser CHICAGO was disabled but did not sink until the following day after being struck by four more torpedoes in a second attack.

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JANUARY 29, 1943

COMSOPAC DISPATCH 291748

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The American commands in the South Pacific were advised that there was reason to believe that enemy submarines were concentrating southeast of Guadalcanal on the night of January 29. A Dog Fox fix on a submarine in this area was reported and enemy bombers were expected to carry out a search of the same area the following morning.

No. 1

From: COMSOPAC
To : ALL TF COMBRS SOPAG
CINCPAC
COMBCH GUADALCANAL

291748 January, 1943
Urgent

ENEMY SUBS BELIEVED APPROACHING GENERAL AREA 11
SOUTH 161 EAST NIGHT OF 29TH X ULTRA X DF PLACES
ONE NEAR 11 SOUTH 159 EAST AT 2018 LOVE (-11) 29TH
X ORANGE BOMBERS BELIEVED TAKING OFF EARLY MORNING
OF 30TH PROBABLY FROM NORTHERN SOLOMONS ON SPECIAL
SEARCH POSSIBLY IN SAME AREA

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The movement of the submarines was known from an intercepted order. This movement was a continuation of the operation noted in ComSoPac Dispatch 272237 January, 1943.

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JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2

292233 January, 1943

33132

From: RLSU 8 (SubForce)
 To : MOND 2 (AirFlet #26)
 Info: WITO 29 (All Force and Detachment Ctrs.
 Ashore and Afloat Guadalcanal
 Operations Force)

Advance Expeditionary Force Operation Order blank.

If enemy is not sighted each ship will operate so as to be in indicated positions at dawn on 30th.

On deployment line A in order from north, [redacted] (submarine), I-17, I-26, and I-25.

On deployment line B in order from north, I-1, I-32, I-11, (plus unidentified subs [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted]).

COMMENT: Look at HOW's 261116 which is basic order for this operation. [redacted]

[redacted] Para-
 graph on deployment in reference despatch should read "be on deployment lines A and B (KOO and OTSU) by dawn on January 30th". HOW's version has "until" in this sentence but "by" is correct.

(NSS-292101-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 62).

* * *

292223 January, 1943

33132

From: MASU 8
 To : MOND 4
 Info: WITO 46

Advance Expeditionary Force Operation Order # blank.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

Enemy search disposition, as of dawn on the 30th, directed as follows:

Otsu line (counting from the north): [redacted] (in SubDiv 11), I-17 [redacted], I-25 [redacted], I-25 [redacted]).

B line (from the north): I-1 or blank [redacted], I-20 [redacted], I-32 [redacted], I-11 [redacted].

(NFM-170212-February-DI)

(D.T.B. February 16, 1943, p. 93).

Another intercepted order disclosed plans for a search by enemy bomber planes.

No. 3

291946 January, 1943

[redacted]
1354163

From:	MORE	6	(11th Air Fleet)
To :	KINA	62	(Comdr. Shirei or Shikikan, Air Attack Force #1)
	SOKO	1	(Unident)
Info:	WITOU	66	(Garbled)

Base Air Force OpOrd #152.

1st Air Attack Force take off as early as possible tomorrow morning the 30th and search "B" sector.

(NSB-291400-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 60).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 29, 1943GINCPAC DISPATCH 292355(A) INTELLIGENCE

CinCPac reported the position at which an enemy plane had sighted an American force near Guadalcanal and warned that ten enemy submarines were operating south and southeast of Guadalcanal.

No. 1

From: GINCPAC
To : COMSOPAC
ALL TF COMS SOPAC

292355 January, 1943
Operational Priority

ULTRA GINCPAC GIVES X JAP PLANE SEEMS SHADOWING
BLUE SURFACE UNIT AT 0830 L (-11) POSIT 11 SOUTH
160-40 EAST X 10 ENEMY SUBS FORMING 2 LINES FOR
SEARCH TO SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST GUADALCANAL

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The position of the enemy plane undoubtedly was derived from an intercepted report which, however, appears to be no longer extant.

The information concerning the ten enemy submarines was obtained from the intercepted messages quoted under ComSoPac Dispatch 272237 and 291748 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 29, 1943 (Continued)

(c) REPORT OF ACTION

See CincPac Dispatch 290715 January, 1943.

This sighting was of the disabled cruiser CHICAGO and her escort of four destroyers. Later in the day (January 30) enemy planes sank the CHICAGO.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 30, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #320

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMINCH
 COMSOPAC
 COMSWPAC
 ALL TF COMDRS PAC
 OPNAV
 COMNAVEU
 ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
 LANT, CARIB, GULF

300390 January, 1943
 Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The only carrier information placed the Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet at Truk on January 27.

No. 1-a:

CHIEF OF STAFF 3RD FLEET ESTIMATED TRUK ON 27TH
 X OTHERWISE NO ADDITIONAL CARRIER INFORMATION

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This officer was located by traffic routing.

No. 1-b:

Traffic routing indicates CofS 3rd Fleet (EK18) in Truk area on 27th.

(TZW-281158-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 58).

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 Authority *ND 947022*

~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The light cruiser KINU and the AOTAKA, a mine layer, were expected at Singapore on January 31 from Makassar. These ships were known to be escorting a crippled vessel believed to be the light cruiser NATORI.

No. 2-a:

KINU AND POSSIBLE AOTAKA ARRIVING SINGAPORE 31ST
FROM MAKASSAR ESCORTING A DAMAGED VESSEL POSSIBLE
NATORI

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from an intercepted dispatch. The NATORI was reported to be at Makassar, after undergoing an attack by Allied planes, in Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #319, January 29, 1943. A message deciphered on January 31 tended to confirm the belief that the escorted vessel was the damaged NATORI by disclosing that the AOTAKA had escorted the NATORI into Makassar and had been joined there by the KINU.

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-b:

212035 January, 1943

From: NARAE
To : ROWE 0
SAKU 5
Info: EO 4
HOHO 60
TIMO 9

45011

From ComCruDiv 16. CruDiv 16 OpOrd #5.

1. Cancel my OpOrd #4.

2. NATORI, AOTAKA depart 1900-21st, and pass through Buton Straits at Amboina at blank.

On 22 January at 2200 enter Saia -- (Salier Straits?).

On 23 January at 1330 pass through same and on same date arrive Makassar (might be some delay).

3. The KINU will join this unit on 24 January at Makassar.

COMMENT: May mean depart Ambon 21-1900 then pass through Buton (Boeton) Straits at 22-2200.

(NPM-310804-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 168).

No. 2-c:

272209 January, 1943

From: NARAE (NERK)
To : NEKI 1
NEHAMI 1(Singapore Address)
WOKI 0/
Info: UI 4
SOTEO (Repair Section 101)
RIRU 8
SEYAWI 2(Air Group 572)
KAI-KUI 3(2nd Southern Exp. Fleet)

4130

From blanks.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)No. 2-c: (continued)

1. KINU and AOTAKA escorting blanks sortie from Makassar at 1830 (?) 24th and passing through positions arrive Singapore at 1400-31st (estimated speed 13 knots).

Point "A" 5-39S, 113-30E at 0000-29th.

Point "B" 1-48S, 108-38E at 0645-30th.

Point "C" 1-25N, 104-43E at 0800-31st.

2. Particularly desire arrangements for anti-sub defense.

3. (Unreadable except for words "straits" and "towing").

(T2W-290750-January-DI)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The safe arrival of the KINU, AOTAKA, and NATORI at Singapore on January 31, was noted in an intercepted dispatch which confirmed the identity of the escort of the crippled NATORI.

No. 2-d:

311330 January, 1943

From: (Concealed identity) 48888
 To : KATA 9 (Combined Fleet)
 YOKURO-YOBURO (Chief of Nav.Gen.Staff and Minister)
 REYO 6
 AO 1
 Info: NATAHA
 FUNN 52 (All Commanders Force in East Indies Area, probably East Indies Force)

From Captain of NATORI

NATORI, KINU, AK, and AOTAKA, arrived Singapore.

(NBS-061454-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 8, 1943, p. 65).

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Authority *nnd 947022*

JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A vessel of unknown type was known to be due at Wewak on the morning of February 1.

No. 3-a:

UNKNOWN SHIP ARRIVING WEWAK 0900L 1 FEB FROM TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The schedule of this vessel was intercepted.

No. 3-b:

281630 January, 1943

From:	RUNATU	3	Serial 060
To :	KIOSI	2 (Comdr. Truk Har. Aff. Sect.)	
	SIKEKE	29 (Staff 4th Fleet)	
Info:	KOSANU	29 (Staff Combined Fleet)	
	ROINO	29 (Staff 2nd Fleet)	
	HONORA	29 (Staff 8th Fleet)	
	TUUA	29 (Staff Wewak)	

Left PT (Truk) at 1545; expect to arrive Wewak 0700, February 1st.

(NSS-282044-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 61).

* * *

281630 January, 1943

From:	RUNATE	3 (Unident)	Serial 060
To :	KIOSI	2 (4th Har. Aff. Bureau)	
	SIKEKE	2 (4th Fleet)	
Info:	SUSUHO	3 (Unident)	
	KONANU	2 (Combined Fleet)	
	RONINO	2 (Unident)	
	TUUA	2 (Wewak Base)	

Departed Truk at 1545. Scheduled arrive Wewak at

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

No. 3-b: (continued)

0700 1st.

(T2W-290158-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 55).

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JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The #2 NISSHIN Maru was ordered to omit the scheduled call at Miri in North Borneo.

No. 4-a:

CALL AT MIRI OF NO 2 NISSHIN MARU CANCELLED

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This order was intercepted.

No. 4-b:

272010 January, 1943

Serial 654

From: HITISE (Nav. Transp. Sect.)
 To : MITIMS (Yokosuka CofS)
 WIMIN 6 (NISSHIN Maru)
 Info: #1 Escort Force
 CofS #2 Southern Exp. Fleet
 10th Special Base Force, Singapore.
 Osaka Transportation Section
 TAHIRA

(Slightly garbled).

#2 NISSHIN Maru will cancel its Miri sailing, assigned in Transportation Section SMS 546, and will depart blank January 30th (joining a convoy) for Singapore. The blank at Singapore will give instructions blank regarding the unloading place.

(NSS-280855-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 144).

It had been announced in Item 1 of CinCPac Bulletin #312, January 22, 1943 that the #2 NISSHIN Maru would call at Miri.

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ND 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~ **ULTRA**

JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Ten enemy submarines were reported to be operating south and southeast of Guadalcanal.

No. 5-g:

10 SUBS KNOWN TRYING INTERCEPT ALLIED FORCES
SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST OF GUADALCANAL

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was the subject of CinCPac
Dispatch 292355 January, 1943. See also ComSoPac
Dispatch 272237 January, 1943.

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TOP SECRET - ULTRAJANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)Item 6(A) INTELLIGENCE

Six enemy underseas craft were located by
Dog Fox fixes.

No. 6-a:

D/F PLACES SUBS SOUTH AND EAST X 06163 X 11179
X 12156 X 01167 X 15158 X 05166

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCENo. 6-b:

D/F Fixes for January 29, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	5300	159E 11S	1600-28
NARAE	Sub	5300	166-30E 05S	0940-29
NARAE	Sub	5300	163E 06S	0956-29

GILBERT-MARSHALLS

MARAE	Sub	5300	167E 01S or [REDACTED]	1117-29
-------	-----	------	------------------------	---------

So. New Britain

(HYPO-29-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, pp. 67b and 14b).

No. 6-c:

Submarine NARAE working Jaluit on 5300 kes at 1250
Z-28th D/F at 155-39 E, 12-30 S. Fair.

[REDACTED] D/F on submarine at 157-30 E, 15 S working
Jaluit 5300 kes at 0853 Z-28th.

(T2W-290359-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 72).

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Authority

NDD 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was known that the Japanese were employing submarines to transport ammunition from Rabaul to Lae.

No. 7-a:

SUBS ALSO KNOWN TRANSPORTING AMMUNITION TO LAE FROM RABAU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This use of submarines was disclosed by an intercepted message.

No. 7-b:

270734 January, 1943

From:	TIRU	1 (Rabaul Radio)
To :	Garbled addressee	
Info:	SURA	3 (Combined Fleet)
	KII	4 (6th Fleet)
	NAKI	1 (8th Fleet)
	KATOYU	(1st Sect. Nav. Gen. Staff)
	REWA	Ø
	KON	8
	MOI	45

From Commander "B" SubForce.

"B" SubForce Operation Order # blank.

This force will engage in transportation of ammunition between Rabaul and Lae.

1. The date of landing will be (81972). Landing operations will begin at blank.

2. The landing point at Lae will be blank 800 meters to the south of blank (92217) Mountain (YAMA).

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Authority NDD 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)No. 7-b: (continued)

3. Cargo and amount to be loaded blanks provisions and so forth. Blanks (grid positions for transit).

4. The main points of the loading operations will be carried out in accordance with "B" SubForce SMS blank.

(T2W-281736-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 78).

* * *

270734 January, 1943

From:	TIRU	1	(Rabaul Comm. Unit)
To :	NIHE	Ø	(SubCom in Solomons)
Info:	SURA	3	(Combined Fleet)
	NAKI	1	(8th Fleet)
	KIMU	4	(Garbled)
	REWA	Ø	(Garbled)
	NENA	8	(Solomons Area Subs)
	MOI	4	
	RAKATIMA		(Garbled)

34522

From Commander "B" SubForce. "B" SubForce Despatch OpOrd blank.

Blank will participate in transport of ammunition between RR (Rabaul) and RZM (Lae Air Base)

1. Landing date is blank.

2. Landing to be made at point blank miles to the south of blank Mountain near RZM (Lae).

3. Cargo to be about 25 tons ? of ammunition, food etc.

4. (Unreadable).

5. Schedule of landing operations in accordance "B" SubForce OpOrd blank.

(MSS-312256-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 31, 1943, p. 51).

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nnd 947022

JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A cable laying vessel was believed to be near Rabaul.

No. 8-a:

CABLE VESSEL NEAR RABAU

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This vessel was detected by traffic analysis.

No. 5-b:

[redacted] Comdr. cable laying unit [redacted]
[redacted] was addressed in care of or aboard unident

UNEYO (previously associated with Rabaul area) on 27th and at 0825 originated dispatch addressed to CofS Combined Fleet (SURA 3), info CofS 4th Fleet (KASO 2) and 8th Fleet (NAKI 1) plus unident NEKI 06 and WAME 36. Mention of cable laying unit in association with Rabaul area suggests possibility of scheduled cable laying operations between certain bases in Rabaul area to avoid use of radio.

(TWN-281158-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 104).

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Authority AND 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)Item 9(A) INTELLIGENCENo. 9-a:

PREDICT CONSIDERABLE CONVOY MOVEMENTS SHORTLY FROM PALAU TO RABAUL WEWAK AND POSSIBLY HOLLANDIA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An analysis of current traffic indicated convoy movements between these points.

No. 9-b:

Traffic indications would suggest extensive convoy movements between Palao and general Rabaul area with further indications that some of these are enroute to Hollandia - Wewak area.

(T2-W-281139-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 100).

No. 9-c:

Fair volume Army traffic noted on 27th, most of this originated by Wewak. [redacted] CofS 20th Division is indicated as having arrived at Wewak and traffic from that command was addressed for action [redacted] Hollandia Force Comdr, CofS. Asa Division was also shown at Wewak. [redacted] Capt. Matsumoto, care of Army Force Palao Army (HONRU) was associated with this activity, suggesting that additional Army units will proceed from Palao to Wewak.

(T2W-281147-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 28, 1943, p. 103).

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JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

Item 10

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The light cruiser NAGARA was reported at Rabaul on January 28.

No. 10-a:

NAGARA ARRIVED RABAU 28TH FROM TRUK

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The NAGARA's schedule was intercepted.

No. 10-b:

181500 January, 1943

03915

From:	ENE	3	(Unident)
To :	WINE	9	(Unident)
	RAKA	97	(Unident)
Info:	UKA	7	(Combined Fleet)
	TOO	8	(2nd Fleet)
	KETU	3	(Unident)
	YAO	6	(Unident)
	HIKA	8	(Unident)
	SUYO	8	(Unident)

(Reference: Melbunit 0300 of the 24th. Retranslations).

(Reference: Imperial Headquarters Naval Section Serial 1615).

Schedule for NAGARA as follows:

18th January, assume blank duties.
 20th January, sortie from blank
 28th January, arrive Rabaul. En route stop at blank
 21st January, and at Truk on 25th.

(T-290510-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 47).

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Authority

ND 947022

~~SECRET~~ ~~ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #320 [British Addressees]

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

300425 January, 1943
 Priority

NAGARA ARRIVED RABAUL 28 JANUARY FROM TRUK X 10 SUBS ARE KNOWN DEPLOYED ON TWO LINES SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST OF GUADALCANAL TO INTERCEPT ALLIED FORCES X ACCORDING DOG FOX SUBS AT 01167 X 11159 X 05166 X 06163 X 15158 X 17156 X ALL SOUTH BY EAST X KINU AND AOTAKA (QUESTION) ESCORTING DAMAGED SHIP TO SINGAPORE FROM MAKASSAR WHERE WILL ARRIVE 31ST X BELIEVE SHIP BEING ESCORTED IS NATORI X ZYMOTIC X CINCPAC BULLETIN 320 X UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL ARRIVES WENAK MORNING OF 1 FEB FROM TRUK X #2 NISSHIN MARU CALL AT MIRI CANCELLED X SUBS BELIEVED ENGAGED CARRYING AMMUNITION FROM RABAUL TO VICINITY OF LAE X GABLE SHIP NOTED IN RABAUL AREA X CONSIDERABLE CONVOY MOVEMENTS SOON OUT OF PALAU FOR RABAUL AND NORTH NEW GUINEA PORTS PREDICTED X CARRIER INFORMATION UNCHANGED X ESTIMATE CHIEF OF STAFF 3RD FLEET STILL AT TRUK ON 27TH

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCHES 301903 and 312035(A) INTELLIGENCE

Task Force #8 was apprised of the approach of two vessels bound for Kiska.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : GTF 8

301903 January, 1943
Operational Priority

TWO MARUS APPROACHING KISKA X ULTRA X HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO ENTER KISKA HARBOR PRIOR TO TIME OUR PLANES USUALLY ARRIVE IN THE MORNING WHICH TIME WAS GIVEN AS 1900 GCT X DAY OF ARRIVAL UNKNOWN BUT BELIEVED EITHER 30TH OR 31ST GREENWICH DATE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 30, 1943).

On the following day, CinCPac sent further details from the same source which he felt might be of use to American vessels in Aleutian waters.

No. 2

From: CINCPAC
To : GTF 8

312035 January, 1943
Operational Priority

ULTRA X PERHAPS THIS INFO WILL BE HELPFUL TO OUR SHIPS X ADDITIONAL INFO REGARDING 2 MARUS ARRIVING KISKA X 2 HOURS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL BEACONS TO BE LIGHTED ALONG SCHEDULED COURSE FOR THE 2 SHIPS X ALSO SEARCHLIGHTS AND RADIO SIGNALS TO BE USED AS REQUIRED X UPON ARRIVAL ANCHORAGES ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS X SAKITO MARU X PRIMARY ANCHORAGE X 110 DEGREES 1775 YARDS FROM WEATHER STATION X SECONDARY ANCHORAGE X 45 (POSSIBLY 95) DEGREES 155 YARDS FROM PRIMARY ANCHORAGE X ASAKA MARU X PRIMARY ANCHORAGE X 188 DEGREES 1125 YARDS FROM WEATHER STATION X SECONDARY ANCHORAGE 225 DEGREES 163 YARDS FROM PRIMARY ANCHORAGE X SHIPS ARE TO USE BOTH BOW ANCHORS AND HAVE KEDGES READY DUE TO SUDDENNESS WITH WHICH WIND SHIFTS X STEAM TO BE KEPT UP FOR EMERGENCY SHIFTING OF ANCHORAGE OR FOR BEACHING IF NECESSARY X BELIEVE

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JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2 (continued)

SAKITO MARU RENDEZVOISED AT 0300 OCT 30TH WITH UNKNOWN SOMEBODY (POSSIBLY ASAKA MARU) IN 164-34 EAST 52 (POSSIBLY 42) - 27 NORTH X JUDGING FROM THIS SHIPS MAY HAVE ARRIVED MORNING OF 1 FEB LOCAL DATE X NOTE 1ST RATE SEAMANSHIP OF JAPS IN PREPARING FOR ALL EMERGENCIES

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from an intercepted message.

No. 3

301510 January, 1943

Serial 89

From: NARAE
To : KINO 5
TURENO
RON 9
Info: NATI 87
ON ø
SUNO ø

From 51st Base Force Commander.

Part I:

Convoy #12 will enter Kiska in accordance with the following:

1. As recently enemy planes have appeared about dawn (between 0400 and 0500), will enter by 0400.
2. For the following reasons, make use of both anchors and make preparations for using the kedge anchors. At this time the wind changes suddenly from the east to south with great suddenness.

Part II:

(General instructions: Largely garbled). Anchorages assigned as follows:

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)No. 3 (continued)

Part III:

ASAKA Maru: 1st anchorage bearing 188 from marker distance 1030 meters. Secondary anchorage bearing 225 from 1st anchorage distance 150 meters.

SAKITO Maru: 1st anchorage bearing 110 from marker distance 1630 meters. Secondary anchorage bearing 045 from 1st anchorage distance 140 meters. While at anchor keep steam up for emergency shift of anchorage or for running aground.

(NPM-302032-302034-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 135).

* * *

301510 January, 1943

Serial 089

From: NARAE (Cover)
 To : KINO 5 (Unident)
 RON 9 (Unident)
 TUKENO (Garbled)
 Info: NATI 87 (CofS 5th Fleet)
 ON ø (Unident)
 SUNO ø (Unident)

From Commander Base #51.

The entry of #12 Convoy into Kiska Harbor will be subject to the following instructions.

1. Since enemy planes lately have been conducting reconnaissance in the early morning (between 0400 and 0500), entry and anchoring must be effected by 0400 at the latest.

2. In anchoring both bow anchors are to be used and kedge anchors made ready for the following reasons:

- A. Recent wind directions in this harbor are largely south or east and in view of the abrupt changes of direction anchors should be set against all wind directions.

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)No. 3 (continued)

- B. In regard to a possible tendency to swing around if worst comes to worst, blanks (garbled) for this purpose, choose a depth of water which will permit you to rest lightly on the bottom.
3. Anchorages will be scheduled as follows:
- A. ASAKA Maru. #1 anchorage is at bearing 188, distant 1030 meters from weather observation station. #2 anchorage bears 225, distant 15 naught meters from #1 anchorage.
- B. SAKITO Maru. #1 anchorage is at bearing 110 degrees, distant 1620 meters from weather station. 2nd anchorage bears 95, distant 150 meters from 1st anchorage.
4. While at anchor, steam pressure is to be kept up and preparations to shift berths or to beach your vessels should be made.
5. Two hours before your scheduled time of arrival, beacons along your scheduled course will be lighted. We will use searchlights and send out radio signals as required.

(NSS-310051-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 134).

No. 4

300325 January, 1943

From: No originator
 To : NANEKA (SAKIDO Maru) Serial 015

Sent from Horomushiro to Ominato.

Rendervous at noon at position 42-27 North, 164-34 East.

(*Garbled-may be 52-27 North).

(NSS-300455-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 132).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

These two vessels were the subject of an earlier dispatch; see CinCPac Dispatch 260217 January, 1943.

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

Two task forces were stationed on the approaches to Kiska in an effort to intercept these vessels.

No. 5310610 January, 1943
Priority

From: CTF 8
To : CINCPAC
COMINCH
Info: COMCOMWESTSEAFRON
AND ALASKA SECTOR
ADC
VOPNAV

ONE CRUISER NORTH, TWO CRUISERS SOUTH OF BOODLE WITH SCREENING DD'S HUNTING MARUS POSSIBLY ARRIVING.

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

These enemy vessels apparently were successful in reaching their destination without detection. Captured documents indicate that the SAKITO Maru had left Paramushiro on January 28 and had arrived at Attu in company with the KIMIKAWA Maru on January 31. From a similar source it was known that the ASAKA Maru had arrived at Kiska on February 4.

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JANUARY 30, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6

SAKITO Maru: Voyage from Paramushiro to Attu.
(No indication that ship arrived at destination).
Departed from Paramushiro January 28, 1943.

(ICPOA Item #3440)

(GI Ship File, SAKITO Maru).

No. 7

Attu arrivals and departures:

January 31, 1943 - KIMIKAWA Maru and SAKITO Maru
arrived. KIMIKAWA Maru brought 7 float fighters
and one reconnaissance seaplane. On February 1,
1943 these planes flew to Kiska.....

(JICPOA Item #12819)

(GI Ship File, SAKITO Maru).

No. 8

When: - February 4, 1943 - February 5, 1943.
Ship: - ASAKA Maru XCL
Where: - Kiska Harbor.
What: - Arrived February 4, 1943 - Departed February
5 for Yokosuka.

(JICPOA Item #1725)

(GI Area File, Kiska).

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JANUARY 30, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 302037

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Canton Island garrison was informed that the Japanese were conducting extensive air searches from Makin in the Gilberts.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : CANTON

302037 January, 1943
Priority

THIS ULTRA FROM CINCPAC DESTROY BY BURNING X JAPS CONDUCTING AIR SEARCH FROM MAKIN UNTIL 12 FEBRUARY TO 800 MILES ARC 090 DEGREES THROUGH 120 TRUE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 30, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

An intercepted dispatch revealed the extent of these searches.

No. 2

121915 January, 1943

From: RUHI 83
To : TUKO 31
Info: OE 73 (Combined Fleet)

41715

During the period from 29 January to 12 February desire searches for enemy as follows:

(a) Origin Nauru sector between 160 and 230 degrees to 600 miles.

(b) Origin Makin sector between 90 degrees and 120 degrees to 800 miles.

(NPM-301164-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 11).

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JANUARY 31, 1943

CINCPAC BULLETIN #321

From: CINCPAC
To : COMINCH
COMSOPAC
COMSWPAC
ALL TF COMDRS PAC
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL NAV SEA FROM COMS LESS
LANT, CARIB, GULF

310255 January, 1943
Priority

Item 1

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Extensive air searches by the enemy from Makin and Nauru were reported.

No. 1-a:

DURING PERIOD 29 JAN - 12 FEB AIR SEARCHES FROM MAKIN BETWEEN 90 AND 120 DEGREES TO 800 MILES AND FROM NAURU BETWEEN 160 AND 230 DEGREES TO 600 MILES

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The searches from Makin were the subject of CinCPac Dispatch 302037 January, 1943, and the source of this intelligence is quoted thereunder.

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

These searches apparently were related to the presence of the cruiser TONE and the Eastern Diversion Force in the Gilberts, which in turn appeared to be a part of a diversionary operation designed to cover a major operation against Guadalcanal involving the approach of the Advance Force into the Solomons. It

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Authority *ND 947022*

JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

was learned too late that this operation was not an offensive against Guadalcanal but an evacuation of that island. See Item 5, CinCPac Bulletin #323, February 2, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *nm 947022*

JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 2

(A) INTELLIGENCE

There was no new intelligence concerning the enemy's carriers but there was evidence that carrier planes were shorebased in the Solomons.

No. 2-a:

NIL ADDITIONAL DATA CARRIERS X SOME CARRIER PLANES BELIEVED OPERATING SHOREBASED IN SOLOMONS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was derived from traffic analysis.

No. 2-b:

Possibility that carrier planes are currently operating in Solomons indicated in despatch at 1901, 29 January from unknown MUSU 2, to Comdr. 6th Air Attack Force (MUWI 06), 3rd Fleet Detachment (RIMORI 87), unident NIKO 6; info CinC's Combined, 3rd, and 8th Fleets, Comdr. 1st Air Attack Force (KINA 72) and unidents WAWI 2, SEKO-SOKO 1, RAMI 7.

(NSS-292111-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 88).

No. 2-c:

Additional evidence that carrier planes may be operating in Solomons contained in heading of 11th Air Fleet 301227, action Comdrs. 1st and 6th Air Attack Forces, 3rd Fleet Detachment (UMANE 87), info all CinC's and major unit comdrs. of Guadalcanal Operations Force.

(NSS-301420-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 96).

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JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

No. 2-d:

Further and positive evidence that carrier aircraft units are now operating in Solomons is contained in Comdr. 6th Air Attack Force, [redacted] "Comdr. 3rd Fleet Detached Unit" (3 F-HAKENTAI SHIKIKAN) in care of Rabaul, unident NOI 14, info CofS 8th Fleet, unident fleet OKI 27, Comdr. 1st Air Attack Force, Comdr. Reinforcement Force (POME 25), ComSubRon (YUU-YUI 69), latter call appears with both SHIREIKAN and RXSHIKAN (SHIKIKAN?) suffixes, so he may be Comdr. A SubForce or some such. Comdr. 6th Air Attack Force addressed the same lineup at 2120.

(NSS-301720-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 90).

No. 2-g:

Another associated of the 6th Air Attack Force on the 30th was a "3rd Fleet Detachment Comdr." (UMANE 87). Evidently no "detachment" suffix exists for 2 Kana numeral calls necessitating use of a 3 Kana call and identification is confirmed. Cinc 11th Air Fleet addressed the Detachment Commander and 6th Air Attack Force several times, info Guadalcanal Campaign Force. The assumption is that some 3rd Fleet squadrons are shorebased in the Solomons operating with (under?) Commander 6th Air Attack Force.

(HYPO-30-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 123).

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JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 3

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Fixes on five enemy submarines were listed.

No. 3-a:

DOG FOX SHOWS SUBS SOUTH BY EAST X 05155 X 07159
X 08164 X 03160 X 07153

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 3-h:

D/E Fixes for January 30, 1943.

NEW GUINEA-SOLONONS

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	5300	164 E. 08 S	1737-29
NARAE	Sub	5300	155 E. 05 S	0910-30
NARAE	Sub	5300	164 E. 08 S	0825-30
NARAE	Sub	5300	153 E. 07 S	0445-30
NARAE	Sub	5300	159 E. 07 S	1405-30
NARAE	Sub	5300	160 E. 03 S	1115-30
NARAE	Sub	13220	Near Rekata Bay	0555-30

(HYPO-30-January-TI)

(D.T.B. January 29, 1943, p. 41a).

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JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 4

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The enemy's available plane strength at Rabaul and Buin on January 21 was given.

No. 4-b:

FOLLOWING PLANES AVAILABLE 21 JAN X AT BUIIN X FROM 35 TO 55 SHIPBOARD BOMBERS X 14 FIGHTERS X AT RABAUL X 56 FIGHTERS X 49 MEDIUM BOMBERS X 20 RECONNAISSANCE PLANES X 17 SHIPBOARD BOMBERS

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

A report on this subject was intercepted.

No. 4-b:

201220 January, 1943

~~24233~~

From:	YOYU	65 (Comdr., Shirai or Shikikan, 6th Air Attack Force)
To :	SIU	2 (11th Air Fleet)
Info:	RAWO	144 (All Comm. Officers of All Air Groups)
	MUNI	5
	YOYU	6 (6th Air Attack Force)

(Very fragmentary. Starts with "5 PT planes available for use Rabaul Land Base, attack planes type 1, A1 several blanks, type 96, 8. Several more blanks land based observation planes 2 F Buin Land Air Base, shipboard bombers, blank fighters 14",. Remainder of message not deciphered yet, but seems to deal with attack of our B-17's and Grummans).

(NSS-220214-January:DI).

(D.T.B. January 21, 1943, p. 71).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)No. 4-b: (continued)

* * *

201220 January, 1943

21233

From: YOYU 65 (6th Air Attack Force)
 To : SIU 1
 Info: RAWO 144 (Guadalcanal Operations Force)
 MUNI 5
 YOYU 6 (6th Air Attack Force)

(Fragment of 6th Air Attack Operations Report 5.)

Planes available for 21 January:

Rabaul

Type I Attack Planes - - 41 (34 crews)
 Type 96 Attack Planes - - 8
 Shipboard Bombers - - 17
 Zero Fighters - - 56
 Land Reconnaissance Planes - - 20

Buin

Shipboard Bombers (garbled number between 35 and 55).

Zero fighters - 14

(NPM-301416-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 68).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~

JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 5

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Two vessels were reported to be due at
Kiska on January 31 or the following day.

No. 5-a:

2 MARUS BELIEVED ENTERING KISKA MORNING 31ST
OR 1 FEB LOCAL DATE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

This intelligence was reported earlier in
CinCPac Dispatch 301903 January, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~
~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~
 JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 6

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The 14th Submarine Division was known to be in the Malay area.

No. 6-a:

SUBDIV 14 OPERATING MALAY AREA

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The location of this submarine division was disclosed by an intercepted dispatch.

No. 6-b:

291445 January, 1943

27728

From:	NARAE	(Cover)
To :	NOSU	533 (Singapore Collective)
	NIMI	5 (Commander Unit in 8 SubRon)
Info:	HITO	68 (CofS SubForce)
	HATO	1 (Unident)
	HUWI	68 (CofS Combined Fleet)
	KATOYU	(Naval General Headquarters)
	YOHASU	30 (CofS 11th Air Fleet)

From Chief of Staff Southwestern Force.

As of () -date) SubDiv 14 is assigned to the Malay Force.

(NSS-292121-January 31 DI)

(D.T.R. January 29, 1943, p. 138).

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JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

No. 6-b: (continued)

* * *

291445 January, 1943

47728

From:	NARAE	
To :	NOSU	1
	NIMIWO	
Info:	HATO	2
	HKA	5
	NUWI	5 (Combined Fleet)
	KATOYU	(Imp.Hq.Nav.Staff, 1st Section)
	YCHA	8

From Commander Southwestern Force.
Effective 14 February, SubDiv 14 assigned Malay Force.

(HYPO-23-March-DI)

(D.T.B. March 23, 1943, p. 85).

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JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 7

(A) INTELLIGENCE

Wewak's defenses were to be strengthened by the arrival of Army fighter planes on January 31 and by units of the 20th Army Division shortly thereafter.

No. 7-a:

SUBSEQUENT TO ARRIVAL ARMY FIGHTER PLANES WEWAK 31ST EXPECT ARRIVAL REINFORCEMENTS FROM PALAU OF 20TH ARMY DIVISION

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Knowledge of these reinforcement plans was obtained from an intercepted dispatch.

No. 7-b:

140955 January, 1943

25662

From:	WAMA	73
To :	NAKE	03 (Combined Fleet)
	WARO	13 (8th Fleet)
Info:	RUMU	53 (4th Fleet)
	NAU	9
	FUHA	4
	ENA	6
	MOYURA	3 (43rd Guard Div.)
	YORO	66 (1st Sect. Nav.Gen.Staff)

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The 20th Army Division (embarked in 8 transports) is planned to leave Palao about 28 January. Blanks. In view of blanks conditions the above transportation must be delayed until the arrival of the Army fighter planes squadrons at Wewak, about 31 January.

(NPI-301058-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 65).

~~TOP SECRET~~
JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

Item 8

(A) INTELLIGENCE

It was stated that the Japanese had constructed airfields on Ocean, Nauru, and Tarawa Islands.

No. 8-a:

AIRFIELDS SPOTTED AT TARAWA OCEAN AND NAURU ISLANDS BY AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Radio intelligence already had suggested the existence of airfields at these three places. This intelligence was now supplemented by reported sightings.

No. 8-b:

From: CANTON 300640 January, 1943
 To : 7TH BOMBER COMMAND Routine
 Info: CINCPAC

FILM EXPOSED OVER OCEAN AND NAURU 1 STRIP AIR FIELDS CONSTRUCTED ON BOTH ISLANDS X TORPEDO PLANES OBSERVED ON BOTH ISLES ALL PAINTED BLACK

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 30, 1943).

No. 8-c:

From: CANTON 290730 January, 1943
 To : HAWN DEPT Routine
 Info: CINCPAC

ONE RUNWAY STRIP HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED IN SOUTHWESTERN MOST PORTION OF TARAWA APPROXIMATELY 7000 FT LONG NONE OTHER UNDER CONSTRUCTION 4 ZEROS REPORTED AIRBORNE AT LOW ALTITUDE BUT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO INTERCEPT US

(CinCPac Chronological Dispatch File, January 29, 1943).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)

(0) REPORT OF ACTION

The existence of an airfield on Ocean Island was opened to question a few days later when further aerial photographs disclosed no evidence of an airstrip on that island. See Item 7, CinCPac Bulletin #335, February 14, 1943. The earlier report appears to have been in error and the plans described in Item 6 of CinCPac Bulletin #312, January 22, 1943 postponed or abandoned.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)Item 9(A) INTELLIGENCE

The Commander of the Second Fleet was reported to have sortied from Truk on January 30.

No. 9-a:

COMDR 2ND FLEET SORTIED FROM TRUK 1100 L (-11) 30TH X IN THE PAST WHEN THIS COMDR SORTIED FROM TRUK HE WAS IN COMMAND OF A TASK FORCE HEADED FOR THE SOUTH

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The schedule for this sortie was found in the following dispatches.

No. 9-b:

261446 January, 1943

37967

From:	Blank	
To :	SATE	4
Info:	HOWO	17
	IWO	67
	YUKE	10
	MEVO	Ø
	ROHA	5
	WIRO	85

(Partial translation).

Originator Cinc 2nd Fleet.

This force is scheduled to sortie from Truk 0900 30th. Desires blank to do blank. Request immediate report scheduled movements.

(NPM-310142-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 30, 1943, p. 34).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 31, 1943 (Continued)No. 9-b: (continued)

* * *

261446 January, 1943

From:	No originator	
To :	SATE	4
Info:	HOWO	17
	IWO	67
	HUSI	27
	YUKE	10
	MEWO	Ø
	ROHA	5
	WIRO	85

37967

From Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet.

This force scheduled to sortie from PT (Truk) at 0900 30th. Request you conform your movements to this operation. Also request immediate report of your schedule movements.

(NSS-310511-January-DI)

(D.T.B. January 31, 1943, p. 50).

(C) REPORT OF ACTION

The departure of this force from Truk may have been delayed for a day. See Item 4, CinCPac Bulletin 322, February 1, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~JANUARY 31, 1943CINCPAC BULLETIN #321 /British Addressees/

From: CINCPAC
 To : CINC EASTERN FLEET
 NAVAL STAFF HDQTS OTTAWA
 ACNB
 NZNB

310435 January, 1943
 Priority

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE SHOWS AIRFIELDS ON NAURU, OCEAN AND
 TARAWA ISLANDS X SUBDIV 14 ASSIGNED TO MALAY FORCE X ZYMOTIC
 X CINCPAC BULLETIN 321 X 2 MARUS INDICATED ARRIVING KISKA
 SOON X REINFORCEMENTS BELONGING TO 20TH ARMY DIVISION EX-
 PECTED ARRIVE WENAK FROM PALAU ABOUT 31ST AFTER ARRIVAL
 ARMY FIGHTER PLANES X SUBS DOG FOXED SOUTH AND EAST X 08164
 X 05155 X 07153 X 07159 X 03160 X ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
 CARRIERS NIL X POSSIBILITY SOME CARRIER PLANES SHORE BASED
 SOLOMONS X AIR SEARCHES TO 600 MILES BETWEEN 160230 DEGREES
 FROM NAURU AND TO 800 MILES BETWEEN 90-120 DEGREES FROM MAKIN
 DURING PERIOD 29 JAN 12 FEB X PLANES AVAILABLE 21 JAN X AT
 RABAU X 49 MEDIUM BOMBERS X 17 SHIPBOARD BOMBERS X 56
 FIGHTERS X 20 LAND RECONNAISSANCE PLANES X AT BUIN X 14
 FIGHTERS X BETWEEN 35 AND 55 SHIPBOARD BOMBERS X 2ND FLEET
 LEFT TRUK 30TH POSSIBLY FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS SOUTHERN THEATRE

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nnd 947022

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 31, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 310235

(A) INTELLIGENCE

The American commands in the South Pacific were informed through ComSoPac of the departure of a task force from Truk and were warned that important operations in the Solomons might be expected to ensue.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
 To : COMSOPAC

310235 January, 1943
 Urgent

BELIEVE COMDR 2ND FLEET LEADING A TASK FORCE LEFT TRUK 1100 LOVE 30 JAN X ULTRA X THIS MAY WELL MEAN MAJOR OPERATIONS SOLOMONS AREA WITHIN A FEW DAYS

(CinPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

No. 2

From: COMSOPAC
 To : COMGEN GUADALCANAL
 ALL TFC'S SOPAC
 COMSOPESPAC
 COMGENS IN BASES SOPAC

310431 January, 1943
 Urgent

FOLLOWING FROM CINCPAC X ULTRA SECRET X FOLLOWING MAY WELL MEAN MAJOR OPERATIONS SOLOMONS AREA SHORTLY X A TASK FORCE UNDER COMMANDER 2ND FLEET IS BELIEVED TO HAVE LEFT TRUK 1100 L (-11) JAN 30

(CinPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

See Item 9, CinPac Bulletin #321, January 31, 1943.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 31, 1943

CINCPAC DISPATCH 311951

(A) INTELLIGENCE

A fix on a Japanese submarine was reported.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC
To : CANTON

311951 January, 1943
Priority

ULTRA X JAP SUBMARINE BY DIRECTION FINDER AT
00-30 SOUTH 173-30 WEST TIME 1550 OCT 31 JANUARY

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 2

D/F Fixes for February 1, 1943.

HOWLAND-BAKER

<u>CALL</u>	<u>IDENT</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>PLOT & AREA</u>	<u>TIME</u>
NARAE	Sub	6610	173-30 W 00-30 S	1550-31

(HYPO-1-February-TI)

(D.T.B. January 31, 1943, p. 8).

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~~TOP SECRET - ULTRA~~JANUARY 31, 1943CINCPAC DISPATCH 312351(A) INTELLIGENCE

An enemy plane's contact report was given.

No. 1

From: CINCPAC 312351 January, 1943
 To : COMSOPAC Priority
 ALL TF COM SOPAC

ZEAL CINCPAC SENDS X AT 0945 LOVE 1ST NIPPON
 PLANE REPORTED CONTACT IN POSIT 11-50 SOUTH
 161-45 EAST X TYPE CONTACT UNKNOWN HERE

(CinCPac "Ultra" Dispatch File, January 31, 1943).

(B) SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The plane's report was intercepted.

No. 2

0705-1st Plane 5, MERU 3 sent grid position
 161-45 EAST 11-50 SOUTH

(HYPO-1-February-TI)

(D.T.B. February 1, 1943, p. 81).

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

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