

SRH-023
PART-II

REPORTS

BY

U. S. ARMY ULTRA REPRESENTATIVES
WITH ARMY FIELD COMMANDS
IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
SHAEF AIR INTELLIGENCE	3-6
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY	7
SPECIAL ADVISER ON TACTICAL AIR FORCE	8-11
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (Provisional)	12-19
EIGHTH AIR FORCE	20-33
NINTH AIR FORCE	34-56
IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND	57-103
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND	104-109
XXIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND	110-114
XII TACTICAL AIR COMMAND	115-117
ETOUSA, COM Z, SHAEF Rear G-2, and AMBASSADOR MURPHY	118-120

O.K.A., American Embassy.

12 May 1945

Memorandum For: Col. Telford Taylor
From: Lieut. Col. Edward K. Thompson
Subject: D.S. With SHAEF Air Intelligence.

Problems at SHAEF were twofold:

- (1) Keeping General and Air Staffs informed of Air Intelligence matters.
- (2) Disseminating Intelligence based on sources generally not available to subordinate units.

By way of preface, this report is written from the viewpoint of a working Intelligence officer. My position differed from that of officers attached to wholly American units, thus I was not faced with the same problems of ULTRA security.

Lessons which might be learned from experience at SHAEF are applicable mostly to combined headquarters, of which there are few. General observations, which follow the narrative of experience at SHAEF, are based on work in this headquarters and operations of subordinate Air headquarters. In many cases they will serve simply to confirm the reports of officers actually attached to other units. I had a good OP, however, and if I saw the trees rather than the forest it is my fault.

My duties at SHAEF gave me an opportunity to observe the operations of G-2, SHAEF; and every Tactical Air Force, U.S. TAC, R.A.F. Group and some of the Ground H.Q.'s at least once and some as many as three times.

SHIPRATE NO. 1.

Due to establishment difficulties, the token Air Intelligence unit at SHAEF, a sub-division of G-2, could not obtain any American personnel. An office was needed at SHIPRATE NO. 1 (SHAEF Forward in the Forest of BERE, near PORTS-KOUBE), mostly to brief the Chief of Staff's early morning meeting. Since I was available on someone else's T/O my welcome was assured. I arrived in the forest the first week in August.

My training included an unproductive three weeks at Special Branch in WASHINGTON, six weeks at Air Ministry and BLETCHLEY PARK, mostly the latter, two weeks at FUSAG before it joined up with IXth Air Force, and in somewhat less than a week sitting at the feet of the maestro, Group Captain R. Harry Humphreys, chief of the Air Intelligence Sub-Division, G-2 SHAEF.

Group Captain Humphreys believed that the bulk of the work would be done at SHAEF Main but it turned out that whatever part of the war SHAEF was running was directed from Forward. This has been true each time SHAEF has had a Forward. The result was that the entire Air Intelligence Division for a headquarters that usually included General Eisenhower, General Smith and the heads of SHAEF staff sections, consisted of myself and Corporal Margaret Hopkins, WAAF, who was extremely efficient but had been briefed in ULTRA only the day before we left for the "front". My ULTRA training had been adequate, but since ~~the~~ Hut 3 makes a fetish of not considering any other source my own feeling is that I was forced to lean rather too heavily on ULTRA.

As time went on communications became well enough organized so that other sources were available, but it cannot be said that this arrangement was anything but a stopgap until a more complete and better balanced air staff appeared. Apart from ULTRA's intrinsic value, its signals system is universally the most efficient and best run of any headquarters communications setup which I have observed.

/Chief

003

Chief commitments at this stage were appearing before the morning meeting and preparing a daily digest of ULTRA air messages, primarily for the guidance of G-2 personnel. This digest was started on 6 August and has appeared every day, with no gaps due to moving of headquarters or any other reason, until we shut up shop last week. Its employment was expanded and it was subsequently used to brief the Deputy Supreme Commander and the leading members of the Air Staff whose duties necessitated reading of ULTRA. The file of these digests has been turned over to the SLU at SHAEF, in accordance with PROC 4580. Since I do not know of any other operational headquarters where such a record was kept this may have some value.

JOULEVILLE, NORMANDY

This was simply transition headquarters, which lasted from the last week in August until the middle of September without ever being dignified with a code name. AEAFF, which had been a separate headquarters, arrived before we moved. It became obvious that the existence of an Air Intelligence Sub-Division of G-2 was completely redundant, since there was a full scale Air Intelligence component of AEAFF. While the future of AEAFF was being decided, however, I continued to brief the Chief of Staff's meeting, working with Air Commodore Grierson and members of his staff.

LIBERTY (VERSAILLES)

Very shortly after the move, AEAFF became Air Staff, SHAEF. Group Captain Humphreys, who had also joined SHAEF during the last days in JOULEVILLE left. I was asked by Air Commodore Grierson to become head of his GAF Section in place of Wing Commander Jackson, who departed to the SHAEF Mission, and Wing Commander Goar, who was detailed to SHAEF Air (Rear). This was an entirely different commitment. In effect I filled a genuine T/O vacancy. In addition preparing Air Commodore Grierson for briefing the Chief of Staff's meeting and preparing the ULTRA air digest, there were a number of other duties.

1. Preparation of brief for weekly Air Commanders' Meeting, which included heads of all the Allied Air Forces in the theater. This consisted not only of a report of the week's activities but an appreciation of what was likely to occur in the future.

2. Preparation of the daily Air section of the G-2 Summary.

3. Preparation of a weekly appreciation for the Air section of the SHAEF G-2 Summary. This developed into a rather large commitment. After trial to the TACs and RAF Groups it was found that preparation of non-ULTRA material which could be passed on intact to Intelligence officers of operational units was badly needed, and a considerable amount of fan mail indicated that this summary fulfilled the requirement.

4. ULTRA appreciations to subordinate units when needed. In general the Air Ministry Sumsets filled this requirement, but occasionally something came up of purely tactical interest which seemed to require a word of guidance from SHAEF. An example was the warning that attacks on airfields might be expected; this was sent out almost a week prior to 1 January.

5. A digest of ULTRA messages not generally distributed to the TACs and Groups. The Air Forces generally received everything that they needed, but frequently messages which had long range implications for the TACs were not serviced from the Park. A digest was therefore sent out every three or four days and also evoked a very favourable reaction from the recipients. It was probably the original intention that the Air Forces should provide this service for the subordinate units, but since none of them did it regularly the commitment was taken on by my section.

6. Appreciations on specific subjects. These were required on Secret Top Secret and ULTRA levels at the rate of several a week. They included

papers for the J.I.C., appreciations of the likely enemy air operations for the benefit of Air Defence (AAA), Com-Z and the planners of various special operations.

The files of material mentioned in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 have been turned over to the SLU, along with the daily ULTRA digests, in accordance with PROC 4580.

All this probably sounds more formidable than it actually was. For one thing, most of the subordinate units were in existence before SHAEF Air, and the latter in all cases took over Air leadership only gradually. My work was made easier by an extremely efficient and willing staff of assistants and colleagues, all of whom were available on a straight T/O basis, not on loan from the Embassy.

My own section, including Wing Commander Cross, deputy, and Warrant Officer Coogan, was very good indeed. In addition, SHAEF Air had a strong Airfields section and an extremely able 'Y' Section and staff of D.I.Qs. Most of the commitments listed above involved co-ordination of information obtained from other sections with those of my own. The daily brief, prepared in final form by my section, became a combination of sightings, 'Y' and ULTRA, from which, among other things, a daily estimate of sorties was made. The D.I.O.s furnished air sightings and reports from ground units, the 'Y' officer detailed to work with me each morning provided a digest of signal intelligence during the 24 hours and the Airfields section tabulated the results of recce. Estimates of future activity were made after consultation with those who might have pertinent views.

A very real problem during this period was obtaining and keeping the interest of my superiors, both in A-2 itself and above. Unfortunately the American deputy was not interested in Intelligence at all and the various non-operational interests of A/C Grierson (post-hostilities etc.) left me as acting A-2 much of the time. This situation was greatly improved by the appointment of Col. Mattis as Deputy ACAS, A-2.

SHIPATE NO.2 (REMS)

This move involved the continuation of the problems at LIBERTY, and as the end of the war approached there was a transition period in which a useful function was performed in answering questions from various post-hostilities bodies.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

As you know and will further appreciate when you read the next section I am by no means a fanatical supporter of the system under which ULTRA is disseminated. Under the rules as established, however, administration of ULTRA Intelligence officers has been generally on an efficient and extremely benevolent basis. One of the things I like is the encouragement of individualism, a policy of which I now take advantage.

Personally, I think it was a mistake that I was not sent to IXth Air Force, which was considered at one time. I understood my rank was considered to high and that it was desirable from the viewpoint of our organisation to have somebody in SHAEF. The first reason hardly holds up, since officers at TAC and Army levels became lieutenant-colonels very shortly, and I am aware of my shortcomings in feeding back information. The IXth Air Force has had an erratic and sometimes weak Intelligence organisation and I feel I would have been able to do a great deal of good there. I am grateful, however, for the opportunity to have accomplished as much as I did.

ULTRA FOR THE NEXT WAR OR TWO

The reasons, as I understand them, for a special group of ULTRA Intelligence officers were:

1. A handpicked corps was considered necessary because existing staffs of air and ground intelligence organizations were not all considered able to interpret this highly valuable material.

2. A sort of house dick for each headquarters was required in the interest of Security. This was considered necessary for the Americans, although the British had no parallel setup, because of lack of experience in handling ULTRA.

To be most useful, however, one must become an integrated part of an organization. There is at least a partial contradiction in producing Intelligence as a loyal member of a staff and watching the boss at the same time for violations of security. Unless one has been thrust into an already working headquarters it is hard to understand this difficulty. Everyone eventually obtains the confidence of his superiors and colleagues but it should come more quickly and more easily.

Parenthetically, from observing British and integrated headquarters, I feel that American Intelligence and General officers need feel no inferiority complex about their security. I might say also that I do consider Americans need have no inferiority complex as Intelligence officers either. Our Directors of Intelligence (G-2s or A-2s) should not be compared unfavorably with their opposite numbers. On medium levels I think that the British have a larger number of able officers, but man for man there is not much to choose, and in time the numerical position will more nearly equal also.

Just as it is important for one to become identified personally with his co-workers, ULTRA itself should be merged with other Intelligence material. The most successful officers I know did just this, but under the present system the temptation is to lean too heavily on this excellent and largely intelligence officer-proof source. Then, too, Intelligence officers on levels below TAC and Army do not have access to the benefits of ULTRA. I am not suggesting that lower elements get the service, I feel there are far too many in the picture now. But if one applies the insight which is provided by ULTRA to the handling of non-ULTRA material it is possible to be extremely useful to lower echelons without violating security. ULTRA gives merely proper direction and the rest is a matter of applying sound Intelligence procedure to results of reconnaissance, P/W interrogation and 'Y'. I consider this a far more useful and secure employment of ULTRA than let's say providing conversational tidbits for generals. In case anyone is interested, I am attaching a few copies of our Intelligence Summary, which is classified secret. This is an attempt to apply the principles outlined above. I consider it only a start and confess with all humility that one seems to acquire an adequate grasp of what is needed about time the war ends.

More complete co-ordination of all types of Intelligence should have the further advantage of providing more than one string for our bow. Our hold on ULTRA is tenuous at best and the experience of the Ardennes offensive showed that we had become rather too dependant on having our information served on a platter.

Although I viewed with suspicion the method of recruiting the officers who have handled ULTRA, I must admit that it has provided a group which is above average in ability. If this personnel system was good, though, there is no reason why it should not be employed to improve the whole body of Intelligence.

Experience with a number of ground and air Intelligence staffs leads me to appreciate the problem which must have been present when the U.S. Forces first obtained access to ULTRA. If we are not going to get caught short again, it is necessary to start building up Intelligence immediately. The average regular considers his best bet an operational job. It may be quite beyond the power of anyone who reads this report to make Intelligence a profitable military career but it should be made a fully equal staff partner.

I would like, therefore, to go on record with a vote for divorcing the Security and Intelligence aspects of handling ULTRA. Security should become the responsibility of the Senior Intelligence Officer in a headquarters, who would handle violations on a high level CI basis. ULTRA Intelligence should be handled not by an elite corps but by the members of the staff who are experts in the various phases of Intelligence, such as OB, Targets and Logistics. This is the method now used by SHAEP, USSTAF, 8th AF and the British. If the Intelligence service is considered generally too incompetent the answer is: Improve it. The war in the Pacific is too far along for any basic changes there but there should be time enough to prepare for future operational employment of ULTRA.

Edward K. Thompson
EDWARD K. THOMPSON
Lieut. Colonel, A.C.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1, GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

16 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the 1st Allied Airborne Army.

The following report covers an approximate two months period of assignment of this officer to the 1st Allied Airborne Army as an ultra air advisor. As opposed to direct tactical commitment, this officer's activities were confined to the receipt, interpretation and presentation of ultra air information coordinated with a similar advisory set-up for ultra ground intelligence. It must be noted that at the time of this assignment, the above command was based in England, which afforded the opportunity of intimate contact and liaison with the ultra air section of the British Air Ministry.

The main importance of ultra air intelligence with the 1st Allied Airborne Army consisted primarily of furnishing a confirmatory foundation for the compilation and issuance of enemy air appreciations applicable to GAF reaction, possible counter-measures and strength of opposition affecting contemplated airborne operations in various areas; each planned parachute drop and glider landing naturally calling for revised or entirely new appreciations. It is obvious that ultra air intelligence was invaluable in writing these appreciations, in that it furnished the necessary confirmation of German Air Force Order of Battle, strength of operational aircraft, type of aircraft, scale of effort, etc. For each planned operation, two appreciations were written; one based entirely on ultra for perusal and study by the General Staff and one written in generalized "open" terms for dissemination down to Corps Commanders and Divisional G-2's.

In addition to this commitment, this officer also prepared and presented a verbal ultra briefing on the air side to the Commanding General and all briefed officers of the command. This was a "closed" session usually held in the office of the Commanding General and scheduled daily to follow immediately after the "open" war-room briefing on the general war situation. Owing to the large area of possible airborne operations, the volume of ultra air intelligence necessarily covered all sectors of the Western Front. In view of this, the verbal briefing was presented in general terms; however, detailed study and consultation was carried out by this officer with the A.C. of S., G-2 at various times throughout the day.

This officer believes that the presentation of ultra intelligence at the 1st Allied Airborne Army was quite adequate in accordance with the American system of field advisors.

Leo J. Nielsen
LEO J. NIELSEN, JR.
Major, Infantry

1 May 1945

SUBJECT : Report of Special Adviser on Tactical Air Force.

TO : Colonel Telford Taylor
Commanding Officer,
MIS, WD, Station London.

1. The undersigned officer has served as Special Adviser on Tactical Air Force Targets in Western Europe from 24 May 1944 to the present time. Report covering his activities in this connection follows.

2. Period 24 May 1944 to 20 September 1944. Throughout this period this officer was attached to Headquarters Advanced A.E.A.F. This Headquarters, composed of joint Anglo-American personnel, was commanded first by Air Marshal Coningham and later by Air Vice-Marshal Strafford. Its function was to coordinate and direct the Allied Tactical Air Forces (U. S. Ninth Air Force and British Second Tactical Air Force) through the period of invasion and the liberation of France. This officer was head of the Target Section and it was his function to recommend to the Director of Operations each afternoon targets for attack on the following day. His duties brought him into close contact with Army Group Target Sections, Director of Intelligence Ninth Air Force, Head of Target Section Second Tactical Air Force, Target Section G-2 SHAFF (in particular, Major Seattie, Head of Section, to whom he was referred by Major, later Lt. Colonel Baily-King), Air Ministry and War Office target experts. Of the material used Ultra was the basic and most reliable. The Ultra information was blended with PR, PW and agents reports in the location, evaluation and selection of targets.

3. Period 20 September 1944 to 21 March 1945. In September 1944 the French campaign was deemed substantially completed and the German campaign was initiated. Headquarters Advanced A.E.A.F., having lived out its appointed time, was dissolved. Coincident with that dissolution, Colonel Palmer Dixon, Director of Intelligence Ninth Air Force requested that this officer be attached to his Headquarters as Special Target Adviser. The attachment was made on 23 September 1944. The work passed through four distinct periods during this attachment.

(a) Period of Organization. The Ninth Air Force was almost wholly lacking in a Target Research and Planning Section. Colonel Dixon decided that he would head his own Target Section which he organized into three units: (1) Operational Target intelligence (under Major Searles) at Advanced Headquarters; (2) Research Intelligence (under Lt. Colonel Egan) at Main Headquarters; and (3) Special Target Adviser (Major Buck) at Air Ministry, London. The Special Adviser was (through the inability of Lt. Colonel Egan) directed to prepare schedules of targets in the principal categories (P.O.L., Ammunition, Ordnance, and M/T). This officer then discussed the matter with Lt. Colonel Maynard, Head of Target Section, Air SHAFF. Lt. Colonel Maynard

declined to prepare Tactical Target Schedules but requested copies of any schedules prepared by the Special Adviser. Major Seattle (Target Section G-2 SHAEF) was advised of the proposed functions of the Special Adviser and promised full cooperation. Colonel Dixon acquainted General McDonald, Director of Intelligence USSTAF, with the proposed function of the Special Adviser and obtained approval.

(b) Original Service to Ninth Air Force. The Special Adviser obtained working space in Section A.I.3 (USA), Air Ministry, established liaison with USSTAF Target Section and with Section III IAG War Office, and was admitted as a Tactical Air Force observer to the P.C.L., Ordnance and Transportation Working Committees of C.S.T.C. With assistance of the American personnel at War Station research was completed on German targets within the tactical air area. These targets were then tied in with existing air cover and where none existed it was obtained. Available PW and Agents' material was then added. The Publication and distribution of target material was then obtained from Section AI 3(c)2, Air Ministry. This was followed by the preparation of Ninth Air Force Target Schedules which were amended and revised from time to time in the light of current information. Ultra appreciations and data on these targets were sent over the Ultra Link to Ninth Air Force. Copies of the Schedules and revisions were delivered to Target Section USSTAF, Lt. Colonel Maynard Air SHAEP, and Colonel Douglas Air Ministry. It was understood with Colonel Dixon that this officer would express his views freely and recommend priorities for both Recce and attack. Two suggestions of the Special Adviser were overruled by Colonel Dixon, these being: (1) The indoctrination of Major Searles; and, (2) that the Ultra messages from the Special Adviser also go to the Tactical Air Commands.

(c) First Extension of Service Beyond Ninth Air Force. In the Autumn of 1944 there was organized a joint Franco-American Air Force to act in conjunction with the Sixth Army Group. This was the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional). Because of the French component not being in the Ultra picture, there was no direct Ultra link with this Air Force but its Commander and appropriate officers were briefed by Lt. Colonel Rood, Special Air Adviser attached to Headquarters Sixth Army Group. Colonel Young, Director of Intelligence, First Tactical Air Force, requested that the Special Target Adviser's service be repeated to the First via Lt. Colonel Rood. This was approved by Air Commodore Grierson, Air SHAEP, Colonel Taylor, LIS, and Colonel Dixon. The latter directed the Special Adviser to extend the service accordingly, and this was done in November 1944.

(d) Extension of Service to Tactical Air Commands. In the latter half of December 1944 Colonel Dixon was succeeded by Colonel Richard Hughes as Director of Intelligence Ninth Air Force. Early in January 1945 Colonel Hughes called the Special Adviser to Luxemburg for a conference. After somewhat lengthy conferences (in some of which Major Kindelberger, Head of 12th Army Group Target Section was included), Colonel Hughes directed the Special Adviser to return to London and continue the service. This directive was largely the result of Major Kindelberger's statement that G-2 SHAEP was not adequately presenting the Ultra target information to the 12th Army Group.

Colonel Hughes approved the Special Advisers recommendations: (1) That Major Searles be indoctrinated; and (2) that the Ultra messages be repeated to the Tactical Air Commands. Colonel Hughes also instructed the Special Adviser to reach an agreement with Major Kindelberger on the scope of the messages. An agreement was reached that there should be three types of Ultra messages: (a) Weekly Summaries; (b) Special Appreciations; and (c) Replies to specific Requests. As to the Weekly Summaries it was agreed that the following Pro forma was to be used:

First: Railways

- (1) Routes
- (2) Loading Stations
- (3) Unloading Stations
- (4) Front Forwarding Stations
- (5) General

Second: Roads

Third: Fuel

- (1) Production and Supply
- (2) Storage Depots
- (3) Dumps
- (4) Stocks (from Supply Returns)
- (5) General

Fourth: Ammunition

- (1) Production and Supply
- (2) Shell filling and Assembly Plants
- (3) Storage Depots
- (4) Dumps
- (5) Stocks (from Supply Returns)
- (6) General

Fifth: Ordnance (including A/V) Depots

Sixth: M/T

- (1) Parks
- (2) Depots (including spare parts)
- (3) Repair and Salvage work shops

Seventh: Other Depots and Dumps

Eighth: General

4. Period 21 March 1945 to 1 May 1945. At the request of Lt. Colonel Fowell the service was extended to USSTAF Main. At the request of Colonel Douglas phases of the Service were extended to Eighth Air Force. At the same time this officer's attachment to Ninth Air Force was terminated and he reverted to his basic unit (MIS, WD, Station London). The Service, by agreement between Group Captain Jones, Colonel Taylor, Colonel Douglas and Wing Commander Rose, was extended to Second Tactical Air Force with messages repeated for information to Air SHAEF. By mid-April the war had reached a state where the Weekly Summaries had served their usefulness and, accordingly, were discontinued. Since that date the Service has been strictly on a stand-by basis for the sole purpose of answering requests from the Field and furnishing spot information.

5. Messages Sent Since 15 January 1945.

	Serial Number	Actual Number of Messages
Weekly Summaries	12	34
Special Appreciations	14	14
Replies and other Messages	30	30
Total	56	78

6. Comments.

(a) The objects of the service were: To give Ultra information past and present on targets mentioned in current Ultra; to give location and target material references wherever possible for targets referred to in current Ultra; to send or have War Station send all pertinent Ultra target material (this involved comparing all messages sent by War Station with original document to see that target coverage was adequate); to reflect the views and interpretations of Air Ministry and War Office on Ultra targets; to supply results of Medmenham searches of existing cover for new targets mentioned in Ultra; and to send Ultra material in condensed form to the commands on targets well ahead of Ground Forces advances.

(b) The necessity for the Service grew out of the failure of SRAEF to meet the target needs of the Tactical Air Forces; the failure generally to recognize the capabilities and role of tactical air power, coupled with the unworkable and fallacious theory that it was the function of Armies and Army Groups to do target planning for the Tactical Air Forces and their Tactical Air Commands; and a "Battle of Britain" emphasis on Ultra at Air Ministry and War Station, that is, a stressing of Order of Battle aspects and a large discount of the target value. This was inconsistent with American concepts of offensive air power.

7. Conclusions.

(a) Credit for any success which the Service may have enjoyed is due to the guidance and direction given by Colonel Taylor and the cooperation of his personnel at War Station.

(b) The Service has now served its usefulness. The state of the war has rendered it functus officio. Its termination is recommended.

Lucius A. Buck

LUCIUS A. BUCK
Major, AC

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
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LONDON, ENGLAND

7 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra Intelligence at First Tactical Air Force
(Provisional)

A.

First TACAF and Sixth Army Group were both served by Major Gardner and me working at the Army Group as an ultra ground-air team. Gardner's report covers the basic procedures used for dissemination at this combined ultra room. After seven months cross table argument our opinions about ultra have become almost the same and he has expressed them far better than I could. My report should be read as a supplement to his since it deals only with the problems at TACAF.

My problems were not so much ultra ones as they were problems of local organization. I served TACAF from the nearby Army Group, and because TACAF's intelligence staff remained almost nil my interests were far too broad for the results to be up to the desired standard.

B.

1. The First Tactical Air Force (Provisional). MATAF with its subordinate command XII TAC supported the landings in Southern France in August 1944. The TAC stayed with the Seventh Army in its advance northward but MATAF remained in Italy. In September Chaeff assumed control of the operations in Southern France and XII TAC became a part of Ninth Air Force.

The Ninth Air Force was then supporting the 12th and 6th Army Groups and XII TAC was supporting the Seventh Army and the newly activated French Army. A French TAC was expected momentarily. This unsymmetrical setup called for the formation of another air force to be opposite Sixth Army Group, but because the theater had to get along with units already present, Chaeff and USSIAF settled upon a provisional air force formed from personnel and material of two non-operational wings of the Ninth Air Force.

The First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) was activated at Vittel, France, in late October 1944. Major General Ralph Royce was Commanding General, Brigadier General Ned Schramm, Deputy Commanding General and Colonel Charles Young, A-2.

Due to shortages of everything General Royce intended to form what he called "a streamlined staff". The odds and ends of personnel received and the sad lack of supporting service units did not result in

an organization which would evoke the complimentary term "streamlined". This was unfortunate because TACAF was in the vulnerable position of being an inexperienced air force staff superimposed on a single experienced tactical air command.

During the winter the personnel and service unit position was gradually improved; the staff gained experience; and with the emancipation of the First French Air Corps and the acquisition of the 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing, the existence of the Air Force neared justification.

2. The MIS, WD, Recipient. In early September 1944 when it was unclear what was to be the air unit opposite of the Sixth Army Group, I was sent to the Army Group to cover ultra air intelligence. I arrived at Lyon in middle September just as the Ninth Air Force took on the additional mission of supporting the Sixth Army Group.

Referring to the cool reception to ultra, Major Gardner's report calls the succeeding six weeks the "Period of Frustration". For ground generals who had no interest in ground ultra GAF order of battle was obviously unnecessary. I toyed with the idea of forming a target section but rejected it because no personnel was available to keep the open target records which are necessary for exploitation of ultra target information. After three weeks of completely pointless labor I abandoned the GAF to become a ground understudy to Major Gardner whose activities up to that time had been pointless but at least concerned with the Army Groups main business. Within three more weeks First TACAF was activated and I once again shifted trades.

Colonels Taylor and Young and I conferring at Vittel thought that the normal ultra system could be installed at TACAF using the Sixth Army Group SLU facilities. Then we learned that General Foyce intended his staff to be joint French - American rather than American with French liaison officers as was the case at the Army Group.

We agreed that the following procedure would be followed: (1) I would continue to maintain my ultra office at the Army Group, (2) the three indoctrinated officers would attend the daily air-ground ultra briefing at the Army Group, (3) one of the indoctrinated officers would be notified of urgent messages throughout the day and transmission would be arranged personally, (4) I would spend at least half of my time at the Air Force acting as Assistant A-2, the Deputy A-2 being a Frenchman.

The plan worked in part. The three indoctrinated personnel were faithful attendants at the morning briefing from General Dever's first conference at Vittel to his last in Heidelberg. Messages requiring immediate

action were easily taken care of by my walking over to the Air Force Headquarters or Young coming to the Army Group. No ultra material was ever taken into the Air Force Headquarters and no conferences were held there.

The plan that I would be a working assistant to the A-2 at the Air Force was never realized. While setting up an Air Force war room in compliance with Young's orders during his absence in the first week, I was "eaten out" by the unindoctrinated Chief of Staff who was quite naturally puzzled by the activities within his headquarters of an Army Group officer of whom he had never heard. Although the indoctrinated Deputy Commanding General smoothed over the incident it was evident that an officer attached to the Army Group could not violate military conventions by being an Assistant A-2. This even though the A-2 literally had no staff.

Instead of being an assistant A-2 in the Air Force Headquarters where I could use my ultra knowledge in dealing with all intelligence, I became a special assistant for Young working at the Army Group.

- a) In the morning I briefed the air and ground generals on the air ultra while Gardner did the ground.
- b) Young remained after the briefing for more detailed intelligence discussions with Gardner, Torrelli and me.
- c) I kept complete records on the GAF including airfields and briefed the senior officers of TACAF in an open meeting twice a month.
- d) Lacking a sigint officer I acted as such for TACAF.
- e) I participated in all target conferences as the Army Group representative.

At first TACAF was completely dependent on the Army Group intelligence even for such strictly air subjects as GAF and targets. Our ultra room was the heart of intelligence for both the Army Group and the Air Force. However as TACAF became more independent I found it increasingly difficult to inject my ultra knowledge into its operations. To remedy this I became the G-2 Air for the Army Group from which position I could more easily exercise the guiding influence of ultra on the operations of the Air Force.

3. The Mechanics.

a) Briefings. At the 0845 briefing I gave the air intelligence and Gardner followed with the ground. His briefing was the main act. Briefers and briefees alike were far more interested in the ground battle than in the air battle which had already been won.

My air briefing was necessarily elementary because none of the generals had a knowledge of the GAF and I saw no reason why they should be troubled with its details. I led off with the number of enemy sorties flown in our area the previous day and the intentions for the day if we had them. Pece reports or orders were given if they had significance in the ground battle. What followed depended on the traffic received: Changes in strength, moves of units in our area, special operations planned and administrative changes of importance.

Since supply information has significance at Army Group level mainly as it affects targets, it fell into the air province. Materiel

shortages and supply returns, once they had been summarized, were of surprisingly great interest to both the air and ground generals.

My briefing rarely lasted five minutes and I tried to keep it as simple as possible. For instance I use ^{terminology} throughout: tactical air command for fliegerdivision or jagdivision; the number of miles the unit could travel with the fuel on hand; operational aircraft in a group instead of the number on hand. Both Gardner and I thought it better to have the generals leave with the correct impression than with the detailed facts and the wrong impression.

b) Informal conferences. Being out of the main stream of TACAF business where I could put ultra to use in making operational decisions my only substitute was daily conversations with its unindoctrinated intelligence officers. Being unindoctrinated, inexperienced and outranked they were quite willing to accept my word on almost any field of intelligence, but the effect was too transitory to be satisfactory. Ultra must be used in the day to day decisions.

c) Appreciations. Since TACAF officers could not take ultra material to their headquarters there was no reason to write appreciations and summaries for them. Oral appreciations and summaries were, of course, a part of the daily briefings.

Appreciations to XII TAC on the GAF were pointless because its recipient, Major Nielsen, received sufficient facts in the signals from B.P. and was better able to appreciate them than I. I did, however, watch the interests of XII TAC - 7th Army on targets and supply. This took the form of occasional summaries and requests to B.P. for repetition of signals.

d) Notes and Maps. After much experimentation I settled upon a large loose leaf notebook as the most satisfactory means of keeping records. The notebook was divided into sections: supply, targets, fighters, bombers, night fighters, V weapons, aircraft types, GAF policy, etc. Note taking was a great chore which robbed one of the time to use the material, but it did have the advantage of making one mentally digest everything. After some early mistakes of too copious notes about subjects that didn't matter and too scanty notes about things which later assumed importance, the problem was simplified by my own increased experience.

I kept my GAF OB on acetate on a 1/1,000,000 airfield map of Germany and used Major Gardner's ground maps for purposes of demonstration, a truly parasitical method.

e) Separation of Air Force Headquarters from the SLU. On two occasions the Army Group TAC with the SLU station and ultra room moved 100-150 miles ahead of the Air Force Headquarters for periods of two weeks. The Deputy Commanding General of TACAF moved with the Army Group TAC and continued to attend the air - ground briefings. The whole TACAF intelligence staff remained at the rear however. In each case the solution was for either Colonel Young or me to make the trip between headquarters every two days for an ultra briefing. If the Army Group TAC and Air Force intelligence section had been separated for longer periods of time, the situation might have been unworkable but for relatively short periods very little was lost.

f) security. Security never presented a problem at TACAF. No material entered the headquarters and no conferences were held there at the ultra level. Since the Air Force rarely, if ever, took any direct operational action there was no occasion for a security breach of this nature.

There was probably little speculation among the unin-doctrinated at TACAF about the morning conference and my job because both were connected with the Army Group. There was much about the Army Group they didn't expect to know. For these reasons the French were not a security danger.

g) The French Problem. The French had a natural reluctance to comply with orders of higher headquarters run by Americans. General Poyce's plan to make TACAF a truly combined American-French headquarters was therefore admirable. The plan was never carried out, however. The Americans were always in complete control of TACAF and the French sat around as non-working deputies, held minor jobs and filled liaison sections.

4. Ultra by Subject Matter.

a) GAF. Since almost half the ultra information concerned the GAF, our audience of general officers received very complete reports on it. They did not confuse volume with importance. The Allied air operations almost completely disregarded the GAF. Except for the airfield attacks in April which were made for lack of other targets, airfields were rarely attacked on plan.

Until February, the only open records on the GAF at TACAF were some haphazard ones kept by a corporal. In February an officer took over the work but having neither an air force sigint unit or ultra information, his results were necessarily limited. The GAF had become so exclusively an ultra business that the efforts to follow it through open information was analogous to following the war through censored press reports.

b) Sigint. The only sigint unit in TACAF was the under-nourished one which served XII TAC. It operated as one of the four units of the Ninth Air Forces sigint setup.

When TACAF was created this unit was making immediate reports of air activity to the XII TAC control center which warned planes aloft and daily reports to the Ninth Air Force for intelligence purposes.

In the absence of an air force sigint officer I acted as such in making fuller exploitations of the material, formally transferring the unit from the Mediterranean and acquiring an additional unit. Since there was no sigint unit at air force level there was no blending of ultra and sigint information. When Major Nielsen, the MIS, WD officer for XII TAC arrived he began a useful blending of ultra with sigint material and disseminated this in a daily signal to groups.

c) Targets. Unlike ultra CB information which gave a complete and correct picture, ultra target information was fragmentary and debatable. Consequently in this field it was one of the sources rather than the

source. It sometimes provided absolute information on specific targets and sometimes showed what the best bombing policy would be, but more often at tactical level it was just another one of the factors influencing the selection of targets.

The TAC's were given virtually a free hand in the selection of their fighter bomber targets by the broad policy directives of TACAF. This left the four groups of B-26's in the 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing to be employed. For a while XII TAC, by formal or informal means, directed them. Later on the Wing selected its own targets within broad directives laid down by TACAF. The Wing had no ultra so ultra guidance was exercised directly and informally from the Army Group. Unfortunately target selection at most headquarters was done on this informal or lobbying level.

All ultra information which might help in the planning of the use of air power was given at the daily briefings. Some things were clearly shown: (1) oil was always a worthwhile target, (2) interdiction in the Ardennes was effective, (3) knocking out all the Rhine bridges and crossings was an impossibility with a limited force, (4) army fuel dumps were empty.

I made what I thought was a judicious selection of material for presentation to our distinguished audience at the briefing in the hope of influencing them toward the correct target systems. It was obvious, however, that other partisans were making their own judicious selections for distinguished audiences elsewhere because the controversy over the use of air power continued unabated until the air forces ran out of targets.

d) Ground. Major Gardner was the authority on ultra ground intelligence for both the Army Group and TACAF. He briefed the TACAF generals each morning; he kept the ground records; and it was to him the A-2 turned for appreciations of what the German Army was doing. Though relieved of this day to day work I had to keep abreast of the ground battle because of the possibility of taking over the responsibility myself: the headquarters might become permanently separated; Gardner might be ill or on leave. My close association with ground intelligence and Army Group intelligence officers made this possible and the added knowledge was invaluable in air intelligence.

5. Comments.

a) Place of Ultra In Intelligence. Ultra was the most important source of information to TACAF just as it must have been to all other major commands in Europe. In writing about the place of ultra at one command there is an inevitable tendency to compare the value of the messages received at the command's GLU link with the value of the command's photography, sigint or PW's. The attempt to answer in this simple fashion the frequent question "how important was it?" leaves out of the weighing the very important guiding influence which ultra exercised on each headquarters through other headquarters. For instance the widely circulated Shaeff Weekly Target Intelligence Report with its priority lists of fuel, ammunition and ordnance dumps was almost completely reliable and quickly responsive to ultra. Yet, it was never looked upon at TACAF as part of the ultra picture. Or similarly an airfield attack suggested by the Ninth Air Force through open channels usually conformed with what I would have selected from ultra records at TACAF.

It appears to be commonly accepted among field recipients that the reliable guiding influence of ultra in working with other intelligence outweighs its value as a source of operational information. As instances cited by Gardner show, it does have direct operational value but its normal function is to enable one to select the correct information from the huge mass of PW, agent, recce and photography reports.

b) Targets vs GAF. If I have any criticism to make of B.P.'s amazing contribution to the War it is that it failed to recognize after D-Day that targets had replaced the GAF as the main interest of air intelligence. At B.P. I gained the impression that the GAF was a hot subject but at the commands the ops people were completely uninterested in its grandiose plans and ineffective operations. The New Year's Day raid and the concentration of geschwader before the Ardennes offensive confirmed that the Allied air superiority was too overwhelming to be affected by anything the GAF might do.

In spite of this the GAF news continued to come over the link in its carefully processed form while the target information arrived without the benefit of B.P.'s usual dependable thought. Comments were rare and routing reflected the secondary position targets held.

Target intelligence is naturally more controversial than order of battle because in it intelligence becomes operational; perhaps I was seeking order where there could be no order. Let me feel that had D.I. exercised the same careful and ubiquitous guidance in this field as it did in O.B., some of the wasteful target arguments might have been eliminated and the bombers used more intelligently.

The major cause of the differences in bombing policy was the multiplicity of commands which were determining policy. Air Ministry, USSTAR, SHAEF Air Staff, SHAEF G-2, Ninth Air Force and everyone else had a hand in the business and yet there was no common guide or absolute commander.

I recognize that it was not B.P.'s province to reform the air force intelligence but I feel that its guidance in targets might have had the same steadying influence as its guidance in O.B. Expansion of the service started by Major Buck might have been the answer.

c) Attachment vs Assignment. The Thompson school of thought advocates assignment rather than attachment of ultra recipients to commands so that they will become working parts of the headquarters. I agree that an assigned officer can do a better job and under favorable conditions I support his policy. However, under the circumstances of 1944 where intelligence staffs were frequently mediocre and cool to ultra I think it was wise to recruit an elite corps and hold them together to service ultra properly. The MIS, WD, officers frequently were in difficult positions but at least the ultra was taken care of. At Sixth Army Group where Major Gardner and I were attached we suffered few disabilities as attached officers and actually preferred our status.

Having had the unique experience of servicing headquarters A while attached to Headquarters B I can say with no hesitation that such a

-8-

method is utterly impractical. Briefing of generals, informal advising of staff officers and even being the sole, available specialist on some subject, are not substitutes for holding a staff position where ultra can be used in directing the work on open intelligence and making operational decisions.

Leslie L. Rood

LESLIE L. ROOD
Lt. Col., AC

The Handling of Ultra Information
at Hqrs., 8th Air Force

I. Historical Background

The SLU unit at Headquarters 8th Air Force became functional in May 1944 about one month before invasion and one year before the German collapse. Previous to that time, a number of Eighth Air Force officers had been put "in the picture" and received limited amounts of Ultra data in connection with their operational duties, through direct contact with the British Air Ministry and later through the USSTAF Liaison Unit at the Ministry. (The contact originally was handled by Col. Kingman Douglass, who initially served as 8th Air Force Liaison Officer at Air Ministry and was charged with briefing Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker. Col. Douglas later became chief of the USSTAF Liaison Unit at Air Ministry when USSTAF was set up in December 1943 and Gen. Eaker was replaced by Gen. Doolittle.

It was largely at the insistence of Gen. Doolittle that the SLU Unit was organized.)

II. SLU Unit

a. The Ultra signals were received at 8th Force Headquarters by machine.

b. The SLU Detachment consisted of 4-5 officers and 4 enlisted men as follows:

1 Flight Lieutenant	(RAF)
1 Captain	(WAC)
3 Lieutenants	(WAC)
4 Sergeants	(RAF)

c. The volume of work varied from a dozen or so paraphrased messages to 50-75, each 24 hour period. All of it, except for a very few messages directed specifically to commanding officers and directors of intelligence at the end of the war, were handled by the Ultra representative.

d. The SLU detachment had no position in the U.S. chain of command. Its head reported on all administrative matters to his chief in the Air Ministry; the WAC personnel were on detached service from a Signal Battalion at 8th Air Force Headquarters. However, the unofficial understanding was that the SLU Unit was to all intents and purposes part of the "Ultra Section" of the Directorate of Intelligence (cover name "General Liaison and Special Reports") with the RAF officer who was chief of the SLU Unit acting as the executive officer of the "Ultra Section".

e. It would appear to be desirable to have a separate SLU detachment at each active air force or army headquarters because of the need for speedy reception and handling of messages throughout each 24 hours.

III. Ultra Representative.

a. Experience of a sort involving the summarizing of large numbers of facts into an intelligible story giving the overall picture is important as a background for an Ultra representative. It was only too apparent at many "briefings" which the undersigned officer attended that the person making the presentation had not digested the jumble of facts and scraps of information received through Ultra channels, and was repeating them without any effort to link them together or show the trends which they revealed. The only special training necessary, it would appear, would be that giving a basic knowledge of the organization and nomenclature of the enemy air, ground and naval forces.

b. Working quarters at 8th Air Force were not satisfactory for handling Ultra. The Ultra representative's office should have adjoined the rooms of the SLU Detachment,

and should have been of sufficient size to allow the partitioning off of a "study space" in which evaluation work could be done. Actually it was a small single room on the lowest level of the underground "Operations Block" at High Wycombe situated two levels from the SLU rooms and inconveniently located with relation to the principal recipients -- the Commanding General, the Director of Intelligence, the Target Section.

The Ultra officer should be billeted in a single room in which a scrambler telephone is installed, so that the SLU Unit can reach him by day or night. Actually, the Ultra officer was billeted with three other officers none of whom was "in the picture".

In order to discuss any Ultra message of importance which came in during the night, it was necessary after being called, to dress, go to an adjoining building where a scrambler phone was located.

c. The Ultra representative was chief of "General Liaison and Special Reports Section" of the Directorate of Intelligence. The directorate was headed by a Brigadier General, and was part of the "Operations Echelon" consisting of Intelligence and Operations, and commanded by the "Deputy Commander for Operations" of the 8th Air Force. The latter served as deputy to the Commanding General.

d. The Ultra messages after being received on the SLU machine and decoded, were typed and checked by one of the WAC officers and immediately delivered to the Ultra

officer. Each message was single spaced on a sheet of paper $\frac{1}{2}$ the ordinary typewriter letter-sized sheet.

The accumulated messages of each night were delivered to the Ultra representative at 7:30 a.m. and at intervals at the earliest possible time after reception during the day up to 6 p.m.

It was customary for the Ultra officer or his assistant to drop in at 9 p.m. each evening to read over messages which came in after 6 p.m. Anything of importance was brought to the attention of the Deputy Commander for Operations in time for the 10 p.m. final operations conference at which the mission for the following day was "laid on".

e. Handling of Material

1. An extensive filing system of Ultra material was kept by the "Special Reports" Office at 8th Air Force Headquarters. It was the practice to keep a "Hot Message" file for a 10-day period previous to the current date. This consisted of all the important messages which might possibly be needed for immediate reference, filed under about 10 or 12 headings such as for example "GAF Ops Orders", and "Location of German Armou".

A card file was kept, showing the location of each German Air Force Unit. Each disclosure of a new location was immediately entered on the card with the date. This file was coordinated with a large map of Germany on which cardboard-head pins marked with the designation of the various gruppen of the GAF were shifted to correct locations. A large printed chart was kept with wax pencil entries in such a manner that at a glance the current subordination, location and strength of each unit could be seen.

There also were large wall maps of the ground situation with pins showing current Ultra locations of the German Army units and the battle line indicated in elastic tape.

The undersigned officer also had a dozen or so maps of fairly large size mounted on portable wallboard squares on which current ground or air situations of special interest were indicated with colored pins to illustrate important points in the daily briefings of the air staff and the C.E.

2. This officer had one assistant, a Captain who acted as his substitute, and an enlisted man (sergeant) who was charged with keeping the card files. It is difficult to see how the office could have operated efficiently unless, since one officer was needed at all times of the day to receive messages. A need also was felt for a stenographer to type estimates and summaries required from time to time, and the lack of such help was a serious deterrent to efficient operations.

3. The undersigned officer, in addition to his work with Ultra, attended daily the SHAEF (Rear) conference of Air Vice-Marshal Wigglesworth, at which the latest air and ground developments were reported. This was on a "Top Secret" level. Any items of interest to the 8th Air Force were reported in writing to the Commanding General.

The latest reports regarding the battle line from various ground units were obtained in the same manner, and plotted in the Ultra room at 8th Air Force Headquarters.

This served to keep the Ultra officer in touch with the situation at the front as reported by the ground forces. It provided a valuable background for correct interpretation of many Ultra messages which otherwise would have been unintelligible.

The Ultra office also received all (ADIK) P/W interrogation reports for reference.

Great care was taken, however, to restrict all briefings to Ultra, and if any reference was made to non-Ultra material to fill in or provide background this was noted as being such.

A weekly "Intelligence Estimate of the Air Situation" was produced for the Commanding General and his staff by the Ultra Section. This contained a fusion of information from Ultra sources, plus open intelligence, usually "Top Secret".

f. Dissemination of Ultra to recipients.

1. Purposes: At 8th Air Force Headquarters Ultra had the primary purpose of informing the Commanding General, his Deputy for Operations and other operations and intelligence personnel about the future intentions of the enemy, and -- of particularly and vital importance -- what effects the Allied bombing was having on the German war economy. This latter was much more important than might seem likely at first glance. It was the observation of the undersigned officer that most high ranking officers had a personal view as to how air power could best be applied against the enemy so as to win the war.

There was an unconscious tendency to deprecate ideas from ground commanders, the British from higher headquarters, and from any other source. Although the target priority and policy directives from the latter were fairly binding, had it been desired, excuses could easily have been found to pursue, at least part of the time, a different policy.

However Ultra was the agent which changed all of these different viewpoints into a common policy pursued with enthusiasm and confidence by all.

2. The Ultra officer briefed the Commanding General and other Ultra recipients at 9:15 each morning on overall happenings of military and air importance during the previous 24 hours. At 1300 he conducted a further briefing which included certain items from the diplomatic Ultra report prepared at Air Ministry by F/L Pope-Hennessy (obtained through liaison with USSTAF). Any items of special interest at any other times were brought to the attention of the Director of Intelligence, the Commanding General, his deputy and any other Ultra recipients to which the information would have been of value.

There was a weekly "Estimate of the Air Situation" prepared in written form, plus a "Bomb Damage Summary" in which brief operational details of a mission (number of bombers, tonnage, etc.) were coordinated with Ultra reports from German sources. The latter was particularly appreciated by the commanding generals of the three bomb divisions.

A number of special projects were undertaken such as for example, the assembling of all Ultra information about jet and rocket aircraft; the armament of fighters, etc.

There were about 25-30 Ultra recipients in the Eighth Air Force in addition to those engaged in handling or evaluating it. These were selected by various people -- some by the C.G., others by the Deputy for Operations and some by the Director of Intelligence.

4. All the recipients indoctrinated during the last year before German collapse were put in the picture through request via USSTAF to War Station. A number of the older ones were indoctrinated in various ways -- some through a British representative at Air Ministry. The undersigned officer was indoctrinated in Washington by Col. McCormack of Special Branch.

5. The attitude of recipients varied widely at 8th Air Force Headquarters. Gen. Doolittle and his Deputy Gen. Orvil Anderson, were highly receptive at all times, to Ultra information of any sort, and were constantly asking whether any was available on certain subjects which came up from time to time.

Other attitudes including suspicion and apparent jealousy existed, which required considerable tact to overcome. The chief of the Target Section, for example, for a period was outspoken in expressing his distrust for Ultra and its inferiority as a source of intelligence to photo interpretation and P/W interrogations.

A new Director of Intelligence on taking over, remarked in regard to Ultra (apparently confusing it with "Y"):

"We've got to be very careful of this stuff -- down in the Mediterranean the Germans used it to fool the British all the time."

g. Dissemination to non-recipients.

There was no dissemination of Ultra information to non-recipients at 8th Air Force, except for certain small amounts which the "Y Intelligence Officers" -- who were Ultra recipients also mixed with the material they telephoned daily to divisional intelligence officers.

h. Relations with Ultra representatives at higher, LOWER AND PARALLEL commands.

1. Ultra officers at 8th Air Force Headquarters maintained personal contact of a regular nature with Ultra representatives at both Station X and Air Ministry and with Ultra representatives dealing with ground order of battle at SHAEF (Rear). These contacts were extremely beneficial and productive.

Attempts were made to maintain similar contacts with the Ultra representatives at USSTAFE. Actually this contact was of little value, since the work with Ultra at USSTAFE duplicated that at 8th Air Force Headquarters. It is the opinion of the writer that the greatest drawback to efficient intelligence work in the American Army is a tendency at all levels to hoard data and information instead of passing them along to parties which make use of them. The reason for this apparently is a desire to be able to have something "special" which nobody else knows with which to impress a senior commander.

The fewer echellns through which Ultra or any other intelligence data of great immediacy pass from produced to consumer the better!

2. SHEEF (Rear) produced an excellent weekly estimate of GAF from Ultra "Y" and many sources not directly available to the 8th; the sections of Air Ministry dealing respectively with Order of Battle and Organization of the GAF produced weekly papers on these matters which were of great value because often they revealed items which had not been included in the daily messages to 8th Air Force Headquarters. (This was true because these Air Ministry sections saw all the Ultra traffic relating to their specialty, while 8th Air Force received only a paraphrased version of the important messages.

3. No Ultra material in any form was furnished to higher or parallel commands by the 8th Air Force.

1. Relations with War Station.

1. In general the amount and type of material sent to 8th Air Force by Station X was highly satisfactory. There were occasional oversights in regard to messages which definitely would have been of value operationally if sent, but these were rare. (They usually came to light in conver-

sations between Gen. Spaatz and Gen. Doolittle on the continent). Queries were always answered promptly and with the information requested.

2. Speed of transmission and the form of material from War Station was highly satisfactory.

3. Information relating to the details of 8th Air Force operations was furnished to War Station after each mission. (This, of course, was NOT Ultra material.)

4. It is difficult to see what benefit would have resulted from periodic visits to the 8th Air Force of a supervisory officer from War Station. W/C Calvocoressi and other War Station personnel did pay visits from time to time and the undersigned officer usually visited War Station once weekly.

IV. Security

a. The title of the Ultra representative at 8th Air Force headquarters was "Chief of General Liaison and Special Reports". No explanation was given to non-recipients except that of liaison work. When pressed for details, mention sometimes was made of receiving advance plans of coming Allied offensives.

b. All messages were kept either in the SLU or the Ultra Officer's room in the underground ops block at 8th A.F. Headquarters, each entrance to which was guarded. The key to the Ultra office was left each night at the SLU office, where a 24-hour watch was maintained. All messages taken out by the Ultra officer for briefings in the mornings were carried in a ring binder ^{from} ~~from~~ which they could NOT become detached.

c. There were NO breaches of security at 8th AF Headquarters, to the knowledge of the undersigned officer. The Ultra room was not sound-proof however, and adjoined a room occupied by enlisted men of a Signal Corps unit. It was necessary to caution visitors constantly to keep their voices low. This was NOT a satisfactory arrangement and was the subject of repeated representations by the writer. Unfortunately all the other rooms available had disadvantages worse than the one mentioned.

V. Operational Use of Ultra

a. There were many instances where Ultra information was unique. Among these were the several major shifts in GAF fighter order of battle during 1944; the preparations for a "special operation" against the Allies which finally occurred on 1 January 1945 in the shape of an attack against Allied airfields on the continent; the arming of jet aircraft with controlled rocket missiles for use against bombers.

b. The best instance of where the use of Ultra led to results through clarification of open intelligence was in connection with the offensive against German oil. The oil offensive was not undertaken until a few weeks before invasion and there was considerable skepticism in many air force quarters whether it would pay off in time to affect German air and ground operations. By Fall 1944, Ultra began to reveal shortages of fuel which grew in proportions rapidly and soon clearly were revealed by Ultra as being general, NOT local. This convinced all concerned that the air offensive had uncovered a weak spot in the German economy and led to exploitation of this weakness to the fullest extent.

c. I do NOT recall instances where Ultra stopped or postponed Allied operational plans.

VI. Assessment of Value of Ultra

a. Ultra had a high degree of operational value, as already outlined, in providing absolute un-arguable proof that certain bombardment policies decided upon were paying off and paving the road to victory. This prevented any tendency to hedge on directives from taking hold. Ultra reports of large-scale underground construction and increased fighter production in mid-1944 convinced many that the abandonment of all-out effort against German aircraft production facilities in favor of oil had been a wise decision.

Ultra reports of German fighter intentions for the following day were of value to the fighter controllers in laying on fighter escort for a mission. On a number of occasions when Ultra revealed that the GAF would be up in force the following day, requests for tactical use of 8th Air Force fighters were turned down, and the fighters were kept on escort duty.

Ultra figured from time to time directly at 8th Air Force Headquarters in the selection of "targets of opportunity" for heavy bomber missions. It, of course, was one of the most important factors used by higher headquarters in fixing priorities and selecting lists of high priority targets.

b. It is difficult to compare Ultra with information from other sources, since it resembled none except reports from Allied agents. It actually amounted to being able to read the minds of most of the top German military leaders a considerable part of the time. Ultra complemented other types of information and they provided a constant check on its continued accuracy.

c. Ultra did not always give the true picture of the actual situation, since in many cases it showed what the enemy would like to do rather than what he actually did. In other cases, during the rapid Allied advance through France to the Siegfried Line, and later during the final advance to and across the Rhine, it disclosed how much out of touch with the actual situation the German high headquarters were.

It is obvious from study of Ultra that during the last year of the war, on a great many occasions, German air and ground units were unable and in many cases unwilling to carry out orders and directives from high headquarters.

VII. General Comments

Although the atomic bomb and other recent military inventions would seem at first glance to depreciate the value of Ultra in any future wars, it seems to the writer that the opposite will be the case.

Ultra information, if gathered and evaluated in peacetime with the same efficiency that has characterized it in this war, might well be the only means of knowing what actions were planned by an unfriendly nation.

It is apparent that the chances of all-out surprise attack by one nation against another are increased tremendously by the atomic bomb; the new rocket weapons of the type used by Germany and new high speed jet aircraft. Ultra may be the only means in the future of foretelling and forestalling a Pearl Harbor-type attack.

It has never been the policy of the United States, like other nations to employ armies of professional spies, to watch prospective enemies. Here in the shape of Ultra is a weapon which does the work of such an army, without the chance of embarrassing discovery of its working by the enemy.

Let's hope Ultra won't be allowed to dwindle in the next decade!

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11 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra at Ninth Air Force Headquarters

Following preliminary statements this report will divide into two parts. Part I, by Lt. Whitlow, will treat with the general handling of Ultra within the headquarters, the modus operandi by which the Ultra intelligence was inserted into the staff work of the Air Force, culminating in Ultra-sponsored, or Ultra-influenced, air operations. Part I will follow the recommended outline. Part II, by Maj. Hitchcock, will deal principally with the special manner by which Ultra was the ever-present censor to Y intercept intelligence, providing continual priceless guidance and direction; and by which Ultra was enabled to be exploited under Y cover. Part III will be a statement of conclusions.

By way of prologue, two expository remarks are believed necessary. One relates to the organization of the operational elements of the Air Force; these were three Tactical Air Commands--IXth, XIXth, and XXIXth--each disposed in direct support of an army, and one Bomb Division, the 9th. The three TACs operated under broad, general directives issued by Air Force headquarters, and were only occasionally ordered on specific targets; however, the Air Force did specifically order each day the TACs to provide escort for the bombers, stating the size of the fighter force required. (Normally, the TAC in front of whose territory the bombers were to operate was ordered to provide the fighter escort). The TACs had no alternative here. Contrarily, the 9th Bomb Division, composed of 11 twin-engine bomber groups, was controlled directly and completely by Air Force headquarters. Air Force issued to the Bomb Division daily field orders, detailing specific targets (determined at the daily Air Force/Army Group conference) and the attacking force for each. In numbers of aircraft and personnel the Bomb Division was several times the size of any of the TACs, a fact which the TAC staffs, imprisoned by the boundaries and pre-occupied by the affairs of their own limited orbits, more often than not overlooked. It should also be noted that because the 9th Bomb Division was so completely controlled by Air Force with respect to operations, the MIS representatives always declared against indoctrination of any Bomb Division personnel on occasions when the subject was introduced. As will be mentioned later, Ultra intelligence of value to Bomb Division was disseminated to it under appropriate cover.

Another necessary remark relates to the cast of characters at Ninth Air Force who were in the Ultra picture:

LIS REPRESENTATIVE: ~~MAS. HITCHCOCK~~. **MAS. HITCHCOCK. CONSTANT READER.** Maintained Ultra OS and airfield situation in notebook. Primarily concerned, as staff Y officer, with development and exploitation of Y intelligence, and of Ultra under Y cover. See Part II, this memo.

LIS REPRESENTATIVE: Lt. Whitlow. Constant reader, principal handler, and sorter of Ultra signals. Maintained detailed records of Ultra intelligence, and situation maps and charts. Always sited near Director of Intelligence, he was chief advisor and explainer of Ultra matters to D of I. Across his desk, as across Hitchcock's, intelligence from all sources flowed for purposes of relationship, analysis, and establishment of cover for Ultra. See Part I, this memorandum.

CHIEF TARGET OFFICER: Major Searls. Constant reader, exploited Ultra exclusively from target point-of-view in conjunction with G-2 for Air staff, 12 Army Group, which was physical part of Air Force headquarters.

CHIEF FLAK OFFICER: Lt. Col. Curtin. Constant reader, exploited Ultra from flak point-of-view. Injected Ultra when cover available into his flak situation summaries (daily) to lower echelons.

DIRECTORS OF INTELLIGENCE: a series of five officers between July/December 1944, all of whom were constant readers but only of selected signals. All preferred that an LIS representative screen the mass and present to them only important ones, with verbal or marginal explanations. Each D of I preferred, himself, usually to brief the generals.

EXECUTIVE to Director of Intelligence: Lt. Col. Burnam. An infrequent reader, owing to fact that his function was entirely administrative after August 1944 until V-E day when he became D of I at the departure of his senior.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE: Major Noyes. Infrequent reader, indoctrinated while in GAF OS section at AEAFF. Did not work with Ultra at Air Force, but functioned as administrative assistant to D of I at advanced HQ.

COMMANDING GENERAL: Lt. Gens. Brereton and Vandenberg. The former had been indoctrinated in Africa. He was an occasional reader of highly screened signals, and obtained Ultra benefits from AEAFF briefing each morning (which included intelligence from all sources) during time in UK when operational HQ of 2nd TAF, Ninth AF, and AEAFF were together. Was replaced by Gen. Vandenberg when move to France was accomplished on 5/6 August. The latter was briefed on air matters by the D of I, and on ground matters at the 12 AG (Gen. Bradley's) morning Ultra conference.

DEPUTY CG FOR OPERATIONS: a series of three general officers held this position: Maj. Gen. Schlatter, Brig. Gens. Stearley and Lee. The first two were indoctrinated in the UK by G/C Winterbotham, and served under Gen. Brereton. The third served longest, under Gen. Vandenberg. The first two were exposed to Ultra similar to Gen.

Brereton, but were more frequent readers. During their brief time in the position they were administered to by either Lt. Col. Griggs or Maj. Hitchcock who explained as the generals read. (The then A-2 was never quite happy about being by-passed, but was himself incapable of the job). Brig. Gen. Lee was briefed by the D of I more or less daily, and also usually attended the 12 Army Group morning Ultra conference.

DEPUTY CG FOR ADMIN: Brig. Gen. Strahm. Never a reader, as always at rear headquarters.

CHIEF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER: Col. Cody. A rare reader. Only interested when Ultra disclosed successes of German Y with U.S. signals. Then it was usually Maj. Hitchcock who explained the matters.

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS: Col. McGuire. An occasional reader of highly screened signals, but who was regularly briefed by either of the LIS representatives whenever Ultra deemed to be of interest to him was received. Also regularly discussed Ultra relative to targets with Maj. Searls, target officer.

CHIEF, SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE and CO 3rd Radio Sqdn (9th AF Y): Lt. Col. Turkel. Never a reader, but was occasionally briefed on GAF developments. Originally indoctrinated mainly because his proximity to Y intelligence/Ultra intelligence fusing made the alternative insupportable. Also, his relations with higher Y echelons, at SEAEF and AII(f), would have been unsatisfactory were he not in the picture.

TEMPORARY OFFICERS: LIS representatives Lt. Col. Griggs and 1st Lt. Coffman. Operational Intelligence Executive: Lt. Col. Morgan (later sent to 1st Allied Airborne Army). Assistant Y intelligence officers: Maj. Stuart (later put in charge of Duty Intelligence Section and removed from reader list), and Capt. Stever (later sent to XXIV TAC as staff Y officer). OS and Special Studies Officer: Maj. Kornweibel (returned to the ZI in August for new assignment).

JCH

Ultra Intelligence Procedures - IX Air Force

July 24, 1944 - June 1, 1945

Robert S. Whitlow, 1st Lt.

Introductory

The first MIS representative at 9th Air Force was Major Hitchcock who functioned also as staff "Y" officer. At this time (May 1944) the 9th Air Force occupied a joint headquarters with 2nd TAF, its British equivalent, and AEAFF Advanced (later to become Air staff SHAFF). All three headquarters, being under the same roof, were easily served by one SLU, that belonging to 2nd IAF. As, during June, it became clear that the Ultra volume was mounting so that Hitchcock could not alone cope with both it and "Y", Lt. Col. Griggs was added to the 9th Air Force staff (and later given to XXIX TAC). Late in July 1st Lt. Whitlow was dispatched from EP to augment the Ultra staff.

9th AF, 2nd TAF, and AEAFF Advanced remained together until the end of July when 2nd TAF moved to the continent, taking its SLU. Another SLU was provided the two remaining headquarters for the period until August 5/6 when they also went to France. Whereafter, these headquarters being adjacent to 12th Army Group, were served by the 12th AG SLU until mid-August when this SLU became the property of 9th AF, and 12th AG acquired a new one.

The operational headquarters of the 9th Air Force moved, from 5 August 1944 to March 1945, successively to St. Sauveurs, Laval, Versailles, Verdun, Luxembourg, Warrin, back to Luxembourg, and finally to Wiesbaden.

Between July and December of 1944, not^{to} mention our change of Commanding Generals, the air force had five different Directors of Intelligence.

Special Liaison Unit

Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, Advanced, was served throughout the period of experience with Ultra, by machine stations, having a capacity of 20,000 groups per day. Personnel of SLU consisted of 4 officers and about 12 enlisted men, while the SCU included one officer and about 10 men. The unit was treated in the Ninth Air Force as an attached unit. The officers were not considered part of the staff of the headquarters, and accordingly performed no other duties than those appropriate to any signals message center.

This force was sufficient to cope with the heaviest volume of traffic. At times, where traffic attained the level of 15,000 or more groups per day, low priority messages were sometimes 48 hours in arrears. This was almost purely a signals problem, not involving a back-log of undecoded messages in the SLU office.

Events proved the necessity of having a separate SLU/SCU at Air Force level, notwithstanding that the same unit served Ninth Air Force, 2nd TAF and AEAFF (Adv.) at Uxbridge until 5 August 1944, and that it was contemplated that Air Force and Army Group be serviced by the same unit in France. The tactical situation, as well as the difficulty of accommodating two large

headquarters in close proximity in campaign conditions, will always cause separation by inconvenient distances of the headquarters being served. Accordingly, the timeliness of receipt of Ultra intelligence should not be destroyed by stinginess in the supply of units to commands.

Office Procedure

Personnel - The Ultra "cell" from July 24 until September 5, 1944, consisted of one senior officer, Lt. Col. J. W. Griggs (then Major), one junior officer, Lt. P. S. Whitlow, both M.I.S. bodies, and an enlisted clerk recruited from Ninth Air Force. About September 5 the senior officer was posted by M.I.S. to the newly organized XIX Tactical Air Command and the enlisted assistant, was, posted by Ninth Air Force likewise, leaving only one officer composing the "cell". Another enlisted man having other principal duties, was indoctrinated for the sole purpose of providing typing service.

An operational intelligence officer was, on September 5, brought into the office of the Director of Intelligence, from AAF as the nominal chief of the OAF and Order of Battle section which had theretofore been composed of the two M.I.S. officers and one enlisted clerk.

The arriving officer did not at any time assume the initiative which his rank required and took no part in the processing and use of Ultra intelligence.

Adopting the proper staff principle, the undersigned sought to refer all action through this nominal chief, who, not being an M.I.S. body, felt no responsibility for servicing the command with Ultra-derived intelligence, and a period of two weeks ensued during which the only useful work accomplished consisted in completion of numbers of displays and maps and the writing for plan "Talisman", of the appreciation of enemy capabilities on secret level from open sources.

The situation was cleared in mid-September by a verbal directive from the Director of Intelligence that all Ultra references were to stem directly from the undersigned, who was to take matters directly to the Director of Operations, Director of Intelligence or other recipients.

Thereafter, until, about March 6, 1945, the entire processing and dissemination of Ultra intelligence to recipients, including maintenance of files and records, conferring with and briefing recipients and interpreting messages, preparing Ultra intelligence studies and displays fell upon this officer. For two months, March and April, 1945, a second officer joined the "cell" in a trainee status and rendered the type of assistance which should have been available months previously.

Working Conditions

The position of the "cell" in the organization of the headquarters is difficult to describe. The section should have been described as "Order of Battle", and in organization charts until December, 1944, was so shown, or as

"GAF". Nominally, the cell was put under the operational intelligence executive, for administrative convenience. That individual occupied the same office, was indoctrinated, but performed no duties involving use of Ultra, as has been said. The association was a handicap to proper work with Ultra for the reason that the personnel and work of many other intelligence sections ebbed and flowed about the Ultra-working personnel.

Eventually the Ultra cell was disassociated from the operational intelligence executive until in personnel rosters this M.I.S. representative was not shown under GAF, or Order of Battle, but was listed as an assistant to the Director of Intelligence. This caused more than a little confusion and questioning in the mind of the Chief of Staff who somewhat resented the fact that there existed unplaced personnel whose duties were not apparent but who circulated through the inner sanctums freely.

The individual denominated chief of GAF section actually had administrative duties only. There was thus no convenient explanation for the presence of this Ultra representative in the Headquarters other than as personal assistant to the Director of Intelligence.

Working quarters until Ninth Air Force departed on August 5, 1944 for Far Shore were a small cubicle remote from other activities of the Headquarters, yet within the headquarters building. Desirable security was possible, but the space was adequate only if the function of the Ultra representative is deemed to be limited to providing chairs and tables for readers. The method of processing Ultra and its use at this time (July - August 1944) did not justify the number of bodies in the working cell, and the working space provided was inadequate for the development of a superior service. The other difficulties of this period have been judiciously adverted to by Lt. Col. Griggs in the introductory remarks to his report.

Upon moving to Far Shore, the Headquarters lived until September in bivouac conditions. A command post tent was first used as an office, and accommodated uncomfortably three persons, two field tables, many chairs, a field desk, several map boards four feet square and miscellaneous equipment. Later the cell occupied one wing of a trailer van used by the Director of Intelligence. This arrangement persisted until the Headquarters moved into winter quarters in October, 1944.

The bringing of the cell into the office of the Director of Intelligence was accomplished by the A-2 himself and afforded more security than did a CP tent as well as bringing the Ultra representatives into the closest relationship with the Director of Intelligence. No other individual in the command than the M.I.S. representative, could have such an opportunity to reach the ear of the A-2 and influence all decisions by exploiting tactfully the relationship of the A-2 with the Commanding General and other highly placed personalities.

Thereafter, the Ultra cell of one officer remained with the Director of Intelligence, no other arrangement being tolerated by any succeeding A-2.

Upon leaving the office van for quarters in a permanent structure in Luxembourg in October, the Ultra representative was given a partitioned space in the office of the A-2. This space was sufficient only for two desks (one for readers) and the use of the outer office for all business of the A-2

prevented the keeping of extensive ultra charts and maps and handicapped conferences on Ultra. The arrangement was desired by the A-2 incumbent Col. Palmer Dixon and was continued by his successor, Col. P. D. Hughes.

Upon movement of the Headquarters to Namur in January, 1945, the ideal situation was attained. A large office with entrance to the office of the Director of Intelligence, was secured. Sufficient space existed for several readers simultaneously, for small conferences, and detailed maps and displays could with security be maintained at all times. Access could be secured only by passing through two locked doors. The practice of a separate, adjoining office for the Ultra cell was thereafter followed until the station closed in June, 1945.

Something more should be said concerning billet arrangements for the Ultra representative. From August 1944, the undersigned was the sole 24 hour-a-day recipient of messages. This circumstance made it necessary for as many as six or eight messages to be seen each night at some times. Delivery could be accomplished only in the billet of the officer, a circumstance arousing the curiosity of other officers awakened by the flashlights and stumblings of PAF officers and sergeants. The difficulty was surmounted for a brief period when the ultra recipient occupied a billet with the SLU/SCU. Regulations of the unit required delivery - contrast the situation at the comparable army level, Twelfth Army Group, where the traffic was of the same volume (and many times heavier than that received at TAC or army level). At Twelfth Army Group, there were at least six officers in the ultra cell, thus making possible a duty officer 24 hours a day. However, all Directors of Intelligence under which this officer served were satisfied and demanded this service. The burden upon one officer is too great for maximum efficiency at all times. In future, M.I.S. should supply more officers, or allow commands to indoctrinate intelligence duty officers liberally, if 24-hour service is required.

Handling of Material

Ultra messages were received from SLU in neat, typewritten form, in two copies. The typographical work and speed of service of the unit with Ninth Air Force was superior to that of any other unit which this officer observed. It was of benefit, likewise, to have the SLU keep copies of all messages, filed by series, for a reasonable length of time, to assist back reference.

Of the two copies delivered of each message, one copy was placed in a file devoted solely to the use of readers. This file was under several headings suggested by the diverse interests of the readers, and varied from time to time, as the indoctrinated personnel changed. Such headings were:

- Flak
- Operations and Intentions
- Airfields and Order of Battle
- Targets
- Damage reports, etc.

The second set of copies was used exclusively by myself and the Director of Intelligence for all purposes, including briefing.

On the Air Force level, the recipient destroyed all messages rather than returning them to the SLU.

The processing of Ultra material in Ninth Air Force and its presentation visually and otherwise closely approximates the practice in 2nd TAF (British).

When the undersigned joined the Ninth Air Force on July 24 he almost immediately sought out the Ultra-working order of battle team in 2nd TAF at Millington House, the joint location of the British and American tactical air forces. Studying their methods of work and records carefully, he adopted each part over the succeeding weeks, until by September 5, when he was left alone in the command, the 2nd TAF system had been substantially taken over, with some emendations, additions or omissions.

Files: Basic to the work were two card indices, one of air order of battle, the other of airfields. In compact form on the order of battle cards was kept information, by unit, of location, strength, state of training, prospective movements and in short, all pertinent data taken from the Ultra messages. These were cross-indexed to a file of airfield information. The latter file included much other information bearing upon airfields as targets.

Several notebooks were kept of data which was usable occasionally, but which was not strictly O/B information so not entered on the cards. Keeping up a subject matter index is a useless procedure in an operational headquarters and was not attempted.

Maps: (1) Air O/B maps by unit on 1:2,000,000 airfield development maps.

(2) Airfield occupation map by type of unit, i.e. single engine fighter, long-range bomber, etc. on 1:2,000,000 map. A more generalized form than (1) and usable for briefing non-indoctrinated personnel.

(3) Airfield serviceability map based on intelligence from all sources, primarily photo recon.

(4) Airfield occupation by jet aircraft.

(5) Ground Order of Battle on 1:250,000 scale map, overlaid with acetate. A complete ground O/B was never kept, as the War Room kept by G-3 of Army Group was twenty feet away at all times. Only such Ultra information was posted on the ground map as would assist in briefing on the individual messages. All readers were made completely literate on ground O/B by twice daily briefings in the War Room. The Ultra cell added only that which was unique on Ultra source. A staff of six could of course have duplicated the work of G-2 and G-3 which had at least 3 majors and several captains posting the situation.

Charts: (1) OAF strength and disposition diagram was posted on the background of 1:2,000,000 scale maps, thus showing areas represented. One map covered the OAF, in detail, in the area of interest to the Ninth Air Force. A second, more general, represented the disposition of the entire OAF.

(2) Airfield priority chart. A perpetual display with interchangeable slides for each airfield allowing immediate change in suggested priorities for attack, was kept for Operations. Each slide had sections for

entering units, number of a/c on the field, results of last attacks, etc. All sources of intelligence contributed toward determination of priorities.

Many miscellaneous basic maps and charts were kept for convenience of customers and for illustrating messages. Such were maps of Luftgau and Wehrkreise, and charts of subordination of commands and units.

Non-Ultra Materials

It is so obviously true that Ultra is but one among many sources of intelligence that a discussion of fusion of non-Ultra materials with Ultra would be interminable. The principles of fusion of this intelligence with others are not unique. The sole unique feature is the security requirement that it be done in a cool, dark place. This question is really preliminary to a discussion of dissemination of Ultra to recipients.

In Ninth Air Force, intelligence from all sources was available at all times and was searched constantly. Regarding air order of battle, it was routine to examine the following:

- (1) Photo reconnaissance reports of airfield coverage as summarized in the Daily Airfield Intreps, plus selected detailed reports.
- (2) P/W interrogation reports.
- (3) Telephone and W/T reports of sightings and incidents.
- (4) Report of "Y" activity, for which see the associated paper.
- (5) All poop sheets, charts and prepared matter of intelligence nature emanating from Air Ministry, SHAEF, or other organization or command.

With regard to intelligence other than that relating to air order of battle, familiarity with the intelligence materials and procedures of all other sections of the Headquarters became a necessity, and the use of such non-Ultra materials may best be mentioned under the succeeding section of this paper.

Dissemination of Ultra

A. To Indoctrinated Personnel.

The principle of dissemination of Ultra in Ninth Air Force Headquarters was that of assisting the heads of staff sections, not by duplicating in the Ultra shop the work of any staff and presenting a product in competition.

Such was the strong, and proper, adherence to the principles of staff responsibility in this headquarters that any other procedure would have evoked the hostility that is rumored to often beset the path of Ultra specialists.

By continuous observation and experience it was possible to discover the procedures and problems of the various sections in the Headquarters.

And in general, until the Ultra representative knows thoroughly the work of all the officers in the Headquarters being served, his functions remain on the level of a lecturer and supplier of reading decks and chairs.

The list of indoctrinated personnel included all those whose duties obviously demanded their inclusion. Included also were some who might well have been excluded and whose presence was at times inconvenient in that they contributed nothing. In a previous place is outlined the duties of indoctrinated personnel. The non-necessity of inclusion of some is apparent.

In the category of non-essential personnel were:

(1) Executive to the A-2. Carrying on administrative and executive duties, this functionary did not use the material.

(2) Operational Intelligence Officer. This officer was concerned primarily with reporting of air force activity and coordinating certain intelligence functions.

(3) Deputy Commanding General - Administration. This officer had been in the picture since Uxbridge days, but was located at Main Headquarters, never used the material and had no need for it.

Experience with the above suggests that stricter sign-off policy should have the support of M.I.S. as well as stricter review of the qualifications, and necessity for indoctrination of personnel. Let it be said that the three above mentioned were indoctrinated in a free and easy period.

Processing and dissemination of ultra intelligence may be illustrated by describing the procedures used for servicing some staff section heads.

(1) Staff "Y" Officer. See the associated paper by Major Hitchcock.

(2) Flak Officer, Lt. Col. R.D. Curtin. The type of information concerning flak defenses, which was available on Ultra, was not greatly useful in the air forces. Interest is primarily in exact pinpoints of guns and in determination of precise strength of flak defenses surrounding potential targets. This type of information is derived from photographic interpretation and crew reports.

However, often Ultra furnished information on moves or contemplated moves of units, particularly railway flak units, from which increase or decrease of defenses in an area could be deduced. The Senior Flak Officer constantly read the signals for this type of information, and for flak order of battle, which together with his more exact intelligence from other sources concerning deployment of guns, guided Operations in deciding whether certain missions could or could not be undertaken. This fusion was done by the Senior Flak Officer.

In addition, the Second TAF practice of close liaison with flak in preparing and amending its flak maps was adopted by me in September. Pinpoints of suspected flak defenses were suggested, and these pinpoints plotted on flak maps and relayed to flak officers in subordinate commands by daily teletype. Even where photo or visual reconnaissance had not reported flak, it could often be deduced that airfields, assembly points, depots, supply routes, etc. would be flak defended.

This was one of the most successful and fruitful relationships, and reciprocal for the flak defenses reported on open sources often suggested occupation of airfields not otherwise suspected.

(3) Target officer. Major Searls, Ninth Air Force senior target officer was, unfortunately, not brought into the picture until March, 1945, although I had advocated it many times since September, 1944. Prior to March, I had found it necessary to go directly to the Director of Intelligence or Director of Operations, usually coordinating with the target research officer of G-2 Air, Twelfth Army Group. This latter officer, Major Kindleberger, headed a section physically located at Air Force headquarters, and functionally, performing the major part of the proper role of a Ninth Air Force target section. Major Kindleberger was a constant reader and consultant, particularly prior to the indoctrination of Major Searls.

The most successful use of Ultra as a source of target intelligence, followed the indoctrination of Major Searls. This was concurrent with the work of Major Buck at Air Ministry and EP, and his signals received the closest study.

During the Autumn a large number of photo recon missions were requested by me, to provide cover for targets mentioned on Ultra, but substantial results in development of targets were not achieved until the commencement of Major Buck's service during the winter, the development of closer relations with Major Kindleberger and the eventual indoctrination of Major Searls.

Nowhere was it better shown that the best exploitation of Ultra follows the proper use of existing staff sections and facilities with the accumulated experience of many men, rather than attempted duplication of effort by M.I.S. representatives, who with exception only of Major Buck, are order of battle specialists.

(4) Director of Operations - Col. G. F. McGuire. This officer was briefed on particular matters of moment to Operations. Detailed order of battle was not one of these matters. The commitment of Ninth Air Force Operations staff was primarily direction of Ninth Bombardment Division. The employment of medium bombers is the proper reference for any discussion of operational use of Ultra at Ninth Air Force. This has escaped all previous reviewers.

Of interest to the Director of Operations was matter bearing upon results of bomber attacks, particularly by his own groups, but in any case where potential medium bomber targets were affected. Any mention of bridges, viaducts, supply trains, important depots, or unusually large concentrations of aircraft, were of immediate interest. In many cases it was possible to forget about a certain bridge or installation where Ultra indicated its destruction. Usually, however, more information could be obtained from photo interpretation.

An airfields priority list was kept particularly for Operations, with daily amendments. On all matters relating to airfields as targets the Director of Operations regularly consulted the Ultra "cell" and at times when the GAF was being appreciated as an actual threat, was a constant visitor, to examine the Order of Battle displays/visual aids.

The priority list mentioned was kept primarily for medium bombardment use, bearing in mind not only concentrations of aircraft, but types represented, operational units, and activity of units, as well as factors

Limiting our operations such as "Oboc" range. Airfield priority lists from Air Staff, SHAEF were suggestive, but too infrequently published, and did not reflect the factors which the Ninth Air Force operations staff and Director of Intelligence wished.

It is necessary for each command, down to TAC, to continually prepare its own materials, as no one else is sufficiently close to the tactical situation and needs for air cooperation of the army concerned, to make equally valid judgments.

(5) Director of Intelligence and Commanding General. The two Directors of Intelligence under whom the undersigned had longest experience had quite a different requirement.

(a) Col. Palmer Dixon. Until early December, when Col. Dixon left the Ninth Air Force for ZI, daily written appreciations were prepared. In addition, special studies and reviews were written continually, as the A-2 preferred this rather than a verbal briefing, or himself laboring through messages. In addition, he was briefed on certain selected signals, such as might require some urgent attention or which should be presented to the Commanding General without delay.

A weekly Ultra appreciation of enemy intentions and capabilities was likewise prepared. This ceased about mid-December, primarily because the succeeding Director of Intelligence, Col. P. D. Hughes worked somewhat differently and preferred to read most traffic and engage in verbal discussion, rather than read appreciations and digests.

The Commanding General was briefed by the A-2, Col. Dixon, largely from the prepared summaries and studies, together with selected signals. The Deputy Commander for Operations, General Lee, was briefed in much the same fashion. Both Generals regularly attended the ground briefing of Twelfth Army Group.

(b) Col. P. D. Hughes. This Director of Intelligence, taking over in mid-December 1944, preferred to read nearly all traffic after it had been screened and given marginal notes. Briefing of both the Generals was done by Col. Hughes.

B. Non-Indoctrinated Personnel.

Non-indoctrinated personnel could receive Ultra intelligence only when the same intelligence existed in an open source. It is thus more accurate to say that Ultra guided the search for open source intelligence and aided the Ultra working group to use other intelligence significantly.

At the same time, being known as expert in Order of Battle, Airfields, and in general, intelligence relating to the enemy capabilities, requests for assistance came often and opportunities to assist other intelligence officers were frequent.

(1) At own command.

(a) Assistance was given to the office of Director of Reconnaissance in coordinating requests from all levels for P/T of airfields. Each of

the TACs had a reconnaissance group and each had an overlapping area of interest. As it happened, reconnaissance of the same target might be requested by separate TACs of its appropriate reconnaissance group, and conflicting requests came from higher headquarters, as SHAMF and Ninth Air Force. Not only the same target might be requested, but different priorities or frequency of routine coverage were usually involved. Coordination of reconnaissance aviation of all units subordinate to Ninth Air Force was one function of the office of the Director of Reconnaissance, situated in the same headquarters as was undersigned recipient. Assistance in coordinating requests for reconnaissance was therefore part of the routine. This activity was accomplished not by interminable exchanges over the SMO link with ultra recipients in other commands, but by conference with the staff in Ninth Air Force whose responsibility was this coordination. The staff of Director of Reconnaissance did not know of ultra source - but merely that the individuals aiding them were supposed to be experts and were backed up personally by the Director of Intelligence in every suggestion.

(b) Guarded aid could sometimes be given to the APTIU. As these gentlemen were themselves most competent experts on the GAF there was security risk in revealing too detailed knowledge, as they of course knew what intelligence was obtainable from various sources. However, all their reports were monitored, both for the information they imparted, and for the purpose of formulating questions which might elicit statements from prisoners which would then afford cover for Ultra. "Y" intelligence could, with great security and as much success, be used for guidance of APTIU for which see Major Hitchcock's report.

(2) At other commands.

(a) IX Bombarment Division. The position of this command and the fact that operational use of Ultra was effectuated in the higher headquarters have been mentioned heretofore.

(b) IX Air Defense Command. This subordinate command controlled the flak defenses of all Ninth Air Force stations and installations, and as well took over the defense of many bridge and river crossings on the Rhine and elsewhere. No necessity existed for use of ultra intelligence, but a need did exist for a knowledge of enemy air capabilities, particularly when redeployment of AA defenses of some area or installation was projected. The undersigned, as U/B expert in the office of the Director of Intelligence, made a number of special studies of GAF capabilities, from open sources, for the A-2 and A-3 of this command. Most cordial relations existed and on one occasion a special flight was made to the headquarters of Air Defense Command for conferences with the A-2. It is believed that the CG of this command should have been indoctrinated.

relations with ultra representative

The most fruitful liaison for a recipient at an air headquarters should be with the ultra representatives at corresponding army or army group level. This was particularly so where, as in the campaign through France and Germany, the air battle had been won, and air men were seeking the knowledge wherewith they could render more effective air cooperation.

There was seldom a need for giving detailed appreciations of the enemy air capabilities to the Twelfth Army Group staff. Had the GAF been a worthy opponent, the situation would have been otherwise, and it is the observation of

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this officer that where the enemy air power is a substantial threat, an air O/B Ultra expert could usefully be attached to Army Group. For a period of two months, just prior to and during the early phases of the Ardennes battle, lengthy weekly summaries and appreciations of enemy air capabilities were written for the Twelfth Army Group Ultra staff by the undersigned. With the failure of enemy air power to intervene decisively, the subject lost significance and the appreciations were terminated in favor of more intense devotion to material of target nature.

A great deal of Ultra-derived material emanated from Air Staff, SHAEF. Such afforded background and was seldom useable operationally, as the Ultra representatives at SHAEF were too remote from the ever-changing conditions of application of policy in operational commands. SHAEF was indeed the proper level for the evaluation of BP routing and supply of material and when finally undertaking the task of augmenting the supply of background material, did a fine job.

Relations with Ultra-working people at Second TAF (British) were infrequent, but sufficiently recurring to permit comparative evaluation of policy in use of Ultra. Both ^{of} the tactical air forces had similar problems and the opportunity afforded the undersigned to observe and adopt such parts of Second TAF procedure as were useful in Ninth Air Force, was most appreciated by him. There should have been closer and more frequent liaison, as would have been possible had the Ultra cell been composed of more than one officer.

The Tactical Air Commands were operationally independent, functioning under general directives. The proper concern of Ninth Air Force, including the Ultra representative, was whether they had such intelligence as was necessary for accomplishment of their respective missions.

While Ultra signals were always screened for material of operational use to TAC's, the close attention paid to this function at BP made necessary but few signals from Air Force to TAC. Save for a brief period in the winter, no digests of merely background and gossip material were forwarded to the TACs. Encouragement of Narcissism in Ultra representatives was not engaged in.

This subject of routing of material to lower commands was considered in conference with Ultra-working people of Second TAF. Parallel policies in this regard were being followed by both of the Air Forces.

Digests and summaries of Ultra intelligence should be made available on some level. It should be done where the Ultra can be compared and fused, in the writing, with other sources. A command which has an operational commitment is not the proper place for this, unless a staff be made available for this specific purpose and which can be separate from the personnel directly carrying on the work of servicing recipients who are engaged in operational use of Ultra. Such a job was being done by Major Buck between Air Ministry and BP. Summaries were prepared by Lt. Col. Thompson at SHAEF. It is submitted that the work of both could be done together, by a group at SHAEF or USSTAF level, and having an officer at BP and Air Ministry to search for material.

Relations with BP

The most excellent work was done at BP. Any shortcomings were owing to expediency - the need to serve many customers. This was forgotten by some recipients, usually situated in Tactical Air Commands. High priority messages reached Ninth Air Force which were of no conceivable interest to that command. It is realized that such messages were of utmost importance to others. Again, some signals reaching Ninth Air Force tardily might have affected air action if received earlier. For example, as during the winter, photography was often impossible, the results of bridge bombing missions were often obtainable only from Ultra. Prompt receipt of such information, usually only ZZZ in priority can prevent repetition of missions where results are otherwise unknown, or can point to the necessity of further air action on some targets.

Security

The drawing of a black curtain of strict security more often than not defeats itself by exciting curiosity. Thus, provision of an Ultra room at Ninth Air Force, where a lieutenant sat in splendid isolation was a curious feature to some observers. The fact that the intelligent do not ask questions is some protection to security.

Likewise the presence of PAF SLU personnel excites questions. The presence of an PAF liaison section is some protection, but more than a few were not deceived. Opinion generally divides itself among the unindoctrinated into two groups - those who believe that agent's work is involved, and those who believe that a super counterintelligence is at work. Not so far apart, perhaps. A few consider the SLU/SCU as the link to a separate British "Y" service.

The Ultra material itself was always segregated from all other work of the intelligence office. All readers and users were required to come into the Ultra room. The exception was the briefings of the Commanding General in private by the Director of Intelligence.

General Comments and Recommendations

Suggestions and recommendations have been inserted at appropriate points during the above discussion. The following ^{additional} considerations are offered:

Special selection and training of Ultra representatives should be continued. An organization selecting and training personnel, can supply a uniformly qualified body of experts to commands. This result can be achieved only accidentally if commands nominate recipients. Whether this body of experts is uniformly qualified on a high or on a low level will depend upon standards of selection. Some suggestions follow:

1. Men with background of intelligence schooling, and experience with intelligence materials.
2. Selection from operational headquarters where possible; not from 31 establishments.
3. Attachment should not be to the same commands from whence the man came. However, in order to utilize the experience of the representa-

tives, they should be attached to a subordinate, parallel or higher headquarters. It is recommended that men not be sent back to their old commands, for the reason that insofar as he occupies special relationships cutting across staff lines, he should be impervious to probable jealousies of old friends and associates. This cannot be the case where a man must do his duties and oil his old associates as well.

4. Attachment rather than assignment is recommended. The position of assigned personnel is untenable to the extent that Ultra occupies a special place and the Ultra worker must represent that special function. Assigned personnel, beholden to superiors in the command for promotion and advantages, will make but weak representatives.

The quite different system followed by the British is worthy of note and has some admirable features. No special establishment such as the M.I.S. representative, is provided. Indoctrination of staff officers takes place as needed. These perform the processing of Ultra intelligence for their particular staff section. The advantage of securing a body of men skilled in their jobs and familiar with the headquarters is thus fulfilled. Ultra assumes its proper dimension of another source of intelligence, in their hands, rather than the conjuring act seen in some subordinate American headquarters. No provision is made, however, for special training in use and interpretation of Ultra, at the agency where it is produced. In this respect, the American system is superior. The British system likewise has the potential source of weakness outlined in paragraph numbered (3) above. The strength of the British system could be retained by us, by selecting men from operational headquarters for assignment to M.I.S. special training, then attachment to a headquarters with whose work the recipient is familiar (but not returned to his old organization).

Finally, the difficulty experienced by all attached personnel at first, that of playing on the ball team while not a member, is a difficulty only if proper relationships are not fostered during the course of time.

When proper intelligence channels are used and staff procedure of the command is followed, reception given to the Ultra product is gratifying.

Robert S. Whitlow

ROBERT S. WHITLOW
1st Lt., AC

PART II

Besides being an MIS representative, this officer, Major Hitchcock, held the T/O position as Air Force staff Y intelligence officer. To the Y office flowed the endless stream of radio traffic (both voice and W/F) obtained by the several field intercept detachments of the Ninth Air Force, 1st TACAF, and 2nd TAF (British); and, from the theater-level Air Ministry research organization, located at BP, frequent guidance and intelligence. Based on work with these tools, Y staff responsibilities included:

1. Twice-daily briefings, for the Air Force/Army Group staff conferences, summarizing enemy air activity: scale of effort (estimated sorties), types of operations, areas of operations, bases used, and any other interesting details. In written form these summaries were signalled to numerous other headquarters.
2. Periodic appreciations of the GAF for the staff Y officers at the TACs and Bomb Division, and for the Y field detachments, and for the Air Force ops section, with respect to enemy OB, dispositions, tactics, etc. (So that the fighter controllers at the TACs could be serviced more efficiently, the appreciations for the field detachments usually included guidance to relate radio frequencies and call-signs with specific Gruppen on specific bases. The field detachments, with this knowledge, were often able to identify Gruppen in the air and inform fighter controllers the airfields to which the enemy formations would probably return. Thus, in a matter of seconds the conditions were laid for effective interception).
3. Frequent consultations with, and advice to, target officers regarding the operational status of enemy airfields, and their relative values as targets.
4. Opinions, on request, to the Bomb Division (and other inquirers) on matters relating to the GAF: order of battle, dispositions, likelihood and probable strength of enemy fighter interception in various target areas, likelihood of air attack, etc.

In summary, it may be said that the responsibility was that of being an enemy air force expert in the most general sense, and available continually to provide opinion. Pursuant to this responsibility, the undersigned was in telephone conference daily with Bomb Division Intelligence officers, almost daily with staff Y officers at TACs; 12 Army Group requests for enemy air appreciations usually ended at the Y office; the FM Interrogation section and Photo Intelligence often requested guidance, ops section queried escort requirements.

Purportedly, the sources of this intelligence were principally radio traffic analysis, but also FM interrogation reports, photo reconnaissance, crew reports, and miscellaneous sources. Actually, Ultra played a major part in the development of all these summaries, appreciations, and opinions. Ultra was a guide and a censor to conclusions arrived at by means of other evidence, especially Y evidence. Conversely, Y was a most excellent cover in which Ultra intelligence of OB, dispositions, and tactics could be masked and disseminated.

A few examples will **DEMONSTRATE**

Shortly after jet aircraft began to operate tactically on the West Front, it became apparent in Y that each time jets were detected active conventional fighters were also up, remaining in rear areas on some undisclosed mission. Ultra indicated that the conventional fighters were flying airfield cover for jets during take-off and landing. Thus, the Y staff could issue the appreciation, the "guess" that fighters were screening jet airfields during the times that jets were using them.

When in January a high percentage of the enemy fighter gruppen was withdrawn from the West to combat the Russian offensive, it was at once indicated from Y traffic analysis that a reduction of force had been accomplished, and it was clear which base areas were no longer active. From the latter fact it could be established what units had been withdrawn, with a fair degree of precision. By deduction then, using Y alone, a good appreciation was possible. However, with Ultra at hand to guide the deductive processes, the Y staff could speak out with an assurance and a degree of precision not possible otherwise. These same processes were gone through, not only in January, but throughout the war: whenever Ultra indicated a base change, a withdrawal, or a reinforcement by a unit, evidence would be looked for in Y so that the fact could be disseminated from an open source; conversely, when Y suggested a changed situation, Ultra would be read for confirmatory evidence or for precise details.

Y direction-finding apparatus permits the establishment of base areas of enemy units, but when a number of airfields are contained in a very small area it is seldom possible to D/F the exact field. Ultra, in such cases, told us the exact field, and permitted the Y staff to make another accurate "guess."

These are minor examples, and not specially good ones, of the application of Ultra to Y. There were many, many related circumstances in which authoritative opinions were expressed, based ostensibly on Y (or photo recce, or PW interrogation) intelligence, but actually supported by Ultra. Had Ultra not lain unseen in the background many of the expressed opinions would either not have been risked at all or would have been rendered with less assurance, owing to the scrappy or inconclusive quality of the Y intelligence. During the past year few days passed during which Ultra did not insert itself into the estimates and opinions of the Y staff. Y evidence is often not completely conclusive. Like other open sources, it is often fragmentary and permits of more than one alternative conclusion. Ultra insures that the correct alternative is selected. Thus Ultra is the guide and censor for Y, and at the same time the latter is a secure vehicle by which Ultra may be disseminated under cover. This point is not to be under-estimated. It is important to protect source; it is also important to get the last bit of exploitation, the ultimate from Ultra consistent with security. Y is a first class cover for such exploitation.

If all the foregoing may be called indirect aid to Y by Ultra, there was also the direct support. Occasionally Ultra signals contained valuable information directly relating to radio frequencies, call-signs, times of transmission by ground stations, and like technicalities.

-3-

When such signals contained completely technical information relating to cypher tables, key sheets, frequencies, call-signs, etc., of interest only to signal intelligence, it was the policy of BP to address them directly to the signal staffs at SACAF, 2nd TAF, and Ninth AF. These staffs would then manage to impart the needed advice to the technical Y personnel. That section at BP, under S/L Smith, which prepared the special signals for Y staffs are to be commended for their attentiveness to the needs of the field Y service.

It should be remarked that as senior MIS officer at Ninth Air Force the undersigned felt a responsibility for the general handling of Ultra within the headquarters, and occasionally participated when circumstances were special, or when requested. Such participation would have required to be considerably greater had not the junior MIS officer been of exceptional caliber. Lt. Whitlow, who has written Part I, is esteemed to have demonstrated with respect to Ultra matters a competence and diligence of high order.

E. Q. Whitlow
Maj. AC

PART III

1. Staff Y intelligence officers at the TAC level and above should ex officio be permitted to become Ultra readers. The benefits of such a policy both to Y and to the exploitation of Ultra have been suggested in Part II, above, with respect to Air Force level. Similar conditions obtain at TAC level, although narrower in scope, and the experience of XXIX TAC, the Y officer at which was a reader by virtue of his earlier assignment at Air Force, prompts the recommendation for that level.

2. The chief target officer of a tactical air force headquarters should ex officio be an Ultra reader. At the Ninth AF, owing to opposition by one of the Directors of Intelligence to the recommendation, Major Searls was not indoctrinated until March 1945. It is believed that this was a mistake, that the MIS representatives should have exerted more pressure many months earlier to overcome the objection to Searls's indoctrination.

3. It is desired to say a word about MIS field representatives. They should be of high caliber, it almost goes without saying, and completely knowledgeable in their field. (This has not always been the case). Beyond that, they should have a background in general intelligence, an appreciation of the values and general limitations of all intelligence sources; and, in the field, should arrange that the products of these other sources (Y, photo int, PW interrogations, crew reports, summaries of other headquarters) pass through their hands. It is most easy for the Ultra representative to allow himself to become isolated from the main stream of the intelligence section, so that he loses awareness of what other sources are producing. Another facile error, induced by inertia, is to permit Ultra to become a substitute for analysis and evaluation of other intelligence. The two easy errors, isolation from other sources and the conviction that Ultra will provide all needed intelligence, are indeed the Scylla and Charybdis of the recipient. Ultra must be looked on as one of a number of sources; it must not be taken as a neatly packaged replacement for tedious work with other evidence. Now, to avoid these inviting ways requires considerable self-discipline and energy, which fact brings up another quality required by the MIS man. He must not only possess creditable intelligence, but also he must be not loathe to exert it. He must want to work. Finally, the Ultra representative should have knowledge of army procedures, proper channels, and chain of command. This basic knowledge every officer is presumed to have, but it has occasionally been forgotten, and in the forgetting antipathies have been aroused and awkward situations created; it is especially important for newcomers to an organization. It must be remembered that even Ultra representatives are expected, like other officers, to follow proper channels and procedures. It is not believed important whether or not the Ultra recipient is attached or assigned to an organization. What is important is the personality and character of the man himself. Is he able (properly trained in his field and army procedure)? Energetic (diligent)? Affable (sociable, courteous)? All three answers should be unreservedly affirmative to equal one completely satisfactory field representative.

E. Q. Whitcomb

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1. GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

23 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the IX Air Force.

In the ultra picture at IX Air Force Headquarters, airfields, flak, and targets were my chief responsibilities.

The airfield occupation and priority list was kept up to date from ultra, daily intreps, and reliable P/W sources. Farson's lists acted as a check and a guide. Each day a list was made and handed over to the target section. If no mention was made on any of the sources of airfields listed, we would suggest he lay on photo recce of that area.

Targets were treated in much the same manner. In reading over the material, likely or possible targets were noted, a check was made on our notes and in the target section for any previous mention. If nothing could be found or nothing noted for a long period of time, photo recce would again be suggested. At times, if we weren't too sure or Buck had no information, photo recce was requested directly from us through Col. Hughes. Any urgent targets such as troop or supply movements were taken care of by TAC recce.

Flak information was checked against the flak map. If they had it marked, nothing was done about it. If reverse were true, the reports and all open flak sources were checked. If nothing were found, the attention of the flak man in the picture was called to it. He would then take it from there.

Two other things were to check all incoming KO's to see that the TACs received those concerning their area and checking open sources for mention of material contained in ultra.

Having the heads of the Flak and Target Sections in the picture led to better cooperation, understanding and appreciation of our service to the Air Force.

The security was excellent. Only thing that aroused curiosity or comment was the British SLU men attached to the headquarters. Eventually it was believed they were dealing with agents in Germany.

Frank B. Coffman
FRANK B. COFFMAN
1st Lt., AC

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1. GROSVENOR SQUARE. W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

17 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the Ninth Air Force.

The following is a report of this officer's service as ultra recipient at Headquarters, Ninth Air Force for the period 10 June 1944 to 20 September 1944.

1. HISTORICAL.

This officer was assigned as the first Special Branch representative detailed exclusively to ultra work with the Ninth Air Force. Certain serious security problems were found to exist, arising particularly from improper and thoughtless dissemination of ultra information and its physical handling. In addition it was difficult to properly present "source" to the Commanding General and his deputies. This difficulty arose primarily because of the complete failure of the then A-2 to appreciate the value of "source" and the possibilities of its operational use. Fortunately this A-2's services came to a speedy termination through the excellent marksmanship of a Wehrmacht sub-machine gunner. His successors, who were four in number in as many weeks, created a somewhat tense atmosphere, but progressively each successor allowed the presentation of ultra to the Commanding General and his deputies in a less adulterated form and sanctioned its use in an operational capacity rather than as a panacea for otherwise mundane intelligence reports.

2. OPERATIONS.

To effect cover, the position of GAF specialist was created within the A-2 section. Duties consisted of the maintenance of GAF Order of Battle, airfield priority lists, target dossiers, ground situation and the melding of "source" with other forms of general and specialized intelligence.

The Commanding General and A-2 were briefed daily. No particular endeavor was made to present a detailed order of battle but rather a general depiction of the GAF was given which included movements and transfers, operations and intentions, current operational strengths of a/c and crews, production and fuel estimates.

The early indoctrination of the Deputy for operations and the authority given this officer to lay on targets directly, resulted in most cases in effective and prompt results. The ability to order immediate photo coverage and tactical recon furnished an opportunity to scrutinize the security of all operations.

The melding of Y intercept with GAF operational orders and intentions produced excellent results particularly in the Normandy Campaign and after the break-through where by virtue of "source" information the Ninth Air Force was able to carefully follow the retreating Luftwaffe and deal a successful series of blows at the overcrowded German airfields of Eastern France.

P/W reports were of value in substantiating target and order of battle information, frequently affording valuable cover and allowing dissemination to lower commands.

Target information and items of general and specific interest received at air force level were frequently not available to the Tactical Air Commands and these were relayed to the appropriate recipients.

3. Security.

In the early days security was a distinct problem. This was due largely to the fact that in this new command there was neither an appreciation of the value of "source" or the uses to which it might be put. Too many individuals were indoctrinated, caused by rapid changes of personnel and endless shifting of positions. However it can be fairly said that no serious violations occurred during the period under review.

4. Conclusion.

Ninth Air Force operations and use of ultra intelligence may be characterized as satisfactory. There was a certain amount of professional jealousy within the A-2 section arising on the part of those who were aware of the existence of some source of information prohibited to them. The Commanding General and his deputies were deeply appreciative and afforded this officer every consideration.

5. Recommendations.

(a) At commands of this level it is felt that a more favorable use of ultra might be afforded by a larger number of personnel supplied and controlled by Special Branch. This detail should include at least one enlisted clerk/typist. Because of unelastic T.O's, A-2 personnel frequently are not available and supply is sometimes a problem. Lack of both can create a severe handicap. A semi dependent unit controlled in the field by the ultra recipient and functioning as a separate unit apart from the A-2 section is in all probability the answer. This recommendation is limited in its application to air force or army group level.

(b) Air recipients would benefit greatly by a more detailed study of ground order of battle, as knowledge of this subject will aid the recipient in the proper application of air power and use.

(c) Every command should be afforded an SLU directly subordinated to it.

John W. Griggs
JOHN W. GRIGGS
Lt. Col., AC

REPORT of FIELD SERVICE with IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

29 May, 1944 — 9 May, 1945

JAMES D. FELLERS
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps
M.I.S., War Department

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I. MISSION.	Page 2
II. ORGANIZATION.	
A. DESIGNATION.	3
B. PHYSICAL SET-UP.	3
C. RECORDS.	6
D. S.I.U. 'Link' SERVICE.	7
III. RELATIONSHIP.	
A. With COMMAND.	10
B. With OPERATIONS.	12
C. With INTELLIGENCE.	13
D. With SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT.	17
E. With ARMY.	19
F. With HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.	
1. Ninth Air Force.	21
2. SFAEF-Air.	23
3. Buck.	24
4. Air Ministry.	24
5. The Park.	25
G. With ADJACENT HEADQUARTERS.	28
IV. OPERATIONS.	
A. EMPLOYMENT.	29
B. SIGNIFICANCE.	35
C. SCOPE.	37
D. SECURITY.	41
V. CONCLUSION.	44

I. MISSION.

The mission of the Special Intelligence Officer in the field, as outlined by the MARSHALL letter, was:

1. "To evaluate ULTRA intelligence, present it in usable form to the Commanding General and such senior staff officers as are authorized recipients;
2. "To assist in fuzing with intelligence derived from other sources;
3. "To give advice in connection with making operational use in such fashion that the security of SOURCE is not endangered."

Aside from the security aspect, the key to useful service is to be found in the words: "evaluate", "usable", "fuzing", and "operational". The actual application of these functions depended on an understanding of the mission of the Command to which the Special Intelligence Officer was attached, as all such interpretation and action were dictated by those requirements. A full and uninterrupted knowledge thereof was absolutely essential.

The mission of IX TAC followed the conventional pattern of employment of tactical aviation, falling into three primary re-occurring phases:

1. Destruction of the Enemy Air Force;
2. Isolation of the Battlefield;
3. Close cooperation with Ground Forces.

Phase 1 was an unceasing objective carried out by fighter sweeps and airfield attacks. The 2nd Phase was accomplished by cutting off supplies and reinforcements through rail and road interdiction and attacks on ammunition and fuel dumps. By concentrating along these lines during periods of fairly static ground activity, the German Air Force was not permitted to become a formidable obstacle and the German Army was not able to improve its supply and reinforcement position. When the ground forces were ready to roll again, the air effort then could be devoted primarily to direct participation in the ground battle through close cooperation (Phase 3).

In view of the fluctuating tactical situation and the inherent flexibility of air power, the air mission varied frequently. It was therefore important that the ULTRA Representative be promptly informed of changing Letters of Instruction involving the Command's mission in order that his personal

mission could be effectively performed.

II. ORGANIZATION.

A. DESIGNATION.

The 'cover name' which this recipient planned to adopt was that of "A-2 LIAISON", suggesting special training with higher headquarters and a relationship with Air Ministry which would explain having a particular knowledge of GAF order of battle and activities.

On joining IX TAC, however, it was found that an RAF Squadron/Leader was already serving with the A-2 Section as special representative of Air Ministry. This non-indoctrinated officer complicated the set-up and spoiled the use of that 'shield'.

The vague title of "Air Intelligence -- Order of Battle" was selected and retained throughout the campaigns with satisfactory results.

B. PHYSICAL SET-UP.

Office accommodations and personal assistance constituted two relatively minor but noteworthy problems of the ULTRA Representative in the field.

In the pre-invasion days, conditions were necessarily "catch-as-catch-can" in the over-crowded Fighter Control Center at the RAF Station at UXBRIDGE. Upon transferring to the continent on 12 June, the situation remained difficult. For a period it was necessary to operate sitting on a log under an apple tree in a NORMANDY orchard. Facilities were limited to a briefcase, including a portable map-case. Briefing was done on the log or leaning on a fence for the A-2 and in a private van for the CG. An attempt was made at sharing a trailer with the A-2 but the continuous flow of non-indoctrinated people in and out made this arrangement undesirable. A wing of the A-2 Duty van adjoining Combat Operations was eventually shared with the signal intelligence ('Y') officer who, though not in the picture, was exceedingly discreet and respected the privacy that the Writer's work required.

On moving indoors in WERVIERS, Belgium late in September, a private office was obtained and from then on to the end this Recipient did not lack for satisfactory working conditions. Accordingly, a private office, conven-

to the A-2, A-3, CG, and Combat Ops, was provided wherein adequate mapboards could be maintained. An 8' x 8' ground situation map (1:100,000) of the First Army front was kept posted with complete enemy ground order of battle, as well as two 4' x 4' air operational maps (1:1,000,000)--one portraying airfield activity by type aircraft and one showing disposition and strength of the GAF. Other appropriate displays were also exhibited. For subsequent moves to the field, an M-7 van was assigned personally to this Recipient and was especially designed and fitted for carrying out the same functions and displays on a slightly more compact scale. Thereafter the problem of a private, independent, "ULTRA" office was mastered.

In both the room and the van, an endeavor was made to make these maps and displays as neat, attractive, and interesting as possible. One of this Special Intelligence Officer's assumed responsibilities was of selling ULTRA intelligence and this could be more readily accomplished by presenting the material in an inviting manner. This 'salesmanship' was especially important in the case of the air operational types whose previous opinion of air intelligence had been extremely low.

To make it easy for them, SOURCE messages were typewritten clearly on uniform-sized paper, arranged by categories and associations, stamped neatly with a rubber stamp for initialling by the readers, and placed in clipboards. A reading table was provided convenient to the maps and displays whereon ULTRA references were plotted graphically or schematically to facilitate their understanding of message contents.

In organizing and arranging the signals initially, care was taken to add explanatory notes covering questionable references to, for instance, technical equipment, or associating the contents with other items of interest and concern. While most of the operational and intelligence members (after a period of careful briefing) preferred to do their own reading, the ULTRA Specialist stood by ready to answer questions, to offer oral supplements, and to point out the relationship to the maps and displays. This provided the opportunity to 'point up' items of special importance from an operational angle.

It is believed that these efforts made in presenting ULTRA aided in producing the receptiveness with which it was accepted by the readers and was a worthwhile endeavor from that standpoint.

The lack of personal assistance was a genuine handicap. By extending the work-day to 16-18 hours daily, it was possible to accomplish the mission in the manner envisaged by this report. Following the ST. LO breakthrough the last of July, an Army and Air Advanced Headquarters was established and went flying ahead some 75 miles distant at a time taking the Special Liaison Unit along.

It was determined that the ULTRA Specialist was most needed with the Combat Ops set-up which trailed behind. Arrangements were made to obtain the material once daily by travelling to an adjacent headquarters where S.L.U. would make an additional copy for IX TAC. This procedure was approved by Group/Captain WINTERBOTTOM providing the material was carried in a locked briefcase in a four-wheeled vehicle with armed protection, with which directive the Writer complied. It did necessitate spending four to nine hours a day on the road which was in itself an exhausting experience and greatly curtailed the amount of recording and coordinating that could be done during this period. Maj. Leslie L. ROOD and Capt. Edmund H. HELLOGG were sent out on short periods of temporary duty during this phase which helped greatly in collecting the material.

During this period of separation the Air Commander was briefed on particularly important air messages by the Deputy A-2 (Lt. Col. James J. LEE, Jr.). The bulk of the material and the continuity thereof, however, were covered by the Undersigned every two or three days when a special trip to the forward Command Post was made.

This problem was solved by the attachment of a Special Liaison Unit (Capt. Robert T. HOOPES) but new difficulties arose in that this Writer had meantime commenced to participate in the daily Army-Air Commanders' conference which regularly consumed the bulk of the morning away from Headquarters. This left the Combat Ops and Intelligence sections unserved.

An effort was repeatedly made to solve the manpower problem within the IX T.O. Headquarters. The CG refused flatly to ask for the indoctrination of any enlisted personnel and the A-2 was unable to recommend any officer in the Command for training in this specialized field. The Deputy A-2, Colonel LEB, returned to The States and no other substitute could be found whose primary duties did not make his delegation to this work impossible.

Capt. Langdon VAN NORDEN was finally sent out for temporary duty enabling this Writer to delegate some duties and responsibilities and to obtain four days in U. K. to visit The Park. VAN NORDEN's performance was outstanding and it was with considerable reluctance that his attachment was terminated.

A further interim in this struggle was provided following the ABERNES offensive when Group/Captain JONES generously sent S/L Eric FAURE from The Park out for ten days during the siege of LIEGE. FAURE reorganized and greatly simplified this Writer's bookkeeping system and was of inestimable aid during this trying period.

This exhausting condition was completely and satisfactorily remedied in mid-February by the attachment of 1st Lt. Robert S. MORRIS, Jr. All existing difficulties were solved as MORRIS was 'made to order' for the local requirements. He not only unravelled the clerical problems of posting maps and maintaining records, but conducted briefings, was available as a substitute in the event of sickness or leave, and provided intelligent companionship to the Undersigned.

It must be realized that one of the most trying angles of this Specialist assignment is the loneliness that necessarily accompanies it. It is extremely unsatisfactory not to have someone around who "speaks the same language", understands the capabilities and limitations of SOURCE, and with whom the possible interpretations can be discussed comprehensively. This healthy companionship is not provided by the general casual reader.

C. RECORDS.

Probably the maintenance of records is a question of the individual personality and mentality of the Specialist. This ULTRA Representative, with

a legal background and habit of knowing where to look up the answers rather than endeavoring to retain an accurate memory of details, preferred the confidence provided by having fairly extensive records available for ready reference. These were kept as notes, partially in the Writer's own shorthand, and always in such a brief and cryptic manner as to bear no literal relation to the original SOURCE material.

The Undersigned is indebted to Squadron/Leader FAURE of The Park for the simplification of this bookkeeping to a system more within the physical and timely capacities existing. As generally adopted, these fell into the following classifications:

- Order of Battle — GAF Units.
- Intentions, Orders, Operations.
- Strength and Serviceability.
- Scale of Effort (Sorties).
- Tactics.
- Targets.
- Technical Data.
- Flak.
- Logistics.
- Special Projects.

These notes were kept in a loose-leaf notebook. Some ground order of battle information was kept from time to time but this was generally unnecessary due to the close association with the First Army ULTRA Specialist and his willing cooperation in keeping the Air Representative's ground situation accurate.

An additional loose-leaf notebook was maintained on "Enemy Airfields" which constituted an important part of the operational work. Such notes, as well as maps and appreciations which included SOURCE information, were kept in a safe and/or office which was locked when not in use.

This Writer found no satisfactory comfort in the statement that recourse could be made to higher headquarters or The Park at any time repetition, association, or clarification was desired. At a Command where tactical action is taken, immediate answers or interpretations are desired and this Representative preferred the work entailed by keeping such records to taking the chance on being 'caught short' on occasion.

D. S. I. U. 'Link' SERVICE.

The fallacy that air and ground headquarters at Army-TAC level could

continue to "use the same tobacco can" throughout the war presented serious difficulties. In the pre-invasion and early NORMANDY days, one S.I.U. was adequate and both air and ground headquarters were satisfactorily serviced by each receiving a copy of all messages signalled to that station.

Air and ground requirements in the field did turn out to be different in a fast-moving situation where communications dictated the location of Command Posts. The Army needed to be close behind its Corps while the Air had to remain adjacent to its units which were stationed on airfields frequently left far behind in a rapid ground advance. Operation "OCERA" (ST. LO, 25 July) produced this situation initially for First Army--IX TAC.

By September a pad unit was provided to Ninth Air Force and this was attached to IX TAC due to the tactical requirement existing there for this service. The operational area given this Command at that time included three German armies and four out of the five GAF geschwadern then operating on the Western Front. The PAS DE CALAIS and adjacent areas were of major and decisive importance, the Enemy was on the run with the First Army (and its S.I.U.) close behind them, and it was recognized that current and expeditious use of this special 'link' service against the remaining bulk of the German air and ground forces might contribute critically to the situation.

Throughout the campaigns the SLU-SCU component was directly associated with the Command Post and, wherever possible, immediately adjacent to the office of this recipient. This entailed some difficulties with the Headquarters Commandant and the Chief of Staff who laid out camp sites on the theory that offices and quarters must be widely separated, and with the Signal Section who believed in removing all signal equipment well outside the perimeter of the Headquarters. Nevertheless these objections were overcome by firm but tactful action and this Detachment was afforded the opportunity of maintaining themselves as a separate and interdependent unit.

The custom was to provide field space or building accommodations sufficient for SLU-SCU to office and billet together in order to prevent unnecessary mixing of enlisted personnel with other headquarters personnel. This segregation afforded the best possible security precaution under the circumstances.

Some intervention was necessary to uphold this position for the S.L.U. but could be accomplished satisfactorily by the ULTRA Representative. The latter should feel a strong responsibility for the Unit in keeping it informed of Command plans, advising in ample time of contemplated moves, etc., so that plans could be made without haste. If this is not done, there is likely to be a tendency to forget their existence and their new requirements, and the Unit may find itself thoughtlessly left behind in the old location or no preparations made for accommodating it in the new one.

During moves from one Command Post to another this Recipient accompanied the Unit, including his van in the S.L.U. independent convoy, and staying with them until they were satisfactorily located in the new area. For all moves within GERMANY a special armed detachment of Military Police was provided.

One helpful scheme developed during moves was for The Park to summarize collectively three 'Z', two 'Z', and one 'Z' messages 'queued' up during the interim of the transfer. This was of considerable aid in keeping current during necessary moves in vital periods.

Ordinarily deliveries were made four times a day with special service on matters which were of particular concern to the Command. A private field telephone line was always maintained between the S.L.U. office and the Recipient. All messages were typed and stamped with a rubber stamp provided to the Unit showing the names of the customers (for simplification in checking off). Each message was signed for by the Recipient and turned back to the S.L.U. for destruction.

A vain effort was made to return ULTRA signals within 24 hours but this was frequently impossible owing to the full program of the Writer (not having the ready opportunity to make necessary notes therefrom) and due to the number of individual customers who had to be serviced (totalling eight during one period). The bookkeeping system between the S.L.U. and this Recipient was a nuisance and a headache as a result of these re-occurring delays, but no other solution was found. The Undersigned did not desire to assume responsibility for destroying the messages personally because of the lack of proper facilities. The value of this additional security check

was also recognized.

III. RELATIONSHIP.

A. With COMAND.

The status of this Recipient has been described in IX TAC publications as "special intelligence officer on the staff of the Commanding General". This relationship was established in May, 1944 and was maintained with increasing significance throughout eleven months of association.

The Undersigned was delivered to Maj. Gen. E. R. QUESADA, Commanding General, IX Fighter Command and IX Tactical Air Command, without background build-up or introduction. It was left to this War Department Representative to explain personally the M.I.S. program, the training afforded its chosen representatives, and the mission to be performed in the field. This is considered an unfortunate and careless procedure and one failing to take advantage of the opportunity to further pleasant relations between the War Department and Commands in the field.

While the MARSHALL letter provided that the field Representative was to work under the control of the A-2 as part of his staff, it was recognized that this question of relationship was one which had to be modified according to the various personalities involved.

The personality of General QUESADA was receptive to a direct and personal relationship and advantage of this opportunity was taken to obtain the best possible utilization of SOURCE at this Command. This Air Commander desired that he be briefed direct and personally by "his Special Intelligence Officer" on both air and ground matters and that the ULTRA messages be associated with other relevant information, fused with other intelligence, and interpreted in the light of the mission and activities of IX TAC.

The 'Q' refused to read for himself any 'link' message, stating that, in their condensed field signal form, accompanied by code names, crypto numbers, abbreviations, and qualifications, he found them confusing and perplexing. He relied on his W.D. Representative to present them orally and/or graphically to him. While he demanded that the message be 'tied in' with other known or

suspected activities, he insisted that it be brought out clearly in the briefing as to which portions were based on SOURCE, as distinguished from those gleaned from recce, prisoners of war, or the briefer's own estimate.

During the early months the Undersigned briefed The 'Q' nightly in his private trailer, presenting the interwoven air and ground picture, and supplemented by significant excerpts from the air operations of the day. Special or operationally urgent matters were presented immediately during day or night whenever the occasion arose.

For the General's fuller comprehension of the subject matter, this Writer frequently prepared special reports summarizing GAF activities for the week, and special papers on such matters as: Jet-Propelled Developments, Ground Force Reinforcement Situation, the Siege of CHERBOURG, Flying/Bombs, V-Weapons, etc. Also charts on the organization of the SS, demonstrating the position and relationship of individuals figuring in the SOURCE reports, diagrams on the German Flak set-up, maps portraying German recce operations, or, for example, German employment of night bombers coming up from South FRANCE to COGNAC area in the afternoon, flying on up to the NORMANDY coast at night for attacks on Allied landings and supplies (showing routes in and out, times, scale, etc.).

Frequently during these sessions, Command decisions would be made regarding the employment of air units. These were relayed on to Operations for execution. As this Writer became more involved, it became necessary to discontinue the periodic written "ULTRA TOP SECRET" summaries and appreciations.

Later the Air Commander desired that his Special Intelligence Officer join him in participating in the daily Army-Air Commanders' conferences and to brief the Army Commander on ULTRA information. He fully recognized that a better interpretation of SOURCE could be made if his ULTRA Representative was kept informed on all high level planning and operations and he insisted that such be done.

General QUESADA would listen to SOURCE and would accept it. But he also required other evidence to be supplied. He refused to be "rocked to sleep" by its intimations although often the messages were extraordinarily

encouraging. There was no need for hesitancy in passing on to him the German reactions to the air effort of his units for he derived a great amount of 'cautious' inspiration therefrom. When he heard German ground forces report "All movement on roads impossible owing to continuous fighter/bomber activity" or "Attack by Army brought to standstill by extremely strong fighter/bomber activity" or "Supply, owing to Allied aircraft, only conditionally possible", it appeared to give him a great inward courage to drive on to an even greater exploitation of such indicated success. At the same time he searched for "bad" reports where he might find suggestions for further improving his employment of air power.

Throughout the ~~Six~~ campaigns during which the Undersigned served with The 'Q', the relationship was friendly and inspiring and left little to be desired.

General QUESADA was succeeded the last of April by Brig. Gen. Ralph F. STANLEY who spent a couple of weeks at IX TAC prior to The Q's departure. During this time he observed the routine existing between the Air Commander and his Special Intelligence Officer and continued the same relationship in full force and effect.

B. With OPERATIONS.

The relationship established and maintained with Operations was an enviable and unusual one from an air intelligence standpoint. For once Intelligence had something to sell to which Operations would listen and this situation was exploited for the good of the cause with believed effect.

During the early months the Director of Combat Ops (Col. Dyke MEYER) was not a member of the ULIRA fraternity. The Air Commander did not want to place him on a non-operational flying status so handled the situation by informing him that there were some intelligence reports which did not go through ordinary intelligence channels about which he did not need to know, but that if the A-2 or the Special Intelligence Officer came to him on a special matter that he should give full credence to the recommendations made and be governed in his operational action by the security restrictions proposed.

This situation was not ideal but nevertheless workable in view of the personalities involved.

A later Director of Combat Ops (Col. Gilbert I. METERS) was indoctrinated and a wholly satisfactory relationship was established. This officer participated in the daily air-ground commanders' conferences along with the Air Commander and this Writer and was an eager and willing receiver of ULTRA intelligence. He was orally briefed every morning at the regular conference and came around to read the signals personally later in the day.

In the latter months Colonel METERS became A-3 and the succeeding Director of Combat Ops (Col. Howard F. NICHOLS) was indoctrinated. NICHOLS was likewise receptive to ULTRA intelligence and this made him the incidental recipient of much good open source material to which he would otherwise never have responded.

Guided and influenced by the Air Commander's outlook, these operational types welcomed associated general information along with the SOURCE 'gen'. The universal air reaction to intelligence has been one of indifference but ULTRA provided the means of overcoming this barrier. Intelligence could therefore feed to Operations much open general information which was of value in the operational picture by weaving it in with SOURCE and demonstrating clearly and effectively how such can and must be fused and collated. This substantially increased the burden of responsibility of this ULTRA Specialist in his care and selection of other material. The evidenced confidence of these operational people, however, made the task and the risk worthwhile.

C. With INTELLIGENCE.

Most delicate of all relationships is probably the one with the A-2 himself. Here, again, it is important that a proper introduction be afforded the W. D. Representative when he is presented to the A-2 to "work under his control" as "part of his staff".

In spite of the lack of presentation and buildup, a highly satisfactory relationship was established with the IX TAC A-2 (Col. R.F. McCLEMMAN).

He accepted the training and background experience of this Recipient as well as the requirement for direct relationship with the Commanding General and he respected them. In return, the Undersigned was careful to make every effort to keep the A-2 as well and thoroughly informed as the CG, and, wherever possible, to do it first.

When McCLENNAN departed early in January there was a period of four weeks during which the Command operated without a designated A-2 who was in the picture. Lt. Col. Francis PARKMAN, as ranking officer in the A-2 Section, was designated on paper but the Air Commander called on this Representative to perform all general, as well as special, intelligence functions.

It was at this time that the Air Commander asked the Undersigned to become his A-2. Inasmuch as the opportunity came so late in the game and no outside disposition of PARKMAN (a capable and intelligent officer who had been in the Section for more than a year) was contemplated, it seemed wise to avoid this position. The 'Q' finally agreed to PARKMAN's indoctrination and retaining the title and as such he continued to direct the administrative details of the Section.

The Writer continued to act as intelligence advisor to Command and to Operations and to participate in staff planning. This avoided an awkwardly impossible situation and seemed a better solution for congeniality within the Section. So long as Command and Operations would listen to the Undersigned and accept his 'gen', that was what really counted! This relationship was maintained even through the interval when Col. George W. PECK, a former reconnaissance group commander, served as A-2. The latter's appointment was predicated on training operational types in air intelligence staff work but this individual was apparently lacking in interest and enthusiasm for either general or special intelligence. Had his personality figured earlier, the problems of the W.D. Representative in relation to Intelligence might have been different, but the established operational routine was not disturbed.

Most difficult of all is probably the relation between the Specialist and the other non-ULTRA members of the A-2 Section. At IX TAC this involved intimate daily work with some 15 officers who knew that something 'strange'

existed and were initially and naturally resentful that all sources of intelligence information were not made fully available to them. While these people are not in a position to 'make' or 'break' one, they can make his existence exceedingly tough or relatively easy.

This writer believed that to be useful it was desirable to become an integrated part of the Headquarters and the Intelligence Section and this policy was adopted. To off-set the potential antagonism, it was announced that this individual was only 'attached' to the Command (no T.C. vacancy or promotion involved!); that he had a background of special training in G-2 and Air Ministry in GAF order of battle and with field commands in the Med which had been fighting the Luftwaffe; that it must be recognized that certain items of air intelligence were intended for "eyes only" and would not flow through ordinary intelligence channels. Those who recognized the writer's association with something special attributed it to high level espionage sources and this remained the consensus of opinion to the end.

On arrival at the forward Command Post in NORMANDY on D Plus 6, the first break came when the intelligence officers in the advanced echelon were 'sweating' over enemy airfields. Operations was hollering loudly for information and recommendations thereon and no one on hand had any knowledge regarding same. Fortunately this had been a special pre D-Day study of the Underigned and some immediate help could be given. This provided an entree to the Section and indicated that some useful purpose could be served by having a GAF Specialist around.

Thereafter it was only a question of one's establishing himself as a working member of the Section and the organization and this could be accomplished by doing "just a little bit more" than was required under the strict interpretation of the MARSHALL letter.

In addition to enemy air order of battle, current German airfield activity by type aircraft was maintained. While detailed records of enemy airfields (status, serviceability, etc.) were kept as part of the Target Section, all operational recommendations were handled by the ULTRA Specialist.

Priority lists of these airfields were prepared daily for Operations and periodically for dissemination to Groups and Squadrons. This was a main activity of the Undersigned and relieved the Target Section of duties which they were not adequately prepared to perform.

Recommendations on other type targets (supply dumps, marshalling yards, communication centers, etc.) were made more irregularly, but were unquestionably accepted by the Target Section in view of the Recipient's close association with the Army from where it was believed most of the information was received.

Other material prepared for publication to lower echelons included a monthly review of "Enemy Air Activity against Ground Units", periodic summaries of GAF activity, and appreciations of enemy capabilities. These functions lessened the burdens of other officers in the Section.

The Writer's direct relationship with Command and close association with the Army served as 'cover' for any special information or actions. Consequently there was no difficulty in laying on races direct with the Recce Officer on prospective ground-type targets as well as on airfields.

The Undersigned did not do a regular tour on the Duty desk, preferring to read all Ops Flashes (pilots mission reports) and reports from other Commands on his own time. Close association was maintained with the D.I.C.s and the latter sent this Recipient special flash reports on all sightings and encounters involving enemy aircraft. In return, the Undersigned assisted them in the preparation of the daily Summary of Operations by identifying airfields involved and interpreting enemy air activity.

Relations with the Signal Intelligence ('Y') Officer were necessarily intimate. He was the only other individual in the entire headquarters who had an adequate knowledge and appreciation of enemy air order of battle. The close association was mutually beneficial. This Recipient recommended early that the 'Y' Officer be indoctrinated but the C' refused to ask for his clearance and preferred to have the 'Y' material fused with other intelligence by the ULTRA Specialist. The 'Y' Officer submitted daily a digest of signal

intelligence during the preceding 24-hour period which was used for this purpose.

Relations with the Prisoner of War Interrogators were important. These men came in on the average of once a week for a special briefing on general GAF developments and to be instructed on matters of particular interest to the Command on which they were to interrogate. It is believed that this effort produced a much higher quality of helpful information than would have been possible otherwise. Documentary and Technical Intelligence were handled in a similar manner. Some help was also afforded the Disarmament Officer.

Little effort was made to assist the Flak Section as the Flak Officer at Ninth Air Force was in the ULTRA picture and fed this material down to TAC as rapidly as it could be developed openly. The TAC Flak Officer, on the other hand, was of considerable assistance to this Writer in working up target recommendations and in establishing new airfields. Where SOURCE could refer to a new airfield, this officer could suggest pinpoint locations (for further recon) based on standard air field flak defenses.

Outside of the period when BROCKHORN was on the rampage, little association was necessary with the Counter Intelligence Section.

On the whole, the relations with the components of A-2 were satisfactory and secure. While more time, work, and effort were required by this method, it is believed that a more effective utilization of SOURCE was obtained than would have been possible under a program of isolated segregation.

D. With SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT.

The relationship established with the Special Liaison Unit was that the Undersigned was the official Recipient of all 'link' messages and deliveries were made accordingly. This included signals designated "Personal for QUERSABA" or "Personal for McCLERNAHAN" unless the subject matter involved the Recipient personally. This was in accordance with the desires of the Air Commander and the A-2. This system was retained until the introduction of the 'C' Series which presented an awkward situation solved only by the termination of the war and the service.

Earlier relationships with Capt. Val CURTIS (British Army) and his S.L.U. were friendly and courteous. This unit was attached to First Army and no administrative problems were dealt with by the Undersigned. A separate unit (Capt. Robert T. HOCPLS) was attached to IX TAC in September.

At all times Captain HOCPLS was recognized as the Officer-in-Charge of the S.L.U. Detachment and his rights, privileges, and responsibilities as such were respected. It was, however, desirable to act as an intermediary with the Headquarters in many instances and the ultimate responsibility for the Unit in its administrative relations with the Command was accepted by the Undersigned. HOCPLS was encouraged to work out his own administrative dealings directly wherever possible. He did this with the knowledge and assurance that he would be supported whenever necessary by the Recipient and in turn by the A-2 and the Air Commander.

A position of joint and individual responsibility for security was adopted by the Recipient and the S.L.U. Commander.

Few noteworthy problems were encountered, probably due to the capable and energetic supervision of Captain HOCPLS and the efficient functioning of his Unit. Especial effort was made by them to 'snag' corrupt passages, to type messages neatly, and to make deliveries promptly. The continued maintenance of this service (especially in connection with moves) on this high plane frequently called for extraordinary undertaking which was readily and willingly given. In return for this cooperative attitude, this Recipient endeavored to pass on the story of their merit and it was recognized by the Air Commander in January, 1945 in a personal commendation to Captain HOCPLS in which he acknowledged that "all members of the Unit have untiringly performed their duties and have rendered individual services towards the success of our operations."

The disposition of one minor problem may be of value, that is, the arbitrary ruling that four or five 'Z' priority signals be delivered immediately during the night. Regulations would not permit S.L.U. Officers to exercise discretion in this regard. Upon request, S.L.U. Headquarters sub-

sequently altered this ruling. S.L.U. Personnel were instructed to use their own discretion as to whether high priority signals were delivered immediately or not. The decision was to be influenced by the requirements of the situation as outlined to them each evening and bearing in mind any particular information which the Headquarters wished to obtain and of which the S.L.U. had been given notice.

This solution was perfectly adequate as the S.L.U. officers involved were intelligent and discerning and were kept reasonably well informed on all important developments. While strict interpretation of ULTRA regulations did not seemingly envisage these people being more fully informed on the use of the information which they provided, an effort was made to brief them on the application of ULTRA material and on the currently developing situation. A regular briefing was held at the S.L.U. office at night where situation maps were maintained. It is believed that the interest and enthusiasm of the 'Link' personnel was on a much higher pitch by virtue of this friendly co-operative relationship.

On occasion, when a seemingly pointless message had been decoded by a S.L.U. representative, an effort was made to show him and the others how that fitted into other information already available to round out the enemy picture. Through such simple gestures the confidence of the S.L.U. personnel in their dull but important job was gained.

Further evidence of the success achieved is indicated by the action of General QUESADA on his leaving the Command, in setting up Bronze Star Awards to Captain HOOPES and 1st Lt. Charles D. WORLEY and in recommending through channels for post-war consideration RAF Sergeant MURRAY of S.L.U. and Communications Sergeant DAY of S.C.U. for similar citations.

B. With ARMY.

The cooperative relations between IX TAC and First Army, their commanders, and their Special W. D. Representatives were exceptional. The coordination between BRADLEY and QUESADA and later HODGES and QUESADA was exemplary. The helpful assistance of the ground ULTRA Specialist (Lt. Col. Adolph

G. ROSENBERG, Jr.) was invaluable to the Undersigned.

The interest of IX TAC in the ground situation was keen and evoked substantial responsibility on this Writer. This Recipient maintained the only complete enemy ground order of battle map kept in the Headquarters. This was a difficult and tiring task at best and only made possible by the unselfish cooperation of the ground ULTRA Specialist (and his ULTRA assistant, Capt. William D. ROSENBERG, Jr.) who made frequent personal visits to this Headquarters to straighten out the ground dispositions and subordinations as well as to keep the air Representative thoroughly and regularly informed on all ground developments of interest and importance.

In addition to keeping the Undersigned 'straight', the ground W. D. Representative briefed the Air Commander on ground matters on occasion and made appearances at the air Target Conferences to present the general ground intelligence picture. He further assisted in the development of ULTRA information into usable air targets. The ground intelligence agencies available frequently provided the substantiating cover necessary for action.

In return, ground force agencies often called on this Recipient for appreciations and estimates on enemy air dispositions and strength, flak, capabilities, etc. For example, First Army Antiaircraft Section would ask for an appreciation on the GAF situation in CZECHOSLOVAKIA as to what airfield were active in what strength (and the capabilities of the forces there) in order that they might more intelligently deploy their antiaircraft defenses in the First Army sector in that area.

This Writer was brought into the joint Army-Air Commanders' conferences in October at the instance and request of the Air Commander who was unhappy over the ULTRA BRIEFING being received by the Army Commander (the Army G-2 persisted in presenting the SOURCE material personally to the Army Commander to the exclusion of the ground ULTRA Specialist). While the substitution of the ground W.D. Representative for the G-2 in the presentation of ground SOURCE material was never achieved, it is believed that a substantial improvement was provoked in that the ground Specialist was delegated to prepare and

organize the material presented.

These daily meetings included, in addition to the Army and Air Commanders, the Army Chief of Staff, G-2, G-3, and Artillery Officer, and the Air Operations A-3 and the Undersigned. Held in the form of joint staff-planning conferences, they presented an opportunity for thorough consideration of ULTRA with other intelligence and the interest in and reliance on SOURCE information by these leaders was inspiring and gratifying.

F. With HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

1. Ninth Air Force.

The relationship between this Command and its next higher echelon was thoroughly unsatisfactory. From beginning to end no noteworthy sustained effort was ever made from Ninth Air Force to assist IX TAC or its ULTRA Recipient.

During pre-invasion UXBRIDGE days this Representative used the same S.L.U. station as Air Force and received full coverage then, but, after departure therefrom, Air Force Representatives provided no supplement to the pad station service being received in the field.

The Writer repeatedly sought to provoke the type of help needed by signalling his personal ideas on order of battle questions and asking and welcoming opinions on future dispositions and employment of certain units and on current subordinations, etc.

During a brief period in November, following Col. Telford TAYLOR's personal visit and request, some supplementary tidbits were sent but this died out shortly.

After some three months of operating under these conditions, The Park recognized that Air Force did not send summaries to TACs of those complete messages which had been received by them but not sent direct to TACs (because of length, strategic nature, or perhaps not wholly of tactical concern). At that time The Park agreed to pick out "snippets" and send them in daily summaries direct to ARMY-TAC level which aided this situation considerably.

A classic example of total failure to appreciate anything down to subordinate commands occurred the latter part of October when, within a 48-hour period, some 35 flying bombs (V-1's) passed over the First Army area. This sudden and new activity stirred considerable local interest and the Army and Air Commanders were demanding information concerning this German activity.

In response to an effort to obtain pertinent SOURCE data available, this Command was informed that Air Ministry saw nothing remarkable in this scale of effort and that the activity was in fact expected. The Park further advised that intelligence on flying bombs was being signalled currently down to Air Force, reinforced constantly by Air Ministry summaries and appreciations, and suggested that relevant information be obtained from this Command's higher echelon. Although Air Force was included in the distribution of these two-way signals, no acknowledgment nor reference was made to same by them and no information was forthcoming.

Throughout, Air Force was kept informed of the needs and desires of this Command and specific requests were directed for fuller information on certain vital questions. On occasion, when the problem had a ground aspect, it was suggested that Army Group could help from the more extensive information available to them. Generally no answer nor acknowledgement was received.

The greatest difficulty, outside of the complete lack of information on the 'strategic' picture, was in the lack of coordination of activities of the three TACs under this Air Force. As a result it was necessary for the special Representatives at these TACs to work out through direct liaison many things which could have been readily set up at higher headquarters. For example, all ULTRA Specialists were relied on for the selection of airfields for attack by their respective Commands. Frequently these airfields were situated within the over-lapping air operational area of two the the TACs and coordination was necessary to prevent a wasted duplication of effort or an unfortunate avoidance of lucrative targets by both TACs involved. Likewise with the development of new airfields--as when first reported on SOURCE. No guid-

ance or direction was forthcoming from above. It would be necessary for the ULTRA Representatives to get together and agree which one would use his Command reconnaissance to endeavor to pinpoint the new airfield.

In all fairness, the one thing done for the TACs by anyone in a-2 is herewith reported. That was setting up the transmission of nightly airfield Intreps from Air Ministry over the signal intelligence ('Y') links direct to each TAC. This contained the results of Allied airfield recce of the preceding day and was extremely useful in supplementing (and covering) the airfield occupation reports from SOURCE. This contribution was, however, unique.

The inadequate and ineffective set-up at Ninth Air Force is believed by the Writer to have been the greatest weakness of the War Department organization in the field. The service to TAC representatives which could have been performed at that level would have made the job easier and eminently more successful.

2. SHAEP-Air.

A personal visit from the SHAEP-Air ULTRA Specialist (Lt. Col. Edward K. THOMPSON) to forward air commands in February, 1945, finally produced a periodic digest of messages not sent initially to TAC level. This filled a long missing gap in air intelligence circles and was an outstanding contribution to ULTRA service.

These digests were extremely well prepared and exceedingly welcome as they helped to 'spice up' the routine 'soup' which was fed daily to the Army and TAC Commanders. When transmission priority was reduced to one 'Z', some difficulty was experienced in delivery delay--digests requiring 48 hours for transmission and receipt. It was recognized that time was not necessarily the essence of these digests but their interest and value increased according to their freshness. Corruptions resulting from repetition through W/T operators was overcome by the digests being sent to HOLE where they were re-signalled to TACs.

THOMPSON also performed a valuable service to lower commands in

writing a weekly summary of CAP activity into which he wove ULTRA evidence that had been developed on open sources available to him. These greatly aided this TAC Recipient in his job of furnishing the best possible air intelligence to subordinate Groups and Squadrons.

Another pleasant relationship with this top Allied headquarters was with the Airfield Section (i/c Ian PARSONS) who likewise came to the rescue in latter months to supply a much-needed link in the air intelligence chain. His airfield priority lists were exceedingly useful and his efforts to establish new German airfields in the open picture definitely simplified the uncoordinated efforts at lower levels.

3. BUCK.

The relationship with Maj. Lucius A. BUCK was unsatisfactory, simply because the writer always felt that BUCK never understood the problems at forward commands.

Repeated efforts were made (in vain) to obtain a joint session at which there could be a mutual exchange of problems and solutions between BUCK and his TAC recipients. An attempt was made to explain over the 'link' that this Command was especially interested in having SOURCE references 'tied in' with other information at Air Ministry which would present a fuller target picture.

The principle on which BUCK was working at Air Ministry was good and one in which all TAC representatives concurred, but some further collation and organization of material available there would perhaps have resulted in furnishing intelligence more potentially useful to this end.

BUCK's Special Appreciations could probably have been improved through condensation and reorganization of material, but were certainly a welcome and valuable addition to the intelligence knowledge at TAC level.

4. Air Ministry.

Air Ministry provided many valuable special appreciations from time to time throughout the campaigns. Even the periodic "Sunsets", which were frequently no more than a review of the regular SOURCE material, were helpful

as they recalled previous traffic and tied it together in a meaningful manner which otherwise might have been missed by the tactically-thinking field Recipient.

On occasion these appreciations were disappointing in that they seemed to play all the horses in the race without placing the money on any one. This procedure tended to lower one's respect for an agency dealing in intelligence as it was felt that more help could have been provided than by merely citing every possible possibility. Such was not always the case and many of the summaries and estimates were absolutely first-rate. The Air Ministry 'views' reaching TAC level were fewer and farther between in the latter months but seemed of a generally higher calibre.

DISTRAMs and Occupation Lists contributed by A. I. 3b were useful. The proposed discontinuance of the Occupation List toward the end of April, however, was somewhat disturbing. This was practically the only 'link' information then reaching IX TAC of current operational value. With the extension of the Russian dividing line to DRESDEN-PRAQUE and the lift on the ban on armed reconnaissance missions, this Command was in a position to devote special attention to lucrative airfields in the area between the Bomb Line and the International Boundary of which there were four figuring prominently in the German traffic at that time. There were no other ground targets during that period--total claims resulting from 136 sorties on 30 April being one M/T destroyed and one damaged--and it was still desired to pursue the destruction of the Luftwaffe. When so advised, Air Ministry continued this service until 4 May when it was discontinued owing to the lack of up-to-date information.

5. The Park.

The extent to which The Park can be of service to the field recipient is dependent on the extent of the relationship, i.e., the extent to which that organization, called 'HOLE', knows what the score is in the field.

Liaison visits from Park representatives were invaluable in this regard. They aided in clearing troubles over map coordinates, place and cover names, comments, local expressions, priorities, etc. They also enabled Park personnel to become familiar with a Recipient's working conditions in the field and to obtain a picture of the Command's operations and its spheres of concern.

The only other means available to The Park of appreciating the Recipient's problems was by exchange over the 'link'. An example of the necessity of keeping The Park informed of local activities and interests: GAF night operations were not signalled down to Air Commands in FRANCE as it was understood that forward TACs did not operate at night. While night fighters were dispatched from U.K., however, they were controlled in the battle area by the Fighter Control Station under IX TAC. This information was therefore of interest and value to this Command for a more intelligent supervision of the control system. There was also the angle that if SOURCE revealed an intended attack by a known GAF unit from a known GAF airfield, then local fighters could be dispatched to 'prang' that airfield prior to dark. On occasion IX TAC fighters did operate after midnight landing in England following their mission.

Fortunately this particular incident occurred early in the beach-head days and brought out the necessity of keeping HQUE advised concerning capabilities, limitations, operations, and priorities of field Commands. Thereafter this Recipient endeavored to advise The Park regularly on intentions and priorities, keeping them informed as to whether the current emphasis was on Phase 1, 2, or 3 of the air mission.

Another lesson learned was that it is important to send highlights to The Park of new or unusual developments which are not apparent from SOURCE reading, such as, repeated appearances of ME-163 rocket-propelled fighters in the KOELN area (far from their sole known operational base), first sighting of ME-260 in the battle area, etc. Also new activities of one's own Command, such as employment of Black Widows (P-61s) on intruder patrols, A-20 night fighters on radar-controlled bombing missions, night photo work with A-20 type aircraft, etc.

Keeping The Park posted on these developments (in addition to changes in air plans and priorities, as, from close cooperation to rail-cutting, or reversion from supply dumps to armored column cover for attacking spearheads), will enable a more intelligent processing and choosing of ULTRA material by the people who have the power of selection.

Probably 'ECME' could have been a little more helpful to the 'field' if fuller and more frequent comments had been made, especially with references to technical equipment. Even negative comments were solicited as such were reassuring that one's personal ignorance was somewhat justified.

To this air Recipient it appeared that generally the Air Advisors were somewhat better than the Ground. More could have been done by the latter to make their material of greater value. For example, Unit returns reporting tank strength and mobility. If some comparison to previous reports could have been made, it would have aided greatly in interpretation. This Air Command was interested in the results of fighter/bomber attacks and was seeking a significant relationship in such returns (which showed "crews without tanks" and "guns under repair"). No such ground records were maintained at this level and such information in the way of 'comment' was desirable.

One lesson definitely learned is that The Park did confine itself to its job of factual reporting leaving estimates and appreciations to others. It took a while and a few incidents to get this straight. This writer had recognized The Park's job as factual reporting but did consider that the answers desired were frequently available from other 'facts' available to them, or that on request there could be no objection to Park personnel stating their 'views' so long as the requesting Recipient was willing to accept same with full knowledge of the limitations involved. This Recipient initially proceeded on the premise that, if further clarifying 'facts' were not available at The Park nor their personal 'views' permissible, contact would be made by Park personnel with the proper authority at Air Ministry or War Office in order to supply a 'best estimate' or an 'agreed comment'. Responses received to a number of queries were eventually convincing that The Park would not be drawn from the confines of its province.

One example will suffice. On the afternoon of 7 March, units of First Army captured the REMLAGEN bridge intact and poured elements of two divisions over the REMLA. The first 24 hours was a critical stage. The potential immediate employment of German flak in a ground role against the bridgehead

was of urgent concern. First Army asked IX TAC for its estimate of plan in the immediate vicinity which could be employed in a ground role. A local evaluation was given to First Army immediately and this Recipient turned to the 24-hour Park service with a four 'E' CLSU signal that night (reported to Air Force for information) in search of fuller facts on such a seemingly important enemy matter. The answer which arrived the next day advised that such estimates were quite outside The Park's province and suggested that the matter was for action for Air Force and for them to bring to higher authority if they wished!

G. With ADJACENT HEADQUARTERS.

A healthy relationship existed between IX TAC and other field commands which was preserved by frequent conferences where problems could be discussed, ideas exchanged, and coordination effected. This was particularly true between this Recipient and the ULTRA Representatives with First and Ninth Armies and XXIX TAC as their geographical locations permitted weekly get-togethers for such conferences. To a lesser extent personal visits were possible with Third Army, XIX TAC, 12 Army Group, and Ninth Air Force. It is believed that these frequent sessions were extremely beneficial in enlarging the knowledge of all those participating and in increasing their value to their respective commands.

Liaison was especially important where occasional 'flaps' developed over special German undertakings. Most of the Representatives at TAC level were operating alone and had no one to whom to turn or with whom the possibilities could be discussed who knew any more about it than themselves. Where possible, suggestions were made and in some instances this Recipient found it desirable to respond with "unable to become alarmed", citing the possibilities from the limited evidence, and advocating close watch for indications of the nature and development of plans. Actually the GAF seldom justified a flap!

IV. OPERATIONS.

A. EMPLOYMENT.

Most important in the employment of ULTRA intelligence is that it be collated with other lower level material. Besides Special Intelligence, information from all sources--higher headquarters, adjacent commands, pilots reports, air P/W interrogations, photo interpretations, visual recce, signal intelligence ('Y'), captured documents, ground sources, agents, and civilians--must be utilized. All available evidence must be collected and fused together to produce the answers to the Essential Elements of Information.

To bring together all information concerning the enemy and grind it into meaningful intelligence was the real mission of this Recipient at IX TAC. If this recognized conception is understood, then the use of ULTRA intelligence operationally at this field Command may make sense.

The office of this ULTRA Specialist served as the 'assembly room' for information wherein collecting and fusing was done. Here all reports of other Commands, pilots, recce, P/Ws, etc. were sent for perusal and collation. The Writer's conception is that there are two intelligence pictures--one, the ULTRA Source, and the other, the general open source. The 'assembly room' was the place where an effort was made to build up the general intelligence picture to the ULTRA level by ascertaining the extent to which ULTRA items had been securely revealed by open sources.

The value of this was demonstrated when a IX TAC P/W interrogator brought in the account of a Polish P/W who provided complete details of a German planned operation called "GISELA". This was immediately recognized as SOURCE's Operation "ROPER", a projected large scale intruder operation over British airfields. The report was flashed immediately to Second TAF and Ninth Air Force for their information and action.

If, as, and when SOURCE items became 'firm' on open evidence, the ULTRA Specialist passed them on personally (or through the A-2 or other likely individuals) to the Combat Ops personnel by oral presentations at the evening Target Conference or in appreciations and summaries in the daily A-2 Periodic

Report for the benefit of Groups and Squadrons and adjacent commands. So, for example, when an air P/W identified on photographs the headquarters of GAF Command West in a certain castle in LIMBURG, the previous SOURCE report that this German command's headquarters was in "SCHLOSS VON DORF" in LIMBURG provided the confidence which senior operations personnel desired in laying on an attack.

Considerable SOURCE information was provided lower echelons in regular periodic summaries of GAF operations on the Western Front which were prepared by the Undersigned at the request of the A-2. These summaries, as well as a monthly one on Enemy Air Activity against Ground Units, contained material which had been established through normal channels in which the writer had ULTRA confidence.

For each major operation undertaken by IX TAC, a "Top Secret" appreciation on anticipated GAF reaction thereto was written. While such necessarily were 'best estimates' of the writer, they could not have been written with such assurance without the background of ULTRA information. For such operations the Air Commander generally called in all Group Commanders for a conference wherein they were thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the projected plan, including enemy air activity which was done by his "Special Intelligence Officer" who "plays with the Luftwaffe".

Special air operations were, on occasion, recommended, based on indications from SOURCE, such as, Operation "RIPTIDE", first advocated early in November as an all-out effort by Anglo-American air forces to destroy German aircraft, airfields, and supply and maintenance facilities at a time when the GAF was building up a threatening fighter force on the Western Front.

With such matters the SOURCE material had to be 'written down' to a "Top Secret" classification for normal channeling through higher headquarters but was frequently supplemented by personal messages on the 'link' to associated Recipients calling attention to specific ULTRA messages which provoked the recommended action. The execution of "RIPTIDE" was interrupted by the ARDENNES breakthrough but culminated in the heavy bomber attacks around Christmas time which were particularly successful in the FRANKFURT area.

One of the most valuable employments of SOURCE information from an operational point of view was in the target field. Many target leads were provided by ULTRA references and the search for security-safe confirmation was a never-ending function. Whenever possible this was done in the recipient's 'assembly room', but otherwise the information was fed into the A-2 Target Section as "target leads" for development there. This included "suspected supply dumps" and places where "military installations and activity" had been reported. Available photo cover was checked to verify and pinpoint these suspected targets and visual recce with photo confirmation was laid on to cover the areas involved.

For inclusion in large scale "Isolation of the Battlefield" programs, such as, Operation "TOUCHDOWN", lists of active enemy airfields, active marshalling yards, supply depots, ammo and fuel dumps, etc. were furnished. Towns and localities reported on ULTRA as headquarters or active centers for German ground organizations were studied and, where the facts justified, were labeled as "active communications centers" or simply as "active military centers". These type targets were also used regularly by Operations for blind bombing missions under MEW (Microwave Early Warning Radar) Control when weather conditions would not permit operations against visual targets.

Direct operational employment of SOURCE was also made in other ways. For instance, in NORMANDY a Group of fighter/bombers would take off from their beach-head bases with bombs, fly to the LGIEE where each of three squadrons would drop their bombs on three of the ANGERS satellites (established by photo reconnaissance and genuinely active on ULTRA), and then fan out flying armed recce back along three key road and/or rail lines (which routes had been selected based on ULTRA indications of activity).

The indirect use of SOURCE in air operations is not so readily apparent but was none the less important. Based on ULTRA-interwoven intelligence, Operations could determine the extent of escorting aircraft required on a mission or the risk involved in employing, for example, four-ship flights on armored column cover or squadron missions on deep armed recce, in lieu of larger formations.

Although the closest and most congenial liaison existed between IX TAC and First Army intelligence sections, it was important that the Air Specialist

Have some knowledge and background in ground order of battle. There is certainly no question as to the value of a general intelligence background for any ULTRA Representative in view of the understanding of all sources he must have for effective contribution. These campaigns further demonstrated that it is not enough to be simply an air specialist at Army-TAC level. The coordination of operations there is so extensive that a fuller appreciation of the other's Essential Elements of Information is required.

Since a fundamental phase of the air mission was to isolate the battlefield and interfere with ground reinforcements, ULTRA references to movement of ground units were of vital interest and dictated air employment to a large extent. For example, when SOURCE would report the German Order for a division to move into the First Army battle area, Tac/Recco would be sent out to search the zone through which it would approach and, when found, armed recon strikes would be dispatched to attack. It was cheering to those who directed these operations to receive the German reactions, such as, "Owing to allied air attacks 116 Pz Div suffered heavy losses on march and lost considerable time, with result that the attack planned for the 29th has not yet taken place".

SOURCE provided a persistent impetus for attacks on enemy airfields. In FRANCE the Air Commander was encouraged by the reports of driving the GAF from its established bases to satellite landing grounds and desired to make the existence of the German fighters on even these make-shift locations "intolerable". Through this Recipient's ULTRA-inspired recommendations, repeated attacks were made against the clutches of fields at ALERON, LE MANS, ANGERS, etc. Invariably pilots would return from these missions reporting "no aircraft seen" and somewhat 'browned-off' at dumping their eggs on apparently inactive fields and dispersal areas.

Regular as clockwork, however, SOURCE would produce a reaction, such as, "Ten a/c lost from low level attack", "No serviceable a/c left", "All technical flying equipment heavily shot up", "Impossible to occupy airfield any longer", etc. Even Operations, non-indoctrinated at the time, was skeptical, but the Air Commander continued to back the program because he knew they were

there and that they were being affected by the effort. Eventually a IX TAC pilot was shot down over one of the ANGERS strips and lay for days in the woods where he watched the German fighters take-off and land throughout daylight hours and he observed their careful camouflage and dispersal systems. On his return to Allied lines he told of having been mentally gripped at the time of his attack because he could see no aircraft and thought he was performing a wasteful and useless mission. His eye witness account did much to boost morale and to obtain confidence in the advocated program on which the Air Commander was insisting.

A specific example of the use of ULTRA is recalled. During NORMANDY days the Undersigned was approached one afternoon with the report that a Wing Sq of IX TAC had just reported the capture and interrogation of an Fw-190 pilot who stated that his unit was based near a town called "ESSAY". The Wing A-2 said there was no airfield known as "ESSAY" and he believed the pilot must mean "LESSAY". The Wing wanted to send a Group of Thunderbolts to plaster the latter place at once.

A message from SOURCE had revealed a Fighter Gruppe occupying landing grounds at "ESSAY" and "LONRAI" but this had not been established in the general intelligence picture. "LESSAY", on the other hand, was known to be trenched and ploughed. The Wing was advised to pass up the chance to prang LESSAY and reconnaissance was laid on to photo the pinpoint obtained from the air P/W and to search for other airfields in the same area. This recon produced pictures of both ESSAY and LONRAI and also of BARVILLE, a third strip in the area which had not even been mentioned on SOURCE at that time. The next day all three fields were attacked simultaneously with good success.

The airfield target program continued to be a principal commitment of this Command throughout the war. SOURCE evidence played a determining role in these operations. This Recipient prepared daily lists of active day/fighter and night/activity airfields in order of importance which were available at all times to Combat Ops and specially presented each evening at the Target Conference.

The determination of these priorities was a somewhat arduous task in the early days but was greatly simplified by October when SOURCE started reading Airfield Regional Command returns of occupation of airfields. A.I.3b's Occupation Lists and SHAEF-Air's airfield priority lists were also most helpful in the latter days.

Action taken generally consisted of night intruder operations over the active night/fighter or night/ground attack fields and special day fighter/bomber attacks on top priority airfields. Where the current mission or situation did not justify specific airfield attacks, the more attractive enemy bases were listed in the Ops Orders for special attention on armed recon missions.

By early December three Lightning (P-38) Groups of IX TAC were being used to provide area cover for deep penetrations by Eighth Air Force bombers. With help of The Park and SHAEF-Air, intelligence was built-up on GAF activities as far as the LEIPSIG area, including order of battle of first line and training units, airfield occupations, flak on airfields, and damage reports. TAC fighter groups returning from these deep commitments were free to make strafing attacks on attractive deeper airfields and SOURCE information was relied on strongly in selecting airfields for special attention by them.

An effort was made to utilize the ULTRA messages relating to supply of the Western Fortresses. For two weeks in October the traffic was studied in coordination with open evidence. Bases, routes, times, numbers, etc. were determined. It was decided that route interception was virtually impossible but that, based on flying times between dropping points and bases, the approximate hour of return of the transport a/c could be estimated. Thereupon Black Widow (P-61) intruder operations were laid on over FRANKFURT and MULLHAUSEN areas to shoot up aircraft returning from these supply missions.

Later, during the attempted supplying of Army Group B in the ROSE (Ruhr) Pocket, Black Widows interfered effectively with a number of German transport aircraft destroyed.

It is believed that SOURCE is indirectly responsible for having saved a number of IX TAC a/c in the German Operation "JEREMY" on New Year's morning.

While there were many indications of this potential threat from open sources, the policy of the Air Commander was always purely offensive and he was strongly urging execution of "RIPTIDE" as a means of neutralizing the GAF capabilities. In view of the serious indications from ULTRA, however, he was persuaded to take some precautionary defensive measures which he did in the form of setting up dawn alert flights over IX TAC bases and placing combat pilots with the anti-aircraft units around the fields to aid in recognition in the event of air attacks. Consequently, when German fighters came over two IX TAC airfields at 0920 on 1 January, there was a flight airborne which engaged them and kept them occupied until other squadrons could take off and participate in the encounter. The high claims of the fighters and the AA units and the few losses suffered (in the air or on the ground) are a real tribute to the defensive employment of ULTRA information.

B. SIGNIFICANCE.

While the value of ULTRA is readily seen in the report of its employment, proof of its further significance is furnished by SOURCE itself.

Von RUMSTEDT's Estimate of the Situation of 26 June was an early tribute:

"Allies exactly informed on German bringing up of forces by recon and considerable activity by agents".

He also paid respect to air power at work:

"Allied air attacks to block railway transports to battle areas were very large in scale and had corresponding effect".

Recognizing the vital part played by SOURCE in the air operations of this Command, the German reactions thereto are effective expressions of the success achieved. The German traffic was a continuous memorial to the results, but a few examples will recall the tone and trend that prevailed:

"Very strong Allied fighter/bomber pressure preventing division's tank thrust from coming off".

"Unusually heavy fighter/bomber operations making it almost impossible to hold position".

"Fighter/bombers, flying continuously at very low altitudes, even prevented movement by cyclists and individual men".

"Allied air forces dominated the skies and made full use of this by systematic destruction of all traffic centers. All-out employment of German fighters resulted in only limited relief. The progressive destruction of railway lines and stations and of multiple road junctions in UIRL making supply situation tense in a way threatening to be dangerous. Railborne supplies must be unloaded at UIRL."

"Allied fighter/bombers have destroyed during last few days, traffic installations on an extreme scale. Repair work nullified within a few hours. Railway and transport communications interrupted. Telephone facilities hardly exist. As a result, re-routing of rail transport hardly possible and armaments production being crippled. Coal and armaments transport hardly possible. Request again fighter protection for this area. Everything possible done to repair installations but without fighter protection almost pointless".

Jagd Korps II, the Luftwaffe's TAC on the Western Front, attributed its ineffectiveness to the inability of its fighters to penetrate the target area due to continuous Allied interception between German bases and the battlefield. These explanations were genuinely substantiated by combat reports by the pilots and it was on these that the Air Commander openly relied as his basis for enthusiastic exploitation and continuation of the fighter/bomber effort.

The influence of UIRL on the tactical program can be demonstrated. For example, one could watch creeping into all the SOURCE airfield references an increasing note of unserviceability. For some time it was a close race for the German to provide sufficient fields for his fighter units (31 airfields for 36 groups at one time). Then the 'bleating' became steadily worse and the situation was critical for the GAF. From SOURCE it was known that German operations were suffering from weather on grass fields. When this was combined with Allied attacks, many fields were closed owing to bomb craters and soft ground. It was known also from UIRL that repair facilities were extremely limited; that P/Ws were used for airfield construction and repair and that they proved unsatisfactory as the work was interrupted for periods up to three hours by air raid alarms.

From this supplemental information to ordinary intelligence, it was apparent that the airfield situation was just in hand with no margin and that purposeful bombing of airfields would overtax the German resources of repair.

It was evident that it was of key importance to produce bomb craters. Repair was no longer a simple process of bulldozer and roller. In the existing weather, the craters filled with water, drainage was poor, and considerable delay in restoring serviceability was effected. SOURCE revealed that the real way to render the GAF non-operational was not in shooting up individual aircraft by strafing, but rather by destroying fuel stocks and supplies, rendering airfields unserviceable and delaying repairs. The significance of ULTRA in affecting such changes in Allied tactics is noteworthy.

One thing, however, must be recognized. Intelligence cannot be based on SOURCE alone. The picture painted from reading ULTRA, unfused and unsupplemented, is false and misleading. This was borne out by repeated personal statements from Park personnel who have stated that (from their vantage point) it appeared that the GAF was filling the skies with intercepting fighters, etc.

Even higher headquarters was somewhat misled on occasion, as when SHAF appreciated that the rise in ground claims in late December was mainly attributable to German airfield restrictions. The value of the bomber attacks on German bases was recognized and strongly advocated. Fighter/bomber successes against ground targets, however, were chiefly dependent on weather conditions and the extent of ground activity. GAF interference, or the lack thereof, was never a serious factor in view of the established Allied air supremacy.

For the record: The vowed intentions of the Luftwaffe were seldom, if ever, executed as envisaged. In contrast with the picture painted by the German, the GAF did not "engage" fighter/bombers of this Command; it did not "clear" the battle area; and, it rarely exercised the capabilities which SOURCE evidence compelled to be attributed to it.

C. SCOPE.

The principal criticism offered is in regard to the discrimination shown in selecting material for consumption at Army-TAC level. A continuous but ineffective plea was made from beginning to end for wider coverage. A repeated effort was made to remove the limitation on scope of ULTRA service

to permit the sending of diplomatic, abwehr, and other so-called 'strategic' information which did not come to this level.

The initial decision to withhold such 'strategic' information from TAC was evidently based on the belief that Air Force would appreciate such information down to TACs after 'chewing it up' and 'wedding' it with other high level intelligence available at that level. This, of course, was never done.

The discrimination policy appears to have been based on two further principles:

1. Limitations of Fed Stations.

While the daily operational capacity of these Units was initially estimated at 4000 groups, it was adequately demonstrated that they could handle efficiently 9000 groups daily over a sustained period.

This policy reasoning surely did not apply in February when traffic declined substantially and 'powder' traffic was sent. Full advantage of available facilities was certainly not taken and it seemed incredible that 'spocf' traffic would be sent when such further information was in existence and local Recipients were eager and hungry for additions to their knowledge of the situation.

2. Lack of requirement for such background material at a Command whose mission was considered to be a limited tactical objective.

It is believed that this reason was based on a lack of knowledge of the flexibility of air power and the employment of tactical aviation.

This great quality of 'flexibility' enables air power to be employed widely in a variety of ways. Its mission can be altered and its striking force diverted almost as rapidly as a thought can be changed. The situation provokes a new requirement, snap, and air power is directed into a new field in a new role.

This same 'mobile' capability existed in the GAF. An effort was made by this Recipient to keep complete GAF order of battle in order to be able to make lightning estimates of enemy capabilities.

Prior to the ARDENNES offensive, SCURCE indicated the potential tactical employment of GAF strategic fighters, yet tactical area limitations on service to field commands continued to be imposed.

This friendly and enemy versatility places a sizeable burden on air intelligence and constitutes a challenge which is difficult at best to meet and was not made easier by the limitations imposed on the scope of material which reached this TAC Command.

The IX TAC Commander was always interested in the 'big picture'. His local thoughts and actions were dictated by what was going-on strategic-wise. His influential ability was limited by the restrictions imposed on the scope of the information available to him.

Another angle is the American Socialist himself, who, as a special U. S. representative, could have performed his services with greater self-confidence and increased value had he been more fully informed on the over-all situation as known to SOURCE.

By October this recipient was participating daily in joint air-ground conferences briefing the Army and Air Commanders and their indoctrinated staffs on UTR material. Having their ear presented an opportunity to make them 'intelligence-conscious'. With such personalities a little more than routine order of battle information is required to hold their interest and enthusiasm. Interesting and valuable diplomatic and strategic tidbits would have aided in holding their attention on intermediate intelligence in addition to enlarging their own knowledge and understanding.

In many cases such further information was not merely of "interest and value" but was essential to their own operational needs. For example, from the time the Siegfried Line was reached, the heavy bomber attacks on COLOGNE and DUSSELDORF definitely had a 'tactical' aspect in which HODGES and QUESADA rightfully evidenced a requirement. And certainly in the latter months there was no sound reasoning for limiting intelligence at Army-TAC level to one's immediate tactical area. By then the battlefield was GERMANY and the capability of collapse and surrender was one of growing possibility which had to be recognized and met initially at that level.

It was not just the diplomatic--strategic--gossipy--agent stuff that was desired but a fuller and more extensive coverage of GAF operational fighter information was needed. As pointed out before, the German fighter force was an exceedingly mobile organization and knowledge of its activities were vital in employing Allied aviation to the best possible advantage.

For example, Evidence of Jafus Middle Rhine's intentions were not signalled to IX TAC during the period after 1 January, although these forces

were within striking distance of this Command's battle area. Knowledge of Jafue Middle Rhine's projected operations in the SAAR (rather than the HIFIL) would have enabled IX TAC Operations to concentrate their air-attacking force with reasonable assurance on the Jagd Division 3 (GAF's fighter command in Northwest GERMANY) pattern of approach and departure (developed from 'I') to the general exclusion of the Southern approaches by fighters from the FRANKFURT area. During this period a Mustang (P-51) Group was being used for the purpose of breaking up German fighter formations prior to their arrival in the battle area in order that fully-bombed up Thunderbolt and Lightning units could be free to perform unhindered close cooperation with Allied ground forces.

Furthermore, this incessant clamor was not based on the idea of simply more information but for a fuller, more intelligent choice where possible. Every single item received fitted into the local picture someplace and when such could not be used advantageously The Park was so advised. For instance, Flak reports which bore too detailed for local consumption were eliminated on request. And when the effort to interfere with German supply transport to western Fortresses was abandoned, The Park was advised that no operational use was being made of routine night air transport traffic with the suggestion that it be eliminated from this station for the present.

The "separate-discrimination" between air and ground messages signalled to air and army stations at Army-TAC level was a practical and efficient step. It is recognized that air order of battle is of no practical value to ground forces while ground O.B. is comparatively vital to tactical air units. The system was placed into execution in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.

The most unfortunate blunder of the European war period came (fortunately) at the very end. At the 11th hour it was evidently decided to broaden the scope by sending certain items from the 'C' (gossip) series to the Senior Intelligence Officers at field commands.

This was apparently handled in uniform manner with complete disregard for the American system of Special Intelligence Officers at these field headquarters whose primary responsibility was the evaluation and presentation of

such material, and who had been especially trained and assigned in order that the security of SOURCE would not be endangered at American headquarters.

The by-passing of trained special representatives was incredible and placed the American officers serving in this capacity (heretofore recognized as the official ULTRA Recipient) in an embarrassing and untenable position. It has been fundamentally recognized that all SOURCE intelligence should be interpreted by qualified intelligence officers, familiar with its pitfalls, trained in interpretation, and experienced in its use. Otherwise it is likely to mislead as often as enlighten.

The "Senior Intelligence Officer" at IX TAC at the time this series was inaugurated was an officer who had only a few weeks of questionable experience with ULTRA--an operational type who was being replaced and who had previously been signed off the list but who returned to his job as A-2 until reassigned. The thought of his floundering around unadvised with such material was shocking! To send such material blandly to the Senior Intelligence Officer (with the specific exclusion of the ULTRA Specialist) just did not make sense.

D. SECURITY.

While it was recognized that 'security' was ultimately a responsibility of Command, the burden of same was carried jointly by the Special Liaison Unit Commander (Captain HOOPES) and this Recipient.

Greatest success and least concern resulted from a stiff initial briefing followed by regular local cautions and frequent blasts from higher up. Periodic security signals from WINTERBOTTOM, EISENHOWER, Combined Chiefs of Staff, etc. were a great help in maintaining security as they provided an outside excuse for reviewing the question. More of these would have made the job easier.

No serious breaches of security occurred at IX TAC Headquarters during the entire period. While General QUESADA was exceedingly resentful of the flying restrictions imposed on him, he was strongly aware of the necessity of not compromising ULTRA and the importance of reserving same from an operational standpoint.

Full use was made of SOURCE by Command, Operations, and Intelligence but no action was taken on specific targets in any instance without proper safeguards having been previously established. Air attacks on enemy headquarters were generally avoided unless very circumstantially covered by other sources, and then generally only in connection with a large scale close cooperation effort in coordination with a ground force push where hundreds of fighter/bombers were attacking all recognizable targets in the area and it was considered that the enemy's suspicions would not be unduly aroused.

Army requests for specific air attacks were carefully scrutinized and, on occasion, refused, when the evidence available was not considered sufficient cover for SOURCE by the Air Commander or this recipient.

Early in the game a disturbing press interview with The 'Q' caused some concern. Actually, however, the references made to German difficulties in moving troops and supplies as a result of fighter/bomber activity were well substantiated from all other sources and were common knowledge in the general picture. Although there was an ULTRA message making reference to an Airfield Regional Command's giving fuel to the German Army because of the Army's shortage (which message was unseen by this Recipient), The 'Q' maintained that his reference to panzer divisions commandeering fuel from Luftwaffe airfields was somewhat inspired by local interrogation of an Fw-190 pilot and was presented to the Press purely as the General's own ideas as to what was happening to the GAF in NORMANDY and not on any factual report.

This Writer's one personal security 'breach' involved calling for a German offensive in the west in an A-2 Periodic Report classified as "Secret". From The Park Colonel TAYLOR queried the 'open source' evidence supporting the estimate. For the record, a portion of the response thereto, dated 17 November 1944, is included:

"Periodic Report 103 presented Enemy Capabilities repeat Capabilities in standard text-book pattern (attack, defend, withdraw). Capability of attack necessarily contemplated at this tactical level wherever evidence justifies.
Tac/keccs has revealed considerable train movements and numerous P/Ws have stated that reserves are being brought up. P/Ws reporting accumulation of ammunition stocks and other supplies, as well as the observed heavy train movement, considered indicative of offensive intentions.

"First Army has appreciated the enemy will stake all on an offensive in the West.
Photo recon has revealed repairs in progress and/or airfield development at . . . (listing eight locations).
German pilot said GERMANY was hoarding planes and gas in order to launch one last offensive.
Two Polish P/Ws reported a talk being given their unit from Division commander relative to recognition characteristics of two new aircraft which were to be employed in force during the next drive on their front.
. . . etc. . . ."

To this explanation TAILOR responded: "Ochids for your prompt and thoroughly satisfactory reply". The lesson learned, however, is that it is important to state clearly one's supporting evidence in order to avoid possible suspicions.

After General STEINER assumed command one inadvertent slip was made by him at a IX TAC Target Conference in connection with defensive fighter patrols when he referred to the fact that "we know the German is sending saboteurs into the rear areas in liaison aircraft". This passed unnoticed by all except the ULTRA readers who got a bad shock out of it. The General accepted his security lecture from this Recipient humbly and graciously. The next day six such aircraft landed in the Army area and P/W interrogations produced the complete details of "Commando Vienenstock" and its mission into the general intelligence picture.

Chiefly responsible for the fairly clean IX TAC record is the effort that was made to indicate clearly in briefings just what information was based purely on ULTRA and to keep the indoctrinated personnel informed promptly as to what SOURCE information had been established in the open picture so they knew where they stood at all times on such matters.

The only further suggestion is that the security problem would have been less if the list of ULTRA-indoctrinated personnel had been maintained more up-to-date at all S.L.U. stations. Frequently a high-ranking guest would walk in five minutes before the morning high level conference and a mad rush would be made to ascertain his status on the S.L.U. Roster. On occasion when no record could be found promptly it was necessary to ask senior guests to leave the conference room prior to the reporting of "closed" information.

This sometimes provoked a response of "Oh, I'm in the ULTRA picture if that is what you are worried about". At other times there was nothing to do but postpone the presentation of SOURCE references and confine the briefing to general intelligence items currently available.

V. CONCLUSION.


While the German Air Force never actually materialized as a force capable of seriously interfering with the mission of this Command, it did present a challenge to Intelligence as far as information pertaining to its organization, location, and strength are concerned. Enemy capabilities and intentions were perennial questions and, without SOURCE, it would have been tough to ascertain the answers.

The fuzing of all informational sources is essential in order to "know your enemy". ULTRA serves as a standard toward which to aim and as a guide toward reaching there. That it also provides the means of getting the foot of Intelligence inside the door of Command and Operations is no minor quality.

The American Specialist system as instituted by the War Department in the European Theater of Operations was workable under the circumstances. The results achieved indicate that it can be done.

With no specific knowledge of future operational plans for the employment of ULTRA and ULTRA Specialists, no practical recommendations can be made. This Report, however, has not been merely an historical account, but contains highlights of problems encountered and solved and lessons learned through these experiences. A sincere effort has been made to accompany statements with examples and illustrations clarifying the point made. These may be of some value, not only to a historical compiler, but to any individual who may be destined for a similar assignment, in previewing some of the likely obstacles and pointing out angles worthy of development.

Respectfully submitted,


JAMES D. FELLERS
Lt. Col., Air Corps

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LONDON, ENGLAND

30 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Service at IX TAC.

This memo will be limited in its scope and value. Firstly, my period of service (12 February thru 14 May) was relatively short. Secondly, my duties and services at the command were limited as compared to those of Lt. Col. James D. Follers (herein referred to as the Senior Recipient). Thirdly, the Senior Recipient has presented such a full account in his "Report of Field Service with IX Tactical Air Command" (herein referred to as the Principal Report), that Lt. Col. Hilles has suggested that I limit myself to a sort of addendum to that report.

Duties.

These were summarily set forth on page 6 of the Principal Report:

"He not only unravelled the clerical problems of posting maps and maintaining records, but conducted briefings, was available as a substitute in the event of sickness or leave, and provided intelligent companionship to the Undersigned."

This means that I kept extensive and detailed records on the GAF, posted innumerable maps with essential and non-essential data, led our readers by the hand when they came in for their daily sessions, briefed General Quesada (and then later General Stearley) when the Senior Recipient was indisposed or away on leave, and acted as a sounding board or audience for the Senior Recipient which helped to overcome his "loneliness".

Conclusions.

1. As to the value of ultra, the necessity of fuzing it with intelligence from all other sources, the attitude and helpfulness of the Commanding Generals of IX TAC, the receptiveness of the operational staff, the most pleasant relations with Lt. Col. R. Thompson of SHALF Air, the security aspects, the splendid work of the SLJ men and their Chief Capt. Hocpes, the desirability of recording simple but complete notes - on all of these I agree substantially with the remarks of the Principal Report.

2. I believe the Park was not only justified, but wise, in confining "itself to its job of factual reporting, leaving estimates and appreciations to others." By limiting itself to factual reporting, the Park maintained its high standards of operational efficiency and ensured the excellence of its ultimate product. To have done otherwise would have resulted in jurisdictional disputes with Air Ministry and War Office, wasting the time of all concerned and undoubtedly decreasing the value of the Park's ultimate product.

In this connection, the Principal Report at p.27 refers to the Remagen Bridge episode and the request of the First U.S. Army for an estimate of the flak which could be employed in a ground role. A local estimate was supplied as indicated. The signal was sent to the Park for its best local estimate with complete disregard of the tried, tested and many times stated rule of the Park that such a request should be directed either to higher headquarters or to the appreciation office concerned. The Senior Recipient had been reminded of this rule a short time previously by the Park, and that reminder was called to his attention by the Junior Recipient and the SIU officer on duty before the particular signal was dispatched. But, as the records shows, to no avail.

3. As to the scope of service for the Army - TAC level, I believe that it was more than adequate as an aid to IX TAC in executing its assigned missions. All pertinent order of battle (air and ground) and target material available to the Park was received. While the "limited" scope may have imposed certain limitations on both the "influential ability" of General Quesada and the personal performance of the Senior Recipient, it is submitted that the ultra received was commensurate with their respective military positions. Even conceding the premise that General Quesada and the Senior Recipient were hampered, the service could not be "tailor made" to fit the whim and curiosity (intellectual or otherwise) of each station and each reader.

4. The "introduction to the 'C' Series" episode which the Principal Report calls the "most unfortunate blunder of the European War period" was not a blunder to anyone at IX TAC but the Senior Recipient. Lt. Col. Parkman, Senior Intelligence Officer, and acting A-2, who had been "in the picture" for more than four months, was somewhat startled to receive the introductory message which indicated that such traffic would be forthcoming. ("Startled" because this was his first active participation in the ultra family.) But he was quite capable of handling the matters to come (which, for the record, never did come) and had no fears or worries about the "by-passing of the trained special representative". If the Senior Recipient was in an "embarrassing and untenable position", it was self created. Conceivably under other circumstances, the contemplated "by-pass" of the American specialist might have been unfortunate but factors and results here did not justify the excitement generated.

5. With regard to the "Conclusion" (p.44) of the Principal Report, I would go further than to state merely that "the American Specialist system was workable under the circumstances. The results achieved indicate that it can be done." That is a gross understatement. The system was excellent as proved by both operational and security results.

To my mind, it is not only desirable, but necessary, to have a trained representative present with the individual commands. There are too many fine points of style and reference which would go unexplained if such an individual were not present to handle the many details connected with the bulk of the traffic received.

The adopted method of selecting and training recipients is believed to be better than to allow each individual command to choose an embryonic recipient and send him back to the Park for training. Not only is a high personnel standard maintained, but a bond or "esprit" is developed between the recipients which is of great benefit in the relations between the field commands and the Park, and between the various field commands themselves, both horizontally and vertically. For example, in view of common training and background with Lt. Col. Ed. Thompson and Capt. Langdon Van Norden, our relations with Chief Air and XXIX TAC were much more intimate, satisfactory and less confused with red tape than would have been the case had all of us come from and returned to the individual commands with which we served.

Related thereto, the adopted procedure of "detached service" is superior in my mind to that system which calls for "assignment" to the individual command. The status of "detached service" affords "cover" within the command for the special intelligence operation and decreases the possibility of local curiosities and jealousies developing. Further, it prevents a "trained intelligence specialist" from becoming a mess officer or a military policeman at the pleasure of the local command.

6. While the functions that I performed at IX TAC were on the whole interesting and enjoyable, I do believe that possibly with the exception of briefing the Commanding General, they could have been done equally as well by an enlisted stenographer. My suggestion would be that each TAC adopt the policy installed at 9th Air Force and XXIX TAC by Lt. Col. J. W. Griggs. Under that system an enlisted stenographer was indoctrinated and thereafter kept records, posted maps, typed appreciations and reports, answered the phone, etc.

Supplementary thereto, there should be a "roving" or relief specialist, a trained officer recipient, who would visit the various air commands, relieve the permanent recipient for a day or a week of rest, talk over and develop ideas picked up elsewhere, and afford the permanent recipient a chance to relax and effect liaison with his colleagues at other commands.

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30 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR

Subject: Ultra and Its Use by XIX TAC

The following is a report of this officer's service as ultra recipient with XIX TAC, from 16 June 1944 to 16 May 1945.

1. Historical.

Upon completion of training at the Park the undersigned was assigned to XIX TAC and reported on 16 June 1944 to Col. Joseph Cella, A-2, at Aldermaston. He was immediately sent from there to Uxbridge, to bring ultra service personally to the Commanding General, G.P. Weyland. This was prior to the command's active operations. Gen. Weyland was assisting in the direction of IX Fighter Command, and he felt the need of working into the ultra picture.

The writer made a daily briefing to Gen. Weyland based on the day's receipts of information, until about June 30th, when the writer left for the Continent with the advance party of XIX TAC H.Q. After the General arrived in France, these daily briefings were continued, and in addition, a separate conference was held with Col. Cella, at which the ultra information was received, and Col. Cella also made studies of the GAF order of battle, Luftwaffe nomenclature, etc. based on the writer's training.

On 1 Aug 44, XIX TAC commenced active air operations in cooperation with 3rd Army. Shortly after this, demands on General Weyland's time made it necessary to brief him periodically but not at a given hour daily. He continued to be kept up to date on ultra, but gave added responsibility to his staff with regard to operational details. Col. Cella continued with his daily briefings and studies, and took whatever action was necessary as a result of ultra information. Both continued to receive immediately any ultra signal, and its interpretation by the writer, which had operational significance and where time was a factor.

At the time of the formation of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, Col. Cella left to become its director of intelligence, and was succeeded by Col. Charles Hallett as A-2 of XIX TAC. He was immediately indoctrinated and continued to receive ultra in the same manner and made the same studies as Col. Cella. Shortly after that, his executive A-2, Lt. Col. Walter E. Bligh, was indoctrinated and was briefed with Col. Hallett. The last officer to be indoctrinated was Col. Roger E. Browne, Chief of Staff, at Etain in the latter part of October 1944. Indoctrination in the field was given either by Lt. Col. McKee, or the Senior SLD officer, and the writer.

The two A-2 officers continued to receive daily ultra intelligence, and the General and his Chief of Staff to receive periodic briefings, plus all ultra intelligence of immediate operational significance. This service was continued until the writer left the Command on 16 May 1945.

2. Methods of Handling Ultra.

A. Service to Indoctrinated Officers.

At the beginning of service as ultra recipient at XIX TAC the writer adopted a standard form of presentation in which the information was arranged under the following headings:

1. GAF Intentions
2. GAF Operations
3. Indications of GAF Capabilities
4. Damage Reports
5. Potential Targets
6. GAF Order of Battle and Changes
7. Special Information (Japanese Military Attache reports when received, German appreciations of Allied activities, GAF reports and descriptions of new aircraft, compilations by higher commands, etc.)
8. Ground Force Information.

This sequence was found satisfactory to all customers, and was continued, although the method of presentation varied with circumstances.

In the beginning, a written report, as above, was presented to General Weyland, preceded by a brief of one page, when possible, covering the significant information in any or all of the above categories.

This was accompanied by a portable map, and any questions developing from the information were answered. The same method was followed for Col. Cella.

After active air operations commenced and Gen. Weyland was briefed at irregular but frequent intervals, the briefing became more and more a verbal one, but the writer continued to make a written report, both because Col. Cella and Col. Hallett preferred it, and because the writer desired to be sure of including all items of significance in an overall briefing.

In addition to the daily reports, the writer offered, during the middle of the move across France, a resume of ultra information, showing the recent changes in the enemy picture, and concluding with an estimate of GAF capabilities.

This was well received, with a request that the same type of report be submitted periodically, at least as often as significant changes in the GAF situation occurred.

About the same time, a request from Gen. Patton's Chief of Staff came through Lt. Col. Melvin Helfers, ultra recipient at 3rd Army, that a verbal presentation of ultra information on the GAF be given to Gen. Patton and his staff

at the regular ultra briefing, along the same lines as the written resume. This request was complied with, and was continued periodically whenever the 3rd Army and XIX TAC Headquarters were together. It was the custom of Gen. Weyland and Col. Browne to attend the regular morning ultra briefing of Gen. Patton and his staff, given by Lt. Col. Helfers and his successor, Capt. Church, during these times. It should be stated here that both generals and staffs were extremely attentive listeners, and gave the most serious consideration to ultra information. This interest was indicated by the concentration of attention during the briefing, as it was the rule to ask no questions during the verbal presentation, but afterward many intolligent questions were asked and opinions requested, based on the material at hand. It afforded the writer the greatest satisfaction to observe the influence of source information on the conduct of operations.

B. Field Conditions Affecting Handling of Ultra.

During the summer campaign and until October, when the Command moved into buildings in Etain, the Headquarters was in the field, in tents. The writer was assigned a command post tent for working, and later it was used also as living quarters, largely to maintain security and facilitate delivery of signals at odd hours. Working space and facilities were at a premium under these conditions, making it necessary to prepare portable maps and other presentation aids that would be at the same time effective and secure. During these times both generals and the A-2 were briefed in the privacy of their office vans. Supplies were not plentiful, and it was necessary to make use of expedients which fell short of being completely satisfactory to the writer.

When the command moved into buildings, this recipient was assigned an office which could be securely locked, and from then on much better presentations could be made. A permanent situation map, order of battle charts and maps, potential targets charts, and other displays were set up. These visual aids were effective in building up intelligence from ultra signals. It then became the habit of the indoctrinated officers to come to these offices, and a much clearer picture could be given.

Under these conditions the daily written report was no longer necessary, and the signals were divided into the categories, and in the same sequence as before mentioned. Interpretive comments were written on the signals themselves.

It became the habit of Col. Hallett in particular to come in daily, and digest the information, with the maps and charts before him, prior to the staff conference, when operational plans were laid. At all times, signals having possible immediate operational significance were brought to all of the indoctrinated officers available as soon as they were received; most often to Col. Hallett, who was responsible for either tying in, or developing ultra intelligence into open source intelligence.

As to important messages received at night, a working procedure with Gen. Weyland was agreed on at the beginning. Gen. Weyland stated that he wanted to be awakened at once for any information that he could DO something about, and it was left to the writer's judgement and experience.

It was the same for Col. Hallett, and the procedure was satisfactory and became standard.

C. SLU-Recipient Procedure.

The XIX TAC used the 3rd Army SLU as long as the two headquarters were together. Depending on varying conditions, receipts of signals averaged twice daily, with high priority messages being delivered as received.

With the breakthrough from St. Lo, 3rd Army HQ, and its SLU moved ahead to maintain communications with its forward elements, and XIX TAC HQ was forced to separate from them for the same reason; fighter groups could not have advance fields prepared as fast as the army moved forward, and there was the same necessity for maintaining communications with them. Therefore it was necessary for the writer to go by road to the nearest SLU. During this period the writer was serviced by various other SLU's, those with IX TAC, IX Air Force, 12th Army Group. For one period, when XIX TAC HQ were in the Forêt de Marchenoir south of Chateaudun, the nearest SLU was at Versailles. The writer moved from the HQ to Versailles where he could prepare the information, and made a daily trip of 96 miles and return to present the ultra picture.

This necessitated 8 hours on the road, in addition to a full-time period of preparing and interpreting ultra receipts. Use of ultra information under these conditions was limited.

When the Command rejoined the 3rd Army HQ at Etain in October, normal relations with its SLU were resumed.

Except for very brief and infrequent intervals, when 3rd Army moved forward a day or so in advance of XIX TAC, the necessary time element on delivery of signals was observed. XIX TAC received its own SLU in March 1945 at Luxembourg; the SLU and this recipient were given adjoining offices. This is the ideal situation, messages being delivered frequently during the day and any corruptions could be straightened out at once by consultation with the recipient.

All SLU's were highly cooperative. Relations were cordial, and every effort was made to render special assistance to this recipient under the special circumstances related.

3. Security.

Maintenance of security at XIX TAC was not a problem. The writer secured permission to have his presence explained at the outset in the following manner:

Col. Cella called the officers of the A-2 Section together and stated that the writer had had special training with British Intelligence; that they had developed through longer experience in the war many sources and methods of interpretation; that their results were excellent. They had agreed to share them with our Army and Air Forces by training American officers for assignment to various commands. But they maintained a higher security standard, and this officer therefore would work directly with the A.C. of A.S., A-2. His work would be Top Secret and would not be discussed.

This statement satisfied the natural curiosity, and the writer's direct contact with the A-2 as intelligence liaison with the British was accepted without further comment.

4. Operational Use of Ultra.

Use of ultra signals at XIX TAC are indicated by the headings under which the writer presented the material. They are so obvious that detailed discussion is not believed necessary. A comparison of intentions with the enemy scope of operations proved very useful in establishment of actual capabilities.

Damage reports were scanned for confirmation of results and claims, and were more than once the deciding factor in determining whether a repeat operation was necessary. When Patton's open flank was along the Loire River and XIX TAC was assigned the job of protecting that extended open flank, ultra knowledge of enemy locations and movements was of great value.

Order of battle information was of equal value in determining enemy capabilities.

At all times, ultra proved an excellent means of confirming or completing intelligence from other sources, influencing the decision to take operational action.

There were times when ultra information was of such immediate value that the shortest possible steps were taken to translate it into open source intelligence so that operational action could be taken at once. A good example was the signal received early one morning (late March or early April) that the enemy had a strong concentration of M/T in a woods near Marburg. This was immediately passed to the Chief of Staff and the A-2, who ordered a visual reconnaissance to include this area. The recon pilot returned immediately with a report that a huge concentration was there; a squadron of fighter-bombers was in the vicinity and was redirected to the attack. They achieved excellent results, and throughout that day, as the enemy attempted to get out, successive waves were directed against them. At the close of the day, claims amounted to some 400 plus M/T, tanks and armored vehicles destroyed.

Another example of direct results obtained through ultra information was at the time Gen. Patton was preparing to attack through the Siegfried Line. Air-Ground plans included an attack on enemy Battle HQ at the proper moment in advance, to disrupt communications and direction of defense.

A careful collection of Battle HQ locations was made, confirmation and pinpoint locations were confirmed by photo and P/W interrogation. The attacks were successfully made. Enemy signals citing damages were received, confirming the decisive influence of the information.

5. Recommendations.

A. Each command at a level which can make effective use of ultra should have its own receiving and decoding unit. The time factor in translating signals into operational intelligence and action makes this essential if the maximum results are to be achieved. Limitations of atmospheric conditions and human errors in transmission and reception of radio signals cause unavoidable corruptions under the pressure of heavy traffic.

These can be quickly corrected if the recipient can confer with the signals unit at his own HQ at any time. Ultra information is the highest form of intelligence; it must be accurate and on time.

B. Col. Hallett has suggested, and the writer concurs, that the recipient and the officer in charge of the SIU should be one and the same person. The recipient is the officer in contact with the indoctrinated staff members of the Command; he soon knows how, what and when these officers can make the best use of ultra.

C. Supplies and equipment for the ultra recipient, particularly under the field conditions described above, should be planned in a table of equipment or by agreement with the unit to be served.

This recommendation is entirely in the interests of efficient service. An office van, or trailer, similar to those provided for staff members, would be best from the writer's experience; it would be visually and physically secure and could be most effectively prepared for the exclusive dissemination of ultra information to indoctrinated officers.

D. An assistant, either a junior officer or a non-commissioned officer, should also be assigned to the recipient.

There were frequent times in the European campaigns when there were just not enough hours in the 24 to properly prepare all that was available. An assistant, to prepare visual presentations, to keep charts and records up to date, as well as to provide occasional relief, would be invaluable.

Harry M. Grove
HARRY M. GROVE
Major, AC

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LONDON, ENGLAND

17 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the XXIX Tactical Air Command.

The following is a report of this officer's service as ultra recipient at Headquarters, XXIX Tactical Air Command from 20 September 1944 to 1 February 1945.

1. HISTORICAL.

This officer was assigned as the Special Branch representative at the XXIX TAC upon its activation. Commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard Nugent, formerly Deputy Commander for operations of the Ninth Air Force, and thoroughly indoctrinated in ultra, there were no difficulties to be surmounted. Additionally this officer was given the duty of helping in the selection of A-2 personnel for the new command and was for a short period the acting A-2. All equipment and an enlisted clerk were furnished.

2. OPERATIONS.

To effect cover the Commanding General, following the general pattern invoked in the Ninth Air Force created the position of a GAF specialist within the A-2 section. Duties consisted of GAF order of battle, airfield priority lists, supervision and control of the target section and particular emphasis on the screening of all forms of intelligence. Targets, photo and tactical recce were laid on directly.

The Commanding General was briefed daily at a joint meeting attended by the Commanding General of the 9th Army and the members of his staff. At the same time the ground situation was presented by Major Becker, ultra recipient of the aforementioned army. The result was extremely effective and gave to both ground and air recipients a complete overview. This method furnished information that might not otherwise be available to one or the other commands. In addition the writer had the authority to directly contact the Commanding General or his deputy for operations at any hour depending upon the importance of the matter in hand.

3. SECURITY.

Security was excellent. With a limited number of individuals indoctrinated there was no problem in strictly controlling the use of this material. In the comparatively small Tactical Air Command close associations within the command give rise to some curiosity on the part of the unindoctrinated.

This was rather subtly handled by the Commanding General's and A-2's vague suggestion that "cloak and dagger" was responsible. This placated the uninitiated and appeared to be a happy solution.

4. CONCLUSION.

XXIX Tactical Air Command's use of ultra intelligence was good. Maximum use of all material was continuous, and it can be unqualifiedly stated that a great measure of this command's success can be attributed to the intelligent use of ultra. Possibly a portion of the success is due to the fact that ultra can and should be used in an operational capacity at a tactical level to a greater extent than in higher commands. Another very distinct contribution arose from the fact that the Commanding General had unlimited experience in the use of this material and confidence in Special Branch as an organization.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) Every command should be afforded an SIU directly subordinated to it.

(b) Air information available to Tactical Commands has been limited to a radius of 150 miles adjacent to the immediate front line. It is felt that no such arbitrary limit should be invoked and that all pertinent air information be forwarded irrespective of geographical boundaries.

John W. Griggs
JOHN W. GRIGGS
Lt. Col., AC

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25 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the XXIX Tactical Air Command.

The following is a report of this officer's service as ultra recipient at XXIX Tactical Air Command from December 6, 1944 to May 17, 1945. For the first 6 weeks of this period, this officer served as temporary relief for Lt. Col. J. W. Griggs, then ultra recipient at the command. Thereafter, upon Lt. Col. Griggs' recall to the U.K., he served as permanent ultra recipient.

1. Historical.

The operations of XXIX Tactical Air Command, and the ultra intelligence supplied therewith, fell into 2 distinct phases during the period covered. There was, first a brief defensive period, initiated on December 16, 1944 with von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive. During this time, the German western tactical air force came up in a strength never before or later equalled. The aircraft of XXIX TAC were operationally subordinated to the 2nd TAF and operated mainly against the GAF in the air and in close cooperation with allied ground units counter-attacking in the Ardennes Bulge. Close cooperation with the forces of Ninth U.S. Army temporarily took a secondary role.

With the elimination of the Bulge and the withdrawal, during mid-January, of over 50% of the German western tactical units to the eastern front, the aircraft of XXIX TAC reverted primarily to close cooperation with the U.S. Ninth Army. The G.A.F. never again became a real threat to the TAC in the air, and one of the principal objectives of the TAC became the systematic destruction of enemy aircraft on the ground.

2. Organization.

Ultra was handled by this officer in a separate office at the TAC at all times, in a sub-section of the Directorate of Intelligence (A-2), which was called the "G.A.F. Section". An enlisted man, Tech. Sgt. John J. Vasko, acted as clerk throughout and performed his work most capably. It was found necessary to keep fairly complete records (in addition to maps, charts and diagrams), and for this purpose two main files were always maintained: a) a card index system for airfields, with a separate card for each airfield, with a separate card for each airfield enumerating all information received on the airfield, including units located thereon, and b) an order of battle notebook, with a separate sheet for each unit (down to individual

Gruppen) on which information was received.

3. S.L.U.

Up to February 20, 29th TAC shared with Ninth Army one SLU station - CX. Thereafter, the TAC had its own SLU station - CXA.

During the critical days of late December - January, recipient had all ZZZZ and ZZZZZ messages (air and ground) delivered to him directly at any hour of the day or night. Thereafter, however, he felt that a relaxation of this rule, during the night hours, could safely be made with respect to ZZZZ messages and the rule was instituted that all ZZZZZ signals would be delivered at once, but that the delivery of ZZZZ signals at night could be left to the discretion of the senior SLU officer on duty, provided that in case of any doubt in said officer's mind, the doubt should be resolved in favor of prompt delivery.

The provision of a separate SLU for the TAC, a convenience whilst still in Holland, became a necessity once the entry into Germany was made (early in March), for the two headquarters of Ninth Army and XXIX TAC, though usually relatively nearby, were never actually together.

4. Procedure. All ultra messages (except where personally addressed otherwise) were delivered directly to this officer. Information of general significance was conveyed to the Commanding General, the A-2 and the A-3 at a daily briefing held each morning at Ninth Army Headquarters before these officers and corresponding officers of the army. Major Becker briefed on the ground aspect of the daily ultra picture, and this officer briefed on the air. Other information, not so covered, was fed into the TAC by recipient through the A-2 or A-3 throughout the day, as circumstances required.

This officer found of great advantage the fact that the "Y" officer at the TAC, Capt. Stever, was ultra indoctrinated. His information and ultra was thus often enabled to be carefully (and discreetly) coordinated.

5. Security. This was no great problem at the TAC. The Commanding General was extremely conscious of the necessity for careful ultra security and cooperated most admirably thereto. The A-2 and A-3, as well as the "Y" officer, were also very security conscious.

This officer found not one single reportable breach of security throughout his entire tour of duty at the TAC.

"Cover" for ultra activities was provided through the medium of the "G.A.F. Section." This officer acted as self-appointed "expert" on all matters relating to the G.A.F. All information from non-ultra sources relating to enemy airfields, aircraft, air order of battle, technological developments, etc. were routed to the officer, and various articles were written from time to time in the daily A-2 periodic report (from open sources) on the strength and disposition of various parts of the G.A.F. and on the serviceability of airfields. Thus the receipt of ultra intelligence was kept well submerged in other matters from open sources relating to the G.A.F. in general.


6. Conclusion.

The TAC used ultra consistently and well. This doubtless stemmed mainly from the fact that the Commanding General, the A-2 and the A-3 were absolutely convinced of the reliability of the material and quite "sold" on its value. The reluctance of all of them, even the A-2, however, to read the material directly, placed a considerable responsibility on the instant recipient (and his predecessor). Such an attitude, though flattering, at times produced gray hairs.

7. Recommendations.

(a) The SLJ at a headquarters should be subordinated (in command level) to the ultra recipient. However friendly relations may be between the two parties, in a military organization the most effective coordination of effort is not usually achieved by barter and negotiation.

(b) A more effective system of temporary relief for single ultra recipients at forward commands should be devised. Such a recipient is on tap continuously seven days a week. He should have some regular procedure for occasionally getting a few days off.


LANGDON VAN NORDEN
Captain, AC

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16 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the XII Tactical Air Command.

The following report is predicated upon approximately seven months experience as an Ultra Air Recipient and Field Advisor with the XII Tactical Air Command operating in conjunction with the Seventh U. S. Army in the field; and as such, will cover only those operational capabilities and limitations of ultra as applicable to this command.

1. HISTORICAL.

The undersigned officer had the advantage or disadvantage in being the first officer from Special Branch assigned to the above Command in the capacity of an ultra recipient. It immediately became apparent that "cover" for ultra activities would present a certain amount of difficulties, which were further aggravated owing to the fact that only one S.L.U. team was available for serving both Seventh Army and XII TAC Headquarters.

It was decided by the Commanding General that this officer should be introduced to the Command as the "expert" on the German Air Force and in addition, accept full responsibility for airfield target priority lists within the operational area of the command; all target photo reconnaissance commitments and requests within the same defined area; control the collecting, compilation, dissemination of information and advising of two Y detachments operationally subordinated to XII TAC; and finally present a daily "open" war-room briefing for all Staff Section officers on the details of the enemy air activity for the preceding 24-hour period, which had previously been prepared in signal form and sent to all Groups and Squadrons, Seventh Army G-3 Air and 1st Tactical Air Force (Provincial).

2. OPERATIONS.

It has long been known that ultra information is invaluable to any command, and this is especially true when sufficient cover is available for translating its contents into operations. As a Tactical Air Command, XII TAC had as its primary mission the neutralization and destruction of the German Air Force with a secondary mission of equal importance in that of direct support. It is obvious that both commitments, although not entirely dependant upon ultra information alone for successful accomplishment, benefited greatly through access to the same, with special emphasis on both German ground and air target data.

Having been accepted as an integral part of the Command's A-2 section (without the usual "cloak and dagger" complex) and given responsibility for the magnitude of open sources on the GAF, this officer had an excellent opportunity of presenting ultra information in such a way that, in most cases, it was possible for cover to be established with a minimum loss of time, and the necessary information transmitted to the Groups and medium-bomber wings for action.

The main ultra briefing took place at a scheduled time each morning (0945 hours) with all "briefed" officers in attendance. At this time, a compilation of the available ultra information was presented and discussed as pertained to both the ground and air picture. Immediately following this meeting, the A-3 and A-2 remained behind for a consultation on possible targets, counter air-force measures and direct ground support operations as may be affected by ultra. Although there was only one general ultra briefing per day, all briefed officers made it a practice to make frequent visits to the office of the undersigned officer throughout the day. In addition to this, this officer had access to the Commanding General at all times for the purpose of calling anything special to his attention; usually, an additional briefing would take place on these occasions. During the night hours, a private telephone was installed in the quarters of this officer for possible calls from S.L.U.

As a supplementary aid for acting immediately upon "fresh" ultra evidence, a copy of all rush reports from Tac-R, P/R and fighter-bomber pilots was passed to this officer for a possible confirmation and identification.

3. SECURITY.

Security of ultra was well protected within the command channels of XII TAC through an agreement between this officer and all briefed officers of the command, which called for a clearance of A-3 and/or A-2 directives through the office of the undersigned when and if any information contained in the respective directives was based on ultra. In addition, this officer encouraged the frequent discussions and consultation by the A-3 and A-2 prior to the preparation of such directives. This officer has no knowledge of any security violations incurred by the above Command.

4. CONCLUSIONS.

Other than two suggestions, this officer feels that the present American system of field recipients with both Ground and Air Command in the field has proven itself very satisfactory. In the case of an air recipient, it should be stressed that a workable knowledge of the "enemy" ground situation is not only desirable but essential for the successful presentation of ultra to a tactical air command. Obviously, the Commanding General must be in a position to receive ultra ground information as well as air, and the recipient will find it necessary to keep a situation map on the general ground picture in addition to picking out suitable fighter-bomber and medium targets from available ultra ground information. If possible, this officer also believes that a separate S.L.U. station for each command would have been advantageous, especially when entering occupied territory where security regulations prohibit the physical transfer of ultra messages outside the compound of the headquarters to which the

-3-

S.L.U. station is assigned. In the case of this officer, XII TAC and Seventh Army Headquarters were usually occupying barracks in separate areas, which often necessitated the operation of two briefing rooms at each respective headquarters.

Leo J. Nielsen, Jr.
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Major, Infantry

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17 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Report of Paris Officer for Dissemination of Ultra,
(ETCUSA, Com Z, SHAEF Rear G-2,
and Ambassador Murphy).

1. Introduction.

This officer had responsibility for the briefing and servicing of several commands in the Paris area which did not have their own S.L.U. facilities. He also acted in various other capacities as Paris representative for Special Branch.

2. Combined Headquarters, Com Z and ETCUSA (Gen. Conrad).

(a) As G-2 of Etcusa, Gen. Conrad is chief intelligence officer of Gen. Eisenhower in his capacity as Commanding General of all United States forces in Europe. In this capacity, Gen. Conrad is required to be familiar with all major developments in the European theatre of an intelligence nature. Among the matters of particular concern, in addition to the day to day development of the front, were such matters as "V-weapons", the so-called "Proximity fuze" and developments of new equipment and inventions.

(b) As G-2, Com Z, Gen. Conrad was concerned with any intelligence of enemy activities and developments which could in any way affect U.S. Supply, or installations in the Communications area. This included enemy capabilities and offensive intentions which might affect supply (Antwerp, Liege, Pipe Line, etc.) through the use of offensive air, naval and special weapons, it included such capabilities against the Communications Area as German activity from the Atlantic Fortresses. The Ardennes Offensive was of course particularly important from the supply aspect.

(c) This officer also performed other functions in connection with B.U. material. For example, he assisted with counter intelligence material at the time of the Skorzeny Scare over Christmas. All the material of interest to these commands at S.L.U. SHAEF at Versailles was examined and selected material was prepared for the briefing of Gen. Conrad and Col. Hauenstein which occurred daily. Summaries were prepared on the most vital matters for Gen. Lee, who also showed a lively interest. An attempt was also made to work non-ultra material into the briefings so as to keep the material in its true perspective.

4. Mr. Murphy, Advisor to Eisenhower on Germany and head of Political Division, U.S. Group Control Council.

The service to Mr. Murphy grew up in the latter months of the tour of duty of this officer in Paris. It was essentially the same as the service to Mr. Caffery, and was based on the same materials and techniques.

In this case also, the reception of the material was warm.

5. SHAEP (Main), after split in early spring.

The split in SHAEP Headquarters left Gen. Betts (usually sick in hospital) and Col. Collins in charge of G-2 SHAEP Main in Versailles. A full intelligence staff was maintained in Versailles and a War Room operated. Gen. Betts in his capacity as Deputy G-2 to Eisenhower in the latter's capacity as Supreme Commander, felt it necessary to be kept fully informed. Since he was sick most of the time, this in fact meant that Col. Collins received a daily briefing and in turn saw Gen. Betts at the hospital.

6. Odd Jobs.

As Paris representative of Col. Taylor, there was a constant succession of odd jobs arising. These concerned matters of security which had a habit of arising constantly, helping out the Special Branch representatives on Jap intelligence, and getting them in contact with various people, etc.

7. Comments.

(a) It is easily possible that a lot of the material brought to the attention of Gen. Conrad in his capacity of G-2, EtUSA, was not of any

3

operational necessity. Although he had to be generally informed, he did not need the material on any rush basis. A periodical summary from Shaef could have covered a lot of the ground.

(b) It appears to this officer that the inclusion of certain of the higher ranking officers on the list - e.g., Gen. Lord, was unnecessary. Gen. Lord, as Chief of Staff of Gen. Lee, attended meetings at Shaef at which ultra was discussed. Gen. Strong did not take responsibility of preventing this.

(c) The cooperation of Dr. Robertson of OSGPD with Gen. Conrad in connection with this material was most useful.

(d) A lot of the value of the job held by this officer is to attempt to keep B.P. informed of the changing special needs of the Commands.

Edmund H. Kellogg
EDMUND H. KELLOGG
Captain, AC