

MARSHALL LETTER TO MacARTHUR  
ON THE USE OF "ULTRA" INTELLIGENCE

May 23, 1944

AND RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

SRH-004

MARSHALL LETTER TO MacARTHUR  
ON THE USE OF "ULTRA" INTELLIGENCE  
MAY 23, 1944  
AND RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Marshall Letter to MacArthur	1
Bissell Letter to Menzies	4
Marshall Letter to Buckner	6
Regulation for Maintaining the Security of Special Intelligence in the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters	8



1. A large volume of extremely valuable "Ultra" intelligence is already being obtained by reading Japanese military and air communications enciphered in high-grade cryptographic systems. This work is participated in by large U. S., British, organizations in Washington, London, Brisbane and New Delhi. These organizations exchange decoded messages, and each of them disseminates Ultra to various commands. It is reasonable to hope that, if the cooperation between these organizations continues and if the results achieved do not become known to the enemy, the volume of Japanese Ultra intelligence will greatly increase in the future.

2. Inherent in the present arrangements for producing and disseminating Japanese Ultra intelligence, however, is the grave danger that the whole structure may collapse if a single blunder in the handling of Ultra in any theater leads the enemy to suspect that his high-grade cryptographic systems are being read. Each Commander must recognize that however secure he may consider the handling of Ultra within his own theater, he may lose this vital source of intelligence if adequate measures are not taken to insure uniformly strict adherence in all theaters to uniform security regulations.

3. To achieve this end, the War Department has agreed with London, to adopt uniform methods for the dissemination of Ultra. Joint U. S. - British Ultra security regulations have been issued for the European, North African and Middle East Theaters, and are now in successful operation. The arrangements in the European Theater are outlined in a letter to General Eisenhower dated 15 Mar 44.

4. The War Department is now proposing to the British uniform regulations for the handling and use of Ultra in all theaters in the Pacific and Asia. The circumstances leading to the proposal of these new regulations and the reasons for including certain provisions are explained in a letter from the A. C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S.

5. Particular attention is called to of the proposed regulations, which provides that the War Department will attach to each U. S. headquarters receiving Ultra, special security personnel who, except for administration and discipline, will be under the control of the War Department, and that all such U. S. special security personnel in each theater will be under the immediate supervision of a representative of the War Department. The new regulations will govern the handling within each theater of all Ultra, whether produced within or without the theater

6. In order to carry out the arrangements for handling Ultra in the European Theater, the War Department has already assigned 48 carefully selected and specially trained officers to its detachment in that theater. Six such officers have already been sent to the China-Burma-India Theater, and more are to follow. Similar arrangements are being instituted in the Central Pacific. The U. S. Commanders in those theaters have welcomed the services of these officers and given them full cooperation. The War Department proposes, when the inclosed regulations are put into effect, to provide your theater as rapidly as possible with similar carefully selected and specially trained officers, in the numbers required to permit Ultra to be handled in accordance with the regulations.

22 MAY 1944

Dear Menzies:

Reference is made to paragraph 8 of the agreement, dated 17 May 1943, between the U. S. War Department and British Government Code and Cipher School, which provides that all recipients of high-grade signal intelligence ("Ultra"), whether British or American, shall be bound by the security regulations annexed to the agreement, and that if at a later date either country wishes to modify them in the light of further experience, this may be done by mutual agreement.

As you know, U. S. regulations conforming to the requirements of the agreement were issued in October 1943. Also, in March 1944, the War Department accepted a modification of the security regulations, proposed by G. C. & C. S. pursuant to the agreement, but limited its acceptance to the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operation because the modifications proposed appeared unsuitable in certain respects for the Pacific and Asiatic theaters, for which the U. S. under the agreement has assumed the main responsibility with respect to Ultra.

There is inclosed herewith a new set of regulations, which are proposed as a modification of existing regulations for the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters. These regulations have been prepared with special regard to the fact that Japanese Ultra is produced not only by the War Department and G. S. & C. S. but also by a U. S.

organization in Brisbane and both British and U. S. organizations in India. Because of that fact and because of the different intelligence requirements of the several widely separated theaters in the Pacific and Asia, it is felt that the collation and evaluation of Japanese Ultra from all sources and the preparation of Ultra messages to field commands cannot be confined as in the case of German Ultra to a single disseminating agency for all theaters, but must take place within each theater as well as in Washington and London. The proposed regulations permit that to be done, and provide for centralized control only of the security aspects of the handling of Ultra within theaters.

The inclosed regulations, like those for Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, recognize that in combined U. S. - British operations within any theater the maximum security and efficiency in the handling of Ultra can be achieved only by having a single agency to receive all Ultra and disseminate it to both U. S. and British recipients within the theater. However, regulations for the Pacific and Asiatic theaters must take into account the fact that at present some of those theaters include only U. S. forces. Also, as the situation develops in theaters of combined operations it may become impractical to adhere in every case to the requirement of only a single such agency within each theater. The proposed regulations therefore provide for a combined agency only in theaters of combined operations and permit separate U. S. and British agencies in such theaters when the situation requires.

The proposed regulations are being forwarded by the War Department to the U. S. Theater Commanders concerned, for their comments prior to final adoption. They are therefore proposed at the present time subject to such changes as may appear desirable after the comments of the Theater Commanders are received.



CLAYTON BISSELL,  
Major General,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Major General Stewart G. Menzies,

# SUMMARY SHEET

(FOR ACTIONS BY OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF OR OFFICE, SECRETARY OF WAR)

TO →		G-4			FOR →		APPROVAL	FROM M	OFFICE SYMBOL	
	G-1	OPD				X	SIGNATURE		G-2	
	G-2	X	CHIEF	OF		STAFF				GRADE-SURNAME-PHONE
	G-3		SECRETARY	OF		WAR				Colonel Clarke 5510
FILE NO.	SUBJECT						DATE			
	ULTRA DEXTER INTELLIGENCE						15 April 194			

**SUMMARY**

Letter for Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr., Commanding General, Alaskan Department informing him of existence of Ultra Dexter intelligence and enclosing copy of security regulations governing its dissemination. States that present flow of Ultra for Alaska does not justify assignment of a Special Security Officer from the War Department to his staff. However, arrangements have been made for passing Ultra to Alaska over existing Navy Ultra channels from Pearl Harbor through the Army Special Security Officer on General Richardson's staff.

**COORDINATION**

OPD Concurrence ( )

**Incl:**

Ltr for sig Chief of Staff with incl.

CLAYTON BISSELL  
Major General  
A. C. of S., G-2.



April 15, 1944

Dear Duckner:

The War Department has had great success recently in securing intelligence from reading enciphered enemy radio communications. This extremely important intelligence is known as "Ultra".

The preservation of the source of Ultra requires that the enemy be prevented from obtaining even the slightest hint that his secret communications have been compromised. Therefore the most stringent security measures must be observed in its handling.

The plan has been to assign an officer, known as a Special Security Officer, to each Commander who requires Ultra. This officer is equipped with special cryptographic systems and serves as a direct channel for the transmission of Ultra from and to the War Department. Dissemination within the theater is supervised by this officer according to Special Security Regulations.

The flow of Ultra pertinent to your theater does not justify the assignment of a Special Security Officer to your staff at present. However, the Navy does have a special Ultra channel from CINCPAC to COMSOPAC. The Special Security Officer assigned to General Richardson has made arrangements to use this channel for forwarding Ultra to you until such time as we will be able to establish our own channel.

I am enclosing a copy of an Adjutant General letter dated 14 October 1943 which contains the security regulations for the dissemination of Ultra in all theaters. Please give this matter your personal attention and take all necessary steps to insure that these regulations are meticulously observed as to any Ultra received by you through the Navy. If you desire to make any comments on Ultra items, please do so only through the Navy, using the same channel through which Ultra is received.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. O. MARSHALL

Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr.  
Commanding General, Alaskan Department.

Original dispatched from OCS

Incl: 1

AG ltr 312.1 (13 Oct 43)  
OB-S-B-M dtd 14 Oct 43. Copy #31

07

REGULATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE SECURITY  
OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC AND ASIATIC THEATERS

1. DEFINITION. Special Intelligence is the designated term for highly secret information obtained by intercepting and reading enemy messages which have been enciphered in cryptographic systems of a high security classification.
2. GENERAL. The extreme importance of Special Intelligence as a source of reliable information concerning enemy activities and intentions has been repeatedly proved. Preservation of this source requires that the enemy be given no reason to suspect that his communications are being read. If from any document which might fall into his hands, from any message he might intercept, from any word revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action taken upon the basis of such intelligence, the enemy were given cause to believe that his communications are not adequately safeguarded against the interception which he knows to be employed against him, he would effect changes which would deprive us of knowledge of his operations on all fronts. Extreme secrecy is therefore required and these regulations are to be strictly observed.
3. CODE WORD FOR SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. All messages or other documents transmitting Special Intelligence, information based thereon, or any direct or indirect reference thereto, will contain the code word Ultra to indicate the source. When transmitted by wire or radio, the word Ultra will be buried within the body of the message near the beginning and cryptographed as part of the text.

4. AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS. The levels upon which Ultra may be disseminated, and the number of officers at any level authorized to receive it, are severely restricted, as follows:

a. Ultra will not be made available to staffs below the level of Army or equivalent Air Force formations, except that (1) Ultra may be passed in the form of operational orders to lower formations, as provided in paragraph 9(c) below, and (2) in exceptional circumstances making it imperative, the Commander-in-Chief of the Theater may authorize Ultra to be passed to lower formations down to the level of divisions or equivalent Air Force formations if they are operating independently, but only in strict accordance with paragraph 6 below and only if the physical security of the receiving headquarters is assured.

b. Within headquarters authorized to receive Ultra, it may be made available only to officers holding the following posts:

- (1) Commander and his Deputy  
Chief of Staff and his Deputy  
Senior Intelligence Staff Officer  
Senior Operations Staff Officer  
  
Senior Planning Officer                    ) At Army Group  
Senior Signal Officer                    )            or  
Senior Signal Intelligence Officer) higher level

(2) Additional intelligence and operations staff officers absolutely necessary for its handling and use, as specifically authorized in each instance pursuant to paragraph 3(b)

below (except that in the case of formations below the level of Army or equivalent Air Force formations, no recipients may be authorized in addition to Commander, Chief of Staff, and senior intelligence and operations staff officers).

g. No officer will be entitled to receive Ultra solely by reason of the post which he holds.

5. DISSEMINATING AGENCY WITHIN EACH THEATER. All Ultra produced or received within any theater will be transmitted to a single agency which will be charged with responsibility for disseminating the intelligence derived from such Ultra to authorized recipients over authorized channels. Within any theater of combined U.S.-British operations (a) such agency will include both U.S. and British personnel who will be jointly responsible for dissemination to British and U.S. recipients, or (b) where it is considered desirable, there may be separate U.S. and British agencies which will be responsible for dissemination to British and U.S. recipients, respectively. In the latter event, such separate agencies will cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in order to avoid duplication of effort in the collation, evaluation and dissemination of Ultra, to obviate the necessity of separate transmissions of Ultra from production centers to each such unit, and to permit wherever

---

possible the use of common communication facilities and cryptographic systems for the receipt and transmission of Ultra messages.

6. SPECIAL SECURITY PERSONNEL, CHANNELS AND CIPHERS FOR ULTRA (SEE DIAGRAM ATTACHED).

a. Approval of Channels. Except in strict accordance with paragraph 10(a) below, Ultra Intelligence, information based thereon, or any reference thereto, will be transmitted only by personnel and by means of channels and ciphers approved,

in the case of U.S. commands, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, or, in the case of British commands, by  
London.

b. Special Security Personnel. Special Security personnel, to be known as Special Security Officers (S.S.O.) will be attached by the A.C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S., to each U.S. headquarters entitled to receive Ultra, and like personnel, to be known as Special Liaison Units (S.L.U.), will be attached by London to each British headquarters entitled to receive Ultra. Such personnel for purposes of administration and discipline will be subject to theater control. They will hold special cryptographic systems, or special settings of machine ciphers, for the transmission of Ultra and will have sole responsibility for (1) the decrypting of all Ultra messages received at the headquarters

to which they are attached and the safe delivery of the  
decryptographed texts to authorized recipients and (2)  
the cryptographing of all Ultra messages sent from such  
headquarters. They will also advise recipients at such  
headquarters regarding security in the handling of Ultra  
and the carrying out of these regulations.

c. Communications Personnel. Where necessary to  
provide for the prompt transmission of Ultra messages, special  
communications personnel will be attached to disseminating  
centers and operational headquarters and will be responsible  
for maintaining direct radio communications between such  
centers and headquarters.

d. Special Security Representatives.

London may designate, for each theater having  
British headquarters authorized to receive Ultra, an officer,  
with such assistants as may appear desirable, who will  
represent London on all matters  
involving the security, transmission and exchange of Ultra  
and who, except for administration and discipline, will  
supervise all British special security personnel within such  
theater. The A.C. of S., G-2, W.D.G.S., may designate, for  
each theater having U.S. headquarters authorized to receive  
Ultra, an officer, with such assistants as may appear desirable,  
who will represent the War Department in all matters involving

the security, transmission and exchange of Ultra and who, except for administration and discipline, will supervise all U.S. special security personnel within such theater. Such officers and their assistants will be attached to theater headquarter for administration and discipline only.

e. Use of Courier, Bag or Pouch. Except as specifically authorized pursuant to paragraph 6(a), Ultra material may be transmitted by courier or by bag or pouch only if (a) the route is completely secure and does not pass over enemy, enemy-occupied or neutral territory, or the material is enciphered in an approved cryptographic system, and (b) the handling arrangements at both ends are confined to personnel authorized pursuant to paragraph 6.

7. CLASSIFICATION OF ENEMY CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS. The A.C. of S., G-2, E.D.G.S., in the case of U.S. commands, and

London, in the case of British commands, will have sole authority to determine which enemy cryptographic systems are of a high security classification, for the purpose of defining which ones fall within the class of Special Intelligence, and will have authority to upgrade the security classification of any enemy system when desirable in the interests of security. Such classifications and any changes therein will be forwarded from time to time as they are made to Theater Commanders over the special channels

provided pursuant to paragraph 6.

8. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO RECIPIENTS.

a. Briefing. Before Ultra is made available to any authorized recipient, he will first be properly initiated into the nature of the source and briefed regarding the security regulations, and will sign a form stating that he has read and understands the regulations and will comply therewith. Briefing will be carried out either by the senior S.S.O. or S.L.U. officer or, if no such officer has been designated, by the senior intelligence staff officer or such other officer as the Commander may designate.

b. Additional Recipients. In the event that a Commander considers it essential that any officer in addition to those specifically enumerated in paragraph 4(b) (1) should be authorized to receive Ultra, he will make application through the S.S.O. (or S.L.U. to the War Department, in the case of a U.S. recipient, or to London, in the case of a British recipient, giving reasons for the request. When an officer who is not already an authorized recipient is assigned to a post which entitles him to Ultra, a similar application will be made, unless the Commander making the assignment personally guarantees that such officer is a reliable recipient.



c. Relinquishment of Post. If an officer relinquishes a post which has entitled him to receive Ultra, he automatically forfeits his right to see such material and will sign an undertaking to that effect. In such a case it is highly undesirable that the officer be transferred to any post which will subject him to the risk of capture by the enemy.

d. Discussion with Non-recipients. No authorized recipient of Ultra will under any circumstances show or read any Ultra material to, or discuss it with, any person of any service unless he is satisfied that such person is also authorized to receive such material.

e. Lists of Recipients. The S.S.O. or S.L.U. at each headquarters which receives Ultra, or, if no such officer has been designated, an authorized recipient designated by the Commander, will maintain on a current basis a list of all persons at such headquarters authorized to receive Ultra and will transmit over Ultra channels to the disseminating agency the names and posts of all authorized recipients and any changes therein. The disseminating agency will transmit this information over Ultra channels to London in the case of British recipients and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 War Department General Staff in the case of U.S. recipients.

f. Communication between Ultra Recipients. Communication between recipients on matters which in any way concern Ultra, whether in the form of queries, comments, summaries or appreciations, will be transmitted only over the Ultra channels authorized pursuant to paragraph 6 hereof. If any recipient considers it essential that any Ultra should receive distribution additional to that already given, he will not transmit it directly but will request the S.S.O. of S.L.U. to arrange for the additional distribution.

9. EMPLOYMENT OF ULTRA.

a. Action Based on Ultra. Any action based upon Ultra must be so camouflaged that the action itself cannot lead the enemy to the conclusion that it is based on Ultra. Momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by Ultra unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance or other suitable camouflage measures have also been undertaken.

b. Briefing of Pilots. The utmost care is to be taken, when briefing pilots for an operation based on Ultra information, that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and then only such as are essential to the success of the operation. In no event will the source of such information be disclosed, and whenever

practicable the information will be attributed to some other source. The risk of capture makes it imperative that these provisions be strictly observed.

c. Orders to Subordinate Commands. When Ultra furnishes the basis of action to be taken by a command which is not authorized to receive Ultra, the information when passed to the subordinate command must be translated into terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the enemy the origin of the order could not be traced back to Ultra. Such orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an enemy operation, or the name of any ship or tactical unit revealed only by Ultra. Such operational orders if transmitted by radio must be in high grade cryptographic systems.

#### 10. SUMMARIES, APPRECIATIONS AND PAPERS.

a. Restriction on Use of Ultra. Any summary, report estimate, appreciation or other paper based upon or including information from Ultra sources automatically becomes subject to the same security regulations concerning dissemination, distribution, handling and use, as the Ultra material itself, unless

(1) the information has also been received from other sources, or

(2) the information relates to Order of Battle and

(a) sufficient time has elapsed to make it reasonable for the enemy to assume that the information was obtained from other sources known by the enemy to be available to us, and (b) the Theater Commander has specifically authorized such information to be so included.

In any case, the source of such information shall not be disclosed.

b. Avoiding Restrictions on other Intelligence. In view of the above, it is evident that, in order to avoid subjecting information not from Ultra sources to the special security requirements for Ultra, such information should not be mixed with Ultra except when absolutely necessary.

c. Intelligence Records, War Diaries, etc. No information from Ultra sources, and no reference thereto, shall be included in any intelligence journals or logs, war diaries or other similar records.

#### 11. SAFETY OF ULTRA MATERIAL.

a. Retention of Ultra Material. No Ultra material, and only such records as cannot give any clue to the nature of the source, may be kept at any operational headquarters below Army Group. It is the duty of the S.S.O. or S.L.U. to keep an accurate record of all copies of messages delivered to any headquarters and, in the case of formations below the level of

Army Group, to retrieve and destroy them. The number of hours during which Commanders may retain Ultra messages depends on their proximity to the enemy, but destruction should normally take place as soon as the necessary action has been taken.

b. Physical Handling of Ultra Within Headquarters.

Special measures will be taken to insure that all Ultra material is at all times so handled and kept that no unauthorized person can obtain access to it. Recipients of Ultra at operational commands may not under any circumstances carry on their persons, or dispatch outside their headquarters, Ultra messages which have been delivered to them. Ordinarily, Ultra may be received, discussed or worked upon only in a room which is reserved for that purpose alone and to which no person who is not authorized to receive Ultra has access. When it is impossible to set aside a room exclusively for this purpose, a room or other segregated place shall be provided which Ultra recipients may use periodically, or when required, for reading, discussing or otherwise using Ultra. When circumstances require that a commander or other recipient receive or discuss Ultra at any other place, every precaution shall be taken to insure that no unauthorized person shall see such material, that such discussion does not take place within the hearing of any unauthorized person, and that the Ultra material is retained only for the minimum period of time necessary for reading and discussing it.

c. Safety of Special Security Personnel. It is the responsibility of the commander to whom special security personnel are attached to see that they are never required to go where they would be subjected to the risk of capture by the enemy.

d. Destruction of Ultra Material. It is the responsibility of the senior S.S.O. or senior S.L.V. officer attached to any headquarters to destroy all messages and documents containing Ultra and all special cryptographic material, should he consider the situation warrants such action.

12. SECURITY OF REGULATIONS AND CODE WORD. These regulations shall be transmitted only over channels authorized for the transmission of Ultra and shall be made available only to persons authorized to receive Ultra. The meaning of the code word Ultra shall not be disclosed to any person not authorized to receive Ultra.