

TRIP REPORTS
CONCERNING USE OF ULTRA IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

1943-1944

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Date: *4/16/78*

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16 May, 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Mediterranean Theater.

TO : Lt. Col. Samuel McKee, MID, War Department, station London.

Report of Visit to Mediterranean Theater, 25 March - 10 May,
1944, is submitted herewith in triplicate.

JAMES D. FELLERS,
Major, Air Corps.

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AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1, GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1,
LONDON, ENGLAND

REPORT OF VISIT

to

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

25 March — 10 May, 1944

Through arrangements made by the London Office, MID, W.D.G.S., the undersigned (in company with Capt. Edward C. Hitchcock, Hq, Ninth Air Force) made a trip to the North African Theater of Operations, where some fourteen (14) headquarters installations and the Special Liaison Units known as: FK, SB (LH), KQ, ZUA, and JY, were visited. Six weeks time was consumed (including transportation delays) and an estimated total of 8,000 miles were traveled.

The principal purpose of the mission was to observe and study the methods of handling special intelligence in the field by operational commands. For whatever interest and value is served, a chronological account and an itinerary are included in this report, together with some reactions of the writer gained from observations on this trip.

Respectfully submitted,

James D. Tellers

JAMES D. TELLERS,
Major, Air Corps,
MID G-2, W.D.G.S.

I T I N E R A R Y

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>		<u>PLACE</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>
23 March	1330	Depart	London	Rail	
	2140	Arrive	St. Austell, Cornwall		240
	2150	Depart	"	Bus	
	2230	Arrive	St. Mawgan, Cornwall		20
26 March	0130	Depart	"	Bus	
	0150	Arrive	Newquay, Cornwall		10
	2330	Depart	"	Bus	
	2350	Arrive	St. Mawgan		10
27 March	0140	Depart	"	Air (Warrick)	
	0845	Arrive	Gibraltar		1700
	1430	Depart	"	Air (Warrick)	
	1730	Arrive	Maison Blanche (Algiers)		500
30 March	1130	Depart	"	Air (Dakota)	
	1630	Arrive	(via Italy) El Aouina (Tunis)		1000
31 March	0845	Depart	El Aouina (Tunis)	Air (Dakota)	
	1145	Arrive	Capodicino (Naples)		400
	1445	Depart	"	M/V	
	1530	Arrive	Caserta		20
5 April	1300	Depart	"	M/T	
	1400	Arrive	Naples		30
	2200	Depart	"	M/T	
	2300	Arrive	Caserta		30
6 April	0900	Depart	"	M/T	
	1000	Arrive	Francolise area		20
8 April	1330	Depart	"	M/T	

ITINERARY cont.

8 April	1430	Arrive	San Angelo		30
7	1630	Depart	"	M/T	
	1730	Arrive	Francolise		30
9 April	1400	Depart	"	M/T	
	1500	Arrive	Caserta		20
10 April	1000	Depart	"	M/T	
	1100	Arrive	Fratta Maggiore		20
	1330	Depart	"	M/T	
	1430	Arrive	Pompeii (Naples)		20
	2030	Depart	Naples	M/T	
	2200	Arrive	Caserta		40
11 April	0900	Depart	Marcinise (Caserta)	Air (Mitchell)	
	0945	Arrive	Bari		150
13 April	1145	Depart	"	M/T	
	1245	Arrive	Conversano		30
	1430	Depart	"	M/T	
	1500	Arrive	Castellana		10
	1600	Depart	"	M/T	
	1730	Arrive	Bari		40
14 April	1330	Depart	"	Air (Mitchell)	
	1415	Arrive	Marcinise (Caserta)		150
15 April	1100	Depart	Caserta	M/T	
	1200	Arrive	Naples		30
	2030	Depart	Naples	M/T	
	2130	Arrive	Caserta		30
16 April	0800	Depart	Caserta	M/T	
	0845	Arrive	Capodicino (Naples)		20

ITINERARY, cont.

26 April	0945	Depart	Capodicino (Naples)	Air (Dakota)	
	1245	Arrive	El Aouina (Tunis)		400
	1330	Depart	"	Air (Dakota)	
	1400	Arrive	Sidi Ahmed (Bizerte)		60
	1430	Depart	"	Air (Dakota)	
	1730	Arrive	Maison Blanche (Algiers)		400
28 April	1445	Depart	"	Air (Dakota)	
	1830	Arrive	Salé (Rabat, French Morocco)		600
1 May	0930	Depart	Rabat	M/T	
	1130	Arrive	Casa Blanca		60
2 May	1400	Depart	"	M/T	
	1600	Arrive	Rabat		60
9 May	2045	Depart	Salé (Rabat)	Air (Dakota)	
10 May	0615	Arrive	Whitchurch (Bristol)		1700
	0700	Depart	Bristol	Rail	
	1215	Arrive	London		110

47 Days

(Approximately) 8000 Miles

CHRONOLOGICALSUMMARY

- 25 - 27 March Trip from London to Algiers, via Newquay and Gibraltar.
- 28 - 30 March Reported to AFHQ and G-2 Secretariat, NATOUSA, Algiers. Visited SLU installation (PK - S/L Robinson) which enjoys privacy of top floor of building housing customers (Army, Navy, and Air). Inspected SCU receiving facilities and ascertained SLU technique of handling and distributing.
- Conference with A/Cmdre F. Woolley, Chief Int. Officer, MAAF (Rear) regarding Mediterranean organization and security procedures. Also Maj. Richard H. Tandler, Deputy C.I.O., who is only American officer in ultra picture in Algiers (excluding Commanders, etc.).
- Visited MAAF (Rear) Operational Intelligence Section (W/C Joe Hurst; S/L R. Bowker)—an entirely British organization engaged in preparation of digests and appreciations and special reports. Inner offices afford desired privacy.
- 31 Mar - 3 Apr Reported to MAAF (Adv) (Lt. Col. R.G. Storey) and spent this time principally with the G.A.F. Section (S/L O.A.G. Jackson; S/L E. Fielden)—an entirely British section which provides O.B. and G.A.F. data for A-2. This ultra organization—known as the "Black Market" boys by others in A-2—moved twice during visit, finally to top floor of building and adjoining SLU installation (SB, LM - F/L Thompson) which was also visited. Y-Service (F/L J. Robertson) material is fused with ultra here.
- Conference with G/C James Luard who outlined training program and explained policy of indoctrinating field special intelligence officers through training periods in the G.A.F. Section.
- Conference with Col. Harris B. Hull who was the only indoctrinated American A-2 officer in that headquarters. American T/O includes 17 officers in A-2 section but these not engaged in operational intelligence on the ultra level.
- Good Target & Photo Section (Maj. Bill Ballard; Lt. Phil Raash). Attended daily Air Room presentations (W/C Robinson) and became familiar with general intelligence publications produced by MAAF (Maj. Wm. Lathrop).
- 4 - 5 April Visited Tactical Air Force headquarters (W/C Donald J. Wiseman) where the intelligence section has expanded from 3 to 9 officers. Ascertained method of operation: use of safe, notebook, private map room, portable map board (with lock), etc. Visited Combat Intelligence Section and Duty Room (S/L Thayer) and the Intelligence Planning Section (F/L Windsor) where photo intelligence and target material are handled. Photo recon missions for the following day are laid on in this office.

Chronological Summary, cont.

4 - 5 April,
(cont.)

Conference with S/L Thornhill regarding TAF reporting system and the preparation of the daily operations and intelligence summary. Conference with Col. Charles Pottenger, A-3, on TAF organization and direct employment of medium bombers.

Visited AIO setup (Captain Self) from where all Army Liaison Officers attached to TAF units are controlled and serviced.

Visited AAI (Allied Armies in Italy, formerly IV Army Group) (Major Hoffman) where a large number of people appeared to be working with ultra information. An elaborate private War Room is maintained, including a map indicating what the Enemy knows about us as revealed by Source.

6 - 9 April

Visited XII Tactical Air Command (Maj. Leavitt Corning, Jr.) at Advanced Headquarters adjacent to Fifth Army where A-2 activities are carried out from a trailer and one fly wall tent. One other officer, Major Campbell, of the eight in the intelligence section, is in the ultra picture and assists Major Corning in the preparation of a digest of the special intelligence received for briefing of the CG and C/S who are the only others "in the know". Notations are made in a looseleaf notebook (kept in field safe) as original messages are returned within 24 hours to SLJ (KQ). Current signals were reviewed daily with Major Corning and his technique of protecting security and utilizing operationally was observed.

Conference with Brig. Gen. Gordon Saville, CG, who indicated that he is well pleased with his A-2 and the special intelligence service at his headquarters.

General intelligence activities of the section (under Maj. Don W. McKinney, Executive) were studied.

Visited Fifth Army and attended the daily G-3 meeting where oral situation reports are given.

Visited SLJ installation (KQ - F/L Val Edwards)—in a trailer. Conference with Lt. Col. Hansborough who operates the Air Support Control at Fifth Army regarding the methods employed of air support of ground operations.

Conference with Major Merke who operates the Target & Defense Section for Fifth Army in close cooperation with Maj. Corning. Effective air support was being achieved through extensive use of annotated photos with air and ground units using a common index system.

Trip made to Eighth Army advanced headquarters with F/L John Bedford (from KQ).

Visited the SLJ trailer (ZUA - F/L Parsons) there and the intelligence section (S/L Graham) of Desert Air Force. Procedure employed in Western Desert and since was explained.

Conference with Col. Joe Calla, A-2, XII Tactical Air Command, who was also visiting Major Corning's organization. Conference with Maj. Jack Chairs, S-2, 26th Fighter Bomber Group, re importance of flak knowledge as a ground intelligence problem.

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Chronological Summary, (cont.)

10 April

Visit to 64th Fighter Wing headquarters (Major Bunn, Captain Merton) observing wing intelligence procedures and the wing fighter control system.

11 - 14 April

Visit to Fifteenth Air Force headquarters (Maj. Russell E. Murphy) where cover is "A-2 Liaison" Branch. Three rooms on top floor of headquarters building are occupied jointly with SII organization (JI - F/L A. MacMillan). Murphy, who is also known in that hq as the GAF Fighter Expert, has a full-time assistant (Lt. M. Miller), and shares his facilities with a Balkan expert (S/L Allen) and a Y-Service specialist (P/O Lomas). Conferences with Col. C.M. Young, A-2, and Col. P.M. Barr, Deputy A-2, on the organization and operation of their A-2 section. Attended at 0900 daily the War Room theater summary and at 1100 daily the Staff Planning Session at which the following day's missions are laid on. This meeting is presided by C/S and attended by specialists on priority of targets, weather, flak, armament, photography (recce, strike attack, and bomb damage assessment), pathfinder equipment, operations, G.A.F. Fighters, etc. During the afternoon and evening reports on the day's operations would be posted on the mission board in the Duty Room.

The various branches of the A-2 Section were visited, the officers interviewed, and their activities noted, including: Counter Intelligence (Maj. D. C. McGovern); Flak (Capt. C. A. Crone); War Room (Maj. V. M. Schmidt); Duty Room (Lt. Col. L. A. Nevaleff, Capt. D. G. Williams); Operational Analysis (S.G. Frantz); and the Analysis Branch, where Maj. E.S. McGill, who also has been indoctrinated, is given this special intelligence for use in connection with his work on maps, photos, target charts, etc.

Trip to 276 Wing RAF (S/L C. F. Pugh-Davies) to visit the W/T setup which was demonstrated by F/L J. D. Simmonds.

RAF signal intelligence operations are closely integrated with the American 849 S.I.S. Det. (Lt. Richard L. Mayer). A daily and a weekly summary is produced for operational air commands. 24 American radios are being employed on Radio Intercept by the 9th A.A.F. Radio Squadron (Capt. H. G. Christian) which was also visited while in this area.

This trip also produced a conference with Colonel Seaborne who is in charge of all S.I.S. training for the Army Air Forces in the United States and is responsible for supplying trained bodies for American radio intercept duties.

15 April

Return visit to MATAF and further conference with W/C Wiseman and Capt. James Austin, the only indoctrinated American special intelligence officer in the A-2 section at that echelon.

Chronological Summary, cont.

16 - 28 April

While the majority of this period was spent in an effort to obtain immediate passage to U.K. by air transport, courier, PW escort, Navy, and/or any other available means, still, between these intermittent efforts there was opportunity to see something of the signals organization (W/C Morgan). Likewise to study and review the G. A. F. material available in the Operational Intelligence Section of HAAF (Rear) and to read current signals at W/C R. P. Crawshaw's SIU office as well as recent digests and appreciations prepared by W/C Hurst's organization.


29 - 9 May

This period was spent at Rabat, French Morocco, an A.D.R.U. (Aircraft Dispatching and Receiving Unit) on the RAF ferry route to India.

Due to a large number of ferry crews who were coming through with a '2 Plus' priority no ordinary '2' priority individuals were being moved.

Repeated signals and telephone calls to Algiers, personal trips to CasaBlanca, and persistent local endeavors finally resulted in movement to United Kingdom by British Overseas Airways Corporation.

ORGANIZATION CHART
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES



The above represents only the principal operational commands and does not include the subdivisions of AAF/MTO and RAF/MED & ME, the administrative commands of the U. S. and the British respectively.

TRAINING AND LIAISON

The importance of background training for those field recipients who serve as special intelligence officers has not been overemphasized. Throughout this venture it was realized what a tremendous advantage it was for a special intelligence officer to have received his preliminary training at GC&CS. To have seen and worked on the original material at the B.P. "factory" and to have observed the mental and physical treatment given it there makes all the difference in the world to a man in the field who is going to have to make the most out of the meager information supplied.

Likewise the brief training received at Air Ministry (in AI3b) was of considerable help in utilizing the intelligence produced from that place. At best published facts and figures are cold and uninformative unless one has a first-hand knowledge of the manner in which these facts and figures were determined. If the recipient has the picture of the capabilities and limitations of the "author" and understands the procedure employed in making the published deductions, he is able to utilize same with a more appropriate degree of confidence than would otherwise be the case.

When it was explained to the people visited what was being done regarding the selection, education, and assignment of special intelligence officers in the European Theater of Operations, there was a highly favorable reaction. Even the air corps personnel seemed impressed with the fact that old G-2 way back in the War Department was making an effort to render an outstanding service to the operational commands in the field. There still exists a strong feeling that the W.D.G.S. in general and G-2 and Special Branch in particular are too military-minded to the exclusion of air forces interest and representation. This situation restricts air force enthusiasm for the Special Branch program and encourages separate and individual thought and action.

These Mediterranean people do recognize that it is no longer practical to provide them with such service and they have endeavored to make the best of the situation by the use of Luard's and Hurst's workshops as training grounds for newcomers. It has been the policy of G/C Luard to bring men like Murphy, Miller, Corning, Campbell, etc. into his G.A.F. Section and have them work there for a reasonable time in order that they may obtain the best available background in the use of this information. Liaison and exchange with these people is valuable, however, and it provides the next best substitute and enables the producers and consumers to understand one another's problems and requirements.

An illustration of this occurred at an air headquarters in Italy which was embarking on a new phase of target priorities (endeavoring to isolate the enemy from his supplies by concentrating on railroad bridges rather than marshalling yards to interdict the supply lines). To the inquiry as to whether this information had been relayed to G/C Jones at B.P., the special intelligence officer at that headquarters replied that he did not understand why the "factory" should be interested or what they could do about it. It was explained that B.P. was definitely interested in this knowledge and that by knowing such they could utilize the many and varied facilities available to them (index room, specialists in various fields, etc.), and concentrate on furnishing to that command information indicating the effectiveness of that program. The surprised recipient recognized the possibilities and dispatched a signal to Jones explaining the shift in interests.

In many places visited S/L Geoff Myers and Capt. Bob Forwood (air and military advisors from B.P.) had already explained the desires of the GC&CS personnel to be of greater service. Considerable mutual benefit should result from their trip. It is likewise for the good of the cause that frequent liaison between Special Branch and operational field commands be maintained.

SPECIAL LIAISON UNITS

Closest cooperation is necessary between the SLJs and the special intelligence officers. A jointly-shared office-room, however, such as is the practice at Fifteenth Air Force, is not advocated. There Major Murphy admitted that since his staff had been increased by the full-time addition of Lieutenant Miller and with the frequent visits of Y-Service representatives from 276 Wing RAF and the Balkans specialist (S/L Allen), it was almost too much of a good thing. An arrangement was being considered whereby the SLJ officers could have some privacy away from the SCU equipment and still not have to be in the same room with the utilizing recipient.

If the SLJ can be located conveniently to the special intelligence officer it greatly increases the efficiency of the situation and assures correspondingly greater security. The recipient should assist the SLJ in the arrangements for its location. The SLJ personnel are generally provided with passes signed by the CG permitting them to come and go without question. Because they are such a hush-hush outfit, they are sometimes overlooked, as has been the case with ZUA (Eighth Army--DAF) when on occasion the Command Post would be moved and the SLJ personnel would almost be left behind working all alone in their trailer. For this reason the special intelligence officer can be helpful in seeing that they are kept informed of the local plans and that they are not forgotten when changes are effected.

The regulation making the SLJ responsible for the security of ultra material was causing no concern at any location visited. The high quality and caliber of the SLJ personnel and their friendly spirit of reasonable cooperation eliminated any possible dissension in this field. The undersigned came away with the strong impression that the SLJ officers should be high on the recipient's list of people with whom he should "get along". It was obvious that this cultivation would pay dividends in business functions between the two.

STATUS OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

It is a conceded fact that special intelligence officers must have specialized training and background in order to be able to interpret and evaluate the information furnished from this source. The "cover", however, for such ultra recipients within a given headquarters is not a settled matter.

Throughout the visits to the field headquarters the undersigned was searching for an arrangement which would satisfy the requirements in United Kingdom. That established by Major Murphy at the Fifteenth Air Force appears to lend itself very well to the contemplated needs. The designation "A-2 Liaison" apparently satisfied everyone in that headquarters. Those within and dealing with that headquarters recognized that there is a certain amount of high level intelligence liaison work which must be performed between a headquarters and higher, lower, and adjacent organizations. Murphy is regarded as the man who does this--collecting and exchanging information personally with MASAF, MATAF, MAAF, and the British, French, and Partisan organizations cooperating in their area.

A possible complication developed in view of the part his headquarters is playing in the Balkan situation and the function of maintaining liaison with Tito was almost superimposed on Murphy by some unsuspecting people. Inasmuch as he does have considerable information on the activities in that area from source and there is a Balkan expert (S/L Allen) now in his section, this has worked out satisfactorily. This term has served also as cover for the British SLJ personnel who are included as part of "A-2 Liaison" Branch.

Status

In the Fifteenth Air Force one of the main interests in Ultra (and chief concerns in general) is the enemy fighter defense situation. Therefore it is quite logical that Murphy should be considered the headquarters Authority on G. A. F. fighters. He attends the daily planning sessions where the missions for the following day are laid on and he advises where and in what strength the enemy fighter opposition is likely to be encountered. The top personnel (who are in the ultra picture) are briefed privately on other source material. The staff is well satisfied with Major Murphy's position.

In the coming disposition in U. K. it would seem that a somewhat similar plan could be effected. From observations it is the opinion of the writer that it is a mistake to try to bury a special intelligence officer within an intelligence section as "just another assistant A-2 (or G-2)" with no further explanation for his presence or activity.

It is recognized that there are special items of intelligence on a high level which can be expected to emanate from the W.D.G.S. or from higher or adjacent headquarters (such as AEAFF, USSTAFF, SHAEF, Air Ministry, War Office, etc.) which may require special treatment, evaluation, interpretation, and limited dissemination. It was the consensus of ultra recipients interviewed that the special intelligence officer must have ready access to the CG, C/S, and those senior headquarters officers who are in the picture and require the edited information for operational use. While this somewhat depends on the personalities involved and their individual wishes, it is considered inadvisable for a special intelligence officer to have to brief an intermediary. He should be able to report and make his evaluation personally to key ultra receivers without causing confusion and consternation within the intelligence section or the rest of the headquarters.

In a small headquarters, particularly, it is necessary that there be close harmony and complete confidence among all personnel involved. Ultra does create a difficult situation. This does not mean that all have to be in the picture. That is neither necessary nor desirable. Many of the field commands visited were operating satisfactorily with a minimum of personnel knowing the ultra score. But, it is essential that a militarily plausible explanation be apparent for "what goes on". With a little forethought to each individual setup, an answer can be effected which will satisfy the curious and forestall any friction or misunderstanding within the organization.

ANGLO — AMERICAN RELATIONS

The most disappointing reaction to the entire trip was one concerning the lack of mutual understanding and cooperation between the British and the Americans. This is not true among those in the ultra picture but it does exist openly otherwise.

This was especially apparent in the combined headquarters commands visited where there was no wholesome congenial exchange of undertakings. American officers were clannish and did not mix freely with their English associates who likewise appeared to prefer their own cliques. There were instances of trying to "out-do" one another in the assignment of rank to combined sections and petty jealousies and complaints were in evidence.

This condition reportedly has existed for some time in that theater and it is probably due to a lack of initial incentive to try to "get along with" one's opposite number. The Americans complained of British 'superiority' and the lack of common views, and claimed that the British were selfish and obstinate. In contrast to this, the writer found these self-same English individuals modest, extremely willing to cooperate, and eager to mix socially on common terms.

This situation may be due largely to the fact that there are very few American officers in the ultra picture. At MAAF (Rear) the Operational Intelligence Section (under W/C Hurst) is entirely British, with only Major Richard N. Tandler, Deputy Chief Intelligence Officer, on hand to uphold the American interests. Tandler appeared to be on extremely friendly relations with the British but the rumor was that he was to be dropped because the American T/O at MAAF had to be reduced to 17 officers in A-2 and the Advanced Headquarters

Anglo-American Relations

did not feel they could retain him. Likewise at MAAF (Adv) the G.A.F. Section is entirely British and the Americans are jealous of this situation. With the exception of the Target Section, the American officers in A-2 of this combined headquarters seem to be engaged principally in presenting daily Air Room summaries, special shows for the press, etc., which activities apparently have a high priority with the Commanding General (American).

It would appear highly advisable that at least one American representative should be working in the ultra workshops in such combined headquarters and that qualified American special intelligence officers should be detailed to all such joint headquarters. Special Branch, either through direct action or continual liaison, can do much to improve this Anglo-American condition.

ULTRA versus OTHER FORMS OF INTELLIGENCE

On one point everyone visited and interviewed was in accord. That is, that special intelligence must be used in conjunction with other forms of intelligence. A full and complete knowledge and understanding of Photo Reconnaissance, Prisoner of War Interrogation, OSS Agent's Reports, Radio Intercept, etc. are vital in order to derive the maximum value from Source.

There is no lack of appreciation of Special Intelligence in the Mediterranean Theater for those people know and admit that it won the Battle of North Africa for them and that it is the most important single intelligence factor available. But they likewise counsel the importance of not relying on this alone, but rather of utilizing it to substantiate information received from other sources and to employ other sources in obtaining intelligence already established by ultra.

An individual officer with no general combat intelligence background cannot be "bathed in the blood of the lamb" and thereby be made into a truly valuable special intelligence officer. Key intelligence officers visited counseled without dissension that such recipients must be men with wide experience in ordinary combat intelligence. Learning to use the special "on top of" general intelligence is a task in itself, and the special intelligence officer should not be handicapped by a lack of knowledge and understanding of the capabilities, limitations, employment, and productivity of these other forms of intelligence.

The ultimate aim in every intelligence section is to build the ordinary intelligence picture up to the level of the special intelligence picture.

This not only requires initiative and ingenuity but a broad knowledge of general intelligence. Just as one must have particular background and training in the interpretation and evaluation of special intelligence, it is essential that the chosen recipient have a background in general intelligence.

The greatest value which the special intelligence officer can be to the headquarters which he is serving, is to be constantly developing and exploiting (in a legitimate manner) the general intelligence which he knows has been confirmed by Source. Likewise in guiding the employment of other intelligence sources in order to build up the general intelligence picture and bring to the knowledge and use of all intelligence personnel the information involved. To influence the general intelligence picture accordingly the special intelligence officer must know these sources intimately in order to avoid compromise and to devise proper ~~cover~~ for his source of knowledge. This is the real challenge in the job confronting the special intelligence officer.

14 May 1944

Subject: Report on Visit to Operational Air Commands
in Mediterranean Theater (4 April - 10 May 1944)

To: Lt. Col. Samuel McKee, MID, WD, Station London

1. The subject report is attached hereto in
quadruplicate.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Major, Air Corps

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REPORT ON MEDITERRANEAN TRIP

(4 April - 10 May 1944)

NOTE: The primary purpose of this trip was to observe and study the technique of handling Special Intelligence (Ultra) material employed at the principal air commands. A secondary purpose was to deliver to certain senior intelligence officers, both ground and air, the A.G.C. letter of 15 March 1944 concerning the security and dissemination of Special Intelligence. The summarized report which follows is subdivided on the basis of commands visited, with general comments and recommendations at the end.

I. ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, ALGIERS.

a. Dates of Visit: 8 April 1944, 23/28 April 1944.

b. Officers Visited: Brig. General T.E. Roderick, Deputy G-2, AFHQ.; Col. Sloan, Assistant G-2, AFHQ.; Major Warren S. Richards, Secretary to Gen. Roderick; and W/C R. P. Crawshaw, Senior SLU officer in Mediterranean Theater. Also met General Strong, G-2 of AFHQ.

c. Discussion: Copies Nos. 6 and 7 of the A.G.C. letter were delivered to General Roderick on 8 April 1944, Copy No. 7 to be retained by him and Copy No. 6 to be delivered to Lt. General Devers. The purpose of this letter was explained, and copies of Regulations "A" and "B" (referred to in the letter) were obtained from W/C Crawshaw for presentation with the letter to General Devers.

II. MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES (REAR), ALGIERS.

- a. Dates of Visit: 8/9 April 44, 23/26 April 44.
- b. Officers Visited: Air Commodore Wooley, Chief Intelligence Officer; Maj. Richard L. Tandler, Deputy C.I.O.; W/C Joseph Hurst, Chief of Air C.B. Section; W/C James Morgan, Senior "Y" Intelligence Officer in Mediterranean Theater.
- c. Discussion:
1. MAAF, commanded by Lt. General Eaker, is the top air command and covers the entire Mediterranean, extending as far east as Cairo. It has two headquarters, the principal one at Caserta (Italy) and a rear headquarters at Algiers. Allied Force Headquarters, under General Wilson and with Lt. General Devers as Deputy, is at Algiers. MAAF maintains a rear headquarters to coordinate, especially on plans, with AFHQ. The senior air commanders here are Air Marshal Slessor, Deputy to General Eaker, and Brig. General DePoord (USA) who has recently replaced Brig. General Timberlake. The chief functions of the air intelligence staff under A/C Wooley are to service these air commanders, provide air intelligence for long range planning, and to a decreasing extent to service the intelligence sections of subordinate commands. The principal commands under MAAF are Fifteenth Air Force (subject to an over-riding operational control

by United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe - General Spaatz), Tactical Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force (see Appendix "A" for organizational chart).

2. The intelligence section of MAAF (Rear) is exclusively RAF except for Major Tandler of the U. S. Army Air Forces. Special Intelligence is handled primarily by W/C Hurst and several RAF officers under him. They maintain rather permanent and detailed records, prepare a daily summary for very limited distribution, and brief A/C Wooley (or Major Tandler in his absence) for the daily meeting of senior commanders. Major Tandler shares A/C Wooley's office, as well as a considerable part of his responsibility. He is also Wooley's deputy on the Joint Intelligence Committee for the entire Mediterranean theater.

III. MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES, CASERTA.

- a. Dates of Visit: 10/13 April 44.
- b. Officers Visited: Group Captain James Luard, Chief Intelligence Officer; Lt. Col. Robert L. Storey, Executive; S/L Toby Jackson, Chief of Air O.B. Section; Major William Ballard, Chief of Target Section. Brig. General Norstad, Director of Operations and Intelligence, and Col. Harris Hull, Deputy to G/C Luard, were

absent on trips.

c. Discussion:

1. The organization of the MAAF intelligence staff is substantially as follows: Brig. General Norstad is Director of both Operations and Intelligence, although inevitably his primary concern must be with operational matters. G/C Luard has recently succeeded Col. Hull as Chief Intelligence Officer, and is in immediate charge of all intelligence matters. Col. Hull remains as Deputy C.I.O., but it is understood that a very considerable part of his time is devoted to special projects for Gen. Baker. Lt. Col. Storey, as Executive, handles all administrative matters. The principal functional divisions are the Target Section (Maj. Ballard), Operational Intelligence (Major Lathrop), Technical Intelligence (S/L Shilatoe) and the War Room (W/C Robinson and Capt. Snyers). The chief duty of the Operational Section is the dissemination of combat intelligence information to subordinate units (down to Groups and Squadrons), primarily through the MAAF Weekly Intelligence Summary. Other functions customarily attributed to "Operational Intelligence" are actually performed by S/L Jackson's O.B. Section, discussed in paragraph 2 below.

2. Special Intelligence at this headquarters is handled almost exclusively by RAF personnel under S/L Jackson. His section consists of six officers (four S/L's, one F/L and one F/O), all with considerable experience in this field and two of them also specially qualified in "Y" intelligence. They keep permanent records, prepare a daily summary, maintain detailed air order of battle information (including day to day estimates of strength and serviceability), and service subordinate units by supplying a weekly O.B. appreciation and occasional miscellaneous appreciations. Ultra intelligence service for General Eaker and General Horstad is provided by C/C Luard or by S/L Jackson.

3. A.G.O. letter No. 8 was delivered to G/C Luard on 10 April in the absence of Col. Hull. G/C Luard agreed to deliver it to Col. Hull upon his return. The Regulations "A" and "B" were at Caserta in the custody of F/L Thompson (SLU), and G/C Luard advised that these had already been brought to the attention of General Eaker and others concerned.

IV. FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP, CASERTA.

- a. Date of Visit: 10 April 44.
- b. Officers Visited: Col. George S. Smith, Deputy G-2, and F/L Thompson, SLU.

c. Discussion: The sole purpose of this visit was to deliver copy No. 9 of the A.G.O. letter and explain its purpose and content to Col. Smith. This was accomplished on 10 April. P/L Thompson was present with copies of Regulations "A" and "B", and Col. Smith agreed to see that the letter and Regulations were brought to the attention of all proper parties.

V. TACTICAL AIR FORCE, CASERTA.

- a. Dates of Visit: 11 and 16 April 44.
- b. Officers Visited: Maj. General Cannon, C.G. of TAF and Twelfth Air Force⁺; Col. Charles Pottinger, Chief of Operations (A-3); W/C Wiseman, Chief Intelligence Officer; Major W.N. Mallory, Chief of Target Section; and Capt. James Austin, Deputy C.I.O.
- c. Discussion:
1. TAF is one of the three large operational air forces under MAAF. Its mission, broadly speaking, is air support of the Fifteenth Army Group. Subordinate units include Twelfth Tactical Air Command (which directly supports the Fifth Army), Desert Air Force (which directly supports the Eighth Army), and 42nd Bomb Wing (which operates medium bombers in support of both Armies).

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⁺Twelfth Air Force is now purely an administrative organization. All operational functions are under Tactical Air Force.

2. Special Intelligence is handled to a large extent by W/C Wiseman personally. This is to be contrasted with other large commands (such as MAAF and Fifteenth Air Force) where the C.I.O. or A-2 is usually too preoccupied with other matters to give this special work the attention it requires. Capt. Austin is the only other officer in the intelligence section of TAF who is authorized to work with Ultra. He has been W/C Wiseman's deputy for a relatively short time, but is gradually assuming increased responsibility. Special Intelligence here is conducted on a strictly informal basis. Few records are kept and no summaries written. Information is passed verbally to General Cannon and Col. Pottinger. Each morning a combined services Ultra meeting is held, with senior officers present from Fifteenth Army Group, TAF and the Royal Navy. The enemy air situation is presented by W/C Wiseman or occasionally by Capt. Austin.

VI. TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND.
(Formerly 12th A. S. C.)

- a. Date of Visit: 13/15 April 44.
- b. Officers Visited: Brig. General Saville, C.C. of 12th TAC; Lt. Col. Kenneth Wade, A.C. of S., Operations; and Major Leavitt Corning, Jr., A.C. of S., Intelligence. (Note: This Headquarters is staffed purely by American officers, with the con-

ventional staff organization).

c. Discussion:

1. This Command, equipped with light bombers, fighter bombers, fighters and tac/recce aircraft, has the mission of providing air support for the Fifth Army. The advance Headquarters of 12th TAC and of Fifth Army are adjacent to each other. Major Corning has only seven officers in his A-2 Section. He is able to give personal attention to all Special Intelligence, although one of his assistants (Major M. M. Campbell) is indoctrinated. Extreme informality prevails. Major Corning submits information orally to General Saville every morning, and at such other times as may be necessary. No records are kept more than twenty-four hours. A single SBU detachment (F/L Edwards) serves both 12th TAC and 5th Army.
2. The cooperation between Army and Air Force on targets is close and effective. The 5th Army has its own air target section, consisting of some ten to twelve officers and men including several photo interpreters. Target material consists almost exclusively of annotated photos, copies of which are sent to 12th TAC in sufficient numbers for squadron distribution. Targets at

this particular time are largely static ones, such as bridges, marshalling yards and RR tracks, petrol and ammunition dumps, M/T parks, repair depots, CP's, ports and airfields. Representatives of the Army attend an afternoon target meeting at 12th TAC, where the next day's targets are agreed upon after discussion. When the ground situation is more fluid, requests for immediate air support come over a special communications system from Air Support Parties ("Tentacles") with the ground divisions directly to the Air Support Control Officer with Fifth Army. This officer, after coordination with G-3 of Army, passes requests to 12th TAC which in turn gives the operational orders to the appropriate groups or squadrons.

VII. FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, BARI.

- a. Dates of Visit: 17/22 April 44.
- b. Officers Visited: Major Gen. Twining, C.G.; Col. Percy Barr, Deputy A.C. of S., Intelligence; Lt. Col. Sullivan, Executive; Major Bradley McGill, Chief of Target Section; Major Russell Murphy, Special Intelligence; P/L McMillan, S.L.W. (Col. Charles Young, A.C. of S., Intelligence was away.)
- c. Discussion:
 1. Fifteenth Air Force is a purely strategic

bombing force, comprising some 21 Groups of heavy bombers and 5 Groups of long-range escort fighters. These are organized into five combat wings. Since targets in southern, central and eastern Germany, as well as all of the Balkans, are within range of Italian bases, the operations of this air force must be coordinated closely with those of Eighth Air Force in England. This is accomplished through United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (General Spaatz), which exercises an over-riding operational control over both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. Target directives are passed from USSTAF through MAAF to Fifteenth Air Force. The function of MAAF as a middle-man in this chain of command is not altogether clear, but apparently under certain circumstances it may make the directives of USSTAF more specific. Also, when Army needs dictate it, MAAF may direct the employment of the Fifteenth Air Force against tactical targets (e.g. Cassino). The day to day targets are usually selected by Fifteenth Air Force within the framework of priorities set by prevailing directives. As a practical matter, the weather is frequently the controlling factor in target selection.

2. Special Intelligence is handled almost exclusively by Major Murphy. He has recently ac-

quired an assistant, 1st Lt. Middleton Miller, who is still undergoing training. Also P/O Lomar is attached to Major Murphy's section as liaison officer from 276 Wing (RAF "Y"). Col. Young is indoctrinated, but delegates practically the entire responsibility of this work to Major Murphy. His principal concern is keeping General Twining, Brig. General Atkinson, Chief of Staff, Brig. General Born, A.C. of S., Operations, and Col. Young fully advised on Special Intelligence matters. This is accomplished by a daily personal briefing of each of these officers. Major Murphy also has exclusive responsibility for air order of battle intelligence, and each day at the planning meeting for the next day's operations he is called upon to estimate the number and type of enemy aircraft likely to be encountered on the proposed route and over the prospective target. He has been remarkably successful in these estimations.

3. Major McGill, Chief of the Target Section, is the only other intelligence officer who has been indoctrinated. Apparently, he makes only a limited use of this information which he obtains through Major Murphy from time to time.

4. Copy No. 10 of the A.G.O. letter was delivered to Major Murphy in Col. Young's absence. Regulations "A" and "B" were sent up from Taranto by the SLU, and the letter and regulations were presented to Gen. Twining.

VIII. Other Commands Visited.

- a. Fifth Army: Part of a day was spent studying the Army side of air support operations. Officers visited included Col. Howard, G-2; Major Merk, Chief of Target Section; Major Quello, Tactical Reconnaissance Officer; and Major O'Brien, Air Support Control Officer.
- b. Desert Air Force and Eighth Army: These two commands were visited with Major Corning. They function together (under Tactical Air Force and Fifteenth Army Group) in substantially the same manner as do Twelfth Tactical Air Command and Fifth Army. Officers visited included S/L Richard Graham, C.I.O. of Desert Air Force, and Lt. Col. Prater and Major Willet, General Staff Intelligence Officers of Eighth Army in charge of air targets.
- c. Coastal Air Force: This Air Force is subordinated to MAAF, and is responsible for (1) fighter defenses over all harbors and coastal areas, (2) air escort of convoys, and (3) certain offensive operations against

enemy shipping and submarines. It is a combined Allied command, the American element being Twelfth Fighter Command. The operations of Coastal Air Force extend over an enormous area, and its operational subordinate commands are widely dispersed (Bizerte, Tripoli, Taranto, Bastia, Naples). Only the headquarters at Algiers was visited, where Major Dudley Wood, A-2 of Twelfth Fighter Command and Deputy C.I.O. of Coastal, and his assistant, Major Russell Wiggins, were seen. The C.I.O. of Coastal is W/C Tudor. No American in the intelligence section is authorized to handle Special Intelligence.

- d. MAAF Signal Intelligence Service: Radio intercept in the Mediterranean is under 275 Wing for the RAF and the 9th Radio Squadron Mobile (plus a detachment from the 849th Signal Intelligence Service) for the Army Air Forces. The headquarters and central intercept stations of these units are located at Conversano and Castellana in southeast Italy. An afternoon and evening were spent at these places. The cooperation between the RAF and AAF is now well organized, and all reports (except flash information) are put out as a combined effort of both under the name: "MAAF Signal Intelligence Service."

e. Combined Services Detailed Interrogation

Center (CSDIC): This is the Allied P/W interrogation center located near Algiers. It has three sections, Naval, Ground and Air, each of which specializes on prisoners from its branch. Field teams located in the battle areas do quick interrogations, and then send P/W's back to CSDIC for detailed interrogation which may extend over weeks. The entire organization is under G-2 of Allied Force Headquarters. An afternoon was spent with the Air Section at CSDIC. Officers visited included Lt. Col. Van Cleve, C.O.; and W/C Day, Chief of Air Section.

IX. GENERAL COMMENTS.

a. Interest in American Participation in Special

Intelligence: Great interest was shown by the officers visited in the extent of American participation in Special Intelligence. Two general officers, in particular, (Major General Twining and Brig. General Saville) were interested to the extent of having the functions of Bletchley Park and the work of Special Branch explained to them in some detail. See, in this connection, Recommendation X (c) below.

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b. High Quality of American Special Intelligence

Officers: It would be difficult to find officers better qualified for this work than Major Murphy,

Major Tandler, Major Corning and Captain Austin. They are all intelligent, energetic and thoroughly experienced in air intelligence. Also each appears to have the respect and confidence of the general officers whom he serves. They have intense enthusiasm for their work and its importance.

- c. Security: On the whole, the problem of security appears to be well handled. The problems and the necessary precautions naturally vary with each command. In one place, particularly, the physical facilities and arrangements left something to be desired. The Special Intelligence Officers were usually designated as air order of battle experts. Major Murphy was described as "Special Liaison Officer." Unindoctrinated personnel in the various intelligence sections were of course aware of the existence of something. They usually referred to it as "Black Market."
- d. SLU officers: The entire trip was greatly facilitated by the courtesy and helpfulness of the S.L.U. officers at the various commands.
- e. Intelligence Officers: Similarly, the intelligence officers visited, both RAF and American, extended every possible assistance as well as most generous hospitality. Those engaged in Ultra work were, in every instance, pleased with the service from Bletchley Park.

f. Miscellaneous Personnel Problems:

1. MAAF (Caserta) Should Have an American "Special Intelligence" Officer. Special Intelligence is now handled at MAAF almost exclusively by RAF personnel. There are six RAF officers engaged in this work, in addition to G/C Inard.⁺ The only American intelligence officers indoctrinated are Col. Hull and Major Ballard, both of whom have other primary duties. While the RAF officers are fully competent, the situation is manifestly unbalanced. This is especially true since MAAF is predominately an American command. General Eaker and his Director of Operations, General Norstad, are American, and a substantial majority of all personnel, aircraft and equipment of subordinate commands are American. It is understood that S/L Jackson, who has been in charge of the Special Intelligence Section, is scheduled to return to a new assignment in England. This will afford an excellent opportunity to place an American in his position. Two officers capable of assuming this responsibility are Major Richard W. Tandler and Major William R. Lathrop. Major Tandler is now

⁺See Section III of this Report for a brief summary of organization of the Intelligence Section at MAAF, Caserta.

Deputy to A/C Wooley at MAAF (Rear) and has had nearly a year's experience with Special Intelligence. In view of a probable reduction of the staff at MAAF (Rear), Major Tandler may be available for assignment. Major Lathrop is already with MAAF (Caserta), and has had eighteen months experience in general combat intelligence with 12th Air Force, NAAF and MAAF. (Note: It is realized that the foregoing matter is not a concern of Special Branch, but it illustrates the type of problem which arises and which could be met if Special Branch had a broader jurisdiction in recommending the placement of Special Intelligence Officers.)

2. The A-2 of Twelfth Fighter Command (who is Deputy C.I.O. of Coastal Air Force) should be indoctrinated. The American elements of Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force are administratively under 12th Fighter Command. The A-2 of 12th Fighter Command, Major Dudley Wood, is Deputy C.I.O. of MACAF. As such he has to deal from time to time with several RAF intelligence officers at subordinate Coastal commands who are indoctrinated. Manifestly he is handicapped by virtue of not being fully informed.

3. Major Matthew M. Campbell, 6-159152, now with 12th TAC, is Available for Reassignment. This officer was indoctrinated some months ago to qualify him as the Special Intelligence Officer for 12th TAC. Subsequently Major Corning assumed this responsibility,

and he and General Saville now feel that Major Campbell's services are no longer required. It is suggested that Major Campbell be considered for the same type of office or research work, for which he appears admirably qualified.

4. Special Intelligence Officers Are Frequently Under-Ranked for Maximum Effectiveness. Each American officer visited felt (perhaps naturally) that his rank was something of a handicap in view of the character of work required. These officers have daily contacts with very senior officers, up to three-star generals. Also they usually find themselves out-ranked by several other officers in the A-2 section, a situation which renders more difficult their already peculiar status.

Examples: Major Corning advises General Saville and Colonel D'Arcy, and confers frequently with the general officers of the Fifth Army. Major Murphy serves three generals and a colonel, and is out-ranked by four other officers in the A-2 Section. Major Tandler serves a general and an air marshal; he is deputy to an air commodore, and is outranked by RAF intelligence personnel who are nominally subordinate to him. Captain Austin likewise serves general officers, is deputy to a wing commander and is outranked in his A-2 section by four other officers. (It is

understood that Majors Corning and Murphy will be promoted as soon as they have served the requisite time in grade. In fact, General Saville has requested that the time requirement be waived as to Major Corning).

X. RECOMMENDATIONS.

The following recommendations as to Special Intelligence in the Air Forces and the personnel engaged in handling it are based primarily on observations made on this trip. It is appreciated that Special Branch is not in a position at this time to act on certain of these recommendations, but it is believed that they merit consideration in organizing and planning for future operations, especially in the Pacific.

a. Special Branch Should Be Made a Joint Ground-Air Force Agency.

Discussion: The idea of controlling and coordinating Special Intelligence by a single centralized agency at the War Department level is sound. Special Branch admirably meets the need for such an agency so far as the Ground Forces are concerned, but as a section of G-2, M.I.S., it is too essentially a Ground Forces organization to be fully effective with the Air Forces. It is appreciated, of course, that the Air Forces are a part of the Army and that Special Branch is an Army organization with jurisdiction over both Ground and Air Forces. However, the Air Forces have already obtained a large measure of practical autonomy, and in actual fact the attitude of Air Forces personnel, especially

in the field, is considerably more independent than the de jure status might justify. Moreover, on the subject of Special Intelligence the Air Forces in England and the Mediterranean are able to say, with much truth, that they have made their own arrangements independently of Washington and the Ground Forces. Finally, it must be recognized that any significant problem of air intelligence, including the disposition of air intelligence officers, should normally be handled by experienced Air Force officers. In view of the foregoing considerations, it is believed that the effectiveness of Special Branch in its relationship with the Air Forces would be improved materially if it were established as a truly joint Ground-Air Forces agency.

b. Each Operational Air Command Where Special Intelligence Is Required Should Have an American Officer Whose Primary Duty Is Special Intelligence.

Discussion: This recommendation involves two main points: (1) The handling of Special Intelligence should be the primary duty of at least one carefully selected and highly qualified officer at each command. (This officer will be referred to hereafter as the "Special Intelligence Officer"). He should, of course, be available for other intelligence duties, but these always should be secondary to his responsibility for all Special Intelligence matters. In certain commands, the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, may wish to be his own Special Intelligence Officer. While this may prove satisfactory in certain of the

smaller commands (such as Twelfth Tactical Air Command), the senior A-2 on the staff is usually too preoccupied with other urgent affairs to give Special Intelligence the detailed and primary attention which it requires.

- (2) Since the creation of NAAF in February 1943 there have been several joint American-British Air Commands. (Examples: MAAF, Tactical Air Force (Caserta), MACAF, ABAF). The senior commanders who require Ultra service customarily include both American and British officers. In some instances in the past, as was natural under circumstances then existing, there was no American Special Intelligence Officer. Now that qualified American officers are available, it is felt that each such Joint Command should have at least one American specialist in Ultra. The present situation at MAAF in this respect is discussed above under general comment (f. 1.).

c. The Special Intelligence Officers at the Various Commands Should as a General Rule Be Members of Special Branch.

Discussion: It is assumed, in view of General Marshall's recent letter, that in ETOUSA, at least, the policy has been established of having members of Special Branch attached to the various operational commands as the officers primarily

responsible for Ultra intelligence. It is not clear whether this policy will be applied to NATJUSA as well, or whether intelligence officers already indoctrinated but not members of Special Branch will be transferred to it. Circumstances within the commands vary to such an extent that it would probably be unwise to attempt to apply any rule universally. However, it is strongly believed that it would be desirable for the Special Intelligence Officer at every operational air command (as defined above under b.) to be a member of Special Branch. Accordingly, it is felt that the policy enunciated in General Marshall's letter should be applied to other theaters and to existing Special Intelligence Officers wherever practicable. The full success of such policy would certainly be implemented if Special Branch is meanwhile given a joint Grand-Air Forces status, as contrasted with its present position as a section of G-2.

d. Close Liaison Should Be Maintained By Special Branch and Bletchley Park with the Commands in the Field.

Discussion: A close relationship between those who produce and process the material at the source and those who use it in the field is highly desirable. The RAF has recognized the necessity for this and officers from Air Ministry and Bletchley Park have made frequent visits to field recipients. Also there has been some actual interchange of RAF personnel.

It is recommended that Special Branch follow this precedent, and particularly that officers who are familiar with the work

at Bletchley Park be sent periodically to visit the various operational commands. It is equally important, although perhaps more difficult to arrange, for Special Intelligence recipients to visit Bletchley Park. Even those who have had training there would benefit by brief refresher visits.

e. The Role of the American Army in the Special Intelligence Field Should Be Brought to the Attention of the Proper Officers in the Operational Commands.

Discussion: It was found that comparatively few officers at the commands visited had any real appreciation of the part now being played by the American Army in this field. The impression still prevails that special Intelligence is purely a British product in the most exclusive sense. It is not generally known, even by senior air commanders, that American personnel assist the British at Bletchley Park in the various steps involved in producing and processing Special Intelligence. Nor is it known that the American Army has assumed the major responsibility for developing this intelligence for the Pacific theater. In short, very little is known by Air Forces officers of the work of Special Branch and the Signal Corps, or of the extent to which cooperation now exists between the British and American Forces in this entire field. It is believed that officers engaged in handling special Intelligence in the field, and especially the commanders, should be familiarized with the scope and general

aspects of this cooperation.* One means of accomplishing this is the establishment of closer liaison between Special Branch and the field as suggested in d. above. The visit of Colonel McKee to the Mediterranean in February, which did much to inform the commands on this subject, is an example of the type of liaison needed.

f. In the Training of Special Intelligence Officers Greater Emphasis Should Be Placed on the Development of a Sound Knowledge of All Sources of Air Intelligence.

Discussion: The importance of other sources of intelligence must never be minimized. The most valuable Special Intelligence officer is one who also thoroughly understands and appreciates the value of intelligence derived from ordinary radio intercept, prisoners of war, "crash" or technical intelligence, photographic reconnaissance, reports and observations of combat crews, and reports of agents. While the importance of these other sources will usually be conceded, there seems to be a tendency in practice to rely too heavily upon Ultra to the exclusion of all else. Officers trained by Special Branch must avoid this tendency, and this can best be accomplished by greater emphasis during the training period on what may be described as general combat intelligence. This is particularly necessary for officers who may not have had prior experience with Air Force intelligence. The course of lectures at Bletchley Park is fairly comprehensive


*Of course, care must be exercised not to minimize the magnificent efforts of the British, both past and present, or to exaggerate our present role.

and lays a good general background. Perhaps a week instead of two or three days should be spent in Block "F". If possible, there should be a visit to Kingsdown for observation of the tactical employment of "Y". The real emphasis on other sources should come during the visit to operational commands, where special study should be made of the technique of correlating, evaluating and using all intelligence. It is specifically recommended (1) that considerable time be spent with officers at the commands who work primarily on other sources; (2) that the photographic reconnaissance wing (MAPRW) be visited; (3) that one or more of the tactical radio intercept stations (276 Wing) be visited; and (4) that several days be spent with tactical air units actually engaged in combat operations.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Major, Air Corps

APPENDIX "A"

Organization Chart of Air Forces in Mediterranean



⁺Subject to over-riding operational control of USSTAF (Gen. Spaatz).

⁺⁺ USA 12th Air Force is now purely an administrative command. All of its operational functions are exercised through Tactical Air Force.

24 June 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Mediterranean Trip.

To: Commanding Officer, MIS, WD, London.

From: Lt. Col. Leslie L. Rood, A.C.

1. This is a report on my visit to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in June 1944, to observe the use of air special intelligence. Because the London office is already familiar with the general functioning of the Mediterranean organization this report is only of a supplementary nature.

2. Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, a joint British-American Command, is the supreme air headquarters of the Mediterranean Theater. It has a rear headquarters at Algiers and an advanced headquarters at Caserta. Under it are Strategic Air Force, Tactical Air Force and Coastal Command.

The Strategic Air Force is an almost wholly American Unit, the 15th Air Force, operating from Bari. They have one British group of Wellingtons for night bombing. The 15th is an operational command in that it plans and directs missions.

Tactical Air Force at Caserta, on the other hand, is a British-American Command that is not operational. It has under it (1) the 12th Tactical Air Command (American) which gives close support (fighter bombers) to the 5th Army, (2) Desert Air Force (British) which gives close support to the 8th Army, and (3) two wings, one of medium bombers and one of fighters, which operate at a greater distance behind the enemy lines.

Coastal Command with defensive, convoy and coastal missions, is spread out over the whole Mediterranean. Tactical and Strategic are in Italy.

3. I departed from London on the evening of 26 May 1944 by sleeping car and arrived in Newquay, Cornwall, the next morning. I should have taken off from St. Margans that night, but due to engine trouble did not get off until the fourth night. The plane arrived at Casablanca the next morning and by evening I was in Algiers.

I spent three days with MAAF (rear) and took off for Caserta on 4 June. For the succeeding three days I was there with MAAF (adv.) and TAF. On 6 June I went to Bari by courier plane to spend three days with the 15th Air Force and 276th Wing. Returning to Caserta on the 11th I was unable to go forward to 12th TAC at Rome until the 14th because they were disorganized by the rapid advance. When I did reach Rome I was able to stay with them for only two days

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because they once again split into three echelons and moved on.

On the evening of the 17th I left Rome; on the morning of the 18th I left Caserta; the next morning I departed from Algiers; after a delay of one day in Casablanca I took off for the U.S. and was in London on the evening of 21 June 1944.

4. The two MAAF special intelligence sections operate like miniature Air Ministries. At each headquarters the four or five officers processing the material are segregated in an out-of-the-way room where they do their work. Each officer has a specialty such as order of battle, "Y", supplies, Balkans, or targets and as the expert on that subject, he writes a part of the daily digest which is prepared for the generals. The senior officer of the group usually carries the digest around, so that he can answer any questions which arise. They write very few appreciations, nor do they have any direct connections with operations. Their prime purpose is to be completely familiar with the material so that they can interpret it to their operational people. Secondly, they compile a weekly order of battle which is published at several levels. MAAF (rear) also sends out a weekly supply summary at the highest level.

5. The 15th Air Force at Bari impressed me as a very smoothly functioning organization and its "A-2 Liaison Officer", Major Murphy, as an able part of it. Each morning the staff meets with the A-3 (acting as the operational chief of staff) to plan the missions for the subsequent day. First the weather officer dictates the possible areas of operation by his forecast; the A-2 names the targets having priority in that area; the damage analysis officer advises the A-3 to what extent the suggested targets have already been destroyed. Attention then being officially centered on several targets (the staff had already informally decided on these and spread the proper target charts before the meeting) the flak officer is called upon for the number of minutes the ships will be in flak if approaches are made from certain angles.

Major Murphy is then called upon for an estimate of where, how many, and what kind of enemy planes will be encountered. Along with the weather officer he stakes his reputation daily since both of their predictions are checked by the next evening.

After quite a succession of direct questions by the A-3 and unequivocal answers by the staff, the A-3 fluently dictates a complete operations order. Each officer copies down the part pertaining to his responsibility and during the early afternoon submits the written annex to the finished order which is placed before the Commanding General for his approval.

Because of his daily forecast, Major Murphy is known to most people as the order of battle expert but even more important is his servicing of senior officers with special intelligence. He separates from the general material that which might interest the senior officers, annotates it with brief notes when necessary, and then shows them the annotated material. He often has to do some verbal explaining and elaborating but he writes no digest.

There was a time when special intelligence was important at Bari for its order of battle information, but now when the GAF puts up a maximum of 150 planes to protect the most important targets and none for lesser targets, raids are naturally planned with little regard for the possible opposition!

The most valuable material, therefore, is that pertaining to targets, e.g. that a bridge was destroyed, that shipping on the Danube has been stopped or that the damage to refineries has caused a gasoline shortage. Operations people take a very keen interest in anything which gives a clear cut statement of the damage done by their bombers the day before. With the increase in blind bombing this is even more true.

Most of the intelligence at the 15th Air Force consists of target work, i.e. photography, collating of agents reports and economic studies of objectives, and bomb damage analysis. There is a large target section at MAAF (adv.) which serves the 15th Air Force almost exclusively by preparing target charts and the 15th Air Force also has a large target section which selects objectives and analyzes bomb damage. Since no one in the target section at Bari has special intelligence, Murphy helps them with his superior wisdom quite frequently.

In attempting to summarize for me what special intelligence supplied to the whole intelligence organization at Bari, Murphy said that its primary contribution was a "negative influence". Most of the information Murphy gets from special intelligence is also procured from photos, PW's, pilots' reports and "Y", but in them the good is mixed with the bad. Special intelligence tells Murphy and his superiors what not to rely on. Rarely does he get anything of pure operational value, something which causes him to rush into A-3 demanding that a mission be layed on.

6. TAF's functions are difficult to understand because of its intermediate role below the policy level of MAAF and yet above the target selection level of TAC and DAF. Its role is further complicated by its being an operational headquarters over its medium bomb wing but a non-operational headquarters over its close support commands.

It is primarily a coordinating command. Its greatest interest during my visit was in the progress of its campaign to choke off all supplies to the battle area. Special intelligence provided very good material on this subject.

The segregation of special intelligence is not very noticeable here because only the chief intelligence officer, W/C Wiseman and his assistant, Captain Austin, have it. Their knowledge is used through attendance at all planning conferences, some of which are at the highest level. They show selected material to the senior officers and do not write a digest.

7. Discovering how Major Corning, at 12th Tactical Air Force uses special intelligence was not easy. He keeps no records that one can analyze. He is the A-2 and the only person doing pure intelligence work so special intelligence is not neatly segregated for the visitor's examination. Corning operates out of his shirt pocket, merges all sources in his mind and is not given to pat statements about what part of his total knowledge is supplied by special intelligence.

12th TAC, in supporting the 5th Army is wasting absolutely no enemy planes so naturally order of battle is forgotten. Likewise, the occasional damage reports on specific targets are of doubtful use because TAC attacks vast numbers of small targets each day such as motor transport, bridges, railway cuts and dumps.

What is important is that special intelligence shows TAC very clearly that its primary mission, cutting the lines of communication and supply, has been successfully accomplished. The German inability to defend has been caused to a great extent by the lack of supplies.

In the fast moving situation prevailing during my visit special intelligence indications of where the enemy might make a stand was also of great value to TAC in deciding where to establish its airfields as it advanced.

TAC's intelligence set up is very simple. The broad plans of attack are made by Army; the target section is run by the Army and all TAC gets is a set of photos and a request for missions; there is no air order of battle; almost all the special intelligence coming through during my visit concerned the Army and was only of incidental interest to the A-2. The A-2 does the pure intelligence work and his eight subordinates are primarily engaged in compiling operations summaries, an A-3 job.

8. My visit to the 276th Wing was valuable chiefly because I saw a complete "Y" organization operating under one roof. This organization functioning without the complicated refinements of Block F was "Y for Children".

Special intelligence is used at 276 Wing solely as a guiding influence. It enables the senior officer to eliminate from the published reports many of the erroneous conclusions which would result from dependence on "Y" alone. Unfortunately there is so little traffic to be picked up in the Mediterranean that their reports are comparatively unimportant.

9. Seeing four levels of command in the field immediately following my visit to War Station and Air Ministry, the stair like decline of formality in handling special intelligence was very noticeable. At one extreme is the elaborate recording and weighing of every detail and at the other is the casual treatment at 12th TAC where the recipient skins through the pencil written pages of the day, tracing some out on the map, rereading some, ignoring others and in no case writing anything down. At MAAF (rear) quite a bit of indexing is done so that records will be available for appreciations and weekly summaries. At MAAF (advanced) only an order of battle index is maintained, and at the next lower level, TAF, the informality approaches that of TAC in that only an occasional note is made. The 15th, like its parallel command, TAF, uses practically no records.

10. It is also noticeable that each level of command endeavors to stand on its own feet rather than rely on appreciations and digests from superior commands. MAAF (rear) sends little to MAAF (advanced), MAAF (advanced) almost nothing to TAF, TAF nothing to TAC and naturally TAC can have no recipients. What little is sent is treated with not too much respect. Each level services its own generals without attempting to also service its lower echelons.

Many of the recipients do see each other quite frequently to exchange views. Probably for this reason no great differences of opinion are evident.

11. At War Station and the Air Ministry, I got the impression that intelligence was 75% special intelligence, 10% "Y", 5% photographs, 5% PW and 5% miscellaneous. The figures varied somewhat but were usually definite. The people in the field don't think much in terms of percentages and, if they did, the

figures would vary tremendously from place to place because each headquarters looks to intelligence for a different type of information. Sometimes special intelligence can fill the need and sometimes it can't. The usefulness of other sources varies also, depending on what the headquarters is interested in.

For commands where few records are kept Fw reports mean little because no report is complete within itself. Usually they are skimmed through. Agents reports are seldom read by the A-2 or the order of battle people but they are of some importance to target sections. "Y" in the Mediterranean is sketchy, but along with photo recon of airfields which is fairly good in the Med, does provide good cover for the special intelligence order of battle.

Probably the most valuable source in the theater is photography. With the decline in interest of order of battle, targets are of comparatively more importance. The photo tells the pilot where the target is and within 24 hours of the attack photos give fairly complete damage information. Special intelligence docs, of course, enable one to exercise great wisdom in reading photos.

12. Covering the use of special intelligence in the field does not present the problems which I understood it did. This is primarily so because receipt of the material does not usually point the way to an operational mission. The material provides background which enables commanders to make the correct decisions; it confirms or negates information from normal sources; it provides basic facts. None of these need cover.

13. At both KAAF headquarters the groups of people processing special intelligence are wholly British. The senior intelligence officers under whom these people work, A/C Woolley and G/C Luard, each have American executive officers but only Woolley's executive, Major Tandler, handles special intelligence. Even he does no actual work with it.

While in theory this use of British personnel alone to serve a joint British-American Command may be criticized, there is no practical solution. The British appear to be doing a good job and their long experience in work where knowledge of the past is invaluable would place any newly assigned American officer in a distinctly subordinate position. In addition they already are over-staffed.

At TAF also the chief intelligence officer is British but this provides good balance since the remainder of the staff is predominantly American.

DETAILS:

1. A helmet and gas mask are not needed in visiting Mediterranean headquarters. The only use for a helmet is as a wash basin at headquarters near the front and even there borrowing is expected.

2. Arrangements for transportation take time and should therefore be initiated for the next hop as soon as one arrives at a station.

3. Orders cut in London should authorize visits to all cities which must be reached by ATC, i.e. Algiers and Naples in June 1944. If orders mention only Algiers, more orders must be obtained to get on to Naples. Transportation beyond the ATC terminus is by courier plane or airfield hitch hiking for which no orders are necessary.


4. Cotton uniforms may be purchased in Algiers at the PX.

1 August 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Visit to Mediterranean Theater
(18 June - 20 July 1944)

To: Lt. Col. Samuel McKee, MID, MD, London

1. Report, in quadruplicate, is attached
hereto.



LOTTUS E. BECKER
Captain, FA

053

Report on Trip to Mediterranean Area made by Major
Warrack Wallace and Captain Loftus Becker from 19
June to 20 July 1944, inclusive.

INTRODUCTORY

The following report is a summary of observations made on a tour of the Mediterranean area in the company of Major Warrack Wallace from 19 June to 20 July 1944, inclusive. The tour began and ended in London.

This report should be read in the light of the following general observations:

1. During the period of the tour, certain organizational changes were taking place in Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and in Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy (AAI). They included the promotion of Brigadier Airey to Major General and his appointment as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at AFHQ and, as well, the promotion of Colonel Hirsch to Brigadier and his appointment as GSI (or G-2) at AAI, vice General Airey. There were indications at the Headquarters concerned that these changes would lead to others, both in personnel and in organization. The precise form that any such reorganization would take was not clear by the time the tour ended, but future visitors may expect to find arrangements at these Headquarters somewhat different from those described in this report.

2. Since the period covered by the report, AFHQ has moved from Algiers to Caserta, 5th Army has moved to the Cecina area and AAI has probably moved to the Siena area.

3. An effort was made at each Headquarters visited to observe the manner in which U material was handled and, in addition, to study the activities of each of the sections dealing with, or supplying information for, intelligence matters. Observations of the former type are here reported in more detail, but it is believed that observations of the latter type served a very useful purpose, both by giving a rounded view of the intelligence organization and also by suggesting sources and agencies available on call for information useful in evaluating or interpreting U material.

4. Times of departure and arrival, as stated in the Itinerary, are approximate.

5. We understood that our ultimate assignment would be at an Army or Army Group Headquarters; consequently, our

primary interest was directed to operations at AAI and 5th Army. At AFHQ we sought to become generally familiar with the work done, with particular emphasis on what types of information or services were available to, and desired from, the intelligence organizations at Army and Army-Group level.


6. The following report is that of the undersigned only. Major Wallace is making a separate report.

ITINERARY

Started from	At	On	By	Arrived at	At	On	By
London	0015	19 June	rail	Newquay	0830	19 June	rail
Newquay (St. Mawgan A/F)	2320	19 June	air	Casablanca (Cazes A/F)	0720	20 June	air
Casablanca (Cazes A/F)	0950	20 June	air	(Dry run - returned to Cazes A/F shortly after takeoff due to mechanical difficulty).			
	1500	20 June	air	Algiers (Maison Blanche A/F)	2000	20 June	air
Algiers (Maison Blanche A/F)	0715	1 July	air	Naples (Capodicino A/F)	1200	1 July	air
Naples (Capodicino A/F)	1315	1 July	air	Rome (Littorio A/F)	1415	1 July	air
Rome	1400	2 July	car	AAI (Lake Bolsena)	1600	2 July	car
AAI (Lake Bolsena)	1130	9 July	car	5th Army	1615	9 July	car
5th Army*	1100	13 July	car	AAI (Lake Bolsena)	1600	13 July	car
AAI (Lake Bolsena)	1300	16 July	car	Rome	1600	16 July	car
Rome (Littorio A/F)	0900	18 July	air	Naples (Capodicino A/F)	1000	18 July	air
Naples (Capodicino A/F)	1115	18 July	air	Algiers (Maison Blanche A/F)	1615	18 July	air
Algiers (Maison Blanche A/F)	1415	19 July	air	Port	1730	19 July	air
Port	1830	19 July	air	Casablanca (Cazes A/F)	1925	19 July	air
Casablanca (Cazes A/F)	2110	19 July	air	Newquay (St. Mawgan A/F)	0600	20 July	air
Newquay (St. Mawgan A/F)	1530	20 July	air	London	1705	20 July	air

*While at 5th Army, trips were taken by car to:
 Photo. Recn. Units at Follonica on 11 July
 PW cage at Civita Vecchia, on 12 July.

II. MEDITERRANEAN COMMANDS



- Sigs. I - W/C Morgan (B)
Lt.Col. Lonnon (A)
Other officers
- "A" Force - Brig. Dudley Clark (B)
Lt. Col. Train (A)
Maj. W.E. Rose (?)
- Tech. I - Maj. Webb (A)
teams of officers specializing in particular
service, such as ORDNANCE materiel.
- MAAF - Air Commodore Wooley (B)
W/C J. Hurst (B)
other officers

+Those individuals whose names are underlined are known
to be indoctrinated.

B. AFHQ - ALGIERS: NOTES ON TOUR OF G-2 SECTION

In this section is set out a brief summary of our activities in Algiers with particular reference to the individuals interviewed and the nature of our discussions with them. In the next following section, an attempt will be made to outline in more detail the G-2 procedures and techniques as they existed at that Headquarters at the time of our visit.

We arrived in Algiers on the evening of 20 June and on the following morning proceeded to the SLU offices on the top floor of AFHQ in the Hotel St. George. Due notice of our coming had preceded us and we were cordially received by F/Lt. Frew, in the absence of W/C Crawshaw who was then in Gibraltar. Both because F/Lt. Frew was obviously unwilling to proceed to details without further instructions from the W/C and because we thought it best to approach the G-2 organization through the SLU, we deferred further action until W/C Crawshaw's return. In the meantime we were given office space in the SLU section and were given access to incoming messages and the section files.

It may be appropriate to mention at this time that earlier reports as to the cooperation and courtesies extended by the various SLU units to visitors such as ourselves were fully confirmed by our experience.

We had our first interview with W/C Crawshaw on the morning of 22 June and at that time he reviewed the work of the SLU unit at AFHQ, showed us the files and records maintained there, discussed his own duties (with particular reference to the security problems encountered by him), and, as well, took us through and explained the operations of the SCU unit at AFHQ. Subsequently, the W/C arranged for us to meet Colonel Sloane, Lt. Colonel Hitchens and other key personnel of the G-2 section and made himself available to answer such questions as occurred to us in the course of our tour.

Throughout our stay in Algiers, it was our practice to proceed first to the SLU offices each morning for the purpose of reviewing all messages received the preceding day. This procedure fitted in well with the G-2 routine, because pressure of work made it impossible to see members of the operating staff in the early morning.

Our first interview within the G-2 Section at AFHQ was with Colonel Strong, who is responsible for Operational Intelligence and reports directly to Generals Airey and Roderick. Colonel Sloane outlined generally both the G-2

Sloane

organization at AFHQ and the manner in which U material is there handled. He also answered a number of questions and conducted us through the War Room. In answer to our request, he stated that it would be impossible for us to attend a morning conference because of strict limitations on the number allowed to sit in.

Thereafter we talked with Lt. Col. Hitchens who is responsible for posting a map based on U material which is kept in General Airey's office during the day and in the U library at night. Col. Hitchens also prepares a brief daily paper outlining development of the preceding twenty-four hours and this is used (by Col. Sloane or by Col. Hitchens) to brief Generals Airey and Roderick each morning before the conference. At the same time, we spoke with Major Roberts who generally assists and understudies Col. Hitchens.

It is advisable to note that at the time of our arrival in Algiers, General Airey had just undertaken his new duties at AFHQ. Consequently, the time of General Roderick and of the other key members of the G-2 Staff was very much taken up in bringing him abreast of the current situation at that Headquarters. Every effort was made to meet the needs of our mission, but it is probable that these circumstances limited the time we were able to spend with such key personnel (e.g., Col. Sloane, Lt. Col. Hitchens).

The same circumstances made it impossible for us to see Generals Airey and Roderick for several days. When we did, the conversation related mainly to the nature of the work we were to do and the training we were undergoing in preparation therefor. We stated that in addition to our educational mission, we had also been instructed to request expressions of opinion as to how the U service might be improved or made more useful to the field commands. Generals Airey and Roderick expressed the view that, in view of the number of individuals who had recently visited AFHQ and the action that had been taken on their recommendations, all difficulties had been eliminated for the present. General Roderick suggested that we see him again on our return. This we did.

Our detailed study of the G-2 organization at AFHQ and the handling of U material there began with our interview with Major Larsen, Chief of the Order of Battle Section and responsible for the spade work in connection with U material (other than that relating to the Balkans and to supply and communications). Major Larsen outlined to us in detail the manner in which U material is received and processed at AFHQ, took us through the U library,

showed us the files, records and maps he maintains, and also conducted us on a tour of the Order of Battle Section. Mainly, of course, this section is composed of unindoctrinated individuals who deal with open sources. He also discussed in some detail the various security problems that had arisen, particularly with reference to the unindoctrinated officers in the Section.

Through Major Larsen we met Captains Fraser and Mertens who compose the Supply and Communications Section at AFHQ. We talked with them at some length and reviewed their records.

Major Larsen also introduced us to Major Brookfield and Captain Ching who specialize in Balkan or Eastern Mediterranean matters and handle the U material dealing with those areas. We reviewed their procedures, their reports and their records.

We also sought to meet the Signals Intelligence staff at AFHQ, but it was suggested that, in view of the fact that their work was very much the same at each headquarters, we should wait until we arrived at AAI and 5th Army before pursuing that line of inquiry. We were also unsuccessful in our attempt to speak with Lt. Col. Train, who deals with A Force matters under the direction of Brigadier Clark. W/C Crawshaw, who sought an appointment for us, reported Col. Train's statement to the effect that the work of the A Force Staff had been explained to several visiting officers and it was felt that no useful purpose had been served thereby. This appeared to rest in large part on the belief that it would take several months for one to understand A Force activities.

At our own request we were introduced to Wing Commander Hurst, who is in charge of U material for MAAP. The W/C fully explained his activities and opened his files to us.

We inquired specifically of each of the individuals we met whether he could advise us of any others at AFHQ whom it would be advisable to contact. Those listed above include all of the sections and individuals suggested by Lt. Col. McKee and at AFHQ (where the customary answer was in the negative).

We were delayed for several days at Algiers because of the fact that AAI (Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy) was moving from Caserta to the neighborhood of Lake Bolsena and consequently withheld approval of our visit pending completion of the movement. We were finally enabled to depart on 1 July and travelled by air to Rome, via Naples (where we stopped only for lunch). In Rome, we secured transportation to AAI (Advance) from AAI (Rear), which is situated in Rome and arrived at Lake Bolsena on the afternoon of 2 July.

C. AFHQ - ALGIERS: NOTES ON OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES OF G-2 SECTION

1. Introductory:

It is obvious, but worth mentioning, that the G-2 Section at AFHQ performs a dual function. On the one hand it acts to keep the C. in C. (and his immediate staff) informed on intelligence matters in as much detail as is appropriate to the level of the headquarters. On the other hand, it correlates material arising from the various sources of intelligence and transmits the resulting summaries and studies to the field commands (as well as to London and Washington). The former function is predominant and in it a freer use of U material may be made. The section also has a semi-operational function insofar as its supply and communication sub-section is concerned, because that sub-section produces studies on the basis of which air targets can be and are recommended. By far the greater part of this work is based on U material.

2. Receipt of U Material at AFHQ and Delivery thereof to G-2 Section.

At AFHQ in Algiers the SCU and SLU units were situated in adjoining offices on the top floor of the headquarters building. Incoming messages were received at the SCU office and were there logged and deciphered. The deciphered message was produced on gummed strips and was retyped onto flimsies for delivery to the SLU office. All copies were delivered to the SLU office where the gummed-strip and typed messages were compared and logged and the routing was checked. It is understood that the copies on gummed strips were kept on file in the SLU office for about two months while SLU office copies of the typed messages were retained for a period of approximately 20 days. After this processing, the typed messages were segregated in folders for delivery in accordance with the following distribution:

Army	1
Navy	1
Air	3
SLU file	1
SLU Adm.	
Officer	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	7

Messages marked 3 Z and above were delivered as received. Others were held for regular deliveries, of which there were usually three per day, one in the morning, one in the afternoon and one in the evening.

It was the practice of certain officers at AFHQ, notably Col. Train, to go to the SLU office to read messages rather than to the U library maintained by the Army G-2 section, but this practice may have originated because of the small size of the room used as U library and the number using it.

W/C Crawshaw's discussion of security problems arising in connection with the dissemination of U material conformed with earlier discussions on this subject as heard in the UK. It was indicated in the course of this discussion that there has been no undue curiosity as to the functions of the SLU unit at AFHQ.

3. Use of U Material at AFHQ, G-2 Section.

One floor down from the SLU offices in the headquarters building of AFHQ in Algiers, and a short distance along the hall, was the room used as an office by the Supply and Communication subsection of G-2, all members of which were indoctrinated. Opening off of this office, and having no entrance of its own onto the hall, was a small room used as the U library.

SLU deliveries were made to the U library where an officer (or T/Sgt. Heinecke who was indoctrinated) remained on duty at all times. No individual not on the list was allowed into the room. Incoming messages were kept there in folders, but such messages were not retained for more than about three or four days. If the text of an earlier message was desired, it was necessary to go to the SLU office to refer to the same.

It was the practice at AFHQ for officers on the list to drop into the U library twice daily in order to read the incoming messages. For those attending or preparing for the morning conference, this meant an early morning visit prior to the conference and a late afternoon visit to review the messages which had come in during the day.

Also in the U library were two maps based on U sources. A third map, on a portable map board (which was posted by Colonel Hitchens daily on the basis of U material), was kept in General Airey's office during the day and was returned to the U library in the evening. The last mentioned map had on one side the situation in Italy, showing dispositions down to divisions and independent non-divisional units and on the other side the situation on the Horman coast, showing dispositions in the same detail. These were ordinary 1/100,000 maps covered with acetate and dispositions were indicated by pencilled symbols. Of the two remaining maps in the U library, one showed Italian and Southern French dispositions and the other showed the situation existing in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. The former was posted by Major Larsen and the latter by Major Brookfield and Captain Ching. It

was indicated that these latter maps were generally maintained currently, but they were not used for other than reference purposes and there did not appear to be any rule requiring that all data be posted within a certain time after receipt.

Also in the U library were two card files, one maintained on OB Italy by Major Larsen and the other maintained on OB Balkans by Major Brookfield. Both were based on U material solely and were typical in form and in the classifications used.

Other files based on U material were maintained in the office of the Supply and Communication subsection adjoining the U library. These included records of shipping movements, classified by boats and by ports, of the enemy supply position, of dumps and installations, and of rail and road conditions, including the state of the enemy's M/T.

The definite impression was obtained that the C. in C. at AFHQ was briefed very largely on the basis of U material. The procedure was as follows:

Major Larsen, Chief of the OB Section, read all incoming messages, abstracted items relating to the Italian and Southern French fronts for his card file, posted the U map in the U library for these areas, and, in addition, in his capacity as Chief of the OB Section, reviewed the large amount of data based on open sources prepared by his staff. He also reviewed the Y material as it came in. Major Larsen prepared no written summary or report for Col. Hitchens, but he did have a daily talk with him, at which time the current situation was reviewed generally. Col. Hitchens, of course, read all U material himself. Independently, Major Brookfield or Captain Ching of the Eastern Mediterranean subsection prepared a written daily summary of events in that area and handed the same to Col. Hitchens. The Colonel also received a written daily summary of U material received during the preceding 24 hours. In addition, summaries and estimates prepared by the Supply and Communications Section were handed to Col. Hitchens as they were prepared.

With these various informal reports before him, Col. Hitchens prepared a daily statement of the situation during the preceding 24 hours which was used by Col. Sloane or by Col. Hitchens to advise Generals Airey and Roderick prior to the conference each morning. The point is not entirely clear, but the impression was received that such briefing was oral, although the man who attended the conference may have read Col. Hitchens' paper or even taken it with him to the conference. At any rate, whichever of the two presented the G-2 report at the morning conference did so orally.

No file of Col. Hitchens' daily papers was retained and they were destroyed immediately after use. None were seen by us. A number of the other written summaries mentioned above were read and it was noted that all were based almost exclusively upon the U or U messages received during the previous day.

4. Use of U Material at MAAF, A-2 Section.

The use of the U material at MAAF is somewhat different from that at AFHQ. The U material is received and kept in the office of W/C Hurst. All personnel of that office are indoctrinated. In the place of card files, a log is maintained consisting of copies of the messages pasted in a book. In addition W/C Hurst prepares a written daily summary of events of the preceding 24 hours and this is read by Air Commodore Wooley, who comes into the W/C's room for the purpose. Maps showing some target data and GAF dispositions are maintained, but little emphasis or reliance appeared to be placed upon these maps.

Air-Ground liaison, insofar as the U material is concerned, appears to be confined mainly to discussions at the morning conferences. Points of contact in the field of operations seem to be confined to the question of suitable air attack objectives. On the basis of data accumulated by the Supply and Communications Subsection of G-2, ground intelligence may recommend such objectives of a certain type (such as bridges) leaving the choice of targets to the Air Force. Such recommendations may or may not agree with Air Intelligence recommendations and any points of difference are resolved at the morning conferences.

Neither at AFHQ nor at the other ground headquarters visited was there any attempt to maintain an air order of battle on maps showing GAF dispositions or strengths.

The foregoing is not intended to cover air-ground liaison in the sphere of photo reconnaissance which will be considered in a later portion of this report.

5. Procedure of Sections Using Open Sources at AFHQ.

The principal subdivision of the G-2 Section at AFHQ is the Order of Battle Group headed by Major Larsen. Within the section his duties appear to be mainly supervisory. One important function performed by him, of course, is the review of the various publications produced by the unindoctrinated members of the section to eliminate, so far as possible, errors arising from the non-availability of U material.

Directly subordinate to Major Larsen is Capt. Judge, who has been specializing in strategical studies. We were unable to see Capt. Judge during our tour. On our return visit to Algiers we were informed by Major Larsen that Capt. Judge had been placed on the U list and was being trained to replace Major Larsen. The new position contemplated for Major Larsen was not mentioned.

OB Central Mediterranean, covering Italy, is the responsibility of Captain Henderson who uses all the various open sources, including CX reports, interrogation of PW reports, U, and the various publications produced by inferior and superior units. He is assisted by Lt. Marcus who specializes in the interpretation of captured documents. Typical card files are maintained, as well as a map showing dispositions down to divisional level.

Coordinate functions are performed by Capts. Siegel and Sawbridge with respect to Southern France; by Major Brookfield and Capt. Ching with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly the Balkan area (Greece and Rumania being the primary responsibility of Cairo); and by Capt. Raggi and Lt. Rush with respect to the Fascist Italian army. Lt. Rush also correlates and reports on information dealing with evacuation and political problems.

The records maintained by each of the aforementioned subsections are typical, and similar to those maintained in B.P. and Washington. Capt. Raggi uses a folder of map sheets interleaved with tracing paper on which to note down every report on the situation and composition of Italian units. This procedure, which appears to be relatively rare, would appear to be of considerable value in evaluating and correlating in graphic manner a number of apparently unrelated reports such as those received from OSS or CX sources.

Additional subsections of the OB Section deal with Defenses (one officer), Organization of the German Army (Capt. Allen and Capt. Koch) and Personalities. (one officer). Again records and files are typical.

The Order of Battle Section as a whole produces a daily intelligence bulletin and more detailed intelligence summaries and notes, the former utilizing Y sources and not being circulated below corps, and the latter omitting Y material and going to divisions. These latter papers are published roughly each week.

The Supply and Communications Section is relatively independent and it seeks to maintain information as to the enemy's supply position and the most effective means of making the same deteriorate. As previously mentioned, this section relies mainly upon U sources, although photo-reconnaissance pictures are also utilized. Maps are prepared showing the effect of attacks on enemy communications, and, as well, enemy dumps and installations.

Another section of the C-2 organization at AFHQ is that dealing with technical intelligence. The British and American methods of handling this type of work appear to differ somewhat. The British system is to have a single group of officers investigate

and report on enemy materiel of all types. The Americans, on the other hand, have organized field teams of specialists in ordnance, and other classes of equipment who confine themselves to materiel falling within their particular field. We heard no criticism of either method and each has certain advantages. The technical intelligence section of AFHQ publishes bulletins summarizing the results of its studies.

6. Comments on Use of U Material at AFHQ.

The following comments are submitted for what they are worth, calling attention to the fact that the undersigned made only a brief visit to the headquarters concerned, did no operational work there, and during his stay was mainly interested in learning the technique of field operations.

The general impression received as to the manner in which U material is utilized at AFHQ is that the entire indoctrinated group fully appreciated the value of the source, and relied heavily upon it. The attitude of the field group with respect to security is the same as that encountered at B.P. In this relation, we were informed by Major Larsen that he knew that the unindoctrinated members of the G-2 organization were aware of a source of information unavailable to them, but he had no indication that they appreciated the nature of such source. At any rate, there was no evidence of undue curiosity.

There is one feature as to the field use of U material that forces itself strongly upon one who has come directly from B.P. Throughout the period of our stay at B.P., we were impressed by the extreme care and effort devoted to use precisely the right phraseology in outgoing messages. In view of that fact, it would appear that the messages in their original form should be read by each man who must take action or make decisions on them. As a matter of fact, however, those who make the decisions often receive nothing more than summaries or abstracts of the original signals in which the full flavour of the original may be lost. The same applies to card files based on U material. Unless, when reference is made to such files, reference is also made to the original messages on which the notes are based, again there is a possibility that error will develop.

It is recognized that those who must make decisions have limited time, but it does not seem impossible for them to read all vital messages at the time they receive whatever type of briefing may be customary at their headquarters. Insofar as card files are concerned, it would appear more responsive to the peculiar needs of the material to have a properly indexed log of messages — since there is in reality little difference in the security problem involved.

IV. AAI - LAKE BOLSENA

A. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

C. in C. - General ALEXANDER (B)+
CGS (or CS) - Lt.Gen. A.F. HARDING (B)
DCGS (or DCS) - Maj.Gen. L.L. LEMNITZER (A)
CAO (Chief Adm. Officer) - Maj.Gen. B.H. ROBERTSON (B)
BGS (ops) (or G-3) - Brig. H.S.E. MAINWARING (B)
BGS (I) (or G-2) - Brig. C.E.R. HIRSCH (B)
PA to BGS(I) (or Aide) - Capt. D.E.L. HAYNES (B)

I (a)
(Combat Int.)

G-1 - Lt.Col. D.W.C. HUNT (B)
G-2 - Maj. F.R. RAWLES (B)
Maj. H.G. EDWARDS (B)++
G-3 - Capt. O.L. GENTY (A)
IC - Capt. W.G. CRAWFORD (B)
IO - Capt. H. de HADELN (B)
IC - Capt. EVANS (B)
7 Clerks (B)
2 Orderlies (B)

I (a) V
(Photo. Rcn.)

G-2 - Maj. H.W. BUCHANAN (A)
G-3 - Capt. WHITE (B)
9 Clerks (7A, 2B)
1 Orderly (A)

I (p)
(Logistics Int.)

G-2 - Maj. M.C. HOFFMAN (A)
G-3 - Capt. S.T. MEADOWS (B)

I (s)
(Sigs. Int.)

G-1 - Lt.Col. MAKOWER (B)
3 other officers (B)
5 clerks (B)
1 orderly (B)

+Those whose names are underlined are indoctrinated. Chief Sig. Officer is also

++Maj. Edwards has been posted to AFHQ and will probably be replaced by Capt. Evans.

I (b)
(Counter. Int.)

G-1 - Lt.Col. GIBSON (B)
G-2 - Maj. THILL (A)
7 other officers (5B, 2A)
6 clerks (3B, 3A)
1 orderly (B)

I (c)
(Censorship)

3 officers (2B, 1A)
2 clerks (1B, 1 vacancy)

I (z)
(Adm.)

1 officer (B)

I (tech.)
(Tech. Int.)

G-2 - Maj. BAWELAM (B)
G-3 - Capt. THOMPSON (A)
1 other officer (B)
1 clerk (B)

SLU

F/Lt. THOMPSON (B)
F/Lt. NEWPORT (B)
F/Lt. STEVENSON (B)
F/O HOSTER (B)
Lt. ? (B)

"A" Force

Lt. Col. R.A. BROMLEY-DAVENPORT
1 Maj. (B)
1 Capt. (B)

1st TAF

CG - Maj.Gen. CANNON
CS - Air Commodore HUDDLESON
Air Ops (A-3) Colonel (A)
Air Int. - W/C WISEMAN (B)
Capt. AUSTIN (A)

Naval Liaison

Capt. A.L. BESANT (B)
1 Sub.Lt.
Wireless unit

No. 1 - ICU

Col. G.S. SMITH (A)
Lt.Col. T.G. YOUNG (A)
Maj. WARD (B)
Maj. J.A. COLE (A)

B. AAI - NOTES ON TOUR OF I SECTION

Our stay at Headquarters, AAI (adv.), on the shore of Lake Bolsena, was divided into two periods. We arrived at about noon 2 July and remained until 9 July, at which time we proceeded to Headquarters, 5th Army. We returned from 5th Army on 13 July and departed from AAI finally, en route to the UK, on 16 July.

Upon our arrival at AAI, we first contacted F/Lt. Thompson who is in charge of the SLU unit there and who had received notice of our coming from Algiers. He conducted us to the Nissen Hut used by the I Section where we were introduced to Capt. Gentry of the I (a) staff. The latter then took over and generally guided us about for the period of our stay.

When we were at AAI, the command was under canvas and conditions were ideal for informal meetings and discussions with all members of the Intelligence organization. This was facilitated by the fact that U activity was concentrated in the Nissen Hut above mentioned, into which no unindoctrinated personnel were admitted (with certain exceptions to be noted later). Consequently, our tour at AAI consisted less of formal interviews than of a daily circulation around the I section, observing the work and questioning the men who were doing it.

Special mention should be made of the time and assistance given to us by Captain Gentry. Prior to our visits to the other members of the Int. organization, he outlined in considerable detail the organization of the section and the handling of U material therein. He secured appointments with those men, in and out of the I section, whom we sought to meet and made a number of helpful suggestions in that respect. Of special value was his review of the development of the technique of handling U material at AAI. He also made all necessary administrative arrangements for us. There is no question but that our stay at AAI would have been less valuable without his able assistance.

We had several talks with Brig. Hirsch, BGS (I) or G-2 at AAI during our stay there. In the course thereof he offered us all assistance and stated that he was entirely satisfied with the U service as he was receiving it. At the time of our first visit to AAI, Col. Smith was acting G-2 at 5th Army, during the temporary absence of General Howard. We had the opportunity of talking with Col. Smith, however, when we visited 5th Army.

At AAI, both members of the I (p) or Logistics Intelligence subsection were indoctrinated and all save one member of the I (a) or Combat Intelligence subsection were in the picture. Consequently, we were able to obtain a clear idea of their activities in the course of conversations in the U hut, supplemented by visits to their tents to look over records and files. The sole unindoctrinated member of the I (a) staff, Capt. Crawford, specialized in

Order of Battle and we spent a morning talking with him and going over his records.

In addition, we spent a day in I (a) V, or the photo reconnaissance section where the work of the unit was explained to us by Major Buchanan and we examined the various types of reports prepared and received there. With respect to Sigs. Int. (I (a)), Counter Int. (I (b)), and Technical Intelligence (I (tech.)), we confined ourselves to discussions with the chief of section, supplemented, where advisable, by observation of records and reports.

Although we spent no time at the A Force section at AFHQ, we did examine the U records maintained for the benefit of that section. We also had a talk with F/Lt. Thompson regarding SLU activities and problems at AAI and, as well, two excellent discussions with Capt. Austin who handles U material for W/C Wiseman, A-2 for the 1st TAF.

After visiting all of the I subsections and the related units, we talked with Lt. Col. Hunt and Major Rawles who head the I (a) staff and are immediately subordinate to Brig. Hirsch and Col. Smith.

Our last task at AAI was to consolidate the notes we had taken and to seek to fill in the gaps. In this, as this report shows, we were not entirely successful.

C. AAI - NOTES ON OPERATION AND TECHNIQUES.

1. Receipt and Distribution

SLU operations at AAI are performed in caravans situated in a section of the bivouac area reserved for the unit and within easy access of the I section. Messages classified 4 and 5 Z are delivered upon receipt. All others are held for the four regular daily deliveries at 0730, 1200, 1630, and 2100. Deliveries are made to the Lissen Hut previously mentioned (which might be termed the U hut), where an indoctrinated member of the I staff is on duty 24 hours per day. SLU delivers two typewritten copies of each message to the I section. Another copy is delivered to 1st TAF which is camped next to AAI.

There is little to add with respect to the security problems encountered by the SLU unit at AAI since they are in all respects similar to those of AFHQ. We were told that some indoctrinated personnel were under the impression that the function of the SLU unit was to enable officers at highest levels to exchange comments (such as reprimands or acrimonious debates) of a character unsuitable for regular channels of communication. It was stated that nothing was said to contradict this belief because of its obvious security value.

2. Filing and Logging.

As has previously been mentioned, the SLU unit delivers two typewritten copies of each message to the U hut. As the messages coming on a single delivery are handed over, the I officer or dut. at the hut checks them over with the SLU receipt and at the same time numbers from 1 up, in pencil, the messages received on that delivery. On the first and last messages, the total number of messages received on that delivery is noted also. Hence, immediately after a delivery is received, it is possible to check whether all messages can be accounted for.

After marking, all of the messages of one set are placed in a folder, marked "Army (2)", which accomodates the messages received during the preceding 24 hour period. At the same time, the set of messages received on the delivery made 24 hours earlier is withdrawn from the folder and burned by the duty officer.

The messages of the second set are then segregated into two groups, one dealing with I (a) or combat intelligence matters and the other dealing with I (p) or logistics intelligence matters. If a message is of interest to both groups, a cross reference is made so that written notice of the same will be in both files.

The I (a) pile of messages is then placed in the I (a) folder for the delivery on which the same were received and the I (p) pile is placed in the I (p) folder for that delivery. In all there are 6 folders which are marked and in which deliveries are kept as indicated below:

Folder marked

I (a)	-	messages dealing with	I (a)	matters rec'd.	on	1200	delivery
I (p)	-	"	"	"	"	1200	"
II (a)	-	"	"	"	"	1630	"
II (p)	-	"	"	"	"	1630	"
III (a)	-	"	"	"	"	2100 and	
						0730	deliveries
III (p)	-	"	"	"	"	2100 and	
						0730	deliveries

Messages are kept in folders based on the delivery on which the same were received, rather than by number because of the confusion in the time of receipt of numbered messages caused by priorities and because those who read the messages in a particular folder wish to know that they have read everything that has come in up to that time. Messages are segregated as between those relating to I (a) matters and those relating to I (p) matters so that the members of both sections can work on them at the same time.

As the messages received on a particular delivery are placed in the I (a) and I (p) folders, messages filed 24 hours earlier are withdrawn from the folders and logged - that is to say that they are posted in notebooks classified according to subject matter. The U logs maintained at AAI during the period of our visit were:

For I (a)

Invasion - covering events in France
Balkans - " " " Balkans
Italy - " " " Italy
Knowledge of OB - covering German knowledge of Allied OB
MK Comments - intertheater comments, queries, etc.

For I (p)

Supply - what enemy has
Shipping - } enemy supplies enroute and state of routes
RR & Roads - }
Dumps (Ammo. & Gas) } Where the enemy stores
Installations (Refineries, Arsenals, etc.) and makes his supplies

We were told, and saw, that the categories into which logs are to be divided will vary depending on local requirements and will vary locally as the situation changes.

The only log that appears to require special comment is that dealing with German knowledge of Allied order of battle. This is maintained primarily for the use of the Air Force and Counter-Intelligence groups, the chief of each group being indoctrinated. Both stated that they found the same to be most valuable.

At one time an attempt was made to maintain a map showing this data, but this is no longer done at AAI. It is probable that if such a map were desired, it should be posted by those who are primarily interested in this type of material, since, from what little we were able to gather, both the counter-intelligence and Air Force fields (particularly the latter) are relatively specialized.

On the cover of each U log is noted the date upon which the same was opened and, ultimately, the date upon which it was closed. There is no regular rule as to the time when U logs are destroyed. The criterion used at AAI was the completion of a particular phase in operations. For example, at the time we were there, logs dealing with events prior to the beginning of the drive through Cassino were destroyed. When the line stabilized again, or perhaps when the Gothic line was reached, another group of logs could be destroyed. The criteria in this respect must be indefinite and pragmatic rather than one based on a time table.

In addition to the folders and logs kept in the U hut, the following notes based on U material are also kept there:

By or For I (a) and Related Sections

- German OB - Italy - in loose leaf notebook rather than on cards
- Location List of identified German formations
- Personalities - also in loose leaf notebook form
- Tank Strengths and other strengths
- Distribution of German Divisions
- Flak OB
- Reference Points - given up during our tour on ground that when reference points are known, they are included in the messages received in the field.

A Force Notes

By or For I (p)

General Notes

- Returns - worked out to ton, or days of use basis; selected items most in use included and rest excluded to avoid weighted average.
- Shipping Notes - Correlations, classified by movements and ports
- Supply Notes
- Maps - Logistics Data - originated during our tour; an effort to display graphically, each week, the enemy supply and communications picture and, by comparison of successive weeks, spot trends and developments.

The more general files, also kept in the U hut of AAI, included:

- SHAEP Cositintreps
- A Force Plans
- AFHQ Summaries
- ICE Summaries

In addition, the following files of papers produced by the I Section at AAI were kept in the U hut:

- Daily Bulletin - I (a) - as prepared daily by Lt. Col. Hunt, for Brig. Hirsch
- Daily Bulletin - I (p) - as prepared daily by Maj. Hoffman, for Brig. Hirsch
- Appreciations - long range - usually signed by Brig. Hirsch; some signed by Gen. Alexander.
- Estimates - shorter range - usually prepared by Maj. Rawles.
- Strategic Bulletins - by Maj. Rawles or Maj. Edwards.
- AAI Cositintreps - daily, one paragraph by I Section.
- Intelligence Summary - AAI - weekly, includes Y information and doesn't go below corps.
- Intelligence Notes - AAI - No Y - to division and below.

All of the above-mentioned folders, notes, files, and other items were numbered and kept in a wooden filing case and in a field

safe standing beside it. They could be located by reference to the following diagram and list, posted on the wall of the U hut above the safe+:

I (a) I (p)	II (a) II(p)	III (a) III (p)
Papers to be filed	11,12,13,39,48 OB References	4 Daily Bulletin I (p)
Daily Bulletin I(a)	20,41,42,43 Invasion & Strat. Files	Appreciations - I(p)
8,24,46,51,52 Logs I (a)	16 MK Comments I(a)	36,38,54,55 Logs I (p)
9,10,14,15,50 Appreciations - I (a) Estimates & Returns	17 Brig. H. Personal	22,23,37,44 Supplies, Returns & Logs - I (p)
registered numbers not in use 5,6,7,26,28,29,32, 33,34,35,40,45	In Safe 21,25,27,30,31, 47,49,53	Total 55


1. I (a) & I (p)
2. II(a) & II(p)
3. III(a) & III(p)
4. Daily Bulletin I (p)
5. Italy Log - I (a)
6. Balkans Log - I (a)
7. Knowledge of OB Log - I(a)
8. Army 2 - message file
9. Numbered Appreciations I (a)
10. Misc. Appreciations I (a)
11. German OB Italy - I (a)
12. German Personalities Italy I (a)
13. Location List of Identif./German
14. Estimates I (a) / Formations
15. Tank Strengths I (a)
16. MIS Comments
17. Brig. H - personal
18. Daily Bulletin I (a)
19. Appreciations I (p)
20. SHAEF COSITINTREPS
21. Supply Log I (p)
22. Supplies-Logs & Returns I (p)
23. Dumps Log I (p)
24. Italy Log I (a)
25. Bigot Anvil I (a)
26. Flak OB - I (a)
27. A Force Cover Plans I (a)
28. German OB Italy - I (a)

29. Reference Points I (a)
30. Distribution of German Divisions I (a)
31. Shipping File I (p)
32. Balkans Log I (a)
33. Italy Log I (a)
34. Italy Log I (a)
35. OB Log - Maj. Heard
36. Shipping Log I (p)
37. Supply Notes Log I (p)
38. AFHQ Summaries I (p)
39. A Force Log I (a)
40. Italy Log I (a)
41. Invasion Bulletins I (a)
42. Misc. Strat. Bulletins I (a)
43. Invasion Log I (a)
44. Supply Log I (p)
45. Knowledge of OB Log I (a)
46. Balkans Log I (a)
47. Italy Log I (a)
48. Master File German OB Italy I (a)
49. Italy Log I (a)
50. ICE Summaries
51. Knowledge of OB Log I (a)
52. Clippings only
53. Italy Log I (a)
54. Installations Log I (p)
55. R R Log I (p)

*Numbers on the diagram were on slips of paper attached to the diagram by strips of Scotch tape, enabling one to shift them easily. Duplications in the list are mainly logs covering different periods of time.

3. Operations of the I Section at AAI

The ground plan of the U hut at AAI is as follows:



The following maps were posted in the U hut at AAI which required raised walls and longitudinal partitions because of their size:

1. Italy - This map (1/100,000) showed units down to Bns. on both sides. Unit designations had been marked on rectangular strips of paper to which were attached strips of Scotch Tape, enabling changes to be made easily. Boundaries and lines were indicated by crayon. Higher headquarters were indicated by symbols (Div. and above)
2. Normandy - This map (1/100,000) was similar to the above but showed units only down to division and independent non-divisional units.
3. Europe - This map (1/1,000,000) showed dispositions and lines on all fronts down to divisions.
4. Italy - air - This map (1/500,000) was used by the air representatives at the morning conferences to designate targets and objectives.
5. Enemy defenses-Italy - This map, prepared by I (a) V, was based on open sources (Photo. Recon.)
6. Supply map - Italy - This was a map used by I (p) to show the state of enemy supply lines and communications.

The foregoing maps, save for the one on enemy defenses, were based upon all available sources, including U, and no attempt was made in posting the maps to distinguish as between sources. This should be qualified by noting that U reports were always dated, but this would also be true of sitreps and like reports. The practice at AAI, therefore, differed from that at AFHQ where maps, notes and files were either U or open sources exclusively, and the two were not combined.

The set of maps found at AAI, as a whole, was by far the best observed on our tour.

The U hut at AAI has been described in some detail, because it is believed that it represents an advance over the other arrangements observed. The advantages of having a single, secure place where all U data is freely available and all indoctrinated persons at a headquarters can meet and discuss U matters fully,

cannot be overestimated. The U library at AFHQ roughly served the same purpose, but it seemed inadequate in size and by no means all U data was kept there, since some was held in the SLU office and the basic U maps were kept in the G-2's office.

Shortly before our arrival at AAI the practice was there adopted of having a morning conference at the U hut at 0930 each morning immediately following the 0900 conference in the Ops. caravan. The meeting at the U hut was attended solely by indoctrinated personnel and was headed by the C. in C. This, we were told, was the vital meeting of the day and most of the work of the I section was devoted to the preparation of material and briefing the BGS (I) for this meeting.

Aside from this meeting, it should be noted that the U hut was visited frequently by members of the I(a) staff (all but one being in the picture), the I (p) staff (all being in the picture) and the other I men who were indoctrinated. Consequently, there was a constant exchange of ideas, greatly facilitated by the existence of a secure, common meeting place.

The sole exception to the rule against the admission of unindoctrinated personnel to the U hut at AAI was made in the case of enlisted draftsmen who were brought in from time to time to show them what was wanted for map slips etc. This was thought to be helpful for security purposes, because the men admitted could not interpret the meaning of the maps, while their admission made the hut less of a talk-provoking mystery.

It should also be noted that at AAI in general the men who dealt with the U material also actually worked on material flowing from open sources, while at AFHQ open sources were dealt with almost entirely by unindoctrinated personnel. If the staff is available, the former procedure seems much preferable, because there are many items too unimportant to report that are picked up while reviewing open source material which would be of value to one seeking to interpret U material.

It is possible to review briefly the functions of individuals within the I (a) section at AAI. First, it should be noted that Brig. Hirsch, BGS (I), himself comes to the U hut at least twice daily and reads incoming messages. Consequently, the daily bulletins and reports handed to him serve the function of notes or reminders of what he himself has seen.

Lt. Col. Hunt is Chief of the I (a) section and he, with Major Rawles, reviews incoming material from open sources, marks it for routing within the section, prepares a daily bulletin for Brig. Hirsch consisting mainly of U material, (but also containing significant items from open sources which are indicated as such) and

generally advises with Brig. Hirsch and Col. Smith. The latter acts as the Brig's deputy. Major Rawles tends to specialize in more long range and strategic papers based upon both open and U sources.

Major Edwards (prior to his transfer) and Captain Gentry are occupied with supervising the receipt and filing of U material and in part with posting the maps. The former also prepared strategic studies. Captain de Hadeln specializes in Balkan matters and posted the map for that area. Captain Crawford, the sole unindoctrinated member of the staff, devotes his time to German order of battle, and maintains typical records for that purpose. He also is charged with the translation of captured documents received at AAI.

As distinguished from American organizations, one notable feature of the foregoing is the fact that the Chief of the I (a) section in effect performs the duties of an executive officer and himself reviews, routes, and evaluates all incoming and outgoing material. The volume of open material is large, including as it does:

- CX reports (including OSS and SOE)
- I summaries, 5th Army, daily and more
- I summaries, 8th Army, " " "
- Ops sitreps - 5th and 8th Armies, daily and more
- Corps summaries
- Interrogation of PW reports
 - 5th Army
 - 8th Army
- CSDIC - Advanced and Base units
- U reports - daily and more
- AFHQ - summaries and notes - various intervals.
- War Office and War Department - publications
- Basic news broadcasts
- Monitoring reports
- Reports on Air Ren - photos and visual

The I (p) or Logistics Intelligence group at AAI consists of two officers whose functions are similar to those of the Supply and Communications group at AFHQ. As a result of studies made by this group, recommendations are sometimes made at the morning conferences as to appropriate air attack objectives.

I (a) V, dealing with photo reconnaissance at AAI operates closely with I (p) although neither of the two officers in I (a) V are indoctrinated. This group obtains air photos showing (1) status before attack, (2) bomb damage and (3) state of repairs on:

1. Naval installations and shipping
2. Installations such as fuel and ammo dumps
3. Communications, including roads and RR's
4. Ports and harbours
5. Industries, possible useful targets
6. Defenses.

In addition, special reports are made on defenses, beaches and terrain.

The work of I (tech.) closely parallels that of the organization at AFHQ.


4. First Tactical Air Force.

At AAI we found close cooperation between 1st TAF and AAI, where the two headquarters were situated in neighboring bivouacs. The air intelligence group at 1st TAF performs three major functions under the general direction of the A-2 and Deputy A-2, as follows:

A-2 - W/C Wiseman (indoctrinated)
Deputy A-2 - Capt. Austin (indoctrinated)

1. Air O/B - Capt. Austin, who maintains two notebooks, one of which is open. No maps are maintained.
2. Target planning - two officers.
3. Duty intelligence - 5 officers - maintain 24 hour watch, publish (a) nightly a typewritten summary of the day's operations which is ready for the morning conference; (b) a combined ops and int. summary, daily, which is classified "restricted" and is distributed down to squadrons; (c) studies reporting on enemy activities and results of photo reconnaissance - at various periods.

One additional unit at AAI may be mentioned. This is known as No. 1, ICU, and is an intelligence task force which, by communicating with Army, Navy and Air ascertains the offices and installations likely to contain valuable intelligence material in a place such as Rome which may soon be occupied. This group, with an adequate number of troops, then enters such place in the wake of the combat troops and acts to preserve all such material of value for intelligence purposes.



5. Comments on Intelligence Section at AAI.

It is clear from the foregoing that full and intelligent use of U material is being made at headquarters AAI. Some question could be raised as to whether the duty officer in the U hut should not also be utilized to perform the functions of executive officer in reviewing and routing incoming and outgoing papers.

At this headquarters some dissatisfaction was expressed as to the status of the American members of the staff who, in general, could have undertaken greater responsibilities.

V. 5TH ARMY - NEAR MONTEPESCOLI, NORTH OF ORBETTELLO

A. Organization and Personnel (names underlined, indoctrinated)

CG - General CLARK
CS - Maj.Gen. GRUENTHER
G-3 - Brig.Gen. BRAUN
G-2 - Brig.Gen. HOWARD
DG-2 - Maj. RIGGS (Combat. Int.)

OB
Capt. Fischer
Capt. Pleasants
(also G-2 Historian)

G-2 Reports
Capt. Hindley
Lt. Goodman

Defenses & Targets
Maj. Merks
Capt. Fama

Air Liaison - TAC/R
Maj. Quello

PRU
Lt. Col. Fugelsang (B)
Capt. Boucher (B)

Enemy Equip.
Lt. Col. Stoddard

Adm. & Advance Planning
Maj. King
Adm. Rear
Maj. Hobbs

Sigs I
Maj. Conner
Capt. Giles
Capt. —

SLU
F/Lt. Edwards (B)
F/O Spaulding (D)
F/O Bedford (B)
Lt. Reeves (B)

IPW
Capt. Kolish
7 interrogators

12th TAF
Maj. Corning
Maj. Wocley

B. 5th Army - Notes on Tour of G-2 Section.

Upon arrival at 5th Army Headquarters in bivouac north of Grosseto on 9 July, we reported as usual to the SLU unit and were introduced thereby to Major Griggs, Deputy G-2. Major Riggs explained his activities and duties to us and then introduced us to Major King, administrative officer for the G-2 Section, who arranged a tour of the section for us. This included visits to each of the sections listed on the foregoing tabulation and also (1) a trip to two photo reconnaissance units on 11 July (225th Squadron - RAF and 111th Squadron, USAF), and (2) a trip to the 5th Army prisoner of war interrogation center, then situated at Civita Vecchia, on 12 July.

During the period of our stay we had a talk with Col. Smith of the AAI intelligence group, who was also acting G-2, in the absence of General Howard, and on our last day, we were able to talk with General Howard. Both officers expressed themselves as well satisfied with the U service, although General Howard stated that he desired somewhat fuller coverage than he had been receiving. In answer to our question, General Howard stated that he would be delighted if he could have an officer in addition to Major Riggs with the special duty of handling U material.

We returned to AAI on 13 July. On the way we visited and examined the operations of the administrative rear of the 5th Army G-2 section handling personnel, funds, supplies, translation, publications and distribution thereof, interrogation and Italian Liaison.

C. 5th Army - Operations of G-2 Section.

1. Receipt and Delivery of U material.

At 5th Army, the SLU unit worked in caravans in an area near but segregated from that occupied by the G-2 section. The messages were written out by hand and were delivered at least 3 times a day, morning, afternoon and evening, messages of 3 Z and above being delivered at once. All messages were taken back and destroyed by the SLU unit roughly 24 hours after receipt. No unusual security problems had been encountered.

2. Operation of G-2 Section.

As Deputy G-2, Major Riggs received daily reports from each of the G-2 sections, and, as the sole member of the G-2 staff

in the picture (save for the G-2), he also received all U messages. He made no attempt to abstract or summarize the same, but instead, carried the original messages to the G-2's caravan to be read by him. For record purposes, Maj. Riggs maintained a small notebook on U material and he also maintained a U map which was in folding form and was kept in a safe in his caravan. This map also showed material data from Y and other sources. Its area was roughly that of the 5th Army and its immediate flanks.

The activities of the remainder of the G-2 Section at 5th Army were based on open sources of information. In the main G-2 tent there were maintained the following maps:

1. Italy - 1/100,000 - mainly area of 5th Army - I-data indicated by different color
2. Italy - 1/100,000 - summary form, showing whole of Italy
3. Invasion - down to divisions
4. Defenses.

One feature first encountered at 5th Army was the G-2 duty officer who maintained a journal of incoming and outgoing papers. Another was the Reports Section to which was delegated the responsibility of preparing all reports published by the G-2 Section, including summaries and notes.

Close liaison was maintained with the Tactical Reconnaissance units (through Major Quello) and the Photo Reconnaissance Units (through Lt. Col. Fugelsang). The former covered areas nearer the front and confined itself mainly to visual reconnaissance. It also performed liaison (or fire control) missions for the artillery. The latter section, in addition to performing missions over the more rearward enemy areas, on request, had also, on its own initiative, mapped large areas well in advance of the fighting areas, which maps would be available when needed.

When we visited the PW interrogation center at Civita Vecchia, Capt. Kolish, in charge of the unit there, emphasized three points, viz:

1. To obtain maximum value from PW interrogation the center should be full advised as to both intelligence and intentions.
2. In many cases, the center does not receive captured documents taken with a prisoner, or which might well be explained by a prisoner. It was suggested that at least a subsection of the G-2 documents section be stationed permanently at the center, which subsection could withdraw documents not needed by the center, but would make available all documents for which the center had legitimate use. This suggestion appeared to have merit.

3. Close liaison must be maintained between the center and the G-2 Section. At 5th Army this was maintained by frequent exchange of visits.

Captain Kolisch also remarked that his activity was under the administrative control of the Provost Marshall who did not obtain the benefit of his services. Consequently, it was often necessary for the G-2 to intervene to insure that the physical needs of the center were adequately taken care of.

One subsection of the 5th Army G-2 section was engaged in the rather unusual activity of making a physical count of destroyed enemy materiel. In practice it appeared that Army salvage units had more than enough to do in recovering and repairing damaged Allied materiel, so there was no one to care for or count wrecked enemy equipment. When the G-2 asked how many enemy vehicles had been destroyed, it was found necessary to assign an officer to make a physical count. It was indicated that this work was to be taken over by a group from AFHQ which arrived while we were at 5th Army. Lt. Col. Stoddard, who had been in charge of this work at 5th Army, recommended that 2 officers without combat duties aided by an evacuation platoon be assigned to this work.

VI. COMPARATIVE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MED.

The following comparative table showing roughly the various intelligence units and the functions thereof at AFHQ, AAI and 5th Army is interesting because of the large number of similarities (despite varying terminology) and because of the few interesting differences.

AFHQ

Op. I
Briefs C. in C. verbally, on basis of daily bulletin (U). This is done at morning meeting in War Room.

Deputy
Hands over to Op. I and discusses each morning daily bulletin (U) prepared by him - using separate daily bulletins prepared for Balkans and for supply & communication.

No Duty Officer
as such - the such functions performed by Executive Office headed by Maj. Richards.

Order of Battle

Areas:
Cent. Med. (Italy)
(also covers invasion)
S. France
E. Med. (Balkans)
None

National Groups:
Italian O/B
(also refugees)

Specialities:
Strat. & Tac. Int.
Organization
Captured Docs.
Personalities
Defenses
No reports

AAI

BGS (I)
Briefs C. in C. verbally, on basis of daily bulletin (U). This is done at morning meeting in U hut.

I (a)
Id., except no separate Balkans bulletin.

No Duty Officer
some of functions performed by Chief of I(a) section.

Order of Battle

Areas:
Italy
(also covers invasion)
None
Balkans
Europe as whole

National Groups:
Italian Liaison
No O/B

Strat. & Tac. Int.
None - separately
Captured Docs.
Personalities
Defenses
No reports

5th Army

G-2
G-2 is briefed orally and briefs CG orally. This is done at morning meeting.

Dep. G-2
No daily bulletin: has daily discussion with G-2 (who himself reads all U) after talks with section chiefs.

Duty Officer
who maintains journal of incoming and outgoing messages and routes papers. (Note: this man is not indoctrinated).

Order of Battle

Areas:
Italy (mainly 5A area)
(also covers invasion)
None
None
None

National Groups:
Italian Liaison
No O/B

Limited Strat. & Tac. Int.
None - separately
Captured Docs.
Personalities
Defenses - see below
Reports

AFHQ

AAI

5th ARMY

Supply & Communications

Supply
Roads
RRs
Shipping
Installations
Air Target Liaison
through daily meeting
in War Room.

Semi-Autonomous Sub-Sections

Sigs I
A Force
I (b)
Tech. I
IPW
CSCIC
D

Supply & Communications

Supply
Roads
RRs
Shipping
Installations
Air Target Liaison
through I(a)V and
through daily meeting
in U hut.

Semi-Autonomous Sub-Sections

Sigs I
A Force
I (b)
I (tech)
IPW
CSCIC
D

Defenses & Targets

No supply
Roads
RRs
Limited shipping
Installations
Air Target Liaison (of
unknown type) with 12th
TAC; also photos.

Semi-Autonomous Sub-Sections

Sigs I
No A Force
Counter Int.
Tech. Int.
IPW

VII. POSSIBLE DUTIES OF U SPECIALIST

While we were at AAI for the second time, we sought to consolidate the notes and impressions we had obtained in the Hed. As one method of selecting what seemed to be desirable features from each of the Headquarters visited, the following outline was developed and is presented here for whatever interest it may have.

The objective sought was to suggest the maps, files, and other records to be maintained at (a) an Army Group and (b) an Army Headquarters operating in North France; to suggest what might be desirable arrangements for the same; and to propose various functions that might be performed best by the U specialist at such a headquarters.

A. Army Group

1. Physical conditions for reception and maintenance of U material:

In this respect, a Nissen hut, or tent, for the special use of indoctrinated personnel and the safekeeping of U material is believed to be the best arrangement. It has the advantages of security, privacy, and convenience. It is assumed that an indoctrinated officer will be on duty there 24 hours per day.

2. Maps to be maintained in U hut:

- (1) Theater intelligence map - 1/100,000
 - a. Sources - all, including Y and U - it may be desirable to indicate nature of source by color of crayon used.
 - b. Units - down to Bns; different colors used to distinguish Pz, Inf., para. units, etc. Units indicated by tabs, on Scotch tape.
 - c. Marking - lines and boundaries - with special color to indicate changes within last 24 hours.
 - d. Table at side of map showing summary of units
- (2) Theater logistical map - 1/100,000 or 500,000
 - a. Either consolidated map or separate maps for (1) communications and (2) installations and dumps.
 - b. Character of installation indicated by symbol and color.
 - c. Table at side of map giving experience date on time to bring various types of units from other fronts.
 - d. Flak included.
 - e. Changes of last 24 hours shown by different color.

- (3) Theater air map - 1/500,000
 - a. Maintained in any manner desired by related Air Intelligence Group.
- (4) Theater defenses map.
- (5) Italian intelligence map - 1/100,000
 - a. Units down to division.
 - b. Changes of last 24 hours in different color.
 - c. To include significant logistical features.
- (6) European intelligence map
 - a. More detailed on immediate flanks, including Norway and Denmark. Generally units down to division. Russian Front schematic.
 - b. Events of last 24 hours in different color.
 - c. Annexed table showing distribution of enemy divisions by types (Pz. etc.)
- (7) Far East informational map
 - a. General - recent significant events shown by different color.
- (8) Enemy knowledge of Allied O/B
 - a. Maintained by A Force

3. Files to be maintained

a. Within U hut

- (1) Folders: two for each SLU delivery - one for combat intelligence and the other for logistic intelligence. Set complete for 24 hours. Separate folder for 2nd set of U messages.
- (2) Logs: messages to be logged in loose leaf notebooks by number, rather than in order of receipt. (By the time messages are ready for logging this is generally possible).

Classification of Logs:

- a. For Combat Intelligence Group
 - i. OB - France and Lowlands
 - ii. OB - neighboring theaters, broken down if necessary
 - iii. Enemy materiel strength
 - iv. Enemy knowledge of Allied O/B

- b. For Logistic Intelligence Group
 - i. Communications - in 3 parts
 - (a) Shipping (if material)
 - (b) Roads and RRs
 - (c) Air
 - ii. Installations
 - iii. Dumps
 - iv. Supplies
 - v. Flak and defenses
- c. Miscellaneous
 - i. G-2 - Personal
 - ii. Queries and Comments (cross referenced to appropriate logs where basic messages may be found)
 - iii. Air
 - iv. German Army Organization

(3) Notebooks:

- a. Index to Combat Int. Logs (by subject and number)
- b. Index to Logistical Int. Logs (same comment)
- c. Index to Strategic Int. matters
- d. Index to Flak and Defenses Log

(4) Bulletins and summaries prepared by staff:

- a. Daily bulletin for G-2, combat int.
- b. Daily bulletin for G-2, logistic int.
- c. Appreciations and estimates - combat and logistical
- d. Bulletins and reports received from:
 - i. subordinated units
 - ii. superior units
 - iii. supreme units of neighboring theaters
 (Query if these last need be kept in U hut.)

b. Outside U hut - within G-2 Section

(1) Files:

- a. O/B - France and Lowlands (notebook - not cards)
- b. O/B - neighboring theaters
- c. Personalities
- d. Organization of German Army
- e. Captured documents
 - i. Subsection stationed with Interrogation of PW Center
- f. Defenses and Targets
- g. Reports on interrogation PW's.
- h. CX reports
- i. News and monitoring reports

4. Duties of U Specialist

a. To be made responsible for:

- (1) Receipt and logging of U messages, and maintenance of indices.
- (2) Posting all maps, save those to be maintained by Air and A Force.
- (3) Receipt and routing of papers coming into and leaving G-2 Section.

b. It is believed that the foregoing is at least a full time schedule of duties, and some relief would be required over a period of time. It was indicated at the various Med. headquarters that if the U specialist is charged with duties requiring regular reports to be produced by him (such as would be required of a member of the Reports subsection at 5th Army or the logistics intelligence section at AAI), he does not have time to perform his primary duty in relation to the U material in a time of active operations.

B. Army

1. Physical conditions for receipt and safekeeping of U material.

At 5th Army, Major Riggs, who is charged with this duty has a caravan in which he keeps a field safe. If no caravan is available, the U specialist should have a tent by himself and a field safe.

2. Maps

a. To be kept in caravan or tent of U specialist. U map of theater - including pertinent material from other sources - with different colors to show changes of last 24 hours and source.

b. To be kept in G-2 Section.

- (1) Theater intelligence
- (2) Theater defenses and targets
- (3) Italian
- (4) European
- (5) Far East

3. Files - only U file to be notebook maintained by U specialist in such terms that source is concealed.

4. Duties of U Specialist.

- a. Aide to G-2. This position gives an officer of low rank full excuse for conferring with the G-2 and other ranking officers at odd times, gives him duties in addition to U duties, but leaves him free to assist the G-2 as needed.
- b. Deputy G-2 - same advantages, plus good reason for overall attention to operation of G-2 organization.
- c. O/B specialist - may be too time consuming in active situation.
- d. Report writer - Has been proved to be too time consuming by experience in Med.

VIII. CONCLUSION

It will have been noted that throughout this report, little mention has been made of the field use of Flak data. This is so because, in general, those in the field rely mainly upon photo reconnaissance or pilots' reports for their flak data and nowhere did we observe adequate flak records. In part this may have been due to the fact that we were mainly concerned with Army as distinguished from air units.

One suggestion was made and discussed at AAI in this relation. It would seem that the section at AAI and AFHQ having the greatest interest in flak is the Logistics Intelligence group. Flak movements may indicate changes in dumps or supply installations, and it might be desirable in recommending air targets to include some statement about local flak.

The suggestion was thought to have some merit but it is believed that without an educational program of some sort and active pressing of the matter by B.P. or London, the field units will not make all possible use of the flak data they receive. Conferences are desirable, moreover, as to the type of flak data most useful to the field commands.

It was indicated that commanding officers or G-2's practically never ask for studies of the amount of flak in a given area and this is one reason why it is pushed aside at a busy headquarters.

All officers interviewed indicated that no difficulty was experienced in segregating in their minds the U data from that obtained from open sources.

No reference is made to travelling conditions, since Colonel Taylor's data will be more up to date.

27 July 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Visit to Mediterranean Theater
(18 June - 20 July 1944)

To: Lt. Col. Samuel McKee, MID, WD, London

1. Report, in quadruplicate, is attached
hereto.

Warrack Wallace
WARRACK WALLACE
Major, CAC

098

General:

- a. Purpose: The trip to the Mediterranean Theater was made by Capt. Becker and Major Wallace during the period 18 June - 20 July 1944 for the primary purpose of obtaining practical experience in the field in the work of the G-2 Section and the use of Ultra in connection therewith.
- b. Itinerary: An itinerary, marked appendix 1, is attached hereto.
- c. Clothes & Equipment: The following suggestions are offered for future travellers in this Theater at this time of year.
 - 1. A blouse is a useless burden. Cottons will be worn throughout except for such time as is spent at Army HQ when wool may be worn, if desired.
 - 2. The following articles will be useful: flashlight (essential); canteen, cup and steel helmet (can be procured upon arrival); field shoes; toilet paper; steel mirror; folding drinking cup (useful but not necessary); cigarette lighter. A mosquito net is an essential and is not always procurable upon arrival. Reading material helps on the long hops.
 - 3. Gold Seal money is easily convertible en route.
 - 4. The Red Cross Clubs at Algiers and Rome provided food and coffee at odd hours and were pleasant and useful. Ain Taya Rest Clubs at Algiers was a choice place for a swim.

II. Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers.

- a. Dates of visit: 20 June - July; 18 July - 19 July.
- b. General: AFHQ was located in the St. George Hotel, Algiers, but completed its move to Caserta by 21 July. W/C Crawshaw, in charge, and F/L Frew, of the SLU unit, explained the workings of that unit and Col. Sloane (OI) and Col. Hitchens (OIOB) arranged visits to Gen. Roderick and officers of the G-2 Section.
- c. Chain of Command: The Theater chain of command is shown in appendix 2, attached hereto.
- d. Personnel: The following named officers are key Army, Air and U.S. ground force officers at AFHQ concerned with the operational use of G-2 intelligence or charged with the responsibility for its collection, distribution and dissemination.

AFHQ:

Gen. Sir H. Maitland Wilson	(C-in-C)
Major General T. Airey	{ AC of S, G-2)
Brig. Gen. Roderick	{ DAC of S, G-2)
Col. C. Sloane	{ OI)
Lt. Col. Hitchens	{ OIOB)

U.S. Army Ground Forces

Gen. J. Devers	(D C-in-C)
Maj. Gen. Barr	(D to Gen. Devers)
Maj. Gen. Hooks	(DC of S)
Maj. Gen. D. Noce	(AC of S, G-3)
Lt. Col. G. Train	("A" Force)
Maj. R. W. Larsen	(CIOB)
Capt. Fraser	

Air

W/C Hurst

(Air Liaison)

SLU

W/C Crawshaw

F/L Frew

P/O Illingworth

e. G-2 Section: It was not feasible to examine a complete cross-section of the G-2 section as was done at HQ, AAI and HQ - 5th Army. An appointment with Lt. Col. Train (A-Force) was cancelled following his opinion that his work was so complicated that brief explanations would serve merely to confuse. Sigs. I was not included in the schedule of conferences. Experience at HQ - AAI developed angles which were to be investigated upon the return trip to AFHC but the return occurred at a time when AFHC was in the throes of a move and circumstances did not permit further inquiry. The use of Ultra, however, was examined thoroughly as were most of the phases of G-2 work. G-2 Sections in each of AFHC, HQ - AAI and HQ - 5th Army are roughly parallel, each with much the same departmental content. Hereinafter, under HQ - AAI, each of these departments is discussed, but for AFHC the comments made below do not purport to cover all G-2 activities.

1. SLU: Here, as everywhere else, the SLU personnel (all British) were the original contacts and subsequent advisors with regard to any doubtful points. They were unfailing in their courtesy and efficiency and the association was a constant pleasure. Either W/C Crawshaw or P/O Frew was available at any time for explanations or assistance.


(a) SLU organization and procedure: There are 16 units and 200 officers and men engaged in this work in the Mediterranean Theater. They receive and deliver ultra messages, act as liaison and advisors for the users and regard themselves as responsible for the security of the service. The St. George Hotel was well adapted to distribution and security needs. None of the material was permitted to leave the Hotel or the particular rooms to which its use was confined. Users came to the rooms.

(b) Watches and deliveries: Normally, 4 watches of 6 hours each were maintained. Deliveries to the registration office were made 8 times daily and whenever a 3 Z signal arrived. A 3 Z, or higher signal, whatever its time of arrival at night, was scanned by the Duty Officer and its disposition at once decided.

(c) Distribution: The 7 copies of each signal were distributed as follows: 3 to Air; 1 to Army; 1 to Adm. Sec.; 1 to Navy; and 1 to the registration office for reference, where a file was retained for about 20 days. Every copy was registered, in and out, in a record kept by the registration office. The Army copy went to Capt. Fraser who maintained the supply records, and was kept in his room (adjoining the ultra map room) for the use of Army until returned by him to the registration room.

2. Ultra distribution and handling:

The following diagram shows the former location of the rooms, the key G-2 officers concerned with ultra and a general idea of the routing:




Numbers 1, 2, 2½, 3 above denote relative locations as to floor of Hotel.

(x) denotes Ultra knowledge in above diagram and hereinafter.

3. Ultra Security: Here, as at HQ-AAL and HQ-5 Army, Ultra is merely one of the many sources of information and is used accordingly. All of the usual sources are exploited to the fullest and ultra added near the top. There seemed to be full precautions taken for its security by all handling or using it. Those not briefed were well aware that there was something beyond their ken, in which SLU played a part, but had become accustomed to the thought. Only one officer persisted in questioning the travellers as to their purpose in life and this obviously was done out of mere curiosity and not to solve a mystery. He seemed satisfied, as did others less persistent, with the statement that the travellers were students in G-2 activities who would be instructed upon their return where they were to go and in what G-2 activity they would participate.

4. Communications & Supply Committee: (Col. Sloane (x)). This Committee seems to be the crucial committee to which all intelligence flows. It makes the recommendations as to target policy. It consisted of Col. Sloane, Lt. Col. Hitchens, Capt. Fraser, and W/C Hirsch and a Navy representative, and fits in a diagram thus:



The Committee meets daily, considers all information, writes a daily summary and presents recommendations which are almost invariably accepted at the conference of higher officers and acted upon. Policies, rather than specific targets, are fixed at AFHQ, the actual targets normally being selected at lower HQ.

5. Supply & Communications: (Capt. Fraser (x)). records are maintained currently on ships, ports, supplies (tonnage & kind), and main M/T traffic. This is done mainly by card systems which contain information gleaned from all sources, including ultra. Summaries at about 10 day intervals, or upon special request, are prepared by Capt. Fraser for the Supply & Communications Committee. The main emphasis is upon Italy and S. France.

A current stock record is kept, also, which shows ammunition (first issue, expenditures, with units and at depots); oil and gas stocks; and rations. This record is compiled primarily from ultra information. Capt. Fraser keeps the Army KV copy in his desk drawer and those Army officers desiring to read it do so in this room or use the copy in the registration room. An adjoining room contains situation maps of Italy and France, with locations of enemy units, these based upon all sources, including ultra. The Italy map is taken to the daily conference room and returned immediately upon adjournment of the conference.

6. C.B. Section: (Maj. Larsen (x)). Maj. Larsen is the only briefed officer in his large section which covers Italy and France and has many and various responsibilities.
- (a) Maps. (Lt. Leeds). Situation maps showing location of enemy units, unit boundaries and other information are maintained currently from all information except ultra. Card indexes contain references as to places and units.
 - (b) Factics: Card indexes pertaining to Abwehr matters, morale, and policies and items of a general nature.
 - (c) Enemy personalities: A lieutenant keeps in great detail a card index covering all enemy officers, drawing upon all sources of information except ultra. This record is almost more than one man can handle and it is always behind. It has been found useful in many ways and often is invaluable in the identification and movement of units.
 - (d) Identifications: (Lt. Rogge). This was the most complete record seen as it included: (1) A map with unit identification; (2) a notebook with all information carefully indexed both as to unit and subject; and (3) a map with information written upon it at the locality concerned. The record was thorough, usable and complete. The notebook is more compact and much easier to use than a card system.
 - (e) Captured documents: All captured documents "not found on the body" go to AFHQ for careful inspection. This is slow work during a drive in which many prisoners and material are taken and comments follow under HQ - AAI.
 - (f) Flak: (Major Larsen). The flak record is practically useless. There are no location maps and flak information was only posted as late as April. It is the last chore to be performed. To make any report or summary would require a long search thru unindexed records with the possibility that much information would be undiscovered or missing. Some units might thus be located but the number of guns and calibres would be unavailable. Maintaining a flak record is a one-man job, if done properly,

and Maj. Larsen has neither time nor staff for it. Apparently, flak information is rarely asked for at this level and, if it were asked for, the best that could be given would be "estimates" on area quantities. The record is so futile that it should be done away with at AFHQ and thus save time and the worry of a job always incomplete and ineffectual. The proper place for a flak record seems to be Army Group and this is discussed under HQ - AAI. Ultra flak information is regarded as satisfactory and there was no suggestion made as to any additional help that could be accorded by B.P. Nevertheless, the new flak summary, instituted by B.P., will be most useful.

(g) Outgoing reports. Maj. Larsen has the additional responsibility of supervising the work of several officers in the preparation of:

(1) Weekly and Monthly Intelligence Summaries. These set forth OB and other intelligence, gleaned from all sources except ultra, and are sent down to all echelons including Corps. They include "Y" information.

(2) Intelligence Notes: Weekly. These set forth intelligence from all sources except ultra as to organization, equipment and tactics, and are sent down to all echelons including divisions. "Y" information is expunged.

7. Air: (W/C Hurst (x)). W/C Hurst acts as liaison for Air and is a member of the Communications and Supply Committee. He has a substantial staff of officers and enlisted men. He maintains Army and Air situation maps for Italy, France and the Balkans. His AV copies are kept indefinitely, pasted in a log book. The records were clear and easily used and his knowledge of the Air side complete. The Army relies entirely upon him for Air information and he issues opinions and air intelligence digests as the situation requires, including a regular "Review of the week". He works closely with "Y", but most carefully, association with "Y" being regarded as having security dangers for ultra.

8. Balkans: (Maj. Brookfield (x)). Albania, Dalmatia & Yugoslavia are a full responsibility but Maj. Brookfield receives, also, information from all sources relating to Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania and South Russia, which are mainly a Cairo responsibility. He issues a daily summary and contributes a Balkan paragraph for the weekly summaries. He maintains situation maps for enemy units and card index files for all Balkan information, and is the AFHQ Balkan authority. (His flak information for the Balkans is of slight, if any, value).

f. War Room: The War Room maps spotted all enemy and Allied units. They did not show any ultra information unconfirmed by another source.

E. Comments:

1. It is suggested that flak records, as kept at AFHQ, might well be done away with, relying upon HQ - AAI or Army Group HQ to maintain them.
2. Gen. Roderick and others who were asked for opinions seemed very well satisfied with the performance of B.P. and had no suggestions to offer.

II. Hq. A.A.I. (adv.)

a. Dates of visit: 2 July-9 July; 13 July-16 July.

b. General: Base Hq. were in Rome. Adv. Hq. were under canvas on the E. side of Lake Bolsena, about 80 miles E. of Rome. A move to Siena was intended and may have been accomplished by now. There was some difficulty in making contact by telephone and in obtaining a billet and transportation, due probably to the recent arrival of Hq. The following suggestions may be helpful to future travelers:

For HQAAI (Adv.)	-	telephone 496541 and ask for Advance Philpot. (Ext. 34 was SLU).
For billets	-	Go to St. George Hotel (transients). Excellent hotel and mess.
For AGO	-	Aeronautical Adm. Bldg.
For Rome Transportation	-	TRY telephoning 34881
For transportation to HQAAI (Adv.)	-	Telephone HQCoAAI (Major Crow).

c. Personnel: The following named officers are those at HQAAI (Adv) who are concerned with the operational use of G-2 intelligence or are charged with responsibility pertaining to it.

General Sir H. Alexander	(Br)	GOC	(X)
Lt. Gen. Harding	(Br)	CCS	(X)
Maj. Gen. Lennitzer	(US)	DCCS	(X)
Brig. Mainwaring	(Br)	BGS Ops.	(X)
Brig. Hirsch	(Br)	BGS 1	(X)
Col. George Smith	(US)	DECS1	(X)

GSI(a):

Lt. Col. Hunt	(Br)	G I	(X)
Maj. Edwards	(Br)	G II	(X)
Maj. Rawles	(Br)	G II	(X)
Capt. Gentry	(US)	G III	(X)

GSI(a5):

Maj. Buchanan	(US)	G II	
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GSI(a):

Capt. Crawford	(Br)	IO	
Capt. de Hadeln	(Br)	IO	

GSI(Tech.):

Maj. Baukham	(Br)	G II	
Capt. Thomson	(Br)	G III	

GSI(p):

Major Hoffman	(US)	I (p)	(x)
Capt. Meadows	(Br)		(x)

GSI(s):

Lt. Col. MacKowar	(Br)	I (s)	(x)
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GSI(b):

Lt. Col. W.D. Gibson	(Br)	GI	(x)
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SLU:

F/L Thompson	(Br)		
F/L Stephenson	(Br)		

Those who attend the 0830 daily conference are: General Alexander; Gen. Harding; Gen. Lemnitzer; Gen. Cannon (Air); Air Chief (Air Commodore Huddleston); Chief Adm. Off. (Gen. Robertson); Brig. Mainwaring; Col. Smith; Lt. Col. MacKowar; W/C Wiseman and Capt. Austin (Air); Naval Liaison Officer (adviser C.in C. Med.); Naval Intelligence (Air) Officer; and the British and U.S. Ops. Chiefs.

d. Ultra.

1. The SLU unit retains a reference copy and delivers 2 copies to Army and 1 copy to Air, making 4 deliveries daily, at 0830, 1200, 1600 and 2100 o'clock, respectively. SLU responsibility ceases upon delivery and receipt, as no copy is returned. Though the HC is under canvas, a Nissen hut has been provided for the sole purpose of serving as a map room, where the conferences occur, and an Ultra office. This is invaluable as it is a secure, dry and convenient workshop which neither a tent nor a caravan could supplant satisfactorily. All Ultra material is kept here and no one is permitted inside who is not briefed. An officer is in the hut at all times, day and night. The hut immensely simplifies the problem. The maps contain Ultra information and unbriefed visitors are taken to the O.B. section of Capt. Crawford and shown the non-Ultra maps he maintains.
2. The 2 Army copies are delivered to the hut. One is put into an Army "2" cover, and the other is clipped and divided between an I(a) (operations) and an I(p) (supply) cover. There are (a) and (p) covers for the 0830,

1200 and 1600-2100 deliveries, thus permitting use of the same day's material by several persons simultaneously. All messages are checked and numbered by the Duty Officer at the hut as they are delivered by SLU. The Army "2" file is clipped daily and its parts and the I(p) copy parts put in the pertinent logs. The sheets are checked by number and those parts not used for the logs are burned daily. This mechanical work is mainly performed by Capt. Gentry, he having the responsibility. His duties have become almost entirely clerical.

3. The system is orderly and workable. There are many files and each is numbered and goes in its proper cubby-hole which is shown by its number on a chart. At the end of each day a check is made to see that each file is there. (It might be well to add a receipt book to be signed by any officer who removed a file temporarily from the hut for any purpose).
4. Four logs are kept current; Italy, Balkans, O.B. Knowledge and Invasion Logs. These contain the KV (or XL) signals and run as far back as 3 Feb 1944. There are 55 file covers, numbered from 1 to 55, though many of them are continuations of various logs. As the file covers show the possible use of Ultra information, and a method of filing and keeping it, they are set forth below, with comments. The circled numbers are those files which do not seem to be worth the upkeep in usual circumstances.

- (1) I(a) and I(p)
- (2) II(a) and II(p)
- (3) III(a) and III(p)
- (4) Daily Bulletin I (p). Maintenance. Major Hoffman writes this. It contains supply, harbour, M/T and railway situations.
- (5) Italy Log I(a).
- (6) Balkan Log I(a).
- (7) Knowledge of O.B. Log I(a).
- (8) Army "2" Message File.
- (9) Numbered Appreciations I(a). Strategic Appreciations by Gen. Alexander.
- (10) Miscellaneous Appreciations I(a). Old and unused.
- (11) German O.B. in Italy I(a). Unused.
- (12) German Personalities in Italy I(a). Not kept up.
- (13) Location List of Identified German Formations. Information from AFHQ. Not kept up.
- (14) Estimates I(a). Contain strength work sheets for appreciations of Lt.Col. Hunt. Not indispensable.
- (15) Tank strengths I(p). Tanks and guns. Can be replaced by tables hereinafter mentioned.
- (16) "MK" (old XL) comments I(a). Messages to and from 5th Army and other miscellany.
- (17) Brig. Hirsch. Private file.
- (18) Italy Bulletin. Summation of intelligence by Lt. Col. Hunt which goes to Brig. for briefing Gen. Alexander. Important file.

- (19) Appreciations I(p). Supply. Written by Major Hoffman.
- (20) SHAEF Coaitintrep. Messages re invasion to AFHQ and AAL.
- (21) Supply Log. Not kept up. Useless.
- (22) Verbrauchsetze I(p). Depots and stocks. Not posted.
- (23) Dumps Log. Not up to date. Useless.
- (25) BIGOT-AKVIL.
- (26) Flak O.B. I(a). Not kept up.
- (27) A-Force Cover Plans I(a). Not kept up. Capt. Gentry once kept a map showing enemy's knowledge of our units, using red, yellow and black for the different kinds of information. Now Lt. Col. Davenport keeps a log but no map. A map should be useful.
- (28) German O.B. Useless.
- (29) Reference Points. Useless as none tied in.
- (30) Distribution of German Divisions. Useless.
- (31) Shipping File.
- (37) Supply Notes Log. Empty. Useless.
- (38) AFHQ Summaries. (By AFHQ).
- (39) "A" Force Log. Book record of identification by Germans of Allied units.
- (41) Invasion Bulletins I(a). France.
- (42) Misc. Strategic Bulletins I(a).
- (55) Road and Rail Log. Maj. Hoffman

e. G-2Section:

1. Working basis for G-2 Section: Using the organization at HQAAL (Adv.) as a guide, a working basis for a G-2 Section might be set up as shown below. This, of course, is G-2's problem and local circumstances, together with the individual views of the GOC and G-2, will require changes. While the organization of the section is not the SIO's responsibility, he should be helpful if called upon.

GOC (x)
Executive Officer (x)
 G-2: (x)

Aide to G-2 (x): to assist generally in the executive work of the Section and the use and distribution of incoming and outgoing material from every source. (Distribution with proper notations to officers concerned is vital).

Clerk: For handling and filing all incoming material and assisting Aide to G-2.

Aide to G-2 (x): responsible for the receipt from SLU of Ultra material, its handling and security, and to assist generally in preparation of appreciations and reports.

Maps: (Ultra); one officer (x):

1. All Europe: (1 to 1,000,000). Enemy unit locations.
2. France: (1 to 100,000). Enemy units down to battalions and Allied units; Army, Corps and Div. boundaries; points and direction of attacks; front lines.
3. France: (1 to 500,000). British system of coordinates (for reference and locations).
4. France: (1 to 500,000). Communications. Railways, rivers, canals and highways.
5. France: (1 to 100,000): Defense positions as shown by PR and other information.
6. A Force: Showing enemy's identification and location of Allied units.

Note: The Air C.B. map should be maintained by the Air Liaison Officer and need not be in the Ultra map room.

C.B.: (all sources except Ultra and, perhaps, "Y"); officer in charge (x);

Maps: (non-Ultra):

2, 3, 4 and 5 above.

Enemy Personalities;

Unit identifications and information;

General; Abwehr, morale, policies, etc.;

Flak;

Reports; summaries and digests, out and in;

I.P.W.;

Captured Documents.

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Supply & Communications (x): all sources except Ultra. Officer in charge (x);

Targets and Defenses;

- Maps:
1. Ammo and fuel dumps and points of interest.
 2. Communication lines, targets and cuts.

PRU: officer in charge (x)

SLU: all officers (x)

A-Force: officer in charge (x)

Map: showing enemy knowledge of Allied units.

Sigs I:

TAF: officer in charge (x)

← Technical (enemy materiel, etc.)

← CI:

2. HC-AAI (Adv.) G-2 Section: The following account of conferences with the various officers in the G-2 Section will indicate their respective duties which, with the noted exceptions, should be much the same in any theater or situation.

(a) Lt.Col.Hunt: (with the assistance of Maj. Rawles) scans all intelligence material coming in, supervises CB and writes the daily bulletin. He sends a signal to the 5th and 8th Armies each night by telephone and gives releases nightly to the Press. He keeps in close touch with Ops. His daily bulletin is the basis upon which Brig. Hirsch briefs Gen. Alexander at the morning conferences in the Hissen hut. (Col. Smith, DBGSI, was at 5th Army, acting there as G-2 in the absence of Gen. Howard.)

(b) Maps (Ultra). Major Richards and Major Edwards (now transferred to AFM C) were responsible for Ultra.maps in the hut which were up to the minute and posted from information from all sources, as follows:

1. All Europe (1 to 1,000,000). All enemy units, including Hungarian, Roumanian and Bulgarian.
2. France (1 to 100,000). Cherbourg and Caen lines. Both German and Allied units (divs. only).
3. Italy (1 to 100,000). Situation map with all enemy and Allied units down to regiments and odd bns.; boundary lines; green and red arrows showing attacks and progress. Y information.
4. Italy (1 to 500,000). British system of coordinates.

5. Italy (1 to 500,000). Railways. Targets and cuts marked.

6. Italy. Defense positions shown by P/R.

A map for visitors which does not contain Ultra information is maintained by Capt. Crauford in the O.B. tent.

- (c) O.B.: (non-Ultra). Capt. Crauford examines the sitreps, P.W. interrogations, captured documents, Y, and all other intelligence except Ultra, and posts his maps for Italy, Balkans, France, Russia and the Far East. He is concerned with recording information for strength estimates of enemy forces and keeps a careful card index record for this purpose. Enemy personalities are recorded down and through Div CO. Battle Groups go into a notebook and are not card indexed as they will disappear shortly. A mimeograph prepared by Capt. Crauford states in detail the duties of his section, but this is not set forth or digested in this report.
- (d) Supply and Communications. Major Hoffman (z), assisted by Capt. Meadows (x), maintains a map, using all sources, marking positions of ammo dumps, fuel dumps and general interest spots. These positions are numbered and a notebook, under corresponding number, gives information as to quantities, etc. Notebook also shows ports, freight in and out, and comments, and contains information on shipping, railways and supplies. A "general" section with all other (p) information is kept in this same notebook for 30 days and then destroyed. Cross references for numbers are kept for cover names. Nations are only checked generally. Maj. Hoffman prepares summaries on supply and communication situations when requested and for ammo and fuel when the information warrants. (Ammo shows (1) first issue, (2) expend., (3) on hand. Fuel is a stock account for gas and Diesel primarily. The last such stock summary was rendered on 4 June). These summaries go into brief summaries for the Brig.'s use at the conference and pertinent parts go to Armies. Maj. Hoffman's information is used to determine targets. He reports by a supply bulletin each morning for the Brig. TAF daily gives a copy of a map to Hoffman, showing breaks in the lines and the points attacked, and he makes a map from this. His main functions are to keep track of supply and suggest specific targets in the way of dumps and communications. He also suggests policies of target selection. He uses notebooks and no card indices.

(e) MAIU: Maj. Buchanan is in charge. His original duties were solely P/R but he now acts, also, as Special Operations Officer and has charge of the topographical Section and Defences. The scope of his work is indicated by the following records kept in his office:

- (1) P/R reports. Daily. Aerodromes and communications. By MAPRW.
- (2) P/R reports. Pictures, refineries, ball-bearing works, etc.
- (3) P/R reports on Flak positions. Shows whether batteries light, heavy or medium. Has large scale section maps showing position & concentrations. Does not have all information to add to flak maps so ^{these} are incomplete.
- (4) P/R Reports. MAIU (interpretation unit). Report on defences.
- (5) P/R reports. Bombing results.
- (6) P/R reports. Radar installations. (Freya, etc.) Card indexes covering routes, railroads, bridges, dams, industries, ports, collations (radar - defences - dumps); topography; beaches; aerodromes.

Most of the information comes from MAPRW, but some from AFIC. All of the above mentioned card indexes are not up to date as the staff is insufficient to cover the ground. An elaborate cumulative set of Northern Italy Interpretation Reports, based on P/R, has been prepared and is waiting for the day of need. It would be logical and efficient to tie in Maj. Buchanan's work with Supply & Communications as the two fit together well and some duplication would be avoided by this consolidation.

(f) TAF: W/C Wiseman A-2 (x) and Capt. Austin (x) made it clear that they operate independently from Maj. Hoffman. Capt. Austin studies intelligence from all sources (including GBB reports) and briefs W/C Wiseman in the morning and evening. W/C Wiseman and Maj. Hoffman brief Lt. Col. Hunt, specifying target recommendations, and he writes an appreciation for air targets and hits for the daily conferences. It was clear that the air regarded the final selection of targets as its choice because of its special knowledge of a/c capabilities. Work falls in three sections:

- (1) GB (air): (Capt. Austin) No maps are kept but 2 notebooks give information down to each gruppe for France and the Balkans.

- (2) Target Analyses Section: 2 officers - 2 E1; records show position and state of railways, ammo and fuel depots, and supplies.
- (3) Duty Intelligence: 5 officers; duty is to report on operations during the 24 hours.

An OB for flak was kept but Capt. Austin thought pilots got their flak information solely from P/R and pilot experience so the record was only for "strategic" use (probably to show movements of units).

(g) Technical (enemy materiel, etc.) Maj. Baukram is in charge. The Army informs him when any new materiel appears, such as a new tank, gun, booby trap or mine, and he investigates. Tech combines all the experts of this kind while the U.S. investigates such matters by Ordnance teams, each specializing in a certain field. Reports are rendered weekly in the AFHQ Technical Intelligence Summary and fortnightly, but any urgent item goes into the G-2 daily report. The usual procedure is that Tech goes to the field, talks to Army and then reports to AFHQ which puts out photos and reports. Advance knowledge of new weapons is often obtained by study of documents.

(h) Reports (incoming): Incoming papers go to the Chief Clerk and then to Lt. Col. Hunt who reads and underscores. Other officers read the same material and extract what they want. None of it is called to any officer's particular attention. Reports are as follows:

- (1) Cositintrep. 8th Army - to AAI and others.
- (2) Radio reports by Psychol. Warfare Br.
- (3) Cositintrep. 5th Army to 8th and AFHQ
- (4) Cositintrep. HQ AAI Adv. to AFHQ & others.
- (5) "I" summary (daily). 5th Army to AFHQ, AAI, 8th, French Corps, 2 Corps, 4 Corps, 6 Corps. (C.D., Captured Documents, Pearls, etc.)
- (6) Intelligence Summary. Almost daily - facts and appreciation. By 8th Army.
- (7) Intelligence Notes (without Y) for lower distribution.
- (8) HQ AAI Intelligence Summary - weekly. Has paragraphs for shipping, OB, supply. Technical situation, Balkans, Yugoslavia, etc.
- (9) Interrogation Reports. 5th Army HQ Interrogation Center and Division Interrogations.
- (10) M reports on PW's.
- (11) OSDIC - Interrogation Reports.

(1) Comments:

- (1). In a new organization, the making of the SIO

an Aide to G-2 might avoid the result of reducing his activities to the purely mechanical and place him in a position to be of greater service. To give him OB duties would be less desirable as these also would tend towards the mechanical. The assignment of duties, of course, depends upon G-2 but there may be opportunities to influence his decision. The Ultra officers should be in the working intelligence picture and the senior Ultra officer should play an important part therein. HQ AAI is largely a British show and this has resulted in the relegation of the American officers to duties of lesser importance.

- (2) Distribution of incoming material is important and should be made carefully and systematically to avoid the waste of time which occurs when each officer reads everything in order to ferret out what pertains to his work. An officer should be charged with the duty of marking material for the attention of the proper officer or section. G-2 and his executive Aide could accomplish this.
- (3) Flak is a headache. Much time is wasted everywhere in preparing partial and useless records. No officer questioned had any suggestion to offer as to B. A. handling of flak signals, all being satisfied with this, but questioning at AFHQ, HQ, AAI and HQ-5th Army discovered many partial flak records and much time spent, without any real return. Officers at both TAF and PAC-R said that their pilots learned about flak only through W/M and by being shot at. HQ-AAI has flak data and records and much duplication would be spared and better results achieved if these flak records were kept, and kept carefully, by one responsible officer or NCO, and the flak records at AFHQ and 5th Army dispensed with.
- (4) The high calibre of the SIO men encountered deserves comment. They should prove of great assistance in many of the field problems of the SIO.
- (5) Forms for recording data of various kinds were procured but will not be set forth herein.
- (6) The Nissen hut, or other separate housing, for ultra material and conferences at group level is the key to its security and efficient use.
- (7) All officers are security-minded at HQ AAI and the system runs smoothly. At a newly established HQ it would be advisable, however, to

insure a receipt book and allow no file to leave the ultra room for any purpose without the receipt of the officer taking it noted therein.

- (8) Capt. Gentry was invaluable to the travellers in that he explained the workings of HQ AAI and arranged conferences with other officers. His assistance and courtesy are highly appreciated

IV. HQ - 5th Army.

a. Dates of visit: 9 July - 13 July.

b. General: Rear and Adv. HQ were under canvas about 20 and 30 miles, respectively, N. of Grosseto. A move of Adv. HQ northwards was under way on 13 July.

1. Rear HQ: Maj. Hobbs was in charge of administration for the G-2 Section. His duties cover:

- (a) Personnel matters of G-2 Section.
- (b) Handling of intelligence funds (for special purposes).
- (c) Distribution of publications and other material.
- (d) Requisitions of supplies and equipment for G-2 Section.
- (e) Translations.
- (f) I. R. administrative matters.
- (g) Italian liaison (CI) administrative matters.

2. Personnel: There are 16 officers assigned to the G-2 Section of 5th Army and 46 officers attached. The E/O provides for 16 but many additional and unforeseeable requirements fall upon an Army G-2 staff in a chaotic situation such as exists in Italy with rapid occupation of a territory peopled by a former enemy.

3. Adv. HQ: Maj. King, Executive Officer of the G-2 Section, was responsible for the mechanical functioning of the Section, arranging the moves and directing routine personnel, housing and office matters. He courteously provided the schedule of conferences and trips for the travellers.

c. Personnel:

Gen. Clark	C-in-C	(x)
Gen. Greunther	C of S	(x)
Gen. Brann	G-3	(x)
Gen. Howard	G-2	(x)
Maj. Riggs	CIO	(x)

OB: Capt. Fisher

Records: Capt. Pleasants
Capt. Hendley
Lt. Goodman

Targets and Defenses (Supply):
Capt. Farna

PAU: Lt. Col. Fugelsang
Sigs I: Capt. Giles
SLU: F/L Edwards (x)
 F/L Reeves (x)
 F/O Bedford (x)
 F/O Spalding (x)
LFJ: Capt. Kollisch
 Lt. Latoracca
TAC-R: W/C Goldthorp (CO)
 Maj. Andrews (Flying Officer)
 Maj. Blythe (Liaison Officer)
 Capt. Burtin
Air Liaison: Maj. Suello
Enemy Equipment: Col. Stoddard

d. Ultra:

1. Gen. Howard and Maj. Riggs each have caravans. The caravan of Maj. Riggs is used for his own quarters, his office and for housing of a safe containing an ultra situation map and signals. Deliveries by SLU are made to Maj. Riggs at 0700, 1200, 1800, 2100 and whenever any important signal arrives. 1 copy goes to Army (Maj. Riggs); 1 copy to Air (which is called for by Air at the SLU caravan); and a copy is retained for reference. SLU keeps a notebook in which a receipt is initialled by each recipient and in which a counter-receipt is initialled by SLU when the message is recouped within 24 hours. The reference copy in SLU hands is destroyed after 4 days time and, if old messages are required, ANHQ is asked for them.
2. Maj. Riggs receives the ultra messages and "Y" reports in his caravan and keeps in touch with the other intelligence officers. He posts his ultra map, makes notes and submits the map and other information to Gen. Howard at 0830 daily. Gen. Howard briefs Gen. Clark at the daily conferences. The separate ultra housing at HQ ANJ, in which ultra maps and material are kept and conferences held, possesses decided advantages there as to security and use. However, Army HQ present a different problem. Comparatively few ultra signals arrive daily and these are destroyed within 24 hours. The GOC knows his immediate situation from the usual intelligence sources and has before him maps showing the picture. Ultra adds a few facts to this information which can be handled by a rough map, an oral statement and memory. A separate caravan for ultra at Army would prove a greater burden than benefit as it would be conspicuous, require a guard and serve primarily only to house a situation map, little different from the regular CB map.

e. G-2 Section:

1. Duty Officer: A duty officer sits in the CB tent at all times. He receives all messages, by telephone or cable, and notes the receipt of each. He distributes all incoming messages to the proper persons. All intelligence messages coming in except top secret are noted in a journal; all other

Messages are placed in a file. An outgoing message file is also kept. ISUMS are prepared by the DC and issue twice daily, these giving CB information to Corps. ISUMS come in from Corps 3 times daily. The Sigs.I nightly report is kept in the incoming message file.

2. O.B.: (non-ultra). Capt. Fisher is in charge.

(a) Maps: The usual situation maps are maintained currently for Italy, France, Russia and the Balkans. A system of acetate overlays is employed to show dumps and communications. The situation map for Italy shows enemy units down to battalions and Allied divisions.

(b) Records: The records section is under Capt. Fisher but Capt. Pleasants handles this work. He disseminates information by:

- (1) ISUMS.
- (2) Daily G-2 Report, which goes down to Divs., AA Brigade, Navy and 12th Air Force.
- (3) Special reports on enemy equipment, etc.

He maintains records:

- (1) Card index files.
- (2) Notebook (very complete) containing all information on all enemy units. This is a detailed history.
- (3) File for enemy personalities.

Capt. Pleasants is responsible, also, for the translation of "hot" documents.

3. Targets & Defenses: (Supply & Communications). Capt. Fama is in charge. Information from all sources (except ultra) is used to plot depots and other targets on a map. Each point is numbered on the map with an index number which ties in with reference material. A map of defenses is currently posted with (1) an overlay for P/R; (2) overlay for general information; and (3) overlay for a combination of information. 12 TAC and TAF divide the area for P/R. The 5th Army works directly with 12 TAC. No bombing is done without P/R first taken. G-3 and A-3 meet nightly and select the targets. 12 TAC does the bombing unless heavy bombers are needed.

4. PRU: Lt. Col. Fugelsang maintains 3 sets of maps showing P/R taken, as follows:

- (a) Small scale, showing areas covered.
- (b) Larger scale, showing crucial areas.
- (c) Very small scale, for use of a platoon commander who need carry only 2 maps (mosaics), one showing the terrain & information up to the objective and one (smaller scale) beyond.

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Lt. Col. Fugelsang's work is activated by G-3 and his results are G-2 intelligence so he works closely with both G-3 and

and G-2. He is informed of G-3 operational plans and then has the responsibility of seeing that the Army has the photographs it needs when it needs them. He must keep up with Army demands so he P/R's the crucial areas first. All Corps demands for P/R come to him and he coordinates them. He is an exceptionally able officer (Army) and seems to have no difficulty in coordinating requests and having the desired missions performed by Air.

5. Sigs I: Units are at Corps and at Army, where Capt. Giles is in charge. He transmits his information to Gen. Howard daily and to Maj. Riggs 2 or 3 times daily. He has telephone connection with Corps and, if this is out, uses a radio cipher. His unit does not attempt to break the cipher used by enemy Divs. as this is difficult and is left to the unit at Army Group. His information is put on Capt. Fisher's map in black grease pencil.
6. SLU: The SCU units are supplied by the British from Bari. The SLU unit is entirely British. It messes at the regular Army HQ mess. Supply is accomplished through the British and presents no problems. Four watches are maintained in the SLU caravan which is used solely as an office. Other comments are contained under "ultra" above.
7. IPW: The unit is located at Civitavecchia, Capt. Kolisch in charge.
 - (a) Scope: This unit deals with German captured soldiers or deserters; some Italians of the Fascist Republican Army; some Italian civilians who have passed the lines; our own repatriated PW's; and Partisans. CIC handles Italian civilian spies. Every 5th Army PW is seen by this unit. Favorable or unfavorable civilians are sent to AMGOT.
 - (b) Process of interrogation: A PW is first disarmed and then given a very short interrogation at Bn. HQ for information of immediate tactical use. He is then taken to Reg. HQ and questioned about gun positions, mine fields, OB and similar matters. He is then passed on to Div. which goes over the same ground more extensively and also into ammunition, morale and broader fields. Corps does not interrogate but administers and coordinates only. All interrogation is performed by trained interrogators.
 - (c) Civitavecchia Unit: The unit here is 2680 HQ Co., MIS, of which Lt. Col. Holsten is CO. This unit has 50 officers and 100 EM, and supplies interrogators for the entire 5th Army. Capt. Kolisch calls Gen. Howard or Capt. Fisher for instructions. At Civitavecchia the interrogators speak all of the important languages except Chinese, but often employ PW's to aid in interrogation when prisoners are numerous.

- (d) Captured Documents: Captured documents present a difficult problem. All documents are sent by Army to AFHQ for careful examination except those regarded as "hot", which accompany the PW. In some instances, documents captured with the PW are sent to AFHQ when they would have proven an invaluable aid to interrogation by way of refreshing the PW's memory or providing suggestions for interrogation. Capt. Kolisch believed that every document captured "with the body" should accompany the body to him for interrogation. This might be done or, as an alternative, all captured documents might be sent to the IPW unit and the unneeded documents dispatched to AFHQ from there.
- (e) Method. PW interrogation is in great detail at Civitavecchia, the PW being retained there so long as he seems useful. Only straight interrogation methods are employed, a clear desk and no microphone. (Questioning from a strategic point of view is performed by CSDIC in Rome which covers Europe and not just Italy).
- (f) Records. It is essential that the unit keep abreast of the current intelligence. Records kept are:
- (1) Map. Enemy units are posted down to Battalions.
 - (2) Files. C.B.
 - (3) Enemy personality files.
 - (4) Daily G-2 Reports.
 - (5) Intelligence Summaries.
 - (6) CSDIC, 5th and 8th Armies exchange interrogation reports. The files are beautifully kept and indexed.
- (g) Reports. A daily report on PW interrogation is rendered, 10 copies of which go to G-2, 5th Army, and 10 to AFHQ. The 5th Army distributes its copies to Corps and Divs; AFHQ distributes to WD and specialists. Some special reports on graves, air raids, etc., are rendered when the information calls for them.

3. TAC-R.

- (a) Personnel & Equipment: W/C Goldthorp is CO of the British squadron. Maj. Andrews is in charge of the flying. The unit has an infantry, a tank and an artillery officer as specialists. The Squadrons are:

British: 16 Spitfires, 6 equipped with cameras
 French : 6 Spitfires
 U.S. : 25 a/c, mostly P-51 (with longer range) with same type of camera equipment.

(Two Lockheeds of the PRU Wing, with much longer range, cover the area daily).

Each squadron has its own CO and missions are assigned to the specific squadrons by 5th Army and 12th TAC. Maj. Quello is the Air Liaison Officer.

(b) Operations: TAC-R's main functions are:

- (1) Visual observation is the primary function. Usually, TAC-R's area is confined to a 15 mile strip but it is flying as far as 100 miles now in view of the dearth of near targets. Planes operate between 4000 - 9000 feet, in pairs, one observing and the other watching for enemy aircraft.
- (2) Artillery adjustments. The British bracket system is used.
- (3) P/R. These missions are only flown when the PRU cannot take them. Small obliques are taken.

(c) Procedure. In the request for a mission, it should be stated definitely what area, road nets and particular features are desired. Visual observation has its limitations as, for example, it can observe road movements and gun flashes but not dugouts. The pilot is briefed on the request and on the front line and bomb line, no observation being made in front of the bomb line. He is given information about flak which has been discovered by P/R or by other pilots who have been shot at. On his return, he is interrogated and a message sent in clear text to Corps and Divs. stating the results.

(d) Maps: The following are posted currently:

- (1) Map showing targets, with comments.
- (2) Situation map, showing enemy units. This is useful in displaying information valuable to the pilots such as the location of Panzer units. The map attached to the G-2 daily report was thought to be in too great detail for this use.

(e) Photographs. Prints are distributed: 1 to Army Photo Center; usually 2 to Corps; 1 to TAC; and 1 to TAF.

(f) Mimeographs: Mimeograph notes issued by the 5th Army give operational information and sample reports which are extremely useful. These are not attached or summarized herein.

8. Air Liaison. Maj. Quello coordinates and passes on requests for TAC-R missions.

9. Enemy Equipment. There being no existing unit available to examine and determine enemy M/T and assault gun losses, and a/c observation having been found inadequate, Col. Stoddard was assigned this duty by AFHQ.

f. Comments:


1. The handling of ultra and of IPW material is discussed above under the respective sections.
2. Here, as at HQ AAI, full precautions were taken to protect ultra in that its information was covered by another means, usually P/R or P/W interrogation, before being passed down for action.

APPENDIX I
ITINERARY

<u>Leave</u>	<u>Arrive</u>	<u>Means</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
June 182330	190830	Train	London	
192320	200720	C-87	New Quay " "	St. Mawgan airfield.
201000	202000	C-47	Casablanca " "	Cazes airfield. Excelsior mess. (Atlantic billet)
			Algiers	Cazes airfield. Delayed 5 hrs. by faulty landing gear. Maison Blanche airfield. Billetted at Globe Hotel and messed at TAM (47 Rue Michelct)(Both excellent) Conferences and study of records and files.
July 010715	011145	C-47	Algiers	Maison Blanche airfield.
011315	011415	C-47	Naples " "	Capodicino airfield
021400	021615	M/T	Rome HQ. AAI	Littoria airfield. Billetted St. George Hotel (Transients). Room and mess excellent.
091130	091530		HQ. AAI HQ, 5th Army	E. side Lake Bolsena July 3-9: HQ, AAI: conferences with personnel of G-2 Section and study of records & files.
131000	131600	M/T	HQ, 5th Army	July 9-13: HQ, 5th Army; TAC-E (Falconica); I.P.W.(Civitavecchia); conferences & study of records and files.
161300	161500	M/T	HQ - AAI HQ - AAI	Visited HQ - 5th Army (Rear)
180850	180950		Rome	Billetted St. George Hotel
181115	181600		Rome Naples	Littorin airfield.
191415	191930		Naples Algiers	Capodicino airfield
192115	200600		Algiers Casablanca	" "
201530	201700		New Quay " "	Maison Blanche airfield
			London	" "
				Cazes airfield. Stopped en route of Pt. Lyantey for 1/2 hr.
				Cazes airfield.
				St. Mawgan airfield

APPENDIX 2

Organization Chart for Mediterranean Theater



NOTE: MASAF is subject to an over-riding operational control by USSTAF (Gen. Spaatz).

9 December 1943

Report for Col. McCormack and others interested:

After a 4-day delay at Prestwick, I got off to N. Africa on a C-54 freight transport on the night of Saturday, 27 November. For your interest, log of my subsequent travel to the date of this report follows:

27/11	Prestwick	LV	10:30 PM	(All times are English War Time, which is one hour later than GMT, and is used throughout N. Africa and occupied Italy)
28/11	Marrakesh	AR	8:30 AM	
	(switched to C-47 at Marrakesh)	LV	11:00	
	Casablanca	AR	12:00 NOON	
		LV	12:30 PM	
	Oran	AR	3:15	
		LV	4:15	
	Algiers	AR	5:40	
2/12		LV	9:25 AM	
	Tunis	AR	12:00 NOON	
4/12		LV	9:00 AM	
	Malta	AR	10:50	
		LV	12:15 PM	
	Catania	AR	1:15	
		LV	1:45	
	Bari	AR	3:45	
6/12		LV	7:35 AM by RAF C-47	
	Foggia	AR	8:15	
		LV	11:00	
	Naples	AR	12:00 NOON (Pomigliano Airport)	
8/12		LV	10:25 AM (Cupadichino Airport)	
	Algiers	AR	3:00 PM	

Now hope to get off from here to Cairo tomorrow morning, the 10th. (Plane cancelled -- now hoping for departure 11th)

On arrival here on Nov. 28th, by strange coincidence, the name last on the register at the AGO when I signed in was that of Lt.Col. Paul Birdcall, who had just returned from 5-days leave. I got in touch with him and have seen him for lunch a couple of times. He is in good health and seems to be enjoying his present job -- he sends his very best to everyone in the Sp.Brn.

On the morning of Nov. 29 I reported to Brigadier Strong and Col. Pederick, who had received notice of my intended arrival from the WD. I presented my credentials from G/C Winterbotham and was put immediately in touch with SLU, who have taken me in hand ever since. At this point I might say that the SLU people here and at every other place I have visited, namely: Medit. Air Command at La Marea, near Tunis, 15th Army Group Hq. at Bari, and 5th Army Hq. at Caserta near Naples, have without exception put themselves at considerable pains to extend me every possible courtesy and the hospitality of their billets and messes. They have not only taken the time to show me every detail of their own establishments, but have put me in touch with their recipients in each place, so that I have had an opportunity to see how their material is used and in what form it is sent forward to the commanders in the field. I think if it has not already been done, some expression of appreciation might well be sent from the Sp.Br. to Winterbotham and the others responsible. If you care to mention the particular people who have been most helpful here, their names are:

S/L Barker and Flt/Lt. Scannel at AFHQ, Algiers
Flt.Lt. Robinson at MAC HQ, La Marea
Flt.Lt. Thompson at 15th Army HQ, Bari
Flt.Lt. Cook and Lt. Whitfield at 5th Army HQ, Caserta
Sq.Ldr. Bigden, a transient who was at both Bari and Caserta.

On the SCU side:

Lt.Col. MacFarlane at AFHQ, Algiers, took a day out to explain to me the SCU set up in the Mediterranean, of which he is in charge.

AFHQ, Algiers:

The Chief of SLU in Algiers is Lt. Col. Gore-Brown, who has been absent in Cairo throughout my stay here -- he is responsible for the administration of all 9 SLU's in French N. Africa, Corsica and Italy, as well as the 3 in Egypt and Syria which come more directly under Cairo's supervision. In his absence S/L Barker, the acting chief, took me in hand and showed me the works during my first 4 days here. The SLU officers occupy almost the whole of the top floor of the St. George Hotel and include the transmitting and receiving room of the SCU which services SLU. This was explained to me as a desirable security feature, as it reduces the number of people who even walk past the rooms where SLU personnel are working, and therefore who are even aware of their existence. Moreover, the offices of the various Air, Army and Navy customers of SLU's material, are all in the same building on the lower floors, obviating the necessity of carrying any messages outside for delivery.

7 copies of each item are typed, one of which is filed for 6 weeks by SLU, 3 delivered to Air, 2 to Navy, and one to Army. The number of copies to each customer is a matter arranged between SLU and the recipients and is pretty much determined by how each recipient uses them -- for example Air has 3 copies because they want to keep one for permanent file and each of two air intelligence officers uses a copy to work on. He is responsible for its destruction after he has finished with it. In view of the remoteness of this HQ from the enemy, and its relative security, the recipients are allowed to retain their copies as long as they

like, and are not required to return them to SLU for burning as recipients further forward must do. They are under no circumstances, however, permitted to carry them, or any appreciations based on them, outside of this HQ building. In the case of intelligence appreciations or directions containing this material which are sent forward to 15th Army Group or to 5th or 8th Army, they must all be given to SLU here to encypher and send forward on SCU links.

Before I go into the matter of SLU personnel, I ought to say something about their traffic, since naturally the number of people needed at any particular station is determined by the amount of traffic. This involves a discussion of SCU, or the wireless side of the picture. Chief of SCU in the Mediterranean is an Army Col. named MacFarlane; he is the only member of SCU in the entire theatre who is "in the picture". He is responsible for the administration of all stations as far as W/T goes, both fixed and mobile, and for their maintenance, although in most of the forward stations the SCU personnel consist entirely of enlisted men (W/T operators, drivers and mechanics) and they are in those cases under the senior SLU officer for administration and discipline. All SCU communications are run on the principle of VHF (very high frequency) and therefore use as little as from 4-6 watts at night to 36 in the daytime, to maintain contact with Windy Ridge, the central SCU station in England. Each SCU station has a list of its own allowed frequencies for contacting Windy Ridge, and separate lists for intercommunication with the other

stations in the theatre. The following is a list of the network in this theatre:

<u>Algiers</u> , (fixed sta.)	servicing	AFHQ (Eisenhower) C-in-C Med. (Adm. Cunningham) Med. Air Command (Air Marshal Tedder)
<u>Gibraltar</u>	(fixed)	
<u>Malta</u>	(RAF W/T used -- no SCU)	
<u>La Marsea</u> (semi-mobile)	servicing	Med. Air Command forward post E. African Air Force (Spaatz)
<u>Bastia</u> - [Corsica]	servicing an HQ for combined Air & Naval Operations (mobile)	
<u>Taranto</u> (mobile)	servicing	Coastal Air Command and Navy
<u>Beri</u> - 2 stations, (semi-mobile)	one serving 15th Army Group HQ (Alexander) and Tactical Air Force (Air Marshal Cunningham) and the other serving	Strategic Air Force (Jimmy Doolittle)
<u>Foggia</u> (mobile)	temporarily split into 2 stations, one serving Desert Air Force, and the other serving 8th Army (Montgomery)	
<u>Caperta</u> (mobile)	servicing	8th Army HQ (Gen. Clarke)
<u>Cairo</u>	(fixed)	
<u>Bengazi</u>	- serving an RAF unit	
<u>Beirut</u>	- " Navy sub operations	
<u>Alexandria</u>	- " Eastern Med.	

BP sends, as you know, the vital material direct to each of the above stations. The channels used, however, are not in every case exclusively SCU. From Windy Ridge to Algiers, for example, nearly 50% of the material is sent by regular commercial cable, the balance, which

consists chiefly of very high priority stuff, being handled over the SCU link. At La Marsa almost 90% is received by an RAF Heavy Mobile high speed link -- again, the balance being taken by SCU. At Malta the traffic is considered too small to justify the establishment of an SCU, so RAF facilities are used exclusively. I believe in other cases Army and Navy links are used. This can of course be done without any danger to security, since the messages cannot be broken by anyone not possessing the special systems available only to SLU, so that whether it is SCU personnel or others who handle them in their encyphered form, they have no idea of the nature of their contents. The chief reason, in fact, for the existence of SCU is that for purposes of speed and absolute reliability even under the chaotic conditions of the initial stages of a new operation, an independent channel is necessary. For this reason SCU's are equipped to be completely self-contained for tentage, reserve rations, gasoline, water, motor transport, spares and both wireless and transport maintenance. To this end MacFarlane has two mobile maintenance units in operation, one in Italy under a Major Watt, the other in N.Africa. These units are capable of visiting the various smaller mobile stations and providing such heavy maintenance as the units are not able to do for themselves.

A report of MacFarlane's which I saw gave the following list of personnel and equipment for a so-called "Single Channel (i.e. one transmitter and one receiver) Mobile Station":

- 4 SLU officers (for cypher-work & delivery to recipients)
- 1 Sgt. Wireless operator
- 1 Lance Cpl. " "
- 2 Pmts. " "
- 1 L/cpl. driver mechanic
- 2 drivers
- 1 completely equipped W/T car
- 1 cypher office car
- 1 3-ton lorry for baggage, supplies, etc.

The above station would be typical of that serving an Army HQ, and would be capable of handling a maximum of 4000 groups per day (both in and out), would be supplied on the cypher side with only one-time pad systems (no types). The one that I saw functioning at 5th Army HQ was almost exactly that size, although they had managed to get 2 3-ton trucks for baggage, and had a considerable amount of extra equipment -- for example they had 5 separate standby sources of power, 3 of which were captured German dynamos. No SCU chap seems to rest easy until he has scrounged every possible motor and dynamo in the vicinity.

In the initial stages of an operation, like the Salerno landings, a smaller outfit consisting of one SLU officer and 1 wireless clerk in a single jeep may be used, but such a unit would be miserably overworked and should be brought up to the strength of a Single-Channel Mobile Station as soon as feasible.

Multiple-channel mobile stations are established by merely doubling or tripling the above equipment, and increasing proportionately the wireless personnel (SLU personnel need not increase at the same rate, because as groupage increases beyond the point where it is feasible to

work on a one-time pad basis, Typex machines are substituted, allowing a single cypher clerk to handle a greater volume of traffic). Such multiple-channel stations are of course necessary where the groupage exceeds 4000 per day, and are also extremely useful when an HQ moves, since one element, with a complete single-channel can pack up and move to the new site, while the other channel can remain in operation at the old, and only move forward with the commander when the forward element has set up and commenced operation.

So much for the digression on SCU.

To get back to the nature of the traffic -- at Algiers 80% of it consists of the actual material from Windy Ridge; the other 20% consists of administrative intercommunication between the various stations and between each of them and London; Intelligence appreciations based on the original material sent from such HQ's as AFHQ and 15th Group Army further down; and certain other intelligence and special communications between certain individual high ranking officers to whom the link has been made available (very little traffic of the last category exists). Each type of communication has its own series-name, and is logged by its number in that series so that each station can be sure he has received everything sent him. Very complete logs are kept, including the times of origin, receipt, etc., and each SLU is responsible for checking the time lapse on its own incoming stuff, so that delay is noted and brought to the attention of the responsible party. I shall not go into the logging system in detail unless you request it, since it is more or less standard message

practice designed to insure the ability to trace any given incoming or outgoing message at any stage from originator to final delivery.

The volume of total traffic at Algiers is an average of 20,000 groups per day, of which the vast bulk is encyphered on the Typex machine. Probably about 1500 groups per day are sent in 1-time pad, since any message common to all stations including those which do not have Typex, is sent on 1-time pad. The maximum groupage in recent months was about 25,000 groups in a single day. Of the total groupage about 1/10 is outgoing, the rest incoming. To handle this traffic they use a system of 4 watches consisting of one Duty Officer and 4 cypher-sgts. each. These watches are staggered so that each person gets $1\frac{1}{2}$ days off in every four. The chief and deputy-chief and one other officer do not take part in these watches except in rare instances, as they are fully occupied with the administration of this and the other stations, and with various liaison duties with their customers. The duty officer's job then, is divided between one RAF flying officer, one WAAF flight officer, and 2 civilians. They do some of the cypher work, most of which is done by the sergeants, and also make the deliveries at specified times to the various recipients. 3 of the sergeants work at the Typex machines, the fourth at one-time pad. I believe the logging is done by everybody.

I was given the following statistics as a fair average of the capacity of experienced cypher-clerks using Typex:



1500 groups per man per day, including encyphering (or decyphering), logging and typing.

Anything above 12,000 groups per day, however, requires a minimum of 12 clerks.

Anything below 5000 groups per day requires a minimum of four men.

Because the likelihood of sickness, and the possibility of occasional very heavy days, it is considered unwise, whatever the traffic of a station, to let it fall for any length of time below a status of 4 cypher-personnel.

How similar the requirements would be on sigaba I do not know -- I have the impression good men would be a bit faster on that than on Typex, but you will be able to translate these figures into our own requirements in collaboration with Arlington Hall.

So much for Algiers.

LA MARSA:

At La Marsa, where I spent 2 days under the tutelage of F/L Robinson, SLU has one customer: two copies of each item are struck off, one kept on file with SLU for one month, the other delivered to the office of G/C Luard, who is not required to return it, but pastes it up in a book of his own for a similar period, after which he has it destroyed. As the SLU is in the basement of the same building as that in which Luard has his office, the material is quite securely handled. The groupage at La Marsa amounts to between 12,000 and 15,000 groups per day, for which a personnel

of 4 officers and 12 sergeants are required. They are organized into 4 watches as at Algiers, but the senior SLU officer (Robinson) participates in the watches as well as the other 3.

The SCU, although it only uses one channel 24 hours a day and a second-channel part-time (remember that the great bulk of its traffic is handled over an RAF link) has 3 channels available. The one of these which is in full-time use has been moved into a building, but it could be made mobile on a moment's notice, as the truck into which the equipment fits is available.

BARI:

I only visited the SLU at Bari which serves 15th Army Group and Tactical Air Force -- the one for Doolittle's Strategic Airforce HQ, 9 miles distant, was only just being set up. Flt.Lt. Thompson was the senior SLU officer. His groupage had reached a high of 15,000 groups per day, but averaged between seven and nine thousand. His was the least compact of the units I visited, his offices and living quarters being in one building, and his customers in two others, approximately 100 and 200 yards distant. Four deliveries a day were made, at 7:00 and 11:00 AM, and at 5:00 and 9:00 PM. 3 copies of each item were made, one for file by SLU for 7 days, one for the air people and one for the Army; each of the last 2 copies had to be returned to SLU to be burned within 24 hours of delivery, though in the case of the Army copy, negotiations were under way for permission for the recipients to keep their copy and paste

portions of it up, in order to save them the labor of making notes from the items they wished to keep available -- they quite reasonably maintained that the notes they took were quite as compromising as the typed copy itself since in some cases they practically copied whole items out.

I forgot to mention that the above figures on groupage of 7-9000 daily are for incoming messages only; besides this they had an average of between 1 and 2000 groups per day outgoing -- and it had been as high as 4000. To handle this there are 2 officers and 12 sergeants on the cypher side, and 8 wireless operators and 6 driver-mechanics belonging to SCU. This groupage, the senior SLU officer told me, is close to the absolute maximum for the 2 channels he has available, though his SLU personnel could handle more. They have 2 Typex machines, and are thus capable, during a move, of splitting into 2 single-channel Typex stations, one forward and one temporarily behind.

CASERTA:

The SLU at General Clarke's forward echelon HQ was the only one I saw which was under canvas. The forward and rear echelon HQ's are at the moment only 2 miles apart, both being within the grounds of the Royal Palace at Caserta. Rear Echelon is in the 3000-room palace itself; forward is in tents at an outlying part of the enormous grounds. Here there is, of course, only one customer: indeed, there were only 4 people officially "in the picture" in the whole HQ: Gen'l. Clarke, and Gen'l. Gruntler his C of S, and Cols. Howard and Wells, the G-2 and ass't. G-2

respectively. A fifth officer, British Brigadier Richardson, representative on the staff of the British Increment, was also a recipient, not by virtue of his post but because in a previous job he had been on the list and had therefore had longer experience with the material than any of the U.S. officers and hence could give valuable aid in its interpretation.

The chief SLU officer, Flt-Lt Cook, enjoyed excellent relations with his American customers, and seemed entirely satisfied with their security-mindedness. His cypher-office was in a truck adjacent to and actually connected with the truck which contained the SCU sending and transmitting apparatus. The W/T operator handed each item as he got it thru the window to the duty-officer who decyphered it and took it over to the G-2 tent for either Col. Wells or Col. Howard, whichever happened to be in at the moment. So careful are they to safeguard the material that even the connection of any of the SLU officers with intelligence was never mentioned in front of the other G-2 personnel, and when I inadvertently dropped a remark in violation of this rule (of which I was not aware) I was properly ticked off by Col. Wells. The cypher officer makes only one copy of each message, in longhand. The copy is delivered in person, as I have stated, to one of the 2 G-2 recipients, who may or may not wish to convey it to Generals Clarke or Gruntler. If they do, they must carry it to him in person and return it to a safe in Col. Howard's truck which is always kept locked, and which is separate from the G-2 tent. Each item can be kept 24 hours in this safe and must then be

returned to the SLU for burning. If any other recipient wishes to see the item, he must come to the truck and read it there. Notes may be taken of the contents by Cols. Howard or Wells, but they must be cryptic and brief, and bear no literal relation to the original. Such notes, as well as maps on which OB information from these items are entered, are likewise kept in Col. Howard's safe and never removed from the truck unless to be shown the commanding general. Cols. Howard or Wells sign for each item and their signature is checked off when that item has been returned to SLU for destruction.

The groupage is about 2000 daily, and is handled by 3 officers, though this is recognized to be one officer short of the normal. There are 4 WT operators, and 3 driver mechanics in the SCU servicing this unit. The reason for the shortage of one officer is that Lt. Cook is most anxious to maintain the principle that in such a forward outstation only officers should be used on the cypher side; he has been offered a sergeant but prefers to work shorthanded rather than break this rule. His reasoning is that in such a small station, where the watch consists of one individual only, he must combine the duties of delivery to recipients as well as that of encyphering and decyphering. It is not so easy for an enlisted man to refuse to deliver an item should any but an authorized recipient demand to see it in the absence of anyone "in the picture". Moreover, such an enlisted man must necessarily bunk and eat with other enlisted men and the temptation to answer questions about his job would be great. I think his reasoning is sound -- the problems of keeping

his job a secret in so closely knit an organization as a forward echelon
are difficult enough for an officer to handle -- the speculations as
to what SLU is at 5th Army HQ have ranged as far afield as "Search Light
Unit," but they are generally believed by the smart fellows to be engaged
in Y work, which is uncomfortably close to home. It is true that units
as small as the one at 5th Army HQ are functioning with 2 officers and 2
sergeants and that the sergeants have been entrusted with the responsi-
bilities of duty officer of the watch, but that is not ideal, and if we can
avoid it in the Far East, I think we should. It appears to be chiefly
shortage of officers which has forced the authorities to make this com-
promise here.

So much for SLU/SCU.

I have mentioned the fact that I have had a chance to talk with
various recipients: here at AFHQ I talked to representatives of all three
services: at La Marca with G/C Luard to whom I had a letter from Winter-
botham; at Bari I had a brief talk with one of the Air fellows, and spent
considerable time with all the Army intelligence officers who work on the
staff; at 5th Army Lt.Col. Wells gave me a considerable amount of time.

On one point these people were all unanimously agreed; next to
security itself, the most important consideration in connection with this
intelligence is that it be collated with lower level staff, and that it
be interpreted for the operational people by intelligence officers familiar
with its pitfalls, trained in its interpretation, and experienced in its
use. Luard was especially strong on this point and emphasized the fact

that it could mislead an inexperienced hand as often as it could enlighten him -- he is therefore placing men who have worked on it for some time under himself in the position of recipients in the more forward HQ's.

On consideration of the above, it was interesting to me that of some 16 recipients at 15th Army Group HQ, more than half were Intelligence Personnel, and that of the remainder, which included Alexander and his G of and his G-3, very few of them ever saw any of the original items. Their being "in the picture" entitled them to remain in Alexander's 9:00 staff meeting after all the non-authorized personnel trooped out, and to hear the daily G-2 appreciation based on this material. Of course Alexander himself could see anything he liked, and has had considerable experience with the material, but he relies on his G-2, Brigadier Avery, and the personnel under him to interpret the stuff for him. In the case of 5th Army, as I have already reported, even the G-3 is not in the picture; moreover, it is largely items containing OB information which are sent there direct from BP. Material requiring more collation and interpretation, such as information about enemy supply and communications, as a rule reach 5th Army HQ only in the form of appreciations from AFHQ and from 15th Army Group, who have more material available and larger intelligence personnel to work it up in useable and intelligible form. As far as the "cover" for OB and other information available from this source is concerned, that is ingeniously worked out by the men who prepare the various appreciations. AFHQ may know that a certain division is being sent into the line facing 5th or 8th Army; depending on the amount of collateral

Intelligence indicating such an enemy reinforcement, they may have to say that photo recon suggests such a move, or that PW interrogation places a certain division in a certain area suggesting its possible movement into the line (in both cases the PR and PW cover must be genuine) or they may have to say simply that in view of the casualties known to have been suffered by the enemy in a given area, reinforcement is likely, and any one of 5 divisions known to be available are mentioned as possible for movement -- one of which will be the actual one known to be ordered up. As soon as confirmation on a lower level is received the beans can then be spilled.

Hope some of this proves of value. Again repeat I have been extremely well treated here and have seen everything I asked to see. Now hope to get on to K. Delhi as quickly as possible with no further stops.

JOHN F. B. RUNEALLS
Capt., Inf.