

SRH 013

ULTRA
HISTORY OF US STRATEGIC AIR FORCE
EUROPE VS. GERMAN AIR FORCES
JUNE 1945

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 5, E. O. 11652
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

DP Date: 18 May 78

From London, 6 June 1945

PROC 5154

WA 54

McCormack from Hilles.

Ref. GL 698. Supporting Documents ULTRA.

As Haines will have explained, report prepared by Order of Spatz and MacDonald. Haines ordered to act as courier carrying report and supporting documents to Hodges. We explained this was contrary to regulations and promised safe delivery of all material to you for A 2. Supporting documents still here awaiting next ship which is due to leave next Tuesday. In view of U.S.S.T.A.F. co-operation over here hope amicable settlement can be reached.

PART I
INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared in compliance with instructions to compile a record of "ULTRA", Diplomatic Intercepts and S.R. Reports related to Army Air Force operations in the European Theater of Operations.

Only such items as became available to American Intelligence through its active participation in the daily work of Royal Air Force's Air Ministry have been used in this compilation. No facilities were available either at the time or afterwards for direct access to such parts of this material as were sent exclusively to the Admiralty or the Foreign Office.

We are informed, however, that all such information significant to the war in the air came to the Air Ministry, where it was entered into appropriate files. These back files, dating from the beginning of "ULTRA" interception in the spring of 1940, have been read through by various American Intelligence personnel. The messages considered relative to our operations have been marked and copied verbatim. These have been made into a master file of this report, prepared in duplicate as follows:

1. A Chronological Master File, day by day since December 7, 1941, containing all messages considered relevant, in the sequence in which they were received by Intelligence at Air Ministry and the various headquarters subsequently appointed to receive "ULTRA".

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2. A Numerical File, containing copies of the same messages, arranged in the order in which they were indexed on receipt at the central receiving agency for "ULTRA" interception and deciphering.
3. Classified Files which divide messages according to the subject matter division used by the Air Ministry itself. For example, there is a file of Higher Command Orders and Reports, a file on Aircraft Shortages, etc.

These general classifications of filing may be studied in the Table of Contents which lists the major files consulted and the number of messages copied from each.

There were, in addition, many messages too miscellaneous for arbitrary classification by title, which have been simply entered into the monthly folders of the Chronological Master File.

4. The Diplomatic Intercepts and the S.R. conversations were likewise filed first in the Master Chronological File and, secondly, in Numerical Files of their own based upon the indexed numbers that record them.

Thus, every important statement in the following paper can be attested by direct reference to the particular intercept or conversation on which it is founded.

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It has been thought undesirable to burden with foot-notes a text which is over half straight quotations. The quotations used in the report, in almost every case, are the exact wording or relevant excerpts from the exact wording of a message or conversation.

As each page of the report is marked with the month it concerns, the text of the original may be examined in the master folder of that particular month. Quotations are always verbatim except for a few slight modifications inserted to make a very technical jargon self-explanatory to the inexperienced reader.

For readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of the "ULTRA" source and the details of its usage in formulating workable military intelligence, the following notes are offered.

"ULTRA" messages are intercepts of German Army, Air Force or Navy signals which the Germans themselves considered important enough to transmit in high-grade cipher. Sometimes the whole message, complete with addressee and signature, is intercepted and deciphered. Sometimes only a fragment yields to the "ULTRA" treatment.

The scope of these messages is the whole daily flow of Most Secret orders, reports and communications of the German armed forces. The ones which are intercepted and deciphered successfully are obviously only a fraction of the German communications. What is more, they represent a most capricious selection. "ULTRA" is a grab-bag which contains many glittering prizes and many maddening dis-

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appointments. The messages range from operations orders for tomorrow's bombing as issued by Oberkommando der Luftwaffe in Berlin itself, to an indent for pull-overs for female auxiliaries of a G.A.F. Signals regiment at Muenchen-Gladbach (December 1943).

"ULTRA" never had control of the messages it could intercept and decipher; there were too many messages and the process was too laborious. As skill and facilities increased, "ULTRA" became incredibly expert at achieving daily samples of the communications in the most important commands, including all-important operations orders and expressions of future intentions. Yet, always, the authorities controlling "ULTRA" had to try to answer an unlimited Allied curiosity with limited facilities and personnel. Arbitrary selection of what kinds of information would be sought had to be made, priorities determined and neglect of much accepted for the invaluable acquisition of some.

The foremost merit of "ULTRA" was always its unquestionable authenticity. This was so certain as to make it the basis of most Allied Intelligence about German military operations, much about diplomatic action and some about the industrial and economic effort directly related to the war.

It is doubtful if any armed force in history ever had such thorough and timely knowledge of its enemy's capabilities, condition and intentions as "ULTRA" has given the Allied Forces in this theater.

Nevertheless, the raw intercepted messages themselves never give a complete or sequential chronicle; the gaps must be filled by detailed knowledge of the

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inner administrative and operational procedures of the German armed forces and by deduction based on this knowledge.

Often "ULTRA" itself has been dangerously misleading. The "ULTRA" technique may decipher the message ordering an intended operation, but fail often to intercept the message that cancels or alters it, as in the case of the "lightning blow in the West", which preoccupied the Germans with countless plans and counterplans through the last three months of 1944.

Again, in the formation of an Enemy Order of Battle "ULTRA" may intercept a message ordering an enemy unit from one front to another, but fail to intercept cancellations or changes. A new unit may be activated for some time before "ULTRA" picks up a message identifying it.

As regards Targets, "ULTRA" gave relatively little direct information for strategic bombardment because high-grade military cipher is not the normal form of correspondence about industrial activity. Most of such industrial - military communication took place by letter or land-line telephone or teleprint within the Reich. Occasionally, however, "ULTRA" did present strategic bombardment with brand-new and very valuable targets, as in the case of the message in April 1944 which indicated beyond doubt that the Walter-Werke at Kiel was making power units for rocket aircraft.

In the larger sense, however, "ULTRA" was the root of our strategic target intelligence because of the knowledge it gave us of the strength, disposition, com-

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position, production, wastage, reserves and service-ability of the German Air Force, which was our major strategic target until April of 1944. These, from the strength report of a unit to the works number of an individual plane, were the raw materials of knowledge that produced most of our picture of the institution we were attacking.

In the matter of tactical targets, "ULTRA" was indispensable as a chronicle of the day to day, and even hour to hour, movements of operational units of all three German services and the supplies on which they depended.

One regrettable lack in "ULTRA" concerns its cover of G.A.F. operations against the Russians. Either because interception in that area was difficult or because decoding of such messages had low priority, the amount of material has been for the most part meager. The result has made it difficult at times to assess the Luftwaffe and to answer the questions of those who could not believe the G.A.F. strength and the production of aircraft in Germany to be what Intelligence estimated.

Two examples are to the point. Undoubtedly, large production of the F.W. 190 was achieved by the Germans ultimately, but as many of these aircraft were used on the Russian Front, Intelligence had little knowledge of them. Already captured documents are revealing works numbers series never before heard of. Again, in the last weeks of the war, when the G.A.F. seemed earthbound by lack of fuel, fleeting glimpses told us that they were

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operating hundreds of sorties a day against the Russians, but there was no solid information.

The Diplomatic Intercepts are of many kinds. They range from the technical reports of the Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin on aircraft performance and production to the most mendacious form of German Foreign Military press release. These reports, though more readable than the queer jargon of military German encountered in "ULTRA", cannot be taken at face value. Some reflect chiefly the ignorance of the sender, some the untruthfulness of his informant. In one case the Japanese Consul at Vienna informs Tokio that he has been falsifying his own reports so that the Russians may intercept them and be misled into urging the Anglo-American Air Forces to a course of action detrimental to them.

Nevertheless, there is hard truth in them. The Japanese Ambassador informed Tokio that Hitler had promised him a German attack in the West very shortly before Runstedt's offensive. Yet, whoever examines other statements of Hitler, as transmitted by Ribbentrop to the Japanese Ambassador, will discover for himself why this one was not immediately and fully credited by Intelligence.

It should be added that the text of these diplomatic messages so often was mangled by interception and deciphering, especially of Japanese phonetics, that some imaginative reconstruction was often necessary. This was done by well informed and experienced Intelligence

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personnel, and it is believed that the essential content of these messages has been reproduced accurately, but, unlike "ULTRA", they are often not the verbatim text of the message as quoted herein.

The S.R. Reports are the monitored conversations of German prisoners of war, ranging from casual privates to Lieutenant Generals, who were unaware that their confidences to one another were being systematically eavesdropped by mechanical recorders. These conversations range the whole gamut of human motive and thought. They are usually distorted by wishful thinking, ignorance, prejudice, and the passion for self-justification common to prisoners. At their best they reflect accurate personal observation and sound judgment of events already concluded, or events so general as to require no intimate contemporary information. At the worst, they are not above the latrine rumors standard to all armies.

These three categories of material, therefore, are the foundation of this report, which attempts to summarize the contributions they made to Intelligence in this war. They do not, of course, represent all of Allied Intelligence, yet their testimony has had profound influence upon the most vital parts of American Air Intelligence.

These were the enemy Order of Battle, which was largely compiled from "ULTRA" intercepts, most of our tactical, and many of our strategic targets. Finally,

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these classes of evidence, especially the "ULTRA", profoundly influenced our air policy. The outstanding instances were, of course, "ULTRA" reports clearly foreshadowing the attempted expansion of the German Air Force and the reports basic to the decision to continue the attack on oil. This was made largely from the evidence "ULTRA" produced on the effect of our first oil attacks, long before it was visible in reduction of the enemy's operating capabilities.

One kind of source not used here, but represented in the files by a handful of excerpts, is the A.D.I.(K) formal reports of interrogations of prisoners. These have not been used here as being too much colored by the information, or lack of it, and the personality and opinion of the interrogator. But the information in these reports has been of the greatest assistance to the target specialists. Occasionally one - as one in which the decision to use the Me. 262 as a fighter-bomber - has later proved to be sterling in value. A few such have been included.

The Master Files, copied and attached for use in the consideration of this report, contain between 2,500 and 3,000 separate items of "ULTRA", as well as many HUNDREDS OF PAGES OF DIPLOMATIC REPORTS and prisoners' conversations. The simple factor of space has permitted quotation in the text of only a few of the outstanding

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ones, which have been selected and interpolated with a narrative background of conditions at the time of their receipt, so as to indicate the running contribution this material made to American Intelligence and, through it, to American Air Operations.

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PART II

FROM PEARL HARBOR TO ROUEN

The "ULTRA" Intelligence of this period and prior is relevant to American operations, chiefly as an indication of the position of Germany just before our entry into the war. Militarily, it was a strong position. The German Armies were in possession of the Continent of Europe. They were so close to Moscow that they had actually formed a command with the hopeful title of "Luftgau-Moscow". Luftflotte 4 in the summer and fall of 1941 was capable of flying 1600 sorties a day in support of the Armies that were pushing confidently into Russia. In May of 1941, Goering was delivering fullsome compliments to his Bomber Command, "results have been worthy of the object. Immense damage including the complete destruction of war factories and above all, all of the dock-yards so vital to England has been achieved." In June of 1941 Goering was laying down target priorities for a new blitz on England.

Yet, the day after the German attack on Russia June 21st, 1941, Hitler himself issued an order to his U-boats that "during the coming weeks all incidents with United States of America were to be avoided. Act in this sense in all conceivable eventualities." It is evident that confident as they were of their position in Europe, the Germans did not want war with us.

The file is full of operation orders and reports from the first German campaign in Russia but in general
016 they show only the triumphant progress of the Army and

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Air Force in which the Germans had such well justified confidence. There are evidences of fighter shortage in the summer of 1941 over Norway and in Cyrenaica, a shortage which in Africa persisted into the winter. These reflect chiefly the tremendous strain on the Luftwaffe of conducting offensive operations far from home. There is a clear indication of the efforts which would be required as a result of this strain in a rather pompous pronouncement of late January, 1942: "C.I.C. G.A.F. gives following orders: The Fuehrer has drawn attention to the necessity of employing the G.A.F. in extremely concentrated fashion at the point which at any particular moment is the most important, and/or for the most urgent tasks. The comprehensible desire of the army units to be supported everywhere by the G.A.F. leads, if given way to, to a complete splitting up of the G.A.F. This, with the present small operational strengths, brings real success at no point. The Fuehrer has instructed the Supreme Command of the Army correspondingly." The copy seen by Intelligence was circulated by Fliegerkorps VIII, but the order clearly went to the whole Armed Forces. They are, however, undoubtedly precursors of the German intention to expand their Fighter Forces even before our entry into the war. It was, of course, clearly the German intention to expand its whole war economy with the captured resources and slave labor of Europe. There is little "ULTRA" on this intent because at first this expansion was not a military operation. Reconnaissance and agents' reports at the time agreed on the slow beginnings of the industrial and

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social revolution which was to make the German people supreme over Europe and their Armies invincible within it. This, in fact, was proceeding slowly and the pace did not really accelerate until some time in 1942 when their reverses in Russia and our entry into the war were making the most foresighted Germans think in terms of expansion for defence. There is a hint of these Russian reverses in the withdrawal of some beaten-up bomb groups from the Russian Front in early December 1941.

On the 12th December 1941, the day after the German declaration of war against us, the Fuehrer issued a circular command which says in part "United States of America and those states of Central and South America who join the U.S.A. or her Allies in their attitude toward Germany are henceforth to be treated as enemies." A further light on German progress in Russia may be found in Higher Command orders of the 21st of January 1942, "The Reichmarschall commands that all officers, NCO's and men of the G.A.F. who are commanded into the presence of the Fuehrer or Reichmarschall for interview or to receive decorations must in all circumstances be free of lice."

But if the German Air Force had become literally lousy by then it was still a formidable and expanding force. Prisoner of War conversation in S.R.A. 2421 between two captured airmen records unshakable confidence in the enormous expansion of aircraft manufacture they have witnessed in Germany.

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Though winter curbed operations on the Russian Front the G.A.F. was, in fact, recuperating from the summer campaign in 1942, when on the 25th of February Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, who had recently arrived in England, was instructed by Brigadier General Charles L. Bolte to "make a thorough study of bombing operations being conducted by the R.A.F. Bomber Command and submit to this Headquarters recommendations covering the training, equipment, tactical doctrine and methods of employment of the units required to conduct an effective air offensive in cooperation with the R.A.F. against Axis objectives in Germany and Western Europe."

Although General Eaker's instruction was "to prepare to conduct an effective air offensive against Axis objectives in Germany and Western Europe," it was generally realized that our first struggle would be against the German Air Force. Of this there were already available accurate measurements in the Order of Battle kept by British Intelligence.

For readers interested in Order of Battle, there will be found in the files a manuscript describing in detail the methods by which one is compiled. As a sample, however, of the information on which the existing Order of Battle rested, a message to Luftflotte 1 on the 8th of April 1942 states "the Gruppe requests that all measures be taken to bring up to full strength the Gruppe's aircraft and to have aircraft repaired rapidly at Jesau (East Prussia). The actual strength of the

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Gruppe at the moment is 29 aircraft but of these 10 Me. 109's need to have their engines overhauled as they have already flown 70 to 90 hours. Six further engines have flown 50 to 60 hours, the remainder under 50 hours. Replacements for aircraft all strength have already been asked."

This message was from the 3rd Gruppe of the famous Third or Udet Fighter Geschwader then engaged against the Russians. It is exceptional for the exactness of its information. Later in the course of the war our Intelligence was to receive long lists of such reports daily. At the time they were few and far between but there were enough to establish a reasonable confidence of the location, strength, and serviceability of the different units of the German Air Force. This message is cited merely as an example of the kind of information on which our Order of Battle was based.

On June 13th a diplomatic intercept of the ISOS series records the first operation of the American Army Air Forces in this Theater: "an incomplete German report on the results of the American raid on the Ploesti - Bucharest - Buzau area on 12th June reports that 6 civilians were killed and that the Ploesti - Buzau railway would be out of service for two days. No damage was caused in Bucharest and 1 a/c was shot down. A simultaneous attack was carried out by 6 to 8 Russian Aircraft on Constanza and Cernavode. No damage had so far been reported."

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The operational records of the "Halvorson" Group are not available at this Headquarters although it is known that they did participate in British operations in the Eastern Mediterranean in the summer of 1942.

At that time, however, the center of gravity of the German Air Force was clearly deep on the Southern Russian Front where Luftflotte 4 reported flying 1600 sorties on the 15th of June 1942. The same report claims only 14 a/c shot down in combat, a clear indication that Russian air resistance was negligible against the full might of German air power driving towards Stalingrad.

In the Mediterranean, also, German air power was still at a relatively high peak of efficiency and effectiveness. Fullsome telegrams of congratulations from Goering to Rommel and Kesselring reflect the kind of mutual admiration that flourishes on success. Tobruk had just fallen and the publicity conscious Goering was anxious to share the glory his forces had undoubtedly helped to win.

Furthermore heavy bomber units were moving back to the West although it is impossible to tell from the order of July 10th whether they meant to resume intensive operations against England or against the Atlantic shipping. Nevertheless, three groups are mentioned, two from Russia and one newly activated.

A high-grade agent's statement of a month later speaks confidently of the German plan "to start a lightning air offensive against Great Britain and Northern Ireland by means of the largest air force

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available. The aim of this offensive being to smash the Allied, and especially the American, air potential in order to make rather impracticable in 1942 any large-scale operation from the British Isles against the enemy."

Thus the G.A.F. was still in every way a formidable and aggressive fighting force when on July 21st a directive from General Eisenhower, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S.A., assigned the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force: "the mission to initiate immediately the maximum degree of air operations with a view to obtaining and maintaining domination of the air over Western France by April 1st, 1943."

The attaining of air domination over Europe was a stupendous assignment. The Germans themselves understood the importance of air domination as an imperative precondition to victory better than any living people.

Potential air domination over their enemies had long since won for Hitler the political triumphs of reclaiming Austria and annexing Czechoslovakia. Air supremacy had been the decisive factor in the conquest of Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the Balkans, Greece, Crete, Lybia, Western Egypt and finally the successful parts of the Russian Campaign.

The Germans had begun these campaigns with air supremacy and won them because of it. They had learned also very rueful lessons about what happens to the loser of air supremacy, first over Dunkirk and later in their costly and inconclusive efforts against England

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and Malta.

Their formula for retaining successful air supremacy was forced upon them but they had learned a lesson. They no longer challenged equal or superior air power. Spitfires in the summer of 1942 were sweeping the British Channel and the French Coast 500 at a time in a vain effort to provoke combat.

So long as they could refuse unprofitable combat over other countries the Germans were confident of retaining their aerial supremacy over Europe.

When the American forces began operations here there was no known method of forcing the Germans into disadvantageous aerial combat.

The operations against Dieppe were a classic instance. Among the many reasons advanced for conducting them was the hope of luring the German Air Force into destructive combat. There is hard and fast evidence in "ULTRA" that as early as the 12th of August the Germans knew of the forthcoming Dieppe operation.

It did provoke some German wastage which "ULTRA" does not record but has been assessed otherwise at about 125 to 150 planes. Almost as many Allied planes were lost in addition to 3500 casualties among the landing forces.

When the day's operations were concluded it was evident that no army could afford this scale of operation to inflict this scale of wastage. So the German Air Force like the continent it covered seemed secure in mastery of its previous conquests when on the 17th of August the first American heavy bombardment

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mission from the U.K. attacked German Europe in broad daylight and in open challenge to the German defensive position.

Daylight strategic bombardment in this Theater was a technique that both British and Germans had abandoned as being too costly. The German and British Air Forces, like our own, had once shared the early airman's dream of systematically destroying the enemy's war production by precision bombing while simultaneously destroying his air defensive in the fighting that bombing will provoke.

Both sides had found the technique too costly to continue. Both bomber forces had been driven into the darkness in which they could scarcely aim for a more precise target than the enemy's morale. The American experiment represented a tenacious belief that the technique could be prosecuted successfully by the use of a bomber capable of flying above the limits of preclusive flak, capable of hitting precision targets from that height with a revolutionary bomb-sight and capable of defending itself from enemy fighters by the superior fire power of mutually supporting 50 caliber machine-guns.

The Americans had such a bomber and had had time to develop it while the other countries were already wasting obsolescent and under-armed bombers in helpless struggle against the inherent superiority of the fighter aircraft. Similarly the Americans had had the advantage of time to develop a long-range fighter, a luxury impossible to European countries whose factories

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measured the distance to neighboring bomber airdromes in minutes.

Now in August of 1942 we began with these implements the long struggle in which both the Luftwaffe and the R.A.F. had completely failed, the struggle to win air mastery over the territory of a powerful opposing air force.

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It is characteristic of the capriciousness of the "ULTRA" source that it contains no direct reference to the Rouen raid. Indeed, the best direct Intelligence upon American operations has always come from the reports of our own crews.

It should be added that the "ULTRA" service at this time had not reached the high level of coverage and selection which was later attained, and so it is not surprising that Intelligence had to rely on more conventional sources through the early weeks of our operations from August to the autumn of 1942.

Yet it is perhaps portentous that after our eight operations along the French, Belgian and Dutch Coasts, the German Air Force Works Staff, on September 4, 1942, issued urgent instructions for improving smoke screen at Schweinfurt and at Politz.

Perhaps the best appraisal available on our early operations came from a German pilot, captured 2 September 1942, from the famous 26th Fighter Geschwader or Wing. Speaking to a fellow-prisoner in S.R.A. 3172 he says: "American aircraft are good, that is obvious, but they and the Americans themselves need to gain experience in flying first if they are to keep up with us. It doesn't matter how good an airman you are, when you first go into action you are just a beginner." Later, he says, "They were American aircraft, Boeings; they dropped their bombs from 7000 meters and scored good

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hits." And later still, with some evident awe, "The Boeings were flying at 7000 meters - the four-engine bombers."

Throughout September, however, the preponderance of German interest was clearly focused upon El Alamein, where, in a little-heralded defensive victory, the British had stopped Rommel dead in his tracks, barely seventy miles from Alexandria.

The Luftflotte 4 files show some slowing of the German drive toward Stalingrad, but there is still no clear hint of the disaster that city was to mark for them. A much more important point in the progress of the war than our bomber operations apparently escaped German attention altogether.

In September two of our Lightning long-range fighter escort groups were withdrawn from operations altogether in preparation for their transfer to the impending North African invasion. This withdrawal was to leave our bombers without fighter cover beyond Spitfire range until June of the following year.

In retrospect, the want of those fighter groups appears as the most important factor in curbing our early operations from the United Kingdom so severely that the thickening of the smoke screen over Schweinfurt and Politz seemed ironically premature.

The effect in the change of our capabilities caused by the removal of the fighter cover, which had always been considered a pre-condition to success of our technique, may be read in General Spaatz' directive

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to the 8th Bomber Command of October 20th. It lists as first priority the five major submarine bases on the Bay of Biscay; as the second some aircraft factories and repair depots on the fringes of the channel and the North Sea, and as third transportation targets equally close to Spitfire cover.

The first direct German allusion to these operations probably occurs in an order of 20 October which says: "The Field Marshal expects that home fighters following the example of the English will, by diving from a great height through English fighter escort, shoot enemy bombers out of the formation." The context, unfortunately, does not tell us which Field Marshal held this expectation or of whom he expected such action.

The message does seem to express the implicit faith in the lesson both Britain and Germany had previously learned about daylight bombardment, to wit: that it is impossible against competent fighter defence. It is quite possible that this message refers to the Mediterranean Theater, where American bombers from the Halverson Group were operating consistently.

There are a few direct mentions of American operations as such. Early in October eight Liberators attacked Suda Bey in Crete. The report concludes with the statement that flak defenses were without success. Within twenty-four hours orders were out for strengthening the flak at Suda and hurrying up of

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deliveries of guns to the Aegean area.

This sequence of events was to become more and more routine. No doubt the Germans learned early that daylight bombers flying at 20,000 feet or above presented a serious ordnance problem. There is no positive proof that a critical supply situation in flak ammunition resulted from early operations. But on October 28 "ULTRA" received an order of early October which indicates that a strained raw materials situation and lack of suitable labor compels a husbanding of stocks of flak. Firing must be limited to targets within range, and "firing at excessive distances, above all with light flak is to be restrained by all means."

The folders of the Mediterranean commands are full of allusions to hard air fighting and much damage by "enemy" bombardment. This activity, of course, reached its climax in the beginning of Montgomery's attack for El Alamein. American planes and units supported this attack, but their contribution remains anonymous in the German record. The combined Anglo-American air effort was to bring from Kesselring on October 22 a peremptory demand for a report on the falling off of serviceability.

Fliegerfuehrer Africa replied with a series of accounts of his calamities including a lack of copies of the Table of Organization. Specifically, he says his fighters have had to fly up to four sorties a day against concentrated and continuous daylight attacks.

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The attack on German-Italian convoys was a decisive element in this campaign. ("ULTRA" with its almost daily reportings of convoy intents or routes was at this point making one of its greatest contributions.) American formations had a share in these attacks. It is therefore significant that on October 5 the Chief Signals Officer under Kesselring was ordering efforts to discover the procedure with which American bomber formations approach German convoys for the attack. The combination of air forces and naval attacks on convoys was to bring from Kesselring himself on October 28 a vehement (and, for once, brief) message to Panzer Army Africa: "Are doing our damndest to deliver and protect supplies." On the same day, in another message, he promises Panzer Army Africa fighter reinforcements, though hedging them with the comment, "further measures are dependent on the development of the situation at Gibraltar," - clear evidence that the Germans were viewing the gathering of Allied power there uneasily.

On the 29th a heavy bomb group was ordered withdrawn from the Stalingrad Front to bases in France, though direct connection between this and the evidence in the West is only inferable. A circular message of 31 October states: "On 18/10 the Fuehrer ordered that with effect from the beginning of the current operation victories of our own escorting fighters over enemy fighters cannot be counted for the days on which we have lost bombers over Malta to enemy fighters."

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The thought behind this seems clear - the Germans had had rueful experience in the vulnerability of heavy bombers over Malta, as well as over England. They clearly understood the indispensability of careful fighter cover.

With this background of experience it is evident that they recognized the inherent difficulty of our avowed technique of sending our Fortresses beyond fighter cover. They undoubtedly believed the experiment could never succeed.

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How much the Germans knew of the impending TORCH operations is not clear from "ULTRA" evidence. A message on 2 November states: "According to information from pilots who have arrived from England, an Anglo-American invasion of Italy is projected in November.

On 3 November an order commands Luftflotte 4, which by now was having grave troubles before Stalingrad, to dispatch long-range night fighters to Greece, doubtless with the intention of countering the Anglo-American air action against Rommel's supply lines both by land and sea.

But a message on 2 November orders transfer of a heavy bomb group and a torpedo bomb group from Norway to the Mediterranean with immediate effect. On the 3rd Kesselring speaks again of the troubles in protecting his convoys in the Mediterranean, and on the 4th Kesselring is advised that there were now three aircraft carriers in Gibraltar. Two more significant orders of that week indicate an even more profound change in the course of the war in Russia and, although the cause and effect are not specified, the inference is unmistakable.

On the 4th Luftflotte 4 was ordered to sacrifice an experienced fighter group for immediate transfer to the Mediterranean.

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On the 5th an order addressed to Luftflotte 4 states: "The Fuehrer has given orders that when weather is suitable air attacks are to be made with the object of destroying the oil refineries at Baku." It is evident that Hitler had realized even then that he was on the defensive in Russia. His dream of capturing the Caspian oil, which would have made his oil position invulnerable and which had been the obvious lode-stone of the South Russia Campaign, was shattered.

On 7 November German uncertainty about the TORCH operation ended with the Allied landings, which Kesselring greeted in a characteristically bombastic order - "I demand that every man should surpass himself and that the attacks on the formations should not be surpassed even by our Japanese comrades of the air. Every man (C% must realize) that even his own best protection lies in close range accurate attacks. My best wishes to you all."

Incidentally, this particular order was to serve Kesselring even more faithfully than the men it encouraged, for three times later, at the Sicilian landings, the Salerno landing, and finally after our crossing of the Rhine, Kesselring used almost identical text in encouraging his forces to emulate the Japanese.

Strangely enough, Goering's Order of the Day was sober and sensible, specifying aircraft carriers as first priority targets and ordering the use of 100-pound frags "to make flying operations from the flight decks impossible."

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Even Kesselring had some sober second thoughts that day. He issued orders, said to be based on conversation with Fliegerkorps V, that 5 Me. 110 crews trained in bombing were to be withdrawn from the operations of Fliegerkorps V and posted to Grottaglie in Southern Italy. Four recce crews were to be posted to Trepani for Fliegerkorps V, who was to expect further reductions. But most significant, "All senior crews of Me. 110 and 210 Staffeln are to be trained immediately in bombing, especially of shipping targets." Shipping targets and how to attack them was to be a pre-occupation of the G.A.F. for many months. Also on the same day, Kesselring (or someone in his name) gave Fliegerkorps V and Fliegerfuehrer Africa directions for attacking Liberators based on recent experiences at Benghazi and Tobruk. Quarter head on and from slightly above was thought to give the best chance.

The records of the time contain many allusions to Rommel's trouble with supply. On the 15th he says: "The fuel situation, already in a state of continual strain, has now reached a catastrophic stage, which at present almost immobilizes the remainder of the German forces in Cyrenaica."

American bombers participated fully in the bombing of the key harbors, notably Benghazi. The Germans were already learning the first of many bitter lessons about fuel and bombardment, although at this time the real vulnerability of fuel lay in the long transportation lines by which it reached the fighting forces.

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A second order to Luftflotte 4 to bomb Russian oil installations at Grosne was issued. Again they were having recourse to the barren comfort of destroying the oil installations they had tried so desperately to capture intact. This order was actually given on 29 October, though not deciphered by us until mid-November.

By mid-November the Mediterranean operation was sufficiently appreciated to call for German moves into unoccupied France, to strengthen the defences of the French Mediterranean Coast, and to dispose units which could operate against Allied harbors and shipping in the South. A long order of Luftflotte 3 on November 15 calls for moving a bomber group to Toulouse, a bomber and a fighter bomber group to Istres, a fighter group to Marseilles/Marignane, a night fighter group to Lezignan, a fighter squadron and a fighter bomber squadron to Perpignan, and four reconnaissance squadrons to Avignon. In contrast to these preparations for imminent action or danger, the order also detailed moves of a number of training units which disposed two bomber R.T.U. in South France, a move which the Germans later would regret.

The order also includes moves which are clearly a reflection of Eighth Air Force operations from England: "III/JG 2 to Vannes for protection of U-boat bases Lorient and St. Nazaire. . . . OC Fighters 3 is to transfer 5/JG 2 to Nantes for the protection of the U-boat bases."

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It should be emphasized again that "ULTRA" does not give us all movements or re-dispositions, but the connection between this one and the four raids Eighth Air Force Fortresses had already made to Lorient-St. Nazaire is evident, as the units of JG 2 were day-fighter units.

This is only the first recorded movement of units against the Eighth Air Force. Yet we have already seen that others were leaving Russia for the Mediterranean, which was to be only a way-station for the magnet that ultimately drew almost every German Air Force unit to oppose us in the West. The process began then and continued to the end. By mid-November Hitler was saying to Von Richtofen of Luftflotte 4 in Russia, "I am aware of the difficulties of the fight for Stalingrad and of our diminished battle strength."

Kesselring, on the 28th, could view the situation in the Mediterranean with something less than the Fuehrer's gloomy grandeur and remoteness. He was feeling the direct impact rather than the shadow of Allied Air Power when he wrote angrily to the commander of his flak units at Bizerta: "The effect of today's defence against enemy attacks was insufficient. I demand for the future that enemy aircraft are at least driven off, better still shot down. You are to make it clear to your men that the high losses of recent days in aircraft or in ships are for the future intolerable."

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This picture is the unpleasant obverse to one presented by Peltz on November 18 when he reported that day attack on Bone with weak forces and without fighter escort was costly and unsuccessful. In two days four good crews had been lost over this target.

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On 1 December Rommel's Air Commander contributed to our knowledge of Germany's fighter shortage in Africa in a message saying: "Owing to lack of fighter protection the ground personnel are being sent during the night from Tripoli to Gabes."

The files of the Mediterranean Command up to this time are a continual series of complaints about shortages in supply, imposed on them by Allied Air Power, but they seldom specify whether British or American. Indeed the Germans may not have known, for on December 12 Kesselring's operations officer directed that when aircraft of American pattern were seen or shot down, a report should be made as to whether the markings were English or American.

American operations in the Mediterranean were not yet in full strength, but on December 18 Bizerte Harbor was attacked by 36 Fortresses. Earlier in the month Kesselring had demanded that flak at Bizerte be strengthened, but his efforts did not hinder the Twelfth Air Force.

The Germans presumably were chiefly pre-occupied with what the Allies would do next. On December 15 Berlin received an agent's report that discussions and plans were in progress for terror raids on Austria after the frost season had set in.

On December 30, Kesselring's Intelligence Officer sent out to the forces in Africa an agent's report

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indicating that the attack on Tripoli would be made from the sea and that as American Air Forces appeared to be concentrating in Syria and the East, attacks on Roumanian oil fields could be expected. That protection of these targets was a continuing pre-occupation is indicated by an appeal on December 15 from the Air Attache in Roumania to provide a Caudron 445 for the instructional staff there, as tasks would be urgent and increased.

Direct "ULTRA" evidence on the Russian Front, or Western Front, is not worth recording for December 1942. The Eighth Air Force flew only two missions in the month, which was only a foretaste of the grave handicap European winter weather was to impose upon precision bombardment. The question of whether we should in fact abandon daylight for night bombardment was still open and a subject of sharp differences of opinion.

In December, evidence from sources other than "ULTRA" indicated that two additional single-engine day fighter groups came into active status along the German occupied coast opposite the Eighth Air Force, which was perhaps the best, although silent testimony of the opinion the Germans then held of our capabilities.

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On 2 January a message states that the Fuehrer has ordered a fighter group and a Stuka (fighter-bomber) group to be transferred to the Stalingrad area where "they are to go into operation only when enemy ground attacks demand it." Intelligence does not show which groups, if any, were sent. They certainly were not from either the Mediterranean or Western Front. This order for defensive action is clearest evidence of the sweeping reverse of fortune deep in Russia which was to culminate in the surrender of Stalingrad itself a month later.

An order of the day from General Richtofen of Luftflotte 4 to his major subordinate command, Fliegerkorps VIII, accentuates the dilemma in the East - "Fliegerkorps VIII will carry out the supply of the 6th Army with all formations." In short, what had been the offensive aerial spearhead of the Panzer drive into Russia was now reduced to a supply command for the cut-off armies.

On 18 January a routine message orders a ground attack squadron in Luftflotte 4 to be taken off operations "and transferred to Dehlin-Irana for re-equipment with F.W. 190's." On its bare face this message appears to be only a routine rest order, but the intention to re-equip with F.W. 190's confirmed a flow of evidence from other sources indicating that the Germans were preparing to expand Focke Wulf production mightily.

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At the New Year, the Japanese Minister in Bucharest (not necessarily well informed but a perfect sounding board for German official opinion) remarked that Axis Air Forces have superiority and that this will increase Anglo-American problems. Field Marshal Rommel could hardly have shared this view. He was steadily being forced toward the dead end of Tunis, and his columns dared not move by day. Nothing that Kesselring could do was of more than momentary aid. For perhaps the first time they became aware of American air transport. Kesselring's Intelligence Office reported on January 5 that large quantities of fuel were said to be brought up from Egypt by what he queried to be the "9 American Army." The Ninth Air Force had in fact been in existence for nearly two months.

On January 7 Kesselring's Operations Officer was fuming about loss of heavy aircraft through pilots' errors, and on the 16th Kesselring himself "demanded" that the Junkers transports fly in formation. He continues with the remarkable statement, "It must not happen that the fighter escort fails to notice enemy attacks on the formation to be protected." He refers to enemy successes that day in attacking transport airfields and prophesies repetition. Nevertheless on January 24 in outlining the Mareth position, he will bring over all necessary personnel and supply from Italy. On January 23 Kesselring blandly congratulated the long-range recon unit LF123 on their 3000th sortie, only to receive on the 25th a statement from Rommel

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that his recce was completely inadequate. A plan was hastily scrambled up to use Me. 109 fighters.

German pre-occupation with our bombardment capability is again indicated by an order of January 13, apparently from or to the C. in C. South East, designating as objectives to be defended by Fliegerkorps XII the Ploesti oil region, Giurgiu and Konstanza oil trans-shipment harbors and the Danube bridge at Cernavoda, as well as supervision of the Roumanian air defences in the Bucharest area.

On 20 January a circular from the Higher Command, relayed through Luftflotte 4, "mentioned that the Kommodore of Fighter, Heavy Fighter, and Schlacht (ground-attack) Geschwader, were to be called to a conference and that all Kommodore on leave would have to be informed that attendance at the conference was compulsory."

This, as we later learned, was the conference at which General Galland, the Air Officer Commanding for Fighters, detailed to his Field Commanders, in a series of lectures by himself and others, the High Command plans for strengthening the German fighter arm.

The context of the lectures was never available to us; agents were able to procure notes which had been taken of some of them. These provided a miscellany of extremely useful and detailed intelligence. Every word of it pointed toward expansion; Colonel Luetzow lectured on W/T and D/F organization expansion and an explanation of the inauguration of separate area day-fighter control commands in the West, to be known as Jafues. |

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Colonel Brustellin assured the operational commanders that the internal strength of their units was to be increased. Galland's own statement that there were presently available 40 fighter groups tallies exactly with our Intelligence records at the time. He did not specify the increase to be forthcoming from new training and production, but said it would be large. He spoke truthfully.

The 40 groups were to be increased to 60 odd, and everyone of the new ones was in its turn to be employed against American daylight strategic bombardment. In addition to these there were a score of miscellaneous fighting organizations improvised at various times and places, in training schools, reserve pools, ferry pilot squadrons and the test flight personnel of actual factories.

General Galland's lecture was notable for containing the first mention available to Allied Intelligence of the Me. 262 jet plane, which was to become so formidable two years later, and of the Heinkel 280 jet plane, and the Me. 163 rocket plane, as well as the Mark 108 30-mm cannon, which was to give these jets such formidable firepower.

Most of these developments were still far in the future, yet they showed clearly the trend of German thought and the clear recognition by the German Fighter Command that its present resources were inadequate to defend against American bombardment.

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There was every reason for them to concentrate on this new problem of defence, for in the Allied Councils January witnessed also a portentous meeting. At Casablanca the Combined Chiefs of Staff, after examination of the record of our unescorted Fortresses, decided to continue and expand their faith in the concept of daylight strategic bombardment.

The Eighth Air Force was promised its long deferred build-up of planes and was given a directive and a list of priorities. These priorities recognized the reality of our comparatively weak position and the hazards confronting them. They were in order, submarine construction yards, German aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants and other targets in the enemy oil industry.

Even then all thoughtful observers realized that submarine production could be a little more than a comparatively safe proving ground for our technique until the day came when we were strong enough to accept a finish fight with the German Air Force and the aircraft industry on which it rested.

There was no other weapon in the Allied arsenal which could bring the German Air Force to combat on terms unfavorable to it. The only hope of doing so was to confront the German Air Force with the alternatives of accepting ruinous attrition in the air or unopposed accurate bombing of their aircraft factories. American strategic bombardment was the only weapon that could force these alternatives upon the German High Command. Both Allied and German meetings

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in January 1943 recognized this fact and set in train their preparations for the test.

PART IV
CASABLANCA TO CAIRO
FEBRUARY 1943

Although the die had been cast in the Casablanca and Galland conferences February did not see the battle between American Air Power and the German Air Force fully joined. The process was one of jerky acceleration in the fighting tempo. The Eighth Air Force had been able to raise fewer than 70 bombers for our first trip into Germany itself at Wilhelmshaven on January 26th. More were coming but the delays extended through February in this Theater.

The German Air Force similarly was conserving its strength as far as possible and building up steadily over France and Northwest Germany in direct opposition to the obvious course of our future raids. Bloody battles were fought in February with loss to both sides but their real import was only to indicate to both Air Forces the severity of the test ahead.

In the Mediterranean where weather favored air fighting heavy combat was already joined. On the 16th of February the Fliegerfuehrer of Tunis filed a Daily Operations Report which was to become a model for endless repetition until the end of the African Campaign.

It describes attacks by Fortresses, Marauders and Lightnings on Kairouan A/F. The Fliegerfuehrer claims the destruction of 14 Lightnings and 1 Mitchell shot down without loss to himself. He acknowledges: "3 Focke Wulf 190's burnt out, 1 Me. 109 recce a/c completely destroyed by splinters, 5 F.W. 190's fighter bombers and 1 F.W. 190 fighter damaged by splinters,

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and 1 direct hit on the Battle Headquarters of the Second Group. The whole fighter control installation was destroyed as a result."

Variations on this battle were to recur throughout the campaign. Unlike the Western Front the African Theater had relatively few first-class airdromes. This fact the American Air Forces in the Theater recognized and they capitalized upon it with exemplary tenacity.

There were two great factors in the use of American Air Power in the Mediterranean. The destruction of the German Air Force down there was in great part achieved by airdrome bombing and the combat it provoked. The second and perhaps equally significant factor was the destruction of convoys across the Mediterranean. The two objectives were, of course, inter-related. Kesselring's inability to protect his convoys from bombings permitted the Strategic Forces to impose and continue the aerial blockade which was to ruin him for want of supplies.

A great factor in this success and an excellent augury for the future of the American concept of escorted bombardment appears in a day report of Fliegerkorps Tunis of February 25th: "For the first time an extraordinary well-flown fighter escort on the part of the enemy was noted. Our fighters endeavored to engage the bombers but were forced away by the protective escort, so that the attack against the fighter aircraft was carried out by only a few of our fighters. This shows that with a well-flown

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fighter protection not only bomber formations but also the fighters must be attacked by some elements."

Two days before this event, Kesselring, in commenting on an Allied attack on a tanker, made the point that fighters on convoy protection must not allow themselves to become involved with fighter escort. Three days later the Fliegerfuehrer again was impressed. He apologized for the small number of aircraft shot down over Bizerta by one of his fighter groups of JG 53 and laid it to the strong and well-handled American fighter escort.

It would have shown more if the Fliegerfuehrer had been a more far-sighted man. It showed that within six months of our first operation in this Theater, we were mastering the technique of protecting our bombers sufficiently to assure our bombardment the advantage of daylight operation and precision sighting.

It was to require only time and more fighters to apply this technique as surely over Germany itself as we had applied it over German Africa. Yet the matter of time was the very crux of the question. In Germany itself more far-sighted men than the Fliegerfuehrer Tunis were already expanding the German fighter forces as rapidly as they could, though we had yet no fighters at all to support our bombers in the United Kingdom. One form of this expansion was, within a month, to transfer a whole group of fighters from Africa back to

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France even at the time when Kesselring was first threatening court-martials against his local commanders for failure to provide adequate fighter defence in Africa.

A problem which American bombers presented to the Germans turns up in the somewhat obscure and highly technical activities of the G.A.F. Signals organization. The speed of the Fortress and the Liberator required drastic changes in the German spotting and reporting system. Eventually in Germany it reached great heights of elaboration. But in the Mediterranean results were unpredictable. On February 23 Fliegerkorps Tunis reporting on a Fortress attack at Karouan that there were no Kibreta or Freya reports and that fighters scrambled as the bombers were over the airfield. Four days later the Senior Signals Officer reported as if a matter of congratulation that an attack had been picked up by the reporting service and plotted in good time.

Another feature of Mediterranean operations has not so far been noticed in this report - the Italian Air Force. "ULTRA" gives us little information on the subject. Initially the Italian Air Force had to offer to the Germans substantial technical improvements and experiments. They pioneered in the use of the aircraft torpedo. And their fighter aircraft and pilots had quality.

By the time American operations began in the Mediterranean, however, the Italian Air Force had been

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knocked about by the R.A.F. and was in decline. A glimpse of the situation is given on February 16 when Fliegerkorps Tunis reported to Kesselring that the Italian fighters at Sfax would no longer escort the German mine detonating aircraft.

He requested that directions be issued "that the Italian boys should in general operate more than has hitherto been their wont and should provide escort." And he adds that promised reinforcements of the Italians have not arrived. And yet on February 23 the Comando Supremo, Ambrosio, in transmitting orders to Rommel on the reorganization of the African forces could speak of the G.A.F. and I.A.F. as if equal forces. But his final sentence is ominous: "Luftflotte 2 and Superaereo are responsible for ensuring that in this period of battle all serviceable aircraft are operated several times a day."

February had seen also the surrender of Von Paulus and the 6th German Army before Stalingrad. There is an apologetic note in Luftflotte 4's report of "a decisive part in the successful defensive battle in the Rostov area."

Luftflotte 4 had not gone to Russia to fight defensive battles before Rostov. It had gone to cover the capture of the Caspian oil and the destruction of the armies defending it. It had remained there to bomb the installations in despair and then withdrawn leaving the Army itself to be captured. This failure

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to secure the Russian oil was to make the whole of Germany vulnerable to precision attack against her inadequate internal oil production. But this fatal consequence of Luftflotte 4's failure was at that time still 14 months in the future.

By the end of the month the German Air Force in Russia had recovered enough to speak of a thousand sorties flown on the 21st of February probably in connection with the German counter-attack into Kharkov. But the recapture of Kharkov was a small consolation for the loss of the 6th Army and the Russian oil. It is impossible to speak with certainty of how things might have been. Yet, considering the narrowness of the decision at Stalingrad, it appears possible if not probable that the margin of German failure was contained in the fighter and bomber groups which had left Luftflotte 4 to counter operations in the Mediterranean.

MARCH 1943

The March files for the Mediterranean Command accentuate the continuous troubles of fighter protection for both Mediterranean convoys and ground supply lines. Although Goering's order of the day on March 1st (G.A.F. Day) was characteristically bombastic his Luftwaffe, in fact, was in trouble on three fronts. The sweeping plans for increasing it were in motion but not yet effective in the field.

A message from the A.O. for Fighters in Berlin on the 8th speaks "of the strained situation with regard to personnel, particularly flying personnel."

It was probably only a temporary strain for even then new units, notably the whole 11th Wing, were forming. But it reflects the tension which heavy-scale fighting on three fronts was beginning to enforce upon the Luftwaffe that had been designed only for intermittent fighting at times and places of its own choosing. In March the Eighth Air Force was to accentuate this strain with 11 missions involving a heavy scale of air fighting.

As has been noted one of the African groups came north to reinforce the Western Front early in this month, but on the 7th the terrible tempered Field-marschall Kesselring saw fit to encourage the remainder of his dwindling forces as follows: "I have been obliged to institute court-martial proceedings owing to the negligence in the escort provided for valuable

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merchant vessels." His fighters may, in his view, have been negligent but the continuing scale of fighting in Africa would seem to indicate less of negligence than of sheer incapacity to cope with well-escorted Allied bombers.

Almost every operations report cites heavy fighting over both convoys and airdromes which were to be the twin Achilles heels of Kesselring's position.

Although Luftflotte 2 was promised substantial allocations of aircraft for April, it was not relieved in March from the great strain on its resources to protect its own convoys and airfields and at the same time attack Allied convoys and airfields. For one thing, the Germans could never be quite sure where our convoys were going. They were convinced that further landings might take place at any time anywhere.

Thus in March great plans were laid on in case an approaching convoy were going to Sardinia. (No doubt repeated bomber attacks at Cagliari had something to do with the German fears.) Their efforts to attack our airfields extended even to bringing in for special operations the new Me. 210 twin-engine fighter. Much had been expected of this aircraft, but it was not entirely satisfactory and had been delayed. Now it was being rushed in despite its limitations.

As for the German's own supply, by the end of the month Luftflotte 2 was ordering that all in any way serviceable bomber aircraft including instructor crews were at once to be used for transport of fuel and ammunition and Kesselring was saying. "On this

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side we shall do what is humanly possible to get supplies to you."

The value of "ULTRA" itself to this blockade is indicated in a report from Fliegerkorps Tunis to its superior echelon (Luftflotte 2). On the evening of March 13th "the enemy activity today in the air and on the sea must, in view of Fliegerkorps Tunis, lead to the conclusion that the course envisaged for convoy D and C were betrayed to the enemy. At 0845 hours a comparatively strong four-engined aircraft formation was northeast of Bizerta. Also a warship formation consisting of light cruisers and destroyers lay north of Bizerta, although no enemy warships had been sighted in the sea area for weeks."

In fact the Twelfth Bomber Command was regularly serviced through "ULTRA" information with the sailing times and routings of Kesselring's convoys, a factor which contributed immeasurably to the great success our bombers enjoyed in the sinking of them.

Adequate fighters might have done much to protect those convoys but first priority for German fighters was now clearly established on the Western Front.

A message from Luftflotte 4 on the 20th indicates clearly the cost of this priority even to the Russian Front. "Fighter forces available only allow operations where they are necessitated by our own bomber operations. Fighter protection for local limited undertakings behind the Front, unconnected with bomber operations, cannot be provided."

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On the 22nd the operations order of the Fliegerfuehrer Tunisia reported as angrily as prudence permitted to Kesselring himself "the protection of important convoys is insufficient today because Fliegerfuehrer 2, taking his stand on an order of the Fieldmarschall, is not providing the necessary fighters. I request an unambiguous order as to where the responsibility for the safety of convoys and with it the right to give orders lies."

The similarity of these two messages is evident but the responsibility for fighter shortage that was so costly, both in Russia and in the Mediterranean, lay in neither of those Theaters.

It lay, in fact, on the Western Front where fighters were steadily increasing in number and the real explanation may be found in a Naval situation report of the 23rd (exact originating command un-
deciphered): "On Wilhelmshaven from a height of 7,000 to 8,000 meters, according to available reports, about 30 H.E. (C% bombs) in dockyard, causing heavy (B%) structural damage to magazine."

That is all there is to that particular message, yet it was something too new and too portentous to this war to have been misunderstood in Berlin. The German High Command was not used to having its harbor installations heavily damaged from 7,000 meters in daylight attack. It was against this that German fighter strength was being deployed at an increasing cost to the other fronts.

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On the 25th a message intercepted through Luftflotte 4 states: "The Reichsmarchall has ordered the reinforcement of fighter defence in the Northwest German Region. The Fighter Gruppen employed in the East will each give up, for this purpose, one pilot with experience of the front and successes to his credit The despatch of the pilots is as far as possible to be speeded up."

Not only were the numbers of German fighters in the West increasing steadily but here is a clear call for the highest skill and qualifications. It illustrated more clearly than any evidence received to date the gravity with which the German High Command was viewing the progress of the Eighth Air Force to practice its technique over Germany itself.

APRIL 1943

Even before the date of the Casablanca directive the Eighth Air Force had prepared the plan of a specific bombardment program to implement that directive. This plan, later known as POINTBLANK, amounted to a list of targets which must be destroyed to implement the directive. The targets were chosen, firstly, for their accessibility to the Eighth Air Force.

It was still too weak in numbers, in long range fighters and in long range bombers, to begin with the most important objectives first, but the plan took cognizance of the Eighth Air Force's promised expansion in all three of these categories and scheduled most of the German installations for progressive attack at the earliest possible time.

This plan was submitted by General Eaker to the Combined Chiefs of Staff late in April. With their approval it became at once the operating charter and the target list of the Eighth Air Force for the remainder of the year.

The plan represented actually the precision daylight bombardment dream. The first stage, to prove both ability to hit targets and power to survive missions, was successfully behind the Eighth Air Force. The second stage was the application of a measured bombardment program to a measured war economy.

It had previously been considered indispensable to win mastery of the air before attempting such an ambitious plan. In point of fact it was realized that the Eighth Air Force had not yet won it. It was considered that

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it could not win it, with the forces then available, except through the operation of the plan itself.

The chief reason for this was that it was not fighting a fixed economy or a fixed enemy strength. Both were expanding prodigiously. In the earlier stages of the war Germany had measured her military power to the tasks before her accurately and precisely.

By the time probably of the first Russian campaign, and certainly of America's entry into the war, the Germans had begun to realize that it was no longer their sole option to measure the military tasks before them. They foresaw campaigns and battles that would not be of their own planning and timing.

The exact dates when they began to integrate the economy of all of Europe into intensified war production are not yet clearly determinable, nor are the various stages of the subsequent plans for increase and dispersal. These had already begun to supersede each other, and the objective of each was greater and still greater production.

Little reliable evidence of organized industrial expansion appears in "ULTRA". Its fruits, however, have already begun to appear in the steady flow of reports of new aircraft, principally fighters, and crews. These fighters were the indispensable insurance of the whole industrial scheme, and indeed of Germany's whole mastery of the Continent. From this time forward their increase not only in total numbers but in almost exclusive opposition to American daylight bombardment is a matter of clear record.

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It may be studied in the attached chart of the activation and disposition of the fighter groups that opposed American strategic bombardment. The internal strength of these groups varied, of course, with the day-to-day fighting, replacements and expansion. This had been estimated in many papers, including, of course, the weekly disposition charts, regularly provided by Intelligence. In retrospect, it is soberly considered that these were accurate at the time within the 10% margin claimed for them. Whoever is interested in the totals at various times may consult them.

It is the concern of these notes only to explain that the American bombardment program was not fighting a fixed force or a fixed economy. Both were expanding in response to a threat which the Germans clearly realized as the foremost on the whole perimeter of conquest, which had now become for them a defensive line.

Evidence of these very points may be found in the first "ULTRA" message in the April file, which clearly indicates the actual emergence into operation against us of 3 new groups. Against this stiffening opposition there was severe fighting in April on all of the 4 missions which weather and a still restricted strength permitted.

One evidence of these may be read in Goering's rueful order of the 13th:

"Subject: Day Operations by Night Fighters.

"On orders of the Reichsmarschall, with immediate effect night fighter crews with 20 or more night victories are not to be sent on day operations."

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one expedient of
It is evident from this that/an experimental period had been ended. The German Air Force had thought to end our attempt at daylight bombing by combining against it both the existing day and night fighter forces in the West. It appears that they realized that this would soon ruin the only protection they had against British night bombing, and so had decided to rely on the expansion of the day forces, of which we have already seen so many evidences.

The increase in the urgency of this need may be judged from two different messages written by the same man, Kommodore Wilcke of the celebrated 3 Jagdgeschwader, who was justly proud of that famous unit. In almost continuous service on the Russian Front, it had amassed over 4000 victories, the second highest record in the German Air Force. We have noted that one of his three Gruppen had already been ordered away from him to the West late in March, although it appears from other evidence that it did not reach the Western Front until June. Following that he had evidently received by 6 April the circular letter previously noted ordering him to surrender two of his best fighter pilots. In a message explaining this to his Gruppen Kommandeurs on the 6th, he says:

"The transfer of pilots takes place without reference to the A.O. for Fighters; therefore, when giving them up, take care that the 2nd and 3rd Gruppen are not deprived of their best pilots."

Between this and Kommodore Wilcke's next message on the subject, the Eighth Air Force struck its first direct blow at the German fighter produc^{tion}/with the attack on the

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Focke Wulf factory at Bremen on April 17th, in which it suffered record losses to date of 16 heavy bombers, for the record claims to that date of 63-15-17.

The intervention of this particular raid is perhaps only coincidence, but the change in Wilcke's attitude is very evident. Six weeks later (see May files) the following message went to the 2nd and 3rd Gruppen from the A.O. for Fighters:

"The most difficult task at present confronting the fighters in the West is in engaging strong four-engined bomber formations with and without escort, and high flying and speedy Mosquito recce aircraft.

"The Reichsmarschall has ordered that it is to be ascertained by means of an inquiry addressed to the fighter pilots, who will volunteer for this task. For the moment, volunteering will not be followed by transfer. A.O. for Fighters expects numerous applications."

On the previous occasion Wilcke had been at the least uncooperative enough to instruct his Kommandeurs to look out for the local interest first. Now, in a footnote to this second message, Wilcke instructs his subordinate commanders in a very different vein:

"In view of the state of things, only a spontaneous, voluntary and unanimous volunteering by the entire Gruppe can be the response. Send me at once such a report, with reference to the message of the A.O. for Fighters."

The mortal struggle between our bombardment and German defense had begun, and the succeeding months were to see it intensified with every mission.

In the Mediterranean, meanwhile, the Germans were

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steadily being compressed into Tunis, and their continuous clamor for fighters was the best testimony available on Allied air power.

On the 4th Fortresses attacked Naples Harbor and the airfield at Capodichino. The Twelfth Air Force was now in a position to extend its operations regularly and to attack the Italian mainland, as they had done once in February. Luftflotte 2's report on Naples Harbor suggests considerable upset to an important supply center.

It was in that month that the Allied Air Forces made their brilliant strikes against the air transports which were such an indispensable factor in the support of the German position at Tunis. Two different messages from Fliegerkorps Tunis stressed the disastrous consequences seen in the loss of 15 to 18 Ju. 52s and the miscellany of other transport aircraft. Actually, these losses were much higher, though not exactly measurable, as may be discovered by an examination of the S.R. conversations of the ranking officers in Tunis. These were not available until May, after capture of these officers in question.

On the 22nd of May one of them said:

"You cannot imagine how catastrophic the air personnel is. We have no crews; all the instructor crews were shot down in the Junkers."

On the 16th of May the Chief Artillery Officer of German Group Africa said:

"It was nearly always materiel.....and the loss of personnel really occurred in the last six weeks when the English, with terrific concentration, literally closed

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the air out from Sicily to Tunis for all practical purposes. One day they shot down 11 out of 13 Gigants. The Gigants which were.....alone and each of which takes 100 men."

General von Thoma:

"Were they all killed?"

"All lost."

This same artillery officer has thrown interesting light on our air blockade of shipping as well:

"I was once told that the Italians betrayed the fact each time a ship put out to sea, but it isn't true. The English had such a well-organized reconnaissance service that when ships put out to sea, no matter whether it was by night or in daylight, they were attacked with mathematical certainty four hours later out at sea, and they are not, as our people said, merely bombed---they were sunk."

This in fact is exactly what was happening, and the influence of the Allied air blockade on that campaign, though not exactly measurable, was certainly decisive.

On the land the Germans were scarcely enjoying better times, as may be judged by a report from Army Group Africa to Kesselring himself on the 9th:

"Continuous 'Parteitag' and fighter bomber attacks resulted in heavy losses to the troops and had a considerable effect on their morale. Our own Air Force has, on the other hand, hardly put in an appearance."

It hardly had, because of the concentration in the West, which has been previously noted.

The singleness of Higher German purpose to defend the West at all costs is clearly illustrated in an answer

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to what had evidently been a request from Luftflotte 5 for further fighters in Norway, at the opposite extreme of the German conquests. There the air task of blocking the Murmansk route had already been impeded by the removal of most of their best bomb groups to the Mediterranean, and it is probable that General Stumpf had asked for fighters to protect his remaining ones. The answer is noted:

"The problem concerning Jagdgeschwader 5 has been decided by C in C GAF as follows:

"According to a decision of the Chief of Air Staff, the new organization of Jagdgeschwader 5 is to be postponed until it is possible to set up three Gruppen for the projected Jagdgeschwaders 5 and 55. This will be at the earliest in the autumn of 1943. Until then the present organization will stand."

On the 20th the impending collapse in Tunis was clearly foreshadowed in an order by Luftflotte 2 for the wholesale transfer of German Air Force units in Africa to Sardinia and Italy.

On the 28th Kesselring's Chief of Staff, Seidemann, attempted consolation to the deserted armies:

"The demands constantly received from the different armies.....as well as from the Navy, for fighter protection.....cannot be met with the forces available. Fliegerfuehrer Tunis.....will concentrate its effort in order to be able to hold its own against the numerical superiority of the enemy."

The words sound bold, but in fact the transfer of air units had already been made, and after their loss the surrender of the African armies at Cape Bon early in May was inevitable.

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May 1943 produced the first "ULTRA" evidence of a new German concern that followed logically upon the loss of Africa. This was the aerial defence of Roumania in general and Ploesti in particular. It is probably coincidence that on the very day of the German surrender at Cape Bon a long and rather garbled message, apparently from the G.A.F. Mission in Roumania to Coering and appropriate staff sections, sets forth the plan to incorporate substantial German additions into what remained ostensibly the Roumanian Air Force.

The evident concern over signals personnel in this message is clearly indicative of preparations for the reporting and ground control of fighters. Almost a year had elapsed since the Halverson mission had first revealed American interest in Ploesti as a major target. It was obvious to the Germans that our experienced heavy bomber units now safely based in ^{ia} Tunis/ and Benghazi were a serious if not immediate threat to hitherto inaccessible German targets.

On the 22nd of May a staffel of night fighters was dispatched to Roumania and on the 29th a communication to Officer Commanding Fighters, Roumania, subordinates that functionary "in every respect to G.A.F. Mission, Roumania, with all units. Of these, the Roumanian day and night fighter forces will only be subordinated for operations." This is only another of the innumerable instances of reorganization,

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preparation and dispersal which our by now proven strategic capabilities were forcing on the German defences. It is of exceptional interest, however, for the reflection it casts both upon their sensitivity to oil attack and their respect for our newly won strategic position in the Mediterranean.

Still further evidence is afforded by the elevation of Fliegerkorps XII in Greece and the Balkans to the more resplendent title of G.A.F. Command Southeast. Kesselring in saying farewell to them, as they were passing from his command, spoke of the great tasks which would fall to them and wished them a resounding "Good Hunting."

Air operations in the Mediterranean, once Tunisia had been cleared, were free to proceed against Sicilian and Italian airfields and harbors. There is ample evidence of how much damage was done, notably in a truly catastrophic attack on Grosseto on May 20.

Although a landing in Sicily did not take place until July, the German (and Italian) position there was untenable from the moment the Air Forces were free to attack. At the very end of the month attacks began on what from now on would be a prime objective, the extensive chain of airfields at Foggia. On May 30 Luftflotte 2 was worried about results of un-serviceability or over-occupation at Foggia and Bari. The airfield was attacked that day and again on May 31, after which KG 76 reported probably severe damage.

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These attacks again made the Germans realize the necessity of sound warning and defence systems. On May 31 Kesselring said, "The fighter gruppen have got to cooperate in the scheme for air defence.They are also responsible for making certain of the liaison with the a/c reporting service, especially the Freya sets."

On the Western Front May had opened with hard combat over St. Nazaire and continued on the 4th with a heavy attack on the Erla Antwerp factories of the Messerschmitt Company, the most important aircraft installation, except for the Bremen Focke Wulf works, which was within our still restricted range.

The month was to see our attack against submarine installations extended in repeated strikes against Kiel, Emden and Wilhelmshaven, which were to produce some of the bitterest fighting of the war.

On May 13th U.K. based Thunderbolts operated in our protection and, although they were still too few and short ranged for the longer attacks, their presence and influence were of vital importance in the continuance of the bombardment program. Already the superiority of fire power upon which Fortress formations depended was seriously challenged.

It is characteristic of the blind spots in "ULTRA" that the messages intercepted contained, up to this date, no mention of the 21 cm rocket mortar which the Germans had adapted from tank busting to use against Fortress formations. This weapon had an effective range greatly exceeding the 50 caliber gun and a

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lethal burst considerably exceeding the heaviest known flak.

In May our crews began to report its effect in our close formations and, although the Germans themselves had endless trouble with it, they were to persevere and to improve it until it reached its climax in the record losses it cost us over Schweinfurt in October.

Although this weapon enjoyed prodigious advantage over Fortress formations, it carried the inherent disadvantage of making the aircraft to which it was attached hopelessly inferior in fighter to fighter combat. It was this factor which enabled our Thunderbolts again to turn the scales of a balance that the 21 cm rocket was tilting inexorably against our bombing technique. In May, however, our Thunderbolts were still strictly limited in range and it was the unescorted bombers which carried the brunt of the very heavy fighting in Northwest Germany.

In addition to the rocket the Germans were experimenting with other countermeasures clearly designed to capitalize upon the inherent vulnerability to explosion of our tightly packed formations. Thus on the 19th the Air Officer for Fighters in Berlin informed his subordinate in Sicily as follows:

"At the express desire of the Fuehrer fighter-bombers with bombs bursting in the air (Luft-sprengpunkt) for use against close bomber formations (bomber-busting bombers) (Sprengbombers) are to be employed in increased strength.

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"For this purpose the Staffel operating in every O.C. Fighters' area is to be kept permanently up to its strength of 12 serviceable a/c and pilots. Further increases are to be expected.

"On 19/5, JG 11 achieved by this means its third and fourth victory. Short report on experience in action follows."

This report may well have been the literal truth as on the 19th we did lose 6 bombers at Kiel and JG 11, as has been noted, was organized in Northwest Germany particularly against us. Otherwise the only direct mention of our activities in "ULTRA" are routine damage reports following our attacks on Heligoland on the 15th and St. Nazaire on the 29th.

The files henceforward will contain hundreds of these reports. It should be pointed out that most of them are of little value in assessing the actual damage done. They originate haphazardly from the smallest local to the largest regional command. Most of them are sent too soon for even experts to appraise the actual damage.

What is more, our targets were usually industrial and these are strictly military reports from men who had no way of assessing the actual industrial damage and often had an obvious concern to minimize it, as the defence was their responsibility. Examples will be quoted from time to time, but it must be remembered that the best of our damage assessments came from

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other sources. Thus the Airfield Regional Command for a subordinate unit of Luftgau (service and maintenance) West France reported on the 29th:

"To Luftgau 1C: Situation 1456 to 1515 hrs., attack on St. Nazaire by 120 to 140 enemy aircraft. Type: four-engined American Flying Fortresses, Boeing 17. Enemy a/c observed in good time.

"Preliminary warning 1448 hrs. Air raid warning at 1448 hrs. Height of flight 6000 to 8000 meters, approach from the north in several waves. The a/c flew off from the target to the west over the sea. Weather conditions very good. Heavy flak defence. Strong fighter effort. Bombs on St. Nazaire. Up to the present the shooting down of two aircraft has been observed. Damage not yet established last line or so torn off.

"Note: Above seen in a file marked Airfield Regional Command 4/VII - Luftgau West France."

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A more indicative report of a different kind on American bombardment effectiveness is to be read between the lines of an order which Goering issued in June. This report happens to have been picked up in Italy, but the fact that it was issued by Goering himself indicates the sensitivity of all G.A.F. installations to precision bombing.

"The Reichsmarschall has issued the following orders:

"In spite of all the orders I have already issued, during enemy air attacks large industrial and G.A.F. supplies have yet again been destroyed as the dispersal of these dumps had not been completely carried out. I order once more that both in the G.A.F. and in the G.A.F. industry all dumps of material and supplies of equipment, clothing, rations, medical stores, etc., are to be dispersed at once, into areas less endangered from the air. I reject in advance excuses about lack of workmen or transport. In future I shall take the severest measures, if necessary by court martial, against those responsible, through whose culpability or slackness G.A.F. property or supplies of the G.A.F. industry are destroyed or damaged.

"ADDENDUM by Italuft:

"The events in the (illegible) show once more the importance of carrying out the

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dispersal orders issued.

"ADDENDUM by A.R.C. 9/VII:

"Measures taken are to be reported by 3/6.

This date must be adhered to in all circumstances."

Goering's concern was well founded. The stiffening resistance by the G.A.F. may best be studied in the operations reports of our own missions. The fighting of May and early June had been so severe as to leave no doubt of what was in fact no longer so much a matter of priorities/^{as} of survival.

Above all things it was necessary for the Army Air Forces to check the rising strength of the German Fighter Force. To this end the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in January was modified in a letter from the Chief of the Air Staff to General Eaker on June 10th. It may be examined in the June files, but its import was to raise German Fighter Strength to the status of an intermediate objective transcending the other priorities of the Point Blank Program.

This letter recognized the limitation of Fortress range which still kept the major centers of fighter manufacture beyond our reach, but it set forth a list of such ancilliary targets as airdromes and forward repair depots which enabled even our limited range to strike directly at existing German strength and serviceability.

The operations records will show how quickly this decision was implemented. The claim and loss columns are better testimony than any, "ULTRA" of the German reaction to our evident purpose.

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A different kind of testimony, however, appears in an appreciation by the Japanese Minister in Bucharest. A note of caution must be repeated on the character of this evidence. Diplomats depend upon informants within the country where they work. These may be ignorant, untruthful, or both. Nevertheless, the Minister thought it worth informing Tokyo that "the Luftwaffe was having difficulty in assembling on the Eastern Front the large air forces necessary for a big scale offensive there owing to the greatly increased strength of the British and American Air Forces." Later in the same message he says, "while encountering the increasingly heavy air attacks Germany would endeavor to build up her air force, to increase the output of munitions, and to train additional troops."

A more direct piece of testimony is to be found in a message from Luftflotte 2 to the Fliegerfuhrer Sardinia on the 24th of June, in which he says, "breakdown in the industry with respect to supplies of Me. 109 (B; P.R. a/c) deficiencies can only be made good with normal fighters."

Again as is usual in "ULTRA" the play of cause and effect is not certainly demonstrable, but it is well worth noting that Erla Antwerp was the modification center for the adaption of Me. 109's to reconnaissance usage principally through the building of pressure cabins for high altitude. A reliable agent had reported in May, following Eighth Air Force's second attack on Erla Antwerp, that the factory was completely destroyed.

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Reconnaissance shortage was to trouble the Germans sorely during the remainder of the war, long after Erta Antwerp was restored to operational use and protected from our further attention by elaborate dispersal and the diplomatic protestations of the Belgians. The occurrence of this particular shortage, however, was perhaps the more noteworthy as coming shortly before our preparations for the landing on Sicily, which was to catch the Germans so unprepared.

Air Force operations in June contributed to this lack of preparation with a continuation of the attack on Sicilian airfields and a gradual extension of the attack on important Italian transportation centers. There are repeated reports in the files. Sometimes the damage is scattered, but the accumulation mounted. The airfield attacks produced repeated warnings about camouflage and dispersal and eventually the motto: Everyone must have his slit trench. An attack on Naples on June 21 was especially successful. Kesselring's Quartermaster appreciated on June 22 that only in exceptional cases could transport be moved in less than 14 days. On the 26th he appreciated again the considerable transport difficulties inside Italy and was especially exercised about the loss of large quantities of soap.

On June 21 G.A.F. Southeast was given a slight foretaste of the "great tasks" assigned him by American attacks on the airfields at Salonika and Athens.

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In June a message from Luftflotte 4 on the 1st instructed its commanders to prepare a series of blitzes against Russian airdromes and aircraft on them. Fragmentation bombs were specified and it is impossible not to wonder whether the Germans were profiting by the lessons in this technique which they had learned so painfully from us in North Africa.

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The American technique of airdrome bombing was to surpass even the African scale and effectiveness against the concentrated airdromes of Sicily, which was in such large measure responsible for the weakness of the air resistance to the attack.

Such attacks vary a good deal in their effect, and it is not surprising to find reports indicating little or no damage. But the accumulative effect is made perfectly clear by a report on July 7th by Kesselring's Chief of Staff which mentions considerable damage to airfields in Sicily. On July 8th the question was being raised of using German and Italian military personnel for repairing airfields. On July 10th orders were given to fly damaged aircraft, if at all possible, to the Italian mainland.

And only six days after the landing in Sicily orders were given for evacuation of the G.A.F. elements in Western Sicily. Communications systems suffered especial damage, and on July 18th Luftflotte 2 was informed that all lines to the mainland were broken down. As the month went on, the attack spread to Italian mainland airfields and transportation.

There are no direct reports on the heavy attack on the Rome area of July 19th and Naples on the 17th. The consequent difficulties are seen only in glimpses; no fuel at Capodichino on the 19th; both airfields at Ciampino unusable on the same day; no bombs available for the ground attack units in the heel of Italy; the airfield at Aquino still closed on the 21st because of delayed action bombs; no transport aircraft available anywhere after another attack at Aquino on the 23rd.

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The general situation is probably well indicated by an order to S.G. 2 from Von Richtofen (who had been brought from Russia in June to take over Kesselring's duties) on July 16th, perhaps one of the most unreasonable and unintelligent orders ever issued:

"I am making you responsible for ensuring that fighter bombers now finally overcome with determination the difficulties they are experiencing and expel the enemy warships from the Bay of Catania and annihilate them."

The Germans appreciated as much as the Allies the value of the Foggia airfields. In mid-July the unrealistic Von Richtofen ordered their evacuation, but apparently was prevailed upon to change his mind. By July 21st the Kommodore of K.G. 6 was made special representative of Luftflotte 2 to take charge of the Foggia area and given the authority of a Fliegerfuehrer. By the end of the month there was serious difficulty in fuelling the area because of bomb damage to railway lines.

The Germans were in fact making further preparation for use of two innovations - the 21 cm mortar against bombers and the HS 293 and FX bombs against shipping. For the 21 cm mortar they had brought south elements of their best experimental unit, Test Group 25, and planned to operate from Vibo, but air attack made that airfield too dangerous. Foggia was the ideal base. The Germans were nervous about risking the HS 293 and FX equipment in Italy and probably preferred to use bases as far north as possible or in France, but the Foggia fields were essential for emergencies. The picture becomes clear in the plans and moves of K.G. 100.

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From a message of July 12th to Luftflotte 2, it appears that they had asked for the 2nd Gruppe of K.G. 100, which had 27 Do. 217s equipped with HS 293, and the 3rd Gruppe, which had 26 Do. 217s equipped with FX bombs. Both were radio controlled bombs, HS 293 being jet propelled.

The full story of air activity in Sicily and Southern Italy is not in "ULTRA", but in the reports of the technical services on crashed aircraft. The German losses were heavy and the Italian catastrophic. For Intelligence the results were in the nature of a bonanza. From the evidence collected in these areas, it was able to establish a much more solid basis for estimating German aircraft production and to see more clearly where German industry was going.

On the Western Front July was to provide the most significant week of the air war to date. The Eighth Air Force was now strong enough to deliver attack on an extensive and protracted scale.

The earlier attacks of the month continued principally against G.A.F. establishments in France, but on six of the last seven days of this month the Eighth struck deeply into Germany and the roots of its troubles in the single-engine fighter factories at Kassel, Warnemunde and Oschersleben.

The intensity of combat was the greatest yet. Record combat claims were reported by American gunners and fighters, and the Eighth Air Force lost in one week about a quarter of the effective strength with which it began these attacks. Again there is no exact measure-

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ment in "ULTRA" or perhaps anywhere else of the precise effect.

In the last two days of these attacks our crew reports contain many accounts of fights with obsolete German aircraft types. It is clear from them that the Germans, like ourselves, were strained to the very breaking point when our own numerical weakness and crew fatigue compelled us to terminate the effort.

The exact cost to the enemy in fighter planes produced is not calculable from evidence in "ULTRA" because it seldom entered what were essentially military communication channels. Indeed there was every reason for the Germans to keep their hard-pressed defenses from knowing the full truth.

The real evidence was to crop up only months afterward in our discovery of the dispersal of the German aircraft industry, which these attacks and the greater subsequent ones of August and October so surely accelerated.

Yet German concern over their whole fighter position recurs again and again in "ULTRA". As early as the 2nd of July the Luftgaus of Norway and Finland were urged to accelerate salvage and repair of fighters. On the 15th a message relayed through Luftflotte 5 in Norway states that the A.O. for Fighters has ordered a series of exercises "to improve the training position, to strengthen self-confidence and to increase successes particularly against enemy bomber units flying in close formation, as well as at the same time to cut down our own losses."

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The German frame of mind comes out even more clearly in a message to General Galland, who had long been the Air Officer for Fighters in Berlin and a popular and respected figure in the Luftwaffe. Yet on the 15th of July he received this message:

"The Reichsmarschall is astonished at your long stay in the South, as he is of the opinion that there was sufficient time to hand over the conduct of operations to Oberst Vieck and that A.O. for Fighters is being compulsorily kept away too long from his real sphere of duty.....the Reichsmarschall expects your return as soon as possible."

On the 16th another message clearly states:

"Further 20 Me. 109s with 21 cm.....at Erding re-equipping." Clear evidence of the German expansion of the forces using this weapon.

A routine air situation report on the 17th says, among other things:

"D) 1 Lightning a/c made a recce flight into the area of Muenchen/Gladbach. On its return flight the enemy a/c was shot down by fighters in the area of the Scheldt Estuary."

This is the first direct allusion observed in "ULTRA" of the American reconnaissance which began operations from England in the summer of 1943.

A circular message on the 15th says:

"The Reichsmarschall has laid down the following scale of values for aircraft shot down by day for purposes of the award of decorations: The shooting down of one four-engine bomber equals the shooting down of

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three twin-engine bombers, equals the shooting down of two single-engine aircraft."

And on the 21st the Air Officer in Berlin prefaces a message full of administrative changes with the statement:

"The frequent changes of Gruppen Kommandeure and Staffel Kapitane within the fighter arm, caused by casualties, has led to an increase in the significance of those officers, who owing to their duties.....can take little or no part in flying ops."

A message dated the 5th of July inaugurates special high altitude training for three pilots from every fighter group. It was against this background of urgent expansion that the Eighth Air Force launched its intensive drive against fighter manufacture at the end of the month.

A message on the 28th says: "Raid by Boeing Fortresses (Roman) II from region of Emden as far as Kassel, return flight Scheldt Estuary. Ops by Gruppe with 21 a/c; 2 enemy probably shot down, 2 effectively shot up - Kommandeur shot down by Thunderbolt, belly landing, unharmed. Leutnant Werner, belly landing. Missing up to now: Leutnant Roisch, Uffz Schriegel, Uffz Apenburg, 3rd staffel also operating."

This is the first direct evidence of the effectiveness of our Thunderbolts and a clear harbinger of the difference they were to make in the precarious balance between our bombardment and the German defense. The exact unit making this report was not identified in that message, but subsequent evidence established it as the first group of J.G. 5. Losses of 5 out of 21 oper-

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ating, with the 3rd staffel probably unreported up to that time, clearly indicates the severity of the fighting.

A routine air situation report on the 29th mentions, among other operations:

"Targets: - A/C Works Kassel and Oschersleben. Damage caused, according to information available at time of writing, Kassel - Fieseler Works - damage of a fair extent caused by fire. Production not stopped, 2 foreign workers camps seriously damaged. Junkers Works - as well as fired in the roof framework there was here and there serious damage to buildings. Slight damage to machinery. Production not stopped. Spinnfuss Factory AG - considerable damage to buildings. 100% stoppage of production for several days."

A Naval situation summary of the 30th mentions negligible damage at Kiel on the 29th, but specifies heavy naval damage at Warnemeunde.

The August folder is likewise full of fragmentary miscellaneous reports on the damage of that week.

Yet Northwest Germany, and even the fighter industry, was not the sole concern of the hard-pressed German defenses at this time. The preparations in Roumania had been proceeding apace. A message on the 23rd is signed by Jafue Roumania which in itself indicates that a fighter control, undoubtedly German, had been set up there. It requests re-arrangement of the existing forces there and mentions for the first time the presence there of two excellent German single-engine day fighter groups.

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Two July messages from the Eastern Front are of special interest. On the 6th Luftflotte 4 reported flying over 1200 sorties in support of what it calls the attack of the SS Panzer Corps. This in fact was the spoiling attack which the Germans launched on the front between Kursk and Orel as an offset to the evident preparations for the massive Russian attacks which were to distinguish that summer's fighting.

It will be remembered that after hard fighting the SS Panzer Corps was not only stopped but was thrown into reverse and shared in the general German retreat of that summer. The date is of particular interest. Although the Germans had promised themselves, the Japanese and in fact the whole world an offensive, they had let the good campaigning weather of May and June go by before even attempting this spoiling attack. 1200 sorties was a respectable day's work for the forces available, but one cannot help wondering what might have been possible to the SS Panzer Corps with the support of the air units it had already surrendered to the defense of Italy, Floesti and of the Central Reich itself.

Even for the summer offensive of 1942 the Germans had been able to mount 60% of their air strength against the Russians and the numerical figure takes no account of the superior quality of the groups themselves. For the 1943 holding attack they were able to mount no more than 36% of which the preponderance were by now ill equipped and ill trained units with obsolescent aircraft.

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To protect this 56% only 21%, or one fifth of the German fighter forces, were available. Never again in the course of the war were the Germans to have air supremacy or even air equality on the Russian Front.

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The August files contain several belated damage reports of the July raids, but all should be scrutinized with the reservation previously noted for military reports of industrial damage.

No more can full authenticity be claimed for the report which, after reciting accounts of bomb damage in Hamburg, says,

the bombing of Ploesti was a brilliant success and was carried out with astonishing accuracy."

Thus the fears of Jafue Roumania and G.A.F. Command Southeast had come true on the 1st with the longest sizeable air raid in the war which had been delivered by American Liberators from Benghazi.

There is no knowing whether the Germans had anything more than general premonition of this highly courageous operation. On July 27 an agent's report was available to the Mediterranean Commands on elaborate airfield construction at Benghazi. And on July 29 G.A.F. Southeast ordered reconnaissance of the area by one of its relatively new Ju. 88 T's. It is of some ironic interest that further recce ordered for August 1 was abandoned because the wind was too strong.

On the 8th, Ribbentrop considered it worth telegraphing German diplomatic representatives abroad:

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"We do not intend to make light of what is happening in Italy. Naturally National Socialist Germany is distressed that the Duce is no longer in charge of Italian affairs."

Later, "Despite the air attacks on Germany's war weapons production is rising by leaps and bounds and is increasing far beyond expectation. The enemy will soon realize the strength and efficiency of our new German weapons."

"In the circumstances the German High Command has every reason to face future developments with calm and confidence."

On the 13th, however, occurred an event that may well have shaken this calm/^{and} confidence for all the aridity of language that reported it, from A.O. C. in C. Center to Luftflotte 2: "On 13/8. 1156-1309 hours raid by about 50 aircraft from the southeast over Lake Balaton (Hungary)-Seedenburg with the Wiener-Neustadt area. Return flights via Harburg/Lienz. H.E. and incendiary bombs were dropped on Wiener/Neustadt. Medium damage."

For the first time the great new Messerschmitt complex which had been placed in Wiener/Neustadt specifically for safety from bombing had been proved within range of American aircraft based on Africa. Not even the official deprecation of "medium damage" could comfort a defence already engaged to the breaking point over Northwest Germany.

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On the 17th, however, occurred an even greater shock recorded by three separate though fragmentary reports:

"Situation report: 0830 hours, 200 a/c via Brussels, Trier, Kaiserslautern, Nuernberg to Munich and Regensburg. Bombs dropped in Regensburg (Messerschmitt Works) a/c flew on to Northern Italy. 400 to 500 a/c to Munich, Schweinfurt and Regensburg. Bombs dropped in Schweinfurt (ball-bearing factory, barracks and gas works).

"150 aircraft sighted over Essen."

Thus within four days the second of the three great Messerschmitt factories in Germany and Austria had come under American bomb sights and it is not to be wondered that the Regensburg-Schweinfurt raid recorded the heaviest fighting and the highest losses and claims of our efforts to that date. Again the direct damage assessment value of "ULTRA" is meager, but the very admission that bombs were dropped on these two principal targets is proof of the seriousness with which the Germans must have regarded these events.

It should be stated here that it was unquestionably these raids which expedited, if they did not entirely cause, the dispersal and decentralization of both of these huge complexes. Abundant proof of this dispersal is to be found and will be noted in "ULTRA", through many months later, because the movements were attended with most successful security precautions at the time.

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As will be seen the Germans did manage ultimately to restore a very high scale of fighter production. But the set-backs of this summer were so effective as to postpone their fighter expansion and cripple their fighter training through the critical period until American fighters themselves had won unquestioned combat supremacy over every corner of Germany. The very loss of production entailed by the dispersal process itself helped to contribute to the single-engine fighter shortage of which the ensuing months were to provide incontrovertible evidence.

As direct an effect as any may be illustrated in a message to Luftflotte 4 on the 26th directing that the Stab and 3d Group of K.G. 51 were to be withdrawn from operations on the Russian Front and moved to Illesheim for reequipping on to the Me. 410.

The order followed by less than three weeks an order stating the final decision to use I/K.G. 51 as a heavy fighter unit equipped with the hot, new Me. 410. This first group had been withdrawn from Russia at the end of April and in the then leisurely fashion of the G.A.F. had gone on to heavy fighter training. This extraordinary decision to convert bomber pilots into fighter pilots was to be repeated in 1944 with the advent of the Me. 262. These August moves of K.G. 51 reflect a then new hope.

For the Me. 410, as equipped with the 21 cm rocket, was then the greatest hope the Germans had of breaking up our bomber formations. Although the plan actually came to little, thanks to the intervention of our fighters, it is significant that the Germans

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felt compelled to withdraw still another experienced group from the hard-pressed Russian Front at this time.

Another direct consequence of our operations of a character that was to recur even more dramatically as the war advanced is to be found in messages of the 25th and 6th. On the 24th the Eighth Air Force had conducted a very successful attack against Villacoublay. For once the report of damage in "ULTRA" is substantial and impressive, including a statement: "production at Junkers for the September program reduced by 60%." It is little wonder that on the 26th Luftgau West France was ordered to transfer two different flak batteries for the protection of Villacoublay and of Remilly.

The month in the Mediterranean saw the liquidation of the Sicilian campaign and preparations for the landings on the Italian mainland. It likewise witnessed the disintegration of Italy as an Axis partner and participant in the war. The basis was the heavy Italian losses in Africa and subsequently in Sicily. For although the Germans were skilful in withdrawing from Sicily, despite our clear superiority, they could not, or would not, do anything for the Italians. Congratulations by Von Richthofen on August 19 to the flak units which had guarded the Messina Straits were entirely justified.

The air warfare, in addition to the long range operations against Ploesti, Regensburg and Wiener

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Neustadt, included the first of many attacks on the airfields in South France onto which the Germans had only recently moved. The report does not indicate serious damage, but the event gave the Germans a foretaste of the difficulties under which they would operate their anti-shipping forces. The main weight of the attack was against Italian airfields and rail lines with Foggia as a main target.

These operations provoked greater reactions than had been met for some weeks. Late in July Luftflotte 2 had stated its intention to operate fighters on an increased scale. And it did in fact considerably strengthen its forces, particularly by bringing to Italy the new fourth group of J.G. 3, a group of especially selected, well trained and skilled pilots. One squadron was to specialize in the 21 cm mortar which was expected to be the answer to our formations of bombers.

For delivery of fighters to Italy the airfield at Munich Riem was cleared of all other activity. The Germans gave due respect to Allied Air Power in deciding to keep the home bases for the fighter units well to the north in Italy. The results of this activity were several bloody battles over the South Italian area.

The reports of the big scale operation against the Foggia airfields on August 25 serve as a model. The first attack by Lightnings was a complete surprise. The subsequent attack by Fortresses amazed the Germans.

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Although they claimed to have attacked the bombers and caused them to jettison their bombs, they remarked that the Fortresses again flew very close together; "their defensive fire was extraordinarily strong." On the Lightning escort they commented that they flew well in a position at a higher level so that it was not possible for their fighters to get at the bombers after the first attack approach. By the third attack the German fighters were scattered and had difficulty in getting up until the formations were flying off south.

The German reconnaissance reports indicate their quite understandable preoccupation with Allied shipping. There were further indications of their intention to use their new anti-shipping torpedo and bomber units. During the month, the first reports appear of the use of Dueppel, the German Window, in the Mediterranean.

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In September the combination of bad weather and weakness from the heavy losses of the previous two months prevented the Eighth Air Force from continuing the same scale of fighting. Very heavy combat marked the mission of the Eighth to Stuttgart, where overcast weather prevented the precision bombing of ball-bearing factories which were among the highest priorities.

A message on the 1st appropriately introduces the subject which was to be as new to the Eighth Air Force as to the world. In this message Luftflotte 3 orders the move of heavy flak units to Watten and says in evident explanation of its failure to do better:

"The relief of the Army forces by forces of Luftflotte 3 is impossible, in view of the strong enemy attacks on the German Air Force ground organization and on the aircraft industry."

The Eighth Air Force had already attacked Watten on the 27th of August, the first of innumerable attacks by American Army Air Forces against the secret weapon installations on the Channel Coast.

The "ULTRA" records of the secret weapon and its development are not available to this compilation. They would be too technical for exposition in the space of this report in any case. It may be said briefly that the Allies had good warning by "ULTRA" and even better by aerial reconnaissance of the

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development of these secret weapon sites and of the weapons themselves. Much of it remained a mystery and some to this day is unexplained.

It is now the generally accepted opinion that in the development of V-weapons the Germans had made not only the most important technological advances of this war but a revolutionary contribution to the whole theory of war, which is perhaps of greater significance for the future than the airplane itself.

At the time the only countermeasure available was aerial bombardment. Both the heavies and mediums of the American Air Force in England contributed substantial tonnages and sorties to the attacks against these sites which continued until April of 1945.

The greater part of the task was, of course, borne by the Royal Air Force, which had always assumed the commitment of defence of the British Isles in order to free our forces for their unique technique of long range daylight attack.

Again our exact contribution to the delay in the V-weapon attack and the reduction of their scope is not measurable. Months later a diplomatic message of uncertain reliability says that the German necessity to re-convert production facilities from secret weapons back to single-engine fighter production after the American attacks in February materially delayed the inauguration of the secret weapon attacks. Otherwise such direct evidence as appears in these files of our effort against CROSSBOW and rocket production is too minute to be significant.

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One further aspect of the secret weapon development, though again not clear in "ULTRA", is of sufficient significance to remark. The steady decline of the German heavy bombardment forces throughout the war has often been noted. They never fully recovered from their beating in the Battle of Britain. Again they were over-strained in the Russian campaigns and the conversion of many active bomber units to supply work further depleted this arm of the Luftwaffe. In the Mediterranean campaigns it suffered severely again from over-strain and Allied fighters. Yet the German failure to conserve and restore the bomber arm seemed the more remarkable in view of the extremity of their efforts to expand their fighter strength. Their need for more fighters has been too clearly demonstrated to require further exposition here. For a long time it was the opinion of Intelligence that the Germans were consciously sacrificing bomber production to fighter production, as in many instances they certainly were.

By hindsight, however, it appears that the Germans' reliance upon secret weapons had much to do with this conversion of facilities and their conscious practice of allowing conventional bombers to decline was balanced at least in part by their hopes for the secret weapons, instead of being singly attributable to the need for fighters.

The situation in the Luftwaffe in general and the German bomber force in particular is illustrated by events at the time of the Salerno landing. Before the

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landing but while the Eighth Army was crossing at Messina, Luftflotte 2 reported that from September 1 to 5 it flew 726 sorties, of which 502 were fighter, 87 ground attack, 99 reconnaissance and 38 bomber. A special breakdown for attacks against shipping alone (in which the Germans were almost exclusively interested) shows that they flew 63 on September 2, 48 on September 3, and 11 on September 4, with losses of 10 over the three days. The operations reports for the night of September 8, the landing at Salerno which the Germans were apparently well aware of in advance, are more revealing. Luftflotte 2 was able to operate 158 aircraft of which 54 were bombers and 44 launched torpedoes. Destruction of 200,000 tons of shipping was claimed. For the night of September 10 the reports show 98 sorties against shipping, but the substantial claims were made for a flak regiment at Salerno, with recommendation for a special High Command communique mention.

These were the capabilities with which the Luftwaffe found itself on the occasion of the first Allied invasion of the Continent. It was the result in part of the continuous air fighting of the ten months preceding. In part it was a deliberate policy of paring down the bomber force. The Germans seem to have thought that with the new weapons for attack against England, they could do with a relatively small force, especially since, for anti-shipping purposes, it would be equipped with new types of bombs and torpedoes.

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"ULTRA" evidence suggests that the Luftwaffe may have planned to equip as many as eleven groups for anti-
shipping purposes. The plan did not come off, partly
because of the rough treatment the units got in
action and on the airfields of South France, partly
because of the failure of the He. 177, which in 1943
was to be the great new German long range bomber.

It should be recorded here that this small force
nevertheless had some success. Records are not
available to check the substantial German claims.
But it is known that the British battleship Warspite
and the cruiser Uganda were severely damaged and the
American cruisers Philadelphia and Savannah, as well
as some lesser shipping. The Italian battleship
Roma was sunk and the Italia badly damaged as the
fleet was trying to escape to Allied control. There
is no direct "ULTRA" evidence. "ULTRA" does tell us
that the third group of K.G. 100, equipped with FX
bombs was at Foggia in late August. Also that anti-
shipping operations were undertaken from North Italy.
But there is no direct evidence on what type of
weapon was used in these Salerno attacks.

On the 11th Kesselring addressed the 10th Army
as follows:

"The military and political situation demand
that we achieve complete defensive success at
Naples and Salerno. Everyone must be aware of
these facts."

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Aware they must have been, for the success of the landings is a matter of record. But although units from the north might have done much to delay or possibly even repel the invasion they were not provided. The available forces were left to fight the losing battle by themselves.

The effect of the Allied Air Forces in these landings is not to be found in "ULTRA". There is no direct evidence on the results of our heavy operations on September 13, 14, 15, when the Germans from the hills back of the Salerno plain nearly pushed to the sea splitting our ground forces. Elsewhere the evidence is clear: orders to hurry up flak protection for Milan, Genoa, Turin and more significant, for the Brenner railway line. This on September 10.

On September 13, Foggia was critically short on fuel. Two fuel trains were said to be near Bologna. Nevertheless, Kesselring demanded retention of Foggia. On the same date an attack at Bastia, Corsica, sank a destroyer and set the Germans to preparations to evacuate. An attack at Frosinone wiped out Luftflotte 2's reconnaissance unit.

By September 21 flak at the Volturno River crossings was being reinforced. By the 23d at the harbors of Lighorn and Prombino. On the same day Luftflotte 2 appreciated that although its main effort was against shipping, it could not do anything to prevent interference with the evacuation of Corsica. The High Command decided that available forces should

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be used to protect the withdrawal from Corsica. IV/J.G. 3, the prize mortar group, was withdrawn to Germany to join the three other groups of that celebrated wing which had gone directly from Russia to oppose the Eighth Air Force.

On the 22nd it appears from evidence that the Germans themselves well understood what was to be the most serious consequence of the whole Italian campaign. On that date the German Air Force in Roumania signalled Luftflotte 2 as follows:

"The development of new airfields on Sicily as also the occupation of South Italy by the Anglo-American forces make the danger of air attacks by heavy bomber formations on the Roumanian oil area become greater. It is considered of decisive importance for forming an appreciation of the air situation to have the following information:

1. Occupation of airfields by heavy bomber units in Sicily.
2. Occupation of airfields in South Italy by heavy bomber units.
3. Occupation of airfields in North Africa by heavy bomber units.

"It is urgently requested that corresponding reconnaissance results be communicated to us."

On the 22nd a message from Luftflotte 2 in Italy says: "Pilots are (B) still) placed at the disposal of A.O.C. Italian Air Force (Generalleutnant Mueller)

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for the ferrying of Italian fighter aircraft until such time as the fighter aircraft situation permits of the refitting of these fighter gruppen. It is therefore requested that you immediately speed up and increase the supply of fighter aircraft."

The addressee of this message is not given, but it is one of several indisputable proofs that the Germans were forced to use Italian Macchi 205 fighters for at least one group, II/J.G. 77, for several weeks in the late summer and the early autumn. This improvisation was forced upon an experienced and skillful group because of extreme shortage of German fighters in the months following our first bombing of the fighter industry, and the intensive air combat it provoked.

By the end of the summer indeed there was every evidence that the Germans had revised the opinion they once held of our Air Force, although it is impossible to state clearly whether envy, wishful thinking, or only the sincerest form of flattery is at the root of a message on the 22nd, which states: "The Reichsmarschall desired that our aircraft to correspond with Anglo-American types (such as Fortresses and so on) be distinguished by names which will as far as possible represent their nature and which will become catch-words."

Although it does not come from "ULTRA" special notice must be taken of a Prisoner of War report which became available to American Intelligence in

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late September. This is in the form of a long statement from an Italian aeronautical engineer who was closely associated with German Air Ministry circles from 1937 until early September 1943, and subsequently deserted to the Allies, and gave information willingly.

The text of the report may be studied in the September file, but it cites the complete German plans for expansion of their aircraft, particularly fighter aircraft, production. The evidence is so circumstantial that it must be credited as having been accurate at the time, although there is no doubt that the plan then in effect was superseded several times subsequently, and always upward.

The report of this interview states that the Germans had begun expanding their aircraft industry rapidly early in 1942 and says further: "In the aircraft program the highest priority was, on the direct orders of Hitler, given to fighter production, which was to be increased from about 450 a month to 1600/1700 a month. Hitler and the High Command took the view that without a large production of fighter aircraft the skies over Germany could not be defended and the rest of the armaments production could be smashed by Allied bombing attacks."

A later section of the report quotes a speech made in June of 1943 by Milch (who was then in charge of aircraft procurement for the German Air Ministry) to a meeting attended by all heads of the German Air Force production and planning section:

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"We must not speak theoretically of victory. We must admit that the Allies are much stronger in the air than we are and they are building more than three times the number of aircraft. If we cannot carry out our air production program to the full, then Germany must lose the war."

There is little doubt that this was the official German view in June. Yet in spite of their exertions and all of the previous effort behind them, by September a first line German fighter unit was already reduced to flying Italian aircraft.

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On the 5th of October a message signed Adolph Hitler states: "The withdrawal of the troops employed in Sardinia and Corsica, including their heavy arms and their equipment, to the mainland was an exceptional achievement." It is a new turn in the affairs of the war to find Hitler congratulating his troops on a retreat, but henceforward the files are replete with evidence of this new attitude.

The plain fact is that the German withdrawal from Corsica was a success, but at the expense of operations in South Italy. Such air force as was available was moved north to cover the withdrawal and no additions were provided. The situation in general in Italy is revealed by orders of October 20 from Richthofen on flak, dispersal and passive defense measures to be taken in areas near the front because of increased enemy low-level attack. There is no hint of G.A.F. activity.

Elsewhere the Luftwaffe could say more for itself. In the Aegean it had its final success in demonstrating the necessity for air cover. It was able to prepare for and cover the German operations against the Dodecanese Islands. The Allied Air Forces, especially the American, put substantial effort into attacks on Greek airfields, but, although "ULTRA" reveals casualties and some damage to aircraft, it does not indicate any hindrance to German operations. The same is true of attacks on the rail line from Bucharest into Greece.

An air situation report of A.O. C. in C. Center describes heavy damage in Frankfurt caused by the

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Eighth Air Force raid on the 4th, and a subsequent report describes the heavy scale combat and damage in the raid of the 8th upon Bremen. After the comparative lull of September the air war was to reach new peaks of violence and intensity in this month.

Almost as if in preparation for them, a detailed order from A.O. C. in C. Center lays down flying routes for ferrying and non-operational flights within the Reich in careful channels, obviously for the purpose of preventing confusion among the German flak and radar services. Paragraph 4 says:

"To expedite the delivery of the Me. 109 and F.W. 190 fighters from the manufacturers to the front, the following is ordered for the area of A.O. C. in C. Center:

"The ferrying of replacement a/c of the types (B% named) by day may be carried out without restriction...."

Again this order is only another of the many confirmatory evidences of the condition of German fighters at that time. The normal procedure had always been for the fighters to go from the manufacturer not directly to the front but to the reserve pools, which all evidence shows were at the time nearly dry.

Another kind of illustration appears in the methods used to set up the 1st Group of J.G. 5 on its move from Norway to Roumania to reinforce the oil field defense. The aircraft were to be crated and shipped to Roumania, where they would at once be taken over by the pilots of

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J.G. 5. Another suggestion of difficulties comes from Goering's order of October 12th to Luftflotte 2:

".....the securing of the aircraft production potential of Italy, particularly in the case of high-grade machine tools, is a matter of urgency for our aircraft production program....."

Aircraft shortage, which was troublesome enough within the Reich itself, was having another injurious effect upon the German armed services that is often overlooked.

A message from C. in C. South, Operations Department, to Luftflotte 2 in Italy on the 7th says:

"10th Army states in its day report for 6/10 that the total absence of air recce, which has now existed for days, makes the Army blind and has worked out particularly unfavorably on the northern flank principally at Termoli."

The message goes on to beg even for coastal reconnaissance if nothing else is available.

The lack of reconnaissance is seen especially in German ignorance as to what we were doing with South Italian and Sicilian airfields. Even though they expected that we would use these fields, on October 4th, when medium bombers attacked Argos airfield in Greece, the best G.A.F. Southeast could say after a day was that it seemed certain that the bombers took off from Sicily or Apulia. Much later in the month, October 25th, Luftflotte 2 "presumed" that an attack on Wiener Neustadt originated from South Italy and asked cover of Grottaglie and Lecce.

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A message to the Director of Training in Berlin is full of detailed schemes to improvise reconnaissance with Italian types, on the 5th of October. On the 10th, Luftflotte 4 in Russia was complaining to the A.O. for Recce in Berlin in the following terms:

"In view of the lack of Me. 109 and the extreme urgency for re-equipping close recce staffeln with fast a/c, the Luftflotte suggests that the equipment of recce units "Spaehflieger" with captured Italian a/c of the Macchi 202 type be considered."

Want and indeed total absence of reconnaissance was to be a recurrent theme of complaint by German field armies everywhere, and it was directly attributable to the shortage of Me. 109 fighters which compelled the allocation of all planes of that type directly to fighter defensive work.

On the 9th the Eighth Air Force struck again directly at fighter production with the unprecedented raids on Marienburg in East Prussia and Anklam and Tutow, which lie between Berlin and the Baltic. The raids were brilliantly planned and executed and although there was severe air fighting it is evident that the timing and routing had done a great deal to outwit and frustrate the defenses.

On the 10th the Eighth Air Force fought again heavily over Meunster and on the 14th it fought what was, perhaps, the bloodiest battle of the entire air war in its assault on Schweinfurt.

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The consequences of these operations were far-reaching and so miscellaneous that they must be considered together in examining the "ULTRA" evidence of the subsequent period. It should be remembered that American bombardment had now shown its capacity to strike from two different directions to almost every part of the Reich. The whole spate of orders in that month and November show how clearly the Germans understood this and how feverishly they set about erecting even stronger countermeasures.

On the 12th a circular from Goering to all the Operational Defensive Commanders severely criticizes the practice of jettisoning auxiliary fuel tanks and sets up as a firm principal: "Auxiliary fuel tanks may in future only be jettisoned by fighter and heavy fighter aircraft if the auxiliary tanks have been damaged by being shot up and are a danger to the aircraft and the crew. B) In the case of a combat between fighters, only when it is necessary to get maximum performance from the fighter aircraft in the course of the fight."

The significance of this must be clearly understood. Goering had now realized that units based anywhere in Europe might have to fly long distances before fighting, due to the ever-increasing range of our operations. The importance of auxiliary tanks for this is evident not only as an intrinsic fact but as a reflection on the fact that he did not have enough fighters to disperse in such a way that all parts of Germany could be protected at once.

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A message which was not picked up until March of 1944 carried a clear allusion to the establishment of two new fighter control units, Jafue Upper Silesia and Jafue East Prussia. The message we got was principally interesting because it quoted the order establishing those units as of the date of the 10th of October, exactly one day after American bombers had first struck in East Prussia and Upper Silesia.

On the 12th Luftgau XI (Maintenance and Service Command of Northwest Germany) ordered "the greatest possible serviceability of day and night fighters, as well as of heavy fighters, is to be secured by utilizing all available means and possibilities in day and night work, and work on all other aircraft is to be postponed. Working hours are to be raised with immediate effect to 84 hours. If necessary, missing parts are to be dismantled from aircraft unserviceable for long periods."

This is the first direct evidence of cannibalization of aircraft in Germany itself which "ULTRA" reveals, and again clearly indicates shortage.

An angry communication of the 9th from the Fighter Control of the Heligoland Bight to the Factory Protection Schwarm, Langenhagen, is interesting for two reasons. It cites the failure of fighters to keep in control with their ground stations during that day when our deception plans were so very successful and it identifies the Factory Protection Schwarm itself.

These Schwarme were simply improvised fighter groups stationed around vital factories and often enough

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supplemented with test pilots and testing aircraft and armament. They are only part of the miscellany of improvised elements such as Ferry Pilot Schwarme, Training School Schwarme, and Experimental School Schwarme, which had come into use about this time and remained so to the end as supplements to the inadequate strength of the regular Fighter Gruppen. Their use is a reflection in itself on the weakness of defenses since, especially in the loss of the best instructors from the Training Schwarme, they represented the very severest drain on the underlying structure of the G.A.F.

Yet what the G.A.F. was up against comes out clearly in a conversation between two members of bomber crews, in which one says:

"The Americans have been very cunning again. Two to four "Boeings" fly a little away from the formation, not carrying bombs, but with a very heavy armament. Our fighters approach and are greeted with such a hail of fire that they simply can't do anything."

One of these German crewmen had been engaged unsuccessfully in air to air bombing against us. It is curious that this is the only reference noted so far to our destroyer Fortresses, which had in fact been superseded by Thunderbolts even before these men were captured.

On the Schweinfurt raid itself the German Foreign Minister saw fit to issue a press directive which is quoted in full:

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"2.

GERMANY

(i) Schweinfurt: German Press Instructions:

a) The following press directive was issued by the German Foreign Ministry of 15th October:

"Please publish with all means of disseminating information at your disposal the number of United States bombers, 139, which according to today's report were shot down during the attack on Schweinfurt on October 14th. Use the headline "Germany's air defense is becoming stronger."

You might even bring out large leaflets on this subject, provided you consider that these would be acceptable. If so, good use might be made of the photographs of bombers shot down, which were recently sent to you."

b) On the following day representatives abroad were instructed to "make full use of Roosevelt's reminder that the Allies cannot afford every day the great losses of aircraft which they had over Schweinfurt. Stress the fact that the President of the United States, when making his statement, concealed fifty per cent of the real number of aircraft shot down."

There have been various appraisals of the damage caused to Schweinfurt by many varieties of expert and in this connection it seems appropriate to quote the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in reply to a question submitted by the Japanese Government.

This was on the subject of bomb damage in general and was actually written the day before Schweinfurt, but

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on the matter of assessing bomb damage he says that some conception of the difficulty might be gathered "from the fact that in the air raid on Berlin, with it happening right before our eyes, it was practically impossible to assess the damage."

Nevertheless, "ULTRA" does cast some reflection on that damage. A message without signature and addressed only to an unidentified General Kraus on the 20th says:

"A Schweinfurt factory with about 600 men has moved into the neighborhood of the flat it is proposed to take in W. It is rumored that further industrial moves will take place to W."

It required some subsequent intelligence from many sources and several photo reconnaissance missions, which were maddeningly delayed as usual by European weather, before we could establish beyond doubt that a considerable part of the Schweinfurt ball-bearing industry had in fact moved to Wurzburg.

On the 16th a very clear message evidently relayed down from Fliegerkorps XII, which had formerly had charge of all Western Defenses, orders a complete and wholesale reorganization of the whole air defense structure of the Reich. This, coming at that time, is clear enough proof of how unsatisfactory the Germans had found their defenses against the intensive operations of early October.

On the 22nd, eight days after the Schweinfurt raid, the Officer Commanding Flak in Northern Italy, evidently in reply to some promptings from the Air Officer Commanding in Chief Center (Berlin), acknowledges that there are

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no smoke troops available in his sphere of command. He requests some and promises that both the Brenner and Villar Parosa will be reconnoitered and a report submitted. As Villar Parosa, near Turin, was the most important center of ball-bearing manufacture in Italy, it is surely no coincidence that finds it being measured for smoke protection eight days after our Schweinfurt raid.

On the 24th A.O. C. in C. Center reported again a raid by about 100 Liberators against Wiener Neustadt and states with a note of unmistakable relief, "the attack planned, it is thought, against the aircraft factory at Wiener Neustadt was not carried out because of the weather conditions." He was quite right, but the weather was only an intermittent protection against the continuous threat of the bombers of the Twelfth Air Force.

A report on the evening of the 20th by the 2nd Jagd (fighter) Division, which had regional control of Air Defense in Northwest Germany, reads in part as follows:

"No operations. Following formations were put up against a raid in the areas of 3 JD:

"1257 - 1446 49 Me. 110, 14 Me. 410,
4 Do. 217, 2 F.W. 190, 1 Me.109"

It is a curious miscellany of planes to be flying against a mid-day raid. Some undoubtedly were rocket carriers but the large numbers of twin-engines among them appear to indicate something else. Goering's order in April forbidding the use of experienced night fighters in this very area will be remembered. Yet here are large numbers of them operating in one small sector against a raid late in October. Though not certain

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evidence, this appears to indicate poverty of single-engine fighters which the Reich might well have been suffering after the fighting and bombing of early October.

On the 21st the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported as follows:

"In the Schweinfurt raid a total of 300 American machines were used, of which 200 got over the target. As 150 aircraft were shot down and the Americans have not attempted any raids since then, the German Air Defenses had a great success."

On the 1st of November, however, A.O. C. in C. Center stated:

"In accordance with the ruling ordered for aircraft factories, serviceable fighter and heavy fighter aircraft of front transit stations -Frontschleusen- are to be employed with immediate effect against the enemy on the occasion of major day raids."

This is simply another instance of improvisation which reflects something less than satisfaction with what the Japanese Minister was pleased to consider a great success.

The climax of these various repercussions of our operations, however, came on the 8th of November in the form of the following message:

"Air Officer for Fighters issues the following orders in his memo No 2159, dated 8/11/43:

"The fighter and heavy fighter formations have not been able to secure decisive success in air

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defense against American four-engined formations. The introduction of new weapons, such as 6 MG 151 in F.W. 190s, MK 109 and MG 151 underslung wing armament in Me. 109s, 3.7 flak in Me. 410s, 21 cm Mortars in fighters and heavy fighters has not appreciably changed the situation. The main reason for the failure is that the Kommandeure and Kapitanes do not succeed in securing attacks in close formation up to the shortest ranges with their whole formation.

"The Reichsmarschall has, therefore, ordered the setting up of an assault Staffel (Sturmstaffel). Its tasks will be to break up the enemy by using more heavily armored fighters in all-out (Rasante) attacks in close formation from the closest range. Then there is no need to discuss here whether this is to be done by shooting down the enemy at the closest range, by employing a new type of weapon, or by ramming. The fundamental idea of assault units of all arms is now also to be applied to the G.A.F. The attack, by assault units once undertaken, will be carried right into the heart of the enemy, without regard to losses and completed, whatever happens, until the enemy be annihilated.

"It is obvious that the final success of this type of attack does not reside only in the assault thrust, but can only be gained by the fighters and heavy fighters who attack immediately afterward. The assault staffel, therefore, serves as a weapon of attack to the fighters and will be employed only

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in the closest collaboration with fighters.

"It is of urgent necessity for interception, to provide this unit only with those pilots who are absolutely determined to crash with their opponent rather than land without a victory. I have proved already out of the small circle of fighter pilots to whom this idea was brought home, that an appreciable number of pilots have volunteered for the assault staffel. I request Kommandeure and Kommodoren to instruct their pilots of the character of the assault staffel (observing secrecy) and to report immediately and currently to A.O. for Fighters those volunteers who are proven as able to fulfill their task.

"As the staffel has been set up as a unit fully air mobile, it can be employed at the main points of effort of all fronts in defense of the home country. Signed Galland."

The issuance of such an order is evidence of a despair so deep as to impair reason. It should be stated here that as far as is known the German fighters made no serious attempt to ram our formations until much later in the war.

Although this Sturmstaffel was set up, maintained with an effective strength, and became merely another of the continuous accretion of units operating exclusively against us, it was created at the very climax of the air struggle.

in an earlier report the A.O. C. in C. Center was to say:

"The total quantity of bombs dropped and casualties inflicted have not yet been reported. Six shops of the factory were hit, some of them seriously damaged."

In the long retrospect of hindsight it is reasonable to believe now that the struggle for air mastery over Germany itself was very nearly won by early November 1943. Goering clearly was at his wits end to defend his factories and to keep anything like adequate strength flying.

At the same time our own losses had been extremely heavy whenever we ventured beyond the excellent but limited cover of our Thunderbolts, for there the rocket carriers lurked and the 50 caliber machine gun was no adequate defense against them.

A few more battles on the October scale might either have shattered the German Air Force for good in November or compelled the modification of our own attempts. As it happened, November and December of 1943 were marked by almost unflyable weather from the United Kingdom and so the full decision for air mastery over Germany itself was to await the late winter and early spring of 1944, when the range and skill of our Mustangs were to decide it for good.

It should be categorically stated, however, that this achievement by relatively few Mustangs would have been impossible but for the bombing and air fighting of the summer and fall of 1943. The plans to expand German

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fighter production were evident, as was the serious check which we imposed upon that expansion. But for that check, caused by both bombardment and combat, the late winter and early spring of 1944 would have found the German fighter defenses multiplied and organized into an effectiveness that must have prolonged decision in the air late into 1944 and might completely have altered it.

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Much of the significant "ULTRA" intelligence of November has already been cited as bearing directly upon the events of October. It is of interest, however, to find the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reporting to Tokio:-

"Preparations for German retaliation against England are making steady progress and already it is a matter of a few weeks. Enemy air raids, especially night bombing by the British, will no doubt continue in future, but Germany's retaliatory measures will completely alter the complexion of the air raid war."

How much the Ambassador knew of the secret weapons is certainly not clear from this text, but the very tone of his utterance indicates how strongly the Germans were counting upon their effect more than seven months before they were able to operate.

An intelligence report from the Air Ministry in Berlin on the 12th contains a careful appreciation of the relay tactics of our Thunderbolts and Lightnings and of their dependence on auxiliary tanks. This is especially interesting in the light of Goering's recently noted preoccupation with auxiliary tanks for his own defenders. Three days later Goering issued another long order on this subject, describing the conditions under which his fighters might jettison their tanks.

Four days after that there was deciphered a message of November 3rd which indicated that a fighter group

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firmly based over Frankfurt by past intelligence had participated in the defense of Wiener Neustadt on the 2nd. Again the evidence is not certain but the inference is strong that the German fighters were quick to take advantage of the drop tank technique learned from us.

On the 14th the Japanese Minister in Sofia sent Tokio a long message about the damage resulting from our attack against that city on the previous day, which concludes as follows:

"This is the first American air raid on Sofia. Judging from its scale and method, its object was terrorization, and the shock which it has given to the citizens is considerable."

There are innumerable messages on the bombing of the Toulon Harbor on the 26th of November, reciting for once very extensive and explicit damage. Otherwise, as has been noted, the weather was largely unflyable and the German Air Force, like our own, was probably very glad for a respite.

A long and substantial report from Luftflotte 5 (Norway) does, however, describe the operation of the 18th against Oslo Kjeller Airdrome. Though it does not recite the excellent bomb damage effected on Focke Wulf Repair Depot there, it is of interest in acknowledging three total losses and three belly landings by the forces under that command. Our claims were 10-7-5, but undoubtedly forces other than those of Luftflotte 5 participated in the battle.

Of further interest is a report to the A.O. for Fighters in Berlin from the Test Unit at Achmer, which,

after describing some combats against our attack on the 29th November on Bremen, states:

"In operations up to date it has been shown that operations of a special weapon (this in a discussion of 21 cm mortar operations) are purposeless when under Schwarm strength (normally 5 or 6), as similar units are rendered unfit to engage even before own attack by strong defense."

In the perimeter of the G.A.F. the month produced some symptoms of the creeping paralysis which was to overtake it, despite expansion of production. The South East Command, charged with the sprawling areas of the Balkans, had in October issued orders of a routine sort on economy in fuel. Now in November it pointed directly to a shortage and used a prescription later to be repeated almost daily in "ULTRA". Only operations of importance for the war effort. Such economy, it is thought, can be traced to the expansion of production checked by the attack on Ploesti. G.A.F. South East found itself in constant difficulty from our attacks on the Yugoslav and Albanian airfields. Now it began to give up the fields near the coast, Valona and Sorak in particular, and to move inland. A comparable move had gone on in France.

On the 18th G.A.F. Command South East reported in detail attacks by Mitchells, Marauders and Fortresses on Eleusis and Kalamaki airfields in Greece, which caused relatively severe personnel casualties and destruction or damaging of 25 miscellaneous aircraft, as well as considerable damage to installations.

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From another area of the long perimeter there appears to have been no "ULTRA" worth recording, but it should be noted that the Russians in November had sealed off the remaining German forces in the Crimea and had recaptured Kiev.

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On the evening of the 2nd our old enemies of the 3rd Fighter Wing had the pleasure of reporting something new in Western Front air warfare in the following terms:

"Para 6) Attack on Lille-Vendeville Airfield by a Marauder formation.

"Gefr. Krenson killed, pilot, 12 NCO's and men of the 2nd Staffel killed, 1 man of the 1st Staffel killed and 1 man of Stab's Company killed. 1 man of Stab's Company seriously wounded, 1 man of 2nd Staffel seriously wounded, 4 men of the 2nd Staffel slightly wounded, 1 man of Stab's Company slightly wounded.

"Lt. Hellfritsch arrived. Transferred to the 3rd Staffel. Not fit for operations."

This is the first clear "ULTRA" on the effect of our Marauder operations from the United Kingdom, but particular interest attaches because of the effectiveness of this attack.

It had always been a doctrine of air warfare on the Western Front that airdrome attacks were not profitable here as they had been proven in the Mediterranean because of the enormous numbers of good airdromes available for transfer or dispersal.

Like most doctrines, it was founded only on partial truth, for airdrome attack was to become a highly successful feature of our subsequent operations against the G.A.F., in which the Marauders, despite their limited range, were to play a very significant part.

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On the 5th a high grade agent report referring to the air raid on Zara, Jugoslavia, on November 28th, states:

"A direct hit was reported on the barracks and 600 Germans were killed. The morale effect on the partisans of such raids is past belief."

On the 3rd the G.A.F. Command South East, then based in Greece, working evidently from a higher headquarters intelligence appreciation that had filtered down to it, wrote a short and sensible appreciation of our diversionary tactics on the simultaneous use of Marauders and Fortresses.

Then after mentioning the experiments with blind bombing, which were our only recourse during the bad weather stretch previously noted, this appreciation concludes rather naively, -

"The fact that targets to be attacked and actual places where bombs were dropped were not identical proves that there are at present still limits to the bad weather operations aimed at by the enemy."

There were indeed still limits, but with almost continual overcast covering Central Europe there was little else for the United Kingdom based forces to do but experiment with a technique in which they were subsequently to achieve remarkable proficiency,

Another long report from the Intelligence Office G.A.F. South East cites very extensive damage caused by Liberators and Lightnings on the airfields of Eleusis and Kalamaki on the 6th.

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On the 12th the same Command appealed in urgent and angry tones to A.O. C. in C. Center for both fighters and flak protection, citing a long list of shipping losses.

On the 15th occurs the first mention of what was in fact the most significant consequence of the entire Mediterranean campaign, when a routine report by Luftflotte 2 in the Mediterranean states:

"The following operated:

"About 250 four-engined a/c

50 Lightnings

20-30 Thunderbolts (2 Liberator Geschwader from area Apulia and probably 3 to 4 Fortress Geschwader presumably from area Foggia-Apulia)."

Their presumption was correct for by then Fortress, Liberator, Lightning and Thunderbolt "Geschwader" were indeed operating from Italy. The factories of Central Germany had been brought several hundred miles closer to the bomb sights of the Fifteenth Air Force.

It is probably only coincidence that this message and intelligence reached Berlin on the same day that a message from the Russian Front brought other tidings of air activity. For on the 15th a routine air situation report from the East remarks:

"In the areas of Luftflotte 6, in better weather conditions, the enemy's effort with 3200 sorties reached a level not hitherto attained."

The previous sensitivity in Berlin to our air potential in the South had been noted. It requires little effort of the imagination to realize what a

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shadow these two items on the same day must have cast over the impending Christmas Season.

A third report of the same day, this time from Luftflotte 3 in the West, contains first "ULTRA" mention of a factor that was to be of almost equal importance in the arid statement-

"Strength of enemy formations on day raids
20 fighter bombers and 80 fighters."

It was the first German acknowledgement noted of the use of our Thunderbolts in the West as fighter bombers, an experiment which was to expand into a weapon of immeasurable effectiveness against both German air bases and later against the German armies.

One wonders if it was premonition based upon these three events which prompted the order of Reichsmarschall Goering on the 16th, from which it is necessary to quote only one characteristic paragraph:

"I expect of every member of the G.A.F., who has the misfortune to fall into captivity, a proud unbending soldierly bearing which in every respect proclaims a belief in the Fuehrer and the New Germany, unshakeable by death."

The December files are full of routine damage reports from Bremen to Bulgaria, but few are of exceptional interest.

These few relate to the Mediterranean Theater. On December 3rd, the Commander in Chief Southwest gave a report on the Italian railway situation with details of great difficulties in moving two divisions because of constant interruptions and damage. Part of the reason

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appears in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Communique of December 7, reviewing Allied air operations for November. The concluding sentence reads:

"With renewed raids on rail communications in the South of France, the enemy achieved his object of disturbing traffic with Italy."

On December 11th the Chief Quartermaster of the Southwest Command said that he had received and noted orders on fuel economy, but pointed out that the constant interruption from bombing of lines of communication required intensive use of lorries and made economy almost impossible.

The effect of the spreading Balkan attacks appears in a report of G.A.F. Command South East on December 12th demanding more flak for Croatia and Albania, especially along the coast. The Commander concludes angrily:

"The enemy air situation on the Albanian-Dalmatian coast should be treated on a par with that on the Channel coast and dealt with accordingly."

There is frequently a myopic quality about reports from the perimeter commands, especially the subdivisions of Croatia and Albania. But these commands could see clearly that they were going begging because of preoccupation with the attack in the West.

The growth in Russian air strength through this time has been noted in the report of the 3200 sorties flown against Luftflotte 6 on the 15th.

On the 30th an Intelligence appreciation from Luftflotte 6 identified the operational activity of

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7 (Russian) ground attack regiments and concluded:

"....the enemy established the absence of German fighter defense and thereupon decreased or entirely abandoned fighter protection for ground attack a/c."

Absent they were indeed and principally for the reason already noted - the continual transfer and posting of units and recruits to the West. Even there, however, the situation was still less than satisfactory to the Germans. Galland's rousing appeal for Sturmstaffel, or suicide squadron, in early November will be remembered. "ULTRA" information on its further progress was not forthcoming until what was evidently a circular message from A.O. for Fighters in Berlin was picked up enroute from a fighter wing to its gruppen on the 30th. The first sentence says:

"A.O. for Fighters again requests names of volunteers for Sturmstaffel....."

A report of Jagdkorps I (Fighter Defense Northern and Central Germany) speaks however of preparations "for a state of emergency in Jutland", and orders that one unspecified staffel of Focke Wulf 190 should be permanently equipped with bomb racks, citing in the context a previous message by Goering to the effect that all flying units were to be able to operate as fighter bombers and were to equip and train themselves for practice in that technique.

This, of course, is indicative not only of German premonitions for the coming invasion but of their relative poverty in fighters through this time. The groups

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they had had already concluded a year of the hardest air fighting of the war at high altitude interception work against a fire power unique in air warfare. Now the shouldering of these same groups with the burden of responsibility for the impending ground assault was only another of the many indications of how fighter production and strength had disappointed the Luftwaffe in 1943.

December witnessed also another event which was not recorded in "ULTRA", but must be noted in its relation to both the Intelligence and Operations of the ensuing period.

At the Cairo Conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved the integration of both the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom and the Fifteenth Air Force, already based in Italy, into a Command called United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. The purpose of this was to correlate, in time and targets and in strategic intent, the proven capabilities of the two daylight strategic bombardment forces now operating against Germany.

CONCLUSION FOR PERIOD FROM

CASABLANCA TO CAIRO

This period saw the American concept of daylight precision bombing completely vindicated. Good intelligence usually emerges only long after the event. The immediate bits and scraps of vital information provided by the "ULTRA" source have been invaluable to contemporary operations and planning, but not until long after the fact, when they have been closely integrated with other evidence, does a clearer picture emerge.

Even so, it is not a certain record and never will be. If every piece of paper in Germany were in our hands there would still remain conjecture as to what was in the minds and intentions of the opposing commanders at the time, and as to whether the paper itself represented the fact, hope, excuse or dream. Final estimates by Intelligence, therefore, are always opinion, and the following comments on the period from Casablanca to Cairo are offered only as such.

It is considered that it was this period of the war which wounded the German Air Force beyond hope of recovery. The process had really begun late in 1942 when the Anglo-American air power began, feebly at first, to apply aerial pincers from both the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean.

The essence of the matter was that these pincers forced the Germans into a scale of continuous combat for which, if it could be sustained, neither their air force nor the vital roots of a/c production and even training were adequate. It was sustained and, indeed, intensified.

CONCLUSION FOR PERIOD FROM
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Recognizing the obvious end of such a course of events the Germans had introduced a series of plans for the expansion of their force and its underlying facilities. It was against this plan that the American Air Forces had to match their unique capability of forcing combat where the Germans dared not refuse it and destroying the roots of replacement and recovery by precision bombardment.

They were able to force the Germans into the vicious cycle of trying to expand to increase their strength and simultaneously accepting fatal wastage of their strength to protect their efforts to expand.

The progress, or rather the retrogression, of this vicious cycle was in full and fatal motion by the end of 1943; although its consequences, like those of many a mortal wound, were not immediately apparent. Even by then, however, the German Air Force no longer had much more than nuisance value on the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts, where continuous Allied successes were now offering such an evident contrast to the fortunes of war in the days of the Luftwaffe's greatness.

Over Germany itself the G.A.F. would and did fight still as savagely as any animal at bay, but the very fighting only opened the wound further. German industrial resilience was finally to produce an enormously expanded production of fighters - too late. German ardor and courage were ultimately to produce impressive numbers of inadequately trained crews to man them - too late.

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But these indispensable requisites, that might in another year have made German Europe impregnable, were hopelessly and fatally delayed by the American Air Forces' unique capacity to destroy production by precision bombing, and to destroy, by killing, the life-blood of the G.A.F. in the air fighting that bombing provoked.

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As evidence of the opinion just stated a message from the Fighter Controller of the Jafue Brittany, received on the 1st, though dated 30 December, states:

"Very lively enemy air activity today, chiefly in the western area of Brittany. No operations were flown by us. Four Me.109s flew as escort for a convoy without shooting anything down or being shot down themselves."

Thus the German Air Force, which a year ago had been fighting us savagely over the Channel, now calmly reports no operations against our very lively air activity and concludes, almost with relief, that their vaunted fighter forces had flown 4 sorties of convoy escort without being shot down themselves.

Over Germany itself the German Air Force would still fight and fight hard, as the year was to show, but it was notable by now that Western France, like Russia and the Mediterranean, had become an aerial no-man's-land over which the Germans no longer contested enemy action except sporadically and weakly.

It is not to be thought that they did not wish to defend the air over France; we were to learn later what prodigious proportions of their energies and faith were mortgaged to the Crossbow and Rocket sites, yet it was a noticeable and to Intelligence

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an anomalous and perplexing feature of these sites that the Germans would not expend fighter strength in their defense.

At this very time, however, they were arranging a series of conferences in the Southeast for which the agenda reads, in part, as follows:

"Wireless aircraft reporting service coverage of the Roumanian oil regions by an inner and outer ring to include also the Iron Gate, and establishment of coverage to the east for the area of maximum concentration in Hungary (and coordination of Hungary, Austria, Silesia, the General Government and the Southern sector of the Eastern Front)."

Substantial air coverage was subsequently provided for this region and fought bitterly in its defense, for there lay much of the oil on which the whole German armed forces depended, and already that area had felt the bombs of the Fifteenth Air Force.

On the 5th a signal from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Spaatz formally activated USSTAF and from thence forward the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces operated as one in the common purpose of pressing the assault from their respective bases. The extension of our striking threat to the south was well understood in Berlin.

On the 8th German Air Force Command South East signalled the Air Officer Commanding in Roumania as follows:

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"It has been laid down in the Fuehrer's order that in the South East area the strengthening of the Bulgarian fighter forces is at present the most urgent task. Discussion with East Air Staff, Department 6, has shown that the simultaneous material strengthening of the fighter units in Roumania asked for by you in above reference cannot be carried out. Nevertheless, the normal flow of replacement BF 109 can be regarded as assured. After the strengthening and training of the Bulgarian fighter units is completed (probably the end of February) I/JG 5 will be moved back to Roumania."

The Fuehrer's concern over Bulgaria was well-founded. The diplomatic messages of the month contained several allusions to Bulgaria's desire to get out of the war, a desire which reflects in itself recognition of the fact that Germany not only could no longer offer her protection but probably could not retaliate against her defection. In both of these considerations the condition of the German Air Force was of paramount importance. Only over Germany itself and its indispensable oil supplies would the German Air Force now fight earnestly, a condition that was to remain true until D Day. In Germany it was making feverish efforts to improve its internal defenses.

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On the 8th Generaloberst Stumpf was brought from Norway to the post of Air Officer Commander in Chief in the Center, a command he presently abolished to give the central defenses of Germany the new dignity of full air fleet status under the title of Luftflotte Reich. A continuous series of reorganizations of subordinate units within Luftflotte Reich followed, but their solitary aim was to strengthen fighter defenses. Some success attended these innovations. Although bad weather persisted through most of January, the fighter defenses fought savagely and with heavy losses on at least five occasions in that month. The most significant of these were the raids on the 11th, in which we resumed direct attack upon single-engine manufacture at Oschersleben and initiated attack on twin-engine manufacture at Brunswick.

On that very day General Spaatz, as Commanding General of USSTAF, had issued operational directives to both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. These reiterated the primary directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on January 1943 for "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the under-mining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

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The new directive, however, went on to specify expressly that "in view, however, of the steady increase in German fighter strength which, if unchecked, may render us unable to fulfill the tasks allotted to us by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the priority objective will be "the destruction of the German Air Force." This will be accomplished in the following order of priority:

- a. German single-engine fighter forces.
- b. German twin-engine fighter forces.
- c. German ball-bearing industry."

The attacks of the 11th were in direct conformity to this priority and produced, in addition to severe fighting and destruction, a notable response in "ULTRA".

A German intelligence appreciation of the 13th, probably from Berlin but picked up on a relay to the lower units in the south, states:

"The attack against Oschersleben, carried out beyond the effective range of fighter escort, for which the enemy must have counted on having heavy losses, again underlines the importance attached to the ^{i u}diminution of German fighter aircraft production. The attack was carried out contrary to the Americans' usual tactics. Without reliance on diversionary

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and feint attacks. This may possibly be explained as an attempt by the new chief of the American Air Fleet, Major General Doolittle, former Commander of the Strategic Air Force Mediterranean, to apply in the west operational experiences gained in that theater of war. The crushing of the attack and the very considerable losses will presumably limit American daylight activity for some time to the range of the escort formations."

Much of this is true. The attack did extend beyond fighter escort and the risk involved was one calculated in the urgency of the task. The German appreciation of results is characteristic.

We had lost 69 bombers. On the 12th the German Minister for Foreign Affairs issued instructions for diplomats abroad to set our losses at 123 in official utterance. While the instruction boasts of their defenses it was evidently decided to make no specific acknowledgment of losses, which our claims set at 125 destroyed, 42 probably destroyed and 33 damaged. No clear statement of the bomb damage is recorded in "ULTRA".

A routine message from the Japanese Ambassador on the 12th, however, casts some light on the relation between the air activity in the West and the ground activity in the East with the statement

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that "The Germans would probably be compelled to shorten their line at the Nikopol bridgehead in the sector west of Zaporozhe and other places." The nickel and manganese deposits of the Nikopol region were among the foremost prizes of the whole Russian campaign. Now the Japanese Ambassador was speaking calmly of Germany's impending relinquishment of them.

On the 18th a routine situation report for the 16th stated:

"1027 hours raid by 70 aircraft approaching from the south as far as the area of Graz and Klagenfurt, with report of bombs dropped on Klagenfurt."

The report was quite accurate and was merely another instance of the singleness of purpose which was to govern USSTAF henceforth, for Klagenfurt contained a Messerschmitt plant on which we had long cast covetous eyes.

This operation was mounted less than a week before the Allied landings at Anzio. "ULTRA" does not tell us much about this effort. On the 24th Luftflotte 2 issued the correct orders for support of the armies, attack on shipping and reconnaissance. But, long since, the Luftwaffe could do little in Italy, either against the Tactical Air Forces of the Twelfth Air Force or The Strategic Forces of the Fifteenth. Fighter-bomber activity and even some revived use of the

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Hu.87 went on at Anzio but to no purpose beyond harrassing attacks.

It might be said that from this time on the story of our Strategic Forces in Italy merges with that of the force based in the United Kingdom. The story of the Tactical Air Forces recedes, partly because complete operational records are not available here, partly because "ULTRA" gives us only bits and pieces. The general picture is clear. The Tactical Forces were free to operate where they wished, and they made highly skillful and patiently persistent use of this freedom.

As an instance of how belated even the best intelligence may be, there appeared only on the 19th of January a message casting its own light on our opinion that the German fighter defenses were strained to the breaking point late in 1943.

Replying to an unobserved communication from a senior echelon, the 2nd Jagddivision, which at the time had between 15 and 20 full fighter groups operational against us, states:

"The Division reports that it is impossible to provide two officers as ordered. Necessary qualifications only possessed in this command by operational pilots. For operational reasons and because of the high losses in the Division, the removal of two pilots on a course of such length cannot be considered."

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Another belated message, only deciphered on the 22nd, is of interest for the light it throws on the state of mind prevalent among both single-engined fighters and the twin-engined day fighter groups who were conducting the 21 cm. mortar rocket attacks against us.

"The A.O.C. in C. Center has authorized a weekly supplementary meat ration of 250 grams to Stab ZG 26, I, II and III ZG 26, JG 11 and NJG 3 in view of the extraordinary demands made upon these units."

January is notable also for the beginning of Fliegerkorps IX's little blitz on London, ^{alt. name} No mention of it appears in the "ULTRA" of that month, ~~but the operation was apparent even to~~ American Intelligence by the ~~explosion of bombs~~ in USSTAF Headquarters area.

As is usual, the reasons behind it were not so clear. The Germans obviously wanted to retaliate for the heavy RAF raids on Berlin which characterized that winter. Likewise, they wished to experiment with the radar jamming technique known as "window", which the British had inaugurated so effectively over Hamburg in the previous summer. The first few of the German raids were quite successful in this respect, clearly baffling British night fighters and flak, which were rusty from long quiescence, and found these "Dueppel" strips of tinfoil as confusing as the Germans had found ~~them over Hamburg.~~

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Nevertheless, no military damage was effected by these raids and, after the first fumbling, the excellent British defenses began to exact a steady toll of from 15 to 20 per cent a night. The raids never reached an intensity above about 250 sorties, carrying less than 500 tons. They did lead to some misjudgment of the German bomber strength. Intelligence found it impossible to believe what was later proven as a sober fact that the Germans were bleeding themselves to death with maximum effort of forces available throughout every favorable night of the dark moon phases of the ensuing three months.

It seems the more remarkable in view of German certainty of the pending Allied invasion of the Continent, and what should have been only a prudent instinct to conserve their dwindling bomber forces for the critical and lucrative target of the invasion fleet itself.

Again the hind-sight enjoys many advantages not available at the time. These clearly show that this was not a well planned series of training missions for a calculated expenditure of losses, but was in fact an almost suicidal and militarily insane wasting of what might have been a decisive asset at the beachheads in Normandy.

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The Germans have done many irrational things from sheer malevolence throughout the war. Yet Intelligence still hesitates to ascribe the folly of this wastage to such frivolous causes. There is no certain answer, but it is possible now to conjecture that the sacrifice of an obsolescent bomber force may have been offset in German thinking by faith and hope in the secret weapons that were so clearly designed to replace it.

No hard evidence on this is available and it is offered at this time only as a possible explanation for a phenomenon otherwise inexplicable by reason.

The severity of the air fighting on favorable re-
days in January has been marked. On the 30th, against our raid on Brunswick, the 2nd group of JG 11 filed a report which was not deciphered until 14 February.

On that occasion this one group raised a total of 52 sorties, 31 in the first scramble which reported no contacts with the enemy. They landed at Deelen two hours later and this time were able only to scramble 21, of which an early and incomplete report records 2 victories, type unspecified, and losses of 4 missing, 1 crash landing (fatal), 3 baled out, 1 belly landed and 3 crashed on take-off. In short, out of 21 in the second sortie, there were 12 casualties, - evident testimony not only of the fighting but the operational strain inherent

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in compelling the same inadequate groups to fly
double sorties against our missions.

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There is obvious discrepancy between the many evidences of aircraft, particularly fighter, shortage already cited and the many other evidences of severe fighting and determined defense by the German fighter force over Germany. At the risk of reiteration, it must be emphasized that the German fighter position must be considered not only in the light of what it was but in the light of what the Germans had intended it to be, and what it would have had to be to fulfill the major functions of the German Air Force in defending German conquests.

Throughout all this time, and indeed throughout the war, the Germans had large numbers of fighters. The point is that they were not equal to their tasks. The determined efforts to expand the force can never be considered successful when measured against that objective.

We have already seen the effects of fighter shortage on the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts, in vital army reconnaissance, over the shipping in the Mediterranean and over Western Europe, including the V-weapon installations, on which the Germans were expending such prodigious parts of their energy and resources. Against these shortages, however, must be weighed the continuous strengthening of the inner defenses over Germany itself. Only daylight air combat deep in Germany was to shatter those defenses and February was to provide a record scale of that. Yet, as an indication of the German position

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generally, the first message in the February folder is a fair example.

Fliegerkorps I on the Russian Front in a message evidently to a subordinate unit, states:

"By reason of the state of short supply of Focke Wulf 190s, insure that the two salvage Focke Wulf 190s are brought back."

An intelligence appreciation from the indefatigable scribes of G.A.F. Command South East on the 3rd says; after a conjecture that Lightnings are to be withdrawn from American use for unsatisfactory performance:

"In contrast to this, there is the aircraft type Thunderbolt whose performance in the air is hailed by all American crews. Hence, the offensive spirit of the Thunderbolt units is said to be considerably greater than that of the Lightning units. Aircraft type Mustang apparently does not yet come up completely to requirements in escort tasks. The Mustang is said to be inferior to the German fighter, above all in fighting which involves twists and turns."

It is unfortunate that we do not have the views of this sage on the performance of the Mustangs which was to be observed above Berlin itself exactly a month and a day later.

On the 7th G.A.F. Command South East ordered withdrawal of a fighter squadron for immediate dispatch to Regensburg-Obertraubling to re-equip with new planes. The message stated:

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"After arrival in Regensburg-Obertraubling the staffel will report every 48 hours to G.A.F. Command South East the position reached in regards to taking over aircraft."

It should be stated that the number of a fighter staffel was 9 planes. The message is of interest as reflecting firstly that procurement of these 9 planes might be so delayed as to require reports at 48-hour intervals; and secondly, for the fact that the staffel went down to the factory instead of to a reserve pool.

A situation report from Luftgau 12 on the evening of the 8th emphasized very heavy damage to a miscellany of works in Frankfurt, following our blind bombing raid of that day upon Frankfurt. This is perhaps the first and best evidence we have of the progress our crews were making with the difficult technique of bombing through cloud.

A similar message from Luftflotte Reich on the 10th describes damage to Brunswick on that day of the same miscellaneous character. This, too, was effected through cloud, which obscured the important Messerschmitt works that had been assigned target.

Heavy fighting attended both of these raids, but by now the presence of the Mustangs was giving our bombers fighter support in almost all parts of Germany.

One immediate result which does not appear in "ULTRA" may be observed in our own operational records. In February for the first time the claims of German fighters shot down by our fighters exceeded the claims of German fighters shot down by our bombers. The margin was narrow,

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but thereafter the graph lines draw rapidly apart, so that bomber claims were to become scarce by late spring, while the fighter claims continued steadily to increase.

As was the case with the great efforts of July and of October, there is surprisingly little direct "ULTRA" evidence of the great effort the last week in February. Between the 20th and the 25th both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces attacked almost every known source of German fighter plane manufacture. The results were to be very far-reaching indeed. It has been noted that fighter manufacture had already been driven into dispersal by the summer and autumn raids. By early March production was again achieving substantial figures, but the check re-imposed upon it by this week's bombing and the fighting that attended it was to affect the German Air Force so seriously as to preclude any possibility of recovery of its effective strength.

As a direct consequence, it was ultimately to free our Air Force from major commitment against German aircraft production. The certainty that G.A.F. production had been severely checked again permitted transfer of the majority of strategic bombardment energies to attacks on German oil and on the transportation systems, then judged vital to the movement of the armies in the West.

Some direct evidences of that week do appear, tellingly. The first operation, on the 20th, to Leipzig and six other remote targets, was brilliantly successful, not only for the extent of its bomb damage, but for the very low loss of bombers which attended it. This low loss is attributable to many factors, including the

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presence and skill of our fighters and the brilliant planning and timing of the separate elements of the mission, which was designed to outwit and confuse German reporting and radar services.

On the 23rd the Chief of the Air Staff of the German Air Force Ops Staff wrote a sharp directive to the Director General of Signals on the subject: -

"Orders for re-organization of the Aircraft Reporting Service."

There follow in the message details of the reform, which may be examined by those with technical interest; but the purport of the message was to reflect dissatisfaction with the condition of aircraft reporting at the time, although this same service had been repeatedly re-organized in the preceding months.

A message of the 26th from G.A.F. Command South East informs the Fliegerfuehrer Albania that:-

"As a result of the withdrawal of J.G. 27 to the air defense of the Homeland, the projected transfer of a fighter staffel to the Adriatic Coast...will not take place."

On the 27th an intelligence officer of G.A.F. Command South East in Greece files a report on a Mustang which had been shot down, in which, after carefully specifying the fuel content of the tanks, he states:-

"Maximum depth penetration with all auxiliary tanks and 80% engine performance is 1250 kilometres", an estimate which should have been noticed in Berlin, although we have no way of telling whether it was.

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In Italy the chief German need of the time was to eliminate the Anzio beachhead. On the air side Luftflotte 2 was strengthened to the extent of two fighter groups, one late in January and the second in February. The attempt probably helped to constrict the bridgehead temporarily.

But sufficient air power to have a decisive effect was never sent there. It could not be spared from Germany itself and the groups mentioned were both recalled to the defense of the Reich in the early spring.

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A circular message intercepted on its way to Petsamo discloses that Goering had summoned another three-day conference of the Kommodeure of his day fighter wings early in March.

A message actually of February 28th, though not deciphered until the 4th of March contains a statement from the Quartermaster of Luftflotte 3 in the West:

"Owing to the most seriously strained supply situation of bomb, flak and aircraft armament ammunition, and to the further deterioration which is to be expected in the near future, attention is directed again to the necessity for the most exact accounting as well as maintenance, storage and handling of this ammunition."

This shortage certainly reflects the intensified scale of operations in the West, though part of it must have been caused by the indirect results of heavy Royal Air Force bombing throughout this period, and the resumption of intensive fighting in the East.

A message from Flak Headquarters in Berlin, however, indicates still another facet of the kind of thinking which was beginning to govern German authority of Defense. It is evident from this communication that Luftflotte Reich (Central Germany)

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was shouldering Luftflotten 4 and 6 to the east with a large part of its territorial responsibility by the expedient of changing boundary lines. Yet although those two Luftflotten were bearing the full brunt of the Soviet winter attacks of the time, Luftflotte Reich specified:

"In the regions which Luftflotte Reich is ceding to Luftflotten 4 and 6, it is ordered that, with immediate effect, no flak units may be withdrawn."

As a further comfort, the fourth paragraph advises the outlying commands:

"Bringing up of further flak forces on the basis of the increase in territory is not to be counted upon."

On the 5th Luftflotte 2 in Italy was informed of the impending transfer of another of its few remaining groups to the central area of Luftflotte Reich.

A feature of the intensive action of February was the widespread damage and devastation caused on innumerable German airfields, a by-product of the action often overlooked in the common exultation over photographs of demolished factories. Reflection of this, however, appears in a message of February 28th which Luftgau XI addressed to a lower echelon on the pleasing subject of drink and tobacco; it authorizes:

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"Joint consumption with the flying personnel to be issued against payment to the men of the ground services in the German Air Force Stations that were bombed on 21 February. The issue is intended as special recognition of their behavior during the attack, and for their outstanding achievements in the clearing and repair work."

A message of the 16th illustrates still another indirect effect of our onslaught on the German Air Force. Though garbled in some respects, it is from Luftflotte 4 in the East, and speaks of the relinquishment of bomber crews:

"Less the observers, to be handed over for the sphere of command of Air Officer for Fighters for employment on day or night fighters, or heavy fighters."

The message further signifies additional transfers of bomber crews under key-word translated as "Fighter Assistance Scheme."

It will be remembered that although Mustangs were over Berlin on the 4th, the first American bomber raid against that city occurred on the 6th.

In the fighting it entailed we suffered the record American
bomber losses of the war, 69 heavies,

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[REDACTED]

Consistent as always, the Japanese Minister reported our losses as 140, including 115 four-engined bombers on that day.

It is notable that two days later another large-scale attack on the Erckner ball-bearing works just east of Berlin provoked heavy fighting again, although our claims are less than half for the first Berlin mission, and losses on this occasion were down to 38. The third attack on the 9th records no claims whatever on the Berlin raid, and the loss of only 8 bombers. This was indisputable proof of a new tendency in the war, the complete failure of the fighter force to respond to a deep penetration.

It was to respond later on other occasions, and ferociously, but never again could it fight hard for more than two successive days.

This failure was to free our fighter forces for what became one of the most effective techniques in the war -- the ground strafing of German airdromes on the return journey, after they were certain that the bombers were safely beyond dangerous opposition.

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German recognition of this practice finds its first expression in "ULTRA" again from the loquacious G.A.F. Command South East, who on the 8th of March advised the Fliegerfuehrer Albania as follows:

"The enemy has recognized our own tactics of taking off and getting away from the airfield with all serviceable aircraft before attacks on our ground organization. In the West he has recently put aside a part of the escorting fighter force to attack these aircraft and has achieved successes in this connection."

There follows a long series of precautionary instructions to cope with this practice. But although the writer may have been confused about the exact play of cause and effect, the shooting up of airdromes and the shooting down of aircraft engaged in fugitive sorties became a standard practice for our fighters, as the aerial opposition to their primary function of defending the bombers steadily dwindled.

Exact reports of German losses against us remain scarce, but a pair of excellent ones from JG 11, which, it must be remembered, had been organized especially to combat American operations in North West Germany, are probably fairly representative of what was happening through this time in most of the groups consistently engaging us. Reporting a battle on the 3rd of March, the 2d Gruppe of JG 11 scrambled 16 aircraft (a weak effort in itself).

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It claimed 4 Mustangs shot down, 2 certain and 2 probable, and acknowledged 1 aircraft crashed fatally, 2 missing, a fourth baled out, and a fifth "thought to have crashed at Lubeck", or almost 33% loss for one engagement.

On the 6th of March this same gruppe scrambled 15, all of which contacted the enemy on a first sortie and scrambled 5 on a second sortie. All aircraft contacted the enemy. They claimed 3 victories certain and 2 probables. They acknowledged 1 killed, 1 missing and 1 baled out with the pilot wounded, or 15% loss for the two sorties.

A further effect of our fighters and a further instance of our supremacy in the air over Germany which was by mid-March all but publicly acknowledged, even in Germany itself, may be found in a message of Luftflotte 3 on the subject of exercises in combatting parachutists and air landings. These operations were to be an increasingly grave apprehension of Luftflotte 3 from March until its fears came true over Normandy.

On the 16th it advised its subordinate units to practice resistance against such actions, but in the concluding paragraph stated clearly:

"In consideration of the great danger to the aircraft operating and to their crews, the Luftflotte must refuse to sanction parachute jumping and glider exercises within the area of penetration of the enemy fighter

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forces, because, in view of the weakness of our own fighter forces, sufficient protection cannot be afforded. The exercises must be carried out at least south of the line Brussels - San Quentin - Evreux - Dinant - Brest."

By the 19th the German fighter pilot situation was such as to produce from the Air Officer for Fighters the following message:

"The strained manpower situation in units operating in defense of the Reich demands urgently the further bringing up of experienced flying personnel from other arms of the service, in particular for the maintenance of fighting power to the air arm, tried pilots of the ground attack and bomber units, especially officers suitable as formation leaders, will now also have to be drawn on. The basis for this is still to be volunteering."

The message contains further exhortation to subordinate commands to encourage this volunteering, and ends with the note of warning:

"But the provision of replacements is on no account to be made a condition of release."

In evident amplification of the same message, another relayed version of the message states:

"Every officer and official of the Staff is to be called on to give the very last ounce in the performance of his duty, as demanded by

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the manpower difficulties in the fifth year of the war. Luftflotte Reich and Luftflotte 3 need officers who will give their utmost as fighter and formation leaders in defense of the Reich."

Manpower, however, was not the only shortage troubling the Germans in March. On the 21st Chief Quartermaster General for the G.A.F. instructed a subordinate command:

"All crashed fighter aircraft worth reconstruction, particularly fighters type Me.109-G, are to be salvaged and returned as quickly as possible. All salvage work must yield priority to this task."

In a long and plaintive message of the 24th Luftflotte Reich states:

"During flights into the Home war zone enemy fighters have repeatedly carried out attacks on aircraft which were landing or on the airfields themselves. In doing so they imitate the landing procedure of German fighters, or effected surprise by approaching the airfield in fast and very level flight. The difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe often makes it impossible for the flak artillery on the airfield to fire on them."

There is a time cycle in the application of even the most successful bombing through which reserves and the pipe-line of final modification and

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transit protect forces in the field from operational shortage. This in part accounts for the scarcity of direct "ULTRA" evidence of the bomb damage effected in January and February. No one can measure exactly the duration of this time scale in various places and fronts. Thus it was not until the 26th of March that there appeared again through the loquacity of G.A.F. Command South East what must have been a round-robin circular, and which he as usual transmits to the much-bedevilled Fliegerfuehrer Albania in the following terms:

"The extraordinarily difficult situation in the air defense of the Homeland requires with all emphasis: (1) The speedy salvage of all fighter and heavy fighter aircraft and their immediate return for repair. (2) The unrestricted employment of salvage personnel for salvage tasks. Subordinate units are expressly forbidden to employ them for any other purpose. (3) That spare parts be acquired by repair and salvage units by removal from aircraft worth salvaging only in case of absolute necessity. (4) That repair of aircraft in your own area be energetically speeded up in order to increase serviceability and to relieve supply."

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On the 27th appears an indirect but even more serious evidence of fighter shortage in a circular from Luftflotte Reich to subordinate commands which states:

"Generalleutnant Buelovius, A.O.C. Fliegerkorps II, by permission of Luftflotte Reich, will visit the fighter units intended for surrender in the case of a state of emergency for the purpose of instructing formation leaders."

This message only confirmed what was already known -- the Germans had intended to create a large and independent command within the framework of the experienced Fliegerkorps II for exclusive use against the impending invasion; yet from the date and context of this message it is evident that General Buelovius' force was in fact to consist only "of units intended for surrender," from Luftflotte Reich. Whether realization of the bankruptcy of their hope of expanding fighters by invasion time followed only upon our great effort of February and March is impossible to say. But it is evident that the full impact of it had struck them by this date. The General's visit to units that were only prospectively his must have come as a dark omen.

The appeal for volunteer fighter pilots from bomb groups has been noted in two messages. Now on the 23rd it is repeated again, this time addressed to transport groups in substantially the same terms,

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and exhorting unit commanders to rob even these distinctly inferior types for active fighter duty.

There is little wonder that, in this condition of the German fighter force, a routine telegram from the Foreign Office to German Air Attachés abroad on the 23rd of March does not even bother to amplify the conclusion of a description of an attack upon Berlin by 500-600 American bombers with strong fighter escort which it words as follows:

"Small loss of life, effective defense by anti-aircraft guns, no fighter defense."

Fighters there still were, of course, in formidable numbers, but it is only too evident that they could no longer be risked against every Allied attack.

On the same day one of its subordinate commands was informing Jagdkorps I with more of apprehension than of accuracy as regards the date:

"(1). For the first time on 21 March the enemy employed long-range day fighters on a large scale over the occupied territories in the West. Their purpose was to destroy aircraft on and over inland airfields by attacking them on the ground with aircraft armament, as well as in the air. The operation was carried out by formations of Mustangs (2 formations of 50 aircraft each) and also by Mosquitos in Rotten. Our own losses were considerable.

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(2). Long-range fighter sweeps must also be expected in the Reich territory in connection, too, with large-scale enemy raids for the purpose of preventing our own fighters from operation.

(3). The above measures show how urgent it is to carry out the measures which have been laid down for airfield protection and for dispersal as quickly and as thoroughly as possible."

On the last day of the month a for once moderate and polite communication from Kesselring indicates the effect of the month's intensive bombing of the communication system. He reports that air attacks against the rearward area of his armies are giving rise to increased demands for road repair and construction and asks the Todt Organization for two units. In this connection the operations reports of Luftflotte 2 are revealing. On March 19 they reached 293 sorties but in general averaged 200.

Further information comes from the Japanese Naval Attache's version of a statement sent him on March 9th by Von Richthofen in lieu of an interview. The situation in Italy depended on supply, and the German Army was moving 35,000 tons a week by small craft which skirted the coast at night. Much less was carried by rail and road because of Allied bombing.

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The master file for April contains over 120 pages of "ULTRA" material directly or indirectly related to American operations. In part this volume reflects increase in the tempo of our operations themselves, in part improved service in the acquisition of "ULTRA". Space will permit, therefore, mention of only the most significant items.

April was to witness transfer of the control and command of all American Air Forces in this theater to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, for integration to the common preparation of the Allied landing in Normandy. The correspondence effecting this transfer may be studied in the April folder. The consequences are summarized in the letter from Major General F. L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General for Operations, USSTAF, to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, which said in part:

"Objectives allotted to the Eighth Air Force are as follows, and are listed in order of priority:

(a) The primary objective is the German Air Force.....

(b) The secondary objective is the enemy rail transportation system."

From the beginning of the war the German Air Force had been recognized as the makeweight between German aspiration and German capability. It was this Air Force which had permitted the German armies to overrun and conquer the population and territory of Europe. It was

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primarily this Air Force on which the Germans had counted to defend their conquest against the prodigious numerical superiority which that conquest so slowly but surely assembled against them. Yet, until its power was shattered, it would have been impossible for the Allied Armies even to engage anything but the Africa Korps and the small proportion of German soldiers in Italy. Now the major attempt in the West was in the last stages of preparation. The chronicle of the foregoing months has shown how persistently, how single-mindedly, and with what indications of success the Army Air Forces had already been reducing the power of the once invincible Luftwaffe.

After the German failure to continue adequate air defense of Germany through March, it was the view of American airmen that the Luftwaffe was already crippled beyond effective restoration. Our air power was then in a position to apply its proven and unique destructive power directly to the industrial roots on which all of the German armed forces depended.

Oil was the most vital and vulnerable German war supply and American airmen wished to exploit this dearly won supremacy of the air over Germany for the attack which American strategic bombardment alone in the arsenal of the United Nations was capable of delivering. It was certain that such a course would also provoke a high rate of aerial combat.

However, by this time D-Day in the West was only two months distant. The necessity of adequate air preparation was deemed to overshadow all else. Such

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preparation included the tactical neutralization of the G.A.F., and the destruction of communications serving the critical areas. These tasks became the major commitment of the Eighth Air Force until our armies were securely ashore, and although an auspicious beginning was made against oil in May the full scale strategic attack against this target system was not to commence until later.

During this month the Fifteenth Air Force was to put a considerable effort on communications targets in the Balkan capitals of Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest.

A G.A.F. Command South East report of March 30th says:-

"The center of Sofia and the railway installations suffered very heavy damage by the attacks of the night 29-30/3 and on the following day when H.E. and incendiary bombs were dropped by 200 to 300 enemy four-engined bombers. Large areas of fire were spreading to the Eastern part of the town as a result of the strong wind and lack of water. The Bulgarian officials and population completely lost their heads in a state of panic."

The Eighth Air Force was meanwhile continuing its attacks upon the German aircraft industry. On the 9th it encountered heavy fighting on a raid of record distance to the Focke-Wulf factories at Posen and Gdynia in Poland. The Fifteenth, in addition to efforts against communications and oil, turned in excellent attacks against aircraft and ball-bearing ob-

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jectives in Southern Germany, which were appreciated in an intelligence report from Berlin as follows:

"The attacks against the German aircraft works in the Budapest area represent a continuation of the systematic Allied air offensive against the German aircraft industry. At the same time the enemy is trying thereby to achieve political repercussions in Hungary."

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The Diplomatic Intercept | teem with accounts of the effects of our attacks upon the three Balkan capitals but they vary so widely as to suggest only correlation between the Diplomat | involved and the nearest bomb as the determinative factor in their appraisal.

Against these, however, should be recorded appraisals of the Fifteenth's more professional activity, of which an intelligence report from Berlin may be quoted:

"Regensburg and Steyr were attacked by strong formations from Italy. Regensburg also being attacked simultaneously by formations coming from England. Here again there was extensive damage in the industrial works and also in the town area."

The difficulty of determining exactly and numerically the effect of these attacks was a problem not peculiar to American Intelligence. At about this time we began to intercept a series of reports from the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin. The whole character of these reports stamps him as the most learned and competent of all our

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sequence, his notes are of particular interest though they cannot be taken literally.

He, too, had pondered deeply the numerical riddle of what Germany had, had lost, and would have, and he was pertinacious in pressing inquiry upon Milch himself. After one session he wired Tokyo on the 7th:

"Monthly production of German first line-aircraft had remained at a figure between 2600 and 2700. It had been hoped to increase the figure, but owing to "transfer of plant carried out in expectation of intensification of enemy air raids, strategic bombing by British and American aircraft, production of new types, etc." this had not been possible. A further increase was however anticipated about the middle of the year and there would be a further increase in fighter production "in the next month or two." Monthly production of fighters during February and March was 1400."

These figures are more than double the Anglo-American Intelligence estimate for German fighter production at that time. Milch's interest in exaggerating to his Japanese ally is obvious. Later Admiral Abe was to record Milch's confidences first with sarcasm, and then with open disbelief. The exact answer, however, is not to be found in a categorical denial of these figures.

We have seen too many evidences of German fighter shortage to doubt that they were hardpressed. We have seen evidences of wastage on the Western Front which the Germans themselves set at figures ranging from 15 to 30% per group, per engagement. Yet numerical fighter strength,

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although it declines somewhat in April, did not fall in accordance with current damage and wastage enough to point to entire harmony in our estimates. It was evident by late April that dispersal had brought numerical replacements through our bombing more safely than could have been imagined. It was equally evident, however, that combat killing and the incredible strain of fighting had so weakened the effective strength of the German Air Force that it now opposed even operations deep in the Reich only intermittently and, by contrast to the last year, weakly.

This circumstance was reported not only by our combat crews but is reflected in an OKW appreciation of the 24th of March, not intercepted until the 12th of April, which states:-

"In repulsing numerous enemy raids into the home theater of war, our defensive forces were severely strained but were successful....."

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On the 11th, a small detachment of the Eighth Air Force attacked Poelitz, near Stettin, in the course of a raid on scattered G.A.F. objectives in that neighborhood.

The night of the 17th saw the last of the "little blitz" conventional bomber attacks on England. It was not fully appreciated at the time how near to ruin these senseless operations had brought the German Bomber Command.

As the "little blitz" drew to a close there were symptoms of intruder activity by the G.I.A.F. On the night of March 30th German aircraft came over England with returning bombers and machine-gunned airfields. Somewhat inconclusive wireless activity identified these aircraft as Me.410s. This aircraft, at the time, was something of a mystery operationally. Introduced as a reconnaissance aircraft in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1943, it was used that summer and into the winter as a bomber against England. It was known that one group of K.G. 51 had re-equipped with Me.410 in 1943 and then had been turned over to the Commanding General for Fighters. On 2 March 1944, "ULTRA" provided two messages which pointed strongly to some kind of Me.410 night fighter activity.

On the evening of April 22nd, German aircraft came over England with returning American bombers and shot down seven bombers and damaged ten. It was not possible to identify these aircraft as Me.410, but within a few days it was clear that two groups of K.G. 51 were operating part of their Me.410s as in-

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truder night fighters. The activity continued intermittently throughout May.

Several "ULTRA" reports in May make it quite clear that this program was one which the Germans had long planned and had now brought to a point. That it did not develop beyond causing momentary anxiety is due largely to the high loss rate of the Me.410 in operations over France, especially after D-Day.

On the 21st occurred the first and a very substantial "ULTRA" mention of the Me.163, which pointed directly to the manufacture of power units by the firm of Walter, at Kiel, and spoke tentatively of an impending plan to occupy each of ten airfields with a staffel of twelve of these new rocket fighters. Other evidences of jet and rocket innovation in the G.A.F. were already at hand and the full history of the evidence may be considered in a paper especially written upon this subject and included in the files. This particular message, however, did lead us directly to a vital target which was effectively bombed, though reconnaissance troubles and weather somewhat delayed action.

The desperation that was driving Germany to premature introduction of these weapons finds explanation in still another message picked up on relay through the

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very communicative G.A.F. Command South East:-

"The increased tenseness of the situation in the defense of the Reich necessitates further reinforcement of the air defensive operating there by bringing up crews from all units of the G.A.F. The need is for crews and formation leaders for day and night fighting."

The same difficulty is reflected also in a message of the 6th to Fliegerkorps I, which was already too weak to cope with the steady tide of Russian advance:-

"Dispatch Major Hall immediately to take over the High Altitude Fighter Group. Surrender further 14 fighter pilots, including 2 to 4 aces, after the arrival of replacements for the defense of the Reich."

The need for good pilots now appeared even more acute than the need for planes, a condition best illustrated in an operations report of an attack on the 24th against G.A.F. targets in the Munich area, which says in part:-

"Ops: Successes, losses:

"Jafue 4: 12 F.W. 190, 2 Liberators effectively shot up. Losses not known. Jafue 5: 6 F.W. 190, 15 Me.109, 5 Liberators (words undeciphered) Me.109 with pilots, missing, 1 pilot seriously wounded, 2 F.W. 190 destroyed. 7th Jagddivision: 7 Me.110 (line not deciphered) fighters probably shot down. 17 four-engined aircraft shot out of formation, 12 Me.109 with pilots missing, 5 pilots killed, 2 wounded. 11 Me.109 destroyed, 6 Me.109 damaged."

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The incompleteness and fragmentary character of the report will be noted. It should also be mentioned that these commands certainly did not represent all the forces engaged on that day. Yet, from these alone, there are 39 clear casualties against one operation.

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May

Throughout/the majority of the significant attacks of both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces continued against the German aircraft industry, although an increasing proportion of the Eighth's effort now began to be diverted against the transportation program in Northern France.

The condition of the German Air Force and the industry behind it has been so well attested in the foregoing months of this chronicle that it seems unnecessary to elaborate in May the voluminous additional proofs. Most of them would simply be repetitions or variations on the instances of damage, shortage and inadequacy already so well demonstrated. One G.A.F. venture is worth looking at.

In late May missions to Berlin and east provoked a substantial resumption of twin-engine day fighter reaction, predominantly Me.410. At the same time, the Fifteenth Air Force encountered Me.410 opposition in the Vienna and South Germany area. "ULTRA" helped very little. It was clear that the units in the Berlin area were part or all of ZG 26, of which very little had been heard since its activity with the 21 cm. mortar in the autumn of 1943. The South German units were part of ZG 76, an early war twin-engine unit which had been all but dead for some time.

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Particularly in the Berlin area these Me.410's made aggressive attacks. As it was known that experiments had been made in fitting a modification of the 3.7 A.A. gun and the 50 mm. cannon, some anxiety was felt. And although it was known that as a result of attacks at Augsburg and Budapest, the production of the Me.410 had been much reduced, it was not entirely clear how many the Germans might be producing elsewhere.

This last appearance of the twin-engined day fighter was short lived. "ULTRA" did not supply any evidence. As our claims were substantial, it was thought at the time that sheer wastage was the reason. Long after the event, prisoner of war statements confirmed this suspicion. The losses of ZG 26 against American Air Forces were catastrophic. There was slight evidence in "ULTRA" that during the summer of 1944 part of ZG 26 converted to single-engine fighters as the nucleus of JG 6 while part went into the Me.262 program, and that ZG 76 was absorbed into JG 76. Late prisoner of war statements have confirmed both.

The picture of the Italian Theater is strikingly repetitious. Luftflotte 2's daily operations reports, of which samples will be found in the files, day after day detail the hundreds of American aircraft attacking in the Balkans, in South Germany, in Italy itself and humbly record their own few sorties.

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"ULTRA" messages which would detail the damage in Italy itself were not in priority and perhaps still have not been decoded. Early in the month Naval authorities were informed that Kesselring had once again "demanded an increase in supplies transported by sea in view of severe interruption of land communications." But the demands were not, and could not be, fulfilled.

The rapid crumbling of the German positions south of the Apennines was the proof. And it is good evidence that, on the word of a Colonel in the 362nd Division, a favorite joke was that Kesselring said of his planes, "Shall we throw in both or only one?"

A series of messages from G.A.F. General for Central Italy illustrates this joke. On May 17th, ground attack operations were not possible because the aircraft were being used as fighters. On the 20th they were again impossible for lack of fighter protection. On the 21st all ground attack aircraft and fighters were to operate under the Command of the fighters. To such ineffectual vacillations was the G.A.F. in Italy forced by the overwhelming need in the West.

Intermittently and deep in Germany the scale of air fighting in May was quite heavy though it never reached the severity of the preceding months. These deep penetrations were in themselves part of the plan to keep the German fighter forces pinned tightly down in Central Germany, so as to prevent

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their forward movement into France prior to the invasion. The plan as will be seen was highly successful and particularly so because of a change in our own policy.

Early in May the Eighth Air Force made its first intensive attacks against enemy oil installations. These attacks were highly successful. What is more they produced such immediate proof of the German sensitivity that oil attack was to become at first tacitly and subsequently by formal directive the foremost priority of our strategic bombardment.

This program was of double value, not only for the oil shortage it imposed upon the Germans at the critical stage of the war but as a proved insurance of the attrition by combat which it provoked. The Germans defended oil ferociously. This was in clear contrast to the complete disregard and lack of opposition which greeted most of the Strategic Air Forces' effort against transportation.

The volume of "ULTRA" messages available for May and the ensuing months is so great as to preclude direct citation of all but a few. As our efforts against the German Air Force and industry have been so well covered in the preceding months, the oil Intelligence will take priority in the ensuing sections of this chronicle, as indeed it did in the hopes and intentions of our strategic bom-

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bardment force.

Whoever doubts the continuing troubles of the German Air Force in direct consequence of our actions through this period, however, may examine the scores of separate relevant items in the May folder.

One message of the 5th of May must be cited as evidence of the predicament in which the German Air Force found itself. By this time the systematic bombing of enemy airdromes in the West had already begun. After a survey of it on the 5th of May the OKL Ops Staff in Berlin put out a circular to Luftflotte 3 and subordinate units which reads in part as follows:

"1) Owing to enemy air attacks on ground organization to be expected in event of state of emergency West, transfer will not always be possible to the operational airfields laid down in the standing instructions and it will become necessary to bring up units to different airfields. Luftflotten are to take this eventuality into account, and to provide for re-direction of units via the surrendering authority but at the latest at the intermediate landing place.

2) There remains the final possibility of transmitting the change in operational airfield to the unit when it is already in flight, by R/T or W/T and

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It is notable that this message speaks of Luftflotten, in the plural, signifying still further the evident intent to rob even more ruthlessly the insufficient units remaining on the Russian, Mediterranean and Norwegian Coastal Fronts. Even more remarkable, however, is the plan envisaged for transmitting its destination to a unit already in the air.

This desperate expedient in fact was the one utilized at the time. It contributed in large measure to the low serviceability and virtual impotence of groups moving up to enter intensive combat operations against our invasion. By early May the G.A.F. recognized itself as powerless to defend any certain French airdromes in a condition of readiness to service operational aircraft.

As a reflection of the miscellaneous air activity of the time, the following Intelligence appreciation from Luftflotte 3 was picked up on the 9th:

"From Luftflotte 3, No. 7228/44 on 8/5:

Appreciation of air situation on 7/5 and night 7-8/5:

1) Day operations of 7/5 the strongest yet. Raids into Reich by about 1000 four-engined aircraft, about 500 twin-engined and about 2700 fighters, including about 350 fighter-bombers. Main effort on 7/5 of the fighter activity, which continued throughout the day, consisted unmistakably of attacks on

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structures on railway lines and waterways on the course of the Seine between Mantes and Le Havre. From this, the view of Luftflotte 3 already often expressed, that landing is planned area Le Havre, Cherbourg is confirmed once more.

2) Operations by RAF during first few nights with four-engined aircraft exclusively, in occupied western territories against troop camps, ammunition depots and airfields is to be assessed as the second stage of the invasion preparations."

On the 12th the Ops Staff in Berlin felt compelled to issue a warning to Luftflotte 4 in Russia in the following terms:

"In accordance with the experiences gained in the defense of the Reich, it must be assured as an absolutely essential precondition for the successful fighting of the units which have hitherto fought on the Eastern Front, that they always operate only in sufficiently powerful battle units. Operations by smallish part units or even single aircraft against Anglo-American formations, which fly almost invariably with fighter cover, are synonymous with heavy losses without prospects of success."

It is regrettable that no time stamp appears on this message. For on that very day the Reich was suffering extremely heavy losses in opposition to the first major attack by the Eighth Air Force

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on synthetic oil production at five of the largest centers of that industry.

Our own losses were heavy but success of the attacks and their full significance are reflected best in a message from the G.A.F. Ops Staff in Berlin to Luftflotte 3 on the following day:

"1) In accordance with above reference Luftflotten 1 and 6 were each to give up to Luftflotte 3 a mixed flak abt (mot) with a total of 5 heavy and 4 light or medium batterien. Their despatch to Luftflotte 3 is cancelled. The abt will be placed at disposal of Luftflotte Reich to reinforce the flak protection of the hydrogenation plants. They will be brought up to and operate at Troglitz near Zeitz.

2) On arrival at their destination the abt will be subordinated in every respect to Luftflotte Reich.

3) Accordingly, Air Staff QMG is requested to re-route the transports.

4) In order further to reinforce the hydrogenation plants the following forces (C% operating) on the (C% protection of) the Air Force arms industry have^{been}/released: 4 heavy flak batterien operating at Cschersleben, 2 operating at Wiener-Neustadt and 2 at Leipzig-Erla. These flak batterien are to be employed so that Politz is reinforced with 8 heavy batterien and Blechhammer with 2 further heavy

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flak batterien.

5) Luftflotte Reich will report arrival and readiness to fire of the batterien in their operational locations."

This wholesale removal of flak not only from the already denuded Russian Front (Luftflotten 1 and 6) but from protection of the German fighter plane manufacture itself of Oschersleben, Wiener-Neustadt and Leipzig-Erla constitutes one of the most decisive and timely pieces of Intelligence received in this war.

Its unmistakable purport, that the Germans were giving oil defense a priority even above the defense of aircraft manufacture, was to ratify the assertions of the most ardent advocates of the oil program in terms of unquestionable authenticity. Henceforward oil attack became a vital if not a formal part of all American air activity, and the ensuing months were to see the RAF itself join in the drive with significant contributions.

Further proof arrived on the 19th in the form of a message from the Chief Q.M. Motor Dept. of Luftflotte 3, which was written on the 14th, the day after our second oil attack:

"The following was ordered: As a precautionary measure, independent of the present fuel situation and independent of whether wood fuel is at present available in sufficient quantities, it is intended to convert a further proportion of the armed forces

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M/T (including also M/T of battle units -Kampfverbände-) to the additional use of wood fuel generators. Conversion will take place according to the so-called conversion procedure."

This procedure, a well established routine one, had of course been in effect for some time, but its existence in itself was a part of the available evidence that oil storage was already an embarrassment to the German armed forces and one that could be accentuated in direct proportion to the effort we were to expend.

The information on the transportation program likewise is both voluminous and miscellaneous. As this program, however, was designed principally to impede the movement of troops and supplies it seems appropriate to quote a dialogue between two prisoners. These were German pilots captured before D-Day. In all fairness it should be pointed out that although this particular dialogue mentions only Thunderbolts and Marauders, RAF planes of all types were taking the major part in the long and massive transportation campaign in preparation for D-Day.

"Information received: 24 May 44

S.R.A. 5304

A 1547 - Leutnant (Bomber Pilot: Ju.88, US/BN, 5/KG 2) Captured 19 Apr. 44.

A 1592 - Leutnant (Bomber Pilot: Ju.188, 3E/LK, 2/KG 6) Captured 15 May 44.

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A 1592: Travelling by train is a sickening business.

A 1547: Have you travelled since those attacks?

A 1592: Yes, I once travelled on about the 28th of April.

A 1547: They had been attacked a few times already by then.

A 1592: Yes, all the time. I travelled from Brussels to Paris, a journey which normally takes six hours and it took me exactly 24 hours. The next day it took one NCO 36 hours. Of course we left Brussels by a completely different route, a detour round by Lille. Lille was then Douai. Just after we left Douai station - up till then the train had made very good time, the engine driver kept a good look-out. Then just after we left Douai there was an air-raid warning and I was shown the damage being done to the station. Terrific; at the same time they smashed up a piece of the line about 600 m. ahead of us.

A 1547: Was the train stopped in time?

A 1592: Yes, it had already stopped. We had got out of the train. Another train had got stuck there. But before these 600 m. There was another way which you can take into Valenciennes. We could still branch off. It is all so well arranged. All the same it caused a delay of almost three hours. We sat

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there and then we went on to Valenciennes. I don't know why, it must have been damaged or something like that. We were stuck there without an engine and wandered round the neighborhood.

A 1547: Were those daylight attacks?

A 1592: Yes, it was during the day. We spent the night at Valenciennes.

A 1547: How was the attack carried out, at what height?

A 1592: They used Marauders and before that Thunderbolts and then Marauders. They were a wonderful sight.

A 1547: At what height were they?

A 1592: About 3000 m.

A 1547: Do they cause great havoc?

A 1592: Yes.

A 1547: They must have made a very accurate job of it.

A 1592: Oh, incredibly so.

A 1547: But they can a perfect target flight.

A 1592: Yes, of course. There's nothing there to stop them. Then they smashed up the goods station at Valenciennes. That was at about 2230. It was utter hell and we were stuck at Valenciennes until about 5 o'clock the next morning. We got thoroughly drunk at Valenciennes. After that it wasn't too bad.

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A 1547: They have made a few more heavy raids on railway centers recently.

A 1592: Then I went through Juvisy (sur l'Orge (?)) beyond Paris. It has been fairly badly hit too. Creil has been attacked time and time again. It's incredible! You ought to have seen the trains lying about, one engine on top of the other just like proper double-deckers. They had been standing there and were hit and all the carriages were flung all over the place. I can clearly remember one express train carriage at Creil, that was standing pretty close up to the station building. The building itself was more or less intact except for one corner. The carriage had been flung into the air and crashed against the one corner of the station building, tearing out one corner of it. Then it crashed to the ground again. It was flung up to a height of about 8 m.

A 1547: What does the town of Creil look like?

A 1592: I have only passed through the station, but everything near there has been razed to the ground."

The dates both of the capture of these men and of the actual journey, which appears to have been April 28th, should be noted but it needs only to be stated that through May the progress of attack was even further intensified.

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Another facet of preparation for the invasion was the systematic bombing by USSTAF of two small but highly significant German commands. Flieger-division 2 then comprised 5 or 6 groups of experienced torpedo bombers. They had been operating chiefly in the Mediterranean since removal from the Norwegian coast about a year and a half before, but their action against the invasion fleet of D-Day was a foregone conclusion. Owing to their quiescence through the Spring of 1944 reliable estimates of their strength and effectiveness were difficult to make.

Fragmentary Intelligence, however, did confirm the general opinion that they were readying themselves for intensive operations. Accordingly several attacks were made against their bases in the south of France on one of which "ULTRA" provided the following report dated 27/5:

"Preliminary report.

Raid by approximately 300 four-engined a/c with fighter protection. Airfield attacks on Salon, Nimes and Montpellier. Damage report: Salon: continues serviceable. Flying units had no a/c and no personnel losses. Nimes: 1 Weike 34 slightly damaged. Montpellier: landing area not serviceable for three days. 4 Ju.88 20 to 80 per cent damaged. Unit had 1 dead and 1 badly injured."

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This attack and several others, as well as systematic destruction of the intermediate staging airdromes along the Loire, where torpedoes were known to be stored, contributed vitally to the negligible effect which these units had against the landing and subsequent traffic of the invasion fleet.

The second command, of a purely anti-shipping character, was Fliegerkorps X. It contained 4 or 5 groups that had been practicing with the 2 ton FX radio control bomb and at least one group which had effected serious damage against Allied and Italian warships at the time of the Salerno landings. The bases of these groups also, principally on the Bay of Biscay around Bordeaux, were repeatedly attacked and the effort of Fliegerkorps X against our invasion was minute and ineffective.

The steady campaign against airfields in general was in fact having a result that may be judged in a circular order promulgated from Goering's Headquarters in Berlin on the 25th of May:

"Subject: Dispersal Works.

The order given in accordance with reference 3 for drawing in all Air Force personnel for a total of 5 hours weekly to undertake dispersal works, during time when they are not required in their employment or for training, has up to the present not served to step up the dispersal works which in the face of increased air attacks are becoming steadily more urgent. It is therefore ordered that

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W.I.E. all units stationed on and near a/f's are to be drawn on weekly, Sundays included, for a minimum of 12 hours for labor service. In addition, in especially urgent cases..... illegible fighting units are to be used for labor service, regardless of duty period, until the emergency is overcome. Luftgau will decide in these cases. Operational units will also take part in labor service as long as operations are not affected thereby. It is again pointed out that maintaining the serviceability of all G.A.F. units tied to an a/f is dependent upon speedy and energetic dispersal. Since additional labor forces are not available these works must be carried out by way of self help by all authorities concerned with increased vigor."

The Fifteenth Air Force meanwhile had been continuing systematic attack against Axis oil in the south and the results are indicated in a commercial interception of the 23rd of May. The reliability of this French representative is unknown and the message has been reproduced simply as an indication.

"On 23rd May the French representative in Ankara claimed to have ascertained from a reliable source that following the recent air attacks on Ploesti, Roumanian refining capacity had been reduced to 825 waggons a day, of which 300 were dealt with at the

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Roumano-Americana plant. Installations at the Astra-Romana refinery had been totally destroyed. As a result of the state of the refining installations, production had declined from 1,400 to 700 waggons. Products most affected were lubricating oils and aviation spirit."

On the 28th and 29th the Eighth Air Force made heavy attacks on synthetic oil production in Central Germany and fighter production in Germany and Western Poland. These also were marked by heavy combat.

On the 31st a diplomatic intercept records still another appreciation of the Japanese Ambassador following an interview with a German whose reputation for truthfulness cannot be entirely indorsed:

"The G.A.F., Hitler continued, was unfortunately inferior numerically owing to American participation in the war."

JUNE TO D-DAY

As an instance of dispersal of the German aircraft industry following our long onslaught upon it, the following message intercepted upon the 2nd of June on its way to the Reich Minister for Air and Command^{er} in Chief, Berlin, tells its own story:-

"Subject: Lectures by holders of the Ritterkreuz.

"The Wiener-Neustaedter A/C Works have shifted from Wiener-Neustadt to so many factories that a general lecture is out of the question. Because of the transfer it is only possible for lectures to be given at the factories mentioned before to a very slight degree."

As a further instance of the success of American strategic bombardment in spreading out the German defenses and pinning them down far from the invasion beaches, there was intercepted on the 4th of June a long and technical order for signals and defense re-organization which began with the following paragraph:-

"The appearance of American bomber formations on the Russian Front makes it necessary to develop immediately the route-tracking organization with immediate effect in the European (East) Theater."

This was, of course, in direct response to the first American shuttle raid to Russia which was initiated upon that day.

On the Western Front American attacks were provoking still another response which found its best expression in the German Foreign Ministry telegram to German Diplomatic Posts abroad. This must be read in full for

proper understanding. The essence of it, however, is simple. The German people were being encouraged to lynch and maltreat American aviators.-

"1. GERMANY

"ii) Treatment of Allied Airmen.

"A telegram circulated on the 27th of May to all German diplomatic posts abroad contains an official directive on the recent article on the Voelkischer Beobachter in which Goebbels attempted to incite the German civil population to attack Allied air crews in low flying attacks on Germany:

"(a) The directive stresses that the views advanced in the article constituted "a considerable modification" of any hitherto advanced. There had never previously been any disagreement as to "the application of the protective laws of international warfare to enemy terror fliers" and cases had in fact arisen where legal regulations had been applied "to protect such men from the violent attacks, justified by all human standards, of the suffering civilian population." It had been decided that in future the German Information Service should "refrain from supporting the view that these terror raiders are entitled to protection from the military or police authorities" on the ground that "the indignation aroused amongst the entire populace including the Wehrmacht" rendered any such interpretation inadmissible. It was considered that Allied air crews personnel had forfeited their right to

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protection against retaliatory action on the part of the civilian population by virtue of the low flying attacks in which they had indulged. "The feeling caused amongst the stricken population by their deeds makes it evident that their abstract claims to protection can no longer be sustained, even though they argue they are acting in a military capacity."

"(b) The recipients of the telegram are instructed in the concluding paragraph "to report if the development of the bombing warfare has led to any similar feelings in your area, and to examine the question how best to exploit the new situation to strengthen the common will to resist, and to deter enemy airmen from making further terror attacks."

Although oil attack was still being conducted only intermittently because of the pressure of other tasks, clear evidence that it had begun to hurt the whole structure of the G.A.F. itself emerges in a message from the G.A.F. Ops Staff, Berlin, on the 5th of June:-

"1) a) As a result of renewed encroachment into the production of A/C fuel by enemy action, the most essential requirements for training and carrying out production plans can scarcely be covered with the quantities of A/C fuel available. Allocation of B4 (relatively low octane fuel) can only be made to A.O. for Training, A.O. for Bombers, A.O. for Fighters, A.O. for G/A a/c and Director General of Supply. No other holders of quotas can be taken into consideration in June.


"b) In order to assure the defense of the Reich and to prevent the readiness for defense of the G.A.F.

JUNE TO D-DAY

in the East from gradually collapsing it has been necessary to break into the strategical reserve."

"ULTRA" provides many reflections of the war from various men and in various frames of mind.

JUNE TO D-DAY



CONCLUSION FOR PERIOD

CAIRO TO NORMANDY

In conclusion of the evidence of American air effectiveness in the period from Cairo to Normandy, it is submitted that the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe had won complete aerial supremacy over all of Western Europe.

This had been accomplished by a program of bombing which entirely frustrated the planned expansion of the German Air Force, and by a scale of fighting over Germany itself which had so seriously undermined the strength of the existing forces as to preclude automatic opposition and to doom the effectiveness of the savage opposition that still appeared intermittently.

The true weakness of the German Air Force was not of course to be fully exposed until the supreme test of invasion itself, for which its inadequacies will presently be recited. Yet the collapse of the facade of aerial strength which attempted to oppose our landings had only been achieved through weary months of the fighting and bombing that preceded the event.

As a secondary accomplishment, which was only possible after the reduction of the German fighter defenses, USSTAF had begun with immediate and noticeable effect the program of oil attacks. These were to afflict every branch of the German armed forces with chronic and fatal loss of mobility and operational power. This loss was to be noticeable in the field itself within a few days of the Allied landings, which

CONCLUSION FOR PERIOD
CAIRO TO NORMANDY

went forward under a cover of overwhelming air superiority that had been won for them in the preceding months over Germany itself.

PART VI

NORMANDY TO AACHEN - ARNHEIM

JUNE 1944

(FROM D-DAY)

The month of June began with an event which the invasion in Normandy has somewhat obscured - the Allied occupation of Rome. The position which the clearing of all central Italy presented to the Germans is indicated by a message to Naval Command Elba on June 17th. The point is that Elba must be held at all costs to prevent leap frog landings to North Italy. But there is the interesting incidental revelation that there is no such fortified position in the Apennines as the German army has supposed. The Fuehrer has ordered all possible measures to gain time until such a position can be developed. This disorganized and insecure position is a tribute to the operations of the Tactical Air Forces. And it must have been a comfort for Command Elba to be told on the same day that it could have no air support "for the present", as G.A.F. forces were in operation against the invasion in France.

On the morning of June 6th Generalfeldmarschall Sperle of Luftflotte 3 in the West brought out the following proclamation:-

"Men of Luftflotte 3! The enemy has launched the long-announced invasion. Long have we waited for this moment, long have we prepared ourselves, both inwardly and on the field of battle, by untiring, unending toil. Our task is now to defeat the enemy.

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NORMANDY TO AACHEN-ARHEIM
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I know that each one of you, true to his oath to the colors, will carry out his duty..... Great things will be asked of you and you will show the bravest fighting valor. Salute the Fuehrer."

Thus, the formal announcement and specific action followed rapidly.

Fliegerkorps II, mentioned before as the improvised Ground Attack Command which General Beulovious could expect to fill up only with units from the Reich, released an order at eight o'clock on the morning of the 6th, which says:-

"1. Enemy landed with strong forces between Dieppe and Cherbourg.

"2. All out preparations necessary."

The remainder of the message is notable, however, for ordering nothing but the extension of reconnaissance activity. This was because Fliegerkorps II had to await the arrival of the combat units it was to direct.

By 2:30 that afternoon, however, the first and second gruppen of J.G. 1, which had never in the history of the war operated at anything but aerial defense of the Reich itself, signalled that they were on their way; one with 31 and the second with 32 F.W. 190s. The third gruppen, somewhat less ardently, reported that it would take off "when the thunderstorm now over the airfield has passed".

These were only the first recorded movements of an order from Germany that was to bring 18 first-class interceptor groups into Northwestern France within a week and to see most of them return to Germany decimated and shattered within two weeks.

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NORMANDY TO AACHEN-ARNHEIM
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Space will not permit quotation of the innumerable commands for movement and operations themselves which fill the June folder, but representative ones will be cited.

Thus at 1330 hours on the 7th an order was received by three fighter groups, now converted to fighter-bomber usage, which reads:-

- "1. Concentrated attack on tank concentrations around locality Periers-sur-le Dam (10 km North-Northeast of Caen).
- "2. Time of attack 1700 hours.
- "3. Fighter protection by simultaneous operation of units of Jagdkorps II.
- "4. Alternative target:

Disembarkation of tanks and shipping targets Bernieres-sur-Mer 1064." (1064 is of course an arbitrary grid number on German operational maps.)

It is to be noted that fighter protection was guaranteed, this being the indispensable condition of operating fighter-bombers, heavily laden, against our own roving fighters.

No time stamp appears on the copy to indicate the actual time of Allied receipt of this message. It should be remembered, however, that by this time Allied facilities for handling "ULTRA" had so improved that very often our Field Commands themselves were advised several hours in advance of impending German operations, a circumstance of incalculable value to the crushing of those attacks.

By the evening of the 8th another order from the Airfield Regional Command cites the arrival of 7 additional groups and their exact locations on airdromes which were, of course, fed into the target folders of our appropriate Commands within an hour of receipt.

In view of this rapid influx of fighters to the West, it is both instructive and ironic to note an order from Kesselring, in his usual state of extreme exasperation, which is time-stamped four o'clock on the afternoon of the 5th and, after a recital of other troubles, concludes:-

"I must report that a real easing of the situation, in spite of the new measures now ordered, can only be expected if immediate and strong fighter and ground attack aircraft support is provided, even if only for a short time."

The troubles in Italy, however, were now purely subordinate to the problem of the Second Front, so much so that Kesselring himself was to be surrendering fighter groups, instead of acquiring new ones, before the month ended.

By the 9th a clear-cut appreciation of unspecified origin was picked up on its way to the Naval War Staff. After acknowledging success of the landing itself this appreciation says:-

"In a large-scale operation by thousands of bombers and fighter-bombers, the enemy air force stifled our tank attacks and had an extremely harrassing effect on our movements. The high losses in wireless equipment by (part undeciphered) fighter-

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NORLANDY TO AACHEN-ARNHEIM
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bomber attacks. The (Roman) I, SS Panzer Corps, for example, has now only four wireless truppe and Panzer Gruppe West has lost 75% of its wireless equipment."

Fuel shortage was to play a decisive part in German failure to expel or resist the invasion. Yet, at this time and place, the shortage itself cannot be dissociated from the appalling transportation problems which confronted the Germans. It should be considered on these occasions as a consequence of both, rather than solely the result of our promising beginning on the extinction of fuel supply itself.

A message of the 10th from Luftflotte 3, says:-
"I urgently request abundant supply of ammunition and fuel near the Front. Both are still quite inadequate."

By 1600 hours on the 8th, Fliegerkorps II had got itself together sufficiently to report strength and

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NORMANDY TO AACHEN-ARNHEIM
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location of 9 more newly arrived fighter units for itself, and the allocation of 7 fighter, fighter-bomber and reconnaissance units to its subordinate command with the grandiose title of "Fliegerfuehrer West". In every case the locations were firmly given and so it is not surprising on the 9th to find Fliegerkorps II signalling:-

"Serious losses in personnel and equipment due to attacks on airfields."

A more remote and objective observer has already been identified in the person of Admiral Abe, the Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin, who had sent Tokio a careful appreciation of air warfare up to the 6th of June. His general terms are too vague to recite, but in conclusion Admiral Abe says:-

"The Allied air offensive on German war potential has not, so far, put any special hindrance in the way of operations generally, but the cumulative results of the offensive should now be given very close attention."

These cumulative results were already more obvious to the active participants in the struggle.

By the 10th the German Air Ministry was to advise Luftflotte 3:-

"The very high allocation of fighter aircraft for Luftflotte 3 cannot, however, be coped with on its way through by only two transit depots.....It is, therefore, proposed.....to find out if, in view of the present situation, it is possible to bring up fighter aircraft direct from the industry.....as

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NORMANDY TO AACHEN-ARHEIM
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has been done by Luftflotte Reich for several months past."

On the 8th the Highway Commission of France, evidently being quoted in a German operational message, had reported:-

"All Seine crossings from Conflans (20 km Northwest of Paris) to Rouen (inclusive) destroyed."

This message is quoted as only representative of the innumerable ones testifying to the efficacy of the three-ring interdiction program of bridge bombings in which our Marauders had participated so effectively.

We noted the German Air Ministry's scheme to ferry operational aircraft direct to units on the 10th. Yet, some reflection on the obvious desperation of this measure is contained in a report of the 11th, evidently belated, which simply says:-

"5 F.W. 190s of S.G. 4 (a fighter-bomber unit) Laval shot down by fighters on June 6th while on ferry flights."

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By June 12th, however, far more than the Seine crossings had been destroyed. On that date Luftflotte 3, quoting an order from G.A.F. Berlin, states:-

"With immediate effect all Fighter Gruppen are to be re-equipped back to fighters. ETC (bomb racks) are to be kept ready for possible later requirements."

This brief order signifies, in fact, the end of a dream. Later, in garbled passages, the same message clearly heralded the removal of Buelowius and Fliegerkorps II.

It had been discovered that German fighter-bombers simply could not live in the same air with our unencumbered fighters and henceforward the remaining German fighters were to operate strictly on the defensive against our own fighter-bombers in the forward area. Buelowius himself was subsequently returned to the interior, while the tactical defensive commitment was entrusted to the experienced and proven General Junck, of Jagdkorps II. Thus in six days had completely collapsed the most important of the German provisions for aerial opposition to the invasion.

It was scarcely remarkable in view of the unprecedented strains under which the men had fought against hopeless odds and which is well illustrated in an angry message from Berlin on the 10th stating:-

"The Reichsmarschall has established the fact that during enemy operations and the state of emergency men of the G.A.F. have been sleeping with their clothes off."

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The message goes on to order instant and continuous alertness and ends:

"The slightest contravention of this order will be punished by me according to martial law."

Counter-measures against the German bomber forces were a continuous feature of operations throughout June, as they had become before the invasion itself. The formation of the FX radio controlled Bombing Groups into one Anti-Shipping Command entitled Fliegerkorps X has already been mentioned. This command made a few sorties against the invasion fleet but only in a fraction of the strength that had been expected for it. The primary reason for its weakness comes out clearly in a report from its Intelligence Officer, issued on the evening of the 15th:-

"On the 14th and 15th the enemy made attacks on numerous bomber airfields causing serious damage. Attacks may be expected in the immediate future on undamaged airfields in the Geschwader's area. Check up on dispersal and take immediate steps to make it as extensive as possible."

Likewise from the Operations Officer the same evening:

"From 0618 to 0628 hours high-level attack by four-engined aircraft. Very great damage."

The Eighth Air Force had indeed assigned enormous forces on the 14th and 15th to bomber airdromes, most of which had already been attacked many times before, and would be again, as the Germans shuffled their forces around.

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The conventional bomber force (Fliegerkorps IX), meanwhile, was having its own troubles of a similar character. These, in fact, had been presaged in the following order dated 8/6:

"In view of the heavy casualties which must be expected and the great transport delays resulting from the present transport situation, crews who are fully trained and ready for the gruppen at the Front are to be sent by the quickest route without any kind of leave being granted."

A clear example of the diplomatic mind at work emerges in a telegram of June 5th, in which the Japanese Minister at Bucharest pays his respects to the Fifteenth's continuous operations against Ploesti. After this the Minister states that "he had previously reported such matters as the poor results of Anglo-American bombing in a non-confidential code. He had done this because he thought that if the Russians deciphered his telegrams, they might become distrustful of the British and Americans or incite them to further efforts in bombing this area. If this was successful, the opportunities for a relatively adequate German - Roumanian anti-aircraft defensive to shoot down American planes would be increased and the reinforcement of the American Air Forces engaged in the war in Greater East Asia would be to some degree held in check."

The telegram then concludes with a warning:-

"Telegrams of this nature may cease to accord with the Facts", and in this case they would not be dispatched in the future.

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The prisoners captured in Normandy began to produce by mid-June a flow of exceptional accounts of our invasion from the point of view of eye witnesses and victims. Most of these are preoccupied with the prisoner's eternal theme of self-justification, yet a monitored conversation of the Colonel commanding the Grenadier Regiment of an Infantry division seems worth reporting. In this he was speaking to a General captured in Bizerta 15 months before.

General: "Did you shoot down many of the gliders?"

Colonel: "No. You can't see them and there were such numbers of them. I should like to speak to General Marcks and the 'Divisionkommandeur' now. Everything we used to practice in the T.E.W.T.s and so on was just child's play. They landed four hundred gliders at one spot. That is about four thousand men; we hadn't reckoned with that. I am convinced that my Regiment was completely annihilated. We all signed a declaration that we would not surrender. I signed it, that no commander of a strongpoint or a pocket of resistance is justified in abandoning or surrendering his pocket of resistance or his strongpoint. If he did so, he would be courtmartialled after the war and possibly sentenced to punishment. So naturally we worried a lot about what we should do."

On the 21st an intercept believed to have been from the 21st Panzer Division to the fighter forces or Jagdkorps II cast its own bleak light on the state of affairs then:-

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"Division requests information of the time (B% at which) supply roads are patrolled by our fighters during the day, or alternatively what roads are patrolled, since up to now 50% of our supplies have been lost through air attacks."

This same day Jagdkorps II was obliged to address the 17th Panzer Grenadier Division in evident reply to an appeal as follows:

"No bomber forces available. All forces employed as fighters."

This probably refers to fighting in the forward area itself, yet on the 20th the Eighth Air Force had resumed deep penetrations against the oil production of Hamburg and Poelitz. On the 21st it struck not only Berlin itself but a vital oil installation at Ruhland.

Again the play of cause and effect are not certainly demonstrable. By this time many of the fighter forces in the West were already battered into impotence. The wholesale withdrawal to the East was necessary to rest them. It was also necessary, however, to restore the weakened defenses of Central Germany and the indispensable oil production there.

A reference has already been made to Milch's statement to the Japanese Ambassador that German fighter production had been held up to a level of 1,400 monthly for February and March. Our estimates always considered those to be the low months and set the figure at about half of that. On June 15th the Japanese Consul General in Vienna, who should have been in a position to get

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good information from the large Messerschmitt enterprises centering there, stated categorically to Tokio:-

"Allied bombing had reduced German fighter production to about 600 per month (as compared with the figure of between 1200 and 1500 at the end of last year)."

This report is cited neither to prove nor disprove anybody's estimates at any time, but merely to show the discrepancy between the reports of even well-placed observers. The Jap goes on to say:-

"Accordingly, the German authorities suspended the production of the rocket shell (secret weapon A-4) in March and increased the weekly hours of aircraft workers to 72 doing their utmost to increase production (of fighters) with the aim of reaching a monthly production of 1,000 by July. Despite this, however, the output has continued to fail to pass the 600 mark."

It continues:-

"About 400 catapults had been completed on the French coast and the rocket shells to be used had a range of 350 kms, but the Germans felt, on the other hand, that if they were unable to strike a decisive blow against the London area at a single stroke, there was a risk that the weapon might aggravate the Allies; on the other hand, an increase in fighter production was even more urgent and, as stated above, production of the rocket shell was discontinued. It seemed, therefore, that the bombardment of England with this weapon would be ruled out for the present."

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This quotation is illustrative of intelligence from diplomatic sources. There is part truth in all of it and exact truth in none. The Japanese were often confused by the number and variety of German secret weapons, as, to be fair, was Allied Intelligence. It will be recollected that the Germans had begun the V-1 flying bomb attacks against England on the 12th with a tentative few and were to initiate intensive and continuous operations with this weapon on the 16th. The A-4 rocket, on the contrary, was not certainly identified in use against England until September.

Steengracht, the German Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave the Jap Ambassador in Berlin a very boastful account of the first flying bomb strikes against London in which he said:-

"There was so much smoke that reconnaissance planes were not able to assess the results precisely," -

a bare-faced lie, not only about the smoke but about German reconnaissance planes which had not appeared over London, in daylight, for over a year at the time.

One interesting feature of the diplomatic communications through June, which are too voluminous to record, was the insistence of the Japanese on being told the date of the counterattack which the Germans had promised to repel the Allies. As time went on the Japs became increasingly more pointed and the Germans increasingly more vague and mendacious in their explanations.

At the other end of Europe, meanwhile, Fliegerkorps I had been able to practice against American operations

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without moving to France. On the 23rd, this Command had scrambled 67 ground attack aircraft, 35 fighters and 30 reconnaissance aircraft. The exact allocation of effort is not clear in the message, possibly all were engaged against the shuttle-raid across to Russia on that day, although it is hard to imagine ground attack planes fighting in our altitude, or reconnaissance planes fighting at all, unless with improvised armament. In any case, the claims were 2 Boeing Fortresses and 2 Mustangs, and the acknowledge losses 8 aircraft.

On the same day a report from the officer in command of Fighters in Roumania reports the heavy Fifteenth Air Force operation against Giurgiu and Ploesti. The details on losses and claims are a bit garbled, but a general appreciation pays tribute to our tactics:-

"Both attacks were screened and masked by strong fighter protection which thrust forward some 30 minutes earlier, fanned out over the whole Bucharest-Ploesti area, penetrated into the assembly of our fighters, tied down our fighter defense for a long period over the whole area, and secured a large measure of freedom of movement for the approaching bomber formations."

The appreciation ends on a more cheerful note with an estimate that the smoke screen over Ploesti was entirely effective.

Three separate reports attest a particularly successful Mustang strike against Angers and satellite airfields on the 24th, apparently carried out in two waves and effectively shattering not only a full fighter group but a reconnaissance group as well, which resulted

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in angry recriminations between the groups and superior echelons.

On the 25th Jagdkorps II was to report of its own operations:-

"During the course of the morning operation of all formations in the Tilly area, very strong enemy fighter activity on forces, some before reaching ops area, involved in hard air combat, suffering considerable losses."

A long message on the 30th, this time from Luftflotte 3 in the West, casts perhaps the best reflection available on the state of the German bomber forces in the West. While too detailed to quote in full, it reiterates the previous need for volunteer pilots from the bomber service to transfer to fighter duties for the defense of the Reich. This time, however, the message clearly foretells that only a few specialist bomber groups for flare dropping and torpedo work will be exempt from the impending dissolution of the bomber force.

The record for June is so voluminous and miscellaneous in character as to defy brief analysis. In general, however, the purpose of our Air Forces in that month was to get the troops safely ashore and protect them during the build-up. The best summary of the Air Forces' fulfillment of this task, yet apparent, comes from the mouth of a Major commanding an infantry battalion in the 77th Infantry Division, who was captured at St. Sauveur on the 16th of June. He said subsequently to a fellow prisoner:

"I once said that the Fuehrer said that if the invasion came, he would send the whole G.A.F.

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into action at the place of the invasion, even if it meant leaving all forces in all the other theatres of war without air cover. That story was over as far as I was concerned after I had seen one single German reconnaissance aircraft in the air between the 6th and 16th, and apart from that, complete mastery of the air by the Americans. We can bring out whole armies, and they'll smash them completely with their air forces within a week. Above all, we have no petrol at all left. We can no longer move any numbers of troops by means requiring petrol; only by rail or marching on foot."

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Resumption of the Eighth Air Force's fuel and attacks/continuance of those of the Fifteenth Air Force has been noted. In connection with these, the beginning of the Russian offensive in mid-June and the intensive fighting in the west were beginning to accelerate the effects of the fuel shortage which had been predicted at the opening of the oil program.

By coincidence or not, the first message in the July folder from Fliegerdivision 2 was to attest a clear-cut instance of direct operational curtailment in the following terms:

"Fliegerdivision 2 reports that M/T fuel for flying formations is used up. 19th Army is not at the moment in a position to supply any of its own. As a result of this, further operations by the flying units are not possible."

The operations of this torpedo-bomber command had in fact been a grievous disappointment anyway. Their citation of fuel shortage is not only significant in itself, but a clear fore-shadowing of the virtual dissolution that was soon to end the effective career of this arm of the German Air Force.

On the 2nd Luftflotte Reich saw fit to warn Luftflotte 3 and its other neighboring commands of its own situation in the following terms:

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"Flights into the Reich area by more than 4 aircraft require previous permission from Luftflotte Reich, in order to insure refuelling, in view of the strained fuel position. Unreported aircraft in formation must expect not to be refuelled."

On the 3rd Luftflotte 3 through a Quarter-master order states:

"The extremely tense situation in regard to supply of M/T fuel demands that all M/T traffic which is not important to the war effort be ruthlessly stopped...I shall personally use the utmost limits of disciplinary action in dealing with refractions of the perfectly clear instructions which have been issued."

The practice and the danger of flying fugitive sorties to escape our fighter-bomber strafing have previously been noted. Now this practice was discontinued for a different reason, set forth in a circular intercepted in the Balkans:

"In cancellation of all previous ideas on this subject, and until further notice, aircraft are no longer, in view of the fuel situation, to be flown away from airfields and diverted to other airfields or waiting areas when enemy attacks are to be expected."

On the 19th the Japanese Consul General in Vienna reported in the following terms:

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"A. As a result of the Allied air attacks on June 16th and 26th, oil refining in the Vienna area would be at a complete standstill for at least 4 weeks. Even after that time part of the industry would have to remain idle. In addition, the benzine stocks stored above-ground, amounting to several hundred thousand tons, were entirely destroyed by fire.

B. These circumstances have caused great concern in government circles, and on July 4th Speer paid a hasty visit to Vienna and conferred with local officials. On the following day Geilenberg, who Hitler had appointed Special Commissioner for Reconstruction of Oil Refineries destroyed by bombing, convened a conference of the heads of the industry, who were ordered to restore the refining industry to normal as soon as possible. This work was to have priority over all other war work in the area, and anyone violating the regulations should be put to death."

A report of the 2nd from Jagdkorps II is of interest for clearly appreciating the presence and purpose of the scouting force reconnaissance planes which flew ahead of our bomber formations and became so effective in guiding them through the bad weather areas enroute to their targets.

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Reports also on the 2nd illustrate two other facets of our continuing airdrome attacks throughout this time. One cited particularly heavy damage effected by a wing of Liberators against the bomb group stationed at Ferighegy. Another recorded the virtual massacre of a group of fighter-bombers at Dreux. The latter is of particular importance, as these were one of the three trained fighter-bomber groups available and particularly necessary after the collapse of the program to convert interceptors to this indispensable function of Army support.

Diplomatic messages continue to speak of heavy bombing of Budapest and Vienna.

A little-known element of our air power receives a handsome tribute in an exasperated message from the G.A.F. Liaison Officer with the 84th Army Corps to Jagdkorps II, in which evidently under severe pressure from the Army, he says:

"In order to maintain the main defense line G.A.F. support absolutely necessary, above all, against artillery spotting aircraft, which direct fire on every movement and our own artillery positions."

A routine press hand-out from the German Foreign Ministry on 2nd July cites, perhaps without realizing it, what was to be the last really effective action of the once dreaded German bomber force in the following terms:

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"By a very successful night attack on a Soviet airdrome recently occupied by American bombers and fighters, which took the enemy completely by surprise, about a third of the U.S. machines which landed there were destroyed."

Two more messages intercepted on the 7th emphasize again the extreme fuel shortage in the west, although here still transportation difficulty was a contributing factor.

A message of the 9th, however, quotes the German view of another serious shortage which was to haunt the G.A.F. until the end:

"Because of the intolerable loss in unit commanders, and (C% officers with flying formations) the Reichsmarschall has ordered..... with fighters, bombers and ground attack units, in the future unit commanders are only to be employed when the significance of the operation and number of aircraft employed make it necessary that the unit commander should fly too."

On the 9th Luftflotte 3 quotes Goering directly in what was evidently an over-all circular order about fuel:

"The deep inroads made into the supply of aircraft fuel demand the most stringent reduction in flying. Drastic economy is absolutely essential; therefore, I order:

1. The relentless cutting down of all liaison travel and communications flying, particularly in the home war area and for

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senior staff personnel."

A number of other provisions of the same general character follow.

A more serious indication appears on the 10th in a complicated message which says in effect that because of the fuel position, training of bomber crews will be limited to direct replacements of losses. The message is of further interest for citing bomber pilot losses in Luftflotte 3 from the 6th to the 30th of June as 175, and still incomplete returns for the first 10 days in July give total losses of 159.

When it is recollected that only on a very few occasions did Luftflotte 3 raise as many as 200 bomber sorties in a night against the invasion, it will be seen that an appreciable proportion of its strength had already been destroyed in the air.

On the 11th, 12th and 13th of July, the Eighth Air Force made extremely heavy raids against Munich. These were occasioned by a weather condition of the time which offered Munich as the only possibly open target of consequence. In fact, most of the bombing had to be done through cloud, even there. A whole spate of reports, however, attest both the accuracy of the bombing and the heavy scale of miscellaneous damage that resulted. Likewise, many belated reports, especially diplomatic, cite the extreme damage and confusion caused in Berlin by the Eighth Air Force's raid on the 21st of June.

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The Fifteenth Air Force through this time had begun the systematic destruction of communications in Southern France in preparation for the Mediterranean landings of August. Innumerable miscellaneous reports cite substantial damage in various places. As might be expected, the diplomatic corps burst into characteristic out-pourings of loquacity and misinformation on the same subject.

An uncommonly coherent report from the Japanese Consul General in Vienna summarizes in detail extremely severe damage effected by the Fifteenth Air Force in the raid to Vienna on June 26th.

By the middle of July the German fighter force appeared to be making some recovery from its devastating experiences in June. The units which had returned to Germany were being equipped by a restored production and re-organized for their former task of interception as rapidly as possible. Their effectiveness remained sporadic, but their potential in at least numerical strength was increasing again. On the 15th Goering was moved to a particularly commendatory outburst of praise for what he calls his "Assault Gruppe".

Although air fighting over Germany never regained the ferocity of the preceding year the reconstituted groups still fought hard on occasions. Subsequent reports indicated a clear plan by which these "Assault Gruppen" were to engage our fighters with the best of German strength, while the other flights tackled the bombers alone.

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On a later occasion Goering expressed himself as well pleased with the results of such an operation, but it can truthfully be said that as far as we were concerned, our crews scarcely noticed the change of tactics, and the principal result was an increase in our combat claims.

On the 18th and 19th both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces did suffer relatively heavy losses on all-out aircraft attacks on ball-bearings deep in Germany; but these in fact were not on such a severe scale as formerly. Now, moreover, they were yielding the double benefits of both the intrinsic damage done and the containing of the reconstituted German fighter force far from the Western Front which so desperately needed it.

Thus an interesting citation recommending Hauptmann Moritz for the Knight's Cross and the Iron Cross for leading a group which on one occasion claimed 48 Fortresses and on another occasion, 39 Liberators, must be understood in the light of the other circumstances. Examination of the records of those days indicates that Hauptmann Moritz' pilots did probably somewhat exaggerate. Even so, it was probably of more satisfaction to the G.A.F. than to the armies on the front, which were still seriously inconvenienced for the want of fighter cover.

On the same day, 19th July, moreover, an unidentified commandant clearly of one of the defensive air commands reports as follows of the opera-

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tions Hauptmann Moritz was opposing:

"At 1907 hours heavy attacks following shortly one after another from English and Italian take-off areas on the armament industry, communications and ground organizations in the southern and southwestern German area. Raids from England by about 1000 aircraft. Raids from Italy by about 500 aircraft..... successes (victories claimed): Fighters: 21 certain, of which 14 four-engined. Flak artillery: 25 certain, 21 probably shot down. Principal damage: In Munich, Augsburg, Schweinfurt and Kempten considerable industrial damage and damage to communications was caused. In Koblenz, Trier, Saarbrucken and Strasbourg damage to railway installations was caused. In addition, airfields at Lechfeld, Schleizheim, Leipheim and Boblingen were attacked. Low-level attacks on airfields at Grosz-Sachsenheim and Aiblingen by escorting fighters. Exact reports of damage are not yet to hand because lines are out of order."

A similar report from Luftflotte Reich on the 22nd again cites very heavy, wide-spread and detailed damage and contains among others the following items:

"Schweinfurt: Considerable damage to ball-bearing industries. One shadow factory almost completely destroyed. Main railroad

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station heavily hit; railroad administration building destroyed; railway traffic stopped for the time being."

and

"Obertraubling and Pruefening (great Messerschmitt producing centers): Aircraft works on both airfields almost completely destroyed; stoppage of production 100%."

A third report of the same character from Luftflotte 4 in the east cites not only a successful attack on Ploesti, but strikes by our Lightnings against airfields in the course of their shuttle to Russia, of which it says:

"Relatively high losses on ground attributed to defective camouflage facilities."

On the 21st Field Marshal Sperrle of Luftflotte 3, like the ardent Nazi that he was, hastened to establish his own loyalty with the following order:

"A brutal blow through which the state at a fateful hour was to have been robbed of its leadership has missed the mark. A deep meaning lies in the fact that the Fuehrer, hovering in the closest mortal danger, has been preserved for the German people.....".

The actual attempt on Hitler's life has been frequently though probably not truthfully recorded. Some of the suspicion and confusion it engendered within the Reich itself, as well as an indication of the ramifications of the plot emerged clearly in a message from Fliegerkorps XIV dated

very late on the 23th:

"General warning: All G.A.F. units in Reich territory are subordinated to General-Oberst Stumpf. Orders of Wehrkreis Headquarters (Army Regional Commands) are not to be obeyed. The only valid orders are those issued by the Fuehrer, the Reichsmarschall, General-Oberst Stumpf and his deputy, General von Seidel, A.O. C. in C. Luftflotte 10.

Messengers in civilian clothes are to be kept ready. Orders will only be obeyed if they are passed by people known personally. Units are to remain in their quarters, armed. Further orders to follow. This order is to be communicated to inspectors, geschwaders, gruppen and independent staffeln in the Reich area."

In the light of subsequent history, it is perhaps worth recording that Admiral Doenitz jumped onto the band-wagon hard, although one wonders a little at the exact motive which caused him to delay until 1100 hours on the 23rd, with an almost slavish expression of loyalty to the Fuehrer, whose survival by then had become certain:

"To mark the preservation of his life from the murderous attack previously reported, the Fuehrer has granted the wish of the Commanders in Chief of the Wehrmacht, that the German greeting is to be introduced throughout the Wehrmacht in place of the

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military salute as the outward sign of unshakable National-Socialist ideology of the Wehrmacht and the loyal devotion of its three branches. I order the use of the German greeting for the Navy, with immediate effect. This order is to be communicated to subordinate offices without delay."

On the 25th a report from the Panzer Lehr Division heralded the American break-through in Normandy in the following message:

"Since 0750 hours very heavy bombing attacks on main defense (C% line) and rearward areas. Following took part:

About 800 four-engined aircraft, 100 Thunderbolts and Lightnings, followed by about 80 Marauders. In addition fighter protection..... fighter-bomber attacks on main defense zone were continuous. Presumably the enemy intends to break through in division area; in area of right and left neighbor no attacks. G.A.F. support is urgently requested."

On the 26th was intercepted a long and belated report of the Japanese Naval Attache, following a personal interview with Korten, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, who had been killed by the bomb intended for Hitler. Although evidently trying to make a good case for the Luftwaffe, Korten's remarks sound distinctly apologetic. He stated that 700 aircraft were brought forward during the second week to counter the Allies in the West.. but at the end

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remarked that:

"One of the matters to which the G.A.F. pay great heed in connection with the strategic direction of their forces is to beware of stocks being reduced by a whittling away and exhaustion, either in the sphere of air operations or production. They make it an invariable rule to keep a definite first-line strength in reserve in Germany (the minimum was stated to be about 20 wings)."

The text of this does not make clear whether the reference was to German or Japanese wings, but if German wing was mentioned by Korten it is the most evident lie. What appeared most plainly between the lines was Korten's evident nervousness about the condition of the G.A.F.

By the 25th, however, even the Japanese Ambassador, who formerly had been reporting to Tokio quite literally even the most palpable untruths had progressed so far in his contact with reality that he was now to signal home:

"One cannot deny the fact that because of something having gone wrong, the present phase of the war in Europe has developed into a hard struggle for Germany."

Among the many things going wrong was the continuation of the Eighth Air Force's oil attacks with the strike on the biggest of all German synthetic producers at Leuna works, which was reported in a sitrep (originating command unidentified) of

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the 29th as follows:

"Principal damage Leuna works. Heaviest attack no far; heavy damage -- works provisionally 100% out of action. In housing estates and town of Leuna considerable damage to buildings."

The same report states also in a later paragraph:

"Danger (presumably damage meant) in town area of Leipzig-Taucha."

The attack on Leipzig-Taucha was one of the first of a series based upon meager but persuasive information to the effect that Leipzig-Taucha was producing Jumo 004 engines for the Messerschmitt 262 jet aircraft, which the Germans were now so frantically rushing toward premature operation.

Several more attacks were made through July and August on Magdeburg, Dessau, Kothen, Strasbourg and other suspected sources. Because of the meagerness of the intelligence at the time, results could not be definitely assessed. It was subsequently learned that these attacks had materially delayed production on Jumo jet engines, which was planned and being implemented on a staggering scale.

On the 26th an order from 7th Jagddivision in Southern Germany reads as follows:

"With immediate effect, aircraft of type Me.163-B will be operating against enemy raids in an area around Leipzig with a diameter of some 100 kilometers."

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There follows a description for the purpose of aircraft recognition instructions to German flak and fighters. Our own crews had in fact already reported seeing the Me.163 rocket plane, although no certain information on instances of its use against us by this time had been received.

These two items, however, were both portents of the jet and rocket development which certainly represented the most important aeronautical advance of the war. Fortunately our own early counter-measures and the subsequent rapid advance of our ground troops after jet production had been buried deeply below the possibility of bombing were to delay fatally their introduction on a scale that otherwise might well have turned the balance of air supremacy over Europe.

On July 23rd the Japanese Ambassador had a three-hour conversation at General Headquarters East Prussia with Ribbentrop on the subject of the attempt on Hitler's life. Because of Ribbentrop's known indifference to the truth and obvious interest in reporting the matter as he considered most suitable for the Japanese to understand it, this report is not believed worth repeating, but may be read in full in BJ. 134238 by anyone interested in making his own appraisal.

On the 27th the Japanese Ambassador at Vichy signalled Tokio that he had been informed by a member of the Staff with the German Division:

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"In the Normandy war theater the enemy has continued further to equip and further to reinforce his troops. Early in the morning of the 25th, with the improvement of the weather, he had begun a large-scale attack with powerful support from the air force southwest of Caen, northwest of St.Lo and in the southwest of the Cotentin Peninsula." This same appraisal predicts a landing in Southern France.

A closer observer in Luftflotte 3, however, appreciated the activity in Normandy more carefully and with evident foreboding in a report of the 30th which reads in part as follows:

"Since 0500 hours the enemy has been attacking with infantry and few tanks in three groups north of Orbois, from Torteval toward St. Germain, and from Coumumont toward Sept Vents. Attacks which as yet have not achieved any large gains of ground are regarded by Panzer Gruppe West as holding attacks.

At 0540 hours attacks by American four-engined formations with bomb groups on St.Lo, Tracy Boucage and Cahagnes.

AOK 7: Break-through crisis is not yet ended.....owing Allied air attacks 116th Panzer Division suffered heavy losses on the march and lost considerable time, with result that attack planned for 29th has not yet taken place."

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In Italy on the 20th the Intelligence Officer of the G.A.F. Command, after reporting the parade of aircraft over the battle area and into South Germany, appreciated the confirmation of Allied Close Support Headquarters in Corsica and thought it foreshadowed a landing in South France or on the Ligurian coast. On the 31st the G.A.F. General in Central Italy, obviously in reply to a complaint from XIV Panzer Corps, pointed out with restraint that his aircraft could not operate in bad weather and were further limited by navigational possibilities and the defensive situation. Furthermore, in five days he had lost one quarter of available aircraft and crews and could afford to fly only road patrol on a broad front.

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In August on several occasions the convalescing German Fighter Force fought hard, but only deep in Central Germany. On the ground the sweeping American advances which were to carry our armies well beyond Paris were virtually unopposed by the decimated units of Jagdkorps II. On the 15th an Allied landing at Marseilles encountered virtually no air opposition whatever, fewer than 50 sorties being recorded.

Fuel shortage had now demonstrably reached the stage of curtailing operations intermittently in all branches of the G.A.F. One exception to this condition, however, is noted in a communication from the Air Officer for Fighters in Berlin, which, after enjoining even more rigid economies, states:

"Aircraft of the Fuehrer Communication Staffel do not fall under the above."

The August folder is full of other references to fuel shortages.

A Naval Sitrep of the 5th and 7th cites extensive damage caused by the Eighth Air Force's attack on Hamburg on the 4th, and concludes a long list of miscellaneous naval damage with the statement:

"Oil works, Rhenanian, Schliemann burned out."

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A message of the 9th attests the German concern in a careful record of our reconnaissance:

"Lively reconnaissance activity in the middle Reich area and over Denmark. Main reconnaissance effort: Hydrogenation Works in area Halle, Leipzig, Poelitz, Moosbierbaum, Brux; Hydrogenation Works and oil plants in area Hannover, Celle and in area Hamburg; a/c industry in the Vienna area, Stettin, Hannover, the Berlin area, Silesia, Central Germany and the Ulm area."

The same message discloses German concern over still another facet of air activity which was steadily increasing in tempo through this time:

"A few a/c on supply for Partisans in Hungary.....Own operations: 3 a/c of against Partisan supply a/c - no victories or losses."

The month was to see the Army Air Forces extend supply dropping to Partisans not only through the Balkans and France but into Warsaw itself.

Another anxiety resulting from Allied reconnaissance, really a tribute to it, emerges from Luftflotte 2. They reported on August 5th for the benefit of other commands their regular experience of low-level attacks on single buildings, generally headquarters, by small formations of fast aircraft. These followed a previous reconnaissance in detail. The technique involved became a regular one for the Twelfth Air Force, with devastating effect through-

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out North Italy.

In the files of the summer of 1942 is a routine message in which Goering congratulates one reconnaissance unit in the Mediterranean on its 3000th flight and speaks glowingly of its contribution to the Axis domination of that sphere. Now two years later, on the 8th of August, G.A.F. Command South East - Greece put out a long order from which it is necessary to quote only representative excerpts:

"Owing to the renewed reduction in the quota of a/c fuel, further restriction in operations is necessary. The following tasks (C% are) still to be carried out:

A) Every month 1 night for reconnaissance of Alexandria, Port Said, Augusta, Syracuse, Messina, and Malta.

B) Every month 1 day for reconnaissance of Cyprus..... and Haifa.

C) Convoy route Sicily - Benghazi, reconnaissance only of convoys sailing East if, after they have entered Gibraltar, it is to be expected that they will pass along this route.

D) Fighter ops 5th Staffel of JG 51 only if prospects of results."

A consequence of our shuttle raids which continued to Russia through August 1944 emerges clearly from a general circular put out by Luftflotte Reich on the 8th, which says:

"Air situation more acute. Thrusts by

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Anglo-American fighter formations from bases in the Italian area and Russian areas have lead to numerous losses of unprotected transport and courier a/c in the area of Luftflotte 4 during the main period of the raids, i.e. between 0700 and 1200 hours. Luftflotte 4 has with immediate effect banned flying activity of every kind between 0700 and 1200 hours; exceptions require special permission of AOC in C. Luftflotte 4

At the other end of Europe, in Norway, Luftflotte 5 was to pass its own involuntary testimony to our fuel attacks in an order of the 9th which states:

"In order to avoid a/c and fuel losses on the ground as a result of enemy action all a/c are to have their fuel taken out, except those a/c which according to recent experience, can be fuelled for operation within six hours."

And later in the same message subordinate commanders are ordered to report to Luftflotte 5 "the number of a/c as on 14/8/1200, with and without fuel in their tanks, divided according to units."

The progress of the Ninth Air Force in the van of the advancing armies is attested in a message from Jagdkorps II, which command had the unhappy task of direct resistance to them. On the 9th it says:

"The following will be withdrawn from the area of the Korps and transferred to the Reich for rest and refit."

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"The following" were four of the best fighter groups available to that command. A long and complicated list of substitutes for them was extemporized by a wholesale process of juggling staffeln around from group to group among the remaining units and bringing forward four of the groups which had straggled back to Germany in virtual dissolution at the middle of June.

The following day that same Jagdkorps II, which had been trying to check our advances by strafing the highways through the darkness with a few groups of night fighters, now ordered:

"For reasons of fuel economy night fighter operations will be carried out only when prospects of success are adequate."

In Southern France meanwhile the Fifteenth Air Force had been carrying out an intensive program of preparation for the invasion. The Germans fully knew this was coming, yet their ⁱⁿ⁻ability to make preparation for it is clearly illustrated in a message from Luftflotte 3 on the 11th. This, after agonized conjecture as to how it will get one torpedo bomb group ready for this emergency, states:

"The destruction of all RR bridges in the Rhone Delta to Avignon inclusive and the constant interruptions of RR lines as far as Dijon, have already precluded the possibility of moving back the ground elements by rail."

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On the same day Luftflotte 3 calling on Berlin for authority states:

"Further damage to fuel production demands a further considerably greater reduction of all flying activity."

It cites some other orders and then says flatly:

"Only fighter ops in the course of air defense remain unrestricted."

Then in concluding paragraphs the same order states:

"Ops by He.177 and Ju.290, with the exception of the flights of Westa 2 (OKL) now only by permission of (OKL)."

Here perished perhaps the fondest and certainly the most disappointing dream of the Ober Kommando der Luftwaffe. The He.177 as the world knows was the four-engined bomber on which Germany had expended such prodigies of effort to create a modern heavy bomber force. The Ju.290 was the extremely long-range bomber and reconnaissance plane, sometimes used for courier flights to Japan, but designed primarily to support the submarine arm and Germany's vanished hope of an effective blockade.

Our experiments with the Aphrodite plane at this time will be recalled. On the 9th a frantic message from Berlin to the German Police and Espionage Service in Lisbon heralded their observation in the following terms:

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"Two B-17's flying inland at low altitude, apparently unmanned and filled with H.E. have been observed to crash in France. What is known about it? Is remote control being used? By whom? What is the idea?"

On the 12th a long appreciation by Luftflotte 4, now itself driven deeply back into Roumania by Russian advances cites the continuance of the Fifteenth's steady hammering at Ploesti with very apprehensive requests for additional smoke companies to be used in the defense of Ploesti.

On the 15th the Americans landed virtually without opposition in the South of France and on this circumstance the 19th German Army was to report to the Commander in Chief West that evening:

"Owing to destruction of Rhone bridges, it is questionable whether tanks can be brought across at the moment."

At 10 o'clock that night a message believed from the German Air Sea Rescue Detachment unit at Berre stated:

"Landing by parachutists area Nice, Cannes and St. Raphael as well as landing with freight-carrying gliders between Grasse and Garguignan."

On the 17th the ill fated Fliegerdivision 2 whose torpedo bombers so consistently disappointed the G.A.F. was to signal plaintively to Luftflotte 3:

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"Airfields in the Rhone Valley being continuously attacked. Shall KG 26 move to airfields further north or to Southwest Germany? Are Avord and Bourges serviceable? A decision is urgent."

The numerical restoration of the German Fighter Force through this time was evident from many sources and had been reported in many ways. A reflection, however, upon the condition that prevented this numerical recovery from ever again achieving true effectiveness appears in the correspondence of Luftflotte 5 (Norway and Finland) on the 18th:

"This allocation of FW 190 pilots (B $\frac{1}{2}$ possible) in limited (B $\frac{1}{2}$ numbers) only from the end of August, but without officers."

After our devastation of the a/c industry in February Speer had been given charge of fighter production, in addition to his other duties as Minister for War Production in General. In a long interview with the Japanese Ambassador on the 9th Speer was at some pains to try to reassure his colleague but it is evident that he was not yet making the mistakes of optimism which had been so characteristic of the deposed Milch. The report cannot be taken as wholly veracious, yet it is worth noting that Speer says himself:

"U.S.A.A.F. escorted day raids, however, had introduced a new factor into this problem, and with the initiation of attacks on oil installations for the first time could it

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have been said that wehrwirtschaftlich raids, which might deal a really fatal blow to Germany, had begun.'""

The remainder of the interview is full of assurances to the Jap that Germany would recover from these but it is evident that not only did Speer himself view the problem more seriously but the Jap's easy acceptance of Milch's former assurances had given place to open skepticism.

On the 18th Jagdkorps II turned in a long operations report on its attempt to relieve the pressure in the Falaise pocket. From beginning to end this report reads like an alibi but three paragraphs illustrate what Jagdkorps II was up against:

"In first operation at 0630 hours owing to fog only (JG) 2 and 26 took off. Second and third operations were greatly hampered by strong enemy fighter activity over the operational airfields as well as by enemy fighter screen along the Seine and were only carried out by part forces.

Gruppen were twice hampered in taking off by low flying attacks on airfields and once attacked while taking off. In this way (JG) 26 and (JG) 2 alone have 22 planes missing. Through the necessary transfers to alternative airfields the serviceability of (JG) 1 and (JG) 26 has still further diminished.

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In triple operations total of 207 a/c operated (details as to serviceability lacking owing to state of communications) according to reports received up to now. 7 a/c were shot down for certain, 5 losses. Landing reports of 27 a/c lacking."

When the advance of the ground armies had begun to threaten the flying bomb sites along the Channel coast, as a counter-move the Germans had trained one group of He.111 bombers to carry and launch these flying bombs from the air. By late August they were preparing to initiate this practice. The procedure received a set-back, however, which was duly reported on the 19th in the following terms:

"On night 18-19/8 50 aircraft took off for advanced landing grounds. 25 He.111 of (Roman) I KG 53 totally destroyed by attack on airfield Nancy."

70 American heavy bombers and a fighter group attacked Nancy on the 18th.

On the 21st Flak Korps III reported on the fighting in the West:

"Unbelievably heavy fighter-bomber activity. Attacks in some cases carried out under tree-top height. In recent days, hedges and bushes, in which targets are suspected, have been raked by fighter-bomber machine guns. Own fighter thrusts have not been seen, an absolutely shameful state of affairs."

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By the 17th the Japanese Naval Attache was to report to Tokyo in terms that clearly indicate a distinct improvement in either his candor or observation:

"Despite this, looking at the German strategical leadership, will power and technical ability as a whole, I regret to say that it is hard to see what they can do that will suffice to bridge the yawning gap between themselves and their opponents' material and military strength."

A routine Intelligence report from the Western Front says on 25/8:

"1440 - 1520 hours. Attack with aircraft armament by approximately 20 Mustangs on Haute Fontaine, one hut on fire, 2 Me.109 30%, 1 Me.109 60%, all three aircraft of 3 NAG 13."

This is a damage report by the 3rd Staffel of NAG 13 which was one of the few available reconnaissance units. German shortage of reconnaissance was an often over-looked factor in their failure to counter the progress of the Allied thrust. Thus Blaskowitz, of Army Group G, was to complain himself on 20/8:

"19th Army has been without any kind of fighter protection, reconnaissance and close-support forces since 19/8.

Army Group urgently requests that new units be brought up, especially reconnaissance and fighter a/c. Reconnaissance on the Eastern flank of the Army most necessary: presence of

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fighters necessary for carrying out reconnaissance, and also for psychological reasons for the troops."

Finally on this subject we have the expert, albeit perhaps prejudiced, testimony of a captured fighter pilot who had been transferred to reconnaissance work, who was to say of his own experience:

WARTHOL: "We had about 100% losses per month. Each month we lost twelve pilots.

WARTHOL: It became considerably easier for us at the beginning of the invasion. We were then flying on shipping reconnaissance. There was nothing out at sea, you weren't located any more by their instruments. Our greatest trouble was that when we took off and were 50 m. above the airfield, the English had already located us. When landing, too, there was no question of zooming. We arrived at low level and always had to make our landing at low level too. It was a game of cat and mouse. It was absolutely necessary for us to have from the 'Jafu' control, too, otherwise we couldn't have made any sortie at all. The critical period was last year at the end of July and in August. That was the worst of all. There were only three pilots left altogether in the

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'Staffel'. We didn't get any reinforcements, so many men had been killed and always the same ones did the flying. From August 20th to 31st I made twenty-three sorties."

It is probable that neither Warthal nor Blaskowitz knew that one of the most significant reconnaissance developments of the war had actually been initiated by the Germans in August. There was no "ULTRA" Intelligence at the time but a message deciphered several weeks later clearly proves that early in August the Germans flew a successful reconnaissance of the Allied supply beaches with an Ar.234 jet plane. Jet reconnaissance was to restore to the German Armies in the West an essential service for want of which they had so severely suffered.

On the other hand, Luftflotte 3's feverish attempts to get some of the Me.262 jet fighter-bombers resulted in the arrival of four a/c on August 24th. They were just in time to experience a good deal of rough life as with the rest of the G.A.F. they were hustled out of the Eastern French airfields into Belgium and so on east.

Throughout the autumn continuous reconnaissance on a very wide scale was flown by these planes. Their speed permitted an extent of coverage which was revolutionary in the service. It is believed that their effectiveness contributed materially to German resistance in the autumn, especially in the Belgian and Dutch Island sectors and it is certain

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that it was these planes which were to give such thorough and exact coverage of the course of Rundstedt's counter-attack in December.

Throughout August, as will be remembered, the Allied progress across France was rapid and irresistible and on the 27th one of its many inevitable results found expression in an order from one of the Airfield Regional Commands in Eastern Germany which says:

"The concentrating of day fighter units within the Reich makes it necessary for (smudge)..... temporary operations, by these units, and their supply, to be assured."

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September was to bring the summer advance of the armies to a pause after the failure of the airborne operation to capture the Arnheim bridges and the over-
be-
extension of the American position/fore Aachen.

On the 1st General Spaatz wrote to the Commanding Generals of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces on the subject of Target Priorities as follows:-

"1. The change in our own capabilities and those of the enemy necessitates a shift in emphasis in our strategic attacks.

"2. The principal factors which have caused this change are:

a. The success of our attacks on oil and the intensification of its effects through the collapse of Roumania.

b. The success of the enemy in at last dispersing his airframe production.

c. The acute shortage of enemy pilots.

d. The defeats of enemy ground forces with great losses of equipment.

"3. The consequences are as follows:

a. The German Air Force, Ground Forces, and economy, are all imminently faced with collapse for lack of fuel.

b. Pilot and gasoline shortages have become the limiting factor in G.A.F. operations, not aircraft.

c. German military equipment is insufficient fully to re-equip the broken divisions and also

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the raw levies being hurriedly assembled as reinforcements.

"4. To exploit this situation to the full, and also to take advantage of the remaining summer weather, it is essential that:

a. The attack on oil be further intensified. All active plants must be rendered inactive and the re-attack of potentially important producers should not await confirmation that the plants have resumed activity. In the present situation no opportunity should be lost of prolonging their inactivity by renewing the attack.

b. Strategic attack on the German Aircraft Industry proper will be confined to attacks on the production of rocket and jet propelled fighters and on aircraft engine factories only. (This does not imply that attacks should be discontinued on large concentrations of operational aircraft or on facilities directly maintaining the G.A.F. in battle.)

c. All strategic effort in excess of that required for a. and b. above will be devoted to the destruction of ordnance depots, armored fighting vehicle production and motor transport production in that order of priority.

d. In the event that weather or other considerations make operations against the above objective impracticable; transportation targets will be attacked by P.F.F. or other methods."

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During August the Fifteenth had extended its range for the record run to the Blechhammer Oil Plants deep in Silesia, and in September it was to strike them again while it and the Eighth continued systematic attack upon the other centers. Every recognizable attack on oil installations continued to provoke relatively heavy air fighting, but all other enemy air activity was drastically reduced in this month.

Of the Fifteenth's attacks on Blechhammer, it should be noted that they represent one of the most persistent and costly operations of the air war. They went there fifteen times, with a loss of over 200 bombers. Records are not available here to show just where these losses occurred. On some occasions other targets were involved. The missions required an extraordinarily long run over routes along which opposition might, from time to time, develop anywhere. It is known from "ULTRA" that the flak at Blechhammer was heavily reinforced, and odd bits of information suggest strongly that Ground Attack (S.G.) units were used as interceptors against these raids. The Hungarian Air Force may have been used as well. From the first mission on August 7th to the last it was a hard-fought battle.

The files from this time forward become an almost continuous chronicle of oil shortage everywhere. Thus, on the 31st of August, the German Air Ministry advised the Field Commands:-

"Instead of the A3 issued up to now, A3 fuel containing about 30% by volume of alcohol will

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be supplied as from 1/9. A3 fuel containing alcohol can be recognized in that it will erase copying pencil",

and, as an evidence of a difficulty inherent in this substitution, the same directive says later -

"the mixing of fuel containing alcohol with that which does not is forbidden. In the same way aircraft with fuel containing alcohol must not later be filled up with B4 or C3."

On the 2nd, Jagdkorps II, the command directly supporting the German armies on the Western Front, was to report:

"At first light there were 285 serviceable aircraft. J.G. 2 and J.G. 53: no operations owing to lack of fuel. J.G. 27, J.G. 76 and elements of J.G. 26 had to break off the first operation ordered owing to bad weather. No victories, no losses. The second operation was only possible with elements of J.G. 26 owing to the strained fuel situation."

On the 3rd, Jagdkorps II reported again -

"J.G. 2, J.G. 53 and J.G. 26 could not operate owing to lack of fuel."

It should be remembered that all of the above mentioned fighter groups were now based in Germany itself, with most of their squadrons behind the Rhine, so that the emergence of fuel shortage itself, as contrasted with local fuel shortage imposed by transportation trouble, becomes increasingly clearer as a determinative factor.

Still another facet of the fuel program emerges in a message of the 6th from Fliegerkorps I on the Eastern

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Front. It will be remembered that from the time of the Galland lectures, certainly in early 1943 and probably long before that, the Germans had cherished an ambition to replace the obsolete Ju. 87 dive bomber with the excellent F.W. 190 as adapted to fighter bomber purposes.

This program had been persistently frustrated by a combination of the over-riding priority which allocated available F.W.s to interceptor work in the West and the bombing of F.W. plants, which prevented their production in the numbers that had been planned. The records of Fliegerkorps I throughout this time have shown how they were obliged to cling not only to the Ju. 87 but to a curious miscellany of other and even more obsolete planes that actually limited many of their ground attack squadrons to operations exclusively against Russian and Polish guerillas.

By September 1944, however, both F.W. and Me. production appeared finally to have surmounted the long delays imposed by bombing and dispersal, as has been noted in General Spaatz' letter. The evidence of the time indicated that they had now reached an all-time high production level - about 1500 planes a month between them.

Yet this success was not to bring its long-awaited reward on the Russian Front or elsewhere for reasons that came out clearly in the Fliegerkorps I message from its superior echelon, Luftflotte 4, -

"Luftflotte 4 is releasing III of S.G. 2 (a dive bomber group) immediately for transfer to the Reich for re-equipment with F.W. 190 aircraft. In order that it may be possible, when C3 fuel becomes scarce, to reinforce the too-weak fighter

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bomber operations by F.W. 190, by operations with Ju. 87, it is requested that 25 to 30 Ju. 87 of III S.G. 2 be held in the rear area so that they can be employed by I S.G. 2."

Thus, although they now had better planes, the Germans could already foresee the day when shortage of high octane C3 fuel of the kind required for F.W. 190 was to compel them to continue using instead the unsatisfactory Ju. 87.

This is a clear proof of the statement already noted in General Spaatz' letter that fuel rather than aircraft shortage was now the Achilles Heel of the German Air Force, and one which our subsequent attacks were to exploit to its final ruin. The dispersal of fuel manufacture was not possible even by the costly exertions which had finally crowned the German aircraft production dispersal with success.

So serious was the German fuel position now that the Wehrmacht GHQ felt obliged on the 1st of September to issue a long and sweeping conversational directive to German Military Attaches abroad. Its whole tone is a curious blend of apology and reassurance, but all the optimism of its context does not explain why for the first time the German High Command finds it necessary to assure the whole world that it will not lose the war for want of fuel.

A truer reflection of Germany's condition is for once to be found in a five-page message from the Japanese Ambassador to Tokio following an interview with Hitler and Ribbentrop. The context is too long to quote, but the essence, which emerges only by careful

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reading between the lines, is unmistakable.

Hitler and the Jap had talked at length of the possibility of peace with Russia through Japanese intercession. In the end, after considerable bombast, probably occasioned by the Jap's skepticism on this possibility, Hitler categorically denied any intention to open negotiations. Nevertheless, after Hitler left, Ribbentrop pursued the matter further and the Jap's conclusions to Tokio were:

"Ambassador's analysis was confirmed on his return to Berlin by a personal message from Ribbentrop expressing the latter's apprehension that from what the Fuehrer and he had said about a German-Russian peace,"

The Ambassador might have inferred that the Jap proposal had been "turned down flat". There must, Ribbentrop emphasized, "be no misunderstanding between them on this score".

When the Ambassador explained that he had "read between the lines on what both of them had said", he was informed that the course of action he had recommended to his Government was exactly right. This course of action, expressed bluntly in the preceding paragraph, was in fact "the best plan is for the Imperial Government to sound the views of the U.S.S.R. and to find a firm basis for negotiations."

From all this it is evident that whatever Hitler may have said in the way of "face saving", Ribbentrop at least was urgently encouraging negotiations with the Russians, and quite possibly with Hitler's private consent.

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On the 11th, Jagdkorps II, whose fuel troubles are now a matter of daily record, advised certainly one and probably two of its fighter groups as follows:

".....no allocation of fuel can be counted on; units are instructed to get hold of horse-drawn vehicles."

American
The decision to abandon attack on conventional aircraft manufacture in favor of concentration on oil attack had, of course, been profoundly influenced by a new factor in the war. The Ninth Air Force now had fighter units based well forward in France itself on such an extensive scale that 1500 sorties in a day is a common operational record.

Attack against the German aircraft industry had only been initiated to win aerial supremacy that would permit bombing operations against the whole German economy at an acceptable loss rate. This had long since been achieved and its advent, its achievement in fact, had been signaled by our switch to oil in the preceding spring. It was always recognized that German fighter production would ultimately increase in dispersal; but the presence of abundant American fighters now based so as to assure continuous operation over all of Germany was considered an adequate hedge against any numerical resurgence of conventional fighters the Germans might effect.

Two messages of the time eloquently attest this measurement of German fighter capability. On the 14th Jagdkorps II originated a message which says:-

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"The Reichsmarschall has ordered that, in view of the latest battle experience in the West, the operation of our fighters is not to be carried out under staffel strength."

The second is a message from the second fighter group of the 53rd Geschwader. It is a final month report for the group's activities in August, and the conclusion of the somewhat garbled context is reproduced exactly as intercepted:-

"Aircraft losses total 42 through enemy action, 18 without enemy action, 20 blown up because of (C% giving up of airfields) (B% La Fere) 4 turned over to factory 2, under 30% 5, under 60% 15, total loss 20."

By the most conservative reckoning this indicates 100 aircraft lost to this group in one month. Even at the expanded group strength of about 50, which was to become a noticeable feature of this period, this represents a casualty rate of 200% per month.

As a third piece of testimony, a Jagdkorps II operations report of the 12th details the accounts of battles by two of its groups for that day. The first one, fought by II of J.G. 6 against 20 Lightnings, is described as "especially successful". It claims "6 Lightnings shot down certainly, 6 Lightnings probably, 2 of our aircraft shot down, pilots unharmed, and 2 aircraft have made no landing report as yet." The second battle, by a veteran group of J.G. 2, was fought with "four-engined aircraft and Mustangs over Weisbaden shortly after rendezvous, during which enemy fighter

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formations were continually reinforced. 5 Mustangs shot down certainly, 2 Mustangs probably, 2 Mustangs effectively shot up. 15 own aircraft shot down, 7 pilots killed, 5 pilots wounded slightly, 1 seriously, and 2 uninjured. No landing report as yet from 9 aircraft."

The number of sorties was not given, but could scarcely have exceeded 30 as a reasonable serviceability factor for one group, and of these the acknowledged losses are 15 with 9 unreported.

On the 14th a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference is recorded in the following terms:

- "1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that executive responsibility for the control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe shall be vested in the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, jointly.
- "2. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, are designated as representatives of the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, respectively, for the purpose of providing control and local coordination through consultation."

This document represented in fact a declaration of independence for American air power. Up to this point in the war it had always operated under the over-riding control of either Marshal Portal or the Supreme Allied Commander. It is to be noted that the British Chiefs of Staff had addressed a memorandum to the Combined

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Chiefs of Staff recommending this change.

A message of the 17th assigns a subordinate command of Jagdkorps II -

"the task of engaging enemy transports and bomber formations in the Netherlands area with the day fighter forces brought up in accordance with (a previous order)....main emphasis is to be placed on destroying enemy gliders and transport aircraft, and attacking with aircraft armament paratroops who have landed."

On the 18th, Kriepe, who had replaced the dead Korten as Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, issued another long instruction on this same subject, but otherwise details of the successful German counter-measures against the Allied airborne operations in Holland are too scanty and minute in "ULTRA" to be worth recording.

On the 19th, Jagdkorps I (the interceptor Command in Northern Germany) made indirect acknowledgement of its inability to defend its territory in the following order:

"Units and transports in the rear of the Front area are only to move at night or when the weather prohibits fighter bomber attacks. Further movements are only to be carried out by single vehicles, observing all orders governing march security and making extensive use of side roads."

Still another facet of German defensive difficulty emerges from the experience of a night fighter group evidently relayed to all commands in a circular signed

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GAF Chief Engineer -

"During fighter bomber attacks on wooded area, in which well camouflaged aircraft were dispersed, the aircraft were not recognized and not hit, but were completely destroyed by forest fire..... camouflaged dispersal, particularly in coniferous forests, are considerably impaired by the danger of forest fires and the difficulty of flak defense. Forest fire fighting apparatus are to be provided in sufficient quantities for such airfields."

On the 22nd, Luftflotte 3 signalled -

"The Reichsmarschall has ordered once more that all available weapons of every unit of the G.A.F. are to be used for AA defense as far as they can be effective. If this order should be disobeyed the Reichsmarschall has empowered Luftflotte Reich to instruct Luftflotte 3, Flakkorps and equivalent Hqs, after investigation, to set up at once on the spot regimental courts martial, to bring offenders to book and where cowardice in the face of the enemy is proven, to shoot them in front of the assembled personnel."

On the 23rd appears an unequivocal directive agreed by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, which orders their respective forces

".....to direct your strategic attacks, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, against the following systems of objectives:

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"1st Priority. 1. Petroleum industry with special emphasis on petrol (gasoline), including storage.

"2nd Priority. 2. The German rail and waterborne transportation systems.

"3. Tank production plants and depots, ordnance depots.

"4. M/T production plants and depots."

On the 17th, the indefatigable Admiral Abe was received by the Chief of Staff of the G.A.F., Kriepe, for a long interview, which is remarkable chiefly for recording Kriepe's great hopes for the Me.262 and Me.163.

It was becoming evident from all sources that the Germans were putting a continuously increasing amount of hope and energy into the production of this jet propelled aircraft. Although the program had been delayed, Kriepe hoped to replace existing fighters by the beginning of next year (1945) and said that when this was accomplished "it would be possible that with their material superiority they could at least regain air superiority over the battlefields."

Some Me.262 were in fact already operating as fighter bombers. And the Ar. 234 was about to enter on regular operation for reconnaissance. There were no indications of similarly regular operation by the

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Me. 163, and it continued to be very much a mystery. It was the opinion of American Intelligence at the time that the Me. 262 fighter bomber represented either only an experimental phase of jet usage or a parallel development to the jet fighter development for this highly versatile type. It was thought that the jet development in general clearly had the potential of effective opposition against our bombers.

This potential resided chiefly in the high speed which would enable it to elude our fighters, and in the already established firepower of four 30-mm cannon which constituted a prodigious advantage over the 50-calibre machine guns of our bombers. Intelligence as to actual production of these planes, however, remained meager though attacks continued against the known engine plants. But beyond those no definite program of counter-measures could be effectively formulated at the time.

The attack on engine facilities was as good insurance as we could take, judged by hindsight. Intelligence did not know until January 1945 that the Germans had begun in September with active development of a single jet fighter, the 162. It was brought along with great speed, but possibly engine shortage held it up the necessary bit. There were small items of "ULTRA" evidence throughout the autumn to indicate difficulties with engine supply.

It is characteristic of "ULTRA" that a first-rate piece of evidence on jets in September could not be taken at face value. It was an order from Hitler forbidding all further discussion of the employment of the Me. 262 as it was still in the experimental stage and existed

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in only small numbers. The difficulty was that orders were often issued as Fuehrer orders which were not actually his personal instructions, though some of them were. Another problem was whether or not this statement was merely a kind of propaganda to the armed forces. In the end, it has been found to be quite the truth of the then situation.

On the 26th a routine order, probably from Luftflotte Reich, records a change both symbolic and significant in the fortunes of the war, with these words:

"As Luftflotte 3 has been renamed G.A.F. Command West and has been subordinated to Luftflotte Reich, the latter has issued the following orders."

Luftflotte 3 was one of the original four air fleets of the G.A.F. It had ruled in the West, with its headquarters in Paris since the collapse of France. American Intelligence Officers who entered these headquarters in Late August found that its records had been burned.

They were further informed by the Concierge that Marshal Sperrle had on the day of his recent departure sent both keys and a careful inventory of his furniture to the local French police chief with instructions that he would exact a strict accounting for the condition of the premises upon his return. Now the Command was downgraded to a subordinate status in Germany.

An operations report from unspecified command, not intercepted until the 27th, recorded first German recognition of a new facet of American air operation evidently observed during the night of the 16th in the following terms:

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"Northrup P-61's (Black Widows) established in night ops, also in the area Luxembourg--Aachen."

On the 28th the Colonel of a rifle regiment, captured at Brest on the 18th, records an opinion of Americans, which, while not entirely an Air Force matter, is reprinted as a social observation of the times:

"We had 20,000 litres of cognac at Brest."

I said, "Leave all of that alcohol for the Americans, as they are not blessed with much culture anyhow. They would have got roaring drunk on it. For that reason I am always opposed to destroying supplies of alcohol."

CONCLUSION

PERIOD FROM NORMANDY TO AACHEN/ARNHEM

In this period the complete failure of the Luftwaffe for everything but an inadequate and intermittent home defense became evident. The preceding periods had seen it helplessly enfeebled, in both front-line strength and production adequate to protect the aerial perimeter of its conquests. Now, in its first test of heavy defensive fighting against ground assault/it crumbled further, ^{from the west,} leaving only a weakened core to defend the Reich itself.

The Bomber Command, which had once terrorized London, Stalingrad and Alexandria, was reduced to an occasional effort to lay sea-mines in the Antwerp harbor. The Anti-Shipping Command, which had once blockaded the North Cape, the Mediterranean, and made the Atlantic life-line precarious, was largely disbanded and grounded for want of fuel and crews. Two groups only remained to skulk in idleness in Norway.

The Fighter Command could no longer defend Germany from daylight raiding at will by both American and British forces.

The Fighter-Bomber Command, which had been improvised to repel our landings, had been dissolved in disgrace six days afterward. And the Night Fighter Command, which had alternated in advantage against the brilliant night tactics of the RAE, was now increasingly grounded for want of fuel.

CONCLUSION
PERIOD FROM NORMANDY TO AACHEN/ARNHEM

The failure of the Luftwaffe is cited here as proof and consequence of the major, and for long the solitary, purpose of American strategic bombardment. It was of course a pre-condition of the continuance of that bombardment but in the larger plan of the whole Allied action it had represented a stake of even greater significance.

This was aerial supremacy. However the lesser doctrines of the different services or nations may have differed it was universally agreed that the most indispensable pre-condition to safe shipping, sea-borne assault and victorious ground campaigning was aerial supremacy.

This had been won for the Allied invasion by laborious, protracted and bitter air fighting and bombing in the years and months preceding. The full significance and extent of the Air Victory was only to become apparent in the relative ease and cheapness of the invasion operation and subsequent campaigns. It was the supreme test of air power's contribution to the overall effort and the event proved how well the test had been met.

Additionally through this period strategic air power was to intensify its strangle hold upon the enemy's oil production. The fall of Roumania and capture of Ploesti were to accelerate the progress of the oil shortage that had already grounded much of the Luftwaffe, caused the abandonment of innumerable tanks and armored vehicles and the capture of tens of thousands of troops. All

CONCLUSION
PERIOD FROM NORMANDY TO AACHEN/ARnhem

this was only a foretaste of the ultimate immobility that was to bring the whole Wehrmacht to its final end. The oil campaign was a long one but this period had seen notable progress with it and progress was cumulative.

The period saw also the end of ground-launched V1 weapons and the beginning of the use of V2. It must be candidly recorded that air power had proved almost wholly ineffectual against the first and helpless against the second of these advances of technology. Bombardment of sites, transport and production had reduced the enemy scale of effort but it was only an inadequate counter-measure which his efforts would have circumvented if he could have retained occupation of the launching sites.

Above all things related to the air this period was notable for the development of the Allied fighter-bomber in close correlation with the armor whose advances it led.

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AACHEN - ARNHEIM

TO

THE LAST RUSSIAN DRIVE

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A German Intelligence report intercepted on the 2nd of October explains the general situation at the beginning of that month well:

"On 30/9, taking advantage of the slight improvement in the weather over England, strong attack by heavy American bomber formations against important traffic junctions in the Rhine - W. France industrial areas. At the same time operation of a medium formation of heavy a/c of the RAF against fuel industry in Ruhr district. Attacks carried out in spite of unfavorable weather situation in target areas. The enemy shows in this way again that he is consistently utilizing every possible means for attacking his operational targets. The choice of target area is to be seen in close connection with his operational intentions on the ground, viz. support of the penetration (smudge) W. France area. It is to be expected that the enemy since the attempt to gain possession of river obstacles by surprise attack has failed will give far reaching support to his further attacks on the ground by the systematic destruction and elimination of means of transport (an area devoid of traffic behind our own front lines), and supply routes. The

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same object is being pursued with the attacks against fuel industry above all in the area (C% near the front) by which at the same time the operational capacity of the G.A.F. is to be diminished by lack of fuel."

On the 3rd, however, began what might, by hindsight, be regarded as the first strong clue which Intelligence had to Von Rundstedt's counter-offensive in December. This was in the form of an order from Jagdkorps I effecting a wholesale reposition of German fighter units. The result was immediately and materially to strengthen the fighter position of Jagdkorps II at the front, which up till then had been almost exclusively engaged in trying to protect the retreating German troops from our own fighter-bombers, although it always carried out a small proportion of offensive work of a similar character.

At the time this reshuffle of fighters was generally thought to be essentially defensive in character. Though our armies were resting and re-supplying from the summer's campaign it was their plan to resume attack as soon as possible and we knew that the Germans appreciated this.

Still further light is cast upon this movement by a lecture delivered by Oberst Kogler, formerly Geschwader Kommodore of JG 6, to the German generals in captivity in England. This was not monitored until March but Kogler said then that German air

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thinking in the fall was critically divided between two courses.

One element wished to risk the entire force in a desperate air battle against American bombardment for the purpose of inflicting such heavy losses as to deter us from continuing operations. The other and more conservative element wished to use their newly restored groups more prudently for normal coverage of the troops.

Decision between these two courses was postponed through many weeks of vacillation and bickering until finally the whole force was used for Rundstedt's counter-offensive and for the now famous airdrome strike against us on January 1st. Kogler's story is certainly plausible and quite possibly accurate, although the Germans certainly did make one major effort at interception on the 2nd of November.

In any case the movement of these units back to the front was known and noted at the time. On USSTAF's orders special arrangements were made between General Doolittle of the Eighth Air Force and General Vandenburg of the Ninth to insure the availability of the Ninth Air Force's fighters against any sudden alteration in the existing balance of air power.

Throughout the autumn General Vandenburg in fact made it a practice to release what fighters he could spare from direct Army support to cover-

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ing the German fighter bases in the course of the Eighth Air Force's impending penetrations. This practice proved a most effective counter-measure.

In addition to this the Ninth Air Force was continuing its own persistent attacks not only upon Jagdkorps II but upon the German army itself. A report of the 5th says:

"Dive-bomber attack by 12 Thunderbolts, with bomb-dropping and a/c armament fire. On bridge Wiltingen/Saar, 10 kms south of Trier. Bridge damaged. Direct bomb-hit in flak gun position - 9 men killed and 2 guns total loss."

A report of the 6th for a Night Fighter Group reads:

"The gruppe reports attack by 33 Thunderbolts with a/c armament, on 5/1, on the smudge..... duration 45 minutes. Casualties: personnel, 1 a/c mechanic injured; equipment: 4 Me.110 total loss."

For the 6th also Jagdkorps II was to file a report as follows:

"Total of 135 a/c operated. Each Geschwader conducted a separate concentrated operation in support of the Army -A- in Turhout -- Tilburg -- Eindhoven area. During approach in battle area and while returning, engagement with strong Spitfire and Mustang formations.

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JG 2: Victories, 1 Spitfire effectively shot up. Losses: 9 a/c still missing.

JG 26: Victories, 2 Mustangs shot down certainly, 1 Mustang effectively shot up. Losses: 1 a/c still missing.

JG 27: Victories, none. Losses: during a landing of (Roman) II/JG 27 made necessary by lack of fuel. 20 Thunderbolts made a surprise attack on the formation and airfield. 2 Me.109 shot down over airfield. Pilots uninjured. 10 a/c destroyed in parking places on the ground by a/c armament. 12 others damaged."

Throughout the whole war a deadly duel had been fought between the German night fighter defenses and RAF night area bombardment. In this advantage had alternated frequently and sometimes so greatly as to indicate a conclusive victory for one side or the other. Thus from the introduction of "window" over Hamburg in July 1943 the RAF Bomber Command had enjoyed for a while almost complete immunity from the German night air. This they utilized not only to continue their onslaught on the Ruhr but to bring their whole program and its philosophy to the supreme test in their massive mauling of Berlin in the winter of 1943 and 1944.

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By spring, however, the German night fighter system had once again reorganized itself so that in the spring of '44 Bomber Command's losses were running beyond an acceptable rate for continued operations. The transfer of Bomber Command's major efforts from Germany to Western France for the months prior to and after the invasion postponed conclusive showdown between it and the German night fighter force.

During the summer, moreover, Bomber Command had begun daylight operations in a tentative and limited way over France itself as the daylight skies became demonstrably safer. When the lengthening winter nights and a restored strength found them ready for heavy night attack deep in Germany again, still another circumstance had changed in their favor.

This was the loss of the forward and coastal radar and signal stations on which the Germans had counted so heavily for warning and for the organization of their defensive counter-attacks.

Even as late as the summer of '44 General Schmid, the veteran Night Fighter Commander of Jagdkorps I had congratulated his command in fullsome and bombastic terms over a successful night or two. Now, however, that the nights were longer we find that the General had forgotten his summer satisfaction in the condition of contemporary affairs which impelled him to write as follows:

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"The Staffs of 2 and 3 (Jagddivision) and Officer Commanding Fighter Area Middle Rhine failed completely when (C's reporting) and judging the air situation on evening of 6/10. I am astonished that in spite of pains, admonitions, and orders throughout a whole year, I have not succeeded in bringing the Jagddivisions at least to the point of being able to distinguish in what strength and in what direction the enemy is approaching. In my view, there is no excuse whatever for this failure."

On the 14th was recorded an order of the Supreme Commander dissolving the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. This had the effect of removing the Ninth U.S. Army Air Force and its subordinate commanders from the operational control of Sir Trafford Lee Mallory.

A long telegram by the Japanese Naval Attaché despatched to Tokyo in Mid-September but not deciphered until October 19th takes a gloomy view of the war for Germany. He cites disappointment in the scale and effect of the rocket attacks upon England and says, among other things:

"The lack of oil and the difficulties of transport caused by the enemy's large scale strategic bombing were proving a serious obstacle not only to G.A.F. but also to German Army operations."

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And as a concluding paragraph:

"In these circumstances it is now regrettably questionable whether the German Air Force is in fact rallying and obtaining the anticipated objective of regaining control of the air and whether it is possible to observe any symptoms of recovery in the war situation as a whole."

The conversation of a prisoner of war monitored on the 20th of October is considered worthwhile recording as coinciding at least with the fact that we did attack the Opel works at Russelsheim, although the usual reservation about prisoners' comments must be applied also to consideration of this rather subjective account.

BALZER: "(Re Air Raid Damage): I have only to think of Mainz and Russelsheim. At Russelsheim there are the Opel works with 24,000 employees: the Americans made a daylight attack lasting 55 minutes there, and after that, my dear fellow, there was nothing left of the Opel works; that was the 14th of August. You just can't imagine what it was like. That day the Opel works turned out the first of a new type of aircraft, at half-past six in the morning I think it was; at 11 o'clock the attack started, and at 12 o'clock there was nothing left of the whole

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Opel works; and not only the Opel works themselves, but the settlement of the Opel employees behind the works was all reduced to ruins! The incendiary bombs lay three to four on top of each other; you simply can't imagine what it was like, it was as though they were just shovelling the incendiary bombs down."

An unexpected benefit adhering to our fuel program was recorded on the 20th. It will be remembered that in August rules were laid down for the mixture of alcohol with fuel. Now on the 18th of October G.A.F. Command West admonished one of its subordinate echelons:

"Particular attention is drawn to the fact that methyl alcohol is a fuel of the highest operational importance, is to be used with the utmost economy and is not to be squandered or used for other purposes, e.g. in spirit stoves. In this connection we would further point out that methyl alcohol is extraordinarily poisonous. Troops are to be informed of this."

The October files team again with instances of fuel shortage curtailing operations in every sphere of the G.A.F. Yet this same curtailment was to confront the G.A.F. with another dilemma of equal gravity. It will be remembered that in the summer Luftflotte Reich had served notice that it could not

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fuel aircraft from other commands landing within its territory. Yet in October this so conflicted with another crisis in the G.A.F. that the Air Officer for Fighters in the Air Ministry itself over-ruled Luftflotte Reich in the following terms:

"In order not to hinder training, a/c of the R/T Fighter Gruppen, when they have landed at airfields which are not supplied with fuel by Air Officer for Fighters, are to be fueled from the supplies of Luftflotte Reich and are to be despatched again with all speed; Luftgau will report monthly the amounts of fuel issued in this way for the settling of accounts."

Similarly we were to learn much later from the Kogler lecture and other sources that difficulty with the firing of the 30 mm. cannon was a strongly contributory factor to the delay in expanding the operational use of the Me.262. The difficulty doubtless had many roots but one emerges clearly in a request from the branch at Goslar of the Director of G.A.F. Technical Armament, which says in part:

"Urgently request again that Luftflotte Reich or Luftgau XI be told to deliver aircraft fuel, as all aircraft dry and no testing or ferrying possible."

On the 24th there was intercepted a message from the Japanese Naval Attache to Tokyo which seemed, and seems in retrospect, so superior to the general run of diplomatic messages in both signifi-

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cance and accuracy that it is reproduced entire:

It should be said in advance, however, that excellent as this report is in details of German dispersal and development of underground factories, it is misleading in the figures it gives or suggests on production. The Japanese were most interested in the Me.163 and took at face value evidence of production which did not correspond with actuality. They accordingly somewhat minimized the Me.262.

"We have seen over the factories making Me.262's and Me.163's near Augsburg and Stuttgart and saw the Me.262 in flight. Principal facts learned and our comments are as follows:

a) The Messerschmitt works in the city and neighboring suburbs of Augsburg have been almost wiped out by bombing and only some small jobs, a very small part of the work, is being carried on there. The work is now being done in dispersed factories several kms. away from the city.

b) The Messerschmitt Co. used to build aircraft in six main factories, but these having been almost totally destroyed, the work is now carried on dispersed among ten main factories and several dozen other places. These factories are sited in woods or elsewhere where the topography may help to conceal them from observation by enemy aircraft. Three "bunker" factories (three underground floors and two

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above ground floors; roofed with 5 meters of concrete on which earth is piled to improve bomb-proof qualities) are already in operation, and others are said to be in course of construction.

c) About 60 km away from Augsburg, just at the end of a deadstraight section of a national motor highway the trees in a wood have been cut down on as small a scale as possible, and on this site they have a factory about 100 meters in length where they carry out the general assembly of the Me.262. All the completed parts of the equipment, the nose section, fuselage, tail section, main wings, tail wings, power unit, and legs are assembled. Eight assembly stands on rails move around every three hours, and there is a monthly output of about 150 aircraft. Trials and tests of the upward and downward movement of the legs are carried out in an open space outside the settlement, and then they are taken away by tractors onto the motor highway. The turf in the middle of the motor highway has been removed and the space paved to serve as a take-off runway (about 35 meters wide). The aircraft take off from here and fly to a neighboring airfield where they undergo various test flights. The gaps cut out amongst the trees are camouflaged with camouflage netting.

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This factory was completed about three months ago. There are two such factories for the general assembly of Me.262's in operations elsewhere, and two are said to be under construction.

d) Assembly (excluding the equipment) of the body section of Me.163's (including nose section) is being carried out utilizing a small furniture factory situated at the front of a little country (railway) station some 50 km. from Stuttgart. Ordinary tubular jigs are used and drilling is all done by hand. Possibly because the work has not been long carried on there it is not up to schedule and production capacity is short of the mark, the daily output being thought to be two.

e) Assembly (excluding attachment of main wings) of Me.163's is being carried out utilizing a small textile factory in a mountain valley about 40 km. from the above factory and about 80 km. from Stuttgart. The above mentioned body sections (including nose sections) are assembled with tail sections and power units coming from other factories and the various items of equipment are fitted. There are nine assembly stands and double tracks provided, and they move around every $5\frac{1}{2}$ hours. The daily output schedule is four but work is not progressing well because body sections (nose sections in-

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cluded) are behind time, and present output is said to be about half that scheduled.

f) On the way from Ulm to Stuttgart a new tunnel is being made for a motor highway (Autobahn), and it is said that this is to be used for a two-story factory."

The Attache supplied the following general comments on this report:

1. "Germans had studied dispersal of factories to minimize damage from bombing, but failed to put it into execution owing to the demands of efficiency in mass production, and it was not until enemy air-raids since the summer of last year, and particularly the bombing of factories since last spring, had wiped out large factories one after another that they turned to dispersal of (? groups of small) factories. Some of these are still being built and are unfinished, and in consequence of this and owing also to changing over to new types they have been unable to fulfill their expectations of increased production capacity. It is believed that this will be properly underway at the beginning of next year. A particularly noticeable feature of dispersal is the numerous devices for avoiding detection by the enemy, and any consequent lowering of efficiency has to be accepted; it appears they consider that the only way to com-

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pensate for this is to multiply the number of small factories. It is realized in service departments and civilian circles alike that the dispersal of German aviation factories has been too long delayed, and we believe that adequate study and preparation must be carried out in Japan so that we may avoid this pitfall. Luckily we are blessed in Japan with topography more readily adaptable to such measures than is the case in Germany, and country elementary schools and small factories are available for such purposes. Measures to prevent enemy recognition of a factory are comparatively easy to carry out, and we think there is a call for a research body to go into this question.

2. We saw the Me.262 in flight and what particularly struck us was the ease and simplicity with which it could be handled on the ground, and it also gave the impression of being very safe. In the case of propeller aircraft one always has to be on the look-out not to get too near it while the propeller is turning, and there have been many instances of people losing their lives owing to carelessness in this respect. In the case of rocket aircraft, on the other hand, the machine can be handled in comfort without any fear of such a thing happening because it has no propeller, and we think that this is one of the main advantages

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of this aircraft."

Another feature of the now famous Kogler lecture was his statement that although the Germans had contrived finally by dispersal to produce large quantities of fighters, the very process of production and dispersal had seriously impaired the quality of the delivered product. These statements found support in a message from the Russian Front on the 25th in which the Commanding General, Dessloch of Luftflotte 4, states:

"Recently cases have increased in which units have refused a/c (pl) and flown them back without permission from the superior authority (Korps and Luftflotte) and in some cases without real technical reasons. This selfish procedure is not consonant either with the state of the a/c nor with the fuel situation and efforts to keep up serviceability by superior authorities are made extraordinarily difficult. Unit commanders are to be given immediate instruction about this. Express permission by Fliegerkorps (Gepdo) (Fliegerfuehrer) and/or Luftflotte for bringing back is necessary in each individual case. Requests for bringing back are to be submitted, giving exact details of shortages."

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Again on the 25th there appeared a message often remembered after the Rundstedt counter-offensive but which appeared at the time self-explanatory in the text that is herewith reproduced. It is from the Chief of Staff of Commander in Chief West to Army Group B, evidently in reply to previous correspondence and it states:

"A) Preparations for the bringing up of very strong fighter forces in the event of enemy large-scale attacks in the west are at present being made by OKL. A transfer of these forces before such a time is not possible for reasons connected with training and supplies of fuel.

B) Strategic air reconnaissance, even though on a small scale is assured by some Ar.234 of Detachment Goetz, which for the present is to receive the recce a/c coming from the factories."

Much of the flying weather in October was so bad as to preclude operations altogether and on many of the occasions when we did fly recourse was had to blind bombing. On this a long and technical dissertation from G.A.F. South East discusses the mechanical procedure and concludes with the following paragraph:

"The railway station of Klagenfurt was attacked by four lone-flying Fortresses and

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on 26/19 the railway station of Innsbruck likewise by four lone-flying Fortresses. The lone-flying a/c (pl) approached on north-south and east-west course at intervals of several minutes. Weather conditions from 5 to 8 tenths cloud cover. Altitude: 7/7000 meters. According to a report from O.I.C.Y. - service at the central plotting station for route-tracting (ZAF) the lone a/c dropped their bombs by Meddo apparatus which resulted in surprisingly good hits on the railway station. The Meddo apparatus was not switched on until just before the run up to the target and was switched off again immediately after attack."

A second long report of the Japanese Naval Attache on the 25th is concerned with the German technique of fighter planes ramming our bombers as evidently reported to him at the time. The German intentions and hopes to initiate this practice were by then a year old and considering the probable sources of his information, it could not be expected of Admiral Abe to know that our crew operations' reports have never included an eye witness's account of this practice until the 7th of April, 1945.

It is certain, however, that at least some elements of the German Fighter Command wished to introduce this practice. Doubtless they exaggerated their progress with the hope to their colleague who had probably given them glowing accounts of Japanese

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successes at this practice.

On the 30th the Air Officer Commanding G.A.F. Command West again circularized his subordinates on the subject of fuel economy in terms of extreme severity but these add little to the information already adduced on this subject.

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The second directive issued by General Spaatz in his new capacity as Deputy for General Arnold specified only two classes of targets. First priority again is the petroleum industry. Second priority is the German lines of communication. These directives, of course, were always supplemented by more explicit lists of targets, revised daily in the light of current intelligence, about the installations they list.

The major changes effected by this second directive, therefore, were the discontinuance of attacks on ordnance depots, vehicle factories and motor transport factories, although General Spaatz' letter contains a clear indication that such attacks might be resumed if demanded under special circumstances by SHAETF.

The precautionary counter-air commitment which remained always in the thought behind every other decision was heeded in this as in former directives with a clear statement. -

"Counter Air Force Action.

5. All of our intelligence information indicates that the Germans have so dispersed their aircraft production so as to make the attack of its production facilities uneconomical. Due to the forced withdrawal of the German Air Force into Germany proper, with its numerous landing fields and facilities for dispersion, normal attacks against these operational facilities are uneconomical. In these circumstances we are no longer justified in regarding the German Air Force and its supporting industry as a primary objective for attack. Our major efforts

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must now be focused directly on the vital forces of Germany's war economy. To this end policing attacks against the German Air Force are to be adjusted so as to maintain tactical conditions which will permit of maximum impact upon the enemy. No fixed priority is therefore assigned to policing attacks against the German Air Force."

Actually, of course, the most effective counter-air action that could be applied against the German Air Force was in continuous operation. This was the provocation of air combat by our attacks on oil which the Germans now defended so desperately and with such appalling losses.

On the 2nd of November the Germans put up what may have been the record defensive effort of the war. Sortie estimates are impossible to make with complete accuracy. Often "ULTRA" received after the fact will contain very exact figures of the operations by one or more of the Commands involved, but an attack into Central Germany involved so many Commands that it was never possible to be sure all were reported in "ULTRA". Even the most conscientious effort to compare crew observations and the recorded W/T and R/T conversations picked up by the "Y" service could never produce an exact figure.

Thus on the 2nd of November the most careful estimates indicated that the Germans raised about 700 sorties. In retrospect it seems clear that they were trying at least tentatively the plan mentioned in the Kogler lecture of effecting record losses among our bombers with the hope of altering our policy. Our losses that day, however,

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were well below those on many previous occasions and our claims of 189 - 40 - 53, compiled almost entirely by our fighters, tell their own story of the effect on the German fighter forces.

A tantalizing "if" in these operations concerns the jet aircraft. If the Luftwaffe had developed its fighter Me. 262 to the point that it could have operated in force on this occasion, what then? At any rate, the Propadanga Bureau in Berlin felt called on to send out instructions. A few of the new aircraft did operate and claimed three victories. The "line" was to be that the new aircraft so far were operating as bombers chiefly and not supposed to give combat. The Germans were quite aware of our expectations, and those incidentally of their own people.

A message picked up on November 5 indicates a somewhat confused story relating to the quality of German fighters and attempts to improve it. The message says that the old bomber unit K.G. 55 is to be set up at once as a Kampfjagd unit, two groups with Me. 109 and one with F.W. 190. This unit had remained under Fliegerkorps IX with the virtual disbanding of the bomber force in late September. Presently the Fliegerkorps blossomed out as Fliegerkorps IX (J)-Jagd, that is, fighter. Training units were set up to retrain bomber pilots as fighter pilots. And eventually the plan spread to training for the jet units.

of 2 November

The test of the battle/was actually a relief to our Commands, for Intelligence had continued to record the numerical increase of these German fighters, but it took the battle itself to show how inferior in quality the

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new crop was. This decline in quality was, of course, the direct result of the effect of previous shortage both in planes and oil upon German fighter training.

Two long appreciations by the Japanese Naval Attache were picked up early in November. They reflect a further summary of his outlook but in terms so general and vague as to be scarcely worth particular citation.

On the Southern Front Luftflotte 4 was feeling increasingly the pressure of the Fifteenth Air Force and its continual attack upon the many oil installations within its range. On the 5th an operations order for the conduct of ops on the 6th states:

"Paragraph 4: G.A.F. General in Hungary, with fighter forces subordinated back to him (Stab J.G. 76, II/J.G. 51, I/J.G. 53 and Hungarian fighter forces), will operate to engage Anglo-American day raids in accordance with orders."

On the 7th was intercepted another message giving clear warning again of German intent for imminent action. The actual message records nothing but the projected movement of an interceptor fighter group to the Front region, but it is a repetition of similar moves which had been noted throughout this time. It is not possible to say yet what actually lay behind this move. It may have been a foreshadowing of the Rundstedt offensive. It could have reflected merely a decision to strengthen the inadequate defensive capabilities of Jagdkorps II, or it could have been preparation for the airfield strike against us on January 1st.

All three of these possibilities existed within the conflicting German plans of the time, and the message

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is reproduced here verbatim together with the relevant notes by Intelligence as an indication of the evidence itself:-

"From GELIP (Luftgau) VI, No. 23383/44 (3344) to GIFRO (ARC) 19/XI, on 6/11:

"Advanced Det. J.G.77 and arriving at short notice (*) on following A/Fs:

Kirchhellen, Lohausen, Boeninghardt, Essen-Muelheim, Krefeld - Linn, Hilden.

On each A.F get ready quarters for 70 men flying personnel, and 400 men other personnel, and have ready AMC and fueling personnel and armament mechanics.

NOTES: 1) (*) Kurzfristig, here translated "at short notice", can equally bear the meaning "for a short term".

2) Oberst Steinhoff, Kommandore of J.G.77 was at Boeninghardt on 5/11 (T360/67).

3) The projected bringing up of Me. 163s to Deelen and Twente (T361/1), the moves of J.G. 300 and J.G. 501 to the Kassel area (T360/126), and the bringing up of J.G. 77 to J.K. II sphere conform to the preparation for a "scharfer einsatz" (T351/21) and "lightning blow" early in November (T350/15)."

On November 8th the first group of K.G. 51 made what on the surface appears to be a routine report. It had not operated. In the morning its airfield, Rheine, had been attacked by about 30 four-engined bombers. There was no destruction of airfield installations, but two

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huts used for billeting had been destroyed, two men killed and six wounded. Later in the day it reported that its W/T station had been bombed out. It was a repetition of such attacks as these that held the development of the operational jet units in check. Later in the month low level attacks on airfields in South Germany likewise contributed. Very real alarm is behind orders for dispersal and protection sent out on November 21st by Luftgau VII.

A further reflection of the fuel situation by the 10th of November emerges clearly in an order from Luftflotte 4 (probably to its ground attack units) then engaged in heavy fighting against the Russians in the Balkans. -

"The fuel situation, which had become more acute, makes it essential for Ops by front units to be restricted more severely than as instructed in previous orders. Ops are from now on only to be undertaken when there is a certainty of success or in definitely critical situations (the most stringent standard to be applied.)"

A Naval report on the 5th from Berlin says:-

"Results of air-raid on Hamburg: Midday 4th: Harburg, Wilhelmsburg and the port principally affected. Blohn and Voss shipyard severely damaged. Number 5 dock, 1 U-boat hit by bombs. Naval arsenal Tollefort hit by 7-10 bombs. Destroyer Erich Steinbrinck, 1 Speerbrecher, 1 accommodation ship damaged."

Such a report as this appears to indicate attack not within the scope of the directive quoted on

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November 1st. In fact, however, the targets of that day were important oil installations at Hamburg and Hannover. The problem of weather and of keeping our by now very large bomber formations under effective fighter cover often restricted operations to a narrow locality. In such cases, when the force assigned was clearly large enough to destroy the principal objective, it is the practice to put additional effort upon such targets as appear here.

A recurrent problem, not only of our bombardment but of all bombardments, had appeared by this time in the full gravity it was to assume. As clear an explanation of it as can be stated comes unexpectedly from the mouth of a simple seaman, prisoner of war, who had been captured in the Mediterranean. Even most of the details he recites were known to be reasonably accurate, but the statement itself is reproduced for its truth and relevance. -

"Funk: (who is a native of Augsburg): The Allies can bomb Messerschmitt factory at Augsburg as much as they want. Only a minimum amount of work is going on there now. The Messerschmitt works themselves are where they can't be hit any more. And do you know where it is? All in the Allgau..... Oberammergau etc. All right inside the mountains. They can bomb there as much as they want; they'll never destroy the 1000 m they have above as a roof. Reichenhall, etc., all the Messerschmitt works are scattered all over the place back there. The work at Augsburg will go on until the place is destroyed, but it won't be rebuilt again afterwards."

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This, in fact, is what had happened and although the process fortunately came too late in the war it should be pondered as gospel in the formation of future air policy.

A disadvantage of this dispersal comes out clearly in the second of two reports from Luftflotte 1, which states:-

"1. Aircraft transit depot (C% accept direct from factories) is slower than aircraft transit depot Insterburg. . At present orders are fully taken up by Me. 109 and Luftflotte 6 which, according to telephone conversation of General Oberst von Grein are very urgent. The fighters are being taken in hand as early as possible and will successively become serviceable."

There is innumerable other evidence that the process of dispersal itself caused many delays, not only in grandiose expansion plans but in day to day operation at delivery. Furthermore, evidence has been cited to show that the quality of aircraft made in this way was often inferior. Nevertheless, these were relatively minor difficulties which would have been ironed out in time. Our future air policy must ponder seriously the incontrovertible truth that the ground itself and carefully planned dispersal can still afford adequate protection from the bombardment techniques and explosives of the present.

The immediate and close support of ground operations remained, of course, an intermittent commitment of the Army Air Force throughout this time. German recognition of this is well recorded in an abbreviated air intercept

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from Luftflotte Reich on the 17th, of which four paragraphs are here reproduced verbatim:-

"1) On 16/11 massed attack of USAAF with about 1100 a/c and RAF with about 700 a/c against troops in battle area Aachen and with fairly weak forces against rearward communications in area (C% Cologne) (blot) in preparation of the (blot) offensive. Escort by a total of 700 a/c. From the south terror-attack of USAAF with about 1500 a/c on Munich and with smaller forces against railway installations in the area of Innsbruck. Fighter escort with about 150 a/c (smudge) bomber formations in Mosel area and in the area south of Metz. Strong fighter and fighter-bomber activity with about 650 a/c. 400 of these in battle area Aachen, 150 battle area Metz, 60 area Upper Rhine. Thrusts by smaller formations against Southeast and Southwest Germany. "Slight recce activity over West and South Germany. "Own 0 ps: No fighter ops against main raids owing weather. 5 Jagddivision: 56 fighter and fighter-bomber a/c, 2 recce a/c. Successes of flak artillery: 6 certain and 2 probables from the raiding force from the South, and 1 certain and 9 probables from the Western raiders. "Main damage: Munich: heavy damage to buildings; medium damage to some factories. In the surrounding district, slight damage to railway installations. Damage to dwelling houses. Duren: medium damage to railway installations. Heinzberg: heavy damage in town area of Juelich. Medium damage to railway installations."

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Throughout this time the Russian forces in the North were relatively quiet but both the apprehensions and their causes in Luftflotte 1, which was probably then still safely in Insterburg in East Prussia, emerged clearly in a message of the 13th:-

"1. On the 13th there was again no delivery of fighters but, on the other hand, three ground attack aircraft, one recce aircraft. Give reason immediately.

"2. (Chief OM) Chief Engineer with Geisler is to go out at once to Bromberg to clear up the matter of the allocation of fighters."

The conspicuous weakness of Luftflotte 1 in aircraft was to become evident two months later, in January, when the Russians launched their all-out attack, but their poverty through this time is a direct reflection of the policy of rigid priority of fighters to the West.

Apprehension of the Russian drive was not restricted to Luftflotte 1. In a telegram of the 10th the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reports a conversation of Goebbel's from the previous day. The text is not worth quoting, but through all the deception and counter-deception implicit in discussion among the worried diplomats, there emerges the fact that Goebbel did speak - "Quite frankly the German desire for a political settlement with Russia."

Several other diplomatic messages have hinted at the same matter. Unfortunately, although the evidence hints that this desire might even have reached the stage of attempted negotiation, there is not a particle of evidence of what Germans had or might have offered. Nor is there

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any evidence on whether the unfathomable Hitler would have assented to negotiations, or whether, in fact, these contemplated his removal from power.

An order of the 18th shows still another stage in the inexorable tightening of the fuel shortage. -

"1. By reason of the strained fuel situation the following orders have been issued by (B% GABOF) (C.in C.G.A.F.) operations are to be ruthlessly cut down, i.e. operations must only take place when the weather situation and other prerequisites guarantee promise of a success.

"2. The following operations will be discontinued forthwith, and will be resumed only by special order:

- a. Night ground attack operations.
- b. Transport flights (except the supply of the Channel Islands and besieged fortresses).
- c. Bombing and special operations (composite aircraft and mine-detecting flights, etc.).
- d. Operations by K.G. 53 are to be restricted to a strength of one gruppe at a time (20 aircraft at the most)."

It will be recollected that the function of K.G. 53 was to launch flying bombs from Heinkel bombers against London. It is a singular testimony of German malevolence that, even at the time when essential military operations necessary to their own defense were being ruthlessly curtailed, they persisted in these wanton and purposeless attacks which they fully realized could have no military effect whatever.

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On the 19th was intercepted another message clearly portentous of future operations on an increased scale. Again it will be noted that the context gives no certain clues to the character of these operations. An order from C. in C. West, Chief of Staff, on the subject of firing air defense weapons, states:-

"1. With immediate effect appearance of strongish own fighter forces (type Me. 109 and F.W. 190) in Western Germany is to be expected.

"2. Flak artillery, particularly that operating with Batterien and Auxiliary arms on airfields, is to be informed of this immediately.

"3. Shooting up of own fighters must be avoided at all cost....."

The remainder of the message is simply detailed instruction for flak procedure.

Another message of the 19th is an appreciation from the Intelligence Officer of G.A.F. General, Upper Italy, of the Fifteenth's very heavy attacks on North Italian airfields on the 18th. He supposes that these attacks resulted from Allied observation of the continuous transfers of the II Italian Fighter Group. -

"Doubtless the enemy finds the activity of the Italian fighters disagreeable."

On the other hand, the attacks may be a harbinger of large scale ground attacks. This appreciation was one of the first indications that the Germans were making some effort to resuscitate the Fascist Ital/^{ian} Air Force and substitute its fighter arm for their own. But it was difficult to believe that they had such confidence

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in it, as the scornful remark on our feelings would suggest. The report is another tribute to the excellent reconnaissance which the Twelfth Air Force was carrying on.

A powerful contributory factor to fuel shortage through this time was the excellent success our fighters achieved in destroying fuel in transit to the Front in both lorries and railway tank cars. On the 19th a long order from C. in C. G.A.F. takes cognizance of this hazard in severe instructions mostly concerned with railway procedure. A few excerpts, however, are worth noting.-

"Losses of fuel arising from enemy attacks show that orders given for the transport, evacuation and storage of fuel are still not being observed everywhere. There follows a further short summary of all instructions given for the transport and storage of fuel.....

"In the West Luftgauern traffic should, as far as possible, only be carried on during bad weather and at night. Pay attention to the air situation.....

"No fuel is to be dumped in large fuel storage installations which are liable to air attack."

A further ramification of fuel shortage occurs in the message from the Naval Chief Command Baltic to "Scheer", time stamped 0430 hours 21 November.-

"Owing to the fuel situation it is not possible for Luftflotte 6 to provide fighter protection for "Scheer" on her approaching passage.

Cockpit readiness has been ordered."

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Again on the 21st another message clearly portended imminent operations in the West in the following terms:-

"According to final decision of the Reichsmarschall, the fighter aircraft envisaged for the ops in the West are not to be equipped with ETC (bomb racks), these are to be stored for possible (C% later) (part undeciphered), at the present operations stations or in the ops areas in such a way that they can be installed at any time. The parent units are responsible for seeing to it that the bomb racks remain in good serviceable condition."

The use of the word "final" to describe a decision, which in the very context provides for contradictory action, is noted as one of the many difficulties inherent in determining the exact intention. It is considered quite probable that this, like so many of Goering's "final" decisions, was altered several times between even this writing and the event itself.

Whoever can tell from this context which of the several subsequent events it envisaged would have been a great asset to Intelligence at the time. It was, however, up to Intelligence to try to fathom the mystery and the prevailing opinion was that the decision not to use bomb racks indicated a defensive intention, though whether for high inception of bombardment or strengthened opposition to our fighter bombers was impossible to say.

On the 21st there was received a very rare and valuable kind of message. We had operated that day deeply in Germany against oil and communications targets, and there had been relatively active fighting. Our claims 29

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for this were 71 destroyed, 7 probably destroyed and 23 damaged in a certain part of Germany, for which we were fortunate enough, on this one occasion, to receive an exact report by Jagdkorps I of the fighter groups and strengths operating against us and their losses.

These state categorically that the losses amounted to 6 pilots killed, 33 missing and 20 wounded. Aircraft losses were: total 32, missing 33, damaged 39. This is a very remarkable corroboration of our fighter claims at the time, the total of our claims, in all categories, being 101 and the German acknowledgement of aircraft lost, missing and damaged being 104. While too much cannot be read into any one incident, the evidence of this report and of many similar though smaller and more fragmentary ones indicated that our fighter claims were in the main very close to the actual facts.

In a long telegram of November 16th the Japanese Ambassador recounts his conversation at a luncheon with Ribbentrop on the previous day. It is filled with little more than gossip and Ribbentrop's continual assurances that things were improving for Germany, but in the course of it Ribbentrop did say to the Ambassador that there would be a German offensive in the West. He did not mention any date for it in spite of evident pressure from the Jap on the point. In view of Ribbentrop's record and the general character of similar past conversations, this can only be recorded as one of the instances in which truth from the mouth of a liar reaches the highest pinnacle of deceptiveness.

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On the 27th a message from Jagdkorps II illustrates a practice which had become standard. This was to hold the fighter forces of that command available through the morning for high-altitude interception work if a strategic attack developed and, only when the time of day precluded further possibility of a strategic operation, to release them for either defensive work against our fighter-bombers or fighter-bomber activity of their own against our troops. -

"Ops on 27/11: Because of operation to combat raiders over the Reich and later because of mist over the operational airfields, the intended support of the Army "H" in the Schwerpunkt area of Geilenkirchen--Vossenack could not be carried out.

"Ops intention for 28/11: If our forces are released from defense of the Reich anti-fighter bomber operations and low-level attacks Schwerpunkt area Army Group B."

Toward the end of November, a message went the rounds of the G.A.F. stations. It is a monument especially to the work of the fighter forces. It says:-

"The Reichsmarschall has offered special prizes for good proposals for dispersals, proposals for appropriate camouflage, and especially proposals for camouflage of runways." The troops especially are to be encouraged to participate.

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On December 1st was deciphered a message of the 29th of November from a small fighter command on the Western Front, relaying an order from Luftflotte Reich which reads as follows:

"We can take it as certain that the enemy had recognized the increased concentration of fighters "Jagdaufmarsch" in the west and is making every effort to smash our fighter forces in the air (as in the large-scale fighter operation in NW Germany on 27/11) and on the ground. We must, therefore, expect at this particular juncture, that operational airfields will be attacked on an increased scale, even on days when German fighters are grounded on account of the weather. In consequence the primary order of the hour must be: Dispersal, camouflage and instant readiness of every defensive weapon."

This again clearly portended the Rundstedt offensive. Yet the enemy's need to build up defensive fighters in the west was so evident that again nothing in this context pointed unmistakably to any other intention.

On December 2nd there was deciphered a routine normal appeal for flak protection. Messages of this kind occurred by the dozens but subsequent history was to make this message perhaps the most ironical one of the whole war:

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"(Luftgau) XIV urgently stresses the importance of the traffic installations in the area Remagen, including Sinzig and the Ahrbridge and the artificial structures near the triangle formed by the railway lines at Sinzig. The installations have been already repeatedly attacked and considerable damage caused. Only heavy flak protections promises to do any good. As this cannot be made available from our own forces, the bringing up of 8 heavy batterien is urgently requested."

"ULTRA" does not show whether the flak ever arrived or whether it was good fortune or bad bombing which preserved the traffic installation at Remagen to become an historical milestone in the progress of the war.

On the 4th a message from Jagdkorps I summoned all Geschwader Kommodore and Gruppen Kommandeure of the day-fighter Geschwader to a conference at Jagdkorps II on the following day. Again by hindsight it appears probable that this conference was to inform such senior personnel of the impending Rundstedt offensive, but these facts were not discernable in the message at the time, such conferences being a not uncommon occurrence in the G.A.F.

It seems inevitable that there was also some discussion of the Me.262 fighter type. At the end of November the one operational unit, which had started out in October as III JG 6 and then disintegrated into Detachment Nowotny, had been recon-

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stituted as the Third Group of a new fighter unit, JG 7. The Second Group of JG 7 (until this message never heard of) was to be renamed IV JG 301 and the establishment of an Me.262 squadron was to be reduced to 12 aircraft.

A good deal of confusion and delay is suggested by these moves. There seems to have been an intention to set up JG 6 as a jet Geschwader. The plan lapsed, presumably because of the lag in developing the Me.262. Then there had been an intention to set up a JG 7 with conventional fighters. Now plans were starting all over again with JG 7 as a jet fighter unit.

It is significant, therefore, that on December 4th and 5th the First Group of KG 51 reported operations by its aircraft as fighters. On the 4th it also reported that it had a staffel equipped with four MK 108 cannons. It was known by then that the bomber Me.262 carried only two cannons. These operations coincide with some kind of course for Formation Leaders carried on by General Peltz early in December, very shortly after he became Commanding General of G.A.F. Command West.

On December 13th the Second Group of KG 51, then finishing its re-equipping, were ordered to continue to equip all aircraft with four cannons. There seems in all this activity to be an attempt to hurry up the Me.262 fighter on a kind of makeshift basis. The main desire was to break up Allied fighter screens and cause fighter-bomber formations

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their bombs.
to jettison/ KG 51 reported success on one occasion
in the latter aim but the reports generally indicate
little success.

An excellent damage report of the 9th from
Stuttgart enumerates very considerable damage caused
there by a blind-bombing attack on that day. Although
the hits were upon miscellaneous objectives as is
always the case with blind bombing, the intense in-
dustrial activity of Stuttgart itself, almost wholly
connected with direct armament manufacture, made the
attack a very effective one. Readers interested in
details may consult MSS/T394/13 in the Master File
for December.

In SJA 1259 the Japanese Naval Attache signalled
Tokyo the gleanings of a long conference with an
unnamed member of the Staff of the Operations Section
of the German Admiralty, which is of some interest
as indicating the general effect of aerial bombard-
ment upon the German Navy in general and its U-boat
campaigns in particular. The report, however, is
couched in such general terms and the identity of
the informant is so uncertain as to make it scarcely
worth quoting.

Early in December the Germans invited the
Japanese Ambassador and Naval Attache to a demon-
stration of new weapons at the Muritzzer Zee Proving
Ground. From this the Naval Attaché returned with
some technical data on the Me.262 and 163 which was
of great interest at the time but has, of course,
been superseded in accuracy and contemporary value

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by our own captures of those aircraft. . . .

The Ambassador, on the other hand, made the most of the opportunity for long discussions with Speer on the general problems of war production, of which it will be recollected Speer was the highest official. Little that was actually new emerges from these discussions and the whole record must be treated with reserve in view of the Ambassador's technical ignorance and Speer's manifest interest in impressing upon him the favorable side of the picture.

In the course of the discussions, however, Speer makes one remark that was quite possibly true, to the general effect that the enemy's bombing of synthetic oil plants continued at full blast and damage was suffered constantly, but Germany had some 72,000 men engaged solely on repair. If damage was done they promptly set about repairing it and they were squeezing the last drop out of all plants.

These concentrations of men had already been noted in photo reconnaissance of the enormous tented and hut settlements adjacent to the works, which by then had become a standard phenomenon of oil installations. It was largely owing to their efforts that so many repeat attacks were required and flown against the major installations throughout this time and indeed up until the very advance of the ground troops made further bombing impossible.

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The success of our blind bombing attack upon Stuttgart was apparently noted by another observer as clearly as by us. For on the 14th of December the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin wrote home a general appreciation on the subject. As is often the case with Japanese intercepts the exact language emerges from the deciphering in so mangled a condition as to require paraphrasing with some independent interpolation to make sense. The work, however, is done by experienced Intelligence personnel, who reproduced the Jap's text in the following sense:

"With the remarkable improvements in radar instruments, a superior air force is exhibiting its special qualities in real earnest regardless of weather and day and night alike, and achieving considerable results. The standard of bombing from above the clouds is steadily improving, and at present they are already carrying out attacks of this kind against almost all targets, in conjunction with area bombing by large formations, and there are indications that the practicable range will be expanded in the future."

The message goes on to warn Tokyo to bestir itself in the development and improvement of countermeasures by radar jamming but the text is too general to be helpful to Technical Intelligence.

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A message of the 21st addressed to Jagdkorps II, when read in context with several other messages of the time, clearly indicates that groups of one of Jagdkorps II's subordinate commands were practicing low-level attacks on airdromes at that time. Allied forward commands were informed of this matter, although it was impossible from the information to predict the exact date of the large operation of this character which these same German commands conducted on the 1st of January.

On the 9th the Japanese Naval Attache had another long discussion with the G.A.F. Liaison Officer of the Naval Operations Staff. The latter gave to the Jap a rather careful statistical analysis of Allied operations during October and the target policy deduced from them. At the conclusion either the Jap quoted or said directly to Tokyo of the U.S. Army Air Forces, that they had "almost completely given up their terror bombing and were concentrating on targets of strictly military importance."

As is well known Rundstedt's offensive actually began on the 16th. The "ULTRA" of any significance on this subject found its way to Air Ministry files in small quantities. The usual items were concerned only with day to day operations reports of the fighter groups supporting that ground attack. A characteristic Ops Order of the 22nd assigns effort by the various air commands assisting for the day of the 23rd and says in the context:

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"The weather will in the morning probably bring relief to us and difficulties to the enemy. In the afternoon the enemy will be able to fly. All forces are to be made ready, so as to be able to engage successfully in a possible air battle on a grand scale. Four-engined bombers are the Army -H's- greatest danger. All formations will therefore direct their ruthless attack exclusively against them."

The four-engined bombers of the Eighth Air Force did in fact operate on the 23rd in relatively small numbers owing to the weather, but on the 24th 1875 four-engined heavy bomber sorties were flown by us in direct attack on the communications system feeding the Rundstedt advances.

On the 23rd Jagdkorps II reported to an unspecified addressee, in evident reply to, or apprehension of, criticism:

"Because of bombing attack ground attack operation Bastogne impossible."

A spate of other operations reports from various commands engaged in support of the Rundstedt offensive testify to the daily presence and bombing of the Strategic Air Forces from the 23rd (when the weather cleared) through the end of the month, but most of these record nothing more than an estimate of numbers and towns attacked.

On the 24th, however, the G.A.F. Liaison Officer with the 67th Army Corps and subsequently

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with the 2nd SS Corps reported:

"Strikingly heavy employment of Marauder a/c against rearward corps area. At 1315 hours, bombs dropped on Schmidheim (B% Stab) LXVII Army Corps bombed out again. No casualties."

A somewhat garbled message on the 24th almost certainly identified as coming from the SS Panzer Division states:

"Division urgently requests fighter protection for own attacking spearheads. Own attacks were considerably hampered today by massed fighter-bomber attacks. Losses of personnel and equipment. Flak protection weak."

A message dated the 25th from Jagdkorps II might have been written in direct reply to the above message, as an explanation of Jagdkorps II's failure to support the SS Panzer Division, although in fact it appears to have been addressed to one of Jagdkorps II's own fighter groups:

"Temporary runway will probably be serviceable about 1100 hours. Therefore, no operation by the Gruppe possible before 1100 hours."

And then a second part of the same message, time-stamped 1700 hours on the 25th, says:

Throughout the day heavy losses inflicted by fighter-bombers. Own fighters completely absent."

A report from Army Group -H- on the 28th speaks of the progress of the offensive in these terms:

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"Air Force dominated the skies today too and made full use of this by systematic destruction of all traffic centres. All-out employment of our own fighters resulted in only very limited (0% relief).

The progressive destruction of railway lines and stations and of multiple road junctions in the Eifel is making the supply situation tense in a way which threatens to be dangerous (part undeciphered)..... be unloaded at the Rhine. The long distance from the troops resulting from this cannot be covered sufficiently or quickly enough in view of the lack of fuel and tonnage space."

The story of the Rundstedt offensive must be studied fully from other sources for the air "ULTRA" is too sketchy for a complete account. One aspect of it, however, had evidently been reflected by a remote but interested observer in a Prisoner of War Camp in England. The prejudices of prisoners has been remarked before. It is not certain that General Bruhn's outburst was based entirely on the emotion aroused in him by available newspaper accounts of that particular offensive. It is certain, however, that his statement reflects the incorrigible and unalterable viewpoint of the German professional soldier and as a reflection of such it is quoted entire:

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BRUHN: "It's the greatest mockery in the history of the world and at the same time the saddest part of it, that the flower of our manhood is being mowed down by the aircraft and the masses of tanks of an army which has no real soldiers and which doesn't really want to fight."

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Goering's Order of the Day for January 1st was badly garbled in our deciphering, but the fragments that emerged seemed to indicate the spirit of the time, -

"Comrades of the G.A.F.!

"A year, heavy with fateful tests, has come to a close. In the teeth of all opposition and in spite of all our needs and worries, the year found us more than ever ready to fight in the inflexible discharge of our duties. On the threshold of the New Year we turn our gaze full of trust and hope, to the future.

"At the present time, we see the first fruits of hard and dogged work of reconstruction in the G.A.F. attaining maturity. With your new Geschwadern, which have risen again, with exemplary paratroops, zealous flak-gunners, supported by members of the German labor service, by male and female flak-personnel and the trusty LN. formations, our Air Force will continue to prove that it will (smudge) in the old tried and true way (smudge).

"We bow our heads in homage and proudly mourn our dead, who, at the front and at home, laid down their lives for Germany. Their sacrifice fills us with glowing faith (large portion torn away.....

MARSHAL OF THE GREATER-GERMAN-REICH
AND C. IN C. OF THE G.A.F. "

In one respect the general gloom of the message was brightened by an element of truth. The new Geschwadern he mentions were undoubtedly the Me. 262 units which, by now, were beginning to show a consistent

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although limited expansion. Otherwise, his conventional fighter force was filled up to an almost record strength in numbers.

On the morning of January 1st, however, these numbers were tested in the great fighter bomber strike against Allied airfields. The exact truth about the German side of this operation will probably never emerge because of lost records. The Allies appear to have lost something over 300 aircraft in total, destroyed on the ground principally in the British bases of Holland, Belgium and North France.

The most careful estimate that can be made from various sources indicates that about 900 German fighter bombers took part. Of these over 60^{pilots} were captured alive after crash landings. Allied claims against the remainder could never be satisfactorily assessed because of the multiplicity of AA units participating. A further difficulty lay in the impossibility of deciding the day on which many German pilots, later discovered dead in crashed planes, had actually been killed. Nevertheless, careful examination of the available evidence would indicate that in killed, captured, damaged and crash-landed at home, the Germans must also have suffered a loss of at least 300 aircraft.

A factor of even greater seriousness to them was the relatively high percentage of experienced formation leaders either killed or captured, a loss far more serious than any numerical estimate can appraise.

As final evidence of the German view of the operation, it needs only to be said that, in spite of their triumphant announcements, it was never repeated.

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An unexpected event of January 1st was the sudden transfer of the jet fighter bomber units from Rheine to Griebelstadt so that they could be used to back up the Rundstedt offensive. Their orders contain the significant injunction that, although they are to operate against Allied fighter bombers to split up their formations and cause jettisoning of bombs, they are not to accept combat with Allied fighters. Obviously there was still some lack of faith in the then stage of development of the Me. 262 and its relatively inexperienced pilots for fighter work.

Our own persistent fighter bomber attacks against both German airfields and the armies and their supply were increased and intensified. On the 3rd, General Schmidt, now Air Officer Command^{ing}/G. A.F. Command West, issued a circular which said:-

"As a counter-measure against the all-out attack by our fighter forces and all-out operation by the enemy against our ground organization, in the shape of high low-level attack, must be reckoned with for certain....."

The remainder of the order is concerned with instructions for counter-measures by the Flak and Dispersal.

As testimony of the General's prophetic powers, 2 SS Panzer Corps, at 1100 hours on the 3rd, signalled an unidentified addressee, -

"Battle Hqs destroyed and completely burned out at 0900 hours on the 1st in attack by about 12 Lightnings. 6-8 HE bombs fell near the target. Phosphorous containers dropped directly on the target. Estate St. Jean 4 kms SW of Les Tailles.

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Some slightly wounded, 7 M/T destroyed, baggage and equipment burned."

The files are full of references to the daily appearance of large numbers of four-engined aircraft over the now shrinking salient of the Rundstedt offensive, and the supply lines which fed into it from all parts of Western Germany.

A belated commentary on the German airfield strike of the 1st is contained in a message from an Airfield Regional Command, which was evidently the relayed version of a circular from the Air Officer for Fighters, on the 14th of January. It says:-

"Loss of formation leaders of day fighters force us to adopt immediate non-recurring measures. From your airfield regional command, and from all flying units subordinated for organization, except Fliegerkorps IX, names are to be submitted therefore without delay of all officers who, after training, can be employed at short notice....."

Directive No. 3 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe, issued by General Spaatz on January 12th, took cognizance of the factor now rapidly emerging as a serious consideration in the future of our air supremacy over Europe. This was the introduction into operational usage of increasing numbers of jet aircraft. The position was somewhat anomalous up to this time; jet aircraft had represented no serious threat to our operations.

Intelligence, however, had at last been able to unravel the outlines of the German plan by interrogation

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of workers and officials who had been engaged upon it at Strasbourg. The sum of its conclusions may be simply expressed as it was at the time. The matter had to be determined in relation to the length of the war. Provided that we could count upon victory by early summer, it was considered that the jet threat would never assume unmanageable proportions.

Intelligence, however, stated bluntly that if the war continued throughout the summer jets of such superior performance and such numbers as to challenge our aerial supremacy over not only Germany but all of Western Europe were to be soberly expected.

In accordance with these advices, General Spaatz issued a directive which, while still designating the Petroleum Industry as first priority and the German lines of communication as second, utilized the authority always vested in him for appropriate counter Air Force measures to name certain vulnerable jet installations and training and test airdromes for immediate attack.

The essence of the matter is well expressed in a letter accompanying the directive, which is quoted in part:-

"2. A new directive is considered to be necessary at this time since it is estimated that approximately 400 to 500 jet aircraft will be available for operations against us by early summer unless adequate measures are taken promptly.... Accordingly, the important changes effected are the restoration of the G.A.F. and primarily of its jet aircraft production, training and operational establishments, as a principal objective for attack....."

CONCLUSION FOR THE PERIOD
FROM AACHEN-ARNHEIM TO THE LAST RUSSIAN DRIVE
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This period was not notable for any striking developments or changes in the air war. The conventional types of the G.A.F. had recovered high numerical strength, but were ineffective either to prevent or to inflict prohibitive cost upon the continuance of our own air operations.

These operations, under the new directive which returned control of the Strategic forces entirely to American air authority, continued their faithful concentration on the top two priorities of oil and communications as intensively as the characteristic weather of the season permitted.

The one significant variation in this pattern was not so much a departure from directive as an intensification against the second priority or communications directly related to the Rundstedt offensive. The full effect of air power in this emergency cannot be assessed from "ULTRA" alone, but the available evidence in "ULTRA" and S.R. Reports does suggest the importance of air power in checking and reversing the offensive.

Finally, the period was significant for notable German progress in development and advancement of the jet aircraft. In assessing this and its significance, Intelligence had to attempt to estimate the duration of the war. It was considered that if the war lasted beyond early summer of 1945 German jet development had the capability of reversing the existing Allied air supremacy over Europe.

CONCLUSION FOR THE PERIOD
FROM AACHEN-ARHEID TO THE LAST RUSSIAN DRIVE
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It will be remembered that at the time it was generally considered that the Rundstedt offensive, while checked, had probably succeeded in imposing considerable delay on the Allied prospects of crossing the Rhine and campaigning in Germany. Furthermore, the usual winter drive by the Russians on the Northern and Eastern parts of their Front had been conspicuously delayed for reasons not available or apparent to Intelligence.

In these circumstances it was considered prudent to recommend the immediate application of all possible counter-measures to the threat of German jet development, even though its present stage of progress did not then show the full outlines of the German intentions for its future.

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On the very date of General Spaatz's new directive, however, the Russians opened their traditional winter offensive along the Vistula and into both East Prussia and Silesia as well.

It will be remembered that their southern forces had reached the Danube north of Budapest in early December. There German resistance had noticeably stiffened and Budapest itself was not fully occupied until mid-February.

In consideration of the resistance in Hungary and the inexplicable delay, long after the ground had frozen in the northeast Allied planning had had to envisage the contingency that the winter might not see a full scale Russian offensive in the northeastern part of their fronts.

Such an offensive did, however, begin without announcement on January 12th. Its extent, vigor and success were immediately apparent in the startling reversal of aerial trend which had not changed in almost two and one half years.

For twenty-seven months the history of G.A.F. dispositions had been one of a steady removal, unit by unit, from the Russian to the Mediterranean and Western Fronts. Now, in the third week of January, more than twenty groups of single-engine fighters were to leave the inadequate defenses of the west for a precipitate transfer to the defense of the

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Oder line, East Prussia and Silesia.

On the 14th, the Eighth Air Force fought ^{one of} the last substantial air battles it was to encounter in the war. From then until the end the preponderance of German fighter units were arrayed against the Russians. By that time, however, the contracted perimeter of Germany was so short that on a few occasions fighter groups transferred from ground strafing the Russian troops to intercepting our bombers above Berlin and the eastern oil installations within an hour's time.

On the 13th, Goering himself was entertaining the Japanese Naval and Military Attaches at Karinhall. As is usual on such occasions, much more was said than recorded and most of it too vague and sociable for serious consideration. Goering appears, however, to have been in a somewhat chastened mood and a few excerpts from the Japanese report to Tokyo are reproduced as a matter of interest.

In speaking of the air war in Europe, Goering frankly admitted: "that he himself had thought that for large enemy bomber units to operate in the air over Germany for an extensive period of time was a complete impossibility, but this belief had been shattered."

Later, the Jap report continues "Moreover, he had not envisaged the enemy's ability to carry out accurately aimed bombing from above the clouds, due to the enemy having outstripped Germany in the de-

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velopment of radar," nor "the success of the enemy in building long-range fighter aircraft which accompanied the bombers, subsequent to which the effectiveness of the German fighter forces had diminished....."

The Japanese, who by now had become both skeptical and scornful, not only of the G.A.F. but of the official opinion given him about it, concludes this message with the following words:

"At the present time the G.A.F. is characterized by an extremely strong tendency toward dictatorship, with the result that suggestions put forward by staff officers are completely without effect. It follows that in dealing with any matter of importance or stating an opinion, nothing can in fact be accomplished without securing the direct approval of the Marshal."

The January file again, like its predecessors, teems with individual items bearing upon shortage of fuel, both local and fundamental, but in general these are mere repetitions or accentuations of previous orders and complaints on the subject.

It should be remarked that the removal of such large numbers of fighters to the eastern end of Germany resulted, among other things, in their being placed in new commands on that front. The "ULTRA" coverage of these new units was much less complete than that which had been built up by long experience with the habits and call signs of the western commands.

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Consequently the volume of material really relevant to our part in the air war shrinks noticeably in January.

On the 25th, however, a circular over Goering's signature to all Commands takes note of a fundamental change in the G.A.F.:

"Order of the Day to the Fighters:

After several years' activity as AO for Fighters, General Lt. Galland is relieved of his appointment to be employed on the High Command after his health has been restored. I express my sincere thanks and my particular appreciation to Gen. Lt. Galland for the service which he has rendered to me, to the German Fighter Force and to the Fatherland. Gen. Lt. Galland (few words illegible)..... Acting AO for Fighters I expect the fighter force to support Oberst Gollob with its confidence and all its strength. It is neither the organization nor the person that is decisive, but only the aim which is common to us all: to regain mastery of the air over the German area. We stand in the hardest and most decisive hours of this war. In many places the Volksturm has been called up for national defense. The last German is reaching for his weapons. The German fighters will not lag behind these men, but, inspired with sacred ardor and with the consciousness of fighting in a just cause, will

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give its all.

GOERING
REICHSMARSCHALL OF THE GREATER
GERMAN REICH"

Thus Galland had gone. His successor, Oberst Gollob, was a man of long and honorable record as fighter-pilot and unit commander, but the significance of the change seems clearest in view of the fact that for many months Gollob had been known to us as one of the foremost figures in jet aircraft development.

Galland had long been Goering's pet, but in spite of the Jap's remarks it is evident that new blood was at long last coming into the G.A.F.

On the 25th there appeared a message of double interest, both for its intrinsic content and for bearing the signature of one Wilke, now a Major General of JK II, but probably the former experienced commander of JG 3, which was undoubtedly through the whole war the best single Geschwader in the German fighter forces:

"Dated 24/1 from Grabman, Gen. Maj., and
AOC Div. No. 187:

The war situation and development in the east demand the withdrawal and transfer of fighter and G/A units which have hitherto been subordinated. In the west, too, increased enemy offensive operations must be reckoned with. With fewer units than hitherto we have to get to grips with the Anglo-American enemy

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of the air and particularly therefore we have to give the army the support from the air, which it requires to carry out its heavy defensive fight, as well as the protection of the homeland. I know that every brave and right-thinking airman in the Geschwaders and Gruppen subordinated to me thinks exactly the same and will do everything to inflict damage and injury by his ruthless recklessness. The hour is more than serious. There is only use for real men who are minded to give their utmost. Germany is at stake.

Signed.. Sieg. Heil Dem Fuehrer.

Signed.. Wilke, Gen. Maj. JK II, IA 79e"

One way in which they might have come to grips with their enemy was to use the jet fighter. That the attempt was in mind is indicated by an order of January 11th directing the airfield at Frankfurt/Rhein Main to keep itself continually stocked up for III JG 7. Nothing could make clearer the limitations of the Me.262. Rhein Main was in far from good condition but it was the only field with a sufficiently long runway and within the necessary range. The unit did not move there because, as reconnaissance revealed, the severe winter conditions kept the field from being made serviceable.

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In the course of the month a conversation was monitored between an excellent, high ranking pilot from JG 26, captured in December, and an American Air Force officer. It may turn out to reveal one of the great cruces of the air war and already seems to throw light on the Me.262 fighter. This officer said that until November, 1944, Hitler did not know that G.A.F. losses were due to fighters and not to bombers. He, therefore, thought that each German fighter should have no trouble in shooting down a bomber. Then he learned that the American fighter escort was the difficulty. The pilot said "That was the cause of the whole affair whereby we got the 262 as a fighter at all." It seems entirely likely that Hitler's ignorance of the truth of air matters was one reason for the delay in the 262 fighter.

Late in January a message came along addressed to the Armaments Test Unit at Tarnowitz calling to their attention the fact that the Fuehrer had again ordered rapid development of aircraft rocket R4M. Intelligence has since learned much about this rocket. Like the 21 cm. mortar it was calculated to knock down our bombers in a single shot. In the light of subsequent events it stands as a monument to last ditch German tenacity. Had the ground operations not engulfed the jet aircraft development, this rocket might have become a serious problem.

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On February 1st occurred one of those crises which have frequently marked the history of "ULTRA" interception. This date was selected by the German Signals Service for a wholesale alteration, not only in codes but in call-sign practices. It is considered that this was only a routine security precaution of the German High Command and reflected no suspicion of "ULTRA" interception.

Nevertheless, its effect was to render useless large accumulations of lore which had brought "ULTRA" deciphering to such high peaks of efficiency and consequently to effect a very noticeable reduction in the number of messages successfully deciphered. As was also usual, the cryptanalysts performed prodigies of work to meet this crisis and eventually succeeded in restoring a large daily flow of important messages. But throughout the early days of February there was a noticeable famine of "ULTRA" reports from the commands which had been our most faithful, if involuntary, contributors of information.

It should be remarked here that if this internal German reform of the Signals Service had been a little more thorough, far-reaching and rigidly enforced, the best Allied cryptanalysts are of the opinion that German messages henceforward would have become largely unbreakable; a circumstance that should be carefully pondered by the appropriate authorities in our own signals security section.

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A message of January 25th, not deciphered until February 1st, reports difficulties of the armies in the West, as expressed by Army Group G. The report concluded:-

"Offensive strength of German divisions clearly weakened by shortage of artillery ammunition, by leaving behind of almost all motorized artillery, owing to shortage of fuel and heavy losses. Army Group, therefore, must go over to defense in Rotbach-Moder section and, with permission of C. in C. West, was pulling over the Moder."

The full and final effects of oil famine were, of course, always contingent upon the coincidence of production stoppage and intensive operation in the field. Evidence that the Russian drive was now providing the other half of this combination was received on February 1st in a message from Luftflotte 6 to Army Groups North and Vistula, which explains:-

"Non-arrival of individual aircraft fuel transports sent to the West Prussian area, and the impossibility of obtaining evacuated materiel in this area are hindering the supplying of the envisaged take-off area for transport aircraft with fuel. Since fuel is no longer available in the East Prussian area either, transport flights between East and West Prussia no longer will be carried out, until the arrival of the aircraft fuel train asked for as Preil."

Further testimony of the effect of fuel shortage upon the G.A.F. and the German fighter force, especially, providing curtailment of training appears in a monitored conversation of Oberstleutnant Kogler. Kogler will be

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recalled as the Kommodore of J.G. 6 who, after his capture in the course of the airdrome strike on January 1st, delivered a long lecture to senior prisoners of war on the subject of the failure of the G.A.F. and its causes. On this occasion, however, he was talking to a fellow fighter pilot, also in captivity, and said:

"In the A and B Schools they are cutting down the number of flying hours because those aircraft use up 30 litres. Then at the Fighter School they waste it again, for they have to do an additional 5 hours down there. They could have flown another 50 hours down there (at the A and B School) on the same petrol. I happen to know what struggles Kuhl had; he struggled in vain to obtain petrol."

On the 3rd the Eighth Air Force made a particularly heavy and successful attack upon Berlin, for the purpose of disrupting the flow of supply and replacements to the Eastern Front. The day after this the Japanese Ambassador visited Ribbentrop at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express his condolence on the fact that the Ministry itself, as well as Ribbentrop's official residence, and the former official residence of the Fuehrer, had received direct hits. Ribbentrop admitted that the raid was -

"the biggest Berlin had experienced for a long time" and that "a number of hits had been received by the district in which the Government offices were. The Fuehrer and other important personages were, however, all safe."

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On the 5th the Japanese Ambassador filed another long cable about this attack, which is significant principally for the comment that -

"No fighter opposition was offered to the attack, this being due presumably to operations on the Eastern Front."

A message of the 13th from the Fighter Control Command of the Southwestern and Southern German area speaks of -

"Continuous attacks by the tactical and strategic Mediterranean Air Force on the Brenner Line, attacks by fighter-bombers and waves of twin-engine bombers have recently been combined. By means of low-level attacks with HE and aircraft armament by the fighter-bombers, which dive from a height of 1700 metres at an angle of 60% to 400 metres, and by bombs dropped by 3 Mitchells strung out far apart in front of the main position, the flak positions were eliminated so that the following 24 Mitchells could drop their bombs undisturbed on the protected objective. The railway installations attacked were not hit, but this form of attack... is for the present to be interpreted only as an experiment with the object of eliminating the dreaded flak on the Brenner."

This was in fact a good example of a highly successful technique developed by the Twelfth Air Force in the course of the winter, especially with the use of Shoran.

Another example of successful Twelfth Air Force operations appears in a report of February 25th. the

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essence of which is the phrase "additional interruption of the Brenner".

February also revealed in the North Italy theater what had come of German attempts to resuscitate the Italian Air Force, of which a glimpse had been seen in the autumn. The Second Group was operational at Aviano and Osoppo with 35 Me. 109s, of which 23 were the now obsolescent Me. G6. The First Group had just completed training in Germany and the Me. 109s were being brought to Italy. A Third Group had 80 crews training in Germany, but no aircraft.

Communications and transport attacks in general were extended during this period to places of vital importance for the flow of supplies to the Eastern Front. On the 15th an intercepted message of un-decipherable origin or address reports attacks on the 14th in the following terms:

"About 1000 four-engined with about 750 fighters, bombs dropped at Dresden, Chemnitz, Zwickau, Glauchau, Crimmitschau, Bamberg area, Munster, and other places. About 550 twin-engined, bombs dropped, among other places, at Andernach, Bad Kreuznach, Koblenz, Speyer, area Karlsruhe. In area of Army Group G, about 500 fighter-bombers with numerous attacks on traffic targets in Saarphalz, area Karlsruhe, area Bottweil."

On the 10th the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin telephoned to Tokio an account of information passed on to him by a semi-official contact in the German Foreign Office. Most of the message is worthless,

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but a paragraph of interest says:-

"In this connection one of the neutral Ministers in Berlin had telegraphed to his Government asking them to advise Britain and America to stop terror-bombing the capital, as this was driving the German people into the arms of Russia."

In the opinion of the Japanese Minister, "that was interesting, regardless of whether it brought any results or not."

A report not deciphered until the 17th, from the German Admiralty, says:-

"On 6/2 between E-0855...and 1220 hours, 1000 American four-engined aircraft with strong fighter protection in Central Germany industrial area, schwerpunkt Magdeburg. Serious damage to industry and traffic system there. Railway lines cut in numerous places. In addition, attacks on Chemnitz, Gotha, Gera, Schmalkalden, Arnstadt and Poeszneck. Serious damage to traffic system at all targets, as well as moderate to light industrial damage."

Such attacks continued throughout the month, and there are several similar reports on different dates. A message not deciphered until the 19th effects sweeping reorganization of the various G.A.F. Commands in the East into more compact operational units. The general effect of this long message, however, comes clearly out of a single fragment:-

"II. In the course of creating the new set-up the following will be:

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A. Disbanded:

Luftgau XV, Jagdfliegerfuehrer Silesia,
Jagdfliegerfuehrer East Prussia."

Several other diplomatic and commercial messages throughout the month stressed the extreme damage done by the Eighth Air Force's attack on Berlin on the 3rd, but the details are too vague to be worth repeating.

A message from G.A.F. Command West on the 20th relays to its jet units a circular from OKL on the subject:

"Fuel J2 for aircraft with TL jet engines.

The orders previously issued concerning economy in the use of aircraft fuel and control of operations of flying units apply equally to fuel J2 and to aircraft 8-162, Me. 262 and Ar. 234. The monthly production, compared with possibilities of consumption, is very small, so that fuel for current needs must be met by eating into stocks, which are also very small. As the TL jet engines have a relatively high consumption, it is absolutely forbidden for these particular aircraft to taxi under their own power prior to taking off and after landing and also to and from their parking places. Exceptions are only permitted in special cases, when the situation compels. The consumption of J2 in M/T is forbidden. Remember that an Me. 262 consumes 200 litres of J2 while taxi-ing for 5 minutes under its own power. 5 Me. 262s consume in this space of time as much fuel as one 8-162 requires for one operation.

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Please issue further instructions and arrange for the strictest supervision of flying."

On February 14th the following personal message was addressed by Himmler to Alvensleben, the head of the SS organization in Dresden:-

"I have received your report. The attacks were obviously very severe, yet every first air raid always gives the impression that the town has been completely destroyed. Take all necessary measures at once. I am sending you at once a particularly able SS Fuehrer for your staff, whom you may find useful in the present difficult situation. All the best."

On the 17th the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin communicated with the Japanese Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and the Vice-Minister of War in a message somewhat garbled, which Intelligence has translated in the following sense:-

"I am filled with anxiety about the results of the heavy bombing of Tokio on the 16th. I find it quite impossible to believe the enemy propaganda which apparently states that advocates of peace have raised their heads inside Japan....."

The remainder of the message is only a fulsome and bombastic assurance to Tokio of the Military Attache's faith in the Homeland and ultimate victory.

A long message of the 22nd dealt with general subject of construction of blast bays for parked aircraft in the Reich, and emphasized, as usual, the Fuehrer's interest in this subject. This was a

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familiar recourse to stress urgency on any subject, but the last paragraph sheds some light on German thought with the following words:-

"In view of the particular importance of jet aircraft, the factory and unit airfields occupied by these aircraft are to have priority of development. Gauleiters are to be requested in this matter for specially urgent support."

The urgent support requested was, of course, for civilian and slave labor, whom the Gauleiters customarily furnished for special projects.

On the 17th the Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin reported that three of his assistants had visited the G.A.F. bomb groups stationed at Trondheim in Norway to exchange lessons derived from operational experience. They found the elements of the two remaining groups of K.G. 26, which had always specialized in torpedo work, in a state of low morale and activity, largely induced by want of fuel and their evident end of all effective connection with the war. The text is scarcely worth reading, although in the conclusion it pays handsome tribute to the effectiveness of rocket projectiles against shipping, as demonstrated by the Beaufighters and Mosquitoes of the Royal Air Force.

Several of the Japanese diplomatic reports of this period quote both Steengracht and Ribbentrop to the general effect that the Germans would hold along the Oder and counter-attack in force through Silesia, but it is impossible to tell whether again this might be a partially truthful explanation of the evident Russian delay at these positions.

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A telegraph of the 22nd from the Japanese Naval Attache appears to have been an objective and thoughtful piece of work, which in the main seems fairly accurate, and is there reproduced in full. It will be noted in the case of this, as in all other Japanese messages, that the original text was so garbled that the whole thing had to be interpolated and paraphrased by Intelligence. Nevertheless, this is considered an accurate reproduction of what was dispatched:-

"A. According to the Naval Attache's information, monthly production of first-line aircraft was in the region of 2,800-3,000. This and other Japanese estimates were 'believed to possess a high degree of accuracy', and were 'considerably lower' than 'the figures for production given by the German Ministry of Munitions, the Propaganda Ministry, and the Air Force authorities', which were 'figures mainly representing the production of airframes, etc.' which appeared to have included 'figures for production which was only projected', and which had 'always been exaggerated'. It was clear that from now on the Germans could not 'hope for any very great increase in their productive power', while the loss of Upper Silesia would result in 'a further decrease in production of several hundred aircraft'. The fact that the Germans had failed in their aim of achieving a monthly output of 6,000 aircraft at the end of 1944 was ascribed by the Naval Attache to 'direct damage through bombing', 'alterations in the production machinery used and the dispersal and rebuilding underground

of factories', 'the large scale changeover...to fitting rocket engines', interruptions to the belt conveyor system as a result of the 'decisive and systematic bombing of lines of communication and transport', concentration on high altitude and high performance aircraft, and loss of productive capacity of occupied areas. First line strength was of the order of 6,000-6,500 aircraft.

"B. 'From the point of view of the capability of the aircraft, although the Germans have a fair number of partial advantages over the enemy in the Air Force materials and equipment, yet, apart from their aircraft being slightly inferior to those of the British and Americans in high altitude performances and endurances, they are markedly inferior in number, and it is hard to see how they can make up for lack of quantity by quality. However, the Germans are hoping that they can bring about some slight improvement in the war situation by bringing into service on a large scale the rocket aircraft which they have managed to put into service ahead of the enemy (it is thought, by about six months to a year).'
As a result of the 'systematic and concentrated bombing of oil resources..., the German aviation spirit supplies have been very strictly curtailed and most of the new air crews have not received adequate training in the new, high-performance aircraft. Thus the average ability of air crews has, it must be acknowledged, greatly decreased.' Morale was good, but it was the Japanese view that 'those in command of operations, despite our giving them our opinion

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in the same terms on every occasion, are still being too economical of strength, too concerned with cutting down their losses, and avoiding a drain on their strength, and altogether too negative in their strategy, so that this seems to be having a bad effect on the spirit of their airmen'.

"C. 'The enemy's air forces' ceaseless bombing directed deliberately and systematically against oil production centres, and the loss of oil-bearing regions, are, despite the utmost efforts made by the Germans, having a very great effect on the future of the war. Moreover, bomb damage is disorganizing and interrupting the smoothness of fuel supply and distribution, and of lines of communication. The Germans are trying by the utmost economy to find some way out of their present difficulties and they have hopes of shortly (they say about March) starting production in new underground plants. However, it is an open question whether they will attain their program and thus be able to overcome the present crisis. (The fuel for their final trump-card has already been assured). At present their yearly production of natural oil (800,000--900,000 tons) and synthetic oil (2,500,000 tons) is said to amount to a total of 3,000,000 tons. However, even supposing 10% of the synthetic oil is refined for aviation fuel, the yearly production would amount to 800,000 tons and even if they have besides a certain amount in store, it will be very difficult for the Germans adequately to maintain their Air Force at its present strength or increase it, taking their transport problem as well into account. Again

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there are technical difficulties in regard to the amount of special material that can be produced for fuel in the Me. 163. They have been able to produce only one-tenth of the projected amount (a full load for 200 aircraft for a single flight.)

"D. The Naval Attache appreciated that since the end of 1943 it had been the aim of the G.A.F. 'to surpass the enemy at least in fighters and small type aircraft...to recover supremacy over the battlefield, to defend their essential munitions production.' 'Gigantic efforts' had been made toward realization of this scheme, but it was the view of the Attache that in present circumstances 'these plans will not enjoy fruition'. Though they may by their resourcefulness achieve partial successes in their counter-measures against the large-scale attacks of the enemy's strategic air forces, yet in the main issue they will as before leave the initiative in operation in the hands of the enemy. However, even in the present grave crisis those directing operations and those engaged in every branch of the technical field have lost none of their natural skill and are still making the utmost efforts. The young men naturally, because the vast majority of the people know how terrible are the results of defeat, are all every one throwing themselves into their duties under strong leadership; and it is in this fact that their one and only strength lies. Nevertheless, although they are not without hope of recovery in the war situation in the future, it seems very probable that they are being gradually overshadowed

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by the enemy's quantitative superiority and are headed towards a complete exhaustion of their strength."

The large scale changeover to "rocket" engines referred to in paragraph A was illustrated on February 19th, when recognition orders were issued on Fighter Aircraft 162. This "162" had first been heard of in January in a message which at the time didn't mean much except that some kind of extensive assembly program was under way. By February 1st Intelligence had decided that this 162 was the single-engined jet fighter, the Volksjaeger, about which we had heard from the Japanese intercepts in November. But the prospect of such immediate operations was something of a jolt. So was a message of February 26th reporting the crash of a 162 (now labelled Heinkel) on a test flight at Schwechat at the Heinkel Works. Here was indeed evidence of large scale and rapid development.

The possibility of the Me. 262 fighter still loomed with little evidence beyond the fact that on February 19th J.G. 7 instructed its units that as there would be no operations they were free for training. It was interesting that the directive concluded with the remark - "Flying will be in closer formation than hitherto." But, the formations were limited to Kette strength, that is two aircraft.

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It has been noted that the two pre-conditions for decisive success with the fuel program were the maintenance of a high degree of destruction and the operation of intensive demand caused by active large-scale fighting. March was to see these two approaching their climax. The first message in the March folder demonstrates still another facet in the fuel shortage. The German plans to withdraw into the Redoubt area of Lower Bavaria and Bohemia are well known. On the 26th a signal within the SS itself read as follows:

"Subject: Bringing Back of Valuable Scientific Material.

With the situation at the front as it now is and the shortage of transport and petrol, the bringing back of the scientific material of Professor Dr. Unversagt can no longer be guaranteed."

Unfortunately, we have no further light on what particular deviltry Dr. Unversagt and the SS were discussing.

The emergence of the Me.262 jet aircraft was to come forward in a long stride through March, as had been predicted. On the 2nd the Eighth Air Force attacked Central Germany, and of this mission the Regional Fighter Command, Jagddivision 7, was to write:

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"From 0637 to 0945 hours, 14 Silber (Me.262) of I/KG 54 put in action against the four-engined aircraft in the area of Fulda. Successes: none. Losses: 2 Me.262 shot down shortly after takeoff by Mustangs. (Me.262) destroyed, 1 pilot killed, 1 pilot baled out, slightly wounded, 1 Me.262 made a belly-landing, percentage crash not yet ascertained, pilot uninjured."

KG 54 was, of course, one of the new groups, carefully nurtured for interceptor work and just now coming into operations. In other reports it was referred to as KG(J)54 showing that it was part of the Fliegerkorps IX (J) plan and that the unit was in no way a bomber unit.

On February 27th the Eighth Air Force made a very heavy attack on Berlin. In a description of it in a message not deciphered until March 3rd, the Japanese Ambassador says:

"The Germans say that the number of bombers engaged in the raid was over 1000 (enemy broadcasts have it that 3000 tons of bombs were dropped by 1200 Fortresses and Liberators), and it is stated to be the heaviest raid so far, either by day or by night."

In the first week of March occurred an event that was to transform the whole of Allied strategy and the war itself. As is often the case, the "ULTRA" does not tell the whole story, and yet a badly garbled message issued at 2240 on the 7th,

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signed C. in C. West, Von Rundstedt, tells perhaps enough to indicate the gravity of what has happened:

"..... remain in possession of this or any other bridge. It is of decisive importance that the situation near Remagen or Erpel be thoroughly cleaned up this very night, and that the bridge be immediately destroyed with lasting effect.

3. To be laid on for this purpose:

All available elements of 11 Panzer Division, all emergency defense units that can be got hold of by any means whatever the bridge is to be kept under harrassing fire.

4. G.A.F. Command West will establish immediate liaison with Army Group B, in order, by employing all aircraft suitable for the purpose, to destroy the bridge by bombing.

5. Army Group G, in direct lisison with Army Group B, will make available to the latter the Naval special detachment (Flossenschwimmer) arriving on 8/3. Army Group E will settle its employment.

6. The setting in train of each individual measure is to be reported to me.

7. Independently of this, an investigation into the neglect of duty is to be instituted forthwith. If appropriate, the guilty parties are to be reported to me, with an exact account of the matter."

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Thereafter there were repeated orders to bomb the bridge, both by day and night.

On the 6th the Japanese Naval Attache signalled Tokyo a detailed report on German aircraft production based upon information "obtained recently from the Technical authorities of the German Air Force." Only three paragraphs are of sufficient general interest to record:

"(a) The productive capacity of the aircraft industry is now showing a considerable decline. Directly or indirectly the continuous bombing has contributed largely to bring this about, but on the other hand technical administration has suffered in the past from faults enumerated below, and these seem to constitute the underlying cause of the decline in air power. This indicates the vital importance of the possession by the Operations Department of sufficient technical knowledge to be able to give appropriate (corrupt? guidance to technical research).

(b) Before it was decided to adopt the present policy of concentrating to an extreme degree on the production of (? fighters), the successive modifications in production types and other alterations which were made in production plans resulted in a lowering of production efficiency.

(c) It has proved possible to perfect and put into service a "TL" engine which does not require high-grade fuel, but the oil refineries

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operate on the principle of the I.G. Company's process (? synthetic) which is not suitable for this purpose because that method has as its main object the production of high-grade fuel. Moreover, the damage from bombing due to the installations being concentrated in a few places has been serious. For these reasons it has been impossible to secure production on an adequate scale of the fuel necessary for aircraft equipped with "TL" engines. Again the I.G. Company's process produces few by-products, and cannot meet the demands for synthetic resin for wooden aircraft. If, on the other hand, the coal liquefaction process had been adopted, damage from bombing could have been minimized by the use of dye factories scattered all over the country, and a sufficient quantity of by-products would have been available."

NOTE: "TL" is, of course, Turbine-Luft, which was the German term for the jet motor.

On the 12th a message from the Production and Works Minister, evidently in Luftgau VI (Headquarters Muenster), to the Luftgau itself complains bitterly of fuel shortage and concludes:

"Despite several inquiries to Luftgau VI, the delivery for the first ten day period of February had not yet arrived by the 10 th of March. The immediate delivery of the fuel for the first ten day period of February and March is urgently necessary, since otherwise the

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whole flying-in service at the plant named above will have to cease. I would be grateful if a decision could be sent to me at Fieseler Works, Kassel, as speedily as possible."

We have noted many times and in many places the German preoccupation with suicide ramming as a means to air victory. Principally, it was Goering and Kesselring who could envisage the sacrifice of other peoples' lives with such bravery and bombast, It was not surprising, therefore, as the future became evident even to them to find Goering once again contemplating the most heroic of all possibilities for someone else to perform:-

"A copy of the following memorandum is sent to you for your information:

On the orders of the Reichsmarschall, the following appeal is to be read to all pilots who have completed or almost completed their bombing (K) training in the fighter units of Luftflotte Reich, of the R/T JGs of AO for Fighters and of the units of AO for Training. It is to be read by senior officers holding the rank of Geschwaderkommodore, the pilots being laid under an express obligation to keep it secret:

The fateful struggle for the Reich, our people and our native soil, is at its climax. Almost the whole world is fighting against us and is resolved to destroy us and, in its blind hatred, to exterminate us. With our last and

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utmost strength we are opposing this menacing flood. As never before in the history of the German Fatherland, we are threatened with final annihilation, from which no rebirth will be possible. This danger can only be arrested by the utmost preparedness of the highest German warrior spirit. Therefore, I turn to you at this decisive moment. By consciously staking your lives, save the nation from extinction. I SUMMON YOU TO AN OPERATION FROM WHICH THERE IS ONLY THE SLIGHTEST POSSIBILITY OF YOUR RETURNING. Those of you who respond will be sent back at once for flying training. Comrades, yours will be the seat of honor of the G.A.F., besides its most glorious warriors. In the hour of the most pressing danger, you will give the whole German people hope of victory, and be an example for all time.

Signed: GOERING."

"The number of pilots who volunteer on this basis is to be reported, divided according to units. The final selection of the pilots will then be made by GABEG (CIC G.A.F.) in agreement with GAKIA (AO for Fighters)."

There remains only disputable evidence about how seriously this was actually attempted. Prisoners of war captured later did say circumstantially that they had been trained for ramming and it appears that a few attempted it on April 7th. That day they were certainly being exhorted to it by a program of emo-

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tional encouragement which included the female singing of Deutschland-Uber-Alles and the Horst Wessel song, over one of the R/T frequencies used by German fighter pilots for control. These were monitored on the "Y" Service and, apparently, the pilots on that day were exhorted to ram.

One possible instance was recorded in our crew observations and, although this might have been a collision, the probability is that a few of the most ardent young Nazis actually did try it on that date.

It should be pointed out that we probably would have no record of a successful suicide ramming, especially against an isolated bomber, and it seems quite possible that such episodes occurred, though never on a large or systematic scale.

At the time this message was received, March 15th, this possibility was carefully considered and reported. Another possibility carefully considered was that of suicide dive bombing missions against the Rhine or Oder bridges, possibly connected with radio controlled planes, pick-a-back planes or merely planes filled with H.E. There is some fragmentary evidence that the Germans were attempting this, but no complete account of it ever emerged in "ULTRA".

The rather ambiguous context of the message will be noted. Undoubtedly, there was a great flurry of activity about this kind of operation in the G.A.F. at the time, but "ULTRA" never happened to intercept the messages that would have made a clear and coherent story of this phase.

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If these dreams of the time seem wild and feverish it is because they were so. A clearer picture of the whole nightmare, from which they were born, emerges again from a local Gauleiter, driven by desperation to appeal over channels to Goering himself:-

"In continuation of my report of 5 March, I am making following correction, that according to information of Oberst Handrick, Kommandeur of 8 Jagddivision, Vienna, fighters could be made available immediately, if 50 to 100 cbm of fuel are procured. I would earnestly ask the Reichsmarschall, in view of the special importance for armaments which Styria possesses at the present time for the Reich, to give the necessary order. Heil Hitler!"

It has been illustrated how the fuel shortage finally drove the Germans back upon the desperate and ironic expedient of using old Ju.87's, even at a time when they had excellent FW 199's available in quantity, simply because the fuel program had by now so drastically curtailed the kind required for the better modern aircraft. Three groups of these old Ju.87's were actually used intermittently at night on the Western Front through the last months of the war, and "ULTRA" has provided us with a very appropriate epitaph for one of them, written from G.A.F. Station Lippe on the 14th of March:-

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"1. Air Situation: 0845 hours air-raid alarm sounded by plotting office of G.A.F. Station Lippe.

2. Course of Attack: (a) Number of aircraft:

1st attack 16 to 20 Thunderbolts & Mustangs

2nd attack 12 to 16 Thunderbolts

3rd attack 12 Thunderbolts.

(b) Duration of attack:

1st attack: 0955 to 1040 hours

2nd attack: 1045 to 1129 hours

3rd attack: 1345 to 1420 hours

(c) Type of attack: Bombs and strafing.

3. Weather situation.

4. Losses.

(a) a/c: 22 Ju.87 probably total loss through strafing.

(b) Personnel: 1 airman of the gruppe killed.

(c) Other damage: 1 car burned out, 200 liters of fuel and 300 liters Diesel fuel burned out. Articles of clothing and equipment which were packed in burned-out a/c.

Damage to station buildings, 2 dwelling houses badly damaged, 1 barn and 2 stables burned out....."

All these groups had been ordered at various times to bomb the Remagen bridge. A report of the 15th from G.A.F. Command West gives the best indication available how clearly the Germans realized

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the peril inherent in that fateful structure and is worth reprinting in entirety for its significance:

"Extract from No 5832 issued late on 15/3, from G.A.F. Command West, IC, signed Kruse, Hptm:

Own Ops: (A) Fighter Ops. 320 a/c (232 FW 190, 88 Me.109) of which 2 FW 190 on weather reconnaissance, Remagen. 148 a/c (60 FW 190, 88 Me. 109), fighter sweep and engaging low-flying a/c area Remagen, 88 FW 190 fighter and bomber attacks on Remagen bridges and enemy concentrations and troop movements in Honnef-Linz-bridgehead. 82 FW 190 attacking Marauders in area Rheine-Muenster-Wesel. Losses: (partial report) Air crews: 2 killed, 4 missing, 2 wounded. Aircraft: 4 destroyed, 4 missing, 1 damaged.

(b) Bombing Ops: 50 a/c (28 Silber (Me.262), 20 Zinn (Ar.234), 2 FW 190, of which 24 (Me.262) and 3 (Me.262) broke off owing to technical trouble. Attacks on Cleve-Xanten area. Losses: Air Crews: 9 missing, 1 wounded. Aircraft: 0 destroyed, 1 missing, 0 damaged.

20 a/c (4 Me.262, 14 Ar.234, 2 FW 190) attacks in Remagen bridgehead area. Losses: (partial report) 1 Me.262 missing.

(c) Recce Ops: 5 a/c (3 Ar.234, 2 Me.109) Recce by 1 Ar.234 in NE France. 2 Ar.234 broke off owing to weather situation. 2 Me.109 - bridge - recce, Remagen."

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Mention has already been made of the principal jet planes which first Intelligence and then crew reports observed. From the beginning of the year, however, a series of reports from a multiplicity of sources had been indicating very large scale plans for still another type, which ultimately was identified as the He.162. The Intelligence was anomalous. It pointed on the one hand to a staggering production and output of small single pilot, expendable jet aircraft. On the other hand no large-scale training had been observed or noted and details of all important points remained maddeningly elusive. Reconnaissance had seen many types never entirely explained, but small jets had been observed at Schwechat, and the firm of Heinkel had been clearly implicated from many sources.

Full details of the development of the jet program may be studied in the separate paper upon the subject incorporated into the files of this record, but as an instance of the Intelligence of the time the following message was intercepted on the 16th:

"Detachment LT. Hachtel can take over in a few days the ferrying of 162 a/c (pl) from Vienna-Schwechat to Lechfeld. Pilots need a few more practice take-offs until then. The pilots must return if possible by a/c. I request immediate information."

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On the 13th the following message was addressed to the German representatives in Madrid and Lisbon by the German Foreign Minister:

"The Times quotes a statement of the Allied Supreme Command that terror bombing raids on German towns are deliberate military policy. Please send the complete text of this statement."

On the 13th the Japanese Naval Attache, industrious as ever, signalled Tokyo information obtained in a long interview with Koller, Chief of Staff of the G.A.F. The evident interest of the G.A.F. in misleading the Japs has been emphasized before and should always be borne in mind when examining such testimony. None the less, Koller emerges from all these interviews as a thoughtful man and a sorely troubled one, and he evidently had spoken with great candor. The quotation is, of course, the Jap's text, but he quotes Koller as having said to him:

"The German Air Force was still at a low ebb. The main reason for this was shortage of fuel due to damage to oil installations by enemy bombing and transport troubles. Every possible step was being taken to alleviate this, but, unfortunately, such measures would take some considerable time."

The Naval Attache was shown photographs of the Me.262, Ar.234, B and C, and the He. 162, and Koller referred to the excellent results obtained by these

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new rocket aircraft as fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and bombers. He said that great expectations were held of them and spoke of the disappointments and delays that attended the production of such novel types, on account of enemy bombing and the solution of technical problems and ceaseless modifications.

Later in the same interview Koller went on to remarks which the Jap recorded as saying that in the west the RAF, like the G.A.F. "was predominantly adapted to the requirements of Continental Europe, the cruising range of its aircraft being comparatively small. The American Air Force, both as regards bombers and fighters, had the characteristics of a trans-oceanic force and was operating over the whole of Europe, and, what was more, under fighter cover. Germany's present plight could be ascribed in part to ^{the} tardiness with which the G.A.F. had set about equipping itself with this kind of offensive aircraft, and to the lead which the enemy had been allowed to establish in the development of wireless equipment."

As evidence of Koller's admission that the "G.A.F. was still at a low ebb", there was deciphered on the 19th a message from the Commander of Luftflotte 6, still opposing the Russians but now deeply within Germany itself. It will be remembered that once upon a time a routine day's operations reports would record from 1200 to 1600 sorties by the active Luftflotte opposing the Russians. Now in mid-March of 1945 the General commanding the Luftflotte was to

say:

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"I will make my permission for the setting up of the Volksturm night harrassing staffel, mentioned in the above reference, dependent upon the submission of detailed documentary evidence concerning efficiency, composition, etc. (bomb racks), as with the present fuel situation, ^{is} a matter of using the best crews to make the best possible use of the very small fuel supplies available."

When one considers that the strength of such a staffel was probably no more than the normal nine planes, the full gravity of Germany's plight stands revealed in an air fleet commander's concern over such trifles.

The low ebb of matters in North Italy is to be measured by a report on the situation for March 3rd. Allied effort was mainly in the front area south of Modena but attacks elsewhere caused damage to railway installations, roads and rolling stock. Two railway bridges received heavy direct hits, and the Brenner line was interrupted. The G.A.F. had up its close reconnaissance aircraft and reported several trucks effectively shot-up. As if its own troubles were not enough, later in the month the North Italy Command was informed that Luftflotte Reich could no longer protect the South German supply routes with flak. Thus G.A.F. Upper Italy found itself charged with all the Tyrolean routes in addition to its commitments in North Italy.

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In addition to the interview of the Japanese Naval Attache with Koller just reported, there was deciphered on the 20th a message which appears to have originated this time from the Japanese Military Attache. It is quoted in full for its relevance:

"(a) We asked General Koller about any methods of dealing with combined attacks by enemy fighters and bombers which the German Air Force, with its experience of such attacks, had discovered; since the loss of Iwo Jima now meant that American long-range escorting fighters would be able to raid Japan proper. General Koller replied that the best method was to concentrate attacks on the bombers as well as the fighters. This was because the enemy aircraft had travelled a long distance over the sea and thus even if they were only damaged they would probably have to land on water on their way back.

(b) In reply to a question about methods of dealing with low-level attacks, the General said that for this purpose it was necessary not only to use fighters but also to have in readiness a large number of anti-aircraft guns. The German Air Force was now being equipped with large numbers of triple-mounted 20 mm. machine guns, which were being extremely successful against this kind of attack."

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An indication of the by now universal difficulty under which the oil shortage had placed all of Germany emerges through the air channels in a message from the G.A.F. Chief of Staff, General Koller, to the G.A.F. Command East Prussia, dated March 23rd:

"As the exceptionally strained position of 2 and 4 Armies is clearly recognized, everything is being done at this end to bring relief to the hard fighting ground troops by bringing up flak ammunition and aircraft fuel for flying formations. The shortage of aircraft fuel on all fronts and in defense of the Reich, however, makes it impossible to bring up any large quantities of aircraft fuel. Aircraft fuel stock on evening of 22/3 in East Prussia, 32 tons, with 9 ton days' consumption. West Prussia, 32 tons with 8 ton days' consumption. Being brought up: 93 tons in tanker from Liebau and 27 tons in ship from Swinemunde."

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A serviceable rule of thumb estimate for fighter consumption is reckoned at half a ton per sortie for single-engine fighters, from which calculation the poverty of the above position stands forth in all its harshness.

At the opposite end of German defenses a message from one of the local Fighter Commands on the 25th says simply:

"According to decision of G.A.F. Command West, the fighter protection requested cannot be provided, partly because no fuel is available, partly because of very low operational strength."

Although jet aircraft production remained in many underground places invulnerable, there were other ways of countering the jet threat, and the success of these is well attested following the Fifteenth Air Force attacks on a hot-bed of jet activity at Neuberg in a message from what now became the over-riding command of all jet interceptor activity:

"Dated 26/3. 24/3/45, attack on Neuberg, 1047 to 1153 hours. 250 four-engined aircraft. 6 Ahorn (jet a/c, 0% Me.262) total damage, 6 Ahorn, 10 to 80%, 2 Ar.96, 10%, 1 workshop vehicle 40%, 1 starting apparatus - Anlassgeraet - and tools damaged.

Personnel losses: 5 dead, of these 1 armed forces female assistant; 2 injured, of these 1 armed forces female assistant.

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Damage on 21/3, damage increased on 24/3:
1 Ahorn, 5 to 40% to 1 Ahorn destroyed completely, 9 Ahorn from 50 to 90%, 1 Ar.96 from 10 to 30%. Almost entirely fragmentation and incendiary bombs. Dispersal area strewn with fragmentation bombs to extent of 4 to 5 km..... hits by fragmentation bombs on runway. Runway conditionally serviceable for (B% take-off) and landing. 24/3, attacks on four-engined a/c. 11 bombs on parking place - Liegeplatz - and (B% edge of airfield). (C% no damage) "

For the same reason Prag Gbell airfield was heavily attacked and, although jets themselves appear to have escaped, the damage report makes pleasant enough reading as it stands:

"(1) Document dated 26/3 signed (B% 9) Flieger Div. (Roman) (C% C): 25/3 (B% attack) on Prag Gbell from 1050 to 1220 hours, 300 Fortresses and Liberators. 11 BF 109 destroyed, 51 BF 109 splinter damage, 2 M/T losses, 1 light towing vehicle with arms trailer and 20 drums field quad cable damaged. Personnel casualties: 4 dead (amongst them (C% 1) Signals Officer, 5 badly wounded, 10 slightly wounded. ANC: 4 hangars and Gruppe Battle Hq badly damaged. 1105/26/3 airfield for 4 km radius nothing but splinter bombs. Station and civilian population fairly strong..... emergency area Wisetchan large calibre H.E. bomb.

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(2) From 9th Flieger Div. 10, dated 26/3:
Correction, Attack Prague-Gbell 25/3.

Instead of 11 BF 109, 10 BF 109 and
1 Ar.96 destroyed. Instead of 51 BF 109, 48
BF 109, 2 Ar.96 damaged by splinters. Losses
in personnel raised to 7 dead, badly injured
now 2 instead of 5."

During these days great efforts were being made
to forge the jet aircraft into a last minute instru-
ment of salvation. These moves are proof of the
great, and probably justified, faith which the
Germans had in them. On the other hand, it is dif-
ficult to believe that they had so little under-
standing of their situation as to suppose that any
effort could turn the scales. They quite under-
standably were possessed of a mania to find something
that would knock down those never ending parades of
heavy bombers from the west. But it is possible
that they had a more reasonable desire to find an
instrument to use against the Russians. The ulti-
mate appearance of the Me.262 in May was against the
Russian armies in the Dresden area, and apparently
it enjoyed some success.

By the middle of March it was clear that
Goering was stirring himself, possibly to stave off
the peril to his personal position he must have then
known to be imminent. On March 17th the Luftgans
were told that on his wishes daily reports on
serviceable and unserviceable Me.262 and Ar.234 with
details of missing parts were to be telephoned to

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someone especially appointed at a special telephone number. From then on a good deal was heard of the Special Commissioner of the Reichsmarschall for Jet and Rocket Aircraft.

But the Nazi Chiefs were moving in on the G.A.F. as they had threatened to in the past. On March 29th orders went out, based on a Fuehrer Order of the 27th, transferring entire control of jet aircraft to the grandiosely titled General Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for Jet-Propelled and Rocket Aircraft. The Command was given to Dr. Ing. Kammler, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS, who had given great satisfaction as controller of all the flying-bomb and rocket organizations. An elaborate hierarchy was set up in which the Luftwaffe was represented by the somewhat outmoded General Kamhuber. But the plan does indicate that operationally the G.A.F. retained some control. A Liaison Officer to General Peltz is named. Peltz had retained his Fliegerkorps IX command and as the only G.A.F. General of any real energy had nursed it into an overall command for all fighter forces. Evidence of this control appeared in March 30th when Fliegerkorps IX appointed an inspector for Me.163 with injunctions to hurry up that aircraft, especially to get a second group into operation.

But all of these efforts were a case of too much too late.

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We have seen innumerable instances of the G.A.F. weaknesses and troubles and how progressively and inexorably our efforts compounded both. It is not only fair, it is vitally necessary to understand the other side of this picture. By the end of March the G.A.F. like Germany itself was, for all intents and purposes, a shattered ruin; yet, upon the 30th was intercepted a long and rather technical message setting forth the training program for ground attack units during April. Even then the originating authority, Air Officer for Ground Attack, saw clearly that he could not allot more than an average of 20 tons of low grade fuel per staffel, or probably fewer than 40 training sorties, for the four specified staffels. Yet the very crux and core of this matter is not in the message; it is in the simple fact that at that date and in that condition the G.A.F. was still making serious energetic efforts to prepare for training to continue the battle.

The world has seen many instances of determination, but history will record none more striking than the last of the German resistance. It is what made them, until the very end, so formidable; it is what, with the slightest opportunity, would make them even more formidable next time.

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On the 1st of April the American 1st and 9th Armies announced the closing of the Ruhr trap. In fact, most of the Ruhr had already been destroyed and had been cut off from communications with the rest of Germany through most of March. Substantial German armies were surrounded in the area, however, and on the 1st the Chief of Staff of the C. in C. West signalled Army Group B at one o'clock:-

"Air supply not possible on a sufficient scale because of fuel situation in the convoy system."

It will be recollected that Army Group B was systematically compressed into the Ruhr pocket until it was hammered into capitulation. In recognition of this fate, Kesselring arose to new heights of ambiguity for his final message to Feldmarschall Model on the 9th, which said:-

"The brave Army Group B, under its well-trying command, has received a new independent and highly important task. For this purpose it is outwardly leaving the area of C. in C. West. It will, however, always be an integral part of our Western Front, and its deeds will never be forgotten.

"Together with my thanks and recognition, I send to you and Army Group B today my wishes for the continuance of the fight by Army Group B and for its successful conclusion."

On the same day, at 1630 hours, the officer commanding the Armed Forces Air Transport Section of the G.A.F.

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Staff also signalled to Army Group B:-

"There is no air transport space or fuel available for immediate supply by air."

There follow questions about the condition of landing strips in the pocket for possible future use, but it is evident that for air supplies, as for everything else except isolated battles by small units, often fiercely fought, the G.A.F. was helpless.

At 2200 hours that same night General Student, of Paratroop fame, also signalled to C. in C. West:-

"1. Intended attack on Haltern on 24 not yet possible because:

a. The fundamental prerequisites for attack cannot be achieved until tomorrow.

b. The available ammunition and fuel is in no way sufficient for such an attack."

Messages actually dated late in March, but not deciphered until the 3rd of April, reveal an almost identical condition on the other side of German defense, where Luftflotte 6 reported:-

".....we must point out exactly that supplies by air to Fortresses in the East and West Prussian areas cannot be carried out, as the fuel necessary for this is absolutely unavailable.....Supplies to these Fortresses can only be sent by sea."

On the 3rd a particularly heavy attack against Kiel was reported in a Naval War Staff sitrep in the following terms:

"Air raid on Kiel afternoon 3rd by 800-1000 bombers with strong fighter protection caused

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following damage and casualties: 2 U-boats, 1 small floating dock, 1 tug and 1 crane sunk. Steamship New York burning out (strong indications Monte Clivia) capsized, Dar Es Salaam with stern aground. Cruiser Emden hit in No. 3 boiler. Hipper also hit (comment details not available). Kiel canal southern lock damaged. Severe damage in dockyards and town.

"Secondly, Air Park Kiel--Holtenuau evening 4th reported an air attack on 3rd on Kiel. Town and A/F area. Damage to buildings slight; 3 Ar. 196 and 1 Caudron destroyed as ascertained so far. Damage to water supply and current not yet ascertained."

A second damage report on Kiel, also from the Naval War Staff, at six o'clock on the morning of the 6th reports:-

"According to a Naval special detachment supplementary report during the air attack on Kiel on 3/4, S201 was sunk. During another attack on Kiel on the morning of 4/4, in addition to damage already reported, 3 R-boats were sunk and 2 battle ferries destroyed. Damage in the shipbuilding yards, arsenal buildings and workshop."

At the opposite end of the defensive perimeter on the 4th, Army Group South was reporting:-

"Stocks of ammunition and fuel with units and formations have sunk so low that even with the most modest demands conduct of operations is no longer guaranteed."

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On April 5th the Japanese visited a Me. 262 fighter group. (The message was not deciphered and disseminated until May 5th). They learned what was quite true, that a Geschwader was in operation in North Germany, and another in South Germany. They also learned what problems in control and tactics the new fighter had raised. A fairly full discussion can be read in the notes in the April file.

"ULTRA" for April reveals operations by the Northern unit, notably on April 4th, when the G.A.F. made one of its last gestures against the American Air Forces. Forty nine operated, of which seven were lost. Nine victories were claimed. Twelve aircraft dropped out of the operation because of technical failure.

Regular jet fighter operations had at last begun. What would have happened then can never be known; for the development of the ground situation during April broke down all German plans.

Throughout the winter and spring arrangements had been in negotiation to send General Kessler of the G.A.F. to Tokio. The usual ambiguities of diplomatic language shroud the motives of this arrangement. At various times Kessler discussed the possibilities of going by submarine, and at least twice there were reports of his desire to fly by Ju. 290 over Siberia and the Arctic.

On the 28th the Japanese Naval Attache had a long talk with a veteran fighter in the G.A.F. who was to accompany Kessler, and signalled home to Tokio the fruits of his conversation and tactical recommendations.

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These appear to be of little actual merit, but they may be read in the context of the April file by anyone interested.

Kessler, it is believed, ultimately set out by submarine with the intention of helping the Japs on both conventional and jet manufacture and air tactics.

On the 29th of March the Japanese Naval Attache had another long heart-to-heart talk with Koller on the general subject of how to fight superior American air power. The interview was remarkable for little, most of its contents having been reported many times before, but it did bring out from Koller the admission that the high speed of the Me. 262 had at first been offset by the great disadvantage it imposed upon accurate gunnery. This difficulty, however, according to Koller, had been practically solved by fitting a new sight. What little of hope and optimism comes out of Koller's guarded statements is clearly based on the prospects of the 262.

From North Italy on April 7th came in a report of activity of the 6th, an impressive list of heavy damage to bridges and installations.

On the 9th Flak was to be moved to Munich, but must go by road, as all rail lines were out.

A situation report of the 14th, from the German C. in C. Southwest, contains a passage which can stand without comment as a picture of an air force in full operation:-

"The enemy Air Force, even the strategic, is being thrown in incessantly and tightly concentrated

at the focal points of the battle. Not only by day, but also by night, strong points, artillery positions, and battle headquarters are smothered with bomb carpets. Ground attack aircraft attack uninterruptedly, by day and night, every recognizable target. They fly unhindered at the lowest levels, pinning down our weapons and impeding our counter thrusts. Signals communications are constantly destroyed, so that for practical purposes the control of operations is made quite impossible for by far the greater part of the day and artillery forward observers are crippled. Liaison officers take hours to cover short distances. Movements even of the smallest reserves are well nigh impossible by day. If one orders them, nevertheless, they are smashed before they meet the enemy."

On the 17th the Japanese Naval Attache reported, in a badly garbled message to Tokio, the fruits of a conversation with Admiral Doenitz. For some time previously, Vice-Admiral Abe had persistently badgered the Germans to send their submarines to Japan, where he represented both the need and opportunities with a tact which noticeably wore thinner over the many weeks of negotiations and probably in direct proportion to the increasing pointedness of the Jap's remarks. It is evident that only the most superficial politeness covered this particular occasion. After another transparent excuse (from Doenitz) on the score of fuel, the Jap saw fit to barb the German with a question:-

"As to whether he was not finding the loss of basins, one after another, or bombing of these

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an increasing embarrassment."

Doenitz replied, however:-

"The damage to port installations and submarines, due to six air raids, could by no means be ignored, but in practice this damage was much less than one would imagine."

On the 7th the German fighter force made its last substantial effort. "ULTRA" gives only the scappiest evidence of the operation. It is worth recording, however, that on this date a few planes did appear to be operating with intention to ram, and at least one case of successful ramming was reported by our crews.

Additionally, the Germans appear to have put up everything available, and our claims of 168--20--49 as against losses of 10 tell their own story. Crews report the preponderance of German fighters were hopelessly green and inept. That the Germans themselves recognized this was evident in the intercepts of the R/T control. Over these female voices sang Deutschland uber Alles and the Horst Wessel song, and in the intervals highly emotional exhortations congratulated the green pilots on their opportunity to die for Fuehrer and Fatherland.

April saw many sweeping changes in the whole internal structure of the G.A.F. Preponderantly, these were changes of desperation, consolidation of a dwindling force into a compressed territory, and frantic efforts to find some man who could reorganize chaos and rebuild ruin.. In the course of these the SS showed its teeth and, briefly, had sufficient strength to secure the appointment of its own Oberfuehrer for all jet affairs,

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a command almost parallel to the existing one in the G.A.F. itself and clearly illustrative of the deep cleavage which now began to show between the die-hards and the more realistic.

In general, it may be said, however, that these reforms came to nothing; so complete was the chaos of communication, control and supply that authority could no longer be sure of where to address its units, whether they received the message, whether they were subordinated to a different command, whether they had equipment to operate at all, and, finally, of whether they were still loyal even to their own instinctive willingness to fight.

Thus on the 15th the Air Officer Commanding G.A.F. Command West, who was probably then, though not certainly, the veteran and capable Schmid of night fighter fame, instructed his subordinate commands as follows:-

"1) The enemy air arm is trying to cripple German defense completely.

"2) German fighters: Your ACC expects that you will do your duty even in the most difficult conditions, under commanders who fly with you and lead you in the air.

"3) I forbid the (B $\frac{1}{2}$ setting up and development) of Geschwader and Gruppe battle hqs, but expect that available radar positions without reinforcement by members of the Geschwaders will pass on a picture of the air situation in such an efficient manner that operations can follow without delay.

"4) It is the job of every fighter, regardless of his specific task, to shoot down enemy a/c, The general battle assignment for my fighters is therefore: up and at the enemy and shoot him down

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where you find him."

This order recognizes a condition of complete disintegration, if not anarchy. Schmid, in effect, renounces all responsibility for any better plan than instructing his forces to fly when they can and kill what they may.

On our side of the war, our conduct of operations had become restricted by an embarrassment of its own. Since the middle of March the rapid advancement of both Russian and Allied armies had pushed the bomb lines toward each other with such rapidity as to squeeze strategic bombardment slowly out of the war.

By mid-April there remained only small and relatively unprofitable sectors in the extreme north and extreme south of Germany, which were large enough to operate our forces over. The targets in these areas were all accessible to fighter bombers and mediums, and were now entirely of a short term or tactical nature. Although, on several occasions afterward, our heavies operated against these, the practice of strategic bombardment as such was clearly superseded. In recognition of these facts, General Spaatz, in a formal statement of the 16th of April, declared that strategic bombardment as such had come to an end.

To the very last, however, our Air Forces did continue unremitting vigilance over the remaining fragments of the G.A.F., and a relentless harrying of the collapsing German armies.

It should also be recorded that to the very last individuals and elements of the G.A.F. did maintain resistance, on their own initiative, with exemplary

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tenacity.

On the 23rd a message from the Headquarters of the G.A.F. recognized and encouraged this resolution in the following terms:-

"Owing to development of ground situation, considerable part of industrial capacity has dropped out. Supply of new aircraft of the latest fighter types only guaranteed to a limited extent.

"Put aside scruples on employment of aircraft of old production types. If necessary, use inferior types, taking advantage of the weather."

On the 26th the National Socialist Political Commissar of Army Group G, either took it upon himself or was directed to inform the 24th Army:-

"Every soldier is at once to know: The Fuehrer has personally taken over command of all forces for the defense of the Reich capitol. The Fuehrer is in Berlin."

On the 25th, Jodl, signing for the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, addressed Kesselring, Vietinghoff, Schoerner, Rendulic, Loehr and Winter as follows:-

"At the present stage of the war the fight is to be conducted with final determination against Bolshevism. Every available force is therefore to be put in against the Bolshevist arch enemy. In contrast to this, the loss of large areas of territory to Anglo-American forces fades into the background. However, any transfer of forces from West to East is subject to the permission of OKW."

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On the 30th Feldmarschall Schoerner signalled to Kesselring:-

"You have my word for it that the heroic death of our Fuehrer signifies for every soldier of my army group the obligation to fight on unconditionally in the southern battle area, which, it is hoped, will soon be under your command. The Bolshevist flood must and will be halted as it has been before. With a proud "in spite of all" we must now as never before be equal to the sternest test of all."

On the 30th, also, a message to a Command which clung wistfully to the title of Army Group Vistula says:-

"Gross Admiral Doenitz has been appointed Deputy to the Fuehrer."

No direct mention of Doenitz' succession to the post of Fuehrer itself appears in "ULTRA".

On the 1st of May, however, an emotional outburst over the signature of Keitel says in part:-

".....the only basis for the existence of the German people and the German Reich is our political and military cohesion. The highest law for the German Wehrmacht is still unconditional obedience to the new head of the State, whose orders are passed on through OKWNo one who lost his life for his people, even in the last minute, must be regarded as having died in vain. The Fuehrer has given his life to the German people. The life of the German people depends on the steadfastness and

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loyalty of the German Wehrmacht."

On the 5th a message of undeciphered origin or address, but evidently originating in the G.A.F., faced the future in the following terms:-

- "1) When the (B% Allied) Commissions arrive at G.A.F. stations, and at supply installations, etc., their official questions are to be answered (C% honestly) and frankly in the correct manner. Conversations going beyond the scope of what is necessary for the carrying-out of the purely official task are to be restricted to a minimum.
- "2) Above all, conversations with a political tendency or a political context are to cease or be suppressed. Communicativeness, characteristic of the Germans, is in this case detrimental to the matter in hand.
- "3) Private (C% conversations) between members of the commission with persons belonging to units, stations, etc., are to be avoided.
- "4) Measures and instructions concerning "Werewolf" are to be cancelled. Discussions on this subject are to cease.
- "5) In spite of the gravity of the situation, and the demands made on body and soul, it is above all important for Kommandeurs and officers to keep their nerve and to devote all their strength to preserving the discipline and cohesion of the troops."

Also on the 5th, a long order signed Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall, OKW, says in part:-

"If we lay down our arms in Northwest Germany,

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Denmark and Holland, that is because the battle against the Western powers has lost its meaning. In the East, however, the battle continues in order to save as many Germans as possible from Bolshevization and enslavement."

Nevertheless, the remainder of this rather long message instructs troops in the manner of laying down arms, surrendering equipment and accepting the authority of the German army for a policy of non-resistance henceforward.

At 0300 hours on the 5th a message signed Jodl says:-

"In the whole of the sphere of command of C. in C. Northwest, including Denmark, there will be a cessation of hostilities from 0600 hours 5/5."

The same message orders another army, whose identity is undecipherable, to -

"Try by all possible means to force its way through to American sphere of power."

At 1400 hours on the 5th the Naval War Staff issued orders to U-boats -

"To all: Cease hostilities against English and Americans forthwith."

Two more messages of the 8th contain detailed instructions to U-boats still operating for surrender and specified that there must be no sabotage or treachery.

Thereafter, only fragmentary and irrelevant messages from isolated commands and units, who did not know the true state of affairs, were received for a few more days before silence finally descended upon "ULTRA".

24 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL McCORMACK:

SUBJECT: "Ultra" history of USAAF vs. GAF prepared by Lt. Col. Haines.

1. Substance of History: The history is summed up in several sets of "conclusions" as follows:

a. Conclusion for period from Casablanca to Cairo: "This period saw the American concept of daylight precision bombing completely vindicated. Good intelligence usually emerges only long after the event. The immediate bits and scraps of vital information provided by the "ULTRA" source have been invaluable to contemporary operations and planning, but not until long after the fact, when they have been closely integrated with other evidence, does a clearer picture emerge.

"Even so, it is not a certain record and never will be. If every piece of paper in Germany were in our hands there would still remain conjecture as to what was in the minds and intentions of the opposing commanders at the time, and as to whether the paper itself represented the fact, hope, excuse or dream. Final estimates by Intelligence, therefore, are always opinion, and the following comments on the period from Casablanca to Cairo are offered only as such.

"It is considered that it was this period of the war which wounded the German Air Force beyond hope of recovery. The process had really begun late in 1942 when the Anglo-American air power began, feebly at first, to apply aerial pincers from both the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean.

"The essence of the matter was that these pincers forced the Germans into a scale of continuous combat for which, if it could be sustained, neither their air force nor the vital roots of a/c production and even training were adequate. It was sustained and, indeed, intensified.

"Recognizing the obvious end of such a course of events the Germans had introduced a series of plans for the expansion of their force and its underlying facilities. It was against this plan that the American Air Forces had to match their unique capability of forcing combat where the Germans dared not refuse it and destroying the roots of replacement and recovery by precision bombardment.

"They were able to force the Germans into the vicious cycle of trying to expand to increase their strength and simultaneously accepting fatal wastage of their strength to protect their efforts to expand.

"The progress, or rather the retrogression, of this vicious cycle was in full and fatal motion by the end of 1943, although its consequences, like those of any mortal wound, were not immediately apparent. Even by then, however, the German Air Force no longer had much

more than nuisance value on the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts, where continuous Allied successes were now offering such an evident contrast to the fortunes of war in the days of the Luftwaffe's greatness.

"Over Germany itself the G.A.F. would and did fight still as savagely as any animal at bay, but the very fighting only opened the wound further. German industrial resilience was finally to produce an enormously expanded production of fighters — too late. German ardor and courage were ultimately to produce impressive numbers of inadequately trained crews to man them — too late.

"But these indispensable requisites, that might in another year have made German Europe impregnable, were hopelessly and fatally delayed by the American Air Forces' unique capacity to destroy production by precision bombing, and to destroy, by killing, the life-blood of the G.A.F. in the air fighting that bombing provoked."

b. Conclusion for period Cairo to Normandy: "In conclusion of the evidence of American air effectiveness in the period from Cairo to Normandy, it is submitted that the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe had won complete aerial supremacy over all of Western Europe.

"This had been accomplished by a program of bombing which entirely frustrated the planned expansion of the German Air Force, and

by a scale of fighting over Germany itself which had so seriously undermined the strength of the existing forces as to preclude automatic opposition and to doom the effectiveness of the savage opposition that still appeared intermittently.

"The true weakness of the German Air Force was not of course to be fully exposed until the supreme test of invasion itself, for which its inadequacies will presently be recited. Yet the collapse of the facade of aerial strength which attempted to oppose our landings had only been achieved through weary months of the fighting and bombing that preceded the event.

"As a secondary accomplishment, which was only possible after the reduction of the German fighter defenses, USSTAF had begun with immediate and noticeable effect the program of oil attacks. These were to afflict every branch of the German armed forces with chronic and fatal loss of mobility and operational power. This loss was to be noticeable in the field itself within a few days of the Allied landings, which went forward under a cover of overwhelming air superiority that had been won for them in the preceding months over Germany itself."

c. Conclusion for period from Normandy to Aachen/Arnhem:

"In this period the complete failure of the Luftwaffe for everything but an inadequate and intermittent home defense became evident. The preceding periods had seen it helplessly enfeebled, in both front-line strength and production adequate to protect the aerial perimeter

of its conquests. Now, in its first test of heavy defensive fighting against ground assault from the west, it crumbled further, leaving only a weakened core to defend the Reich itself.

"The Bomber Command, which had once terrorized London, Stalingrad and Alexandria, was reduced to an occasional effort to lay sea-mines in the Antwerp harbor. The Anti-Shipping Command, which had once blockaded the North Cape, the Mediterranean, and made the Atlantic life-line precarious, was largely disbanded and grounded for want of fuel and crews. Two groups only remained to skulk in idleness in Norway.

"The Fighter Command could no longer defend Germany from daylight raiding at will by both American and British forces.

"The Fighter-Bomber Command, which had been improvised to repel our landings, had been dissolved in disgrace six days afterward. And the Night Fighter Command, which had alternated in advantage against the brilliant night tactics of the RAF, was now increasingly grounded for want of fuel.

"The failure of the Luftwaffe is cited here as proof and consequence of the major, and for long the solitary, purpose of American strategic bombardment. It was of course a pre-condition of the continuance of that bombardment but in the larger plan of the whole Allied action it had represented a stake of even greater significance.

"This was aerial supremacy. However the lesser doctrines of the different services or nations may have differed it was universally agreed that the most indispensable pre-condition to safe shipping, sea-borne assault and victorious ground campaigning was aerial supremacy.

"This had been won for the Allied invasion by laborious, protracted and bitter air fighting and bombing in the years and months preceding. The full significance and extent of the Air Victory was only to become apparent in the relative ease and cheapness of the invasion operation and subsequent campaigns. It was the supreme test of air power's contribution to the overall effort and the event proved how well the test had been met.

"Additionally through this period strategic air power was to intensify its strangle hold upon the enemy's oil production. The fall of Rumania and capture of Ploesti were to accelerate the progress of the oil shortage that had already grounded much of the Luftwaffe, caused the abandonment of innumerable tanks and armored vehicles and the capture afoot of tens of thousands of troops. All this was only a foretaste of the ultimate immobility that was to bring the whole Wehrmacht to its final end. The oil campaign was a long one but this period had seen notable progress with it and progress was cumulative.

"The period saw also the end of ground-launched V1 weapons and the beginning of the use of V2. It must be candidly recorded that air power had proved almost wholly ineffectual against the first and helpless

against the second of these advances of technology. Bombardment of sites, transport and production had reduced the enemy scale of effort but it was only an inadequate counter-measure which his efforts would have circumvented if he could have retained occupation of the launching sites.

"Above all things related to the air this period was notable for the development of the Allied fighter-bomber in close correlation with the armor whose advances it led."

d. Conclusion for the period from Aachen-Arnheim to the Last Russian Drive: "This period was not notable for any striking developments or changes in the air war. The conventional types of the C.A.F. had recovered high numerical strength, but were ineffective either to prevent or to inflict prohibitive cost upon the continuance of our own air operations.

"These operations, under the new directive which returned control of the Strategic forces entirely to American air authority, continued their faithful concentration on the top two priorities of oil and communications as intensively as the characteristic weather of the season permitted.

"The one significant variation in this pattern was not so much a departure from directive as an intensification against the second priority of communications directly related to the Rundstedt offensive. The full effect of air power in this emergency cannot be assessed from

'ULTRA' alone, but the available evidence in 'ULTRA' and S.R. Reports does suggest the importance of air power in checking and reversing the offensive.

"Finally, the period was significant for notable German progress in development and advancement of the jet aircraft. In assessing this and its significance, Intelligence had to attempt to estimate the duration of the war. It was considered that if the war lasted beyond early summer of 1945 German jet development had the capability of reversing the existing Allied air supremacy over Europe.

"It will be remembered that at the time it was generally considered that the Ludstedt offensive, while checked, had probably succeeded in imposing considerable delay on the Allied prospects of crossing the Rhine and campaigning in Germany. Furthermore, the usual winter drive by the Russians on the Northern and Eastern parts of their Front had been conspicuously delayed for reasons not available or apparent to Intelligence.

"In these circumstances it was considered prudent to recommend the immediate application of all possible counter-measures to the threat of German jet development, even though its present stage of progress did not then show the full outlines of the German intentions for its future."

2. General impression: As a collection of "Ultra" dealing exclusively with operations of USAAF and GAF reactions to those operations, the book is excellent. The book should not, however, be considered to be an "Ultra" history of the GAF.

For example, the report as a whole gives the impression that only the USAAF and the GAF were engaged in the Air war over Europe. RAF operations played no small part in that air war and to ignore the RAF—even in a story of the USAAF—seriously impairs the value of the report. Even if no other aspect were included, mention should have at least been made of the very considerable extent to which GAF capabilities against the USAAF were reduced by reason of the large twin-engined and single-engined night fighter forces which the GAF was compelled to maintain because of the RAF. Without such a reference the report is, to say the least, misleading.

3. Errors: The book contains many errors, most of them of a minor nature and which probably resulted from the hastewith which the book was prepared. Examples of errors follow:

a. Definition of "Ultra"— In the introduction of the book, on p. 3, "Ultra" is defined as being "intercepts of German Army, Air Force or Navy signals * * * in high-grade cipher" and excludes "Diplomatic intercepts", a description of which begins on p. 7.

b. Misquotations: Many of the "Ultra" items contain errors, some of which make the text ambiguous or misleading. For example:

- (1) On p. 20, in the 5th line, the word "all" should be "off."
- (2) On p. 42, in the quotation beginning on line 12, past tense verbs are erroneously used throughout.
- (3) On p. 47, 2nd line from bottom, the word "fighter" should be "bomber."
- (4) On p. 70, last 2 lines, the "Note" was inserted as a cover by / and is not a part of the quotation.
- (5) On p. 120, line 7, the word "similar" should be "smaller."
- (6) On p. 162, line 6, the word "measures" is clearly an error, although I do not recall the correct word.
- (7) On p. 234, line 19, the word "not" should be inserted between the words "can" and "be."
- (8) On p. 267, line 17, the date "5/1" is an error, apparently for "5/10."
- (9) On p. 288, beginning on line 14, past tense verbs are used incorrectly several times.
- (10) On p. 290, beginning on line 8, the quotation is bad, something having been omitted.
- (11) On p. 325, line 10, the word "was" should be "is."
- (12) On p. 326, beginning on 5th line from bottom, past tense is used several times incorrectly.

(13) On p. 329, beginning on 2nd line, past tense is used twice incorrectly.

(14) On p. 350, beginning on 10th line from bottom, past tense is used incorrectly several times.

c. Deductions and conclusions: Several minor errors in deductions and conclusions have been made:

(1) On p. 36, line 11, appears the statement " * * * ultimately drew almost every German Air Force unit to oppose us in the west." That statement would be more nearly correct if the word "fighter" were inserted between the words "Air Force" and "unit."

(2) On p. 40, line 2, "Stuka" is defined as meaning "fighter bomber." It should be "dive bomber." On the same page, line 20, the term "ground attack" is used to describe a unit which, from the context, was evidently equipped with JU-87's (Stuka's); while a dive-bomber is unquestionably a ground-attack a/c, the text would have been clarified had the term "dive bomber" been used.

(3) At the top of page 61 (as well as elsewhere in the report, e.g., p. 119, line 26) is a reference to U.S. claims of CAF aircraft destroyed, probably destroyed, and damaged. That reference to claims, and the way in which claims are cited elsewhere in the report, gives the impression that claims were a reliable statement of CAF losses—whereas bomber claims,

in particular, are known to have been greatly exaggerated.

(4) On p. 83, line 16, the German counter-offensive of 16 Dec 44 is referred to as a "spoiling attack"—the only place where I have seen it so described.

(5) On pages 102, 104, 105 and 106 appear statements regarding the stringent GAF position with respect to single-engined fighters during the fall of 1943. Yet neither on those pages nor anywhere else in the report is a reference to the fact (supported by "Ultra") that three single-engined night fighter Geschwader (JG-300, 301 and 302) were activated, built up to full strength, and sustained from about September 1943 onwards.

(6) On p. 115, line 21, is a statement which infers that the Sturmstaffel was created as a ramming unit. That inference is not supported by "Ultra." Evidence from P/W's in large numbers indicates that, to the contrary, ramming was not a function of the Sturmstaffel, nor was it a function of Sturmgruppen subsequently set up. The only known deliberate ramming attack by the GAF occurred during the last stages of the war and not by a Sturm unit but by volunteers from GAF training units.

(7) On p. 135, beginning on line 1, appears the statement, "On the 8th [of January 44] Generaloberst Stumpf was brought from Norway to the post of Air Officer Commander in

Chief in the Center, a command he presently abolished * * *."

If General Stumpf had authority to abolish his own command he is the first officer I ever heard of who possessed such authority.

(8) Pages 144 through 149 cover February 1944, the month when "Ultra" references to GAF jet-propelled aircraft began to appear—a development of major significance. Yet no mention to those "Ultra" references appears on pages 144-149 or elsewhere in the report.

(10) On page 220, beginning on line 24, the functions of Sturmgruppen are described as intended to "engage our fighters * * * while the other flights attacked the bombers alone," whereas the facts were exactly the reverse—Sturm units attacked bombers exclusively while other GAF fighters endeavored to protect them from U.S. fighters.

(11) On page 226, line 11, the report states that a Japanese message (quoted in the report) does not make clear whether a statement of Korten, C/S of the GAF, referred to 20 Gruppen or 20 Geschwader and states that if Korten meant Geschwader he was telling a "most evident

lie." Other "Ultra" indicates clearly that Korten meant Gruppen and not Geschwader.

(12) On page 310 is quoted a 1 Jan 45 Order of the Day of Göring's, which refers to "your new Geschwadern, which have risen again." Following the quotation is the statement that the "new Geschwadern (Göring) mentions were undoubtedly the ME-262 units," whereas there is much more reason to believe that Göring was referring to SEF units which had "risen again"—to an all-time high in strength.

(13) On page 328, line 28, it is stated that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin "telephoned" to Tokyo.

Telephoned ????????