

SRH-023
PART-1

REPORTS

BY

U. S. ARMY ULTRA REPRESENTATIVES
WITH ARMY FIELD COMMANDS
IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Ultra representatives who served a tour of duty attached to U.S. Army commands in the European Theater of Operations.

Subject: Methods and recommendations for handling ultra intelligence at field commands.

1. A study of the history of ultra intelligence during the European War is now being made at War Station by a joint Anglo-American team. One purpose of the project is a critical examination of the techniques and organization which were employed, designed (i) to record for future use the lessons learned and the methods which were efficient and workable, and (ii) to recommend ways in which the value of the intelligence could have been exploited more fully.

2. The part of that critical examination which deals with intelligence at U.S. Army commands is being made on the basis of reports submitted to Col. Taylor by field representatives after VE-Day and interviews with some of the representatives. In the aggregate the reports have supplied much of the necessary information and have touched upon the satisfactory and unsatisfactory aspects of the situation. There are, however, a number of points with which only a few representatives dealt and on which a consensus must be obtained in order to form the basis for authoritative recommendations.

3. Accordingly, each representative, regardless of whether he has made a previous report, is requested to submit a rough and uninhibited memorandum embodying his experiences and recommendations. Three copies of each memorandum will be given to Major Finan in the office of the Director of Intelligence on or before ___ July 1945.

4. The attached outline prepared at War Station is designed to serve as a point of departure and to insure a uniform coverage of necessary topics. The memoranda should be organized according to the numerical or alphabetical designation given in the outline. If a representative feels that a given topic has been adequately handled in either his previous report or in a report from another representative at the same command, a statement to that effect will be sufficient. (Copies of the previous reports may be obtained, for reference purposes, from Major Finan.) It is desired that each representative include his comments and recommendations freely and fully under every relevant heading as well as under the final general heading. Comments and comparisons based on knowledge of methods used at other commands, both British and American, will be particularly helpful.

5. Throughout the outline the title "representative" has been used to designate the MID/WD intelligence officer attached to a command and specializing in the handling of ultra material; "recipients" has been used to designate all other indoctrinated personnel at the commands; "non-recipients" covers all persons at field commands who were not indoctrinated.

6. The illustrative instances called for by title 5. of the outline need not be described exhaustively. If the representative sets down what he remembers, with particular attention to the operations side of the story, the intelligence picture can be filled in by the persons at War Station who have access to the records.

7. The ultimate project is to be a dispassionate appraisal; it will not be a brief for intelligence or for any particular kind of intelligence. It is important for all memoranda to be objective. -

ALFRED MCCORMACK
Colonel, GIC
Director of Intelligence

1. Brief historical background

2. SLU

- a. Manner in which signals were received (one-time pad or machine)
- b. Number of personnel in SLU/SCU detachment
- c. Volume of work and portion thereof which was not handled by ultra representative
- d. Position of detachment in chain of command
- e. Desirability of separate SLU/SCU detachment with each ultra representative

3. Ultra representative

- a. Type of person best suited to job; necessity for military background or special training
- b. Physical setup (working quarters and billet)
- c. Position in chain of command
- d. Form and frequency of deliveries of material from SLU/SCU detachment
- e. Handling of material
 - (1) Nature of files, indices, maps or charts kept
 - (2) Desirability of assistance (junior officer or clerical EM)
 - (3) Non-ultra materials handled and uses made of them; extent and manner of fusion of ultra with open intelligence
- f. Dissemination to recipients
 - (1) Purposes
 - (2) Methods (briefings, written summaries, special projects, etc)
 - (3) Number and types of recipients; by whom selected
 - (4) Indoctrination of recipients; when, how and by whom
 - (5) Attitude of recipients toward ultra intelligence; methods and extent of their use of it
- g. Dissemination to non-recipients at own and lower commands
 - (1) Purposes

(2) Methods (consultations, monitoring of open summaries, etc)

h. Relations with ultra representatives at higher, lower and parallel commands

- (1) Amount of personal contact with them
- (2) Nature, amount and adequacy of material received from them
- (3) Nature and amount of material furnished to them

i. Relations with War Station

- (1) Satisfaction with amount and type of material sent to you and answers to your queries
- (2) Satisfaction with speed of transmission and form in which material arrived
- (3) Amount and type of information furnished by you to War Station
- (4) Desirability of periodic visits by supervisory officer from War Station

4. Security

- a. Title of ultra representative and SLU/SCU detachment and explanation given to non-recipients as to their functions
- b. Measures taken to safeguard ultra material
- c. Instances of breach of security

5. Operational use of ultra

- a. Instances of its use where its information was unique
- b. Instances of its use where it led to results through its clarification of open intelligence
- c. Instances of negative use--where it stopped or postponed Allied operational plans

6. Assessment of value of ultra

- a. Effect on operations
- b. Comparison with intelligence from other sources
- c. Relation of picture given by ultra to actual situation met in combat

7. General comments

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1. GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

23 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Report of Lt. Col. Murnane and Lt. Col. Orr on
Use of Ultra at 12th Army Group.

1. On the basis of approximately one year service at 12th Army Group as ultra recipients, it is evident that the system employed for dissemination and evaluation of ultra material in the European Theater was highly successful. More particularly, at 12th Army Group the system not only provided an adequate means of exploiting ultra but a highly effective method of providing Gen. Bradley and his staff with the maximum amount of intelligence which the source offered.
2. Assignment of specially trained personnel to each command proved to be an effective and efficient method of disseminating and safeguarding ultra. At the beginning of the Western campaign in Europe, none of the commands had adequately trained personnel who fully understood the technical background of ultra, the peculiarities of German signals traffic, or the style and technique devised at War Station - all of which are essential factors in the proper evaluation of ultra. The specially trained officer filled this need. This officer, being charged with the direct responsibility to the controlling source of safeguarding ultra, provided each command with a responsible agency to ensure the secure employment of ultra. It is believed however that the assignment of a specially trained officer is wholly unnecessary when the command already has suitable personnel experienced in evaluating ultra and who have a proper sense of responsibility for its security.
3. At 12th Army Group, a special section was established for the handling of ultra which was designated as the Estimates and Appreciations Group with a staff consisting of the attached officers and one senior member of the G-2 Section. The function of this group was to collate ultra intelligence with intelligence from all other sources and to formulate, under the direction of the A. C. of S., G-2, estimates of the enemy situation and capabilities. The specific duties of the attached officers were to receive and register all ultra messages from the SIU, post a current situation map, conduct two daily briefings for the Commanding General and other staff members, dispatch signals to subordinate armies, record all order of battle information, and maintain a topical reference index of more generalized ultra information.

4. The functions of the Estimates and Appreciations Group were performed entirely within one room to which admittance was limited to indoctrinated personnel only. Such personnel had full access to all ultra messages which were divided into folders according to content, such as Order of Battle, Supply, Operations and Intentions, Air, Enemy Estimates of Allied Intentions, etc. Removal of ultra material from this room was strictly forbidden. A large scale map of the western front was maintained showing the complete allied and enemy situation. The posting of this map was the responsibility of the attached officers. Because of its constant use by the A. C. of S., G-2, it was found desirable to locate this room adjoining his office. Under strict field conditions a special trailer was used for ultra material and served in substantially the same manner as the above described room.

5. In the early phases of the campaign, one daily briefing on ultra was conducted at which the Commanding General, his staff, and all other indoctrinated personnel were briefed in the ultra room or trailer. However it became apparent that the presence of a large group at this briefing tended to limit discussion by the Commanding General and his staff. To alleviate this problem, the system of conducting two daily briefings was adopted, the first for general officers only, and the second for all other indoctrinated personnel.

6. The General Officer's briefing was conducted at 0945 hours, immediately following the G-2, G-3 open briefing in the War Room, and was regularly attended by the following officers of 12th Army Group:

General Bradley, CG
Major Gen. Allen, C of S
Brig. Gen. O'Hare, G-1
Brig. Gen. Sibert, G-2
Brig. Gen. Kibler, G-3
Brig. Gen. Moses, G-4
Col. Standish, Chief Intelligence Branch

and of the 9th Air Force:

Lt. Gen. Vandenberg, CG
Brig. Gen. Lee, Deputy to CG for Cps.
Col. Hughes, Director of Intelligence

The presentation of ultra material was made in the ultra room by the attached officers and was based on information received during the previous 24-hour period. Upon conclusion of the presentation the A. C. of S., G-2 or the Chief of Intelligence Branch highlighted enemy intentions or capabilities as revealed by ultra or open sources, such as tactical reconnaissance, P/W interrogation, etc. Upon conclusion of the presentation a discussion customarily followed in which the CG expressed his views on the current situation and reviewed operational plans under consideration, and invited discussion from his staff. The briefing normally covered all pertinent information on the GAF, its operations and intentions, and in the discussion following, Gen. Vandenberg and his staff consulted with Gen. Bradley on plans for tactical air support, or target programs such as lines of interdiction or enemy supply installations. Thereupon the needs of the ground forces were announced and appropriate air support or tactical bombing agreed upon.

7. The second briefing conducted at 1130 hours for all other indoctrinated personnel was less formal and more in the nature of a discussion or forum. Present at this briefing were: G-2 air, G-3 air, Deputy G-2, Deputy G-3, Chief Order of Battle Branch, Chief Terrain and Defence Branch, Chief Supply and Transportation Branch, personnel from G-3 Special Plans (Cover plan), and the signal intelligence officer. Ultra information was again presented by the attached officers, and comments invited as to interpretation placed on particular messages. On this occasion the chief of the Intelligence Branch reviewed the current G-2 estimate of the enemy situation and capabilities and invited comments from the branch chiefs on matters pertaining to their special interests.

8. In addition to attending the 1130 briefing the branch chiefs frequently visited the room throughout the day to review the messages in detail and to discuss with the ultra staff messages of special interest. For example, the chief of the order of battle branch daily reviewed all messages and discussed with the ultra staff new open identifications, F/W interrogation, troop movements, strengths of units, etc. Thus the chief, CB was in a position to guide the interpretation of open sources, control the tenor of periodic intelligence summaries, and safeguard against dissemination of reports contrary to ultra information. His close association with both sources permitted prompt blending of ultra into open intelligence as soon as sufficient evidence from non ultra sources justified release of ultra. Conversely, the ultra staff was in constant touch with all relevant open sources.

9. Within the ultra room a special map was posted portraying the disposition of allied forces as known to the enemy and revealed by ultra in enemy estimates of allied dispositions and intentions. This map was posted by officers of G-3 Special Plans. In addition to aiding them in formulating cover plans it provided a ready means of determining which allied units had been identified by the enemy and consequently which units could be released to the press.

10. All order of battle information as revealed by ultra was recorded under appropriate unit headings such as Army Group, Army, Corps, Division or smaller units. This index was absolutely essential in correctly evaluating the ultra material, in preparation of estimates, in servicing the army commands, and as a ready reference for the chief of the CB Branch. In addition to this, a topical index was maintained of such other messages as appeared to require subsequent reference.

11. Another principle function of the attached officers was to provide regular signals to the armies of such information received at army group which had not been directly dispatched to armies. Normally, routing from War Station provided armies with the essential information in their spheres of interest; but, it is highly desirable that army group send signals to armies containing extracts from various messages of general interest not bearing directly on a given army front. The volume of traffic to armies from army group must be tempered by the capacity of the signals unit at army level, otherwise the army channels might easily become overtaxed with this material to the impairment of the flow of current information from War Station.

12. Weekly ultra summaries were dispatched to the armies over the SLU link expressing the current opinion of G-2 based on ultra and open sources. The summaries were prepared by the Chief of the Intelligence Branch with the assistance of the attached officers in formulating the views contained therein.

13. With the exception of one or two isolated instances of minor security violations which in no way impaired the source, the security record at 12th Army Group was excellent. This, in a large measure, can be attributed to the method employed for handling ultra. As previously stated, all ultra material was confined to a single room or trailer, where all briefings, conferences involving ultra, or preparation of ultra documents were accomplished, an indoctrinated officer was present in this room 24 hours a day. As messages were received they were listed by date and number in a register and fastened in the appropriate folder according to subject matter, where it remained for 48 hours. After a message had remained in a folder for 48 hours it was removed, checked against the register, and burned. By this means an accurate check was made on the receipt and destruction of each individual message. The personnel of the 12th Army Group were keenly sensitive to the security necessary for safeguarding this source. The prevalence of this attitude is the best safeguard against security violations and undoubtedly accounts for the record achieved.

14. The following recommendations are made:

(a) Extreme care should be exercised in the indoctrination of every person, so that he is left not only with a full understanding of the security regulations but also with the manner with which he can effectively employ ultra in his particular function. Uniform application of this principle can best be achieved by use in the indoctrination of a well thought out set of points which must be reviewed in detail.

(b) Ultra is effective only when in the proper hands. To limit indoctrination to the barest minimum at any command is likely to seriously restrict its effective use. All key personnel within a G-2 Section who have been cleared from a security standpoint should be indoctrinated. This should include A. C. of S., G-2, Deputy A. C. of S., G-2, Executive G-2, Chief of Intelligence Branch, G-2 Air, Chief of Terrain and Defence, Chief of Supply and Transportation, Chief of the Order of Battle Branch, and such other persons who are engaged in preparation of periodic intelligence summaries. It is also advisable that an enlisted stenographer be indoctrinated to facilitate preparation of ultra reports and summaries.

(c) All administrative signals from the controlling source should be directed to the attached officer with instructions to pass to the desired individual. A signal directed to individuals within the command amounts to by-passing the attached officer and handicaps him in his constant effort to keep informed on developments relating to his responsibilities.

(d) A field representative of the source should be available at all times for supervision of attached officers at commands. He should be physically in the field and available to aid in solving problems arising at commands, and to know precisely the manner of performance of the attached

officers and the utilization of ultra at commands. In lieu thereof, the ranking officer at the senior command should have this responsibility.

(e) Based on traffic in the European Theater at least 2 men should be attached to an army and 3 to an army group. An ultra recipient is subject to call 24 hours a day without chance for respite. Personal liaison with higher or lower commands is invaluable but cannot be accomplished without an available relief officer. It is preferable that at each command one officer be designated as the senior command recipient and that his assistants be of junior grades.

(f) The marking of certain signals for the Chief Intelligence Officer only should be discontinued and reliance placed on the G-2 to judiciously disseminate such information.

(g) The practice of stamping all ultra documents with the classification "ULTRA - Top Secret" should be discontinued. It needlessly exposes the code word to the curious eye. The stamp "U - Top Secret" should be sufficient.

Charles R. Murnane

CHARLES R. MURNANE
Lt. Col., MI

Samuel M. Orr, Jr.

SAMUEL M. ORR, JR.
Lt. Col., Inf.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1. GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

21 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR

Subject: Report on Ultra Intelligence at First U.S. Army

1. The undersigned reported to the C.G. of First U.S. Army at Bristol, England on 15th May 1944 and remained with the command as a member of the G-2 Section during the campaigns of Normandy, North France and Germany. D.S. terminated at Weimar on 11 May 1945, when the undersigned returned to his parent organization. This report is based upon his experiences during that period.

2. The work done was in the field of intelligence which should be defined both to limit the scope as well as explain the content of this report. FM 30-5, par 5 states that the primary object of combat intelligence is to reduce as far as possible uncertainties regarding the enemy and local conditions and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions, and secondarily in the formulation of a counter-intelligence plan and its execution.

Successful accomplishment of the first objective requires the employment of all the agencies at the G-2's command: P.W. interrogations, P/R and Tac/R, Signal Intelligence, Agents and Documents, as well as Ultra. No single one is a touchstone and dire results will follow from the notion that ultra is the only agency which need be studied and believed. Rather a skillful blending of all is required and only by experience in enemy techniques and psychology plus native intelligence can an accurate picture of the enemy's situation and his capabilities be drawn and presented to the commander.

Intelligence functions only to assist the commander in making his decision and its weight as a factor of that decision varies directly with the relative strength of the forces engaged. "It is at its greatest importance when you are losing and vice versa." Further, there are other factors such as logistics, terrain, the morale and conditions of the troops and the weather. Of all these the G-2 must be aware, lest he become so isolated from reality that intelligence becomes a study for its own sake. Finally, and perhaps most important to the G-2 and his assistants, is the problem of the personalities and temperaments involved, as well as habits of work and of mind. These can only be solved by experience.

In the end, the task confronting the writer was to become a good G-2 to his G-2. It is felt that this mission was successfully accomplished but only after much labor and travail and at a time when it was of least importance.

3. In view of the above a word on prior training is in order. Order of Battle is the principal tool with which one works and a very thorough knowledge of it is required. This takes time because of the unusual mental discipline involved. Secondly, an understanding of tactics and strategy is very helpful. For allowing for minor variations, the same principles are universally applied. Finally, some experience as a soldier is a benefit, not that one is likely to have to organize a strong point, but from the fact of rank, others are entitled to assume knowledge of certain things that come only from having been "through the mill". In the first the writer was definitely deficient. Insofar as studying the personalities and temperaments of the G-2, and for that matter, the functioning of the command as an integrated staff, it is felt that arriving at the Hq. eight days before moving into the marshalling area for the invasion was much too late.

4. Pre-Invasion. Most of the information which formed the intelligence for operation "Neptune" was gathered and evaluated by the British. It involved terrain, hydrography and enemy defenses. In Order of Battle alone ultra made possible correct evaluation of agents' reports. We knew what we would meet and that our cover plan was working.

The main job at Army level was, therefore, (1) organizing and training for the campaign, (2) dissemination of intelligence and advising the commander and the troops by estimates of the enemy's capabilities to react to our attack.

In connection with the latter, much work went into the preparation of charts showing just when and where and in what strength the known enemy armored divisions could, under the most favorable conditions, launch co-ordinated and piecemeal attacks against our beachheads. Fortunately, the predictions proved false but the charts had sufficient verisimilitude to make the writer believe his chances of surviving the invasion were about nil.

5. The Battle of Normandy. (June 6th to 24 July 1944). Our operations were in two phases; first, to land and secure the beachhead and secondly to expand it to support the build-up of troops, supplies and air facilities for the break-cut, which marked the beginning of the Battle of Northern France.

Intelligence for the landing was, in effect, done before D Day. In an amphibious operation control must be decentralized so far that all the commander can do is to start it in motion and hope for the best. While it had originally been estimated that certainly piecemeal and possibly coordinated attacks to destroy the beachhead could be made late on D Day by two enemy armored divisions, and by ten infantry and four armored divisions on D plus 6, with corresponding variations between these dates, actually by D plus 9 (15th June 1944) only fourteen nominal divisions were in the "Neptune" area. No piecemeal or coordinated counter-attack had materialized but it was estimated that ten more divisions could arrive by 22 June 1944.

What had happened was that (a) air cooperation had restricted large scale enemy movement to darkness, (b) the airborne troops had ruptured his chain of command, and (c) the courage and dash of our assault troops prevented the enemy from "getting set" and compelled a piecemeal commitment of his reserves as they arrived on the battle field.

Therefore, the essentials of intelligence were (1) to watch for the movement of the expected divisions, (2) explain the untidy enemy O.B. map based on identifications resulting from piecemeal commitment, and (3) explain the evolution of the chain of command into an orderly pattern. These tasks remained the same throughout the battle but the details varied with each phase. They were directed to the sole question when and where would the enemy counter-attack.

By June 19th 1944, the Cotentin Peninsula was cut. The immediate problem was, therefore, the defense plans for Cherbourg and the extent of its supplies. There were not many Allied divisions ashore then and the balance between the troops needed for a quick reduction of the port and those to hold the lines against the expected German counter-attack was as delicate as it was important.

By June 29th Cherbourg was ours and the Peninsula was cleared. We had a major, though damaged, port and our beachhead was reasonably secure. The occasion was signalized by your reporter changing his socks, shirt and underclothes for the first time since June 6th. The first phase had ended.

The second phase is associated with "hedge-row" fighting. Opposing First Army was Seventh German Army with LXXXIV Corps of five divisions and II Para Corps of four divisions. In the rear areas were known to be four infantry and one armored divisions, while Pz Gruppe West, with II SS Pz Corps and 9 and 10 SS Pz Divs, was known to be moving west and was expected momentarily against the British on our left. Still remaining in Brittany were three divisions. First German Army in SW France could spare the 11 Pz Div and Nineteenth Army on the Mediterranean, the 9 Pz Div, but neither was believed capable of sending up more infantry divisions. Only in the Pas de Calais, Holland and Germany itself were reserves available.

Here, then, was the issue. While we were slowly and gradually fighting our way out of the "Bocage" into terrain favorable for armor, would the enemy bring in enough forces either successfully to rope off the beachhead or even to mount a counter-attack, thus setting us back indefinitely, if not destroying us?

Equally effective were two quite different factors. First was operation "Fortitude" and the second was the American divisions who got their battle training and the American soldiers who died in the hedge-rows of Normandy. The G-2 estimate of 10th July 1944 said "No sooner do his reinforcements arrive than they are thrown into combat, not through choice but immediate necessity". The search for information was obviously directed to points throwing light on the issue.

6. The Battle of Northern France. (25 July to 14 September 1944). After an intense bombardment by heavy bombers, on July 25th, VII Corps, with three divisions abreast, attacked in a S.W. direction between St. Lo and Ferriers. The purpose initially was to pocket the German LXXXIV Corps which was defending on the western portion of the Cotentin Peninsula. The larger mission was to destroy

the German Armies west of the Seine and secure the "lodgement area". The attack had been postponed several days on account of the weather and we had helplessly watched II Para and LXXXIV Corps get prepared for it by bringing in Pz Lehr from the east, 5 Para Div from Brittany and pull 353 Division out of line into reserve.

By the 28th it was apparent that LXXXIV Corps was in pretty much of a route. On that day, we spoke of the La See or the Sélune Rivers as lines behind which the enemy would defend. On the 1st of August the general line, not connected with an obstacle, of Trouville-Falaise-Mortain-Rennes was suggested. Our armor had shaken loose.

It was obvious that the enemy needed two things: (1) an obstacle to get behind and (2) fresh forces. It was mobile warfare and so our problem was to ascertain how the enemy would meet these two requirements and, of course, to watch above all things the flanks of our spearheads. For the first time, two other factors appeared: morale, for it was hoped that the July "putsch" would have repercussions among the troops, and secondly, supply, for fuel and ammunition are the critical items of mobile warfare.

Of obstacles, there were none short of a line through Dreux, Chartres and Orleans, with the flanks anchored on the Seine and the Loire. For troops there was, in whole or in part, the Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais. While "Fortitude" was still "selling", its appeal had dropped off and five divisions came down between the 25th of July and the 8th August. Therefore, the Germans took the very long chance of attempting to push us back into the beachhead by attacking from Mortain westward toward Avranches. With all the forces he could muster under XLVII Pz (2 Pz, 2 SS and 17 SS, Lehr and 116) he made the attempt between the 8th and 11th August, while LXXXIV Corps tried to extend and stabilize the line southward. The effort failed and the east flank of our spearhead was secure. The stage was set for the debacle which followed.

No useful purpose will be served by elaborating on the Argentan-Falaise Pocket, the fall of Paris and the Mons Pocket. They were great victories but credit for them must go to the commanders and the troops. Of the enemy it may be said, to quote from the After-Action Report (which I wrote, so it's no plagiarism) that the weight and speed of our attacks was appreciated "too little and too late" and, therefore, the divisions the enemy sent to stop us only became engulfed in our offensive. It mattered not what we did, provided we did something. As was stated before, intelligence is unimportant when you are winning and even though we were reading the enemy's mind, it mattered not for he did not have the means to carry out his intentions. The Battle of North France ended on the 14th of September when, reaching the Siegfried Line, we ran out of gas.

7. The Battle of Germany. (September 15, 1944 to May 9, 1945). In the current perspective, the highwater mark of the campaign is the Ardennes offensive, for had it not occurred we might be still fighting on the Rhine River. I shall, therefore, divide it into three phases: first, events leading up to the Ardennes; second, the Ardennes offensive; and finally, its aftermath.

By 15th September, it was apparent that the enemy would attempt, at any rate, to defend the West Wall, using remnants of the battered divisions from France, L. of C. and administrative troops. For our part, the problem was to get up fuel, ammo. and supplies. It was not until early October that we were able to undertake even limited objective offensives to breach the West Wall, while the German had well used the time to set his own house in order. By the middle of October, we had expended our offensive powers and surrounded Aachen, but achieved no great breakthrough. After the fall of Aachen, the German remained on the passive defense on our front, but in later October he was capable of launching a medium scale diversionary attack on the exposed east flank of Second British Army NW of Venlo. The wave of optimism of September was gone; the seventy battalions that he combed out after the fall of France had made themselves felt. On 12 November G-2 estimate said, in part, "It is now a race against time. Can the enemy complete his dispositions for his offensive prior to the launching of our attack? With the approach of winter in the east, it is believed the enemy will stake all on an offensive in the west."

I have recited the events historically as being the easiest means of showing in what direction our intelligence efforts were bent. We reached the West Wall, optimistic but logistically broke. We watched the enemy recuperate at a slightly faster rate than we could get up our supplies. We watched the master hand of von Rundstedt deftly deploy his forces and his reserves, bringing up battalions from the replacement army, giving some ground on the south, but always keeping in balance.

On the 16th November, First Army launched a large scale attack which it was hoped would carry through to the Rhine. The fighting that followed was probably as bitter, as long drawn out and on as large a scale as has occurred in this war. ^{on} December 10, 1944, the perhaps too famous and certainly much discussed Estimate No. 37 was published. The real intent of it was to warn that, despite the fighting that had taken place during the previous three weeks, Sixth Pz Army west of the Rhine was uncommitted and, therefore, available for a counter-offensive. This counter-offensive, it predicted, would most probably occur after our major forces had crossed the Roer River. It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the validity of the "ex post facto" constructions placed on it, that it intended to warn against the large scale offensive that actually occurred.

That the Ardennes Offensive, which was very costly, could have been foreseen is submitted for the following reasons: (a) the enemy was defending on an artificial line with a major obstacle, the Rhine, astride his supply lines. (b) The German doctrine is an active defense. (c) The German situation, in the big picture, was so desperate that he could afford to take the longest chances and, (d) finally, the effect of our overwhelming air superiority was minimized by choosing a time when daylight was shortest, and the weather most likely to be bad. While the enemy had no cover plan to mislead us, his counter-intelligence was superb and merits very careful study. Some clues came from open sources but were not heeded as no clue came from ultra.

Once it was appreciated that a real offensive with strategic objectives like Antwerp and Liege was underway, the tide swung precipitously from general optimism based on the long-term hopelessness of Germany's strategic position to calamity and woe, involving the imminent arrival of divisions believed to be in the East (as well as invented ones), and new secret weapons. The problem was to keep the record

accurate and straight.

The details of the offensive I need not go into. Suffice it to say that it was an unpleasant experience. I cannot pass without remarking on the superb courage and fortitude of the American soldier. Between 19 December 1944 and 11 January (24 days), we published twenty-three G-2 estimates of the situation, the last one stating that the enemy's offensive power on First Army's front was spent and, in fact, he had barely sufficient divisions for a counter-attacking reserve.

By the beginning of February it was becoming more and more apparent that the enemy had shot his bolt. With a major disaster in the east and southeast requiring the transfer there of 6 SS Pz Army and with his reserves of manpower and his stocks of material gone, particularly his fuel, it was doubted if he could put up more than a strained defense of the West Wall.

With what little there was the enemy did a magnificent job of regrouping and regaining his balance, and his intelligence was aided by his excellent "Y". However, while the plans were good, there was very little with which to execute them, and the enemy, in effect, wilted before the drives of all the Allied Armies in the west, and by the end of the first week of March his forces west of the Rhine were split into bridgeheads defending the critical crossings.

The Remagen Bridge (7 March 1945) was a piece of luck, to be sure, but it required a skillful and well-trained army to exploit it. That it was a matter of life and death to the enemy was self-evident and the intelligence effort was directed to the question of where, when and with what would he counter-attack and by what other means would he attempt to destroy it. For the remainder of the month our efforts were directed to expanding the bridgehead and to building up within it sufficient supplies to be able to exploit it.

The Ruhr Pocket was created April 1st and has been described by captured German generals as the greatest single defeat that the German Army has ever suffered. The burning question, of course, was to determine the when, where and the with what of the German plan to open it up. Had we actually known how many enemy troops (315,000 P.W.'s were taken) were contained in the pocket, we might well have left more troops to reduce it at the expense of the corps which turned east (about the middle of April) and started to work-over the Hartz Mountains.

With the Ruhr pocket closed, the end was obvious. River lines there were to the east, such as the Weser-Werra line, the Saale and the Elbe. But the German was then beaten. He was totally lacking the means of executing any plan.

The end came as an anti-climax. We had lost our three corps and were in the process of turning over the army and service troops, preparatory to return to the U.S.A. for probable employment in the Orient. The Isum of 062400 3 May 1945 read: "For the first time in eleven months there is no contact with the enemy. The victory which was won on Omaha and Utah Beaches reached its climax. Today belongs to the men of this Army who fought and conquered the enemy from Normandy to the Elbe. There is no enemy situation to report for there is no longer an enemy to defeat."

8. In the three preceding sections I have sketched at strategic level the actions of First U.S. Army and the German reactions. It was required because intelligence is important only as it bears on the success of our operations. Without this history, it would be impossible to explain or determine the use and effect of ultra, for the test is did the signals sent out at the time resolve or confuse the issues as we saw them.

The most important question in combat intelligence is where. In the main, ultra furnished the answer. Certainly it was invaluable in separating the true from the false out of all the information that came in. Without it, we would have been pretty much in the dark and our actions might have been determined by the caution or aggressiveness of the commander. But to have relied on it alone would have been foolhardy, not only because by blending the intelligence from all agencies can the real picture be obtained, but also because at Army level the tactical is frequently more important than the strategic, which is the proper field of ultra. Therefore, the answer to the effect which ultra had on the operations of First U.S. Army is to be found in the history of ultra, rather than in this report. In the main, ultra did resolve the issues.

9. The first objective of my job, as I see it now, was to be able to present to the commander a clear and accurate picture of the enemy situation as it effected his command. It is therefore, a matter of record keeping and presentation. But both the G-2 and I "grew with the job" and the record of my trials may prove helpful to someone else at some other time.

Initially, the G-2 presented the signals, unsorted, unedited and without comment, to the C.G. and the G/S twice daily. Later I was permitted to see them after everyone else. By keeping records and by plotting a map, I was able to show the G-2 that a good deal of valuable intelligence had been overlooked. Gradually I was allowed first to sort and then to edit and by the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, the material was assembled and written up twice daily with a summary of whether the situation had changed and why. This write-up was then read to the C.G. by the G-2 and, of course, the maps in the general's office were kept posted. No briefing was ever done directly by the ultra representative.

The equally important objective of informing the troops was accomplished by G-2 estimates of the situation. As the situation changed, I would write "appreciations" based on ultra for the G-2 and as time passed and the information was covered by other sources, the intelligence would be put out in the open estimate.

At tactical level a more difficult situation arises as the desire to take immediate action on a target disclosed by source can so easily result in a breach of security. This tendency increased toward the end, possibly due to the indifference of the commander to intelligence generally. It was also found to be very dangerous even to hint to the corps to expect enemy action where the only knowledge of it came from ultra, for the corps G-2's are insistent on the source of the information.

A further difficulty is the tendency to highlight the dramatic, particularly as when there is no real change in the situation, the G-2 feels he must say something at the daily conference. Another was the fact that other readers, for lack of something better to do, would frequently grab a seemingly important signal and

rush it to the G-2 without giving it the thought and study it required. Ultra is something which must be "read, marked, learned and inwardly digested". If a signal is not understandable, it must not be dismissed as unimportant. Ultra must be presented not for what it says but for what it means to the command which receives it.

10. Security. The security of Ultra at First U.S. Army was not good. Initially there was much curiosity as to the nature of S.L.U.'s work and my connection with it, particularly as two of the assigned members of the G-2 Section had the inevitable curiosity of all professional newspapermen. It is submitted that the situation created by having an S.L.U. present in the section should be faced and it be explained that its work is secret, rather than to pretend that it is not there.

How the secret got out, I do not know for certain and my suspicions are not worth recording, as they are unquestionably founded on personal prejudice. Under the circumstances surrounding First U.S. Army's departure, I honestly feel that anything more than was done to correct the situation would have done more harm than good.

11. Conclusion. Throughout the job I have felt great discomfort over the fact that I was serving two masters: one was the C.G. of First U.S. Army through his G-2 by reason of my detached service there, and the other was my parent organization. An example of this difficulty is clearly presented in the problem of security. Is ultra given to the command subject to the rules and regulations and is it the responsibility of the command of which I am a part to see that the rules are obeyed, or am I not part of the command and Special Branch's watchdog?

Again, is it my responsibility and duty to see that the best use is being made of ultra and that the greatest advantage is being taken of the intelligence derived from it. When I raised this point, I was told I was criticizing the command.

If I have learnt anything in the Army it is that the first duty of a superior (whether it be a supreme commander or a squad leader) to a subordinate is to give clear orders. Where all the major circumstances cannot be foreseen, then the duty of the superior is to find them out and make his will known, just as it is ultimately by imposing his will on the enemy that the commander defeats him.

Many of my difficulties were caused by the personality of the G-2 at First U.S. Army and to his relatively unimportant voice in the Army's cabinet. Some were due to the weak and inadequate initial setting-up there of the plan. The burden of overcoming them and of making such success of ultra as was made was mine and mine alone, for I got no help from "home" and my duties as your representative were "in addition" to those given me by the G-2 of First U.S. Army of eight hours daily on the duty desk (this was later changed to eight hours on and thirty-two off), of organizing the "target section", writing the weekly periodic for a while and a good many "after action" reports. I hope I did not let you down.

Adolph G. Rosingarten, Jr.
ADOLPH G. ROSENGARTEN, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, Inf.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
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LONDON, ENGLAND

27 May 1945

Memorandum for Colonel Taylor

Subject: Notes on Ultra Traffic, First U.S. Army

1. Officer concerned was attached to HQ FUSA on 6 January 1945 during the Ardennes offensive, due to a request made for additional personnel, and remained with that command until 11 May 1945.
2. As source traffic with HQ FUSA has been fully covered by the senior WD representative to HQ FUSA in a separate report, this is in the nature of a comment.
3. Cover: When a new officer joins an army command, his fellow officers are naturally curious as to his antecedents, his status, and his duties. It is felt that the problem of "cover" was poorly handled by the G-2, who should have laid all rumors by simply stating to the curious as a group that intelligence of a special character was being carried out which did not concern them, and that speculation was expressly forbidden.

Unfortunately, this was not done, which resulted in either vague explanations of "Russian Liaison" or ignoring the issue entirely.

A situation of this sort may easily lead to hard feeling among the various officers in the G-2 Section which is increased when the recipient is observed to be taken into the confidence of the AC of S, G-2 and to be called in on certain matters from which the rank and file are excluded.

Furthermore, it takes no genius to deduce that signal intelligence is being carried out when the SIU station, the G-2, and the recipient are so intimately and obviously connected. This is particularly true in the case of CIC personnel, who were receiving MEL and VAR items through SIU, and the British Phantom service (G-3 radio liaison) who suspected something out of the ordinary. What kind of operations may not be correctly appraised by the curious, but it is dangerous to allow idle speculation.

Another sore point was the necessity for the recipients to have a private room, which resulted in the doubling up of senior officers not indoctrinated into inferior office space. As Army HQ in Germany was generally established in badly battered German barracks, this involved a problem of adequate space.

Fortunately, the G-2 Section officers were a competent and cooperative group, and after the initial suspicion and grumbling, the situation was accepted. However such tolerance may not always be the case.

4. Readers: First Army had six readers in the G-2 Section alone, but excluded one officer who should have been in the picture, the O/B officer.

Other readers, excluding WD representatives, were three colonels and one lieutenant colonel who had the following duties:

- a. A C of S, G-2
- b. Chief of Combat Intelligence
- c. Administrative Officer
- d. G-2 Periodic Report (Daily)

As it turned out, the Administrative Officer handled his own job and that of Combat Intelligence as well, and in addition, pinch-hit for the A C of S, G-2. This was an unusual situation, for normally the Chief of Combat Intelligence is one of the most important of all of the G-2 officers and should definitely be in the picture. The Administrative Officer could be dispensed with as a reader, as well as the OIC G-2 Periodic Reports, since ultra material is not used in this daily report of operations.

This leaves the A C of S, G-2 and the Chief of Combat Intelligence, to which group it is strongly recommended that the O/B officer be indoctrinated, thus giving a maximum of 3 readers in the G-2 section, exclusive of the ultra WD representative.

The O/B officer has one of the most important and difficult jobs in the Army, and access to ultra information would be of the highest possible value to him. This is especially true as regards piecemeal employment of units which can result, as it has in the past, in a nightmare of identification.

This works both ways. Although MIRS publications were invaluable and greatly appreciated, many units referred to in ultra could not be properly evaluated at the time as to military capabilities.

The O/B Officer, having the daily P/W identifications, was of great help in this matter, but curiosity was again aroused as to the source of the identification. This glaring fault can be easily remedied by the indoctrination of the O/B specialist.

5. Army Group: During the build-up period for the Rhineland campaign, it was felt that Army Group could have then supplied First Army with more source information of a higher level, which was then only sent to Army Group. On occasion of visits to Army Group, a perusal of source material available there revealed much information which was considered to be of high value to the Army Commander.

After explaining the problem, this situation was rectified, and from then on Army Group was very cooperative in selecting and forwarding items judged to be of interest to Army. As a matter of record, near the end we were dependent on Group to a large extent for source material.

6. Other Duties: It is well to have general military abilities when assigned to an Army Command, since there is no assurance that one will be concerned with ultra traffic alone. An officer by virtue of his rank and position is expected to perform any duties assigned to him, and when illness removes a section officer from his duties, or when leave is granted, the recipient may well be called upon to take over duties quite foreign to his own position.

As the majority of Army staff officers have had either C and GS training or combat experience, or both, at least the former experience would be a very helpful background to the recipient. Attendance at Army Service Schools and careful training in O/B are invaluable in this respect.

It is the writer's firm conviction that ultra, invaluable as it is for giving a commander that assurance needed for decisive action should not be relied upon to the exclusion of every other source of intelligence. Rather a skillful blending of all sources should be attained which required thorough training.

William D. Roenthal, Jr.

WILLIAM D. ROENTHAL, JR.

Major, Inf. Res.

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28 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR

Subject: Ultra and the Third Army

1. Ultra Specialists

Major (later Lt. Col.) Melvin C. Helfers was ultra specialist with 3rd Army from 6 June 1944 until he was hospitalized about 12 March 1945.

Major Warrack Wallace assisted Lt. Col. Helfers for a month in 1944, leaving the UK for France on June 16 and returning to the UK on September 20.

Lt. Col. Samuel M. Orr, Jr. of the ultra staff at 12th US Army Group served as temporary replacement for Lt. Col. Helfers when the latter was hospitalized, and remained there for about a week until relieved by the undersigned.

The undersigned officer (Capt. George C. Church) reported to 3rd Army on March 18 and remained there until the SIU received orders to close on 15 May 1945.

2. Officers in Ultra Picture

General George S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General
Major General Hobart R. Gay, Chief of Staff
Colonel Paul D. Harkens, Deputy Chief of Staff
Brigadier General Halley G. Maddox, G-3
Colonel Oscar W. Koch, G-2
Colonel Harold M. Forde, G-2 Executive Officer
Colonel Robert S. Allen, Assistant G-2
Major Charles W. Flint, Signals Security Officer

3. Duties of Ultra Specialist

The interpretation of ultra to the staff officers as listed above involved the keeping of a situation map combining ultra and open sources, a regular morning briefing of these officers, and conferences with Colonel Koch and other staff officers at irregular times with the arrival of operationally important items of ultra.

The ultra briefing took place every morning (except when cancelled for lack of material) at approximately 0900 hours, immediately preceding the open briefing in the War Room. The special briefing was held either in General Gay's or Colonel Harkens' office and was regularly attended by all officers in the ultra picture, with the exception of Colonel Forde, who never attended during the term of duty of the undersigned, and Major Flint, whose interest was limited to items involving Signals Security.

Close contact was kept with the G-2 situation room and situation reports from open sources were constantly checked for supporting and expanding information.

Since the Special Briefing was not held in the office of the ultra specialist, the situation map was necessarily portable and was kept by the undersigned on a large folding map board.

Officer billets for 3rd Army Hq staff were often located at a considerable distance from the Hq. To facilitate the handling of high priority items arriving during the night and the preparation of the map with current items for the special briefing, the undersigned found it necessary to live in the office, rather than in the billet provided.

The special briefing was also always attended either by General Weyland and/or Colonel Brown of XIX TAC. It had been customary during the campaign for Major Grove (ultra recipient at XIX TAC) to give occasional talks on the GAF at the special briefing, in addition to his work at his own command. During these last two months, however, the XIX TAC Hq was usually located at some distance from the 3rd Army and it was possible only once for him to attend.

4. Role of Ultra in 3rd Army

(a) General: The undersigned arrived at the 3rd Army when the liquidation of the German forces west of the Rhine had already reached an advanced stage. The Rhine was crossed within a week, and at no time during these last two months of the war was the 3rd Army front stabilized for more than a few days. The German generals were conducting a war with means that were hopelessly inadequate and many of their orders were in effect "for the record" only. Orders for the preparation of defense lines were usually outdated by the time they reached us, with the line already pierced at many points or completely overrun. Orders for the commitment of new divisions were shorn of their normal significance because the divisions at best were ill provided with heavy weapons and the piecemeal employment of units as they arrived at various points of the rapidly moving front led to a speedy frittering away of such new divisions as actually did arrive. German Order of Battle had become a tangle of miscellaneous replacement and training units, whose command relationships were no sooner established than they were destroyed by our further advances. German resistance had degenerated into sporadic, if fanatic, defence of individual towns or strong points, and such counterattacks as were actually mounted never assumed serious proportions.

Under these conditions, the value of ultra (as of intelligence generally) had undoubtedly suffered a decline from the time when the enemy had sufficient forces at his disposal to make his intentions of decisive importance.

During this period, however, ultra continued to be of great value in forecasting or confirming the identifications made by actual contact and in providing an insight into the intentions and operations of the German commanders.

Concerning the previous period (from D-Day until his own term of duty) the undersigned can give only general impressions based on conversations with Lt. Col. Helfers which were necessarily very limited because they were held in the ward room of the hospital at Luxembourg, and discussions with members of SIJ. It appears that initially no special briefing was held and that ultra information was passed only to the G-2 orally or by written report. The German attack towards Avranches seems to have been the time when the value of ultra became apparent and the custom of holding a special briefing each morning was instituted. Relations with members of the G-2 section not in the ultra picture were also a problem at the start, but these straightened themselves out once the positions of the SIJ and the ultra recipient were thoroughly established with the Commanding General and his staff.

By the time the undersigned arrived at 3rd Army, these problems had all been smoothed out. There were no administrative difficulties, our position was accepted without question if not without curiosity, and all G-2 agencies including the situation room, the photo interpretation section, the order of battle section, and the prisoner of war section, were extremely cooperative in providing information without receiving anything in direct return.

(b) Detailed: The fact that the special briefing from ultra each morning was attended and carefully followed by the Commanding General and his staff ensured that ultra intelligence was fully considered in the operational plans of the 3rd Army. It is beside the point that German capabilities at the end were not of sufficient seriousness to cause any change in these plans.

There was only one considerable German counter-attack on 3rd Army front during the undersigned officer's term of duty. It occurred when the German 11th Army attempted to concentrate forces in the vicinity of Muehlhausen for a thrust to the southeast, at a time when the 3rd Army extended well to the east. Ultra provided valuable indications and identifications of this build-up, completing information from open sources. No change of 3rd Army plans was involved, since sufficient forces were available on the spot to cope with the threat. The Germans also planned a build-up for the Passau-Linz area, but this never fully developed owing to immobility of German formations and the complete collapse of German resistance.

One of the most valuable single contributions from ultra during the two month period witnessed by the undersigned was provided during the closing days of the war, when we were notified by the 7th US Army that Army Group G had surrendered. The line specified in the surrender negotiations ran well up into Czechoslovakia, and therefor seemed to indicate that a considerable sector of the 3rd Army front was concerned in the surrender. From ultra information, however, we were able to determine that Army Group G included only the German 19th and 1st Armies, that the right boundary of the German 1st Army lay in the area just east of Linz, and that the line specified in the surrender negotiations was apparently the boundary reported in ultra between C in C West and Army Group South, rather than an Army Group G boundary. We therefor concluded that the surrender affected only a small sector of our front, which proved to be the case.

Operational aspects of ultra were fully considered. The same cannot, however, be said for the Order of Battle information provided by ultra. Most of the detailed work on German Order of Battle was done by a Captain Gerber who headed the Order of Battle team at 3rd U S Army. Ultra was not available to Captain Gerber. The issue of his indoctrination was raised with Colonel Koch by the undersigned, as it had been by Lt. Col. Helfers and Lt. Col. Orr, but Col. Koch felt that it was inadvisable and insecure to increase the list of those in the ultra picture, and that our information should be reserved for use as a check on information produced and compiled exclusively from open sources. The situation in this respect must have varied at different headquarters, depending on the officers who produced the detailed analyses of German O/B, but it seems clear that if any considerable use is to be made of ultra O/B at Army level (even though only as a guide and check), the officer producing the detailed analyses of O/B should be in the ultra picture.

There was no real necessity for the indoctrination of Col. Forde, the G-2 Executive Officer, whose activities were almost exclusively administrative and who never attended the special briefings.

5. Security

Physical security at 3rd Army was satisfactory for the period during which the undersigned was on duty there. The SIU was invariably provided with two office rooms, one for the WT section and one for the decyphering and encyphering, and if there was no lock on the door of the latter, it was fitted with hasp and padlock. The ultra specialist was assigned to a separate office near the G-2, was provided with a safe, and the map kept from ultra sources was fitted with hasp and padlock. Ultra papers were handled very carefully by the entire staff and no reports based on ultra were retained by anyone other than SIU or the ultra recipient for more than a few hours.

Material received by the undersigned called in few cases for any direct action. During the German build-up in the Muehlhausen area already referred to, Colonel Allen occasionally talked in general terms to the G-2 of the US Corps concerned, and was able to base his interest in the area on information provided by open sources. In one instance, during the Battle of France, there had been some indiscretion. On that occasion, a warning of German air attack on the Hq area provided by ultra was passed on to AA and other units without sufficient cover.


One serious instance involving ultra security arose while the undersigned was with 3rd Army. Col. Allen was captured by the enemy on 7 April, while on a mission which involved the investigation of captured German installations. The circumstances were not entirely clear. In the opinion of the undersigned, the episode resulted from a succession of slight errors in judgment which added up to a tragedy involving loss of life and limb. The mission originally assigned to Colonel Allen, while fairly far forward, was in an area behind our lines and the mission was not in itself dangerous. Colonel Allen after completing this mission seems to have entrusted himself and his party to another officer who was presumably familiar with the situation, and this officer led the entire group further forward than was safe. It is, however, certain that the security of

ultra was preserved, since Col. Allen was safely installed in a hospital located immediately in the path of our advance and with the cooperation of a helpful Austrian doctor was held there until the arrival of our troops. He was never subjected to interrogation.

In general, all officers in the ultra picture at 3rd Army were conscious of their responsibilities in connection with security. General Patton expressed his complete agreement with the reasons underlining the need for ultra security as set forth in the memorandum circulated by Group Captain Winterbotham.

6. Summary

The undersigned officer received complete cooperation and every consideration while on duty at the 3rd Army, both from those in the ultra picture and others with whom daily contact was necessary. Material presented at the briefing was followed with interest and appreciation, and as indicated above, the only respect in which improvement could have been desired was in the greater use of Order of Battle information.


GEORGE C. CHURCH
Captain, CAC

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27 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Use of Ultra by Ninth U. S. Army.

The undersigned was on DS with Ninth U. S. Army from 7 September 1944 through 16 May 1945, during which period he served as ultra recipient at the command. The following report on this service expresses the views of the undersigned alone, and should not be regarded as having been approved, directly or indirectly, by any other officer of the command.

1. HISTORICAL.

Prior to beginning his operational tour of duty with Ninth Army, the undersigned spent about a week with the army while it was in training at Bristol, England. He was thereby enabled to make the acquaintance of the members of the staff and to explain and illustrate to indoctrinated personnel how ultra material would be used in the field.

When the undersigned joined Ninth Army near Rennes, France, the army had the mission of reducing Brest and containing the other French coastal fortresses held by the enemy. Shortly after his arrival, the undersigned was enabled by ultra to advise the G-2 and the Commanding General that open estimates of the strength of enemy forces in Brest were too low by about 50%, and the point was proved within a week by the prisoner count. From that time, there was no question as to the value or accuracy of ultra information at Ninth Army.

Following the fall of Brest, Ninth Army controlled the Ardennes area with a containing mission, and then, in October 1944, it moved into the area north of Aachen whence, in early November 1944, it launched an attack toward the Roer River. This operation was interrupted by the enemy's Ardennes offensive which began on 16 December 1944. While the major part of Ninth Army's troops were employed in repelling this offensive, the army had a defensive mission in the Aachen area. By February 1945, however, it was possible to renew the Allied offensive and Ninth Army operating under 21st Army Group crossed the Roer River and advanced to the Rhine. After a brief pause, the advance was resumed in March and by 15 April Ninth Army had reached and secured a small bridgehead across the Elbe River. The advance was halted on order at that point and, except for considerable mopping up, the operational phase was at an end.

2. Method of Using Ultra.

Within the G-2 Section, Ninth Army, the undersigned was known as SLU Liaison Officer. At all times he maintained a separate office, entrance to which was restricted to indoctrinated personnel. The method of operation was as follows:

a. SLU deliveries were made four times daily, at approximately 0730, 1030, 1630 and 2230. At all times during operations, ZZZZ and ZZZZZ signals were delivered as soon as ready. In addition, during certain phases, the undersigned would instruct the SLU on certain types of messages (e.g., relating to a particular area) to be delivered immediately regardless of priority.

b. Briefing notes were prepared early in the morning and about 0845, the G-2 was briefed. The undersigned attended the open briefing at 0915, and thereafter went to the Commanding General's office where he briefed the General and the indoctrinated members of his staff. A portable ultra map was used for this purpose. Capt. Van Norden, ultra recipient at XXIX Tactical Air Command, attended both briefings and briefed on the air situation at the latter.

c. During the remainder of the day, ultra material was processed as received (i.e., read by the undersigned and appropriate notes made). In addition, the undersigned read all papers passing through the situation room (where a special box was maintained for him) and consulted with all members of the G-2 Section on the current situation.

d. The undersigned participated in the writing of all G-2 estimates and usually wrote or outlined the "Reserves" paragraph of the daily periodic.

e. Daily liaison was maintained with Capt. Van Norden of XXIX TAC, and more frequent meetings were held when the situation required. A number of visits were exchanged with the ultra recipients at First U.S. Army and IX TAC, as well as with Twelfth and Twenty-First Army Groups, depending upon Ninth Army's subordination.

f. The undersigned also consulted daily with the "Y" group at Ninth Army (none of whom were indoctrinated) and the IPW personnel attached to the Army.

g. The objectives sought to be accomplished were as follows:

(1) To give the Commanding General and all indoctrinated members of the staff a clear picture of the open situation as it was affected by ultra, together with a clear understanding of how each item could be used without loss of security.

(2) To give unindoctrinated members of the staff and the corps staffs as much of the situation in the light of ultra as could be accomplished with appropriate cover, and to kill, so far as possible, open items of information known to be in error through the ultra source. It was not always possible to "float" ultra items, but it was possible to minimize errors from open sources.

3. Security

The security consciousness of indoctrinated members of the command was in general good. This was due in part to the fact that following the first ultra briefing, the Commanding General, of his own accord, made a brief talk emphasizing the need for such security in the strongest terms.

There were no breaches of security which the undersigned regarded as appropriate for reporting to Col. Taylor. On two or three occasions it was necessary to reprimand the G-2, (Col. Bixel) for indiscreet questions. It was also necessary on three occasions to speak in the strongest terms to Lt. Col. Abbott (head of Operational Intelligence for the greater part of the time) because of his attempts to include ultra material in estimates without appropriate cover. In no case were these items seen by unauthorized persons, and the talks ultimately accomplished their purpose. Each incident was fully discussed with Capt. Vineyard, who commanded the SLJ unit at Ninth Army.

4. Factors Found to be Helpful.

Ninth Army went into the field with a G-2 Section which had had no prior operational experience. In addition, there were personnel difficulties within the organization that led to inefficiency. These were solved in part, as late as 23 March 1945, by the relief and replacement of the G-2. In the various situations arising from these facts, the small degree of independence retained by the undersigned by reason of the fact that he was on DS and not assigned was invaluable. This status was also valuable in dealing with security problems. It is doubted whether an assigned officer could adequately handle such problems.

The unfailing accuracy and helpfulness of the staff at B.P. was of immeasurable value in the field, since it enabled the ultra recipient to speak with confidence and authority. This was supplemented in practice by signals and personal conferences with indoctrinated personnel at Twelfth and Twenty-First Army Group (depending upon subordination) who were untiring in complying with requests and volunteering additional material. Thanks to this high degree of cooperation, the undersigned experienced no difficulty with the general principles of selection which denied certain types of material to armies. It is believed that in general, where such items were material to the mission of Ninth Army, they were passed on at the request of, or by, one of the Army Groups.

The training received at B.P. and the experience gained from a visit to the Mediterranean Theater proved fully adequate.

5. Principal Difficulties and Recommendations.

The primary difficulty experienced in the field was in no way attributable to any deficiencies in the ultra organization. In order to piece ultra into the open picture, it is necessary to have a relatively accurate open picture. It was found that an inexperienced G-2 Section was unable to provide such a picture and consequently it was necessary to build up the open picture from basic open sources, persuade the G-2 Section to recognize the validity of this open picture, and finally to float ultra against this perspective.

Another difficulty was the fact that all personnel other than assigned personnel at Army Headquarters are expected to be relatively self sufficient, so that it was often difficult to obtain necessary supplies or transportation.

If the ultra recipient at army level were also in command of the SIU detachment, both difficulties mentioned above would be eased. A non-commissioned member of the SIU staff might be indoctrinated and used part time to keep records and to do other administrative tasks. Through the same means, transport would be available for liaison trips and, moreover, it would be less difficult to obtain supplies as the representative of a unit.


The weak link in the ultra system appears to be the possibility of error in the transmission and receipt of signals. The problem is a technical one, but it is believed that further effort can be devoted to it, because of the vital necessity for accuracy.

Considerable difficulty was experienced because some of the individuals indoctrinated prior to the arrival of the ultra recipient at the command were either of such caliber that they should not have been indoctrinated regardless of the position they occupied, or were less useful as indoctrinated personnel than others in the command because of changes in their duties brought about while the command was shaking down into operational form. Observation indicates that titles in operational intelligence staffs bear no absolute relation to functions, and it is believed that this problem should be solved on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, it is recommended that initially only the Commanding General and the G-2 be indoctrinated and that further recommendations for indoctrination be made only after the ultra recipient has spent a period at the command and has had an opportunity to observe the de facto functions of the various members of the staff. For example, at Ninth Army, the G-2 executive, who had been indoctrinated, performed purely administrative functions, while no member of the "Y" organization was indoctrinated.

The ultra recipient at Army level bears heavy responsibilities and works long hours, seven days per week. He is practically the only man on the staff who has no one to relieve him and the strain of prolonged operations is most severe. It is necessary, because the law of diminishing returns, if for no other reason, that an adequate system of periodic relief be provided.

6. Conclusion.

Ninth Army relied heavily upon ultra intelligence, and, when the service was withdrawn, all indoctrinated personnel expressed complete confidence in the material and appreciation of its value to the army's operations. Although there are details that can be improved, one may say that the ultra organization as a whole was of material assistance to the army throughout the period of its operations.


LOFTUS E. BECKER
Major, F.A.

APPENDIX

It is relatively easy to keep indoctrinated personnel advised on the enemy situation as it appears from all sources, including ultra. It is more difficult to accomplish the same end with respect to non-indoctrinated personnel at one's own headquarters and still more difficult to do so with respect to corps staffs. In order to accomplish the last, the ultra recipient must establish his position within the G-2 Section so that he can (a) veto or amend incorrect passages in publications sent to corps prepared by unindoctrinated members of the staff, and (b) publish appreciations or estimates to advise the corps of the true picture, with appropriate cover. Forms of appreciations and periodic reports prescribed by American manuals are not as well adapted to this task as the more informal type of discussion used by the British. The task is basically simple: to review the enemy situation using all bits of open information known to be correct (from ultra or otherwise) and filling in bits of ultra information by way of speculation or reasoning. At Ninth Army, experience gained from work with Twenty First Army Group led to the publication of a series of so-called "Notes on the Enemy" prepared by the ultra recipient. These were published as annexes to Periodic Reports or as Spot Intelligence Reports, and by means of them the corps were kept currently advised of the enemy situation, including such ultra items as would be "floated" by this means. There is attached to the ribbon copy as an example the series of these "Notes" published in this manner by Ninth U.S. Army during preparations for the Rhine crossing and the advance toward Berlin.

AUTH: CG, NINTH US ARMY
INIT: *WJ*
DATE: 20 March 1945

ANNEX #2 to
G-2 Periodic Report #196

HQ NINTH US ARMY
APO 339
20 March 1945

NOTES ON THE ENEMY ACROSS THE RHINE

(Sidelined Passages Are Not To be Reproduced)

Northwest HOLLAND: From the sea to a bit northwest of EMMERICH is the province of Twenty-fifth Army, commanded by Gen der Inf BLUMENTRITT. Its field forces amount to the equivalent of a Corps in strength. Disposed in the ZALTBOEMEL area (E25) and westward as far as it can reach is 331 Inf Division. To the east, from TIEL (E46) to somewhere east of OCHTEN (E75) is 34 SS "LANDSTROM NEDERLAND", a unit of no more than brigade strength and of uncertain fighting value. Between it and EMMERICH (E96) is situated 346 Inf Div, with or without the Fusilier Bn it contributed to First Parachute Army in February. Laying back, in the general AMERSFOORT area (E49), according to reliable civilian sources, is 361 VG Division, formerly located some 60 km to the northeast at ZWOLLE (Z33). XXX Corps controls in the west and LXXXVIII Corps in the east. Twenty-fifth Army is purely and simply a flank guard, with one division disposed to back up a thinly held line, and also to forestall an air drop between ARNHEM and the ZUIDER ZEE; an old enemy obsession. First Canadian Army report evidence of a general withdrawal of Germanic elements from northwest HOLLAND, but there is no evidence that the units named above are joining the move.

EMMERICH to KREFELD: Between these bounds are disposed the forces of First Parachute Army under Gen der FLIEGER SCHLEH. On its right flank, EMMERICH (E96), inclusive, to the area across from GRIETH (A05), 6 Para Division has been identified. Southeast of REES (A05), possibly between HAFFEN (A14) and BISLICH (A14), 84 Inf Division has been talked about, and below WESEL (A24) as far as SPELLEN (A23) sit 1222 GR of 180 Inf Division which is said to have parachutists on its right. Both between 6 Para and 84 Divs, and between 84 and 180 Divs there is room for another division, and we may, by way of hypothesis, fill these two gaps with 7 and 8 Para Divisions; which is north and which is south is a detail which will doubtless be made clear in time. From the DINSLAKEN area (A23) has come a prisoner from a so-called Regiment HAMBURG, who states that the regiment incorporates Nebelwerfer personnel from WEHRKREIS X. The city of the same name is situated in WEHRKREIS X and the WEHRKREIS has been counted upon for at least a division in the present crisis. The presence of two regiments, or roughly a division of replacement troops from WEHRKREIS X in or behind DINSLAKEN is a reasonable possibility and the term "Division HAMBURG" for such an aggregation is at least convenient. 2 Para Division has been well established just south of DUISBURG (A31), although battle groups have gone to REMAGEN (F62), and the obvious location for the remaining infantry unit of First Parachute Army, 190 Inf Division, is in DUISBURG and to the north, possible controlling the collection of VOLKSTURM and replacements comprising Parachute LEER GRUPPE II. We may assume that the line units are subordinated to the known Corps of First Para Army, II Para and LXXXVI. (LXIII Corps is believed to be in the general area also but we have no evidence as to their relative locations. Well behind the line, it would not be surprising to encounter at least a Battle Group of 245 Inf Division and WEHRKREIS VI Battle Groups amounting to at least a division (and probably a bit more) in strength, disposed in such manner as to be available against air landings. Disposed in tactical reserve, we can identify 116 Pz Division in the VORSEVELD (A17) area, and it is also in order to assume that 15 FG. (hinted at around ISSELBURG (A16)) is somewhere to the southeast and that both are controlled by XLVII Pz Corps. If we mention that there are likely to be a lot of parachutists generally north of BOCHOLT (A26), useful both as replacements and possibly for new ad hoc parachute units, we may leave Army Group H.

KREFELD TO KOLN: Somewhere around KREFELD (A10) is the boundary between Army Groups H and B, as well as between First Parachute Army on the north and Fifth Pz Army on the south. These are old acquaintances, and as long as we have known them, XII SS Corps has been the northern Corps of Fifth Pz Army (or of Fifteenth Army while it had the sector) and we have no reason to believe that the situation has changed east of the RHINE. The divisions of XII SS Corps, too, are familiar and we can now locate them: 183 Inf Div - KREFELD to the north edge of DUESSELDORF; 176 Inf Division - in DUESSELDORF; and 338 Inf Division - from the south edge of DUESSELDORF to somewhere south of the STURTZELBERG (F58) river bend. To the south,

We must rely on the assumption that the lineup east of the RHINE is as it was west of the river, in which case we may place 476, 59 and 363 Inf Divisions (probably under LXXXI Corps) in the area between 358 Inf Division and KOLN. How much of 476 Div is still in the north is open to question since battle groups of its component elements (34 ERS. Regt with 80 Bn) have been fighting at the bridgehead. Pz LEHR Division has been only partly committed in the REMAGEN area and there are indications that elements of the division are as far north as ALTENDORF (A5513), LINTORF (A4005) and WERMELSKIRCHEN (F6385). These may be rear elements and the main body of the division may be concentrating for an attack on the bridgehead but the evidence is not conclusive. Substantial elements may be behind DUISBURG and DUESSELDORF. As to the other reserves of Fifth Panzer Army, both infantry and armored, we have every reason to believe that they are all collected around REMAGEN (F62) where they, and others, are fully occupied. (See attached overlay - limited distribution.)

OK Thorn, Major
for HAROLD D. KEHM
Colonel, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-2

NOTES ON THE ENEMY ACROSS THE RHINE
(Supplementary to Annex #2, G-2 Periodic Report #196)

(Sidelined Passages are NOT to be Reproduced)

NORTHWEST HOLLAND: The ghost of ARNHEM is walking again, as shown by the enemy's concern about his northern flank. 361 Volksgrenadier Division has moved from the AMERSFOORT area (E49) into the line below EDE (E68), and thus fills in between the Dutch SS and 346 Infantry Division. If he is really concerned about this area, his line is still thinly held and there may be more on the way.

EMMERICH to KREFELD: On the north, the fog has lifted to show the parachutists neatly gathered together; 6 Parachute Division from EMMERICH (E96) to about A0353, 8 Parachute Division from the latter point to REES (A05)(?), and 7 Parachute Division either southeast of REES in the line, or in a layback position in the same area. It has been suggested that this formidable fighting force is under II Parachute Corps and there is no reason to dissent. Proceeding south, we find 84th Infantry Division just north of WESEL (A24) and 180 Infantry Division just south of the same town (as far as A2134, according to one PW). For the defense of WESEL, which is one of the better fortified areas on the east bank, therefore, the enemy is depending upon infantry, probably under control of LXXXVI Corps. Still farther south, there have been located in order an unidentified "EAR" Battalion, a regiment of Division HAMBURG, Parachute LEHR GRUPPE II, and 23 Parachute Regiment, the last said to be operating under 2 Parachute Division. The stubborn refusal of 190 Infantry Division to appear in this area, where its presence had been assumed, is accepted as proof that the assumption was wrong, rather than that the Division is coy. We have, therefore, to the south of 180 Infantry Division, a long sector under the newly identified LXIII Corps, with Division HAMBURG controlling odds and bodds on the north and 2 Parachute Division on the south.

KREFELD to KOLN: No change in the line.

TACTICAL RESERVES: The armored reserves of Twenty-fifth Army are non-existent; those of First Parachute Army are well known and reasonably well located. Under XLVII Panzer Corps are 116 Panzer Division in the general area VARSEVELDT (A67) - AALTEN (A27) - DINKPERLO (A16), slightly to the southeast of recent identifications, and 15 Panzer Grenadier Division, somewhere northeast of BOCHOLT (A26). It is clear that the enemy's weight is on his right flank, and it is most likely that a correspondingly high proportion of non-divisional Assault Gun Brigades, Anti-Tank Battalions, and Artillery units will also be found on contact in this northern area. It now appears, moreover, that what is in all likelihood the main body of Pz LEHR Division is located in the ESSEN (A41) - SOLINGEN (F58) area, northeast of DUESSELDORF, as armored tactical reserve for Fifth Panzer Army. The Battle Group of LEHR formerly at the bridgehead, has gone south, (M1009), to forestall another if it can. We call attention to the presence of parachutists in the OVERIJSEL-TWENTE area, to the possibility that a Battle Group of 245 Infantry Division may be in the background, and to the practical certainty that Battle Groups of WEHRKREIS VI troops are also in the bushes, in a strength of at least 3 reinforced regiments. One, KARST, is mentioned by a prisoner as commanding one of them. Finally, 190 Infantry Division, having failed to appear where expected, must be regarded as unlocated and available as a reserve in this area.

STRATEGIC RESERVES: It is believed that in all the West, the only place the enemy could spare troops, if pressed, is Northwest Holland, where Battle Groups, at least, of 346, 361, and even 331 could be withdrawn from the line. The non-appearance in the West of 715 Infantry Division (ex-ITALY) and 169 Infantry Division (ex-DENMARK), gives rise to the belief that they have joined the DRANG NACH OSTEN. 160 Infantry Division (also ex-DENMARK) appears disposed of in the form of a Battle Group DENMARK at REMAGEN and a reliable report that the rest of the Division hasn't moved at all. The news from the East is self-evident, and it seems unlikely that anything can be spared there, in the North or in the South. We take the view, therefore, that April will be here before the enemy's reinforcements of one division each from ITALY, DENMARK and/or the East. KESSELRING'S cupboard is not bare, but there is no meat on the bones.

AUTH: CG, NINTH U S ARMY
 INIT: *afm*
 DATE: 22 March 1945

ANNEX #2 to
 G-2 Periodic Report #198

HQ NINTH U S ARMY
 APO 839
 22 March 1945

COORDINATE	DATE	DESCRIPTION	SOURCE
F 6669 9815	15-3-45	Possible supply of military barracks.	9 APID Arty
A 4805 0149	16-3-45	Supplies stacked S of MUELLERLAUS.	XIII Corps G-2 129
F 6160 9959	"	Large storage plant active; supplies piled around bldg.	"
A 3854 1262	18-3-45	Supply point at BROCHERWALD.	XIII Corps G-2 130
A 3497 0964	"	Large number of small huts, probably supply dump.	"
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>			
A 527 147	15-3-45	Factory operating.	Recon Rep 2360
A 590-178	"	Factory operating.	"
A 580 150	"	Factory operating.	"
A 548 120	"	Factory operating.	"
A 523 110	"	Factory operating.	"
A 455 280	"	Factory operating.	Recon Rep 2361
F 242 935	"	Factory operating.	Recon Rep 2358
A 530 120	17-3-45	Factory in operation.	Recon Rep 2388
A 356 224	"	Factory in operation.	Recon Rep 2378
A 375 245	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 357 921	13-3-45	Electric power station.	83 Div XII
A 360 920	"	Gasworks.	"
A 361 960	"	Rheinmetall Borsig armament factories.	"
A 350 970	"	Mannesmann Munitionwerke.	"
A 370 915	"	Dusseldorfer Waggenfabrik.	"
A 4257 0361	16-3-45	Schlagbaum - radar, S/L along road.	XVI Corps G-2 129
A 4000 0130	"	Large factory.	"
A 3780 0575	"	Large factory.	"
A 5572 0947	"	Factory in operation.	XIII Corps G-2 129
A 5463 0938	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 5412 1037	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 5235 1205	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 5296 1726	"	Possible radar installation.	"
F 6182 9796	"	Large factory in operation.	"
A 5840 0308	"	300 ft mast, possible radio antenna.	"
A 5809 0661	"	Large radio station.	"
A 6019 1023	"	Large factory in operation.	"
A 3374 2062	14-3-45	Factory in operation.	XIII Corps G-2 128
A 3974 2106	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 3916 1956	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 3722 1515	"	Small factory in operation.	"
A 3150 2585	17-3-45	Possible radar.	XVI Corps CPID 14
A 3050 0968	18-3-45	Large radar installations.	XIII Corps G-2 130
A 337 155	14-3-45	Deutsch-Essenwerk plants in MUELHEIM.	Civ Interrog
A 628 347	18-3-45	Factory in operation.	Recon Rep 2404
A 626 361	"	Factory in operation.	"
A 669 189	"	3 factories in operation.	Recon Rep 2409
A 664 213	"		
A 703 197	"		
<u>TROOP CONCENTRATIONS</u>			
A 3780 0529	16-3-45	Barracks area.	XIII Corps G-2 129
A 3654 0734	"	Barracks area.	"
A 4170 3558	17-3-45	Camp area of at least 20 huts.	XVI Corps CPID 14
A 3478 0928	18-3-45	Ten barracks in woods.	XIII Corps G-2 130

Minichiello

for H. D. KEHM
 Colonel, G.S.C.,
 A. C. of S., G-2

AUTH: CG, NINTH US ARMY
DATE: 26 March 45
INIT: m

HEADQUARTERS
NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

APO 339
26 March 1945

Intelligence Spot Report

NOTES ON THE ENEMY
(Supplementary to Annex #2, G-2 Periodic Report #196)

Now that we have made contact with the enemy east of the Rhine, we find that his dispositions along the River were substantially as we had surmised while we were on the other bank. II Para Corps was located from EMMERICH (E06) to BISLICH (A05), exclusive, 6 Para on the north, 8 Para in the center around REES (A05), and 7 Para Division on the south. These units are tough and they fight well. LOXXVI Corps extended from BISLICH to the area A2926 (across from ORSOY), with 84 Inf Div, occupying the area from BISLICH through WESEL (A24). To the south of it, from the LIPPE River to A2926, was the sector of 100 Inf Division, together with a mixture of odds and ends, including various "ear" and "stomach" battalions and 580 Regt of Division HAMBURG. Finally, further south, as far as KREFELD (A20), was the sector of LXIII Corps with a single division, 2 Para, subordinated. All of its regiments were along the river and they were disposed, from north to south, 7, 23, and 2 Para Regts. 7 Para Regt has already edged north of the RUER in an attempt to block Ninth U. S. Army's right flank, and it is believed that other elements of 2 Para Division will be moved north for the same purpose. Although prisoners were taken from the Arty Regt of 190 Inf Division early on the 24th in the northern part of 100 Inf Division's sector, no further elements of the division have appeared in this area and the main body of the division is believed to have gone to strengthen the enemy's northern flank somewhere west of ARNEEM (E79).

Enemy dispositions, supplemented by prisoners' statements, make it abundantly clear that he expected the main weight of the Allied drive across the Rhine north of WESEL (A24), and both of the two armored units held in tactical reserve under XLVII Corps were located to meet such an attack, - 116 Pz in the general area of VARSEVELDT (A17) and 15 PG to the south near DINPERLO (A16). There is good reason to believe that non-divisional assault gun brigades, anti-tank battalions, and Arty were similarly disposed, with the weight north of the LIPPE.

II Para Corps fought well, but by the afternoon of the 24th the weight of the British attack, supplemented by the air drop, forced the enemy to commit a Battle Group of 115 PGR of 15 PG Division in the area south of BIENEN (A0556). On the morning of the 25th, a second Battle Group, of 104 PGR, 15 PG Division, had been committed to the southeast of BIENEN, and 15 PG Division was no longer in reserve. During the same day 394 Assault Gun brigade was identified on the front of XII British Corps.

Meanwhile, Ninth US Army was driving through 180 Infantry Division with little opposition and the enemy was forced to divert 116 Panzer Division south of the LIPPE in an attempt to stabilize his line. 60 PGR has been contacted at A3535, and 156 PGR in the area A3538. We may expect the armor of the division to follow. The total fighting strength of this division is estimated at 3,000 men and 40 tanks.

It is estimated that the enemy has no additional armored units of divisional status available for commitment, either in tactical or strategic reserve. Pz LEHR is fully committed in the RELAGEN area, and no others are available from the south, from GERMANY, from ITALY, from DENMARK, or from the east. There is little evidence with respect to non-divisional units, but it is estimated that the enemy has available within 24 hours of the battle area a maximum of 2 assault gun brigades, 3 anti-tank battalions, 2-3 waffer battalions, and possibly 2 motorized battalions of Wehrkreis VI troops. Of these, not more than one half will be available against Ninth US Army, in all 2,500 men, 40 assault guns, 45 SP AT guns and 25 woffers.

The enemy's infantry reserves are scarcely more imposing. It is judged that the divisions located west of EMMERICH (E96), (346, 361, 331, 34 SS and the bulk of 190 Inf) are not presently available against Ninth US Army both because of the dan-

...er of an attack across the WAAL by the Canadians and the need of troops to face the British to the north. The enemy must rely, therefore, on Battle Groups of 245 Inf Division (if the division is in condition to furnish them), on Battle Groups of Wehrkreis troops (such as Battle Group KARST already contacted east of the IJssel River), and on such scratch parachute units as he can bring down from the concentration in the OVERIJSEL-TWENTE area, roughly estimated at 10,000 men in the aggregate.

This picture speaks for itself. What the enemy has available on the Western Front is too little, and that which he might in time secure from other fronts will be too late.

John C. Miller, Capt.
for H. D. KEEM
Colonel, G. S. C.
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DISTRIBUTION:

"A" Plus 5 to G-2
"S"

AUTH: CG, NINTH US ARMY
DATE: 15 April 1945
INIT: 721

NINTH US ARMY, APO 339
15 April 1945

Intelligence Spot Report.

NOTES ON THE ENEMY NEAR BERLIN

NOTE: Under the pressure of time we have taken the liberty of illustrating this discussion with a modified version of a map prepared by Second British Army and attached as Appendix A to its Intelligence Summary No. 314.

When NINTH US ARMY crossed the RHINE, it drove into the area between WESEL and the RUHR which the enemy, judging from his dispositions, did not regard as a likely one for an attack in force. Almost immediately, he found it necessary to commit 116 Pz Division (one half of his armored tactical reserve) to back up a line none too securely held by elements of 34 Inf Division, 130 and 190 Inf Divisions (including elements of Div HAMBURG), and 2 Para Division. Going was sticky for a while in the pocket formed by the LIFFE-SEITEN Canal on the north, the RUHR on the south, and the DORTMUND-EMS Canal on the east, but when the British broke free on the north, our armor was able to cross the canal and head east. The British struck north, forcing aside the left wing of First Parachute Army; NINTH ARMY linked up with the FIRST ARMY, to encircle the enemy Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies (and as well substantial elements of the Parachute Army); and NINTH ARMY's armor, exploiting the hole in the enemy line made thereby, has now reached the ELBE without encountering a single major enemy field formation on the way. Such resistance as there has been was made by various Replacement and Training Units of WEHRKREISE VI and XI, by ad hoc formations organized from schools, Landesschuetzen personnel, Hitler Jugend, and the ineffective Volksturm, and by odds and ends of the SS.


Our advance to the ELBE has been swift, (swifter than any self-respecting G-2 could have ventured to predict three weeks ago), but the enemy we face is notorious for his ability to reorganize in the face of an apparently hopeless situation. Even now, the signs of a fight for BERLIN are appearing in the form of bitterly resisting Flak troops and two new divisions, POTSDAM and SCHARNHORST, the former of which turned up in the HARTZ, around BLANKENBURG, and the latter north of SCHONEFELCK (D2160).

First, it is worthwhile to turn for a moment to the big picture, for a part of the enemy's confusion has been due to his loss of control of his fighting forces. A thorough reorganization of the enemy chain of command was called for, and on the basis of captured documents and prisoners' statements, we may conclude that this much has been accomplished. The "Sorrows of Werther" were riotously funny compared to the picture confronting KESSELRING as C in C WEST for the past couple of weeks, and it was obviously necessary to limit his responsibilities. This has been done, apparently, by the creation of the new post of C in C NORTHWEST which has been entrusted to Generalfieldmarshal FUSCH, a man of wide experience in RUSSIA. It may be assumed that his sphere of command includes (a) HOLLAND, including the old area of C in C NETHERLANDS and that of Twenty-Fifth Army, (which carries us to the EMS), (b) the sector of First Parachute Army, (between the EMS and the WESER, judging by its dispositions) and finally, in all probability, (c) the sector of a new command, of army status, controlling the area between the WESER and a line roughly through MAGDEBURG-BERLIN. In support of this thesis is the statement of a general captured at HANNOVER who stated that for the last few days he had been operating under command of a newly organized Army. South of the line indicated would be the restricted sphere of command of C in C WEST, and he would require a new Army in the HARTZ area - because two full armies were surrounded in the RUHR and the front has expanded, not contracted. An obvious candidate for the vacancy either south or north of the MAGDEBURG-BERLIN line is Eleven SS Pz Army, last located on the eastern front without field units under its control.

In the same document that mentioned C in C NORTHWEST, reference was made to an Army Group BLUMENTRITT. The function of this command may well be to conduct

the defensive battle in the north and east, with Para Army and the new Army to its south, while C in C NETHERLANDS retires into FORTRESS HOLLAND for a Hitlerian defense of the ports.

On this basis, the new enemy chain of command should look something as follows, (Eleven Pz Army could be either "X" or "Y" Army):



It is easier, however, to accomplish an administrative reorganization than to raise an Army, and the foregoing measures are merely a background against which we may view the enemy troop status, and specifically, the forces he may be able to gather to face NINTH US ARMY between the ELBE and BERLIN. This we shall do from Northwest to Southeast.

NETHERLANDS: NINTH ARMY can now disregard all enemy forces in HOLLAND. Twenty-Fifth Army (with 34 SS, 361 VG, 346 Infantry, and as well, 6 Para Divisions) and the other forces in the NETHERLANDS (including the recently identified 219, 703, 63 and 11 Marine Divisions) are nothing more than a garrison squatting on the valuable ports of ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. In the same category as far as NINTH ARMY is concerned, but more likely to garrison prison camps than any fortress, are the miscellaneous enemy forces being cut up between the IJssel and the Rhine River.

EMS to WESER: This appears to be the sector of what remains of First Parachute Army (less 6 Para Division), and it too may be disregarded as a source of forces for the annoyance of NINTH ARMY. The parachutists are fully engaged in the double task of retiring gracefully before a determined British attack from the south and rallying to the defense of BREMEN. The holding troops, as always, are infantry under Div 471 (of WEHRKREIS XI), and possibly 325 of DENMARK, while 7 and 8 Para Divisions leap frog it to BREMEN. Meanwhile, 15 PG with the help of the Navy tries to hold off its British south of BREMEN until the parachutists arrive from the southwest. Except for several heavy anti-Tank or Pz Bns (e.g., 683) and elements of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND complex of units, it looks as if the Parachute Army will have to fight it out alone, with nothing to spare against NINTH ARMY.

WESER to MAGDEBURG-BERLIN line: This is the sector of one of the two new Armies in the west, and until the last couple of days, the only regular forces identified in the area were in the northern half, in the British sphere, where 2 Naval Division was identified along the WESER at HOYA, and other elements of 325 Division (of DENMARK) turned up, also along the WESER. In front of NINTH ARMY until it reached the ELBE there were only miscellaneous lots of WEHRKREIS troops (possibly under control of XI Army Corps, which one prisoner claims to be the field designation of WEHRKREIS XI), school units, Hitler Jugend (fanatical fighters), and other odds and ends. Yesterday and today, however, in the ELBE Bridgehead area one new infantry division has appeared, named SCHARNHORST. Another named POTSDAM has turned up in the HARTZ near BLANKENBURG. These are, as appears from prisoners' statements, formations organized to face the Soviet forces as did one of similar character, named HOLSTEIN. No other forces save Flak troops are known to be in the line in this sector; the possibility of tactical or strategic reserves will be considered below:

MAGDEBURG-BERLIN line to south of the HARTZ: This is the sector of the other of the two new Armies in the west, and in it despite the identification of a Bn

of Pz LEHR and elements of Pz Formation Westphalia, the troops have been of the same general character as those facing NINTH ARMY. There are some signs of an attempted build up in this area in the recent appearance of Division POTSDAM and also of 85 Inf Division. More of an enemy build up seemed to be in the making to the south, in the area of THIRD US ARMY where a rejuvenated 5 Para Division, Division DONAU, 456 Inf Division (Elts), 166 Inf and, it may be assumed an Assault Gun Brigade or two in addition to elements of 2 and 9 Pz Divisions, have been operating with little success. The enemy's line here will be more fully occupied with FIRST US ARMY, and its major concern to NINTH ARMY is a breeding ground for limited counterattacks, mainly by infantry elements.

RESERVES: Exclusive of forces from East: The speed of our advance has brought us in a matter of weeks to the enemy's rear areas - for the WEST and for the EAST. It is therefore possible for the enemy to move forces either way very quickly even if they are forced to do so with limited transport.

The actual facts on strengths and locations of the forces in this central area are extremely limited. The discussion that follows therefore can only point out the known possibilities. Among these are: (a) Those infantry divisions which have been resting and refitting in Germany (Twelfth Army Group has mentioned 600 Inf (Russian) 85, 89, 49, 716, 348 Inf, 169, 212 VG). (b) Some divisions known to have been in the course of formation. Two (POTSDAM and SCHARNHORST) have already been encountered. It is estimated that up to three additional divisions may be met between WIDGEBURG and BERLIN from the two groups mentioned above. (c) Up to 2 additional infantry divisions may be situated in the general HAMBURG area. These may well include a division of Naval infantry which, according to British reports, fights well. (d) Flak troops of which considerable numbers are known to be in the general BERLIN area. Reports from the front indicate that they also fight well and they, as well as supply and other rear elements of the Eastern army, may be placed under divisional control and make up the equivalent of another 2 to 3 infantry divisions, with specially strong anti-tank artillery.

Our major problem is not infantry, but rather the armor available to the enemy for counter offensive action. As to that, it is estimated that the enemy has one Battle Group, of less than divisional size, available in the general area of BERLIN, and another Battle Group, of similar size, in the general HAMBURG area, all exclusive of forces from the EAST.

Reserves from other fronts: The speed with which events are moving these days cannot be disregarded in considering the availability of forces from other theaters. We estimate that the forces now in DENMARK, or enroute there, are of no significance except as they can be used to implement the threat from the north referred to above. For that purpose, 233 Pz Tng Division can contribute armored units and about 2 Regts of infantry can also be made available in a short time from that area. Italy can contribute at best one division per month and any forces from there are likely to go to the southern part of the West Front. There remain the forces now on the Eastern front. Those in HUNGARY, including 6 SS Pz Army will, it is believed, be thrown against THIRD or FIRST rather than NINTH US ARMY. The same applies to 18 PG Division which is now out of contact in the East. The forces for which we must watch from now on are those believed to be somewhere in the BERLIN-DRESDEN area, including 21 Pz and 25 PG Divisions. To a lesser extent, we must also be prepared for movements from the East front north of BERLIN where 19 and 25 Pz Divisions are thought to be, and where HERMANN GOERING Pz and 10 SS Pz Divisions, presently unlocated, might well be, in view of past commitments. As yet, there is no sign that the enemy has diverted, or is capable of diverting, troops from East to West, but even HITLER must see the futility of holding back the police on the front porch while the bluecoats are pouring through the back door.

There is one important factor with respect to all enemy reserves that cannot be disregarded in estimating their combat value. He has many staffs without divisions, and many men and small units without controlling divisional staffs, but he is sorely lacking in trained, coordinated units of divisional size. And these cannot be whipped into shape by staff order; experience with the WEHRKREIS "Divisions" has fully demonstrated that point.

The enemy forces may delay, but they cannot stop our advance, and they can only gain in force if given time. There will undoubtedly be a serious attempt to hold the line of the ELBE and forces from the East are needed to do it. As to employment, it is estimated that the enemy forces will be used in delaying counterattacks, before BERLIN, and possibly against our north flank, from the HAMBURG area.

John M. Melson, Capt.
for H. D. KEHR
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - Appendix A

DISTR:

"M" Plus 5 to G-2
"S"

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
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LONDON, ENGLAND

19 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR

Subject: Ultra Intelligence at Sixth U.S. Army Group

A. Operations

1. The Army Group. The invasion of south France on 15 August 1944 was directed by AFHQ. Its Advance CP was at Bastia, under command of Gen. Devers. On about 1 September this CP moved to France and became 6th AG. The 1st French Army was organized at about this time or slightly later. The Army Group did not become formally operational until 15 September when it and its territory were transferred from AFHQ to SHAEF.

7th US Army and 1st French Army were subordinate to 6th Army Group throughout the remainder of the war. In addition the Army Group controlled the French Forces of the West (concerned with the reduction of the Gironde and La Rochelle fortresses) and the forces, first American and then French, operating on the Franco-Italian frontier.

The operations of 6th Army Group fall into six major phases: (1) An advance up the Rhone Valley to north of Dijon, where contact was made with the American armies operating in north France roughly about 1 October. (2) A drive through the Vosges and Hardt mountains in the latter half of November, which resulted in an angular front stretching along the Siegfried line in the north and (except for the Colmar pocket) along the Rhine to the east. (3) A period of defense in the latter half of December and most of January when the objective was to hold the Alsace plain if possible and the Vosges in any event against the threatened German offensive. (4) The elimination of the Colmar pocket and the regaining of earlier lines, accomplished during February. (5) The 7th Army offensive, in conjunction with the drive south by 3rd Army, which in March eliminated the enemy forces in the Saar triangle. (6) The final drive from the Rhine, first crossed by 7th Army near Speyer and by the French Army near Gernersheim, south to the Swiss frontier and east to Munich and Berchtesgaden.

The major mission of the Army Group during all but the first and last phases may fairly be said to have been to offer flank support to 12th Army Group. Within the Army Group, the major objectives have usually been allotted to the 7th Army, with 1st French Army, on the southernmost sector of the Western Front, offering flank protection and undertaking supporting attacks.

The main Hq of the Army Group moved to Lyon about 15 September, to Vittel about 5 October, to Kaiserslautern about 1 April and to Heidelberg about 15 April. Tactical Hq (always including the ultra station) were established in Pfalzburg

in the latter part of December and again in March, in Landstuhl about 20 March and Heidelberg about 1 April.

The following pages undertake to trace the part which ultra intelligence played in the Army Group.

2. The Period of Frustration. The SLU station was installed, ^{under the guidance of Col. Taylor} and an intelligence officer, Capt. Gentry, assigned to handle ultra intelligence, ~~under the guidance of Col. Taylor~~ during the middle of August. General Frank A. Allen was G-2 at this time. I arrived on 26 August.

During the Corsica period joint MATAF and Army Group briefings were held, at which the intelligence and operations personnel from both commands gave briefings. The audience was confined to those in the ultra picture. The system was not entirely satisfactory on the ground side, in that the briefings were undertaken by general officers (each with his many other responsibilities) rather than by comparative experts. It was yet far better than anything which was evolved for a long time after 6th Army Group separated from the MATAF tradition.

During the fortnight at St. Tropez General Allen undertook one or two informal and hurriedly arranged briefings of General Devers. He was given a new assignment (as PRO of SHAEF) on 15 September. Colonel (later Brig. Gen.) Eugene E. Harrison, a former cavalry officer then serving as Deputy G-3, was appointed G-2 about 10 days later. During the 3 weeks in Lyon the G-3 came around once and the G-2 twice to see if there was any ultra intelligence of interest. The other customers were confined to visiting generals from other commands.

The first month at Vittel was only a slight improvement. The procedure there was for Col. Harrison to deliver a G-2 briefing at the 0900 staff conference, combining both open and ultra intelligence. He would in turn be assailed by an open briefing from the OB Section at 0830 and an ultra briefing at about 0850, and would dash for the staff conference crumpling notes (which often later proved to be illegible to him) into his pockets. Once arrived at the conference, he would ordinarily discover non-briefed persons there and would be unable to deliver himself of his ultra intelligence. There would follow on such days several subsequent attempts to catch the CG alone in his office so that the ultra intelligence could be disgorged.

On an average of once a week I would descend upon the G-2 with one proposal or another by which the situation, which he readily agreed to be unsatisfactory, could be remedied. Each proposal was accepted in principle but never proposed to the CG. The one most frequently advanced was that the indoctrinated officers of the general staff stop in at the ultra room for a quarter hour briefing by the underlings before going to the staff conference in the war room.

A combination of happy circumstances led to the unexpected adoption of this proposal. Col. Taylor, who had visited at the Army Group, mentioned the unsatisfactory state of affairs to General Sibert who promised unhelpfully to do what he could. He visited 6th AG on 4 November and told Gen. Devers of the reliance Gen. Bradley placed upon ultra. Col. Harrison at this point brought forward the current proposal for reform and it was agreed to try it for a morning or two. Since 5 November neither General Devers nor any member of his staff (save the C of S

during the last month of the war) has, when at the Hq, ever missed the 0845 ultra briefing. The following history relates to the period from 5 November onward, when ultra intelligence first began to be used at 6th AG.

3. The Mechanics. The substance of the use of ultra intelligence is best understood if placed on the mechanical framework by which it was processed and disseminated.

a. SLU. The SLU/SCU detachment grew from 3 officers and 15 men in August to 6 officers and 44 men by May. It was ordinarily quartered in a suite of offices nearby the ultra room. Two typed copies of each message were delivered, with varying degrees of periodicity, during the day; the high priority messages were delivered as they were received. On an average of about once a month a message would seem to the SLU of such urgency that it should be delivered in the night. After the messages were signed for, the SLU responsibility in practice ceased.

b. The Recipients. Lt. Col. Food arrived at the Army Group about 20 September and, among other things, handled the air ultra intelligence from that time on, first for the Army Group and after its formation for 1st TACAF as well. He and I were the regular occupants of the room. Gentry transferred to the open side early in October. A Capt. Mertens, who worked on supply problems, was stationed in the ultra room in the early winter; he lasted for 3-4 weeks. Lieut. Richardson, sent in early March to assist me, was a welcome addition to the room and was with us to the end. Capt. Zimansky contributed his 10 day leave from BP in January, and Capt. Slusser relieved me for a return to BP in February.

I was rather severely over-taxed from October to February. The fault was largely my own, since I had rejected one offering from Col. Taylor. In consequence, with a basic schedule ranging from 80 to 100 hours a week, there was little time in this most crucial period for the reflection and the relaxed discussion which is necessary for a completely satisfactory job of disseminating ultra. A temporary diminution in volume during February and the arrival of Richardson in March eliminated the over-work problem.

c. Briefings. The heart of the ultra operations was the morning briefing at 0845, where Food gave the air intelligence and I the ground. The CG, the C of S, the G-2, 3 and 4 and Lt. Col. Torrielli attended from the Army Group; the CG (occasionally), his deputy and the A-2 from the Air Force.

At this conference, after Food gave the air and supply matters, I would spend from 10 to 20 minutes on the salient ground intelligence during the past 24 hours, with occasionally a special study or summary added in on lean days. With the sad experience of the first 10 weeks my major criterion in selection was that of interest or even entertainment, and I felt strongly that my job could be done only if the show remained appealing. From this there were several consequences. I did not read the messages, save in the occasional instance where the exact text was important, but trusted instead to acetate tabs attached to the maps to jog a very faulty memory. This resulted frequently in minor inaccuracies and the loss of detail, but the general officers would in any event have carried away only a broad and inaccurate picture. In the second place I led the audience only very gradually into the numbers racket. At the outset they

did not know the two German armies which were opposing them; by the end they had a reasonable familiarity with the divisions on their front and the armored divisions on the entire western front. Except for armored units I never discussed units of less than divisional size (and made no attempt myself to become familiar with them). In the third place, all summaries and facts of any degree of intricacy were put forward on large charts (done in colored crayon) so that they could be examined while I touched orally only upon the salient features or conclusions. Finally, I made every effort to keep the discussion on an entertainment level rather than one of correct military precision; this probably shaded over into impudence on occasion but at least kept the audience awake. Good, it should be added, proved of inestimable aid in his constant and caustic reminders of how the scholar should phrase and present his thoughts to the army.

Through most of the period a 1/100,000 scale map was used for the Army Group area and a 1/250,000 scale for the Western Front, chiefly in order to conform to the war room maps which were used in the staff conference. After much experimentation, large and easily-read cardboard tabs for both German and Allied units were used. Since the conferences would frequently fall into a planning or discussion stage, and since the generals thought of locations in terms of their own units, it was necessary to keep the front lines and the Allied units and boundaries up to date. This proved a distressing chore, but one which could not be avoided.

d. Use of Ultra by Other Sections. There were some 5 sections which put ultra to greater or lesser use.

(1) OB. The chief of OB, Lt. Col. Torrielli, attended the morning briefing and would drop in for a chat or a question two or three times a day. He did not read the messages, save an occasional one thrust upon him, but has a quick and retentive mind and kept abreast of the ultra picture by ear. For most of the period the OB section had none who was indoctrinated, and its products and briefings were guided by Torrielli, on the whole satisfactorily and so far as I knew with complete regard for security. In the last 3 months, Torrielli's then OB assistant, Capt. Chiccs, was in the picture. He did not attend the morning briefings but read over the messages each day.

(2) Sigint. The chief of the section, Lt. Col. Boarce, for most of the period read over the messages each day. Since his job was more administrative than concerned with the details of intelligence he glanced through the messages only for matters of broad interest or for the very rare message which might illumine a particular sigint problem.

(3) A Force. Lt. Col. Sweeney and his intelligence officer, Capt. Ekstrom, were in the picture and made a more or less consistent practice of reading the messages. For about half of the period my relations with Sweeney were not good, because of divergent theories of the extent of the service I was to provide him. Because of a possibly erroneous view that it would be unprofitable even if I had the time, I refused both to arrange a regular briefing for him and to keep notes for the A Force work. The personal relations were eventually restored to cordiality, but I doubt that ultra was ever of much real use to the A Force at the Hq.

(4) Supply and Targets. Neither the supply work nor the target work ever developed into a very satisfactory state at 6th AG. On the supply side a succession of men (Major Frankel, then Capt. Mertens, then Major Gentry) were supposed to be responsible for the work. Because of want of time (or in some cases want of capacity) the work was never satisfactorily done, but this was not too important since an Army Group has really very little need for detailed supply intelligence. The target work was similarly organized (and indeed the responsibility was never clearly marked between Army Group and Air Force) until Reed took over the work of G-2 air about February. At about the same time, because of their interrelation and possibly also because of boredom, he took on the ultra supply problems.

(5) Fortifications. Frankel, originally indoctrinated in the thought that he was to handle supply problems, never in fact worked in this field but devoted himself to defenses and terrain. Messages bearing on fortifications or defense lines would from time to time be called to his attention. Ultra was however of no real importance in this field.

(6) Signals Security. Chiefly because of ultra reports of the German Y service, the chief signal officer and his signals security officer at each command were indoctrinated and given access to the relevant messages. At 6th AG Capt. Glidden read the messages noted for Signals Security and General Lenzner participated in an occasional conference on the signals problems.

e. Appreciations and Planning. No regular ultra appreciations were prepared at 6th Army Group. This for a number of reasons. General Harrison had a considerable antipathy to any written material which might be unnecessary. The work as things were arranged would have to be done by me and for most of the period I was too busy to take on anything not absolutely imperative. Finally, with only one of the subordinate armies having knowledge of ultra it was far more profitable to put the main emphasis upon the open appreciations and summaries. Accordingly, the use of ultra in this connection was confined to my informal discussions with Torrielli and an occasional checking or revision of the open appreciation.

7th Army had both an unusually good G-2 and a talented recipient so I felt no necessity to give them the benefit of my somewhat inexperienced judgment on the enemy's forces and capacities. Since, however, the necessary routing policy of BF left 7th Army with a chronic hunger for intelligence of other fronts or of general interest, I sent down each day an informal summary of the intelligence of the past 24 hours which might be of use to the army. On occasion I would also include the gist of some longer study which had been prepared on a particular topic.

On the planning side, the direct use of ultra was again confined almost entirely to discussions with Torrielli. He handled the G-2 side of the "Junior Planning Committee", a group representing the various sections and services of the Army Group which did the lion's share of the overall planning.

f. Notes. An ever-present chore was that of note-taking. I felt obliged to be in a position where I could whenever necessary lay my hands on any ultra intelligence which might unexpectedly prove of value. This included a commitment to keep full ultra records on all units from divisions up, on the Western Front and all units of any size in our own area, together with items of general intelligence

and more rudimentary notes on the German knowledge of Allied forces. In addition, I included some of the more important open intelligence in the briefings and kept the maps posted on the basis of both open and ultra intelligence. This led me, when time permitted, to include open intelligence in the note-taking task. According to the demands on my time, I varied between no open notes, notes on units on our front, and notes on all divisions on the western front. After the arrival of Richardson the latter course was consistently followed. To aid both security and searching, the ultra was entered in red and the open in blue ink.

Most of the prodigious effort was wasted in the sense that not more than 5-10% of the entries were ever used. But it seemed an inevitable waste since, even were one so shameless as to rely on inquiries to B.P. as to past intelligence, the information was almost invariably needed at once, to illuminate a current message or to answer a question.

g. Sitrapa. B.P. liked to have front lines and boundaries, new identifications and intentions sent back to it in a daily sitrep. I never did a very good job on this, chiefly because it seemed a less imperative task than others and accordingly was the first to be slighted. The new identifications were taken without checking from the daily G-2 summary of the Army Group; the front lines were an off-shoot of the map-posting; and the intentions presented a problem which I never solved. If one took at face value the informal discussion of intentions, then decided there would be no breach of confidence if they were sent off, it would be at least as likely as not that the intentions would be changed and possibly without my knowing of it. If one waited for formal letters of instruction, the matter was either too general or too old to be of much use. General Harrison was not sympathetic to this interest of B.P. so no formal channels could be developed.

h. Moves. Experience gradually taught us the mechanics of living so that a move was a matter of comparative ease. All maps were mounted on 4' x 8' plywood boards, which could be put face-to-face and tacked together with the tabs still mounted. All open papers were kept in a transportable box and ultra papers in a small safe. Toward the end, having discovered that tables and chairs were usually available, we carried only the folding variety. One SLU party was sent off a day in advance, usually with Hood, and the morning briefing continued at the old Eq on the day of the move. Immediately after the briefing the advance station would open up and the old one close. I would load the map boards and the small amount of furniture on a truck and leave just after the briefing. With good fortune on electricians, carpenters, etc., the net cost in time would thus be reduced to not more than an hour or so at each end in addition to travel time.

B. Evaluation

1. Use of Ultra by the C.G. The major contributions of ultra intelligence to 6th Army Group seem to me to have been (a) It gave in the aggregate a good over-all picture of the course of the war and the state of enemy forces on the Army Group front. (b) It was on a half-dozen times or more of major operational value. (c) It served to introduce the C.G. and his general staff, in a more or less painless manner, to the intelligence work of the Army Group. (d) It operated as a guide and a general control to the open intelligence produced by O.I.

a. General Background. It is impossible precisely to estimate the value to a C.G. of knowing the general state of the enemy's mind. Even the more precise matters such as the enemy priorities between the various fronts, the state of his supply, and the disposition of his troops are rarely if ever directly reflected in an operational decision at Army Group level. Yet these matters, more or less unconsciously assimilated over a period of time, were probably the most significant value of ultra intelligence at the Army Group. They pointed the way to the choice between a bold or a cautious decision, and lent to command decisions a confidence which otherwise would have been lacking.

b. Operational Value. An Army Group, which carries out the strategic decisions of a supreme Hq and leaves tactical decisions to the subordinate armies, does not have a very large area in which specific intelligence can be translated into operational value. There were, however, a fair number of important decisions in which the Army Group at least participated which were due in whole or in part to ultra intelligence. They include:

(1) In the course of the operations between Dijon and the Vosges, ultra gave 4 or 5 days advance notice of the appearance of 5 Panzer Army on the northern flank of 7th Army and forces were redispensed to strengthen that area.

(2) The Ardennes offensive was not in 6th AG area, and except for Torrielli's expectation of a medium-sized diversionary offensive, was not anticipated by 6th AG. However, ultra did serve promptly to indicate its scope and to produce some preparations for the inevitable draft upon our divisions for the benefit of the northern armies.

(3) The bargain counter offensive which was undertaken by Army Groups G and Upper Rhine in our area in January was anticipated very completely by virtue of ultra. The indications were never as conclusive nor as specific as one would wish, but they served to give warning successively of an attack south of Saarbruecken, of the attempt to break through the Hagenau corner into the Rhine plain, of the Rhine crossing north of Strassbourg and of the offensive north out of the Colmar pocket. The latter two moves were also anticipated by open intelligence, and Pearl contributed greatly to the Hagenau forevision, but the successful defense at those points was, I believe, in large part due to the foreknowledge obtained through ultra intelligence.

(4) I know of no operational decision which resulted, but ultra was at least a consolation at the time both open intelligence and higher Hq were threatening us with the arrival of 6 SS Panzer Army after its withdrawal from the Eifel, and it served quite definitely to remove that somewhat fantastic threat a fortnight or more before it would have been surmised from open intelligence.

(5) The eventual elimination of the Colmar pocket by the French Army and the XXI U.S. Corps would have proceeded without ultra intelligence, but only with the expenditure of disproportionate forces in view of the persistent reports from agents of large forces in the pocket and across the Rhine. In contradicting these reports, ultra served to leave the 7th Army largely intact and to gain some time in preparations for its subsequent offensive.

(6) Immediately after the enemy was driven from the Saar triangle the general belief from open sources was that the 7th and 1st German Armies were substantially eliminated. Ultra served to temper that overoptimism and to prepare the C.G. for the rather quick formation of organized lines of resistance in the Army Group area.

(7) The "National Redoubt" had been a bogey for some months before its approaches were reached by the Army Group. I had been perhaps too cautious in refusing to generalize from the absence of ultra evidence, but by the time it had become an imminent problem there were enough fragments from ultra so that I could lend affirmative support to the no-fortress school of thought. This conclusion, combined with the overall evidence of German collapse, probably sped up the ~~trial~~ stages of the Army Group war by a bit.

c. Educational Value. It may, I believe, fairly be said that the ultra intelligence and briefings helped to make the C.G. aware of the value and perhaps of the existence, of intelligence generally. The frequent presence of items of major interest, plus a determined effort to banish the risk of boredom, managed to hold attendance at a virtually perfect level. From this it inevitably developed that the C.G. and his staff became first aware of and then rather interested in enemy dispositions and plans. Both the open and ultra intelligence had accordingly a rather more fruitful role than would otherwise have been the case.

2. Relations with G-2 Section. Throughout the operational life of 6th AG the ultra intelligence and recipients had a rather ambiguous status in the G-2 section. The ambiguity had its advantages, but I think on the whole was neither a fortunate nor a necessary thing.

a. O.I. General Harrison left me entirely on my own and confined his work on ultra intelligence to attendance at the morning briefing plus an occasional trip to the room, every day or so, to see if there were anything new. I was formally under Torrielli, as chief of O.I., but we soon reached a tacit agreement that I would operate on my own but would as a matter of course (and gladly) defer to him, on matters of open intelligence which arose in the course of the briefings. This had large advantages in the resulting independence it gave me. It gave rise also to equally serious disadvantages, in that both I and ultra were regarded as outside the regular stream of G-2 work. Apart, therefore, from my unilateral invasion of open intelligence for the purpose of briefings, I had only an indirect influence, through Torrielli, on the open intelligence work.

As an abstract matter, I am convinced that the ultra recipient should regard himself, at least for most purposes, a working member of O.I. and be prepared both to take orders and to contribute his efforts, when there be time, to the open work. With my own deficiencies and in the circumstances the contrary course adopted at 6th Army Group was, however, inevitable and, since it avoided worse consequences, probably desirable.

b. O.B. Whatever the ambiguity of the command and administrative relationships, Torrielli and I remained on good working terms throughout the period. The result was quite close correlation of open and ultra intelligence. I used as much of the open identifications and signal intelligence as suited my purpose (averaging perhaps one item a day, or rather less, in the briefings) and the open battle order and estimates received general and quite effective guidance from Torrielli's knowledge of ultra. Again, as an abstract matter, it would be far better to have the head of O.I., or at least of the O.B. Section, read and work over the ultra intelligence as a regular matter so that there would be automatic fusion of the two. As matters developed, the only regular and detailed fusion was done by me and I was (a) for most of the time too busy to do a completely adequate job of it, and (b) confined to the briefings as a means of dissemination.

c. Sigint. On the Sigint side, I believe from the experience at 6th AG that not only the head of the section but also his assistant should be indoctrinated. The chief has operational control not only of his staff officers, but of the R.I. companies in the area and cannot himself do the intelligence work. The man who does this work and disseminates it, on the other hand, would be better aware of the problems which ultra might answer and in a better position to extract Pearl and Thumb which could be used as a cover. And since it is a remarkably stupid Sigint officer who does not have a very good idea what intelligence is hawked behind the locked doors of the recipient, there would be no occasion to worry on the security side. I never got around to asking the indoctrination of Capt. Riesberg at 6th AG because the limited volume of sigint on our area was reported fully, and the correlation with ultra was easily accomplished by me and Torrielli in our respective fields. However, in other circumstances, at least two sigint officers should I believe be indoctrinated.

d. C.I. The chief of C.I., Col. Erskine, was in the ultra picture, but as things developed found very little use for ultra in his operations (as opposed to whatever discussions may have been carried on at SHAEF which would include ultra). I would show him an occasional message dealing with enemy agents or a recurrent Skorzeny threat but cannot say that either I or the ultra intelligence had any noticeable impact upon C.I. functions.

e. Supply and Targets. The use of ultra intelligence in the field of supply and targets is better discussed by Rood, as he took over that work about midway in the life of the Army Group.

3. Use of Ultra by Other Staff Sections. Ultra intelligence was of comparatively little value to the other sections which had access to it, but still had occasional uses.

a. Chief of Staff. Gen. Barr's use of ultra intelligence was in his capacity as acting C.G., during the absence of Gen. Devers, or as a guide to the detailed decisions reached in the C of S meeting, and presents no problem separate from those discussed under the C.G.

b. G-3. Gen. Jenkins, as G-3, also had about the same uses for ultra intelligence as the C.G., so far, at least, as concerns enemy dispositions and intentions, and separate discussion is not needed.

c. A-Force. In theory, ultra would be indispensable to the operations of the A-Force Section of G-3. It shows, with a fair degree of completeness, the enemy knowledge of Allied dispositions, the threats which most concern the enemy, and very often the enemy intentions. I am unable, however, to say just how far this potential benefit was realized at 6th Army Group. My belief is that it was only partially so. Had the A-Force been more diligent in following enemy battle order, and enemy knowledge of Allied dispositions, the ultra intelligence was available to form a rather precise background for their planning. Similarly, had I been in a position to do this work for them, and to participate in the A-Force discussions, this would probably have resulted. It should be added that, after some unpleasant discussions, A-Force toward the end did do at least some and perhaps all of the drudging necessary to gain all benefits from ultra. But as a generalized conclusion, I fear that Ultra was of real benefit to A-Force only when a message happened to deal with a specific enemy fear which A-Force was trying to stimulate or allay.

d. G-4. Gen. Adcock, G-4, followed ultra closely and with much interest. I am by no means clear of any immediate benefit to G-4 work which was offered by ultra, but of necessity the position requires close participation in operational planning and the staff work would have suffered considerably had the G-4 not been aware of the basis for the plans.

e. Signals. After the indoctrination of the Chief Signals Officer, General Lenzner and his security officer, Capt. Gliddon, there was a noticeable effort to improve security. The Army Group issued several directives and sent one investigating party to the French Army, the signal security of which had long been known on all sides to be shockingly bad. Probably because the French Army in March was largely inactive, a considerable improvement was noted. When the final offensive across the Rhine began very little effort was made to apply any security measure to the radio traffic of either army which would interfere with operations. On the balance, ultra intelligence contributed something toward the promotion of signals security and, although the gains were by no means commensurate to the need, would probably have led in time to the revision of basic procedures which I understand was a necessary prelude to genuine security in ETO. And it certainly operated to destroy what would otherwise have been a probable illusion that Allied units out of the line were unknown to the enemy.

h. Relations with SIU. The SIU/SCU station was, at least after the arrival of Fl/Lt. Harris, a thoroughly efficient organization and did its job without hitch or without any threat to security. There were however many difficulties at 6th Army Group arising from their undefined relation to the Hq and to the recipients; these difficulties were accentuated by the difference in nationality. On another occasion, it would, I believe, be far better to have an American SIU in American commands and somewhat more clearly to define their function.

The senior SIU officer is given a nominal responsibility for security which in practice cannot possibly be performed, as he never sees any of the customers (other than the recipients, or an occasional administrative contact with the G-2) and has no intelligence training to permit passing a security judgment even if he had the opportunity.

Another aggravating feature is that the Hq and the G-2 consider (rightly, I believe) the SIU as wholly subordinate for administration and discipline, while SIU tends to believe itself a wholly independent unit. Correlatively, because of the difference in rank, it was ordinarily believed at 6th AG that the SIU was subordinated to the recipients; Rood and I ourselves had a tendency to operate on this theory. The matter would have sorted itself out automatically had the same army been involved. As it was, there was a constant under-current of friction. This friction was not alleviated by the specialized training of the recipients which led us to pass judgment on the way SIU did its job; that the judgment was ordinarily favorable did not alter their preference for a wholly separate status.

I accordingly believe rather strongly that (when the occasion might permit) American commands should have American SIU's, and that they should either explicitly or in consequence be subordinated to the recipients or to the G-2 if there be none. And it is illusory, and therefore dangerous, to suppose that the technical radio and Cryptographic people can have any control or even influence upon the security of what happens after the customer has the message.

5. Relations with 7th Army. In general, there was only limited contact between the ultra recipients at 6th AG and 7th Army. In contrast to open intelligence, the commodity was shipped to each of us and there was not the mechanical necessity for daily interchange. The distances between the Hq were often too great, and Bussey and myself ordinarily too busy, to permit very free visiting back and forth. There was in result little or no consultation or cross-fertilization between us. I do not think the practical loss very great, since Bussey was amply able and I presumably so to reach sound results with only the aid found in our respective Hq's. My daily summary of intelligence not sent to the Army served to remove the handicaps of too limited knowledge under which he would otherwise have labored. However, certainly as a social benefit and ordinarily as a professional gain, the army and ~~navy~~ group stations should have considerably more frequent contact than was the case with us.

There was never any thought that, in consequence of my army group position, I had any form of control over the 7th Army recipient. This reflected both the complete competence of Bussey and the roughly similar relations of the G-2's. I should think that as a general rule there would never be any need for any form of formal control between recipients, and that a reasonably free interchange of ideas would meet every need.

6. Relations with the French. The French problem at 6th Army Group had two aspects, (a) the liaison officers in the Hq, and (b) the 1st French Army, neither of which could, of course, be allowed to suspect the existence of ultra.

a. French Liaison Officers. Whatever may have been the original intention, the French had no operational role in the Army Group Hq. There were, however, a sizeable cluster of Frenchmen in each section, doing what I do not know. Since they did not attend the staff conferences, and since there was in any event no impulse to an over-generous candor with the French, there was at no point any security problem as regards them. To this there is one exception, the one or two officers stationed in the G-2 Section who of necessity were aware of the locked ultra room, the daily appearance of the generals, and the fact that I figured in operational intelligence. I should think it possible that Major de Chizelle, who was longest in the office, had a rather shrewd idea of what in fact was cooking. He was, however, too much of a gentleman ever to make any direct inquiries.

b. 1st French Army. No security problem ever arose with respect to this army and, correlatively, ultra intelligence was rarely, if ever, of direct benefit to the operations of that army. On the comparatively few occasions when the intelligence presented a matter of operational urgency, Torrielli and I were usually able to concoct an approximately correct story out of agents' reports, Tac R, etc. which was passed down to the Army G-2. Apart from these half-dozen instances, the French Army benefitted from ultra intelligence only so far as it had far better open intelligence from the Army Group than otherwise would have been the case. This was of some general value in that after about 6 months of indignant protests at Army Group estimates (which persisted in placing the opposing enemy forces at about $\frac{1}{4}$ instead of quadruple the French Army) the French began eventually to have a fair degree of confidence in the American intelligence estimates.

7. Security. My experience, which so far as I can see is typical, convinces me that substantial security is ordinarily rather easily attained, and that perfect security is an impossibility.

a. General Exhortations. At 6th AG, a beguiling appearance of complete awareness of the security problem was produced by a series of rather easy steps:

(1) The briefing discussion, ordinarily undertaken by me with the senior SII officer and a general officer to supplement my statements, served as an introduction. The regulations were dutifully read and signed but included so much only partially relevant material, and were couched in such technical language, that they contributed nothing.

(2) I drew up a poster which, by taking some liberties with the text, reduced the ultra regulations to 5 rather simple precepts, roughly as follows: don't mention ultra within hearing of those not on the list; don't discuss or hint at ultra over the telephone; don't take any ultra paper out of the Hq; don't issue orders which could give the enemy or those not on the list any notion of the nature of the intelligence; and don't leave the Hq without being de-briefed. This was posted on the wall at Vittel, where the ultra room was under 24 hour guard, and was from time to time trotted out and posted during the day time at other Hq. I am convinced that this poster was worth a dozen readings of regulations, and when it was up steadily I was gratified to note references to "Rule 2", etc., by the general officers.

(3) When the telephone situation seemed to be getting out of hand, chiefly due to the rather dangerous belief of the Shaef, 6th AG and 7th Army Group intelligence officers that their thinly veiled references would baffle the enemy, General Devers issued a directive to the Army Group and 7th Army forbidding any reference to or disguised hint at ultra intelligence.

(4) On the rather frequent occasions when the CG asked what was being done to exploit ultra intelligence, or showed signs of doing something about it himself, I would try to bring up the security problem by way either of warning or suggestion. Since there is inevitably a problem of some delicacy when a major wags an admonitory finger at a full general, about half the time or more I passed the opportunity by, but think the remaining occasions were sufficient to keep the problem alive.

b. Telephones. The telephone is perhaps the greatest threat to ultra security, particularly if it masks its dangers under the green color of the scrambler phone. It is far easier to pick up the telephone on one's desk than to prepare a message and get it to the SII. This ease has in most commands been confused with operational necessity, although in point of fact the occasions are very rare, when an hour or a half-hour's delay in intelligence are important to operations. As indicated above, 6th AG issued a formal prohibition rather early in the game, but this could not control Shaef and I am confident that Torrielli did not in fact tell Generals Strong and Ford that they should mind their tongues. It did however largely serve to eliminate the somewhat more vulnerable conversations from Army Group to Army. I was able to stop the C.G. once as he was reaching for the phone, the G-2 perhaps a half dozen times, and gave Torrielli about a fortnightly warning. All of this served certainly to prevent my hearing of the use of the telephone, and probably considerably to diminish its use. I have, however, no illusion that the prohibitions were uniformly followed.

c. Papers. Ultra papers were never the slightest problem at the Hq. Soon after my arrival, because of a considerable scepticism as to the conduct at the time of my superiors, I let it be understood that papers could not be taken from the ultra room; it was assumed by the victims that this was the import of the fine-type regulations. The general prohibition was, of course, relaxed to the point that a particular message could be taken to the C.G., and returned immediately thereafter, and during the period when the G-2 was undertaking to do the briefing, when his notes would always be returned to me. When there was any occasion to carry notes away from the Hq, either to brief the C.G. when he was away or to confer at other Hq, the G-2 or other note-taker would ordinarily submit them for approval.

d. General Officers. So long as ultra intelligence is fed to high ranking officers, which of course is its chief purpose, its security must inevitably be a somewhat chancy problem. These men have many responsibilities, and receive information from many sources. While their exceptional talents are evident from their rank, they would have to be blessed with super-human memories and caution if they were consistently to remember the source of their information and the rules as to its use. The indiscretions, moreover, almost always occur in circumstances of which even the G-2 is unaware, to say nothing of the ultra recipient.

There were perhaps 4 or 5 minor incidents at 6th AG which came to my attention during its operational period: ordinarily of an order such as a statement by the C.G. in the war room that, for example, 245 Division was in Holland not the Saar. On that particular occasion I tried to lecture the C.G. on the next briefing but rather botched the job. The other instances were even less incriminating and I did nothing. The only major incident of which I know is not yet fully explored, but I should not be surprised if Gen. Devers had been present when Gen. Patch made his Meredith phone call to XV Corps. I am sure, however, that there have been dozens of instances of minor, and possibly major, indiscretions which never reached my ears.

I of course do not suggest that any security violations were conscious. In truth, both Gen. Devers and his entire staff were thoroughly cooperative and concerned on the matter of security. He warmly approved and unhesitatingly issued the telephone directive. All visitors were scrupulously checked against the list before admittance (and one flabbergasted major general summarily evicted when an aide brought him to the door during a briefing). All security messages and warnings were most sympathetically received.

e. "Strictly Personal". One minor B.P. practice was, at least at 6th Army Group, a threat to security rather than the safeguard which was intended. "Gossipy" items (quite frequent in the closing weeks) were sent strictly personal to the G-2. Until two firm statements that they were to be passed only to the C.G. and the C of S were received, these were as a matter of course shown to me. Thereafter (unless the message was wholly incomprehensible to the G-2, as one or two were) I did not see them. This had the result that the gossipy items, unevaluated and without security warning, were confined to the hands of those with the least training in their interpretation and with the least preoccupation with security. The result had the appeal of a nicely turned paradox, but was hardly efficient. So far as the American commands were concerned, such messages should obviously have been sent strictly personal for the recipients.

8. The Ultra Recipient. I am hardly able to pass unbiased judgment, but it seems entirely clear to me that the attachment of a special ultra intelligence officer is a wise move, and often an indispensable one.

a. Security. The security of ultra is, I believe, promoted more by the presence of the recipient than by any other single factor. (1) He is largely preoccupied with ultra, and has a long training in the need for security. (2) The papers and the intelligence are centralized, with the resulting responsible control of its use and custody of the papers. (3) The recipient is attached, rather than an integral part of the command, and ordinarily has at least a residue of civilian outlook. Both serve considerably to augment his independence and to minimize the view that regulations are self-enforcing so far as officers of higher rank are concerned.

b. Augmenting the TO. The ultra recipient is not a change in the TO and has, as a rule, been more carefully recruited than the officers of comparable rank in the G-2 Section. The presence of the recipient should therefore serve to increase the over-all effectiveness of the G-2 Section.

c. Expertise. There is, too, some advantage in having the ultra intelligence worked over by one thoroughly familiar both with the potentialities and limitations of ultra, and with the conventions of the disseminating agency. This advantage, however, is probably off-set, if not overbalanced, by the difficulties of fusion with open intelligence which are consequent upon the one-man monopoly of ultra which is likely to result from the presence of a recipient.

On the balance, I feel that the policy of attaching ultra specialists to the commands is one which has paid dividends.

9. The Work of B.P. A paper written at BP in February, and the 6th AG reply to the questionnaire, serves adequately to explain virtually complete satisfaction with the superb service rendered the commands by BP. In addition to the fabulous volume of intelligence uncovered by Hut 6, the work of Hut 3 seemed in every major aspect to be beyond cavil. The routing, the priorities and the draftsmanship were uniformly excellent.

10. The Role of Ultra at 6th AG. I am not wholly convinced from my experience that the Army Group has a real function to perform. This, however, is neither the place nor the critic to explore that topic and I proceed upon the possibly unreal assumption that ultra is justified to the extent that it helps the Army Group to function.

Ultra intelligence during the operational life of 6th Army Group has certainly been the most important and useful single source of intelligence. I incline to the belief, indeed, that it has been more valuable than all other sources combined. This certainly is the case if measured by the attention paid it by the CG, or by the impact upon decisions and operations of the command. It is not, however, the case if measured by its direct effect upon the work of the G-2 Section or, of course, by the size of the audience which the intelligence reaches.

The major uses of ultra at 6th AG have been: (1) educating the CG as to the value of intelligence; (2) affording him a general background as to the state and

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disposition of the enemy forces; (3) serving as a control to the open intelligence; and (4) offering otherwise unavailable knowledge of major enemy operations. Its effectiveness (and the good fortune of the G-2 Section) is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that we were never surprised by any German move in our area and that, of the perhaps 60 divisions which at one time or another opposed us, not more than a half dozen appeared without advance ultra warning.

So far as concerns the recipient, it was good fun.

Respectfully submitted,



WARNER W. GARINER

Major, LI

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26 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra at 6th Army Group.

My general comments on ultra at 6th Army Group must, of necessity, be limited in their scope and value. Firstly, my period of service with the army group was relatively short, extending for only two months, from early March 45 to the end of the war. This was a period during which intelligence procedures had become fixed, and frequently the speeding tempo of operations seemed to overshadow in interest all intelligence including ultra. The general "last lap" attitude at our headquarters was perhaps not a fair atmosphere in which to judge the value of ultra. Secondly, my duties at 6th Army Group were primarily of a clerical or routine nature, and though I at all times had access to the substance of ultra and a first hand observation of its functioning there, I don't feel that I can accurately evaluate the ultra picture at 6th Army Group under all the various categories to which Major Gardner has made reference in his report.

Duties

(1)
My duties were maintaining much of the material on the situation map in the recipients room, i.e., front lines, boundaries, unit headquarters, etc; (2) Recording of much of the ultra and open intelligence in the permanent record; (3) Drafting the daily sitrep for despatch to The Park; and (4) Miscellaneous odd jobs of a clerical or administrative nature for Lt. Col. Rood and Major Gardner. The bulk of the information for the recipients maps was obtained in the war room to which I had ready access. Its flow became systemized and routine, though perhaps too frequently because of the press of other matters or my own ineptness, our map information lagged considerably. In retrospect, although the note taking task frequently seemed onerous and the records were infrequently used, upon reflection I perhaps must agree with Major Gardner's conclusion that the effort was valuable and necessary. In any event I am hardly the one to judge in this matter.

Impressions

Attitude of CG - As a member of every morning's briefing session I would want to underscore Major Gardner's conclusions as to General Dever's concern with ultra. At each session he appeared most interes-

ted in and responsive to the recipient's discussions, frequently interjecting questions. Not hesitating to disagree on occasion with the recipients conclusions he appeared to indicate to them at all times a marked attitude of respect for the soundness of their judgment.

Relations with SLU - Due to the somewhat indistinct and anomalous relations between SLU and recipient I was early conscious of a degree of friction that was not always helpful. I must concur with Major Gardner's emphasis on the need for a clear, unmistakable understanding as to the subordination of all SLU personnel to the recipient and consequently, to the G-2, and the desirability of identical nationality. The fact that SLU were, with one exception, British led to an unwarranted feeling of discrimination. This feeling was, I am confident, limited to the officer personnel. Actually, and all things considered, SLU and recipients did work together quite harmoniously during the period I was there.

Relations with CI - While the G-2 himself appeared to have narrower interests, his CI and the recipients seemed to work in uniform harmony. It is difficult to conceive how there could have been a closer liaison between them. It was, I am sure, most valuable from the standpoint of both. Nor am I entirely clear on how, with the volume of ultra remaining constant, the recipients could have participated much more than they did in the G-2 or open work. Both the CI and his assistant had at all times freedom of use of the ultra intelligence and used it quite constantly during the day and evening hours. The recipients, pointing to the morning briefing session, were almost entirely absorbed in the integration and evaluation of ultra for these sessions.

Need for Ultra Recipient - All in authority at 6th Army Group were sold on the need for the ultra recipients. It seemed an obvious need to them, and examining the matter objectively, it seemed to me, quite apart from the security angle, that trained personnel whose sole duties were ultra are best qualified to interpret and present the material, using, where possible open intelligence, as well. This, I feel, was done quite adequately at our headquarters.

Security - On some occasions the arrangement of the briefing rooms proved awkward in preventing attempts by unauthorized persons to gain admittance. This actually was a minor mechanical problem, but perhaps I was more conscious of it because I assumed the exalted station of doorkeeper during the briefing sessions. There were very few instances of security violations during my stay. All personnel entering the recipients' rooms were conscious that it was in effect on intelligence "holy of holies". On most occasions some representative of the recipients was present at the daily open intelligence briefings of staff officers in the war room. On no occasion when I was present at the daily open intelligence briefings, and I intentionally kept a careful watch, did I observe any compromise of ultra.

Relation with Recipients - My relations with the recipients, and I flattered myself to think I was also one, were at all times harmonious. They were uniformly courteous, considerable, and generous to me, I have a high regard for their abilities.

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12 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR

Subject: Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army

1. Introduction: The following report summarizes the experience of the Seventh U.S. Army in the use of ultra intelligence between 16 August '44 and 8 May '45. The judgments, conclusions, and recommendations are based solely upon work with that command and are not intended as generalizations necessarily applicable to either air or other ground commands.

2. Operations: The SCU/SIU link and ultra specialist joined the Seventh Army at Naples, and the station opened on D plus 1, the 16th of August. It had been agreed with the G-2 that the job of the ultra specialist was to receive signals from the SIU, process them, and post the information on a map. For the first few days of operations in South France, the only map available was a folding map which was shown periodically to the G-2. During this period the quality of ultra intelligence was unusually high and in the rapidly moving situation was the primary source of tactical information. The G-2 decided, therefore, that an ultra war room was desirable, and henceforth the ultra specialist occupied a room in the CP adjacent to the G-2. Also during these early days the volume of ultra was so great that it was soon apparent to the G-2 that he could not personally brief his commander on the content. Accordingly, the responsibility for the briefing of all recipients devolved upon the ultra specialist.

At no time during operations by the Seventh Army was there a formal briefing for all recipients. There can be little doubt that formal briefings are desirable for they permit a more careful preparation of the material. But the recipients were not amenable to the idea because it involved an additional commitment of time in their already busy day. Also, the demands of the tactical situation dictated that important ultra intelligence be disseminated to recipients without delay, and any other information was of insufficient importance to justify formal briefings. The typical method by which ultra reached the recipients was as follows: Each morning the G-2 was briefed on the messages received during the night. If in his judgment the information was important, the Commanding General and/or the Chief of Staff were called in and the briefing repeated. Throughout the day, usually after dinner and again after supper, the G-2 was briefed on later messages. Other recipients were briefed throughout the day whenever they found it convenient. At any time during the day or night an important message was passed to the G-2 without delay. In the absence of the G-2, the ultra specialist was authorized to call any message directly to the attention of other recipients if the information therein warranted such action.

The ultra specialist was expected to be currently familiar with information from other sources, but at no time was it desired that his briefings include a merging of ultra and other information. This distinction was closely drawn by the G-2, both for reasons of security and because the merger of all sources of information was accomplished in other ways. At the Seventh Army the chief of the order of battle section was a recipient and the "opening up" of ultra was his primary responsibility. Estimates of the enemy situation were prepared by still another officer in the combat intelligence section, and ultra was injected into these estimates of enemy capabilities by informal consultation with the G-2. Target information derived from ultra provided no problem for it had been agreed between the G-2 and the A-2 of XII Tactical Air Command, supporting the Seventh Army, that all ultra targets would be handled by the Air Force. With order of battle, estimates, and targets provided for in the above manner, the remaining ultra required little or no correlation with other information.

Attached hereto as Tab A is a statement of two instances in which ultra provided intelligence of extreme tactical importance to the Seventh Army. All recipients were genuinely interested in ultra and aware of the tremendous advantage provided by source. On one occasion the G-2 remarked, "You know, this just isn't cricket."

Generally, ultra information is of primary value in a static or defensive situation; this is indeed true of all information and intelligence derived therefrom. In the attack and pursuit, intelligence has done its job during the planning phase of the operation, and subsequent information is usually outdated by the time it reaches the command. The examples in Tab A, however, cover both situations.

3. Security: It is difficult to really know the security situation at a command, but it was evident that some recipients at Seventh Army were either not cognizant of or sufficiently impressed with the need for security in the use of ultra. There was little questioning the minimum security requirement that the nature of source must not be disclosed, but this understanding did not extend to an appreciation that information derived from source must be properly safeguarded and serve only as the basis for tactical orders when the information itself cannot be "opened up". The greatest misunderstanding here was in the idea of "cover". Recipients were inclined to believe that cover was an invention; the idea of cover as an indication from an actual but open source was alien to all but a few recipients.

The security situation at Seventh Army was complicated by the fact that the G-2 of VI Corps, and at the outset the Commanding General, were former recipients at a time when the Corps was operating at Anzio as a virtually independent task force. On a few known and probably on many unknown occasions the G-2 of Army passed on "hunches" to the G-2 of Corps; the latter was certainly aware of their origin but was not bound by security regulations. In this situation it is almost impossible to expect that a Corps G-2, formerly in the picture, will not receive ultra, thinly disguised; as the Army G-2 frequently stated, "You can deny membership in the Elks to a person, but once he has been an Elk and forfeits his membership he will still remember the initiation."

Generally speaking, however, the handling of ultra from an intelligence point of view by the G-2 was consistent with security regulations. The difficulties at the command were more directly traceable to the Commanding General and in the operational use of ultra. The reasons for this are manifest.

Charged with responsibility for success or failure in the battle, the temptation to knowingly or unknowingly employ ultra improperly is well-nigh irresistible at times. This, considered along with the fact that the Commanding General is relatively isolated from daily security reminders by the ultra specialist appears to be the major cause of violations.

Annexed hereto as Tab B are the full reports of security violations at the Seventh Army. There is little to add since they were originally reported. In all instances the method employed for ascertaining the facts was the same. Once the violation was observed, the facts in the case were obtained from the G-2 and reported to London. The G-2 was never told by the ultra specialist, although he probably guessed, that violations were being reported.

4. Conclusions: The policy of a separate channel and the assigning of an ultra specialist to American commands is basically sound. If nothing else, the mere presence of a War Department representative has a salutary effect. For reasons of administration the SJU/SLU link might well become the responsibility of the specialist. There is often a real question whether a particular security violation is the responsibility of the SLU or the specialist. Moreover the command is frequently confused in their administrative relations with the SLU, and are never certain whether they should deal with the SLU or with the specialist. There was never any difficulty of this kind at Seventh Army, but there is a real danger in the failure to provide unified control.

There is much to recommend that all ultra matters be considered within the province of the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff, rather than as an instrumentality of the G-2. In the first place, the G-2 might then be subjected to controls which cannot be exercised under the present arrangement. Moreover, by attaching the ultra function to the Chief of Staff's office, the ultra specialist has direct access to the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General and thus can more carefully safeguard security at the point where it is most vulnerable. Also, by removing the ultra function from the G-2, security is improved by the mere fact that it is not automatically associated with intelligence.

The reading and understanding of ultra security regulations is not sufficient to insure their inviolability. In addition to constant reminders by the ultra specialist, periodic warnings from high commanders seem desirable. The subject must be kept a live one at all times, and the interest of the War Department continuously impressed upon recipients.

Regardless of what other persons are recipients at a command, it seems particularly desirable that wherever possible the order of battle chief be included. At Seventh Army this occurred through accident; the personality involved was "in the picture" at a higher headquarters before joining Seventh Army and his status was continued. But this might well become standard practice, other considerations permitting, for the order of battle man is the key to opening up ultra and the preparation of sound strength estimates.

Finally, it is essential that well-grounded intelligence officers be assigned to commands. The proper interpretation of ultra is very often dependent upon a thorough familiarity with information derived from other sources.

Donald S. Bussey
DONALD S. BUSSEY
Major, Inf.

TAB A

(1) Late on D plus 2, ultra information reached the Seventh Army which indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from south and southwest France. The Commander was faced with a major decision involving two factors:

- a. To what extent could the enemy be pursued and outflanked, considering the difficulty of supplying advance columns over a beach, and
- b. Would the enemy counter attack on the right flank, from the Maritime Alps, and so endanger rear communications.

Ultra provided the answer to the second question, at least a sufficient answer to permit a calculated risk; there was no indication that the enemy would adopt an attitude other than defensive on the flank. Accordingly, it was decided to purane and all unloading priorities were altered, with the whole emphasis given to fuel and vehicles. Also, Task Force Butler, which had penetrated deep in the enemy rear, was reinforced with the 36th Div. Together they established a road block at Montelirar in the Rhone Valley and cut the enemy escape route. The road block proved insufficient to destroy the 19th Army and they succeeded in fighting their way out, but all heavy equipment was lost in the process.

It is also noteworthy that ultra guided public relations all through these opening days of the campaign, for it was clear from source that the enemy was not aware of the character of the forces operating in his rear. He apparently believed that there were only guerilla forces endangering his lines of communications; and so the existence and operations of Task Force Butler were not disclosed to the press.

(2) Shortly after the German Eifel offensive in mid-December, it became evident that the enemy was preparing an offensive in the Saar-Palatinate, possibly in conjunction with a coordinated attack out of the Colmar bridgehead and a crossing of the Rhine N. of Strasburg. German Air Force reconnaissance orders from ultra pin-pointed the possible crossing area but source was relatively quiet on the Colmar attack; open sources, however, clearly suggested the latter intention. But it was in the sector between Saarbrucken and the Rhine that ultra provided information necessary for a proper estimate of the situation and preparations to meet the attack when it came. During the critical days prior to the attack the Flivo with the German First Army was being read consistently, and enemy order of battle and boundaries were thoroughly known. It was possible, therefore, to state with relative certainty that the main effort in the attack would be made west of the Hardt Mtns., with a secondary attack between the mountains and the Rhine. If there was ever an essential element of information this was it, for the passes through the Vosges Mtns. were a serious obstacle to the rapid movement of Seventh Army reserves. Based on this appreciation, the sector west of the Hardt Mtns. was reinforced with the 2nd French Arm'd Div. and the 36th U.S. Inf.Div., both moving from the Rhine plain. It should be noted that up to the day of the attack, German intelligence failed to pick up these moves.

When the attack was launched on 1 Jan., the German main effort collapsed completely. Their only success was in the sector of the secondary effort, in

A - 1

and East of the Hardt Mtns. This German offensive was properly appreciated and preparations made to successfully meet the threat. Lacking ultra it seems very doubtful whether the attack would have been repulsed, or whether other sources of information would have given advance warning. Open sources provided only the most meager evidence of an attack, and there was much opposing evidence suggesting precisely the opposite -- a thinning out in the sector and movement of units away from the Saar-Palatinate to reinforce the North.

TAB B

1. 10 September This command contemplates sending liaison party to 12th Army Group on 11 September. It is believed party will include Chief of Staff, G3, G2 and representative of Air Support Control. All but last named in picture. Prohibition on flights over territory, unless approved by theater commander, called to attention of G2 previously and again to Chief of Staff today in presence of commanding general and G2. Flight route not known. SLU fully informed.

2. 20 November: (1) On morning 20 November, source which could not be employed as basis for further inquiry informed me that information regarding withdrawal of 198 Division in EP 7173 had been passed to 6 Corps by G2 of this headquarters, and that a great flap was started thereby.
(2) During mid-afternoon, liaison officer from corps referred to rumour of withdrawal of 198 Division.
(3) During the evening 20 November, in connection with unrelated matter, I learned that G3 of this headquarters was not aware that G2 of corps was no longer a recipient (this misunderstanding now corrected).
(4) On basis of para 2 and para 3 above I asked G2 of this headquarters if he knew anything about it. Here is the story:
(A) 6 Corps was jumping off an attack this morning and information regarding 198 Division was vital.
(B) Accordingly G-2 of Army called G-2 of corps and asked "What about 198 Division?"
As former recipient, corps G-2 had good idea of meaning behind question. This innocent inquiry was passed down to 36 Division G-2 and then bounded back through a different channel (the order of battle team at each command) all the way to army, each command requesting confirmation of withdrawal, and insisting that information had come from next higher echelon.
(5) The incident appears to be closed and no repercussions endangering security of ultra are anticipated. The fingers burned in this relatively harmless case should have salutary effect.
Supposition of withdrawal of 198 Division has now been "opened up" by Army Group. So far as is known, no prior written suggestion to this effect has appeared. It never got beyond rumor stage.

3. 25 November: During evening 23rd, this Hq's, on basis ultra evidence, issued warning to a subordinate corps by telephone that air attacks might be expected. Consider this serious security violation, and, more important, indicative of a failure to appreciate safeguards which must be employed in using ultra.

4. 20 January: (1) At 1430 hours 20 January Nielsen informed me that Newton at XII TAC had received call from VI Corps requested night operations in defence against expected German air attacks in the Hagenau area. Corps stated they had received information from 7th Army.
- (2) Obvious that information was passed to corps on basis BT 2834, showing 5 Jagddivision intention to employ NSG 20 in night ground attacks in VI Corps area. Nielsen briefed his command on stated intention and added that no counter-measures were possible as "cover" was lacking. This was first indication that NSG 20 was operational in our area.
- (3) The G2 and G3 of 7th Army were briefed on BT 2834 at 0900, 20 January.
- (4) At 1500, 20 January G2 7th Army was informed of incident in para 1 above.

Facts are as follows:-

- (a) Upon learning that enemy air intentions for 20-21 January included night attacks on area VI Corps, the G2 7th Army called G2 of VI Corps and passed substantially the following intelligence:

On 19th January XII TAC flew fighter bomber missions in area of German Rhine bridgehead including the crossing sites. It is probable that the enemy will react by attacking our line of communication in bridgehead area.

- (b) G2 7th Army further stated that information of this type was worse than useless if commands were not alerted to enemy capability when we know it is in fact an intention. To withhold such information would result in our troops getting the hell knocked out of them.

5. 28 April: Following is extract from G2 periodic report number 265, 4th Inf. Div., 252000B April 45: "Information received from higher H.Q. indicates that a determined German effort will be made on night 25th April to destroy the bridge at Dillingen T 0301".

Quinn informs me that Patch telephoned XV Corps this information based on ultra message relating to "Meredith". Patch briefed on this policy at army group and call was made from there. Presumably XV Corps passed information on to 4th Division.

Only discrepancy above account is that 4th Division is under XXI Corps.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1. GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

23 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Ultra and the Fifteenth Army.

1. General.

On 8 February 1945 this officer, having for some months performed ultra duties with the Twelfth Army Group, including tours with the Ninth and First Armies, reported for duty as ultra specialist with the Fifteenth Army, then languishing in seas of mud in the old French training area near Suippes, France. The ultra family consisted solely of the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, the G-3 and G-2. The latter, Col. Rheinburg, being on the point of departure took very little part in handling ultra intelligence, and was not present at the two briefings given during this period in the General's office, both of which concentrated on background material to bring the General, the Chief of Staff and the G-3 up to date on the tactical situation. After a few days Col. Rheinburg left, and on moving its headquarters to the area of Dinant, Belgium, the army was joined by Col. Robert A. Schow, the new G-2, who had gained a sound ultra background at War Department and Shaef. He was instrumental in providing for the ultra group excellent and secure quarters, with the ultra specialist's briefing room and office next door to the SLU/SCU set-up. Here the ultra map was kept up and daily briefings were given to the general and the three staff members. After the briefing, which followed the daily open briefing, it was the general's custom to ask questions, discuss the strategic situation, and make plans with his staff. General Gerow and Col. Schow in particular were extremely interested in the information furnished by ultra, especially as it clarified the motivation and pattern of German command decisions. Since, however, in its tactical role the army was merely holding the west bank of the Rhine facing the troops in the Ruhr pocket, with orders not to cross the river, very little direct use was made of the ultra information received. It was chiefly used to keep up a correct order of battle. By careful study of all open sources of intelligence this officer constantly strove to keep the Combat Intelligence Section in general and the O.B. team in particular as up to date as possible on O.B. matters, engaging in frequent discussions on the subject and collaborating in the writing of reserves paragraphs in the daily intelligence summary.

After liquidation of the Ruhr pocket the role of ultra at Fifteenth Army sank to that of merely providing the general with odd bits of interesting information which were of very little use to him in

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his role as commander of an army of occupation far behind the main battle lines. After the headquarters moved to Germany no further briefings were given, pertinent information being summarized and passed periodically to the G-2 in typewritten form.

2. Security.

Owing to the small size of the indoctrinated group and the enthusiasm of all concerned for maintenance of security, no security problems arose. The SCU/SLU were always in a remote part of a guarded building within a guarded perimeter, as was the office of the ultra specialist, and any action regarding the service or information derived from it was always first referred to the ultra officer.

W. T. Capnaahan
W. T. CAPNAHAN
Captain, O.C.