REPORTS

BY

U. S. ARMY ULTRA REPRESENTATIVES

WITH FIELD COMMANDS

IN THE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, PACIFIC OCEAN

AND

CHINA BURMA INDIA THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

1944 - 1945

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Report of Special Security Representative, Headquarters
Armed Forces, Pacific (formerly SWPA)

The following report covers the period 1 January 1945 -
1 December 1945:

1. The Office of the SSR was established originally in
Brisbane in 1943 and moved successively with General Headquarters
in Hollandia, Dutch N.G. (Aug. 1944); Tacloban, Leyte, P.I. (Jan.
1945), Tolosa Leyte, P.I.; Manila, Luzon, P.I. (April 1945) and
Tokyo, Japan (Sept. 1945).

Although the office of the SSR remained with General Head-
quarters to serve the Military Intelligence Section with Order of
Battle information, a member of the Office, an SSO, always
accompanied the Commander in Chief on operations in order to serve
him and his advance staff with operational priority and urgent
messages bearing on current operations or vital diplomatic
traffic.

Personnel shortages, both officer and enlisted, prevented the
most effective operation of the Main Office and in the field until
GHQ reached Hollandia, at which time personnel required began to
reach the theater.

2. <u>Organization</u>. The SSO organization in the theater was
set up to conform to the logical chain of command viz; the main
office of the SSR with GHQ; an office with Far Eastern Air Forces;
an office with rear echelon G. H. Q. (Australia) near the theater's
large crypt center, Central Bureau and the SSO with each Army
and Corps Hqts.

3. <u>Office of SSR</u>. The SSR had overall responsibility for
matters pertaining to the Security of Special Intelligence and to
assure that such Intelligence reached the proper authorities in
the various echelons of command. Members of the office included
a ground order of battle officer who handled all messages in this
field and worked closely with the Theater Order of Battle section;

An air order of battle officer whose duties were similar to
the Ground O/B office;

Another officer handled all diplomatic messages also acted
as executive to the SSR and was on alert at all times to accompany
the C in C on forward operations and a Communications Officer who
was in complete charge of all cryptographic material and the
operation of the code room. The latter also acted as a trouble-
shooter for the SSR in untangling communication problems which
would occasionally arise in the field.

An Administrative Assistant (WOJG) who supervised all the
office personnel, records, rosters and requirements.

Code Clerks and typists were used according to their qualifications.

A special Distribution section handled in an outgoing mail.

4. Office of Deputy SSR

This office remained in Australia in close proximity to the large crypt center in the Theater in order to scan messages decoded in the Theater and transmit those of interest both to GHQ and the War Department.

Ground, Air and Economic sections were set up in the structure of this office.

5. Office of the SSO FEAF.

The Special Security Officers with the Far Eastern Air Forces composed the entire Special Intelligence Section in the Office of the A-2. Full support on all matters of security, dissemination and evaluation was given to the head of this section.

The Three Air Forces (5th, 7th and 13th) were served by this office with long range intelligence and immediate operational items sent from the War Dept., GHQ or Navy (7th Fleet intelligence center).

Air, ground and economic desks were setup as well as a reports and cable desk.

6. Field Offices.

An SSO was placed with each army (6th, 8th, 10 th and 1st) and with each active corps headquarters. The SSO at each field headquarters was accepted as a working member of the G-2 Section and eventually became an integral part of the section. The 10th Army came under the command of General MacArthur in August 1945 after the battle for Okinawa thus little dissemination to this headquarters was made as the Japanese capitulated in September. The 1st Army merely established a Headquarters Cadre and was soon deactivated.

7. Naval Liaison.

More than 40% of the operational intelligence of immediate value was received from Naval Sources. A SSO liaison was placed with 7th Fleet headquarters at Hollandia and maintained at Fleet Hqtrs until after the Japanese capitulation.

All information derived from Naval Sources was passed to GHQ with a copy to the SSO FEAF.

Inter Theater. Communication between the other theaters (Cinc Pac and CBI) were constantly maintained.

8. <u>Narration</u>. The following experiences of the SSR are related to indicate the lessons to be derived for the future and as background to the recommendations concluding this report.

The entire G-2 section moved north to Leyte leaving the Office of the Special Security Section in Hollandia. One officer accompanied the C in C. This was the result of the G-2 complaining of a space shortage both on board ship and in the space allotted the G-2 section. The net result was that the Hqts. did not get the intelligence it required and caused an unjust criticism of the SSO system, which caused several months effort to build up goodwill and prove that the system was secure, efficient and an advantage to the G-2 personally. The ideal situation for the SSR was finally set up in Manila and working to the best advantage to G-2, AFPAC, G-2 War Department and Field Commands when GHQ was established in Manila, and the Office of the SSR was within the Special Intelligence and Order of Battle Section, Military Intelligence Division of AFPAC.

<u>Attempts to Coordinate SIGINT on Global Basis.</u>
In July, the AC of S, G-2 (General Bissell) visited Manila to confer with General MacArthur and his Staff regarding the placing of all SI activities under the jurisdiction of the War Department.

<u>Conclusions</u>. That the Special Security System be maintained as it is the most secure, efficient method of serving Theater and/or Field Commanders. The system at first seems restrictive to a major overseas Commander. However, his appreciation for it and its prestige gains rapidly after it is put in operation.

<u>Recommendations.</u>

a. Personnel sent to the theater should be thoroughly screened and only the best assigned as the reputation of the Special Security System rests on the ability of its personnel in the theater. Air Officers or those trained in air

intelligence should be attached to Air Forces not as in World War II where economic and shipping experts were used because of the lack of trained air officers.

b. A Table of Allowances and Equipment should be established for the Office of the Special Security Representation and each SSO down to and including the Army. So that Jeeps, field safes etc., need not be begged from the Unit to which the SSO is attached.

c. A policy file should be set up by the SSR. The policy should be the results of decisions the SSR made in the theater either on Security, sanitizing of material, relations with other than American nationals, etc.. If a policy file is not established the SSR might well find himself in the embarrassing position of contradicting himself on similar problems that may arise from time to time.

d. That a SSO should not be attached to a headquarters lower than Army unless a separate Corps Task Force is formed and then the SSO should be withdrawn after the task force completes its mission or reverts to control of an Army Headquarters.

e. An officer experienced in communication technique (preferably a Signal Corps officer) should be assigned by the War Department to the Office of the SSR to be his communication officer and relieve the SSR from the burdens that communication entail.

f. Administrative messages that are unrelated to Ultra intelligence or the Special Security System should not be sent over SSR channels. Such unrelated messages disclose to unauthorized individuals the existence of the separate Crypto channel and causes many unanswerable questions in a higher headquarters. A crowning example of unauthorized use of this channel was the message allegedly from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur to destroy the Cyclotrones in Japan. General MacArthur carried out this order and then the Secretary of War denied to the press that he sent the message. Later it was revealed that an assistant in the Secretary of War's office directed that the message be sent over the Special Channel. This leads to the lack of confidence by the Theater Commander of all messages he receives over the Special Crypt System held by the SSR. Such messages should be sent by Command Channels after proper coordination in the War Department.

BENJAMIN W. HECKEMEYER
Colonel, GSC
Special Security Representative
AFPAC

004

20 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER, MIS:

SUBJECT: Report of Major John R. Thompson, O-1283167, Deputy
Special Security Representative, Southwest Pacific Area.

1. In the Spring of 1942 when GHQ SWPA was organized in
Australia, a small American SIS detachment was combined with
Signal Intelligence personnel in Central Bureau. Central
Bureau was subordinated to GHQ and the Chief Signal Officer of SWPA
(Maj Gen Spencer B. Akin) was made its Director in addition to his
other duties. The Bureau had three major subdivisions, each headed
by an Assistant Director----.
American Army.

the American subdivision was under
complete control of the Chief Signal Officer. From 1942 until the
end of the war Central Bureau and the field units under it were
steadily expanded, At first it
operated as a large "field unit" and concentrated on traffic analysis
and low-grade Japanese ciphers; but expansion of its activities
proceeded with expansion in size and increasing emphasis was placed
on work which had theretofore been considered the function of central
agencies in Washington and London, solution and translation of high-
level Japanese Army systems. This expansion in scope was pushed over
the consistent but mildly expressed objections of the War Department
and War Office.

2. Until mid-1944 Central Bureau, first in Melbourne and later
in Brisbane, was in the same city as the principal offices which used
its high-level decodes----the intelligence sections of GHQ, Australian
Land Headquarters, RAAF, and FEAF. Decodes were delivered by daily
courier. At the behest of the Chief Signal Officer a few decodes
were occasionally radioed to the Signal Officer of subordinate or
parallel commands such as the Fifth Air Force in New Guinea or HQ
South Pacific Area. Four other signal agencies worked on the same
high-level systems as Central Bureau----SSA in Washington, GCCS in
London and SIS in New Delhi.

the intelligence organizations associated with the other _____ agencies (for example, MIS for SSA) radioed important decodes to each other and to GHQ SWPA. _____ Central Bureau unofficially radioed and pouched some decodes to other centers but attempts to have Central Bureau decodes officially added to the exchange were successfully opposed by Generals Sutherland (Chief of Staff, SWPA) and Akin. Likewise MIS proposals to assist Central Bureau by sending to it (as distinguished from G-2, GHQ) important SSA decodes were vetoed by General Sutherland. In Brisbane G-2 officers working with Ultra knew Central Bureau personnel on a social level only, and there was no liaison of the type so successfully developed between SSA and Special Branch, MIS.

3.   In the last half of 1944, GHQ and FEAF moved to Hollandia and then the Philippines; and the RAAF and LHQ were planning to transfer their main operational intelligence work to Morotai. In addition the improved quality and quantity of decodes and the extension of the SSO network had by then made it desirable and possible for important decodes to be made available to individual Air Forces and Armies north of Australia. Since Central Bureau remained in Brisbane and flying weather was often bad, it often required as much as a week for decodes to reach the operational commands by pouch. To eliminate this time lag the War Department, War Office, GHQ, and Australian authorities reached an agreement whereby (a) a British SLU would be assigned to each Australian command entitled to receive Ultra, (b) a British SLU and American Deputy SSR would be attached to Central Bureau to provide an approved Ultra channel from Central Bureau to major commands within and without SWPA, and (c) that MIS would assign to the office of the Deputy SSR personnel experienced in dealing with Ultra intelligence who should scan Central Bureau decodes, check garbles and apparent discrepancies in translations, and radio important ones to appropriate commands. It was hoped that the presence of these officers in Central Bureau would insure that operational Ultra reached the commands who needed it in the fastest possible time, contribute to an improvement in quality of Central Bureau decodes, and also carry with it all the benefits of closer liaison in a field where _____
linguistic personnel in the various _____ and intelligence agencies were daily duplicating each others' efforts or producing conflicting results. These arrangements were approved by the Chief of Staff, SWPA. MIS designated me as Deputy SSR and in November 1944 ordered me to proceed to Central Bureau with four lieutenants (one executive officer and one specialist on Japanese ground forces, air forces, and economic matters respectively), two code clerks, and two enlisted WAC secretaries. The War Office sent SLU personnel to Australia.

4.   Upon the urging of the Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Staff of SWPA cancelled this arrangement while the personnel were enroute to Australia. He summoned me to Leyte for an interview. The gist of his remarks was:

a. The Ultra regulations were the only War Department directive defining the functions of MIS personnel in SWPA. Barring a further directive he would consent to their performing only those Special Security functions outlined in those regulations: (1) advising on security of Ultra and (2) enciphering and deciphering messages passing Ultra.

b. The selection of those Central Bureau decodes warranting radio dissemination was a function of G-2 SWPA and he would not have MIS officers performing it.

c. A "Filter Group" of theater G-2 officers would be established in downtown Brisbane, several miles from Central Bureau. They would decide which decodes should be radioed to various commands and would hand the messages to the MIS and SLU personnel for encipherment. The G-2 officers would also handle any necessary liaison with Central Bureau.

d. He would not consent to MIS attaching to the Filter Group any liaison officers (as distinguished from Special Security Officers).

5. In fact only one G-2 officer, an Australian major, was ordered to Brisbane. A combined office was opened on 1 January 1945 with the G-2 officer, SLU, and MIS-SSO personnel occupying separate parts of it. Central Bureau delivered decodes to the office by courier four times a day. These decodes had to be checked against and correlated with information already known from Ultra or other sources and then, where appropriate, promptly radioed to commands within and outside SWPA. The main intelligence content of the decodes was (a) ground order of battle, (b) air order of battle, and (c) miscellaneous economic information on raw materials and merchant shipping. The information was detailed and fragmentary; and the peculiar nature of Japanese Army codes made badly garbled, incomplete, and poorly translated messages the rule rather than the exception. A great many of the messages had previously been read in Washington and to a lesser extent in the other cryptanalytic centers and the information already disseminated to necessary commands. All these factors made it a painstaking, detailed, and difficult task to (a) hold duplicate radio dissemination to a minimum, (b) recognize promptly what bits of information were new and (c) prevent the dissemination of inaccurate or misleading translations. It was a task far beyond the capacity of any one officer, regardless of his ability, to maintain the necessary files and keep posted in detail on all the fields to which the information applied. The G-2 major whose responsibility this was on paper was, in addition, lacking completely in any experience or training either in cryptanalytic techniques or the intelligence processing of the information he was now to handle. Fortunately he recognized his limitations and tacitly delegated the responsibility to the trained MIS personnel under me. In our part of the office, three desks--ground, air, and economic-- were set up. Each desk created and maintained two basic types of files: (a) one to show the very latest information on the subject with which it was charged and (b) the other a "cable index" showing all Ultra received from other British or American centers or disseminated

by radio from our office. For a single officer with almost no clerical

assistance to maintain, even in skeleton form, these records which were kept in other headquarters by large sections was a task of appalling dimensions. It was successfully done only because of the conscientiousness, ability, and training of the lieutenants MIS had selected. Central Bureau produced about a hundred decodes a day. These were scanned at each of the three desks and perhaps fifty selected as important enough to warrant careful processing. It was then usually found that about thirty of the forty contained information already disseminated by Washington or another center. Of the remaining ten, three or four were consistent both internally and with other information and could be radioed immediately, through American channels to U. S. commands and (after paraphrasing) through the SLU to British and Australian commands. The remaining six or seven required checking with Central Bureau technicians or linguists. This was done by writing a memo outlining why the decode looked questionable, requesting a re-check, and suggesting alternative and more logical degarbles or trans-lations. The framing of the memo and the answer to it and the time consumed in getting it to and from the proper officer at Central Bureau often delayed the final dissemination by as much as 48 hours--time which would not have been lost had our office been in Central Bureau itself. All working personnel at Central Bureau cooperated splendidly, recognizing within a few weeks that the work of the MIS personnel was contributing materially to the accuracy of Central Bureau's work and to the overall intelligence picture. Working personnel both at G-2 of GHQ and at the various Australian air and ground headquarters were lavish in their praise of the improved service they received.

6.   Brisbane was the only point in SWPA where both the approved American and British cryptographic systems for passing Ultra were held. This made it a relay point for all Ultra being passed between an American headquarters anywhere in the world and any Australian head-quarters in SWPA. Every day there came to us in an American system, either from Seventh Fleet or MIS, Ultra which had to be rapidly paraphrased and passed to the SLU for onward transmission. Personnel were on call 24 hours a day for this work.

7.   The office could have accomplished much more had the Chief of Staff not cancelled the original working arrangements or had MIS and the War Department, which were sympathetically understanding of the basic difficulties, felt in a position to send GHQ a new directive. That so much was accomplished anyway is a tribute to the ability of the MIS officers; their success in "selling" all with whom they worked on the value of their mission; and to the extra latitude both we and Central Bureau had as a result of the absence from Australia of those officers who might otherwise have insisted that their conceptual framework be adhered to in more detail.

8.   In June 1945 Central Bureau began moving to San Miguel, about 80 miles north of Manila where GHQ was located. Working personnel in our office, at Central Bureau, and in G-2 of GHQ all hoped that at last the time had come when the F-2--MIS--SLU office could be placed right in Central Bureau for its work in the months just prior to the projected amphibious assault on Japan. While concurring with the arguments for such a development, however, General Akin said that facilities at San Miguel were not sufficient to feed, house, and care for the twenty-five members of the office. The MIS-SSO office had just been established in Manila and SLU personnel were preparing to leave Australia for Manila when the Japanese surrender brought to an end the function of the office.

JOHN R. THOMPSON
Major, GSC

History

Special Security Officer with Far East Air Forces

24 October 1944 - 2 September 1945

1. **Introduction.** Far East Air Forces was the air command of General MacArthur's South West Pacific Area, General Headquarters. FEAF consisted of a headquarters organization with the 5th and 13th Air Forces (toward the later stages of the war, the 7th Air Force was added) and the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Forces as the operational units. General George C. Kenney was in command throughout FEAF's existence. In September 1944 it became apparent that FEAF would require a Special Security Officer due to the increasing volume of ultra intelligence concerning purely air matters and the possible geographical separation of FEAF's Headquarters from General MacArthur's GHQ. Previously FEAF had been serviced by the SSR with GHQ. Lt. Col. James Ashby, Jr., at that time Special Security Representative of MIS with GHQ SWPA, made the proper arrangements for an SSO with FEAF. At the same time it was decided to place SSO's with the 5th and 13th Air Forces who would work primarily with the FEAF SSO. Soon after it became advisable to have an SSO with the 7th Fleet.

2. **Historical Summaries.**

a. **FEAF.** On 24 October 1944, Captain Philip L. Graham, who had just arrived in Hollandia from MIS, Washington, was designated as SSO for FEAF. FEAF's advanced headquarters, including the SSO, moved from Hollandia to Tolosa, Leyte, on 25 November 1944. Graham was joined by 1st Lt. Edward S. Washburn, who also came from MIS, Washington, on 10 December 1944. Shortly after that, on 30 December 1944, 1st Lt James C. Sargent, who had previously been with various units in the 5th Air Force, was acquired and transferred to MIS status. At about the same time a WAC officer, Captain Marjorie G. Hugo, was added but not transferred to MIS status. In similar manner some ten enlisted WACs were acquired from FEAF at various times during the period at Leyte. Cpl. Marvin E. Case had been Graham's code clerk from the start and was later joined by S/Sgt. Charles B. Baucom. During early January 45, Graham took over the former Enemy Appreciation Section of A-2, FEAF, thereby becoming an integral part of FEAF's intelligence set-up. Between 17 and 20 February, 1st Lt. William E. Pardoe, 2nd Lt. Charles E. Mercer and T/Sgt Georgiana K. Cuthbertson arrived from MIS, Washington. On 22 February 1st Lt. Brewer J. Merriam arrived from Brisbane, Australia, having previously been with MIS, Washington. On 1 May 45, FEAF Headquarters moved from Leyte to Fort McKinley, about 10 miles southeast of Manila. Code clerks, Cpls. Loren P. Beth and Gerald A. Gerwin were

added at the time of the move. About 1 June, 1st Lt. Russell G. Olsen, who had been SSO Liaison Officer with 7th Fleet Headquarters at Tolosa, came to FEAF and was replaced by Sargent. On 20 July, 1st Lt. James A. Brabson arrived from MIS, Washington. By about 15 August the work of the SSO FEAF was ended. Pardoe went forward to Okinawa and Tokyo late in August; Sargent, Merriam, Olsen, Mercer and Cuthbertson left Manila for Washington on 6 September; Washburn was evacuated to the States about 15 September for medical reasons; Graham and Mercer returned about 2 October; Brabson went forward to Tokyo about the same time.

b.   5th Air Force. Captain Jefferson D. Sogard was assigned as SSO 5th Air Force, then located at Owi Island, on 24 October 1944. Early in November 5th Air Force Hq moved to Burauen, Leyte, and in late December to Mindoro Island. About 1 February, Sogard was replaced by Captain Thomas Sterling who had had brief training at MIS, Washington and at FEAF. In February 45 the 5th Air Force moved to Clark Field. About 1 April 45, Sterling was hospitalized with Yellow Jaundice and was replaced by Captain Flory. Captain Flory remained with 5th Air Force through its move to Okinawa in June to the end of the war, except for a brief period of illness when he was replaced by Lt. Olsen. The SSO with 5th Air Force was primarily a security officer and did relatively little purely intelligence work.

c.   13th Air Force. On 24 October 1944, Captain James R. Vaughan was designated SSO with the 13th Air Force then located on Noemfoor Island. 13th Air Force Headquarters moved to Morotai Island in November 44 and to Tolosa, Leyte, in February 45. Captain Vaughan remained as SSO with 13th Air Force until relieved in June 45 by Captain Sterling. In July 45, 13th Air Force moved to Clark Field. During the period when both FEAF and 13th Air Force Headquarters were located at Tolosa (Feb thru April 45) Vaughan was physically located with the FEAF SSO. The 13th Air Force SSO, as developed by Vaughan, was a regular part of A-2 Section -- being solely responsible for enemy air order of battle and regarded as a specialist on intelligence matters.

d.   7th Air Force. In June 1945 the 7th Air Force was transferred from its Pacific command to FEAF. Captain Vaughan was designated as its SSO joining the 7th Air Force Headquarters at Saipan in June, and moving to Okinawa soon after. The war ended before the 7th Air Force Hq was fully established.

e.   7th Fleet. The 7th Fleet, being on the Navy's main ultra intelligence circuit, offered a major source of operational intelligence. Early in January 1945 Lt. Russell G. Olsen was designated as SSO or Liaison Officer with 7th Fleet which was also located at Tolosa, Leyte adjacent to FEAF Headquarters. Olson remained with 7th Fleet until relieved by Sargent about 1 June 45. On approximately 1 July the 7th Fleet Hq moved to Manila.

On 30 July Sargent was joined by 1st Lt. Joseph Fribrock.

3. <u>Development of FEAF Special Intelligence Section</u>. After acting primarily as a Special Security Officer in FEAF's A-2, Captain Graham gradually assumed more intelligence functions until late January 45 when he became head of the Special Intelligence Section of A-2. This Section, previously designated as the Enemy Appreciation Section, had originally been organized in Australia by Wing Commander Percy Feltham under the direction of Wing Commander Robert Wreford, Assistant Director of Intelligence of Allied Air Forces (AAF was also under the command of General Kenney). W/C Feltham's section had been primarily responsible for enemy air strength and disposition, utilizing both ultra and non-ultra sources. Graham, as SSO, had a superior channel of communication to the subordinate 5th and 13th Air Forces; in addition he was well trained in the use of ultra intelligence having worked on both the German and Japanese Air Forces while on duty at MIS, Washington. It was eventually decided that W/C Feltham should return to head a similar section in RAAF Headquarters in Brisbane and, after a brief interim period, Graham took over the section and changed the name to the "Special Intelligence Section." Most of W/C Feltham's personnel returned to Australia and Graham built his staff from personnel acquired in the field, supplemented later by key personnel from MIS, Washington. It should be pointed out that this development of an SSO from a security officer to an integral part of the A-2 Section was not planned in advance, but rather developed by chance largely as a result of the initiative of the officer concerned. It is believed that this development made possible the maximum exploitation of ultra intelligence as well as to provide maximum security.

4. <u>Organization of FEAF Special Intelligence Section</u>. By March 45, the SSO's Special Intelligence Section virtually reached its maximum strength. Graham, as head of the Section, read incoming intelligence and for the most part decided which items would be further disseminated; he also provided the chief liaison with the CG FEAF, with the A-2 and other Staff Officers and with other A-2 Section heads. Merriam, as Graham's assistant, handled administrative matters including communications and acted as chief cable writer. Washburn was in charge of Japanese Army Air Order of Battle, Pardoe handling Navy Air Order of Battle. Mercer and Olsen (or Sargent) wrote the daily publication and any special projects. Shipping and economic matters came under Hugo. Enlisted men acted as chief clerks, code clerks and research clerks; enlisted women as research clerks and typists. The Section, in practice came directly under the A-2, FEAF, but on organizational charts came under an intermediate section titled "Operational Intelligence."

5. <u>Sources of Intelligence</u>. As the main part of FEAF's operational intelligence set-up, the Special Intelligence Section used all types of intelligence from a variety of sources.

a.   Ultra Intelligence Sources.

(1) Navy Ultra Circuit. The primary source of intelligence of immediate tactical use was the raw ultra intelligence taken from the Navy circuit. This came through the SSO with 7th Fleet who read the incoming material, paraphrased it and passed it on to SSO FEAF. At Tolosa the physical proximity (about 400 yards) of 7th Fleet Hq made this a simple matter. After moving to McKinley, the information was relayed over the FEAF circuit (in the code held only by the SSO's) through the 13th AF SSO. Relations with the Navy on the working level were extremely good, but frequent differences of opinion on policy-making levels sometimes strained relations. Particular difficulty was experienced due to the Navy's laxness in regard to security matters.

(2) MIS, Washington. Washington relayed a large volume of air intelligence items particularly of strategic or other long-range value. FEAF SSO was a direct addressee of Washington signals. In addition, finished intelligence studies based on ultra were pouched directly to FEAF SSO. Washington's particular value was as a source for finished intelligence, as a research center, and as a place where queries could be answered.

(3) Central Bureau, Brisbane. The ultra output of Central Bureau was scanned by the Deputy SSR in Brisbane and major items were radioed directly to FEAF. The entire output was pouched to FEAF, arriving two to four days later. CB was a relatively minor source except for the rear areas covered by the RAAF. British ultra radio links were used to relay information to RAAF at Darwin and Morotai.

(4) GCCS, London. British ultra items were relayed via Washington or Brisbane, the two major points where the American and British links met. Very little intelligence of immediate value came from this source.

(5) Other Ultra Sources. Some ultra items originated in New Delhi and were sent directly over the American circuit. A few Navy ultra items were sent from Pearl Harbor or Guam. Exchanges of opinion on ultra items were made with all of the SSO's and SSR's dealing with air matters.

b.   Pearl and Thumb (Low Level) Intelligence Sources.

(1) Within the Theater. Low level intelligence came primarily from units within the theater: (under Central Bureau) located at Tolosa and the two Radio Squadrons Mobile attached to the 5th and 13th Air Forces. Close liaison was maintained with these three units doing low level intercept work. The intelligence officer in each unit was cleared and pertinent ultra intelligence items were passed

to them by secure means. As the war ended, a central low level intelligence agency was established at FEAF. This agency was to coordinate all low level activity both within the theater and from China and the Central Pacific. The intelligence thus derived was to be further coordinated with ultra intelligence at FEAF.

(2) Outside the Theater. Daily Pearl and Thumb signals were received from RAGFOR at Guam and from New Delhi over the American ultra link. High level traffic analysis signals were received daily from MIS. Central Bureau and one radio field unit also produced some high level traffic analysis.

c. Non-ultra Intelligence Sources.

(1) Captured Documents and Prisoners of War. Major non-ultra source was from captured documents translations and prisoner of war interrogations supplied largely by Allied Translation and Interpretation Section of GHQ (located in Brisbane and later in Manila). Close liaison was maintained with ATIS through the 8th Army, ATIS echelon on Leyte and Advance ATIS at Manila. Assistance in screening air PW's and suggested lines of interrogation were provided by the Special Intelligence Section. No ATIS personnel were cleared for ultra intelligence, but due to the fact that the SSO personnel were regarded by outsiders as part of FEAF's A-2 Section, there was no possibility of a compromise of security. Every effort was made, through document and PW exploitation to reduce the classification of intelligence to secure the widest possible dissemination.

(2) Captured Material. Another section of FEAF's A-2 was a Technical Air Intelligence Unit with which close liaison was maintained. None of their personnel was cleared, but a considerable interchange of information was possible on Secret and Confidential levels.

(3) Other Non-ultra Sources. The usual flow of intelligence periodicals, studies and special projects came into the Section from all sources within and outside of the Theater. Washington provided valuable studies on economic and political matters of Secret or lower classification. The Special Intelligence Section was normally the only part of A-2, FEAF which processed material of this type.

d. Photographic Intelligence. FEAF maintained a fairly large section within A-2 devoted to advanced phases of aerial photographic interpretation. The head of this section and his assistant were both cleared for ultra to permit close coordination of the two types of intelligence. Most of the coordinated work was done on airfields and industrial targets. Some interchange of intelligence based on a combination of photo and ultra was made with Washington and Guam.

6. Dissemination of Intelligence.

a. Within FEAF Headquarters.

(1) Daily Bulletin. The primary means of disseminating Ultra, Pearl and Thumb Intelligence within FEAF Headquarters was by means of a daily typed bulletin titled "Special Intelligence Bulletin." This daily bulletin included all intelligence which had been received for the past twenty-four hours. The recipients were the CG, Chief of Staff, A-2, A-3 and A-5. In most cases these recipients read the bulletin in the Special Intelligence Section or a copy was delivered to them by a SSO who stood by while the bulletin was being read. Items included in this bulletin were from all sources with comment added which included any planned operations based on the information.

(2) Special Studies. From time to time special studies based largely on ultra intelligence were prepared for the CG and his staff as operations required.

(3) Direct Dissemination. Matters which required immediate action were usually given verbally to the CG or his operations officer. The Special Intelligence Section personnel was, of course, always available for consultation.

b. To FEAF Operational Units.

(1) 5th and 13th Air Forces. The daily bulletin, described above, was also circulated to the CG's 5th and 13th Air Forces. Transmission of the bulletins was accomplished by pouching them to the SSO's with the Air Forces who then became responsible for their further circulation. Items requiring immediate action or of immediate interest were transmitted over the FEAF radio circuit to the SSO's at the Air Forces by means of the code system held only by the SSO's. Other items of interest were pouched to the SSO's for such treatment as they considered advisable.

(2) Royal Australian Air Forces. The RAAF Commands were reached by transmitting to the Deputy SSR, Brisbane, who paraphrased the message for relay over British links to Darwin or Morotai. The 13th Bomber Command, located at Morotai, was also reached in this manner. The RAAF had their own liaison officer with 7th Fleet who worked closely with our SSO and relayed his messages over our circuit to Brisbane.

c. Dissemination Outside the Theater.
A daily signal was transmitted on the American ultra circuit which summarized low level intelligence derived within the theater. A weekly signal giving estimates of Japanese Army and Navy aircraft strength were also transmitted on the

circuit. Miscellaneous bits of intelligence or interpretations of intelligence went over the circuit or to individual addressees from time to time .

7.   Security.

a.   Communications. Friendly relations were established with FEAF Signal Center personnel from the start which made it possible for the SSO's code clerks to operate in one corner of the code room under reasonably secure surroundings. The normal curiosity was evidenced by signal center personnel but no security breaches resulted therefrom. Much of the security in decoding and handling ultra messages in the Signal Center was due to the alertness and capability of the code clerks assigned to FEAF's SSO. Some difficulty was experienced due to the limited facilities and shortage of SIGABA's.

b.   Physical Layout. After operating under rather insecure conditions in Leyte, the situation was remedied at Fort McKinley by enclosing the whole Special Intelligence Section in an area surrounded by heavy wire netting. Only cleared personnel were admitted within the area. While this aroused a certain amount of curiosity, the diverse nature of the Section's activities tended to dispell such curiosity.

c.   Personnel. The personnel acquired in the field were selected with care and thoroughly briefed on the importance of main-taining ultra sources. Recipients of ultra intelligence were also thoroughly briefed and every effort was made to keep the number of recipients as low as was consistent with the proper dissemination of ultra intelligence.

d.   Security Problems. Most of the security problems that did arise came as a result of lax security on the part of Australians or the US Navy.

8.   Commendations. Aside from the outstanding work of Major Graham in setting up the Special Intelligence Section, special note should be made of the outstanding contribution of Major Vaughan and Captain Washburn. Major Vaughan demonstrated the value of an SSO trained in air intelligence work to an Air Force commander; during the period when Morotai was under constant attack by the Japanese he worked twenty-four hours a day getting ultra intelligence to the proper operational commanders. Captain Washburn, in addition to his superior estimates of Japanese aircraft strength, made two trips to the Clark Field area during combat; in making these trips Washburn demonstrated the value of combining ultra with other types of intelligence in his remarkable exploitation of captured documents and his recovery of a complete butanol plant.

9. Recommendations. In general it is believed that the integration of the Special Security Officer with the A-2 Section as achieved at FEAF offers the maximum possibility for exploitation of ultra intelligence as well as to provide maximum security. Certain problems were encountered which are covered by the following recommendations:

a. Personnel. There was a distinct need for more personnel trained in ultra intelligence. It should be possible to provide every Air Force or any isolated air command with an SSO who is fully trained in air intelligence. In certain cases it appears advantagous to acquire personnel in the field; such acquisitions tend to make for better relations with the headquarters involved.

b. Communications. A single world-wide network for ultra signals which would include both British and American was sorely needed.

c. Navy. Relations with the Navy left much to be desired. The obvious solution would be to combine ultra activity under a single agency even though the Army and Navy are not merged.

d. Theater. A peculiar source of friction in the Pacific Theaters was the distrust of anything that came from Washington. Presumably such a situation would not exist in another war, but the solution would seem to lie at a high level because harmonious relations existed almost without exception on working levels.

e. Low Level. The intelligence possibilities of low level interception were barely scratched in the Pacific Theater. In combination with ultra and photographic intelligence the possibilities are virtually unlimited.

Prepared by B. J. Merriam
26 February 1946

6 December 1945

SUBJECT: Report on SSO System at Eighth U. S. Army

TO: Colonel B. W. Heckemeyer, SSR, GHQ, AFPAC

GENERAL

This report is based on the experience of the SSO attached to Hq, Eighth U. S. Army, from the period 9 March 1945 to 13 October 1945. Also considered are observations made between 9 December 1944 and 9 March 1945 as one of the Special Security Officers attached to GHQ, SWPA.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The SSO system was adequate. No major changes are recommended.

2. The control and subsequent restrictions placed by GHQ, SWPA, on the dissemination of ULTRA reduced its value to Eighth Army to a minimum.

3. There is probably little or no need for an SSO below Army level.

EIGHTH ARMY RECIPIENTS

Commanding General	Lt Gen Robert L. Eichelberger
Chief of Staff	Maj Gen Clovis E. Byers
Deputy Chief of Staff*	Col Arthur Thayer
G-2	Col G. A. A. Jones
Executive G-2	Col J. P. Kaylor
Chief of OB Section	Lt Col Robert McQuail
Chief of Planning Section	Maj T. H. Tonnessen
G-3*	Brig Gen Bowen

*In practice, while these officers were recipients, they were never shown the information as the nature of their duties and the staff arrangements at the headquarters made it unnecessary.

FAVORABLE FACTORS IN OPERATION OF SYSTEM

1. All recipients were very security conscious, and no breaches of security were observed within the command.

2. The SSO was placed in the Plans and Estimates Section of G-2 and was introduced to and accepted by the entire G-2 personnel as a working member of the G-2 Section.

3. All publications coming to or emanating from the G-2 Section except those pertaining to personnel administration passed across the

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SSO's desk, so that it was possible to be entirely conversant with all matters of G-2 and Army interest at all times.

4. All plans, estimates or other publications originating at Eighth Army were submitted to the SSO in draft form for checking _before_ publication, and suggestions made by the SSO for amending wording where a possible breach of security might be involved were readily accepted.

5. All PEARL and THUMB reports were directed to the SSO and the information contained in them was disseminated by him.

6. Since all Top Secret OB files were kept by the SSO, he became the Top Secret OB officer for the command, as well as vice-Chief of the Plans and Estimates Section of G-2.

7. Colonel Jones, the A. C. of S., G-2, gave the SSO a free hand in the handling of the information, and almost without exception accepted recommendations made on dissemination, security measures, briefing and debriefing.

UNFAVORABLE FACTORS IN OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM

1. The daily Special Intelligence Bulletin which GHQ, SWPA, published and distributed through SSO channels, was discontinued in April 1945. A subsequent bulletin was issued but was not distributed to Army. In addition to this curtailing of information, GHQ policy operated to send to the individual armies only such ULTRA cables as were considered pertinent to their immediate field of operations.

2. This resulted in an almost complete lack of ULTRA information being received at Eighth Army, with the exception of the sanitized versions which appeared in GHQ's monthly summaries of enemy dispositions, and consisted almost entirely of the appearance of a new unit or two in their Order of Battle listings.

3. A week after the discontinuance of the Special Intelligence Bulletin, the writer framed a carefully worded letter which General Eichelberger signed urging resumption of the Bulletin and pointing out its worth to Eighth Army. This brought no result. In July, the writer made a trip from Leyte to Manila to try to get GHQ to release to Eighth Army information on the Japanese Homeland so that files could be kept current and trends watched for planning purposes against the day the Coronet operation (Eighth Army landing in Kanto Plain) would take place. The net result was a lot of sympathy, but in the words of the Chief of the GHQ Order of Battle Section the information could not be released until "Eighth Army was officially in the planning stage for the operation". In the end, copies of the maps submitted by the Japanese emissaries showing their dispositions were brought from Manila to Okinawa by Colonel Jones. These represented the first dissemination of detailed information, other than the entries which appeared in the ULTRA Supplement to the Top Secret Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions which GHQ had but recently inaugurated.

4.   As much as was possible, the SSO kept his files current, but could not disseminate the information to the Eighth Army as that could be construed to be a usurpation of the Theater G-2's prerogatives which could embarrass the entire system.

5.   It became very quickly apparent, however, that General Eichelberger was keeping himself informed on the ULTRA level through naval sources, and it was an extremely awkward position for an SSO. It was possible to make it clear to General Eichelberger and to General Byers that the restrictions on the dissemination of the information originated at GHQ and not at the War Department. Even so, General Eichelberger made it clear that while he knew the writer had "done all that could be done" the General resented the position in which he had been placed and thought it was a "hell of a note" that he had to get his information through the Navy.

CORPS SSO

1.   Tenth Corps operated under Eighth Army during this period, and was the command which invaded Mindanao in April 1945. So very few messages were sent over the SSO channel, and those were of a nature which would have permitted sanitized versions, that the question arises as to the necessity of having an SSO below Army level.

2.   Some thought might be given to the desirability of briefing the G-2 at Corps level even though only sanitized information would be sent to him. Without experience at the Corps level I do not feel qualified to make definite recommendations in this regard, but I do think that the knowledge that some Army level publications and directives may be ULTRA based would be helpful to the subordinate G-2 and would not be unhealthy from a security standpoint.

MAURICE J. MOUNTAIN
Lt Colonel, CAC

HISTORY OF SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY

6 October 1944 - 8 August 1945

On 6 October 1944, Major C. M. Easley, Jr. arrived at Headquarters Sixth Army in Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, as Special Security Officer. This represented the first assignment of such an officer to any headquarters outside of GHQ in the Southwest Pacific Area.

By this time, final planning for the Leyte Operation had been completed so that the SSO could be of very little assistance in the preparation of the G-2 Estimate. The AC of S, G-2 had, however, been receiving for sometime the Special Intelligence Bulletin published daily by GHQ.

The Headquarters set sail for Leyte on 13 October. Because of the SSO's late arrival, he was unable to obtain space on the Command Ship, which was very limited and already assigned, and had to be placed on another ship which landed and was unloaded under strong artillery attack on the morning of D-Day. General Krueger and his staff remained on the Command Ship until D plus 4 when Headquarters was established ashore. During these four days the SSO, who was completely separated from the Army Headquarters, was reduced to wandering up and down the beach, obtaining food and shelter from whatever unit was at hand. This procedure is considered to have been dangerous from a security angle and would have been unnecessary if the SSO could have arrived at his post sooner.

Again because of his late arrival, the SSO had to work his way into the organization and functioning of the G-2 Section during the most difficult days of the Leyte Operation. Since there was at that time insufficient special intelligence work to keep the SSO busy, he became another body in the G-2 Section and worked at first on the Control Board, through which went all incoming and outgoing messages, and later in the Reports and Estimates Section.

By direction from GHQ, there could be no dissemination of Special Intelligence to units under Sixth Army without permission from the AC of S, G-2, Sixth Army. In order to avoid unnecessary delays, authority was obtained from the G-2 by the SSO to disseminate to the Corps' at his own discretion. This arrangement worked very well and permitted the SSO's at Army and at each Corps to be prepared to make their presentations the first thing each morning since, in Leyte, 90% of the information arrived by radio between 2400 and 0500 hours.

The Luzon Operation was in the planning stage all during the Leyte Campaign and the SSO was able to be of considerable assistance in the preparation of the G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation. However, it is

believed that Special Intelligence did not have as great value to a field headquarters in the Philippines as elsewhere because of the numerous and excellent sources of information available in the form of guerrillas, Alamo Scouts, special agents, etc.

The Mindoro operation was undertaken in mid-December by a separate Task Force directly under Sixth Army command. It was at first considered to detach the SSO from one of the Corps' to accompany this Task Force but it was finally decided that the need was not sufficiently great to warrant the risk involved, especially in view of the fact that SIGABA machines would not be taken ashore for ten days or two weeks. In the very few cases in which it was necessary to bring Special Intelligence to the attention of the Commanding General of the Task Force, messages with adequate cover were transmitted via command channel.

The Headquarters went aboard ship for the Luzon Operation at the end of December 1944. This time a plan had been worked out at GHQ whereby Special Intelligence would be communicated to the Command Ship via Navy channels during the course of the voyage. In view of this arrangement, it was determined that the SSO would not go on the Command Ship since space was at a premium and the corresponding naval official would be aboard anyhow. As it worked out, this system was not wholly satisfactory to the Commanding General and G-2, Sixth Army, who felt that all available information had not been received through the Navy.

The SSO landed in Lingayen Gulf on the night of D plus 1 with a nucleus headquarters which organized the CP for the arrival of General Krueger and the Staff on D plus 4. Whenever the Headquarters was split, the SSO always went with the Advance Echelon in order to be with the Commanding General, the G-2, and the G-3. From the middle of January until the middle of February there were successive moves of the CP from Blue Beach to Calasiao, Gerona, and San Fernando (Pampanga). The Headquarters remained in San Fernando from the time of its arrival until it moved to Japan.

As has been noted above, the Headquarters had been receiving the daily Special Intelligence Bulletin from GHQ for some time before the arrival of the SSO. Order of Battle facts from this bulletin had been entered on Order of Battle cards, without indication of source, along with information from other sources. The arrival in February of Sgt. Lemoine Kingsbury to serve as code clerk and assistant to the SSO made possible the setting up of a separate Order of Battle card file containing only information from Special Intelligence, and the deletion of such information from the original file.

After the early stages of the Luzon Campaign it was found that the information most valuble from an immediate operational standpoint came from the Signal Radio Intelligence Companies operating in Luzon rather than from the high level Special Intelligence from the War Department. The latter was, of course, of tremendous value from a stategic standpoint. The SSO made a special arrangement with the SRI Companies to have the information they acquired delivered directly to him by special messenger. This infor-

mation was evaluated and passed on to the Corps concerned via special radio channel.

When Sixth Army turned over the Luzon Campaign to Eighth Army on 1 July 1945 the Headquarters immediately began the Planning Phase of the Kyushu Operation. Practically none of the sources of information which had been used for the Philippine operations were available for Japan, therefore the importance of Special Intelligence became inestimable. As the Japanese continued their rapid reinforcement of Kyushu, the discrepancy between an estimate based on Special Intelligence and one based on other sources became enormous. The problem of adequately informing lower units of the strengths and dispositions which they were likely to encounter in an invasion of Kyushu and, at the same time, maintaining proper security presented itself. The solution was found by making the regular G-2 Estimate, which went to all units, very general as to overall strengths and dispositions, naming only those units identified from other sources, and sending a special supplement of Special Intelligence to the four Corps Headquarters under Army command. This special supplement was prepared by the SSO and contained complete Order of Battle information, with maps showing the dispositions of units, and other special intelligence notes indicating tactics to be expected.

Benefitting from previous experience in regard to the shipping of the SSO on new operations, it was agreed that he should be aboard the main Command Ship and that the code clerk should be aboard the second Command Ship. In accordance with this decision, arrangements were made with the Navy to receive traffic in the SSO's system for him to decode personally. It was also considered advisable, in view of the hazards of the voyage, to have a stand-by SSO accompany the Army Headquarters who would be available as a replacement wherever needed, and plans were being developed towards this end when the war ended.

On 8 August 1945 Major Easley was relieved as SSO, Sixth Army Headquarters, by Lt. Col. John Crimmins who accompanied the Headquarters to Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Special Security Officers should be attached to their Headquarters in time to allow them to become a working part of the G-2 Section and to assist in the planning before embarking on an operation.

b. The SSO should always accompany the Commanding General and the Staff in the course of amphibious operations and should be enabled to continue his duties aboard the Command Ship while at sea.

c. In regard to the question of how low in command level SSO's should be placed, it is felt that much depends on the specific theater conditions. In the SWPA there was no Army Group level, the functions normally performed by this size unit being performed on Army level, and the Corps' in turn inheriting some of the functions normally performed in an Army Headquarters. It is therefore believed that under these conditions

it was advantageous to have an SSO stationed with each Corps.

      d.   In dispatching an SSO, he should be as fully equipped with office equipment as possible. Field headquarters usually do not have sufficient equipment to take care of attached personnel. Such equipment should include a typewriter without fail and a safe if possible.

23 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER, MIS:

SUBJECT: Report of Major John H. Gunn, O-388247

The undersigned officer departed Washington on 15
September 1944 for Brisbane, Australia. I reached Brisbane on
the night of 22 September. At this time most of GHQ was in
Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, in the final stages of planning
and preparation for the invasion of Leyte. The Leyte operation
had been accelerated and it was necessary that those SSO's
designated to serve the participating commands cut short their
indoctrination course in Brisbane and proceed to Hollandia at
an earlier date than planned.

My principal duties in Hollandia were to assist Lt
Colonel Ashby, then Special Security Representative for the
theater, at his headquarters. I had been introduced to Lieut
General Sutherland, Chief of Staff, and it was indicated that
I was to accompany the Advance Echelon into Leyte and serve
General MacArthur, General Sutherland, and appropriate G-2 and
G-3 personnel. The acceleration of the date for the Leyte
operation necessitated Ashby's being absent several days while
placing SSO's at the subordinate commands. During this period
the undersigned was left at GHQ. I was impressed with the fact
that the people on the working level in the theater are, despite
the idiocyncracies, jealousies and animosites of their superiors,
an amazingly cooperative group.

The Chief of Staff had indicated that there would be
no room on the Command Ship for an SSO. As a result he referred
Ashby and me to the G-3 section to make arrangement for trans-
portation to Leyte in some other vessel in the Advance Echelon
convoy. The G-2 officer in charge of the details of loading
the G-2 section was to notify me of the proper time and means of
departure. I am confident that this charge never again crossed

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this officer's mind, for Ashby and I discovered the following
Saturday night that the G-2 convoy had loaded without any notice
to our office. In the improvision that was necessary I finally
arranged to "hitch hike" to Leyte aboard a 6th Army convoy leaving
the next day.

The trip to Leyte was uneventful. I carried no classified
material other than a black handbag filled with cryptographic
material. This material I kept stored in a locked closet in the
ship's captain's cabin. This seemed the most secure procedure
aboard a vessel whose Commanding Officer kept 18 quarts of bourbon
whiskey in his ship's safe, and kept his top secret battle plans
for several operations on top of the desk in his sleeping quarters.

We arrived off Dulag at the southern portion of the invaded
beach area three days after the initial landings. The usual
confusion prevailed on the beach and I was at a loss to find a
secure place to keep my cryptographic materials until I could
find transportation to GHQ, then located at Tacloban, 20 miles
north. Such transportation was not immediately available. After
two rather unpleasant nights ashore, when minor but apparent enemy
infiltrations of the beach position occurred, the undersigned
decided that the most secure place for himself and the classified
material was aboard a boat in the harbor. A problem like secure storage
seems minor, but it is typical of the practical problems our system
often poses.

Upon arrival at GHQ I presented myself to the G-2 section and
commenced operations. I was introduced to General MacArthur on
the first day of my arrival and found him at all times as cordial
and cooperative as possible. It is a matter of record that the
same observation cannot be made of a number of his immediate
subordinates.

It took only a short while to comprehend the low state of
security at the headquarters. For example, no adequate safe
accommodations existed, and the loose physical security of the
headquarters was evidenced by the presence of innumerable
Filipinos who stalked in and out of the staff section area at
random.

As for the handling of Ultra, complete insecurity was a
recurrent malignancy. The details of numerous security violations
involving our material that occurred during this period have been
reported to MIS. One fact was obvious--the main factor contributing

to such incidents was a basic lack of appreciation of the value of our material. The principal of sacrificing tactical advantage to security was not even accorded lip service. It seems incredible that Ultra could be obtained and passed by a non-recipient to a non-authorized recipient over a radio relay telephone which was almost certainly being tapped by the Japs. This, and other occurrances as serious, if not as spectacular, are indicative of the security point of view of the persons designated to receive our material.

Without going further in detail, there are certain conclusions that I have drawn with regard to the situation as it occurred on Leyte.

First, General MacArthur has been oversold by his subordinates on the quality of the production of his theater agency, Central Bureau. For example, on one occasion General MacArthur expressed to me a desire to see more diplomatic material, as "I get all the other information anyway."

Second, tactically, the Navy material was incomparably superior to Army production. For example, no Army material was operationally comparable to the Navy material describing the pending Jap reinforcements in the Ormoc area.

Third, there was no excuse for relaxing enforcement of our regulations to permit passage of Ultra down to Corps level. In no case can I recall seeing any Ultra appropriate for a Corps in its limited sphere of action, and I can imagine no case where a Corps, operating nonindependently, cannot be served by an operational order.

Fourth, none of us, staff officers or SSO's, dealing with Ultra, were adequately indoctrinated in the handling of this material in the field, and in the security practices necessary to ensure its safety. The G-2 men lacked any adequate security indoctrination. In the future the indoctrination of appropriate personnel should be as integral a part of their intelligence training as the preparation of maps or summaries. The security qualification should be a strict exaction for the holding of a responsible intelligence position. It was not in GHQ, SWPA. Nor were the SSO's adequately prepared for their job. Extensive training in the drafting of operational orders, as a security device, is one fundamental necessity in which no early SSO received any training whatsoever. The undersigned, without any previous experience, drafted several such orders in efforts to present an acceptable substitute for an otherwise unwarranted

dissemination. It would have been an infinitely more simple task had the undersigned even seen an operational order before he tried his hand at drafting one. Further, if the SSO is to work in an Intelligence Section, he should be thoroughly schooled in the G-2 duties he will perform. Camp Ritchie should furnish the best answer to this problem.

Fifth, closer coordination between Army and Navy Ultra recipients and communications personnel is essential. Tales of the Navy "indiscretions" in SWPA are legion, but in a great measure they may be attributed to a lack of mutual understanding and agreement. For example, Navy furniture shipped from Hollandia to Leyte was addressed to "the Ultra section", and mess bills were addressed to Lt X, c/o the Ultra section. This came about in great measure because the Navy considered "Ultra" as a classification, not a code word. Similarly, Navy acceptance of SSO personnel as participating counterparts aboard ships receiving Ultra is essential to secure handling of the material - since Navy Ultra may obviously be used on the basis for Army directives to Army units. On such directives a trained SSO should be infinitely more authoritative, security wise, than a Navy communications man.

On completion of the transfer of GHQ to Leyte, I was sent to the Office of the Deputy Special Security Representative in Brisbane. There is no need to include in this report any description of the organization and work of this office. Major John Thompson will make such a report and he is more conversant with this situation than any other person in the theater. It can only be added that, as an impartial observer, I find it difficult to accord enough credit to Major Thompson and his organization. They contributed quite substantially to the intelligence progress that occurred in the theater during our stay there, and the warm personal relations existing between the Filter Group and Central Bureau personnel resulted in an exchange of dendai lists, in an informal checking and querying procedure, and in a mutual exchange of advice which reduced appreciably the errors and duplications so familiar in Central Bureau's "pre-Filter Group" days. Thompson and his office did a splendid job for MIS.

JOHN H. GUNN
Major, Inf.

30 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL CARTER W. CLARKE:

SUBJECT: Report of Captain James C. Sargent's
          Activities as SSO in SWPA

1. In October 1943 I left the Army Air Force Air Intelligence School in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where I had been teaching on the staff for eight months, in order to join the 5th Air Force. On 9 December 1943 I arrived at Brisbane, Australia, the headquarters of the 5th Air Force. For a year I acted as a combat intelligence officer in New Guinea and the Philippines with the 5th Air Force, 5th Bomber Command, 43rd and 417 Bombardment Groups. During this period my duties in the main consisted of collating, evaluating, and disseminating combat intelligence as well as briefing and interrogating combat crews.

2. On 6 December 1944 I arrived at Leyte, Philippines, aboard a transport with the 417th Bombardment Group. While waiting there for sailing orders which were to take this Group to Mindoro, Philippines, I visited FEAF, where I ran into Major Philip Graham, with whom I had worked at Harrisburg prior to my departure for overseas duty. At Leyte Major Graham was not only very busy but was in bad need of personnel. He persuaded me to join him and, after making the various requests through channels, he briefed me early in January 1945 and I began to work for MIS.

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3. Our duties and functions at FEAF primarily consisted of evaluating and disseminating ULTRA information received from the War Department and from the Navy's communication circuit (which was received in full by the 7th Fleet). Recipients of this ULTRA information were the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, A-2 and A-3 at FEAF, the Commanding General and A-2 of the 5th Air Force, the Commanding General and A-2 of the 13th Air Force and the Commanding General of the 13th Bomber Command.

4. In addition we wrote the intelligence annexes to the FEAF operational plans which preceded each of the island landings within the Philippines as well as writing various estimates of the Japanese air capabilities for General Kenny and his subordinate commands.

5. In May I transferred to the 7th Fleet at Leyte, where I went to replace Captain Russell Olsen, who went to FEAF (then at Luzon). While at 7th Fleet I read the ULTRA intelligence received on the communication circuit and, depending on the urgency, despatched the important information either by cable or typewritten letter form to Colonel Benjamin Heckemeyer at GHQ, Major Graham at FEAF, Captain Flory at 5th AF, Captain Sterling at 13th AF and Major Vaughan at 7th AF.

6. Because of the tremendous amount of intelligence which came over the communication circuit, there should have been two Army officers and an Army enlisted man assigned to the Navy unit. In addition to having a thinking and talking knowledge of the Japanese air and ground strengths and their capabilities, these officers should have a good knowledge of the operations, particularly

of the Allied air forces and to a lesser extent of the Allied
ground forces. I found that I was constantly called upon to
discuss with, or brief, various Naval officers on these operations
and to familiarize them with the scope of the functions of these
various Army forces.

7. Perhaps one of the most difficult problems for the Army
liaison officers attached to the Navy will be the communication
one between himself and his important Army Commands. While the
7th Fleet, GHQ and FEAF were all at Leyte, this process resolved
itself into a process of "walking" the intelligence across the
highway two or more times a day. When GHQ and FEAF moved to
Manila, the process entailed taking the intelligence matters in
cable form to the 13th AF SSO, which Command occupied FEAF's
former physical location and despatching them to GHQ and FEAF.
When 7th Fleet moved to Manila, the problem became strangely
more difficult because of the diversified locations of the
various interested Commands (FEAF at Fort McKinley, GHQ at City
Hall, 5th AF in the Clark Field area, the 13th AF remaining at
Leyte, and the 7th Fleet on Dewey Boulevard, 6 miles from the
center of Manila). When matters of urgency arrived it was
necessary at first for the SSO to call the GHQ motor pool for
transportation, which process, if the transportation were
available, never took less than an hour. This was a ridiculous
situation since often the intelligence information to be despatched
concerned immediately impending Japanese air strikes against Allied

installations on Okinawa, where time was of the essence. I discovered that GHQ was either unwilling or unable to assign transportation to me personally; so I made arrangements through the Army and Navy communication sections to have a SIGCUM (with rotors) attached to a teleprinter on a land line. This connected the Navy's ULTRA code room with the SSR's code room in the Waterworks Building in Manila. When this machine was working (I emphasize that point), we had excellent communications and I was able to dispatch urgent matters in post haste to the Waterworks Building, where an enlisted code man of the MIS detachment, who was on duty for twenty-four hours a day, was able to relay the message to the proper interested Command. Unfortunately very often this SIGCUM set was on the blink and I was again forced into the arduous task of calling the GHQ Motor Pool for transportation, which arrangement in the wee small hours of any morning is enough to try a man's sleepy patience. I managed to talk Colonel Heckemeyer out of a set of SIGABA rotors and with these I was able to supplement the sporadic operation of the SIGCUM connection by sending Army encoded messages on a Navy communication net. As a third device, I succeeded in talking the 7th Fleet out of a jeep, which was generously assigned to me. Two days before the Japanese surrender my welcome assistant, Lt Fribrock, arrived; so at the war's end I had three fairly good means of communication with the essential Army Commands and an extra body to perform some of the leg work. I go into these difficulties at some length in

order to emphasize some of the problems which can be expected when an Army ULTRA recipient becomes a liaison officer with the Navy; namely, that he must be prepared to set up his own communications with his Army commands.

8.   Another difficulty which taxed the patience of the Army liaison officer was the difference between the Army and Navy methods for handling the word "ULTRA". The Navy treated it merely as a word designating the classification of the type of intelligence and did not consider it a Top Secret code word. Thus a sign at the entrance to the ULTRA Intelligence office read "ULTRA Personnel Only." And the Army liaison officer received his mess bill "c/o the ULTRA Section." On many occasions the ULTRA Section despatched ULTRA information by officer messenger with the word "ULTRA" clearly stamped on the outside envelope. Toward the end of the Japanese war such discrepancies had been noticeably overcome but the fact that they did exist indicates that they will always be present and will require tactful handling by the Army liaison officers.

9.   Without doubt the most dastardly situation in the SWPA intelligence organization was that which prevailed in the low level radio and voice intercept setup. In the theater the "Central Bureau" was designated as the disseminating source for PEARL and THULE intelligence, which were picked up by the

With the advent of the better equipped and better trained Radio Squadrons, the ever current jealousy and fear of lost prestige, which prevailed throughout the theater's high echelons, came to the fore and

refused the free exchange of PEARL and THUMB technical intelligence information between the _____ Radio Squadrons. The anomolous situation of having the 5th AF believe implicitly in its own Radio Squadron's (the 1st Mobile Radio Squadron) abilities to the practical exclusion of intelligence derived from "Central Bureau" sources resulted. Thus "Central Bureau", whose primary function involved dissemination of matters of air intelligence (since PEARL and THUMB primarily concerned Japanese air activities) failed to reach its one real bone fide customer. It is regrettable that the causes for the prevention of the free flow of such intelligence between these radio units could not have been officially circumvented.

10. In spite of the fact that the CBI theater had experimented most successfully with voice intercept, nothing of significance was ever accomplished in the SWPA sections although the Radio Squadrons and the _____ were crying for an opportunity to try their hands.

11. In the SWPA Theater the difficulties and practical inability of the MIS Detachment of GHQ to operate as anything more than a quasi-administrative-signal-corps outfit has been and will be further discussed by members of that Detachment. It is unfortunate that personnel within the theater are permitted to guard their own inadequate functions jealously at the expense of gaining better intelligence from War Department sources, which are often considered as more undesirable encroachments.

12. Perhaps the main criticism of the function of the SSO in SWPA so far as the air picture was concerned was the fact that he was not operating in the operational command and his success in passing on necessary information depended to a large extent on the personality of a man who often had little or no real connection with the planning of or the actual operation of the particular Air Force concerned. Unless the SSO was able to surmount this problem, which necessarily included the petty jealousies against the War Department personnel, he would be unable to do his job properly.

13. This criticism is not only of the theater officers but of the individual SSO, some of whom were completely unsuited to meet this problem. Men chosen for the SSO job should be more closely scrutinized so that their choice would be based not only on their academic records but also on their own personalities and abilities to sell themselves and their subject matter.

14. It would have been a very wise move if those theater men in responsible positions could have been briefed from above and thus have been informed of the nature of the SSO's tasks. Certainly this would have made the SSO feel much more at home and much less like the proverbial stranger in an unamicable camp.

JAMES C. SARGENT
Captain, AC

HISTORY OF OPERATIONS OF SPECIAL SECURITY
OFFICERS IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

On 7 December 1943, Major (now Lt. Col.) E. E. Huddleson, Jr.,
arrived at Ft. Shafter, T. H., for duty as Special Security Officer
to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. For the next six
months he performed his mission without benefit of any assistants,
officer or enlisted. Despite the burden of routine cryptographic
work (which he was forced to do himself) and personal briefing of
the Commanding General on ULTRA developments, he found time to
organize a system of ULTRA dissemination within the theater which
proved the most successful SSO organization in the Pacific.

The Army headquarters at Ft. Shafter was never an operational
headquarters. It provided logistic support and training for CINCPOA,
which directed all operations in the Central Pacific. As a result,
all combat intelligence was under the control of Admiral Nimitz and
his joint staff. The senior intelligence officer of this joint
staff was Brigadier General Joseph J. Twitty, who directed a large
intelligence organization known as the Joint Intelligence Center
Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA), located at Pearl Harbor, seven miles
from Ft. Shafter. Unfortunately, there was intense rivalry between
JICPOA and the G-2 section at Ft. Shafter, which was under Brigadier
General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2 for General Richardson, the Commanding
General. There was little cooperation between the two agencies, and
a feeling of mutual distrust existed throughout the war. There was
no ULTRA cleared section of the G-2 organization at Shafter, and
because it had no responsibility for dissemination of combat intelli-
gence to the Army units operating under CINCPOA, the Navy consistently
refused to supply any Navy ULTRA to General Richardson's headquarters.

Huddleson was, therefore, in an anomalous position at the start.
His mission was to organize at theater headquarters an ULTRA analysis
group which would disseminate down to the operating commands any
ULTRA intelligence of tactical value. Preferably, this section should
have access to both Army and Navy produced ULTRA. He was attached to
the top Army headquarters in the theater, but the headquarters had
no ULTRA section, no right to disseminate any combat intelligence to
operating commands, and was forbidden to receive Navy ULTRA. Further-
more, if he developed too friendly relations with JICPOA, his position
at Shafter would be suspect.

After considerable discussion with interested authorities,
Huddleson conceived and put into operation the following plan:

a.   The senior SSO (later called the SSR - Special Security
Representative) in the theater would remain on General Richardson's
staff and supervise the SSO's at operational commands;

b.   The SSR would brief General Richardson and his key staff officers on all ULTRA developments, whether Army or Navy produced;

c.   Detailed ULTRA reports and individual ULTRA items would not be made available to the G-2 section at Ft. Shafter, although General Fielder and his deputy, Colonel Tyson, would be cleared as "key officers";

d.   All ULTRA evaluation and analysis would be performed in the Estimate Section of JICPOA at Pearl Harbor;

e.   All ULTRA dissemination to subordinate Army commands in the combat zones would be controlled by JICPOA;

f.   Special Security Officers from MIS would be furnished to JICPOA Estimate Section to evaluate all ULTRA bearing on the Japanese Army and Army Air Force, and to prepare reports and radio messages for dissemination over ULTRA channels;

g.   Special Security Officers would be furnished by MIS to each Army combat command under Admiral Nimitz in accord with Army Security Regulations; these officers would maintain ULTRA communication channels both to JICPOA and to MIS.

The above plan was evolved piece-meal. It was never embodied in any formal agreement. However, it was put into effect and it worked.

The JICPOA operation got under way in August 1944 with the arrival of four officers. A history of their activities is attached as Tab A. Shortly thereafter, Major Ross Woolsey reported to Huddleson at Ft. Shafter and served as SSO for General Richardson until the end of the war.

The first combat commands to require service were General Harmon's AAFPOA, and General Buckner's Tenth Army. Both of these headquarters were located on Oahu in 1944. Major Alfred A. Miller and Major Sam T. Dell were selected for these assignments and reported in the fall of 1944. AAFPOA did not move to Guam until the end of the year, and the Tenth Army did not leave Schofield Barracks until February 1945 for the Okinawa campaign. The success of Miller at AAFPOA and Dell with the Tenth Army is largely due to their early assignment to their respective commands. Each had full opportunity to become acquainted with the staff of his command, and also to brief himself thoroughly on the work of JICPOA during this waiting period. Consequently, when D-Day arrived, the SSO knew his job, his customers, and his back-up organization. I feel that this is the most important lesson to be learned -- start your men early.

The next combat recipient to be served was the XXI Bomber Command. Major Charles T. Kingston was attached to it, arriving in Hawaii in November 1944. This command moved forward at once, and became the first operational customer of the fast growing theater SSO organization. Kingston's history is attached as Tab B. It does not do justice to his own contribution to the war. He had the complete trust and support of General Le May and was almost the sole source of intelligence for the B-29 operations against Japan.

By the beginning of 1945, the SSO system had sold itself so well that additional bodies were much in demand. The XXIV Corps was assigned to CINCPOA for the Okinawa campaign. It was decided to supply it with an SSO from the group already on duty at JICPOA, and Captain John Geillard was assigned the job. The Marine Air Force supporting the Tenth Army desired ULTRA service, and the Navy and Marine officials turned to the Army for help--since there were no Marine SSO's. Captain Laurence Goodyear, from the group at JICPOA, took this assignment. In January 1945, Admiral Nimitz moved to Guam--and his intelligence officer asked for an Army SSO; Captain Leathers, also from the JICPOA group, was promptly sent forward. This necessitated more replacements for the JICPOA group itself--all of which is detailed in Tab B.

By spring, Guam had become the air center of the Pacific war and everyone wanted more intelligence help. Moreover, every command had learned that MIS was sending out capable officers and a brisk demand for SSO's developed--not for "security officers" alone but for target analysts, photo interpreters, order of battle experts, etc. The seperate Tabs attached hereto tell the story for each command. They are as follows:

> SSO's attached to CINCPOA.
> SSO, XXI Bomber Command.
> SSO, X Army, including Marine Air Force.
> SSO, XXIV Corps.
> SSO, AAFPOA.
> CICFOR History.

In February 1945, I replaced Huddleson as SSR. I continued my headquarters at Ft. Shafter with Major Woolsey as SSO for General Richardson. Briefing of General Richardson was done uniformally and on no regular schedule. The Magic Summaries (both Diplomatic and Japanese Military) were digested as received and delivered to him and General Ruffner (Chief of Staff) for reading. On request, a general briefing of all developments was presented in the office of the SSR, to which all recipients of the headquarters were invited. On these occasions, Major Fager of the JICPOA group would present the ground situation, with his assistants presenting the air situation and any special studies of interest. Special maps were prepared for these briefings by Major Woolsey.

All administrative and policy radio messages were received at Ft. Shafter and deciphered by the two enlisted clerks (Sgts. Haire and Binchard). All ULTRA intelligence items went directly to the JICPOA group at Pearl Harbor and were broken there by an Army cryptographic team. Intra-theater messages were handled in the same way-- administrative from Shafter and intelligence from JICPOA. I made periodic trips to Guam, and was in process of moving the headquarters there when the war ended.

The history of low-level signal intelligence activities in the theater is one which should be written since the SSR spent at least 50 percent of his time on this problem, although it was not strictly his business. Since it is highly unlikely that I will ever write such a history, I am including as _____ a statement prepared by Lt. Commander Emory of his activities on Guam with the 8th Radio Squadron Mobile.

Several comments will serve as a conclusion:

1. The SSO system is ideal for the purposes for which it was designed--a secure method of field dissemination of ULTRA. Direct control by the War Department of the SSO's and the special communications channel are the two key features which insure its success.

2. SSO's were most useful when they disregarded their charter and tools on any intelligence job which required doing. Kingston used his channel as an "all source" radio channel--not just for ULTRA. This was a violation of the rules, caused some high level bickering in the Pentagon--and helped win the war. Until the War Department recognizes that an intelligence radio channel is required for daily and direct contact between Army and Air Force intelligence sections and the big research centers like MIS and JICPOA, I would recommend using the ULTRA channel for this job. Radio-telegraph from every G-2 or A-2 section to the working levels of your back-up organizations would permit the use of much valuable intelligence material that otherwise goes to a premature grave in a card-file or an 80-page report.

3. To make an SSO system work in any theater, you need a central organization at theater headquarters (JICPOA in POA) where the officers are trained for their field jobs. You can't train them in Washington. Furthermore, you build up a pool in the theater from which replacements are readily available.

<div align="right">
THOMAS E. ERVIN
Lt. Col., GSC
SSR, POA
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SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICERS ATTACHED TO CINCPOA

In the fall of 1943, the preparation for the United States'
offensive operations in the Central Pacific led to the creation of
a joint staff under Fleet Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor, which
assumed operational control of all army, navy, and marine forces
in the area. As commander of these forces, Admiral Nimitz assumed
the title "CinCPOA," as compared with his naval title of "CinCPac".
Colonel (now Brig. Gen.) Joseph J. Twitty, USA, was named as in-
telligence officer (J-2) on the joint CinCPOA staff. Maj. Gen.
Leavey (J-4) and Colonel Twitty were the principal army officers on
the joint staff, the remaining key officers being naval officers
from Fleet Admiral Nimitz's CinCPac staff.

To coordinate the intelligence activities required for the
planned offensive westward, the naval intelligence center at
Pearl (ICPOA) was expanded in September 1943 into a joint intelligence
center for the Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA). Colonel Twitty became
officer in charge as the ranking intelligence officer on the joint
staff. The principal responsibilities of JICPOA were the interpreta-
tion of aerial photographs, production of maps, charts, and terrain
models for the fleet and amphibious forces, translation of captured
documents, interrogation of prisoners, conduct of the psychological
warfare campaign, and production of weekly and other intelligence
bulletins. The great bulk of this work was done on a Secret level
or lower. At the end of the war, over 1,700 officers and men were
on duty with JICPOA.

The activities of the naval communication intelligence service
from the beginning of the Pacific war provided invaluable information
on the activities of the Japanese armed forces. The principal work
on the breaking of the Japanese Navy's codes was done in Washington
(OP-20-G), but a large unit was also maintained at Pearl Harbor. At
the time of the creation of the joint staff in the fall of 1943, this
activity at Pearl Harbor was redesignated as the Fleet Radio Unit,
Pacific Fleet. Frupac was treated as a communication activity rather
than an intelligence organization and was under the command of Captain
Goggins who was responsible to Captain Redman, communication officer
on the CinCPOA staff.

The fruits of all naval cryptanalysis were made available in the
form of operational intelligence through the medium of a small section
known as the Combat Intelligence Center or Estimate Section. Captain
W. J. Holmes, USN (Retired), was in charge of this activity, and the
section was part of JICPOA, although, for security reasons, the section
was physically located in the building occupied by Frupac. Captain
Holmes was also second in command at JICPOA under General Twitty. The
intelligence produced by the Combat Intelligence Center was disseminated
to the fleet commands through the office of Captain Edward Layton, Fleet
Intelligence Officer. Captain Holmes had been in charge of ULTRA

intelligence for the Pacific Fleet from the beginning of the war. He and several junior naval officers received all decoded messages from Negat, Frupac, and other U.S. naval cryptographic centers, processed them and prepared the intelligence derived therefrom for dissemination to the top operational commands in the Pacific Fleet. Information on the Japanese Fleet processed in this manner contributed substantially to the United States' victory in the Battle of Midway, and the successes of the United States' submarines varied in direct proportion to the availability of ULTRA information on the positions of Japanese merchant and naval vessels. In addition to preparing intelligence, the Estimate Section worked closely with the Frupac translators and cryptographers, helping in the process of decoding Japanese Navy messages. Until early 1944, Captain Holmes was assisted by less than 10 officers, which included 4 watch-plot officers, who stood a rotating watch, plus specialists on the Japanese Navy, Army, and Air Forces. At that time, no Army ULTRA information was fed into this Combat Intelligence Center, and no army officers were on duty with Captain Holmes. During the early part of the war, the main emphasis was on the strength and capabilities of the Japanese Fleet.

On 7 December 1943, Lt. Col. (then Major) E. E. Huddleson, AUS, reported for duty at Fort Shafter, as the U.S. Army Special Security Representative for the Pacific Ocean Areas. He was attached to ComGenPOA (Lt. Gen. Robert Richardson) and was responsible for the security and dissemination of all army ULTRA intelligence in the theater. By the beginning of 1944, work on the high level codes of the Japanese Army by U.S. Army cryptographers had progressed to the point where information of operational importance was becoming available. Lt. Col. Huddleson established contact with Brig. Gen. Twitty and Captain Holmes and made arrangements to pass to the CinCPOA Combat Intelligence Center all army ULTRA forwarded to him from Washington. This implemented the February 1944 Army-Navy agreement signed in Washington whereby army and navy ULTRA material was exchanged between the War and Navy Departments.

This system was in operation prior to the invasion of the Marianas in June of 1944 by CinCPOA forces. Looking into the future, it was considered desirable that the JICPOA Estimate Section be reinforced by army officers who were trained in the processing and evaluation of ULTRA information, which related primarily to the Japanese Army and Japanese Army Air Force. A formal request was made by CinCPOA through Cominch that the War Department G-2 send 4 trained officers to Pearl for duty with the CinCPOA Estimate Section.

The four officers selected from the War Department G-2 (Special Branch) for this assignment were Major (Now Lt. Col.) John W. Fager, AUS, Captain John Galliard, AUS, 2nd Lieutenant (now Captain) Harland Leathers, AUS, and 1st Lt. (now Captain) Gordon Hamilton, AUS. The first three of these men had been working on the Japanese Army while Lt. Hamilton was trained in intelligence relating to the Japanese Army Air Force.

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These four officers proceeded to Pearl by air and reported for duty on 4 August 1944. All files on Japanese Army ground and air units were immediately turned over to these army officers in the Estimate Section; 2 clerks (one army, one marine) were made available to handle the files and do the necessary clerical work in processing the intelligence on the Japanese Army. These army officers, after a short shake-down period, were given full responsibility for preparation of all CinCPOA ULTRA publications relating to the Japanese Army. This included all estimates made by CinCPOA as to the strength and dispositions of the Japanese ground forces and army air force. The 3 marine officers who had been in charge of this work were reassigned to other duties.

In order to simplify the communications situation, a direct radio channel was established between Washington and Frupac for the transmittal of army ULTRA material. Prior to this time, such messages had been sent to Fort Shafter and hand-carried to Pearl. Messages on this channel were prepared in the ULTRA sections of MIS in Washington, enciphered at Arlington Hall and sent via this Navy radio channel direct to Frupac. The Frupac code room was issued the army ULTRA systems and deciphered the traffic. Communication was also possible with Special Security Officers in other Pacific theaters. In April 1945 one army officer (1st Lt. Woodrow Wilkinson, AUS) and 4 army sergeants (M/Sgt Charles Carroll, T/Sgt Arthur Baker, T/Sgt Edward E. Campbell, and T/Sgt William A. Jones) were sent out from Washington to take over from Frupac the full cryptographic burden on army ULTRA messages.

Due to limitations of personnel and space, only one set of files were maintained on the Japanese Army and Army Air Forces, which contained ULTRA material, plus extracts from interrogations of prisoners and captured documents, and photo interpretation reports. Consequently, any requests for information on the strength or disposition of the Japanese armed forces were referred to the Estimate Section, regardless of classification. However, the weekly and monthly reports on the Japanese Army and Navy, prepared and published by the Estimate Section, were classified either Top Secret or Top Secret ULTRA.

In addition to the regular reports, the Estimate Section supplied the CinCPOA staff (planning section in particular) with the intelligence on the enemy situation needed to formulate an operation plan. Captain Holmes and his assistants supplied this information for every operation of the Pacific Fleet and CinCPOA. The officers from the War Department arrived in time to help prepare the final estimate on the Japanese capabilities and intentions with reference to the invasion of Peleliu and Angaur. From that time to the end of the war in the Pacific, all CinCPOA intelligence on the Japanese Armed Forces represented a joint effort in which army, navy, and marine officers worked on all available material, both army and navy. The JICPOA Estimate Section was probably the outstanding example of army-navy cooperation in the field of current operational intelligence.

When Fleet Admiral Nimitz opened an advance headquarters at Guam early in 1945, Captain Harland Leathers moved forward to Guam, attached to Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. The great majority of the intelligence work continued to be done at Pearl where the bulk of JICPOA, including the Estimate Section, remained. A direct SIGTOT circuit was established between the Estimate Section at Pearl and Captain Layton's office on Guam in order that Fleet Admiral Nimitz and the CinCPOA staff officers on Guam would be served with the latest intelligence on the enemy. All War Department ULTRA publications for Admiral Nimitz, including the Diplomatic Summary, Far East Summary, and Shipping and Economic Notes, were pouched to Captain Leathers at Guam directly from Washington. Captain Leathers helped Captain Layton prepare all ULTRA intelligence for presentation to Admiral Nimitz.

With the build-up of the aerial warfare against the home islands of Japan, it became desirable to move forward to Guam the members of the Estimate Section who specialized on the enemy air forces. Captain Gordon Hamilton, specializing in the Japanese army air force, plus the experts on the naval air force, moved to Guam in May and June of 1945. At Guam, they were known alternately as Combat Intelligence Center Forward (CICFOR) and Air Estimate Section. They were assigned to Advanced Intelligence Center, the forward echelon of JICPOA set up to serve CinCPac Advanced Headquarters. They functioned in close association with the Radio Analysis Group Forward (RAGFOR). The function of RAGFOR was to solve the air-ground communications of the Japanese air forces, with a FRUPAC forward echelon working on the navy air communications. Thus, the Air Estimate Section bore the same relation to RAGFOR on Guam as the Estimate Section did to FRUPAC at Pearl. Thereafter, all CinCPOA air estimates were published at Guam.

This forward movement of the Air Estimate Section was invaluable in making the increasingly plentiful photo interpretation reports on Japan as well as air-ground traffic immediately available to the air estimators. At the same time, all army air ULTRA was henceforth routed directly to Guam instead of Pearl and all navy ULTRA (air) was sent to Guam as well as Pearl. Secure teletype lines (mux) were maintained to CinCPac Advanced Headquarters (Capt. Layton), USASTAF (Lt. Col. Miller, SSO), and 20th Air Force (Major Kingston, SSO). Since the Air Estimate Section served USASTAF as well as CinCPOA, it was unnecessary for an air order of battle section to be established at either USASTAF or any of its subordinates, or for air estimates to be produced at USASTAF. Daily estimates of Empire air strength, in terms of number and type of plane at each airfield, were produced by the Air Estimate Section for tactical use in scheduling air strikes, in addition to the more general estimates for long-range planning.

With the opening of an advance headquarters at Guam, it became necessary to send additional army intelligence officers from the War Department to duty with CinCPOA. Captain William H. Pomeroy, AUS, and 1st Lt. William H. Orrick, AUS, went to work at Pearl as experts on the Japanese ground forces, replacing Captain Leathers (who had moved to Guam) and Captain Galliard, who became Special Security Officer for the XXIV Corps. Captain Pomeroy took over the main responsibility for the

ground estimates in April when Lt. Col. John W. Feger became head of the Estimate Section at Pearl. On the air side, Captain Lawrence Pritchard, AUS, 1st Lt. Osborne Webb, AUS, and 1st Lt. Kenneth Young were attached to the Air Estimate Section at RAGFOR on Guam. Captain Pritchard worked closely with the men at RAGFOR who were experimenting with the low-level Japanese Army and Navy air codes. 1st Lt. Bruce Grant, AUS, was sent to Pearl as liaison with FRUPAC and the main Estimate Section.

Also in connection with the accelerating carrier and B-29 strikes against the Empire, it became necessary to develop that part of the Estimate Section which concentrated on shipping and economic targets. 1st Lt. George McKay, AUS, Captain Amory Bradford, AUS, and Captain John Guthrie, AUS, were sent by the War Department to help in this intelligence activity with particular reference to the B-29 mining program. A new weekly report was initiated, starting in February 1945, which reported all ULTRA information bearing on the Japanese shipping and economic position. Close liaison was maintained with XXI Bomber Command, CominPac, Fleet Airwing 1, ComSubPac and other activities, which needed current intelligence on Japanese shipping and other strategic targets.

To summarize, a total of 14 army intelligence officers from the War Department G-2 served with JICPOA either at Pearl or Guam. These men were specialists on the Japanese Army, Japanese Army Air Forces, and on the Japanese shipping and economic position. They not only acted as liaison between the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the War Department, and other army commands but also worked on the CinCPOA intelligence reports and shouldered important responsibilities in the intelligence organization of the United States Pacific Fleet. It is submitted that this unique position enabled CinCPOA to produce better intelligence and resulted in closer contact between the War Department and CinCPOA, to their mutual benefit.

SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE, XXI BOMBER COMMAND

I, Charles T. Kingston, Jr., Major, Air Corps, O-912230, was detailed for duty as Special Security Officer, XXI Bomber Command, on or about 15 October 1944, at which time the Command was in training at Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, Colorado. On 16 October 1944, I flew from Washington, D.C., to Peterson Field, Colorado, and spent 4 days there. The object of the trip was to meet the Commanding General, his staff officers, and in particular to become acquainted with the A-2 Section. The trip also offered an opportunity to determine in what ways MIS would be able to supplement the A-2 Section of the Command through the Special Security Office.

Colonel James Saxon Childers, then A-2, and fully 75 percent of his staff were men with whom I had been associated on the staff of the Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Penn.

On 3 November 1944, I departed Washington for San Francisco, from whence I flew on to Hickham Field, Hawaiian Islands, on 15 November.

Through the good offices of Lt. Col. Edwin E. Huddleson (then Major and Special Security Representative, Pacific Ocean Areas), the necessary details were accomplished to secure the cryptographic devises and clearances for the U.S. Navy's special intelligence radio channel, known as System 35. Thus, the Bomber Command became the first Army Unit to personally hold this highly secure naval system.

Similarly the War Department's crypto material was obtained so that I would be able to communicate with complete security either with Lt. Col. Huddleson in Hawaii or directly with MIS in Washington.

Liaison with the Navy had been excellently established by Colonel Huddleson who introduced me to Captain E. T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, CINCPAC, and with Captain W. J. Holmes, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area. These were associations which later proved of immense benefit to the Bomber Command.

On 22 November 1944, I departed Hickham Field for Saipan and the Advanced HQ of the XXI BomCom arriving there just in time for the first bombing mission against the Japanese Homeland on 24 November 1944 (25 November Hawaiian and Washington times).

The advanced headquarters was extremely short-handed because most of the personnel was enroute Guam aboard ship. The A-2 and one assistant had a serious air crash at Eniwetok, such that his arrival at Saipan was delayed until about 10 December. Because of the critical manpower situation, my duties were quite varied. In addition to briefing Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., ComGen XXI BomCom, on such Special Intelligence as became available, I acted as an Order of Battle Section, Flak and Fighter Reaction Unit, and briefed on those subjects at Mission Planning Meetings.

Special Intelligence was my principal function, but neither the BomCom nor the 73rd Bomb Wing had the necessary cryptographic machines that the devises I carried required so I was incommunicado for a few days.

Investigation finally resulted in the following arrangement: I moved my living quarters to Island Command. Each morning I hitchhiked 12 miles to the BomCom early enough to prepare for an 8 A.M. Planning Meeting; returning to Island Command about 4 P.M. the same way. After 4 each afternoon at the nearby HQ of COMAIRFORWARD I read the daily Navy Spec Intell info at the office of Comdr. Densford, J-2, who held the Navy 35 system and had watch officers on duty 24 hours a day to receive and break it. Then I used the desk of the Communications Officer of the Islands Joint Communications Center as an office and used their crypto machines to decipher and encipher such messages as there were between the War Department and myself. So long as the BomCom had an HQ on Saipan this arrangement continued and the Signal Center in effect became my office for Special Intelligence work while the lower security classification work was done during the day at the BomCom. Except for 3 days in mid-December, we remained at Saipan until New Year's Day 1945.

During this period weather data coming over the Navy channel was rather cumbersomely obtained. Each day, Colonel Seaver, Staff Weather Officer of the Command, or Lt. Col. Shafer, OinC Weather Central, or myself copied the clear text weather data at Commander Densford's office.

From 1 January 1945 until the end of the war, the Bomber Command HQ was on Guam and more permanent arrangements were eventually established. Communications were a bit heterogeneous until about mid-January. Then Captain Howeth, USN, OinC Radio Station Able, became a holder of the Navy 35 system in preparation for the arrival of CINCPAC, and I was able to read the clear text there. Since Captain Howeth had no use for the weather data, we picked up all the classified weather info which came in and the laborious process of copying it was eliminated.

For War Department traffic, I used the Signal Center of the Bomber Command until it became too busy and security became a problem. Then I arranged for the Island Joint Communications Center to hold our traffic and they permitted me to use their code room for enciphering and deciphering.

By 1 February we had a small office and our own crypto machine but it was 10 February before we had a wall plug so that we could get electricity to run the thing. By that time we had also had scramblers on them so that Special Intelligence material could be passed.

We were then pretty well in business, Sergeant John E. Kennedy having arrived about 19 January to take over the crypto and typing duties.

Captain Howeth had at his control much monitoring equipment, including that of FRUPAC (Fleet Radio Unit Pacific) and that of the 8th Radio Squadron Mobile. For our missions, this equipment was turned over almost in its entirety to the BomCom. Some of it was used to minitor our air/ground frequencies and they helped lost B-29's find their way home--giving them headings when they called in or establishing their location by D.F. if they

called in that they were ditching. Other facilities were used so that we could follow the progress of the mission by enemy reaction as our own planes maintained radio silence until after "bombs away" except in an emergency. This material was all sent to us via the teletype so that the Commanding General and some of his staff could follow events over Japan 10 minutes after they took place while sitting in the Special Security Office at Bomber Command Headquarters.

Colonel James D. Garcia became A-2 about 15 February 1945. He was rather quick to realize that the best source of operational intelligence was via the Special Security Channel which by this time was getting a steady flow of information from JICPOA at Pearl Harbor and from Washington both by radio and air pouch.

Thereafter our unit grew rather rapidly and its influence upon Bomber Command operations was considerable.

The mining of Japanese waters started on 27 March and 1st Lt. George W. McKay of MIS arrived to help that program get underway. McKay had been working at JICPOA on the Japanese Shipping situation. He stayed about two weeks after which his duties were taken over and expanded by Captain Kirk Jeffrey, a specialist in this field from MIS Washington. All the intelligence to support and direct the mining program was supplied by MIS and the success of that program was far beyond expectations.

On 5 May 1945, Captain Clarence H. Dalton arrived to take over the publication of an Air Order of Battle Bulletin which was put out weekly and sent to each squadron, group, and wing intelligence officer. It contained not only estimates of strength but editorial material to completely serve the intelligence officer's needs for briefing material on enemy tactics, intentions, and capabilities.

Likewise, T/Sgt Kennedy on 21 April received an assistant in T/Sgt Monroe D. Heinbuch. These two men handled all the crypto and clerical work and one or the other was on duty from 7 A.M. until 11 P.M. each day and 7 days a week until the war ended.

Early in June we secured larger working space--an entire 20' x 48' Quonset Hut. At the cost of numerous bottles of whiskey, some friendly SeaBees built partitions and furniture and painted the hut so that we had then a 12' x 20' communications room, a briefing room for the general the same size, and very adequate office space between these two rooms. We then started a 24 hour communications section and started to receive all air intelligence radiograms originated by MIS personnel in Washington or elsewhere in the Asiatic-Pacific theater. Four cryptographic clerks maintained this vigil, namely, M/Sgt Charles Carroll, S/Sgt Roy T. Zahrndt, Sgt James Scobell, and Sgt Leo F. Hughes, with the assistance of Sgts Kennedy and Heinbuch.

Second Lieutenant John L. Koonce arrived to direct the Communications Section, but M/Sgt Carroll had it running so smoothly that much of his time could be devoted to intelligence work and he kept track of bomber command missions and followed the enemy reaction thereto. This information he kept plotted on large maps in the General's briefing room.

On 14 July our staff was expanded with the arrival of First Lieutenants Allston F. Dana and John A. Moekle. The former became a target analyst for us and the latter became our political and economic specialist.

In the meantime, some personnel and command changes were being planned, and on 1 August 1945 the XXI Bomber Command became the XXth Air Force and what had been known as Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Area became United States Army Strategic Air Forces. Lieut. Gen. Nathan F. Twining became ComGen XXth Air Force. Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who had commanded the XXI Bomber Command since 20 January 1945, became Chief of Staff USASTAF.

The USASTAF HQ was immediately adjacent to the XXth AF and our office was about equidistant between the two, so we were admirably situated to serve both.

Lt. Col. Alfred A. Miller had arrived at Guam about 1 February 1945 with the AAFPOA HQ and served them as Special Security Officer. As he had been overseas some time and was eligible for retirement on 20 July, Major George E. Diller arrived to replace him.

It was contemplated and planned that all mission planning would henceforth be done at USASTAF for the XXth AF and the 8th AF which was forming on Okinawa. It was, therefore, obvious that the Special Security Office of the XXI Bomber Command should serve USASTAF under such an arrangement, as we were organized for mission planning work as the Miller-Diller one-man office was not. Effective with the command changes, a Joint SSO office was created with myself in charge and Major Diller responsible for administrative matters. It was decided that with complete planning work done at USASTAF and with complete intelligence work done by the newly created joint SSO office, each air force needed only one officer responsible to it for Special Intelligence. Because of the proximity of the two headquarters on Guam, no such officer had been specifically designated before the war ended. However, Major Edmund P. Lord, assisted by Sgt Lloyd L. Adams, served the 8th AF at Okinawa.

Such was the nature and character of the Special Intelligence organization which served the strategic bomber units of the Pacific when the war ended.

It is worthy of mention that through the SSO and through the good liaison which existed between MIS and JICPOA, we were of benefit to the command in two unusual ways:

1. A naval officer was assigned to the command who was experienced in the photo interpretation of shipping and a specialist of the highest caliber in that regard. He ran the shipping section of the Photo Interpretation Unit. The reports turned out prior to Lt. Marriner's arrival were a source of embarrassment to the command.

2. The command was able to make excellent target models but had no facilities for reproducing them. Arrangements were effected through the good offices of Capt. W. J. Holmes of JICPOA to have the master model flown to Pearl Harbor by the daily CINCPAC plane and there they were reproduced in rubber and flown back.

Another very special service rendered by MIS to the Bomber Command was their sending Lt. Col. Fred M. Brown to Guam for 60 days temporary duty. Colonel Brown arrived about the end of May and was there during the heat of the Industrial/Urban area attacks which continued through June and until almost the end of July. During that period, he personally analyzed from photos the industrial content of about 60 Japanese cities and recommended to the command which should be hit and in what priority. He assisted in the planning of photo missions and at the request of A-2 wrote a new directive for the 3rd Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, which resulted in more efficient operation of that unit.

The contribution of MIS to the successful bombing of the Japanese Empire by B-29's cannot be overstated. As the agent through whom MIS products reached the Bomber Command, I was in an excellent position to see that, except for MIS, the A-2 Section of the Command would have been practically without intelligence. Special Intelligence was merely one function of SSO serving XXI Bomber Command, XXth AF, 8th AF, and USASTAF.

CHARLES T. KINGSTON, Jr.
Major, Air Corps
SSO, USASTAF

HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY

APO 357

REPORT OF SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER

OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

I. Introduction.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this report is to outline
the functions and activities of Special Security Officers
serving at an army level, and to recommend various methods
by which it is believed that services of such officers can
be more effectively rendered.

2. Scope. This report is based on the experiences of
Special Security Officers serving the ground and air forces
of the Tenth Army during the OKINAWA campaign. It is believed
that the unusual nature of the command organization in that
operation resulted in enlarging the normal duties of Special
Security Officers serving at an army level and gave rise to
a number of problems which might not otherwise have been en-
countered. It is not intended therefore that the material
herein set forth should necessarily form a pattern to be
followed by officers holding similar posts in armies having
more orthodox functions and responsibilities.

3. Subordination to Naval Command. The subordination of
Tenth Army to CINCPOA and intermediate naval commands resulted
in the availability to Tenth Army of Navy ULTRA intelligence

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through Special Security Officers attached to the Army. All ULTRA intelligence relating to enemy naval and air activity was derived from this source.

II. Body of Report.

1. Cryptographic Systems and Procedures. The Tenth Army Special Security Officer was issued two army systems, 3301 and 3306, the former inter-theater and the latter intra-theater. In the interim between departure from Oahu and arrival at Leyte there was no occasion to use either system as the primary command element of Tenth Army Headquarters was still being served on Oahu by the Assistant Special Security Officer.

Upon arrival at Leyte, 5 March 1945, the communication facilities of the Special Security Representative, SWPA, were available and were employed for such contact with the Special Security Representatative, POA, as was necessary. The Navy ULTRA channel, 35, was forwarded from the Special Security Representative, POA, and received through the office of the Special Security Representative, SWPA. Thus at the time the Special Security Officer boarded the Tenth Army command ship he held both army and navy cryptographic channels for ULTRA.

Once aboard the command ship, adequate communication facilities existed for the receipt and transmission of messages with all Special Branch agencies including the Special Security Officer attached to the XXIV Corps who was aboard the command ship of his Corps. After sailing from Leyte Gulf radio silence was maintained until the morning of "Love" day; there-051

fore only incoming traffic was available.

2. Receipt and Dissemination of Intelligence. Items of intelligence including the CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Enemy Land Forces Area Distribution and Changes in Monthly Unit Location Report" and spot items relating to the target area were forwarded by radio and air pouch to Leyte where they were received in the office of the Special Security Representative, SWPA. Moreover, operational intelligence on an ULTRA level was accessible at GHQ, SWPA on Leyte. From this material and that received by radio and pouch from the Special Security Representative, POA, estimates were prepared and notes made for delivery by officer courier to the A.C. of S., G-2, Tenth Army, who was at that time on Ulithi.

The Special Security Officer attached to Headquarters XXIV Corps was also on Leyte and received ULTRA for dissemination to Corps recipients as outlined in the preceeding paragraph.

The Commanding General Tenth Army together with the chiefs of his general staff sections embarked from Leyte aboard the command ship of Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific. Navy ULTRA incoming over channel 35 was received by the Amphibious Force Commander and arrangements were made through his staff for all authorized army recipients to have access to it by adding their names to the list of distributees. The physical proximity of the Corps command ship to the command ship of the Army, off shore at the target, made possible frequent visits by the Corps Special Security Officer. During these visits the Corps Special

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Security Officer was briefed on so much of the army and navy ULTRA as was of interest to Corps recipients. It might be well to point out here that during the early phases of the operation there was little or no ULTRA of operational interest to Corps. The bulk of the traffic was essentially intelligence of enemy air action and intent. Pertinent ULTRA was passed to Corps in the form of operational orders by Commander Amphibious Forces commanding Task Force Fifty One, the overall commander during the amphibious phase of the operation. At the time the Commanding General Tenth Army moved his command post ashore, Love plus 17 days, he assumed command of the ground forces and from that time, ULTRA was passed to the Corps through the Special Security Officer.

After the command element of XXIV Corps went ashore, Love plus 6 days, the Corps Special Security Officer was serviced by communication in system 3306. Technical difficulties rendered communication between Army and Corps Special Security Officers unsatisfactory for a time and during the initial portion of this period the Corps Special Security Officer made trips from shore to ship. On Love plus 17 days when the Tenth Army Headquarters moved ashore, authority had not been granted to the Special Security Officer to take in the navy system, 35; therefore the recipient Army commander and staff officers were serviced by the Assistant Special Security Officer who made daily trips to the command ship for ULTRA material returning with it to both Army and Corps.

On Love plus 28 days the Army Special Security Officer was

granted authority to take the navy system ashore and on Love plus 29 days he moved ashore with both the navy and army systems. Prior arrangements with the Signal Officer, Tenth Army, had been made for use of SIGABA, space in the Tenth Army signal center code room and monitoring by the Army of those circuits over which both army and navy ULTRA were broadcast. The communications officer on the staff of the Amphibious Force Commander agreed to retransmit traffic over channel 35 to Tenth Army signal center pending the time it would take Army to "come up" on the necessary circuits. This assistance continued for approximately two months.

Once again the physical location of the Army and Corps command posts, in close proximity one to the other, made hand carry of ULTRA more expeditious than radio communication. While daily contact was not necessary throughout the operation, officer courier service was available twice each day for hand delivery to the Corps Special Security Officer.

Pouch service from the Special Security Representative, POA, was available within a week after Love day and was continuous thereafter. All materials were pouched to the Special Security Officer Tenth Army who in turn distributed to Special Security Officer at Corps.

3. Function in Section to Which Attached. The Tenth Army Special Security Officers were attached to the Intelligence Section and at times worked as members of that section under the direction of the A.C. of S., G-2. The Tenth Army Intelligence Officer was most considerate in not assigning or requesting

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duty beyond the scope of Special Intelligence and has been careful to see that no demand was made upon the time of the Special Security Officers which would in any way conflict with the processing and dissemination of ULTRA.

Upon being attached to the G-2 Section, the Special Security Officer was assigned the duty of liaison officer, in addition to his other duties, between G-2 Tenth Army and other intelligence agencies on Oahu. This duty continued until the advanced echelon of Headquarters Tenth Army embarked for the target area. Aboard the command ship the Special Security Officer was detailed as a regular working member of the Combat Intelligence Subsection in which position he directed the extraction of order of battle information from captured enemy documents, prepared daily intelligence summaries, shared in the supervision of the G-2 journal and processed incoming intelligence messages.

The Assistant Special Security Officer for air prepared daily intelligence summaries of enemy air action for the Combat Intelligence Subsection and served on the roster of duty officers in that section.

4. Other Functions of the Special Security Officers. The Special Security Officers maintained close and constant liaison with Signal Intelligence Subsection of the Tenth Army Signal Section. Much time was spent in coordinating the production of PEARL and THUMB intelligence between radio intelligence units of subordinate commands and the Tenth Army Signal Intelligence Subsection. This work was necessary in order to maintain an overall security check on the channels through which PEARL

and THUMB material passed. Another important aspect of maintaining close liaison with Signal Intelligence was the coordination of materials from captured documents incoming to the G-2 Combat Intelligence Collecting Agency Subsection of use to Signal Intelligence in the production of PEARL and THUMB.

The Combat Intelligence Collecting Agency, a sub-section of the G-2 Section, was the agency within the Tenth Army Intelligence Section charged with processing and exploiting information from captured enemy personnel, materiel and documents. Here, with the willing assistance of the officers in charge and from members of attached intelligence teams, much important and highly valuable information was made readily accessible for immediate dispatch by air pouch and radio to units in higher headquarters, both army and navy, interested in the production of Special Intelligence.

5. Service to Authorized Recipients. Because of the singular command structure of Tenth Army, several additional staff officers not usually included in an orthodox army headquarters organization were authorized as ULTRA recipients. Authorized to receive ULTRA in addition to the Commanding General and his army staff officers were air staff officers of the subordinate tactical air force and naval officers on the staff of Commander Naval Forces Ryukyus also subordinate to ComGen Ten. It was not necessary however to serve the naval commander or members of his staff as he directly received ULTRA in his headquarters over channel 35 S.

The assistant Special Security Officer experienced in Japanese air order of battle, served the commander and general staff officer recipients at Army and the commander and staff of the tactical air force with ULTRA pertaining to air. The Special Security Officer served the commander and general staff officer recipients at Army with ULTRA pertaining to enemy ground and naval forces and the Corps Special Security Officer with all ground and such of the air ULTRA as affected Corps recipients. Service to authorized personnel primarily consisted of:

(a) Adequate warning against enemy air, ground and surface attacks to recipients in Tenth Army Headquarters. Scale of effort, composition of force and direction and time of attack given when known.

(b) Immediate delivery to the tactical air force and to Corps of information as received during the 24 hour period concerning the time, size, place of origin and method of air and ground attacks and movements scheduled by the enemy including major and minor raids and reconnaissance missions.

(c) Daily written summary to the tactical air force of enemy air activity.

(d) Daily delivery to the tactical air force of all available information on enemy aircraft concentrations and movements for use in target selection.

(e) Informal weekly briefing of authorized recipients in Army headquarters and the tactical air force on enemy air and ground strengths, new identifications,

unit movements, and locations, capabilities, organ-
ization and all matters relating thereto such as avgas
supplies, aircraft production, development of new equip-
ment, new tactics, transport facilities and the like.

6. MANX, Distribution and Handling. Available to the
Special Security Officer over the navy channel 35, was a large
volume of Japanese weather traffic. This information was
placed in the hands of the Tenth Army Weather Officer att-
ached to the G-2 Section. Daily plots of the information de-
rived from MANX were prepared by the Army weather officer and
made available by him to five other weather officers on duty
at the main weather central on OKINAWA. These six officers
were the sole and only necessary recipients of MANX.

7. Administration. No attempt is to be made here to out-
line an approved system of administration for adoption by Special
Security Officers. Rather it is hoped the following suggestions
will assist Special Security Officers in making initial plans
for serving a unit in the field.

Obviously complete files of outgoing and incoming
intelligence and administrative messages should be kept
current at all times. Any simple method providing a quick
and accurate check on the consecutive numbers of messages
will not only suffice but also avoid outstanding unreceived
messages from going undetected. For the same reason, a file
on incoming and outgoing pouches should be maintained.

A signal property record file constituted in the form of

a tickler for due dates of destruction and inventory reports, provides a valuable check on registered documents accountable for by the Special Security Officer. It also serves as a standing inventory of documents currently on hand.

Such other files as suit the pleasure of the individual concerned may be maintained under such headings as "Estimates," "Economic Targets," "Authorized Recipients," "Captured Documents," et al.

III Recommendations

1. During the planning phase of an operation, ULTRA material can be and is of great assistance to corps recipients. Once the planning state is over and operations begun, the corps recipients absorbed in the tactical problems of an engaged command do not have need of a full flow of ULTRA. ULTRA items of immediate operational interest to corps can be passed from army in the form of operational orders. It is, therefore, suggested that the assignment of a Special Security Officer to corps is not justified during an operation in which the corps is subordinate to an army.

2. At army level for the OKINAWA campaign two Special Security Officers were attached. This proved adequate for the service of all recipients in the diversified command framework of Tenth Army as constituted for "ICEBERG." One officer and two code clerks should be sufficient for an army headquarters operating under orthodox organization or as a component of an army group.

3. An invaluable asset for any Special Security Officer is a thorough working knowledge of the signal communications upon which he depends for his "stock in trade." Simple Signal Corps procedure, technical information of the frequencies over which the messages are to be broadcast and a well grounded pre-view into the actual physical facilities which will be available in the field would eliminate many time consuming problems after arrival at the target. Should the Special Security Officer hold the navy ULTRA system in addition to that of the army, he and his assigned code clerks should be schooled in the fundamental differences between the two systems. Especially should the Special Security Officer satisfy himself that the army signal plan provides for adequate coverage of the circuits carrying navy ULTRA dispatches.

4. The physical separation of authorized recipients in the field should be anticipated as accurately as possible, for the distance between the headquarters of units to be served can well influence the efficiency by which service is rendered. It is believed that proper service to three or more headquarters located at a distance of over five miles, one from the other, will require not less than two Special Security Officers for adequate dissemination of ULTRA.

5. In order to provide constant service on a momentary basis a minimum of two officers and three code clerks are necessary. This personnel can maintain a twenty-four hour

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duty status and insure complete dissemination of ULTRA when time is of the essence. In this connection the recommendation in sub-paragraph four above should be considered.

6. The routine operation of the Special Security Officer's office will be facilitated by a field desk generously stocked with miscellaneous office supplies as such are practically impossible to obtain for the first three months in the field. A requisition for a safe for the sole use of the Special Security Officer in the field should be filed with the supply agency of the organization to which he is attached in ample time to assure its availability. Typewriters, portables preferably, should be furnished each Special Security Officer. Difficulties in obtaining transportation together with the necessity of having same constantly available for emergency use, make it highly desirable for the Special Security Officer to be provided with a quarter ton, 4X4, truck which will be in excess of the T/E of the section to which the Special Security Officer is assigned.

7. The Special Security Officer should maintain close contact with all agencies through which captured documents pass. Captured enemy code books, message files, maps and miscellaneous documents of value to the producers of Special Intelligence can thus be detected and sped to rear headquarters through the more expeditious channels open to the Special

Security Officer. Caution should be exercised not to preclude proper credit being received by responsible organizations and individuals and to avoid taking such materials out of usual channels without due notice to and consent of interested parties.

SAM T. DELL, JR. LT COL
Special Security Officer
Headquarters Tenth Army

LAURENCE R. GOODYEAR
Capt. Field Artillery
Assistant Special Security
Officer, Headquarters
Tenth Army

OKINAWA JIMA
27 July 1945

HQ XXIV CORPS
APO 235

17 July 1945
Nakagusuku Castle

SUBJECT : SSO Report, 20 Feb - 17 July
TO   : SSR, AF MID PAC (Lt. Col. Thomas Ervin)

The XXIV Corps is the first Corps operating under CINCPOA to receive a SSO for disseminating ULTRA intelligence. A description of his activities before and during the Okinawan operation may provide some basis for future decisions on such assignments and be of assistance to other Corps SSOs.

ASSIGNMENT TO XXIV CORPS

Presence of a SSO at Corps level was not originally contemplated under ULTRA security regulations. The assignment to the XXIV Corps was predicated upon the special requirements of this Corps staging from Leyte far from its superior HQ, Tenth Army at Oahu. It was felt that direct and immediate access to raw ULTRA would be of value to the Corps CG and his staff in planning for Okinawa. During the Leyte operation under GHQ SWPA another SSO (Capt. Armstrong) had accustomed XXIV Corps to receiving this intelligence direct rather than in the evaluated form of operations orders from a higher Army HQ. The independent operations of the corps on Leyte and other Pacific islands did require an SSO since speedy and adequate evaluation of ULTRA was quite impractical at a distant Hq.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

Systems 3301 and 3306 were made available to the SSO in order to assure access to SWPA as well as to JICPOA. On Leyte, however, XXIV Corps was served through the SB Detachment at GHQ SWPA and scarcely needed its own channel. All ULTRA cables, bulletins, as well as the ULTRA section's

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files (Maj. Magruder) were available to the Corps SSO. Therefore Corps received everything while on Leyte.

While on the AGC en route to the target the Navy 35-S channel covered all Army ULTRA of the period and was read by the indoctrinated staff officers.

On Okinawa delivery of ULTRA between Army and Corps passed through two distinct phases, before and after the Tenth Army SSO arrived ashore with both the Army and Navy systems.

In the first phase before Col Dell came ashore some four weeks after L-day various channels were used between AGC afloat and Corps ashore: radio traffic via 3306, officer courier service, personal visits from Corps to AGC, and finally almost daily visits ashore by Capt. Goodyear. Some hitches both in radio and pouch delivery did occur during the most difficult period in all amphibious operations. Some delays can be anticipated on all campaigns while the communications systems are settling in and must be guarded against by close cooperation with the signal officers concerned. Fortunately none of these delays prevented ULTRA warnings from reaching Corps in time.

Transmission of Naval ULTRA to Corps except in the form of operational orders or personal delivery by Capt. Goodyear was impossible until the 35-S system was brought ashore some four weeks after L-day. Corps did not have 35-S nor could pertinent data be passed via 3306. Nevertheless, Corps received warning of all impending attacks. On several occasions the SSO warning appeared tardy because of the greater speed of the CASCU air liaison channel. This brought a direct message from the Navy Command vessel first decoding 35-S without the delay of passing through Army signal channels. The freedom with which Navy and Air Force commands notified all units and liaison officers of threatened air attacks in rather transparent operational messages endangered ULTRA security. This was immediately called to the attention of SSR POA by Col. Dell. Per-

mission to pass paraphrased pertinent 35-S intelligence via the SSO's 3306 channel would eliminate this possible gap in the ULTRA picture.

In the second phase after Col. Dell was ashore, personal delivery from Tenth Army has replaced all other methods. This relieved the Corps SSO of considerable SIGABA work but was practical only because of the small combat zone and the close proximity of Army to XXIV Corps.

System 3301 has never been used. No ULTRA material originated in SWPA pertinent to the Okinawan campaign.

CORPS ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

XXIV Corps received through the Tenth Army SSO pertinent dispatches from both the Army and Navy systems. In addition the following ULTRA publications provided background and evaluated intelligence: CINCPAC-CINCPOA A-III and "C" reports (weekly), CINCPAC-CINCPOA ENEMY LAND FORCES UNIT LOCATIONS (monthly), Washington SB ULTRA aids except the Perdue weekly ULTRA JOB bulletin, the GHQ SWPA monthly ULTRA SUMMARY, and periodic CINCPAC-CINCPOA ENEMY ORGANIZATION studies (TOP SECRET).

On Leyte in addition the Willoughby SIB (Special Intelligence Bulletin) was read by Corps indoctrinees with great interest. Considerable disappointment was expressed at the loss of this source on leaving the P.I. It provided in the original more general ULTRA material than appears in the A-III reports. Personal evaulation appealed to the readers. All material concerning Okinawa was, however, made accessible by JICPOA either through individual dispatches or the A-III Summary. Now that the SIB has ceased publication, the A-III report provides XXIV Corps with a general ULTRA picture that is not available on the Corps level in SWPA (now AF WEST PAC).

The strategic level of much of the A-III data meant that it was read much more closely before and after an operation when Corps officers were less wrapped up in their tactical duties.

RELATIONS WITH CUSTOMERS

At XXIV Corps the SSO personally passed all ULTRA to the indoctrinated officers: the CG, C/S, Asst. C/S for Operations, G-3, G-2, Asst. G-2.

Raw ULTRA was frequently accompanied by typewritten or oral evaluation. Previously evaluated ULTRA, such as the A-III reports, were presented in various ways to suit individual tastes. In all cases the highlights were underlined in red and appropriate notes appended to facilitate the reading. Some officers read the entire issue from cover to cover. Only the G-2 read every issue completely. Most preferred a precis covering the week's main developments. They would then read only those parts of the report that particularly interested them. Maps were used to illustrate the ULTRA material.

Normally the SSO would sit beside the officer reading the material to answer questions and promote security. Occasionally if the CG were busy, the ULTRA would be left on his desk and called for later. This was necessary only at the rush periods of activity.

The prime interest of all indoctrinated officers was ULTRA of tactical value to Corps. The pre L-day strength estimates were strategic rather than tactical in nature. Totals passed by Army would have served Corps needs equally well. Army ULTRA items of tactical worth were few and far between before and during the campaign. High level codes on an Army basis were not being broken on a current basis. Luckily there were no reinforcements requiring ULTRA warning. Le; had been a different proposition. On that isle raw ULTRA is reported by Col. Nist to have been of great value. Army control there was also at a minimum.

Naval and Air ULTRA provided ample and effective warnings of the long series of KIKUZUI operations. These were of little import to Corps unless coordinated land attacks were also directed. Corps received notice of all, whether or not land attacks appeared possible. A telephoned warning in general terms to his division CGs was the Corps CG's normal method of disseminating this intelligence.

The information did not require operational orders or devious methods for making ULTRA accessible. Whether indoctrinated or not, division commanders know Corps has special intelligence of some sort. Some have used ULTRA in the past. At any rate a phone call advising general precautions against a morning attack was an adequate hint. Carrier phones were used.

ULTRA intelligence caused no changes in Corps plans on Okinawa. The lack of fruitful ULTRA during this campaign does not mean that similar conditions will prevail in the future. The Corps SSO, however, feels that passing raw ULTRA direct to Corps was unnecessary on Okinawa. The Corps G-2, though disappointed at the small quantity available, states it was of "some value", and he definitely desires it be continued. Further comment on Corps need of ULTRA appears in the final section of this report CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

SSO's FUNCTION IN THE G-2 SECTION

During the operation the SSO was a functioning member of the G-2 Section. A slack ULTRA season and the evacuation of the JOB officer for wounds on L-day substantially altered his duties from those of SSO and an asst. operations officer to JOB officer with added duties.

On Leyte - The final pre L-day JOB and artillery estimates were prepared by the SSO. Eliminating ULTRA that had filtered into the Corps files while on Leyte warned of the dangers of passing to Corps JOB officers intelligence which was not essential to them. This had occured while XXIV Corps was under SWPA. The SSO was able to eliminate the delay in passing JOB data from JICPOA to Corps throu bypassing the distant Tenth Army Eq then aboard ship. Personality lists and declassified ULTRA, however, should normally pass quickly enough to Corps from an ex perienced higher echelon JOB section. At that higher Hq the SSO must insure such declassified material being disseminated as soon as possible.

On Okinawa - During the campaign the SSO doubled as JOB officer. The two

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enlisted JOB team members proved very superior men and almost no supervision of the filing system was needed. The following were the more important of the JOB officer's duties: drafting the paragraph 1 (b) of the daily G-2 Periodic, maintaining a JOB situation map and preparing overlays at intevals, writing memos on essential elements of JOB information as a guide to JOB and ISO teams, supervising JOB bulletins attached to the daily periodics, writing and editing the weekly JOB Summary which included a survey of the week's action in terms of JOB, discussion of new developments, revised strength estimates and, as appendices at intervals, code numbers and cumulative JOB lists.

Liaison with JOB teams at divisions and III Phib Corps proved most important. Problems and new information were discussed by telephone and the long delays involved in waiting for periodic and ISO reports were largely eliminated. Since JOB and ISO teams worked in the same tent, their close cooperation and mutual support was assured in theory though some practical rough spots occurred during the campaign.

Serving as an asst. operations officer in the G-2 section facilitated the JOB work as it meant immediate access to all new information and discussions that followed. As the JOB task grew, the burden of the regular operations watch was lifted but the SSO continued to spend at least half his time there.

PEARL THUMB AND PIN-UP

No valuable PIN-UP was available during the operation. Tenth Army SIS was frustrated on the verge of successful exploitation of low-level codes by changes in those codes a few weeks after L-day. PIN-UP then boiled down to rather erratic DF fixes plus translations of clear text Jap radio traffic. These were passed to the G-2 operations section. Literal enforcement of regulations re PIN-UP is impossible when everyone knows of DF activities and almost any unit may turn in a translation of a clear text message they have intercepted. Radio station locations

became targets for Corps and division artillery - except the high level stations about which Tenth Army was consulted. To obtain a definite policy from Army re these stations was a slow process. No prior planning was evident. Telephone or teletype sent the DF locations as possible enemy CPs or OPs under SECRET classification. Simultaneous photo interpretation was employed to help out the rough DF coordinates. Inquiries as to source were discouraged but actually the source was quite clear. The very slim pickings from clear text Japanese was occasionally passed to divisions in an effort to expand their value. They remained valueless chatter. The PIN-UP reports from the Corps R.I. platoon were retained by the SSO and eventually destroyed. They did not circulate outside the Operations Section.

The Corps R.I. platoon was fatally handicapped by lack of information and training. Col Nist is willing to be quoted: "Their product was lousy." SIS had never even passed Pearl and Thumb regulations to the officer in charge. The SSO briefed the R.I. officer in order to clear up the breaches in the security regulations that had followed this failure. He was very cooperative. In addition the platoon was sent to Leyte so untrained that they did not even know the standard Jap message classifications. Col. Nist reports they had no clear idea of their mission nor how to perform it. Since they were not indoctrinated for ULTRA or trained in decrypting, the natural tendency for this platoon was to hold captured codes and additive tables, especially on the low level, in an effort to work them out. With their knowledge and manpower limitations this wasted valuable time but was wholly understandable.

A Corps R.I. platoon must be briefed adequately by SIS if any success is to be achieved. Removing the platoon from the Corps Signal Bn and attaching to Army SIS better capable of directing its labors appears a likely solution of the problem. However, unless Army SIS platoons be attached for operations to Corps, copy on a low level and the value of DF fixes will be reduced since Army does not get

as far forward as Corps troops. This would mean that low level possibilities would still further diminish.

As an ex-division R.I. platoon leader who never had any equipment the Corps SSO was once more painfully impressed by the utter waste of manpower resulting from SIS' apparent utter neglect of its lower echelon R.I. units. The Corps R.I. officer had wholly inadequate instruction for the mission assigned. If R.I. units are to copy traffic interminably, morale requires they be trusted with some explanation of what they are about, and commended on good copy even if the translations are not passed to them.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC CODES AND DOCUMENTS

The SSO was able to speed the transmission of captured cryptographic materials to higher echelons. Previously much had passed through the Corps Signal and R.I. officers and had been greatly delayed. It became SOP for Corps ISO and CIC to give this material to the SSO for direct passage to Tenth Army SSO. Their cooperation was remarkable in view of their ignorance of the end results. Data on commercial codes sent by AH for dissemination to ISO units provided no crop of documents. At Corps level JICPOA language personnel are integrated into the Corps ISO and have no special function relative to the search for documents. Their job is primarily to service documents passed to them from divisions.

In similar fashion JOB documents on a strategic level bypassed channels through Army for the swifter SSO route.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During the Okinawan operation the SSO feels he was of definite value to Corps not because of ULTRA intelligence made available but because of the abnormal circumstance installing him as JOB officer. In this capacity ULTRA background was of assistance but not at all essential. Previous experience in an infantry division was of much greater value.

The presence of an SSO is not recommended for future large scale operations

under an Army. Although this recommendation runs counter to current practise in this theater and withdrawal of ULTRA from indoctrinated generals presents problems, the SSO believes Corps will suffer no intelligence handicaps while at the same time ULTRA security will be improved by returning to the original view of the ULTRA security regulations.

The ULTRA intelligence on a strategic level presented in the A-III reports is enormously interesting but the view is submitted that it is not essential at the Corps level. The A-III data is currently not available to any Corps except the XXIV and the two Phib Corps.

ULTRA intelligence on a tactical level is needed by an independently operating Corps. Such a Corps should have an SSO. In the past ULTRA has been of value to Corps ground troops, though its primary value has been to air and naval commands. In a larger combat zone an army, however, should have no difficulty in passing pertinent information to subordinate Corps through operational orders and regular signal channels. This was done in the ETO. Any breakdown of Army communications will normally eliminate those to Corps at the same time. An SSO at Corps therefore provides no safety factor. Any loss of time in passing ULTRA through the hands of Army SSO and G-2 partly balances against the signal delay in sending ULTRA on through Corps message center and decrypting the dispatch with fewer facilities than an Army SSO possesses.

Col. Nist disagrees with this recommendation. He feels that ULTRA may by one instance justify the whole machinery. He thinks ULTRA was of some value on Okinawa and may be of great value on KYUSHU and HONSEU. Throughout the operation the Corps G-2 and CG definitely desired to see and evaluate all ULTRA. This was forcibly expressed during the first three weeks when Corps had almost sole charge of the fighting responsibility. Corps will therefore oppose any policy that would force reliance on the vaguer operational message version rather than personal view

of the raw ULTRA.

Any decision as to SSO at Corps level must indeed balance security against Corps needs. Personally I feel service by Army should suffice.

Though desiring an SSO at Corps during operations Col. Nist sees no useful purpose served in retaining SSOs at Corps between campaigns. Return to an ULTRA center would use the SSO as well as prepare him for another operation. In this connection the Col. may have been influenced by the use made of the Corps SSO on Okinawa. The only limitation on this release scheme which the Col. expressed was the wish that the A-III service be continued by a weekly trip from Army. This is a possibility though my recommendation would eliminate this service. When Corps receives the SECRET version of the War Dept MIS Perdue JOB Bulletin, they will be quite adequately serviced with late JOB information.

Whether or not SSOs are assigned to Corps, full or part time, dissemination practises should be standardized so that all Corps, Army, Marine, West Pac and Mid Pac, will be governed by similar policies re both Army and Navy ULTRA. It is the current impression at Corps that Marines have so ready an access to Naval ULTRA as to make Army regulations appear rather absurd.

/s/ John P. Gaillard
JOHN P. GAILLARD
Captain, Signal Corps
SSO, XXIV Corps.

SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE
ARMY AIR FORCES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

7 September 1945

From the security standpoint the system of dissemination of
ultra only through specially-trained officers assigned to a central
agency in Washington and attached to the various commands entitled
to receive it proved an eminently practical one, and I believe no
one in the field would argue that there is any adequate alternative.
From the standpoint of effective utilization of the intelligence
derived from this source, my own experience and observation lead
to the following recommendations as to the field organization and
its relations to Washington and to field commanders:

1. (a) With respect to all categories--air, ground, naval;
high and low level; strategic and tactical--centralization in Wash-
ington and in a single agency in each theater of both cryptanalytic
work and intelligence production; (b) complete exchange between
Washington and all theaters of message texts as broken, other intel-
ligence sources, intelligence derived therefrom, and sufficient
comment and discussion to eliminate or confine to narrowest possi-
ble limits disagreement as to the proper conclusions to be drawn.

2. Dissemination solely by theater production agencies through
SSOs to all commands in the theater entitled to Ultra in accordance
with their respective needs as interpreted by the SSO. Non-ultra
versions should be prepared when and in the form requested and dis-
seminated by the production agencies for further dissemination to
lower commands which are not ultra recipients. All intelligence,
ultra and non-ultra, disseminated to subordinate commands should
be automatically disseminated for information to all higher echelons
of command in the theater as well, and each copy should show the
commands to which it was being disseminated.

3. It would be desirable for the SSR to be chosen by the
theater commander and the SSOs to be chosen by the several commanders
from lists of eligibles, but both SSR (OIC Theater Production Cen-
ter) and SSOs to remain under the operational control of Washington.
Since local theater and other commanders will be responsible for
action taken, the basic tenet of the field organization should be
that the commander and his own intelligence officer are free to
treat the local production center as a working intelligence group
serving them in accordance with their respective needs as deter-
mined by them. The SSO can serve as a most important element in
this situation. The direction of effort of the production center
should be constantly adjusted to the operational needs of the com-

mands entitled to service. Ideally, the SSR would also be the chief
intelligence staff officer of the theater commander, and responsible
to him for integration of all intelligence work within the theater.
In any event close collaboration must be secured to insure access to
photos, documents, pow reports, materiel and other collateral sources
of intelligence.

4. The primary function of the SSO should be interpretation
of the intelligence requirements of his commander, communication of all us
all useful operational information to production agencies, requesting
intelligence of the kind and in the form required and assisting in
its application to the problems of his command. The balance of his
energies, if any, should be devoted to such intelligence duties for
his headquarters as might be appropriate rather than to an attempt
to participate in the production of finished intelligence from ultra
sources. Such attempts are apt to be confusing rather than helpful.
On the other hand, details of the evidence supporting any conclusions
or recommendation should be readily available to him so that he will
be in a position to answer any question as to sources which may be
asked by his commander. In general, expansion of the SSO establish-
ment beyond one officer and one enlisted man should be avoided. Pro-
liferation of competing production centers, each with incomplete
sources, can provide a fascinating game of wits but is unlikely to
serve any useful purpose. The advantages of continuity within the
command are believed outweighed by the advantages of rotation of
SSOs between commands, on the one hand, and production centers in
the theater and in Washington on the other. Mutual understanding
by both operations and production personnel of their substantially
different points of view and problems cannot be effectively accom-
plished in any way other than direct experience in both fields at
fairly frequent intervals, and is perhaps the most important single
element in the successful utilization of intelligence.

ALFRED A MILLER
Lt Colonel, AC

20 August 1945

From: Officer-in-Charge of CICFOR.
To :   Officer-in-Charge Supplementary Radio Station Able.

Subject: CICFOR, history, functions, job description, operating
             methods and recommendations.

1. HISTORY

CICFOR has served both as GI for incoming and outgoing radio intelligence traffic and as CIC for intelligence on the Japanese Air Forces. Although GI and CIC activities are sufficiently different as to require separate description, the two are so interrelated that in a small organization such as SUPRAD joint operation was desireable.

The section began operations about 15 January 1945 with GI functions for traffic produced at SUPRAD. The complement at that time was four Army watch officers and 7 Army enlisted men. Very little traffic was received from other Comb and Disc addressees and from other Army communication activities. As incoming traffic and traffic produced at SUPRAD increased, the GI activities were enlarged. Four Navy watch officers were added in early March and ten Navy enlisted men on 1 April. Very little was done in the way of CIC activities until May when the Comb traffic received at SUPRAD reached a level that made it feasible to move CIC functions for air intelligence from Pearl to Guam. About 15 May, two officers and two enlisted men instituted the CIC files and began to send out operational intelligence on the Japanese Air Forces. The section was rapidly built up to its present size and had begun to fulfill its present functions as described herein by 7 June. The section has had all the personnel and equipment required except for the need of one additional Navy officer to assist in the CIC functions.

2. GI FUNCTIONS AND JOB DESCRIPTION

CICFOR at SUPRAD has fulfilled the following GI functions:

(1) Logged, typed and dittoed all incoming and outgoing Army and Navy radio intelligence traffic.

(2) Prepared and released daily Army and Navy dispatch traffic summaries from "Japanese Low Level Air Summary" prepared by RAGFOR. These dispatches sent in Fomof and Crypto 3517.

(3) Prepared in conjunction with CIC and released all 35-S (Ultra) and CSP-1629 (Pinup) intelligence dispatches for CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters.

(4) Passed by teletype all 35-S and CSP-1629 traffic to CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters, USASTAF (previously AAFPOA), 20th AAF (previously XXI BomCom), Com Marianas (previously Com Forward Area) and Com Sub Pac.

(5) Passed by teletype to CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters special traffic summaries prepared at 0630, 1030, 1700 and 2400 and served as liaison between CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters and RAGFOR and other radio intelligence activities at SUPRAD.

(6) Passed by teletype all Manx weather to Weather Central and to 20th AAF.

(7) Passed all FCC intercept material by teletype to CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters, USASTAF, 20th AAF, Com Marianas and Com Sub Pac.

(8) Prepared for mailing together with CIC Daily Japanese Low Level Air Summary, weekly Ultra Report A-II "Japanese Air Forces, Current Employment, Area Distribution and Unit Locations", weekly secret report "Empire Air Distribution" and other miscellaneous traffic summaries and intelligence reports.

CICFOR has had the following personnel to perform these functions:

    4 Navy watch officers
    4 Army watch officers
    1 Army sergeant - supervisor and office manager
16 non-rated men (11 Navy and 5 Army) who have served as typists and teletype operators.

A four section watch has been maintained with 1 Navy officer, 1 Army officer and 4 enlisted men to a watch. During periods of heavy traffic officers and men worked a 3 1/2 section watch by having a stand-by watch from 0800 to 1200, which was the period of peak load. The Army and Navy watch officers have had charge of the incoming and outgoing radio intelligence traffic of their respective services. The Navy watch officer, in conjunction with CIC, has prepared and released all 35-S and CSP-1629 intelligence dispatches. The Army watch officer has had special jurisdiction over FCC material. The enlisted men have worked 4 to a watch - 1 on teletype and 3 on typewriters and ditto machine.

3. CIC FUNCTIONS AND JOB DESCRIPTION

CICFOR at SUPRAD has fulfilled the following CIC functions:

(1) Prepared and maintained files of traffic by date and time of origin, air units, airfields, operation orders and every conceivable subject pertaining to the Japanese Air Forces and operations.

(2) Prepared weekly Ultra Report A-II "Japanese Air Forces, Current Employment, Area Distribution and Unit Locations" and weekly Secret Report "Empire Air Distribution". These reports were distributed under the name of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.

(3) Prepared weekly Secret Report "Enemy Air Order of Battle". This report was distributed under the name of 20th AAF.

(4) Prepared daily Pinup air bulletin and in conjunction with GI Navy watch officer prepared and released all 35-S and CSP-1629 intelligence dispatches sent under name of CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters.

(5) Prepared twice weekly data on Japanese air strength and deployment for CinCPAC's release in Opintel Dispatches.

(6) Prepared and released daily dispatch order of battle bulletin sent to the War Department.

(7) Maintained an operations plot, ultra and operations summaries and operations calendar for RAGFOR analysts.

CICFOR has had the following personnel to perform these CIC functions:

2 Navy officers (one of whom was officer-in-charge of CICFOR)
4 Army officers
4 Navy yeomen (2 Y1/c and 2 Y2/c)

The officers have kept themselves constantly informed of all Japanese air units and their locations, Japanese airfields and all subjects pertaining to the Japanese Air Forces. These officers have prepared the numerous intelligence reports and dispatches. They have also spent much time in close cooperation with RAGFOR analysts, particularly in providing them with ultra and operational information. The enlisted men have maintained the files and done the typing and other office work.

4. METHODS OF OPERATIONS

The methods of conducting the GI and CIC functions at CICFOR have been substantially the same as GI at FRUPAC and CIC Pearl except on a smaller scale but with the addition of operating 7 teletypes. All incoming traffic has been immediately degarbled and dittoed. Outgoing traffic produced by RAGFOR has been put through the same process. A daily book of all traffic has been prepared at 0800. Files have been limited to air matters as air intelligence has been the scope of CICFOR jurisdiction and capabilities of personnel assigned. Operations at CICFOR have differed from FRUPAC in only the following particulars, which are, however, considered important:

(1) Marking traffic for filing and maintaining the files on enemy units and activities has been a CIC function. It is believed that much

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better and more useful intelligence files resulted from having the files maintained by personnel who spent all their time studying and following the units. GI personnel have been so busy handling the details of sending and receiving traffic that it has not been possible for them to be as familiar with Japanese units and activities as CIC personnel.

(2) 35-S and CSP-1629 intelligence dispatches have been released as well as prepared by CICFOR without the delay of sending the information through staff channels at CinCPAC.

(3) Teletype communications with the important Army and Navy staffs on Guam (CinCPAC, USASTAF, 20th AAF, Com Marianas and Com Sub Pac) have been most useful for the exchange of information and have made possible a closer liaison between these staffs and intelligence activities at SUPRAD.

(4) Personnel performing the CIC functions have worked in much closer relationship with other communication intelligence personnel such as traffic analysts and translators to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

5. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CICFOR accomplishments have been indicated best by the large volume of outgoing intelligence information. A traffic study showed the following daily volume of dispatch traffic:

Type of Traffic	Average	Maximum
35-S (ultra)	3	8
CSP-1629 (pinup)	6	10
FOMOF	5	10
COPEK	14	39
CRYPTO-3517	3	5
TOTAL	31	72

The following weekly reports have been prepared and distributed to authorized Army and Navy recipients:

CinCPOA Ultra Report A-II "Japanese Air Forces, Current Employment, Area Distribution and Unit Locations."
CinCPOA Secret Report "Empire Air Distribution".
20th AAF Secret Report "Enemy Air Order of Battle".

On many occasions special intelligence studies have been made and dispatches or reports prepared on the basis of them.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations have been made on the basis of 2 1/2 years experience at CIC Pearl, 5 months at CominCH, PSIS and Op-20-G and 2 1/2 months at CICFOR, SUPRAD.

(1) Too few personnel and too little effort have been expended in the exploitation of communications intelligence information. Thousands of people have been employed to produce the best information in the world, but only a handful have been employed at CominCH, PSIS, CIC Pearl, CICFOR and Com 7th Fleet to study the information in detail and mould it into a sound intelligence picture. The evolution at Pearl of a CIC to exploit communications intelligence has proved a practical necessity that should be followed in the future. GI, whether at Op-20-G, FRUPAC or SUPRAD, has been too burdened with traffic handling to do an adequate intelligence job.

(2) The relationship between intelligence personnel at CominCH and CIC Pearl has not been sufficiently close to traffic analysts, translators and cryptanalysts of the communications intelligence organization. By working together as a team all hands can be of enormous mutual benefit to each other and produce a far better intelligence picture, which is the ultimate objective of all concerned. There has been far too much of a tendency to compartmentize and segregate the work of cryptanalysts, traffic analysts, translators and intelligence officers. Once thousands of personnel engaged in these activities were admitted to the secrets of communications intelligence the security problem was not rendered one bit easier by unsuccessfully attempting to hide from the left hand what the right hand was doing.

(3) Intelligence officers with staffs who have had access to ultra reports and 35-S dispatches should have been trained in the communications intelligence organizations and CIC functions. Here there has been a serious security problem because intelligence officers with fleets and task forces often have not been sufficiently educated in the necessity of strict observance of security regulations. Furthermore without experience in the communications intelligence organization and CIC functions, these fleet and task force intelligence officers have often lacked the necessary experience and training for proper evaluation of information.

(4) There has been too much of a tendency to retain all communications intelligence at a rear headquarters, first in Washington and later at Pearl. Communications intelligence should have kept more abreast of the commands it served. We should have been equipped to establish CICFOR at Guam no later than January 1945 and much earlier if possible. Instead CICFOR did not become fully operational on Guam until 1 June.

(5)   There has been an enormous waste of communications time and effort in transmitting useless information to Comb and Disc addressees. Selection was not feasible because GI personnel, particularly in Washington and to a lesser extent at Pearl, have not been sufficiently cognizant of operational and intelligence requirements and utilization of information. For example, innumerable aviation fuel status reports have been radioed from Washington to Guam in spite of CICFOR and CinCPAC having arranged with CominCH and PSIS to have all intelligence study of these status reports be made in Washington.

(6)   War experience has proved it essential that the Army and Navy combine their CIC personnel and information to form a single intelligence organization. The need for a single Army-Navy intelligence effort has been accentuated by the fact that United States Navy communications intelligence facilities have been used on Japanese Navy communications and United States Army communications intelligence facilities have been used on Japanese Army communications. Information from all sources must be processed by CIC for a sound intelligence operation. At CIC Pearl since August 1944 and at CICFOR during its brief existence, the Army and Navy have functioned as one; elsewhere the services have continued to pool their sources by trading and liaison officers.

(7)   War experience has proved the absolute necessity of combining all sources of information into a single intelligence product. Ultra and Pinup decryption and traffic analysis have to be studied in conjunction with photographic reconnaissance, captured documents, prisoner interrogations and other sources of information. CIC Pearl and CICFOR have operated on this principle.

                            Richard W. Emory,
                            Lt. Comdr., USNR.

REPORT OF SPECIAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
IN THE CHINA BURMA INDIA THEATER AND THE TWO THEATERS
CREATED FROM IT, INDIA BURMA THEATER AND CHINA THEATER

The first regulations governing the dissemination to active theaters
of top secret signal intelligence were promulgated in October 1943 as
AG 312.1 (13 Oct 43) OB-S-B-M. These regulations provided for such
dissemination from cryptanalytic centers or from the Military Intelligence
Service at Washington through Special Security Officers assigned to the
War Department but attached to recipient commands and operating in the
field.

The first Special Security Officer designated for the China Burma
India Theater was Captain (later Major) John F. B. Runnalls, who arrived
at theater headquarters in New Delhi, India, on 19 December 1943. There-
after, all top secret signal intelligence, to which the code name "ULTRA"
was applied, was delivered to China Burma India Theater, and its security
supervised, by Captain Runnalls. The method of transmission of such
intelligence was from the beginning and at all subsequent times by radio
and by pouch.

Captain Runnalls established his office in New Delhi with the local
Signal Intelligence Service, which was engaged in the production of high,
low and medium grade signal intelligence. Arrangements were made for the
use by Captain Runnalls of the SIS code room and of the services of
certain SIS code clerks. Intelligence messages in constantly increasing
volume were sent from MIS at Washington by radio to Captain Runnalls in
New Delhi. These messages were transmitted in a cryptographic system
held only by the War Department and by Captain Runnalls. Much similar
material was sent then and later by officer courier also.

The problems faced by Captain Runnalls in beginning his work were
primarily (a) receipt and secure distribution of ULTRA intelligence
(b) supervision of the security aspects of handling and using ULTRA
(c) representation of War Department G-2 in ULTRA matters and (d)
coordination of U. S. efforts in signal intelligence with those of the
British, who had large signal intelligence enterprises in India and
many military commands using the material.

This work, and the vast geographical area covered by CBI Theater,
made it necessary for assistance to be obtained. In April 1944, Captain
(later Major) George E. Diller, who was already in the CBI Theater, was
transferred to MIS from theater strength and, after training by Captain
Runnalls, was assigned as Special Security Officer at Calcutta. Captain
Diller was an Air Corps officer, formerly aide to the Commanding General

Tenth Air Force. As Special Security Officer at Calcutta, Captain Diller served three important air commands, Tenth Air Force, XX Bomber Command and Eastern Air Command, all of which were near Calcutta and to which he travelled in rotation. In serving these headquarters Captain Diller received ULTRA intelligence from MIS Washington and elsewhere by radio and by officer courier and effected its distribution under the provisions of the regulations applicable.

The constantly increasing volume of signal intelligence being produced and the mounting tempo of operations in CBI (especially the Burma Campaign) resulted in the dispatch from MIS Washington of additional Special Security Officers to that Theater. Lieutenants Edward B. Hale, Franklin Wood, Karl G. Harr and Edwin G. Flower arrived in New Delhi during May 1944 and began work under the direction of Captain Runnalls. They functioned to read all incoming signal intelligence items, locate place names, condense the material and select for each air and ground command the items of significance to it.

Meanwhile at Washington and London, U. S. and British signal intelligence authorities were drafting new ULTRA regulations, based on actual experience in the field and designed to secure complete uniformity of handling by British and U. S. forces while at the same time promoting a greater security for ULTRA intelligence already yielding information on the Japanese of both immediate and long range value.

It had also been recognized by Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, Deputy Chief, MIS, and War Department Special Security Officer, that the insurance of security for ULTRA intelligence at each recipient command in CBI required an extensive detachment of MIS personnel there, with a central supervisory and administrative section and a special security officer at each command. Accordingly in April, 1944, Lt Colonel (later Colonel) Inzer B. Wyatt was selected to recruit, train and organize a group of MIS officers for that purpose. Colonel Wyatt obtained the necessary officers and completed their training in Washington in July 1944.

The new ULTRA regulations, adopted jointly by the U. S. and by the British were promulgated by the War Department in July 1944 as   These regulations in general provided for the control by the War Department of all aspects of ULTRA security, for the dissemination of ULTRA intelligence only through War Department Special Security Officers, for the use in radio transmission of ULTRA of special cryptographic systems held only by security officers, and for the supervision of all security personnel in each theater by a Special Security Representative, who should act for the War Department in all matters pertaining to the receipt, transmission and distribution of ULTRA material.

Colonel Wyatt, designated as the Special Security Representative for the China Burma India Theater, arrived in New Delhi on 19 August 1944. By the end of two weeks thereafter, new and adequate office space was obtained in the Theater Headquarters, separate from SIS, and preparations were made to receive the group of security officers, who were sent by air from Washington.

Initially, special security operations continued under the old regulations but a scheme for Ultra intelligence distribution was worked out which would be in accordance with the new regulations and would permit these to be soon declared effective in the CBI Theater.

The central agency for receipt and forward dissemination of Ultra, and for supervision of all special security activities, was established at New Delhi. The Theater G-2 Section was able to provide a group to handle Ultra ground order of battle material, but it was necessary to use MIS Special Security Officers to process all other Ultra material at the central New Delhi disseminating agency. Accordingly, Lt Colonel Pomeroy Day, Deputy Special Security Representative, was placed in charge of the operation of this central agency. Captain Franklin Wood, and Captain Edwin G. Flower were named to assist him in general intelligence matters and Captain Edward B. Hale named to assist him in administrative matters. A separate air intelligence section was created. Major Diller was relieved as Special Security Officer at Calcutta and assigned to head this section. Captain Richard G. Powell and 1st Lt Wayne A. Lee were named to assist him.

On 27 September 1944 Major John F. B. Runnalls was relieved in CBI Theater after distinguished special security work there for nearly a year, and returned to MIS Washington.

On 1 October 1944 Colonel Wyatt began a tour to visit each operating command in the theater designated to receive Ultra intelligence. With him went the security officers appointed to serve those commands.

With the complete support and good will of all commanders concerned, Special Security Officers were installed in the CBI Theater at operating commands as follows:

6 October 1944 - Captain Archibald Craige, AC, at Eastern Air Command, Hastings Mills (some 20 miles from Calcutta).

7 October 1944 - Major Edmund P. Lord, AC, at XX Bomber Command, Kharaghpur, India (some 85 miles from Calcutta).

16 October 1944 - Major Robert L. Augenblick, AC, at Fourteenth Air Force, Kunming, China.

17 October 1944 - Major W. F. Colclough, FA, at Forward Echelon, Theater Headquarters, Chungking, China.

20 October 1944 - Major Sam E. Cumpston, CAC, at Northern Combat Area Command, Myitkyina, Burma.

30 October 1944 - 1st Lt Karl G. Harr at Y Force, Paoshan, China.

With the establishment of these Special Security Officers, the pattern of operation was fixed. The central office in New Delhi received all Ultra intelligence, by radio or pouch, from MIS Washington or elsewhere. The material was examined at New Delhi, processed (i.e., edited, selected, commented upon, combined, condensed or otherwise made more usable) and radio messages then drafted for the appropriate forward commands. In some instances, publications or more bulky material were sent forward by officer courier. Each of the Special Security Officers held a cryptographic system used only for Ultra messages. Enlisted personnel supplied by MIS Washington were used for cipher work. One code clerk was assigned to each security officer, and a number of such clerks kept on duty at the central agency.

In the early part of November 1944 the China Burma India Theater ceased to exist as such. In its place, the War Department created two separate theaters, the India Burma Theater, with headquarters at New Delhi, and the China Theater, with headquarters at Chungking. In the same month, the new Ultra regulations were declared effective in each of these theaters. The change made little difference in the method of special security operation. Colonel Wyatt was designated SSR for each theater. Lt Colonel Day was named Deputy SSR for the India Burma Theater, and Major Colclough Deputy SSR for the China Theater. The technique of processing and rushing intelligence to the operating commands was not affected.

On 24 November 1944 a Special Security Officer was established at Tenth Air Force, Myitkyina, Burma, an air unit beginning active support of the Central Burma campaign. Captain Richard G. Powell was detached from the air section at New Delhi and sent as Security Officer to Tenth Air Force. His place in the air section was taken by 1st Lt John A. Killick, AC, transferred to New Delhi from MIS Washington.

In the latter part of January of 1945 the Salween campaign conducted by Y Force, came virtually to an end and the Special Security Officer was withdrawn from Y Force. Lt Harr, assigned to Y Force as Special Security Officer, relieved Major Cumpston at Northern Combat Area Command and Major Cumpston was transferred to the central office at New Delhi.

In the same month of January 1945 the headquarters of Northern Combat Area Command and of Tenth Air Force moved from Myitkyina to Bhamo in Burma.

In March 1945 Captain Franklin Wood became special security officer at Northern Combat Area Command, replacing Lt Karl G. Harr who was transferred to the Pacific Theater after a period of temporary duty in Washington.

In early May 1945 XX Bomber Command completed its move from bases in China and at Kharaghpur, India, to the Pacific. This command passed out of the India Burma Theater therefore and its special security officer, going with the command, left the supervision of Colonel Wyatt.

At about this time, 1st Lt Wayne A. Lee replaced Captain Richard G. Powell as security officer at Tenth Air Force, Captain Powell replaced Captain Craige as security officer at Eastern Air Command and Captain Craige returned to MIS, Washington.

At the end of May 1945 all operations in Central Burma were concluded. The Tenth Air Force began to move into China and Ultra service to it was suspended, to be resumed upon the beginning of activities from China bases. Northern Combat Area Command ceased to have any operational responsibilities and Ultra service to it was terminated, effective 21 May 1945. Captain Franklin Wood, security officer at the time of termination, was ordered back to MIS Washington.

On 28 May 1945 1st Lt John A. Killick of the air section at New Delhi was returned to MIS Washington.

In June 1945 a special U. S. liaison office for Ultra intelligence was opened at South East Asia Command in Kandy, Ceylon. Although this was a joint command, the commander was British and the staff predominantly British. With the enthusiastic welcome of the British the U. S. Ultra office opened at Kandy in charge of Major Sam E. Cumpston and with Captain Edwin G. Flower as his assistant. This enabled Ultra intelligence to be sent by radio or officer courier dire ctly over U. S. channels from Washington to Kandy.

In July 1945 the pattern of Ultra security operations in the India Burma and China Theaters was completely changed. This was made desirable by the ending of all major combat operations in the India Burma Theater and the increasing importance of the China Theater.

Eastern Air Command, near Calcutta, was dissolved. General Stratemeyer and his staff moved to Chungking, became "U. S. Army Air Forces, China Theater," and assumed control of all air operations in China. Captain Richard G. Powell became special security officer at this headquarters in Chungking.

The central supervisory and administrative office was moved from New Delhi to Chungking. Lt Colonel Pomeroy Day with enlisted assistants remained in New Delhi to operate a special security office for theater headquarters there.

Accordingly, at the time of the Japanese surrender, made formally on 2 September 1945, the special security operation in the two theaters was as follows:

    a. Headquarters of the Special Security Representative (Colonel Wyatt) was at Chungking and intelligence from all Ultra sources was collected there and disseminated from there, except in the case of Kandy (served direct from Washington).

    b. Special Security Officers were located at the following commands:

       South East Asia Command, Kandy
       Fourteenth Air Force at Peishiyi, China
       Tenth Air Force at Luichow, China
       U. S. Army Air Forces, Chungking, China
       India Burma Theater, Headquarters, New Delhi, India.

After the termination of hostilities, there was no necessity for the maintenance of any of these offices. By the end of September 1945 all officer and enlisted personnel engaged in special security work had been repatriated from the two theaters except for Colonel Wyatt, Captain Hale and two code clerks.

The Commanding General, China Theater, felt that a special security office should be maintained at his headquarters as long as his theater existed and the War Department approved such a request by him.

On 15 October 1945, Headquarters, China Theater, opened at Shanghai and the special security office there was established by Colonel Wyatt, with Captain Hale and two code clerks to assist.

On 31 October 1945, Colonel Wyatt was recalled to MIS Washington. The operation of the special security office in Shanghai is therefore continued in charge of Captain Edward B. Hale, Special Security Officer at Headquarters, China Theater.

There were no Ultra security violations of any consequence in the India Burma or China Theaters during the period of special security activities outlined above.

It is believed, moreover, that the special intelligence furnished to the commands through the War Department special security channels was of the utmost value in operations conducted in the India Burma and China Theaters. As indicative of this and as an appropriate close to

this report, the Commendation of the War Department's work in this field by the two Theater Commanders is given herewith.

Under date of 8 September 1945, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, Commanding the China Theater, sent a radio to the War Department, reading in substance as follows:

"With the capitulation of Japan, it is a fitting time to recall that some of the top secret activities of Signal Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Service, which have been of the greatest value in the war, have had to be conducted with such security restrictions that the extent of their contribution is not known at all to the public, and to only a small number in the Army. The Theater Commander has found most valuable the aid furnished him through the Special Security Organization of the War Department. Those officers on my staff and at the several other headquarters who received this aid have been and are most appreciative. We also realize that the ingenuity, technical skill, judgment and patience of all those in the Military Intelligence Service and in the Signal Security Agency, who have been devoting themselves quietly to their duties throughout the past several years, have made possible such successful results. I should like them to know that a valuable contribution to the war effort has been made by their good work. We in the China Theater desire to commend you and your personnel, military and civilian, for unselfish devotion to duty and highly efficient work."

Under date of 28 September 1945, Lieutenant General Wheeler, Commanding the India Burma Theater, sent a radio to the War Department, reading in substance as follows:

"I wish to express at this time my appreciation for the splendid contribution made by the War Department special security organization.

"Those officers in the theater, both on my staff and at forward commands, who have been familiar with this Military Intelligence Service activity, have found it of extraordinary value.

"I am fully aware that the success of this undertaking depended upon the quiet perseverance of many personnel, both Civilian and military, who have performed their tasks in the United States and overseas under such conditions that the merit of their services could not be generally recognized, even within the Army. Those of us in the India-Burma Theater who are familiar with this activity wish to commend all those who have played a part in this highly successful undertaking."