

SRH 012

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

The Role of Communication Intelligence  
in the  
American - Japanese Naval War

Volume IV

The Solomon Islands Campaign

2. Background of the Battle of  
the Eastern Solomons. (August 23 -  
25, 1942)

DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 5, E. O. 11652  
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

HTJ Date: 26 May '78

1 December 1944

5 MAY 1942

It was observed:

Traffic analysis suggests that all or part of Airron 22, recently transferred from the Malay Area, may operate from Horomushiro in conjunction with the 5th Fleet, and #1 Air Attack Force in the Northern Area, and might also be used as a counter-acting force against air attack from the Aleutians. (Summary, #230600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 53

FROM: COMML  
TO: OPNAV

#220052 May 22, 1942

and — in Ominato Area.

It was noted:

is believed to be a carrier associated with Cardiv 3. is suspected to be KORYU. (Summary, #230600, May, 1942)

Traffic analysis and decryption of enemy messages made it very evident that an unusual concentration of Japanese forces was taking place in the Northern Area.

No. 54

FROM: COMML  
TO: OPNAV

#222024 May 22, 1942

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . 1 - 4  
Summary . . . . . 5 - 60  
Chapter II . . . . . 61 - 134

August

9 . . . . . 61 - 62  
10 . . . . . 63 - 67  
11 . . . . . 67 - 72  
12 . . . . . 72 - 76  
13 . . . . . 77 - 82  
14 . . . . . 82 - 88  
15 . . . . . 88 - 95  
16 . . . . . 95 - 102  
17 . . . . . 102 - 107  
18 . . . . . 107 - 108  
19 . . . . . 108 - 111  
20 . . . . . 111 - 115  
21 . . . . . 115 - 119  
22 . . . . . 119 - 123  
23 . . . . . 123 - 127  
24 . . . . . 127 - 131  
25 . . . . . 131 - 134

Appendix II . . . . . 135 - 823

August

9 . . . . . 135 - 142  
10 . . . . . 143 - 188  
11 . . . . . 189 - 235  
12 . . . . . 236 - 284  
13 . . . . . 285 - 343  
14 . . . . . 344 - 388  
15 . . . . . 389 - 432  
16 . . . . . 433 - 490  
17 . . . . . 491 - 520

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Table of Contents  
(Continued)

Appendix II (Cont.)

August

18	.....	521 - 573
19	.....	574 - 605
20	.....	606 - 654
21	.....	655 - 706
22	.....	707 - 748
23	.....	749 - 777
24	.....	778 - 803
25	.....	804 - 823

Chart I Map of Solomon Islands

Chart II Map of Battle of Eastern Solomons  
(Enclosure "A" to ENT. SECRET  
SER. #008, September 5, 1942)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

### INTRODUCTION

This is Volume IV of a series which has been devoted to the secret history of United States Naval Communication Intelligence in the Japanese-American war. The first two volumes dealt with some of the high lights of the Hull-Nomura diplomatic discussions before Pearl Harbor, and discussed the important battles of Coral Sea and Midway. Special chapters outlined the development of cryptanalysis by various nations during the twentieth century, the gradual adoption of security measures by the Japanese during the past decade, the damaging publicity leaks concerning communication intelligence which have occurred in late years, and the means taken to prevent their recurrence.

Volume III began the story of the United States Navy's long and difficult struggle to drive the Japanese out of the Solomons, and it narrated the communication intelligence background of the first naval battle at Savo Island which occurred at night just after our troops had landed on Tulagi and

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

Guadalcanal. Volume IV describes the background of the second major battle of the Solomons campaign - the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, involving air versus surface actions from August 23-25, 1942.

Each battle of the campaign will have a separate volume dedicated to it, with summary, chapter, and appendix numbered in accordance with the sequence of the battle in the campaign. Thus, all parts of Volume IV will discuss the second battle of the Solomons, and they will be numbered accordingly, e.g., Chapter II, Appendix II.

#### Scope of Each Volume

Each volume will contain a summary, a chapter and an appendix, all three of which will be devoted to the same major battle.

1. The summary is written expressly for the busy reader who desires to know the general picture in the Solomon Islands as furnished by communication intelligence just before each of the major battles occurred. It is comparatively short and contains all the essential information to be found in the succeeding chapter and appendix, but, with a few

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

important exceptions, no attempt is made to furnish references for the statements made.

2. The chapter gives in chronological order the communication intelligence background of the period just before the major battle, so that the reader will be aware from day to day of exactly what was known from this source by United States operational authorities. Each statement is supported by a reference to the actual messages in the appendix which were either intercepted or sent by one of the communication intelligence units.

3. The appendix contains a very detailed account of each day's findings, and also furnishes the complete text of every message referred to in the chapter. Though these volumes will be read only by those in the United States Navy who need to know, it is desirable that they be written as if they were to be used as source books by professional historians. Therefore, every intercepted enemy message of any importance will be found in the appendices. Some may be rather technical for the general reader, but they have been included to make the record as complete as possible for the expert.



CONTENTS

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

The reader will also be able to know when a particular dispatch was sent out by American naval units, for the Greenwich Civil time of origin is appended to the text of each message. This is the best check available at the moment on the approximate time at which operational authorities were made aware of certain communication intelligence. Future research into the communication files of our field units at Melbourne and Pearl Harbor should provide more accurate data.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

SUMMARY

Beginning with July 1, 1942 when the formerly obscure Solomon Islands became the center of Japanese operational maneuvers, this comparatively small area of land and sea was the scene of some of the most important battles of the Pacific theater, which, if lost, might have decided the fate of the Australian mainland and might have delayed an Allied victory for many years. The air versus surface action in the Eastern Solomons from August 23 through August 25, 1942 was such a battle.

At a time when complete and accurate cryptanalytical intelligence would have been an invaluable aid to our forces, the Japanese improved their communication security and changed their codes with such success that operational intelligence had to be derived almost solely from traffic analysis. Thus, forewarnings of Japanese units concentrating for an offensive were not as complete as usual. Despite this disadvantage, however, the aggressive tactics of American task forces brought the battle to a successful conclusion.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

As early as August 9, 1942 it was fairly obvious that the Japanese were reorganizing and reinforcing their fleets in the Southern Pacific for further attacks against the wedge that the Allied advance was driving into their newly acquired holdings. That a formidable task force was being assembled to carry out such a mission could scarcely be doubted. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was observed issuing orders to his commanders in the Rabaul area including the Eighth Fleet Commander aboard the Chokai. To join the powerful Japanese unit forming at Rabaul, Cruiser Division Seven, possibly accompanied by Destroyer Divisions Two and Fifteen steamed from Malay, and destroyers escorted a convoy of personnel and equipment to the Solomons. It was also believed that Cruiser Division Six and Destroyer Division Seven were en route to Rabaul. Meanwhile, Destroyer Divisions Four and Seventeen and the Thirty-fourth Defense Force were scheduled to arrive at Truk.

Emphasizing the development of Japanese air strength throughout the Solomons, the Commander in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet arrived at Rabaul to assume control of the Southeastern Air Force. Aerial units including carrier planes, the Sixth Air Attack Force which had formerly operated in the North Pacific, and shore-based aircraft drawn from fields as far west as Takao and as far north as the Empire, were being sent into this area as reinforcements. In response to urgent dispatches from the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, the Misawa Air Group and Air Squadron Eleven headed for Rabaul, while twenty-two bombers of the Kisaratsu Force were expected to move southward from Tinian.

In establishing a lifeline of supplies to the air groups and other units, merchant ships were used in the attempt to consolidate Japanese holdings throughout the Southwest Pacific. Two marus were associated with troops sent to repel the Americans at Guadalcanal, and others reinforced New Guinea.

In an effort to checkmate the American invasion, the Japanese Radio Intelligence organization sent numerous reports concerning United States naval fleet movements to their forces. An increasing

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

number of enemy submarines were drawn to the Solomons from adjacent areas in order to disrupt American supply lines.

As the Japanese steadily amassed men and equipment in the South Pacific, their communication security increased in the same proportion, and it was suspected that a new change in code would probably take place. Dispatches issued by the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet from the Yamato in the Empire were in a special cipher, and there were other evidences of use of a special code by the Japanese in the South Pacific when prospective operations demanded the utmost secrecy. Efforts to disguise the source of important messages and attempts at radio deception also provided a warning that the enemy was becoming conscious of radio security.

Although there were no reliable indications that the Second Fleet was in the Southwest Pacific at this time, it seemed possible that its Commander was organizing a task force to operate in that vicinity. Cruiser Division Six was reported as stationed near Kavieng on August 11, 1941, while Cruiser Division

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

Eighteen, associated with Destroyer Division Twenty-nine, acted as a convoy escort and, in addition, assisted in the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal. Japanese destroyers appeared to be assembling in the Rabaul area for units of Destroyer Squadrons Two and Three and Destroyer Division Thirty were assigned there, as was the Yukaze. Destroyer Division Four was charged with the safe arrival of the specially trained Ikki Detachment, and Destroyer Division Seventeen announced that it would arrive at Rabaul on August 17, 1942. Meanwhile, the Akikaze, spotting Allied aircraft, possibly by means of radar equipment, was reported leaving Rabaul for Buka on August 14, 1942. Only one Japanese battleship was noticed in the early days of August 1942, and this occurred on August 11, 1942 when a dispatch from the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet to the Haruna suggested that this ship might move southward.

Additional aircraft from the Empire, Philippines and Mandates were brought in to supplement these surface forces, and the enemy air commanders now present in the Solomons included: the Eleventh

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Air Fleet, Fifth Air Attack Force, and the Tainan and Misawa Air Groups. The Commander of the Twelfth Air Fleet was also actively associated with the south and southeastern areas on August 11, 1942. Aside from these commanders, Air Squadrons Twenty-two and Twenty-six and units of the Second and Fourth Air Attack Forces were identified with southern operations, and on August 14, 1942 it seemed probable that Air Squadron Twenty-three would shift its activities from Koepang to the region around the Solomons.

The location of the powerful Japanese carriers was always a major concern of American traffic analysts. After the defeat at Midway, Carrier Division Three had to be reorganized and on August 12, 1942 it was evident that new carrier groups were training near Sasebo, where the Zuiho of Carrier Division Two was being overhauled. However, there were many indications that the real strength of the Japanese air arm would not remain relatively inactive in the Empire. Carrier Division Five received plane reinforcements and Carrier Division Two sent bombers and fighters to the Marcus Islands



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

because of the diversionary attacks of the U.S.S. Boise. But the actual indications of a southward movement came from dispatches on August 13, 1942 which suggested that the Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo were apparently prepared for duty outside home waters.

Japanese submarines were patrolling along Allied shipping and communication lines in southern waters, and several submarine contacts were noted in the traffic of August 12, 1942. Submarine Squadrons Three and Seven were ordered to the area adjacent to Bougainville, and the Commander of Submarine Squadron One was observed leaving the Empire on August 13, 1942 for the south. The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 14, 1942 stressed that enemy submarine units were moving into the New Britain area and were also present near Tulagi, where an Allied striking force had been sighted.

From the steady elimination of readily recognizable serial numbers in enemy dispatches and the continuous use of special calls, plus heavy traffic from the Tokyo Communication Section on August 16, 1942

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

it was discerned that a change in Japanese communication procedure was imminent, and at midnight on August 17, 1942 a major change in call signs took place. Since this security precaution delayed the prompt identification of many enemy units noted in the heavy operational traffic, the Japanese were able to successfully mask numerous fleet movements. Before this change was put in effect however, the Second Fleet was indicated as playing a prominent part in the new southern offensive.

On August 9, 1942 the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had ordered the Kaga Maru, Cruiser Division Seven, Destroyer Division Seven and Destroyer Division Two to rendezvous with the Second Fleet in the vicinity of Truk around August 19 or 21, 1942. By August 15, 1942 warning was received that a task force of the Japanese Second Fleet was on its way to the Bismarck-Solomons area and would arrive there approximately on August 21 or 22, 1942 while the flagship, Atago, was scheduled to operate off Rabaul. Meanwhile, dispatches associating the Fourth Fleet with the Second Fleet were indicative

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

of joint operations, and the Third Fleet appeared in connection with the movement of enemy ships from the Netherlands East Indies to Rabaul.

In the Eighth Fleet area Rabaul appeared to be the ultimate destination and headquarters for some of the most powerful units of the Japanese Navy, and, in addition, was the focal point for destroyer reinforcements. The following were noticed in the Truk-Rabaul area: The Commander of Destroyer Squadron Four, and the Commander of one of his subordinate destroyer divisions; Destroyer Division Thirty; two units of Destroyer Squadron Three; the Commander of Destroyer Division Four; Destroyer Division Seventeen and one unit each of Destroyer Divisions Sixteen and Twenty-nine; and ten destroyers were escorting the Ikki Ikki Detachment into the Solomons.

Close aerial support followed Japanese surface reinforcements. Planes from the Takao Group and the Fourteenth Air Group, which had been formerly based in the Marshalls, moved southward and a carrier plane group, was expected from Kisaratsu. One detachment of the Yokosuka Flying Boat Squadron was near Gasmata, while a fighter plane group prepared to move to Truk aboard auxiliaries of the First Air

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Fleet. On August 16, 1942 the newly built Buna airport was ready to receive enemy planes. In the Gilbert and Marshalls, Japanese air patrols increased steadily, and the Fourth Fleet Commander requested additional units to replace those that had moved into the Solomons.

Conflicting reports were made concerning the whereabouts of Japanese carriers. Although they were not associated with Rabaul on August 15, 1942 and single bearings definitely placed the Shokaku, Hitaka and the Hosho around Japan, destroyer movements on August 16, 1942 indicated that there was a possibility of the carriers moving south. The Fleet Intelligence Summary of August 17, 1942 issued from the flagship of the Commander in Chief of the South Pacific Fleet, stated that "The Zuikaku and Shokaku, plus the Ryuo, although still apparently present in Empire waters will definitely go south, if not already under way in that direction."

Though powerful Japanese surface and air forces were being drawn into these regions to forestall the strengthening of Allied fleets and bases, and to repel any new Allied invasions, the enemy recognized

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

a need for land and amphibious forces to hold shore positions. Thus, additional base and landing forces were brought into the vicinity. Under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, the "Del Force" was to operate in the Outer South Seas with its principal objective probably the recapture and defense of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. At Rabaul the Personnel Officer of the Chichijima Base Force and the Chief of Staff, Oki Group, were observed on August 15, 1942. The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Base Forces were at Truk, Jaluit and Rabaul, respectively, and at Buna the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force was also prominent. In a successful campaign, the Japanese were observed on August 17, 1942 reoccupying Munda.

With the need for transportation, fuel and provisions becoming more acute during reinforcement operations, the constant shuttling of enemy supply ships to and from the Empire continued. The Kinai Maru carried the Fifth Special Landing Force to Rabaul, and the Mikkai Maru also announced its arrival there on August 17, 1942. Several others, including an air tender and auxiliary, were in this

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

general vicinity.

Devoted to the efforts of locating American forces, Japanese submarines continued scouting patrols in the operational area. The Commander of Submarine Squadron One was en route to the South Pacific to relieve the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three as Commander in Chief of the Japanese Southeastern Submarine Force. Submarine Division Twelve was also located in the South Pacific.

As these Japanese activities gained in momentum, American units counter-attacked. Allied submarines were crippling the enemy supply lines by their aggressive attacks. On August 16, 1942, the Goshu Maru reported that it had been attacked by an American submarine, and contact reports from a maru attached to the Sixth Base Force gave further indications of American submarine activity.

An interesting diversionary movement took place on August 7-8, 1942 when a raider battalion of the United States Marines, operating from the submarines, Argonaut and Nautilus, made a surprise

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

attack on Makin Island. It succeeded in wrecking Japanese planes, ships and supplies, though its main purpose was to divert Japanese units from Guadalcanal, where an attack had been planned for late in August. Considering the number and wide distribution given to Japanese contact reports, this feint by Allied forces was believed to have been successful. Dispatches on August 19, 1942 indicated that all enemy forces in that general area, including the Makin Relief Force, the Sixth Base Force, and Nineteenth Air Group were brought into action.

Nevertheless, from August 18, 1942 until American and Japanese forces actually clashed in a major engagement on August 23, 1942, the enemy continued to build up its forces in the Solomons. Japanese operational dispatches were still emanating from Guadalcanal on August 18, 1942, and details of the enemy's plans for the active defense of this island were disclosed. A great part of the enemy's strength in both cruiser and destroyer groups was assembling in the Truk-Rabaul area.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Of major concern to traffic analysts at this time was the disposition of a Second Fleet Task Force, which had appeared, though elusively, in traffic since August 11, 1942. The fueling of Second Fleet units was reported taking place in the Truk-Rabaul region, and on August 22, 1942 further evidence of a task force gathering for operations under the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was drawn from the presence of the Chikuma and the A+ago, as well as the Moya of Cruiser Division Four, at Truk. Whether this striking unit was composed of any battleships or aircraft carriers was another important issue, the answer to which remained fairly obscure until the actual battle. Early in August 1942 a ship, tentatively identified as part of Battleship Division One, appeared in Japanese communications, and though the composition of two major enemy task forces that included the battleships Kongo and Haruna was determined on August 11, 1942, there were no clues to their location or assignment. Nothing further was observed concerning these men-of-war until the Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on August 21, 1942, stated that the ultimate destination of the striking



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

force composed of the carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku and the Ryujo, along with Cruiser Division Eight, one unit of Cruiser Division Four, plus the battleships Kirishima and Hiei, was still unknown.

The location of enemy carriers and their place in the Solomons offensive continued to be a problem throughout this period, although their movement southward from the Empire under destroyer escort was suspected. On August 20, 1942 the tactical exercises of the carriers, Shokaku, Hitaka, Hayataka and Zuiho, were believed to be a front for actual movements, and this supposition was strengthened by the delivery of messages for the Commander of Carrier Division Two to Truk. In a report from the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet for August 22, 1942, it was stated that the Commander of Carrier Division Two and the Zuiho were definitely in the Sasebo-Kure area, but were probably scheduled for an early departure. The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Fleet for August 22, 1942 also declared that the possibility of the undetected departure of the carriers, Zuikaku, Shokaku and Ryujo, subsequent to August 16, 1942, should not be disregarded.

Besides these units, associated with the Second Fleet, there were other forces scattered throughout the Solomons which were thought to be planning to operate in conjunction with this command or to act as separate units. In either case the various concentrations of enemy destroyers and cruisers had reached such strength that reports of new associations were watched carefully since any one of them, though apparently operating independently, could have become the nucleus of an enemy striking force.

Particular attention was paid to the accelerated activities of Japanese destroyers since they usually reflected the movements of capital ships. The Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two, the Akikaze, Destroyer Division Seventeen and units of Destroyer Divisions Eight and Fifteen and Destroyer Squadron Three were all associated with Rabaul, where the

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

traffic was undoubtedly heaviest. One unit of Destroyer Division Thirty appeared to be leaving Saipan on August 19, 1942 for Rabaul, and Cruiser Division Seven, with Destroyer Squadrons Three and Fifteen and Destroyer Division Two were ordered to join with the Outer South Seas Force. Utilizing information gathered by smaller units and lookout posts, Japanese destroyers scouted for Allied striking groups, aided their own landing operations, and also cooperated with what appeared to be a Cruiser Division Six offensive. In the Buna area Destroyer Division Eight acted as a radio guard for the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force, which was associated throughout August 1942 with Cruiser Division Eighteen.

Although the enemy's main preoccupation was with these new drives in the Solomons, heavy ships of the Japanese fleet also gathered at Truk, the Marshalls and ports closer to the Empire, either preparatory to joining the current campaign further south, or to guard Japan's outposts. On August 20, 1942 the flagships of both Cruiser Division Five and

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Destroyer Squadron Four were at Truk with Destroyer Division Seven and a division of Destroyer Squadron Three located in the same vicinity. Escorted by two destroyers, Cruiser Division Seven was reported as approaching Truk on August 22, 1942 while the light cruiser Kashima was headed for some unidentified port in the South Pacific.

While the Eleventh Fleet Chief of Staff and the Fourth Air Attack Force Commander directed operations at Rabaul, the enemy continued to draw in additional planes and equipment from other fields to the Solomons. Active in this area on August 13, 1942 were the Fifth Air Attack Force, which was prepared for operations, and the Sixth Air Attack Force which was concerned with plane transfers from the Empire. Aircraft supplies were forwarded to the Kisaratsu and Misawa Air Groups at Kavieng and further air activity was also observed at Gizo. Japanese planes were patrolling this area and frequent contacts were reported in the vicinity of New Guinea. Between the Marshalls and Rabaul enemy planes maintained shuttle flights. Meanwhile, the prominence

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

of the Commander of the Takao Air Group and Air Squadron Twenty-three at Kendari in the Netherlands East Indies suggested that planes from these bases might be used for future attacks on Allied positions.

It was suggested that Army units were being sent from both the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies to hold Japanese bases in the South Pacific. The presence of the Commander of the Akatsuki Detachment, an army transportation unit, and the Commander of the First Debarkation Party at Palao, indicated that some convoys would originate from there. On August 22, 1942 the Yokosuka Fifth Special Landing Force and the Eighty-fourth Base Force were associated with southern army operations and the Sasebo Force remained at Buna. Although not yet completely identified, one group known as the Simun Force was also believed to be concerned with an impending offensive.

As days passed, Japanese submarines attempted to inflict losses on American ships and to halt their flow of supplies, and to carry out these important activities they adopted certain security precautions to disguise their identity when transmitting or receiving

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Meanwhile, American planes and submarines undertook the task of preventing the Japanese from succeeding in their reinforcement plans. The delaying action off Makin Island was important, but day by day American units harassed the enemy partly to destroy Japanese bases, and partly to conceal the reinforcement of American bases and naval forces.

On August 22, 1942 it was known that a Japanese striking force was ready for action, and it was evident that it was composed of a major portion of the enemy's cruiser and destroyer strength. The possibility of battleship protection had not been overlooked, for a dispatch from the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet on August 11, 1942 had indicated that the Haruna would move southward. The Summary issued on August 22, 1942 by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet associated the Kirishima and Hiei with the three carriers that the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet had suggested were moving south.

Yet it was the location, number and assignment

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

of Japanese carriers that remained the real problem for American traffic analysts, since a new enemy code, temporarily resisting cryptanalysis, made it impossible to read Japanese operational messages. There were incomplete indications that the Japanese carriers were in the Empire conducting training exercises, and it was remembered similar carrier exercise traffic had taken place before the battle of Midway. It was suspected, therefore, that the Japanese carrier fleet would not remain inactive in the Empire during a major battle in the Solomons.

Dispatches on August 13, 1942 had suggested that Japanese carriers were preparing for duty outside Empire waters, and this belief was strengthened by destroyer escorting movements on August 16, 1942. On August 17, 1942 the Summary of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer stated that the Zuikaku, Shokaku and Ryujo were possibly already en route south, and this probability was restated in the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on August 22, 1942.

Destroyers of the United States Navy engaged in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

combat operations in the Solomon Islands during the night of August 21-22, 1942. The U.S.S. Blue, flagship of Commander Destroyer Division Seven, accompanied by the U.S.S. Henley and U.S.S. Helm, was operating as an escort for a convoy consisting of the U.S.S. Fomalhaut and Alhena.<sup>1</sup>

At 2313 (Zone - 11), latitude 09:40:00 south, longitude 161:02:00 east, the Blue and Henley departed from Task Force 62.1.7 to proceed in accordance with a COMSOPAC dispatch of 210332 August, which stated in part,

Enemy submarines and surface ships have been reported in the Cactus-Ringbolt area since seizure by United States Armed Forces.

The dispatch directed that the

Commander Destroyer Division Seven send forward two destroyers to arrive earliest hour tonight consistent fuel limitations to unloading area. Destroy enemy forces approaching for landing or in opposition to our forces.

---

1 - Cincpac File A16-3/SOL, L11-1/BD/(90). Serial #02761; Cincpac File PAC-90-1H A16-3/SOL; Comsopac File A16-3 Serial #0046b, Serial-03370; USS Henley, FB7/A16-3, Serial #(017); USS Henley, DD387/A16, Serial (#041)-(#042); USS Henley, DD 391/A16/P20, Serial (0165); ComTask Force 62, FE25/A16(3), Serial #00277.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

At 0140 (Zone-11) August 22, 1942 the Blue led the Henley by 600 yards as it entered the eastern end of Lengo Channel on course 270° true, speed 20 knots. A column of ships about 5° on the starboard bow was sighted two to three miles away. General Quarters was sounded, both ships swung left to bring their batteries to bear on the sighted vessels, and challenges were made by flashing light. Although no reply was received from these ships, they were recognized as friendly units in Transport Division Twelve, namely the Manley, Stringham and McFarland. They were allowed to proceed to sea, and the two American destroyers resumed the course which would take them through the channel.

The destroyers arrived off the western end of Lengo Channel at approximately 0230 and assumed a speed of 11 knots on several successive westerly courses. The Blue was conducting radar search ahead, and the Henley in column 400 yards to the rear was searching astern. At 0324 a radar contact was discovered at 290° true, distance 4500 yards, by the Blue in latitude 09:18 south, longitude 160:03 east.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Though the sea was calm, the moon had set and visibility in the direction of land was very poor. Both radar and sound gear were able to track a contact, caused by high speed propellers, across the bow of the Blue to port at a minimum range of 2900 yards. Although no sight contact had been obtained, the Blue's course was changed five minutes later at 0329 to 350°, and the speed was raised to 15 knots. At 0332 the course was changed to 330°, speed 25 knots, at which time both radar and sound contacts were lost. It was estimated that the contact was a small craft possessing a speed of 20 knots.

Despite the fact that the contact was assumed to be a friendly patrol boat, various precautionary changes in course and speed were initiated during the succeeding half hour. At 0346 permission was granted to reduce the speed of the Blue so as to reduce wind interference with the lookout ahead. At 0355 a radar contact on a high speed surface craft showed that it was 5,000 yards forward of the starboard beam. High speed propeller noises were noticed on the sound gear at this same time. The contact could not be sighted, but at 0358 radar and

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

sound tracked him on a bearing of 195° true, at a range of 3200 yards. It disappeared rapidly astern, and for this reason the Henley was warned to be on the alert. The Henley sighted a wake on its starboard bow at 0357, apparently made by a small craft making high speed. Radar contact was obtained at a range of 2,000 yards, when the unseen craft was about abeam of the Henley. The Henley then reported to the Blue that the small craft appeared to cross its stern from starboard to port.

At 0359 the wakes of two, and possibly more, torpedoes were sighted by the Blue as they approached on the starboard quarter, and within a few seconds a heavy explosion occurred aft. The Blue applied right full rudder, but the order to put on engines ahead full could not be complied with. The ship pitched forward sharply, and was shaken twice within a few seconds by tremblings and internal heavings. Shortly thereafter the ship was entirely obscured by a large column of smoke.

The Blue was now dead in the water with its stern blown off, and with a small fire burning in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

the aft compartment. During the next hour and a half both the Blue and the Henley received radar contacts which were investigated by the Henley at full speed. However, on each occasion the contact receded as the Henley approached. No enemy craft was sighted any time. Finally at 0600 the Henley rigged for towing and proceeded to take the Blue in tow.<sup>2</sup> These daring and successful attacks on American destroyers were believed to have been made by Japanese PT boats.

Returning to a discussion of the communication intelligence available at this time from the messages on hand, it was certain that the Japanese were increasing their strength in the Solomons. The battleship Yamata was noticed on August 23, 1942 and the Fuso was believed to be accompanying the Seventh Cruiser Squadron to the Solomons, where it was thought probable that the battleships Kongo, Kirishima and Haruna with the aircraft carrier Zuikaku were probably already assembled as a formidable striking force. Since the enemy's striking power would be considerably strengthened by carriers, particular attention was paid to their maneuvers. Traffic analysis on August 22,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

1942 disclosed that the Shokaku, with the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet, aboard the Zuikaku and the Ryujo, as well as plane transports were headed for Truk, according to the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on August 23, 1942.

A total of fifteen to twenty Japanese destroyers from Divisions Nine, Fifteen, Twenty-nine, Thirty and Thirty-four and from Destroyer Squadrons Three and Six were operating in the Solomons, and Cruiser Division Eighteen, the Kako and Furataka were also in that area. Enemy submarines patrolled this area, and enemy landing forces including the Yokosuka Third Special Landing Force and the First Landing Force prepared for action. The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet on August 23, 1942 stated that heavy enemy landings, which American forces had long expected, would probably take place in the Guadalcanal area within the next twelve hours.

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons  
(August 23-25, 1942)

During the two weeks which had elapsed since

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Allied troops had invaded the Solomon Islands in early August, the Japanese had been building up their naval strength at Rabaul for a smashing blow to recapture Guadalcanal. This waiting period was marked by the attempts of the United States Navy to bring in reinforcements for the marines in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area, and the counter efforts of Japanese surface and air forces to prevent these reinforcements. Japanese air attacks were quite ineffective, but their small surface craft created much havoc by night attacks, thereby retarding the strengthening of the American position on Guadalcanal.<sup>3</sup>

American authorities were well aware of Japanese efforts to strengthen their striking forces in the Solomons, and for this reason reinforcements were sent to Task Force Sixty-One, and, in addition, Task Force Seventeen was ordered into this area. For two weeks after the Guadalcanal-Tulagi invasion, American units were engaged in establishing bases despite nightly bombardments by Japanese cruisers and destroyers. To conceal the presence of its carriers, Task Force Sixty-One operated to the south, out of contact range of

---

3 - Action Report Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to Cominch, CINCPAC File PAC 90-wb A16-3/SOL Serial 03102.

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

Japanese scout planes. Therefore, the many land bombardments by Japanese ships in the waters between Tulagi and Guadalcanal went unmolested by our carrier planes or surface ships.

By August 23, 1942 the Japanese were able to assemble a very powerful striking force, which began to move south to retake their former positions at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Japanese forces available at this time were estimated from later battle reports to have been as follows:

3 or 4 CVs (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, RYUJO with possibly a fourth small carrier).  
1 or 2 battleships.  
7 to 15 light and heavy cruisers.  
10 to 20 destroyers.  
At least 15 APs, AKs, and AOs.  
Approximately 160 land based planes.  
(VBs and VFs)

Meanwhile Task Force Sixty-one, comprising Task Forces Eleven and Sixteen under the command of Vice Admiral Fletcher, had moved to the north in anticipation of an attack on Guadalcanal. On August 23, 1942 it was operating 100 to 150 miles due east of Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

A dawn patrol covering two hundred miles had been made by planes from the U.S.S. Enterprise. Two

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

enemy submarines proceeding south at high speed had been sighted between latitudes 06-48 and 07-30 south, and had been unsuccessfully attacked. These submarines were approximately two hundred miles north of Task Force Sixty-one, and were presumably acting as scouts for Japanese surface forces.

At 0950 (-11) a Japanese Occupation Force was sighted by one of COMAIRSOPAC's long range search planes. Four transports, two cruisers, and three destroyers were 250 miles to the north of Guadalcanal, towards which they were steaming at seventeen knots. At about 1445 the U.S.S. Saratoga launched an attack group of thirty-one SBDs to attack this Japanese force. They carried 1000-pound bombs, and six TBFs were loaded with torpedoes.

The enemy changed course at 1300, but the report of the search plane of Task Force Sixty-three concerning this did not reach Task Force Sixty-one until that night. For this reason the Saratoga Attack Group failed to locate the Japanese ships, and were forced to land at the Marine field at Guadalcanal. They spent the night there, and experienced a night



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

bombardment by a Japanese submarine. A Marine Air Attack Group flew from Guadalcanal at 1615 on the afternoon of August 23, 1942 to attack the same Japanese force, but again it could not be found. Real action was to take place on the following day, however, when contact with the enemy was established.<sup>4</sup> Since no information concerning a Japanese striking force had been received, and the latest intelligence reports placed Japanese carriers near Truk, Task Force Eighteen, including the U.S.S. Wasp, was sent south to refuel at 1830 August 23.<sup>5</sup> Concerning this move, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander of Task Force Eleven, in his report to the Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet stated that:

"At about 17 hours on the 23rd of August, I received CINCPAC 230345 locating all enemy carriers north of Truk, and it was then decided to send one Carrier Task Force to a refueling rendezvous."

The CINCPAC dispatch mentioned by Admiral Fletcher is available in full in No. 1096. It will be noted that this particular dispatch did not include the warnings

---

4 - CINCPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC File PAC-90/wb, A16-3/SOL, Serial 03102, Page 4. (October 24, 1942).

5 - Ibid.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

found in the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of previous days, which indicated the possibility that some Japanese carriers had made an undetected move to southern waters. (See Appendix II, Nos. 795, and 1047).

As the action of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons drew into a second day, there were several indications that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was at sea, but his location could not be discovered. It was also believed that certain units of Battleship Division Three were not with the First Air Fleet Staff, and that the battleships Kongo and Kirishima were still associated with Pabaul, but nothing definite could be stated concerning the activities of any of these units.

Early in the morning of August 24, 1942 American carrier planes of Task Force Sixty-one carried on their usual morning patrol northward for 200 miles. Judging from later developments, it would appear that at this time the major Japanese force was 50 to 100 miles north of the outermost limits of our searching planes. Our planes, having found nothing in their search, turned back to rendezvous with the carriers.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

At 0935 a long range search plane of Task Force Sixty-three reported the presence of Japanese warships at latitude 04-40° south, longitude 161-15° east. One enemy carrier, two cruisers, and one destroyer were steaming on course 180°. Task Force Sixty-one received this report at 1015 or earlier, and proceeded to build up to full boiler power by 1200 in an effort to close the distance between itself and the enemy force. The American task force included two carriers, the Saratoga and the Enterprise; one fast battleship, the North Carolina; three heavy cruisers, the Portland, the New Orleans, and the Minneapolis; one light cruiser, the Atlanta; and eleven destroyers. Plane strength included those of the Cactus Marine Air Group, 12 VBs, 15 F4Fs, 5 P-400s, and the planes of Task Force Sixty-three (Airforces South Pacific), approximately 39 PBIs and 30 B-17s.

Steaming at 15 knots and later at 18, at 1200, Task Force Sixty-one was at 09-00° south, 163-00° east on course 100° true. It was then about 250 miles away from the enemy ships reported in the morning. The carriers had to turn into the wind to the southeast

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

to launch and recover planes, and this slowed the progress of the American ships. Demonstrating their usual ability to locate and track our forces, Japanese search planes found Task Force Sixty-one by 1100 or earlier. The presence of several of these enemy planes was shown by radar; four of them were shot down by carrier fighters during the morning and early afternoon. Scouting reports from enemy planes and submarines in this vicinity undoubtedly kept Japanese operational authorities fully aware of the activities of our task force. At 1257 at a distance of only eight miles from Task Force Sixty-one on a bearing 210° true, one of these planes was shot down. Because of the short distance between this enemy plane and the task force, orders were issued to all units to prepare to repel air attack.

At about 1130 the Saratoga had recovered her attack planes, which had spent the night at Guadalcanal, and two hours later, refueled and re-armed, they were sent out to attack the Japanese carrier reported in the early morning. Information concerning the location

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

of the enemy forces was still inadequate, and to ensure that an opportunity for combat with these forces would not be lost, the Commander of Task Force Sixty-one launched 22 SBDs and 7 TVs from the Enterprise at 1300. These planes were ordered to search to the northward to a distance of 250 miles.

During this flight they discovered three groups of enemy warships, steering south and covering an area 60 to 80 miles wide, centered on about longitude 162 east. One group, including a carrier which was thought to be the Ryujo, a light cruiser, and three destroyers, was discovered 198 miles away from Task Force Sixty-one on a bearing 317° true at 1510. This was believed to be the same force reported early in the morning at 0935. Difficulties experienced with the receiving equipment, and probably interference by fighter direction transmission on the same frequency band, caused a delay of more than an hour in the receipt of this report by the Enterprise at 1518.

A second enemy group, comprising two carriers, four heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and eight or more destroyers, was found 198 miles from Task Force Sixty-one on bearing 340°. This report, made at 1430,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

was not received by either the Enterprise or the Saratoga, but at 1525 the Saratoga heard from the reporting plane that it had made an unsuccessful attack on one of the two enemy carriers. Its bombs had struck very close aboard to what might have been the Zuikaku, and, therefore, it was thought that some damage might have been received by this ship. At any rate, no further information was received as to the composition or movements of this force. A third group was reported at 1440 to be 225 miles from Task Force Sixty-one on bearing 347°. This group included four light cruisers and three to five destroyers.

It will be remembered that an attack group had been launched from the Saratoga at 1330. Going directly to their objective, 29 SBDs carrying 1000-pound bombs, and 8 TBFs with torpedoes, attacked the Ryujo. In a well coordinated attack, four hits were made by our dive bombers, and one sure and one possible hit were made by our torpedo planes which attacked just as the last of our dive bombers dove against the enemy carrier. One torpedo missed the carrier and sank a destroyer, and two torpedo planes, attacking a heavy cruiser, scored

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

one hit. On their return flight to the Saratoga, our dive bombers encountered seven enemy dive bombers and shot down four, possibly five, of them.

It is interesting to note, in view of the fact that Guadalcanal was attacked by enemy carrier type planes, that when the Ryujo was sighted at approximately 1400 by two Enterprise scouts, the deck of the carrier was already empty of planes. When the Saratoga group made its devastating attack at 1530, the Ryujo had only a few planes on deck and a few in the air. These were reported as four Nakajimi 97 dive bombers and four to six Zero fighters. Furthermore, just as the Saratoga attack group had left at 1330, a large group of unidentified planes, bearing 350° at a distance of 112 miles, was detected by radar. These planes faded at a distance of 103 miles on an estimated course of 220°, which would have brought them to Guadalcanal. Since the airfield there was attacked an hour later, at 1440, by twin-engine and single-engine carrier type bombers protected by land-type Zero fighters, it is possible that the carrier planes came from the Ryujo. Five Japanese twin-engine bombers, five single-engine bombers, and eleven

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Zero fighters were shot down by the Marines at a loss to themselves of only three F4Fs and pilots.

At 1335, a few minutes after the Saratoga attack group had departed to strike the Ryujo, a search plane of Task Force Sixty-three reported one small enemy carrier, two cruisers and one destroyer at 05-50° south, 162-20° east, on a course 140° and speed 23 knots. This force, located about 75 miles northeast of the Ryujo and 200 miles from Task Force Sixty-one, was in the same vicinity in which an Enterprise scout, an hour later, sighted a large force comprising two carriers, four heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and eight or more destroyers. Four hours later, Flying Fortresses obtained some hits with 300-pound bombs on a small CV at a spot 40 miles southeast of the 1435 contacts. In view of this information, it appears probable that three enemy carriers were operating 70 to 100 miles east of the Ryujo.

Returning to the story of Task Force Sixty-one, we find the Enterprise with a plane attack group of 11 VSBs, 7 TBFs, and 7 VFs, still aboard. These planes had not been launched against the carriers operating to the east of the Ryujo because of the impossibility of



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

recovering them before darkness set in. The Enterprise was acting as duty carrier for Task Force Sixty-one and, therefore, was exercising fighter direction control. At 1602 a radar contact indicated that a large unidentified flight of planes on bearing 320° was only 88 miles distant from the carrier. Twenty-five fighters from both carriers were in the combat patrol at this time with twenty more on the deck of the Saratoga. Initial radar contact was lost for seventeen minutes until the enemy planes were picked up again on the same bearing at an altitude of 12,000 feet, but now only 44 miles away. Some fighters had been landed for refueling, and some of those on the deck of the Saratoga had been launched. There were now thirty-eight fighters in the combat patrol defending the carriers.

At 1625, thirty-six enemy bombers with many Zero fighters above and below, on a bearing of 300°, were sighted about thirty-three miles from the Enterprise, which was steaming ten miles to the northwest of the Saratoga. At least one and probably two other groups of enemy torpedo planes accompanied by dive bombers were also approaching the American forces.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Warning had been sent to the ships screening the Enterprise and the Saratoga, and amplifying reports were made continually from this time on. Fifteen additional fighters were now launched by the Saratoga to make a total of fifty-three friendly fighters in the vicinity of the carriers. Considerable confusion arose because many of the fighter pilots did not observe radio discipline. For this reason few of the orders from the fighter direction officer reached our planes and he received little of the information transmitted by the pilots. Because of this interference with fighter direction, only five to seven of our fighters engaged the enemy dive bombers on their approach, though later ten fighters closed with enemy dive bombers which were already in the process of attacking. The remainder of our fighters were either engaged by Zeros or attacked the dive bombers only as the enemy retired. Some of our fighters did not get into the action at all. Despite these handicaps, however, a group of ten enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers was turned back before it came in sight of Task Force Sixty-one, and six were shot down. Other torpedo planes

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

approaching Task Force Sixty-one were shot down or turned away by anti-aircraft fire before they could attack.

To add to the confusion, the attack group aboard the Enterprise, which had not been sent out on a mission because of the near approach of darkness, was launched at 1625 so as to clear the deck of the carrier. This move was completed at 1638, just before the first Japanese dive bombers began their attack on the Enterprise. The Enterprise attack group was ordered to leave the scene and find and destroy the Ryujo, but not succeeding in locating this carrier, it was forced to proceed to Guadalcanal to spend the night. The TBFs of this group, however, returned to land after dark on the Enterprise and the Saratoga.

At the same time that the Enterprise cleared her decks of its attack group, the Saratoga launched 3 SBDs and 5 TBFs with orders to attack the enemy battleship and heavy cruiser force reported to the north. These planes succeeded in finding their target, and obtained a 1000-pound bomb hit on the battleship, tentatively identified as the Mutsu, and one torpedo hit on a cruiser. There were sixteen to eighteen enemy ships in this group, and the anti-aircraft

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

fire was very heavy.

The departure of these attack groups was a disturbing element in the fighter direction of the Enterprise. Search planes from the Enterprise, returning from the north, also helped to confuse radar interpretation. It is believed that the Japanese succeeded in finding our task force without much trouble because they were able to follow these search planes on their way back to the carriers. Task Force Sixty-one was now steaming at twenty-seven knots, and it was employing violent evasive tactics. Cruisers and destroyers closed in to screen the carriers with the North Carolina stationed twenty-five yards behind bearing 180°.

Our fighter planes, receiving a report that enemy planes were about fourteen miles from the Enterprise at 18,000 feet, attacked immediately, climbing through opposing Zero fighters to get at the enemy bombers. This permitted the majority of the dive bombers to begin their attack before they were intercepted. As the enemy planes came within the minimum range of the search radar, contact was lost,

OPIGINAL

1 December 1944

and because of the dozens of friendly and enemy planes, it was impossible to track the targets as they came in. Suddenly some Japanese dive bombers were sighted as they began to dive on the Enterprise. A twenty-millimeter battery on the carrier opened fire when it sighted these planes at about 12,000 feet in their dive. This warning was taken up by the remaining batteries, and about the same time the North Carolina and other screening ships opened fire with their five-inch guns on the same group of planes.

This first attack by enemy dive bombers, ending in a near miss at about 1641, heralded a continuous attack of diving planes for the next four minutes. Some of the planes were forced to pull out of their dives at 4,000 to 6,000 feet by the intensive fire of the accompanying screen of destroyers. Some swerved to avoid the bursts of fire, others were knocked out off their point of aim, and a few jettisoned their bomb loads. Despite the density of our anti-aircraft fire which destroyed three enemy planes and left others in flames, fifteen bombers dove at the carrier in dives of approximately seventy degrees, which

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

brought them to 1,500 feet or lower before releasing their bombs. Very little time elapsed between the dives of various sections, sometimes as little as seven seconds. Thus our anti-aircraft gunners were continually harassed by the shock of hits or misses close aboard, and had very little time to clear gun jams or replenish their ammunition. Despite this, however, anti-aircraft fire succeeded in beating off most of the enemy attackers.

At least ten enemy planes crashed near the Enterprise, and others flew away smoking heavily. Some planes did not pull out of their dives but went headlong into the sea; others, pulling out of their dives at low altitudes, were shot down by the fire of the carrier screen. Two of the burning planes almost landed on the flight deck, but though they were avoided, the carrier received three other direct hits and several near misses. One bomb, striking the water under the fantail near the hull, did considerable damage. As the gunners in the vicinity were recovering from the shock of the near miss, another enemy plane dived low and released a large bomb which penetrated to the third deck where it exploded, killing about thirty-five men

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

and starting many fires. A few seconds later another large bomb struck about twenty feet away from the first, exploding an ammunition locker and killing about thirty-eight men at two, five-inch guns. A third hit struck within a few seconds and put an elevator out of commission.

In the meantime the screening vessels were hurling a tremendous anti-aircraft barrage at the enemy planes. Observers reported that the North Carolina's fire was so heavy that she looked to be ablaze amidships. When the enemy's attack began, the Enterprise had increased her speed to thirty knots which caused the North Carolina to fall behind gradually, leaving her 4,000 yards from the Enterprise at the end of the engagement, 1,500 yards behind her assigned station. Thus, almost as a separate unit, the North Carolina fought off sixteen dive bombers and several torpedo plane attacks in addition to a high altitude bombing. The North Carolina had picked up many unidentified planes at 141,000 yards as early as 1506, and from that time on until 1636 several groups of planes were tracked on her radar screen. After that,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

there were so many contacts it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, which made it impracticable to adjust the gunnery radar sets for efficient fire control. However, at 1641 the North Carolina picked up about fifteen dive bombers flying over the Enterprise at a range of 8,000 yards and a height of 15,000 feet. She fired at these planes, and two minutes later opened fire on ten dive bombers attacking her from the starboard bow.

The Japanese pilots were diving to a very low altitude, but so heavy was American five-inch and automatic weapon fire that some of the planes turned away. Only three were able to come through to place their bombs with sufficient accuracy close to the North Carolina. During this dive bomber attack on the starboard bow, low flying planes appeared on the port quarter and then others came in from every direction at altitudes from 50 to 5,000 feet. Some came in directly for a torpedo attack, others glided in from an altitude of about 6,000 feet to level off at 50 to 200 feet. Approximately eight planes in all were coordinating their movements with those of the dive



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

bombers. A second dive bombing attack was made on the North Carolina at 1645 by six planes on the port quarter, despite the constant firing of her twenty 5"/38, four 1V1 mounts (16 barrels), forty 20-millimeter and twenty-six 50 caliber guns. The ship's batteries were firing at so many targets that this new attack could be met only by the after 20-millimeter guns which shot down two of them. Four near misses were obtained by the enemy bombers but no damage was done, though some gunners were knocked down when the decks were flooded.

As this dive bomber attack was in progress, eight to twelve heavy bombers made a high altitude attack over the North Carolina at 15,000 feet and dropped a pattern of heavy bombers between her and the Enterprise. This last attack was unobserved, partly because of the clever use of cloud cover by the high level bombers, and partly because the North Carolina was busily engaged with low altitude dive bombing planes. These last attacks on the North Carolina ended the activities of the Japanese planes against Task Force Sixty-one, although they were

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

flying around for another five to seven minutes and the firing of our guns continued. Most of these were either dive bombers or torpedo planes attempting to escape.

At 1700 the attack group which was returning to the Saratoga after bombing the Ryujo sighted an enemy group of at least eighteen dive bombers, nine torpedo planes and three fighters on course 140° in 7-45° south, 162-10° east, which would have brought them to Task Force Sixty-one within an hour. However, this enemy air force turned south to pass within fifty miles of our formation, then turned east until it was almost due south of the American ships, and finally reversed its course to the northwest. If it had turned north at this point it would have found Task Force Sixty-one at about 1821 when the Enterprise lost control of her rudder. Fortunately, no contact was made, and the Enterprise was able to regain full steering control. After steering various courses the American carrier at 1944 set its course to 190°, speed twenty knots, to retire south. Later in the evening the Japanese planes which had missed the Enterprise were heard trying to

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

reach their carrier, and it is possible that some or all of the group were lost.

The total number of Japanese planes shot down by Task Force Sixty-one is difficult to determine. Saratoga and Enterprise planes claimed fifty, and anti-aircraft guns claimed between thirty and forty. Though there is no doubt that some of these claims were duplications, it is evident that the plane losses of the enemy were very high and that their attack groups had very few survivors. The Commander of Task Force Sixty-one estimated that seventy of the enemy's eighty attacking planes were shot down, with our planes receiving credit for forty-seven and anti-aircraft fire responsible for twenty-three.

The day ended with the enemy landing expedition turned back, and control of the air in the hands of the American forces, with three or four Japanese carrier groups lost in action. The Wasp Task Force was now fueled, and was proceeding north to join Task Force Sixty-one as it retired southward. The Hornet task force was also near, and it was steaming to the scene of action.

Since the whereabouts of Japanese carriers remained the chief concern of American forces throughout

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

the entire battle of the Eastern Solomons, the Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet located the Shokaku, Zuikaku and possibly the Ryujo in the Solomons, the Kasuga Maru near Truk, and the other carriers in the Empire ready for sea. It was already known from contact reports that one unidentified Japanese carrier was engaging Allied forces.

Throughout the Solomons urgent operational dispatches were transmitted by Japanese army groups, and two enemy radio stations on Guadalcanal were active. Japanese air activity increased in the same proportion. The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet on August 24, 1942 warned that a probable air attack would be carried out by the Japanese against Allied positions in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area. The second phase of the battle was at hand.

About midnight on August 24, 1942 four Japanese warships, probably destroyers, bombarded Guadalcanal for about an hour. Eight American dive bombers were sent to attack them between 0245 and 0300, and three of these planes found the enemy force and were able to obtain a hit on a destroyer. Large oil patches in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

this area seemed to indicate that the destroyer was sunk.

At about 0300 on August 25, 1942 Task Force Sixty-one, heading south, passed Task Force Eighteen as it steamed north to take a position in the general area southeast of Guadalcanal to repel any further Japanese attacks. After daylight the Saratoga and the remainder of Task Force Eleven refueled, and that night they turned northward to join Task Force Eighteen, while the Enterprise continued to retire for repairs.

Three submarines were sighted on the surface during daylight of August 25, 1942. One of them was probably destroyed by a direct bomb hit by an Enterprise scout, and another was sunk by an aggressive attack of the Grayson, Patterson and Monssen. There were numerous reports of scattered Japanese forces because the enemy ships had continued to move toward their objective despite the destruction of their air power. During the morning and early afternoon of August 25, 1942, however, these forces began to retire at high speed.

By this time it was seen that the American forces had dealt the enemy heavy blows, but the battle was not

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

yet over. The traffic issued by the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet to major air and fleet units in the South Pacific rose sharply, and warnings were sent by the British that a powerful Japanese striking force had left its rendezvous base in the Empire for the Mandates and New Guinea. Because any movements at this time could provide a clue to the enemy's battle plan, close watch was kept on all Japanese ship activity, including marus.

Japanese aircraft replacements increased the offensive against Allied positions at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island and Salamau. The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on August 25, 1942 implied that the Battle of the Eastern Solomons had already reached its climax, and that all contacts showed the enemy returning northward.

Allied forces at Guadalcanal had expected a dawn air attack, but none came. An attack group of eight dive bombers carrying 1,000-pound bombs set off after daylight with an escort of fighters to attack the Japanese carrier. But at 0835 about 125 miles

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

north of Guadalcanal they discovered the enemy's Occupation Force, comprising one heavy cruiser, four light cruisers, four destroyers, one large transport and three small merchant marus. An attack was made on the large 14,000-ton transport, setting it afire and destroying it. The heavy cruiser was also hit, as was another transport. In addition to this, a group of eight Flying Fortresses took off from Espiritu Santo at 0617, also with the intention of attacking the carrier north of Guadalcanal. But at 1015 they likewise found the Occupation Force, and succeeded in hitting two cruisers. Three bombs landed on one of these, breaking it up, and the other cruiser was left in flames. This fire might have been the result of a hit from a Flying Fortress or this ship might have been the same cruiser set afire by dive bombers from Guadalcanal. The action of this three-day combat came to an end about noon when twenty-one enemy heavy bombers made a high altitude attack on Guadalcanal from 27,000 feet, killing four men and wounding five, though causing very little other damage. They had no fighter escort and there was no repetition of this attack. Evidently, Japanese air strength had been seriously reduced.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

Thus a major battle, second at that time only to the Battle of Midway in the forces involved, came to a successful conclusion for the United States. The first serious threat to the Solomons since the American invasion had now been dissipated, and, in addition, very serious losses had been inflicted on the striking forces of the enemy. These were as follows:

SHIPS SUNK

Enemy Losses

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| 1 CV, <u>Ryujo</u> | - Seriously damaged by <u>Saratoga</u> air group attack, possibly sunk.  |
| 1 DD               | - Probably sunk by Marine air group attack.  |
| 1 CL or DD         | - Sunk by B17  |
| 1 DD               | - Sunk by <u>Saratoga</u> air group, torpedo hit.  |
| 1 AP               | - Sunk by Guadalcanal Marine and Navy air group attack.  |
| 2 SS               | - One sunk by <u>Enterprise</u> search plane; one sunk by <u>Grayson</u> , <u>Patterson</u> and <u>Monssen</u> . |

SHIPS DAMAGED

- |      |  |
|------|--|
| 1 CV | - Possibly hit and damaged by B17s.                                |
| 1 BB | - Damaged by 1,000-lb. bomb hit from <u>Saratoga</u> dive bombers. |
| 1 CA | - Damaged by torpedo hit from <u>Saratoga</u> torpedo plane.       |



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

- 1 CL - Damaged by torpedo hit from Saratoga torpedo plane.
- 1 CL - Damaged by B17.
- 1 CA - Damaged by Guadalcanal Marine and Navy air group.
- 1 AP - Damaged by Guadalcanal Marine and Navy air group.

PLANES DESTROYED:

Approximately two carrier groups plus twenty-five seaplanes and landplanes, totaling about 100 planes were destroyed. There is a possibility that much of another carrier group was lost, while trying to reach its own carrier after dark after failing to contact Task Force Sixty-one.

AMERICAN LOSSES:

Our losses consisted of damage to the Enterprise by three bomb hits, plus some near misses, and the total loss of twenty planes from all causes, including water landings. Sixteen of these were carrier planes of which only six were shot down with loss of crews.

This ends the story of the second battle of the Solomon Islands Campaign. The intelligence background

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

of the remaining battles of this important campaign will be dealt with in succeeding volumes of this series. The next volume, Volume V, will describe the Battle of Cape Esperance comprising night surface actions on October 11-12, 1942.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

The Solomons Islands Campaign

Chapter II

Background of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Air Versus Surface Action  
August 23-25, 1942

AUGUST 9, 1942

With the first battle of the Solomons campaign completed, it remained the task of United States Naval Communication Intelligence to furnish operational data concerning the enemy forces within the battle zone. Since United States cryptanalysts had not succeeded in deciphering the enemy codes current at that time, most of the intelligence had to be furnished by traffic analysis. Consequently, there were a great many gaps in the intelligence concerning the enemy because only the enemy's tendencies, rather than intentions, could be ascertained.

The staff of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was issuing a great many orders to Japanese Commanders in the South Pacific on August 9,

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

1942.<sup>1</sup> The Commander in Chief of the Japanese Eighth Fleet, who had formerly been at Rabaul, was at sea aboard his flagship, the Chokai.<sup>2</sup>

The possibility was seen that Cruiser Division Seven, en route at this time from Malay, would join Japanese warships at Rabaul to form a very powerful striking force.<sup>3</sup> In addition, there were many signs that reinforcements of personnel and equipment were being shipped by the enemy to the Rabaul-Solomons area under convoy.<sup>4</sup> Japanese destroyers escorting these convoys were assigned to combat duty with the Eighth Fleet, once they had reached the South Pacific.<sup>5</sup>

---

1 - Appendix II, 1. Chapter I and Appendix I deal with the first battle of the Solomons Campaign and is found in Vol. III of this series. Appendix II appears in this volume (Vol. IV), and contains all the Communication Intelligence dispatches which outline the background of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the second battle of the campaign. All references made hereafter in this volume will be given as follows: II, 2-3, which will refer to Messages 2 and 3 in Appendix II.

2 - II, 2-4.  
3 - II, 5-6.  
4 - II, 7-10.  
5 - II, 11.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet continued to send many dispatches to his Commanders in the Rabaul area, and further confirmation of the American opinion which placed the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet aboard the Chokai was received. The large volume of dispatches issued by the Japanese Fourth and Eighth Fleets at this time undoubtedly contained many operational reports.

The Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet split its command at this time so as to leave its administrative offices at Tinian while its Commander in Chief went to Rabaul. The Sixth Air Attack Force, which had formerly operated in the North Pacific, was also en route to that area. Further indications concerning the reorganization of Cruiser Division Seven were studied, for it appeared from traffic analysis that this division was being ordered to move from the Netherlands East Indies area to the Solomons. Finally, a deciphered dispatch proved the validity of this hypothesis. Cruiser Division Six made arrangements for a fueling rendezvous in the Rabaul

---

6 - II, 12-16.  
7 - II, 17-26.  
8 - II, 27-31.

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

area.

A tentative outline of a Japanese task force was furnished by American traffic analysts at this time.<sup>9</sup> Shore-based aircraft in the Rabaul area were being increased by the Japanese, who drew reinforcements from as far west as Takao and as far north as the Empire.<sup>10</sup>

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet was sending urgent requests for reinforcements, and various air groups were en route to the Solomons in response to this and previous requests. The Misawa Air Group was at Rabaul, Air Squadron Eleven was flying to that region, and twenty-two bombers of the Kisaratsu Force stopped at Tinian on their way southwards. Carrier planes were also being shifted to that region.<sup>11</sup> There was much radio activity by Japanese aircraft carriers, but there were no indications that they were departing for the Solomons.<sup>12</sup>

Evidence in certain dispatches led to the belief that certain Japanese aircraft and submarines

---

9 - II, 32-34.  
10 - II, 35.  
11 - II, 36-42.  
12 - II, 44-45.

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

had been fitted out with radar. <sup>13</sup> It was thought also that Destroyer Division Seven might be ordered into the Rabaul area. Destroyer Division Four was engaged in escorting the Thirty-fourth Defense Force to Truk, Destroyer Divisions Two and Fifteen were associated with Cruiser Division Seven en route to the South Pacific, and Destroyer Division Seventeen <sup>14</sup> was sailing to Truk.

An unidentified enemy warship, whose movements had long been observed, announced its arrival at Rabaul on August 9, 1942 and a fleet tanker, giving its position and speed, made an appointment to rendezvous with other enemy units on their way to Guadal-  
<sup>15</sup> canal. Dispatches originated by the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet on August 7, were deciphered on August 9, 1942. They revealed some of the moves made by Japanese Special Landing Force troops and by two marus which had set out to help repel the American invaders at Guadalcanal. Reinforcements were also  
<sup>16</sup> sent into the New Guinea area. Several marus engaged in their usual tasks of supplying reinforce-

---

13 - II, 50.  
14 - II, 51-56.  
15 - II, 57-60.  
16 - II, 58-59, 61.

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

ments were noticed throughout the Rabaul-Truk area. An air tender and a tanker were among the ships accompanying the marus.<sup>17</sup>

The Japanese Radio Intelligence organization demonstrated its great interest in American fleet movements by sending an increasing number of reports to both its northern and southern operational forces. The Fifth Air Attack Force and Submarine Squadrons Three and Seven in the south, and Submarine Squadron Two in the north were the principal addressees for this radio intelligence.<sup>18</sup>

Orders from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet brought Japanese submarines into the Solomons from all neighboring areas to help destroy American task forces. Traffic analysis indicated the presence of many of these dangerous units in South Pacific waters, and warned that a Japanese subtender had left the Marshall Islands to be based at Truk. Though Japanese submarines were evidently in the vicinity of Tulagi, American submarines were not idle, for one of the two marus which had carried reinforcements to Guadalcanal was torpedoed on this



AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

day about fifteen miles away from Cape St. George. 19

An important dispatch issued by Tokyo Communication Office went to all major commanders. This was suspected of referring to a future change in Japanese code or cipher. <sup>20</sup> A Japanese espionage report from New York, sent to Tokyo via Madrid, indicated that rumors of impending action by the United States Navy had been prevalent in Washington for some time before August 7, 1942. <sup>21</sup> The Bulletin issued by the United States Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, on August 10, 1942 warned all major American commanders that heavy reinforcements of surface, submarine, and air fleets were being poured into the Solomons by the Japanese. <sup>22</sup>

AUGUST 11, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet originated a tremendous volume of radio dispatches on this day from his flagship, the Yamato, which was still in the Empire area. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was using a special cipher which

---

19 - II, 75-85.  
20 - II, 86.  
21 - II, 87.  
22 - II, 88.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

23

was held evidently by some subordinate commanders.

Attempts at radio deception by the Japanese were uncovered by American traffic analysts. This attempt to disguise the source of important operational messages demonstrated again that the Japanese were aware of the importance of radio security.<sup>24</sup>

Though there was no evidence that the Second Fleet was operating in the South Pacific at this time, there were many indications that the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was organizing a task force which might possibly operate in that area. An intensive study of important dispatches connected with this Commander in Chief was now begun so that an estimate might be made of the future movements of his organization. From this study it appeared certain that the Second Fleet would be very closely connected with operations in the Solomons.<sup>25</sup>

The Commander of the Sixth Base Force at Truk was taking every precaution to ensure the proper defense of the Marshall and Gilbert Islands by his subordinate commanders. The enemy was also on the alert

---

23 - II, 89-94.  
24 - II, 95.  
25 - II, 96-100.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

in the Netherlands East Indies, for their sighting reports announced that an Allied force of one light cruiser, seven destroyers and four submarines had<sup>26</sup> been located fifty miles east of Ambon. The Fourth Fleet seemed about to modify its communication plan, and the Commander of the Fifth Fleet was sending a seaplane unit to Kiska. The Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet was in touch with the Haruna, and since he was aboard the Ashigara at Soerabaja, it was thought that the battleship Haruna might move south-<sup>27</sup>ward.

Cruiser Division Six was stationed in the vicinity of Kavieng and was assigned the task of pro-<sup>28</sup>tecting enemy convoys from Truk to Rabaul. Cruiser Division Eighteen was also active as a convoy escort in this region, and, in addition, it was helping to<sup>29</sup> reinforce the Japanese defenders of Guadalcanal. Cruiser Division Seven was still noticed in enemy traffic, and again it was suggested that it was destined to move to the east. Incidentally, the First Fleet flagship was associated with activities in

---

26 - II, 101-105.  
27 - II, 106-109.  
28 - II, 110-115.  
29 - II, 116.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Malaya.<sup>30</sup>

Destroyer Division Seven was assigned to act as escort for the Kasuga Maru, and though one of the divisions of Destroyer Squadron Two was operating with Cruiser Division Seven, the remaining units of this squadron were already in the Rabaul area or on their way thereto.<sup>31</sup>

Important operational information disclosed that an enemy organization force would depart from Rabaul on the morning of August 12, 1942 and that the First Air Force would provide an air escort for this convoy.<sup>32</sup> The Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force, and the Commander of a unit of the Sixth Air Attack Force were at Rabaul. The Commander of the Tainan Air Group was at Salamaua, and the Commander of the Misawa Air Group was in the Solomon Islands.<sup>33</sup> Enemy planes were being ferried from the Empire and the Mandates to Rabaul. Some of the planes involved belonged to the Kisaratsu Air Group, Air Squadron Twenty-six, Air Squadron Twenty-two, and units of the

---

30 - II, 117-119.  
31 - II, 120-123.  
32 - II, 124.  
33 - II, 125-129.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Second, Fourth and Sixth Air Attack Forces. 34

The Commander of the Twelfth Air Fleet was actively associated with the southern and south-eastern areas on August 11, 1942, and certain dispatches gave evidence that the Zuiho was a unit of the newly organized Carrier Division One. Though Japanese carriers were silent and no bearings could be obtained on their positions, it was thought that Carrier Division Five was receiving plane reinforcements as a prelude to new operations. 35

Several aircraft tenders were prominent in this day's traffic, and many other marus were engaged in the task of ferrying aircraft into the threatened area. The strength of Japanese offenses in the Solomons and in their other recently acquired island possessions depended upon the supplies they received from the Empire and from the Mandates. Consequently, the task of the marus was a heavy one. On each day of the Solomon Islands Campaign, United States Naval Communication Intelligence and air reconnaissance noticed a great number of marus maintaining the

---

34 - II, 130-137.

35 - II, 138-141.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

enemy's supply lines.<sup>36</sup>

American aircraft were active in the area immediately surrounding the first footholds won by the Allies in the Solomons. The Akikaze in the vicinity<sup>37</sup> of Bougainville and the station at Lae were bombed. Japanese Communication Intelligence experts reported<sup>38</sup> the results of their direction finding at Jaluit, and several important enemy submarine squadrons were noted in the Eighth Fleet area. A report of the position of some Allied transports occasioned orders from the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three for an attack by his units.<sup>39</sup> An extensive resume of Japanese submarine positions as of August 9 and 10, 1942 was issued at this time,<sup>40</sup> and a summary of operational intelligence for August 11, 1942 was issued in the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet's Bulletin of this date.<sup>41</sup>

AUGUST 12, 1942

A special type of code used by the Japanese

- 
- 36 - II, 142-155.
  - 37 - II, 156-157.
  - 38 - II, 158.
  - 39 - II, 159-166.
  - 40 - II, 167.
  - 41 - II, 168.

1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

in the South Pacific was believed to be employed only when prospective operations demanded the utmost security. Its use at this time was a possible indication of important movements. The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet was very active since his was the area being invaded by the Allied forces. It was evident that the Eighth Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet would operate together in the attempt to repel the Allied attack. Some doubt had arisen concerning the suggestion that the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Second Fleet had arrived at Rabaul on August 12, 1942 to command the air forces stationed there, and intensive study was made to determine the location of this important enemy official.

Enemy personnel bureaus were quite active which indicated that reinforcements were being made. There was an increase in traffic in all enemy areas, especially in the Rabaul region. Warning was issued that a Japanese Occupation Force was proceeding with air forces to an area tentatively identified as the Buna-Gona region.

- 
- 42 - II, 168.
  - 43 - II, 169-171.
  - 44 - II, 172-173.
  - 45 - II, 174-180.
  - 46 - II, 181-182.

1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division Eighteen was still operating in the South Pacific to which area Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three were proceeding, in order to strengthen Japanese forces in this vicinity.<sup>47</sup> Plans were being made to refuel Cruiser Division Six, which was near Kavieng.<sup>48</sup>

The Akikaze was patrolling in a spot which permitted it to send out warnings of the approach of Allied aircraft. Since one of its many reports contained the bearings of a plane, it was thought possible that it was equipped with radar.<sup>49</sup> Destroyer Division Seventeen was en route from Saipan to Rabaul, and Destroyer Squadron Two was also steaming southwards,<sup>50</sup> as was a unit of the Third Escort Force. One Japanese destroyer seemed to be engaged in battle<sup>51</sup> with Allied forces at 1930 on this day.

Many aircraft reinforcements were being sent into the Rabaul area from the Empire. Frequent weather reports indicated that many aircraft move-

---

47 - II, 183-188.  
48 - II, 189-192.  
49 - II, 193-197.  
50 - II, 198-199.  
51 - II, 200.



AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

ments were in progress.<sup>52</sup> The influx of transport planes, heavy bombers and fighters was stimulated by constant requests from air commanders in the Ra-<sup>53</sup>baul area. Some of the planes were coming from the Philippines, and many were transported by aircraft and seaplane tenders.<sup>54</sup>

Traffic analysis disclosed the location of several Japanese air commanders and their units.<sup>55</sup> The loss of four Japanese carriers at Midway had stricken Carrier Division Three from their organization list, but at this time there were many indications that the division had been reorganized. The training of new carrier groups was going on in the Sasebo area where future tactics were being rehearsed. Important information supplementing communication intelligence was obtained from a captured document. It showed the organization of the Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet.<sup>56</sup>

Many marus were noted in the traffic of August 12, 1942. Some of these ships were engaged in transporting aircraft supplies to the combat zones, and others were carrying out fueling rendezvous with

---

52 - II, 201-202.  
53 - II, 203-205.  
54 - II, 206-208.  
55 - II, 209-217.  
56 - II, 218-222.

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

57  
enemy warships.

Enemy submarine strength was greatly increased in the Solomons by this time, and submarine tenders were in the vicinity of Truk to take care of the needs of their units. Submarine contacts with the Allied forces were noticed in radio traffic. Reports from several units indicated that more enemy sub-  
58  
marines had been assigned to the Truk-Rabaul area. Submarine Squadrons Three and Seven were ordered to  
59  
patrol an area adjacent to Bougainville.

Meanwhile, Allied submarines were carrying out torpedo attacks against Japanese merchantmen. One of the ships attached to the Japanese Eighth Base Force reported that it had been able to sink one of  
60  
the attackers. The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 12, 1942 summarized the information given above by emphasizing that air reinforcements were moving from Japan to Rabaul, and that the enemy was receiving submarine  
61  
reinforcements.

---

57 - II, 223-236.  
58 - II, 237-244.  
59 - II, 245.  
60 - II, 246-248.  
61 - II, 249.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942

It was believed that the Commander of the enemy's Eleventh Air Fleet would assume control of the Southeastern Air Force.<sup>62</sup> The presence of the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet at Rabaul had been suspected because of certain traffic indications,<sup>63</sup> but it was now decided that he had not been there.<sup>63</sup> The use of a special cipher by the Naval General Staff in a dispatch to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet attracted attention at this time because it evidently was employed to carry important messages.<sup>64</sup> However, the Commander of the First Landing Force of the Army was found to be at Palao.<sup>65</sup>

Cruiser Division Seven accompanied by Destroyer Squadron Three continued its journey eastward toward Rabaul via Balikpapan.<sup>66</sup> Cruiser Division Six, whose flagship was the Aoba, was near Rabaul, and the Staff Communication Officer of Cruiser Division Eighteen was aboard a ship of Destroyer Squadron Four.<sup>67</sup>

---

62 - II, 250-252.  
63 - II, 253-254.  
64 - II, 255.  
65 - II, 256.  
66 - II, 257-262.  
67 - II, 263-265.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

Destroyer Division Twenty-nine was also associated with Cruiser Division Eighteen, while Destroyer Squadron Three continued to be associated with Cruiser Division Seven.<sup>68</sup> A unit of Destroyer Division Four entered the Kure zone; Destroyer Division Seventeen, less one of its units, announced that it would arrive at Rabaul on August 17, 1942. The Yukaze was assigned to escort duty indicating that some supply ships were destined for Rabaul.<sup>69</sup>

The Eighth Fleet and the First and Second Air Fleets were actively associated on this day, and it was indicated that the Fourth Air Attack Group and the Fourteenth Air Group were about to leave the Marshall Islands for Rabaul. The Sixth Air Attack Corps was also slated for action in this area.<sup>70</sup>

It was suggested that the Zuiho of Carrier Division Two was being overhauled at Sasebo.<sup>71</sup> Various air units were ordered by the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet to reinforce several Japanese carriers.<sup>72</sup> Since these carriers were quite active in radio traffic and many reinforcements were being sent

---

68 - II, 266-270.  
69 - II, 271-277.  
70 - II, 278-282.  
71 - II, 283-287.  
72 - II, 288-291.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

to them at Kure, it was suggested that the Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo were being prepared for duty outside Empire waters. The commanders of the air fleets and Carrier Division Two had begun to scramble the serial numbers of their messages, indicating that plans were under way for operations which would demand the utmost communication security.<sup>73</sup>

Carrier Division Two was to send fifteen ship-board bombers, fighters, and dive bombers to the Marcus Islands. This action was undoubtedly caused by diversionary attacks of the U.S.S. Boise.<sup>74</sup> It was thought that Air Squadron Twenty-three, which had seen much service for the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies,<sup>75</sup> was now being shifted to the Solomon Islands. Carrier plane groups at Kisaratsu were to be brought to Rabaul by an air tender of the Eleventh Air Fleet.

The location of many important Japanese commanders in the South Pacific was established by traffic analysis,<sup>76</sup> and from Japanese Army, as well as Naval radio traffic, some important information was ce-

---

73 - II, 292-296.  
74 - II, 297-299.  
75 - II, 300-301.  
76 - II, 302-306.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

rived.<sup>77</sup> Many enemy dispatches referred to the aircraft reinforcements which were flying into the Truk-Rabaul area. Two enemy scouting planes went out from Rabaul to observe operations in the Tulagi area,<sup>78</sup> and the Tatsuta reported that three Allied planes were attacking it.<sup>79</sup>

Japanese Radio Intelligence intercepted the report of an Allied scouting plane which had sighted a Japanese convoy. It was evident that the Japanese<sup>80</sup> were guarding Allied radio signals very closely. The usual convoy movements along the enemy's supply lines were noted on this day, and their positions were furnished to American operational authorities. An urgent dispatch from a maru in the Kure-Sasebo area indicated a possible sighting of Allied forces in that region. This information was of great operational importance because it could be speedily transmitted to Allied submarine forces for profitable tactical use. The sinking of many enemy supply ships by American submarines will be an important factor in the eventual weakening of the Japanese along the

---

77 - II, 307-308.  
78 - II, 309-313.  
79 - II, 314-315.  
80 - II, 316.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

periphery of their acquired insular possessions. Information concerning the position of Japanese convoys has been of great assistance in the success of the American submarine campaign.<sup>81</sup>

The Yokosuka Third Special Landing Force was to leave for Rabaul from Ambon at some time after August 12, 1942.<sup>82</sup> Among the enemy units moving along supply routes between the Empire and the South Pacific were a tender of the Eleventh Air Fleet, a submarine tender approaching Truk, and another air tender on its way to Rabaul. Several unidentified units were also noted at sea.<sup>83</sup>

Submarine radio traffic decreased in volume on this day, but it was noticed that the Commander of Submarine Squadron One was leaving the Empire for the south.<sup>84</sup> Several reports indicated that Allied submarines had been spotted in this area,<sup>85</sup> and on the other hand, Japanese submarines were noticed in the New Britain-Solomon region.<sup>86</sup>

- 
- 81 - II, 317-332.
  - 82 - II, 333.
  - 83 - II, 334-344.
  - 84 - II, 346-348.
  - 85 - II, 349-350.
  - 86 - II, 351-353.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet's Bulletin for August 13, 1942 stated that the Shokaku, Hayataka, Ryujo, Zuiho and Hitaka were all in southern Japan.<sup>87</sup>

An interesting diplomatic dispatch from the Japanese Ambassador in Chile to Tokyo described the efforts of Japanese agents to keep Chile neutral.<sup>88</sup>

AUGUST 14, 1942

Enemy commanders in the Rabaul area were quite active,<sup>89</sup> and in turn, the Navy General Staff was issuing directives to these commanders.<sup>90</sup> The Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was apparently en route to the southern area, and it was thought that he was planning operations in conjunction with the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet.<sup>91</sup>

Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three, formerly associated with the Pacific Force in the Netherlands East Indies, were now operating under the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet.<sup>92</sup> Several

- 
- 87 - II, 354.
  - 88 - II, 355.
  - 89 - II, 356-357.
  - 90 - II, 358.
  - 91 - II, 359.
  - 92 - II, 360-362.



AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

unidentified enemy units were scheduled to arrive at Guadalcanal on August 15, 1942, an occupation force from Rabaul was about to depart for Gizo Island, south of Bougainville in the Solomons,<sup>93</sup> and the Director-Inspector of Personnel was busy with personnel assignments for Japanese ships arriving in the Malay area.<sup>94</sup>

An enemy warship, tentatively identified as a battleship, was thought to be leaving the Empire for an assignment in northern waters.<sup>95</sup> Cruiser Division Six was still at Kavieng, and certain indications led to the belief that one ship of this organization had been sunk.<sup>96</sup> Destroyer Divisions Four and Seventeen were active in the Rabaul area, where Destroyer Division Four was charged with the safe arrival of the Ikki Detachment, a specially trained organization force.<sup>97</sup> Destroyer Division Thirty was moving from Sasebo to Rabaul via Truk, and the Akikaze left Rabaul for Buka Island.<sup>98</sup> A division of Destroyer Squadron

- 
- 93 - II, 363-364.  
94 - II, 365-366.  
95 - II, 367.  
96 - II, 368-369.  
97 - II, 370-371.  
98 - II, 372-374.

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

Four and Destroyer Squadrons Two and Fifteen were associated with the Kagu Maru and Cruiser Division <sup>99</sup> Seven.

Japanese carriers, air groups and carrier guard destroyers were more active on this day than at <sup>100</sup> any other time in the preceding two months. A message from Carrier Division Two received on August 12, 1942 and deciphered more fully at this time, indicated that the enemy was planning to strike at an <sup>101</sup> Allied task force. Incidentally, Carrier Division Two was divided, with one section operating in the <sup>102</sup> north and the other in southern waters, where units <sup>103</sup> of the Third Air Attack Force were being transferred. Direction finder bearings indicated that the Zuikaku <sup>104</sup> and the Shokaku were still in Empire waters.

Traffic analysis indicated that Air Squadron Twenty-three was active in the Koepang area; the Fourteenth Air Corps was situated at a base near Kwajalein, with one detachment at Gasmata; the Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force was at Truk, the Com-

- 
- 99 - II, 375-378.  
100 - II, 379.  
101 - II, 380.  
102 - II, 381.  
103 - II, 382-383.  
104 - II, 384-385.

1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

manders of the Fourth Air Attack Force and the Fourteenth Air Group were in the Marshall Islands; the Kisaratsu Air Group was at Ambon, the Commander of the Bihoro Air Group was at Kisaratsu, the Commander of the Takao Air Group was at Kendari, and the Com-  
105  
mander of the Eleventh Air Fleet was at Tinian.

The Commander of the Tainan Air Group was active, but  
106  
his location could not be fixed.

The Commander of Air Group was in the vicinity of Saipan, while part of his organization was en route from Yokosuka to Rabaul, via Kavieng,  
107  
on the Air Tender. Several marus were engaged in transporting aircraft replacements from the  
108  
Empire to the Southwest Pacific. The importance of these plane replacements for any future success of the Japanese could not be overestimated, since constant pressure was being exerted on Japanese aircraft manufacturers to accelerate the shipment of planes to  
109  
this threatened area.

Rabaul was becoming increasingly important as the center of Japanese operations, and the assignment

- 
- 105 - II, 386-396.  
106 - II, 397.  
107 - II, 398-400.  
108 - II, 401-404.  
109 - II, 405.

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

of a meteorological unit to that port indicated that aircraft would play an important role in future de-  
110  
fense. The Buna airport was receiving much attention from the enemy, and the rapid progress of its construction pointed to the desire of the Japanese to use it as quickly as possible. Enemy merchant ships continued their usual activity, and the Tatsuta announced the safe arrival of a convoy which it had  
111  
been escorting in the vicinity of Lae. The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet ordered several marus to proceed to Rabaul, and traffic analysis revealed that four other marus were already en route  
112  
there.

The Sata arrived at Truk and the fleet tanker which had been engaged in refueling Cruiser Division Six near Kavieng, was now sailing from Rabaul to  
113  
Saipan. A submarine tender also arrived at Truk, and it was thought that Submarine Squadrons One and Two would proceed to the south after necessary re-  
114  
pairs had been effected. One Japanese submarine, patrolling the Solomons area, sent a warning that it

---

110 - II, 406-407.  
111 - II, 408-410.  
112 - II, 411-415.  
113 - II, 416-417.  
114 - II, 418-421.

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

had sighted an Allied striking force in the vicinity of Tulagi. Meanwhile, Allied submarines were launching attacks against Japanese merchant ships. <sup>115</sup> On the other hand, close attention was paid to the position of Japanese submarines, and many were tracked by direction finders. It was evident that enemy submarine activity was centralized in the Solomons area <sup>116</sup> at this time.

A report from a Japanese agent in New York purported to give the opinion of the United States Navy Department concerning the campaign in the Solomon Islands. According to the agent, the Navy Department in Washington believed that the naval and air battles of the Solomon and Aleutian Islands were doomed to failure because observers at the scene of action had reported the inadequacy of the landing forces. However, it was thought by Washington authorities that continuous attempts to land throughout Japanese-occupied territory would establish a second front in the Pacific. Considerable sacrifice would be made in order to secure important positions occu-

---

115 - II, 422-424.

116 - II, 425-429.

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

117  
plied by the Japanese. The Bulletin of the Commander  
in Chief of the Pacific Fleet issued on this day  
stressed that enemy submarine units were moving into  
the New Britain area and were also present near Tula-  
118  
gi.

AUGUST 15, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet,  
who was ashore at Rabaul, addressed the Chief of 119  
Staff of the Second Fleet in his operational reports.  
An unidentified man-of-war was proceeding to serve in  
120  
the forces under the Eighth Fleet Command.

There were many indications of future fleet  
movements from various parts of the Empire to the  
vicinity of Truk. The Chief of Staff of the Third  
Fleet supervised movements of enemy ships from the  
121  
Netherlands East Indies to Rabaul.

Traffic analysis revealed the locations of  
important Japanese officials as follows: the Per-  
sonnel Officer of the Chichijima Base Force and the

- 
- 117 - II, 430.
  - 118 - II, 431.
  - 119 - II, 432-433.
  - 120 - II, 434-436.
  - 121 - II, 437-438.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

Chief of Staff of the Oki Group were at Rabaul; the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet at Jaluit and the Commander of the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force was near Buna. Arrangements were being made<sup>122</sup> for the passage of convoys to Makassar.

Various Japanese base forces were located at the following points: The Fourth Base Force at Truk; Fifth Base Force at Saipan; Sixth at Jaluit and the<sup>123</sup> Eighth at Rabaul. Warning was now sent to United States Navy operational authorities that an enemy task force of the Second Fleet was on its way to the Bismarck-Solomons area and would arrive there approxi-<sup>124</sup>mately August 21 or 22, 1942. An enemy battleship which had been silent since late in April 1942, once again appeared in radio traffic. This ship was tentatively identified as belonging to Battleship Divi-<sup>125</sup>sion One.

Enemy radio traffic volume on this day was rather low in all areas, but an important development occurred in Japanese communication security measures. A special five-number cipher system used

---

122 - II, 439-443.  
123 - II, 444.  
124 - II, 445.  
125 - II, 446.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

by the Japanese in the southern area during the preceding few days was now employed for general purposes in all areas.

made it increasingly difficult to identify enemy units. In conjunction with Japanese efforts to hamper American Communication Intelligence activities, the enemy increased his own intercept and direction finder coverage by receiving regular reports from radio stations at Amboina and Soerabaja.

Cruiser Division Six was still in the general vicinity of Rabaul and Cruiser Division Seven, with several destroyers at Makassar. Evidence was observed that a cruiser departing from Rabaul for Japan on August 15, 1942 had possibly suffered damage.

Destroyer Division Thirty-four was escorting ships carrying planes from the Marshalls to Rabaul, while two units of Destroyer Division Sixteen escorted air tenders en route from the Empire to Truk

---

126 - II, 447-448.  
127 - II, 449.  
128 - II, 450-452.  
129 - II, 453.



AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

<sup>130</sup>  
via Saipan. Other destroyers en route to Rabaul were Destroyer Divisions Three, Four and Seventeen plus one destroyer from Division Fifteen. Destroyer Divisions Three and Seventeen had formerly escorted aircraft carriers, but at this time there was no indication of the presence of carriers in the South Pacific. However, it was pointed out that the possibility of Japanese carriers moving into this area in the near future should not be overlooked. <sup>131</sup>

Destroyer Division Seventeen arrived at Truk on August 14, 1942 and Destroyer Squadron Three, recently associated with Cruiser Division Seven, indicated that it would arrive at Rabaul at 1600 on August 16, 1942. <sup>132</sup>

Despite the possibility mentioned previously that Japanese carriers might be moving into the South Pacific with their destroyer escorts, it was noticed that with the exception of single bearings which placed the Shokaku, Hitaka and Hosho in Empire waters, the remaining carriers were inactive. <sup>133</sup>

Carrier Division Two requested that shore

---

130 - II, 454-456.  
131 - II, 457-459.  
132 - II, 460.  
133 - II, 461.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

facilities for operations off Marcus Island be made available.<sup>134</sup> The existence of the Saipan Air Force was disclosed by a new radio call,<sup>135</sup> and increased activity on the part of tenders and destroyers of the First Air Fleet indicated that a new movement was about to take place.<sup>136</sup> The great number of weather reports, as well as routine dispatches emanating from the Truk-Marshalls-Rabaul area suggested that Japanese aircraft movements into that region continued.<sup>137</sup>

Air reinforcements were being ferried constantly to the South Pacific from the Empire. A Japanese dispatch had mentioned the use of what was thought to be paratroops, but speedy investigation disclosed that it referred to enemy ground troops.<sup>138</sup>

The use of air power in providing escorts for shipping was noticed in the Koepang, Soerabaja and Ambon areas. Air Squadron Twenty-three, based in Java, and Air Squadron Twenty-five, situated at Rabaul,<sup>139</sup> were employed in this activity. Heavy shipping in the Yokosuka and Empire waters was also

---

134 - II, 462.  
135 - II, 463.  
136 - II, 464-466.  
137 - II, 467-468.  
138 - II, 469-470.  
139 - II, 471-472.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

provided with air coverage.<sup>140</sup>

Japanese air groups were located in the following positions on August 15, 1942:

Commander, Kisaratsu Air Group at Marcus Island;

Commander, Misawa Air Group at Gasmata;

Commander, Tainan Air Group at Lae;

Commander, Third Air Group at Ambon;

Commander and Staff Communication Officer, Eleventh Air Fleet at Tinian;

Commander, Air Squadron Twenty-two at Kisaratsu;

Commander, Kanoya Air Group at Sabang;

Commander, Air Squadron Twenty-three at Koepang;

Commander, Takao Air Group at Kendari. (141)

Two detachments of the Fourteenth Air Group were at Tulagi and Gasmata respectively, though the Commander of this organization was operating in the Mandates.<sup>142</sup> Seven air tenders of the Eleventh Air

Fleet were in the Kwajalein zone; one was near Jaluit,<sup>143</sup> and five were in the Saipan-Yokosuka area. De-cipherment of Japanese operational dispatches helped

---

140 - II, 473-474.  
141 - II, 475-482.  
142 - II, 483-484.  
143 - II, 485-488.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

to identify some enemy air units, and also confirmed traffic analysis reports that many enemy aircraft were being shipped from the Empire into the South Pacific.<sup>144</sup>

The constant shuttling of enemy supply ships to and from the Empire continued. Several marus were en route to Truk; some were at Rabaul and a few were Empire bound.<sup>145</sup> On August 9, 1942 the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had ordered the Kaga Maru, of Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Division Two to rendezvous with the Second Fleet in the vicinity of Truk on August 19 or 21, 1942, and then to proceed to Rabaul.<sup>146</sup>

The Commander of Submarine Squadron One was en route from the Empire for duty in the Eighth Fleet area and the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three was operating near Truk, together with two other units. Three enemy submarine divisions were active in the Indian Ocean.<sup>147</sup> Submarine Division Twelve was also noticed in the South Pacific, and it was believed that the Submarine would soon be assist-

---

144 - II, 489-491.  
145 - II, 492-501.  
146 - II, 502-503.  
147 - II, 504-507.

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

ing enemy operations in that area. <sup>148</sup> On the other hand, Allied submarines devoted themselves to the usual task of crippling the Japanese supply lines, <sup>149</sup> by attacking enemy merchantmen.

A Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 15, 1942 gave high-<sup>150</sup>lights of the day's communication intelligence. Espionage reports from Japanese agents in the United States continued to flow to Tokyo via Madrid. Most of this intelligence, dealing with Allied convoys was <sup>151</sup> most useful to the Axis submarine campaign.

AUGUST 16, 1942

Since both the Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet were quite active on August 16, 1942, it was believed that a reorganization of Japanese naval <sup>152</sup>forces was being completed. The heavy traffic emanating from the Tokyo Communication Section also indicated that changes were about to be made in the

---

148 - II, 508-509.  
149 - II, 510-511.  
150 - II, 512.  
151 - II, 513-515.  
152 - II, 516-517.

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

153

Japanese communication system.

Enemy radio intelligence traffic was very light at this time, but the Fifth Air Attack Force and the Third and Eighth Fleets were active. The Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was concentrating his forces in the Saipan area, and it was expected that this fleet would shortly move southward to Truk. The discovery that the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet was receiving traffic via Jaluit caused the issuance of a special warning to United States Naval operational authorities, since associations between the Fourth and Second Fleets were possible indications of future joint operations.

Deciphered enemy dispatches disclosed that the Commander of the Dei Force was to operate under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet in the Outer South Seas, where the principal Japanese objective was the recapture and defense of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Japanese forces on Guadalcanal Island were in constant communication with units of the Fourth Fleet.

---

153 - II, 518-520.  
154 - II, 521-522.  
155 - II, 523-525.  
156 - II, 526-528.  
157 - II, 529-530.  
158 - II, 531-532.

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division Six was actively engaged in escort duty in the Kavieng-Rabaul area, and though Cruiser Division Seven was thought to be en route to join the Second Fleet near Truk, it was also possible that it planned to rendezvous with Cruiser Division Eight and the First Air Fleet near Saipan.

Destroyer Squadron Two announced its arrival at Truk from Yokosuka, and an analysis of the dispatches of its commander led to the supposition that the Atago was the flagship of the Second Fleet. Other forces were presumed to be with the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet, but there were no clues to their identity. Destroyer Squadron Three, formerly associated with Cruiser Division Seven, reported its arrival at Truk.

The enemy was evidently reinforcing its destroyer strength in the Solomons, since in the Truk-Rabaul area were noticed the following: The Commander of Destroyer Squadron Four and the Commander of one of his subordinate destroyer divisions; Destroyer Division Thirty; two units of Destroyer Squadron

---

159 - II, 533-534.  
160 - II, 535-539.  
161 - II, 540-543.  
162 - II, 544.

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Three; the Commander of Destroyer Division Four;  
 Destroyer Division Seventeen and one unit each of  
 Destroyer Divisions Sixteen and Twenty-nine.  
 163

The Japanese were sending plane reinforcements into the Solomons to repel any further American advances. Planes from the Takao Group, the Yokohama Air Group and the Fourteenth Air Group were moved into this area. The Fourteenth Air Group had formerly been based in the Marshalls and its appearance in the Solomons denoted the urgency of the situation from  
 164  
 the Japanese viewpoint. It was noticed that the Commander of the Kisaratsu Air Group was at Marcus Island on August 15, 1942 and a carrier plane group,

had stopped at Kisaratsu on its way to the  
 165  
 South Pacific.

Since Destroyer Divisions Three and Seventeen of Destroyer Squadron Ten were en route from Truk and were destined to arrive at Rabaul on August 16, 1942, and since the First Air Fleet and all Japanese carriers were observing radio silence, there was a possibility that the movements of these destroyers re-

---

163 - II, 545-553.  
 164 - II, 554-557.  
 165 - II, 558-563.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

flected the movements of the carriers, though it was stated that the Japanese carriers were not associated with the Rabaul area.<sup>166</sup> However, all Japanese carriers appeared to be in home waters at this time. The Ryujo was not included in the collective call for Carrier Division Two, which was considered as a possible indication that this ship was being refitted in a navy yard.<sup>167</sup> Nevertheless, it was believed that an important carrier movement was taking place or about to take place in the Yokosuka area.<sup>168</sup>

Traffic associations disclosed the movement of several air tenders in the direction of Truk. All of this activity confirmed aircraft reports that the Japanese were sending heavy plane reinforcements, aircraft personnel and supplies into this area to aid in the repulsion of the Allied invaders.<sup>169</sup> Reference to a previously deciphered enemy dispatch relating to the movement of "paratroops" was made again at this time, but it was decided that mention of an air-borne division did not necessarily mean paratroops.<sup>170</sup>

Japanese merchant ships provided usual supply

---

166 - II, 564-567.  
167 - II, 568-569.  
168 - II, 570.  
169 - II, 571-578.  
170 - II, 579.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

lines between the South Pacific and various northern bases. The Kinai Maru was carrying the Fifth Special Landing Force to Rabaul for action against the Allies, and a number of other ships were en route from Saipan to Truk. Several were in the Rabaul area, including an air tender and auxiliary, while several were re-<sup>171</sup>turning from the South Pacific to home waters.

American submarines were crippling the enemy supply lines by their aggressive attacks. The Gosnu Maru reported on this day that it had been attacked by an Allied submarine, and contact reports from a maru attached to the Sixth Base Force gave further<sup>172</sup> indications of Allied activity.

It was expected that Japanese submarine activity would increase within the near future since additional submarines were reinforcing Japanese operational strength in this area. Allied direction finder<sup>173</sup> reports also confirmed this prediction.

Several unidentified originators were en route to Truk and, though no positive information was available concerning these units, the direction of

---

171 - II, 580-595.  
172 - II, 596-598.  
173 - II, 599-601.

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

their movements indicated the general trend. <sup>174</sup> An enemy unit, possibly a reconnaissance plane, announced that "four enemy entered port at 1600". This message was thought to refer to Allied ships at Tulagi since the information was sent to the Eighth Fleet, which was responsible for this area. <sup>175</sup>

The Summary issued by the Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on August 16, 1942 stated that reinforcements were being shipped by the Japanese to the Rabaul area, and that the carriers Hitaka, Hayataka and Zuiho were thought to be operating near Marcus Island. It further stated that the location of the Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo was not known exactly, but was thought to be in southern Japan, with the possibility that part or all had departed from that area for the south. Cruiser Division Seven was en route from the Netherlands East Indies to Truk, where it might rendezvous with the First or Second Air Fleet or possibly with both. The date of anticipated rendezvous was around August 20 or 21, <sup>176</sup> 1942.

---

174 - II, 602-607.  
175 - II, 608-609.  
176 - II, 610.

OPIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet's Bulletin on August 16, 1942 stated that "Hitaka, Hayataka and Zuiho operating in vicinity Marcus Island. Other carriers thought still in Japan".<sup>177</sup>

AUGUST 17, 1942

Heavy Japanese radio traffic made it evident that the enemy was making every effort to reinforce their Southeastern Pacific units and to regain their lost bases. Munda was reoccupied by the Japanese at this time.<sup>178</sup>

A major change in Japanese call signs was imminent judging from the numerous dispatches emanating from the Naval Communication Office at Tokyo. This change went into effect at midnight August 17, 1942.<sup>179</sup> Many enemy planes were operating in the Gilbert Islands but the use of secret tactical calls made identification impossible.<sup>180</sup>

The Eighth Fleet area continued to be the most active as the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet approached Truk. It was believed that the Atago was the flagship of this fleet, and slated to operate in

---

177 - II, 611.  
178 - II, 612-615.  
179 - II, 616-617.  
180 - II, 618.

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

the Rabaul area. The First Air Fleet was also in-  
181  
terested in this region. Despite the flurry of  
activity in the South Pacific, the Commander in Chief  
182  
of the Combined Fleet still remained in home waters.

Cruiser Division Seven was still en route from  
the Netherlands East Indies to Truk where it was ex-  
pected to rendezvous with other cruisers forming a  
183  
task force. Destroyer Division Twenty-nine, which  
had been operating around New Britain and had been  
associated with Cruiser Divisions Six and Eighteen,  
184  
was now observed near Saipan. Destroyer Squadron  
Two and two divisions of Destroyer Squadron Ten were  
operating out of Rabaul. Units of Destroyer Squadron  
Three were at both Ambon and Truk, and ten destroyers  
were escorting the Ikki Ikki Detachment into the  
185  
Solomons.

Japanese Radio Intelligence units maintained  
constant watch on Allied aircraft radio channels for  
a deciphered enemy dispatch revealed that information  
186  
had been obtained by the Japanese from our planes.

- 
- 181 - II, 619-625.  
182 - II, 626.  
183 - II, 627-629.  
184 - II, 630-632.  
185 - II, 633-637.  
186 - II, 638.

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

A request for additional air support in the Mandates area was issued by the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet. <sup>187</sup> Traffic to the First Air Fleet continued to be delivered by Tokyo which indicated that this organization was still in that general area. <sup>188</sup> Japanese carriers had been silent for some time, but a dispatch from Carrier Division Two indicated that three carriers were either at Yokosuka or at sea. <sup>189</sup> A detachment of the Yokosuka Flying Boat Squadron was near Gasmata, and a fighter plane group at Kisaratsu was expected to be moved to Truk on auxiliaries of the First Air Fleet or on carriers. <sup>190</sup> A deciphered enemy dispatch announced that the Buna airport would be ready on August 16, 1942, after a week of strenuous endeavor to put it into operation. <sup>191</sup>

The Mikkai Maru announced its arrival at Rabaul and the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force was still at Yokosuka from which a division and Submarine Squadron Eight were to move southward to Truk. <sup>192</sup> Many Japanese submarines were located by

---

187 - II, 639.  
188 - II, 640-641.  
189 - II, 642-643.  
190 - II, 644-647.  
191 - II, 648.  
192 - II, 649-651.

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

traffic analysis at this time. One submarine was at Kure, two were transmitting in the Rabaul area, and several were near Jaluit.<sup>193</sup> The Commander of Submarine Squadron One was en route to the South Pacific to relieve the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three as Commander in Chief of the Japanese Southeastern Submarine Force.<sup>194</sup> Two enemy submarines were scheduled to cruise in the vicinity of Cape Nojima on this day, while another message disclosed that an Allied submarine had attacked an unknown originator on the previous day.<sup>195</sup>

The Fleet Intelligence Summary of August 17, 1942 issued from the flagship of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated that the Hivo, Hayataka and Zuiho were remaining in Empire waters, but that "the Zuikaku and Shokaku, plus the Ryuio, although still apparently present in Empire waters will definitely go south if not already under way in that direction".<sup>196</sup> The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet's Bulletin for August 17, 1942 warned that air reinforcements were being sent to Truk and

---

193 - II, 652-654.  
194 - II, 655.  
195 - II, 656-657.  
196 - II, 658.

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

197  
Rabaul.

Makin Island was raided in a surprise attack on August 17-18, 1942 by a raider battalion of the United States Marines operating from the Argonaut and the Nautilus, submarines of the United States Navy. Undertaken partly to destroy enemy forces on the island, and partly to gain information, its primary purpose was to divert the forces of the Japanese from an attack on Guadalcanal planned for late August. The raid succeeded in wrecking Japanese planes, ships, and supplies and achieved a hoped-for diversion of enemy ships and aircraft. The effects of this raid were revealed in enemy radio traffic, since several contact reports from Makin Island were given wide distribution to all important commanders in the Pacific. The Commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet at Rabaul, and the Commander of the Fourth Air Attack Group were put on the alert, and enemy patrol planes became very active in the Marshall Islands after the first warnings had been issued.

Despite the activity of our forces at Makin

---

197 - II, 659.  
198 - II, 662-665.



AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

Island and though Japanese submarines and aircraft were known to have been engaged, no indication was received at this time of any enemy losses. <sup>199</sup>

AUGUST 18, 1942

Japanese call signs were changed at midnight August 18, 1942 and it was also anticipated that their codes would be changed in the very near future. <sup>200</sup>

Increased Japanese communication security precautions delayed prompt identification of the many organizations noted in this day's heavy operational radio traffic, which was centered around Guadalcanal. Many old dispatches were circulated anew at this <sup>201</sup> time.

Traffic analysis indicated that the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet, who was at Truk and the <sup>202</sup> First Air Fleet were closely associated. The Combined Fleet Staff was in Japan, and the Staff Communication Officer of Air Squadron Twenty-two was <sup>203</sup> stationed at Tinian. Cruiser Division Eighteen, for which Destroyer Division Eight of Destroyer

---

199 - II, 666.  
200 - II, 667-669.  
201 - II, 670-674.  
202 - II, 675-676.  
203 - II, 677-681.

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

Squadron Four acted as a radio agent, still supported the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force in the Buna area. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three had finally separated on their journey from the East Indies to the South Pacific.<sup>204</sup>

Details of the enemy's plans for active defense of Guadalcanal were revealed by decipherment of some important operational dispatches. The existence of an enemy Japanese "B" Operational Force was also revealed, but very little information was available concerning it.<sup>205</sup>

AUGUST 19, 1942

Although the change in enemy call signs on August 18, 1942 made the identification of Japanese units difficult, the Second Fleet and the First Air Fleet were still near Truk, with a striking force, possibly including aircraft carriers, scheduled to rendezvous in the vicinity about this time.<sup>206</sup> To deal with the Allied attacks on Makin Island, all enemy forces in that general area, including the

---

204 - II, 682-688.  
205 - II, 689-690.  
206 - II, 741-742.

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

Makin Relief Force,<sup>207</sup> the Sixth Base Force, Nineteenth  
Air Group<sup>208</sup> and even the Kago Operations Force, a<sup>209</sup>  
possible task group under the Second Fleet Command,<sup>209</sup>  
were brought into action. At the same time, increased  
Japanese army activities suggested the routing of re-  
inforcements to the Solomons and Rabaul from the  
Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies.<sup>210</sup> The  
Commander of the Akatsuki Detachment was observed at  
Palao.<sup>211</sup>

Cruiser Division Seven arrived at Truk for<sup>212</sup>  
operations against new Allied forces in the Solomons,  
and the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two and a  
division of Destroyer Squadron Three were also lo-  
cated in this vicinity. While an unknown destroyer<sup>213</sup>  
division operated from Tulagi, Destroyer Division  
Twenty-seven and Destroyer Squadron Four were asso-  
ciated with the Marshall Islands;<sup>214</sup> a unit of Destroyer<sup>215</sup>  
Division Thirty was at Saipan en route to Rabaul,

---

207 - II, 743-746.  
208 - II, 747-748.  
209 - II, 749.  
210 - II, 751-753.  
211 - II, 754.  
212 - II, 756-757.  
213 - II, 759-765.  
214 - II, 766-769.  
215 - II, 770.

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

and a ship from Destroyer Division Eight was escort-  
ing the Chitose.<sup>216</sup>

Throughout the New Guinea-Solomons area, Japa-  
nese planes made frequent contact reports, relayed by  
the Fourth Fleet Command,<sup>217</sup> and the carriers Hitaka  
and Zuiho gave indications of a possible movement  
south.<sup>218</sup> Enemy air activity was not confined to the  
Southwest Pacific, for most of the Japanese carriers  
seemed to be in the Empire.<sup>219</sup> A fighter squadron was  
at Chichijima, the Ioujima Base in the Bonins was  
prominent in radio traffic,<sup>220</sup> the Kisaratsu Air Group  
was at Marcus Island, and Air Squadron Twenty-six was  
in the Empire.<sup>221</sup> Despite the activity in the Empire,  
a long operational dispatch between Eighth Fleet area  
commands, though unreadable, suggested future opera-  
tions in the South Pacific.<sup>222</sup>

Unidentified Japanese units continued to be  
routed throughout the Empire and Southern Pacific,  
and one tanker believed to have been sunk in July

---

216 - II, 771.  
217 - II, 772-773.  
218 - II, 774-775.  
219 - II, 776.  
220 - II, 777-778.  
221 - II, 779-780.  
222 - II, 781.

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

1942 was again supplying enemy forces. <sup>223</sup> Contact reports disclosed many offensive air actions by the Allies, <sup>224</sup> and the presence of Japanese submarine reinforcements was noted in the Truk area. <sup>225</sup>

In the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 19, 1942 the possibility of enemy carriers moving southward from the Empire <sup>226</sup> was stressed.

AUGUST 20, 1942

Intensified communication security precautions on the part of the Japanese continued to delay the reading of enemy messages. Nevertheless, it was observed that the heavy radio traffic was mainly administrative, concerning the supplying of ships and submarines, while the absence of Japanese radio intelligence traffic suggested the enemy's failure to <sup>227</sup> anticipate Allied invasion movements. From the regions around Guadalcanal and Makin Island, <sup>228</sup> however, Japanese operational dispatches still emanated.

---

223 - II, 782-789.  
224 - II, 790-792.  
225 - II, 793-794.  
226 - II, 795.  
227 - II, 796-798.  
228 - II, 799-803.

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

Both the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet, at sea near Rabaul, and the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet at Truk appeared to be involved in southern offensives.<sup>229</sup> Neither battleships nor carriers were observed in the South Pacific at this time,<sup>230</sup> but the flagships of Cruiser Division Five, located at Truk, and of Cruiser Division Eighteen appeared in traffic.<sup>231</sup> Close attention was also paid to enemy destroyers since their activity might have reflected the movement of capital ships. The Communication Officer and one unit of Destroyer Squadron Three, with another ship were at Palao; a ship of Destroyer Squadron Two and the flagship of Destroyer Squadron Four were at Truk.<sup>232</sup>

Enemy destroyers, whether attached to a base force like Destroyer Division Twenty-seven or escorting other ships,<sup>233</sup> seemed to be concentrated in the Outer South Seas area. The Akikaze and Destroyer Division Seventeen were at Rabaul, an unidentified destroyer moved southward from the Empire,<sup>234</sup> and

---

229 - II, 804-807.  
230 - II, 808.  
231 - II, 809-810.  
232 - II, 811-813.  
233 - II, 816-817.  
234 - II, 818-820.

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division Seven, with Destroyer Squadrons Three and Fifteen and Destroyer Division Two were ordered into action with the Outer South Seas Force. <sup>235</sup>  
Urgent traffic broadcast by enemy destroyers in the Solomons indicated an engagement with Allied forces. <sup>236</sup>

Meanwhile, in the Empire, the tactical exercises of the carriers Shokaku, Hitaka, Hayataka and Zuiho were believed to be covering an actual movement southwards. This supposition was strengthened by the routing of messages to the Commander of Carrier Division Two to Truk, <sup>237</sup> where the Commander of Air Squadron Eleven was also observed. <sup>238</sup> Plane reinforcements and the Commander of the Third Air Attack Force moved to the Kisaratsu Air Station, and enemy flights between the Marshalls and Rabaul increased. <sup>239</sup> Throughout the Solomons, seaplane and carrier plane forces were prominent, while at Kendari in the Netherlands East Indies, officers of the Takao Air Group and the <sup>240</sup> Twenty-third Air Squadron appeared.

- 
- 235 - II, 821-822.
  - 236 - II, 823.
  - 237 - II, 824-826.
  - 238 - II, 827.
  - 239 - II, 828-833.
  - 240 - II, 834-837.

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

The usual Japanese contact reports, including a warning concerning the presence of an Allied submarine, were noted. <sup>241</sup> Enemy messages, only recently deciphered though sent in July and early August 1942 showed the reinforcement of enemy positions in the Solomons by the Yokosuka, the Fifth Special Landing and Eighty-fourth Guard Forces, as well as by many supply ships. <sup>242</sup> The great amount of supplies passing between the Empire and South Pacific, via Saipan, denoted the enemy's need for reinforcements in this area. <sup>243</sup> Expected to play a major role in cutting off Allied landings, the Commander of Japanese Submarine Forces was en route to Jaluit as was a division of Submarine Squadron One. Submarine Squadron Three, <sup>244</sup> however, was departing for the Empire.

The Summary of the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet, and the Traffic Intelligence Summary of the Fourteenth Naval District, in an estimate of the disposition of the Japanese Fleet, reported that no confirmation of any carrier movements southward had been received, nor could

---

241 - II, 838-840.  
242 - II, 841-855.  
243 - II, 858-863.  
244 - II, 864-868.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

bearings on Carrier Division Two be obtained.<sup>245</sup> The  
daily Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the  
Pacific Fleet, stated "no change in estimated carrier  
position".<sup>246</sup>

AUGUST 21, 1942

Aside from a plain language enemy dispatch  
giving an account of the Japanese victory in the  
first battle of the Solomons,<sup>247</sup> and easily detected<sup>248</sup>  
attempts by the Japanese at radio deception, the  
amount of accurate intelligence gleaned from enemy  
messages decreased on this day. The Japanese were  
constantly rectifying their communication mistakes,  
and this resulted in greater security.<sup>249</sup> However,  
one enemy call sign was definitely established as a  
designator for the Southern Force.<sup>250</sup>

As already noted on previous days, the Eighth  
Fleet Commander and Staff, aboard the Chokai, were at  
sea near Rabaul, probably in connection with a task

---

245 - II, 870-879.  
246 - II, 880.  
247 - II, 881.  
248 - II, 882.  
249 - II, 883-884.  
250 - II, 885.

1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

force being formed in Palao to act under the Eighth  
 Fleet. <sup>251</sup> Urgent dispatches from Guadalcanal also  
 indicated forthcoming operations. <sup>252</sup> The fueling of  
 Second Fleet units in the Truk-Rabaul area with the  
 Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet, aboard the  
 cruiser, Atago, the apparent presence of Cruiser  
 Divisions Five and Seven, and Destroyer Squadrons  
 Two and Four were observed in the Southwest Pacific. <sup>253</sup>  
 Noticed in radio traffic since August 8, 1942 the  
 title "Kago Operation Force" was now believed to re-  
 fer to all Japanese forces operating throughout this  
 area. <sup>254</sup>

The composition of two major enemy task forces  
 that included the battleships, Kongo and Haruna, were  
 discerned from dispatches of August 11, 1942 but no  
 indication of their present whereabouts was uncovered. <sup>255</sup>  
 At Truk, the Fourth Fleet Flagship, Kashima, <sup>256</sup> as well  
 as the Chikuma and other units of Cruiser Division  
 Eight were located. <sup>257</sup> Enemy men-of-war were asso-

---

251 - II, 886-890.  
 252 - II, 891-893.  
 253 - II, 894-896.  
 254 - II, 897-898.  
 255 - II, 899-900.  
 256 - II, 901-902.  
 257 - II, 903-905.

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

ciated with Kwajalein and Rabaul, while the Sasebo<sup>258</sup>  
Fifth Special Landing Force, Cruiser Division Six and  
the Kure Fifth Landing Force were at Buna, Gizo and  
Guadalcanal, respectively.<sup>259</sup> Particular attention  
was paid to the concentration of the Commander of  
Destroyer Squadron Two, units of Destroyer Divisions  
Eight and Fifteen and Destroyer Squadron Three near  
Rabaul as well as to the operations of destroyers at  
Guadalcanal, and to those scattered throughout the  
Pacific.<sup>260</sup> To keep these and other enemy units sup-  
plied, plane transports, tankers, hospital ships,  
auxiliaries, and marus constantly moved along the  
Truk-Rabaul-Saipan-Empire route. One unidentified  
unit was located at Balikpapan in the Netherlands  
East Indies.<sup>261</sup> Allied submarines were warned that  
small type marus were used off the northern coast of  
Japan for anti-submarine patrol.<sup>262</sup>

Further attempts to locate Japanese carriers  
again resulted in indefinite reports,<sup>263</sup> though a move-

---

258 - II, 906-907.  
259 - II, 908-911.  
260 - II, 912-921.  
261 - II, 922-934.  
262 - II, 935.  
263 - II, 937-942.

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

ment southward under destroyer escort was deemed prob-  
able.<sup>264</sup> The usual aircraft movements noted throughout  
the South Pacific on previous days continued. One  
seaplane unit left Kiska,<sup>265</sup> and the Fifth Air Attack  
Force, active in the Solomons on August 13, 1942 was  
observed preparing for future operations.<sup>266</sup> The  
Sixth Air Attack Force was concerned with plane  
transfers from the Empire;<sup>267</sup> the Eleventh Air Fleet  
and Squadron Commands were prominent,<sup>268</sup> and further  
air activity was observed at Gizo and Kavieng.<sup>269</sup>  
Japanese reconnaissance planes were also on the  
alert.<sup>270</sup>

To cripple Allied supply lines by aggressive  
attacks, Submarine Squadron One moved to Rabaul, re-  
placing Submarine Squadron Three in the Solomons,  
while the Commander Submarine Force directed activi-  
ties from Jaluit.<sup>271</sup> Information concerning American  
convoys in their patrol areas were forwarded through  
diplomatic channels, as similar intelligence was

---

264 - II, 943-946.  
265 - II, 947.  
266 - II, 948-949.  
267 - II, 950.  
268 - II, 951-952.  
269 - II, 953-954.  
270 - II, 955.  
271 - II, 956-960.

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

272

supplied to the Germans in the Atlantic.

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet added to the above information. Reports of increasing activity around Palao led to the suggestion that an Allied submarine be stationed there to render intel-

273

ligence on enemy movements. The ultimate destination of the striking force composed of the carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Ruyo, along with Cruiser Division Eight, one unit of Cruiser Division Four plus the Kirishima and Hiei was still unknown, though it was stated that there were no indications of the

274

Japanese carriers having departed from Empire waters. The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 21, 1942 reemphasized conclusions

275

drawn from the traffic analysis already mentioned.

AUGUST 22, 1942

Many enemy messages of preceding days were retransmitted on August 22, 1942 and the increase in Japanese operational dispatches from Guadalcanal on

- 
- 272 - II, 962-964.
  - 273 - II, 965.
  - 274 - II, 965.
  - 275 - II, 966.

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

August 21, 1942 indicated American offensive thrusts  
in the Solomons. <sup>276</sup> It was also noted that Rabaul  
broke radio silence to transmit to warships in the  
Outer South Seas Force, <sup>277</sup> and the battleship, Yamato,  
probably serving as the flagship of the Combined  
Fleet, <sup>278</sup> was mentioned in a dispatch.

Further evidence of an enemy task force  
gathering for operations under the Commander in Chief  
of the Second Fleet was drawn from the presence of  
the Chikuma, the Atago and Maya of Cruiser Division  
Four at Truk. <sup>279</sup> Unidentified men-of-war were also  
reported near Rabaul. <sup>280</sup> Escorted by two destroyers,  
Cruiser Division Seven approached Truk; the light  
cruiser, Kashima, was en route to the South Pacific,  
and Cruiser Division Eighteen continued associations  
with the Fifth Special Landing Force in the Buna-Lae  
region. <sup>281</sup> The whereabouts of the Kako in Cruiser  
Division Six, reported either damaged or sunk in the  
Solomons campaign, <sup>282</sup> could not be determined.

- 
- 276 - II, 967-972.  
277 - II, 973.  
278 - II, 974.  
279 - II, 975-978.  
280 - II, 979.  
281 - II, 984-986.  
282 - II, 980-983.

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

Utilizing information gathered by lookout posts throughout the Solomons, enemy destroyers scouted for Allied striking forces, aided Japanese landing operations and joined in offensive actions.<sup>283</sup> Destroyer Division Thirty, part of Destroyer Squadron Three and other units centered activities around Truk and Rabaul, while the Marshall Islands and adjacent vicinities were the operating areas of Destroyer Division Twenty-seven and Minesweeper Division Sixty-five.<sup>284</sup>

Enemy carrier locations, the cause of considerable research by American traffic analysts on preceding days, were still of primary concern on August 22, 1942. It was now concluded that the previously mentioned carrier exercises in the Empire<sup>285</sup> were not Japanese attempts at deception. However, mounting evidence that the Commander of the First Air Fleet was to rendezvous with the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet at Truk for southern operations also pointed to the possibility of a movement by the Commander of Carrier Division Two.<sup>286</sup>

Additional aircraft supplies were forwarded

---

283 - II, 987-991.  
284 - II, 992-998.  
285 - II, 999-1002.  
286 - II, 1003-1009.

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

to Kavieng for the Kisaratsu and Misawa Air Groups, 287  
while close by, at Rabaul, the Eleventh Fleet Chief  
of Staff and the Fourth Air Attack Force Commander  
directed operations. The Netherlands East Indies air  
activities were also prominent. 288

This general strengthening of enemy units  
throughout the Pacific was also noticed among Guard  
and Landing Forces. The Commander of the First De-  
barkation Party was at Palao; the Yokosuka Fifth  
Special Landing Force was operating in the Solomons, 289  
and the Sasebo Force was at Buna. Not yet identi-  
fied, the Simun Force was believed to be concerned  
with a southern offensive. 290

Along the usual supply routes between the  
Empire and the South Pacific, enemy merchant ships  
established a strong life line of supplies. 291  
To  
prevent Allied planes or forces from cutting off  
their means of supply, and to carry out other offen-  
sive measures, Japanese submarines were increasingly  
active on southern routes. They also adopted certain

---

287 - II, 1010-1012.  
288 - II, 1013-1016.  
289 - II, 1017-1020.  
290 - II, 1021-1022.  
291 - II, 1024-1036.



AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

292  
security precautions to disguise their identity.

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on August 22, 1942 suggested that a major thrust by the Japanese would occur in the Rabaul area shortly. The Summary issued by the United States Pacific Fleet Unit, Fourteenth Naval District and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet's Bulletin reported the presence of three carriers in the Empire, but did not disregard the possibility of their moving to the south shortly. Three other carriers were declared to be either in the Truk area or en route there. 293

AUGUST 23, 1942

The recent adoption of new call signs made it difficult to identify enemy units in the South Pacific at the opening of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. (See the Summary of this chapter for the details of the battle.) While administrative directives and intelligence reports comprised the bulk of enemy traffic early on August 23, 1942, high precedence dispatches were broadcast after 1030 from Guadalcanal, and 294

---

292 - II, 1037-1043.  
293 - II, 1045-1047.  
294 - II, 1049-1052.

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

messages from the Empire to Truk indicated that additional reinforcements were being sent to that area. <sup>295</sup>

A unit of the Japanese Third Fleet was scheduled for Soerabaja. <sup>296</sup>

The battleship, Yamata, was noticed again, and the battleship, Fuso, was believed to be accompanying the Seventh Cruiser Squadron to the Solomons, where the battleships, Kongo, Kirishima, and Haruna, with the aircraft carrier, Zuikaku, were already assembled as a formidable striking force. <sup>297</sup>

Although a report located the cruiser, Chikuma, in the Soerabaja-Koepang area, traffic analysis continued to place it near Truk. Cruiser Division Eighteen, the Kako and the Furataka conducted operations in the Solomons. <sup>298</sup> Enemy destroyers represented a strong force in the Solomons, where a total of fifteen to twenty destroyers from Destroyer Divisions Nine, Fifteen, Twenty-nine, Thirty and Thirty-four, and from Destroyer Squadrons Three and Six <sup>299</sup> operated.

Since the enemy's striking power would be

---

295 - II, 1053-1055.  
296 - II, 1056.  
297 - II, 1057-1059.  
298 - II, 1060-1062.  
299 - II, 1063-1067.

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

considerably strengthened by carriers, particular attention was paid to their maneuvers. Both the Zuiho and Hosho were believed to be in the Empire, and the Kasuga Maru, was ferrying planes southward. Nothing had been heard from the Ryujo since July 24, 1942.<sup>300</sup> However, dispatches late on August 22, 1942 disclosed that the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet aboard the Shokaku, the Zuikaku and the Ryujo, as well as plane transports were probably headed for Truk.<sup>301</sup> Air Squadron Twenty-six was stationed at Kavieng.<sup>302</sup>

Considerable maru traffic was noticed at Rabaul where air tenders and tankers supplied and refueled ships in the battle area.<sup>303</sup> One merchantman was en route from Rabaul to Truk.<sup>304</sup> The Yokosuka Third Special Landing Force<sup>305</sup> was on its way to Rabaul, and the First Landing Force was noticed at Palao.<sup>306</sup>

Though the Japanese had five units of Submarine Squadrons Five and Eight based at Saigon and

---

300 - II, 1068-1070.  
301 - II, 1071-1073.  
302 - II, 1074.  
303 - II, 1075-1079.  
304 - II, 1080-1081.  
305 - II, 1082.  
306 - II, 1083.

1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

a division of Submarine Squadron Eight in the Empire, enemy submarine warfare was centralized in the Solomons. Submarine Division Thirty-three of Submarine Squadron Seven, and apparently all units of Submarine Squadron One were scouting for Allied units in the South Pacific. <sup>307</sup> Almost all ships, including destroyers and submarines, at or near Rabaul, were <sup>308</sup> addressed by the Commander of the Submarine Force. Japanese espionage agents in the United States were seeking secret information concerning convoy movements for the use of these submarines. <sup>309</sup>

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet, on August 23, 1942 stating that Carrier Division One and the Ryujo were scheduled to enter Truk, gave no indication that Carrier Division Two would move from the Empire. Heavy enemy landings were expected in the Guadalcanal area within the next twelve hours, and enemy offensive action around Ocean Island was believed to be a feint to draw Allied forces from the Solomons. <sup>310</sup>

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the

---

307 - II, 1084-1089.  
308 - II, 1090.  
309 - II, 1091-1092.  
310 - II, 1095.

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

Pacific Fleet for August 23, 1942, indicating that no Japanese carriers were south of Truk, omitted the warning of August 19 and 22, 1942, relating to the possible undetected presence of enemy carriers in southern waters. In the action reports of the battle occurring on this day, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher referred to this bulletin as one of his reasons for deciding to send a carrier southwards to a refueling rendezvous. This left the American task force without some of its air support to face an enemy task force comprising several carriers which it encountered unexpectedly later in the day.<sup>311</sup>

AUGUST 24, 1942

As the Battle of the Eastern Solomons increased in tempo on the second day of actual combat, (See the Summary of this chapter for details of the battle) a heavy volume of enemy traffic was intercepted, particularly from a new transmitter in the New Britain area. Unfortunately, the new Japanese cipher systems were not being read at this time and United States Naval Communication Intelligence had

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

to rely solely on traffic analysis. <sup>312</sup>

There were several indications that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was at sea, but no exact location could be determined. <sup>313</sup> It was also believed that certain units of Battle Division Three were not with the First Air Fleet Staff. The battleships, Kongo and Kirishima, were associated with the Rabaul region, although no definite information could be obtained on any of these units. <sup>314</sup>

The Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force on Buna, as well as the enemy forces at Lunga on Guadalcanal, and two radio stations on Guadalcanal were very active. <sup>315</sup> Officers of both the Kure Fifth Special Landing Force and the Kawaguti Detachment appeared in the Truk-Rabaul area, and on Makin, a new enemy base was established. <sup>316</sup>

It was indicated that several enemy fleets were combined under the one title of the Kago Operations Force. <sup>317</sup> Previous traffic analysis had associated this force with the Solomons where Cruiser

---

312 - II, 1099-1102:  
313 - II, 1103-1108:  
314 - II, 1109-1112.  
315 - II, 1113-1114.  
316 - II, 1115-1117.  
317 - II, 1118.

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

Division Eight, the First Air Fleet, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Destroyer Division Three and an unknown destroyer were operating.<sup>318</sup>

Because the Japanese tried to disguise as much as possible any carrier division movements, their disposition remained the chief concern of American traffic analysts. Message routings suggested that the Zuiho was not in company with the Hayataka and the Hitaka,<sup>319</sup> and the Ryujo was again placed in the Solomons.<sup>320</sup> Off Guadalcanal, an unidentified enemy carrier engaged American carriers.<sup>321</sup> Other enemy air groups, including the Sixth Air Attack Corps, made the Solomons their battle area,<sup>322</sup> and Japanese planes were already noticed in contact with Allied forces.<sup>323</sup> The Commander of the Shinchiku Air Group remained at Truk.<sup>324</sup>

With the need for fuel and supplies more acute during the actual battle, the number of tankers routed from the Empire to Truk, Rabaul and even the

---

318 - II, 1119-1124.  
319 - II, 1125-1126.  
320 - II, 1131-1132.  
321 - II, 1133-1135.  
322 - II, 1127-1129.  
323 - II, 1136.  
324 - II, 1130.

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

Marshalls, increased and included the Shiretoko and <sup>325</sup> Hayatomoa. Only one Japanese submarine, located near Santa Cruz Island, was noted on August 24, 1942, <sup>326</sup> though Japanese espionage agents, working through Spanish lines of communication, kept Tokyo's patrols well informed of United States convoy and warship movements by a steady stream of intelligence <sup>327</sup> passed from New York to Tokyo via Madrid.

The Traffic Intelligence Summary of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, noted that Japanese radio security practices were now able to conceal actual fleet movements, although the formation of forces for operations might have <sup>328</sup> been detected by Allied intelligence. The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet indirectly concurred with this statement by pointing out that the Ryujo had not been definitely identified until American forces had actually sighted the ship. This Summary also mentioned a probable air attack to be carried out by the Japanese against Allied positions in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area.

---

325 - II, 1137-1144.  
326 - II, 1145.  
327 - II, 1146.  
328 - II, 1147.



AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

An estimate of the position of enemy carriers was indicated by the following:

<u>Carriers</u>	<u>Location</u>
Shokaku	Solomons
Zuikaku	Solomons
Ryujo	Possibly Solomons
Hitaka	Kure, ready for sea
Hayataka	Kure, ready for sea
Zuiho	Sasebo, ready for sea
Hosho	Kure
Kasuga Maru	Nearing Truk, en route south (329)

In the Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on August 24, 1942, it was announced that Japanese submarines had been located in the southern region by direction finder bearings. The Kako, of Cruiser Division Six, was believed to have been sunk by an American submarine. <sup>330</sup>

AUGUST 25, 1942

With the Battle of the Eastern Solomons drawing into its third day, the enemy's operational traffic, much of it issued by the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet to major air and fleet units in the South Pacific, rose sharply in volume. Several detachments of the Kagou Operations Force were located

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

near Palao, and the call sign for the Makin Relief  
Force Commander was discovered. <sup>331</sup> One operational  
dispatch to ships defending Japanese bases disclosed  
that Cruiser Divisions Five, Six, Seven and Eight and  
Destroyer Squadrons Four and Ten were in or near the  
Solomons. <sup>332</sup> Warnings were also sent by the British  
that a powerful Japanese striking force had left its  
rendezvous base in the Empire for the Mandates and  
New Guinea. Nevertheless, there were still many in-  
dications of Japanese battleships remaining in home  
waters. <sup>333</sup>

Research on Japanese fleet organization dis-  
closed that the Natori, Isuzu and Kinu comprised two  
sections of Cruiser Division Six, that Destroyer  
Squadron Two was under the Eleventh Air Fleet, and  
the Ryujo, though part of Carrier Division Two for  
administrative purposes, was operating at this time  
with Carrier Division One. <sup>334</sup>

Estimated positions of Japanese carriers  
placed the Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo in the Solomons  
and the Hitaka, Hayataka, Zuiho and Hosho in the

---

331 - II, 1150-1154.  
332 - II, 1155.  
333 - II, 1156-1158.  
334 - II, 1159-1164.

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

Empire.<sup>335</sup> As additional aircraft for the Kisaratsu Air Detachment were transported to Kavieng, Japanese planes increased the offensive against Allied positions, including Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island and Salamaua in the line of attack.<sup>336</sup> At an air base on Gizo Island, the Sixth Air Attack Force was believed to be stationed and the Commander of the Misawa Air Group was located at Gasmata. The transferring of an air unit, previously attached to the Aleutians, to the Yokohama Air station suggested that preparations were being made in the Empire for movements to the Indies or the Malay States.<sup>337</sup>

Because their movements might have provided a clue to the enemy's battle plan, all Japanese ship activity, including the marus travelling between Truk and Rabaul and those acting as escorts for warships, were carefully observed.<sup>338</sup> Japanese submarines were also watched closely since the importance of their scouting patrols increased with the arrival of the Commander of the Submarine Force, the fifth major command to appear in the Solomons-Rabaul vicinity.<sup>339</sup>

---

335 - II, 1165-1166.  
336 - II, 1167-1171.  
337 - II, 1172-1174.  
338 - II, 1175-1178.  
339 - II, 1179-1185.

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet, on August 25, 1942, implied that the Battle of the Solomons had reached its climax and that all contacts showed the enemy to be returning northward.<sup>340</sup>

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet showed Destroyer Division Thirty escorting a convoy in the Rabaul area, and the carriers, Zuikaku, Ryujo and Shokaku contacting the Solomons on August 24, 1942 probably to attempt an attack in the Guadalcanal area.<sup>341</sup>

This ends the day by day account of the communications intelligence available for the use of operational authorities at the time of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The story of the intelligence background of later battles in the Solomons Campaign will be told in subsequent volumes.



The Solomons Islands Campaign

APPENDIX IV

Background of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Air Versus Surface Action  
August 23-25, 1942

AUGUST 9, 1942

With the first battle of the Solomons campaign completed, it remained the task of United States Naval Communication Intelligence to furnish operational data concerning the enemy forces within the battle zone. Since United States cryptanalysts had not succeeded in deciphering the enemy codes current at that time, most of the intelligence had to be furnished by traffic analysis. Consequently, there were a great many gaps in the intelligence concerning the enemy because only the enemy's tendencies, rather than intentions, could be ascertained.

The staff of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was issuing a great many orders to Japanese Commanders in the South Pacific on August 9,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 9, 1942

Returning to an analysis of the enemy's radio traffic on August 9, it was seen that the Combined Fleet staff was originating a great many orders to southern commanders. It was believed that one of the cruisers of Cruiser Division Four was preparing to move south.

No. 1

COMBINED FLEET Staff fairly heavy originator with traffic having appearance directives to Southern Commanders.

FROM: COMBINED FLEET Staff 9 August/0850  
TO : CinC 1ST FLEET  
CinC 2ND FLEET  
CinC 4TH FLEET  
11TH AIR FLEET

(Heavy Unit believed  
Cruiser in CRUDIV 4)  
Info: General Staff.  
Has appearance future Southern movement  
this unit.

(COM14-092316-TI)  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 18)

The Commander in Chief of the Japanese Eighth Fleet, who had formerly been at Rabaul, was now at sea aboard his flagship, the CHOKAI.

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 2

CINC 8TH FLEET at sea, probably  
in CHOKAI which was heard  
frequently. (COM 14-092322-TI)  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 48)

No. 3

FROM: (Rabaul Radio) 8 August/2000  
TO : (Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Comdr RABAUl BASE FORCE)

This was urgent intelligence despatch.  
Routing of which indicates Cinc 8TH FLEET  
is no longer at Rabaul. (BEL-090950-TI)

It was commented:

At 0006, 10th, Rabaul called CHOKAI  
to deliver most urgent operational code  
to Cinc 8TH, info COMCRUDIV 6.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 67).

No. 4

Cinc 8TH FLEET sent series  
of short operational type despatches  
between 0010 and 0025 on 9th addressed  
to OUTSIDE AREA SOUTHERN FORCES  
(BEL-090950-TI)

It was remarked:

was action addressee in a  
despatch from Cinc 11TH AIR FLEET which  
ordered some operation by 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE against (Guadalcanal) during  
the ninth of August.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 68)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

An interesting possibility was noticed when the Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force, which was operating in the Rabaul area, communicated with the Commander of Cruiser Division Seven in Malaya. Hence, warning was given of the danger of Cruiser Division Seven's joining some Japanese battleships to form a very powerful striking force.

No. 5

Apparent battle report from Comdr.  
5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE included COMCRUDIV 7  
for information.  
(COM 14 092322-TI)

It was noted:

The 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE is operating in the Rabaul Area. CRUDIV 7 appeared to be in the Malay area. On Aug. 9th, there were slight indications that CRUDIV 7 might return to the Empire. Also, on Aug. 9th, CRUDIV 7 was associated with battleships calls which suggests the possibility that CRUDIV 7 might be recalled from Malaya to join battleships in some STRIKING FORCE. The 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE and CRUDIV 7 were first associated in traffic on August 8th. (Summary, 100600, August, No. 51)

No. 6

No originator, Serial #741 believed to be CINC COMBINED addressed COMCRUDIV 7

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 6 (cont.)

Info: Two high commands in Southwestern Area Unidentified Chief of Staff Chief of Staff SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE and battleships and This association should be watched for possibility CRUDIV 7 has been recalled from Malaya and will join the battleships in some STRIKING FORCE. (GT#604-OPNAV-091915-TI)

It was indicated:

COMCRUDIV 7 was included as an addressee by 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE 8th August which is first indication of CRUDIV 7 being associated with the Rabaul forces. (Summary, 100600, August, No. 55)

Further traffic analysis discovered the presence of some Marus and a tanker.

No. 7

Communication Officer 4TH FLEET addressed Rabaul Base info SATA Tanker Warship (?) and Communication Officers 8TH FLEET and unidentified Fleet at 0920, 9 August. (GT#606-OPNAV-091942-TI)

It was observed:

SAT on 7 August was shown in Truk Area by traffic association. on 8 August was indicated enroute

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 7 (cont.)

Saipan Area to Rabaul Area via  
Truk with possible destination  
Kavieng in Company with man-of-  
war , BEL calls  
Commander 11th AIF FLEET.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 66)

Enemy radio traffic gave many indications  
that personnel and equipment reinforcements were  
being shipped to the Rabaul-Solomons area under  
convoy.

No. 8

Transportation of supplies indi-  
cated by despatch at 2320/7th from  
MARU addressed Tokyo BuOrd,  
Sasebo Bureau Military Stores, Tokyo  
Communication Section and a Tokyo  
Bureau associated with air-personnel-  
supplies, information Comdr of a  
SUBDIV in SUBRON 5 and COMSUBRON 3.

It was pointed out:

On August 3, TI indicated MARU  
might be enroute to Ambon or  
Soerbaya from Kamrahn Area via Makassar,  
in a convoy including KENJO MARU and  
DESDIV 22. On August 7, D/F placed  
COMSUBRON 3 at 07° S, 166° E.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 50)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 9

MARU maybe is hiding  
under call in general Rabaul  
Area. AZUMA MARU also using  
and associated that region.  
(COML4-092322-TI)

It was declared:

The possibility that may be  
a converted carrier was mentioned in  
Item 44, Page 14, R.I. SUMMARY 080600/C  
August and also in Bel. 080928. On  
August 9th, association indicated that  
AZUMA MARU apparently returning to Truk  
from Saipan. is apparently a  
cover call similar to our  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 42)

No. 10

FROM: (CinC 2ND FLEET) 7 August/2050  
TO : (COMDESRON 4)  
(Destroyer of DESDIV  
(COMAIRON 11 shown  
at Yokosuka)  
KAMIKAWA MARU  
Info: (CinC COMBINED FLEET)  
(General Staff)

This appears to be directive and  
may indicate destroyer will serve  
as escort for KAMIKAWA MARU.  
(BEL-090748-TI)

It was stated:

Destroyer of DESDIV  
(DESRON 1) appears enroute from Ominato  
to Yokosuka Area.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 26)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

Additional destroyer reinforcements were also becoming available in the Solomon area, since they had escorted convoys into the South Pacific, and could be used for other duties.

No. 11

COMDESDIV 17 of DESRON 10 is apparently escorting the AKEBONO MARU. At 1200, 8th, COMDESDIV 17 using the cover call originated a COMM Zone Report which indicates that force to be enroute to Truk via Chichijima and Saipan. One other unidentified unit of DESRON 10 is also using and appears to be enroute to Saipan from the Empire.  
(BEL-090715-TI)

It was mentioned:

Association on 8 August with 4TH FLEET and CinC 8TH indicated this unit with others might be ordered south to reinforce 4TH and 8TH FLEETS.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 69)

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942

Further confirmation that the Commander in Chief Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI was given on August 10.

No. 12

CINC 8TH FLEET placed aboard Chokai?  
by serial numbers.  
(COM14-100744-TI)

It was noted:

This fact was previously reported in Item 30, Page 10, R.I. SUMMARY 091400/C August.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 31)

No. 13

Comparison of Station Serial Numbers shows CINC 8TH FLEET to be in CHOKAI. CHOKAI using cover call is working Rabaul Radio on 9980 kcs. Air-tender (MINEKAZE or OKIKAZE?) using cover call on 4715 kcs. addressed despatch at 2200/9th for action CHOKAI AVIATION UNIT at unidentified base, Info: To CHOKAI Commanding Officer.  
(BEL-100936-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 32)

The Commander in Chief Combined was sending many dispatches to Force and Unit Commanders in the

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Rabaul area, to which reinforcements were being directed.

No. 14

CINC COMBINED busy originating despatches to Force and Unit Commanders in Rabaul Area.

{COM14-102104-TI}  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 42)

No. 15

FROM: (Combined Fleet) #742 Aug.9/7  
TO : (CruDiv 7)  
(DESDIV 2 in DESRON 4)  
(KAGA MARU Aircraft Tender)  
" " " "  
Info: (SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(Desron 4)

Is order for certain Unit or units to proceed to RR - but undetermined which ones are actually directed to proceed.

{GZ#2393-OPNAV-101721-DI}  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 39)

It was suspected that the large volume of despatches being issued by the Japanese Fourth and Eighth Fleets were operational reports.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 16

Large volume of despatches from 4TH and 8TH FLEETS appear to be reports of operations.

(COM14-102118-TI)

(Summary, 110600, August, No. 41)

Undoubtedly, Rabaul was destined to receive many more enemy units and, in particular, reinforcements in air strength. A jurisdictional split in the command of the Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet occurred at this time. The administrative office remained in the Guam-Tinian area, while the Commander of this fleet was addressed at Rabaul.

No. 17

A split in the Command of 11TH AIR FLEET occurred with CINC at 5TH AIR ATTACK BASE in Rabaul Area and Staff Communication Officer at Tinian  
(COM14-100742-TI)

It was indicated:

Tinian is the normal location of this command.

(Summary, 101400, August, No. 22)

No. 18

FROM: #353 Aug. 9/7  
TO: KAMIGAWA MARU



AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 18 (cont.)

Intercepted both enciphered and plain code copies - unreadable due to unrecovered values but directs cancellation of something and directs someone proceed Rabaul.  
(BEL-100410-DI)

It was commented:

is the 11TH AIR FLEET. DI had indicated that the 11TH AIR FLEET Headquarters might be shifted from Tenian to Rabaul Air Station.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 21)

No. 19

Administrative Office 11TH AIR FLEET remains in Guam-Tenian Area while Commander is addressed at Rabaul.  
(COM14-102048-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 24)

No. 20

#981 Aug. 8/?  
FROM: (Comdr 11th Air Fleet)  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)  
Info: All Major Commands:  
(Movement Report Office)

This Officer shifted flag to Rabaul at 1415/8 August.  
(BEL-100805-DI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 20)

No. 21

FROM: (11TH AIR FLEET) #421 Aug.10/0620

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 21 (cont.)

One Headquarters heavy bomber with CINC aboard departed at 0600 for RRA (vicinity of Rabaul).  
(BEL-100805-DI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 19)

The Sixth Air Attack Force, which had been operating in the Northern Empire, also sent a unit into the Rabaul area at this time. A deciphered message gave the schedule of twenty-five planes of the Sixth Air Attack Force en route from unidentified Mandate fields to Rabaul.

No. 22

FROM: #509 Aug. 9/?  
TO : (MARU) (Air-Tender?)

"Your ship will cease \_\_\_\_\_ and proceed to RX (Solomons Area) via Rabaul." (Remainder incomplete but orders change of something possibly organization).  
(BEL-100410-DI)

It was remarked:

(6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE) has been in the Northern Empire but a Unit of the 6TH AIR ATTACK is associated with the Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 35)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 23

Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK received  
traffic through Rabaul Station on  
9th.

(COM14-100744-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No.26)

No. 24

Commander 6TH AIR ATTACK  
at Guam at 2000/10 August.  
(GT#610-OPNAV-101457-TI)

It was observed:

COM 14 reported Commander 6TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCE believed in Rabaul Area  
August 9. The 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE  
originally operated in Ominato,  
Chichijima, Marcus Area.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No.25)

No. 25

#366 Aug. 9/?

FROM: (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (11th AIR FLEET)  
(6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)

INFO: (4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Guam Radio)  
( COMBINED FLEET)  
(4TH FLEET)  
(5TH FLEET)  
(8TH FLEET)  
(Yokosuka Comdt.)  
(NORTHERN FORCE)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 25 (cont.)

(In five figures) is schedule of movement on 10th, 11th and 12th of 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE planes (Kisaratsu and 6TH AIR GROUP bombers) from Unidentified Mandate fields to RR Area. Unable to uncover exact figures but believe approximately 25 planes involved in the transfer.

(GZ#2392-OPNAV-101528-DI)

It was pointed out:

6TH AIR GROUP reported by COLOMBO to be operating in Jaluit. Kisaratsu AIR has had a section at Truk and the MARU XCV brought a section to Rabaul area (early August).  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 29)

No. 26

#355 10 August/1900  
FROM: (CinC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
TO : (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
INFO: (CinC COMBINED FLEET)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(CinC 4TH FLEET)  
(CinC 8TH FLEET)  
  
(4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(MARU)

SOUTH SEAS FORCE (?) AIR FORCE despatch Order #\_\_. (1) SIXTH AIR GROUP (?) less \_\_ await orders at PST. (2) \_\_ of 6TH AIR GROUP (?) and \_\_ of KISARAZU AIR GROUP will be attached to RR FLEET \_\_.  
(3) \_\_ of 6TH AIR GROUP will ferry KISARAZU AIR GROUP planes from Tenian to RR in accordance following

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 26 (cont.)

schedule (3 days for round trip)  
1st day, depart PST and arrive PT;  
2nd day, depart PT and arrive RR,  
returning to PT the same day; 3rd  
day, depart PT and arrive PST.  
(GZ#2402-DI)

It was declared:

PST is Tenian.  
RR is Rabaul.  
PT is Truk (Caroline Islands).  
(Summary, 110600, August. No. 35)

Several indications were noted that a reor-  
ganization involving the enemy's Cruiser Division  
Seven was taking place, and it was thought possible  
that this organization, which formerly had been  
active in the Netherlands East Indies area, was now  
being ordered into the Solomons.

No. 27

At 0950, CINC COMBINED FLEET orig-  
inated what appears to be directive  
(Serial 742) addressed for action.

TO :

{COMCRUDIV 7}  
{COMDESDIV 2}  
{KAGU MARU} at Ambon

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1944 (Continued)

No. 27 (cont.)

INFO: (Cinc 2ND FLT) (Cinc 3RD FLT) (COMBINATION 4) (Naval General Staff) (Unidentified)

FROM: (Cinc 2ND FLT) #999 9 August  
TO: KAGU BATT  
INFO: COMBIV 7  
COMBIV 11 (INF 1)  
COMBIV 2  
(Cinc COMBINE FLT)  
(Cinc 3RD FLT)  
(Cinc 4TH FLT)  
Naval General Staff

FROM: KAGU BATT 9 August/1340  
TO: (Chief of Staff COMBINE FLT)  
(Chief of Staff 2ND FLT)  
COMBIV 7  
COMBIV 2  
INFO: (COMBINATION 4)  
(Cinc 3RD FLT)

These associations in addition to the appearance of COMBIV 7 as one of information addressees in second part of 3-part operation order from COMBINATION 25 (number 054 at SOAG, Etc, suggests that COMBIV 7 and COMBIV 2 are in the West Indies and possibly under orders to proceed to Solomons in company with Aircraft Tender KAGU BATT. (100-10740-11)

It was stated:

The first two despatches have been noted here previously. TI on 9 August

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 27 (cont.)

stated in reference to this association that indication is that CRUDIV 7 and DESDIV 2 are coming East to Java Sea, or KAGU MAPU is going West to Malaya.

(Summary, 110600, August, No. 48)

No. 28

9 August/0850  
FROM: No Originator (From Cinc COMBINED FLEET)  
TO : (COMCRUDIV 7)  
INFO: (Chief of Staff SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 1ST FLEET)  
(COMDESRON 2)  
(Unidentified)  
(Battleship)  
(Unidentified (probably garbled for another battleship in same Division as )).

CRUDIV 7 is indicated in other traffic as possibly ordered to Solomons Area and above association with Battleships of 1ST FLEET not understood unless duties previously designated for CRUDIV 7 are to be carried out by these units.

(BEL-101117-TI)

It was mentioned:

This despatch previously reported in RI Summary 100600/C August, page 15, item 55. Call came out before as was identified as Chief of Staff SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 44)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 29

Message Serial #429 from Navy  
Minister to all first and second class  
Naval Stations, all Major Commands  
, and COMCRUDIV 7  
on 9 August may be reassignment of  
CRUDIV 7 in Fleet Organization.  
(GT#612-OPNAV-101622-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 9)

No. 30

Tentative heavy cruiser  
addressed Communication Officer (CRUDIV  
7 at 2100/9th. No indica-  
tion location of . It is slight  
indication that has been assigned  
to this CRUDIV.  
(GT#612-OPNAV-101622-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 12)

Finally, a message was intercepted and deci-  
phered, which proved that deductions made from traf-  
fic analysis had been valid. The message disclosed  
that Cruiser Division Seven was to rendezvous with  
the Second Fleet, which was about to leave Japan for  
the Rabaul area.

No. 31

FROM: (CINC COMBINED FLEET) #742 Aug. 9/0950  
TO : - (COMCRUDIV 7)  
----- (COMDESDIV 1)  
----- (KAGU MARU)



AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 31 (cont.)

INFO: (CINC 3RD)  
(Navy General Staff)  
(COMDESRON 4)  
(CINC 2ND)  
( Unidentified)

Mentioned HYPO 100200 confirms deduction regarding CRUDIV 7 made in HYPO 091915. "Cease \_\_\_\_\_ (operations?) and with \_\_\_\_\_ rendezvous with the 2ND FLEET (which departs Japan the 11th for the Rabaul Area)". Delivery to KAGU MARU was made through \_\_\_\_\_ (Ambon Radio). CRUDIV 7 believed in Singapore or Netherlands East Indies Area.  
(BEL-101728-DI) (MEMO #11-1)

It was noticed:

The despatches referred to above are OPNAV despatches and not COM 14's, and appropriate parts are quoted for information:

"CINC COMBINED ADDRESSED COMCRUDIV 7  
, COMDESDIV 2 , MARU  
AT UNIDENTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_; INFO SOUTHERN  
EXPEDITIONARY FLEET \_\_\_\_\_, COMDESRON 4  
, CINC \_\_\_\_\_, and CINC \_\_\_\_\_  
, at 0950, 9th."

"NO ORIGINATOR SERIAL NUMBER 741, BELIEVED TO BE CINC COMBINED ADDRESSED COMCRUDIV IV SEVEN PAREN PAREN: INFO TWO HIGH COMMANDS IN SOUTHWESTERN AREA and UNIDENTIFIED CHIEF OF STAFF CHIEF OF STAFF SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE and BATTLESHIPS and

THIS ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE WATCHED FOR POSSIBILITY CRUDIV 7 HAS BEEN RECALLED FROM MALAYA AND WILL JOIN THE BATTLESHIPS IN SOME STRIKING FORCE."

(Summary, 111400, August, No. 23)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division Six was making arrangements for a fueling rendezvous near or at Rabaul.

No. 32

CINC 4TH at 1600/10 August to Tanker Infor: CINC 11TH AIP and 8TH FLEETS, COMCRUDIV 6 and Rabaul Base, indicate arrangements for and necessity of fueling CRUDIV 6 units. Rabaul probable location rendezvous. (GT#610-OPNAV-101457-TI) (Summary, 101400, August, No. 34)

No. 33

CRUDIV 6 becoming more active suggesting now taking part in operations unless she has been under silence, is associated Kavieng BASE FORCE and using call.  
FROM: CRUDIV 6 10 August/0700  
TO : Cinc 8TH FLEET  
INFO: (Cinc COMBINED FLEET)  
(Unidentified)  
Tokyo Movements  
8TH BASE FORCE  
(COM14-102118-TI)

It was noted:

TI on 10 August indicated arrangements for and necessity of fueling CRUDIV 6 Units, Rabal probable location rendezvous.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 49)

A message from Tokyo to several important

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Japanese ships gave rise to the warning that these units might very well compose an enemy Task Force.

No. 34

Tokyo Personnel at 1640 on 9th  
addressed Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET  
Information to KONGO  
HARUNA, Takao?  
MAYA, MYOKO  
HAGURO, COMDES-  
DIV of DESRON 4, COMDESDIV  
of DESRON 2 and Fleet Unit  
which, without carriers,  
might constitute a TASK FORCE.  
(COM-14-100742-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 8)

The Japanese were making every effort to increase their shore-based aircraft in the Rabaul area. Traffic analysis disclosed that units were being drawn from as far west as Takao, and as far north as the Empire itself.

No. 35

Increasing evidence Japs making all out effort immediately increase shore based aircraft in Rabaul area drawing units as far west as Takao while others are apparently enroute from Empire.  
(COM-14-102048-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 43)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

A high priority message from the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet to various other high commanders seemed to indicate an urgent need of reinforcements.

No. 36

FROM: CinC 8TH FLEET (Concealed Originator)  
2-part SAKI #185 9 August/0730  
TO : (Chief Naval General Staff)  
(CinC COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdr 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(COMSUBFOF)  
INFO: (CinC 4TH FLEET)  
(Comdr AIRON 25)  
(Comdr RABAUl BASE FORCE)

Probably urgent request for reinforcements.

(BEL-101041-TI)

It was indicated:

SAKI is relatively high priority.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 39)

Despite the unfavorable weather, the Misawa Air Group was among the new arrivals at Rabaul during this period.

No. 37

Commander Misawa AIR at  
Rabaul by traffic routing 10 August.  
(GT#611-OPNAV-101457-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 38

FROM: (HIHORO AIR) #925 Aug. 9

Indicates that due to unfavorable weather he was unable to carry out patrol from Rabaul.  
(COM-14-100746-DI) (MEMO#10-2)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 18)

Air Squadron Eleven was thought to be en route to the Solomons, and twenty-two bombers of the Kisaratsu Air Force arrived at Tinian on their way southwards.

No. 39

At 1700/8th CINC COMBINED FLEET  
originated despatch #732 which  
appears to be directive addressed for  
action COMAIRRON 11 KAMIKAWA  
MARU, CINC 2ND FLEET  
and Comdr. 11TH AIR FLEET  
Info: CINCS 4TH and 8TH FLEETS  
and plus Naval General Staff  
. This suggests that AIRRON  
11 is being ordered to Solomons. Fur-  
ther indication of this is noted in  
heading of despatch #989 from Chief of  
Staff 11TH AIR FLEET at 2100/9  
in which the KAMIKAWA MARU, COMAIRRON 25  
and Kisaratsu address  
and Info addresses. This despatch was  
addressed for action Bureau Aeronautics  
and may concern transporta-  
tion of aircraft or equipment to AIRRON  
25 by KAMIKAWA.  
(BEL-100936-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 6)

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 40

Despatches from CINC 11TH AIR FLEET  
associated KAMIKAWA MARU with AIRRON 11  
and the Rabaul Area.  
(COM-14-100742-TI)

It was commented:

This association has been noted pre-  
viously in Items 57, Page 15, RI Summary  
100600/Q August and Items 23, 24, 25, 26  
Page 7 - same summary.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 24)

No. 41

FROM: #416 Aug.10/1620  
(6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Guam Radio)  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)  
INFO: (8TH FLEET)  
(4TH FLT. (B)/Ominato Rdo)?  
(5TH FLEET)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
(5TH FLEET)  
(Yokosuka Commandant)  
(Base Force #7 at Chichijima)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(6TH AIR ATT.COMDR. of Unit in)  
(?)  
(4TH AIR ATTACK)  
(5TH AIR ATTACK)

22 Bombers and 2 transport planes from  
Kisarazu AIR arrived PST at \_\_\_\_\_.  
At 0700/11 August will depart from RRE.  
(GZ#2394-OPNAV-101908-DI)

It was remarked:

PST is Tenian.  
RRE is Vanakanau?  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 36)

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

A carrier plane group, which had been formerly associated with the AKAGI, was also thought to be shifting from Kisarazu to reinforce air units in the South Pacific.

No. 42

Carrier PLANE GROUP associated with AKAGI during Midway action was shown at Kisaratsu at 1840/8th. Routing later indicated may have shifted from Kisaratsu to Southern Area to reinforce air units that area.  
(BEL-100925 -TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 28)

A resumé of Japanese operational aircraft messages on August 9 indicated that at least seven bomber flights had been instituted by them in the Solomons area.

No. 43

Heavy volume of short operational type messages from aircraft indicates operations probably bombing attacks by at least seven flights between 0800 and 1500 on the 9th. These apparently in Solomons Area.  
(BEL-101041-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 40)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Although intense radio activity on the part of Japanese aircraft carriers was noted for a while, there were no indications of preparations for a departure to the Solomons.

No. 44

Intense activity on carrier channel observed. CINC 1ST AIR FLEET originated numerous despatches to carriers, plane groups and Yokosuka Air, but no other types associated nor no indications of preparations for departure evident.

(COM14-100738-TI)  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 7)

No. 45

No carrier traffic observed since last Digest.

(COM14-102104-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 7)

The AKIKAZE was already in the Solomons-Rabaul area.

No. 46

Traffic routing suggests the AKIKAZE has arrived at (Buka or Bougainville?).  
(BEL-101055-TI)



AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 46 (cont.)

It was observed:

AKIKAZE's serial 206 of August 9th, read, "Arrived at RXC". RXC has been tentatively located as in the vicinity of Bougainville or Buka.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 50)

No. 47

Headings and associations indicate:  
AKIKAZE and YUKAZE with  
Comdr 11TH AIR FLEET. in  
Rabaul Area.  
(BEL-101117-TI)

It was pointed out:

It is believed AKIKAZE, was believed on 8 August to be in Solomon-Rabaul Area. On August 9 DI stated AKIKAZE arrived RXC (In vicinity of Bougainville).  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 51)

The Commander of the First Air Force, who was at Tateyama, was associated in a dispatch with Air Squadron Eleven, and the KAMOI, which was in the Marshalls, was associated with Air Squadron Twenty-five. These associations indicated possible future movements of the organizations concerned to the Rabaul-Solomons area.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 48

Enciphered Commander 1ST AIR FORCE was shown at Tateyama and is associated with AIRRON 11, Chitose and Omura AIR address MASIMU in heading of despatch #132 from at 1450/8th. (BEL-100936-TI) (Summary, 101400, August, No. 13)

No. 49

#986 9 August/1410  
FROM: (Comdr 11TH AIR FLEET)  
TO : (Comdr AIRON 24)  
(Comdr AIRON 25)  
(KAMOI)

KAMOI currently in Marshalls and association with AIRON 25 suggests she may be moving to Rabaul Area. (BEL-101117-TI)

It was declared:

KAMOI was by TI in Marshalls on 8 August. (Summary, 110600, August, No. 25)

A peculiarly addressed message which mentioned "Specially Equipped Vessels" in the heading gave rise to the supposition that radar had been installed in certain aircraft and submarines.

No. 50

#352 9 August/1520  
FROM: (Comdr 11TH AIR FLEET)

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 50 (cont.)

TO: 11TH AIR FLEET less Specially Equipped Vessels

{ 4TH FLEET  
{ 8TH FLEET less Specially Equipped Vessels  
{ SUBRON 3 less Specially Equipped Vessels

Use of this designation in connection with aircraft and various types of surface craft including submarines suggests possibility special vessels may have Radar Equipment.

(BEL-101041-TI)

(Summary, 110600, August, No. 32)

Enemy destroyer activity was watched very closely since the movements of these units would indicate the location of their convoys. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet addressed Destroyer Division Seven but though there was no indication of its location, it was noticed that the same dispatch included the KASUGA MARU as one of its addressees. This ship had been connected with the Sixth Air Attack Force on August 6, and the association was a clue that Destroyer Division Seven might be ordered into the Rabaul area.

No. 51

CINC COMBINED addressed COMDESDIV 7

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 51 (cont.)

and KASUGA MARU  
at 1140/10 August, indicating escort  
for the XCV, but no indication loca-  
tion, nor association with any other  
command.  
(GT#611-OPNAV-101457-TI)

It was declared:

DESDIV 7 was believed operating  
in the Northern Area in early June.  
Since that time little has been known  
except that one of its units  
was noted in connection with the MARU  
XCV receiving traffic from  
Saipan 9 August.

The KASUGA MARU was connected  
with the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE 6 August  
but was unlocated.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 11)

No. 52

DESDIV 7 in DESRON 10,  
and KASUGA MARU associated in  
one message from CINC COMBINED fore-  
shadowing probable operations this  
XCV.  
(COM14-102104-TI)

It was noticed:

Noted by OPNAV and appears in  
R.I. Summary 101400/Q August, page 5,  
Item 11.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 16)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Destroyer Division Four was en route from Truk to Palao to escort the Thirty-fourth Defense Force back to Truk.

No. 53

DESDIV appears to be enroute Palao, possibly to escort 34th DEFENSE FORCE to Truk. MARU also noted this association. (COM14-100738-TI)

It was noted:

is DESDIV 4 and this DESDIV appears to have been ordered South to reinforce 4TH or 8TH FLEETS. (Summary, 100600, August, No. 39)

No. 54

COMDESDIV 4 using cover call , originated SMS #174, at 2030, 9th, which is apparently a Communication Zone report indicating that Command to be enroute from Truk to Palao. Further evidence of this movement is noted in #171, from COMDESDIV 4, using cover call , at 0930, 9th, addressed for action 34TH DEFENSE FORCE at Palau. (BEL-101055-TI)

It was indicated:

Naval General Staff, at 1800, August 9th, originated despatch for action COMDESDIV 4, information Chiefs of Staff COMBINED, 4TH and 8TH FLEETS and

ORIGINAL  
1. December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 54 (cont.)

and 1ST and 11TH AIR FLEETS,  
COMSUBFOR and Truk which indicated  
to OPNAV a change of plan for  
DESDIV 4 and possible destination  
as Truk.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 26)

Destroyer Division Two and Destroyer Division  
Fifteen were associated with Cruiser Division Seven,  
which was destined to come into southern waters, and  
Destroyer Division Seventeen was sailing to Truk via  
Chichijima and Saipan.

No. 55

Traffic originated by 3RD FLEET  
Command associated  
CRUDIV 7 with Balikpapan, Amboina, and  
Davao BASE FORCES, DESDIVS and  
included there this association.  
(COM14-100744-TI)

It was commented:

is DESDIV 2 and is  
DESDIV 15 (DESRON 2).  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 41)

No. 56

FROM: (DESDIV 17 of  
DESRON 10) 9 August/2300  
TO : Comm Officer 5TH BASE FORCE  
Comm Officer 4TH FLEET  
Comm Officer 8TH FLEET

167

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 56 (cont.)

By routing conclude this DESDIV  
now between Empire and Saipan heading  
South.  
(COM-14-102118-TI)

It was remarked:

TI on 9 August indicated this  
DESDIV enroute to Truk via Chichijima  
and Saipan.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 17)

The unidentified warship, whose call sign had  
long been noted as                    finally announced its arri-  
val at Rabaul on August 9.

No. 57

FROM:                    #44 Aug. 9/(?)  
TO : Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET  
      DESDIV of DESRON 6  
      8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul

Scheduled to arrive at seventeen  
thirty.  
(BEL-100410-TI)

It was observed:

(Unidentified) was placed  
in commission sometime between 29 June  
and 1 July. Reported as leaving the  
Empire about 4 July enroute to Rabaul  
via Chichijima and Truk.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 33)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Messages sent by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Eighth Fleet on August disclosed in detail some of the operations instituted to repel invading American forces. Special Landing Force troops were ordered to embark in two Marus and set out for Guadalcanal, in accordance with a schedule found in the two messages which follow.

No. 58

FROM: (Unidentified) #117 Aug.7/1450  
TO : (Commander KURE #5  
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE)  
(Unidentified)  
(COMDR 8TH BASE FORCE  
at Rabaul)  
(Commander SASEBO #5  
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE)  
(COMCRUDIV 18, Command  
in 4TH FLEET)  
(Destroyer in DESRON 2)  
(Comdr. of Unit in 19th  
Division in 4TH FLEET)  
(Unidentified)  
(Comdr. of Unit in  
ESCORT FORCE)  
(Comdr. Armed Guard (?)  
aboard (blank) Maru)  
INFO: (COMDR 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
(Chief of Staff 11TH  
AIR FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff  
COMBINED FLEET)  
(Naval General Staff)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 58 (cont.)

From CINC 8TH FLEET. Passed to 8TH FLEET. "Outside" SOUTH SEAS Operation Order #9: Rest fragmentary but general context is as follows: Detachment for defense of RXI made up of (cg 86568—a number possibly as high as 475) men from SASEBO #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE, (cg 77628 - number less than 60) from KURE #3 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE, and (cg 73719 - number less than 60) from MAIZURU (?) SPECIAL LANDING FORCE under command of (blank) will embark in two Marus and set out for RXI.  
(GZ#2396-OPNAV-102300-MEMO#10-3-DI)

It was observed:

RXI is identified as Guadalcanal.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 37)

No. 59

FROM: (Concealed Identity  
Call) #218 Aug. 7/1800  
TO : (Unidentified)  
(Comdr. Armed Guard (?)  
aboard KINAI MARU)  
INFO: (CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(CINC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(CINC 4TH FLEET)  
(COMDR #7 BASE FORCE at  
Chichijima)  
(COMDR #8 BASE FORCE at  
Rabaul)  
(COMDR 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)

From CINC 8TH FLEET. Passed to



AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 60 (cont.)

FORCE in July and since part of the SASEBO SPECIAL LANDING FORCE is known to be enroute to defend RXI (Guadalcanal Is.), this unit may also be part of the landing Force enroute to Guadalcanal Is. One of the ships of this Force has already been reported sunk by an Allied submarine. Roger Area is Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 42)

Another movement report indicated that Japanese reinforcements were being sent into the New Guinea area.

No. 61

FROM: #218 Aug. 9

Although fragmentary, believed to indicate movement toward Lae, Buna, Gona, and participation of 8TH BASE FORCE in occupation of Moresby. Hypo has noticed reappearance of IKKI in Solomons Area. This is same fellow who was in Rabaul Area last May, and later in Aleutians Area.  
COM14-100746-DI-MEMO#10-2)

It was declared:

is 8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul. A unit which appeared to be a destroyer unit, less 4 ships,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 61 (cont.)

indicated it would arrive about 0600 at Guam, August 8th, and depart from there about 0900 with possibly IKKI DETACHMENT embarked. Destination Rabaul Area. This message was not fully readable. (Summary, 101400, August, No. 17)

The usual activity of the Marus continued on this day. One MARU was en route to Rabaul from Makassar via Palao; another MARU left the Truk Communication Zone and entered Jaluit; the MARU departed from Truk and was in the Rabaul area, to which the KAMIKAWA MARU was ordered to proceed, and the KAGU MARU was at Koepang or Kendari.

No. 62

Traffic routing and association indicate: Maru enroute Rabaul to Makassar via Palao. (BEL-101055-TI) (Summary, 110600, August, No. 54)

No. 63

MARU shifted from Truk to Jaluit Comm Zone at 1800, 9th. (BEL-101117-TI)

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 63 (cont.)

It was stated:

Previously reported in R.I.  
Summary 091400/C August, page 8,  
item 24.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 28)

No. 64

MARU in Rabaul Area  
10 August by routing.  
(GT#611-OPNAV-101457-TI)

It was mentioned:

This MARU left Maizuru about  
16 July for Palao 22 July and ap-  
parently went to Truk and then to  
Rabaul on 6 August.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 38)

No. 65

FROM: #353 August 9th/2100  
(COMDR 11TH AIR  
FLEET)  
TO : (KAMIKAWA MARU)  
INFO: (CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(CINC 2ND FLEET)  
(COMAIRON 11)  
(CINC 4TH FLEET)  
(CINC 8TH FLEET)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
(--- 11TH AIR FLEET)

"FBG" Despatch Order # \_\_\_\_\_  
Fragmentary, but believe about as  
follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 65 (cont.)

"KAMIKAWA MARU proceed to RR (Rabaul). Further orders will be issued after arrival there."  
(GZ#2399-OPNAV-102342-MEMO#10-4-DI)

It was noted:

T.I. on 9-10 August indicated that KAMIKAWA MARU might proceed to New Britain Area possibly to provide transportation and tender services for AIRON 11 which has been indicated by T.I. as ordered from Yokosuka to the New Britain Area.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 33)

No. 66

CINC 2ND FLEET at 1500/9th addressed KAGU MARU at Koepang or Kendari, Info: COMCRUDIV 7, COMAIRRON 11, COMDESDIV 2, CINC 4th, CINC SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CINC COMBINED and Naval General Staff. At 1340/9th KAGU MARU addressed Chief of Staff COMBINED and 2ND FLEET, COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESDIV 2, Info: COMDESRON 4 and unidentified or garbled. Indication is that CRUDIV 7 and DESDIV 2 are coming East to Java Sea, or KAGU MARU is going west to Malaya.  
(GT#612-OPNAV-101622-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 42)

An air tender had left Yokosuka en route to Jaluit, and the , which was thought to be either a fleet tanker or tender, announced that 175

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

would arrive on August 11 at a place tentatively identified as either Kavieng or Avau.

No. 67

Traffic routing and associations indicate: Maru airtender is enroute to Jaluit from Yokosuka via Chichijima and Saipan.  
(BEL-101055-TI)

It was noted:

Maru was by TI on July 23rd, in Yokosuka Area.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 23)

No. 68

#195 Aug. 9/1820  
FROM: (Fleet Tanker or Tender)  
TO : (8TH FLEET)  
(BASE FORCE #8 at Rabaul)  
(4TH FLEET Chief of Staff)  
(BASE FORCE #4 at Truk)  
(AZUMA MARU)

My noon position on 9th was 5° 26' N 150°(?) 14' E Course 180(?) speed 10. Expect arrive RO at 1500(?) on 11th.  
Note: These times and speeds and positions do not quite jibe, but anyway will arrive RO sometime on 11th, probably near midnight.  
(GZ#2388-OPNAV-101528-DI)

It was indicated:

was in Saipan about 5 August

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 63 (cont.)

and was scheduled to arrive at Truk  
9 August then go to Rabaul. RO is  
questionably identified as Kavieng  
or Avau.

(Summary, 101400, August, No. 37)

The AZUMA MARU seemed to be accompanying this  
tanker.

No. 69

At 1820, tanker addressed  
serial 295 for action CINC 8TH FLEET  
, 8TH BASE FORCE, en-  
ciphered Commander RO (at Kavieng),  
Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET  
plus 4TH BASE FORCE at Truk  
and AZUMA MARU. This associa-  
tion suggests tanker and AZUMA  
MARU will proceed from Truk Area to  
Rabaul via Kavieng.  
(BEL-101055-TI)

It was commented:

Decrypted text of above despatch  
appears as item 37, page 11, R.I.  
Summary 101400/C August.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 52)

Although there was considerable radio traffic  
emanating from Kiska at this time, it was believed  
that it concerned operations within the Southern area



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

rather than developments in the Aleutians. The Japanese Radio Intelligence organization at Tokyo was sending an increasing number of reports to both its Northern and Southern operational forces. These R. I. Summaries from Tokyo were directed regularly to the Fifth Air Attack Force and Submarine Squadrons Three and Seven in the South, and Submarine Squadron Two in the North.

No. 70

Considerable file of traffic originated by Kiska Commander , Comdr Aircraft of ALEUTIANS FORCE , and Comdr ALEUTIANS FORCE , but traffic leads to belief that major concern is operations in Southern Area.  
(COM14-100736-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 4)

No. 71

Considerable number R.I. despatches and increasing number of reports from Rabaul Forces noted. Tokyo R.I. reports regularly include 5TH AIR ATTACK, SUBRON 3 and 7 in the south, and SUBRON 2 in the north in addition to usual Fleet Commanders.  
(COM14-102048-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 5)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 72

Tokio RI Intelligence active with Intelligence Traffic to Air and Surface Commands in Southern Area. SUBRONS 3 and 7 were addressed collectively indicating this information of particular interest to these units.  
(BEL-100925-TI)

It was remarked:

SUBRONS 3 and 7 were believed ordered to the Tulagi Area.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 36)

No. 73

SUBRONS 3 and 7 still being extensively addressed not only by P.I. STATIONS but by unidentified activity at Truk.  
(COM14-102118-TI)

It was observed:

TI on 10 August indicated Tokyo RI Active with Intelligence to Air and Surface Commands Southern Area. SUBRONS 3 and 7 were addressed collectively indicating this information of particular interest to these Units.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 63)

No. 74

FROM: (Tokyo) 8 August  
TO : (Sub Force)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 74 (cont.)

Stand by for broadcast at  
1700.  
(GT#609-TI)

It was pointed out:

was an info addressed in  
a despatch from Cinc 4th which directed  
movement of unidentified units from  
Rabaul to Tulagi and from Truk to an  
unknown location on 7 August.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 72)

Urgent orders from the Commander in Chief of  
the Combined Fleet sent Japanese submarines into the  
Solomons from surrounding areas to destroy American  
ships.

No. 75

FROM: (CINC COMBINED) #755 Aug. 9  
TO : 8TH FLEET  
11TH Air Fleet

"COMBINED FLEET Radio Order Number \_\_\_\_.  
Submarines will immediately proceed search  
for and destroy the enemy."  
(COM-14-100732-DI)  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 75)

No. 76

Despatch from CINC COMBINED FLEET  
shows following associations; Chiefs

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 76 (cont.)

of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET and 8TH FLEET,  
COMSUBRON 3 and 7 and and  
SUBDIV ), plus Naval General Staff.  
(COM14-102104-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 56)

No. 77

Headings and associations indicate:  
Comdr and Staff Comm Officer SUBRON 3  
at Jaluit ), Sub Tender  
at Truk  
(BEL-101117-TI)

It was declared:

COMSUBRON 3 on 10 August was by  
D/F at 159°E, 01°30' S. MAPU Sub  
Tender was indicated by TI in  
Truk Area on 9 August.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 30)

No. 78

Some indication COMSUBRON 3  
underway from Jaluit  
to Truk by heading of Communi-  
cation Zone Report, Serial 357 at  
1730/9th.  
(BEL-100925-TI)  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 45)

No. 79

Submarine of SUBDIV?  
was active apparently in Rabaul-Solomons  
Area. From headings appeared to

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 79 (cont.)

be a division of SUBRON 7 or at least  
currently operating under direction  
COMSUBRON 7  
(BEL-100925-TI)

It was stated:

was considered SUBRON 6.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 44)

An estimate of the location of several Japanese units disclosed that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Submarine Divisions were operating from Penang, and that others were in the locations noted in Number 81.

No. 80

FROM: (Penang Base Force) #146 Aug. 7/?  
TO : (SUB UNIT)  
INFO: (6TH FLEET)

(Sketchy) but gives requirements  
some material for both 14th and 15th  
SUBDIVS.

Comment: Both these DIVISIONS must  
be currently operating Penang.  
(BEL-100410-DI)

It was mentioned:

identified as SUBRON 1.  
identified as SUB FORCE.  
SUBDIV 14 was believed to be operating  
from the Penang Base on 8 August.  
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 40)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 81

D/F Fixes on Submarines:  
in Kiska vicinity.  
(SUBDIV of SUBRON 7) at 153°  
E, 15° S, (poor)  
(COMSUBRON 6) at 163° E, 12°  
S, (poor)  
(COMSUBRON 3) at 160° E, on  
equator (fair)  
(COM14-102118-TI)

It was noticed:

TI on 9 August suggested possi-  
bility SUBRON 2 Unit might be  
proceeding Yokosuka for docking.  
on 9 August associated with  
4TH FLEET operations. On 4 August  
traffic routing suggested at  
Rahaul. on 10 August was placed  
by TI in 159°E, 01°30S.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 61)

A Japanese subtender announced that it had  
left the Marshall Islands for Truk.

No. 82

FROM: (Subtender) #195 Aug.9/1340  
TO : (4TH BASE FORCE, Truk)  
(4TH FLEET)  
(Tokyo Movement Report  
Office)  
(Sasebo Movement Report  
Office)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
(SUBFORCE)  
(6TH BASE FORCE, Jaluit)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 82 (cont.)

Left PQ for PT.  
(GZ#2383-OPNAV-100840-DI)

It was noted:

PQ is Kwajalein (Marshall Islands). PT is Truk (Caroline Islands).  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 35)

A message from the Eighth Fleet disclosed that submarines were in the vicinity of Tulagi, but it was not possible to discover whether the message referred to American or Japanese submarines.

No. 83

FROM: (8TH FLEET) #199 Aug.8/1230  
TO : (11TH AIR FLT)  
INFO: (5TH AIR ATTACK FOR)

\_\_\_\_\_ submarine (s) \_\_\_\_\_ in the vicinity of RXB. You will \_\_\_\_\_.  
(GZ#2385-OPNAV-100840-DI)

It was indicated:

RXB is Tulagi. It is not clear whether this refers to U. S. or Jap submarines.  
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 61)

However, a message on August 9 disclosed that a Maru had been torpedoed some fifteen miles from Cape

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

Saint George and that enemy flying boats were searching for the allied submarine. This Maru was evidently one of the two mentioned above which were carrying reinforcements to Guadalcanal.

No. 84

FROM: (Rabaul) #213 Aug. 9/0240  
"R" Area Defense Force Operational Order

(1) MARU at (between 20 and 2300) on 8th was torpedoed by enemy subs 15 miles degrees from Cape Saint George. and flying boats are now searching for sub at the scene.

(2) On the morning of the 9th the Commander of the 1ST AIF GROUP will have 3 reconnaissance seaplanes search for the sub in an area extending 60 miles from Cape Saint George.

Comment: Unable to tell whether MARU sank or not.

(BEL-100805-DI)

(Summary, 101400, August, No. 30)

No. 85

#226 9 August

Mostly unreadable. Is R Area operations report. One sentence says the MEI MARU which was engaged in carrying out operations ordered by SOUTHERN FORCES Despatch Order 9 was attacked by an enemy submarine and sunk.

(BEL-101837-DI)



AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 85 (cont.)

It was commented:

R is initial letter for New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago-Solomon Islands Area.

Additional Note: This ship was one of the two MARUS enroute to RXI (Guadalcanal) carrying the landing force for the defense of Guadalcanal composed of \_\_\_\_\_ (a number possibly as high as 475) men from SASEBO #5 S.L.F., \_\_\_\_\_ (less than 60) men from KURE #3 S.L.F., and \_\_\_\_\_ (less than 60) men from MAIZURU(?) S.L.F.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 53)

The Tokyo Communication Office issued an important dispatch to all Chiefs of Staff and all Commanders. It was suspected that this referred to a positive change in some code or cipher system.

No. 86

#101 8 Aug/1900  
FROM: (Tokyo Comm Office)  
TO : Enciphered "All Chiefs of Staff  
and All Commanders".

This was short despatch and may be relative to change of some code or cipher system.

(BEL-100740-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 4)

A Japanese Intelligence message from New York, arriving in Tokyo via Madrid, contained some interest-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

ing information which indicated that rumors of impending action had been rife in Washington before August 7.

No. 87

FROM: Madrid #860 August 7  
TO : Tokyo

TO (Eastern) Intelligence  
(New York, 6th)

For two or three days there have been whispers circulating among military circles and I am doing my very best to get to the bottom of them. The first is that American forces are going to land in the Aleutians extremely quickly and drive the Japanese forces from those islands. The second is that the Navy with a powerful fleet is going to give great satisfaction to the American people who are now rather disheartened. Try as I will, however, I can find no basis of fact or proof of either rumor. No one in the Navy Department seems to know anything about the dispatching of such a fleet and it has been impossible for me to determine whether or not the War Department intends to make such a move in the North Pacific.

(Summary, 100600, August, No. 3)

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 10, 1942 reads as follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 88

FROM: CINCPAC 100219 August 10, 1942  
TO : COMINCH OPNAV  
COMNAVEU  
CDRS ALL TF PAC  
CDRS ALL SF PAC  
COMSOWESPACFOR

FROM CINCPAC. NSS PASS TO COMINCH, OPNAV,  
AND COMNAVEU.

INDICATIONS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT  
REINFORCEMENTS ENROUTE TO RABAU- SOLOMONS  
AREA UNDER CONVOY. ADDITIONAL DESTROYER  
UNITS AND AIR POWER ALSO COMING. MISAWA  
AIR HEAVY BOMBERS ARRIVED AT RABAU.  
KANIKAWA MARU MAY PROCEED THERE FROM  
YOKOSUKA. ONE UNIT OF CRUDIV 7 ARRIVING  
AT SASEBO WITH AKASHI (AR). SUBMARINES  
FROM AUSTRALIAN WATERS INDICATED AS WITH-  
DRAWING TO SOLOMONS. COMMANDER 11TH AIR  
FLEET AND COMMANDER 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE  
HAVE ARRIVED AT RABAU.

NCR 619 J Bulletin No. 147

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942

An indication of Japanese interest concerning the Solomons was seen in the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was issuing a tremendous volume of radio dispatches. It was thought that he was using the battleship YAMOTO as his flagship.

No. 89

Noted that number messages originated by CINC COMBINED since 0840 on 6 August equals volume for preceding fourteen days.

(GT#614-OPNAV-110117-TI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 3)

No. 90

FIRST FLEET Unit associated with Penang and CRUDIV 7 and may be acting as flagship for Cinc COMBINED.  
(COML4-110732-TI)

It was remarked:

The Battleship YAMOTO, 1st FLEET Flag has been identified as This ship has been Cinc COMBINED's flagship in the past.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 16)

Various associations in radio traffic strongly indicated that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was in the Empire area.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 91

Traffic for CofS COMBINED FLEET  
sent to Kure by Tokyo on  
11 August.  
(GT#620-OPNAV-111720-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 14)

No. 92

CinC COMBINED FLEET and Staff  
closely associated Southeast Asia  
area and possibly there.  
(COM14-110732-TI)

It was observed:

There are strong indications  
appearing above and in item 6, page 3  
RI Summary 110600/Q August which place  
CinC COMBINED in Empire area.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 15)

One of the messages sent by the Commander in  
Chief of the Combined Fleet was the following:

No. 93

FROM: (COMBINED FLEET) #061 Aug. 11  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)  
(8TH FLEET)

"Inform me of the situation in  
Guadalcanal Area."  
(BEL-110755-DI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 49)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

It was noticed that a special cipher was being used in many of the messages mentioned above, and it was obvious from the list of addressees that the cipher was held by some subordinate commanders as well as those of high authority.

No. 94

Naval General Staff sent one Action: Chiefs of Staff COMBINED, 11TH AIR, and 8TH FLEET; Info: Chiefs of Staff 2ND, 4TH and 1ST AIR FLEET at unknown time on 11th in special high command cipher. COMBINED FLEET originated in this special cipher addressing Cofs 11TH AIR and 8TH FLEETS, Info COMDR 5TH AIR ATTACK, COMSUBRON 7 and Naval General Staff indicating this cipher held by some subordinate commanders.  
(GT#622-OPNAV-111702-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 3)

Analysis indicated that the Tokyo Personnel Bureau was acting as a cover for the Navy General Staff. The reasons for such an assumption were contained in the following dispatch.

No. 95

Tokyo Personnel Bureau

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 95 (cont.)

strongly suspected of acting as cover origin for Navy General Staff and others during past 48 hours. Has addressed Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, for information HIEI ( ) - Flag BATDIV 3), KIRISHIMA ( ), SHOKAKU ( ) - Flag 1ST AIR FLEET), ZUIKAKU ( ) RYUJO ( ), HOSHO ( ), TONE ( ) - Flag CRUDIV 8), CHIKUMA ( ), KUMANO ( ) - Flag CRUDIV 7), and unidentified ( ) in CRUDIV 7.

Similarly, this Bureau addressed Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET for action, with HARUNA ( ), KONGO ( ), both in BATDIV 3, MYOKO ( ) and HAGURO ( ) both in CRUDIV 5, MAYA(?) ( ), and TAKAO(?) ( ) both in CRUDIV 4, DESDIVS ( ) and ( ) DD or CL ( ) and tender in 11th AIR FLEET ( ).

Similarly between these line-ups and those noted in early December is too marked to pass as coincidence. A third association is seen in Personnel traffic to 1ST FLEET Units (suspected BB Flagship), KAKO ( ), FURUTAKA ( ), unidentified ( ) and unidentified ( )

Absence of destroyers from these associations suggests possible necessity recall from convoy or other duty for balancing these indicated forces.  
(COM14-111834-TI)

It was pointed out:

( ) is tentatively DESDIV 15 of DESRON 2. ( ) is tentatively the ATAGO of CRUDIV 4.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 9)

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Although the Second Fleet Staff was closely associated with the area dominated by the Japanese Fourth and Eighth Fleets, there was no indication that the Second Fleet was operating therein at the moment. However, there were many indications that the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was organizing a Task Force which might possibly operate in the Southern area.

No. 96

SECOND FLEET Staff closely associated with FOURTH-EIGHTH FLEET areas but no indication of his being there.  
(COML4-110732-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 20)

No. 97

Indications point to possibility  
CinC SECOND FLEET might be organizing  
task force to operate in Southern area.  
(COML4-110732-TI)

It was declared:

There have been indications of  
this organization. See above item.  
This matter being checked.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 24)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 98

Despatch from Flag Secretary  
2ND FLEET, at 2120, 10th,  
serial 12, was addressed action to  
SUZUYA or MOGAMI COMDESDIV  
2, Flagship DESDIV 2,  
COMDESDIV 4, Flagship DESDIV 4,  
HARUNA, COMCRUDIV 8  
COMDR 91st Section (?) CRUDIV  
4 (?), COMDR (1st Section ?)  
CRUDIV 5 and unidentified  
information Flag Secretaries  
COMBINED and 8TH  
FLEETS, COMDESDIV 17 and Per-  
sonnel Offices at Yokosuka  
Kure, Sasebo and  
Maizuru. While this despatch  
is apparently relative to personnel it  
might possibly be indicative of the  
forces scheduled for operations in  
Southern Area.  
(BEL-110714-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 21)

No. 99

CINC COMBINED FLEET active origi-  
nator of traffic to 2ND and SOUTHERN  
FLEET Commanders. Chief of Staff origi-  
nated short URGENT type code at 2025,  
10th, for action Chief of Staff 11TH  
AIR FLEET and information  
COMDR AIRON 25. CINC COMBINED  
, in serial 766, at 1350, 10th,  
addressed short despatch to CINCS 3RD  
, 4TH and 8TH  
plus SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY  
and 11TH AIR FLEETS, informa-  
tion BASE FORCES at Penang and

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 99 (cont.)

Balikpapan plus General Staff  
and Singapore address  
No explanation apparent for this unusual association.  
(BEL-111040-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 3)

A resumé of important dispatches concerning the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was now offered so that further study of future movements of his organization could be made. It was definitely concerned with activities in the Solomons.

No. 100

At 1830, 10 August, CINC 2ND FLEET (concealed originator serial 009) addressed 2ND FLEET, less unidentified, information CINC COMBINED, Naval General Staff, CINC Unidentified FLEET, and CINC Unidentified FLEET.

At 1900, 10 August, CINC 2ND FLEET (no originator serial 0011) addressed 2ND FLEET, less information CINC COMBINED, COMDR 1ST AIR FLEET, Naval General Staff and CINC Unidentified FLEET.

At 2120, 10 August, Secretary 2ND FLEET addressed personnel message to unidentified (Probably light cruiser), SUZUYA, COM-DESDIV 2, COMDESDIV 4.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 100 (cont.)

Naval General Staff and CINC COMBINED.  
This further indicates passage or prospective passage of CRUDIV 7 through Java Sea Eastbound.

COMDR 5TH AIR ATTACK included Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET as information addressee in 2-part serial 066 at 2040, 10 August.

It was remarked:

Of the above messages, #4 is most significant, since no Cinc's movement report will normally include CINC 4TH unless the originator is moving to his area. #3 is probably not significant but may later prove to be list of units which either do or do not accompany indicated movement to South. #7 is definite indication that CINC 2ND FLEET is concerned with activities in Solomons.  
(GT#625-OPNAV-112320 & 120220-TI) (MEMO#11-7)

It was further explained:

The foregoing items are supplemental to and corroborative of, the translation of SAHI 1, serial 742, of August 9th, reported in OPNAV MEMO #11-1 (RI Summary 111400/Q, page 7, item 23), wherein it was indicated that the 2ND FLEET was to leave the Empire on August 11th for Rabaul.

An independent decryption of the latter message by the OPNAV RI UNIT gives substantially the same translation as that reported by BELCONNEN. The only addition that can be made is the identification of \_\_\_\_\_ as the 1ST AIR FLEET.

While CINC 2ND FLEET has in the past commanded the Striking Force in major fleet

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 100 (cont.)

DD in DESDIV 2, DD in  
DESRON 10, HARUNA  
CRUDIV 5 (Staff Officer?)  
CRUDIV 8 (Staff Officer?)  
AIRON ? (Staff Officer ?)  
information Secretary 8TH  
FLEET, COMDESDIV 17  
, Personnel Sections at  
Yokosuka, Takao, Sasebo, and Maizuru.  
At 0950, 11 August, CINC 2ND  
FLEET (no originator serial 015) ad-  
dressed probably Movement Report to  
All Commanders 2ND FLEET  
AKASHI, information CINC  
4TH FLEET, Naval General  
Staff and Movement Report Office Kure.  
At 1030, 11 August, COMBATDIV 3  
(concealed originator serial 356) ad-  
dressed BATDIV 3, information 2ND  
FLEET (less ), CINC COMBINED  
, Naval General Staff, CINC  
Unidentified FLEET, CINC  
Unidentified FLEET (which is  
probably 4TH or 8TH FLEET).  
Concealed originator, serial 714,  
at 2000, 11 August, addressed for  
action COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 3  
, COMDESDIV 15 ?),  
COMDESDIV 2; information CINC  
COMBINED, COMDR 2ND AIR AT-  
TACK, Macassar Base,  
Ambon Base, and probable es-  
cort destroyer  
Ambon Base addressed un-  
identified, Cinc in Southwest  
, 2ND AIR ATTACK  
information CINC 4TH, and  
CINC 8TH in two messages at  
noon, 11 August. Both despatches later  
passed to COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 3,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 100 (cont.)

engagements, there have been recent indications that CINC 1ST AIR FLEET will exercise that command in the future, and may include in his force such units of the 2ND FLEET as CRU DIVS 7 and 8, and DESRONS 2 and 10 (See RI Summaries 051400/Q August, page 4, item 13, and 061400/Q page 6, item 11). (Summary, 120600, August, No. 20)

The Commander of the Sixth Base Force at Truk was in touch with all the commanders in the Marshall and the Gilbert Islands, and, thus, it was thought probable that redoubled precautions would be taken in those areas.

No. 101

Enciphered Comdrs all Marshall and KEA Area (Oceania ?) DEFENCE FORCES appeared in heading of despatch from 6TH BASE FORCE COMM. Officer at Truk. May indicate extra precautionary measures are being taken in Gilberts and Marshall Islands. (BEL-111155-TI) (Summary, 121400, August, No. 30).

The Japanese were kept on the alert in the Netherlands East Indies also at this time, for their messages spoke of Allied activity north of Saparoea

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Island, which was possibly a diversionary action by the British in the Bay of Bengal. Two Japanese sighting reports stated that an Allied force of one light cruiser, seven destroyers, and four submarines were fifty miles east of Ambon.

No. 102

FROM: (Unidentified) # \_\_\_ Aug. 11/1245  
TO : (Unidentified)  
INFO: (2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(3RD FLEET)

\_\_\_\_\_ attack the enemy fleet heard  
North of SAPAROA (?).  
(GZ#2403-OPNAV-111510-DI) (MEMO#11-3)

It was observed:

The 2ND AIR FLEET and 3RD FLEET appear to be concerned with the Dutch East Indies Area. The above place (SAPAROA?) is not located. This message is not complete and it is not certain all of the name appears. This attack may be connected with the British diversion launched by Force A in Bay of Bengal (CINC EF 0301Z/10 Aug.). (Summary 111400, August, No. 50)

No. 103

\_\_\_\_\_ on 11th, to CINC COMBINED, COMORUDIV 7 and others, speaks of some enemy activity transmitting North of Saparoea Island and directs that it be attacked. Comment by COM 14: Apparently

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 103 (cont.)

COMCRUDIV 7 is proceeding to East from Singapore Area.  
(BASE FORCE at Ambon) to 3RD FLEET and 2ND AIR ATTACK CORPS, says that at 1200, 11th, one light cruiser, seven destroyers, one patrol boat, and four submarines were after fifty miles East of Ambon. Search for same. Comment by COM 14: Does not make much sense.  
(COM-14-110804-DI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 27)

No. 104

FROM: #(none), 1300, August 11th  
TO : (AMBON BASE FORCE)  
(3RD FLEET)  
(AIRON 23)  
(Unidentified)  
INFO: 4TH and 8TH FLEETS

Partially readable, reports force of 1 CL, 7 DD, (blank) transports, and 4 submarines, position 45 miles (?) East of Ambon at noon, 11th; orders search. #(none), 1245, August 7th  
FROM: (Unidentified)  
TO : (Unidentified)  
INFO: (AIRON 23)  
(3RD FLEET)

" \_\_\_ torpedo bombers \_\_\_ attack the enemy force heard transmitting to the South(?) of Saporao Island." Latter place south of Ceram.  
(BEL-111400-DI)

It was declared:

Previously reported as items 50-51,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 104 (cont)

page 15, R.I. Summary 111400/Q  
August. Message is somewhat clarified here since COM 14 locates Saparoa Island as South of Ceram. The two despatches above are evidently related since [redacted] is an addressee of one item and originator of the other, and both appear to be concerned with the same locality. (Ambon is on the western end of Ceram).  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 38)

No. 105

(DUTCH EAST INDIES FORCE)  
Serial 572 and (AMBON BASE) NR  
Number 463, both of August 11. Both report sighting or hearing "enemy force of 1 CL, 7 DD's, and 4 SS, 50 Miles East of Ambon."  
(GZ#2407-2408 - -DI) (MEMO#11-5)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 51)

Because of a dispatch which was sent to several principal Japanese radio stations and all major commands, it was suspected that the Fourth Fleet was about to modify its communication plan.

No. 106

Possible change or modification of 4TH FLEET communication plan noted in despatch at 0920, serial 215, from

2012



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 106 (cont.)

Staff Communication Officer 4TH FLEET  
to Radio Stations at Tokio  
, Yokosuka , Chichijima  
, Palao , Saipan  
and Jaluit , plus Tokio Communi-  
cation Office and All Major  
Commands  
(BEL-111106-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 17)

It was discovered now that the Commander in Chief of the Fifth Fleet, in command of a seaplane unit, was proceeding to Kiska on August 9.

No. 107

FROM: #253 August 9  
(any Jap man-of-war)

Is concealed address for CINC 5TH,  
who is ordering a seaplane unit to  
proceed to Kiska.  
(COM14-110738-DI) (MEMO#11-4)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 4)

The Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet, who was aboard the ASHIGARA at Soerabaja, communicated with the HARUNA. This pointed to the possibility that this battleship might move southwards. Meanwhile, it was observed that the HITAKA was in the vicinity of Kure.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 108

HARUNA was action addressee of short despatch, serial 152, from ASHIGARA, at 1950, 9th. Possibly suggesting Southward move by HARUNA.  
(BEL-110714-TI)

It was stated:

ASHIGARA appeared by traffic routing on 8 August to be at Surabaya with CINC 3RD FLEET on board.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 25)

No. 109

FROM: (HITAKA) #42 10 Aug/1330  
TO : (Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET)  
(CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(COMCARDIV 2)  
(Movement Report Office)  
(Chief of Staff Kure)

Indicates HITAKA arrived or departed Kure.  
(BEL-110152-TI)

It was mentioned:

Previously reported in RI Summary 110600/Q August, page 5, item 13.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 21)

The renewed activity of Cruiser Division Six, which had been noticed on August 10, suggested that it would take an active part in operations. Messages

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

outlining the preparations of Cruiser Division Six for a refueling rendezvous were intercepted, and it seemed evident that it was destined to act as a cover for convoys en route from Truk to Palao to Rabaul. There was some doubt as to the exact location of Cruiser Division Six, but though it might not be at the port of Kavieng, it was in that general area.

No. 110

FROM:  
TO : KAVIENG BASE FORCE  
INFO: (8TH FLEET)  
8TH BASE FORCE

Sketchy message originated by COMCRUDIV 6 indicates arrival that DIVISION Kavieng 1530, 10th.  
(BEL-110310-DI)

It was noticed:

TI previously on 10th August stated CRUDIV 6 becoming more active suggesting now taking part in operations unless she has been under silence, is associated Kavieng BASE FORCE and using call.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 43)

No. 111

FROM: (YUKAZE) #559 Aug.10/1430

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 111 (cont.)

TO : (4TH BASE FORCE, Truk)  
INFO: 11TH AIRON  
YUBARI  
COMCRUDIV 6  
(Unidentified man-of-war)

"My arrival your place will be  
delayed until \_\_\_ hours."

NOTE: Assume place is Kavieng.  
(BEL-110425-DI)

It was noted:

On August 6th, YUKAZE  
was associated in traffic with the  
5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE. COMCRUDIV 6  
was associated with KAVIENG BASE  
FORCE on August 10th and, also, there  
were associations with Rabaul Base  
and a tanker which indicates CRUDIV 6  
may be making fueling rendezvous.  
(Summary 111400, August, No. 45)

No. 112

FROM: (Kavieng)  
INFO: (8TH BASE FORCE)  
(Unidentified)

"From COMCRUDIV 6 to CRUDIV 6.  
The first section of CRUDIV 6 will  
depart at \_\_\_ on 17th and arrive RMD  
1500? same day. Each ship will re-  
fuel \_\_\_ (after) 1500 at RMD, will  
take in 6,000 gallons (?) water."  
(BEL-110755-DI)

It was indicated:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 112 (cont.)

There have been previous indications that CRUDIV 6 was making arrangements to fuel. RME is identified as Lorengan; RMD believed to be in that same area.

(Summary, 111400, August, No. 44)

No. 113

COMCRUDIV 6 using cover call originated serials 252 to 259, and association indicates this command to be in Kavieng Area possibly for purpose of covering convoys that may be enroute from Truk and Palao to Rabaul. One convoy apparently is composed of SATA , tanker AZUMA MAPU and escort unit YUKAZE , which is believed escorting Maru aircraft tender , is possibly in vicinity of Kavieng as indicated by association with CRUDIV 5 .

(BEL-111106-TI)

(Summary, 120600, August, No. 35)

No. 114

Kavieng addressed Communication Officer CRUDIV 6 and message was relayed via Rabaul indicating CRUDIV 6 not at Kavieng.

(GT#622-OPNAV-111702-TI)

(Summary, 111400, August, No. 46)

No. 115

From traffic routing COMCRUDIV 7 and companion destroyers are believed enroute

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 115 (cont.)

or arrived at Celebes-Amboina Area;  
associated with air-tender KAGU MARU  
which passed from Palao to  
Koepong Communication Zones yesterday.  
(COM-14-111932-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 26)

Cruiser Division Eighteen was also active in  
escorting convoys between Davao and Truk, but it  
was suspected, in addition, of taking part in the  
reinforcing of Guadalcanal.

No. 116

At 0600, 10th, DAVAO BASE FORCE  
Communication Officer addressed  
serial 974, for action 34TH DEFENSE  
FORCE at Palao and COMCRUDIV 18  
, information TRUK BASE FORCE  
Communication Officer and uni-  
identified. Possibly concerns com-  
munications between Bases involved and  
convoys, and may indicate units CRUDIV 18  
are acting as escort between Davao and  
Truk.  
(BEL-110954-TI)

It was commented:

CRUDIV 18 may be so engaged, however,  
it is noted that COMCRUDIV 18 was an ac-  
tion addressee in the message from CINC  
8TH directing various landing parties to  
embark in two Marus and proceed to RXI  
(Guadalcanal). See RI. Summary 110600/Q  
August, page 12, item 37.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 42)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

It was further indicated that Cruiser Division Seven might possibly move to the Java Sea.

No. 117

At 2130, 10 August, CINC COMBINED addressed CINC MALAY FORCE, CINC 8TH FLEET, COMDESRON 3, COMCRUDIV 7, Ambon Base, Maru at Ambon and unidentified CINC. This further indicates possibility movement CRUDIV 7 to Java Sea. (GT#612-OPNAV-110117-TI) (Summary, 110600, August, No. 45)

No. 118

Destroyer in DESDIV 2 addressed Cinc 2ND FLEET, COMCRUDIV 7, Singapore Radio, Tokyo Radio, unidentified, Info COMDESDIV 2 and KAGU MARU. This is slight indication DD leaving CRUDIV 7 and joining KAGU MARU. (GT#620-OPNAV-111720-TI)

It was remarked:

KAGU MARU is an air tender. There have been indications that CRUDIV 7 and DESDIV 2 are coming East to Java Sea or that KAGU MARU is going West to Malaya. KAGU MARU, DESDIV 2 of DESRON 4 and CRUDIV 7, were addressees in a despatch from Cinc COMBINED FLEET on August 9th which concerned the movement of a

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 118 (cont.)

force under Command of CinC 2ND FLEET to the Rabaul area. This despatch is still being checked and to date it has not been determined which units are actually directed to proceed Rabaul. (Summary, 111400, August, No. 52)

An enemy unit heretofore identified as the First Fleet Flagship was now associated with activities in Malaya.

No. 119

Penang Base Communication Officer, at 1700, 10 August, addressed Communication Officer CRUDIV 7 information MOGAMI and unidentified one time identified as Flagship 1ST FLEET. This is first association MISO 88 with Malaya. (GT#615-OPNAV-110059-TI)

It was observed:

was identified as "1ST FLEET Flagship" on 28 May. The battleship YAMOTO is tentatively indicated as 1ST FLEET Flagship. (Summary, 110600, August, No. 46)

Destroyer Division Seven, which was believed to be in Destroyer Squadron Ten, seemed to be assigned to escort the KASUGA.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 120

CINC COMBINED FLEET at 1140,  
10th, Serial 763, addressed KASUGA  
MARU (and DESDIV 7  
for action suggesting that DESDIV  
as escort for the KASUGA.  
(BEL-111155-TI)

It was pointed out:

This association noted pre-  
viously and appears in RI Summary  
101400/C August, page 5, item 11.  
DESDIV 7 is believed in  
DESRON 10.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 12)

One of the divisions of Destroyer Squadron  
Two was operating with Cruiser Division Seven in  
the Third Fleet area, but the remaining units of  
this Squadron were either in, or en route to, the  
Rabaul area.

No. 121

Aug. 10/1900  
FROM: CINC 2ND FLEET (Under blank orig-  
inator)  
TO : (DESRON 2) less DESDIV  
(Div. Comdrs. 2ND FLEET)  
INFO: Navy General Staff  
CINC 4TH FLEET  
CINC 8TH FLEET  
(COM-14-110734-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 121 (cont.)

It was declared:

DESDIV \_\_\_\_\_ has been placed  
in the 3RD FLEET Area with CRUDIV 7.  
Remainder of DESRON 2 placed in  
Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 47)

No. 122

Service despatch at 0535, 11th,  
from Truk, informs Tokio he is not  
Guard for COMDESRON 2. This  
error in routing by Tokio of COMDESRON  
2 traffic may be further indication of  
projected movement by that force.  
(BEL-110714-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 23)

No. 123

CINC 2ND as concealed originator  
of 9-Kana code, serial 010, at 1900,  
10th, addressed action DESRON 2  
less DESDIV \_\_\_\_\_ (All 2ND FLEET Com-  
manders \_\_\_\_\_ and unidentified ad-  
dress \_\_\_\_\_). Inclusion of CINCS COMBINED  
\_\_\_\_\_, 4TH \_\_\_\_\_ and 8TH  
FLEETS as information addressees may in-  
dicate DESRON 2 will proceed to South-  
eastern Area.  
(BEL-111400-DI)

It was stated:

\_\_\_\_\_ is DESDIV 15 of DESRON 2.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 22)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Decipherment of enemy dispatch provided important operational information concerning the passage of an occupation force from Rabaul to a New Guinea location.

No. 124

FROM: (8TH BASE FORCE) #250 Aug. 11  
TO : (Unidentified)  
INFO: (CRUDIV 18)  
(8TH FLEET)  
(AIRON 11)  
(AIRRON 25)  
(Unidentified)

"RA GUARD FORCE Order \_\_\_\_\_. The \_\_\_\_\_ of the RZJ (Buna) OCCUPATION FORCE WILL depart from Rabaul for RAF (unidentified) during the morning of the 12th, passing to South of RQ (unidentified). The 1ST AIR FORCE with (all available planes) will provide an air escort for the convoy."  
(BEL-111418-DI) (MEMO#11-6)

It was mentioned:

RZJ - Buna. RAF - appears in New Guinea sector somewhere. RZ unidentified, vicinity RME-PMD (Lorengan?) Areas.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 39)

The Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, who was at Truk, according to one report was shown to be at Rabaul with the Commander of the Fifth Air

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Attack Force:

No. 125

Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET  
shown at Truk  
(BEL-111106-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 16)

No. 126

Chief of Staff 11TH AIR  
with Comdr. 5TH AIR ATTACK in New Bri-  
tain at 1800, 11 August, from number  
series.  
(GT#618-OPNAV-111430-TI)

It was noticed:

CINC and Chief of Staff 11TH AIR  
FLEET have been indicated at Rabaul,  
August 9th.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 40)

The Commander of an Air Unit , which  
was a part of the Sixth Air Attack Force, was also  
located at Rabaul; the Commander of Tainan Air was  
shown to be at Salamaua; and the Commander of the  
Misawa Air Group was placed in the Solomons:

No. 127

Station serial numbers indicate

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 127 (cont.)

Commander Air Unit                  still at  
Rabaul  
(BEL-111040-TI)

It was noted:

   appears to be part of  
6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 34)

No. 128

Comdr TAINAN AIR                  at  
Salamaua  
(BEL-111155-TI)

It was indicated:

On August 10 TI indicated Comdr  
TAINAN AIR appeared aboard Tender  
and might be moving from former  
location at Rabaul Air Base.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 45)

No. 129

Traffic routing places COMDR  
MISAWA AIR GROUP in Solomons and  
COMAIRON 22                  possibly in that  
area.  
(BEL-111040-TI)

It was commented:

   is a Major Command call and  
apparently is being used during the  
current period by COMDR 3RD AIR ATTACK

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 129 (cont.)

who it seemed might be COMDR NORTHERN AREA AIR FORCES. If this be correct, then the appearance of as information addressee in several despatches concerning New Britain would seem to be mainly because some of the planes on the way to the south, such as 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE, Kisarazu Air and Misawa Air have been taken from his area or from just to the South of his area. (Summary, 120600, August, No. 31)

Planes of the Kisaratsu Air Group, whose Commander was at Tinian, and aircraft of Air Squadron Twenty-six were being ferried from the Empire and the Mandates to Rabaul.

No. 130

Comdr. KISARATSU AIR GROUP  
at Tinian at 1800, August 11.  
(GT#618-OPNAV-111430-TI)

It was remarked:

CINC 11TH AIR FLEET Despatch Order at 1900, August 10th, indicates that pilots of the 6TH AIR FORCE are ferrying KISARATSU AIR GROUP planes to the Rabaul Area. (Summary, 111400, August, No. 38)

No. 131

Associations indicate planes of

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944.

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 131 (cont.)

AIRON 26 are being ferried from  
Yokohama to Rabaul  
via Hahajima, Saipan  
and Truk  
(BEL-111040-TI)

It was observed:

is identified by OPNAV as  
6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE. D.I. item 37,  
page 10, R.I. Summary 110600/Q indicated  
that Tenian is one of the points on the  
ferry route.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 32)

A group of Air Squadron Twenty-two at Kisaratsu  
was probably scheduled to proceed south as was the Com-  
mander of the Sixth Air Attack Force who was at Tinian.

No. 132

Air Command of AIRON 22,  
shown at Kisaratsu and probably sche-  
duled proceed south (this Command was  
shown in AKAGI last May and  
possibly composed of torpedo planes).  
(BEL-111040-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 14)

No. 133

COMDR AIRON 26 is shown  
at (Tenian ?) with indications  
that Command will proceed Rabaul area.  
(BEL-111040-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 133 (cont.)

It was pointed out:

is identified by OPNAV  
as 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 18)

No. 134

#926 Aug. 10/0800  
FROM: (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (Unidentified)  
(Unidentified)

"21 heavy bombers and 2 transport  
planes at Kisaratsu Air departed from  
\_\_\_\_\_ for Tenian at 0800."

#416 Aug. 10/1620  
FROM: (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)

"21 heavy bombers and 2 transport  
planes arrived Tenian at 1530, and  
will depart for Vunakanau at 0700,  
tomorrow 11th."  
(BEL-102032-DI) (MEMO#11-2)  
(Summary, 11400, August, No. 39)

Although there was very little activity in the  
Mandates, there were some indications that the units  
of the Fourth Air Attack Force would be withdrawn  
from the Marshalls and sent to the Solomons:

No. 135

Very little activity in Mandates,



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 135 (cont)

outside Rabaul-Solomons Area.  
(COM-14-110736-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 37)

No. 136

Maru air tender of  
AIRON 24 at Yokosuka and  
association of COMAIRON 24 with  
Commands in Rabaul Area suggest  
units of AIRON 24 may be withdrawn  
from Marshalls for use in Solomons.  
(BEL-111106-TI)

It was pointed out:

is identified by OPNAV  
as 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE which has  
been associated with the Marshall  
Islands for a considerable period  
of time.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 11)

The Second Air Attack Force was also supplied  
with aircraft reinforcements for the area guarded by  
the Japanese Eighth Fleet.

No. 137

Increasing association noted  
between COMAIRON 23 and  
8TH FLEET, perhaps indi-  
cating units that AIRON to be  
transferred to 8TH FLEET operating  
area.  
(BEL-110954-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 137 (cont.)

It was declared:

OPNAV identifies as 2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE although AIRON 23 may be this force or at least part of it. COM 14 noted by T.I., on 9 August, that there seemed possibility of reinforcement to 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE from, or by, the 2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE.

(Summary, 120600, August, No. 33)

It was noted also that the Commander of the First Air Fleet was actively associated with the southern and southeastern areas.

No. 138

Commander 1ST AIR FLEET more strongly associated with both SOUTHERN and SOUTHEASTERN areas today.

(COM-14-110734-TI)

(Summary, 111400, August, No. 48)

Analysis of the messages of the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet led to the belief that the ZUIHO was a unit in the newly organized Japanese Carrier Division One.

No. 139

CinC 1ST AIR FLEET (no originator)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 139 (cont.)

serial 289) addressed CARDIV 2  
suffix 81, CARDIV 1  
suffix 71 on board ZUIHO plus  
5 plane group Commanders, Info Commu-  
nication Officer CARDIV 2, at 1720  
10 August.  
(GT#620-OPNAV-111720-TI)

It was stated:

Suffix 81 is unidentified. Suf-  
fix 71 is related to medical affairs  
but not definitely identified. ZUIHO  
appeared at Sasebo August 9th. The  
fact that CARDIV 1 suffix 71 is aboard  
ZUIHO supports the assumption that  
ZUIHO is part of newly organized CARDIV 1.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 10)

Japanese carriers were silent on this day, and  
thus, no bearings were obtained on their positions.  
However, it was suggested that carriers of Carrier  
Division Five were receiving new aircraft before begin-  
ning new operations.

No. 140

Carrier activity light. No  
bearings obtained.  
(COM-14-110736-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 9)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 141

Yokohama Air Station  
addressed serial 540, at 1800, 10th,  
to Commander Carrier-Plane Group  
and unidentified, in-  
formation Staff Communication Officer  
1ST AIR FLEET, SHOKAKU  
, ZUIKAKU and ZUIHO  
This suggests carriers of  
CARDIV 5 are receiving aircraft prior  
impending operations.  
(BEL-111106-TI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 10)

The plane tender KAMOI announced its arrival at  
Imiemi in the Marshall Islands, and two other aircraft  
tenders were thought to be operating along the route  
from Makassar to Davao:

No. 142

#425 Aug. 10/1330/I  
FROM: (Kamoi in 11th Air Fleet)  
TO : (11th Air Fleet)  
(4th Air Attack Force)  
INFO: (6th Defence Force at  
Kwajalein or Taroa)  
(?)  
(#6 Base Force at Jaluit)  
(Chitose Air Group)

KAMOI (?) departed PQB for PYI.  
(GZ#2404-OPNAV-111710-DI)

It was mentioned:

PQB is Ruotto ? (Marshall Island).

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 142 (cont.)

PYI is Imiemi (Marshall Island). The KAMOI appeared at Kwajalein on Aug. 10th. The KAMOI is a seaplane tender. (Summary, 111400, August, No. 32)

No. 143

FROM: #426 Aug. 11/1400  
TO : (KAMOI in 11TH AIR FLT.)  
INFO: (11TH AIR FLEET)  
(4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(6TH BASE FORCE, Jaluit)  
(CHITOSE AIR GROUP)  
(DESDIV 24)

Arrived PYI.  
(GZ#2406-OPNAV-111710-DI)

It was mentioned:

See above item.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 33)

No. 144

Concealed originator using cover call (possibly CINC 3RD FLEET originator), serial 333, at 1000, 10th, addressed CINC COMBINED, All Fleet Commanders less 5TH FLEET, Chiefs of Staff Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, plus Navy Minister and General Staff, information COMDESRONS 2, 3 and 4, BASE FORCES at Surabaya, Balikpapan and Davao

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 144 (cont.)

KAGU MARU and Maru air-tenders and . Length of despatch indicates it to be plans for operation and may concern movements of air-tenders involved. Route would appear to be through Makassar to Davao.  
(BEL-110954-TI)

It was noticed:

Possible air tenders and were apparently with CRUDIV 7 when that force first went South to Surabaya and the Malay Area.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 40)

Many Marus were engaged in the task of ferrying aircraft into various regions held by the Japanese. A Maru , which supplied the Eleventh Air Fleet, was at Yokosuka and was about to depart to the south; the KENJO MARU, which had been associated with the First Air Attack Force in the Malaya area, was thought to be near Truk; the KASUGA MARU, which had supplied the Sixth Air Attack Force, was expected to arrive in the Empire during the next week, and the KAMIKAWA MARU was to pick up units of Air Squadron Eleven at Yokosuka, and then proceed to Rabaul. A tender of

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Air Squadron Twenty-six was located at Kisaratsu, and, because it was associated with the Fifth and Sixth Air Attack Forces, it was thought to be proceeding to the Solomons.

No. 145

11 TH AIR FLEET MARU at  
Yokosuka and believed will depart for  
South shortly.  
(COM-14-110736-TI)

It was noted:

Belconnen reported on August 10th,  
that according to traffic routing and  
associations there were indications that  
Air Tender is enroute to JALUIT  
from Yokosuka via Chichijima and Saipan.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 18)

No. 146

KENJO MARU associated with  
INDIES FORCE, #1 AIR ATTACK FORCE  
Rangoon and KANOYA AIR  
(COM-14-110734-TI)

It was indicated:

KENJO MARU arrived Rangoon on July 28.  
Traffic intelligence indicates possibility  
of her having returned to the Truk area by  
August 6. #1 AIR ATTACK FORCE placed in  
the Malay Area. KANOYA AIR GROUP placed at  
Sabang.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 53)

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 147

FROM: (COMBINED FLEET) #763 Aug.10

Only partly readable, but indicates that the KASUGA MARU will arrive in the Empire on 16 August.  
(COM-14-110738-DI) (MEMO#11-4)

It was commented:

KASUGA MARU is an SCV. Its present location is not know, but this ship was associated with the Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE on August 6th.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 11)

No. 148

AIRRON 11 enciphered Communication Zone message at 1100, August 11th, to COMBINED FLEET, unident, but probably 2ND FLEET, Tokyo, Yokosuka, Truk; info Chichijima, indicates route to be followed South.  
(GT#618-OPNAV-111430-TI)

It was remarked:

The KAMIKAWA MARU was indicated enroute Kure to Yokosuka August 9th, and it appears she will pick up AIRRON 11 units and then proceed to New Britain Area.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 22)

No. 149

Maru air tender of AIRON 26 shown at Kisaratsu and association



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 149 (cont.)

suggests that vessel escorted by  
units DESRON 2 or 10, may proceed  
8TH FLEET operating area.  
(BEL-111040-TI)

It was observed:

On 8 August, Maru was  
associated with the 5TH and 6TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCES in a despatch from Com-  
munication Officer 11TH AIR FLEET.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 12)

Another Maru, belonging to the Eleventh Air  
Fleet, moved down from the Sasebo communication zone  
into the Takao communication zone. A Maru associated  
with the Fourth Fleet left Truk for Yokosuka, and still  
another Maru was located at Rabaul.

No. 150

FROM: #78 Aug. 5  
(MARU of 11TH AIR FLT.)

Will leave Sasebo Communication  
Zone 1830, the 8th, enter garbled.  
(BEL-110425-DI)

It was pointed out:

GZ's translation of this same  
serial gives Takao Communication Zone  
for the garbled portion.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 19)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 151

FROM: (4TH FLEET) #943 Aug. 10

States that the \_\_\_\_\_ MARU departs  
Truk for Yokosuka on 10 August.  
(COM-14-110738-DI) (MEMO#11-4)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 31)

No. 152

Traffic routing and association  
indicate MARU \_\_\_\_\_ in Rabaul Area.  
(BEL-111155-TI)

It was declared:

Routing on 10 August indicated  
this vessel in Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 43)

An unidentified Maru left the Saipan communica-  
tion zone and entered that of Truk, to which another  
Maru \_\_\_\_\_ was also going:

No. 153

FROM: (Truk Radio) #994 10 Aug/1700  
TO : (Saipan Radio)

From Master of ( \_\_\_\_\_ - uniden-  
tified MARU) on 11th (?) at (blank) will  
leave #4 Communication Zone and enter #5  
Communication Zone.  
(GZ#2398-OPNAV-110257-DI)

It was stated:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 153 (cont.)

#4 and #5 Communication Zones are tentatively thought to be Saipan and Truk respectively.  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 29)

No. 154

Unidentified address (Army unit?) aboard MARU and believed bound for Truk,  
(COM-14-110736-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 29)

An unidentified was noted on its way to Kavieng:

No. 155

FROM: #194 Aug. 7.  
TO : (Unidentified Tanker?)  
(Rabaul)

"At the 10th, will leave 4TH Communication Zone and enter 8th."  
(BEL-110755-DI)

It was mentioned:

despatch of 9 August stated that she expected to arrive at RO (Kavieng or Ovau?) on Aug. 11.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 41)

American aircraft were busy attacking Japanese installations in various places at this time. The

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

AKIKAZE reported Allied aircraft at 1030 in the vicinity of Bougainville, and the station at Lae announced the presence of our planes just five minutes later.

No. 156

AKIKAZE reported enemy aircraft sighting at 1030, possibly in vicinity of Buka or Bougainville. This vessel reports daily aircraft sightings.  
(BEL-111155-TI)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 51)

No. 157

LAE reported sighting enemy aircraft at 1035, 11th, and promptly went off air. COMAIRON 25 was unable raise Lae until 1100.  
(BEL-111155-TI)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 44)

The direction finder at Jaluit was active for several hours on this day.

No. 158

Jaluit active with direction finder traffic between 1500-1900, August 11.  
(GT#618-OPNAV-111430-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 27)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

Submarines were quite active in the Eighth Fleet area, although nothing unusual was noted. Several units of Submarine Squadron Seven were near Rabaul. Submarine Squadron Six was also located in this vicinity, but Submarine Division of Submarine Squadron Eight was preparing to leave Saigon for the Empire to be replaced by Submarine Squadron One.

No. 159

No unusual activity seen in 8TH FLEET area. Most despatches intercepted were confined to submarine and air activity.  
(COM-14-110736-TI)

It was noticed:

8TH FLEET Area appears to be Rabaul-New Britain-Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 36)

No. 160

SUBRON 6, SUBDIV SUE 3  
and COMSUBRON 7, continue in Rabaul area.  
(COM-14-110736-TI)  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 35)

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 161

COMSUBRON 7 using cover call  
on 9980 kcs., and is in  
communication with Rabaul.  
(BEL-111106-TI)

It was noticed:

T.I. indicates COMSUBRON 7 and  
SUBDIV 33 of SUBRON 7 are in the  
New Britain-Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 37)

No. 162

COMSUBDIV (?) shown in  
Rabaul and addressed by  
Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET  
Serial 769 at 2050, 10th.  
(BEL-111155-TI)

It was noted:

TI on 11 August indicated SUBRON 6  
continued in Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 46)

No. 163

Strong possibility that SUBRON 1  
will depart Yokosuka area for Saigon in  
near future.  
(COM-14-110742-TI)

It was indicated:

COMSUBRON 1, with SUBDIV of  
that Squadron, was placed in Jaluit by

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 163 (cont.)

traffic routing on 10 August. On August 8th, COM 14 believed SUBRON 1 had 2 divisions in home waters and 1 division in South Seas area. (Summary, 111400, August, No. 13)

No. 164

COMSUBDIV in SUBRON 8 will soon leave Saigon area for empire as indicated in Traffic. (COM-14-110742-TI)

It was commented:

SUBDIV of SUBRON 8 was placed in Saigon Communication Zone by traffic routing on 10 August. (Summary, 111400, August, No. 34)

A Japanese submarine announced that it would arrive at Truk on August 13, and the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three, reporting the position of some Allied transports on August 10, ordered his units to attack.

No. 165

FROM: (Submarine) #266 Aug.9/1150/I  
TO : (2ND FLEET)  
(8TH FLEET)  
INFO: (Base Force #4 at Truk)  
(Base Force #6 at Jaluit)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 165 (cont.)

Will depart PQ at 1500. On 12th at \_\_\_\_\_ will be 20 miles (about) north of \_\_\_\_\_ and will arrive PT at 1900 on 13th.  
(GZ#2405-OPNAV-111710-DI)

It was remarked:

PQ is Kwajalein. PT is Truk.  
(Summary, 111400, August, No. 28)

No. 166

FROM: (COMSUBRON 3) #307,0220, Aug.11  
TO : (SUBDIV in SUBRON 3)  
INFO: (CINC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(CINC 8TH FLEET)  
(COMSUBRON 77)

Reports position of some of our transports at 0400, 10th, and orders attack. Reported location is unrecovered but somewhere in Roger area.  
(GZ#2401-OPNAV-110145 - MEMO#10-5-DI)  
(Summary, 110600, August, No. 55)

An estimate of enemy submarine locations on August 9 and 10 was issued at this time as follows:

No. 167

Submarine locations as follows on 9-10 August from traffic routing:  
In Jaluit Communication Zone:  
COMSUBRON 1 with SUBDIV  
COMSUBRON 3 with SUBDIVS  
and



AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 167 (cont.)

In Truk Zone:

COMSUBRON 6.

COMSUBRON 7 with SUBDIV )

In Ominato Zone:

SUBDIVS ) and ) , plus

Sub

In Saigon Zone:

COMSUBRON 5.

COMSUBRON 8 with SUBRONS

and

In Home Waters but possibly enroute

Marshalls:

SUBRON 2.

Foregoing are general locations  
only and following should be noted:

SUBDIVS

were in Rabaul general area 27

July and may still be there.

(GT#615-OPNAV-110059-TI)

It was observed:

Tentative identifications are as  
follows:

and - SUBDIVS in  
SUBRON 3.

- SUBDIV 33 of SUBRON 7.

- SUBDIV 26 in SUBRON 7.

- SUBDIV in SUBRON 7.

- Sub in SUBRON 2.

- SUBDIV in SUBRON 8.

- SUBDIV in SUBRON 8.

- SUBDIV in SUBRON 5.

(Summary, 110600, August, No. 60)

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the  
Pacific Fleet issued on August 11 contained the

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

following information:

No. 168

11 AUG 1942	COMINCH	PRIORITY
0602	OPNAV (DELIVERED BY NSS) COMNAVFORCES EUROPE	
110145	NCR 1316J	

NSS DELIVER TO COMINCH OPNAV AND COMNAVFORCES EUROPE.  
ALL ADDRESSES ARE ACTION. 148TH DOPE SHEET FROM CINCPAC.

DESDIV 17 IN SAIPAN AREA ENROUTE RABAU. CRUDIV 7 IN  
EAST INDIES WITH ONE DESDIV. SUBMARINES BY D/F 153  
EAST 15 SOUTH and 168 EAST 12 SOUTH. INDICATIONS TWO  
SUBDIVS OPERATING FROM PENANG. CRUDIV 5 in HOME WATERS  
MAY LEAVE FOR NEW BRITAIN SHORTLY. ONE UNIT OF SUBRON  
TWO BELIEVED LEAVING KISKA FOR YOKOSUKA.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942

The use by Japanese high commands of a special type of code system employing five numerals was noticed in the Southern Pacific. Since it received very limited distribution, it was suspected that it was employed solely where prospective operations demanded a higher degree of security:

No. 169

Special type 5-numeral system for use of high commands has shown in Southern theatre. Probably used for directives and operations where high degree of security is desired. Use very limited.  
(COM 14 122144-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 57)

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet was as active as ever, and one of his messages disclosed that Cruiser Division Six was at Kavieng on August 10, or 11:

No. 170

FROM:  
TO :

#172 10 August/0610  
(8TH FLEET)  
(All Major Commands)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 170 (Cont.)

INFO: (4TH FLEET)  
(SUBRON 7)  
(5TH AIR ATTACK)  
(CRUDIV 6)

From: Commander-in-chief, 8TH  
FLEET.

(Blank) CRUDIV 6 (blank)  
after (blank) at RO (blank),\*

\*Can't get much out of this, but at least  
places CRUDIV 6 at RO around 10th or  
11th. (GZ#2415 OPNAV 120311-DI)

It was commented:

RO is tentatively identified as  
Kavieng.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 29)

Another message ordered the , which was  
not identified, to join the Eighth Fleet:

No. 171

#187 Aug. 10/1330  
FROM: (Rabaul Radio)  
TO : (Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
INFO: (Cofs COMBINED FLEET)  
(Cofs EXPEDITIONARY FORCES)

From: Commander-in-chief, 8TH FLEET.  
Passed to 8TH FLEET, (---unit  
whose call is ---) is to join this  
fleet (----- rest no good -----).  
(GZ#2414 OPNAV 121515-DI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 171 (Cont.)

It was declared:

... not yet identified.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 41)

A message issued jointly by the Chiefs of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet and the Eighth Fleet to the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, as well as various other operational commanders, indicated that the Eighth Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet were operating cooperatively:

No. 172

Appearing as double originator were Chiefs of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET and 8TH FLEET in Serial 995 at 1930/10th addressed to Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET. Info: Chief of Staff 2ND, 4TH and 1ST AIR FLEETS plus unit Commanders 11TH AIR FLEET shown at AIRRON 23 and Operations Section Naval General Staff. This probably cooperative operating plan of 8TH and 11TH AIR FLEETS. (BEL 120630-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 60)

Traffic analysis suggested the possibility that the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet had

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

departed Kure by air on August 11 at 0950, and had arrived in Rabaul on August 12 at 1630, to assume the direction of the air forces there. However, there were many doubts concerning this interpretation and a discussion concerning the location of the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet will be found in the following items:

No. 173

Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK  
Serial 016, NR 123, is apparently next consecutive message after no originator serial 015, NR 122, attributed to Cinc 2ND FLEET as movement report on August 11. D.I. indicates serial 015 from "Comdr. SCREENING FORCE". CINC COMBINED serial 742 of August 9, indicated 2ND FLEET would depart Kure on August 11 for Rabaul. Serial 016 was addressed to following:

Action: Comdr. MISAWA AIR  
          at Gasmata  
          Comdr. Plane Group           at  
          KISARATSU AIR,  
Info : Communication Officer 11TH AIR  
          FLEET  
          Communication Officer 5TH AIR  
          ATTACK  
          Comdr. 4TH AIR GROUP  
          Communication Officer 6TH AIR  
          ATTACK  
          Comdr. AIR GROUP

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 173 (Cont.)

This serial 016 is completely out of character for a CINC 2ND FLEET message. However, serial numbers and time relation check so accurately with CINC 2ND that it is suggested that CINC 2ND FLEET departed Kure by air at 0950, August 11, and at 1630, August 12 (time of origin of serial 016) had arrived Rabaul Area and assumed direction of air forces. (GT#629 OPNAV 121620-121625-TI) (MEMO #12-1)

It was indicated:

The OPNAV RI Unit is now working on the decryption of serial 016, and the field units have been requested to comment, particularly since the intercept thereof at Station S was on a new frequency, 8430 kcs., and the transmitting and rec. stations were not identified.

CINC COMBINED serial 742, 0950 August 9, indicating the 2ND FLEET departure for Rabaul on August 11, was reported as item 23, page 7 of RI Summary 111400/Q August.

CINC SECOND FLEET serial 015 of August 9, having the appearance of a movement report and exactly the same time of origin as the CINC COMBINED message, appeared as paragraph 4 of item 20, page 9, RI Summary 120600/Q August.

No message originated by CINC 2ND FLEET has been seen during the thirty hour interval between the time of his serial 015 and that of the above identified serial 016.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 173 (Cont.)

Suggestion that CINC SECOND may have moved by air from Kure to Rabaul area is based on (1) information that 2ND FLEET would depart for Rabaul on 11 August. (2) apparent movement report, serial 015, from CINC SECOND on 11 August, and was expected to move to Rabaul.

Two factors discount this possibility: (1) Message serial 016 has no appearance, from the standpoint of addressees, of being originated by CINC 2ND FLEET, who would be expected to make an arrival report as his next message after departure on 11th. (2) CINC 11TH AIR FLEET may have originated serial 016 as his number series had reached 009 at 0930, 12 August. (It should be noted that CINC 11TH AIR could not have originated serial 015 at 0950, 11 August.) Serial 016 has all the appearance of being an 11TH AIR FLEET message. Therefore the unlikely coincidence of serial 015, NR 122 from CINC SECOND and serial 016, NR 123 from CINC 11TH AIR may have occurred. This will later be proven or disproven as all traffic from both commanders is received.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 59)

No. 174.

DI indicates 6TH AIR ATTACK, Serial 016, contains no encrypted originator which further lessens the likelihood that this message was from CINC 2ND FLEET.  
(GT#637 OPNAV 122142-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 65)



AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Personnel bureaus throughout the Empire were quite active:

No. 175

Empire Personnel Bureaus active all despatches except Tokyo appearing bona fide latter addressing all his traffic to Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET.  
(COM 14 120846-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 3)

A deciphered message to the Second Fleet disclosed the existence of a Japanese task force, the strength of which was not known:

No. 176

FROM: #009 10 August/1830  
TO : (2ND FLEET) ( )  
INFO: (Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(unidentified)  
(CinC COMBINED FLEET)  
(unidentified)  
(Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET)

SCREENING FORCE Despatch Order #9.  
Between the (blank) and the 20th Forces awaiting orders will carry out, under the direction of the force commanders, exchange of communications for (drill ?) purposes.  
(GZ#2417 OPNAV 120520-DI)

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 176 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

"Forces awaiting orders" (This is a tactical organization of unknown composition, commanded by COMBATDIV 3. Will hereafter be called "STANDBY FORCE".) (Summary, 120600, August, No. 4)

An increase in traffic was observed in all areas on August 12, especially in the Rabaul region where communication with Tokyo was carried out on a frequency of 9160 kcs. Jaluit and Truk had been noticed particularly on the preceding day because of the D/F bearings they were sending to Radio Intelligence Headquarters at Tokyo between 1500 and 1800.

No. 177

Traffic increase in all Areas.  
(COM 14 120846-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 4)

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 178

Considerable Army traffic in Rabaul Area. OKI FORCE only Army Force shown at Rabaul.

(COM 14-122142-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 62)

No. 179

Rabaul and Tokyo Radio Stations observed working each other direct on 9160 kcs.

(COM 14-12208-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 2)

No. 180

Jaluit (and TRUK active sending D/F bearings to Radio Intelligence Headquarters at Tokio between 1500 and 1800, 11th August.

(BEL-120630-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 35)

A Rabaul defense force indicated that the RZJ Occupation Force was proceeding with air forces to a spot tentatively identified as the Buna-Gona area. Another dispatch directed an unidentified ship to rendezvous in accordance with certain instructions.

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 181

FROM: #250 (Aug.11/(?))

Is a Radio Order of the "R" Area  
DEFENSE FORCES. Speaks of the RZJ  
OCCUPATION FORCE proceeding to RAF  
{suggest BUNA GONA} with air forces.  
{COM 14 122042-DI}  
{Summary, 130600, August, No. 80}

No. 182

"R" Area Defense Force Despatch  
Order # ---. The --- ship)  
will be in following positions: 12th  
at --- bearing --- degrees, distant  
55 miles from --- Island. Same day  
at 1400, 3 - 10' South, 148 (?), 50  
East. 13th at 0800 arrive RR (Rabaul).  
{GZ#2432 OPNAV 122242-DI}  
{Summary, 130600, August, No. 72}

Proof was now obtained that Cruiser Division  
Eighteen was still operating.

No. 183

COMCRUDIV 18 and 5TH SPECIAL LANDING  
FORCE associated in despatch from Rabaul  
indicating this CRUDIV still functioning.  
{COM 14 120902-TI}  
{Summary, 121400, August, No. 55}

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division Seven and the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Three were proceeding to the Eighth Fleet area to strengthen the Japanese forces in the vicinity of Rabaul and the Solomons.

No. 184

Apparent confirmation orders for CRUDIV 7 and COMDESRON 3 proceed 8TH FLEET Area seen in CINC COMBINED despatch 0710/11th, addressed COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 3, the 10TH BASE FORCE at Ambon, unidentified . . . ; information Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET, 2ND AIR ATTACK CORPS, and Navy General Staff. Some indications KAGU MARU will be in company.  
(COM 14 120854-TI)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 57)

No. 185

Traffic Analysis indicates CRUDIV 7 ( and ) with DESDIV 2 is proceeding from Malaya communication zone to Celebes area possibly Balikpapan or Amboina. (CinC EF 1905Z/10)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 58)

It was noted:

The KUMANO appears correct but the other ship is a cruiser whose call is not the SUZUYA. The SUZUYA appears to be in Empire.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 58)

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 186

Association of CRUDIV 7  
and DESRON 3 with Base Forces  
at Ambon and Makassar  
plus AIRRON 23 (Koepong) noted which  
indicates those units either in or  
proceeding to that area.  
(BEL 120650-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 69)

No. 187

CRUDIV 7 continues association with  
3RD FLEET and Ambon. (COM 14 122144-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 70)

No. 188

At 1540/12 August, Balikpapan Base  
Communication Office addressed Communi-  
cation Officer CRUDIV 7 in  
lengthy dispatch.  
(GT#633 OPNAV 122042-TI)

It was noticed:

COM 14 reported CRUDIV 7 and DESRON  
3 are believed enroute to bolster CINC  
8TH FLEET (August 12).  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 71)

Cruiser Division Six was in the Kavieng area,  
although one of its ships had been ordered on August 7  
to go to Rabaul immediately. Several intercepted  
dispatches were concerned with the details of a fuel-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

ing rendezvous for Cruiser Division Six.

No. 189

One ship of CRUDIV 6 indicated as being at Kavieng using that Station Call as cover at 1700/11th addressing Staff Communication Officer CRUDIV 6 with Serial 138. (BEL 120630-TI)

It was observed:

CRUDIV 6 is and has been in the Kavieng Area. On 7 August CINC 8TH FLEET ordered one ship of CRUDIV 6 to go to Rabaul immediately. (Summary, 130600, August, No. 67)

No. 190

FROM: #199 11 August/1530  
TO : (8TH FLEET)  
(BASE FORCE #8 at Rabaul  
(Staff Comm. Officers  
also Chief of Staff of  
Small Commands?)).  
INFO: (4TH FLEET (Staff Comm.  
Officers also Chief of  
Staff of Smaller  
Commands?)).

Fragmentary but mentions fueling of  
CRUDIV 6. (GZ#2416 OPNAV 120520-DI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 36)

It was pointed out:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 190 (Cont.)

is believed a Tanker. This tanker was addressed by CinC 4TH 1600 10th information CinC 11TH and 8TH FLEETS, COMCRUDIV 6 and Rabaul Base. This believed to indicate arrangement for and necessity for fueling CRUDIV 6 Units. Rabaul probable location rendezvous, all from TI. (Summary, 120600, August, No.36)

No. 191

Two suspected Tankers and are addressed by 8TH BASE FORCE in association CRUDIV 6. (COM 14 120902-TI)

It was remarked:

The rendezvous of CRUDIV 6 with Tankers (at RMD; possibly in vicinity of Lorengan) was reported in R.I. SUMMARY 111400/Q, August, page 13, Item 44. (Summary, 121400, August, No. 48)

No. 192

Possibility of arrangements to fuel CRUDIV 6 in Kavieng Area noted in despatch from fleet tanker (?) serial 016, addressed COMDR RABAUl BASE FORCE information fleet tanker, Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET and unidentified at 0830, 11th, which was later passed to Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET Operations Section Naval General Staff, CRUDIV 6, KAVIENG BASE FORCE and unidentified (BEL 120640-TI) (Summary, 130600, August, No. 66)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

The AKIKAZE announced its arrival at Rabaul on August 12 at 1610. It was suspected that the AKIKAZE was stationed in a position which would permit it to send out warnings of the approach of Allied aircraft. There was also a possibility that it was equipped with radar since one of its many reports contained the bearings of a plane:

No. 193

FROM: #212, August 12, at 0730  
          (AKIKAZE)  
TO :           (COMAIRON 25)

States: "Departed RXC for RR."  
Former identified as place near Bougainville, latter is Rabaul. (BEL 120938-DI)

It was stated:

is identified by OPNAV as  
11TH AIR FLEET.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 77)

No. 194

Serial #212, 12th August,  
says "Departed RXC for Rabaul."  
(COM 14 122042-DI)

It was commented:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

(AKIKAZE) on 9 August, DI  
stated AKIKAZE arrived RXC (in vicinity  
of Bougainville).  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 76)

No. 195

FROM: (AKIKAZE) #213  
TO : (?) Aug.12/1610  
INFO: (CINC 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(DESDIV 34)  
(Base Force at Rabaul)  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLT/All Major Commands)

Arrived RR. (Rabaul)  
(GZ#2422-OPNAV 122045-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 78)

No. 196

The number of aircraft sighting  
reports sent by AKIKAZE suggests  
that vessel may be stationed in a posi-  
tion to send out warnings of the approach  
of Allied aircraft and may also be spe-  
cially equipped possibly with Radar equip-  
ment as one report apparently contained  
the bearing of the planes involved.  
(COM 14 120710-TI)

It was declared:

According to traffic routing the  
AKIKAZE appeared to have arrived at RXC  
(vicinity Buka or Bougainville). This  
ship has been associated with the 5TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCE. (Summary 121400, August,  
No. 52)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Destroyer Division Seventeen was in the Truk area en route from Saipan to Rabaul.

No. 197

FROM: (Rabaul) #280  
Aug. 12/1600  
TO : (DESDIV 17)  
INFO: (unidentified)  
FROM: Commander in Chief, 8TH FLEET.

Passed to 8TH FLEET. OUTSIDE SOUTH SEAS FORCE ORDER #11. DESDIV 17 will \_\_\_\_\_ at PS \_\_\_\_\_ on 14th \_\_\_\_\_ will fuel at PT. (GZ#2420 OPNAV 121745-DI)

It was declared:

From the translation it is not apparent whether DESDIV 17 will be at PS (Saipan) or at PT (Truk) on the 14th. DESDIV 17 appears enroute Saipan to Rabaul. See above item. (Summary, 121400, August, No. 35)

Destroyer Squadron Two was associated with the Chief of Staff of the Fourth Fleet. This was another indication that Destroyer Squadron Two was en route to assist in southern operations.

No. 198

Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 198 (Cont.)

addressed Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET  
Info: Chiefs of Staff 2ND  
FLEET, 1ST AIR FLEET  
, 11TH AIR FLEET and  
COMDESRON 2 (at 2140/12th.  
This is first association COMDESRON  
2 with 4TH FLEET AREA.  
(GT#634 OPNAV 122042-TI)

It was mentioned:

BELCONNEN noted the service of a  
despatch at 0535/11th in which Truk  
informed Tokyo he was not guard for  
COMDESRON 2 traffic. This error in  
routing by Tokyo was believed an indi-  
cation that DESRON 2 was enroute South.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 79)

A unit in the Third Escort Force announced  
that it would depart for Truk on August 14. This  
Escort Force had arrived at Kavieng on August 2  
en route from Truk to Rabaul:

No. 199

FROM: #045 Aug.12/2000  
(Comdr. Unit in #3 ESCORT  
FOR.)  
(Comdr. AZUMA MARU)  
(Comdr. 8TH BASE FOR. at  
Rabaul)  
(?)  
INFO: (Cofs 4TH FLEET)  
(Comdr. MARU)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 199 (Cont.)

----- will depart for PT (Truk) on  
14th ----- (GZ#2431 OPNAV 122242-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 75)

An urgent operational message was sent on August 11 at 1930 by a Japanese warship which was thought to be a destroyer. This seemed to indicate that it was engaged in battle with Allied forces at that time.

No. 200

URGENT operational type despatch was originated at 1930, 11th, by man-of-war (possibly destroyer) to Comdr. RABAUl BASE FORCE, information All Units in Southern Area, which suggests engagement with Allied forces at time indicated. (BEL 120640-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 59)

It was evident from heavy traffic concerning Japanese air activities that shore-based aircraft groups in the Rabaul area were being sent many reinforcements. Units of the Yokosuka, Omura, Sukugawa, Iwakuni and Hiro Air Groups were taking part in this movement from the Empire to southern waters.

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 201.

Air Traffic prominent with increased evidence reinforcement shore-based aircraft in Rabaul Area. KISARATSU AIR UNITS at Tenian confirmed. Anticipate immediate departure southward. Units of Yokosuka, Omura, Sukugawa, Iwakuni and Hiro AIR GROUPS indicated as concerned movement aircraft from Empire southwards.  
(Com 14-120846-TI)

It was noted:

Yokosuka, Omura and Hiro AIR GROUPS have been continuously connected with carrier traffic. So far Yokosuka AIR is the only one noted with a detachment farmed out and that was with the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE in Ominato about the middle of July. The Sukugawa AIR has been associated with supplying reinforcements to the Malay-Indies Area. The Iwakuni AIR has been associated with carrier traffic and also seems to be major supply base for AIRRON 11.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 83)

Many dispatches from the weather observer at Truk also indicated that aircraft movements were in progress.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 202

Truk Weather Observer heavy originator further indicating aircraft movements.  
(COM 14 120902-TI)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 32)

The Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force was stimulating this air activity by his demands for additional aviation personnel and aircraft supplies.

No. 203

Commander AIRRON 25 originated long 4-part despatch. Serial 071 at 2100 10th to Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET  
Info: Tokio Personnel Bureau  
Bureau Air ), Commanders AIRRON 24  
and 26 ), Commander MISAWA  
AIR GROUP and Commander AIR GROUP  
This is apparently request for additional aviation personnel and aircraft supplies for use of air units which recently reinforced his command.  
(BEL 120650-TI)

It was noticed:

is Commander 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE (based at Rabaul).  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 86)

Transport planes and heavy bombers were coming south, as well as the expected fighter planes.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 204

FROM: (Tainan Air) Serial #864  
Aug. 12/0800  
TO : LAE AIR COMMAND  
11TH AIRRON  
25TH AIRRON

"\_\_\_\_\_ transport planes left for your Station at 0750." Note: "Blank" questionably recovered as 30, but seems too many. (BEL 121345-DI)

It was observed:

Tainan Air was reported at Salamaua by TI on 11 August.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 87)

No. 205

FROM: #016 Aug. 12/1630  
TO : (Comdr. 6TH AIR ATT. FOR)  
(Comdr. Hahajima Air)  
(?)  
INFO: (Comdr. AIRRON)  
(Kisaratsu AIR)  
(11TH AIR FLT.) (Staff  
Com. Off.)  
(5TH AIR ATT. FOR.  
Staff Com. Off.)  
(Comdr. 5TH AIR GRP.)  
(6TH AIR ATT. FOR.  
Staff Com. Off.)  
(Air Base in Truk  
General Area)

Two type-1 heavy bombers will take off for RR (Rabaul) at 1500 on 13th.  
(GZ#2430 OPNAV 122242-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 64)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Air Squadron Eleven and the seaplane tender, KAGU MARU, were en route to operate under the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet; and an order from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet directed that planes be sent from the Philippines to the Southwest Pacific.

No. 206

CINC 2ND FLEET at 1500, 9th, in serial 999, addressed KAGU MARU plus plane carrier or tender at Koepang, information COMCRUDIV 7 COMDESDIV 2, COMDR. AIRON 11, Chief Naval General Staff and CINC COMBINED FLEET, CINC 3RD and CINC 4TH. Association indicates AIRON 11 and KAGU MARU are to operate under CINC 2ND in forthcoming operations. (BEL 120640-TI)

It was pointed out:

This message heading was noted by OPNAV in R.I. Summary 101400/C August, page 13, first part of item 42. The KAGU MARU is a seaplane tender. (Summary, 130600, August, No. 68)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 207

COMAIRRON 11 believed enroute Rabaul addresses CINC COMBINED and 2ND FLEETS, Tokyo, Yokosuka and Truk radios, Information to Chichijima at 1100/11 August. (COM 14 120646-TI)

It was remarked:

AIRRON 11 was noted (about 9 August) as being in the Yokosuka Area awaiting transportation to Rabaul. (Summary, 130600, August, No. 52)

No. 208

#783 11 August  
FROM: (CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
TO :  
INFO: (Toko AIR GROUP)  
(TOKO AIR GROUP detached  
Air Units)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)

Fragmentary but gist as follows:

- (1) Add (blank \*) to the (blank) base Air Force from TOKO AIR GROUP.
- (2) Add (blank \*) to the SOUTH SEAS FORCE from the PHILIPPINE FORCE and for operations in Southeastern Area. Add (blank \*) to the (blank) force from the (blank) (blank) which was despatched to the Truk Area.

\*NOTE: No numbers or plane types are mentioned but it is believed that the transfers are mostly aircraft.

(GZ#2418 OPNAV 120520-DI)  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 24)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis disclosed the locations of several Japanese air commanders and units. The Commander of the Misawa Air Group was shown at Rabaul on August 11 and at Vunakunau on August 12. The Commander of the Kisaratsu Air Group, who was also reported at Guam, was located at Tinian where the Communication Officer Sixth Air Attack Force was also present. The Biforo Air Group, which had been operating in the Horomushiro area, was at Kisaratsu at this time; a unit from the Yokosuka Air Group was heading south to Rabaul where the Communication Officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet was stationed; the Commander of Air Squadron Eleven was en route from Yokosuka to Truk via Chichijima; and it was thought that units of Air Squadron Twenty-four were to be withdrawn from the Marshall Islands and sent to the Solomons area. The KAGU MARU, an air tender, which was passing from Palao to Koepang Communication Zones, was also thought to be on its way to Rabaul.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942, (Continued)

No. 209

COMDR MISAWA AIR shown at  
Rabaul Air Base (?) at 1500,  
11 August.  
(GT #624 OPNAV 120220-TI)

It was stated:

COMDR MISAWA AIR also appeared at  
Rabaul 10th August, and it appeared by  
T.I. that some of that Air Group arrived  
in the New Britain Area 9 August.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 30)

No. 210

At 2030, on 12 August, Commander  
KISARATSU AIR GROUP was at  
Tenian, Communication Officer  
6TH AIR ATTACK was at Tenian. Commander  
MISAWA AIR positively at enciphered  
Vunakunau, which confirms as  
Rabaul Air Base.  
(GT#633 OPNAV 122042-TI)

It was commented:

MISAWA AIR had a detachment arrive  
in Rabaul Area 10 August.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 46)

No. 211

Commander KISARATSU AIR at  
Guam. Detachment 46 of this Station at  
(YUI 5) AIR UNIT in Truk Area.  
(COM 14 122144-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 45)

1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 212

Commander BIFORO AIR GROUP  
at Kisaratsu at Noon, 12 August,  
(GT#636 OPNAV 122127-TI)

It was declared:

The BIFORO AIR GROUP has been operating in the Horomushiro Area. On 9 August the BIFORO AIR despatch #925 reported by COM 14: "Due to unfavorable weather unable to carry out patrol from Rabaul." This is the only indication of BIFORO AIR having any section Rabaul. It may be a translation error. On August 11 a BIFORO AIR despatch (#945) indicated 25 to 30 heavy bombers departed Hyakurihara for Kisaratsu Air Station. This may be an indication of a transfer South but has not been completed as yet.  
(Summary, 130,600, August, No. 27)

No. 213

Unit from Yokosuka AIR appears heading South to Rabaul.  
(COM 14 122144-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 85)

No. 214

Communication Officer 11TH AIR FLEET  
at Rabaul Radio Station  
(COM 14 122144-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 84)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 215

COMDR AIRON 11 indicated as being enroute Yokosuka to Truk via Chichijima (NOTE 2) by heading of Communication Zone report, serial 264, at 1100, 11th. (BEL 120640-TI)

It was indicated:

This also noted by COM 14.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 53)

No. 216

FROM: (MARU) #273 Aug. 9  
TO : 11TH AIRRON  
24TH AIRRON

Will depart Yokosuka noon, 10th, and head for Ruotto.

NOTE: Middle portion not fully readable but gives distance and bearing from some island near point of departure. (BEL 120423-DI)

It was mentioned:

AIRRON 11 appears in the Yokosuka Area, awaiting transportation to Rabaul. On August 11th, the KAMIKAWA MARU was loading planes at Yokosuka for Rabaul (believed to be AIRRON 11) and it is not certain whether they will depart Yokosuka or arrive Rabaul Aug. 23rd. This translation is being rechecked to try and determine this fact. On Aug. 11th, MARU Air Tender of AIRRON 24 was at Yokosuka and the association with commands in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 216 (Cont.)

Rabaul Area suggested that units of AIRRON 24 might be withdrawn from the Marshalls for use in the Solomons. The above message tends to support this suggestion.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 7)

No. 217

KAGU MARU believed in Ambon Area enroute Rabaul being escorted by CRUDIV 7 and Destroyer units.  
(CINCPAC 120159 BULL. #149)

It was noted:

From traffic routing on August 10th, COM 14 believes COMCRUDIV 7 and companion destroyers are enroute or arrived at Celebes-Ambonia Area; they have been associated with air tender KAGU MARU which passed from Palao to Keopang Comm. Zones yesterday, hence the above is possible but not certain.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 56)

Ever since the smashing American victory at Midway had destroyed four Japanese carriers, Carrier Division Three had been missing from the enemy's carrier organization, but now there were definite indications that it was newly organized. Training

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

of new air units for service aboard carriers was in progress and much carrier activity was noted in the Sasebo area, where the ZUIHO was associated with the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet, the HAYATAKA and RYUJO.

A notebook captured from the Commander of the Japanese Fourth Air Group gave some interesting information concerning the organization of the Eleventh Air Fleet. This occasioned the following summary of the locations of many of the air groups within this organization:

No. 218

Three no originator despatches from Commander 1ST AIR FLEET (Serials 289, 291 and 292) addressed 1ST AIR FLEET and carrier plane groups. Call was used collectively along with CARDIVS 1 and 2 and may be CARDIV 3 newly established in connection with reorganization carrier divisions after Midway engagement. (BEL 120630-TI)

It was noticed:

The call has been unidentified. It appeared first about 16 July. In all but 3 despatches since that time it has



AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 218 (Cont.)

been an addressee along with CARDIVS 1 and 2. In the other 3 despatches known BB ships and division calls appeared. (Summary, 130600, August, No. 21)

No. 219

Short despatch from unidentified Man-of-war ), Serial 060 at 1100 11th addressed ZUIHO and AIR UNIT at Kanoya ; Info: Staff Communication Officer 1ST AIR FLEET (?), Association of UNIT with ZUIHO suggests it is being formed for service aboard that ship. (BEL 120630-TI)

It was observed:

was believed to be a sub in SUBDIV (of SUBRON 5) but seems to be in error. is 1ST AIR FLEET. (Summary, 130600, August, No. 23)

No. 220

Carrier activity Sasebo Area noted. ZUIHO shown Sasebo Area by routing instructions, with indications this carrier in company CINC 1ST AIR FLEET (in SHOKAKU), HAYATAKA and RYUJO. FORCE COMMANDER now at Kanoya Air Station associated with ZUIHO may embark for operations. (COM 14 120854-TI)

It was pointed out:

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 220 (Cont.)

At 1720, August 10th, a unit of CARDIV 1 Staff concerned with medical matters, appeared aboard ZUIHO. The unit is unidentified.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 11)

No. 221

Tokyo Military Stores Section addressed Kure Navy Yard, Kure Stores Section: Info: Chief of Staff Kure, 1ST AIR FLEET, Yokosuka Aircraft Section and SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, HAYATAKA, and HITAKA, indicating all four carriers probably in home waters on 12 August. (GT#638 OPNAV 122142-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 24)

No. 222

From captured notebook from person Lieutenant Commander (Shosa) Naonobu Tsusaki (Comdr FOURTH AIR GROUP) following interesting points. Entries presumably since nine April. Organization ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:

AIRRON 21 consists KANOYA AIR GROUP with 27 fighters and 86 heavy bombers plus TOKO AIR GROUP with 12 undescribed planes.

AIRRON 22 consists GENZAN and BIHORO AIR GROUPS with 27 each heavy bombers.

AIRRON 23 has TAKAO AIR GROUP with 45 heavy bombers and THIRD AIR GROUP with 45 fighters and 6 observation planes.

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 222 (Cont.)

AIRRON 24 includes CHITOSE AIR GROUP with 27 heavy bombers plus FOURTEENTH AIR GROUP with 12 unidentified planes and FIRST AIR GROUP with 27 heavy bombers.

AIRRON 25 embodies TAINAN AIR GROUP with 45 fighters and 6 observation planes plus YOKOHAMA AIR GROUP with 12 of one and 6 of another undescribed types plus FOURTH AIR GROUP with 36 heavy bombers.

Separately listed were KANOYA, TAKAO, CHITOSE, FOURTH, AND KISARATU AIR GROUPS with comment after KANOYA "partly 96", after FOURTH AIR GROUP "original unit", after KISARATSU "type 1 others 96". Another portion lists SVENGOKU MARU as equipped 17 torpedo planes. Designation types listed above derived from presumption meaning suffixed Roman letter F with L, C, and Y, which presumed mean Heavy bombers, fighters, and observation planes respectively. (BEL 120530-DI)

It was remarked:

AIRRON 21 appears to be in the Dutch East Indies-Malay-Philippine area.

KANOYA AIR GROUP appeared at Sabang August 11th.

TOKO AIR GROUP to have one part in the Andaman (Port Blair) area, August 10th and also appeared to have a part in the Kiska area on August 6th.

AIRRON 22 appears divided between Ominato and Solomons areas.

GENZAN AIR GROUP appeared in Ominato area August 6th.

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 222 (Cont.)

BIHORO AIR GROUP appeared partly in Northern area August 3rd and also part in the Rabaul area August 10th.

AIRRON 23 appears in the Dutch East Indies-Ambon area with possible shifts to reinforce the Solomon area.

TAKAO AIR GROUP appeared at Kendari on August 2nd and a section appeared to have departed Kendari August 2nd and arrived Sabang on August 5th.

3RD AIR GROUP appeared in the Dutch East Indies in May.

AIRRON 24 appears in the Marshall Island area with possible shifts to reinforce Solomon area.

CHITOSE AIR GROUP appeared in the Marshall Islands August 11th.

14TH AIR GROUP appears in the Gasmata area. A section was at Tulagi August 3rd.

1ST AIR GROUP appeared at Taroa (Marshall Is.) on August 5th and appeared in Cape St. George area (Southern New Ireland) on August 9th.

AIRRON 25 appears in the New-Britain-Solomon area.

TAINAN AIR GROUP appeared in the New Guinea area August 9th.

YOKOHAMA AIR GROUP appeared in the Solomons near Guadalcanal August 2nd.

4TH AIR GROUP appears in Solomon area and was noted as arriving Vauakanau on August 8th. (Summary, 121400, August, No.50)

Several Marus were noted in traffic on this day. The KENRYU was en route from Rabaul to the

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Empire via Truk; the KAMO I was proceeding to Rabaul from the Marshall Islands; and another Maru announced its arrival at Rabaul on August 12 at 1300.

No. 223

Association and traffic headings indicate KENRYU MARU enroute from Rabaul to Empire via Truk.  
(COM 14 120902-TI)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 42)

No. 224

FROM: KENRYU MARU Serial #220  
Aug. 10/(?)

\*Communication Zone changes: (13th -  
Leave Rabaul enter Palao, 18th, leave  
Palao enter Sasebo, 21st, leave Sasebo  
enter Yokosuka. (BEL 121345-DI)

It was stated:

Traffic routing on 10 August indicated this vessel at Rabaul.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 34)

No. 225

By associations KAMO I will  
proceed to Rabaul near future.  
(GT#630 OPNAV 121730-TI)  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 31)

It was commented:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 225 (Cont.)

KAMOI reported arrival at PYI  
(Imieji, Marshall Islands), at 1400,  
August 11th.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 31)

No. 226

FROM: (MARU) #127 Aug. 11  
TO: Staff Comm. Officer, Rabaul.

Leaving port tomorrow  
{sometime between 1000 and 1300}.  
(BEL 120423-DI)

It was declared:

(MARU) was placed by DF, on  
August 2nd, at 04 N, 152-30 E. There is  
no indication as to the name of the port  
referred to here.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 40)

No. 227

FROM: (MARU) Aug. 12/1310  
Serial #129

"Arrived Rabaul 1300."  
(BEL 121345-DI)

It was indicated:

MARU on 11 August reported  
by DI as leaving a port 12th between  
1000-1300."  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 88)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

The KAMIKAWA MARU transported planes from Yokosuka to Rabaul, where the Eleventh Air Fleet was receiving reinforcements; an unidentified Maru was engaged in transporting aircraft supplies to Jaluit.

No. 228

#894 11 Aug/1100  
FROM: (KAMIKAWA MARU Comdr)  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)  
INFO: (AIRON 11 Comdr)  
(COMBINED FLEET Chief of Staff)  
(Tokyo)

This ship at present loading (?)  
(type of planes) \_\_\_\_\_ 9 \_\_\_\_\_ 2 at Yokosuka  
\_\_\_\_\_ and will depart (?) the 23rd \_\_\_\_\_  
Ship's cruising schedule (?) from Yokosuka  
to RR-\_\_\_\_\_(.)  
(GZ#2409 OPNAV 120311-DI)

It was mentioned:

RR is Rabaul.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 13)

No. 229

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ Serial #64  
TO : 6TH BASE FORCE  
24TH AIRRON  
11TH AIRRON

\*Arrived Jaluit \_\_\_\_\_ 0600 (or 0800)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 229 (Cont.)

11th.\* (BEL 121345-DI)

It was noted:

\_\_\_\_\_ is a MARU in the 11TH AIR  
FLEET.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 47)

An unidentified ship was assigned to the Base  
Air Force under the control of the Eleventh Air Fleet.

No. 230

FROM: #732, 1700, August 8  
TO : (COMBINED FLEET)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
(AIRON 11)  
(Unidentified)  
(KAMIKAWA MARU)  
INFO: (4TH FLEET)  
(8TH FLEET)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)

Effective 11 August, the (\_\_\_\_\_  
ship or unit) will be detached from SCREEN-  
ING FORCE and attached to the Base AIR  
FORCE. (GZ#2429 OPNAV 122242-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 32)

The KOMASAKI, formerly at Truk about August 5,  
was not associated with Yokosuka Navy Yard, which  
suggested that arrangements for docking this ship



AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

were being made. A fleet auxiliary vessel was associated with the Tokyo Repair Bureau, possibly because of damage received in the New Britain area.

No. 231

KOMASAKI was included as Info Addressee along with Chief of Staff Yokosuka and Yokosuka Stores address in despatch from Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET at 1030/11th, Serial 538 to Yokosuka Navy Yard which suggests arrangements for docking KOMASAKI. (BEL 120650-TI)

It was observed:

The KOMASAKI arrived in Truk Harbor about 0615/5 August.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 20)

No. 232

Fleet auxiliary possibly damaged in New Britain Area is associated with Tokyo Repair Bureau.  
(COM 14 122144-TI)

It was pointed out:

Little is known of the Fleet Auxiliary except that it has been associated with CINC 8TH FLEET and believed in Rabaul Area about 26 July.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 89)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

A convoy of two tankers, a Maru, and an escort unit were en route to Rabaul via Palao and Truk, and a rendezvous with some unidentified units was arranged in the Palao area for fueling purposes.

No. 233

FROM: (SATA) #497 Aug. 9  
TO : (4TH FLEET)  
INFO: (8TH FLEET)  
(8TH BASE FORCE, Rabaul)  
(4TH BASE FORCE, Truk)

Sketchy translation, "because this vessel will enter Truk (859511) at 1000-1300 on \_\_\_\_\_, request escort be provided." (BEL 120631-DI)

It was remarked:

A convoy apparently composed of tankers SATA and \_\_\_\_\_, the AZUMA MARU (appeared to be a transport involved in the occupation of Guadalcanal) plus escort unit \_\_\_\_\_ appears to be enroute to Rabaul via Palao and Truk. CRUDIV 6 appears to be covering convoys when they enter Kavieng-Rabaul Area. (Summary, 121400, August, No. 36)

No. 234

FROM: (SATA) #501 Aug. 11  
TO : (unidentified)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 234 (Cont.)

(4TH FLEET)  
(unidentified)

\*At \_\_\_\_\_ (time) rendezvous with  
(35163) at 08 North, and 137-31  
East.\* (BEL 120631-DI)

It was stated:

This rendezvous is in the Palao  
Area.  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 38)

No. 235

Tanker SATA indicated in Truk Area.  
(COM 14 120902-TI)

It was commented:

SATA reported anticipated arrival  
at Truk. (See above item).  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 37)

No. 236

FROM: #076 Aug. 10/0630  
(Surface Ship of Unit on  
Escort Duty)  
TO : (DESDIV 15)  
{ ? }  
{ ? }  
INFO: (Base Force #4 at Truk)

Heading for PT (Truk). Will arrive  
0800 ( - date between 11th and 16th)  
(GZ#2424 OPNAV 122045-DI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 236 (Cont.)

It was declared:

seems to be part of the  
ESCORT FORCE taking the Tankers SATA and  
and the AZUMI MARU to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 42)

The enemy was concentrating submarine strength  
in the Solomons at this time. One subtender was  
located at Truk on August 12, and another of the  
CHOGEI class was noticed near Truk.

No. 237

Subtender at Truk  
12 August. (GT#636 OPNAV 122127-TI)

It was indicated:

According to , Serial #266,  
he should arrive at Truk at 1900/13th  
August from Kwajalein.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 55)

No. 238

CHOGEI class sub-tender  
near Truk. (COM 14 122144-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 54)

Several urgent dispatches to and from Japanese

1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

units in the Solomons area probably indicated submarine contacts with the Allied Forces.

No. 239

Several urgent despatches out of New Britain-Solomons Area beginning at 1400 (-9). Relayed to Forces that area by Rabaul, - probably submarine contacts with our Forces. Also high priority possible intelligence reports given wide distribution, traffic this area diminished otherwise.

(COM 14 122146-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 58)

No. 240

At 0930, on 12 August, Fleet Unit addressed URGENT to Subs and Air, information COMCRUDIV 6 and Commander 1ST PATROL FORCE, placing 1ST PATROL FORCE in New Britain Area.

(COM 14 122146-TI)

It was mentioned:

doubtfully identified as a submarine in SUBDIV. The identity of is uncertain, but on 1 August believed to be a DD in DESDIV 29 (last noted 31 July at Tulagi).

(Summary, 130600, August, No. 81)

Submarine Squadron Six was associated with the Chief of Staff of the Southern Expeditionary

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

Fleet, which pointed to cooperative action in the future by these organizations.

No. 241

Ambon included COMSUBRON 6 as Info addressee of despatch to Chief of Staff SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET on 12th. Timor does likewise in message to Ambon. (GT#636 OPNAV 122127-TI) (Summary, 130600, August, No. 61)

A submarine of Submarine Squadron Three gave notice that it was about to enter Truk, and another submarine was thought to be en route to the same place from Jaluit.

No. 242

Truk Harbor-Master addressed submarine unit in despatch at 1540, 11th, serial 396, information Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET and Staff Communication Officer TRUK BASE FORCE which suggests arrangements for unit to enter Truk. (BEL 120640-TI)

It was noted:

This also noted by COM 14.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 95)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 243

Indications that Flagship  
SUBDIV of SUBRON 3 will soon  
enter Truk Harbor since this vessel  
addressed by Truk Harbor-master.  
(COM 14 122138-TI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 94)

No. 244

Sub unit probably enroute  
from Jaluit to Truk.  
(COM 14 120710-TI)

It was noticed:

Submarine unit serial 266  
Aug 9. Will depart PQ (Kwajalein) at  
1500. On 12th at \_\_\_\_\_ will be 20  
miles (about) North of \_\_\_\_\_ and will  
arrive PT (Truk) at 1900 on 13th.\*  
(Summary, 121400, August, No. 27)

An operational order to Submarine Squadrons  
Three and Seven directed one of their units to patrol  
a certain location very close to Bougainville.

No. 245

FROM: (Rabaul Radio) August 12 #(?) 0700  
TO : (SUBRON 7)  
(SUBDIV of SUBRON 3)

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 245 (Cont.)

Mostly unreadable, but paragraph #2 directs some submarine unit to proceed to RXF (Pavuvu Islands (?)) and says something about "on the line Banika Island \_\_\_\_\_ Island and \_\_\_\_\_ Island."  
(BEL 121345-DI)

It was observed:

RXF is unplaced but believed very close to Bougainville. Banika Island is approximately 25 miles northwest of northwestern end Guadalcanal.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 97)

Meanwhile, Allied submarines reported torpedo attacks carried out against Japanese merchantmen.

No. 246

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ #(?), August 12.  
TO :

"Order # \_\_\_\_\_:

Today, at \_\_\_\_\_ (time), position 33-30, Longitude \_\_\_\_\_, one ship suffered a torpedo attack; search is to be carried out by the \_\_\_\_\_ DEFENSE FORCE and aircraft of the Air Unit."  
(BEL 121345-DI)

It was pointed out:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 246 (Cont.)

(Tokyo Address). The three  
action addressees are believed to be Air  
activities, being tentatively  
identified as an Air Station in the Ise  
Bay Area.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 31)

No. 247

FROM: Serial #177  
TO : TOKYO INTELLIGENCE  
Chief of Staff - Kure  
Chief of Staff - Yokosuka

"Although received torpedo attack  
today at 1230 (3 torpedoes) posits\_\_\_\_\_  
sustained no damage and am proceeding  
to Kure." (BEL 121345-DI)

It was remarked:

(MARU) by TI was placed in  
the Rabaul Area on 23 July.  
(Summary, 130600, No. 33, August)

Unfortunately, one of the American submarines  
was discovered and sunk, if the following dispatch  
is accurate:

No. 248

FROM: #? Aug.12/1130  
(8TH BASE FORCE - Ship  
in Comdr.)  
TO : (8TH BASE FORCE, Rabaul-  
Comdr.)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 248 (Cont.)

INFO: ( ? )  
( OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE )  
( Rabaul Address )

Believe sank enemy submarine - - - -  
- - (Something about number of depth  
charges dropped, etc.). Location:  
Bearing \_\_\_\_\_°, distant \_\_\_\_\_ miles from  
Cape Saint George.  
(GZ#2425 OPNAV 122045-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 74)

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the  
Pacific Fleet for August 12, 1942, read as follows:

No. 249

FROM: CINCPAC (NERK) 120159 AUGUST 12 1942  
TO : COMINCH  
COMNAVEU  
OPNAV

NCR 2152-J BULLETIN NO. 149.

VIA NSS FOR COMINCH COMNAVEU AND OPNAV.

149 FROM CINCPAC

...DESDIV 17 IN TRUK AREA ENROUTE RABAU.  
AIR REINFORCEMENTS MOVING FROM JAPAN TO  
RABAU. KAMIKAWA MARU ENROUTE NEW BRITAIN  
AREA. KENJO MARU IN VICINITY RANGOON.  
CRUDIV 6 IN VICINITY KAVIENG REFUELING.  
UNITS OF SUBRON 3 APPROACHING TRUK FROM  
SOUTH. SUB POSITIONS BY D/F. ALL SOUTH.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 249 (Cont.)

AND EAST. 8 AND 164. 13 AND 164. 7 AND  
171. 9 AND 161. KAGU MARU (XAV) BELIEVE  
IN AMBON AREA ENROUTE RABAUl BEING ES-  
CORTED BY CRUDIV 7 AND DESTROYER UNITS.

THIS MSG DELAYED DUE TO SVCS

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942

Traffic analysis revealed that the call sign which had previously been identified as that of the Commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet was now assigned to the Commander of the Southeastern Area Force. This meant that he would supersede the Eighth Base Force Commander.

No. 250

11TH AIR FLEET Commanders Serial 357 fits a blank number in 8TH BASE FORCE Series. (COM 14 130918-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 30)

No. 251

Consecutive Code Serial Numbers show enciphered Commander SOUTHEASTERN AREA FORCE and previously been identified as Commander 11TH AIR FLEET. (BEL 131015-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 85)

No. 252

Some indication is seen that 11TH AIR FLEET Commander may have superseded 8TH BASE FORCE in "R" Area. Commander by appearance of enciphered SOUTHEASTERN AREA FORCE Commander on August 10th shortly after arrival of 11TH AIR FLEET Commander in Rabaul Area and subsequent

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 252 (Cont.)

handling of traffic from 8TH BASE FORCE  
Commander. (COM 14 130916-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 31)

Suspicion that the Commander in Chief of the  
Second Fleet had been at Rabaul was removed by the  
following comments:

No. 253

No evidence substantiate CINC 2ND  
being Rabaul and considered most unlikely  
due presence CINC 11TH AIR FLEET.  
(BEL 130423-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 63)

No. 254

Nothing noted seen in traffic here  
to warrant comment on Washington's suspi-  
cion of Commander 2ND FLEET visit to  
South on 11th. (COM 14 130916-TI)

It was commented:

BEL also stated on 13 August, "No  
evidence to substantiate Cinc 2ND being  
Rabaul and considered most unlikely due  
presence Cinc 11TH AIR FLEET".  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 24)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1942

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

A lengthy dispatch in a special cipher from the Naval General Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet attracted attention at this time.

No. 255

Naval General Staff at 2125/13 August originated lengthy despatch in special cipher to CINC COMBINED : Info: CINC'S 2ND 1ST AIR 8TH FLEET 11TH AIR and SUB FOR (GT#651 OPNAV 132322-TI) (Summary, 140600, August, No. 2)

The Commander of the First Landing Force of the Army was observed to be at Palao.

No. 256

Routing and association indicate Commander 1ST LANDING FORCE (Army) at Palao. (BEL 131015-TI) (Summary, 140600, August, No. 56)

Cruiser Division Seven, accompanied by Destroyer Squadron Three continued its journey eastward toward Rabaul. The headings of several dispatches indicated that these units were in, or proceeding to, the Balikpapan area. There seemed to

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

be an extra ship operating with Cruiser Division Seven, but it remained unidentified.

No. 257

Staff Communication Officer BALIKPAPAN BASE FORCE originated serial #958, at 1540, 12 August, to Communication Officer CRUDIV 7 (BEL 130759-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 67)

No. 258

COMCRUDIV 7 Staff Communication Officer, DESRON 3 and Staff Communication Officer 3RD FLEET were action addressees in Serial 647 at 1710/12th from Unidentified in which Communication Officers Balikpapan BASE FORCE and Unidentified were Info Addressees. Associations in these despatch headings suggest that COMCRUDIV 7 and possibly COMDESRON 3 are in, or proceeding to, Balikpapan Area. (BEL 130759-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 69)

No. 259

Additional confirmation of CRUDIV 7's location is seen in despatch from SCO BASE FORCE at Balikpapan to SCO CRUDIV 7 at 1540/12.  
(COM 14 130916-TI)

It was declared:

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 259 (Cont.)

This despatch previously reported in RI Summary 130600/Q August, page 21, item 71. SCO is believed to mean Staff Communication Officer.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 39)

No. 260

Nothing seen to change previous indications CRUDIV 7, DESRON 3 and KAGU MARU were heading eastward toward Rabaul.  
(COM 14 131908-TI)

It was indicated:

COM 14 by TI indicated that the above units would proceed 8TH FLEET area.  
Summary 121400/Q August.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 71)

No. 261

Unident  
at 1950/13 August addressed CINCS  
COMBINED, 2ND, MALAY, and 1ST AIR FLEETS  
BASE FORCE at Truk, Info:  
COMDESRON 3  
COMDESRON 2, COMDESRON  
4, CINC 4TH FLEET  
MAKASSAR BASE, BALIKPAPAN BASE  
and Naval General Staff.

If this proves to be COMCRUDIV 7's message, it indicates his destination as Truk after leaving Java Sea.  
(GT#649 OPNAV 132028-TI)



AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 261 (Cont.)

It was noted:

It has been reported that CRUDIV 7 would probably join forces under CINC 8TH FLEET. TI has indicated that CRUDIV 7 was in Ambon Area 12 August. No further progress has been noted.

This message may have been originated by COMCRUDIV 7, from whom no message has been copied since his serial 224 on July 25.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 72)

No. 262

Unidentified Fleet Unit addressed in care CRUDIV 7 and is probably extra ship operating with CRUDIV 7. (COM 14 131908-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 73)

Cruiser Division Six was somewhere in the vicinity of Rabaul, and it was apparent that the AOBA was now its Flagship.

No. 263

Series of 5 despatches including 1 3-parter was originated by COMCRUDIV 6 using cover call between 1800

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 263 (Cont.)

10 August and 1500/12 August, Serials  
259 to 268. Addressees included CINC  
COMBINED FLEET, CINC 8TH  
CINC 1ST (?), Naval Secretary  
Rabaul BASE FORCE  
KIYOKAWA MARU, MIKAZUKI  
COMCRUDIV 18, Kavieng BASE FORCE  
and Fleet Tanker  
(BEL 130714-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 64)

No. 264

Rabaul broadcast traffic  
for COMCRUDIV 6 to the AOBA  
on 5375 Kcs. at 1800/12th. AOBA  
now apparently Flagship CRUDIV 6.  
(BEL 130714-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 65)

The Staff Communication Officer of Cruiser  
Division Eighteen, in which the TATSUTA operated, was  
thought to be aboard a unit of Destroyer Squadron Four.

No. 265

Staff Communication Officer CRUDIV  
18 seen aboard tentative destroyer  
with TATSUTA addressed separately.  
(COM 14 130912-TI)

It was noticed:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 265 (Cont.)

On August 12 COMCRUDIV 18 and 5TH SPECIAL LANDING FORCE associated in a despatch from Rabaul which indicated, according to TI, this CRUDIV still functioning. TATUTA is believed in CRUDIV 18. is believed a DD in DESDIV 8 in DESRON 4.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 40)

No. 266

Rabaul Radio worked TATUTA AOBA, Fleet Unit (who took traffic addressed Commander and ), suspected destroyer in DESDIV of DESRON 4 (who took traffic from COMCRUDIV 18). (COM 14 130918-TI)

It was observed:

is identified here as KAKO.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 41)

Destroyer Division Twenty-nine was associated with Cruiser Division Eighteen, and Cruiser Division Six was associated with Kavieng. It was noticeable that Destroyer Squadron Six had not been observed in radio traffic since the end of July.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 267

DESDIV 29 associated prominently with COMCRUDIV 18 from Rabaul Area originators and COMCRUDIV 6 continues association with Kavieng Area, but COMDESRON 6 has not been seen since July 30th under Tulagi cover. (COM 14 130912-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 2 August BEL TI stated, "from traffic routings and associations neither CinCs 8TH FLEET or 4TH FLEET appear to be in command of OUTER AREA SOUTHERN FORCE, may possibly be COMDESRON 6".  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 37)

No. 268

Still no signs of COMDESRON 6 in traffic. (COM 14 131908-TI)

It was remarked:

COM 14 TI 31 July placed COMDESRON 6 under Tulagi cover.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 75)

Destroyer Squadron Three continued its association with Cruiser Division Seven, both of which were believed to be between Makassar and Ambon.

No. 269

COMDESRON 3 using cover call originated Serial #588 at 1930/11th

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 269 (Cont.)

August to CINC PHILIPPINE FLEET  
Info: CINC COMBINED FLEET and  
COMCRUDIV 7.

Serial #587 at 1000/11th August from  
COMDESRON 3 was addressed to CINC COM-  
BINED 1ST, 3RD  
and 8TH FLEETS; COMCRUDIV 7  
AMBON BASE FORCE (and  
unidentified, Info: to garbled  
(DESDIV (?)). May indi-  
cate units DESRON 3 are in Ambon Area  
some of which may possibly be in company  
CRUDIV 7. (BEL 130759-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 68)

No. 270

COMDESRON 3 addressed  
COMCRUDIV 7, CINC NEI  
Info: CINC COMBINED, COMDESDIV  
MAKASSAR BASE at  
0110/12th August. (GT#650 OPNAV 132028-TI)

It was mentioned:

COMDESRON 3 and COMCRUDIV 7 has been  
associated and believed between Makassar  
and Ambon 12 August.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 70)

A destroyer in Destroyer Division Four an-  
nounced that it was leaving the Sasebo and entering  
the Kure Communication Zone, while Destroyer Division  
Seventeen, less one or two units, reported that it  
would arrive at Rabaul at 1500 on August 17 (?).

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 271

FROM: #066 Aug.12/1500  
TO : (Comdr.DD in DESDIV 4)  
(Tokyo)  
(Sasebo)  
(Kure Radio)  
(AKAGI PLANE GROUP)  
(KAGA PLANE GROUP?)  
INFO: (Staff Comm. Officer  
DESRON 10).  
(Staff Comm. Officer  
1ST AIR FLT.)

"Left Sasebo Communication Zone and  
entered Kure Communication Zone."  
(GZ#2450 OPNAV 132042-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 36)

No. 272

FROM: #466 Aug.12/1300  
(Any Japanese Sta.  
Concealed Ident.Call)  
TO : (8TH FLEET)  
INFO: (BASE FORCE #8 at Rabaul)  
(ISOKAZE DD in DESDIV 17)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
FROM: COMDESDIV 17

This division less ISOKAZE  
will - - - the morning of 17th?  
- - - and arrive Rabaul at 1500 the same  
day. (\*) Destroyer whose call is  
(GZ#2456 OPNAV 132228-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 74)

Some merchant ship or ships were about to come  
to Rabaul for the YUKAZE was ordered to escort duty.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 273

COMDESDIV 17 as concealed originator of Communication Zone report, serial 464, at 1300, 12th, indicates that command enroute Saipan to Rabaul via Truk. (BEL 131000-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 48)

No. 274

COMDESDIV 17 and COMDESDIV 4 being included in dispatches from Rabaul indicating approach of these DESDIVS to Rabaul area.  
(GT#648 OPNAV 131835-TI)

It was stated:

OUTSIDE SOUTH SEAS FORCE order #11, serial 280, 12 August stated "DESDIV 12 will \_\_\_\_\_ at PS \_\_\_\_\_ on 14th August ? \_\_\_\_\_ will fuel at PT". (PT is Truk and PS is Saipan). On 11 August COMDESDIV \_\_\_\_\_ of DESRON 10 appears to be in Truk Communication Zone.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 36)

The Commander of Destroyer Division Four arrived at Palao from Saipan, and a unit of the Second Escort Force was ordered to escort a ship to Rabaul.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 275

FROM: (11th AIRON) #855  
TO : (YUKAZE (?))  
INFO: (CRUDIV 6)  
(8TH FLEET)  
(Unidentified)

"Return Rabaul escorting \_\_\_\_\_."  
(BEL 130423-DI)

It was commented:

YUKAZE is apparently on escort duty between TRUK and Kavieng and has been most recently associated with CRUDIV 6 and Maru air tender.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 33)

No. 276

Movement Report, Serial 179 at 183012 August from COMDESDIV 4 using cover call \_\_\_\_\_ apparently report of arrival at Palao since this Division indicated as going from Saipan to Palao on 9th. (BEL 130759-TI)

It was declared:

COMDESDIV 4 was indicated in Yokosuka as late as 4 August and was noted in Saipan Area 7 August. On 9 August COMDESDIV 4 was action addressee from Naval General Staff which seemed to indicate DESDIV 4 would go to Truk or join the 8TH FLEET.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 47)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 277

FROM: #261, 1710, Aug. 12  
(COMDR #8 BASE FORCE  
at Rabaul)  
TO : (Comdr. Unit in #2  
ESCORT FORCE)  
INFO: (Comdr. Armed Guard  
aboard a Maru)  
(?)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH  
FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 8TH  
FLEET)  
(Comdr. AZUMA MARU)

"R" Area DEFENSE FORCE Order # \_\_\_\_\_:  
After \_\_\_\_\_ is to proceed to PT. Head-  
quarters of 4TH FLEET and of 2ND ESCORT  
FORCE arrange escort for ( \_\_\_\_\_ ship)  
to RR. (GZ#2440 OPNAV 130327-DI)

It was indicated:

PT is Truk; RR is Rabaul.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 73)

The Eighth Fleet and the First and Second Air  
Fleets were actively associated on this day. It was  
noted also that the Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet  
was still split between Rabaul and Tinian.

No. 278

Several instances of association  
between 8TH FLEET AND 2ND and 1ST AIR  
FLEETS. (COM 14 131912-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 63)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 279

Staff 11TH AIR FLEET still split between Rabaul and Tenian with Administration at Tenian. (COM 14 131912-TI) (Summary, 140600, August, No. 57)

Extensive activity by the Fourth Air Attack Group and the Fourteenth Air Group indicated that they were about to leave the Marshall Islands for Rabaul. The Sixth Air Attack Corps was also ordered into this area:

No. 280

4TH AIR ATTACK CORPS and 14TH AIR GROUP extensively addressed by Air Commanders and Units in Area South of Truk and by Staff 11TH AIR FLEET. Strong possibility these units will soon depart Marshalls Area for Rabaul. (COM 14 131908-TI)

It was mentioned:

The 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE has been located in the Marshalls for some time.

The 14TH AIR GROUP is believed based at Gasmata.

(Summary, 140600, August, No. 45)

No. 281

(11TH AIR FLEET), serial 355,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 281 (Cont.)

of 10th, to 6TH AIR ATTACK CORPS as follows in free translation:

"6TH AIR ATTACK CORPS, less two units, will proceed to Tenian, Commander 6TH AIR ATTACK, with members of Staff, will proceed to Rabaul (or order some one to proceed to Rabaul). He will further transport to Rabaul using several groups of Kisarazu planes (this group is something belonging to KISARAZU AIR transported in aircraft. Suggest paratroops). On the first day they will depart Tenian for Truk. On the second day they will proceed to Rabaul and on the same day the planes will return to Truk."  
(COM 14 130506-DI)

It was noted:

BELCONNEN and OPNAV versions of this translation appeared in R. I. Summary 110600/Q August, page 10-11, items 34-35.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 82)

No. 282

At 1630/12th COMCARDIV 2 addressed 6TH AIR ATTACK, Info: General Staff and Chiefs of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET and 11TH AIR FLEET; since Commander 6TH AIR ATTACK is indicated as being in Area near Tenian suspect destination of CARDIV 2 is Rabaul Area via Tenian.  
(COM 14 131914-TI)

1300

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 282 (Cont.)

It was noticed:

Believe this despatch is same one as reported in GZ#2462 - See Item 25. The only difference is the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE for which is unidentified and may garble and (1ST AIR FLEET) for unidentified which may be a garbled call. the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE normally defends the Ominato-Chichijima-Marcus Area. Parts of the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE have been sent to Rabaul with part of the Staff at Tenian since CINC 11TH AIR went to Rabaul. (Summary, 140600, August, No. 24)

Japanese carriers were quite busy on this day, and associations of the Commander of Carrier Division Two suggested the possibility that the ZUIHO was in Sasebo for overhaul:

No. 283

Carriers active on 13 August. FIRST AIR FLEET shown to include:

Identified as Ammunition  
Ship by HYOP on 2 Aug.  
"1st 'KUSA' Base Force"  
) ('KUSA'  
not understood)

Unident  
CRUDIV 7  
Unident  
(GT#646 OPNAV 131650-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No.8)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 284

COMCARDIV 2 addressed  
MARU which is in Truk Com-  
munication Zone, Info CofS Yokosuka,  
Naval General Staff, CofS COMBINED  
SUBFORCE and CofS  
unidentified Fleet. Subject  
not apparent. (GT#648 OPNAV 131835-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 16)

No. 285

COMCARDIV 2 appeared aboard  
HITAKA at 1600, 12th, and sub-  
sequent traffic headings associate HAYATAKA  
, ZUIHO but exempted RYUJO  
from collective in two despatches  
indicating possibility this carrier is in  
Navy Yard for overhaul.  
(COM 14 130912-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 15)

No. 286

ZUIHO shown to be at Sasebo, 13  
August. (GT#648 OPNAV 131835-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 17)

No. 287

ZUIHO still indicated at Sasebo.  
(COM 14 131928-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 29)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet, who was thought to be also the Commander of Carrier Division One, ordered various air units to reinforce several Japanese carriers,

No. 288

Absence of COMCARDIV 1 from originated traffic lends credence to possibility CinC 1ST AIR FLEET also commands CARDIV 1.  
(COM 14 130914-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 10)

No. 289

Comdr. 1ST AIR FLEET worked ZUIHO and unident direct on 5910 Kcs. Flagship 1ST AIR FLEET not determined, but ship takes traffic from shore for Communication Officer 1ST AIR, RYUJO, SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU. Plane Groups all concerned but unable determine whether any are embarked.  
(GT#646 OPNAV 131650-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 11)

No. 290

FROM: #289 Aug. 10/1720  
(Commander in Chief, 1ST AIR FLT.)  
TO : (CARDIV 2) (RYUJO, HITAKA, HAYATAKA)  
(CARDIV 1) (ZUKAKU, SHOKAKU)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 290 (Cont.)

TO : (ZUIHO)  
(SORYU PLANE GROUP)  
(AKAGI PLANE GROUP)  
(KAGA PLANE GROUP)  
(CARRIER PLANE GROUP)  
(SHOKAKU PLANES)  
INFO: (CARRIER PLANE GROUP --)  
(CARDIV 2) (Staff Comm.  
Officer.)

(Not completely recovered but believe reads about as follows: "FROM: Commander-in-Chief, First Air Fleet.

Wish to carry out immediately plane shifts to (SHOKAKU ZUIKAKU and RYUJO as follows:

( - ZUIHO or HAYATAKA) transfer \_\_\_\_\_ planes to SHOKAKU  
\_\_\_\_\_ transfer 6 planes to ZUIKAKU  
ZUIHO transfer 3 planes to RYUJO  
( HAYATAKA?) transfer \_\_\_\_\_ planes to RYUJO  
( - HITAKA?) transfer 2 planes to RYUJO  
( HITAKA transfer 3 planes to SHOKAKU and 1 plane to ZUIKAKU  
( ZUIKAKU transfer 2 planes to SHOKAKU

It was observed:

The answer to the question of "Why does the ZUIKAKU, who is getting planes from the other carriers, transfer 2 of them to the SHOKAKU?", may be that SHOKAKU is

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 290 (Cont.)

not where she can get them direct from the carrier making the transfer, but the ZUIKAKU is.

It is pointed out:

The above message is an indication that SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO are being readied for duty away from Empire.  
(GZ#2445 OPNAV 131845-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 15)

No. 291

Originator call not received, serial 289, at 1720, 10th addressed 1ST and 2ND CARDIVS and five Plane Groups.

"FROM: CINC 1ST AIR FLEET.

The replacement of planes for CARDIV or carrier, SHOKAKU, and CARDIV or carrier will be carried out generally as follows:

- 1) Carrier type plane  
From Plane Group \_\_\_\_\_ to ZUIHO  
\_\_\_\_\_ planes.
- From Plane Group \_\_\_\_\_ to SHOKAKU  
6 planes.
- From Plane Group \_\_\_\_\_ to ZUIKAKU  
3 planes. (One sentence garbled.)
- From \_\_\_\_\_ Plane Group to HITAKA  
/(1-6) planes.



AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 291 (Cont.)

2) Carrier type plane |:  
From Plane Group to ZUIHO --  
3 planes.  
From 2nd Plane Group above to SHOKAKU  
(3-6) planes.  
3) Carrier type plane |:  
From Plane Group to ZUIHO --  
6 planes."

It was remarked:

T.J. today indicates these carriers receiving planes possibly in Kure Area.  
(REL 130903-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 16)

Message from the Tokyo Military Stores Section to its representatives at Kure indicated that the carrier mentioned above were either at Kure, or were scheduled to arrive there.

No. 292

Tokio Military Stores Section  
originated serial 150, to Kure  
Military Stores Section and  
Kure Yards and Docks ( ), informa-  
tion Kure Chief of Staff  
Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET  
SHOKAKU }, ZUIKAKU  
HITAKA }, HAYATAKA } and  
aircraft address KISUNO. This dispatch  
evidently relative to Military Stores

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 292 (Cont.)

or installations for carriers involved and may indicate the presence at, or scheduled movement of these ships to Kure. (BEL 131000-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 17)

A deciphered dispatch indicated that the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU would be at Kure on August 13.

No. 293

FROM: (No originator) #273 9 August/1730  
TO : (less and )  
(A carrier Plane Group  
(Comdr) ZUIKAKU)  
(AKAGI Plane Group  
(Comdr)  
(Carrier Plane Group  
SHOKAKU)  
(SORYU Plane Group)  
(KAGA Plane Group Comdr)  
INFO: (COMBINED FLEET (Chief  
of Staff))

SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU will depart for Kure on 13th at 0800. --- (remainder gives schedule through 16th, but we are unable to recover details as yet. However, we still try)---  
(GZ#2444 OPNAV 131430-DI)

It was stated:

On August 12 TI indicated these Carriers believed probably in home waters.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 12)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

In view of the heavy traffic involving carriers and various air groups which were providing reinforcements, it was safe to suggest that the SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO were being prepared for duty outside Empire waters:

No. 294

Traffic associations give impression that Plane Groups are assembling aboard CARDIV 2 which will consist of HITAKA flagship and HAYATAKA with ZUIHO replacing RYUJO (COM 14 130920-TI)

It was commented:

OPNAV on 26 July suggested this lineup for CARDIV 2. BEL on 4 August indicated this lineup for CARDIV 2 and included Plane Groups i.e. AKAGI, SORYU, and an unknown Plane Group respectively. (Summary, 131400, August, No. 13)

No. 295

Comdr 3RD AIR ATTACK (in his high command capacity) addressed several messages to carriers and detachments of CARDIV 2 at Tateyama Air , 3RD AIR ATTACK collective less FUJIKAWA MARU , Info various air activities, bases and CofS 5TH FLEET,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 295 (Cont.)

indicating that redistribution of aircraft is taking place, and probably that some units of 3RD AIR ATTACK are being transferred to carriers or are being prepared as replacements.

(GT# 646 OPNAV 131650-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 22)

It was noticed that the Commanders of the Air Fleet, and the Commander of Carrier Division Two had begun to scramble the serial numbers of their messages for the purposes of security:

No. 296

AIR FLEET Command and COMCARDIV 2 have apparently begun scrambling message serials.

(COM 14 130920-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 9)

The Commander of Carrier Division Two expressed a desire to send fifteen shipboard bombers, fighters and dive bombers to the Marcus Islands. The Japanese were stimulated into action at this time by the diversionary attacks of the U.S.S. BOISE. Details of some of their reinforcements were as follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 297

#943 Aug. 13/1300  
FROM: (Staff. Comm. Officer  
3RD AIR ATT. FORC.)  
TO : (Comdr. CARDIV 2)  
(Comdr. HITAKA (CARRIER))  
(Comdr. HAYATAKA  
(Carrier))  
INFO: (COMDR. ZUIHO (Carrier))  
(CofS 1ST AIR FLEET)  
(Kure Chief of Staff)  
(CofS COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdr. AKAGI PLANE GROUP)  
(Comdr. SORYU PLANE GROUP)  
(Comdr. CARRIER PLANE  
GROUP)  
(Comdr. CARRIER PLANE  
GROUP)  
(Yokosuka Chief of Staff)

From: ( - CARDIV 2?) Detachment  
Commander.

At 1200 the "Remaining Forces" will  
proceed to (Composition of  
"Remaining Forces" is as follows:

<u>Type of Plane</u>	<u>HITAKA</u>	<u>HAYATAKA</u>	<u>ZUIHO</u>
Fighters	13	11	10
Bombers	15	15	9
Dive Bombers	9	11	--

Believe  
that Commander KISARATSU AIR GROUP is  
currently at Marcus.  
(GZ#2461 OPNAV 132342-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 18)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 298

FROM: #029 Aug.12/1630  
TO : (CARDIV 2)  
INFO: ( ? )  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
(Yokosuka Chief of Staff)  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff (?))  
(Chief of Staff 11TH  
AIR FLEET)

Wish to send the "Remaining Forces"  
of this division (15 each of shipboard  
bombers, fighters and dive bombers) to  
( ) \* area - - - - -

(\*) This has been identified as Marcus  
Island by Hypo but we are unable to  
check.

(GZ#2462 OPNAV 132342-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 25)

No. 299

FROM: #023 Aug. 12/1820  
TO : (Commander CARDIV 2)  
(CARDIV 2)  
Less: (RYUJO)  
(ZUIHO)  
(Comdr. AKAGI PLANE  
GROUP)  
(Comdr. SORYU PLANE  
GROUP)  
(Comdr. CARRIER PLANE  
GROUP)  
(Comdr. KAGA PLANE GROUP?)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 299 (Cont.)

INFO:

(Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
(Chief of Staff 11TH  
AIR FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 1ST AIR  
FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
(Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
(Kure Chief of Staff)  
(Yokosuka Chief of Staff)

( - CARDIV 2?) Order #3.  
- - - tomorrow, the 13th the detachment\*  
with its commander will move to (   
- place)\*\* and - - - the enemy  
striking Force. Detachment Commander will  
be changed to the \_\_\_\_\_ of the HITAKA.

(\* See GZ#2461 above.

(\*\*) Believe that activity occurring in  
GZ#2461, 2462, and 2463 above, see  
items 18, 25 & 28 in this summary,  
is direct result of BOISE diversion.

(GZ#2463 OPNAV 132342-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 28)

Two transport planes from the Third Air Group  
were flying to Saipan, and it was observed that the  
Third Air Group of forty-five fighters and six obser-  
vation planes was in Air Squadron Twenty-three. This  
squadron had been in the Dutch East Indies, but it

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

was now thought possible that it was being shifted  
to the Solomon Islands.

No. 300

#389 4 August/0800  
FROM: (Comdr Kisaratsu Air)  
TO : (TUU O) (MARU)  
INFO: (Comdr 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Comdr BASE FORCE #4 at  
Truk)  
(Staff Comm Officer  
(4TH FLEET)  
(Tokyo Bur Aeronautics)  
(Staff Comm Officer  
COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdr BASE FORCE #5  
at Saipan)  
(Yokosuka Comdt)  
(MARU)  
(Hahajima Air)  
(5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)

From: KISARAZU AIR GROUP. Two type-1  
transport (?) planes of 3RD AIR GROUP  
are headed for PS.  
(GZ#2446 OPNAV 131810-DI)

It was declared:

PS is Saipan.

In the organization of the 11TH AIR  
FLEET, the 3RD AIR GROUP of 45 fighters  
and 6 observation planes is included in  
AIRON 23: AIRON 23 appears in the D.E.I.-  
Ambon Area with possible shifts to rein-  
force the Solomon Area.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No.23)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

Some carrier plane groups at Kisaratsu were to be brought to Rabaul by an air tender of the Eleventh Air Fleet. One of these groups, the Bihoro Air, had been operating in the Horomushiro area.

The Commander of Misawa Air was at Gasmata; the Commander of Air Squadron Twenty-five was at Rabaul, and various associations indicated that the Commander of Kisaratsu Air Group and the Staff Communication Officer of Air Squadron Twenty-six were at Tinian.

No. 301

Air Unit and BIHORO AIR both addressed at Kisaratsu AIR TODAY. (COM 14, 131912-TI)

It was indicated:

The BIHORO AIR GROUP has been operating in the Horomushiro Area. AIR GROUP is expected to go to Rabaul Area in the near future. (Summary, 140600, August, No. 21)

No. 302

Routing and association indicate carrier-type plane groups at Kisaratsu. (BEL 131015-TI)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 302 (Cont.)

It was noted:

By TI it is believed that the plane group is at Kisaratsu and will proceed to the Rabaul Area via Kavieng aboard the MARU - Air-tender of the 11TH AIR FLEET.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 22)

No. 303

Commander AIR GROUP still  
at Kisaratsu Air at 0600/13 Aug.  
(GT#650 OPNAV 132028-TI)

It was noticed:

Plane Group was formerly a Carrier Group. TI has indicated it will go to Rabaul Area in the near future.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 20)

No. 304

Comdr Misawa Air at Gasmata  
at 1230, 13 August.  
(GT#644 OPNAV 131330-TI)

It was observed:

On August 12 Commander Misawa Air was, by TI, positively at Vunakunau.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 43)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 305

Routing and association indicate  
Commander AIRRON 25 at Rabaul.  
(BEL 131015-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 84)

No. 306

Routing and association indicate  
Commander KISARATSU AIR GROUP  
and Staff Communication Officer AIRRON  
26 at Tenian  
(BEL 131015-TI)

It was pointed out:

OPNAV refers to the Call as  
the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 23)

Close supervision of Japanese Army radio  
traffic brought results when a new message heading  
was noted for the first time. Tokyo and Rabaul were  
communicating directly on 18320 kilocycles instead  
of 9160 kilocycles as on the previous day.

No. 307

Considerable volume of Army traffic  
solid in todays file with  
KAKI composite group  
at Rabaul appearing for first time in  
heading. (BEL 131015-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 76)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 308

Tokyo to Rabaul direct on 18320  
kcs at 0300. (GT#644 OPNAV 131330-TI)

It was remarked:

On 12 August Rabaul and Tokyo were  
observed working each other direct on  
9160 kcs.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 5)

The Commander of the Truk Air Force announced  
that two scouting planes arriving at Rabaul had departed  
for Tulagi:

No. 309

12 August/1610  
FROM: (Truk Air) #087  
TO : (Yokosuka)  
(Yokosuka Air Activity)  
(Unidentified)  
(Unidentified)  
(YOKOHAMA AIR GROUP)  
(Hahajima Air)  
(BASE FORCE #5 at  
Saipan)  
(BASE FORCE #7 at  
Chichijima)  
INFO: (5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(BASE FORCE #8 at  
Rabaul)  
(Unidentified)  
(YOKOHAMA AIR)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 309 (Cont.)

The two scouting planes mentioned in my serial #40 arrived RR at 1450.  
(GZ#2447 OPNAV 131810-DI)

It was stated:

RR is Rabaul. Serial 40 referred to above is not in our files.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 44)

No. 310

FROM: (Comd. Truk Air) #078 Aug. 03/0930  
TO : (Comdt. Yokohama AIR  
GROUP)  
INFO: (Comdt. 14TH AIR CORPS?)  
(Staff Comm. Off.  
5TH AIR ATT FORC)

"At 09-- 2 flying boats left RR  
(Rabaul) for RXB (Tulagi)."  
(GZ#2451 OPNAV 132042-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 82)

The Eleventh Air Fleet on August 11 reported that heavy bombers had left Tinian for the Marcus Islands, and that a seaplane had been shipped to Rabaul for use aboard a cruiser. Another enemy flying boat was following the route between Truk and Imieji:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 311

FROM: #416 Aug. 11/0600  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
" replacement heavy bombers  
left Tenian for Marcus Island at \_\_\_\_\_  
hours today. (BEL 130520-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 26)

No. 312

FROM: #790 Aug. 12/2000  
(Rabaul Radio)  
TO : (Tokyo Bureau Ord.)  
INFO: (Yokosuka)  
(Saipan Head-Off of  
Nav. A/C Wks.)  
(Comdr. Kyokawa Maru)  
(Comdr. 8TH BASE FOR.,  
Rabaul)  
(CINC 8TH FLEET)

From #28 (?) Aircraft Assembly  
Plant. - - - will send 1 type Zero  
scout seaplane to RR (Rabaul) for

(KAKO)\*

(\* This is a CRUDIV 6 ship, but not yet  
a definite KAKO.

(GZ#2453 OPNAV 132042-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 66)

No. 313

FROM: #207 Aug. 12/ (?)  
(Air Base in Truk Gen'l  
Area)  
TO : (14TH AIR CORPS?)  
INFO: (6TH AIR ATTACK FOR.)  
(4TH AIR ATTACK FOR.)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
(4TH FLEET)  
(5TH AIR ATTACK FOR.)  
(BASE FOR.#4 at Truk)  
(BASE FOR.#6 at Jaluit)

319

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 313 (Cont.)

"One flying boat of 14TH AIR GROUP arrived PT (Truk) at 1306. Will take off for PYI (Imieji) at 0600 tomorrow, the 13th." (GZ#2439 OPNAV 130212-DI) (Summary, 130600, August, No. 50)

An enemy contact report stated that three Allied land planes had sighted, or were attacking, the TATSUTA which was thought to be near Lae in New Guinea:

No. 314

FROM: (TATSUTA) 13 August/1050  
TO : (Lae)  
(Unidentified)  
INFO: 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE  
COMCRUDIV 18

Abbreviated plain language contact reports which read, "3 large enemy land planes sighted (or attacking) at 1025 13th".

It was commented:

This heading tentatively places TATSUTA in New Guinea waters near Lae.  
(COM 14 130914-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 42)

TOP SECRET ULTRA  
R.I.P. 300

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 315

FROM: (KANO MARU) Urgent (KIN) #(?) Aug.13/(?)  
TO : CRUDIV 18 (Unidentified)  
(Lae AIR)  
INFO: 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE

(1 to 3) planes are attacking and  
pursuing.\* (BEL 131230-DI)

It was declared:

The KANO MARU arrived Kiska July  
31st, but apparently left for the Rabaul  
Area. ( probably garbled for  
TATSUTA) (Summary, 140600, August, No. 87)

A deciphered Japanese message disclosed that  
an Allied plane had discovered the enemy convoy which  
was carrying the Buna Occupation Force. It was evi-  
dent from this that the Japanese were guarding Allied  
radio channels very closely.

No. 316

FROM: (Rabaul) 0640, August 14.  
TO : (RZJ OCCUPATION FORCE)  
(8TH FLEET)  
(11TH AIRON)  
(8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul)



AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 316 (Cont.)

"At 05— a large enemy machine set out and discovering the BUNA OCCUPATION FORCE, made the following report:  
"Sighted convoy comprising 4 transports, 2 destroyers, 1 \_\_\_\_\_ gunboat, in position South 7°-10; Longitude \_\_\_\_\_°, 55' East." (BEL 130520-DI)

It was indicated:

RZJ is tentatively identified as Buna.

Visual reconnaissance data of this Jap Force is reported in despatch 0736Z/13 (NCR 3184) to OPNAV as: "7-10 S., 149-55 E., Course 225 degrees, at 2054Z/12."  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 88)

The usual convoy movements were noted on this day. The SATA indicated that it would arrive at Truk in the near future.

No. 317

SATA communicating with Truk Harbormaster \_\_\_\_\_/13 August, indicating early arrival that place.  
(GT#650 OPNAV 132028-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 52)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

One convoy was south of Formosa; a unit of the Eighth Fleet was departing from the north on its journey to the south; and an air tender of the Eleventh Air Fleet was carrying aircraft equipment for the Fifth and Sixth Air Attack Forces in the Rabaul area:

No. 318

Movement of Convoy south of Formosa indicated in dispatch from CofS PHILIPPINE FLEET, Action CofS SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET N.E.I. FORCE, ESCORT FORCE COMBINED 3RD, Bako, Sama, Davao, Taihoku, Tarao Convoy Central and Naval General Staff at 2030, 12 August. (GT#648 OPNAV 131835-TI) (Summary, 131400, August, No. 28)

No. 319

Association indicated (MAYA ?) will depart from North to proceed southward in near future probably to join 8TH FLEET. (COM 14 131912-TI)

It was mentioned:

identified as a Fleet Unit associated with the 8TH FLEET. (Summary, 140600, August, No. 33)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 320

Believe MARU will proceed from Kisaratsu to Rabaul Area via Kavieng with aircraft equipment for 5TH and 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCES, possibly transporting part of plane group , and escorted by DDs and (GT#639 OPNAV 130028-TI)

It was noted:

is an air-tender of 11TH AIR FLEET. It was noticed in Yokosuka Area about 6 August; Ominato 8 August and is now shown at Kisaratsu Air Station. (Summary, 130600, August, No. 29)

An urgent dispatch from a Maru in the Kure-Sasebo area indicated a possible sighting of Allied forces in that region:

No. 321

Urgent despatch from MARU at 1400/12th, Serial #177 to Comdts. Kure and Sasebo plus Tokio RI , Info: All Ships and Stations Action addressees and wide distribution given this despatch suggests it concerns Info, possibly sighting enemy unit in Sasebo-Kure Area. (BEL 130714-TI) (Summary, 140600, August, No. 35)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis indicated that a Maru and a Hospital Ship were about to leave the Empire for Truk:

No. 322

Routing and association indicate MARU will proceed Truk Area from Empire. (BEL 131015-TI)

It was noticed:

On 18 July by associations the MARU placed at Kure destination Truk. (Summary, 140600, August, No. 40)

No. 323

Routing and association indicate MARU Hospital Ship enroute Yokosuka to Truk via Saipan by heading of Communication Zone Report. (BEL 131015-TI)

It was observed:

August 7th routing and association indicated that the MARU Hospital Ship was in the Yokosuka Area. (Summary, 140600, August, No. 60)

Another Maru left Truk for Saipan, and one associated with the Sixth Base Force also left Truk for Jaluit, to which several other Marus were headed.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 324

Routing and association indicate  
MARU enroute Truk to Saipan.  
(BEL 131015-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 59)

No. 325

#7 11 August/0640  
FROM: (MARU associated with 6TH  
BASE FORCE)  
TO : (DESDIV 18)  
(Jaluit Radio)  
(Truk Radio)  
INFO: (D.E.I. FORCE)

At 0730, in company with the #7 KYO  
MARU, we left the #4 Communication Zone  
and entered the #6 Communication Zone.  
Frequency: 3161 kcs.  
(GZ#2449 OPNAV 131810-DI)

It was pointed out:

DI on 20 July stated, " \_\_\_\_\_  
with #7 KYO MARU arrived Ponape at 1100,  
July 20.

#4 Communication Zone is believed  
Truk Comm. Zone.

#6 Communication Zone is believed  
Jaluit Comm. Zone.

(Summary, 131400, August, No. 29)

No. 326

At 1030, 12 August, Chief of Staff  
4TH FLEET addressed Chief of

326

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 326 (Cont.)

Staff 2ND                      1ST AIR  
info Destroyer      in DESDIV 29, MARU  
and                      \*Comdr KAYUYOKONU  
FORCE\* --- not understood and possibly  
garbled. Destroyer and MARU shown to be  
in Saipan Communication Zone.  
(GT#644 OPNAV 131330-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 35)

No. 327

MARU                      in Saipan Area headed  
for Jaluit. (COM 14 131912-TI)

It was remarked:

MARU                      was shown to be in  
Saipan Communication Zone at 2030/12  
August.  
(Summary 140600, August, No. 39)

Positive identification of the convoy carrying  
Air Squadron Eleven to southern waters was made, and  
two Marus connected with the Eleventh Air Fleet were  
noticed. One was heading for Yokosuka and the other  
departing therefrom for Kavieng:

No. 328

Tokyo sent several messages and  
called following stations several times  
on regular      Broadcasts; MARUS

327

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 328 (Cont.)

DD in DESRON 2  
DD in ESCORT FORCE  
KAMIKAWA MARU and Takao Air  
Station; this group solid,  
inclusion of KAMIKAWA MARU indicates  
this might be convoy carrying AIRRON 11  
to Southern Area. (COM 14 131914-TI)

It was stated:

Broadcast is comparable to our  
FOX schedules. MARU entered the  
Ominato Communication at 1600/2nd August  
MARU despatch #73 Aug. 8th states  
"Scheduled to depart 12 August for Kiska."  
KAMIKAWA MARU, Serial #894, 11th  
August: "This ship at present loading  
planes at Yokosuka and will depart (?)  
the 23rd ----- cruising schedule (?)  
from Yokosuka to RR (Rabaul)."  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 3)

No. 329

#153 Aug. 11/(?)  
FROM: (NITCHO MARU IN 11TH  
AIR FLT.)  
TO : (Cofs 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Yokosuka Cofs)  
INFO:

"Departing for Yokosuka on 12th."  
(GZ#2434 OPNAV 130112-DI)

It was commented:

The NITCHO MARU left Jaluit about  
July 28.  
(SUMMARY, 130600, August, No. 30)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 330

FROM: #086 Aug. 13/1300  
(MARU in 11TH AIR FLT.)  
TO : (CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdr. 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Maizuru)  
INFO: (Comdr. 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORC.)  
(Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK  
FOR.)  
(Comdr. BASE FORCE #8  
at Rabaul)  
(Comdr. BASE FORCE at  
Kavieng)  
(Yokosuka Chief of Staff)

"Departing Yokosuka (?) for RO  
(Kavieng?) today, the 13th at 1300.  
Scheduled to arrive RO about 1500 on 19th"  
(GZ#2459 OPNAV 132228-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 37)

A convoy, including two tankers, had arrived  
at Rabaul for the AZUMA MARU announced its presence  
there, as did the Commander of a Maru Armed Guard:

No. 331

FROM: #419, August 12.  
(Cover Origin Call)  
TO : (8TH FLEET)  
INFO: (4TH FLEET)

"From Commander SUPPORTING FORCE (?).  
Passed to CRUDIV 18. AZUMA MARU arrived  
Rabaul." (BEL 130423-DI)



AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 331 (Cont.)

It was declared:

The AZUMA MARU appeared to be part of a convoy which included the tankers SATA and . The AZUMA MARU apparently operated as a transport in the "SN" operation.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 32)

No. 332

FROM: (MARU-Comdr. Armed  
Grd. aboard a MARU)  
TO : (Tokyo Navy Minister)  
(Yokosuka Comdt.)  
(Tokyo Trans. Section)  
INFO: (CINC 4TH FLT.)  
(CINC 8TH FLT.)  
(?)  
(Comdr. 8TH BASE FOR.)

"Arrived RR (Rabaul) 1300 - - - - -.  
{GZ#2452 OPNAV 132042-DI)  
{Summary, 140600, August, No. 79)

A deciphered message from the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Netherlands East Indies Force indicated that a Maru carrying the Yokosuka #3 Special Landing Force would leave for Rabaul some time after August 12.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 333

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ #406 Aug. 09/1610  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (Dutch EAST INDIES F.R.)  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (COMBINED FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (CRUDIV 7)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (DESRON 3 in 1ST FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (DESDIV 2 in DESRON 2)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (DESDIV 15 in DESRON 2)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (#10 BASE FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (MARU)

From Chief of Staff of GKF (NEI FORCE).

The #2 ( \_\_\_\_\_ - MARU) carrying the Yokosuka #3 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE will depart Ambon \_\_\_\_\_ for RR (Rabaul) about \_\_\_\_\_ (- date) (later than 12 August). \_\_\_\_\_ 10TH BASE FORCE provide escort.  
(GZ#2465 OPNAV 132344-DI)

It was indicated:

10TH BASE FORCE IS BASED AT Ambon.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 86)

A tender of the Eleventh Air Fleet was observed to be at Yokosuka on August 11, and a sub-tender of the CHOGEI Class announced its arrival at Truk on August 13. The KAMOI, and air tender, was en route from Kwajalein to Rabaul.

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 334

11TH AIR FLEET Tender at  
Yokosuka. (COM 14 131912-TI)

It was mentioned:

Shown at Yokosuka on the 11th also.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 30)

No. 335

#270 Aug. 13/1030  
FROM: (Comdr. Sub-Tender,  
          CHOGEI Class)  
TO : (SUB FORCE COMDR.)  
INFO: (4TH FLEET)

"Arrived PT. (Truk)."  
(GZ#2458 OPNAV 132 228-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 51)

No. 336

KAMO I originated serial  
427, at 0630, 12th, apparently Communi-  
cation Zone report indicating that  
vessel enroute from Kwajalein Area  
to Rabaul. Movement  
Report #428, by same vessel, at 0630,  
12th is also indicative of this move-  
ment. (BEL 131000-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 50)

Several unidentified Japanese units were operat-  
ing along the supply line from the Empire to the  
Solomons area. Partially deciphered messages gave

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

hints as to their future operations: The [redacted] and the [redacted] left the Yokosuka area and entered that of Saipan; the [redacted] stated that it would not proceed to Davao, and the [redacted] announced that it would arrive at Truk around the fourteenth. A message from [redacted] was thought to deal with future arrangements for berthing or supplying an enemy Task Force including battleships, carriers and destroyers; and a man-of-war which had been formerly associated with the CHOKAI, announced its departure from the Empire for Rabaul.

No. 337

FROM: (Unidentified) #514, August 2.  
TO : (4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Saipan Radio)  
(Yokosuka)

"At [redacted] will leave Yokosuka Communication Zone and enter #5 (Saipan) Communication Zone." (GZ#2437 OPNAV 130112-DI)  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 48)

No. 338

FROM: (Unidentified) #184  
TO : (Yokosuka)  
(Unidentified)  
(Saipan) August 12.

333

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 338 (Cont.)

At 1000, on 12th, will leave  
Yokosuka Communication Zone and enter  
#5 Communication Zone.  
(GZ#2443 OPNAV 130327-DI)

It was noted:

#5 Communication Zone apparently  
Saipan.  
(Summary, 130600, August, No. 49)

No. 339

FROM: (Unidentified) #491 Aug.12/(?)  
TO : Chief of Staff 3RD FLEET  
INFO: Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET  
Davao BASE FORCE

"Third \_\_\_\_\_ Serial \_\_\_\_\_. This  
FORCE? will omit proceeding to Davao."  
(Remainder unreadable).  
(BEL 130520-DI)

It was noticed:

On 10 August \_\_\_\_\_ was ordered to  
join 8TH FLEET.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 81)

No. 340

FROM: (Unidentified) #097 Aug.12/(?)  
TO : (Rabaul)  
INFO: (4TH)  
(#4 BASE FORCE)  
(Unidentified)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 340 (Cont.)

"Addressed to CINC 8TH, change  
8TH FLEET Order #11 to the \_\_\_\_\_  
(garbled) will arrive Truk about \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_/14th."  
(BEL 130959-DI)

It was observed:

On 12 August \_\_\_\_\_ (unidentified)  
was shown to be in Saipan Communication  
Zone.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 55)

No. 341

tentatively identified as at Truk  
addressed following:

(HARUNA)  
(KIRISHIMA)  
(KONGO)  
(ZUIKAKU)  
(KASUGA MARU)  
Destroyer  
Destroyer  
Unidentified  
Unidentified (possible tender)

Originator is not well substantiated  
as being at Truk. Suffix is not under-  
stood. Research to identify continues.  
(GT#645 OPNAV 131550-TI)

Ref. GT#645: Research indicates very  
probably Truk. Therefore subject  
message possibly deals with arrangements

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 341 (Cont.)

for berthing or supplying Battleship-Carrier-Destroyer Force, although it seems likely that a high command would be included as addressee of such a message. Research continues by GZ.  
(GT#647 OPNAV 131655-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 19)

No. 342

Unidentified Fleet Ship  
originated movement report at 1000/13th  
apparently departure from home waters  
for Rabaul. (GT#650 OPNAV 132028-TI)

It was pointed out:

This ship was associated with the CHOKAI on 20 and 23 July. It is considered a Man-of-war and destined for 8TH FLEET. It apparently did not go South with the CHOKAI. On 8 August BELCONNEN reported it left Maizuru. This departure seems to indicate it is enroute Rabaul at last.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 32)

A message to unidentified ordered it  
to proceed to Rabaul where a detachment of civil  
engineers from Truk was believed to be operating.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 343

"RR DETACHMENT" of Truk  
Civil Engineers noted.  
(GT#645 OPNAV 131550-TI)  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 34)

No. 344

FROM: #226 August 13/0730  
TO : (Rabaul)  
(?)  
(Sasebo Mv't. Report  
Office)

"- - - - \* proceed Rabaul."  
(\* (Presume this is to be carried out  
by  
(GZ#2454 OPNAV 132042-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 78)

A message from the Commander in Chief of the  
Combined Fleet mentioned two place designators which  
could not be identified at this time:

No. 345

FROM: #781 Aug. 11/(?)  
(CINC COMBINED)

(Unreadable) but mentions place designators RHJ and RHL. Believe this 1st appearance RH series. No clue on location.  
(BEL 130520-DI)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 345 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

Washington Unit translated this and got RHL and RH - See Item 37, Page 12, RI Summary 130600/Q August. (Summary, 140600, August, No. 80)

Submarine traffic decreased in volume on this day, but several messages indicated that the Commander of Submarine Squadron One was on the way from Yokosuka to the Rabaul-Solomons area:

No. 346

Submarine traffic noticeably down in volume. (COM 14 130918-TI) (Summary, 131400, August, No. 46)

No. 347

COMSUBRON 1 addressed his squadron and included usual bases from Chichijima to Rabaul suggesting his Squadron less will proceed from Empire to Southeast. (COM 14 130918-TI)

It was stated:

COMSUBRON 1 with SUBDIV of that squadron was, by traffic routing on 10 August, placed in Jaluit Area. On 3 August COM 14 indicated belief SUBRON 1 has two Divisions in Empire and one Division in 8TH FLEET Area. (Summary, 131400, August, No. 47)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 348

COMSUBRON 1 underway from Yokosuka for 8TH FLEET area via Saipan Area. Possibility SUBDIVS and in SUBRON 1 will accompany COMSUBRON 1 or will follow later to Southeast.  
(COM 14 131928-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 96)

An operational dispatch from Tokuyama gave rise to the suspicion that an Allied submarine was operating in this area. Another contact report indicated the probable presence of an Allied submarine in a different area:

No. 349

Tokuyama address originated Operational Despatch, Serial 328 at 1300 12th to MARU Info: Chief of Staff Yokosuka, Naval Minister Comdt. Kure and CINC COMBINED Reason for use Operational Type Code in this Area not clear unless due operations Allied submarine.  
(BEL 130714-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 34)

No. 350

No originator message reports a submarine at 07-50 N, 100-05 E. at 2000 on 13th. (GT#643 OPNAV 131330-DI)

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 350 (Cont.)

It was commented:

This has appearance of contact report and it is believed a contact of a Jap Unit with a U.S. Submarine.  
(Summary, 131400, August, No. 45)

Japanese submarines were noticed at Truk and in the New Britain-Solomons area:

No. 351

Routing and association indicate submarine Unit at Truk or in Truk Area. (BEL 131015-TI)

It was declared:

Sub Unit despatch #266 August 9 will depart Kwajalein at 1500 arriving Truk at 1900 13 August.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 93)

No. 352

COMSUBRON 7 reported sighting 1 enemy plane at 0830/12th.  
(BEL 131015-TI)

It was indicated:

SUBRON 7 operating in the New Britain-Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 94)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 353

Submarine positions:  
Staff Communication Officer SUBDIV  
SUE 3, in SUBRON 7, 163 East, 06 South,  
at 1200/Z, 13 August.  
(Sub ), of SUBRON 7, 161  
East, 04 South, at 0600/Z, 13 August.  
(SUBRON 6 - ) 164 East,  
05 South, at 0600/Z, 13 August.  
(COM 14 131928-TI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 95)

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the  
Pacific Fleet for August 13 read as follows:

No. 354

FROM: CINCPAC 130307  
TO : COMSOPAC 13 AUGUST 1942  
COMNORWESTSEAFRON  
COMWESTSEAFRON  
COMHAWSEAFRON  
COMPASEAFRON  
COMINCH  
CDRS ALL TF PAC  
COMSWPACFOR

FROM CINCPAC. COMINCH GIVE TO OPNAV AND  
COMNAVFORCES EUROPE.

NCR 2935 J

BULLETIN NO. 150

SHOKAKU, HAYATAKA, RYUJO, ZUIHO,  
HITAKA (ALL CARRIERS) ARE IN SOUTHERN  
JAPAN. KASUGA MARU ESCORTED BY DESDIV 7  
ARRIVING EMPIRE SHORTLY. ZUIKAKU

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 354 (Cont.)

BELIEVED IN COMPANY WITH OTHER CARRIERS.  
PRESENT INDICATIONS KAMIKAWA MARU STILL  
AT YOKOSUKA BUT WILL LEAVE FOR NEW  
BRITAIN SHORTLY. KASEIMA BELIEVED STILL  
AT KUPE. BY D/F SUBMARINES ALL SOUTH  
AND EAST: 6-165; 10-167; 7-166; 9-168.

An interesting dispatch of July 7 from the  
Japanese Ambassador in Chile to Tokyo was translated  
on this day. It described the efforts of Japanese  
agents in South America to keep Chile neutral:

No. 355

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) #457, July 7  
TO : Tokyo.  
(Two parts complete)  
(Strictly secret. To be handled  
in superintendent's code).

Of course we should retain our preroga-  
tives as a belligerent; however, at the  
same time I think we should view this coun-  
try's attitude with sympathy considering  
the position it is in. That I believe to  
be the best way to keep her neutral. At  
the time of the government's statement not  
long ago those were the lines along which  
I argued with the Foreign Minister, and I  
see no other plan for us to pursue for the  
moment. The United States is continuing  
her agitation here more than ever: (1) She  
is spreading propaganda among the people,

AUGUST 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 355 (Cont.)

particularly among the Communists; (2) she is stirring up the Leftists, among which are many students; (3) she is bringing economic pressure to bear, and (4) the American Ambassador is harassing the government.

Washington is remiss along none of those four lines and this puts the Government of Chile in a frightfully difficult predicament. The reason why this country is still maintaining neutrality is primarily because she is not yet totally strangled economically. (I might mention, however, that while in June there were 98 million litres of gasoline, in July there were only 78 million.) Then too, the war is going favorably for the Axis.

Now let me suggest to you something which I think would be the best policy to help along in making Chile stay neutral. I believe that our Navy should, in the sea south of Panama (with the exception of territorial waters of Chile), sink American warships. You know we have got to shut the mouths of people here who argue that Japan's energy was sapped at the Coral Sea, at Midway and in the Aleutians, and that consequently she cannot attack the Pacific coast of South America.

I can see no other recourse, so will you please arrange to carry out this measure immediately.

(GZ#5860                      OPNAV 132228-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 4)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 133 (cont.)

It was pointed out:

is identified by OPNAV  
as 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 120600, August, No. 18)

No. 134

#926 Aug. 10/0800  
FROM: (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (Unidentified)  
(Unidentified)

"21 heavy bombers and 2 transport  
planes at Kisaratsu Air departed from  
\_\_\_ for Tenian at 0800."

#416 Aug. 10/1620  
FROM: (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)

"21 heavy bombers and 2 transport  
planes arrived Tenian at 1530, and  
will depart for Vunakanau at 0700,  
tomorrow 11th."  
(BEL-102032-DI) (MEMO#11-2)  
(Summary, 11400, August, No. 39)

Although there was very little activity in the  
Mandates, there were some indications that the units  
of the Fourth Air Attack Force would be withdrawn  
from the Marshalls and sent to the Solomons:

No. 135

Very little activity in Mandates,

AUGUST 14, 1942

Radio traffic on August 14 was comparatively light. The Third Air Attack Force in East Honshu and the commanders in the Rabaul area were most active. Rabaul finally established direct radio communications with Tokyo on a frequency of 4580 kilocycles:

No. 356

Comparatively light volume. East Honshu (3RD AIR ATTACK) and Southeastern (Rabaul) Area most active.  
(COM 14 141838-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 1)

No. 357

Rabaul Radio has now established direct radio communication with Tokyo, using 4580 kcs. Both stations employ same channel.  
(BEL 140730-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 64)

The Navy General Staff issued several dispatches to major commanders in the Solomons area:

No. 358

Navy General Staff originated several to Commander-in-Chief COMBINED, 2ND and 8TH FLEETS, 1ST and 11TH AIR FLEETS and SUBFORCE. (COM 14 140622-TI)  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 9)



AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was thought to be en route to the southern area, and frequent radio associations with him by the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet indicated that operations were being planned:

No. 359

Chiefs of Staff 2ND AIR, and 1ST AIR included in heading of 2 part despatch from COMAIRRON 25, indicating increased association those commands with operations in southern area.  
(Bel 140730-TI)

It was commented:

CINC 2ND FLEET appears enroute to Southern Area and was indicated in the Saipan Communication Zone Aug. 14th, at 2137. COMAIRRON 25 appears in the Rabaul Area. The CINC 1ST AIR FLEET appears in Empire Waters.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 33)

It appeared certain that Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three, which had frequently been associated with the base force at Makassar, Balikpapan, and Ambon, were now operating under the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 360

Comdr. MAKASSAR BASE FORCE originated one long despatch Serial 985, at 1230, 13th, addressed COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 3, and Comdrs. of DESDIVS 2 and 15 info CINC 3RD. During past few days CRUDIV 7 and DESRON 3 have repeatedly been associated with BASE FORCES at MAKASSAR, BALIKPAPAN, and AMBON and appear to be operating under CINC 3RD FLEET. (BEL 140730-TI) (Summary, 150600, August, No. 81)

No. 361

COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 3, DESDIVS of DESRON 2, and of DESRON 4, associated with Makassar. (COM 14 140626-TI)

It was decided:

The association of COMDESRON 3 and COMCRUDIV 7 with Makassar was noted previously, date and time of COMDESRON 3 despatch to COMCRUDIV 7, Cinc N.E.I. FORCE and info Cinc COMBINED, COMDESROV and Makassar Base, was 0110, 12 August. On 13 August COM 14 stated, "Nothing seen to change previous indications CRUDIV 7, DESRON 3, and KAGU MARU were heading Eastward toward Rabaul. Attention is called here to RI Summary 140600/Q August, item 72, and subsequent correction in RI Summary 141400/Q August, page 2, item 3, in connection with probability destination CRUDIV 7 and associated units. (Summary, 141400, August, No. 34)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 362

COMCRUDIV 7 is believed to be the concealed originator of Serial 280 at 1950. 13th, Addressed to CINC COMBINED  
2nd FLEET, THIRD FLEET  
and 1ST AIR FLEET; info  
TRUK BASE FORCE, Comdrs. of DES-  
RON 2, DESRON 3, and  
DESRON 4, Comdrs. BALIKPAPAN  
and MAKASSAR BASE FORCES,  
CINC 4TH and Vice Chief Naval  
General Staff (BEL 141045-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 78)

A partially deciphered dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet mentioned a scheduled arrival of unidentified units at Guadalcanal on the fifteenth:

No. 363

Serial 240 of 14th, just reached us and we cannot read much, but is from Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET, and mentions "scheduled arrive RXI on 15th." Lunga (on Guadalcanal) also may be mentioned. (GZ# 2488 OPNAV 142125-DI) (MEMO #14-3)

It was indicated:

RXI is Guadalcanal.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 62)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

Other dispatches originated by the Eighth Fleet discussed the departure of an occupation force from Rabaul to Gizo Island, which is located south of Bougainville in the Solomons:

No. 364

Two despatches of 8TH FLEET origin mention questionable Gizo of which first half is confirmed, followed by "Island" in one and "OCCUPATION FORCE" in second. Second gives data 14th which may possibly be date departure from Rabaul for Gizo Island. Despatches now being worked and will report further findings.  
(BEL 140800-DI) (MEMO #14-1)

It was mentioned:

Gizo Island is 08°-05' South, 156°-50' East, almost due South of Bougainville in Solomon Islands.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 31)

Communication between an authority, tentatively identified as the director-inspector of personnel, and several important units of a Japanese striking force was thought to refer to personnel assigned to the ships arriving in the Malay area:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 365

12 August/1350  
FROM: (Tentative Inspector  
Director Personnel at  
present in Saigon)  
TO : (Auxiliary  
(Ship of DESDIV  
(Ship of DESDIV  
(HARUNA)  
(KIRISHIMA)  
(KONGO)  
(ZUIKAKU)  
(KASUGA MARU)  
(of )

Suffix used after each addressee.  
Possibility of personnel assignments to  
units listed when and if they arrive Malay  
Area suggested, also Personnel Officer  
(Ship) for suffix appears likely.  
(COM 14 140624-TI)

It was mentioned:

This is believed the same message  
reported in RI Summary 131400/Q August,  
page 6, item 19.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 40)

No. 366

Despatch originated by address  
(referred to in OPNAV 131440 as )  
interpreted here as follows:  
tentatively identified as  
Director-Inspector Personnel now located  
in Saigon Area. Was in Truk during first  
part of May, returning Yokosuka middle

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 366 (Cont.)

May, later going south to Malay Area. Among addressees believed to be tanker or fleet auxiliary, and a unit in a minor command in SOUTH CHINA FLEET. Suffix may be Ship's Personnel Officer corresponding to Division Personnel Officer.

Assuming that originator is Personnel Officer in Saigon Area then this despatch suggests many possibilities. One assumption: That Naval personnel in this area available for units addressed who may be expected receive in that area.

In another despatch today, addressed INDIES FORCE and Medical Address in South China, information 4 principal Empire Personnel Bureaus. (COM 14 140238-TI) (Summary, 141400, August, No. 41)

It was thought that a battleship was leaving the Empire for a northern assignment:

No. 367

Several indications noted 12-13 August that tentative battleship moving out of Yokosuka to Northern Area. (GT#653 OPNAV 141545-TI) (Summary, 141400, August, No. 21)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division Six was still at Kavieng, but it was thought that possibly one ship of this organization had been sunk:

No. 368

CinC 8TH under Rabaul cover addressed CRUDIV 6 and SUBRON 7 collectively, CinC COMBINED FLEET and Operations Section General Staff. (COM 140626-TI)

It was noted:

On 13 August TI indicated COMCRUDIV 6 continued association with Kavieng. COM-SUBRON 7 with SUBDIV were indicated in Truk Zone on 10 August by traffic routing. (Sub ) of SUBRON 7, on 13 August by D/F, was in 161° E, 04° S. On 12 August (SUBRON 7) was an action addressee in a despatch which directed some submarine unit to proceed to RXF (Pavuvu Islands ?) believed close to Bougainville. (Summary, 141400, August, No. 30)

No. 369

An unidentified concealed originator at Rabaul originated Serial #237 at 1500 13 August addressed for action Naval Minister ; Info: CHOKAI COMCRUDIV 6 ), Chief of Naval Affairs , Tokio Personnel Office ) and Commanding Officer of the KAKO (?) shown aboard MARU . This taken as some indication that one ship of CRUDIV 6

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 369 (Cont.)

(possibly KAKO) has been sunk.  
(BEL 140928-TI)

It was noticed:

appears to be a MARU asso-  
ciated with the 4TH BASE FORCE (Truk).  
This MARU reported its arrival at Rabaul  
at 1300/12 August.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 75)

The Commanders of Destroyer Divisions Four and  
Seventeen were in the Rabaul area. Destroyer Division  
Four was escorting the IKKI Detachment, a specially  
trained occupation force:

No. 370

COMDESDIV 4 plus Destroyers  
and of DESDIV 4 in Rabaul Area.  
(BEL 141045-TI)

It was observed:

COMDESDIV 17 and COMDESDIV 4 were  
included in despatches from Rabaul which  
indicates these DESDIVS are approaching  
the Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 58)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 371

FROM: #164 Aug/8/0700  
TO : (Concealed Identity Call)  
(CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdr. 1ST AIR FLEET)  
(COMDESRON 10)  
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(Comdr. 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(CINC 8TH FLEET)  
(CINC 4TH FLEET)  
(5TH BASE FORCE Comdr., Saipan)  
FROM: COMDESDIV 4 (TATO 33)

( - DESDIV 4?) less -----  
and \_\_\_\_\_ (with the IKKI DETACHMENT on board) arrived at Omiyajima. Will depart for RR \_\_\_\_\_. (GZ #2486 OPNAV 142300-DI)

It was pointed out:

RR is Rabaul. Omiyajima is Guam. The IKKI (Army) DETACHMENT was first noted in association with DESDIV 4 on August 7th, while this division was in Saipan Communication Zone. Two suspected transports, BRAZIL MARU, and AKEBONO MARU, were indicated, by TI, to be in Saipan Zone at the same time. Possibly one of these vessels is carrying the IKKI DETACHMENT. It will be recalled that the mission of the IKKI DETACHMENT in the Midway Campaign was the occupation of Eastern Island. It may be, therefore, that this detachment may be specially trained or specially equipped, or both. The concealed originator for the above was possibly COMDESDIV 4 and the unit exempted might possibly have been \_\_\_\_\_ which appeared at Sasebo at this time.

(Summary, 150600, August, No. 41)

353

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

Destroyer Division Thirty announced its schedule of movements from Sasebo to Rabaul via Truk:

No. 372

FROM: (COMDESDIV 30) #365 Aug. 14  
TO : (CINC 8TH FLEET)  
INFO: (Staff Comm. Off. 8TH  
BASE FORCE, Rabaul)  
(Comdr. 4TH BASE FORCE,  
Truk)  
(Staff Communication  
Officer?)  
(Staff Comm. Officer  
7TH BASE FORCE,  
Chichijima)

Schedule of movements of this division is as follows:

Depart SASEBO and arrive PT  
the morning of the 19th, Leave PT - - - -  
The 21st - - - arrive R---.  
(GZ#2487 OPNAV 142305-DI)

It was stated:

Believe RR is meant instead of R.  
21st is not the date of arrival at RR. RR  
is Rabaul. PT is Truk. This division has  
been placed in Truk Area, by TI for some  
time. This is the first evidence of the  
presence of DESDIV 30 in the Empire. DES-  
DIV 30 is a unit of DESRON 6.  
(Summary, 150600; August, No. 24)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 373

FROM: #364 Aug. 14/1150  
TO : (Comdr. DESDIV 30)  
INFO: (CINC 8TH FLEET)  
(Staff Comm. Off. 8TH  
BASE FORCE, Rabaul)  
(CofS. COMBINED FLEET)

This division less \_\_\_\_\_ at 1200  
left Sasebo for RR - - - via PT.  
(GZ #2489 OPNAV 142305-DI)

It was commented:

See above schedule of movement of  
DESDIV 30. The DESDIV 30 unit exempted  
in the above departure report is possi-  
bly the MIKAZUKI; this unit of DESDIV  
30 was placed at 03 South, 152 East by  
D/F on August 12.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 25)

The AKIKAZE, which had been operating with the  
Fifth Air Attack Force, departed from Rabaul for a  
place tentatively identified as Buka Island:

No. 374

FROM: (AKIKAZE) #198 Aug. 7/0930  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)  
INFO: (5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(8TH BASE FORCE, Rabaul)  
(DESDIV 34)

Departed RR for RXC.  
(GZ#2493 OPNAV 142315-DI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 374 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

RR is Rabaul. RXC is tentatively Queen Carola Harbor, Buka Island. The AKIKAZE is a unit of DESDIV 34 and has been operating between Rabaul and RXC on practically a shuttle basis since August 8th. The AKIKAZE and possibly YUKAZE have been operating with the 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 72)

A division of Destroyer Squadron Four was closely associated with the KAGU MARU and Cruiser Division Seven, with which Destroyer Division Two minus one unit and Destroyer Division Fifteen were operating together:

No. 375

Traffic for COMDESDIV \_\_\_\_\_ of DESRON 4 addressed care of CRUDIV 7. \_\_\_\_\_ of same DESDIV associated with KAGU MARU \_\_\_\_\_ and CRUDIV 7.  
(COM 14 140626-TI)

It was declared:

On August 11, Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ in DESDIV 2 addressed CinC 2ND FLEET, COM- CRUDIV 7, Singapore Radio, Tokyo Radio, unidentified \_\_\_\_\_, information COM-

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 375 (Cont.)

DESDIV 2 and KAGU MARU. This, according to TI, is slight indication DD leaving CRUDIV 7 and joining KAGU MARU.

(Summary, 141400, August, No. 35)

No. 376

Destroyer in DESDIV 2 not in company with COMDESDIV 2 or CRUDIV 7. At 1200, 14th, his serial 054 indicates probably enroute through Macassar Straits to Davao, Palao, and Truk. Previously associated with KAGU MARU which was at Ambon. All messages from are addressed COMCRUDIV 7 for action and information, so the entire group CRUDIV 7, DESDIVS 2 & 15, and KAGU MARU is engaged in some movement of mutual concern.

(GT#654 OPNAV 141900-TI)

(Summary, 150500, August, No. 55)

No. 377

FROM: (KAGU MARU) #294 12 August  
TO : Truk Radio  
Tokyo Radio  
Surabaya  
Palao Radio  
Base 22 at Balikpapan  
DAVAO BASE FORCE  
INFO: Cinc 3RD FLEET)

KAGU MARU will be in Communication

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 377 (Cont.)

Zone at times indicated:

JN (Bali ? Surabaya ?) 0800, 13th  
to about 1300, 14th.

Balikpapan from above time 14th  
to \_\_\_\_\_ hours 15th.

\_\_\_\_\_ Zone (Davao ?) from 15th to  
1200, 17th.

Third (Palao) 1200, 17th to \_\_\_\_\_  
at \_\_\_\_\_ enter 4th (Truk).

(BEL 140335-DI)

It was indicated:

KAGU MARU, tentative air tender,  
has been associated with CRUDIV 7 for the  
past several days; however, it is not  
definitely shown that they are still in  
company. (Summary, 141400, August, No. 37)

No. 378

The KAGU MARU Seaplane  
Tender or possible XOY (at Koepang TOFU  
8 yesterday) is now indicated as enroute  
to Truk \_\_\_\_\_, via Balikpapan  
Davao \_\_\_\_\_ and Palao \_\_\_\_\_ in  
order named by heading of serial 294,  
sent at 1430, 12th. KAGU MARU being  
escorted by one ship, \_\_\_\_\_ of DESDIV  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ . (BEL 140730-TI)

It was mentioned:

A decryption of KAGU MARU serial  
294, Aug. 12th, gives schedule for this  
ship as 0800, Aug. 13th to 1300, Aug.  
14th in Bali or Surabaya Area; 1300,

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 378 (Cont.)

Aug. 14th to \_\_\_\_\_ Aug. 15th in Balikpapan Area; \_\_\_\_\_ Aug. 15th to 1200 Aug. 17th in Davao? Area; 1200, Aug. 17th to \_\_\_\_\_ in Palao Area; and at \_\_\_\_\_ enter Truk Area. The KAGU MARU has been associated with CRUDIV 7; however, it is not definitely known whether they are in company or not.

(Summary, 150600, August, No. 57)

Japanese carriers, air groups, and carrier guard destroyers were more active on August 14 than at any time in the preceding two months:

No. 379

Carriers, Plane Groups, and Plane Guard Destroyers more active than at any time in past two months.

(COM 14 140626-TI)

(Summary, 141400, August, No. 19)

A message from Carrier Division Two sent on August 12 and deciphered more fully on this date, indicated the enemy's plans to strike an Allied task force:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 380

FROM: (CARDIV 2) #023, August 12  
TO : less RYUJO, plus  
(ZUIHO), and  
Carrier Plane Groups plus  
unidentified  
and  
INFO: (6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
(KISARATSU AIRON)  
(1ST AIR FLEET)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
(Naval General Staff)  
(Kure Aircraft Section)  
(Chief of Staff  
Yokosuka)

Sketchy. \*From: COMCARDIV 2.  
Radio Order #2:

Under the command of \_\_\_\_\_, this  
force's \_\_\_\_\_ will set out as soon as  
preparations are completed, not later  
than tomorrow the 13th, and proceed  
KISARATSU AIR GROUP . You will  
attack the enemy STRIKING FORCE. Com-  
mander of Despatched Force is appointed  
Commander of \_\_\_\_\_ Carrier Plane Replace-  
ment Group.\* (BEL 140140-DI)

It was noted:

OPNAV's translation of this message  
appeared as item 28, page 13, or R. I.  
Summary 140600/Q August.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 17)

Traffic analysis indicated that Carrier Division  
Two was divided, with one section operating in the



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

north and the other in southern waters:

No. 381

In Serial 01 at 1620/13 August  
Detachment Commander of CARDIV 2  
addressed COMCARDIV 2, ZUIHOO,  
HITAKA and HIYOU or (HAYATAKA)  
Info: Chiefs of Staff 4TH and  
1ST AIR FLEETS, Chiefs of Staff  
Kure (HAKAFU) and Kure (MARAKI) plus  
carrier plane groups  
and Inclusion of  
4TH FLEET as an addressee suggests that  
one section of CARDIV 2 is scheduled  
for operations in Southern Waters.  
Current association links COMCARDIV 2  
with CINC 5TH FLEET and Northern AIR  
Commands. Since CARDIV 2 is apparently  
split, this suggests one section will  
operate to the northward and the other  
in the Southern Area. (BEL 140928-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 11)

Units of the Third Air Attack Force were being  
transferred to Carrier Division Two:

No. 382

#001 Aug.13/1620  
FROM: (CARDIV 2 Detachment)  
TO : COMCARDIV 2  
ZUIHO  
(HITAKA)  
(HAYATAKA)

Info: 9 addressees, including CofS  
4TH FLEET.

361

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 382 (Cont.)

Can be read either this force will proceed to \_\_\_\_\_ or this force departed for \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ is garbled special table group 22150.  
(BEL 141320-DI) (MEMO 14-5)

It was noticed:

CARDIV 2 Detachment at Tateyama was addressed in several messages on August 13th, by Comdr. 3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE in his new high command capacity,

The info addressees included various air activities, bases and Chief of Staff 5TH FLEET and according to GT this indicates redistribution of aircraft is taking place and probably some units of 3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE are being transferred to carriers or are being prepared as replacements. GZ is checking this message to try and locate the blank place.

(Summary, 150600, August, No. 10)

No. 383

FROM: Commander Empire Air Defenses  
(Comdr 3RD AIR ATTACK)  
TO : His Collective Force  
INFO: CARDIV 2

In despatches indicating possibility of readiness of that CARDIV for operations in Empire Area. (COM 14 140628-TI)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 383

It was observed:

On 13 August Comdr. 3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE (in his high command capacity) addressed several messages to Carriers and detachment of CARDIV 2 at Tateyama Air, 3RD AIR ATTACK collective less FUJIKAWA MARU, info various air activities, bases, and Chief of Staff 5TH FLEET, indicating that redistribution of aircraft is taking place and probably that some units of 3RD AIR ATTACK are being transferred to Carriers or are being prepared as replacements.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 18)

Direction finding bearings on the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU indicated that they were still in Empire waters:

No. 384

ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU  
on 5910 working Air Base Com-  
mander NOTI 9. No others appeared.  
Bearings maintain general Empire-Kyushu  
location, these two.  
(COM 14 141844-TI)

It was pointed out:

appears to be a plane group.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 14)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 385

ZUIKAKU and Plane Group  
, believed ashore, busy with plain  
language at 1900-2000, 14 August, re-  
porting arrival and departure of planes,  
and having communication troubles among  
themselves. Planes moving from  
to ZUIKAKU. D/F position 34° N,  
139° E, on 1 August.  
(GT#653 OPNAV 141545-TI)  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 20)

Traffic analysis indicated that Japanese air units were located as follows: Air Squadron Twenty-three was active in the Koepang (Timor) area; the Fourteenth Air Corps was situated at a base near Kwajalein with a detachment of this organization tentatively located at Gasmata; the Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force was found at Truk; the Commanders of the Fourth Air Attack Force and the Fourteenth Air Group were in the Marshall Islands planning to leave for Rabaul; the Kisaratsu Air Group was observed at Ambon; the Commander of the Bihoro Air Group and the Carrier Plane Group were operating at Kisaratsu; the Commander of the Takao Air Group was

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

noticed at Kendari; and the Commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet was addressed at Tinian.

No. 386

Detachment of AIRRON 23  
at enciphered Batavia.  
(BEL 141045-TI)

It was stated:

AIRRON 23 appears to be in the  
Koepong (Timor) Area.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 82)

No. 387

14TH AIR still at base  
near Kwajalein, but close  
association 5TH AIR ATTACK with slight  
indication CHITOSE AIR also  
may send some units to Southeast.  
(COM 14 141842-TI)

It was commented:

On June 24, the 14TH AIR CORPS  
Headquarters was at Imieji, in the  
Marshall Islands. On July 26, a  
14TH AIR CORPS DETACHMENT  
was placed at (tentatively  
Gasmata) and has continued in asso-  
ciation with the latter place subse-  
quent to that date. From associations  
the CHITOSE AIR GROUP was still in the  
Marshalls as recently as August 11.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 40)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 388

FROM: #582 Aug. 13/(?)  
(14TH AIR GROUP)  
TO : AIRRONS 24 and 25

In accordance with 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE Radio Order #\_\_\_\_ 3 flying boats of this FORCE are scheduled to leave IMIEJI for Rabaul at \_\_\_\_\_ hours/15th using call signs \_\_\_\_\_ respectively. (BEL 140550-DI)

It was declared:

The 4TH AIR ATTACK is based in the Marshalls. The Commander of 24TH AIRRON is Com. 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE. The Com. AIRRON 25 is 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE (based at Rabaul).  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 52)

No. 389

Commander 5TH AIR ATTACK addressed at Truk and continued originating apparent intelligence bulletins.  
(COM 14 140622-TI)

It was indicated:

Comdr 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE with Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET was, from number series, in New Britain at 1800, 11 August.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 27)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 390

Commander AIRRON 25 is shown at Truk at 1820/13 August. Traffic for that Command was routed to Saipan by Yokosuka possibly indicating Commander returning to Empire. (BEL 140748-TI)

It was mentioned:

is also the 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE. COM 14 noticed the Commander addressed at Truk on 14 August. He is normally based at Rabaul. No further movement has been noticed. (Summary, 150600, August, No. 39)

No. 391

At 1630, 13th, Commander 14TH AIR made report indicating imminent departure Marshalls for New Britain Area. (COM 14 140622-TI)

It was noted:

On 13 August, 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE and 14TH AIR GROUP extensively addressed by Air Commanders and Units in area south of Truk and by Staff 11TH AIR FLEET. Strong possibility these units will soon depart Marshalls Area for Rabaul. (Summary, 141400, August, No. 26)

No. 392

2ND AIR ATTACK Unit addressed at Ambon. (COM 14 141842-TI)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 392 (Cont.)

It was noticed:

is KISARATSU AIR GROUP.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 83)

No. 393

Comdr. BIHORO AIR GROUP  
and carrier plane group at Kisaratsu.  
(BEL 141045-TI)

It was observed:

Previously reported in Item 21, Page  
11, R.I. SUMMARY 140600/Q August. Traffic  
association indicated that plane group  
(6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE unit, formerly  
attached to AKAGI during Midway Campaign)  
would proceed from Kisaratsu to Rabaul Area  
via Kavieng aboard the MARU Airtender  
Evidently this unit did not leave with  
which departed at 1300, Aug. 13th  
for RO (Kavieng?).  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 21)

No. 394

Comdr. TAKAO AIR GROUP at  
Kendari with one detachment of that air  
group shown at enciphered GEMAERAN.  
(BEL 141045-TI)

It was pointed out:

The above was previously reported in  
Item 91, Page 27, R.I. SUMMARY 130600/Q  
August. (Summary, 150600, August, No. 54)



AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 395

11TH AIR FLEET Command in Rabaul Area consistently includes 2ND FLEET Command in his reports. Also 1ST AIR FLEET in a few. (GT#653 OPNAV 141545-TI) (Summary, 141400, August, No. 32)

No. 396

Comdr. 11TH AIR FLEET addressed at Tainan on August 14th. (GT#656 OPNAV 142200-TI) (Summary, 150600, August, No. 35)

The Commander of Tainan Air was active, but his location could not be fixed:

No. 397

Commander Tainan Air indicated at OSITAND associated with unidentified address. Believed on board or closely associated with Cruiser in CRUDIV 18. (COM 14 140622-TI)

It was stated:

TI indicated Comdr. TAINAN AIR at Salamaua on 11 August. is believed TATSUTA. On 13 August COM 14 stated a heading, i.e., from (TATSUTA) to (Lae), (unidentified), info 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE and COMDRUDIV 18, placed TATSUTA in New Guinea waters near Lae. The garble

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 397 (Cont.)

might be "Lae and" but obviously the  
Commander can't be at Lae and aboard  
the TATSUTA.

(Summary, 141400, August, No. 36)

Commander of Air Group was in the vicin-  
ity of Saipan at this time. Part of his organization  
was en route from Yokosuka to Rabaul, via Kavieng,  
on the air tender

No. 398

From routing, Air Group Commander  
in Saipan Zone or further South,  
at 2000, 14 August.  
(GT#654 OPNAV 141900-TI)

It was commented:

On August 13 routing and association  
indicated carrier-type plane groups  
at Kisaratsu. Also TI on the same day  
indicated belief MARU will proceed  
Kisaratsu to Rabaul Area via Kavieng with  
aircraft equipment for 5TH and 6TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCES, possibly transporting part  
of Plane Group and escorted by DDs  
and  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 53)

No. 399

MARU Airtender enroute Rabaul  
from Yokosuka. (BEL 141045-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 399 (Cont.)

It was declared:

MARU Airtender , Serial #86  
at 1300, Aug. 13th, says, "Departing  
Yokosuka? for RO (Kavieng?) today, the  
13th at 1300. Scheduled to arrive RO  
about 1500 on 19th."  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 70)

No. 400

FROM: MARU #85 Aug. 12/(?)  
TO : 11TH AIR FLEET  
CHIEF OF STAFF COMBINED  
MAIZURU (ESARO)

This vessel escorted by \_\_\_\_\_ (DD or  
DESDIV) - leaves Yokosuka tomorrow 13th  
at \_\_\_\_\_ arriving Kavieng (RO) about 1500  
20 August \_\_\_\_\_. Arrive Rabaul 4th  
Sept.  
(BEL 140550-DI)

It was indicated:

Serial #86 gives arrival at Kavieng  
1500/19th. It does not mention arrival  
at Rabaul. \_\_\_\_\_ is an 11TH AIR FLEET  
vessel and TI has indicated it will take  
part of AIR GROOP \_\_\_\_\_ to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 71)

Several other Marus were engaged in transporting  
replacements from the Empire to the Southwest Pacific:

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 401

1ST AIR FLEET MARU air-tender currently at Yokosuka is indicated by association to be enroute to Truk possibly in company with 1ST AIR FLEET MARU tender (BEL 140748-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI indicated (August 8) that the air-tender would probably go South to Truk or Rabaul.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 43)

No. 402

MARU Airtender of AIRRON 26 is in Saipan Area. (BEL 141045-TI)

It was noted:

Airtender appeared in Yokosuka on Aug. 13th, but on Aug. 11th associations of this tender and 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE in the Marshalls, with commands in Rabaul Area, indicated that this tender may head South to transport 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE units from the Marshalls to Rabaul Area. (Summary, 150600, August, No. 47)

No. 403

FROM: #460 Aug. 13 (MARU Air Tender)  
TO : Chief of Staff Yokosuka  
Saipan  
Truk  
8TH BASE FORCE, Rabaul  
(unidentified)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 403 (Cont.)

NOTE: Latitude readings considered good, but degrees of longitude must be read as plus or minus one degree.

"Cancel the schedule of this ship which departs Rabaul on the 13th for Yokosuka and substitute the following:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LATITUDE NORTH</u>	<u>LONGITUDE EAST</u>
17	0600	07-40	144-00
18	1200	12-00	143-20
19	1200	20-30	142-00
20	1200	24-40	141-10
22	1200	29-00	140-30
23	1200	34-00	139-40"

Remainder unreadable, but describes something to be done after 1200, 23rd, in connection with some place or other unit. (BEL 140535-DI)

It was noticed:

MARU Air Tender appeared in vicinity Kavieng Aug. 11th, apparently under escort of YUKAZE and CRUDIV 6 from traffic associations.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 48)

No. 404

FROM: #265, August 13

"R" Area DEFENSE FORCE Despatch Order (Number about 205): Vessel under escort departs Rabaul \_\_\_\_\_ time, 13th, via following route to return to Japan, speed 11 (point 5?) knots. Noon position 13th - 3-57 South, 151-45 East. From this point course 285. \_\_\_\_\_ (5 or 6)00, 14th, position 3-26 South, 148-20 (about) East.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 404 (Cont.)

Position 0830 (about \_\_\_\_\_), 3-18 South, 148-10 East, thence on course \_\_\_\_\_ (between 300 and 020). Respective Air Units will provide anti-submarine patrol as follows: The number of planes will be determined by the respective commanders. Afternoon of 13th, the 1st Air Unit. During daylight of 14th, the 2nd Air Unit.

Belconnen Note: This sent to \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ and includes Maru air tender \_\_\_\_\_ as information addressee.

(BEL 141812-DI)

It was observed:

\_\_\_\_\_ is 8TH BASE FORCE, a DD in DESDIV 34, \_\_\_\_\_ the 11TH AIR FLEET, and \_\_\_\_\_ a Maru air tender ... (Summary, 151400, August, No. 25)

The following dispatch discloses that much pressure was being exerted on Japanese aircraft manufacturers for the shipment of plane reinforcements to the South Pacific area:

No. 405

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ #859 Aug. 13/(?)  
          (Chief of Staff AIRRON 11)  
TO : Chief of Staff Yokosuka  
          (2ND FLEET)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 405 (Cont.)

All the planes under repair at Yokosuka Aircraft Works will be despatched to Rabaul as soon as possible.  
(BEL 140550-DI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 73)

The Commander of the First Air Fleet was noticed in the traffic of this day, and the growing importance of Rabaul for Japanese operations was indicated by the movement of a meteorological unit to that port:

No. 406

Commander 1ST AIR FLEET using cover call originated 2-part Serial 310 addressed for action 1ST AIR FLEET less HOSHO, Unidentified and ; Info: CINC COMBINED FLEET. In same type heading (Serial #316 at 1900/12 August) (possibly 1ST AIR FLEET BASE FORCE) is indicated as being synonymous with the call (BEL 140748-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 12)

No. 407

FROM: (Rabaul) #247 August 14, 0900  
TO : (Tokyo Naval General Staff)  
(Tokyo Naval Communications Section)  
(Tokyo Weather Observer)

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 407 (Cont.)

INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (Cofs COMBINED FLEET)  
                          (Cofs FOURTH FLEET)  
                          (Truk Weather Observer)

\_\_\_\_\_ in connection with the movement  
to RR of the #4 Meteorological Unit \_\_\_\_\_.  
(GZ#2478 OPNAV 141715-DI)  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 38)

Much construction was in progress at the Buna airport. Enemy merchant ships continued their usual activity on August 14. The TATSUTA, which had been attacked by Allied planes on August 13, announced the arrival of its convoy of supply ships in this area:

No. 408

Buna-Lae Area became prominent about 1500, 14th, when several despatches sent by Buna \_\_\_\_\_ Originators 5TH SPECIAL LANDING FORCE \_\_\_\_\_, Buna Commander \_\_\_\_\_, and TAIMO who yesterday was strongly associated CRUDIV 18 Comdr. and is believed to be construction or engineering activity engaged in preparation Buna Airport facilities. Addressees, 8TH FLEET Command, COMCRUDIV 18, 5TH AIR ATTACK, TAINAN AIR (addressed at Lae). 82nd GUARD FORCE \_\_\_\_\_ formerly at Rabaul now shown at Lae also. (COM 14 141838-TI)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 408 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

GHQ SWPA 0547Z/14 reports enemy troops and 300 coolies landed Buna Aug. 9th, to work on airdrome. (TATSUTA) serial 44 at 0200, Aug. 14th, says, "At 0115 the supply ships completed unloading."  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 63)

No. 409

TATSUTA who initiated plane contact on 13th, apparently unharmed as working Rabaul today.  
(COM 14 141842-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 76)

No. 410

FROM: (TATSUTA) #44 Aug. 14/0200

At 0115 the supply ships completed unloading. They will proceed to \_\_\_\_\_ by number one route. \_\_\_\_\_ 6 o'clock ships position will be 07-30 S, 148-30 E., course 065, speed 13.  
(BEL 141320-DI) (MEMO 14-5)

It was stated:

On Aug. 14th, CINCPAC reported TATSUTA in the vicinity of Lae.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 77)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet ordered some Marus to proceed to Rabaul. Traffic analysis indicated that four other Marus were already en route there:

No. 411

#283 13 August/1910  
FROM: (Comdr. Rabaul Radio)  
TO : (unidentified)\*  
(unidentified)\*  
INFO: (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
FROM: CinC 8TH FLEET. Already passed to  
8TH FLEET. proceed to RR.  
Notify me of scheduled arrival.

The two action addressees, although unidentified, appear to be MARU Patrol Divisions. This seems to fit. (GZ#2477 OPNAV 141715-DI)  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 39)

No. 412

MARU in Saipan Zone has  
unidentified commander on board.  
(GT#664 OPNAV 142130-TI)

It was commented:

MARU appeared in Saipan Com-  
munication Zone at 2030 Aug. 12th. The  
MARU was indicated on Aug. 7th,

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 412 (Cont.)

as in or due at Truk, and is scheduled to go to Rabaul in accordance with \*OUTSIDE SOUTH SEAS FORCE DESPATCH ORDER #4, embark the YOKOSUKA #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE and the #\_\_\_\_\_ Communication Corps and proceed to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 62)

No. 413

MARU \_\_\_\_\_, enroute Rabaul from Yokosuka. (BEL 141045-TI)

It was declared:

\_\_\_\_\_ has not been noted previously.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 66)

No. 414

Auxiliary \_\_\_\_\_ enroute Rabaul from Palao. (BEL 141045-TI)

It was indicated:

\_\_\_\_\_ appears to be a MARU of the 4TH BASE FORCE (Truk).  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 67)

No. 415

MARU \_\_\_\_\_ probably enroute Rabaul from Truk. (BEL 141045-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 415 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

appears to be Comdr. Armed  
Guard aboard a MARU.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 68)

The SATA announced its arrival at Truk, and  
- the fleet tanker , which had been engaged in  
refueling Cruiser Division Six near Kavieng, was now  
sailing from Rabaul to Saipan:

No. 416

FROM: #503, 1000 August 14  
TO : (C.O. SATA)  
(Tokyo Movement Report  
Section)  
INFO: (Sasebo Chief of Staff)  
(Tokyo Transportation  
Section)  
(Truk Military Stores  
Bureau)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)  
(C.O. AZUMA MARU)  
(COMDR #4 BASE FORCE at  
Truk)  
(Truk Harbor Master)  
(Truk)

Arrived at Truk.  
(GZ#2466 OPNAV 140731-DI)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 53)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 417

FROM: #204 Aug.14/0800  
TO : (Fleet Tanker or Tender)  
(CINC 4TH FLEET)  
(Tokyo Radio)  
(Truk Radio)  
(Saipan Radio)  
(Rabaul)

At \_\_\_\_\_ will leave #8 Communication Zone. Will be in #4 Communication Zone until \_\_\_\_\_ on 18th, when will enter #5 Communication Zone.  
(GZ#2485 OPNAV 142300-DI)

It was observed:

#8 Communication Zone is Rabaul. #4 Communication Zone is Truk, and #5 Communication Zone is Saipan. On August 12, Tanker appeared to be engaged in refueling CRUDIV 6 at a point in the vicinity of Kavieng.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 46)

A submarine tender reported its arrival at Truk at this time:

No. 418

FROM: #196 Aug.13/(?)

Arrived Truk 0815.  
(BEL 140550-DI)

It was pointed out:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 418 (Cont.)

... is a Sub-tender which was scheduled to arrive at Truk 13 August. (Summary, 150600, August, No. 50)

No. 419

Auxiliary (probably Sub-tender) is indicated as arriving in Truk Area by heading of Movement Report, Serial 196 at 0840/13. (BEL 140928-TI)

It was stated:

... was scheduled to arrive Truk 0500/13 Aug. (Summary, 150600, August, No. 49)

It was thought that Submarine Squadrons One and Two would proceed to the south after necessary repairs had been made:

No. 420

Indications that SUBBRONS 1 and 2 may proceed Southward after overhaul persist. (COM 14 140628-TI)

It was commented:

On 13 August TI indicated COMSUBRON 1 underway from Yokosuka for 8TH FLEET Area via Saipan Area, possibility SUBDIVS

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 420 (Cont.)

and ) will accompany COMSUBRON 1  
or will follow later to Southeast.  
COM 14 on 10 August indicated belief  
SUBRON 2 in home waters but possibly  
enroute Marshalls.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 43)

No. 421

Inclusion of Truk  
Saipan and Chichijima  
BASE FORCES as Info Addressees in dis-  
patch, Serial 105 from COMSUBRON 1  
to SUBRON 1 less one division  
suggests part of SUBRON 1 will be  
assigned to Southern Area.  
(BEL 140928-TI)

It was declared:

CINCPAC reported that units of  
SUBRON 1 were moving South via Saipan  
and Truk probably to New Britain Area  
on August 14th. On August 13th COMSUB-  
RON 1 was indicated as underway from  
Yokosuka for 8TH FLEET area via Saipan  
with possibility SUBDIVS and  
of SUBRON 1 accompanying him or  
following later.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 91)

A Japanese submarine acting as a scout on a  
patrol line in the Solomons warned that an Allied  
striking force had been sighted in the vicinity of

SRH 012

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

Tulagi. Meanwhile, Allied submarines were attacking Japanese ships.

No. 422

FROM: ) #795 0500/I 14 August 1942  
TO : 8th Fleet  
11th Airron  
Subron 7  
All Command Calls

From (blank) (SUBMARINE UNIT)  
(COMMANDER ?), ENEMY STRIKING FORCE  
sighted vicinity ? Tulagi.  
(BEL 140005-DI) (MEMO #13-2)  
(Summary, 140600, August, No. 77)

No. 423

FROM: - #092 August 14, 1710  
(Comdr Unit in 4TH BASE  
FORCE)  
TO : (Comdr. BASE FORCE #4  
at Truk)  
INFO: (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)  
(4TH FLEET CofS)

Enemy submarine fired 2 torpedoes at me from about 2000 meters but no damage. I am now attacking.  
(GZ#2473 OPNAV 141650-DI)  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 28)

No. 424

sent (in Indies Area, August 6)  
despatch, serial 015 at 1730,



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 424 (Cont.)

13th, which was addressed for info ALL SHIPS AND STATIONS, indicating that vessel probably attacked, possibly by allied submarine. No definite indication of position as action address not received. (BEL 140730-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 69)

Tracking enemy submarines was one of the most important functions of United States Naval traffic analysts at this time:

No. 425

Sub Positions:  
of SUBRON 7 at 161°E, 04°S.  
of SUBRON 6 at 167°E,  
04°S. (COM 14 140628-TI)

It was indicated:

On 13 August the COM 14 D/F position of was 164°E, 05°S at 0600/Z.  
(Summary, 141400, August, No. 45)

No. 426

Fair Fix places Submarine using call in vicinity 10 S, 162 E, at 1630Z, 13 August. (BEL 141320-DI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 94)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 427

Sub units  
Area. (COM 14 141844-TI) associated Solomons  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 89)

No. 428

RDF on Subs:  
(in SUBRON 7) 07-30 S, 161-30 E.  
(in SUBRON 7) 07-30 S, 159-00 E.  
SUBRON 6 unit in 08 S, 163-00 E.  
All Solomons.  
COMSUBRON 6 poor fix, same area.  
SUBRON 3 unit at 240 from Palmyra with  
at 267 from Samoa.  
(COM 14 141844-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 93)

No. 429

SUBRON 3 Units,  
received traffic via Jaluit, but appeared  
rather inactive. (COM 14 141844-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 88)

A Japanese espionage resume from New York  
purported to give the opinion of the United States  
Navy Department concerning the campaign in the Solomon  
Islands as follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 430

(Message to Tokyo #892)

FROM: MADRID (Suma) Aug. 13  
"TO" Intelligence (New York, August 12th)

The Navy Department believed the naval and air battles of the Solomon and Aleutian Islands were doomed to failure. They believed so on the basis of reports from the scene of action that the landing forces were inadequate.

But they pointed out that \_\_\_\_\_ continuous attempts to land throughout Japanese occupied territory would take the form of a second front in the Pacific, therefore, they regard it as necessary to make considerable sacrifices in order to secure important positions occupied by the enemy.

I have transmitted this to Berlin and Rome.

(Translator's Note: Second paragraph garbled)

(GZ#5690/Jap.D1p/OPNAV 142315-DI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 3)

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was as follows:

No. 431

FROM: CINCPAC 140221, AUGUST, 1942  
TO : COMINCH  
OPNAV  
COMNAVEU  
COMSOWESPAC  
COMDRS ALL TF PAC  
COMDRS ALL SF PAC

387

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 14, 1942 (Continued)

NO. 431

NCR 3803 J

BULLETIN NO. 151

TATSUTA IN VICINITY OF LAE. DESDIV  
29 IN NEW BRITAIN AREA. ... UNITS OF  
SUBRON 1 MOVING SOUTH VIA SAIPAN AND TRUK  
PROBABLY TO NEW BRITAIN AREA. GOSHU MARU  
EXPECTED TO DEPART ROI (MARSHALLS) FOR  
YOKOSUKA SHORTLY. SUB POSITS BY DF: 068  
163 E, 048 161 E, 058 164 E. ENEMY SUBS  
PRESENT IN TULAGI AREA. SLIGHT INDICATION  
JAPS MAY CONTEMPLATE USING PARATROOPS FROM  
RABAU AREA. KAMOI ENROUTE JALUIT TO  
RABAU. CINC COMBINED FLEET IN INLAND SEA,  
PROBABLY AT KURE.

---

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, who was ashore at Rabaul, was now including the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet in his operational reports:

No. 432

CINC 8TH ashore Rabaul under that station cover and was addressed with Navy Minister by CHOKAI  
(COM 14 152006-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 67)

No. 433

CINC 8TH FLEET is including CofS 2ND FLEET in his operations report.  
(COM 14 150642-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 68)

A message from an unidentified unit to the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet indicated that it was proceeding as quickly as possible to the Rabaul area:

No. 434

FROM: (unidentified) #493  
TO : (Saigon Radio) Aug. 12/1800  
(Comdr. Palao)  
(unidentified)  
(CINC SOUTH CHINA FLT.)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 434 (Cont.)

At 2300 left Davao Communication Zone and entered Macassar Communication Zone. (GZ #2491-DI)

It was remarked:

is unidentified but appears possibly a unit comprising more than one component. On August 10, CINC 8TH FLEET notified his force that the unit (or force) is to join the 8TH FLEET. On Aug. 12, notified CINC 3RD FLEET that he would omit proceeding to Davao, suggesting that he is attempting to hasten his arrival in 8TH FLEET Area.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 60)

No. 435

Man-o-war originated Serial 493 at 1800/13 August addressed action CINC 8TH FLEET, Koepang Radio, Makassar Radio and Davao BASE FORCE suggesting that ship or force is enroute from Koepang to 8TH FLEET operating area via Makassar and Davao. Since this appears to coincide with the scheduled route of the KAGU MARU it is assumed that - may be in company with that vessel.  
(REL 150954-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 10 August was ordered to join 8TH FLEET. At 1132/15 August apparently reported arrival at Palao and still enroute to 8TH FLEET.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 82)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 436

Unidentified                      apparently report  
arrival Palao enroute 8TH FLEET Area at  
1132, August 15th. (GT #666-OPNAV 152305-  
TI)

It was stated:

On August 12th,                      notified CINC  
3RD FLEET that he would omit proceeding to  
Davao, suggesting that he is attempting to  
hasten his arrival in 8TH FLEET AREA.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 44)

There were many indications of future fleet  
movements to the Truk area. The Chief of Staff of  
the Third Fleet appeared to be concerned with ship  
movements from the Netherlands East Indies to Rabaul:

No. 437

Indications of impending Fleet move-  
ments to Marshalls-Truk Area increasing.  
(COM 14-150618-TI)  
(Summary, 151400, August, No. 3)

No. 438

Chief of Staff 3RD FLEET  
originated #204 at 1600/13th to Chief of  
Staff 8TH                      Chief of Staff 4TH  
and Chief of Staff Philippine  
FLEETS, plus BASE FORCES at Palao

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 438 (Cont.)

and Truk. Despatch may be relative to ship movements from NEI to Rabaul Area. (BEL 151022-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 104)

Traffic analysis revealed that the Personnel Officer of the Chichijima Base Force and the Chief of Staff of the Oki Group were at Rabaul. The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet was at Jaluit.

No. 439

Chief of Staff "OKI GROUP", (OKI SHUDAN) at Rabaul, Aug. 15,  
(GT #662-OPNAV 151721-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 70)

No. 440

Personnel Officer (53) of CHICHIJIMA BASE FORCE shown at Rabaul.  
(COM 14 152004-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 71)

No. 441

CINC 4TH shown at Jaluit at 1330, August 15th. (GT #666-OPNAV 152305-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 47)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander of the Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force was operating near Buna. The Base Force at Makassar was becoming more important in enemy radio traffic, presumably because arrangements were being made for the passage of convoys to that area.

No. 442

Traffic for Commander Sasebo #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE is emanating from Buna. This Commander apparently accompanied Forces which currently landed in Buna Area. (BEL 151022-TI)

It was observed:

SASEBO #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE at Buna was noted as an enciphered address on 6 August. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 72)

No. 443

MAKASSAR BASE FORCE assuming increased importance in traffic possibly in connection with arrangements for passage of convoys through that area. At 1510/14 August Makassar addressed Rabaul BASE FORCE, CINCS COMBINED, 1ST, 8TH and 11TH AIR FLEETS plus Singapore, Tokio and Palao plus unidentified in his serial 365. Since despatch was originated by Staff Communication Officer it may also deal with communications of units of indicated Fleets in Makassar Area. (BEL 150954-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 81)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

The location of various enemy base forces was estimated as follows: The Fourth Base Force at Truk; Fifth Base Force at Saipan; Sixth at Jaluit; and Eighth at Rabaul:

No. 444

Operations Section Naval General Staff addressed several despatches to 4TH, 5TH, 6TH and 8TH BASE FORCES, Mandates Air Units and Defense Units of Truk and Marshalls, information Staffs 4TH and 8TH FLEETS.  
(COM 14-150618-TI)

It was noticed:

These BASE FORCES appear to be placed as follows: 4TH at Truk; 5TH at Saipan; 6TH at Jaluit; 8TH at Rabaul.  
(Summary, 151400, August, No. 4)

Sufficient evidence had now accumulated to indicate that a task force of the Second Fleet was on its way to the Bismarck-Solomon area, and would arrive there approximately on August 21 or 22:

No. 445

Belconnen's 101728, OPNAV's 131330 and 142005 indicate 2ND FLEET TASK FORCE is enroute to Bismarck-Solomon Area. Believe

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 445 (Cont.)

this Force can arrive there 21-22 August.  
(OPNAV 152240-)

It was commented:

Bel. 101728 appears as Item 23, page 7, R.I. SUMMARY 111400/Q August. OPNAV's 131330 appears as Item 27, Page 8, R.I. SUMMARY 131400/Q August. OPNAV's 142005 appears as Item 31, Page 11, R.I. SUMMARY 150600/Q August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 36)

A battleship, tentatively identified as belonging to Battleship Division One, appeared in radio traffic once again after being silent since late in April 1942:

No. 446

previously associated DESDIV again originating traffic after being unseen since late April when presumably damaged? No affiliation seen as yet. (COM 14 152004-TI)

It was indicated:

appears to be a Battleship of BATDIV 1 and appeared in traffic during July and also August 11th.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 21)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

Enemy radio traffic volume was low in all areas on August 15, but valuable information could still be obtained. A special five-number cipher system, which had been used by the Japanese in the southern area during the preceding few days, now was adopted for general use in all areas. The elimination of readily recognizable serial numbers made it more difficult to identify enemy units, which were disguising their presence by the use of cover calls and by the inauguration of various special calls. It was evident that the Japanese were making every effort to improve their communication security:

No. 447

In general, traffic volume was low in all areas. (COM 14 152008-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 1)

No. 448

Special 5-number system in use Southern Area last few days today became universal for all areas lack of visible secret message serial so far complicating identification those units using cover calls and scrambling radio station numbers. This, coupled with two or three types special calls apparent

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 448 (Cont.)

last few days, show increased Japanese interest in Communication Security.  
(COM 14-152002-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 2)

The Japanese Radio Intelligence Communication net was expanded to receive regular reports from radio stations at Amboina and Soerabaya:

No. 449

Amboina Radio and Soerabaya Radio joined RI net, sending regular reports to usual addressees South and Empire. (COM 14 152004-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 80)

Cruiser Division Six was still in the general vicinity of Rabaul, and Cruiser Division Seven, plus several destroyers, arrived at Makassar on August 13:

No. 450

Traffic association continues to place CRUDIV 6 in Kavieng Area. (COM 14-150642-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 88)

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 451

Concealed originator at Kavieng  
addressed Serial 177 at 1800/14 August  
to Staff Communication Officer CRUDIV 6  
possibly indicating true originator to be  
ship of that CRUDIV. COMCRUDIV 6 is origi-  
nating traffic under cover call  
and appears to be in Rabaul area.  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was noted:

COM 14 reported CRUDIV 6 in Kavieng  
Area 14 August, and the Commander there as  
late as 13 August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 87)

No. 452

CRUDIV 7, plus 2 DESDIVS, less 1 De-  
stroyer each, arrived at LM on 13th.  
(COM 14 152012-DI)

It was declared:

LM is Makassar.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 83)

A cruiser, announcing its departure from  
Rabaul to Japan on August 15, gave some indication  
that it had suffered damage:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 453

FROM: (Rabaul) #261 Aug. 14

Unreadable, but indicates Cruiser  
(possibly damaged) departing Rabaul for  
Japan the 15th. (BEL 150630-DI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 93)

Destroyer movements were watched very closely,  
because their presence generally indicated that much  
more important warships were active in the area.

Destroyer Division Thirty-four was escorting ships  
carrying planes from the Marshalls to Rabaul. Two  
units of Destroyer Division Sixteen acted as es-  
corts to air tenders en route from the Empire to  
Truk, via Saipan:

No. 454

DESDIV 34 still occupied in movement of  
planes from Marshalls to Rabaul.  
(COM 14-150642-TI) (Summary, 160600,  
August, No. 92)

No. 455

Destroyers and of  
DESDIV 16 appear engaged in es-  
corting Maru air-tenders at Yoko-  
suka and at Kure? to Truk. Commu-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 455 (Cont.)

nication Zone Report from at 1120/14  
August indicates movement from Empire to  
Truk via Saipan. Probably simultaneous de-  
parture with rendezvous enroute.  
and are included as Info addressees.  
(BEL 151048-TI) (Summary, 160600, August,  
No. 55)

No. 456

Escort Unit in Communication  
Zone Report at 1600/14th appears to indi-  
cate movement from Sasebo to Rabaul  
via Saipan and Truk  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was mentioned:

is COMDESDIV 30. His despatch  
giving his schedule is Item #24, Page 8,  
RI Summary 150600/Q August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 94)

Destroyer Divisions Three, Four and Seventeen,  
plus one destroyer from Destroyer Division Fifteen,  
were now en route to Rabaul. Though Destroyer Divi-  
sion Three and Destroyer Division Seventeen, the  
latter having announced its arrival at Truk on  
August 14, had formerly been employed as carrier  
escorts, there was no indication of the presence of



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

carriers in the South Pacific. However, the possibility of their moving into this area was not overlooked:

No. 457

FROM: (COMDESDIV 3) #054  
TO : Aug. 14/1700  
ZUIKAKU  
RYUJO  
INFO: (COMDESRON 10)  
(CofS 1ST AIR FLT.)

This Force less \_\_\_\_\_  
scheduled to arrive Chichijima \_\_\_\_\_  
hours the \_\_\_\_\_.  
NOTE: Time is between 17 and 2300. Date  
is about 14th \_\_\_\_\_.  
(BEL 150630-DI)

It was remarked:

DESDIV 3 and DESDIV 17 are both destroyer divisions which have been associated with carriers and now appear enroute Rabaul. Although the carriers themselves are not associated with the Rabaul Area, the possibility that the carriers may be associated with the movements of these two divisions should not be overlooked. DESDIV 17 appeared enroute from Truk to Rabaul on Aug. 15th. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 17)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 458

#467, 0600, August 14.  
FROM: (Concealed identify call)  
TO : (CINC COMBINED FLEET),  
(COMDR 1ST AIR FLEET),  
(COMDESRON 10),  
(CINC 8TH FLEET),  
(COMDR 11TH AIR FLEET),  
(CINC 4TH FLEET),  
(Tokyo Movement Report  
section),  
INFO: (C.O. ISOKAZE in DESDIV 17).  
FROM: COMDESDIV 17

This division arrived PT (Truk).  
(GZ #2497 - OPNAV 2497 - DI)  
(Summary, 151400, August, No. 19)

No. 459

Rabaul, or someone covering at Rabaul,  
addressed Destroyer , in DESDIV 15,  
DESDIV 4 less tentative 2ND SECTION  
, DESDIV 17 less Destroyer , in-  
dicating that probably maximum of 5 de-  
stroyers from DESDIVS 4 and 17, plus one de-  
stroyer from DESDIV 15 are expected arrival  
Rabaul Area. (GT #664-OPNAV 152130-TI)

It was pointed out:

Destroyer appeared enroute Para-  
mushiro to Yokosuka via Ominato on August  
7th. COMDESDIV 17 and COMDESDIV 4 were in-  
cluded in despatches from Rabaul on Aug.  
13th, indicating the approach of these DES-  
DIVS to Rabaul Area and on Aug. 14th, COM-  
DESDIV 4 plus destroyers and of  
DESDIV 4 appeared in Rabaul Area. Part of

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 459 (Cont.)

DESDIV 4 appeared escorting IKKI DETACHMENT from Guam to Rabaul on Aug. 8th. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 90)

Destroyer Squadron Three, which had recently been associated with Cruiser Division Seven, indicated that it would arrive at Rabaul on August 16 at 1600:

No. 460

Destroyer in DESDIV 19 of DESRON 3, addressed COMDESRON 3, COMDESDIV 19, CINC COMBINED, CINC 8TH, RABAUl BASE Movement Report Office, Tokyo, and possible, if garbled, COMCRUDIV 18, indicating movement to Rabaul at 1600, Aug. 16, using old cipher. (GT #662-OPNAV 151721-TI)

It was stated:

DESRON 3 has been associated with CRU-DIV 7 in recent weeks and no separate activity of Destroyer has been noted. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 84)

Japanese aircraft carriers were inactive on August 15, though evidence appeared that the SHOKAKU, HITAKA and HOSHO were in Empire waters:

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 461

No Carrier traffic noted. Single bearings continue SHOKAKU, HITAKA and HOSHO in Empire Waters. (COM 14 152008-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 14)

Carrier Division Two requested that shore facilities for its operations off Marcus Island be made available;

No. 462

CARDIV 2 will operate off Marcus Island and wishes shore facilities made available. Each ship of division has available from 15 to 18 each of VB, VT, and VF. (COM 14 152012-DI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 51)

A call for the Commander of the Saipan Air Force disclosed the existence of this new organization;

No. 463

Enciphered "SAIPAN AIR FORCE COMDR." noted. This is new outfit as it has no call and has originated under call of SAIPAN BASE FORCE . MARU associa-  
ted with this command. (GT #662-OPNAV 151721-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 37)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

Much activity of the destroyers and tenders of the First Air Fleet indicated that a new movement was about to take place:

No. 464

Group of despatches from destroyers and tenders of 1ST AIR FLEET sent to Kure, Yokosuka and Truk Radio Stations, information Staff 1ST AIR FLEET. These are typical pre-movement communication despatches. (COM 14-150618-TI)  
(Summary, 151400, August, No. 16)

No. 465

Commander 1ST AIR FLEET  
ZUIKAKU and Flagship of  
DESDIV 3 heard working on 5910  
Kcs. during evening 14th. (BEL 150820-TI)

It was observed:

TI indicates DESDIV 3 is enroute to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 19)

No. 466

Routing of Serial 054 from COMDESDIV 3 at 1700/14th addressed to SHOKAKU, RYUJO and ZUIKAKU, Info: COM-DESRON 10 and Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET casts doubt on assumption that Flag 1ST AIR FLEET aboard SHOKAKU since despatch given to by for delivery

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 466 (Cont.)

to all addressees was passed to ZUIKAKU for delivery on all Action Addressees by with delivery already shown to CINC 1ST AIR FLEET. (BEL 150820-TI)

It was noticed:

COMDESDIV 3 #054 reported in RI Summary 151400/Q August on Page #10, Item #14 and BELCONNEN's version above.

is identified as a destroyer escort for carriers by COM 14.

NOTE: (DESRON 10) was used here rather than in Washington translation. seems reasonable. Believe BELCONNEN means CINC 1ST AIR FLEET is in ZUIKAKU.

(Summary, 160600, August, No. 18)

The transmission of many weather reports as well as routine dispatches in the South Pacific indicated that Japanese aircraft movements were still at a high level:

No. 467

Weather despatches in Truk-Marshalls-Rabaul Area remain at high level indicating continuing of Aircraft movements. (COM 14-150618-TI) (Summary, 151400, August, No. 23)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 468-

Kavieng Base very active with despatches to Air Units. (COM 14-150642-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 79)

Reinforcements were being ferried in from the Empire. Investigation disclosed that a Japanese reference to what was thought to be paratroops was really a mention of ground troops:

No. 469

Further indication that Carrier-type PLANE GROUP (probably torpedo planes or dive bombers and currently at Kisaratsu) scheduled proceed Southern Area taken from heading despatch, Serial #08 from that Command to Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET  
, Commanders Saipan Truk  
and Chichijima BASE FORCES plus  
Commanders AIRRON 25 and 26  
, Info: Chief of Staff Yokosuka  
Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET, HA-  
HAJIMA AIR and YOKOSUKA DEFENCE  
FORCE Unit . . . Route appears to be  
via Chichijima, Saipan and Truk. Commander  
AIRRON 26 shown by routing in Rabaul Area  
and previously associated with AIRRON  
26 will probably proceed same area. Further  
indication of reinforcements from Empire seen  
in current association between Saipan BASE  
FORCE, HAJIMA AIR and  
Tokohama Air Station, Truk BASE  
FORCE, Staff Communication Officers

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 469 (Cont.)

4TH FLEET and 11TH AIR FLEET  
(BEL 150915-TI)

It was commented:

On 8 August TI indicated PLANE GROUP would probably go to Rabaul Area. It has been at Kisaratsu Air Station since 6 August. COMAIRRON 25 is the same as COM 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE. COMAIRRON 26 is the same as COM 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 16)

No. 470

Reference various translations of serial 355, of 10th, involving the ferrying of something or other from Tenian to Rabaul via Truk. In view of COM 14's suggestion that paratroops might be involved, we researched as exhaustively as possible on the code group concerned and believe it to be (ground crews). Thus we believe that that part of message should read "will ferry KISARAZU AIR GROUP Ground Crews from PST to RR in accordance following schedule: 1st day depart PST, etc."

On the 10th we noted

care of KISARATSU AIR  
This may be "Airborne Division". COM 14 and BELCONNEN have been asked to make early comment regarding this.  
(GZ MEMO 8/15 - OPNAV 151751 - DI)  
(Summary, 151400, August, No. 24)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

Shipping in the Koepang-Soerabaya and Ambon area was being furnished air support by Air Squadron Twenty-three, based in Java, and Air Squadron Twenty-five, situated at Rabaul:

No. 471

Increased association between COMAIRRON 23 and COMAIRRON 25 indicate that these commands are keeping each other well informed as to their respective operations, also associations indicate that shipping in the Koepang-Soerabaja and Ambon Area is probably being furnished Air support.  
(BEL-151022-TI)

It was indicated:

AIRRON 23 evidently has reference to who is 2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE (based in Java Area). COMAIRRON 25 is also Commander 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE (Rabaul Area).  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 75)

No. 472

(Air Station in Buna Area?)  
originated Serial #12 at 0630/14th for Action: Commander (TORPEDO or DIVE BOMBER PLANE GROUP at Rabaul) and Staff Communication Officer AIRRON 25, possible indicating transfer of aircraft from Rabaul to Buna Area). (BEL 151022-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 472 (Cont.)

It was noted:

Routing and associations indicated AIR-  
RON 25 at Rabaul 13 August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 73)

Air escorts were also supervising heavy ship-  
ping in the Yokosuka area and Empire waters.

No. 473

Despatches from 6TH AIR ATTACK CORPS to  
Surface Patrol Units indicates movement  
heavy ships in Yokosuka area.  
(COM 14-150618-TI) (Summary, 151400,  
August, No. 17)

No. 474

Saipan Radio continues broadcast traf-  
fic to 2ND FLEET. Navy Minister NOSAI sent  
two despatches apparently connection move-  
ment two heavy units. First at 1800/14  
went to Kure movements, info: CINC 1ST AIR  
FLEET and unidentified believed heavy  
unit or Batdiv or possible 3RD CARDIV?  
Other at 1034/15 was to Kure movements, Info:  
CINC COMBINED and 1ST FLEETS and Battleship  
in BATDIV Neither held hint  
of destination. (COM 14-152002-TI)

It was declared:

has been associated with SOUTHERN  
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE and CRUDIV 7. The call

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 474 (Cont.)

is unidentified. It appeared first about 16 July. In all but 3 despatches since that time it has been an addressee along with CARDIVS 1 and 2. In the other 3 despatches known BB's and Division calls appeared. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 35)

Japanese air groups were located on August 15 as follows:

Commander of the Kisaratsu Air Group at Marcus Island;

Commander of the Misawa Air Group at Gasmata;

Commander of the Tainan Air Group at Lae;

Commander of the Third Air Group at Ambon;

Commander and Staff Communication Officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet at Tinian;

Commander of Air Squadron Twenty-two at Kisaratsu;

Commander of the Kanoya Air Group at Sabang;

Commander of Air Squadron Twenty-three at Koepang;

Commander of the Takao Air Group at Kendari:

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 475

Both Comdr. and Radio Officer KISARATSU AIR are at Marcus today.  
(COM 14 152008-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 23)

No. 476

Routing and associations indicate Commander MISAWA AIR at Air Station (Gasmata?).  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was mentioned:

Commander MISAWA AIR moved to Gasmata from Rabaul about 12 August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 76)

No. 477

AIRRON 4 and MISAWA AIR GROUP included as Info: Addressees in despatch Serial 974 from 108TH AIR BASE to Kisaratsu address and may be operating from that Base.  
(BEL 150915-TI)

It was remarked:

AIRRON 5, Serial 560 of 8 August says:  
"This FORCE arrived Vunakanau at 1515.  
"AIRRON 4 had been operating in Gasmata and Lae during July. MISAWA AIR, Serial 311 8 August says: "Seventeen heavy bombers and 3 \_\_\_\_\_ type departed for Vunakanau." Prior to that time operations of the MISAWA AIR

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 477 (Cont.)

GROUP were unplaced. There has been very close association between these two groups which indicates they are operating together in the Rabaul Area. 108TH AIR GROUP seems to be a Truk Air activity. KEKAYU is Yokosuka Aircraft Factory not Kisaratsu. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 77)

No. 478

Commander TAINAN AIR at Lae  
(COM 14-150702-TI)  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 65)

No. 479

Routing and associations indicate Commander 3RD AIR at Ambon  
(BEL 151048-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 78)

No. 480

Routing and associations indicate Commander and Staff Communication Officer 11th air FLEET at Tenian  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was pointed out:

CINC 11TH AIR FLEET arrived in Rabaul 11 August and was noticed back at Tenian 14 August. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 48)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 481

Routing and associations indicate Com-  
mander AIRRON 22 at Kisaratsu.  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was stated:

--- is the 3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE or  
NORTHERN AIR FORCE since he became a Major  
Commander. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 10)

No. 482

Commander KANOYA AIR at Sabang  
addressed Serial #647 at 0930/12 August for  
Action to COMAIRRON 23 at Koepang(?),  
Commander TAKAO AIR at Kendari and  
Commander 3RD AIR at Ambon, Info:  
To Chief of Staff 3RD and SOUTHERN  
EXPEDITIONARY FLEETS, COMAIRRON 21  
at Sabang, Singapore BASE FORCE  
, Soerabaja BASE FORCE plus  
enciphered Commander BATAVIA EXPEDITIONARY  
FORCE and Commander Submarine BASE FORCE,  
despatch was delivered on Tokio broadcast  
for latter addressee; this may indicate an  
increase of Air Patrol in the Netherlands  
East Indies. (BEL 151022-TI)

It was observed:

OPNAV identifies and as  
2ND AND 1ST ATTACK FORCES respectively,  
both operating in the Malay-NEI Area.  
is 3RD FLEET not 3RD AIR.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 74)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander of the Fourteenth Air Group was operating in the Mandates, though at least two of his detachments were at Tulagi and Gasmata. A report of available planes was made by this organization at this time:

No. 483

FROM: (14TH AIR GROUP) #992 Aug. 14

Is a report of 14TH AIR CORPS planes as follows: Planes (Seaplanes) on hand, type 23, 11; type 23 MOD 1, 1 (Transports?) 3. Total 15. Available, Seaplanes 9; Transports 3; Total 12, including those at Rabaul, under overhaul until 16th, Seaplanes 3.

Pilots: Class A Seaplane Pilots, 10.  
Class B, 2.

Class A

Am sending 3 Seaplanes and 1 transport to Rabaul on 15th. (COM 14 151932-DI)

It was noticed:

is 14TH AIR GROUP. At 1630, Aug. 13th, Comdr. 14TH AIR GROUP made a report indicating imminent departure Marshalls for New Britain Area, but on Aug. 14th, he still appeared at base near Kwajalein. 14TH AIR GROUP Serial 582, Aug. 13th, indicated 3 flying boats of this Force were scheduled to leave Imieji for Rabaul Aug. 15th. A detachment of the 14TH AIR GROUP was believed to be in Tulagi Aug. 3rd, and on Aug. 4th, a detachment of the 14TH AIR GROUP appeared at Gasmata. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 53)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 484

Comdr. 14TH AIR still in Man-  
dates while a detachment (69) is at Truk  
Air , now in New Britain.  
(COM 14 152008-TI)

It was commented:

Previously reported. has been  
identified as Truk Air and Gasmata, this is  
not understood. is more likely  
Gasmata Air Base than Truk Air Group. D/F  
confirms this. (Summary, 160600, August,  
No. 54)

Close supervision was maintained on Japanese  
air tenders, since an estimate of future offensive  
action could sometimes be made from this traffic.  
Seven tenders of the Eleventh Air Fleet were noticed  
in the Kwajalein zone, one was near Jaluit, and five  
were in the Saipan-Yokosuka area:

No. 485

Following 11TH AIR FLEET MARU TENDERS  
in Kwajalein Zone:

Above on 15th, plus KAWOI  
GOSHU MARU , and DESDIV 34 Flagship  
(COM 14 152006-TI)



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 485 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

\_\_\_\_\_ is SOUYOU MARU. \_\_\_\_\_ is un-  
identified MARU. \_\_\_\_\_ is unidentified  
MARU. \_\_\_\_\_ is unidentified MARU.  
\_\_\_\_\_ is unidentified MARU.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 50)

No. 486

Routing and associations indicate MARU  
in Jaluit Area. (BEL 151048-TI)

It was noted:

This MARU has been reported as an air-  
tender. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 46)

No. 487

Routing and associations indicate KAMI-  
KAWA MARU and MARU air-tenders  
and \_\_\_\_\_ are in Saipan Area and  
in company with MARU air-tender  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was declared:

The KAMIKAWA MARU'S #894 of 11 August  
indicated it would leave Yokosuka 23 August  
for Rabaul. Apparently the 23 August was in  
error.

MARU air-tender \_\_\_\_\_ was ordered 9  
August to proceed to Solomons Area via Rabaul.  
MARU air-tender \_\_\_\_\_ arrived at Yoko-  
suka 13 August from the Marshalls.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 487 (Cont.)

MARU air-tender was reported at Yokosuka 13 August. TI indicated it would probably take some 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE units or equipment from the Marshalls to Rabaul. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 60)

No. 488

FROM: #458 Aug. 13/1300  
(MARU Air Tender)

This ship left Rabaul, scheduled to arrive Yokosuka \_\_\_\_\_ (date in latter part of month). Unknown cargo mail and passengers aboard. Remainder not readable. (BEL 150630-DI)

It was mentioned:

Serial 460, Aug. 13th, which appeared as Item 48, Page 15, R.I. SUMMARY 150600/Q August, gives a revised schedule. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 101)

Decipherment of Japanese operational dispatches provided identification of some enemy air units, and also gave further proof that many aircraft were being shipped from the Empire to southern waters:

No. 489

FROM: #953  
(Staff Comm. Off. 5TH  
BASE FORCE, Saipan)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 489 (Cont.)

TO : (Comdr. Yokosuka Air)  
(Comdr. HAHAJIMA AIR)  
INFO: (Staff Comm. Off. 11TH  
AIR FLT.)  
(Yokosuka Comdt.)  
(Staff Comm. Off. 7TH  
BASE FORCE, Chichijima)  
(Staff Comm. Off. 4TH  
FLEET)  
(Staff Comm. Off. 6TH  
AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
FROM: Commander YOKOSUKA AIR DETACHMENT (?)

Tomorrow will search the arc 0° - 90°  
from PS to a depth of 140 (about) miles.  
(GZ #2490-DI)

It was remarked:

PS is Saipan. The YOKOSUKA AIR GROUP has  
been associated with the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE,  
and on 12 Aug. was mentioned in COM 14 TI,  
with OKURA, SUKUGAWA, IWAKUNI and HIRO AIR  
GROUPS as being concerned in movement of air-  
craft from Empire, Southward.  
(Summary, 150600, August, No. 19)

No. 490

#768 Aug. 14/1850  
FROM: (Tokyo Bureau Aero.)  
TO : (TAINAN AIR)  
INFO: (Comdr. 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FOR.)  
(108TH AIR GROUP)  
(Chief of Staff 11TH AIR  
FLT.)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 490 (Cont.)

Three——(landplane?) attack planes which were scheduled to be sent on August \_\_\_\_\_, will be sent to your Station on the \_\_\_\_\_, because they are to be used by 6TH AIR when they are sent forward. (GZ #2494-OPNAV 150912-DI) (Summary, 150600, August, No. 28)

No. 491

FROM: (11TH AIR FLEET) #21 Aug. 13

Not readable, but indicates 1 heavy bomber with Staff Officers of 8TH FLEET and 11TH AIR FLEET scheduled leave Rabaul for Truk about 9 o'clock, 14th. (BEL 150630-DI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 49)

Enemy supply ships were constantly shuttling to and from the Empire. Several Marus were en route to Truk, some were at Rabaul, and a few were homeward bound:

No. 492

Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_, in DESDIV 7. addressed CINC 1ST AIR FLEET \_\_\_\_\_, information Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ in DESDIV 16, Chief of Staff COMBINED \_\_\_\_\_, 4TH FLEET \_\_\_\_\_, Chichijima Base \_\_\_\_\_, Truk Base \_\_\_\_\_, and Maru \_\_\_\_\_, at 1000, 14 August. Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ is in \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 492 (Cont.)

Yokosuka vicinity and gets traffic direct from Yokosuka. Believe Destroyer escorting Maru to Truk. (GT #661 - OPNAV 151720 - TI)

It was pointed out:

Maru has appeared by association to belong to the 1ST AIR FLEET. (Summary, 151400, August, No. 18)

No. 493

Marus and in Palao Zone at 1800, 15 August. Maru in Saipan Zone at 2000. KINAI MARU in Saipan Zone, bound for Truk. (GT #663 - OPNAV 151842 - TI)

It was stated:

KINAI MARU was used to transport part of the SASEBO #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE to the New Britain Area in the "SN" operation in the last part of June, 1942. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 45)

No. 494

Routing and associations indicate MARU of 1ST AIR FLEET enroute from Yokosuka to Truk. (BEL 151048-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 58)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 495

MARU in Truk Zone at 1800, Aug.  
15, (GT #662-OPNAV 151721-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 63)

No. 496

FROM: (MARU) #449 Aug. 14  
TO : CINC 8TH FLEET.

Leave Sasebo 14th, for Rabaul. Sched-  
uled arrive 22nd. (BEL 150630-DI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 102)

No. 497

MARU , on verge of leaving Empire  
at 1200, Aug. 15, originated enciphered zone  
change, addressed to Tokyo, Sasebo, Truk,  
Rabaul, and 8TH FLEET. (GT #662-OPNAV  
151721-TI)

It was observed:

MARU was info addressee along  
with TOKO AIR GROUP of a message from CINC  
COMBINED on Aug. 11, which concerned trans-  
fer of aircraft to the Southeastern Area,  
and on Aug. 13 was apparently directed to  
proceed to Rabaul. (Summary, 160600,  
August, No. 29)

No. 498

Fleet Auxiliary in Rabaul Area.  
(COM 14 152006-TI) (Summary, 160600,  
August, No. 99)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 499

Tanker "SATA" still associated RABAU  
BASE FORCE and in that area.  
(COM 14-150642-TI) (Summary, 160600,  
August, No. 100)

No. 500

#527 Aug. 13/(?)

FROM: (FUJIKAWA MARU)  
TO : (AIRRON 11)  
(3RD AIR ATTACK FOR.) at  
KISARATSU AIR  
(BIHORO AIR GROUP) at KISAR-  
ATSU AIR  
INFO: (Yokosuka)  
(Unidentified)

(Very sketchy translation) indicates  
change her schedule to arrive Marcus  
on 23rd. (BEL 151345-DI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 24)

No. 501

Routing and associations indicate  
(tanker?) enroute Rabaul to Saipan via  
Truk. (This ship appears to be making shut-  
tle trips between Rabaul and Saipan).  
(BEL 151048-TI)

It was noticed:

This is the tanker which appeared to  
fuel CRUDIV 6 near Kavieng about 12 August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 97)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

The KAGA MARU, which together with the Commander of Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Division Two, had received an order from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet on August 9 to rendezvous with the Second Fleet and to proceed to Rabaul, reported that it would rendezvous at Balikpapan. The rendezvous of the Second Fleet was to take place in the vicinity of Truk about August 19 or 21;

No. 502

FROM:  
TO :  
INFO:

#297 Aug. 14/1640  
(KAGU MARU)  
(CINC 2ND FLEET)  
(CofS COMBINED FLEET)  
(COMDESRON 4)  
(CofS SO. EXP. FORCE)  
(COMCRUDIV 7)  
(Comdr. 22ND BASE FORCE  
at Balikpapan)

Will rendezvous with \_\_\_\_\_ at 1400  
on 14th at point (?) "BB" \_\_\_\_\_ and arrive PT  
21st. (GZ #2492-OPNAV 150245-DI) (MEMO  
#14-4)

It was commented:

BB is tentatively Balikpapan. PT is  
Truk. On August 9, CINC COMBINED FLEET  
issued a directive to COMCRUDIV 7, COMDE-  
DIV 2, and KAGU MARU which appeared to in-  
struct the units addressed to rendezvous



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 502 (Cont.)

with the 2ND FLEET (scheduled to depart Japan on Aug. 11) and proceed to the Rabaul Area (Item 23, Page 7, R.I. SUMMARY 111400/Q August). Note that CINC 2ND FLEET was the info addressee of this despatch and also is action addressee of the above despatch. (Summary, 150600, August, No. 56)

No. 503

#054 Aug. 14/1200  
FROM: (DD in DESDIV 2)  
TO : (CINC 2ND FLEET)  
(COMCRUDIV 7)  
(22ND BASE FORCE, Balikpapan)  
(32ND BASE FORCE, DAVAO)  
(Tokyo Radio)  
(Palao Radio)  
(Truk Radio)  
INFO: (COMDESDIV 2)

(DD) will be in BB Communication Zone until the 15th at            in MD Communication Zone from then until            on 17th, then into #3 Communication Zone until 1200, 19th, at which time will enter #4 Communication Zone. (GZ #2505-OPNAV 152240-DI)

It was indicated:

(Destroyer in DESDIV 2) appears to be in company with the KAGU MARU and the above schedule checks with the schedule that the KAGU MARU gives in her serial 294 of Aug. 12th (Item 37, Page 13, R.I. SUMMARY 141400/Q August). KAGU MARU Serial 297, August 14th, addressed to CINC 2ND FLEET says,

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 503 (Cont.)

Will rendezvous with \_\_\_\_\_ at 1400 on 14th at point? BB and arrive PT 21st. BB is Balikpapan and PT is Truk. Note that KAGU MARU and \_\_\_\_\_ appear to be separated from CRUDIV 7 and the remainder of DESDIV 2, but all are action addressees of COMBINED FLEET's Serial 742, Aug. 9th, which orders them to join 2ND FLEET (which departs from home waters on 11th for the Rabaul Area). These messages suggests that the rendezvous between 2ND FLEET, CRUDIV 7, DESDIV 2, KAGU MARU and Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ will take place in the vicinity of Truk about Aug. 19th or 21st, CINC 2ND FLEET was indicated in the Saipan Area on August 15th.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 65)

Traffic analysis disclosed that the Commander of Submarine Squadron One was en route from the Empire for duty in the Eighth Fleet area. The Commander of Submarine Squadron Three was in the vicinity of Truk, where he was to be joined by two other units. Three submarine divisions were in the Indian Ocean area:

No. 504

Strong possibility COMSUBRON 1 is on way south to relieve COMSUBRON 3 as Commander all submarines in 8TH FLEET Area. COMSUBRON 3 fixed by D/F just Northwest of Truk. Units \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ believed

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 504 (Cont.)

will soon join SUBDIV of SUBRON 3.  
Present traffic shows three SUBDIVS to be  
in Saigon or Indian Ocean Area:  
and of SUBRON 8, and of SUBRON  
1. Saigon broadcasts to Subs in area on  
7730 kcs. using 3-kana calls.  
(COM 14-150704-TI) (Summary, 151400,  
August, No. 26)

No. 505

Traffic for COMSUBRON 1  
routed via Saipan at 0700, August 15th.  
(GT #666-OPNAV 152305-TI)

It was noted:

Traffic on August 14th, indicated that  
SUBRON 1, less one division, will be assigned  
to Southern Area.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 108)

No. 506

Some evidence COMSUBRON 1 bound  
South from Empire. Was addressed 15th, by  
COMSUBFOR in urgent despatch, reason urgency  
not clear. (COM 14 152008-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 109)

No. 507

Routing and associations indicate  
of SUBRON 1 at Kure. (BEL 151048-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 110)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

Submarine Division Twelve was in the Eighth Fleet area, and it was believed that the Submarine MAMI 1 would soon operate in the same vicinity;

No. 508

SUBDIV 12 of SUBRON 3 is indicated as being in 8TH FLEET area and was addressed for action by Staff Communication Officer 11TH AIR FLEET, Serial 027 at 1840/14 August which was addressed for info: To Submarine and Staff Communication Officer 8TH FLEET. (BEL 150954-TI)

It was declared:

is believed to be the call of a SUBDIV in SUBRON 6. has been reported as Flagship of SUBRON 6. Both were believed in the Rabaul-Tulagi Area as late as August 11th. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 111)

No. 509

Submarine may soon join his division in SUBRON 8 operating area. (COM 14 152008-TI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 107)

Allied submarines continued their activity in striking at the Japanese lifeline:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 510

#037 July 30/(?)  
FROM: (Unidentified)  
TO : 5 Unrecovered Addressees

"At 1710/30 July in Latitude 7 - 02 North, 151 - 15 East received two torpedo hits sinking(?) at 1720."  
(HEL 151345-DI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 56)

No. 511

#92 Aug. 14  
FROM: (Unit in 4TH BASE FOR.)

"Enemy submarine fired 2 torpedoes in position 05-10 North, (150 to 155) East, from range about 2000 meters, no damage. We are returning the attack."  
(COM 14 151924-DI) (Summary, 160600, August, No. 89)

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 15 stated:

No. 512

FROM: YMS 176 (NPM) 150253, August, 1942  
TO : All Comtaskforpac  
Comsopac  
Comsowestpac  
All Seafrontpac  
Cominch (NSS)  
Opnav  
Comnaveu

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 512 (Cont.)

NCR 4551 J

Bulletin No. 152

Crudiv 7, KAGU MARU, DD's of Desron 3 still in East Indies. Desdiv 17 enroute from Truk to Rabaul. Submarine posit by DF all south and east. 7 161, 7 159, 8 163. One sub sighted at 17-30 south, one 63-50 east. HAYATAKA, HITAKA, ZUIHO (XCV's) plus two heavy cruisers (TAKAO class) believed operating off east coast of Honshu. All other carriers indicated to be in home ports. Indications enemy strengthening and expanding facilities and air field at Buka Straits in Solomons. Also airfield at Buna being expanded. Suspect enemy has eye on Gizo. May attempt landing there.

Japanese espionage reports continued to flow into Tokyo. It was evident that agents in America were still active in ferreting out information which would be useful to Axis submarines:

No. 513

FROM: Madrid (Suma) #891, 13 August 1942  
TO : Tokyo

TO Intelligence (New York, August 12th).

On the 9th, a convoy of 30 ships left Los Angeles. It was escorted by a small fleet of three cruisers and three aircraft carriers. The cargo consisted of railroad and airplane materials. The convoy transported companies of engineers, a unit of

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 513 (Cont.)

anti-tank gunners and two divisions of field artillery.

Two of the three aircraft carriers were rebuilt cruisers, equipped with twelve 380 millimeter cannon. They were commissioned the 15th of last month. The equipment of these ships is unsatisfactory for naval use. The original structure and one of the smokestacks are not suitable. Moreover, the defense of the bridge (quarter deck?) below the runway is not adequate.

This convoy is going to Bombay but the airplane materials are destined for China.

I have transmitted this to Berlin and Rome. (GZ #5889-JAP DIP-DI)

It was mentioned.

Does not check with known Convoy Movements. (Summary, 151400, August, No. 9)

No. 514

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 515

---



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942

The Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff was very active on this date, as was the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. Since subordinate units, such as destroyer divisions, air tenders, and tankers were being addressed, it was believed that a reorganization of naval forces was being completed;

No. 516

Chief of Naval General Staff active originator to general address lists.  
(COM 14-160812-TI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 6)

No. 517

CINC COMBINED FLEET addressed several DESDIVS and individual destroyers. Air tenders and tankers associated with previous moves are appearing in traffic, believe indication that organization Forces approaching more definite form.  
(COM 14-160812-TI) (Summary, 161400, August, No. 4)

The heavy volume of traffic emanating from the Communication section at Tokyo indicated that changes were about to be made in the Japanese communication system. The Communication Officer of the Combined

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Fleet was also much concerned with this change, as was the Communication Officer of the Twenty-third Base Force:

No. 518

Volume of traffic originated by Communication Section Tokyo suggests further changes to existing Communication Systems. (COM 14-162132-TI) (Summary, 170600, August, No. 4)

No. 519

Communication Officer COMBINED FLEET originated short serial 795 on 12 August to COMBINED FLEETS less unident. but probable Southwestern Area Fleets, info: Unident and Communication Section Tokyo. This message has been on the air several times daily ever since and may be important Communication Order. (GT #676-OPNAV 161830-TI) (Summary, 161400, August, No. 5)

No. 520

14 August/1510  
FROM: 23RD BASE FORCE Communication Officer  
TO : (CinC COMBINED FLEET)  
(CinC 1ST FLEET)  
(CinC 8TH FLEET)  
Tokyo Radio  
Palao Radio  
Comdr 11TH AIR FLEET  
8TH BASE FORCE  
Singapore Radio

434

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 520 (Cont.)

Possibly communication arrangements for units moving into Rabaul Area via Palao. (COM 14-162148-TI)

It was remarked:

The 23rd BASE FORCE has not been placed here. 8TH BASE FORCE is believed in Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 55)

Enemy radio intelligence traffic from Jaluit, Truk and Rabaul was very light on this day though the Fifth Air Attack Force was quite busy. Increased activity between units of the Third Fleet at Makassar and Ambon and the Eighth Fleet was also noticed:

No. 521

R.I. traffic from Jaluit, Truk and Rabaul still light, however 5TH AIR ATTACK originates report to large list addressees including 1ST AIR FLEET and 2ND FLEET CINCS.  
(COM 14-160736-TI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 15)

No. 522

Liaison between 3RD FLEET Units at Makassar and Ambon and 8TH FLEET increasing. (COM 14-162148-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 61).

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis disclosed that the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was concentrating units in the Saipan area. It was anticipated that his fleet would move southwards to Truk within the very near future.

No. 523

Saipan Radio Active handling traffic addressed CINC 2ND FLEET, HAGURO and (F/S AIRRON 11). Also works DD apparently in company MARU Commander (Identified as a SPECIAL LANDING FORCE) is aboard. Evidence points toward CINC 2ND concentrating units Saipan Area prior making any further move present association with units in Southeast. (COM 14-160736-TI)

It was pointed out;

is identified as the CHIYODA.  
is identified as KINAI MARU and on 15 August appeared by T.I. to be in Saipan Communication Zone bound for Truk.  
is identified as Flagship of DESDIV 29.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 13)

No. 524

Truk called (general cover call) for delivery message to Cinc 2ND at 2138, 16 August.  
(GT #677-OPNAV-162340-TI)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 524 (Cont.)

It was stated:

On August 16 Saipan Radio was active handling traffic addressed to Cinc 2ND. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 27)

No. 525

Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET addressed Chief of Staff 4TH, Info Chiefs of Staff 2ND, 1ST AIR, SUB FORCE, 11TH AIR, 8TH, Truk Base, Truk Harbormaster and Naval General Staff. This message could be a movement report although somewhat long (38 groups). Messages to Truk Harbormaster almost invariably deal with movements to Truk or with anchorage assignments, locations of anchorages, etc. So, while there is yet nothing to substantiate any movement by Cinc COMBINED, this may deal with preliminary arrangements for berthing heavy, or numerous vessels. All indications point to concentration of 2ND FLEET Units at Truk. (GT #682-OPNAV-162355-TI) (Summary, 170600, August, No. 30)

A special warning was given when traffic analysis revealed that the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet was receiving traffic via Jaluit. Associations between the Fourth and Second Fleets, which

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

were en route to Truk, were watched with interest since these might possibly forecast future joint operations on the part of these organizations:

No. 526

Of special note which bears further watching is one routing where CINC 4TH FLEET traffic routed to Jaluit for delivery. (COM 14-160812-TI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 16)

No. 527

Communication Officer 4TH FLEET addressed Communication Officer 2ND FLEET in short despatch originated at 1635 and delivered by Truk at 1757, 16 August. (GT #680-OPNAV-162350-TI)

It was observed:

TI on 16 August stated Saipan Radio active handling traffic addressed Cinc 2ND FLEET. Possibly Comm Officer not in company but if he be, progress South of Cinc 2ND appears progressing rapidly. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 28)

No. 528

FROM: (Fleet Unit) Aug. 16/0000  
TO : Saipan Radio  
Truk Radio  
CINC 4TH FLEET

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 528 (Cont.)

This was a pre-movement report.  
(COM 14 162142-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 26)

The interception and decipherment of Japanese operational messages had often proved to be of great value to United States naval forces. Information obtained from these dispatches could not have been acquired in any other fashion. Even espionage, which very frequently is of value in indicating potential trends, could not have obtained with the same facility the complete details which were made available by the interception of the enemy's most secret dispatches. An indication of this will be found in some of the succeeding messages.

It will be noticed that there are many gaps in the dispatches, but even with these deficiencies the existence of the enemy's plans for an attack was revealed. It was learned that the Commander of the Dutch East Indies Force was to operate in the Outer South Seas under the jurisdiction of the Commander in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Chief of the Eighth Fleet. The principal Japanese objective at this time was the recapture and defense of Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

No. 529

FROM: #871 Aug. (?)  
(Comdr. DEI FORCE)

From Commander DEI FORCE, OP Order #30 (Part 1). This FORCE has been assigned to the OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE. The \_\_\_\_\_ Unit will load at Base 10 such \_\_\_\_\_ as needed and operate under CINC 8TH FLEET. (Part 2). The same Unit is detached from the \_\_\_\_\_ DEFENSE FORCE. (COM 14-160726-DI) (Summary, 161400, August, No. 24)

No. 530

FROM: #239 14 August 1942  
(Rabaul)  
TO : (COMBINED FLEET)  
(Naval General Staff)  
(DESRON 2)  
(OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE)  
(DESDIV 4)  
(DESDIV 17)  
INFO: (Chief of Staff SUBFORCE)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)

Contains details of projected operations against RXI and RXB. Not very readable but we get following:

From Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET. OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE and BASE AIR FORCE will cooperate



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 530 (Cont.)

with Army in putting a Defense (?) Force into RXI and some other action concerning RXB and Base or Bases in RXB area. CRUDIV 6 will depart RO on 17th apparently with mission of supporting Defense (?) Force by attacking enemy vessels. DESRON 2 and BASE AIR FORCE, under command of COMDESRON 2, will do something or other apparently in connection with a convoy leaving Truk (?) at 0600 on (blank) date and arriving at (blank) point at 1830 on 21st. Unrecovered Unit, DESDIV 4 less Second section, and DESDIV 17 are to join (?) the IKKI DETACHMENT leaving Truk at (blank) hours on 15th and accompany (?) to RXI (date of 18th is mentioned in connection latter operation but unable to determine whether this is date of arrival at RXI or some intermediate point). (Blanks) conduct reconnaissance of RXI with Seaplanes operating from Gizo (?) Island.

It was noticed:

Many blanks in text of above make it impossible to be positive concerning details but can be no doubt as to general intentions. Many messages have been sent same addressees as above in new code. This might be amplifying or changing directives contained in above. (GZ #2512-OPNAV-162000-DI) (MEMO #16-1)

Identifications of above place designators are:

RXI is believed Guadalcanal.  
RXB is believed Tulagi.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 530 (Cont.)

RO is questionable Kavieng.  
Gizo Island is 08-05 S, 156-50 E.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 43)

Close cooperation between Japanese forces on Guadalcanal Island and units of the Fourth Fleet were indicated by operational messages from the Island which were re-transmitted by Truk:

No. 531

Identified as Base on Guadalcanal, originated 2 Most Urgent Operational Codes at 1200 (or 2200) 16 August. Best estimated position 10° S, 159° E.  
(GT #678-OPNAV-162345-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 44)

No. 532

Between 1900 and 2100 on the 16th, Guadalcanal Air Base originated several despatches which were broadcast by Truk to 4TH FLEET. (COM 14 162142-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 45)

Cruiser Division Six was still active in the Kavieng-Rabaul area and was responsible for escorting most of the convoys in this region:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 533

#273 1500/14/Aug.  
FROM: (Indefinite Cover Call)  
TO : (Armed Guard aboard a MARU)  
INFO: (Staff Comm. Officer, 4TH  
FLEET)  
(Staff Comm. Officer, 8TH  
FLEET)  
(Staff Comm. Officer, 8TH  
BASE FORCE, Rabaul)  
FROM: Staff CRUDIV 6.

In accordance with 8TH FLEET SMS #(242) we are leaving RO (MEUE Offing) for Operations at 1400 on the 16th. Please inform concerning (whereabouts of 8TH Convoy)\*  
\*Translators Note: not entirely certain of this. (GZ #2506-OPNAV 160135-DI)

It was commented:

RO is tentatively Kavieng. Meue Offing is possible at, or near, Mowe Harbor, New Britain Island, 06-14 South, 149-32 East. CRUDIV 6 was evidently in RO Area for purpose of refueling.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 86)

No. 534

serial 274, addressed TOYOTAKE MARU and Staff Communication Officer 8TH FLEET, From Staff of \_\_\_\_\_ (CRUDIV 6 or 8TH FLEET(?)), (already passed to CRUDIV 6) reference \_\_\_\_\_ message #141 (about). Please arrange that this Force's \_\_\_\_\_ duty will be completed(?) at Rabaul on about the 23rd. (BEL 160235-DI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 534 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

TOYOTAKE MARU not listed in Lloyds or other lists available to 20-G.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 27)

Though Cruiser Division Seven, together with Destroyer Division Two and the KAGU MARU, was thought to be en route to join the Second Fleet in the vicinity of Truk, the possibility existed that Cruiser Divisions Seven and Eight were going to rendezvous with the First Air Fleet near Saipan:

No. 535

Possibilities of CRUDIVS 7 and 8 effecting rendezvous with 1ST AIR FLEET in Saipan Area exists. (COM 14 162142-TI)

It was noted:

CRUDIV 8 was last heard Aug. 11th in Empire Waters. Both CRUDIV 7 and CRUDIV 8 have been associated in traffic with the 1ST AIR FLEET. However, CRUDIV 7 along with DESDIV 2, KAGU MARU, and unidentified were ordered by CINC COMBINED FLEET Serial 742 on Aug. 9th, to "join the 2ND FLEET" and they appear to be enroute to Truk to make this rendezvous with the 2ND FLEET. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 16)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 536

14 August/0756  
FROM: Concealed originator  
TO : (COMCRUDIV 7)  
(DESDIV)  
INFO: (Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)  
(Truk Harbor Master)

Further associations line COMCRUDIV 7 with 1ST AIR FLEET MARUS ( ) which are now apparently enroute to Truk. This may indicate that COMCRUDIV 7 and DESDIV are proceeding to Truk and may rendezvous with Cinc 2ND FLEET in that Area. DESDIV is apparently in the Makassar/Palao Area and was action addressee of two despatches from Staff Comm. Officer MAKASSAR BASE FORCE at 1510, 14th. (BEL 160755-TI)

It was declared:

This message has the same heading as one previously reported in RI Summary 160600/Q August, page 13, item 43 which has the date and time group 15/0750 Number 6 and believe it is the same message with differences in time date and number a matter of interpretation. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 39)

No. 537

Unidentified originator under Rabaul cover 15/1503 addressed COMSUBRON 7, COM-DESRON 2, COMDESDIV, information Cincs COMBINED and 11TH AIR FLEETS, plus

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 537 (Cont.)

Naval General Staff. (COM 14-160814-TI)

It was mentioned:

is identified DESDIV 4 and by  
TI was between Truk and Rabaul August 15th.  
COMDESRON 2 continued in communication with  
Saipan 15 August.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 60)

No. 538

Chief of Staff PHILIPPINE FLEET (MARU  
704) addressed COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 3,  
Info Davao Base and Davao Branch  
103 Military Stores Depot at 1000,  
16th, substantiating trip from Macassar and  
Celebes Sea to Mandate Area.  
(GT #677-OPNAV-162340-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 62)

No. 539

15 August/1600  
FROM: (In 3RD FLEET AREA recently)  
TO : CinC 8TH FLEET  
Tokyo Movements  
CinC COMBINED  
COMDESRON 3  
8TH BASE FORCE  
COMDESDIV RISE 4

This was a movement report.  
(COM 14-162148-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 539 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

This was previously noted in RI Summary 161400/Q August, page 11, item 30, and indicated this ship enroute to Rabaul possibly from East Indies.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 53)

The Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two, who had been en route from Yokosuka, announced his arrival at Truk on August 15. Thence he set out for Rabaul. The associations noticed in the headings of his dispatches led to the supposition that the ATAGO was the flagship of the Second Fleet:

No. 540

At 1000, 11th. concealed originator addressed station serial to the ATAGO, Tokyo, Yokosuka, Chichijima, Saipan and Truk. Comparison of serial numbers disclosed originator to be COMDESRON 2, apparently reporting shift of communication zones while enroute from Yokosuka to Truk. At 1520, 15th, (no originator serial number), a despatch bearing and emanating from Truk was addressed for action and CINCS COMBINED, 2ND and 8TH FLEETS, Kure Commandant and Movement Report Office

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 540 (Cont.)

information to All OUTSIDE SOUTHERN FORCE  
Commanders plus Chiefs of Staff  
SUBFORCE and 11TH AIR FLEET  
This appears to be COMDESRON 2 report  
of arrival at Truk. At 0500, 16th, con-  
cealed originator of an encoded Communica-  
tion Zone report addressed the ATAGO  
, CHOKAI, Truk, Rabaul  
and Tokyo. Station serial  
indicates originator to be COMDESRON 2.  
This Command is apparently enroute from  
Truk to Rabaul.

Foregoing despatch headings suggest  
ATAGO as Flagship 2ND FLEET. Saipan Radio  
continued to deliver traffic to CINC 2ND  
FLEET on 5375 during the evening  
of 15th. Saipan also called COMDESRON 4  
on this frequency.  
(BEL 160725-TI) (Summary, 161400, August,  
No. 12)

No. 541

COMDESRON 2 apparently enroute Rabaul  
but not there yet. (COM 14-162148-TI)

It was pointed out:

TI on 16 August indicated COMDESRON 2  
apparently enroute Truk to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 50)

No. 542

At 1623, 16 August, Truk relays to  
Rabaul for delivery to Communication Officer



AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 542 (Cont.)

DESRON 2 (GT #683-OPNAV-  
162355-TI)

It was stated:

On 16 August TI indicated COMDESRON 2  
apparently enroute Truk to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 49)

No. 543

5TH AIR ATTACK includes COMDESRON 2  
in reports, 15-16 August. So  
far there is no indication of what Forces  
are with CinC 2ND FLEET except COMDESRON 2.  
(GT #678-OPNAV-162345-TI)

It was observed:

At 2200, 15 August Saipan continued in  
communication with COMDESRON 2.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 24)

There were no indications of the other forces  
which were presumed to be with the Commander in Chief  
of the Second Fleet, though a unit belonging to a  
division of Destroyer Squadron Three reported its ar-  
rival in Truk. Destroyer Squadron Three had been  
associated with Cruiser Division Seven, now on its  
way to Rabaul, but it was not certain that Destroyer

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Squadron Three was accompanying Cruiser Division  
Seven:

No. 544

Concealed originator message  
Aug. 15/0750 NR 6, action COMCRUDIV 7  
, COMDESDIV info CofS 2ND  
FLEET, 4TH FLEET and  
Truk Harbormaster, evidently re-  
port arrival Truk of destroyer in DESDIV  
NONU 1. (GT #665-OPNAV 160040-TI)

It was noticed:

is a DESDIV of DESRON 3. DESRON  
3 has been associated with CRUDIV 7 and  
Dutch East Indies. It is not clear whether  
DESRON 3 is or is not enroute Rabaul via  
Truk with CRUDIV 7.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 43)

It was evident that the enemy was building up  
his destroyer strength in the Solomons. Among the  
destroyer commanders and units noticed en route to  
or in the Truk-Rabaul area were the following: the  
Commander of Destroyer Squadron Four, and a com-  
mander of one of his subordinate destroyer divisions;  
Destroyer Division Thirty; two units of Destroyer  
Squadron Three; the Commander of Destroyer Division

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Four; Destroyer Division Seventeen; and one unit each  
of Destroyer Divisions Sixteen and Twenty-nine:

No. 545

Saipan at 1820, 16 August relayed  
message from YURA F/S DESRON 4,  
to Truk for delivery to CINC 2ND FLEET  
COMDESRON 4 and COMDESDIV  
in DESRON 4. Not clear what ship  
COMDESRON 4 is in. (GT #679-OPNAV 161830-  
TI) (Summary, 161400, August, No. 14)

No. 546

FROM: #365 14 August  
TO : 8TH FLEET

Partly readable. This Force's Opera-  
tion Schedule.

1. \_\_\_\_\_ depart Sasebo. On morn-  
ing of 19th arrive Truk, (After fueling and  
replenishment (?)) depart Truk arriving  
Rabaul on 21st about \_\_\_\_\_ time.  
(BEL 161145-DI)

It was commented:

\_\_\_\_\_ believed DESDIV 30. Serial 364  
from same originator stated, "This Division  
less \_\_\_\_\_ at 1200 left Sasebo for RR  
(Rabaul) via PT (Truk)".  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 59)

No. 547

At 1600, 15th, destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ of DES-  
RON 3, originated serial #34, the routing

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 547 (Cont:)

of which indicates that ship to be enroute to Rabaul possibly from East Indies.  
(BEL 160725-TI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 30)

No. 548

COMDESDIV in DESRON 3 addressed Truk Base, CinC COMBINED 1ST AIR FLEET info  
COMDESRON 3, COMCRUDIV 7  
Appears this DESDIV will join the Forces now headed for Truk.  
(GT #677-OPNAV-162345-TI)

It was indicated:

On August 6 COMDESDIV of DESRON 3 was believed by TI in Saigon Area.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 38)

No. 549

COMDESDIV 4 and Destroyers and were between Truk and Rabaul at 1640, Aug. 15th.  
(GT #665-OPNAV 160040-TI)

It was noted:

These units were reported as being in Rabaul Area by Belconnen on Aug. 14th.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 91)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 550

Rabaul transmits to Truk for delivery to COMDESDIV 4 at 1600, 16th indicating this DESDIV not yet in Rabaul Zone. (GT #682-OPNAV-162355-TI)

It was declared:

TI on August 15 stated COMDESDIV 4 was between Truk and Rabaul at 1640. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 31)

No. 551

FROM: #459 1120/8 August  
TO : (COMDESDIV 17)  
(CinC, 8TH FLEET)  
(CinC, FIRST AIR FLEET)  
(CinC, COMBINED FLEET)  
(COMDESRON 10)  
INFO: (Comdr. 8TH BASE FORCE,  
Rabaul)  
(Comdr. 4TH BASE FORCE,  
Truk)  
(MARU)

This division, less ISOKAZE(?), departs Kure for RR via PT at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_. (GZ #2501-OPNAV 160125-DI)

It was mentioned:

PT is Truk. RR is Rabaul. On 14 August COMDESDIV 17 reported his arrival at Truk. On 12 August this division had reported his anticipated arrival at Rabaul at 1500, August 17th. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 85)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 552

Destroyer in DESDIV 16 originated enciphered Zone Change at 1400, 14 August to following:

TO : (Tokyo Radio)  
(Kure Radio)  
(Yokosuka Radio)  
(Saipan Radio)  
(Truk Radio)  
(NAGARA)  
(SHOKAKU)  
INFO: (MARU)  
(MARU)

Destroyer has been otherwise indicated as probable escort for the two MARUS to Southern Area. DESDIV 16 has been assigned to DESRON 10, which has been serving with 1ST AIR FLEET. The normal communication zone change is addressed to flagships of chain of command. This message, then, confirms NAGARA as Flagship DESRON 10, and indicates SHOKAKU as Flagship 1ST AIR FLEET. (GT #680-OPNAV-162350-TI)

It was remarked:

Yokosuka relayed traffic to Saipan for delivery to Destroyer at 0712, 15 August. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 41)

No. 553

MARU and Destroyer of DESDIV 29 in Saipan Zone at 2030, 16 August. (GT #677-OPNAV-162340-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 553 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

(MARU) was believed by TI bound for Truk on 11 August. Saipan Radio was indicated working Destroyer on 16 August. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 25)

Plane reinforcements were also being brought in by the Japanese to repel any farther American advances in the Solomons. Fourteen fighters and two bombers from the Takao Group were moved into the area, and detachments of the Yokohama and Fourteenth Air Groups were noted at Gasmata. The Fourteenth Air Group formerly had been based in the Marshalls, but the emergency created by the American attack on Tulagi and Guadalcanal had stimulated Japanese aircraft movements:

No. 554

FROM:

TO :

#070, 1320, Aug. 14  
(Remaining Forces Takao Group)  
(Comdr. Omura Air Station)  
(Comdr. China Air Activity)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 554 (Cont.)

INFO: (Staff Communication Officer Air Group associated with 2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE (Sasebo (Navy Yard))?)

At 1140, 14 fighters and 2 bombers arrived. Will take off tomorrow at 1000.  
(GZ #2508-OPNAV 161620 - DI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 37)

No. 555

Detachments of YOKOHAMA AIR GROUP and 14TH AIR GROUP at Gas-mata at 0800, 16 August.  
(GT #680-OPNAV-162350-TI)

It was stated:

On 14 August routing indicated a Detachment of YOKOHAMA FLYING BOAT SQUADRON was shown at Tulagi.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 47)

No. 556

Detachment of the 14TH AIR CORPS is shown at Air Station (Gas-mata ?) in company with a detachment of YOKOHAMA FLYING BOAT SQUADRON (BEL 160755-TI)

It was observed:

COM 14 on 16 August stated Comdr 14TH AIR GROUP enroute Rabaul where a detachment



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 556 (Cont.)

of his command was noted yesterday. TI  
also noted previously detachment of HAMA  
AIR believed headed for Gasmata.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 48)

No. 557

Routing indicates Commander 14TH AIR  
GROUP enroute Rabaul where a Detachment  
his Command was noted yesterday.  
(COM 14-160812-TI)

It was noticed:

14TH AIR GROUP normally appears to be  
based in the Marshalls.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 29)

The Commander of the Kisaratsu Air Group was  
located at Marcus Island on August 15. The presence  
of a commander of a carrier plane group, which was  
scheduled to proceed to the South Pacific, was indi-  
cated at Kisaratsu:

No. 558

Comdr. KISARATSU AIR GROUP remains at  
Marcus Aug. 15.  
(GT #665-OPNAV 160040-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 558 (Cont.)

It was commented:

On Aug. 13th, DI indicated that planes of the KISARATSU AIR GROUP went to NMK (believed Marcus Is.) and TI indicated that the Comdr. KISARATSU AIR GROUP was at Tenian. On Aug. 15th, COM 14 says the Comdr. KISARATSU AIR GROUP is indicated at Misawa. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 22)

No. 559

FROM:

#826, 1640, Aug. 9  
(Staff Communication Officer - 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE).

TO :

(Guam Radio)  
(Staff Communication Officer 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(#5 BASE FORCE at Saipan)  
(#7 BASE FORCE at Chichijima)

21 type - 1 bomber and 2 type - 1 transport(?) planes of this force (carrying COMDR KISARAZU AIR GROUP) will leave Air Station at 0700 tomorrow, the 10th, for PST.

(GZ #2510 - OPNAV 161620 - DI)

It was indicated:

According to D.I. a number of planes of KISARAZU AIR GROUP were to fly from Truk to Vunakanau on 11 August. On 13 August 8 bombers of KISARAZU AIR appeared by D.I. to

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 559 (Cont.)

be enroute Marcus. On 15 August, T.I. indicated COMDR KISARAZU AIR at Marcus.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 17)

No. 560

Comdr. KISARATSU AIR GROUP at Marcus - addressed dispatch to YURA which was relayed from Saipan to Truk at 2000, 16 August. Location of YURA uncertain unless this ship passed from Saipan to Truk Zones between 1820 and 2000, 16th.  
(GT #679-OPNAV 161830-TI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 18)

No. 561

Plane Group Commander - still at  
Kisaratsu at 1500, 16 August.  
(GT #682-OPNAV-162355-TI)

It was noted:

On 15 August further indications were that Carrier-type plane group currently at Kisaratsu was scheduled to proceed Southern Area from a despatch heading.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 18)

No. 562

FROM:

#080-(1/2) 1030/13 Aug.  
(Plane Group)  
(Comdr. 4TH BASE FORCE,  
Truk)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 562 (Cont.)

INFO:

(Cofs, 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
(Comdr. 5TH BASE FORCE,  
Saipan)  
(Comdr. 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
(Comdr. 7TH BASE FORCE,  
Chichijima)  
(Comdr. HAAJIMA AIR)  
(Cofs, Yokosuka)  
(Cofs, COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdr. Unit in YOKOSUKA  
DEFENSE FORCE)

This unit will carry out plane movements as follows: 3 bombers - - - - fighters leave Kisarazu Air (Station?) on 1st day (16th) at 0800 and arrive NME. 2nd day (17th) at 1000 leave NME and arrive PST. On 3rd day (18th) - - - - (Translators note: - cannot make out what they are going to do there all day). On 4th day (19th) leave PST and arrive PT. On 5th day (20th) depart PT and arrive RR at 1000.  
Communications:

(GZ #2503-OPNAV 160310-DI)

It was declared:

Although so far as we can make out, the text of this message deals with only one complete movement, the use of the expressions "first day", "second day", etc., gives the impression that the same movement is to be made by other similar small GROUPS belonging to PLANE GROUP

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 562 (Cont.)

It was further explained:

N&E is new and unidentified; from associations here it would seem to be somewhere in the Bonin Islands (possibly Haha-jima?). PST is Tenian (near Saipan). PT is Truk, RR is Rabaul. AIR GROUP probably a unit of the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE, was placed at KISARAZU AIR by TI on 14 August.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 15)

No. 563

Movement of Air Unit to Rabaul is predicted from his despatch of 0710 on 16th, 6TH AIR ATTACK, 11TH AIR FLEET, BONINS BASE FORCE, YOKOSUKA DEFENSE FORCE Unit, Kisaratsu Air, Enciphered, 5TH AIR ATTACK CORPS, 4TH BASE FORCE, 5TH BASE FORCE, information to Haha-jima Air and Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET (COM 14-162216-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 19)

Traffic analysis disclosed that the First Air Fleet and all Japanese carriers were observing radio silence though the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet was receiving messages from Tokyo. The First Air Fleet had been reorganized recently, but it was thought that none of the addressees in two dispatches, numbers 566 and 567, were a part of this

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

fleet. Comment was made concerning the disappearance of Japanese carrier radio traffic that Destroyer Divisions Three and Seventeen of Destroyer Squadron Ten were en route from Truk and were slated to arrive at Rabaul on August 16. It was pointed out at this time that although the Japanese carriers were not associated with the Rabaul area, the possibility that the destroyer movements reflected the movements of the carriers should not be overlooked:

No. 564

Since last digest, traffic from 1ST AIR FLEET and Carriers has disappeared. CINC 1ST AIR FLEET receiving messages via Tokyo Broadcast. CARDIV 2 not addressee nor seen as originator, believe however he will appear as addressee in RI despatches upon anticipated movement.  
(COM 14-160736-TI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 10)

No. 565

FROM:  
TO :  
INFO:

#459 14 Aug/1800  
(Naval Secretary)  
(Commandant Kure)  
(Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET)  
(Unidentified)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 565 (Cont.)

There have been previous indications that may be the third CARDIV of re-organized 1ST AIR FLEET and foregoing association further suggests relative importance of this unit. (BEL 160755-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 13)

No. 566

FROM: CinC 1ST AIR FLEET (No Originator)  
TO : (CARDIV 1)  
COMCRUDIV 8  
COMDESRON 10  
Possible BATDIV  
(Fleet Auxiliary) at  
Yokosuka  
(Fleet Auxiliary)  
INFO: COMCRUDIV 7  
(Kure Address)  
(COM 14-162132-TI)

It was declared:

COM 14 states on 16 August, "Since last digest traffic from 1ST AIR FLEET and Carriers has disappeared. CinC 1ST AIR FLEET receiving messages via Tokyo Broadcast."

Item 17, Page 6, R.I. SUMMARY 160600/Q August indicates DESDIV 3 is enroute Southward. DESDIV 17 appeared enroute from Truk to Rabaul on August 15th, and was indicated as arriving Rabaul on Aug. 16th. DESDIV 3 and DESDIV 17 are both destroyer divisions of DESRON 10, which have been associated with carriers and now appear enroute Rabaul. Although the carriers themselves are not associated with the Rabaul Area, the possi-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 566 (Cont.)

bility that the carriers may be associated with the movements of these two divisions should not be overlooked.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 12)

No. 567

FROM: #704 Aug. 14/(?)  
TO : (DD in DESDIV 3)  
INFO: (1ST AIR FLEET)  
(BASE FORCE at Chichijima)  
(4TH BASE FORCE)  
(Unidentified MARU)  
(4TH FLEET)  
(DD in DESDIV 16)  
(Unidentified)

From Captain \_\_\_\_\_ MARU. At 0600 left  
Yokosuka for Truk.

It was mentioned:

Both DESDIV 3 and DESDIV 17 are believed enroute for Rabaul. This is apparently one of the MARUS that is going along as far as Truk.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 52)

Carrier Division Two had not appeared in enemy radio traffic for some time, but finally a bearing was obtained which indicated that its Commander was transmitting on a bearing of 300° from Oahu. It was noted that the RYUJO was not in the collective call



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

for Carrier Division Two, which possibly indicated that this ship was in a navy yard for refitting. All Japanese carriers appeared to be in home waters at this time, although the reservation made in dispatch number 566 was worthy of notice:

No. 568

Carrier frequency of 5910 up for short period. COMCARDIV 2 bears 300 from Oahu. (COM 14-162132-TI)

It was remarked:

5910 kcs is normal Carrier-Plane Group frequency.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 5)

No. 569

Carriers all appear to be in Home Waters. (COM 14-162218-TI)

RYUJO exempted from CARDIV 2 collective on 12 August. (COM 14-162218-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 15 August TI indicated belief RYUJO in Navy Yard.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 14)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

A dispatch from the Commander of Carrier Division Two to important naval authorities gave rise to the belief that an important movement in the Yokosuka area was taking place:

No. 570

COMCARDIV 2 originated short  
despatch to TATEYAMA AIR , info  
3RD AIR ATTACK . Carrier Groups  
Chiefs  
of Staff Yokosuka. 1ST AIR FLEET  
, COMBINED , HITAKA  
, HAYATAKA , ZUIHO  
This looks like movement in Yokosuka Area  
but not of ships because of omission Naval  
General Staff and Movement Report Office  
in address. (GT #678-OPNAV-162345-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 15)

Traffic analysis revealed that the CHIYODA had been in the vicinity of Saipan at 0900 August 15, and was approaching Truk at midnight of that day. An air tender, believed to be the KENJO MARU, was also thought to be near Truk, and a detachment of Yokohama Air seemed to be headed for Gasmata. Another air tender, the NARUTA MARU, was noticed in the Rabaul area; and one was observed in the Saipan zone, while

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

still another air tender was associated with Cruiser Division Seven in radio traffic, but did not appear to be in the latter's company:

No. 571

Traffic for CHIYODA and Staff  
suffix 53 of AIRRON 11 being  
routed to Saipan from Yokosuka at 0900, Aug.  
15th. (GT #665-OPNAV 160040-TI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 38)

No. 572

Traffic for CHIYODA routed  
via Truk at midnight 15 August.  
(GT #683-OPNAV-162355-TI)

It was stated:

At 0900, 15 August traffic was being  
routed from Yokosuka to Saipan for CHIYODA

(Summary, 170600, August, No. 33)

No. 573

Truk accepts traffic for delivery  
air tender (KENJO MARU?).  
(COM 14-160812-TI)

It was observed:

KENJO MARU was associated with INDIES  
FORCE, 1ST AIR ATTACK FORCE, KANOYA AIR

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 573 (Cont.)

GROUP and Rangoon, on 11 August. T.I. indicated this ship at Rangoon 28 July and at Truk on 6 August. However, CINCPAC reported it in the vicinity of Rangoon again on 12 August.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 19)

No. 574

Detachment of Yokohama Air  
on board Air Tender on 16 August.  
From associations, this ship headed for  
Gasmata. (GT #679-OPNAV 161830-TI)

It was noticed:

Air Tender appeared to be in the  
Rabaul Area 31 July. Yokohama Air Group  
appears to be part of the 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE which is based in the New Britain  
Area. (Summary, 161400, August, No. 32)

No. 575

MARU Air Tender in Rabaul Area  
at 2030, 16 August. (GT #678-OPNAV-  
162345-TI)

It was commented:

On 4 August TI indicated HARUTO MARU  
appears to be departing Rabaul  
Area possibly for Kure.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 54)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 576

Air Tender in Saipan Zone at  
1800, 16 August. (GT #680-OPNAV-162350-  
TI)

It was indicated:

MARU Air Tender was indicated  
in Saipan Area on 15 August by TI.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 23)

No. 577

MARU Air Tender associated  
CRUDIV 7 but appears not to be in company.  
(GT #678-OPNAV-162345-TI)

It was noted:

On 10 August MARU Air Tender  
was involved in what was believed to be an  
operation order from possibly the CinC 3RD  
FLEET; route appeared might be through  
Macassar to Davao.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 63)

A message addressed to three tenders gave the  
possible indication that all were proceeding in  
company to Truk:

No. 578

FROM:

Aug. 15/1720  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)

469

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 578 (Cont.)

TO : (Comdr. #2 ESCORT FORCE)  
Navy General Staff  
Yokosuka Radio  
INFO: (HIKAWA MARU)  
(KAMIKAWA MARU)  
(MARU)

The three tenders may be in company  
enroute Truk Area. (COM 14 162142-TI)

It was declared:

Previously noted in R.I. SUMMARY  
160600/Q August, Page 17, Item 60.  
is identified by OPNAV as the NITCHO  
MARU rather than the HIKAWA MARU. The  
latter named vessel has been certified to  
Berne as a hospital ship.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 36)

It will be recalled that a previously de-  
ciphered enemy message had contained a reference to  
what was thought to be an action involving paratroops.  
A retranslation of this dispatch disclosed that speci-  
fic references had been made to an air borne division,  
but that this did not necessarily mean paratroops, as  
had been first suspected:

No. 579

Answering OPNAV's 151751.

470

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 579 (Cont.)

----- Inclined to regard "Air Borne Division" as accurate for -----, but do not believe this necessarily involves paratroops. Nature of word suggests ground troops using air transport for mobility. Believe Japanese would use ----- or ----- if actual paratroops involved. T.I. associations show no definite indications of paratroop units with KISARAZU AIR GROUP with possible exception of AIRON 22 whose identification with paratroop activities is derived from Malay and Sumatra operations. (BEL 160315-DI)

It was mentioned:

Refers to GZ MEMO 8/15, item 24, page 13, 151400/Q August R.I. Summary. (Summary, 161400, August, No. 25)

Japanese merchant ships were maintaining their usual supply lines between the South Pacific and various northern bases. The ----- was en route from Saipan to Truk, and a Maru, which had been variously identified as an air tender or a hospital ship, left Tinian for Rabaul. The KINAI MARU was carrying the Fifth Special Landing Force to Rabaul for action against the Allies:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 580

FROM: #098 1400/14 Aug.  
(Maru?)  
(Radio Saipan)  
(Radio Tokyo)  
(Radio Truk)

- - - leave #5 Communication Zone and  
enter #4 Communication Zone.  
(GZ #2502-OPNAV 160135-DI)

It was remarked:

No. 5 Communication Zone is Saipan.  
No. 4 Communication Zone is Truk. On 12  
August the ship, or Unit, , directed  
a change be made to 8TH FLEET Operation  
Order #11, which appeared to be a Directive  
to DESDIV 17 . appears to  
be a MARU, and on 5 August this vessel,  
plus MARU , were involved in traffic  
associating them with one, or more, CARRIER  
PLANE GROUPS. The association of and  
DESDIV 17, through 8TH FLEET Operation Order  
#11 and its subsequent modification by  
, suggests that a Unit Commander superior  
to COMDESDIV 17 is in , and DESDIV 17  
is escorting this unit.  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 64)

No. 581

#10, August 15.  
FROM:  
TO : #3 BASE FORCE (Palao)  
Palao Civil Engineering Section  
34TH DEFENSE FORCE  
(Unidentified)  
INFO: Palao Radio

472



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 581 (Cont.)

Unreadable, but says, will depart  
Rabaul 1600, 21st. (BEL 160300-DI)

It was pointed out:

Maru left Tenian for Rabaul on  
3 August. It has been variously identified  
as a sub tender or a hospital ship. 34TH  
DEFENSE FORCE was first noted at Truk. Re-  
cently, however, its Commander has appeared  
by T.I. to be at Palao.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 36)

No. 582

(tentative KURE 5TH SPECIAL  
LANDING FORCE) is indicated as being aboard  
the KINAI MARU. This vessel is in  
Saipan Area and associations suggest it may  
be enroute to Rabaul. A Staff Officer of  
the 17TH ARMY is shown with AIRON 25  
probably at Rabaul. (BEL 160755-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 58)

No. 583

FROM: #(?) Aug.16/(?)  
TO : (MARU in 4TH BASE FORCE)  
(?)  
(Saipan)  
(Tokyo)  
(Truk)  
(Yokosuka)  
INFO: (Kure)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 583 (Cont.)

At 0830/16 August discontinue communications Tokyo, establish with Yokosuka.

At 1000/19 August discontinue communications Tokyo, establish with Saipan.

At 1200/21 August discontinue communications with Saipan, establish with Truk.

(GT #667-OPNAV 160918-DI)

(Summary, 160600, August, No. 25)

Another Maru leaving Kure for Truk on August 16 addressed the Commanders in Chief: of the Second and Combined Fleets, which indicated that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was probably at Truk:

No. 584

MARU originated apparent schedule indicating departure Kure for Truk at 1030, 16 August. This message addressed to CinC 2ND and COMBINED in addition to normal addressees of MARU Movement Report. (GT #677-OPNAV-162340-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 32)

An estimate of the number of merchant ships in the Saipan communication zone on the afternoon of August 16 was now made available as follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 585

Following in Saipan Communication Zone  
at 1630, 16 August:

(SOUTH SEAS FORCE)  
(Unidentified)  
(MARU in 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(MARU)  
(Unidentified)  
(MARU)  
(Unidentified)  
(MARU in 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(MARU)

(GT #681-OPNAV-162355-TI)

It was stated:

(SOUTH SEAS FORCE) was shown in  
Saipan on 12 August.  
was indicated going from Yokosuka-  
Chichijima Zone to Saipan Zone on 15 August.

TI on August 14 indicated MARU Air  
Tender enroute from Yokosuka to  
Rabaul.

On 14 August MARU was indicated  
enroute Rabaul from Yokosuka.

MARU was shown in Saipan Comm  
Zone on August 12.

Traffic routing and associations on  
August 14 indicated MARU enroute  
Saipan from Takao.

MARU Air Tender was indicated  
in Saipan Area on 15 August.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 22)

Several ships were in the Rabaul area, in-  
cluding a tender and an auxiliary:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 586

Tanker SATA remains Rabaul  
Area. (COM 14-160812-TI)

It was observed:

SATA reported arrival at Truk 14 August,  
however, COM 14 noted continued association  
with Rabaul Area on 15 August.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 34)

No. 587

FROM: #7 14 August

SATA after doing something at Truk  
will depart the 17th for Rabaul.  
(BEL 161145-DI)

It was noticed:

TI on August 16 indicated Tanker SATA  
remains at Rabaul.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 52)

No. 588

MARU is scheduled to shift Comm  
Zones from Truk to Rabaul  
at 0800, 18th. (BEL 160815-TI)  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 51)

No. 589

Traffic routing and association sug-  
gest:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 589 (Cont.)

Auxiliary            enroute from Sasebo to  
Rabaul via Truk.  
COMDESDIV 17            is at Rabaul.  
(BEL 160815-TI)

It was commented:

TI on August 15 indicated MARU ...  
on verge of leaving Empire at 1200, origi-  
nated enciphered Zone change addressed to  
Tokyo, Sasebo, Truk, Rabaul, and 8TH FLEET.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 56)

No. 590

                                  #? Aug. 16/(.)  
FROM:                    (AKEBONO MARU)  
TO :                     (Rabaul)  
INFO:                    (Tokyo)  
                          (COMBINED FLEET)  
                          (8TH FLEET)

At 1200/16 August will establish com-  
munications with Rabaul.  
(GT #669-OPNAV 161028-DI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 96)

Several Marus signified their intention of re-  
turning from the South Pacific to home waters:

No. 591

                                  #227, August 10.  
FROM:                    (#8 BASE FORCE at Rabaul)  
TO :                     (Fleet Tanker)

477

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 591 (Cont.)

INFO: (Fleet Tanker)  
(Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET)  
(COMCRUDIV 6)  
(Unidentified)  
(KAVIENG BASE FORCE)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)

"R" Area DEFENSE FORCE Despatch Order  
# \_\_\_\_\_:

The ( \_\_\_\_\_ - ship or unit) position at 1200, on 9th, was 5-26 N., 148-14 E., speed 10. Will arrive RO at 1500, on 11th. \_\_\_\_\_ will depart RR tomorrow morning, the 10th, and proceed to the Northward, rendezvousing with ( \_\_\_\_\_ - ship or unit) at 0600, on the 11th, and returning in company to RO - - - - - .  
(GZ #2511 - OPNAV 161620 - DI)

It was indicated:

Tankers \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ apparently brought oil to Kavieng and Rabaul and fueled CRUDIV 6, on 11 or 12 August. \_\_\_\_\_ now appears to be going back to Saipan via Truk. (Summary, 161400, August, No. 31)

No. 592

FROM: #91 15 August/1230

Leave Rabaul Comm. Zone and enter Truk at 1600, 17th. (BEL 161145-DI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 592 (Cont.)

It was noted:

On 7 August MARU was indicated moving from Truk to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 35)

No. 593

FROM: MARU #130 14 August

In accordance with orders of 8TH FLEET Staff with (blank) aboard we are scheduled depart Rabaul for Japan arriving 24th. Please notify us whether to proceed direct or via Kure. (BEL 161145-DI)

It was declared:

Commanding Officer of the shown aboard MARU (on 13 August, was addressed in a despatch from concealed originator to Naval Minister, info CHOKAI, COMCRUDIV 6, Chief of Naval Affairs, Tokyo Personnel Office. This taken according to TI, as some indication that one ship of CRUDIV 6 (possibly KAKO) has been sunk. (Summary, 170600, August, No. 57)

No. 594

Traffic routing and association suggest:

MARU in Palao Area.  
MARU Air Tender is enroute from Rabaul to Saipan. (BEL 160815-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 594 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

On 15 August TI indicated MARU  
Truk Zone to Saipan Zone at 2000.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 29)

No. 595

#70 Date Group Missing

FROM: MARU

Depart Kavieng 15th arrive Truk 18th.  
Depart 19th arrive NAA (Chichijima) 28th.  
(BEL 161145-DI) (Summary, 170600, August,  
No. 34)

Evidence that American submarines were making  
their presence felt by their attacks on the enemy's  
supply lines was presented when the GOSHU MARU re-  
ported that it had been attacked by an Allied sub-  
marine:

No. 596

FROM:  
TO :

August 16, 1030  
(Unidentified)  
(CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
(CINC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(COMDR 4TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 596 (Cont.)

INFO:                    {Unidentified}  
                          {4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE}

Attacked by enemy submarine in \_\_\_\_\_°  
20', 156-00 E. - - - -gunfire- - - - -\*

\*Translator's Note: Not quite clear whether  
he is shooting at the sub or vice-versa.  
(GZ #2507 - OPNAV 161658 - DI)

It was remarked:

                          is identified as GOSHU MARU.  
A movement report by GOSHU MARU, on 12  
August, stated that ship enroute Ruotto  
to Chichijima, and on 15 August COM 14  
stated GOSHU MARU was in the Kwajalein  
Communication Zone.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 23)

No. 597

Believe GOSHU MARU           made con-  
tact or was attacked at about 1030, 16  
August, at which time she originated opera-  
tional code to CinCs COMBINED and 11TH  
AIR, Naval General Staff, Comdr 4TH AIR  
ATTACK, info All Ships           and 4TH AIR  
ATTACK Collective.  
(GT #677-OPNAV-162340-TI)

It was pointed out:

DI on 16 August produced the following  
from           : "attacked by enemy submarine  
in \_\_\_\_\_°20', 156°00' E-----gunfire-----". Not

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 597 (Cont.)

clear who was doing shooting - Sub or  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 6)

Contact reports from a Maru attached to the Sixth Base Force were further indications of Allied activity:

No. 598

Jaluit Radio sending to Truk several urgent type contacts originated by believed Makin or vicinity. These despatches started at 0315 addressed to 6TH BASE FORCE associated calls being readdressed to usual air activities Marshalls.  
(COM 14-162022-TI) (MEMO #16-2)

It was stated:

believed a MARU attached to 6TH BASE FORCE whose area includes Jaluit, Marshall Islands-Wake. These messages have just been received here. The text is unreadable but believed contact reports of some nature. The times in the text are 0350, 0406, and 0435.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 40)

The Commander of Japanese Submarine Squadron Three was moving nearer Truk at this time. Allied direction finders fixed Japanese submarines in various

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

locations as indicated in the following dispatches:

No. 599

Four line fix places enemy submarine  
vicinity 12-30 S., 159 E. (BEL 160451-TI)

It was observed:

FUSU is a unit of SUBRON 3.  
Position by D/F were:

August 14	16 S., 161 E.
August 15	13 S., 160 E.

(Summary, 161400, August, No. 39)

No. 600

D/F Bearings:

COMSUBRON 3 shows movement nearer Truk  
vicinity.

Flagship SUBDIV remains in  
Solomons, fixed fair by D/F 07-30' S, 158  
E, at 2030 GCT 15th. (COM 14-160814-TI)

It was noticed:

COMSUBRON 3 by D/F August 15th was  
just Northwest of Truk. Flagship of SUB-  
DIV is , and by poor D/F fix  
was in 18 S, 166 E, on August 14th. SUB-  
DIV was an addressee, together with  
SUBRON 7, of a despatch from Rabaul Radio  
on August 12th which directs some Sub Unit  
to proceed RXF (Pavuvu (?) Islands) and  
something about "on the line Banika Island  
\_\_\_\_\_ Island and \_\_\_\_\_ Island". Banika

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 600 (Cont.)

is approximately 25 miles Northwest of the  
Northwestern end of Guadalcanal.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 66)

No. 601

Submarine Positions:

(SUBDIV	of SUBRON 8)	34 N - 150 E.
(SUBRON 6	)	08-30 S -
		164 E.
(In SUBRON 6)		06 S - 162 E.
(In SUBRON 3)		12-30 S -
		159 E.
(SUBDIV	of SUBRON 6)	09 S - 171 E.
(COM 14-162218-TI)		

It was commented:

On 14 August	was by D/F in 04 S - 158 E.
	was by D/F in 06 S - 159 E.
	was by D/F in 13 S - 162 E.
On 12 August	was by D/F in 30 S - 168 E.

(Summary, 170600, August, No. 67)

Messages from unidentified originators, though not too revealing, were indications, at least, of certain trends; e.g. four unidentified units were en route to Truk. Two Patrol units also announced their intentions of arriving there, and made arrangements for a fueling rendezvous:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 602

FROM: ( ? )  
TO : ( Palao )  
( Truk )  
( ? ) #? Aug. 16/( ? )

At 1230/16 August will discontinue communications with Palao, and establish communications with Truk.  
(GT #668-OPNAV 161028-DI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 98)

No. 603

FROM: ( ? )  
TO : ( Truk )  
( Palao )  
INFO: ( Rabaul )  
( 8TH FLEET ) #? Aug. 16/?

At 1200/18 August will discontinue communications with Palao, and establish communications with Truk.  
(GT #670-OPNAV 161028-DI)  
(Summary, 160600, August, No. 57)

No. 604

FROM: #700 1900/14 August  
TO : ( Unidentified )  
INFO: ( CofS, 4TH FLEET )  
( CofS, Yokosuka )  
( Hydrographic Office,  
Tokyo )  
( Yokosuka Navy Yard )

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 604 (Cont.)

Part 1. \_\_\_\_\_ leave RO the 15th and arrive PT the 18th. Leave PT the 19th and arrive NAA the 28th. (GZ #2500-OPNAV 160125-DI)

It was indicated:

Part 2 of above despatch was blank. RO is tentatively Kavieng. PT is Truk. NAA is unidentified; but is apparently an Empire port. \_\_\_\_\_ was a unit of the Mid-way OCCUPATION FORCE, and has recently been associated with the BUNA OCCUPATION FORCE. (Summary, 160600, August, No. 95)

No. 605

#271, 16 August 1942  
FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ ?  
TO : ( ) Unident Fleet Unit  
Care of Palao  
INFO: ( ) Unident Care of  
Palao  
(From CINC 8TH FLEET passed to 8TH FLEET.)

After escorting \_\_\_\_\_\* and \_\_\_\_\_\* to PT, (Truk) proceed to RR (Rabaul).

\*Garbles  
(GZ #2509-OPNAV 161658-DI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 35)

No. 606

FROM: #187 14 August  
TO : 8TH FLEET

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 606 (Cont.)

Replying to your (blank) 1st and  
(blank) Patrol Units will arrive Truk  
(blank) hours 16th. Please arrange for  
fueling (?) after (blank) date (17th ?).  
(BEL 161145-TI)

It was noted:

is not identified here.  
(Summary, 170600, August, No. 37)

Cruiser Division Eighteen was informed that  
an unidentified unit was to arrive at Rabaul on  
August 15:

No. 607

FROM: #166, August 14.  
TO : CRUDIV 18 (or ship of same)

"My \_\_\_\_\_ (noon ?) position South  
6-23, East 149? (may be as high as 152)-  
05, speed 21, will arrive Rabaul 9:00(?)  
o'clock tomorrow, 15th."  
(BEL 160300-DI)

It was declared:

Originator of this message not known.  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 28)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Another unidentified originator, possibly a reconnaissance plane, announced that "Four enemy entered port at 1600". It was suspected that this reference concerned Allied ships at Tulagi, since the information was transmitted to the Eighth Fleet in this area:

No. 608

Plain language from plane of 4TH AIR(?) passed to 8TH FLEET and COMDR 8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul: "Four enemy entered port." Time group confusing: 1600 given but intercept at 0821, 16th.  
(BEL 160235-DI)  
(Summary, 161400, August, No. 26)

No. 609

Short despatch from unidentified originator probably reconnaissance plane reports "4 enemy entered port at 1600". This probably refers to Allied ships possibly entering port in Tulagi Area since despatch was passed to 8TH FLEET and Comdr 8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul for information.  
(BEL 160815-TI) (Summary, 170600, August, No. 46)

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on 16  
August 1942 said in part:

No. 610

FLEET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

GENERAL

...  
Planes, destroyers and auxiliaries  
continue toward the RABAU area. It is  
becoming apparent that JAPAN is viewing  
the activity in this area quite seriously.

The carriers HITAKA, HAYATAKA and  
ZUIHO are thought to be operating near  
MARCUS Island. Possibly due to fear of an  
attack upon JAPAN. Location of the SHOKA-  
KU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO is not known exactly,  
but thought to be SOUTHERN JAPAN with a  
possibility that part or all have departed  
that area for the South.

The CinC SECOND FLEET is at sea near  
SAIPAN.

CRUDIV SEVEN is enroute TRUK from the  
NETHERLANDS INDIES. This division may  
rendezvous near TRUK with the FIRST AIR  
FLEET or CinC SECOND or possibly with both.  
The date of anticipated rendezvous may be  
around August 20-21.

CRUDIV SIX is now engaged in escorting  
in the NEW IRELAND area.

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the  
Pacific Fleet for 16 August 1942 read as follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 611

FROM: Cincpac 160443, August 1942  
TO : Comsopacfor  
Comsowespacfor  
All Sea Fronts Pac  
All Comtaskforces Under Cincpac  
Cominch  
Comnaven  
Opnav

NCR 5496 J

Bulletin No. 153

HITAKA, HAYATAKA, ZUIHO operating in vicinity Marcus Island. Other carriers thought still in Japan.

KAGA MARU escorted by destroyers enroute Truk from East Indies.

Two divisions of Subron 1 enroute New Britain via Truk.

By D/F submarines 08 South 158 East; 13 South 160 East.

CinC Second Fleet believed at sea in Saipan area. Slight indication may be headed south.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942

Japanese radio traffic was very heavy at this time. It seemed evident that the enemy was making every effort to reinforce the Southwest Pacific, and to regain Japan's lost bases. Operational messages coming from Lunga indicated that the Japanese had reoccupied this point:

No. 612

Believe Japs exerting all efforts to reinforce Southeastern Area and will attempt regain areas lost.  
(COM 14-171956-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 46)

No. 613

Two urgent operational-type codes bearing Station Serial Numbers 1 and 2 were originated by Lunga at 1200, 16th. This is first appearance of call since start Allied Operations in Guadalcanal and suggests reoccupation of Lunga by ORANGE Forces.  
(BEL 170642-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 45)

No. 614

Nothing further has been seen from Guadalcanal since the four KINS originated at 1200/16th.  
(COM 14-170658-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 614 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

identified as BASE on Guadalcanal originated Urgent Operational Codes at 1200 (or 2200) 16 August. estimated position 10 S 159 E. KIN used to designate high priority despatch. (Summary, 171400, August, No. 41)

No. 615

4 highest priority despatches originated at 1200, 16th by (Guadalcanal) re-transmitted for information 1ST AIR FLEET and 2ND FLEET. Traffic from this call also originated on 17th at 0400, 0520, and 0730 addressed to Comdrs 8TH BASE FORCE and 5TH AIR ATTACK CORPS and re-transmitted for information to Chiefs of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET, 8TH FLEET, 2ND FLEET, COMCRUDIV 6, COMDESRON 2, COMDESDIV , 5TH AIR ATTACK CORPS and in one instance 1ST AIR FLEET. (COM 14-171958-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 44)

Numerous dispatches emanating from the Naval Communication Office at Tokyo gave rise to the belief that a major call change was about to take place in Japanese communications. This suspicion gave way to certainty at midnight when the anticipated change became a reality:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 616

Tokyo NavCom continues to file numerous despatches to all hands which gives rise to suspicion augmented by recent appearance of (calls among high commands that a major call change of a new type may be imminent. (COM 14-170658-TI) (Summary, 171400, August, No. 14)

No. 617

Major calls changed 2400, 17th.  
(COM 14-171756-TI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 4)

Traffic analysis disclosed much plane activity in the Gilbert Islands. Identification was impossible at the moment because secret tactical calls were being employed:

No. 618

Traffic on Marshalls Air frequency very heavy with many planes working. Believed this result of activity in Gilberts. No identification due use of secret tactical calls. (COM 14-171956-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 21)

A survey of Japanese radio activity throughout the Pacific disclosed that the Eighth Fleet area continued to be the most active:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 619

8TH FLEET Area continues most active.  
(COM 14-171954-TI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 43)

No. 620

Suspected 8TH FLEET traffic under Rabaul cover was addressed Fleet Unit Info: MARU, both shown at Palao. (COM 14-170702-TI)  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 38)

It appeared evident that the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was at or near Truk. There were many indications that the ATAGO was the flagship of this fleet, which definitely seemed about to be involved in operations in the Rabaul area. The First Air Fleet was also interested in this region, and it was quite probable that a rendezvous was about to be effected between units of the First Air Fleet and Cruiser Divisions Seven and Eight:

No. 621

CINC 2ND FLEET addressed one to Tokyo out of Truk. (COM 14-170636-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 621 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

On 16 August Saipan delivered traffic to CINC 2ND FLEET but he was indicated as going to Truk.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 23)

No. 622

SCO 4TH Fleet addressed SCO  
2nd Fleet info Truk at  
1740/16th which further strengthens 2nd  
Fleet-Truk association.  
(CO# 14-170658-TI)

It was observed:

TI has indicated that the 2nd Fleet  
Units will probably concentrate at TRUK.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 24)

No. 623

Truk Radio was in communication with  
Cinc 2ND FLEET during  
evening on 16th. Traffic for ATAGO  
also delivered on this frequency by Truk  
further indicating ATAGO as Flagship of 2ND  
FLEET. (BEL 170642-TI)

It was stated:

Truk at 2138 on 16 August called  
(general cover call) for delivery message  
to Cinc 2ND. On 17th Cinc 2ND addressed

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 623 (Cont.)

one to Tokyo out of Truk. BEL on 16 August quoted despatch headings to substantiate ATAGO as Flag CinC 2ND FLEET. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 33)

No. 624

Traffic routing indicates:

CinC 2ND FLEET at or near Truk.  
(COM 14-171958-TI)

It was commented:

TI previously on 17th noted CinC 2ND FLEET addressed one to Tokyo out of Truk. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 34)

No. 625

CinC 2ND FLEET definitely involved in operations in Rabaul Area and many indications 1ST AIR FLEET will also proceed this Area. (COM 14-171956-TI)

It was noticed:

COM 14 on 16 August stated possibilities of CRUDIYS 7 and 8 effecting rendezvous with 1ST AIR FLEET in Saipan Area exists. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 35)

The flagship of the Combined Fleet was still  
at Tokyo:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 626

Combined Flagship using suffix  
originated out of Tokyo to  
(located at Rabaul).  
(COM 14-170658-TI)  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 13)

It was thought that the Commander of Cruiser  
Division Seven was proceeding from the East Indies to  
Truk where he might join some carriers in forming a  
task force:

No. 627

Continued association COMCRUDIV 7 and  
COMDESDIV - with 4TH BASE FORCE  
indicates these commands enroute Truk  
possibly to be serviced by 1ST AIR FLEET  
Auxiliaries , and  
(BEL 170642-TI)

It was indicated:

TI on 16 August stated, "appears this  
DESDIV - will join the Forces not  
headed for Truk".  
(Summary, 180600, August, No.37)

No. 628

Slight indication points to possi-  
bility CRUDIV 7 may join carrier or carriers  
in Truk Area to form Task or Striking Force.  
(BEL 170642-TI)

It was declared:

497

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 628 (Cont.)

COM 14 on 16 August stated, "Possibilities of CRUDIV 7 and 8 effecting rendezvous with 1ST AIR FLEET in Saipan Area exists". (Summary, 180600, August, No. 38)

No. 629

COMCRUDIV 7 (listed with 1ST AIR FLEET) tentatively indicated proceeding East Indies to Truk. (COM 14-171954-TI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 39)

The Commander of Destroyer Division Twenty-nine, which had been quite active in the New Britain area and had been associated with Cruiser Divisions Six and Eighteen, was now observed near Saipan:

No. 630

COMDESDIV 29 on DD zone at 1745, 17 August. (GT #692-OPNAV 171652-TI) in Saipan

It was noted:

DESDIV 29 was in the New Britain area to about 13 August and was prominent in traffic with CRUDIV 6 and 18. On 14 August the Comdr was noted in DD in Saipan Communication Zone.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 31)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 631

Enciphered HOIHOU DETACHMENT COMMANDER  
shown on board flagship DesDiv 29  
(COM 14-170658-TI)

It was mentioned:

August 12 TI indications were that  
this Unit enroute Saipan via Chichijima.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 32)

Destroyer Division Thirty announced the schedule  
of its trip from the Saipan area to Rabaul;

No. 632

FROM: (DESDIV 30)  
TO : (8TH FLEET)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
(Tokyo)  
(Saipan)  
(SOUTH CHINA or CHINA FLEET)  
(Sasebo)

\*This division will make following  
changes in Communication Zones:

From 1200/16th in Saipan Communication Zone,  
From \_\_\_\_\_ in Truk Communication Zone,  
From 1200 on 20th in #8 Communication Zone.\*  
(GZ #2518-OPNAV 171717-DI)

It was declared:

According to Serials 364 and 365 the  
arrival at Rabaul will be sometime 21  
August. (Summary, 171400, August, No. 26)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis disclosed that Rabaul was the center of operations for the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two and the Commanders of two divisions of Destroyer Squadron Ten:

No. 633

COMDESRON 2, COMDESDIV and  
of DESRON 10 included in high percentage traffic originating at Rabaul and indicates they are near.  
(COM 14-171956-TI)

It was remarked:

Rabaul was noted accepting traffic for COMDESRON 2 on 17 August. TI on 16 August indicated Rabaul transmits to Truk for delivery to COMDESDIV  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 50)

No. 634

Rabaul noted accepting traffic for delivery to COMDESRON 2  
(BEL 170642-TI)

It was pointed out:

TI on 16 August stated COMDESRON 2 apparently enroute Rabaul but not there yet. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 51)

Units of Destroyer Squadron Three announced their arrival at Ambon and Truk respectively on

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

August 15:

No. 635

DesDiv in DesRon 3, in Truk  
Communication Zone at 2100, 17 August.  
(GT #6 92-OPNAV 171652-TI)

It was observed:

This DesDiv was in Saigon Area 6 August  
and appeared to arrive at Truk August 15.  
On August 14 and 15 it was an action ad-  
dressee with CruDiv 7 from concealed origi-  
nators. (Summary, 171400, August, No. 30)

No. 636

FROM:  
TO :

#034 Aug. 15/1600  
(Comdr. DD in DESRON 3)  
(COMDESRON 3)  
(Comdr. BASE FORCE #8 at  
Rabaul)  
(Comdr. DESDIV 19)  
(COMINCH COMBINED FLEET)  
(?)  
(COMINCH 8TH FLEET)  
(Tokyo Mov't. Report  
Office)

"Arrived Ambon (x26607)."  
(GZ #2514-OPNAV 171522-DI)  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 42)

Destroyers were being used to escort the Ikki  
Ikki Detachment into the Solomons. The date of its

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

arrival was now believed to be August 18:

No. 637

OPNAV 162000 NOW APPEARS THAT 18TH IS  
DATE OF ARRIVAL OF IKKI IKKI DETACHMENT AND  
ESCORTING DDS (ABOUT 10) OFF RXI.  
(GZ # MEMO-OPNAV-171530-DI) (MEMO #17-1)

It was stated:

This has reference to Item #43 Page  
17 of RI Summary 170600/Q August.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 36)

Japanese radio intelligence units maintained  
a constant watch on the radio channels used by Allied  
planes:

No. 638

FROM: (Rabaul) #264 Aug. 14

"At 1410 an enemy bomber apparently  
addressing the Air Base at Moresby, trans-  
mitted the following plain language message  
'one destroyer is in position (145 to 155)  
East \_\_\_\_\_ degrees South, about \_\_\_\_\_ miles  
from base.'" (COM 14-172012-DI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 54)

The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet  
was requesting additional air support in the Mandate

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

area on this date:

No. 639

16 August/1450  
FROM: Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET  
TO : \ (Operations Section Naval  
General Staff)  
(Unidentified)  
INFO: (6TH BASE FORCE at Jaluit)  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 11TH AIR  
FLEET)  
(Comdr. AIRON 24)

This was a long despatch which suggests CinC 4TH FLEET is requesting that additional air support in Mandate Area be furnished by AIRON 24.  
(BEL 170642-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 28)

A bearing was taken from Oahu on the Commander of the First Air Fleet to whom traffic was being delivered by a broadcast from Tokyo:

No. 640

1st AIR FLEET Flag heard working on 5910 kcs at 1900, 17th bearing 303 from Oahu. Traffic for 1ST AIR FLEET delivered via Tokyo broadcast. (COM 14-171958-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 640 (Cont.)

It was commented:

TI on 16 August stated CinC 1ST AIR FLEET receiving messages via Tokyo Broadcast. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 11)

No. 641

15 Aug/1121  
FROM: Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET (concealed  
Originator)  
TO : (CARDIV 1)  
(COMCRUDIV 8)  
(COMDESRON 10)  
(COMCARDIV 3 (?))  
(MARU)  
INFO: (MARU) at Yokosuka (?)  
(Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
- (COMCRUDIV 7)  
(Kure Military Stores  
Section)  
(BEL 170642-TI)

It was noticed:

With exception of included above these same addresses included in despatch from COM 14-162132 and included in RI Summary 170600/Q August, page 6, item 12. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 12)

Japanese carriers had been silent for some time, but an important message from Carrier Division



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

Two at Tateyama suggested that three carriers were either at Yokosuka or at sea. They were believed to have been within the Yokosuka communication zone at the time of transmission:

No. 642

No carriers seen since last report.  
(COM 14-170636-TI) (Summary, 171400,  
August, No. 12)

No. 643

At 1750, 17 August CARDIV 2 Detachment (SO 1 069) at Tateyama addressed Plane Groups (

COMCARDIV 2  
and Comdr 3rd AIR ATTACK info.  
Comm. Officer COMBINED FLEET  
Kure address, Yokosuka Comdt.

COMM. OFFICER 1st. Air Fleet  
HITAKA ZUIHO

HAYATAKA. Yokosuka called Kure and Sasebo\* to deliver to first 3 plane groups listed, Comm. Officer Combined Fleet, and Indications of locations: Combined Fleet Staff at Kure, Plane Groups Sasebo or Kure, three carriers either at Yokosuka or at sea. If at sea, believe they are within Yokosuka Communication Zone, otherwise Yokosuka would relay to Tokyo for further delivery on broadcast.

\*Reference to above Yokosuka called Kure and Sasebo at 1944 on 17th. At 1453, 17th

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 643 (Cont.)

August, Tokyo broadcast a message from ZUIHO to COMCARDIV 2, indicating ZUIHO not in company. Therefore COMCARDIV 2 with HAYATAKA and HITAKA may be at sea in company.  
(GT #691-OPNAV 171652-TI)

It was indicated:

3rd AIR ATTACK FORCE serial 943 of August 13th seemed to indicate that CARDIV 2 would operate with HITAKA, HAYATAKA and ZUIHO in the near future. (Questionably Marcus Island Area).  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 10)

No. 644

17 August/1400  
FROM: (Detachment of CARDIV 2  
at Tateyama Air)  
TO : (COMCARDIV 2)  
(Plane Group)  
(Plane Group)  
(Plane Group)  
(Plane Group)  
(Base Commander)  
INFO: (Comdr 3RD AIR ATTACK)  
(SCO COMBINED FLEET)  
(1st AIR FLEET)  
Comdr HITAKA  
Comdr HAYATAKA  
Comdr ZUIHO  
(YOKOSUKA)  
(Kure)  
(COM 14-171954-TI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 15)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

A detachment of the Yokosuka Flying Boat Squadron was thought to be near Gasmata:

No. 645

Detachment of YOKOSUKA FLYING BOAT SQUADRON shown in Man-of-War (MINEKAZE or OKIKAZE ?) and appears in vicinity Gasmata (?)  
(REL 170736-TI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 47)

The Air Group at Kisaratsu was now believed to be composed in part of fighter planes. It was expected that this unit would move to Truk on auxiliaries of the First Air Fleet, or on carriers:

No. 646

Enciphered address  
at unidentified  
indicates Air Group composed in  
part of fighter planes.  
(COM 14-171942-TI)

It was noted:

BEL on August 15 indicated belief this Group likely composed of Carrier-type planes (probably torpedo planes or dive bombers currently at Kisaratsu) scheduled proceed Southern Area.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 7)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 647

Comdr Carrier Plane Group shown  
at Kisaratsu and association with Base  
Forces at Saipan and Truk  
indicate that command or units thereof  
will proceed Truk with transportation pos-  
sibly furnished by 1ST AIR FLEET auxil-  
iaries or carriers. (BEL 170736-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI on 16 August stated, "Movement of  
Air Unit to Rabaul is predicted \_\_\_\_".  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 8)

A Japanese dispatch announced that the Buna  
Airport would be ready on August 16. Enemy troops  
and 300 coolies had been at work on this airdrome  
during the previous week:

No. 648

FROM: #208 14 August  
TO : (CRUDIV 18 or DIVISION 18)

The Buna Airport will be (ready for  
use) on the 16th. (COM 14-172008-DI)

It was declared:

TI on 14 August stated Buna-Lae Area  
prominent, among originators was  
yesterday strongly associated CRUDIV 18  
Comdr and is believed to be con-  
struction or engineering activity engaged

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 648 (Cont.)

in preparation Buna Airport facilities.  
GHQ SWPA on 14th reported enemy troops and  
300 Coolies landed Buna to work on airdrome  
August 9th.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 55)

The NIKKAI MARU was observed to be at Rabaul:

No. 649

FROM: #254 Aug. 05/1620  
(Comdr. NIKKAI MARU in  
8TH BASE FOR.)  
TO : (Tokyo Navy Minister)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
(YOKOSUKA Naval Com-  
mandant)  
(COMINCH, 8TH FLEET)  
(?)  
INFO: (Yokosuka Navy Yard)  
(CofS, 4TH FLEET)  
(Comdr. BASE FORCE #4  
at Truk)

\*Arrived Rabaul at 1615. Nothing to  
report (?)\*  
(GZ #2517-OPNAV 171522-DI)  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 40)

The Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force  
was still at Yokosuka, from which a commander of a  
division in Submarine Squadron Eight was planning to

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

move southward to Truk:

No. 650

COMSUBFORCE continues use of Yokosuka  
Radio call as cover up.  
(COM 14-171942-TI)

It was remarked:

TI on August 16 stated, "COMSUBFORCE  
remains Yokosuka".  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 16)

No. 651

At 0600/16 August COMSUBDIV  
addressed his Commander, COMSUBRON 8 who  
is placed in Yokosuka, COMSUBFOR and Yoko-  
suka Engineers and Docks, Info: SUBRON 1.  
As this Division has been in Yokosuka since  
20 July, this is evidence of preparations  
to move. Distribution was made to Jaluit  
and Truk indication probable direction of  
movement. (COM 14-170704-TI)

It was pointed out:

SUBDIV operated in the Marshalls  
before going to Yokosuka. The first indica-  
tions of returning to the Marshalls and/or  
Rabaul Area were received in TI August 9.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 46)

Traffic analysis revealed the presence of many  
Japanese submarines. One submarine was at Kure, one

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

was in the Rabaul area toward which another unit was proceeding, and several submarines were in the Jaluit area:

No. 652

Traffic routing and associations indicate:

Units SUBDIV at Yokosuka.  
Submarine at Kure.  
(BKL 170815-TI)

It was observed:

SUBDIV indicated according to TI, evidence of preparation to move from Yokosuka on 16 August.

On August 12 TI indicated Submarine Unit apparently completed overhaul at Kure and ready to rejoin Division (SUB-DIV  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 17)

No. 653

Traffic routing and associations indicate:

Units SUBDIV are in Jaluit Area.

COMSUBRON 3 and COMSUBDIV of SUBRON 3 at Jaluit.

Auxiliary at Mille (?) (

)  
Man-of-War enroute Kure to Truk via Saipan.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 653 (Cont.)

MARU in Saipan Area.  
(BEL 170815-TI)

It was stated:

COM 14 on 14 August reported SUBDIV received traffic via Jaluit, and on 15 August reported Flagship SUBDIV remains in Solomons fixed fair by D/F at 07-30 S. 158 E.

on August 14th received traffic via Jaluit.

COMSUBRON 3 on 15 August fixed by D/F just Northwest of Truk.

TI indicated MARU will establish communications with Jaluit at 1600, 14 August.

on 16 August sent a premovement report to Saipan Radio, Truk Radio, and CINC 4TH FLEET.

TI on 16 August indicated MARU in Saipan Communication Zone.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 40)

No. 654

Traffic routing and associations indicate:

Units SUBRON 1 may proceed to Rabaul Area.

Submarine in Rabaul Area.

Auxiliary enroute Truk to Rabaul.

AKEBONO MARU established communications with Rabaul at 1200, 16th and may be proceeding that place.

NARATO MARU MARU in Rabaul Area. (BEL 170815-TI)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 654 (Cont.)

It was commented:

On 31 July TI indicated COMSUBRON 1  
not at Yokosuka.

On 14 August was indicated as  
being in 8TH FLEET Area.

On 16 August indicated would  
discontinue communication with Palao and  
establish communication with Truk.

AKEBONO MARU and NARATO MARU pre-  
viously noted here.

(Summary, 180600, August, No. 58)

It was believed that the Commander of Submarine  
Squadron One was en route to the South Pacific to re-  
lieve the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three as  
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Southeastern Sub-  
marine Force:

No. 655

Bearings indicate COMSUBRON 1 under-  
way for Southeast where he will relieve  
COMSUBRON 3 as Comdr SOUTHEASTERN SUB-  
FORCE. (COM 14-171954-TI)

It was noticed:

On August 15 TI indicated some evi-  
dence COMSUBRON 1 bound South from Empire.  
Was addressed 15th by COMSUBFOR in urgent  
despatch, reason for urgency not clear.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 18)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

Two submarines were scheduled to cruise in the vicinity of Cape Nojima on this day:

No. 656

FROM: NITUMO

Yokosuka Naval Base Commerce Protection Intelligence Report #73:

In the evening of tomorrow 17, two of our submarines will be cruising in the vicinity of Cape Nojima. (BEL 170723-DI) (Summary, 171400, August, No. 15)

Evidence that an Allied submarine had been in action on August 16 was presented in the next dispatch:

No. 657

FROM: Unknown Originator 16 August

An enemy submarine attacked at 050-10' North, and 156° East. (COM 14-172008-DI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 57)

The Fleet Intelligence Summary of August 17, 1942, issued from the Flagship of the Commander in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, stated:

No. 658

The HIYO and HAYATAKA plus the ZUIHO remain in Empire waters with an apparently defensive task. It is not expected that they will go south. Associations of this force continue to be predominately with definite Empire forces. However, the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU plus the RYUJO, although still apparently present in Empire waters, will definitely go south, if not already underway in that direction. Although not evident of late, units of Batdiv three will probably accompany this force.

CinC 2nd Fleet is at present in the Truk area. It is indicated that he will play a large part in an offensive in the Southern area, although probably not in the first phase, which will be conducted by an Army detachment (IKKI) probably around the 21st in the Guadalcanal area. It is not believed that this offensive can begin by the 18th as was also indicated.

It was stated in the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 17, 1942:

No. 659

FROM: Cincpac (NYCO) 170407, August 1942  
TO : Comsopacfor  
Coms Allseafronpac  
Coms Alltaskforcepac  
Cominch

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 659 (Cont.)

Comsowespacfor  
Opnav  
Comnaveu

NCR 6107 J

Bulletin No. 154

Kamikawa Maru and Hikawa (XAV) enroute to Truk and will probably continue to Rabaul. Kisaratsu Air Group at Marcus. Chiyoda (AV) in Saipan area proceeding South. Desdiv 17 plus part my Desdiv 4 enroute Truk to Rabaul probably as escort for army units. Desdiv 3 in Chichijima area.

By DF, submarine 34 N 150 E. Following South and East. 8-164. 6-162. 12-159. 9-171. 9-156.

Crudiv 6 departed Kavieng believed bound Solomons area. Indications increased air support for shipping in DEI. Fujikawa Maru will proceed to Marcus from Japan shortly.

A surprise raid on Makin Island on August 17-18 was undertaken by a raider battalion of the United States Marines, assisted by the personnel of the ARGONAUT and the NAUTILUS of the United States Navy. This raid was initiated partly to destroy enemy forces and installations and partly to gain information, but it was primarily intended to create a diversion of forces by the Japanese, who, it was

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

thought, were planning to attack Guadalcanal in late August. Despite some unanticipated losses the raid succeeded in wrecking Japanese planes, ships, and supplies. It also diverted enemy ships and aircraft which came to the relief of Makin.

This activity of the United States Navy was reflected in the radio traffic of the Japanese. Several contact reports from Makin Island were noticed since Truk radio gave them wide distribution to all the important commanders in the Pacific as well as in the affected area. The Commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet, who was at Rabaul, and the Commander of the Fourth Air Attack Force were very much on the alert. Enemy patrol plane activity in the Marshall Islands became prominent after the receipt of these contact reports:

No. 660

Tentative Makin Island at  
0315/17 August addressed Commander 6TH  
BASE FORCE and 6TH DEFENSE FORCE  
Commander in a short 9-Kana fol-  
lowed during ensuing two hours by apparent  
contact reports at 0350, 0406, 0435 and

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 660 (Cont.)

another at 0438 followed by a flood of 4-kana dispatches to various Mandates Commands. These were given the customary wide distribution. (COM 14-170636-TI)  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 33)

No. 661

Commander 11TH AIR FLEET maintains activity in Rabaul Area and Commander 4TH AIR ATTACK addressed directives to 4TH AIR bombers, and other Mandates AIR Units following Makin activity. Marshalls PATROL PLANE activity became prominent following contact reports mentioned above.  
(COM 14-170704-TI)

It was indicated:

Commander 11TH AIR FLEET reportedly moved back to Tenian 14 August.  
Is the Call for 1ST AIR GROUP believed based at Taroa and operates under the 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 171400, August, No. 35)

No. 662

Starting 0355 and continuing until about 0800, 17th unidentified Base (probably in Marshalls) originated series of short urgent contact type codes which were addressed for action to 6TH BASE FORCE at Jaluit, 6TH DEFENSE FORCE at Wotje and Staff Communication Officer AIRON 24. These despatches

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 662 (Cont.)

were later given wide circulation by Truk Radio and are possibly indicative of an attack in Marshall or Gilbert Islands.  
(BEL 170815-TI)

It was noted:

These apparent contact reports were previously noted here starting at 0315/17.

is called tentative Makin Island by COM 14. Reported in RI Summary 170600/Q August, page 13, item 40.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 19)

No. 663

All operational and contact traffic originated by suspected Makin was re-transmitted for information 1ST AIR FLEET and 2ND FLEET Commanders plus COMBINED FLEET, SUBFORCE 4TH and 8TH FLEETS and Tokyo Operations and Intelligence.  
(COM 14-171958-TI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 20)

No. 664

Comdr and Staff Comm. Officer 11TH AIR FLEET are at Rabaul with Flag Secretary that command remaining at Tenian.  
(BEL 170736-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI on 17 August indicated Comdr 11TH

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 664 (Cont.)

AIR FLEET maintains activity in Rabaul Area. (Summary, 180600, August, No. 52)

Though submarines and air units were very active in the South Pacific on this day, there was no indication of any enemy losses in the Makin Island engagement which was going on at this time:

No. 665

Submarines and air units continue active in Southeast. (COM 14-171954-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 48)

No. 666

Close check on intercepted messages from all known submarines fails to reveal any apparent enemy losses in present engagement. (COM 14-171942-TI) (Summary, 180600, August, No. 49)

---



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942

An important change in Japanese call signs took place at midnight, August 18. Indications of future enemy security precautions were perceived in intercepted dispatches. It was evident that enemy codes, as well as call signs, were to be changed during this period:

No. 667

Major Command and Shore Radio service calls changed at 0000, 18th.  
(BEL 180713-TI) (Summary, 190600, August, No. 1)

No. 668

FROM: #293 Aug. 7/1440  
(Comd. Fleet Tanker or Tender)  
TO : (Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)  
(Truk Military Stores Bureau)  
INFO: (Comd. BASE FORCE #8 at Rabaul)  
(Comd. in East Indies)  
(Comd. BASE FORCE #4 at Truk)  
(Comd. BASE FORCE #5 at Saipan)  
(Comdr. AZUZA MARU)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 668 (Cont.)

"Please send at once to RO the code which is to be made effective from 16 August." (GZ #2521-OPNAV 181442-DI)

It was remarked:

RO is believed to be Kavieng.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 33)

No. 669

FROM: #503 Aug. 13/1700  
(Ominato Area DEFENSE  
FOR. - currently based  
at Kiska)  
TO : (?)  
(Ominato Area DEFENSE  
FOR. - currently based  
at Kiska)  
INFO: (?)  
(5TH FLEET Staff Communi-  
cation Officer; also  
Chief of Staff smaller  
Comds.?)

"From 16 August until the receipt of Navy Code and related publications(?) this Force will use Navy Code (GZ #2522-OPNAV 181442-DI) (Summary, 181400, August, No. 3)

There was much Japanese operational radio traffic in the South Pacific on this day, but Japanese security precautions prevented the immediate identi-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

fication of the organizations concerned. It was noticed that many old dispatches were being circulated at this time including two dispatches of a very unusual type:

No. 670

Much Operational Code traffic emanating from Southern Area during morning of 18th, with appearance of action or contact reports. No Originator or address and relay only to high commands prevents identification of organizations.  
(GT #698-OPNAV 181452-TI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 18)

No. 671

MOST URGENT traffic from Southern Area using Operational Code, single Kana - Numeral calls. - Guadalcanal (?) noted in one address from at 0625/18th.  
(GT #700-OPNAV 181452-TI)

It was pointed out:

tentatively identified as a Unit in 5TH FLEET PATROL DIVISION. Apparently, in this case it is not a 5TH FLEET PATROL vessel.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 19)

No. 672

Operational traffic from Solomons con-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 672 (Cont.)

tinues heavy throughout 18th.  
{GT #702-OPNAV 181750-TI)  
{Summary, 181400, August, No. 20)

No. 673

Large number 3 to 4 day old despatches  
being circulated, but new traffic low.  
{CO. 14-182222-TI)  
{Summary, 190600, August, No. 3)

No. 674

Two unusual type despatches inter-  
cepted from Tokyo at  
0830, 17th. These were 5-character con-  
tinental code and were sent to and  
neither call identified. (BEL 180713-TI)  
{Summary, 190600, August, No. 4)

Much of the Japanese activity seemed to be  
centered around Guadalcanal. The Commander in Chief  
of the Second Fleet and the Commander of the First  
Air Fleet were closely associated with operations in  
this area:

No. 675

Again activity connection Guadalcanal  
call . Sent several URGENTS, one

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 675 (Cont.)

extremely long. No addressees but going to Rabaul. thought to be Kieta or similar area. Few Kana numeral type calls seen connection these two stations and thought newly established sea-plane bases vicinity. One of these tentatively identified thru enciphered address to be KIYOKAWA MARU Base at Gizo Island unconfirmed. (COM 14-182222-TI)

It was observed:

The Guadalcanal call was tentatively identified as an air base there, and was heard transmitting at 1200, 16 August, between 1900 and 2100, 16 August and 0625, 18 August; as an air base in the general vicinity of Rabaul; Kieta is on Bougainville. KIYOKAWA MARU, by T.I. is in Rabaul Area, and on 12 August was associated in traffic with CINC COMBINED and 8TH FLEETS, 8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul, Kavieng BASE FORCE, COMCRUDIV 18, MIKAZUKI and Fleet Tanker (Summary, 190600, August, No. 35)

No. 676

Lunga ) sent several urgent operational type despatches during morning of 17th, these were mostly in abbreviated form, and were passed to COMCRUDIV 6, Chief of Staff COMBINED, Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET, Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET, Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET, DIV 2, COMAIRON 26, Chief and Chief of Staff, plus COMDES and

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 676 (Cont.)

RABAUŁ BASE FORCE . . . . . One was passed only to CINC 2ND and Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET , indicating close association these commands with operation Solomons Area.  
(BEL 180739-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 41)

Traffic analysis disclosed the presence of the Combined Fleet Staff in Japan, the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet at Truk, and the Staff Communication Officer of Air Squadron Twenty-two at Tinian:

No. 677

Traffic routing indicates presence of COMBINED FLEET Command in Japan.  
(COM 14-180646-TI)

It was stated:

TI indications 17 August, COMBINED FLEET STAFF at Kure.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 5)

No. 678

CINC 2ND FLEET moved from Saipan to Truk and so remains for present.  
(COM 14-180646-TI) (Summary, 181400, August, No. 10)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 679

Despatch from CINC 2ND FLEET at 1330/  
17th (blank origin) to CINC 11TH AIR FLEET  
CINC 8TH FLEET, Commanders  
DESRONS 2 and 4 and COMDESDIV  
Info: CINC COMBINED, CINC 1ST AIR  
FLEET, CINC 4TH FLEET and  
Naval General Staff was broadcast by Truk  
Radio. (COM 14-180646-TI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 11)

No. 680

One despatch noted from CINC 2ND FLEET  
(no originator) at 1300, 15th, to 2ND FLEET  
information CINC COMBINED  
4TH, 8TH, 1ST AIR  
and 11TH AIR FLEETS plus  
Chief Naval General Staff. Further  
indication from noted routing that CINC 2ND  
is in Truk Area. (BEL 180645-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 23)

No. 681

Traffic in one instance for Staff  
Comm Officer AIRON 22 was routed  
to Saipan for delivery, suggesting that  
Officer possibly at Tenian.  
(BEL 180713-TI) (Summary, 190600, August,  
No. 19)

Cruiser Division Eighteen was still active in  
the Buna area, where the Sasebo #5 Special Landing

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

Force was operating. The Communication Officer for Cruiser Division Eighteen was receiving radio traffic via a ship of Destroyer Division Eight of Destroyer Squadron Four. Traffic analysis indicated that the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Three and the Commander of Cruiser Division Seven, which had been in company from the East Indies en route to Truk, were now separated:

No. 682

CRUDIV 18 in Buna Area and 5TH SPECIAL LANDING FORCE associated.  
(COM 14-180648-TI)

It was commented:

On 14 August CRUDIV 18 was action addressee that Buna Airport would be ready for use 16 August. CRUDIV 18 has been closely associated with Sasebo #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE (operating at Buna).  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 25)

No. 683

Commander SASEBO #5 LANDING FORCE, and (TAIHO) shown at Buna. Commander TAINAN AIR at Lae at 2000/18 August. (GT #702-OPNAV 181750-TI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 26)



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 684

One despatch from 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE delivered to (destroyer of DESDIV 8 of DESRON 4) for delivery to Communication Officer CRUDIV 18 (COM 14-180648-TI)

It was indicated:

This DD has been operating with CRUDIV 18. On August 13 it was noted that traffic was delivered to it for Communication Officer of CRUDIV 18. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 23)

No. 685

Chief of Staff PHILIPPINE FLEET sent short despatch at 1016, 16th, to COMCRUDIV 7 and COMDESRON 3 3), information COMDR 32ND BASE FORCE at Davao and Davao Branch of 103rd Military Stores Depot. Routing indicates COMDESRON 3 and COMCRUDIV 7 not now in company although they have been appearing together in traffic past several days. (BEL 180645-TI)

It was mentioned:

D.I. indicates CRUDIV 7, parts of DESDIV 2 of DESRON 4 and DESDIV 15 of DESRON 2, scheduled to arrive at Davao on 16 August. In the same message DESDIV of DESRON 3 was scheduled to arrive Davao about 18 August. (Summary, 190600, August, No. 42)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 686

CRUDIV 7 and COMDESRON 3 in company,  
believed enroute Truk from Makassar.  
(COM 14-180648-TI)

It was declared:

CRUDIV 7 and two DESDIVS (probably of  
DESRON 3) reportedly arrived at Makassar 13  
August. All TI Stations have reported CRU-  
DIV 7 and DESRON 3 will go to the Mandates  
and probably operate with 1ST AIR FLEET  
(carriers) or other forces in the Rabaul  
Area. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 14)

No. 687

Rabaul (probable cover for  
CINC 8TH FLEET) addressed COMCRUDIV 7  
COMDESRON 2, COMSUB-  
RON 7, and COMDESDIV 4  
at 1511/18 August.  
(GT #701-OPNAV 181750-TI)

It was noticed:

COM 14 17 August stated possibility  
COMCRUDIV 7 (listed with 1ST AIR FLEET)  
proceeding East Indies to Truk. SUBRON 7  
operating in the New Britain-Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 22)

The deciphered text of a dispatch which ordered  
Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to  
move from the East Indies to the Solomons region now  
follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 688

FROM: #333, 1000, August 10  
TO : (Concealed identity call)  
(CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
(Comdrs. All Major Com-  
mands less (5TH  
FLT))  
(Yokosuka Commandant)  
(Kure Movement Report  
Section)  
(Sasebo Chief of Staff)  
(Tokyo Military Minister)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)

INFO: (COMDESRON 3)  
(COMDESRON 2)  
(COMDESRON 4)  
(COMDR #32 BASE FORCE at  
Davao)  
(COMDR #21 SPECIAL BASE  
FORCE at Soerabaya)  
(COMDR #22 BASE FORCE at  
Soerabaya)  
(Maru Air Tender)  
(Maru Air Tender)  
(KAGU MARU - Air Tender)

1. CRUDIV 7 less SUZUYA  
\*, DESRON 3 less DESDIV  
DESDIV 15 less  
DESDIV 2 less  
(HIGASHI) MARU and - KAGU MARU ?  
will depart UU about \_\_\_\_\_  
2. Schedule of movements:  
a) CRUDIV 7 less SUZUYA\*, DESDIV  
15 less ( DD), / - DESDIV 2 ?  
less ( - DD), proceed MD (Davao) via  
BB (Balikpapan), arriving MD (Davao) on 16  
August.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 688 (Cont.)

b) DESRON 3 (less DESDIV  
arrive MD (Davao) about  
c) The (HIGASHI) MARU, the  
- KAGU MARU ?) and DESDIV  
less - DD) -----  
arrive MD (Davao) about 18 August.  
----- proceed to PT  
(Truk) escorting the - ship ?  
which departs JN on 13 August\*\*.

Translator's Note: \*Ship whose call is  
\*\*Cannot tell to what units this  
directive is addressed.  
(GZ #2529 - OPNAV 182340-DI)

It was noted:

This message was reported by T.I. in  
R.I. Summary 120600/Q August, page 16, item  
40. UU not identified. Other \*U\* loca-  
tions have appeared to be in the Burma-  
Andaman Is. Area. JN has been identified as  
Bali, although the possibility that it is  
Surabaya has been noted.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 34)

Two other decipherments revealed details of  
the enemy's plans for active defense of Guadalcanal;

No. 689

FROM: -- #239 14 August  
(Rabaul Radio)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
(Naval General Staff)

532

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 689 (Cont.)

INFO: (DESRON 2)  
(OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE)  
(DESDIV 4)  
(DESDIV 17)  
(Chief of Staff SUB FORCE)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)

From Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET. Passed to 8TH FLEET.

(1) (Contains general statement of mission to be accomplished by OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE and Base Air Force in cooperation with Army. Have not been able to recover values for the code group describing the specific action to be taken but has to do with putting a Defense (?) Force into RXI from which operations against RXB are to be launched (?) (possible that operations against RXB are to be launched simultaneous with, or independent of, the RXI operations, but underlined version is preferred)).

(2) Details in following order: (a) Name of Force; (b) Name of Commander; (c) Organization; (d) Operations.

(1)  
(a) \_\_\_\_\_  
(b) \_\_\_\_\_  
(c) \_\_\_\_\_  
(d) cover(?) \_\_\_\_\_ operations.

(2)  
(a) Covering (?) Force  
(b) CRUDIV  
(c) COMCRUDIV 6  
(d) Depart RO on 17th, and with the  
--- of the Defense (?) Force,  
attack enemy -----.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 689 (Cont.)

- (3)
- (a) Defense Force\*
  - (b) COMDESRON 2
  - (c) DESRON 2
  - # \_\_\_\_\_ Escort (?)
  - (d) \_\_\_\_\_convoy leaving Truk at 0600 on 16th and arriving point (or point \_\_\_\_\_)\*\* at 1830 on 21st.
- (4)
- (a) \_\_\_\_\_ Force
  - (b) COMDESDIV 4 (?)
  - (c) DESDIV 4 less 2ND Section  
DESDIV 17 less \_\_\_\_\_ - DD in  
- DD
  - (d) Depart PT at \_\_\_\_\_ (about 10) hours on 15th, join (?) IKKI DETACHMENT and proceed to RXI, arriving off destination (?) on 18th and \_\_\_\_\_.
- (5)
- (a) \_\_\_\_\_Force
  - (b) \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) \_\_\_\_\_
  - (d) Attack enemy \_\_\_\_\_ in RXI Area.
- (6)
- (a) \_\_\_\_\_Force
  - (b) \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) \_\_\_\_\_
  - 4 VS
  - (d) Establish base (?) at (Gizo (?)) Island and conduct reconnaissance of RXI Area and \_\_\_\_\_.

\*In this block the encoder has not followed the order given in the first part of this paragraph. It may be that the name of this force is omitted, and that the De-  
fense (?) Force is part of the organiza-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 689 (Cont.)

tion, not its title.  
\*\*Inserted by translator.  
(GZ #2512-OPNAV-180010-180015-180020-TUNA-  
DI)

It was remarked:

This is essentially the same data as  
previously reported in MEMO #16-1 and RI  
Summary 170600/Q August, item 43, page 17.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 41)

No. 690

#756, 2100, August 9  
FROM: (CINC COMBINED FLEET)  
TO : (CINC 8TH FLEET)  
(COMDESDIV 4 in DESRON 4)  
(COMDR 1ST AIR FLEET)  
INFO: (Unidentified)  
(COMDR 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(COMDR #4 BASE FORCE at  
Truk)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)

DESDIV 4 less  
DD) will escort the IKKI Detachment to PT  
and after arrival at PT will be assigned  
to "Outer" SOUTH SEAS FORCE.  
(To Commander IKKI Detachment for informa-  
tion).  
(GZ #2532 - OPNAV 182356 - DI)

It was pointed out:

Mention of IKKI Detachment in later  
despatches already reported in R.I. Sum-  
maries, indicates IKKI Detachment left Truk

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 690 (Cont.)

on 15 August and is to take part in operations against RXI (Guadalcanal). PT is Truk. (Summary, 190600, August, No. 17)

Evidence that the Japanese had created a "B" Operations Force was contained in another message, but very little information was available concerning this force. Traffic analysis revealed that one enemy submarine was near Soerabaya, the flagship of Destroyer Squadron Six was at Truk, the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two was near Rabaul, the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Four was at Saipan, the Commander of Destroyer Division Four was in the Truk-Rabaul area, the Commander Destroyer Division Twenty-seven was at Truk, and a unit of Destroyer Division Man 5 was associated with Marcus Island and was probably escorting air units southwards. The flagship of Destroyer Division Thirty-four, which was receiving traffic in care of the Eleventh Air Fleet, was located at Rabaul:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 691

#527 Aug. 1/1000  
FROM: (DEI FORCE)  
TO : (?)  
(2nd Fleet)  
(DesRon 5)  
INFO: (3rd Fleet)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
(CruDiv 7)  
(#1 Air Attack Force)  
(Combined Fleet)  
(DesRon 3)

"From Commander SOUTHERN(?) FORCE.  
- DESRON 5? is detached from  
and assigned to the 'B' Operations  
FORCE." (GZ 2528-OPNAV 181742-DI).

It was observed:

About 26 July DESRON 5 was known to be  
in Ambon. Little is known of the "B" OPERA-  
TIONS FORCE. About August 4 CRUDIV 7,  
DESRON 3, DESRON 5 and the "A" Section of  
SUBRON 8 appeared in frequent despatches.  
The only "B" Section noted at that time ap-  
peared to be associated with AIR ESCORT  
FORCES south from the Empire.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 36)

No. 692

Following in Soerabaya Area by Radio  
Guard:

and of DESRON 5, Unidentified  
(COM 14-180646-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 692 (Cont.)

It was stated:

was first noticed in Makassar Area 1 July. BELCONNEN reports is a MARU which apparently received a sub attack about 1730/13 August in the Indies Area. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 35)

No. 693

Flagship DESRON 6 in Truk Zone at 0745/18 August. (GT #701-OPNAV 181750-TI) (Summary, 181400, August, No. 15)

No. 694

COMDESRON 2 in Rabaul Area. COMDESRON 4, apparently less DESDIV 8, in Saipan Area and associated with 6TH BASE FORCE in Marshalls. (COM 14-180646-TI)

It was commented:

COMDESRON 2 noted originating traffic at Rabaul 17 August. On 16 August Truk handled traffic for COMDESRON 4. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 27)

No. 695

Rabaul (probable cover for CINC 8TH FLEET) addresses COMDESDIV 4 at 0715/18th, with routine precedence. (GT #698-OPNAV 181452-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 695 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

By TI (COMDESDIV 4) was between  
Truk and Rabaul 15 August at 1640.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 21)

No. 696

COMDESDIV 27 was in Truk  
Zone at 2332/18 August.  
(GT #701-OPNAV 181750-TI)

It was mentioned:

COMDESDIV 27 appears asso-  
ciated with 8TH FLEET and 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE on 8 August.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 16)

No. 697

(Destroyer of DESDIV ) was  
associated with Comdr. KISARATSU AIR GROUP  
at Marcus and SAIPAN BASE  
FORCE and may be operating as es-  
cort for Air Units enroute to Southern Area  
from the Empire. (BEL 180713-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 11)

No. 698

Routing and associations indicate:

Flagship DESDIV 34 and Man-  
of-War receiving traffic in care 11TH

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 698 (Cont.)

AIR FLEET. (BEL 180739-TI)

It was declared:

CinC 11TH AIR FLEET appeared by TI as  
being at Rabaul on 17 August.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 32)

It was pointed out that the Commander of the  
Hoihow Force was not aboard the destroyer .  
Another unidentified unit, probably a destroyer, was  
ordered to proceed to Rabaul as an escort for a Maru;

No. 699

At 0215, 18 August \*HOIHOW FORCE Comdr\*  
was shown on board MARU instead of  
DD as previously shown. Traffic for  
this command was routed to Truk. Suspect  
DD is escort for  
(GT #697-OPNAV-180025-TI)

It was noticed:

COMDESDIV 29 on DD in Saipan  
Zone at 1745, 17 August, according to TI.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 56)

No. 700

FROM: (Rabaul Radio) #271 Aug. 14  
TO : (unidentified)  
(unidentified)  
(unidentified)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 700 (Cont.)

"From CINC 8TH. Passed 8TH FLEET.  
Proceed Rabaul escorting \_\_\_\_\_ MARU."  
(BEL 180215-DI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 42)

A convoy was gathering at Sasebo at this time,  
and it was thought that Moji, Bako and St. James  
would be its possible rendezvous points:

No. 701

Convoy under command of Number 1 ES-  
CORT FORCE in process of Organization at  
Sasebo. Moji, Bako and St. Jacques men-  
tioned in headings. (COM 14-180652-TI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 9)

No. 702

addresses Moji, Bako, and  
St. James (Sanjiyamaku) appeared in head-  
ing and associated with ESCORT FORCE  
which suggests arrangements for convoy  
with vessels passing through or possibly  
rendezvous at these points.  
(BEL 180713-TI)

It was noted:

on 12 August was associated in  
convoy movement South of Formosa.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 14)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

There was considerable activity at various Japanese bases, possibly indicating that reinforcements were being sent into the Rabaul area. The Fourth Base Force was situated at Truk, the Fifth Base Force at Saipan, the Tenth Base Force at Ambon, and the Twenty-third Base Force somewhere in the Java area. The Yokosuka #5 Special Landing Force had already been ordered to proceed to Rabaul;

No. 703

Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET at  
1450/17 August addressed Chiefs of Staff  
COMBINED and 1ST AIR FLEETS  
; Info: 5TH BASE FORCE, Chiefs of Staff  
2ND FLEET and 11TH AIR FLEET  
plus 4TH BASE FORCE. (COM 14-180648-TI)

It was remarked:

The 5TH BASE FORCE is at Saipan while the 4TH BASE FORCE is at Truk. At 1330/15 August CINC 4TH's traffic was routed to Jaluit. On 16 August traffic seemed to be going to Jaluit for him but on 17 August Truk apparently delivered his traffic. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 12)

No. 704

23rd and 10th Base Forces probably sending unknown units to Rabaul Area.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 704 (Cont.)

(COM 14-180648-TI)

It was pointed out:

The 23RD BASE FORCE is located some place in the Java Area. The 10th Base Force is at Ambon. Both have been closely associated with the 4th, 2nd and 8th Fleets, mainly thru the traffic of CruDiv 7 and DesRon 3.

About August 15, Commander DEI FORCE in Operational Order #30 said,

"This Force has been assigned OUTER SOUTH Seas Force. The \_\_\_\_\_ unit would be loaded at Base 10 (Ambon) and operate under CINC 8th Fleet."

(Summary, 181400, August, No: 34)

No. 705

#228 Aug. 13/1940  
FROM: (Rabaul)  
TO : (?)  
INFO: (Comdr. KINAI MARU)  
(Comdr. DESDIV 17 in DES-  
RON 10)  
(Comdr. DESRON 2)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)  
(Comdr. DESDIV 4 in DES-  
RON 4)

(From CINC 8TH FLEET. Passed to 8th FLEET).

'OUTSIDE' SOUTH SEAS FORCE DESPATCH ORDER #17.

1. Yokosuka #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE proceed Truk - - - - -

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 705 (Cont.)

2. - - -  
(GZ #2526-OPNAV 180742-DI)

It was observed:

The Yokosuka #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE was ordered on 7 August at 1800 to proceed to Rabaul from Truk in the KIN-- MARU. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 28)

Many enemy planes were operating during the daylight hours in the Marshall Islands:

No. 706

Heavy Marshalls Plane Activity continues during daylight hours.  
(COM 14-182222-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 20)

There was very little carrier activity on this day, although the preparations of Carrier Division Two for departure from the Empire was noted. Carrier Division One was not believed to be at sea:

No. 707

Little carrier activity noted.  
(COM 14-182222-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 8)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 708

Traffic and bearings indicate presence of CARDIV 2 Command in Empire making preparation for departure. CARDIV 1 not believed at sea. (COM 14-180646-TI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 6)

No. 709

1ST AIR FLEET Flagship continued to work on 5910 kcs.; traffic involving Commander CARDIV 2, ZUIHO, HITAKA, HAYATAKA and BASE AIR GROUPS again prominent.  
(COM 14-180646-TI)

It was stated:

3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE #943 13 August appears to indicate that CARDIV 2 would operate with the HITAKA, HAYATAKA and ZUIHO. Operational Area was questionable but believed Marcus Island.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 7)

Bearings taken on Japanese aircraft carriers were somewhat contradictory, but it was believed that the HITAKA and the ZUIHO were still in the Kyushu area:

No. 710

(HITAKA) 288° from Hawaii at 0829/Z Aug. 18, 1942. (GX-2 MEMO 8/18/42)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 710 (Cont.)

It was commented:

The Carriers have been bearing about 300° from Oahu. This is the first great change of bearing noted.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 38)

No. 711

(HITAKA) bearing 295 degrees from Hawaii at 0853, 18 August, 1942.  
(GX-2 Plot 8/18)

It was indicated:

This bearing tends to cast doubt on the bearing of 288 taken on HITAKA at 0829, same date, and reported in R.I. Summary 181400/Q August, page 21, item 38.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 45)

No. 712

Single bearings on HITAKA and ZUIHO show in Kyushu Area yet.  
(COM 14-182224-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 47)

Deciphered dispatches revealed the intensive efforts of the Japanese to reinforce the Truk-Rabaul area with as many planes as were available:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 713

#295 0508 10 August 1942  
FROM: (Comdr. Hahajima  
Air (6th Air Atk Force))  
TO :  
- (Comdr. Base For. #4 at  
Truk)  
- (Comdr. 5th Air Attack  
Force)  
- (Air Base in Truk Gen.  
Area)  
INFO: (All Major Comds, Staff  
Comm. Off.)  
- (Tokyo Bureau Aero.)  
- (Base For #5 at Saipan,  
Staff Comm Officer)  
- (?)  
- (4th Fleet Staff Comm.  
Off.)  
- (Kisaratsu Air)  
- (?)

At 0750, 2 type-1 transport  
planes took off for PT (Truk)  
(GZ 2525-OPNAV 181742-DI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 17)

No. 714

#509 Aug. 9/1630  
FROM: (6th AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (Ex-MARU in 11TH AIR  
FLEET)  
INFO: (5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Hahajima AIR)  
(11TH AIR FLEET, Chief of  
Staff)  
(Concealed Identity Call)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 714 (Cont.)

\*Your ship will load -----  
of KISARAZU AIR GROUP and as soon  
as completed will proceed to {  
place in R Area} via RR (Rabaul) -----  
-----" (GZ #2524-OPNAV 181442-DI)  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 29)

No. 715

At 0527, 17th, CINC 4TH ad-  
dressed despatch to COMDR 19TH AIR GROUP  
at Imeiji. information CINC COM-  
BINED FLEET, 11TH AIR FLEET  
COMDRS AIRON 24 and 25  
Tokio Vice Chief of Naval General Staff  
plus SOUTHERN FORCE and  
"Outside" SOUTHERN FORCE. This  
suggests 19TH AIR GROUP may reinforce Air  
Units in Rabaul Area.  
(BEL 180645-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 22)

The prominence of Truk Air Station in enemy  
radio traffic indicated the importance of this island  
in the ferry route between the South Pacific and the  
Empire. Traffic analysis disclosed that a fighter  
squadron of Plane Group had moved to an un-  
identified station, Air Squadron Eleven was at Truk,  
the Commander of the Sixth Air Attack Force was at

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

Tinian, and a detachment of Toko Air was at Yokosuka  
or Yokohama:

No. 716

Truk Air Station appears promi-  
nently in air traffic, probably as stop-  
over point on flights to and from Empire.  
(BEL 180713-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 24)

No. 717

Routing and associations indicate:

Comdr Plane Group at Kisaratsu  
with enciphered Commanding Officer of Ex-  
peditionary Fighter Plane Unit of that  
Group at unidentified  
Detachment TOKO AIR at Yoko-  
suka or Yokohama  
(BEL 180739-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI on 19 August stated Fighter Squad-  
ron of Plane Group has moved to a  
Station (unidentified), but whose  
traffic is routed from Chichijima. Comdr  
AIR GROUP was indicated at Kisaratsu  
on 17 August.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 10)

No. 718

Routing and associations indicate:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 718 (Cont.)

AIRON 11 and Comdr SUB-  
CHASER DIVISION in Truk Area.  
Comdr AIRON 26 at Tenian.  
(BEL 180739-TI)

It was declared:

On 11 August AIRON 11 made  
enciphered Communication Zone Report to  
COMBINED FLEET, 2ND FLEET (?), Tokyo Yoko-  
suka, Truk, info Chichijima - indicates  
route to be followed South. identified  
as 63 SUBCHASER DIVISION. COMDR AIRON  
26 is called COMDR 6TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE here.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 18)

Japanese planes were quite active on the  
morning of August 18, for many reconnaissance reports  
were being sent to operational authorities:

No. 719

Many apparent sighting or reconnaissance  
reports from planes (?),  
, and were received during  
morning of 18th, apparently associated with  
operations New Guinea-Solomons Area and  
passed to Cinc COMBINED, plus Submarine  
Force and 11TH AIR FLEET as well as Opera-  
tions Section Naval General Staff.  
(BEL 180739-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 39)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

The KAMOI, which was bringing important essential supplies to the enemy at Rabaul, apparently fell into difficulty at 0930 on this day, because it issued a most urgent call to operational authorities:

No. 720

FROM: #428, 0630, Aug. 12  
TO : (KAMOI in 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(CINC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(COMDR 4TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
INFO: (Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
(#6 BASE FORCE at Jaluit)  
(COMDR 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
(#8 BASE FORCE at Rabaul)  
(Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)  
(Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET)  
(4TH FLEET)  
(DESDIV 34)

The KAMOI left RYP for RR  
(Rabaul).

\*Translator's Note: Ship whose call is  
. (GZ #2531 - OPNAV 182356 - DI)

It was noticed:

RYP is unidentified. Other RY-designators appear to include locations in the Gilbert Islands. T.I., on 13 August, indicated movement of KAMOI from Kwajalein to Rabaul. RYP may have been a stop enroute. (Summary, 190600, August, No.30)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 721

KAMOI discontinued communi-  
cations with AIRON 24 (in Marshalls) at  
0600, 17th, and apparently proceeding  
Rabaul Area. (BEL 180645-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 31)

No. 722

KAMOI in difficulty at 0930/  
18th, and send MOST URGENT Operational Code  
to Commanders 4TH AIR ATTACK  
5TH AIR ATTACK, CINC 11TH AIR  
, Info: COMDESDIV 34, Rabaul  
BASE, and Unidentified FLEET  
Chief of Staff.  
(GT #699-OPNAV 181452-TI)

It was noted:

KAMOI originated #427 12  
August apparently Communication Zone report  
indicating that vessel enroute Kwajalein to  
Rabaul. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 32)

A Maru in the Eleventh Air Fleet was proceed-  
ing to the Solomons, as were three other Marus be-  
lieved to be sailing in company. Evidence was re-  
ceived which proved that the Maru was near  
Truk;



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 723

#214 Aug. 10/0500  
FROM: (11th AIR FLEET - MARU in)  
TO :  
(Yokosuka)  
(Tokyo)

"On the 12th at - - - hours will leave  
Yokosuka Communication Zone and enter  
- Air Unit) Communication Zone."  
(GZ #2527-OPNAV 181742-DI)

It was remarked:

was ordered on 9 August to pro-  
ceed to the Solomons via Rabaul.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 30)

No. 724

#353 Aug. 9/2100  
FROM: (?)  
TO : (?)  
INFO: --- (CINC 8TH FLEET)  
--- (?)  
--- (CINC 2ND FLEET)  
--- (CINC 4TH FLEET)  
--- (?)  
--- (All Comrs. 11TH AIR FLEET)  
--- (?)

" - - - - - As soon as  
preparations are completed, KAMIKAWA MARU  
will proceed RR (Rabaul) - - - -  
- - ." (GZ #2523-OPNAV 181442-DI)

It was pointed out:

The KAMIKAWA MARU, NITCHO MARU and

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 724 (Cont.)

MARU are believed enroute South together and in Saipan Area 17 August.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 31)

No. 725

Traffic for MARU routed to Truk at 2200, 17 August.  
(GT #696-OPNAV-180025-TI)

It was observed:

(MARU in 11TH AIR FLEET) was shown in Saipan Communication Zone on 1630, 16 August.  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 36)

The Maru which had been attacked by an Allied submarine in May, 1942, reported its arrival at Rabaul on August 19. A new fleet vessel, the KOMASAKI, was also expected to go south.

No. 726

FROM: - #68, Noon, August 17  
TO : (8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul)

Expect arrive noon, August 19th.  
(BEL 181702 - DI)

It was stated:

Maru by T.I. on 3 August, appeared enroute Truk via Hahajima, in Saipan

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 726 (Cont.)

Area 8th, and shifted communications from Truk to Rabaul Zones at 0800, 18th. was attacked by a sub at 1400, May 7th, in 9-50 N., 150-30 E., and requested assistance. (Summary, 190600, August, No. 38)

No. 727

New Fleet Vessel appears to be going South soon. (COM 14-182224-TI)

It was commented:

(KOMASAKI) (Ammunition Ship ?), was shown by TI in Saipan Communication Zone on 12 August. (Summary, 190600, August, No. 12)

Estimates concerning the location of some of the enemy's merchant ships brought the following results:

No. 728

MARU shifted Rabaul to Truk Communication Zone. (COM 14-180652-TI)

It was indicated:

, Serial 70 states he expects to leave Truk 19 August to arrive Chichijima 28 August. COM 14 reported this ship might have been damaged in New Britain Area 11 or 12 Aug. The indicated speed of about 7

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 728 (Cont.)

or 8 knots would tend to bear this out.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 13)

No. 729

Routing and associations indicate:

MARU MARU DESDIVS 4  
and 17 plus NIKKAI MARU  
in Rabaul Area.  
MARU at Makassar.  
MARU enroute to Surabaya  
(BEL 180739-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI on 14 August indicated en-  
route Rabaul from Palao.  
17 TI on 17 August indicated COMDESDIV  
at Rabaul.  
DI on 5 August reported NIKKAI MARU  
arrived Rabaul 1615.  
was reported in Soerabaya by  
radio guard on 18 August.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 37)

No. 730

Routing and associations indicate:

Detachment from Truk Air at  
Singapore  
MARU from Penang to  
Mandates Area via Saigon  
(BEL 180739-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 730 (Cont.)

It was declared:

is believed an alternate call  
for On 4 August MARU was  
an addressee in a despatch from Naval Gen-  
eral Staff which doubtless was an operation  
plan for Southwestern Area. COMCRUDIV 7  
and COMDESRON 3 were also addressees in  
this despatch.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 43)

No. 731

MARUS in Kwa-  
jalein Zone. (COM 14-182224-TI)

It was noticed:

The above 3 MARUS are believed to be  
11TH AIR FLEET MARUS and have previously  
been indicated by TI as being in the Kwa-  
jalein Zone.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 27)

A comprehensive analysis of the enemy's  
strength in the Truk-Rabaul area was now furnished  
by United States Naval Communication Intelligence  
for the information of operational authorities.  
Sources of this information came from either traffic  
analysis (TI) or decryption (DI), unless otherwise  
specified:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732

Units believed to be in the Truk-Rabaul areas are listed below; this information is tabulated to show (1) the name or call of the unit, (2) its location, (3) the date it was or will be in that location, and (4) the source of the information. In some cases, there is information on a large unit and also on the smaller units within the large one; in these instances, the smaller units are listed directly under the large unit, and must be considered only as more detailed information on the large unit;

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
2nd Fleet.	Departs Japan for Rabaul Area.	8/11	DI
CinC 2nd Fleet. (ATAGO?)	Saipan handled traffic. Truk delivered despatch to SCO 2nd Fleet.	8/16 8/16 (1757)	TI TI
CinC 8th Fleet. (CHOKAI)	In Chokai, in Rabaul Area.	8/10	TI
Crudiv 5.	Ordered South ?	8/7	TI
Crudiv 6.	Kavieng. Rabaul Area.	8/17	DI
Crudiv 6).		8/12	TI
Crudiv 7.	Moving from Java Sea to Rabaul ? Rendezvous with #1 Air Fleet at Saipan (after 8/16)?	8/12	DI
Crudiv 8.	Rendezvous with #1 Air Fleet at Saipan?	After 8/16	TI
Crudiv 18.	Rabaul area.	8/1	DI
Crudiv 18.	Rabaul area.	8/13	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
Desron 1.	Enroute or in Truk Area?	8/17	TI
Desdiv 9.	Enroute or in Truk Area?	8/17	TI
Comdesdiv	Enroute or in Truk Area?	8/17	TI
Desron 2.	Escorting, Truk to	8/17	
Comdesron 2.	Enroute Rabaul.	to 21	DI
Desdiv 15.	In company Crudiv 7.	8/16	TI
1 DD	Enroute Rabaul?	8/12	TI
JINTSU (F/S)	Rabaul area.	8/15	TI
		7/27	TI
Desron 3.	Appears to be moving from Java Sea to Rabaul or Truk with Crudiv 7 and KAGU MARU	8/12	TI
Desdiv	Enroute Truk?	8/16	TI
DD	Enroute (East Indies?) to Rabaul?	8/15	TI
Desron 4.	Ordered South?	8/7	TI
YURA (F/S)	Truk?	8/16	TI
Desdiv 2.	In company Crudiv 7.	8/14	TI
DD ROSA 2.	Truk Communication Zone.	8/19	
		(1200)	DI
Desdiv 4 (less 2nd Section).	Ikki Detachment leaving Truk on 8/15; accompany (?) to RXI	8/14	DI
Desdiv	May be ordered South?	8/8	TI
DD	Escort for KAMIKAWA MARU?	8/7	TI
Desron 5.	Engaged in plane movements, Marshalls to Rabaul.	8/15	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
Desron 6.	Tulagi-Rabaul-New Guinea area	7/31	TI
Comdesdiv	Rabaul area.	8/8	TI
Desdiv 29.	Rabaul area.	8/14	TI
DD	Enroute Rabaul in company with Maru Comdr. (Kure #5 Special Landing Force?) on board	8/16	TI
Desdiv 30.	Rabaul.	8/21	DI
YUBARI (F/S)	Tulagi.	7/30	TI
Desron 10.			
Desdiv 3.	Enroute Truk-Rabaul area.	8/14	TI/DI
DD	Escorting Maru to Truk?	8/14	TI
Desdiv 17.	With Desdiv 4, join (?) IKKI Detachment leaving Truk 8/15; accompany (?) to RXI.	8/14	DI
Desdiv 16.			
DD	Enroute Truk?	8/16	TI
AKIKAZE.	Rabaul.	8/12	DI
HAGURO.	Saipan handled traffic.	8/16	TI
SATA (AO).	Enroute Rabaul.	8/17	DI
YUKAZE (?)	Rabaul.	About 8/15	DI
Subron 1.	Will move to Rabaul area?	8/13	TI



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
Subron 3.	3 Divisions ordered to Tulagi.	8/7	DI
Subron 6.	Rabaul area.	8/11	TI/DF
Subron 7.	Ordered to Solomons area (or 2 Divisions Tulagi area).	8/9	TI/DI/DF
Subdiv 33.	Rabaul area.	8/11	TI
(Submarine unit)	Truk	8/13 (1030)	DI
(Submarine unit)	Rabaul area?	8/8	TI
(XAS)	Truk.	8/8	TI
(XAS)	Arrived Truk from Jaluit.	8/13	DI
KOMABASHI (AS).	Truk (may depart for Empire soon)	8/5	DI
Cinc 11th Air Fleet.	Rabaul.	8/17	TI
BIFORO Air Group.	Detachment at Rabaul.	8/9	TI
MISAWA Air Group.	17 heavy bombers at Rabaul.	8/10	DI
SUKUGAWA Air Group.	Truk Area.	8/8	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
TAINAN Air Group.	Lae-Salamaua area.	8/15	TI
YOKOHAMA Air Group.	Detachment at Gasmata.	8/16	TI
4th Air Group.	Rabaul (Vunakanau)	8/8	TI
6th Air Group.	22 bombers and 2 transport planes enroute Rabaul.	8/11	DI
YOKOSUKA Air Station Unit.	Enroute Rabaul?	8/12	TI
14th Air Group.	Detachment at Gasmata.	8/16	TI
Airon 11.	To operate under CinC 2nd Fleet?	8/9	TI
Airon 24 Units.	To move from Marshalls to Rabaul area?	8/11	TI
Airon 12.	Enroute to Truk?	8/11	TI
Comairon 22.	Solomons area?	8/11	TI
Airon 26.	Enroute Yokohama to Rabaul.	8/11	TI
Plane Group	Enroute Rabaul.	8/13	DI
Air Group	Lae area.	8/8	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
KAGU MARU (XAV).	Will arrive Truk. (To operate under Cinc 2nd Fleet?).	8/21	DI
KAMIKAWA MARU (XAV).	Arrive Rabaul from Yokosuka. (Trans- porting Airon 11?).	8/23 <sup>7</sup>	DI
KIYOKAWA MARU (XAV).	Rabaul.	7/31	TI
--- (Maru in 11th Air Fleet).	Kavieng. Rabaul.	8/19 9/4	DI DI
CHIYODA (AV).	Truk handling traf- fic. Saipan handling traf- fic.	8/15 8/16	TI TI
--- (Aux.) (Aux).	Enroute Truk.	8/14	TI
(XAV?)	Enroute Gasmata.	8/16	TI
(Aux).	Truk.	8/17	TI
*All planes under repair at Yokosuka Aircraft Factory will be despatched to Rabaul as soon as possible.*		8/13	DI
(Maru).	Departed Kure for Truk.	8/16 (1030)	TI
AKEBONO MARU.	Rabaul Communication Zone.	8/16	TI
HIKAWA MARU.	Enroute Truk?	8/15	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
(Maru).	Arrive Rabaul.	8/22	DI
AZUMI MARU.	Rabaul.	8/12	DI
	Arrive Truk.	8/14	DI
(Maru).	Rabaul.	8/6	DI
(Escort Unit).	Enroute Rabaul from Sasebo.	8/14	TI
----- (Maru)	Rabaul Communication Zone.	8/8	TI
	Rabaul.	8/9?	DI
(XAV?).	Ordered to RK via Rabaul.	8/9	DI
	Rabaul area.	8/9	TI
	Rabaul area.	8/9	TI
(Tanker) (Tanker)	May be ordered South to reinforce 4th and 8th Fleets.	8/8	TI
KOTOKU MARU	Rabaul area.	7/29	TI
NIKKAI MARU	Kavieng.	8/2	TI
#3 SHONAN MARU.	Enroute Jaluit to Truk.	8/7	TI
(Maru).	Enroute Truk to Rabaul?	8/14	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
(Maru).	Rabaul.	7/28	TI
(Maru).	Enroute Truk area from Empire.	8/13	TI
(Maru).	Rabaul Communication Zone.	8/13	TI
(Maru).	Enroute Yokosuka to Rabaul.	8/14	TI
(Maru).	Yokosuka to Rabaul.	7/26	TI
	Arrive Truk.	8/14	DI
	Departed Truk for Rabaul.	8/7	DI
(Maru).	Truk area.	8/5	TI
(XAV?).	Rabaul area.	8/16	TI
(Aux).	Enroute Palao to Ra- baul.	8/14	TI
	Receives mail at Truk.	8/8	DI
(Aux.)	Arrived Rabaul Area.	8/8	DI
	Enroute Jaluit to Truk	8/6	DI
	Rabaul Area.	8/9	TI
(Maru)	Truk	8/9	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
	Enroute Yokosuka to Saipan	8/2	DI
(DD?)	Rabaul-Truk Area	8/10	DI
(Aux.)	Enroute Truk from Rabaul	8/15	DI
(AH)	Enroute Yokosuka to Truk	8/13	TI
(Maru)	Enroute Truk from Saipan Area.	8/10	TI
	Ordered proceed Truk to Rabaul.	8/16	DI
(May be same as	Truk Communication Zone	8/16	DI
(Maru)	Arrive Truk from Empire	8/21	DI
(Maru)	Enroute Yokosuka to Truk	8/15	TI
(Maru)	Enroute Saipan to Truk	8/15	TI
(Patrol Div.?)	Enroute Rabaul.	8/13	DI
(Patrol Div.?)	Enroute Rabaul.	8/13	DI
	Will join #8 Fleet	8/10?	DI
(Fleet Unit)	Rabaul Area.	8/13	TI

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
(MOW?)	Rabaul Area	8/9	TI
(MOW?)	Enroute Empire to Rabaul.	8/13	TI
(MOW?)	Enroute Palao to Rabaul.	8/16	DI
#4 Meteorological Unit Moving from Truk to Rabaul		8/14	DI
#2___Maru, carrying #3 Special Landing For.	Depart Ambon for Rabaul. #10 Base Force provide escort.	After 8/12	DI
KIN_MARU, with Yokosuka #5 Special Landing Force and ___ Communication Corps embarked. Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force.	Ordered to proceed to Rabaul.	8/7 1800	DI
Kure #8 Special Landing Force. Maizure(?) Special Landing Force.	Men from each, embark in 2 Marus and set out for RXI.	8/7 1450	DI
#7 Base Force.	Rabaul Area.	8/8	TI
Cedar Detachment	Rabaul	8/7	Enciphered Addresses

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 732 (Cont.)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
KIRIKITO De- tachment	Rabaul	8/7	Enci- phered Address
HORII Detach- ment	Rabaul	8/7	Enci- phered Addresses
OKI Detachment	Rabaul	8/7	"
ASADA Detach- ment	Kieta	8/1	"
Chief of Staff, ODA Detachment	Rabaul	7/24	"
YORIYAMA De- tachment	Buna	7/25	"
Comdr. 35th Brigade	Rabaul	8/2	"
Kaki Composite Group (Army)	Rabaul.	8/13	"
Sasebo #5 Spe- cial Landing Force. (Summary, 181400, August, No. 1)	Buna.	8/6	"

No. 733

ship Units in Rabaul Area include Flag-  
and DESDIV of DESRON 2,



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 733 (Cont.)

Units of DESDIV 8, Units of SUBRONS 5, 6  
and 7 and auxiliary  
(COM 14-180648-TI)

It was noted:

has been reported as a tanker.  
(Summary, 181400, August, No. 24)

Two enemy submarines operating in northern  
waters were preparing to move southwards:

No. 734

Subs and appear pre-  
paring southward trip, perhaps in company  
DESRON 1 destroyer in now  
vicinity Kiska. (COM 14-182222-TI)

It was remarked:

at Kure August 17th by T.I.  
in Kure Communication Zone July  
15th. COM 14, on August 15, suggested the  
above units might join SUBDIV of  
SUBRON 3 which has been receiving traffic  
through Jaluit. Destroyer was be-  
lieved by COM 14, on August 11th, to be  
Northward bound. is identified as  
DESDIV 6 of DESRON 1 and was in the Horo-  
mushiro Communication Zone August 16th.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 13)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

Direction finders indicated the positions of  
two enemy units:

No. 735

Two fair fixes on Submarines:

HCE (Flag SUBDIV ) is 157 East,  
03 South.

HONI (COMSUBRON 3) is 145 East,  
05 North.

(COM 14-182224-TI)

It was pointed out:

HOE on 17 August by D/F was in 02 S,  
153 E. HONI on 10 August by D/F was in  
01-30 S, 151 E.

(Summary, 190600, August, No. 44)

Evidence appeared that a Japanese submarine  
which had been severely bombed by Allied aircraft had  
not been sunk:

No. 736

Reference OPNAV 161830: Reference  
TEKA: Report from COMAIRSOPAC reported  
bombing, strafing ORANGE Sub diving  
vicinity Southwest Solomons. At 16/0637  
KII called KOYO, sent  
frantic Series Bearings and  
time close approximated above report. How-  
ever, KII reappeared on 17th, so probably

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 736 (Cont.)

scared but not sunk. (COM 14-182224-TI)

It was observed:

The above is in answer to our despatch requesting COM 14 to clarify a statement regarding possible sinking of COMSUBRON 3 on 13 August. RI Summary 170600/Q August, page 23, item 64.

(Summary, 190600, August, No. 36)

It was evident that Allied planes and submarines were harassing the enemy's communication lines for another report of Allied planes and two other reports of attacks by Allied units were made. One of these dispatches was possibly a practice report:

No. 737

Unidentified in Ambon Area reported sighting planes in short urgent despatch at 0950, 17th, but no amplifying data.  
(BEL 180713-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 40)

No. 738

Short URGENT despatch from KOBE MARU

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 738 (Cont.)

... at 1130, 17th, to CINC 2ND FLEET  
and All Ships and Stations  
suggests that vessel was attacked by Allied  
units, possibly submarine. KOBE MARU was  
in Kure Area on 9 August.  
(BEL 180645-TI) (Summary, 190600, August,  
No. 15)

No. 739

Following from Darwin:

"Plain language from Ambon to air-  
craft, to indicates Jap war-  
ships and merchant vessels engaged by sub-  
marines at point 3 miles, 264 degrees from  
opening Ambon Bay. May be Exercise. Time  
of Receipt there 1105, sent on 8500 kilo-  
cycles." (BEL 180215-DI)  
(Summary, 180600, August, No. 59)

The following is taken from the Bulletin of  
the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet issued on  
18 August 1942:

No. 740

FROM: Cincpac 180131, August 1942  
TO : Cominch  
Opnav  
Comnav  
Cdrs All Tf Pac  
Cdrs All Sf Pac  
Comsopac  
Comsowespacfor

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 740 (Cont.)

NCR 6791 J

Bulletin No. 155

No changes in carrier locations since yesterday indicated. CinC Second Fleet in Truk area. NAKA in Saipan area. AKEBONO MARU arriving Rabaul and SATA departing Truk for Rabaul. Both above vessels are tankers. KAMIKAWA MARU in Saipan area. By DF submarines 078 160 E, 24 N 151 E. Indications of reenforcements proceeding toward Truk with ultimate destination Guadalcanal area.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942

The Japanese had changed their call signs at 0000 on August 18. This made the identification of enemy units rather difficult until proper identification could be established by research. Two units receiving special attention were the Second Fleet and the First Air Fleet, for it was noticed that the First Air Fleet was associated with Truk. This was a possible indication that enemy carriers were en route to Truk. Previous radio traffic had indicated that a striking force was to rendezvous at Truk at approximately this time.

No. 741

Lack of information on CinC 2ND FLEET during past 48 hours is due to inability to identify call signs for this Fleet. Several call signs have been narrowed down by elimination to being either 2ND FLEET or 1ST AIR FLEET. Both Commanders appear, in most cases, whenever either is addressed. Failure of Radio Intelligence Units to report on activity of these two important Commanders should not be misconstrued as indicating lack of activity by them. The following information is now available:

(a) DD of DESDIV 15, is in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 741 (cont.)

New Britain-Solomons Area and addresses for information Chief of Staff of either 2ND, or 1ST AIR FLEET in his reports.

(b) Unidentified Ship addressed Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, info SHOKAKU and Kure Aircraft Section at 1452, 18 August. At 1510, the same ship addressed Truk Base, KURE DEFENSE FORCE, Chief of Staff Kure, info Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, indicating a probable movement to Truk from Kure. The association of 1ST AIR FLEET and Truk in these two messages is suggestive but not necessarily significant of any movement of carriers to Truk. However, the suggestion is strengthened by a despatch from MARU at 1410, on the 19th to Truk Base, info Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, COMCRUDIV 7 and Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET, since it has been previously indicated that both this MARU and CURDIV 7 would go to Truk.  
(GT#709-OPNAV-192322-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 23)

No. 742

Under Rabaul cover, unidentified (believed 8TH FLEET Comdr) at 1247, 18th, addressed COMSUBRON 6, info Staff Communication Officer DESRON 2 and DESDIV, on 1 transmission. This same message later

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 742 (cont.)

seen on Tokyo broadcast going to  
COMCRUDIV 7. MARU in commu-  
nication with Rabaul.  
(COM-14-190744-TI)

It was noted:

On Aug. 18th at 1511, Rabaul  
(probable a cover for CINC 8TH FLEET)  
addressed COMCRUDIV 7, COMDESRON 2,  
COMSUBRON 7 and COMDESNAV 4.  
COMDESNAV 2, SUBRONS 6 and 7, and  
COMDESNAV 4 appear to be in  
Rabaul Area-Solomon Is. Area, and  
CRUDIV 7 appears enroute Truk from  
the Indies to join 1ST AIR FLEET TASK  
FORCE. appears to be an armed  
guard aboard a MARU and according to  
decryption left RO (tentatively Kavieng)  
at 1400 on Aug. 16th, and appears to  
be concerned with location of 8TH CON-  
VOY (?). On Aug. 14th, appeared  
enroute from Truk to Rabaul.  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 69)

Heavy radio-traffic from the Marshall Islands  
evidently dealt with the Allied attack on Makin  
Island. Much of the traffic probably referred to  
enemy effort to place all their forces on the alert  
in this region, e. g., a special detachment, called  
the Makin Relief or Rescue Force, was sent into action.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 743

Series of messages originated by 19TH AIR GROUP on 18th, to Comdr. 6TH BASE FORCE and 11TH AIR FLEET; info Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET, unidentified, Comm. Officer 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE, enciphered Makin, CHITOSE. 1ST, and 14TH AIR GROUPS.

(COM-14-10732-TI)

It was noticed:

This probably concerns Makin action.

(Summary, 191400, August, No. 41)

No. 744

address "MAKIN" appeared as information addressee with Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET CHITOSE AIR GROUP, 1ST AIR CORPS, 14TH AIR CORPS, Staff Communication Officer AIRON 24, and unidentified in despatch from Commander 19TH AIR GROUP to (Unit in 19th Division) at 1730, 18th.  
(BEL-190635-TI)

It was remarked:

COMDR. 19TH AIR GROUP heavy originator on 18th

(Summary, 200600, August, No. 27)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 745

Reason for heavy traffic from  
Marshall Area evident in despatch  
from 19TH AIR GROUP at  
1100, 19th, addressed to:

Actn: (6TH BASE FORCE at  
Jaluit),  
(Ship in 19th Divi-  
sion).

Info: (Communication Of-  
ficer 4TH FLEET),  
(Communication Of-  
ficer 4TH AIR AT-  
TACK FORCE),  
(14TH AIR CORPS COM-  
MANDER),  
(COMDR YOKOSUKA DE-  
FENSE FORCE),  
"MAKIN RELIEF (RES-  
CUE ?) FORCE".

With the exception of the YOKO-  
SUKA DEFENSE FORCE, these addressees  
have all been prominent in heavy  
traffic from Marshalls since the morn-  
ing of the 17th.

Reason for inclusion of YOKOSUKA  
DISTRICT DEFENSE FORCE not apparent  
unless some rescuers are leaving Yoko-  
suka.

(GT#707-OPNAV-192320-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 25)

No. 746

Outstanding feature of last night's  
traffic is prolific origination by 6TH  
BASE FORCE some of which was  
apparently connected with MAKIN action,  
but most undoubtedly concerned with

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 746 (cont.)

placing the area on the alert.  
a Detachment has  
been sent to MAKIN called "MAKIN RE-  
LIEF (or RESCUE) FORCE". Another en-  
ciphred address (KAGOU OCCUPATION  
FORCE) receives Jaluits radio intelli-  
gence despatches relayed by Truk, but  
composition and aims are not clear.  
(COM-14-192054-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 26)

It was noticed that much of the traffic from  
the Marshall Islands was originated by the Commander  
of the Sixth Base Force. The Nineteenth Air Group  
was also much concerned with defense operations. A  
peculiar feature of this traffic was the infrequency  
of enemy radio intelligence despatches.

No. 747

Series three despatches origi-  
nated by 19TH AIR GROUP ad-  
dressed action Comdrs 6TH BASE FORCE  
and 11TH AIR FLEET, info Chief of  
Staff 4TH FLEET, Suffix 95 of 4TH  
AIR ATTACK plus CHITOSE, 1ST AND 14TH  
AIR GROUPS. Enciphred Makin and un-  
identified (alternate ).  
Despatch originated at 18/1528 was re-  
transmitted by Tokyo at 0316 on 19th,  
for information  
(KAGOU operation or Task  
Force). KAGOU unidentified.  
(COM-14-190142-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 747 (cont.)

It was commented:

19TH AIR GROUP was believed, according to TI, at Ponapa (?) on 17 July and interested in Wake Island.

Believe that by Suffix 95 is meant Staff Comm. Officer.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 21)

No. 748

Very heavy file originated by Comdr. 6TH BASE FORCE and all units under his command. This undoubtedly result of Makin action. Plane activity in this area has died down. One R.I. type despatch observed from Jaluit and this type traffic from other R.I. Centers down to low ebb.  
(COM-14-190744-TI)  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 40)

Several indications of a "Kago Operations Force" had been appearing for some time. Traffic analysis disclosed that intelligence reports from Palao, Truk and Jaluit as well as D/F reports from Saipan and airplane contact reports from the Solomons were forwarded to this force. Furthermore, it had also received the traffic concerning the attack on

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

Makin Island. This force was located in the Truk area, and, since it was not in port, it was believed that it was a task force operating under the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet.

No. 749

"KAGO Operations Force" is concerned with Southern Area. Traffic from following sources is rerouted to this Force:

- (1) Intelligence Reports from Palao.
- (2) Traffic concerning Makin originated in Marshalls.
- (3) Intelligence Reports from Truk.
- (4) Contact and amplifying reports from aircraft in Solomons.
- (5) D/F reports from Saipan.
- (6) Intelligence reports from Jaluit.

This traffic is routed via Tokyo to Truk in all cases except when originated by Truk indicating that this Force is in Truk Area. Since Truk broadcasts its own Intelligence Reports to this Force, it seems probable that it is not in port. It seems reasonable that this may be the Task Force under CinC 2ND.

(GT#709-OPNAV-192322-TI)

It was indicated:

Reference to "KAGOU" Operation or Task Force was made in a despatch reported in RI Summary 191400/Q August, page 8, item 41. This Force was information addressee in a despatch from 19TH AIR GROUP on 18 August.

(Summary, 200600, August, No. 28)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

Close monitoring of Rabaul broadcasts revealed that the radio station situated there was transmitting on a new frequency.

No. 750

Rabaul broadcasting on 4990/9980 kcs to forces and units in his area. This new development.  
(COM-14-190744-TI)  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 53)

Increased activity by Japanese Army forces led to the belief that reinforcements for the Solomons were being drawn from the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and possibly Indo-China. The appearance of #6 Yokosuka Special Landing Force for the first time was an indication that additional forces were probably being dispatched to Rabaul.

No. 751

Enciphered heading of Army despatch intercepted at 0808, 18th, COMDR 1ST LANDING FORCE at Palao addressed headquarters at Ujina, Merchant Marine (convoy?) headquarters at Ujina, General Headquarters of Southern Army at Saigon, Commander 52nd Anchorage at Manila and Commander 28th (independent?) Regiment at

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 751 (cont.)

Surabaya. This suggests Army Forces are being drawn from Philippines, Netherlands East Indies and possibly Indo-China to supplement the 1ST LANDING FORCE at Palao. Probably for ultimate operations in New Guinea or Solomons.

(BEL-190745-TI)

(Summary, 200600, August, No. 5)

No. 752

Rabaul. addressed enciphered Commander of 6TH YOKOSUKA SPECIAL LANDING FORCE at Yokosuka in despatch at 0844, 17th, which suggests possibility that Force may be despatched to Rabaul area.

(BEL-190635-TI)

It was noted:

First appearance of #6 YOKOSUKA SPECIAL LANDING FORCE.

(Summary, 200600, August, No. 21)

No. 753

Enciphered "YOKOSUKA #6 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE" associated with Jaluit and other Marshalls Activities on 19 August. No indication from routing where this Force is, but probably a new organization otherwise would have a call.

(GT#70900PNAV-192322-TI)

(Summary, 200600, August, No. 22)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

The presence of the Commander of the Akatsuki Detachment at Palao on August 16 was noted at this time.

No. 754

On Aug. 16, an enciphered call "Comdr. AKATSUKI DETACHMENT #2943, Palao" was noted.  
(GW MEMO 8/19)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 13)

- An old enemy dispatch of August 1, which announced the presence of an Allied striking force, was now deciphered.

No. 755

FROM: (unidentified) #178 Aug. 1  
TO : (unidentified)

(At 1405 the Battleship WARSPITE, 2 Cruisers and 2 Destroyers were 180 miles East of Trincomalee, close).  
(COM-14-190908-DI)

It was noticed:

CINCEP 0842Z/3 reports a message from to the effect that HMS WARSPITE, 2 aircraft carriers and a number of destroyers and cruisers were in undecipherable position from Trincomalee at about 0500A/1st. Another version, by



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 755 (cont.)

OPNAV and BELCONNEN, reports this force about 18 miles East of Trincomalee and the sighting as 1400, Aug. 1st.  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 79)

Cruiser Division Seven was still on its way towards Truk where it was anticipated that a Japanese striking force would be formed for operations against Allied forces in the Solomons.

No. 756

Traffic was being delivered to COMCRUDIV 7 by Rabaul during evening of 18th. Associations indicate CRUDIV 7, DESRON 2, SUBRON 7 and DES-DIV 4 may form Covering or Striking Force for operations against Solomons.  
(BEL-190707-TI)

It was remarked:

This despatch previously reported in RI Summary 181400/Q August, page 15, item 22 and in GI COMMENT RI Summary 191400/Q August, page 12, item 69.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 37)

No. 757

CRUDIV 7 between Makassar Straits

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 757 (cont.)

and Truk.  
(COM-14-192102-TI)

It was remarked:

TI on 18 August indicated CRU-  
DIV 7 and COMDESRON 3 in company be-  
lieved enroute Truk from Makassar.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 38)

Since the Commanding Officer of the Kako, a  
unit of Cruiser Division Six, was receiving radio  
traffic aboard a Maru, it was thought possible that  
this indicated that the Kako had been either sunk or  
damaged in the Solomons.

No. 758

Commanding Officer of KAKO  
of CRUDIV 6 shown aboard  
Maru on 13th, which was ta-  
ken as some indication KAKO was  
sunk or damaged in Solomons Area,  
was action addressee in despatch  
from Kure Personnel Bureau  
at 1738, 17th. Message was addressed  
to COMCRUDIV 6, Chief of  
Staff 8TH FLEET, Tokio  
Personnel and Chief of Staff  
COMBINED FLEET (?)  
(BEL-190635-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 758 (cont.)

It was commented:

The SHOHO, and the AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU and HIRYU were addressed, notably by Personnel Bureaus, for a considerable time after their sinking. (Summary, 200600, August, No. 35)

Traffic analysis divulged that the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two had been in the Truk-Rabaul area on August 18, with some doubt existing as to his exact location. Destroyer Division continued to send operational dispatches from the Tulagi area, and a Destroyer Division of Destroyer Squadron Three was thought to be in Truk. Although the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Three was en route from the region guarded by the Third Fleet, he had not yet reached the Truk-Rabaul area. Routing instructions seemed to indicate that he was at Palao at this time.

No. 759

Traffic from COMDESRON 2 routed from Truk to Rabaul at 2030, 18th. COMDESRON 2 addressed mostly Air Units in Solomons-New Guinea Area on 18th. (GT#704-OPNAV-190240-TI) (Summary, 190600, August, No. 33)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 760

Appearance of Call  
(Lunga ?) in connection with DES-  
RON 2 suggests action may be direc-  
ted against Guadalcanal.  
(BEL-190707-TI)

It was indicated:

TI on 19 August stated belief  
COMDESRON 2 in Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 45)

No. 761

DESDIV suspected as  
having been reported at Tulagi today  
continues to send short operational  
type despatches and is associated  
with COMCRUDIV 6 and COMDES-  
RON 2 plus unidentified  
(COM-14-192108-TI)

It was pointed out:

Previously reported in RI Sum-  
mary 191400/C August, page 12, item  
70. In previous despatch do not be-  
lieve COMCRUDIV 6 included. Call  
here for CRUDIV 6 is  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 43)

No. 762

At 0000, 19th, COMDESDIV  
sent short operational code to COMDES-  
RON 2, unidentified commands and  
. Several indications that this  
commander concerned on operations in  
Tulagi Area reported today.  
(COM-14-190732-TI)  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 70)

588

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 763

Traffic routing and associations suggest DESDIV of DESRON 3 in Truk Area. (BEL-190707-TI)

It was stated:

is believed a DD in DESDIV TI on 17 August indicated DESDIV in Truk Communication Zone 2100, 17 August. (Summary, 200600, August, No. 33)

No. 764

COMDESRON 3 shown as one of the "Outer" SOUTH SEAS FORCE Commanders in despatch from Rabaul at 0741, 19 August. COMDESRON 3 has not yet reached the Rabaul or Truk Area. (GT#706-OPNAV-192320-TI)

It was noted:

Translation of 10 August despatch showed DESDIV of DESRON 3 would arrive Davao 18 August and the remainder of the squadron was also to arrive Davao, but the date was not recovered. (Summary, 200600, August, No. 46)

No. 765

DESRON 3 enroute from 3RD FLEET to Truk-Rabaul Area is being included in 8TH FLEET Collective, and by specific

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 765 (cont.)

routing instructions, COMDESRON 3  
is now in Palao.  
(COM-14-192058-TI)  
(Summary, 290600, August, No. 47)

Destroyer Division Twenty-seven was very  
closely associated with the Sixth Base Force in the  
Marshall Islands and appeared destined for duty there,  
despite the fact that it was operating in the Truk  
area at the moment.

No. 766

On 18 August DESDIV 27  
associated more with Marshall Area  
than with Solomons although appearing  
in Truk Communication Zone.  
(GT#703-OPNAV 190240-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 25)

No. 767

DESDIV 27 is closely  
associated with 6TH BASE FORCE  
at Jaluit, and may be scheduled  
for service in that area.  
(BEL-190635-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 31)

No. 768

DESDIV 27 and unidentified

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 768 (cont.)

which have been regularly included in traffic from 6TH BASE FORCE, today are both at Truk but appear destined for Marshalls Area.  
(COM-14-192102-TI)

It was noted:

TI on 18 August stated this DESDIV associated more with Marshalls Area than with Solomons although appearing in Truk Communication Zone.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 32)

It was thought also that units of Destroyer Squadron Four, which were due to arrive at Truk in the very near future, were slated to operate out of Jaluit.

No. 769

Associations link COMDESRON 4 with 4TH FLEET ) and 6TH BASE FORCE possibly indicating units of DESRON 4 will operate in Jaluit Area. (BEL-190707-TI)

It was remarked:

DI on 14 August gave information which believed indicated COMDESRON 4 would arrive PT (Truk) 21 August.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 30)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

A unit of Destroyer Division Thirty was noticed in the Saipan zone on August 18, and was thought to be en route from Sasebo to Rabaul.

No. 770

Destroyer , in DESDIV 30,  
and Maru in Saipan Zone at  
2123, 18 August.  
(GT#704-OPNAV-190240-TI)

It was stated:

DESDIV 30 less some unit appears  
by T.I. and D.I. to be enroute from  
Sasebo to Rabaul, and, were to arrive  
Truk the morning of the 19th. Possibly  
DD is the unit not with the rest  
of the division.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 26)

The Destroyer seemed to be engaged in  
escorting the Air Tender CHITOSE.

No. 771

FROM: (YOKOSUKA DEFENSE FORCE  
Commander)  
TO : (Tateyama Air)  
INFO: (Chief of Staff SUBFORCE)  
(Destroyer of DESDIV 8)  
(Air Tender CHITOSE)

Indicating probably movement of the  
tender escorted by Destroyer ).  
(COM-14-192104-TI)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 771 (cont.)

It was commented:

The CHITOSE was associated in traffic on 18 August as info addressee in a despatch from 19TH AIR GROUP. Action addressees were Comdr 6TH BASE FORCE (Jaluit), and 11TH AIR FLEET. Other info addressees were Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET, unidentified, Comm. Officer 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE, enciphered Makin, 1ST and 14TH AIR GROUPS. This was broadcast by Tokyo information to KAGOU Operation or Task Force.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 24)

Japanese planes were making frequent contact reports in the New Guinea-Solomons area, and the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet made it a practice to relay these reports to other high commanders.

No. 772

Numerous short operational type despatches from planes in today's file associated with activity in New Guinea-Solomons Area. One short abbreviated despatch from unidentified call (possibly plane) apparently refers to sighting or contact in position bearing 305 degrees, distant 58 miles from Base represented by letter "R" (Rabaul?).  
(BEL-190745-TI)

It was remarked:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 772 (cont.)

Location mentioned may be Rabaul, if the originator (possibly a plane) was using only the second letter of the area designator which could be the case since all the nearby locations have the same first letter. Rabaul is RR.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 42)

No. 773

Unidentified (probably plane) reported "1 Cruiser - Aircraft - bearing 092 distant 160 miles from base, course 180, speed 16 at 0545". Believe this is from plane in Solomons, but not certain. Also message probably originated morning of 19 August as it was intercepted at 2210, 19 August. has been sending unreadable contact and operational type traffic since early morning of 18th. They are always relayed to high commands by CINC 4TH FLEET.  
(GT#708-TI)

It was pointed out:

This message previously reported in RI Summary 191400/Q August, page 12, item 71.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 44)

It appeared from traffic analysis that the HITAKA was travelling in the company of the Commander of Carrier Division Two. Traffic between HITAKA and ZUIHO indicated a possible movement southwards.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 774

COMCARDIV 2                      aboard  
Flagship, HITAKA                  and Carrier  
Plane Group                      heard working in 1ST  
AIR FLEET Channel                  during even-  
ing. COMCARDIV 2 noted handling traf-  
fic for HAYATAKA                  , indicating  
that vessel in company.  
(BEL-190635-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 12)

No. 775

At 1810, 18th, HITAKA heard work-  
ing ZUIHO                      , and bearing 294  
from Oahu. This few degrees lower than  
last bearings obtained several days ago,  
and may indicate movement South from  
Yokosuka Area, possibly to Chichijima.  
(COM-14-190746-TI)  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 19)

An estimate of the location of enemy carriers  
was made at this time.

No. 776

SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU believed in  
Empire. RYUJO believed in Navy Yard.  
HITAKA and HAYATAKA possibly patrolling  
South of Yokosuka or enroute Chichijima.  
ZUIHO believed ready join HITAKA and  
HAYATAKA. HOSHO believed in Empire.  
(COM-14-190746-TI)

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 776 (cont.)

It was stated:

There have been indications that HAYATAKA and HITAKA may be at sea in Empire Area.  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 16)

A fighter squadron of Plane Group which had moved to an unidentified station, was receiving traffic from Chichijima. Associations with the Commander Ioujima Base in the Bonins indicated that this base was used by aircraft flying from the Empire to Rabaul.

No. 777

Fighter Squadron of Plane Group has moved to a Station which is unidentified but whose traffic is routed from Chichimima.  
(GT#704-OPNAV-190240-TI)

It was noted:

Translation of , serial #8, of 13 August, indicated that 3 bombers and apparently some fighters were to leave Kisarazu on the 16th, arrive at Tenian on the 17th, (Activity on the 18th could not be translated), leave Tenian fro Truk on the 19th and arrive Rabaul at 1000, 20 August.  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 9)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 778

Commander Ioujima Base (in Bonins)  
appeared in connection with Carrier-  
based Plane Group , COMAIRONS 22  
25 and 26  
plus BASE FORCES at Chichijima  
Saipan ) and Truk . This  
may indicate that Ioujima is one of the  
Bases used by aircraft being ferried  
from Empire to Rabaul.  
(BEL-190745-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 19)

The Kisarazu Air Group had been at Marcus  
Island on August 18, and the KASUGA MARU, which was  
associated with the Commander of Air Squadron Twenty-  
six, seemed to be in Empire waters.

No. 779

YURA associated with  
KISARAZU AIR GROUP at Marcus, 18 August.  
(GT#703-OPNAV-190240-TI)  
(Summary, 190600, August, No. 16)

No. 780

KASUGA MARU is also associa-  
ted with COMAIRONS 26 and appears to be in  
Empire Area.  
(BEL-190745-TI)

It was noticed:

A partial D.I. translation on 9 August

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 780 (cont.)

indicated KASUGA MARU would arrive in the Empire 16 August.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 18)

A long operational dispatch to important Japanese commands attracted attention because it was issued jointly by the Chief of Staff Eleventh Air Fleet and the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet. Although unreadable at this time, this type of dispatch was usually an indication of important future operations.

No. 781

At 0746, 19 August, Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET and Chief of Staff of probable 8TH FLEET jointly originated a long 3-part despatch to Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET and Naval General Staff, info Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, probable 2ND FLEET, 4TH FLEET, and all Commanders of 11TH AIR FLEET and OUTER SOUTH SEAS FORCE.  
(GT#709-OPNAV-192322-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 49)

An unidentified Japanese man-of-war was en route to Kure, and another unidentified unit was leaving Yokosuka for Rabaul via the usual route.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 782

Man-of-War                      apparently  
enroute to Kure via Makassar prob-  
ably from Surabaya.  
(BEL-190707-TI)

It was remarked:

Position of                      on August 14  
by D/F was 05° S, 115° E. On 7 August  
this vessel reported leaving some un-  
known place for Davao.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 48)

No. 783

Unidentified                      made typical  
departure report indicating he is about  
to leave Yokosuka for Rabaul via Bonins,  
Saipan, and Truk at 1935/18th.  
(COM-14-192104-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 17)

A deciphered dispatch revealed that a tanker  
which was thought to have been sunk in the vicinity  
of Truk in July, was still helping to supply the  
enemy's forces.

No. 784

FROM:                      (Rabaul) #261 Aug. 12

Reported by OpNav 130327. MELBUNIT  
now reads as follows:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 784 (cont.)

"In accordance with R AREA DEFENSE ORDER \_\_\_\_\_, the \_\_\_\_\_ (torpedo boat?) will join company with the \_\_\_\_\_ (special table 63294) and proceed to Truk, and after reporting to the headquarters of 2ND ESCORT FORCE and the 4TH FLEET for duty, will escort the AZUMA MARU to Rabaul."

NOTE: The Tanker \_\_\_\_\_ mentioned above is the same vessel previously thought sunk by 2 torpedoes in Truk vicinity on July 30.  
(BEL-190130-DI)

It was commented:

AZUMA MARU reported arrival at Truk 1000, August 14th.  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 72)

Traffic analysis disclosed the presence of many enemy units in various locations.

No. 785

SATA \_\_\_\_\_ and DESDIV (garbled call) in Truk Area. Tanker \_\_\_\_\_ en-  
route Rabaul to Truk. MARU \_\_\_\_\_ en-  
route Jaluit to Truk. MARU \_\_\_\_\_ in  
Saipan Area. Man-of-War \_\_\_\_\_ and  
\_\_\_\_\_ in Saipan Area. MARUs \_\_\_\_\_,  
\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ in  
Saipan Area  
(BEL-190707-TI)

1600



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 785 (cont.)

It was commented:

On 16 August TI indicated Tanker  
SATA remains in Rabaul Area. On  
18 August TI indicated Auxiliary  
in Rabaul Area. On 18 August was  
indicated in Saipan Zone. On 17 August  
TI indicated enroute Kure to Truk  
via Saipan. On 17 August TI indicated  
in Saipan Area.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 29)

No. 786

MARU enroute Rabaul to Yoko-  
suka via Truk and Saipan (Commanding Of-  
ficer (KAKO ?) has been shown  
aboard this MARU).  
(BEL-190707-TI)

It was indicated:

DI on 15 August stated MARU  
would depart Rabaul arriving Japan  
24 August.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 36)

No. 787

KAMOI, indicated yester-  
day enroute Marshalls to Rabaul, is now  
in communication with AIRON 25 and has  
apparently arrived in Rabaul Area, pos-  
sibly escorted enroute by YUKAZE  
of DESDIV 34.  
(BEL-190635-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 41)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 788

Comdr. SASEBO NUMBER 5 SPECIAL  
LANDING FORCE is at Buna

MARU (?) apparently  
enroute Rabaul.  
(BEL-190707-TI)

It was pointed out:

TI on 15 August indicated traf-  
fic for emanating from Buna.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 52)

No. 789

Auxiliary at Singapore

(BEL-190707-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 55)

Contact reports were quite noticeable in enemy  
radio traffic, for each instance aroused considerable  
activity on the part of the defenders of the area con-  
cerned.

No. 790

Another originated by probable  
plane at 0945, 19th, was re-  
transmitted by direction suspected 2ND  
FLEET for info Mandates FORCE

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 790 (cont.)

Collective , Comdrs. 4TH  
FLEET , 11TH AIR FLEET  
and SUBFOR . Text.

Trans-  
lated 1 destroyer (?) bear-  
ing 092 from Base, distance 160 miles,  
course 180, speed 16, at 0545. Area  
involved unknown.  
(COM-14-190838-TI)  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 71)

No. 791

Apparent plane contact origina-  
ted by unidentified at 0941,  
19th, retransmitted by direction 4TH  
FLEET to Operations and Intelligence  
Tokyo, plus KAGOU SAKUSEN  
BUTAI, text HIIHI.0941. Area unde-  
termined, meaning of KAGOU not found.  
(COM-14-190838-TI)

It was stated:

HIIHI means aircraft sighted.  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 73)

No. 792

Unidentified bearing 250  
from Oahu, sent contact report of  
sighting of five enemy aircraft at  
1345 which caused flurry on 9305 kcs.  
(COM-14-190258-TI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 4)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

An estimate of Japanese submarine positions  
was also made at this time.

No. 793

Submarine Positions:  
HONI/MUSA COMSUBRON 3 at Truk  
at 1400, 18th.  
HCE, SUBDIV , at Admiralty  
Islands (fair) at 1300, 19th.  
(COM-14-190748-TI)  
(Summary, 191400, August, No. 48)

No. 794

On 19 August, traffic for SUBRON  
3 , SUBDIV in SUBRON 8,  
SUBDIV in SUBRON 1, and Commu-  
nication Officers SUBRONS 1 and 3 was  
routed from COMSUBFOR at Yokosuka via  
Saipan to Jaluit for delivery.  
(GT#706-OPNAV-192320-TI)

It was noticed:

COMSUBRON 3 appeared by T.I. to  
be in Marshalls on 17-18 August. T.I.  
has recently indicated SUBDIV  
is in Saigon or Indian Ocean Area.  
is identified as a SUBDIV in  
SUBRON 1 and appeared to T.I. to be in  
Kure as late as 15 August, however, it  
appeared on 13 August that SUBDIVS  
and would leave the Empire for  
the South Seas.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 34)

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 19, 1942 (Continued)

of the Pacific Fleet on 19 August 1942 reads as follows:

No. 795

FROM: CINCPAC (WERK) 190145 19 August 1942  
TO : COMSOPACFOR  
COMSOWESTPACFOR  
ALL TASKFOR CMDRS  
COMHAWSEAFRON  
COMNOWESTSEAFRON  
COMPASEAFRON  
COMWESTSEAFRON  
COMINCH (NSS)  
OPNAV (NSS)  
COMNAVEU (NSS)

Bulletin No. 156

NCR 7662-J

Commander Desron 2 in Rabaul area.  
Part of Subron 3 in Marshalls. ATAGO,  
CHIYOGA and probably 4 or 5 destroyers  
in Truk area. Units of Desdiv 30 en-  
route from Saipan to New Britain via Truk.

Detachment of 14th Air Corps at  
Gasmata. NARUTO MARU in Rabaul Area. By  
D/F submarine 157 East 3 South 145 East  
5 North. HITAKA, ZUIHO, HAYATAKA believed  
in Japanese waters but may move soon. No  
concrete indications departure SHOKAKU,  
RYUJO, ZUIKAKU from home waters but pos-  
sibility undetected move to South exists.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942

Radio traffic on this day was extremely heavy. Most of it was administrative in nature and concerned itself with supply vessels, tankers, air tenders and submarines. There was very little enemy radio intelligence activity, which led American observers to believe that the failure of the Japanese experts to anticipate the movements of the Allied invaders had caused a reduction in volume of radio intelligence messages. However, this was but a temporary advantage for all Allied experts agreed that Japanese radio security measures were making it more difficult to secure information from their communications:

No. 796

Heavy traffic volume. RI File showed pickup but still subnormal. Suggest lack RI success anticipating U.S. movements resulted loss of face and reduction volume. however also apparent this lack of success reacting against our analysis as shown by adoption greater measures radio security.  
(COM 14-202002-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 1)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 797

Traffic volume heavy but mostly administrative in nature. Tokio had 3 broadcast circuits running simultaneously during Mid-Watch employing 4800, 9260 and 8350 Kcs. (BEL 200718-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 2)

No. 798

Increased activity supply vessels, tankers, air-tenders, submarines plus a stream of air reinforcements and troops suggests continued amplified operations Southeast regardless of carrier support. (COM 14-202004-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 48)

The South Pacific was the most active area under Japanese control on this day. A great deal of operational traffic was emanating from Guadalcanal Island, and the region around Makin was also in turmoil:

No. 799

Center of activity again in Southeast Area with CINC 11TH AIR predominant originator. One despatch addressed enciphered "All Commanders Southeast Area Force", Info: Chiefs of Staff COMBINED FLEET, 2ND FLEET, 1ST AIR FLEET and Destroyer (COM 14-202002-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 47)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 800

Operational type traffic continues to emanate from Lunga(?) during Aug. 20.  
(GT #712-OPNAV 201815-TI)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 22)

No. 801

MAKIN RELIEF FORCE  
appeared as Info addressee  
in dispatch from Commander 19TH AIR GROUP  
to Commander JALUIT BASE FORCE  
and 19TH DIVISION Unit  
Enciphered MAKIN has been unusually prominent in traffic for past two days associated with units in Marshalls area and mention of RELIEF FORCE in connection with that place suggests Allied activity possibly an attack in that area. (BEL 200751-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 35)

No. 802

Major center of activity in 4TH FLEET Area with most prominent units being 4TH FLEET Staff, 6TH BASE FORCE, 1ST AIR BOMBERS. CHITOSE AIR, 14TH AIR and Marshalls Collective call. The "KAGOU OPERATION FORCE" is information addressee on all R.I. traffic with location and composition this force still undetermined, but significant is fact non-inclusion CINC 2ND FLEET in R.I. despatches today.  
(COM 14-200808-TI)

It was mentioned:

6TH BASE FORCE is at Jaluit. - "1ST



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 802 (Cont.)

AIR BOMBERS\* probably refers to "1ST AIR GROUP." (Summary, 210600, August, No. 22)

No. 803

CINC 4TH FLEET was originator of long 6-part dispatch at 1105/19 August addressed to CINC COMBINED, Chief Naval General Staff, and Commander 11TH AIR FLEET, Info: CINC 2ND, 8TH, and 1ST AIR FLEET, SOUTHERN FORCE, OUTSIDE SOUTHERN FORCE, and Commanders AIRRON 24 and 25 (BEL 200751-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 23)

Both the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet appeared to be at sea in the vicinity of Rabaul on August 20. Traffic was being routed to Truk for the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet who, through close associations with Rabaul, appeared to be very much interested in operations in the South Pacific:

No. 804

2ND FLEET traffic still routed to Truk. (COM 14-202002-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 24)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 805

Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET is now included as action addressee in some intelligence messages from Rabaul indicating close association that command with operations in Southern Area. (BEL 200751-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 25)

No. 806

CINC and Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET at sea on 20 August as evidenced by transmission of traffic by Rabaul to both. (GT #713-OPNAV 201712-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 49)

No. 807

3-part despatch at 1619/19 August coming out Rabaul using as origin goes for action to CINC COMBINED, 1ST AIR FLEET, 8TH FLEET, 11TH AIR, Naval General Staff, COMDESRON 2, COMDESRON 10, Commandant Yokosuka; Info: Chief of Staff 4TH, Truk Docks, Tokyo Military Stores, Yokosuka Air Supply, originator Unidentified, but viewed as possibility 2ND FLEET CINC. (COM 14-202002-TI)

It was noticed:

is usual hidden originator call. The absence of a 2ND FLEET call is quite conspicuous. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 26)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

There were no indications of the presence of battleships or carriers in the South Pacific at this time:

No. 808

No radio indication presence or arrival of Battleships HARUNA and KONGO in Truk Area evident here, likewise no evidence carrier movements Southeast been observed. (COM 14-202004-TI)

It was declared:

The only association noted so far is that the cruiser MYOKO (of CRUDIV 5) which was supposed to be a part of this TASK FORCE is now reported at Truk. Traffic for CAR-DIV 2 has just been noted as being routed to Palao.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 13)

Identification of the flagship of Cruiser Division Eighteen was tentatively made, and the flagship of Cruiser Division Five, the MYOKO, was located near Truk:

No. 809

Light cruiser \_\_\_\_\_, appears as Flagship of CRUDIV 18. (COM 14 200806-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 809 (Cont.)

It was noted:

has also been suggested as a destroyer in DESDIV 8 of DESRON 4, and has been associated with CRUDIV 18. (Summary, 201400, August, No. 25)

No. 810

Cruiser MYOKO Flagship CRUDIV 5 shown at, or near, Truk. (COM 14 200808-TI)

It was remarked:

CRUDIV 5 has been indicated as possibly in Truk Area. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 27)

Japanese destroyers were being used for many purposes in the South Pacific, but escorting convoys was their principal duty at this time. Close attention was paid to destroyer movements by American observers since the activity of destroyers might very well reflect the movement of enemy capital ships. Therefore, no radio traffic concerning destroyers was ignored. The Communication Officer of Destroyer Squadron Three was at Palao, and a unit of Destroyer Squadron Two was in the vicinity of

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

Truk, as was the flagship of Destroyer Squadron Four, which had been associated with the Fourth Fleet and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit:

No. 811

Communication Officer DESRON 3 shown in Palao. (COM 14 200806-TI)

It was pointed out:

On Aug. 19th, traffic routing and association suggested DESDIV of DESRON 3 was in Truk Area. COMDESRON 3 did not appear to have reached Truk or Rabaul Area on Aug. 19th, but was indicated at Palao. (Summary, 201400, August, No. 15)

No. 812

Flagship DESRON 4 and Destroyer in Truk vicinity. (COM 14 200806-TI)

It was stated:

Destroyer in DESRON 2. COMDESRON 4 was associated with the 4TH FLEET and the 6TH BASE FORCE at Jaluit, on Aug. 19th. Some units of DESDIV 8 of DESRON 4 appear in Rabaul Area. (Summary, 201400, August, No. 16)

A unit of Destroyer Squadron Three appeared

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

to be escorting a Maru from the East Indies to Rabaul.  
Both were at Palao on this date:

No. 813

Destroyer of DESRON 3 and MARU  
associated and both at Palao at  
1010, Aug. 20. (GT #712-OPNAV 201815-TI)

It was observed:

appears enroute Rabaul. Both  
and were formerly in East Indies  
Area. (Summary, 201400, August, No. 20)

Destroyer Division Twenty-seven was attached  
to the Sixth Base Force, and a destroyer division of  
Destroyer Squadron Two was in the northern area. A  
newly commissioned destroyer was at sea, en route  
to an unknown destination, and the Destroyer  
was escorting two air tenders from Yokosuka to Truk:

No. 814

COMDESDIV sent most urgent  
despatch to MARU on which COMDR.  
SEAPLANE UNIT was embarked, at  
1600, Aug. 20. Destroyer trans-  
mitted this direct to Ominato for delivery  
to . (GT #710-OPNAV 201445-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 814 (Cont.)

It was commented:

\_\_\_\_\_ appears to be the KAMITSU MARU,  
a Seaplane Tender. \_\_\_\_\_ is a DESDIV of  
DESRON 2. These units have been associated  
with the Northern Area.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 9)

No. 815

New DD \_\_\_\_\_ in commission and  
underway at 1215/20 August, having origi-  
nated enciphered communication zone change  
to Tokyo, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. No  
indication of direction of movement nor of  
immediate superior in command.  
(GT #713-OPNAV 201712-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 18)

No. 816

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ (?)  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_  
(DESDIV 17)  
(MARU Air-tender)  
(MARU Air-tender)

From Commander 1ST AIR FLEET.

1. Tender \_\_\_\_\_ departs Yokosuka  
tonight and will rendezvous with tender  
\_\_\_\_\_ at point Z 31 N, 137 E, at 0900/  
14th \_\_\_\_\_ and arrive Truk during \_\_\_\_\_
2. Tender \_\_\_\_\_ will depart Kure  
on \_\_\_\_\_
3. During this voyage \_\_\_\_\_ will provide

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 816 (Cont.)

1 destroyer. That is for to the  
rendezvous and from there on for both  
vessels. (BEL 201154-DI)

It was indicated:

TI has indicated the DD is  
the escort for these tenders. They have  
been closely associated with CRUDIV 7.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 33)

No. 817

FROM: (6TH BASE FORCE)  
TO :

"DESDIV 27 (less 2nd Section) is  
attached directly to this Unit."  
(COM 14-202322-DI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 31)

A deciphered message stated that the AKIKAZE  
had left Bougainville for Rabaul on August 12:

No. 818

FROM: #212, 0730, August 12  
TO : (C.O. AKIKAZE)  
(COMDR 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(COMDR 5TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 818 (Cont.)

INFO: (DESDIV 34)  
(5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Chief of Staff 8TH  
FLEET)  
(COMDR #8 BASE FORCE at  
Rabaul)

Left RXC (near Bougainville) for RR  
(Rabaul). (GZ #2533 - DI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 50)

Some doubt was expressed as to the exact location of the Destroyer and the Maru it was accompanying, but it was definitely moving southwards. Another dispatch indicated that Destroyer Division Seventeen would be at Rabaul sometime after the fourteenth of August:

No. 819

Traffic routing and associations indicate destroyer and Maru in Ominato Area. (REL 200718-TI)

It was mentioned:

DD appeared to OPNAV, by T.I. to be in the Saipan Communication Zone 17 August, and to be at Chichijima 20 August (to COM 14). OPNAV noted apparent movement report from Maru indicating

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 819 (Cont.)

departure Kure for Truk 16 August. Difference of opinion as to location of these units may be due to uncertain call identification since the change on 18 August. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 30)

No. 820

FROM: #464 Aug. 12/1300  
(Any Jap Station (concealed  
ident. call))  
TO : (Truk Radio)  
(Tokyo Radio)  
(Saipan Radio)  
(?)  
(DESRON 10)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
INFO: (?)  
(DESDIV 17 in DESRON 10)

DESDIV 17 less ( - DD)  
will leave \_\_\_\_\_ Communication Zone at  
\_\_\_\_\_ on 13th, and enter #4 Communication  
Zone; leave Truk Communication zone at  
1200 on 14th and enter #8 Communication  
Zone. (GZ #2550-OPNAV 202252-DI)

It was noticed:

4TH Communication Zone is Truk.  
8TH Communication Zone is Rabaul.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 56)

Deciphered texts of dispatches which ordered  
Cruiser Division Seven, Destroyer Squadrons Three

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

and Fifteen, and Destroyer Division Two into action with the Outer South Seas Force were now made available:

No. 821

#798 Aug. 13/1340  
FROM: (unidentified)  
TO : (unidentified)  
(unidentified)  
(unidentified)  
(unidentified)  
(unidentified)  
INFO: (unidentified)

----- CRUDIV 7  
DESRON 3 -----, DESDIV 15 -----, and  
DESDIV 2 ----- are detached from the  
EAST INDIES FORCE and attached to OUTER  
SOUTH SEAS FORCE.

----- (cannot read remainder but  
apparently contains directive for all or  
part of above to proceed PT. After arrival  
PT some of the DESDIVS are to be attached  
to "STRIKING FORCE").  
(GZ #2547-OPNAV 201750-DI)

It was declared:

DESDIV 2 and DESDIV 15 are with CRUDIV  
7 enroute Truk. COMDESRON 3 appears at  
Palao. PT is Truk.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 23)

No. 822

FROM: (COMBINED FLEET)  
TO : (CRUISER DIVN. 7)-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 822 (Cont.)

INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (DESRON 3)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (#10 BASE FORCE COMDR.)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4TH AIR ATTACK FOR.)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Comdr. 8TH FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Tokyo Naval General Staff)

\_\_\_\_\_ CRU DIV 7 (7), DESRON 3  
\_\_\_\_\_, DESDIV 15 and DESDIV 2  
are temporarily(?) attached to the  
EAST INDIES FORCE. (GZ #2551-OPNAV 202252-  
DI)

It was noted:

This order was superseded on 13th by  
one attaching them to the "OUTER" SOUTH  
SEAS FORCE.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 55)

Urgent operational traffic by destroyers in  
the New Britain-Solomons area indicated that they  
were engaged in combat or reporting contacts with  
Allied forces:

No. 823

Urgent and most urgent traffic in-  
volving COMDESRON 2, DESDIV 4, Destroyer  
(apparently on some mission of her  
own) and Fleet Commanders in New Britain-  
Solomons Area indicates combat operations

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 823 (Cont.)

in progress or many enemy contacts by these  
destroyer units during Aug. 20.  
(GT #711-GPNAV 201520-TI)

It was remarked:

COMDESRON 2 has been associated re-  
cently with call (Lunga?, Guadal-  
canal) which suggested action may be di-  
rected against Guadalcanal. Part of DESDIV  
4 appeared escorting IKKI DETACHMENT from  
Guam to Rabaul on Aug. 8th. is a  
destroyer of DESDIV 15 which recently came  
South to Rabaul Area from the Northern  
Area. (Summary, 201400, August, No. 21)

The SHOKAKU, HITAKA, HAYATAKA and ZUIHO were  
engaged in tactical exercises with the target ship  
SETTSU. It was thought that these exercises were  
taking place in the Yokosuka area, but it was pointed  
out that this apparent activity might be an attempt  
at deception to cover an actual carrier movement to  
the South Pacific. Further confirmation of this  
belief was provided by a dispatch for the Commander  
of Carrier Division Two which was routed to Palao  
from Truk:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 824

CARDIV 2 association with SETTSU  
continues.

FROM: Staff Comm. Officer 3RD ATTACK  
TO : Comm. Officer, CARDIV 2.  
SHOKAKU  
SETTSU  
INFO: (Comm. Officer. 11TH AIR  
GROUP)  
BIHORO AIR  
GENZAN AIR  
(Unidentified Air Unit)

Association indicates SHOKAKU, HITAKA,  
HAYATAKA, ZUIHO and SETTSU engaged exer-  
cises Empire Waters. (COM 14-200804-TI)

It was pointed out:

TI on Aug. 19th, indicated COMCARDIV  
2, ZUIHO, HITAKA and HAYATAKA were seen  
on tactical channel 7635 kcs which was used  
with target ship SETTSU indicating tactical  
and gunnery exercises probably in Yokosuka  
Area. (Summary, 201400, August, No. 7)

No. 825

CARDIV 2 plus carrier Plane  
Groups and again heard  
working on 5910 kcs. during late evening,  
HITAKA and HIYOU are be-  
lieved to be involved in this activity,  
since carriers have not been actively en-  
gaged in campaign for some time and are  
presumed to be fitted out and ready for

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 825 (Cont.)

service, suggest current activity may be attempt at deception to cover actual movement possibly to Southern Area as Commander 1ST AIR FLEET is closely associated with current activity there. (BEL 200610-TI)

It was stated:

now identified by OPNAV as the carrier HAYATAKA.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 11)

No. 826

Traffic for COMCARDIV 2  
routed to Palao by Tokyo at 2045,  
20 August. Message so routed was from  
CINC 1ST AIR FLEET ACTION COMCAR-  
DIV 2, INFO. Chiefs of Staff, Yokosuka,  
Kure, Unidentified, and Unidenti-  
fied (22).  
(GT #716-OPNAV 202218-TI) (MEMO #20-1)

It was observed:

This is the first indication that  
CARDIV 2 has left the Empire.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 12)

The Commander of Air Squadron Eleven was  
observed near Truk on this day, and evidence was  
obtained which proved that the Kisaratsu and Genzan  
Air Groups had received necessary plane reinforce-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

ments on August 11:

No. 827

COMAIRRON 11 in Truk Zone  
at 1330, Aug. 20.  
(GT #710-OPNAV 201445-TI)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 18)

No. 828

#919, 1720, August 11  
FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ (COMDR NORTHERN AIR FORCE)  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (CINC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (NORTHERN AIR FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (COMDR 6TH AIR ATTACK  
FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff COMBINED  
FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff 5TH FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (COMDR 5TH FLEET PATROL  
FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Unidentified)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Commander YOKOSUKA AIR  
Activity ?)

The transfer to KISARAZU (AIR) of  
- Air Group) Bomber Detachment  
(30\* - planes) and GENZAN AIR GROUP Bomber  
Detachment (15 planes) has been completed.

\*Translator's Note: Approximately.  
(GZ #2537 - OPNAV 200256 - DI)

It was commented:

A Detachment of GENZAN AIR GROUP was



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 828 (Cont.)

noted by T.I. as being at Kisarazu Air  
Station on 13 August.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 7)

The Commander of the Third Air Attack Force  
announced that he had moved to the Kisaratsu Air  
Station, and an air base in the vicinity of Truk re-  
ported that a flying boat had departed for Imieji  
in the Marshalls:

No. 829

FROM: #0912 10 Aug/1610  
TO : (3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(CinC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Tokyo Naval Minister)  
(Tokyo Naval General  
Staff);

INFO: (5TH FLEET PATROL FORCE)  
(All Shore Stations)  
?  
(#1 AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(EAST INDIES FORCE AIR  
FORCE)  
(COMBINED FLEET Chief of  
Staff)  
(1ST AIR FLEET)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 829 (Cont.)

Shifted flag to Kisarazu Air Station

\*Although this code uses the same code group for the "Air Station" and the "Air Group", it appears that the "Station" is referred to here.

(GZ #2539-OPNAV-200256-DI)

It was indicated:

By 18 August Comdr 3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE appeared, by TI, to be at Saipan or Tenian. Believe call \_\_\_\_\_ is obviously garbled,

The only \_\_\_\_\_ we have is \_\_\_\_\_ a sub unit in SUBRON 7 associated with Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET on 30 July.

(Summary, 200600, August, No. 15)

No. 830

FROM: #209 Aug. 13/0530  
(Air Base in Truk General Area)  
TO : (14TH AIR CORPS)  
INFO: (Staff Comm. Officer 11TH AIR FLT.)  
(Staff Comm. Officer 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Staff Comm. Officer 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
(Staff Comm. Officer 4TH FLEET)  
(Staff Comm. Officer 4TH BASE FORCE, Truk)  
(Staff Comm. Officer 6TH BASE FORCE, Jaluit)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 830 (Cont.)

At 0800 one flying boat departed for  
PYI. (GZ #2549-OPNAV 201740-DI)

It was mentioned:

PYI is Imieji (Marshall Islands).  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 10)

Flights between the Marshall Islands and  
Rabaul were very numerous judging from the number of  
enemy dispatches concerning such operations:

No. 831

FROM: #502, 0700, August 11  
(Staff Communication Offi-  
cer, 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : (Unidentified)  
INFO: (COMDR 4TH AIR GROUP)

One bomber, carrying a staff officer  
of the KISARAZU AIR GROUP, left for RR  
(Rabaul). (GZ #2535 - DI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 39)

No. 832

FROM: (4TH AIR GROUP)  
TO : (Tainan AIR)  
INFO: (5TH AIR ATTACK FOR.)  
(AIRRON 25)

\*At 1550 two \_\_\_\_\_ planes left RRE

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 832 (Cont.)

for RRA. (GZ #2552-OPNAV 202252-DI)

It was noticed:

RRE has been considered Vunakanau.  
RRA is unknown but believed to be  
near Rabaul.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 53)

No. 833

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ (Comdr. 14TH AIR CORPS?)  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_, Truk Air)  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (11TH AIR FLT., Cofs)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(5TH AIR ATTACK FOR.,  
Staff Comm. Officer)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Comdr. Yokohama AIR  
GROUP)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(4TH AIR ATTACK FOR.,  
Staff Comm. Officer)

To Commander Rabaul Detachment of 14TH  
AIR GROUP.

At 0700 (about) on 15th depart PYI  
(Imieji) for RR (Rabaul) - - - -  
(GZ #2553-OPNAV 202252-DI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 54)

Headquarters for a seaplane force assigned  
to the Solomons appeared to be located on Guadal-  
canal. Part of the Carrier Plane Group which  
had been prominent in radio traffic for some time,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

was now at Tinian en route to Rabaul. Both the Commander of the Takao Air Group and the Staff Communication Officer of Air Squadron Twenty-three appeared to be at Kendari:

No. 834

■ SOLOMONS SEAPLANE FORCE  
COMMANDER addressed by Rabaul Base  
info Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET at  
1850, Aug. 20. (GT #710-OPNAV 201445-TI)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 29)

No. 835

Solomon SEAPLANE FORCE  
appears to be under jurisdiction of KIYO-  
KAWA MARU with headquarters  
possibly at \_\_\_\_\_ (Lunga?). COMDESRON 2  
is associated with this activity  
further suggesting presence of units DESRON  
2 in general vicinity Guadalcanal.  
(BEL 200626-TI)

It was declared:

The KIYOKAWA MARU has apparently been  
in the Rabaul area since the 28th of June.  
DESRON 2 was reported at Truk 18 August  
but now believed operating in the Solomons  
Area. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 51)

No. 836

Commander of EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTER

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 836 (Cont.)

PLANE GROUP is shown by (address to be at Tenian. This DETACHMENT believed to be a part of CARRIER PLANE GROUP which has been at Kisaratsu and is now apparently enroute to Southern Area. The Commander with part of remains at Kisaratsu. (BEL 200751-TI)

It was noted:

• TI has indicated that PLANE GROUP would go to Rabaul at the earliest opportunity. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 34)

No. 837

Traffic routing and associations indicate Commander TAKAO AIR GROUP and Staff Communication Officer AIRRON 23 at Kendari (BEL 200718-TI)

It was remarked:

(OPNAV identification O 2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE) is believed based in the Malay/HEI Area. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 58)

The usual enemy contact reports were noticed on this day, and warning was sent by a Maru of the presence of an Allied submarine:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942. (Continued)

No. 838

Plane reported sighting 1  
cruiser bearing 92° distance 160 miles  
from Base (possibly Rabaul), course 180,  
speed 16. This message was originated at  
0545/19 August and passed to CINC COMBINED  
COMSUBFOR, Comdr. LITH  
AIR FLEET, Tokyo Operations Sec-  
tion (MIYORE and SOUTHERN FORCE ))  
at 2215/19 August. (BEL 200626-TI)

It was pointed out:

Both Washington and COM 14 believed  
this despatch was originated in the Solomons  
Area. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 50)

No. 839

(tentatively identified as  
Kieta) reports plane contact at 0941, 20th.  
(COM 14 200806-TI)

It was stated:

also originated an apparent  
plane contact at 0941, Aug. 19th.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 28)

No. 840

8TH FLEET Area relatively quiet.  
Chief activity being two planes and one  
submarine contact reports latter by MARU  
at position 31-33 North, 123-03 East, at  
0150, 20th. (COM 14-200806-TI)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 30)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

On August 12, an unidentified authority had directed the Commander of Cruiser Division Six to send a member of his staff to Rabaul at once. This was a reflection, perhaps, of the recent activity of the Japanese in the Solomons region which had been stimulated by the invasion of the Solomons.

Other indications of Japanese interest in the Solomons were seen in the detachment of the Yokohama #5 Special Landing Force from the Inner South Seas Force for duty with the Outer South Seas Force. Several Marus were ordered to duty with this same organization. All of this indicated that reinforcements were being rushed to this area:

No. 841

FROM: #272, 1530, August 12  
TO : (Unidentified)  
(COMCRUDIV 6)

Send a member of your staff to RR  
(Rabaul) at once. (GZ #2534 - DI)  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 40)

No. 842

FROM: #708 Aug. 7/1010  
unknown originator



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 842 (Cont.)

TO : { 4TH FLEET  
8TH FLEET  
MARU-KINAI  
SASEBG #5 SPECIAL LANDING  
FORCE)  
INFO: { 11TH AIR FLEET  
(Tokyo Nav. Gen. Staff)  
FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ . - - - - - YOKOSUKA #5  
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE and 1 \_\_\_\_\_ -KINAI  
MARU?) are detached from "INNER" SOUTH SEAS  
FORCE and attached to "OUTER" SOUTH SEAS  
FORCE. (GZ #2545-OPNAV 201745-DI)

It was observed:

On Aug. 16th, KINAI MARU was in Saipan  
Area and appeared to be enroute Rabaul.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 31)

No. 843

FROM: #242 Aug. 13/0820  
(Comdr. SOUTHERN EXP. FORCE)  
TO : { unidentified  
INFO: { unidentified  
{ unidentified  
(Comdr. 8TH BASE FORCE,  
Rabaul)

FROM: CINC 8TH FLEET (already passed to  
8TH FLEET). Reference "OUTER" SOUTH SEAS  
FORCE Serials #15, #39, and #40. TAMAHOKU  
MARU and (x08259 - ship?) proceed to RR in  
accordance with #2 ESCORT FORCE SERIAL  
# \_\_\_\_\_. (GZ #2544-OPNAV 201740-DI)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 32)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

A deciphered enemy dispatch corroborated traffic analysis which had shown that the Eighty-fourth Guard Force was at Tulagi. The locations of various Japanese units were as follows: the Commanding Officer of the Sixth Air Attack Force was at Tinian; an anti-aircraft detachment of the Saipan #6 Base Force was at Kendari; the Communication Officer of the Eighth Base Force was aboard the NIKKAI MARU near Rabaul, and several Marus were en route from the Netherlands-East Indies and Empire to Truk. One Maru was bound for the Empire from Truk, and it was believed that the Commanding Officer of the KAKO was aboard it:

No. 844

FROM: #030, 0230, July 26  
(COMDR 84TH GUARD FORCE)  
TO : (COMDR #8 BASE FORCE at  
Rabaul)  
INFO: (COMDR YOKOHAMA AIR GROUP)

Will arrive RXI tomorrow.  
(GZ #2538 - DI)

It was commented:

RXI is Guadalcanal. T.I. had indicated

634

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 844 (Cont.):

on 29 July and 4 August that 84TH GUARD  
FORCE was in Tulagi Area.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 51)

No. 845-

Address Noted:

8-17-42: Commanding Officer 6TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCE at Tenian. (GW MEMO 8/20/42)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 36)

No. 846

"ANTI-AIRCRAFT DETACHMENT"  
(of Saipan #6 BASE FORCE shown at  
Kendari 20 August.  
(GT #713-OPNAV 201712-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 52)

No. 847

Traffic routing and associations in-  
dicate Communication Officer BASE FORCE  
in NIKKAI MARU plus MARU  
and man-of-war of 1ST  
AIR FLEET in Rabaul Area. (BEL 200718-TI)

It was indicated:

is identified by OPNAV as "Com-  
mander NIKKAI MARU in 8TH BASE FORCE".  
is an air-tender of the 11TH AIR  
FLEET and by August believed enroute

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 847 (Cont.)

Kisaratsu to Rabaul area escorted by DDs  
and  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 57)

No. 848

Auxiliary appears to be en-  
route from Ambon to Truk Area via Makassar  
and Palao. (BEL 200718-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 39)

No. 849

FROM: (Maru)

"Arrived Truk 1200, 19 August."  
(COM 14-202102-DI)

It was mentioned:

This Maru made a communication zone  
shift from Rabaul to Truk at 1600, 17  
August. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 41)

No. 850

Traffic routing and associations in-  
dicate MARU from Empire to Truk  
Area. (BEL 200718-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 44)

No. 851

Traffic routing and associations in-  
dicate MARU possibly departed

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 851 (Cont.)

Kure for Jaluit Area. (BEL 200718-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 45)

No. 852

MARU is bound for Empire via Saipan, Chichijima, Yokosuka and Kure Communication Forces from despatch at 1256/20 August. Apparently north of, or leaving, Truk at that time.  
(GT #713-OPNAV 201712-TI)

It was noticed:

This is the MARU believed to have the Commanding Officer of the KAKO aboard. BELCONNEN reported it in Saipan area 19 August. It is scheduled to arrive in Japan 24 August. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 21)

A convoy was in Truk, and so was the KAGU MARU, which had come from the Dutch East Indies to join the Second Fleet:

No. 853

KAMOI called by Kwajalein.  
(COM 14-200808-TI)

It was declared:

KAMOI appeared to have arrived in

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 853 (Cont.)

Truk from Marshall Islands on August 20th.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 32)

No. 854

KAGU MARU shown in care of  
Truk at 2200, Aug. 20.  
(GT #712-OPNAV 201815-TI)

It was noted:

This is first indication of the arrival  
of KAGU MARU at Truk. She has been enroute  
from Dutch East Indies to join 2ND FLEET.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 19)

It was thought that a special landing force  
was aboard the KINAI MARU at Truk on its way to  
Rabaul:

No. 855

Traffic routing and associations in-  
dicate KINAI MARU with SPECIAL  
LANDING FORCE aboard in Truk  
Area, MARU COMDESDIV 27,  
Destroyers and KAGU  
MARU and Chief of Staff 11TH AIR  
FLEET in Truk Area.  
(BEL 200718-TI)

It was remarked:

Associations of the KINAI MARU suggest

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 855 (Cont.)

it may be enroute to Rabaul.  
Unidentified (and COMDESDIV 27  
appear to be enroute Marshalls Area.  
From DI the KAGU MARU was to arrive  
at Truk on 21 August.  
TI on 17 August indicated Commander  
11TH AIR FLEET in Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 38)

The HAURAKI, a captured New Zealand ship,  
announced that it was leaving Singapore for Yokohama  
on August 15, with twenty-five British prisoners on  
board:

No. 856

#006 Aug. 13/1000  
FROM: (unidentified)  
TO : (Takao Rdo.)  
(Yokosuka Rdo.)  
(Saigon)  
(Sasebo)  
INFO: (COMB. FLEET)

Captured ship HAURAKI will maintain  
following schedule in communicating with  
Chief Naval Stations:

#11 Communication Force: From August 15th,  
1000  
Takao Communication Force: From August  
21st, 1200  
Sasebo Communication Force: From August

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 856 (Cont.)

24th, 1200  
Yokosuka Communication Force: From  
August 28th, 1200  
Scheduled to arrive Yokohama on the 30th.  
Frequency: 3100  
Code to be used: SC (This ships call  
sign:  
(GZ #2546-OPNAV 201745-DI)

It was pointed out:

HAURAKI was 7,113 ton, 450 foot, New  
Zealand owned diesel ship. She arrived  
Singapore 0930, August 3rd.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 34)

No. 857

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ #009 Aug. 15/1000  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Unidentified)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Tokyo Bu.Mil.Affairs)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Yokosuka Comdt.)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Unit in DESDIV 8)  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (SUBRON 8)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Tokyo Move.Report Sect.)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (CofS SUBFORCE)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (MARUS serving SUBRON 8)

The captured ship HAURAKI leaving  
Singapore for Yokohama at 1100, with 25  
British nationals (crew: 23, passengers:  
2) on board. (GZ #2543-OPNAV 201740-DI)

It was stated:

See above Item.  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 35)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

Some indication of the heavy sea traffic passing between the Empire and the South Pacific was seen in the transmissions from Saipan to seventeen different ships concentrated in this vicinity:

No. 858

Saipan called 17 ships, including 13 MARUS and 4 Men-of-War (probably escort vessels at one time during evening in delivering a general message indicates considerable concentration of shipping Saipan area as vessels normally pass through Saipan Communication Zone when enroute to or from Empire. (BEL 200718-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 42)

No. 859

Traffic routing and associations indicate MARU and at Saipan. (BEL 200718-TI) (Summary, 210600, August, No. 43)

No. 860

FROM: Aug. 20/1300  
(MARU in 5TH (or Saipan BASE FOR.))

\*Departing Palao on 21 August, arriving at Saipan according to schedule 27 August.\* (COM 14-230204-DI) (Summary, 230600, August, No. 51)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

Two Marus were observed at Palao, and another Maru connected with the First Air Fleet seemed to be en route from Kure to Truk. An unidentified unit, possibly also a Maru, announced to the Eleventh Air Fleet that it was leaving Saipan for Chichi-jima:

No. 861

1ST AIR FLEET MARU addressed despatch at 1452/19 August for action  
Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET  
Info: SHOKAKU and Kure address  
. Other associations indicate this MARU to be enroute from Kure to Truk.  
(BEL 200626-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 14)

No. 862

Traffic routing and associations indicate MARUS and at Palao. (BEL 200718-TI)  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 40)

No. 863

#548 25 July/0700  
FROM: (unidentified)  
TO : (11TH AIR FLEET)  
INFO: (DESDIV 34)  
(MARU in 11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Yokosuka Radio)  
(BASE FORCE #7 at Chichi-jima)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 863 (Cont.)

Departed PS for NMA.  
(GZ #2536-DI)

It was observed:

PS and NMA are identified as Saipan  
and Chichijima respectively.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 16)

The Commander of Japanese Submarine Forces was en route from Yokosuka to Jaluit, whence it was expected that he would enter the Solomon Islands. The Commander of Submarine Squadron Three, who had been thought to be in charge of enemy submarines in the Marshalls and the territory bounded by Australia and the Solomons, appeared to be preparing for a departure to the Empire. It appeared that the Commander of Submarine Forces would take over the responsibility of repelling the Allied invasion insofar as submarine warfare was concerned:

No. 864

COMSUBFOR traffic continues to originate from Yokosuka, although evidence at

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 864 (Cont.)

hand to show Flagship at sea. A movement report originated by COMSUBFOR under blank origin further indication this commander underway, but still in Yokosuka waters.  
(COM 14-200802-TI)  
(Summary, 201400, August, No. 36)

No. 865

Traffic routing indicates COMSUBFOR enroute from Yokosuka to Jaluit. COMSUBDIV in SUBRON 1 operating Jaluit Communication Zone. (COM 14-202004-TI)

It was commented:

COMSUBDIV left Kure about 15 August. (Summary, 210600, August, No. 65)

No. 866

Traffic analysis suggests COMSUBRON 3 now in Truk Zone will shortly proceed Empire. (COM 14-202004-TI)

It was indicated:

COMSUBRON 3 was reported as in charge of submarines in Marshall, Rabaul, Australian Area. COM 14 reported TI indicated COMSUBRON 1 would relieve COMSUBRON 3 in this theatre, however, note COM 14's report of COMSUBFOR now enroute to Jaluit.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 67)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

A subdivision of Submarine Squadron One was moving towards Jaluit, and several urgent dispatches were issued to Submarine Squadron Six by Rabaul:

No. 867

Rabaul transmitted several most urgent despatches to SUBRON 6 at about noon Aug. 20. No other addressees. Transmissions to SUBRON 6 was by Rabaul and also by Tokyo broadcast. (GT #711-OPNAV 201520-TI) (Summary, 201400, August, No. 33)

No. 868

SUBDIV in SUBRON 1 in Jaluit Zone and apparently enroute that place on Aug. 19. (GT #712-OPNAV 201815-TI) (Summary, 201400, August, No. 12)

A deciphered enemy dispatch stated that an Allied submarine had attacked a Maru in July, but despite the fact that the message had announced its sinking, traffic analysis disclosed the presence of this ship as late as August 9:

No. 869

FROM:

2350, July 27.  
(Maru associated with  
SUBRON 5)

645

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 869 (Cont.)

TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (COMSUBRON 5)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Kamranh Bay Detachment)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Tokyo Navy Minister)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Tokyo Naval General  
Staff)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (CinC SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY  
FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (CinC 3rd FLEET)

At 1541 in Lat. 12°\* N., Long. 111°\*  
E., was attacked by submarine. Am sinking.

\*Translator's Note: About.  
(GZ #2540 - OPNAV 200130 - DI)

It was mentioned:

\_\_\_\_\_ appeared later as an addressee  
in a message from CinC EAST INDIES FORCE  
on 3 August and as an originator on 9  
August to various Tokyo addressees, informa-  
tion of a SUBDIV of SUBRON 5.  
(Summary, 200600, August, No. 54)

A message with some important addressees was  
interpreted to be a dispatch concerned with opera-  
tions of a task force in home waters:

No. 870

At 1220, 19 August, Communication  
Officer Saeki Air Station ad-  
dressed Communication Officers of the

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 870 (Cont.)

following for action:

KIRISHIMA	-	_____
HIEI	-	_____
SHOKAKU	-	_____
ZUIKAKU	-	_____
NAGARA	-	_____
STONE	-	_____
CHIKUMA	-	_____

For information to Staff Officer, suffix  
79, of:

CRUDIV 8	-	_____
DESRON 10	-	_____
CARDIV 1	-	_____
Unidentified	-	_____

Unless this message is pure deception,  
its subject is communications between all  
addressees and Saeki Air Station for some  
particular operation within home waters.  
(GT #715 - OPNAV 202148-TI)

It was noticed:

The action addressees seem to be a  
TASK FORCE, first noticed about 11 August.  
On 13 August, they were all addressees of  
a despatch from unidentified MOOI. Loca-  
tion for any projected operations has not  
been indicated.  
(Summary, 210600, August, No. 15)

An estimate of the disposition of the Japanese  
Fleet on August 18, 1942 was now made available with

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

comments of United States Naval Communication Intelligence appended:

No. 871

Estimated dispositions Japanese Fleet  
18 August.

Home Waters:

All Battleships except possibly FUSO.  
Japanese Aircraft Carriers: RYUJO,  
SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO and HOSHO and converted merchant ship carriers: JUNYO,  
HITAKA (HIYO), NITTA, YAWARA and KASUGA MARU. Some of these may move southwards shortly.

Japanese Cruisers: MAYA, ATAGO, TONE,  
CHIKUMA, KASHIMA, JINTU, ABUKUMA.

Seaplane Carrier: FUJIKAWA MARU.

Japanese Seaplane carrier CHIYODA enroute to East Indies. Parts of 1ST, 2ND and 4TH Destroyer Squadrons possibly 7TH DESTROYER SQUADRON and FLOTILLAS attached to Aircraft Carriers. Part of 8TH SUBMARINE SQUADRON and possibly 1ST SUBMARINE SQUADRON.

Japanese Battleship FUSO believed to be on passage to Solomon Island. No evidence that any other heavy ships are in company.

(COISEF 1137Z/20)

It was declared:

JUNYO is now called HAYATAKA.

On 13 August TI indicated MAYA would go to CINC 8TH FLEET.

On 21 August Truk delivered traffic to ATAGO.

On 21 August Truk delivered traffic to CHIKUMA.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 871 (Cont.)

On 21 August TI indicated KASHIMA was enroute from Japan to Truk.

The JINTSU has been reported as operating in the Rabaul Area.

The ABUKUMA was believed in Ominato-Kuriles Area as late as 11 August.

The FUJIKAWA is expected to go to the Marshalls soon.

The CHIYODA is believed at Truk August 19.

SUBRON 1 is believed enroute to the Solomons Area.

(Summary, 220600, August, No. 14)

No. 872

Positions of Japanese Cruiser TAKAO, 8TH JAP DESRON, 2ND, 4TH, 6TH, 9TH and 10TH SUBRONS are unknown.

Japanese Cruisers: HAGURO, MYOKO believed in Home waters or enroute to Solomon Islands Area. (COISEF 1137Z/20)

It was noted:

CINCPAC reported the TAKAO in Home Waters 21 Aug.

DESRON 8 is unknown.

SUBRON 2 left Yokosuka 20 August.

On 21 August COM 14 reported SUBRON 2 was addressee in Guadalcanal reports which may indicate the destination.

SUBRON 4 has been unplaced and unnoticed since June 16 when it was in the Central Pacific.

SUBRON 6 has been reportedly operating in the Solomons Area.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 872 (Cont.)

SUBRON 9 and 10 are unknown.  
HAGURO and MYOKO were reported by  
CINCPAC in Carolines 21 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 2)

No. 873

Estimated dispositions Japanese Fleet  
18 August:

Malaya and East Indies Area:

Japanese Cruisers: ASHIGARA, NATORI,  
ISUZU, SENDAI, KASHII.

Japanese Seaplane Carriers: KAGU  
MARU, NOTORO.

Parts of 2ND, 3RD and 4TH DESTROYER  
SQUADRONS, 5TH DESTROYER SQUADRONS.

Parts of 3RD, 8TH and possibly 7TH  
SUBMARINE SQUADRONS.

Japanese Cruisers AOBA or FURUTAKA,  
KAKO and KINUGASA possibly in company with  
Japanese Cruisers SOUYA and KUMANO. All  
believed on passage from East Indies to  
Solomon Islands Area. (COISEF 1137Z/20)

It was remarked:

Cruiser SOUYA is unknown but may  
possibly be the SUZUY of CRUDIV 7 now be-  
lieved undergoing repairs in the Empire.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 44)

No. 874

Estimated dispositions Japanese Fleet  
18 August:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 874 (Cont.)

New Guinea-Solomon Islands Area:

Japanese Cruisers CHOKAI, TENRYU,  
TATSUTA.

Seaplane Carriers KAMOI, KENJO MARU  
and possibly KAMIKAWA MARU.

Possibly 7TH DESTROYER SQUADRON.  
(COIS-EASTERN FORCES 1137Z/20)

It was pointed out:

All these units are placed in this  
area with the exception of DESRON 7 which  
is unknown.

(Summary, 220600, August, No. 45)

No. 875

Estimated dispositions Japanese Fleet  
18 August:

Mandated Area:

Part of 6TH Destroyer Squadron.

5TH Submarine Squadron, part of 3RD  
SUB SQUADRON and possibly 1ST SUB SQUADRON.

(COISEF 1137Z/20) (Summary, 220600,  
August, No. 30)

No. 876

Tanker SATA in Truk vicinity.  
(COM 14 200808-TI) (Summary, 210600,  
August, No. 37)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on August 20 stated that:

No. 877

GENERAL

From general appearances and available information all carriers remain in Empire waters. There has been nothing definite to indicate that any battleships have left for Southern waters. However, a slight possibility still remains that Cardiv One could have departed. At this time it appears most likely that Orange is confused and does not wish to risk his carriers until the situation is either cleared up or cleaned up using shore-based air and the lighter units combined with land forces which he has already sent South.

It appears that Crudiv Eight and one ship of Crudiv Four are the only available cruisers remaining in the Empire.

SUBMARINES

At least two divisions of Subron One are nearing the Bismark area. The majority of units of Subron Three appear to be in the Truk area headed North.

The Traffic Intelligence Summary issued by the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District on August 20, 1942 stated in part:

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 878

No radio trace of the presence or impending arrival of BBs HARUNA and KONGO, mentioned by Washington as possibly in Truk area, has been seen, nor has any evidence of carrier movements to the southeast been uncovered.

The increased activity in supply vessels, including tankers and 11th Air Fleet vessels, submarines plus the steady stream of air reinforcements and troops, forecasts continued and amplified operations in the southeast, regardless of whether carriers are sent. Orange probably figures that land-based planes will suffice for air protection of surface units without risking carriers until the full extent (and areas) of the Allied operations are uncovered. (Page 1 and 2, TI Summary, Morning 20 August 1942)

No. 879

The statement by Washington that Cardiv 2 was in Palao area could not be confirmed here as no traffic was seen. No bearings on Cardiv 2 have been obtained since the last summary hence no check available from that source. Since bearings last night placed Cardiv 2 in the Yokosuka area, they cannot be far from there at this time. (Page 1, TI Summary, Evening 20 August 1942)

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 20, 1942 read as

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 20, 1942 (Continued)

follows:

No. 880

FROM: Cincpac 200235, August 1942  
TO : Comsowespac  
All Seafron Coms  
All Taskforcoms Pac  
Cominch

NCR 8483 J

Bulletin No. 157

No change in estimated carrier locations. CHITOSE at Yokosuka Bay move south shortly. One Desdiv of Desron Two indicated in Kiska area. KAMOI believed in vicinity Rabaul. Change HIKAWA MARU so designated in Bulletin 154 to NITCHO MARU (XAV). Comdesron 3 at Palao. Units of Desdiv 4 and 17 in Solomons area with 3 units of Crudiv Six. Crudiv Seven consisting of 2 CAs approaching Rabaul.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942

A Japanese report concerning the first battle of the Solomon Islands campaign was made available at this time. The results, as stated, were exaggerated and appeared to be designed for propaganda purposes.

No. 881

FROM: Tokyo  
TO : Istanbul  
Lisbon  
Santiago  
Stockholm

The results of the Solomons Battle are as follows:

(1) On August 7, our Air Forces and Ground Defenses shot down 49 Fighters, and 9 scout bombers. We also sank 3 destroyers and badly damaged another.

(2) On August 8th, as the result of air attacks, we sank 1 Astoria type cruiser, 1 Wichita type cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 10 transports. We badly damaged a heavy cruiser, and a transport.

(3) On the night of the 8th, we sank 1 Australia type British heavy cruiser, 1 unidentified heavy cruiser, 4 Astoria type cruisers, 1 Omaha or Astoria type cruiser, and 6 destroyers. We badly damaged 2 destroyers.

(4) On the 9th, our aircraft sank 1 Achilles type cruiser.

(5) This ship sank 1 destroyer, and 3 submarines.

(6) Our losses are 21 aircraft destroyed, and 2 cruisers, which is an extremely light loss.

(GZ#2558-OPNAV-212152-Plain Language Intercept)

(Summary, 220600, August, No. 3)

655

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

The Japanese were engaged in radio deception on this day, and succeeded in partially confusing not only Allied observers but also some of their own operators. However, the attempt was too noticeable to fully achieve its purpose.

No. 882

What appears to be attempted radio deception by deliberately abnormal traffic routing was noted repeatedly today. Outbound traffic, normally routed through Saipan or Truk, has been coming out of Jaluit which appears to confuse Orange operators themselves. Some despatches have been returned to original transmitting station for delivery to certain addressees. Obvious confusion of Orange operators coupled with lack of certain recovery of some Major Command calls, has made enemy deception partially effective.  
(COM-14-210712-TI)  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 18)

Another interesting feature of Japanese radio traffic at this time was the widespread adoption of stricter security measures. The Japanese had made steady progress along these lines after publicity leaks concerning the Battle of Midway had divulged the success of American experts in reading Japanese traffic.



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 883

Tightening of Jap Communication Security evidenced by increasing number of originators who use exactly the same calls in multiple part messages instead of compromising alternates as in the past.

(GT#723-OPNAV-211745-TI)

It was noted:

Reference to greater communication security by Japs was made in RI Summary 210600/Q August, item 1, page 2. (Summary, 211400, August, No. 3)

No. 884

At 0117, 21st, in partially readable enciphered service message, Tokyo warned Truk to be careful in the use of call signs on frequency (unrecovered).

(BEL-210902-TI)

(Summary, 220600, August, No. 33)

The identification of one call sign definitely established another call sign as a designator for the Southern Force.

No. 885

(Inside) was used in conjunction with call (SOUTHERN FORCE) to differentiate between "Outside" SOUTHERN FORCE in serial 550, from Radio Intelligence, Tokio, also confirms as SOUTHERN FORCE. (BEL-210920-TI) (Summary, 220600, August, No. 46)

657

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander and Staff of the Eighth Fleet were at sea in the vicinity of Rabaul, and its Staff Communication Officer was aboard the CHOKAI. Since nothing had been heard from this fleet since August 19, it was thought probable that current operations were being masked by radio silence. Several dispatches from a concealed originator, possibly the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, indicated that a task force was being formed in Palao for use in the Rabaul area. It seemed certain that the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet would be in charge of the operations of this organization.

No. 886

From traffic routing Command and Staff 8TH FLEET are at sea in Rabaul Delivery Zone.  
(COM-14-210758-TI)

It was indicated:

TI on August 20 indicated CinC and Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET at sea, evidenced by transmission of traffic by Rabaul to both.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 34)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 887

Lack of transmission from 8TH  
FLEET may indicate radio silence.  
(COM -14-210802-TI)

It was commented:

On August 19 TI indicated Chief  
of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET and Chief of  
Staff probable 8TH FLEET jointly orig-  
inated a long 3-part despatch.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 35)

No. 888

Routing and associations indicate  
8TH FLEET Staff Communication Officer  
shown in CHOKAI . . .  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 62)

No. 889

FROM: Concealed Originator  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (Unidentified at Palao)  
                  (MARU)  
                  (CinC 8TH FLEET)  
                  (CinC 4TH FLEET)  
                  (CinC 11TH AIR FLEET)  
INFO: (COMDESRON 3)  
      Navy General Staff

Another:

FROM:  
TO : (Unknown Command)  
      (Air Group aboard MARU )

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 889 (cont.)

TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (MARU)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (COMCRUDIV 18)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (COMDESRON 3)  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff COMBINED)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET)  
          \_\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff 11TH AIR  
                    FLEET)  
          8TH BASE FORCE for Staff Member Kami

These despatches indicate formation of a Task Force in Palao apparently destined for Rabaul Area. DESRON 3 and CRU-DIV 18 are already there.  
(COM-14-210718 & 210758-TI)

It was remarked:

TI On 20 August indicated DD \_\_\_\_\_ of DESRON 3 and MARU \_\_\_\_\_ associated and both at Palao at 1010.

DI on August 8 in a message for Yokosuka Comdt to \_\_\_\_\_ Air Group stated (unidentified Air Group ?) ordered to proceed Rabaul). Meaning not clear but believed to mean will be under CinC 8TH FLEET.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 17)

No. 890

Concealed originator believed CinC 8TH FLEET addressed a despatch at 1254/20 August for action to Commander BASE FORCE in MARU \_\_\_\_\_ at Palao Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ of DESRON 3 at Palao, COMCRUDIV 18 \_\_\_\_\_ and COMDESRON 3 \_\_\_\_\_; Info: Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET \_\_\_\_\_, Chief of Staff 2ND FLEET \_\_\_\_\_ and Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 890 (cont.)

plus Staff Officer KAMI indicated as possibly being Chief of Staff 8TH BASE FORCE Destroyer and possibly DESDIV apparently acting as escort for convoy which is enroute Palau to Rabaul. DD originated Movement Report and Report of Communication Zone shift at 0800/19 August which indicates that vessel proceeding directly from Palau to Rabaul. Association of Chief of Staff 17TH ARMY at Rabaul with Staff Communication Officer DESRON 3 shown at Palau suggests that convoy may contain troop transports. Inclusion of COMCRUDIV 18 in connection this activity suggest that Command responsible for escort duties over at least a portion of the route.  
(BEL-210818-TI)

It was observed:

has been reported as an AIR GROUP. The MARU was at Ambon 10 August. Other despatches concerning this FORCE appeared as Item 17, page 7, RI Summary 211400 August. The despatches seem to indicate the formation of a TASK FORCE at Palao apparently destined for Rabaul Area.

CRUDIV 18 is believed in Palao.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No, 52)

The enemy radio station at Guadalcanal was transmitting many dispatches of an urgent nature to the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet as well as the Commander of the Eighth Base Force. Further dissemi-

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

nation of these dispatches to all larger Commanders in the Empire brought the conviction that these were reports of operations in the region of Guadalcanal.

No. 891

Guadalcanal despatches to CinC 8TH FLEET and 8TH BASE FORCE are being classified Urgent and re-transmitted to Chiefs of Staff COMBINED, 2ND, 4TH, 1ST AIR FLEETS and SUBFORCE, General Staff, and Commanders DESRON and SUBRON 2. These probably reports of operations in that Area.

(COM-14-210802-TI)  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 42)

No. 892

Guadalcanal originated approximately 20 despatches of highest precedence to Commander 8TH BASE FORCE. All these given greatest dissemination to Major Commanders and the Empire. Truk Radio re-addressed all these to KAGOU OPERATIONS FORCE.

(COM-14-212028-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 49)

No. 893

Lunga (Guadalcanal) appeared today in Operational type traffic associated with RABAUl BASE

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 893 (cont.)

FORCE COMAIRRON 25  
and MARU, CINC 8TH FLEET  
and KIYOKAWA MARU, Seaplane  
Unit; one despatch was passed  
to Operations Section Naval General  
Staff and Chief of Staff COMBINED  
Chief of Staff 2ND  
Chief of Staff 4TH and Chief  
of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET plus  
Chief of SUBFOR  
(BEL-210740-TI)

It was observed:

The call tentatively  
identified as an Air Station at Guadal-  
canal has been originating Operational  
type codes since 16 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 50)

Several dispatches were thought to deal with  
the fueling of units of the Second Fleet in the Truk-  
Babaul area. Associations with other addressees led  
to the belief that Cruiser Divisions Five and Seven  
and Destroyer Squadron Two and Four were present in  
southern waters. The Commander in Chief of the Second  
Fleet apparently was aboard the cruiser ATAGO.

No. 894

At 1500-1700, 21 August Truk  
called DESDIV in DESRON 4 and  
ATAGO to deliver several  
messages of type usually devoted to  
D/F bearings. Indicates addressees

663

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 894 (cont.)

are not in port at Truk, and if CinC 2ND is on board ATAGO, this Force may be underway Southward.  
(GT#722-OPNAV-211745-TI)

It was pointed out:

BEL on 16 August stated Truk Radio was in communication with CinC 2ND on 9270 kcs during evening of 16th. Traffic for ATAGO also delivered on this frequency by Truk further indicating ATAGO as flagship of 2ND FLEET, and previously BEL quoted headings to substantiate this belief.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 22)

No. 895

Chief of Staff CRUDIV 4(?) appeared once as addressee in intelligence despatch emanating from Southern Area. CRUDIVS 5 and 7, plus DESRONS 2 and 4 of 2ND FLEET already associated with Southern Area, which together with CRUDIV 4, comprises almost entire 2ND FLEET.  
(BEL-210800-TI)

It was declared:

was identified as the cruiser TAKAO. However, before that time it was thought to be CRUDIV 4. Use of the Chief of Staff Suffix with this call indicates that the earlier identification may have been correct.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 53)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 896

Concealed originator believed to be CINC 2ND FLEET at 1700/20 August addressed despatch to COMDESDIVS 2 and 15, Info: CINCS COMBINED, 4TH and 8TH FLEETS, Comdrs. 1ST and 11TH AIR FLEETS, COMCRUDIVS 5 and 7, COMDESRON 4, COMAIRRON 11, TRUK BASE FORCE, Naval General Staff Operations Section and tankers (?), and This apparently concerns fueling of 2ND FLEET Units in Truk-Rabaul Areas and suggests that CRUDIV 5 and DESRON 4 also present in Southern waters.  
(BEL-210827-TI)

It was stated:

DESDIVS 2 and 15 were believed en-route to New Britain Area with CRUDIV 7. CRUDIV 7 was reported in New Britain area about 21 August.

~~and~~ are believed to be tankers while is unidentified (called a cruiser at times but this is believed in error).

CRUDIV 5 and DESRON 4 have been closely associated with Rabaul traffic and believed in that area.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 27)

Many enemy dispatches intercepted since August 8 referred to a KAGO or KAGOU Operations Force. Close

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 12, 1942 (Continued)

observation of the routing of traffic addressed to various high Japanese operational authorities in the South Pacific brought to light the fact that the Kago Operations Force was not a specific task force; presumably it was a title which referred to all Japanese forces operating in the South Pacific.

No. 897

In connection with "KAGO OPERATIONS FORCE" it is noted that traffic specifically addressed to Chiefs of Staff of the COMBINED, 2ND, 4TH, 8TH, 1ST AIR, 11th AIR, and SUB FORCE is still relayed to KAGO OPERATIONS FORCE. Also, this Force has never appeared with any "Commander" or "CinC". It appears likely that the "KAGO OPERATIONS FORCE" is not a specific Task Force but refers to any or all Forces operating in the South Pacific.  
(GT#718-OPNAV-211645-TI)

It was mentioned:

This is clarification of the nature of the "KAGO" or "KAGOU" OPERATIONS FORCE which first appeared in traffic on August 8th as an enciphered address.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 33)

No. 898

Steady flow of Operational Code traffic originated by (Guadalcanal or near by) throughout afternoon and night of 21 August was addressed to CINC 6TH FLEET

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 898 (cont.)

and Rabaul BASE. In most cases these messages were relayed to COMBINED, 1ST AIR, 2ND, SUB, and 4TH FLEET COMMANDS, COMDESRON 2, CONCRUDIV 6, OUTER SOUTH SEAS COMMANDERS, or just "KAGO" OPERATIONS FORCE, which lends some strength to the supposition that KAGO OPERATIONS FORCE includes all Units in Southern Area.

(GT#726-OPNAV-211845-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 48)

The composition of two major enemy task forces were deduced from the following dispatches emanating from the Personnel Bureau at Tokyo. Despite the fact that the KONGO and the HARUNA were part of one task force, there was no sign of their presence in the southern area. Furthermore, it was pointed out that very little was known of their activities since August 10, when the first signs of this organization became evident.

The flagship of the Fourth Fleet, the KASHIMA, was en route to Truk from the Empire on this day. Though radio traffic in the Fourth Fleet area was heavy, very little operational intelligence was derived.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 899

Tokyo Personnel Despatches of 11 August outlined two very significant looking groups that appeared to represent major TASK FORCES, 2ND FLEET GROUP; HARUNA, KONGO, MYOKO, HAGURO, MAYA?, TAKAO?, DESDIVS, and DD or CL. Latest observations on this group follow: KONGO since 24 July associated with Marshalls Islands Commands. HARUNA addressed by ASHIGARA recently. All late entries on CRUDIVS 4 and 5 indicate all vessels in this line-up now in Truk Area. COMDESDIV in same category as COMDESRON 3 - went to Singapore Area but returned to Mandates via Makassar and Davao.

Observations here do not confirm presence in Mandate or Rabaul area of any 1ST AIR FLEET Units at present. All available data indicates 1ST AIR FLEET very much interested in Rabaul Area. CINC 2ND FLEET who is most important Fleet Commander in Truk-Rabaul Area keeps CINC or STAFF 1st AIR FLEET advised all despatches relative operations in this area. Latest report of this group is SAEKI AIR Radio Officer's despatch to following: Action HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, NAGAR, TONE and CHIKUMA; Info: CRUDIV 8, DESRON 10, CARDIV 3? and CARDIV 1 (Radio Officers of all above were addressed).

COMDESDIV seen associated with 4TH and 8TH FLEETS. Cruiser AD or DD loosely associated with 5TH FLEET FORCES. CINC 2ND FLEET reported in Truk Area and may be in Rabaul general area from one indication. Collective information places this entire

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 899 (cont.)

group with exception in Truk  
Area with indications that operations  
in Rabaul Area are in order.

Other Group: 1ST AIR FLEET GROUP:

HIYEI , KIRISHIMA  
SHOKAKU ), ZUIKAKU  
RYUJO , HOSHO ) TONE  
, CHIKUMA , KUMANO

, SUZUYA . Latest observa-  
tion of this Group points to its being  
in Empire Area with exception of CRU-  
DIV 7.

(COM-14-212018-212024-212032-TI)

It was noticed:

Headings of the despatches indica-  
ted were in Item 9, Page 5, RI Summary  
120600 August and Item 15, Page 5 RI  
Summary 210600 August. The second, or  
carrier-group, was in the heading of  
(Unidentified but believed associa-  
ted with either Truk or Saigon) in Item  
19, Page 6, RI Summary, 131400 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 1)

No. 900

Nothing yet seen here to indicate  
presence of BATDIV 3 Units in Southern  
Area.

(COM-14-210826-TI)

It was noted:

KONGO and HARUNA were associated by  
TI with 2ND FLEET Chief of Staff on 10  
August when organization of a Task Force

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 900 (cont.)

under CinC 2ND was first indicated. However, there have been no indications of the nature of their activity since that time.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 13)

No. 901

Delivery of a Yokosuka despatch to KASHIMA, Flag 4TH FLEET, via Saipan indicates he is enroute Truk from Empire.  
(COM-14-210802-TI)

It was indicated:

KASHIMA on August 12 was believed in Empire.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 21)

No. 902

Traffic in 4TH FLEET Area continues heavy but addresses involved are Major Commands and usual smaller units which yield little information of value.  
(COM-14-210802-TI)  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 16)

Doubt as to the exact location of the cruiser CHIKUMA was now expressed. It had been believed that this unit of Cruiser Division Eight was operating in Empire waters, but the routing of certain traffic for

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

the CHIKUMA to the radio station at Truk was a possible indication of the presence of this warship and various other units in this area.

No. 903

CHIKUMA of CRUDIV 8  
shown at Truk. Also Truk broadcast-  
ing traffic for that ship on 4860 kcs.  
(BEL-210827-TI)

It was commented:

Traffic for the CHIKUMA was  
noticed sent to Truk, but Washington  
unit believes this may possibly be an  
error in routing.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 32)

No. 904

Communication Officer SAKKI AIR  
STATION addressed despatch to  
Communication Officer of CHIKUMA  
HIEI, TONE, KIRISHIMA, ZUIKAKU,  
and NAGARA; Info;  
Flag Radio Officers (?) of CRUDIV 8  
, CARDIV 1, DESRON 10  
and Unidentified. Since  
CHIKUMA at Truk and Commander 1ST AIR  
FLEET actively linked with Southern Force  
Commands, suggest other ships in this  
heading are at, or proceeding to, Truk  
area. Heading further suggests that  
is command call assigned to section of

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 904 (cont.)

BATDIV 3 containing KIRISHIMA and  
HIEI.  
(BEL-210827-TI)

It was remarked:

This heading was noted before -  
See Item 15, page 5, RI Summary  
210600 August. Washington Unit sug-  
gested "An operation in home waters."  
The CHIKUMA is not definitely placed  
at Truk but may possibly be in that  
area.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 33)

No. 905

By specific routing instructions,  
traffic for CHIKUMA was sent  
in care of Truk at about mid-  
night 20 August. This conflicts with  
inference that this ship and others re-  
ported in RI Summary 210600/Q August,  
item 15, page 5, are in home waters.  
If CHIKUMA is actually in Truk Zone,  
the entire list of ships addressed by  
Saeki Air Station at 1220, 19 August  
may also be there. It is possible  
that the routing of CHIKUMA's traffic  
to Truk was in error.  
(GT#721-OPNAV-211645-TI)

It was observed:

The list of ships in reference  
above is:

Action Addressees: Information Addressees:  
Staff Office (Suffix 79)  
of:



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 905 (cont.)

SHOKAKU	CRUDIV 8
ZUIKAKU	DESRON 10
NAGARA	CARDIV 1
STONE	Unidentified
CHIKUMA	

(Summary, 211400, August, No. 23)

An unidentified enemy man-of-war asked for orders from the Kwajalein Area Defense Force, and another unidentified man-of-war was en route from the Empire to Rabaul.

No. 906

FROM: Kwajalein Area  
TO : DEFENSE FORCE

"In accordance with serial 6 of 6TH BASE FORCE, we will receive our orders from Kwajalein Area DEFENSE FORCE. Patrols and communications remain as hitherto."  
(COM-14-210650-DI)

It was pointed out:

appears to be a man-of-war and originated a message on 8 August, stating schedule to depart Yokosuka 9 August and arriving at Jaluit (?) on the 18th.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 32)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 907

Routing and associations indicate Man-of-war enroute from Empire to Rabaul Area.  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 64)

Enemy dispatches indicated that there was an expeditionary force at Buna, and there were indications that Cruiser Division Six was the covering force for operations at Gizo.

No. 908

"Commander RAF EXPEDITION-ARY FORCE" at Buna, appeared as action addressee in despatch from unidentified concealed originator at Rabaul at 1638, 20th. This message was addressed to Staff Communication Officer 8TH FLEET for information.  
(BEL-210740-TI)

It was declared:

Area designator "RAF" is not definitely located, although there is a possibility that it is at or near Buna. On 11 August, translation of a message concerning "R" Area DEFENSE FORCES spoke of "RZJ" OCCUPATION FORCE proceeding to "RAF". "RZJ" has also been suggested for Buna.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 55)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

NO. 909

"GIZO PEP" at Gizo Torpedo Boat Base appeared in connection with CRUDIV 6, possibly indicating that CRUDIV is COVERING FORCE for operations in Gizo Area.  
(BEL-210818-TI)

It was stated:

"GIZO PEP" is not understood and may be garble. In R.I. Summary 211400/C August, page 12, item 40, it was noted that COMCRUDIV 6 and various other addressees including enciphered "GIZO Seaplane Base Comdr." were addressed at 1500/20 August, by an unidentified originator.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 56)

There was some indication that the Kure #5 Special Landing Force would be used at Guadalcanal, and that the Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force would be employed at Buna.

No. 910

Association of Kure #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE with COMDESRON 2 suggests that LANDING FORCE may be used in Guadalcanal Area.  
(BEL-210818-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 47)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 911

Small quantity Urgent traffic noted in Buna Area involving LANDING FORCE and CRUDIV 18 (COM-14-212028-TI).

It was mentioned:

(SASEBO #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE) was reported by TI in the Buna Area. CRUDIV 18 by TI in Rabaul Area on 20 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 54)

It will be remembered that the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Two had transmitted urgent operational traffic on August 20, which indicated that he was engaged in combat or had sighted Allied forces. Whatever the explanation as to his activities on August 20, he was still present in the region of Rabaul on August 21.

No. 912

Truk still delivering traffic to COMDESRON 2 at 2300, 20 August.  
(GT#717-OPNAV-211445-TI)

It was noticed:

TI on 18 August indicated traffic from COMDESRON 2 routed from Truk to Rabaul and that COMDESRON 2 addressed

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 912 (cont.)

mostly Air Units in Solomons-New Guinea Area. On 20 August TI indicated COMDESRON 2 concerned in Urgent and Most Urgent traffic with Fleet Commanders in New Britain-Solomons Area, indicating combat operations in progress or many enemy contacts during August 20.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 27)

No. 913

COMDESRON 2 in Rabaul Zone at 1220, 21 August.  
(GT#?-OPNAV-211745-TI)

It was noted:

On 20 August TI indicated Truk still delivering traffic to COMDESRON 2. See previous reference to COMDESRON 2 in "Mandates Area" this summary.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 41)

A new unidentified destroyer was given an assignment on August 20, but neither the organization to which it belonged, nor its Commander, could be ascertained at this time.

No. 914

New DD movement report at 1500, 20 August was addressed for info to COMDESRON 2 indicating

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 914 (cont.)

organization assignment of this ship.  
(GT#717-OPNAV-211445-TI)

It was indicated:

On 20 August TI indicated New DD  
in commission and underway at  
1215 having originated enciphered  
Comm. Report, direction not indicated  
and no indication of immediate superior  
in command.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 28)

Traffic analysts estimated the location of  
Japanese destroyers as follows: A ship of Destroyer  
Division Thirty was acting as an escort en route from  
Sasebo to Saipan; several units of Destroyer Division  
Fifteen were near Rabaul; units of Destroyer Squadron  
Three were sailing from the East Indies to Rabaul;  
another destroyer was in the vicinity of Tulagi and  
Guadalcanal; and some units of Destroyer Division  
Eight were also near Rabaul.

No. 915

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ #056 Aug. 16/1400  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (Truk Radio)  
                  (Tokyo Radio)  
                  (Jaluit)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 915 (cont.)

At 1200 left #6 Communication Zone  
and entered #4 Communication Zone.  
(GZ#2557-OPNAV-211742-DI)

It was commented:

is tentatively identified by  
OPNAV as a DD in DESDIV 30 and appeared  
to have arrived at Sasebo 16 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 40)

No. 916

Traffic routing and associations  
indicate COMDR 2ND ESCORT FORCE  
enroute Empire to Saipan.  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was remarked:

is tentatively identified by  
OPNAV as a DD in DESDIV 30 and appeared  
to have arrived at Sasebo 16 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 41)

No. 917

Traffic routing and associations  
indicate DESDIV 15 and Destroyer  
of DESRON 2 in Rabaul Area.  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was remarked:

is identified as a DD of DESDIV  
15 and was associated with COMDESRON 2 and  
DESDIV 4 in urgent traffic on 20 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 65)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 918

Units of DESRON 3 proceeding to Rabaul from EAST INDIES Area.  
(COISEF-1214Z/21)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 72)

No. 919

AI 7, believed to be DESRON 3, Air Group Comdr. and MARU indicated to be at (Ambon). also identified as Palao but believe Ambon is best identity.  
(COM-14-212026-TI)

It was remarked:

appears enroute Palao to Rabaul Area. Air Group Comdr. also appeared in Palao Area, Aug. 20th.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 73)

No. 920

Destroyer of DESDIV in vicinity Tulagi and maintains closest association with  
(COM-14-212028-TI)

It was observed:

tentatively identified as an Air Station in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. Destroyer on 14 August was indicated to be escorting the MARU with part of PLANE GROUP aboard enroute to Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 51)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 921

COMDESDIV 8 and DD  
of this division associated  
with Macassar Base in mes-  
sage from MARU on 20th August.  
The destroyer Units received the mes-  
sage on Tokyo broadcast.  
(GI#727-OPNAV-212042-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 5 August DD shown at  
Truk by TI and on 20 August some units  
of DESDIV 8 (DESRON 4) appeared to be  
in the Rabaul Area. COMDESRON 4 on  
19 August was associated with 4TH FLEET  
and the 6TH BASE FORCE (Jaluit).  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 60)

The KASUGA MARU usually was engaged in ferrying  
aircraft to Truk from the Empire and at this time was  
found near Saipan.

No. 922

Traffic routing indicates KASUGA  
MARU in Saipan Area.  
(BEL-210920-TI)

It was declared:

KASUGA MARU appeared by T.I. to be  
in Empire 19 August, and COM 14 noted  
traffic routing which possibly indicated  
she was still there on the 21st.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 22)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 923

KASUGA MARU at 1735 ad-  
dressed Truk Aircraft Works, Info:  
Yokosuka Aircraft Assembly Unit.  
Traffic routing indicates this vessel  
in Empire.  
(COM-14-212022-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 23)

It was thought that several unidentified Marus  
were scheduled to proceed to Truk, together with the  
CELEBES MARU and the tanker SHIRETOKO.

No. 924

#2 CELEBES MARU  
appeared as addressee along  
with 3 Unidentified MARUS  
and in despatch  
from Staff Communication Officer  
TRUK BASE FORCE at 1930/19th which  
was addressed for Info: CHITOSE  
of AIRRON 11; association  
with Truk suggests those vessels  
scheduled proceed that area.  
(BEL-210740-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 32)

No. 925

Unidentified auxiliary  
addressed short despatch to CHITOSE  
, tentative battleship  
and man-of-war . This unusual  
association not understood unless call

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 925 (cont.)

garbled, but previously noted association of CHITOSE with enciphered CELEBES MARU suggests as call for that vessel.  
(BEL-210800-TI)

It was stated:

Call is obviously garbled as does not fit Garble Table.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 34)

No. 926

Tanker SHIRETOKO appar-  
ently Ominato Area, appears scheduled  
proceeding Truk via Yokosuka by heading  
of Communication Zone Report at 1300/20th.  
Associations indicate Escort will be fur-  
nished by DESRON 10.  
(BEL-210740-TI)

It was mentioned:

On 1 August the Tanker SHIRETOKO was  
associated with the 4TH FLEET.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 35)

The KOBE MARU and the KENRYU MARU were at Truk  
in the company of a hospital ship. Two auxiliaries  
were noticed at Ambon, one Maru was at Palao, and two  
Marus plus an auxiliary were en route from the Empire  
to the Rabaul-Truk area.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 927

Routing and associations indicate  
Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET and  
Marus and at Truk.  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was noticed:

\_\_\_\_\_ is identified as the KOBE  
MARU. \_\_\_\_\_ is identified as a Hospi-  
tal Ship. \_\_\_\_\_ is identified as the  
KENRYU MARU.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 43)

No. 928

Traffic routing and associations  
indicate auxiliaries and  
at Ambon (UI 1).  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 68)

No. 929

DD AI 7 and MARU remain at  
PALAO, or in Palao Zone, at 1800,  
21 August.  
(GT#724-OPNAV-211745-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 38)

No. 930

Traffic routing and associations  
indicate Maru probably enroute  
from Kure to Truk via Chichijima and  
Saipan.  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 42)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 931

Routing and associations indicate  
Maru possibly from Empire to  
Rabaul.  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 63)

No. 932

Routing and associations indicate  
Naval Auxiliary to be enroute  
from Yokosuka to Surabaya.  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 66)

A unit at Balikpapan was identified as either  
a Maru or a destroyer. Another ship, identified as  
either a unit of Destroyer Squadron Two or fleet  
auxiliary, was en route from Truk to Saipan.

No. 933

Traffic routing and associations  
indicate Maru vicinity of Balikpapan.  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was noted:

is identified by OPNAV as  
the Flagship of DESDIV 34.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 67)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 934

Routing and associations indicate  
Man-of-War enroute Truk to Saipan.  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was indicated:

Translation of ---, serial 700,  
of 14 August, giving schedule upon leav-  
ing Kavieng showed this ship Planning to  
leave Truk 19 August and to arrive at  
NAA (place designator for somewhere prob-  
ably in the Empire) on the 28th. Identity  
of this ship is not clear, but this  
thought to be either a Destroyer of DESRON  
2 or a Fleet auxiliary.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 39)

It was suggested by American traffic analysts  
that small type Marus were being used as anti-submarine  
patrol vessels off the northern coast of Japan.

No. 935

Commander 1ST PICKET BOAT  
FORCE appeared in despatch heading associ-  
ated with NORTHERN FORCE. Code used sug-  
gests this force composed of Marus, prob-  
ably small type presumably acting as anti-  
submarine and patrol vessels off Northern  
Coast of Empire.  
(BEL-210800-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 8)

A dispatch in the Japanese merchant ship code

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

referred to a Simun Force. Neither the name of the force nor the originator of the dispatch could be identified at this time.

No. 936

"SIMUN FORCE" addressed by unknown originator using Merchant Ship Code on 20 August. Info Addressees were CINCSUB FORCE, 11TH AIR FLEET, 8TH FLEET, Unidentified Collective, and HARUS and . Both SIMUN FORCE and Originator of message appear to be in Truk Area by routing. "SIMUN" is probably place name but not recognized.  
(GT#725-OPNAV-211845-TI)

It was commented:

This is first time SIMUN FORCE has appeared.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 37)

The routing of messages to Truk for the Communication Officer of the First Air Fleet aroused some doubt as to the authenticity of the identification of his call sign. However, there seemed to be little doubt that the proper identification had been made, and the presence of two tenders of the First Air Fleet at Palao was cited as a further indication that

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

Japanese carriers were present in the Southern area. But in opposition to this idea, it was stated by some American traffic analysts that the activities of these tenders were not associated with the movements of enemy carriers in the South Pacific.

No. 937

In two instances despatches from Chief of Staff and SCO 1ST AIR FLEET and was routed to Truk from Tokyo which raises doubt of recovery of this call.  
(COM-14-210718-TI)

It was remarked:

has been tentatively identified as 1ST AIR FLEET.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 19)

No. 938

Message for Communication Officer 1ST AIR FLEET was routed to Truk at 0335, 21 August. Message in question was originated by Sukagawa Air for action Plane Group info 1ST AIR Communication Officer, BuAer, and Yokosuka. The identification of is good.  
(GT#719-OPNAV-211545-TI)

It was observed:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 938 (cont.)

On August 17 TI indicated belief Plane Group at Sasebo or Kure. This Plane Group has been associated in traffic with Plane Groups CARDIV 2, Comdr 3RD AIR ATTACK FORCE, Comm Officers COMBINED FLEET and 1ST AIR FLEET, HITAKA, ZUIHO, and HAYATAKA. Believe Sukugawa Air here has reference to the Air Station. This call on 1 July was associated with SHOKAKU, Carrier Plane Group at Kanoya Air, information Sasebo Navy Yard and Comm Officer CARDIV 5. (Summary, 211400, August, No. 12)

No. 939

Presence of 1ST AIR FLEET Maru Tenders ) and at Palao may be further indication that carriers are present in southern Area. (BEL-210827-TI)

It was pointed out:

In an Operation Order transferring CRUDIV 7, DESRON 3 and parts of DESRONS 2 and 4 (Item 34, page 11, RI Summary 190600 August), these two tenders were info addressees along with DESRONS 2, 3, and 4. TI since then has closely associated the two tenders with the activities operating in Truk-Rabaul area. It is believed these two air-tenders are acting independently and not associated with any carriers. (Summary, 230600, August, No. 17)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

Carrier Division Two was placed by direction finders in the Yokosuka area on August 20. The commander of this division was supervising the activities of the HITAKA and HAYATAKA.

No. 940

Only Carrier despatch seen was from COMCARDIV 2 to Plane Group at 1815/29th transmitted by originator direct on 5910 kcs which is believed fair evidence this Unit is not far from Empire.  
(COM-14-210828-TI)  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 10)

No. 941

No traffic seen to indicate change in location of CARDIV 2 from Yokosuka Area as placed by D/F last night.  
(COM-14-210718-TI)

It was declared:

COM14 on 20 August stated no evidence Carrier movements Southeast have been observed. BEL same date suggested current activity (with SETTSU) may be attempt at deception to cover actual movement, possibly to Southern Area, as Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET is closely associated with current activities there. OPNAV TI on same date stated traffic for COMCARDIV 2 routed to Palao by Tokyo at 2045, 20 August.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 11)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 942

Bearings continue place COMCARDIV  
2 aboard HITAKA and HAYATAKA in Empire.  
No other carriers heard or observed in  
traffic.

(COM-14-212022-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 15)

Increased activity among Japanese aircraft  
carriers, tankers, and supply ships, and a departure  
report of what was thought to be a carrier associated  
with destroyer escorts, attracted the attention of  
American traffic analysts.

No. 943

There is increased activity among  
Japanese aircraft carriers, tankers  
and supply ships.

(COISEF-1214Z/21)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 11)

No. 944

Staff Communication Officer AIRON  
22 at 1710, 19th, addressed  
SHOKAKU, Staff CARDIV 2  
and the SETTSU, in despatch which  
was for information to Staff Communication  
Officer 11TH AIR FLEET, Carrier  
Plane Group and, plus Com-  
manders BIHORO and SHINCHUKU  
AIR GROUPS. This suggests exer-  
cises involving SHOKAKU, SETTSU and Carrier

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 944 (cont.)

Plane Groups near Empire, but it more probably concerns operations already completed as routing indicates SHOKAKU and SETTSU not in company.

(BEL-210920-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 16)

No. 945

Absence of any exercise indications leads to belief this message is preliminary departure report. Several indications that is CARDIV 3 and contains RYUJO and possibly HOSHO.

(COM-14-212026-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 9)

No. 946

ZUIHO sent one despatch to destroyer and Staff Communication Officer 1ST AIR FLEET information Staff Communication Officer CARDIV 2, Kure Address and Sasebo Address. This was delivered to first three addresses on Tokyo broadcast.  
(BEL-210920-TI)

It was stated:

is identified by OPNAV as a DESDIV in DESRON 3 and this DESDIV was shown by D.I. to be scheduled for arrival

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 946 (cont.)

at Davao from the South on 18 August.  
This is the first association noted of  
with the carriers.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 18)

A seaplane unit, which had recently left Kiska,  
was being transported to the South Pacific.

No. 947

Commander Seaplane Unit  
has moved from Kiska and was at Yokosuka  
AIR at 1600/21 August.  
(GT#727-OPNAV-212042-TI)

It was mentioned:

Seaplane Unit shown aboard  
the MARU 20 August and believed  
to have been enroute South from the Nor-  
thern Area on that date.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 20)

A dispatch issued by the Commander of the Fifth  
Air Attack Force was noteworthy because its list of ad-  
dressees included all major commanders who were thought  
to be taking part in future operations in the Solomons.  
A report from this same commander announced the speci-  
fic number of Japanese planes available on August 13,  
1942 at certain key spots in the Solomons.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 948

At 2012 Commander 5TH AIR ATTACK  
addressed Chief of Staff 11TH  
AIR FLEET, Chief of Staff 8TH  
FLEET, Chief of Staff SUB FORCE  
, and Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET  
, info unidentified  
Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET  
and Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET  
, General Staff and his command.  
This probably reports operations and is  
believed to include all Units operating  
South of Rabaul.  
(COM-14-210826-TI)

It was noticed:

Identified by OPNAV as 2ND  
FLEET. 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE is in  
Rabaul Area and it is perhaps notewor-  
thy that the addressees of this message  
include all the Major Commanders who are  
thought to be concerned in possible forth-  
coming operations in the Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 36)

No. 949

FROM: #084 (Part 2 of 2)  
13 August/2140  
88 (Comdr 5TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCE)  
TO : 65 (Unidentified)  
INFO: 204 (Unidentified)  
304 (Chief of Staff 1ST  
AIR FLEET)  
(Unidentified)  
704 (Unidentified)  
104 (?) (Unidentified)  
99 (Comdr 2ND AIR  
ATTACK FORCE)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 949 (cont.)

\_\_\_\_ (Comdr 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_ (Comdr 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)  
\_\_\_\_ (Comdr 14th AIR GROUP ?)  
\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_ (Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET)

(Blank) planes available for use  
tomorrow:

- (1) At RRE: 26 type-1 bombers  
7 \_\_\_\_\_ fighters  
1 \_\_\_\_\_ dive bomber (?)  
4\* \_\_\_\_\_  
5 \_\_\_\_\_  
2\* \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) At RZM: 18 \_\_\_\_\_ fighters  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ dive bombers (?)  
8 type 98 \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) At RRF: 8 \_\_\_\_\_ fighters

\*About  
(GZ#2554-OPNAV-211610-DI)

It was noted:

RRE is Rabaul possibly Vunakamua.  
RZM is Lae Seaplane Base.  
RRF is unplaced but believed in  
vicinity of Rabaul.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 44)

The Commander of the Sixth Air Attack Force was  
very much concerned with the transfer of planes from  
the Empire.

No. 950

Commander of AIRRON 26

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 950 (cont.)

still indicated being in Southern Area and associated with Truk-Chichijima-Saipan BASE FORCES plus enciphered IOJIMA BASE Commander probably in connection with transfer of planes from Empire.  
(BEL-210740-TI)

It was indicated:

AIRRON 26 is referred to by OPNAV as the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 57)

The Commander of Air Squadron Eleven was located at Truk, and the Flag Secretary of the Eleventh Air Fleet was thought to be at Tinian.

No. 951

Traffic for COMAIRRON 11 being broadcast by Rabaul Radio and concealed originator traffic which appears to be originated by that command is emanating from Truk.  
(BEL-210818-TI)

It was commented:

COMAIRRON 11 was believed at Truk 20 August. TI indicated COMAIRRON 11 left Yokosuka about 11 August for Rabaul.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 36)

No. 952

Routing and associations indicate



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 952 (cont.)

Flag Secretary 11TH AIR FLEET at  
Tenian.  
(BEL-210902-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 31)

Further evidence was obtained that an enemy  
seaplane base was located at Gizo, and that an anti-  
aircraft unit from Saipan had settled at Kavieng.

No. 953

Unidentified originator ad-  
dressed Rabaul Base, info Chiefs of  
Staff COMBINED, 1ST AIR  
2ND FLEET, 11TH  
COMCRUDIV 6, Comdr  
5TH AIR ATTACK, and  
"Gizo Seaplane Base Comdr"  
at 1500, 20th.  
(GT#720-OPNAV-211545-TI)  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 40)

No. 954

An expeditionary anti-aircraft  
unit from Saipan is shown  
at Kavieng by enciphered  
address in despatch from Secretary  
Saipan, at 1704, 20th.  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was remarked:

This is apparently same as item  
52, page 52, R.I. Summary 210600/Q  
August. Kavieng is correct for  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 61)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

A Japanese plane was transmitting operational messages which probably were observation reports concerning Allied forces in the Solomons.

No. 955

(Plane) was active sending operational type code messages probably relating to sighting or dispositions Allied Units in Solomons Area. These given wide distribution. One signal consisted simply of the Kana character "HOHOHO" which may have been request for units to take bearings on his transmissions in order fix position of units sighted.  
(BEL-210800-TI)  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 58)

The Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force was now at Jaluit, and the Commanders of Submarine Squadrons One and Three were in the vicinity of Rabaul. The Commander of Submarine Squadron One had left the Empire on August 13, 1942. It was believed that he was coming south to replace the Commander of Submarine Squadron Three in the Rabaul-Solomons area.

No. 956

COMSUBFORCE and Communication Officer

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 956 (cont.)

SUBFORCE received traffic on Jaluit  
Broadcast after 1100, 21 August.  
Also via Yokosuka who transmits to  
MARU ) for delivery to COMSUBFORCE.  
(GT#717-OPNAV-211445-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 20 August traffic routing indi-  
cated COMSUBFOR enroute from Yokosuka  
to Jaluit.  
(Summary, 211400, August, No. 30)

No. 957

COMSUBFOR believed at sea since  
traffic delivered to this Command via  
Tokyo broadcast.  
(COM-14-212022-TI)

It was declared:

On 20 August TI indicated COMSUBFOR  
was enroute Yokosuka to Jaluit.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 70)

No. 958

Routing and associations indicate  
Commanders SUBRON 1 and 3  
at unidentified (pos-  
sibly Rabaul).  
(BEL-210902-TI)

It was stated:

COMSUBRON 3 appeared by T.I. to be

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 958 (cont.)

Jaluit on 17 August and possibly in Truk Communication Zone on the 20th. There have been recent indications by T.I. that COMSUBRON 11 will relieve COMSUBRON 3 in the Southern Area shortly.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 72)

No. 959

Indications continue that COMSUBRON 1 will relieve COMSUBRON 3 in Southeast Area.  
(COM-212022-TI)

It was mentioned:

COMSUBRON 1 reportedly left Yokosuka for 8TH FLEET Area 13 August. All Stations seem to think it will replace SUBRON 3 in the Rabaul-Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 71)

Direction finding reports on enemy submarine positions were as follows:

No. 960

Sub Posits:

alt.	in SUBRON 3 - 153-E 01 S
at 2300(Z)/20 Aug.	
(COMSUBRON 6)	158-E 05 S
at 1600(Z)/19 Aug.	
(Sub?)	155-E 03 S
at 0800(Z)/21 Aug.	
(Sub?)	165-E 08 S
at 0800(Z)/21 Aug.	
(COM-14-212022-TI)	
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 76)	

1700

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

An operational dispatch issued by an unidentified man-of-war from the Balikpapan-Makassar area indicated that it was experiencing an Allied submarine attack.

No. 961

Operational type despatch from Man-of-War at 2200, 19th, addressed MAKASSAR and BALIKPAPAN BASE FORCES and CINC 3RD FLEET, information Maru and All Ships and Stations suggests Allied submarine attack on that vessel in Balikpapan-Makassar Area.  
(BEL-210800-TI)

It was noticed:

Man-of-War was associated with the 3RD FLEET on 12 August and appeared to be in the Southwestern Area. Maru appeared by T.I. to be at Makassar 18 August.  
(Summary, 220600, August, No. 59)

The success of Axis submarines at various times during the course of the first year after America entered the war was not due solely to the ingenuity and skill of their submarine commanders. Frequently, they based their operations on information obtained

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

through espionage. This intelligence was very often sent to the Axis capitals through diplomatic channels, as the dispatches which follow immediately will testify. A mutual exchange of intelligence concerning Allied convoys was a common practice of the Axis powers, and for that reason German submarines frequently took advantage of data compiled for them by Italian representatives. Undoubtedly, the Japanese were informed of Allied movements in the Pacific by similar means.

No. 962

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 963

No. 964

The summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence  
Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

21 August 1942 stated as follows:

No. 965

General

There is still no indication of the Japanese carriers having departed from Empire waters. It is estimated that a striking force of the SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO, along with Crudiv 8, one unit of Crudiv 4 plus the KIRISHIMA and HIEI has been fully organized for the past week. Unless ORANGE radio deception is remarkably efficient, this force remains in the homeland still. The only explanation for this indecisiveness is the fact that Japan has no information on the location of our carriers. There has however been continued association between CinC First Air Fleet and the Solomons operations.

There are signs of increasing activity centered around Palao. One of our submarines stationed in the vicinity could offer timely intelligence of any enemy movements in force through that area.

Enemy radio on Guadalcanal is still in operation.

The KASHIMA, former flagship of CinC 4th Fleet is nearing Truk on the return trip South from Empire overhaul.

The Northern area is uneventful.

Submarines

The presence of an enemy submarine in Hawaiian waters has not been verified by D/F.

Subron Seven units in the Aleutians have been quiet for some time, which, in



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 965 (cont.)

the absence of better information, could signify their advance Eastward to Alaskan waters.

Subron One units are nearing Jaluit from the Empire. Comsubron One is expected to relieve Comsubron Three.

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet issued on 21 August 1942 reported that:

No. 966

FROM: CINCPAC (NERK) 210257 August 1942  
TO : COMSOPAC  
ALL SEAFRON PAC  
COMINCH  
ALL TASKFOR COMSPAC  
COMSEFPAC  
OPNAV  
COMNAVEU  
NCR 9252 J Bulletin No. 158

MYOKO, flagship of Crudiv 5 plus HAGURO in Carolines, believed to be continuing to 8th Fleet operating area. 2 divisions of Subron 1 approaching Bismarck area from homeland. Crudiv 7 escorted by units Desron 3 believed vicinity New Britain. Comdesron 3 with staff in Palao area. Comsubfor at sea, possibly returning Mandates. Tanker SATA remains Truk. Comdr. Takao air at Kendari. ZUIHO, HITAKA and HAYATAKA off southeast Honshu exercising with target ship SETTSU. No indication other Carriers have departed Japan. Crudiv 8 plus Takao of Crudiv 4 likewise in home waters. MAYA (Crudiv 4) believed in company ATAGO (flag of CinC

705

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 966 (cont.)

Second) and possibly approaching New Britain from Truk. Comdesron 4 in Naka in Truk area, and may proceed southeast. YURA believed in Truk-Rabaul area.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942

It was noted that traffic as old as dispatches of August 12 was being transmitted on Japanese circuits. An analysis of enemy traffic brought forth the fact that the average number of Japanese dispatches intercepted daily during the period from August 1 to August 19 was 505. However, on August 7, when United States forces invaded the Solomons, a peak of 733 dispatches was reached. American operations on August 20 and 21 were reflected in the 648 and 628 messages intercepted on those days.

Much operational traffic was issued from Guadalcanal between 0600 and 0900 on August 21, and most of it appeared to deal with Allied operations in that sector. Traffic from Guadalcanal was relayed by Bougainville to Rabaul, from where it was forwarded to all major commanders:

No. 967

Bureau traffic appeared of little interest.

(COM 14 221936-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 2)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 968

Noted traffic as old as Aug. 12 being transmitted on Aug. 22.  
(GT#734-OPNAV 221930-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 3)

No. 969

Regarding traffic volume:  
Based on intercepts by Station S, average number messages intercepted daily: from 1 to 19 August, less 7 Aug. was - 505  
On 7 August, day of U.S. attack on Solomons - 733  
On 18 August - 577  
On 19 August - 579  
On 20 August - 648  
On 21 August - 628  
Next highest day prior 18th, on 14th - 548  
Volume for 22nd bids fair to exceed any previous day.  
(GT#732-OPNAV 221745-TI)

It was stated:

The above is supplementary to Item 8, Page 6, R.I. SUMMARY 221400 August. The peaks in intercepted traffic on Aug. 7th, and on Aug. 20-21, reflect the operations which were carried out on those dates.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 4)

No. 970

High precedence traffic mostly confined dissemination despatches from Guadalcanal Area.  
(COM 14 221934-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 67)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 971

6TH BASE FORCE activity apparently dying down. Guadalcanal Radio Station traffic increasing, being relayed by Bougainville Air to Rabaul who in turn passes it to Major Commanders under high precedence.  
(COM 14-221936-TI)

It was pointed out:

is the call of Lunga? (Guadalcanal) but is probably a portable unit in use by Japs still not captured on Guadalcanal to report intelligence on U.S. Forces.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 68)

No. 972

Lunga (?) was again active originator of great operational traffic between 0600 and 0900 21st. Traffic was all addressed for action CINC 8TH FLEET info COMAIRRON 25 and 8TH BASE series of allied attack or operations in that sector.  
(BEL. 220632-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 69)

It was noticed that Rabaul broke radio silence to transmit to Japanese warships in the Outer South Force at 1834 on this day. It went silent in six minutes, and then transmitted again about one hour later:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 973

Rabaul lifted radio silence to ships in OUTER SOUTH FORCE at 1834, 22 August; imposed silence at 1840, and lifted it again at 1936.

(GT#730-OPNAV-221615-TI)  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 19)

The existence of the Japanese battleship YAMATO was proven by specific mention in an enciphered dispatch. It was believed that the YAMATO was serving as flagship for the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet:

No. 974

Unidentified addressed Supply Officer of "YAMATO" verifying existence this vessel. Message was info S.O. 3RD FLEET and Palao disbursing section.  
(GT#733-OPNAV-221755-TI)

It was noted:

YAMATO believed Flagship 1ST or COMBINED FLEET with calls and Association with Southwestern Area is believed shown following: TI on August 17 indicated association between 1ST FLEET Unit, Penang, and CRUDIV 7, and believed possibly acting as Flagship for CinC COMBINED.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 9)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

Confirmation that the CHIKUMA was near Truk was received at this time, and the ATAGO and MAYA were also reported in this area. The presence of these units of Cruiser Division Four confirmed the supposition that a task force was gathering for operations under the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet. It was also noted that two unidentified men-of-war were present in the Rabaul area:

No. 975

Comment on Item 1 Summary 220600/Q

August:

1. No association of KONGO with Marshalls has ever been noted here.
2. Message between two ships such as ASHIGARA-HARUNA is generally without significance unless a Fleet Command is included. This type message almost invariably deals with personnel, records, or accounts.
3. All available info on vessels of CRU DIVS 4 and 5 since 8 August place these units in Truk Area, however, only ATAGO and HAGURO have positively appeared in Truk Communication Zone, from intercepts available to OPNAV.
4. DESDIV - Check, i.e. agree.
5. One message was sent to Palao for COMCARDIV 2 and may have been in error. Also, may not! At least one message for Staff 1ST AIR FLEET was sent to Truk for delivery, and at least two appeared to originate from Truk Area. However, dozens of despatches addressed

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 975 (Cont.)

to 1ST AIR FLEET Command have been placed on Tokyo Broadcast which is not the case with CinC 2ND who is known to be in Truk Area.

6. The 1ST AIR FLEET GROUP which was addressed by Saeki Air Radio Officer should be in Saeki vicinity, but one ship (CHIKUMA) was positively shown by routing instructions to be in Truk Zone, and no complaint from Truk Communication Officer has been noted in regard to this.

7. The ATAGO has definitely not been associated with 5TH FLEET, and was directly addressed several times by Truk on 21 August.

(GT#728-TI) (Summary, 221400, August, No. 1)

No. 976

Traffic for ATAGO and MAYA of CRUDIV 4 noted being routed to Truk by Tokyo, tending to confirm movement CRUDIV 4 to Southern Area.  
(BEL. 220530-TI)

It was observed:

On Aug. 21, Truk Radio was heard communicating directly with ATAGO. The cruiser (tentatively MAYA) has been unreported since Aug. 11, but on that date, appeared in a significant association with what appeared to be a possible TASK FORCE under command of CINC 2ND FLEET. The possibility exists that CINC 2ND may be in ATAGO. The TASK FORCE under command of CINC 2ND, as deduced from associations, appears as follows:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 976 (Cont.)

HARUNA (BB)      ATAGO (CA)      MYOKO (CA)  
MAYA (CA)      KONGO (BB)      TAKAO (CA)  
DESDIV WINA 2      HAGURO (CA)      DESDIV MAN 5  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 35)

No. 977

Traffic for tentative cruiser  
was routed to Truk for delivery by Tokyo.  
This may be ship in CRUDIV 4.  
(BEL. 220530-TI)

It was remarked:

The unit      has been in evidence  
since late April 1942, but its identity and  
type has not been clearly established.  
was noted in association with sus-  
pected COMBINED FLEET Flagship  
KAKO and FURUTAKA of heavy CRUDIV 6, and  
unidentified      in personnel messages,  
on Aug. 11.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 36)

No. 978

Traffic for CHIKUMA      again  
routed to Truk by Tokyo, confirming this  
cruiser in Truk Area.  
(COM 14 221936-TI)

It was stated:

GT believes that if CHIKUMA is in  
Truk Zone the following ships may also be  
there:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 978 (Cont.)

KIRISHIMA	CRUDIV 18
HIEI	DESRON 10
ZUIKAKU	CARDIV 1
SHOKAKU	Unident. SIHO 0
NAGARA	TONE

There have been indications NAGARA, SHOKAKU, and CARDIV 1 may be in vicinity of Truk.

(Summary, 230600, August, No. 31)

No. 979

2 unidentified men-of-war in Rabaul Area - (and ) August 22.  
(GT #737-OPNAV 222300-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 77)

Traffic concerning the KAKO, a unit in Cruiser Division Six, indicated that this ship had either been sunk or severely damaged in action in the Solomons. The fate of this ship had not been definitely determined at this point since available evidence was contradictory:

No. 980

Chiefs of Staff COMBINED, 2ND, 1ST AIR, 8TH, 4TH FLEETS, and Naval General Staff; information COMDESRON 2, ComCRUDIV 6, COMDESDIV 34, and unidentified ; COMDESRON 2 and CRUDIV 6 both frequently addressed by 8TH FLEET seem to come under 11TH AIR FLEET for operations.

(COM 14 221938-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 980 (Cont.)

It was explained:

CRUDIV 6, DESRON 2, DESDIV 34, appear  
in the Solomons Area.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 70)

No. 981

Traffic originated by ship of CRUDIV 6,  
under cover call , is being passed by  
Tokyo to Truk for delivery to COMCRUDIV 6  
. Station Serial Numbers of this  
despatch suggest ship to be former flagship  
of CRUDIV 6, possibly the KAKO  
This ship apparently enroute to Empire for  
repairs following the action in Solomons.  
(BEL 220617-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 34)

No. 982

Cruiser KAKO and COMDESDIV 30  
(ORI 33) shown in Rabaul Area.  
(COM 14 221936-TI)

It was declared:

The Commanding Officer of KAKO appeared  
aboard MARU enroute to Empire on Aug.  
19th, due to arrive Aug. 24th. This indicates  
that the KAKO was sunk.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 75)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 983

Bureau of Personnel addressed Commanding Officer KAKO at 0844, August 22. Message was delivered to MARU by Rabaul.  
(GT #737-OPNAV 222300-TI)

It was noted:

The KAKO has been indicated as sunk or damaged in the Solomon Area. Whether this ship was sunk has not been definitely determined.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 85)

It was noted for the first time that Cruiser Division Seven, approaching Truk, was accompanied by two destroyers:

No. 984

Destroyers and , probably in DESDIV , believed in company CRUDIV 7, and approaching Truk.  
(GT #732-OPNAV 221745-TI)

It was indicated:

This is the first association of these destroyers with CRUDIV 7 noted in GI. CRUDIV 7 was definitely associated with Southeastern Area by Bel. TI on Aug. 21.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 37)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

It appeared probable that the KASHIMA, a light cruiser, had departed from the Empire for the South Pacific:

No. 985

KASHIMA originated despatch at 0930, 20th, which is typical movement report and manner of routing suggests that ship departed Kure, possibly for Southern Area.  
(BEL. 220648-TI)

It was commented:

KASHIMA, light cruiser, appeared in Saipan Zone on Aug. 21st.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 38)

The Commander of Cruiser Division Eighteen was still very active in the Buna-Lae operations where he had been associated with the Fifth Special Landing Force.

No. 986

Using Rabaul cover COMCRUDIV 18 continues to appear as SOPA in Buna Lae Operations. Despatch probably originated by COMCRUDIV 18 at 1500 on 21st was addressed to "Hakentai Siki at Buna", information to 5TH SPECIAL LANDING FORCE, CINC 8TH FLEET and enciphered "FUJIKAWA TAI TEU". Possibly

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 986 (Cont.)

units attached to FUJIKAWA MARU remained Rabaul Area when that vessel departed Northward with GENZAN AIR GROUP.  
(COM 14-220708-TI)

It was pointed out:

Hakentai Siki is interpreted to mean Detachment Commander.

FUJIKAWA TAI TEU is believed to mean FUJIKAWA Detachment Commander.

TI on 18 August indicated CRUDIV 18 in Buna Area associated with #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE.

FUJIKAWA MARU on 17 August was indicated apparently in Empire with slight indication of further movement to Saipan Area.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 18)

Several destroyer units were prominent in operational traffic on August 21, 1942. Since they had been consistently active in operational traffic during preceding days, it was suggested that they were stationed at certain locations in the Solomons to scout for Allied striking forces or to aid in Japanese landing operations. Their evident cooperation with other destroyer units and the Commander of Cruiser Division Six created the impression that they might also become part of an enemy task force in this area. In

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

addition to these destroyers, there were small units operating as lookout posts and forwarding their observations to the destroyers:

No. 987

Destroyer Units and , and were also active with operational traffic during early morning 21st, possibly indicating contact with allied forces. Consistency of operational traffic from these units over the past few days suggests these destroyers are stationed at strategic positions in the Solomons Area for purposes of observing allied movements or to aid in series of Japanese landing operations.  
(BEL. 220632-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 76)

No. 988

Guadalcanal continued prominent in operational traffic associated with Destroyers and  
(COM 14-220708-TI)

It was observed:

TI on August 21 indicated DD of DESDIV in vicinity Tulagi and maintains closest association with has been identified as a DD in DESDIV 29.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 23)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 989

DD \_\_\_\_\_ in DESDIV 29, DD \_\_\_\_\_ in DESRON 1, and COMCRUDIV 6 \_\_\_\_\_ associated in operational traffic in general Rabaul Area. \_\_\_\_\_ originated several short despatches to \_\_\_\_\_ during evening of 21st. Evidently these two DDs cooperating or intending to rendezvous for joint action.  
(GT #729-OPNAV 221515-TI)  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 21)

No. 990

DDs \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, COMDESRON 2, and COMCRUDIV 6 appear to comprise a Task Force in Solomons Area, 21 August.  
(GT #730-OPNAV-221615-TI)  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 22)

No. 991

Calls \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ appeared in no originator Operational type despatch at 1800/21st. These were addressed in care destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ and are probably small detachments equipped to operate as lookout or observation posts after landing (units using similar calls have been identified as lookout posts in Mandates area prior beginning of war).  
(BEL-220556-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 43)

A unit of Destroyer Division Riyu Seven was active at this time. Destroyer Division Thirty left Rabaul for Truk and a unit of Destroyer Squadron Three



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

was en route from Palao to Rabaul via Truk. The first section of Destroyer Division Twenty-seven was active in the Jaluit-Marshall Islands area, and the destroyers (and ) were near Truk and Rabaul, respectively. Traffic originated by Minesweeper Division Sixty-five indicated that it was active in the Makin area where American forces had been raiding:

No. 992

Destroyer of DESDIV at 2015/20th, sends one to SHOKAKU, NAGARA, TOKYO and TRUK RADIO Stations, delivered to SHOKAKU and NAGARA via Tokyo Broadcast.  
(COM 14-221936-TI)

It was remarked:

Reported by BEL. 220617. See No. 1009.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 20)

No. 993

DESDIV 30 indicated departing Rabaul Area for Truk by heading of Communication Zone report originated 0601/21st.  
(BEL. 220556-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 41)

No. 994

Destroyer of DESRON 3 sent Comm. Zone report at 1225, 21st, which indicates

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 994 (Cont.)

movement that unit from Palao to Rabaul via Truk. There have been several indications that possibly with other destroyers will act as escort for a convoy during above passage.  
(BEL. 220530-TI)

It was stated:

Destroyer was placed at Palao by on Aug. 20. and was possibly associated with MARU —, also placed at Palao on 20th.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 74)

No. 995

First section of DESDIV 27 which is now assigned to 6TH BASE FORCE consists of DDs and SHIGURE (?)  
(GT 729-OPNAV-221515-TI)

It was explained:

On 20 August from DI we obtained, "DESDIV 27 (less 2ND Section) is attached directly to this Unit." Despatch was from 6TH BASE FORCE whose Area includes Jaluit-Marshall Islands and Wake.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 14)

No. 996

DD in Truk Area, 22 August.  
(GT #730-OPNAV-221615-TI)  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 13)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 997

DD was direct communication with Rabaul at 1830, 22 August.  
(GT#730-OPNAV-221615-TI)

It was declared:

TI on August 20 indicated Man-of-War  
of 1ST AIR FLEET in Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 20)

No. 998

MINESWEEPER DIVISION 65 was  
originator of Operational type despatch at  
1100/21st which associations suggest is in  
connection with activity Makin Area.  
(BEL-220556-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 42)

American traffic analysts decided to ignore previous indications, based on the routing of one dispatch, that the Commander of Carrier Division Two was sailing South. The misrouting of this dispatch was ascribed to the tremendous confusion experienced at that time by Japanese communication officers. It was conceded that radio deception might be adopted by the Japanese, but it was stated that the enemy's method of routing dispatches did not conform to this theory. However, it was thought that Carrier Division

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

Two and the ZUIHO were at sea, although their exact location was not known:

No. 999

Specific routing instructions show COMCARDIV 2 \_\_\_\_\_ and HOSHO \_\_\_\_\_ to be at Kure \_\_\_\_\_ at 1800, 21 August. Previous indication that COMCARDIV 2 was enroute southbound based on routing of one message to Palao should be disregarded. The numerous instances of specific routing instructions and the extremely large number of service messages from shore stations informing other offices that they are not guard for various units whose traffic has been sent to them for delivery indicate confusion of communication offices as to ship locations. While deliberate deception is a possibility traffic does not have that appearance. If deception is being attempted it is poorly planned. It is believed that locations described as "by specific routing instructions" should be considered accurate whereas simply "by traffic routing" should await confirmation or repetition before being accepted. Note that Jap communication system is handling a huge volume of traffic at the present time.\*

\*Approximate figures being assembled.

(GT#731-OPNAV-221715-TI)  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 8)

No. 1000

CARDIV 2 \_\_\_\_\_, ZUIHO \_\_\_\_\_, and  
Carrier Plane Groups again active on 5910 kcs.  
Other carriers unheard.

(BEL. 220530-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 12)

724

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1001

Tokyo at 1130, Aug. 22, broadcast movement report from ship [redacted] in 1ST AIR FLEET, to CINC 1ST AIR FLEET indicating that delivery already effected to Movement Report Office Tokyo, Maizuru Address [redacted], COMCARDIV 2 at Kure; info HOSHO at Kure.  
(GT#732-OPNAV 221745-TI)

It was noted:

CINC 1ST AIR FLEET has been receiving his traffic via Tokyo broadcast for some time, and on Aug. 21, CARDIV 2 was also indicated as receiving his traffic in the same manner. The identity and type of the ship [redacted] is unknown.  
(Summary, 230600, August No. 15)

No. 1002

YOKOSUKA AIR [redacted] addressed SAEKI AIR [redacted]; info ZUIHO [redacted], Yokosuka and Kure Commandants and very questionable Jaluit address [redacted] at 0945, Aug. 20. Delivery to ZUIHO only was by Tokyo broadcast.  
(GT #732-OPNAV 221745-TI)

It was indicated:

ZUIHO has been associated for past few days with COMCARDIV 2 in HITAKA, and the HAYATAKA. CARDIV 2 has been indicated previously as receiving his traffic via Tokyo broadcast, indicating that this division is at sea, but without indicating their exact location.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 16)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

Evidence was accumulating to indicate that the Commander of the First Air Fleet was intending to take part in enemy operations in the Truk area. A possible rendezvous with the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet at Truk was envisaged. Dispatches which concerned the First Air Fleet also demonstrated the possibility of a movement of the Commander of Carrier Division Two. The movement of First Air Fleet tenders to the South, the increase in traffic for the Chiefs of Staff Second Fleet, and the routing of the First Air Fleet to Truk pointed to the same conclusion:

No. 1003

Comdr. 1ST AIR FLEET originated despatch at 1212. 20th, to Chief of Staff 3RD FLEET; info COMDESDIV 8 Destroyer, and Secretaries Makassar and Surabaya, BASE FORCES. Might be in connection with movement 1ST AIR FLEET Auxiliaries in areas indicated, but also suggests split of 1ST AIR FLEET with some units in Palao-Celebes Area and others rendezvousing with CINC 2ND in Truk Area. (BEL. 220530-TI) (Summary, 230600, August, No. 13)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1004

Confirmation appearance 1st AIR FLEET staff as addressee in Rabaul-Jaluit R.I. traffic now definite, and interpreted to mean this staff now in position to take part in present operations. Ammunition Ship or Tender shows specific routing instructions COMCARDIV 2 and HOSHO at Kure. DF Bearings and other related despatches definitely place COMCARDIV 2, HOSHO, and ZUIHO in Kure-Sasebo Area, however, other associated messages presage possible early movement probable destination Truk Area. COMCARDIV 2 addressed plane groups and information Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET, Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, KURE DEFENSE CORPS., SASEBO and KURE RADIOS, and MARU Tender. This tender in other despatches indicated departure Empire for Truk via Chichijima and Saipan, including 1ST AIR FLEET for information. 1000/21st, unspecified originator, addressed COMDESRON 10, COMDESDIV info Chief of Staff 1ST AIR FLEET, AND Communication Officer CARDIV 2. Above despatches listed as showing possibility CARDIV 2 movement.

(COM 14 221934-TI)

It was commented:

appears to be DESDIV 16.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 14)

No. 1005

Traffic for Chiefs of Staff 2ND FLEET  
and 1ST AIR FLEET also  
routed to Truk, suggesting that place as

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1005 (Cont.)

rendezvous point for formation of STRIKING FORCE preparatory to offensive action, possibly counter attack in Solomons Area or against other Allied possessions.  
(BEL. 220530-TI)

It was pointed out:

This same routing of traffic for 1ST AIR FLEET was observed on Aug. 21. CINC 1ST AIR FLEET has also been associated with a possible TASK FORCE whose composition, as deduced from associations, appears as follows:

CARDIV 1 - Composition undetermined.  
CARDIV 2 - HITAKA, HAYATAKA.

(possibly CarDiv 3)- Composition unknown)  
HIYEI (BB)  
CHIKUMA (CA) (CRUDIV 8)  
KUMANO (CA) (CRUDIV 7)  
DESDIV  
KIRISHIMA (BB)  
TONE (CA) (CRUDIV 8)  
SUZUYA (CA) (CRUDIV 7)  
NAGARA and DESRON 10  
and various minor units, probably plane groups.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 28)

No. 1006

Truk Radio sent several short despatches during afternoon and evening which were apparently direction finder bearings addressed to ATAGO, probably current Flagship 2ND FLEET, and DESDIV, apparently in company with ATAGO and both probably



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1006 (Cont.)

enroute Truk.  
(BEL. 220530-TI)

It was observed:

This same circumstance was observed  
on Aug. 21st.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 29)

No. 1007

1ST AIR FLEET Tender originates  
movement 1100, 21st, including 2ND FLEET as  
addressee, indicating Southward movement.  
(COM 14 221938-TI)

It was remarked:

MARU appeared at Kure on Aug. 20th.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 18)

Messages from a destroyer associated with the  
First Air Fleet also tended to prove the presence of  
First Air Fleet units in the vicinity of Truk.

No. 1008

DD addressed enciphered Zone  
change to SHOKAKU, Flagship 1ST AIR  
FLEET, NAGARA, New Flagship DESRON  
10, Tokyo, and Truk; indicating movement to  
Truk Zone sometime after 2015, 20 August.  
(GT#730-OPNAV-221615-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1008 (Cont.)

It was stated:

TI on 15 August indicated Yokosuka re-  
lays traffic to Saipan for delivery to DD  
This DD associated with MARUS  
(at Yokosuka), (at Yokosuka),  
and Possible convoy forming. MARUS  
and also associated COMCRUDIV 7  
which may indicate late rendezvous.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 12)

No. 1009

Destroyer of DESDIV 16  
originated Communication Zone report ad-  
dressed to Tokyo SHOKAKU  
NAGARA and Truk. Despatch  
routing indicates is enroute Truk to  
NAGARA or SHOKAKU Communication Zones, which  
in addition to indications noted yesterday  
further tends to establish presence of 1ST AIR  
FLEET units in the proximity of Truk.  
(BEL. 220617-TI)

It was explained:

On Aug. 20th, SHOKAKU, NAGARA, and Truk  
were addressed by a MARU in a zone change.  
On Aug. 21st, message for Comm. Officer 1ST  
AIR FLT. was routed to Truk.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 19)

Further evidence indicated that aircraft  
supplies were being forwarded to Kavieng for the use  
of the Kisaratsu and Misawa Air Groups.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1010

Comdr. KISARATSU AIR  
originated despatch at 0702, 21st, to  
Comdr. 11th AIR FLEET, COMAIR-  
RON 4, Kavieng (Air Station?)  
and remaining forces KISARATSU  
AIR: info to MISAWA AIR, COM-  
AIRRON 26 and Truk Air Station  
1. Suggests that units of KISARATSU  
and MISAWA AIR may be ferried to Kavieng  
via Truk. Association of MARU Airtender  
with Kavieng suggests that  
tender proceeding from Saipan to Kavieng,  
possibly with aircraft stores for afore-  
mentioned units.  
(BEL. 220617-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 62)

No. 1011

A detachment of KISARATSU AIR appears  
at Kavieng  
(COM 14-221938-TI)

It was declared:

KISARATSU AIR GROUP appears in the  
Marcus Island Area.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 63)

No. 1012

Staff Officer KISARATSU AIR GROUP  
was at Kavieng on  
Aug. 22.  
(GT #736-OPNAV 221930-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 64)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander of Air Squadron Eleven was still at Truk, and the Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet was shown to be at Rabaul, to which operational dispatches from the Commander of the Fourth Air Attack Force were directed. The Communication Officer of the East Indies Air Force and the Commander of the Takao Air Group were in Kendari on August 21, 1942:

No. 1013

COMAIRRON 11 apparently still in Truk Area and associated with enciphered "COMMISSION FOR DISPOSAL OF REMAINING AFFAIRS FOR THE OKUMA DETACHMENTS." (BEL. 220632-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 30)

No. 1014

By specific routing instructions Chief of Staff 11TH AIR FLEET shown at Rabaul Air Base at 1055, Aug. 22.  
(GT #734-OPNAV 221930-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 65)

No. 1015

Comdr. 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE originated MOST URGENT despatch to Cinc 11TH AIR, info all Fleet Commands, Naval General Staff, and other Air Attack Force Comdrs. in Mandates at 1910, 21 August. No reason apparent.  
(GT #729-OPNAV-221515-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1015 (Cont.)

It was noted:

On August 17 Comdr 4TH AIR ATTACK addressed directives to 4TH AIR Bombers, and other Mandates Air Units following Makin Activity.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 15)

No. 1016

Communication Officer EAST INDIES AIR FORCE (formerly called 2ND AIR ATTACK FORCE) and Comdr. TAKAO AIR GROUP were at Kendari on Aug. 21.  
(GT #736-OPNAV 221930-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 66)

Traffic analysis disclosed the presence of the Commander of the #1 Debarkation Party at Palao. The possible transfer of the Forty-second Guard Force from Ponape to another theatre of operations was revealed, as was the plan to employ the Yokosuka #5 Special Landing Force in the Solomons. The Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force was at Buna, and it was associated with the YASAKAWA Maru which was thought to be an air tender.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1017

On Aug. 16, an enciphered call "Comdr. #1 DEBARKATION PARTY, PALAO" was noted.  
(GW MEMO 8/22)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 45)

No. 1018

42ND GUARD FORCE at Ponape sent long despatch to Naval Secretary Chief of Naval General Staff Comdt. Kure and CINC 4TH FLEET. Despatch is in Movement Report Form which suggests it concerns transfer of 42ND GUARD FORCE to some other theatre, possibly Gilberts.  
(BEL. 220556-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 44)

No. 1019

Comdr. YOKOSUKA #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE was shown at (or in) unidentified and associated with "BUKA BASE". Since YOKOSUKA #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE appears scheduled for operations in Solomons, rendezvous point with supporting force may be in vicinity of Buka.  
(BEL. 220648-TI)

It was commented:

On Aug. 14, Comdr. YOKOSUKA #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE appeared aboard MARU enroute Rabaul from Saipan Area.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 78)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1020

Sasebo #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE  
(shown at Buna "-----") and associated  
with the KIYOKAWA MARU  
{ YASAKAWA MARU unidentified }  
ships of DESDIV 30 ----- and Commander  
TAINAN AIR GROUP ----- at Lae. Associa-  
tion suggests YASUKAWA MARU is an air-  
tender similar to KIYOKAWA MARU.  
(BEL. 220556-TI)

It was pointed out:

Sasebo #5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE has  
appeared at Buna since about August 12th.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 79)

The Shimun Force noticed in the traffic of a  
previous day had not yet been identified, nor was its  
location known. Association with the Commander in  
Chief of the Eighth Fleet and other Commanders in the  
Southern area was an indication of the probable field  
of its operations:

No. 1021

SHIMUN DETACHMENT  
----- appeared as action address in no  
originator despatch which was intercepted  
at 1615/21st. No indication of location  
or composition but association with CINC  
8TH FLEET and other in Southern Area  
suggests scheduled operating area.  
(BEL. 220556-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 80)

735

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1022

Reference R.I. Summary 220600/Q  
August, page 12, item 37: The enciphered  
"SIMUN FORCE" might possibly be a force  
named for and connected with Symonds  
Islet, located near Nura Island, about  
seven miles east of Guadalcanal Island.  
One point against this connection be-  
tween the "SIMUN FORCE" and Symonds  
Islet is that the latter ends in "S".  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 2)

The call sign of the Palao Weather Station  
was identified at this time:

No. 1023

"Rabaul 42ND ANCHORAGE" addressed by  
YURERI at Palao.  
(GT #737-OPNAV 222300-TI)

It was observed:

YURERI appears to be Palao Weather.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 60)

Movement of Japanese merchant ships continued  
along the usual supply routes to and from the Empire  
and the South Pacific. The                    announced its  
schedule en route to Saigon;                    was leaving  
Saipan for Truk, in the vicinity of which the KAMIGAWA



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

Maru sent a dispatch to the auxiliary \_\_\_\_\_ at Ambon. It was thought that the tanker AKEBONO Maru, which had arrived in Rabaul on August 18, would be used to refuel units of Destroyer Squadron Two and Cruiser Division Six.

The KAGU Maru was en route to the New Britain area; the \_\_\_\_\_ was en route from Jaluit to Rabaul, towards which the air tender \_\_\_\_\_ was moving. The \_\_\_\_\_ was at Truk, and it was noticed that the BRAZIL Maru which had been sunk by the USS GREELING on August 8 was no longer addressed as a unit of the Fourth Air Attack Force. Traffic concerning the Maru \_\_\_\_\_ was thought to be an attempt of the Japanese at radio deception:

No. 1024

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ #81, 0630, 20 August.  
#21st at 1100, leave #8 Communication  
Zone (Rabaul), enter #3 (Palao). 28th, at  
0800, leave #3, enter #11 (Saigon).  
(BEL. 220328-DI)

It was remarked:

\_\_\_\_\_ is identified as a Maru.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 16)

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1025

Communication Zone Report at 1600,  
21st, from MARU indicates shift  
from Saipan to Truk  
(BEL. 220617-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 49)

No. 1026

KAMIGAWA MARU addressed  
short despatch at 0605, 21st, to Auxiliary  
which was shown yesterday to be at  
Ambon.  
(BEL. 220632-TI)

It was stated:

On Aug. 18th, KAMIGAWA MARU appeared  
in Truk Area possibly enroute Rabaul.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 81)

No. 1027

KAMIKAWA MARU at 1500,  
Aug. 22, addressed Movement Report to CINC  
11TH AIR, CINC Unidentified Fleet (probably  
2nd) ; info Chief of Staff COMBINED  
Base, COMAIRRON 11, Rabaul  
and Naval General Staff.  
This is possibly departure unknown place  
for Rabaul.  
(GT #736-OPNAV 221930-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 82)

No. 1028

Associations suggest AKEBONO MARU  
will be used to refuel units of  
DESRON 2 and possibly CRUDIV 6

(BEL. 220632-TI)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1028 (Cont.)

It was explained:

AKEBONO MARU is a tanker which appeared as arriving in Rabaul Aug. 18th.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 83)

No. 1029

AKEBONO MARU in Rabaul Zone at 1800, August 22, and associated with COMDESDIV 30 (ORI 33).  
(GT #737-OPNAV 222300-TI)

It was indicated:

See above item.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 84)

No. 1030

Association of KAGU MARU ) with  
(Gasmata?) suggests that airtender enroute New Britian Area.  
(BEL. 220632-TI)

It was declared:

KAGU MARU appeared in Truk Aug. 20th.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 88)

No. 1031

Routing and associations indicate MARU at Mille  
(BEL. 220648-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 47)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1032

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ (MARU) Aug. 22  
TO: \_\_\_\_\_ (Truk Rdo)  
(Jaluit Rdo)

After 1200, Aug. 26, will discontinue communication with Jaluit and establish communication with Truk.  
(GT #735-OPNAV 221930-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 46)

No. 1033

MARU Airtender in Rabaul Area.  
(BEL, 220648-TI)

It was noted:

DF bearings on Aug. 21st, place at 02 South, 155 East. appears to be transporting part of plane group from Kisaratsu to Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 86)

No. 1034

MARU at Truk on August 22.

(GT #737-OPNAV 222300-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 50)

No. 1035

BRAZIL MARU indicated as belonging to 4TH AIR ATTACK, shown in heading 4TH AIR ATTACK, less GOSHU and BRAZIL MARUS.  
(COM 14 221936-TI)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942

No. 1035 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

On Aug. 8th, CINPAC reported that USS GREELING had sunk the BRAZIL MARU near Truk. BRAZIL MARU is a 13,000 ton transport. (Summary, 230600, August, No. 55)

No. 1036

MARU in Jaluit Area, 22 August.  
(GT #729-OPNAV-221515-TI)

It was commented:

On August 21 TI indicated MARU handling traffic in and out of Shanghai and this call identified by British as Shanghai Radio. Unless this call was transmitted garbled this appears to be deception. On 8 August this call by D/F was in 09° N, 153° E. (Summary, 221400, August, No. 17)

A Japanese plane reported contact with Allied seaplanes on this day:

No. 1037

At 1026 on 22nd Tokyo Broadcast contact from probable plane

No time of origin.  
(COM 14 220704-TI)

It was pointed out:

From data captured in Alaska, "TE"

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1037 (Cont.)

was indicated to mean, "can see enemy sea-plane". The significance of "09" is not known but believed to indicate the number of planes sighted.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 3)

The Commander of the Japanese Submarine Squadron Three was now in the vicinity of Truk. It was noticed that enemy submarines had adopted the security precaution of using the general cover call to disguise their identity.

No. 1038

The working Truk on 6085 tentatively identified as COMSUBFORCE.  
(COM 14 220708-TI)  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 24)

No. 1039

Submarine traffic slight majority units using cover call  
(COM 14 221938-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 94)

No. 1040

Truk noted delivering traffic to COM-SUBFORCE. Indicating that command to be in Truk Area.  
(BEL. 220648-TI)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 91)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1041

COMSUBFORCE and COMSUBRON 3 now receiving traffic via broadcast from Tokyo and Truk.  
(COM 14 220708-TI)

It was observed:

TI on 21 August indicated COMSUBFOR and Comm Officer SUBFORCE received traffic on Jaluit broadcast after 1100, 21 August. Also via Yokosuka who transmits to MARU for delivery to COMSUBFOR. On 21 August traffic routing indicated Commander SUBRON 3 at (possibly Rabaul).  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 25)

Most of the considerable Japanese submarine activity was centered in the South Pacific. Units of Submarine Squadron Eight were newcomers in this region:

No. 1042

Unit of SUBRON 3 departed Kure for 8TH FLEET Area and SUBDIV of SUBRON 8 appears to have arrived same Area.  
(COM 14 220708-TI)

It was remarked:

TI on August 18 indicated SUB appears preparing Southward trip. The same source indicated SUBDIV at Yokosuka on 17 August.  
(Summary, 221400, August, No. 26)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1043

Jaluit broadcasts to SUBFORCE, Rabaul  
to SUBRON 7 and Tokyo to COMSUBRON 1,  
SUBRON 3, and SUBRON 7.  
(COM 14 221938-II)  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 93)

An interesting diplomatic dispatch dealing  
with the intentions of the Vichy government concerning  
their fleet was made available at this time. It  
reads as follows:

No. 1044

FROM: Vichy #325 July 29, 1942

TO: Tokyo

Re my #311

On the 26th, Laval said to me,  
"Nothing has been done about this. I  
would like to propose that the fleet sail  
to Casablanca, but as yet I have not asked  
permission of the German-Italian truce  
commission. If and when I do so, I may  
have to ask you to put in a good word for  
me so please bear this in mind. Ah well,  
even though the Germans approve England  
and the United States wont, and a dash  
from Toulon to Alexandria would take four  
days, so after all I am afraid we will  
have to scuttle these ships."  
(GZ/Jap. Dip. #6009 - DI)

The summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet, on 22 August, 1942 stated in part:

No. 1045

No change in the Northern situation.

CINC FIRST AIR FLEET in the SHOKAKU and in company with the ZUIKAKU plus possibly the RYUJO are now believed to be either in the TRUK area or between JAPAN and TRUK enroute South. The HITAKA, HAYATAKA and ZUIHO are believed in home waters with a possibility that they will move South soon.

CINC SECOND FLEET is either in TRUK area or enroute TRUK to RABAUL area. He probably has a task force composed of CRU-DIVS FOUR and FIVE, part of BATDIV THREE plus destroyers.

All indications point to a major effort by the enemy in the RABAUL area soon.

A traffic intelligence summary issued by the United States Pacific Fleet, Fleet Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District on the morning of 22

August 1942 stated that:

No. 1046

The inclusion of the First Air Fleet Staff in the address of dispatches from Jaluit and Rabaul F.I. Stations is confirmed. When reported last evening there was but one call for 1st Air Fleet appearing in these dispatches and if an erroneous

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1046 (Cont.)

identification has been made, false conclusions would have been drawn but during the night confirmed alternates of this call appeared and it is now undeniable that the 1st Air Fleet is now receiving radio intelligence bulletins. This is interpreted to mean that the 1st Air Fleet Staff is now in a position to take a part in the operations.

Some matters in connection with Car-Div Two are cleared up. A Tender which has been tentatively classed as an ammunition ship, addressed CinC 1st Air Fleet ComCarDiv Two information to the HOSHO at 1800/21st. Specific routing instructions for this dispatch showed ComCarDiv Two and the HOSHO to be at Kure.

At 0840/22nd, ComCarDiv Two addressed the plane groups or bases information to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet, the Kure Defense Force, Sasebo and Kure and the Maru. The latter tender in dispatches indicated departure from the Empire for Truk via Chichijima and Saipan and included the Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet for information.

These dispatches, together with bearings obtained on ComCarDiv Two and ZUIHO of 296 and 297 respectively confirm these radio routing instructions and place Car-Div Two definitely in the Sasebo-Kure area. But now that he is definitely located dispatches point to an early departure from the area. The dispatch above points to movement through the Kure Defense Forces. The Maru being definitely headed

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1046 (Cont.)

south, we have a dispatch from an unspecified originator to ComDesRon 10 ComDesDiv information to Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet and the Communication Officer CarDiv Two at 1000/21st. These indications are too meager to positively state that CarDiv Two is about to depart the Empire but they are enough to suggest that possibility.

As to CarDiv One, a dispatch originated at 2015/20th from a destroyer of DesDiv was addressed to SHOKAKU NAGARA, flagship of DesRon 10, Tokyo and Truk Radio Stations. This was delivered to SHOKAKU and NAGARA by Tokyo broadcast.

The Bulletin issued 22 August 1942 by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet reads as follows:

No. 1047

22 AUGUST 1942

FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: COMSOWESTPACFOR  
ALL TASKFOR COMMDRS  
PACIFIC  
COMSOPACFOR  
COMWESTSEAFRON  
COMPASEAFRON  
COMNORWESTSEAFRON  
COMHAWSEAFRON  
OPNAV - (NSS)  
COMINCH - (NSS)  
COMNAVEU - (NSS)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1047 (Cont.)

NCR 0320-J

Bulletin No. 159

PART OF DESDIV 27 IN JALUIT AREA. KASHIMA ENROUTE EMPIRE TO TRUK. KAMISU MARU IN VICINITY OF KURILES. KAGU MARU IN TRUK AREA. SOUYOU MARU DEPARTING MARSHALS FOR KURE. BY DOG FOX SUBMARINES 153 EAST 01 SOUTH. 158 EAST 05 SOUTH. TWO HEAVY CRUISERS UNDER COMCRUDIV 7 PLUS DESDIV 2 and 15 FROM DESRON 3 and PART OF SOUTHERN FORCES. NO POSITIVE INDICATIONS TO SHOW CHANGE IN CARRIER LOCATIONS. HOWEVER POSSIBILITY UNDETECTED DEPARTURE RECENTLY INACTIVE ZUIKAKU SHOKAKU RYUHO SUBSEQUENT TO 16 AUGUST SHOULD NOT BE DISREGARDED.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942

A. Communication Intelligence Reports

The use of new call signs by the Japanese made it more difficult for American traffic analysts to identify enemy units in the South Pacific. Most of the important major commanders in this area were issuing administrative directives and receiving intelligence reports on August 23, 1942. Very little operational traffic was noted until 1030 (Zone - 9).

After 1030 much high precedence traffic emanated from the enemy radio station on Guadalcanal Island. These urgent operational dispatches were undoubtedly caused by the opening movements of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, which was to involve air and surface action between Allied and Japanese forces from August 23 to 25, 1942. Further details concerning this action will be given after the routine communication intelligence of this day is discussed:

No. 1048

3-Kana call signs are being extensively used by units comprising SOUTH SEAS FORCE.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1048 (cont.)

This system, coupled with fact much traffic being originated, has originator concealed in text makes accurate analysis difficult. At present it is impossible to ascertain if these 3-Kana calls will be confined to Major Commanders or will embrace all units. (BEL 230715-TI) (Summary, 231400, August, No. 36)

No. 1049

Only High Precedence traffic intercepted was from Guadalcanal at 0500, 23rd, to Commander 8TH BASE FORCE, information Commander 5TH AIR ATTACK. This message re-addressed for information to KAGOU OPERATIONS FORCE, General Staff and Tokyo Intelligence (COM 14 - 230815-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 34)

No. 1050

Little operational type traffic seen in 8TH FLEET Area. Apparent directives and intelligence reports comprise bulk of traffic from Southern Major Commands and important units. (COM 14-230818-TI) (Summary, 231400, August, No. 35)

No. 1051

Considerable high precedence traffic originated in Solomons-Rabaul-New Guinea Area after about 1030/23 (-9) from Guadalcanal COMDESDIV and several

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1051 (cont.)

unidentified calls.  
(COM-14-232018-TI)

It was noticed:

DESDIV is DESDIV 30.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 13)

Messages from Japanese operational authorities in the Empire to the Harbormaster at Truk indicated that arrangements for receiving reinforcements from home waters were being made in the South Pacific. An enemy ship, tentatively identified as an air tender, was thought to be planning to join the Eighth Fleet in the Rabaul area:

No. 1052

Kure Chief of Staff  
at 1800, 20th, originated despatch  
to Chief of Staff COMBINED and 4TH  
FLEETS and COMDR 4TH BASE FORCE at  
Truk, information to unidentified  
SAEKI AIR KURE  
DEFENSE FORCE, Naval General Staff,  
Operations and Transportation Sec-  
tions and is probably relevant to  
arrival or departure of a 4TH FLEET  
Unit.  
(BEL-230738-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1052 (cont.)

It was noted:

is identified by OPNAV as  
2ND ESCORT FORCE.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 22)

No. 1053

Unidentified at 22/1230,  
addressed Chiefs of Staff following  
Fleets: COMBINED, 4TH  
8TH, 1ST AIR  
11TH AIR COMDESRONS 2 and  
10, 4TH BASE FORCE, Truk, Truk Harbor  
Master info Operations  
, Yokosuka, and Truk  
Docks, Probably arranging  
berths undetermined units from Yoko-  
suka.  
(COM-14-232024-TI)  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 6)

No. 1054

Despatch originated by unidenti-  
fied Man-of-War at 1700, 20th,  
to CINC 8TH FLEET, CINC 3RD  
FLEET(?), COMDR 8TH BASE  
FORCE at Rabaul, COMDR 22ND  
BASE FORCE at Balikpapan, in-  
formation CINC COMBINED FLEET  
and unidentified indicates this  
unit will join 8TH FLEET in Rabaul Area.  
Point of departure may be Balikpapan.  
(BEL-230738-TI)

It was declared:

There has been a slight indication



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1054 (cont.)

that \_\_\_\_\_ may be an Air Tender.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 43)

A unit of the Japanese Third Fleet announced  
that it would arrive at Soerabaya on August 26, 1942:

No. 1055

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_

Says, "Departing Palao(?) on  
the 23rd and arriving Soerabaya on  
the 26th."  
(COM-14-230742-DI)

It was remarked:

\_\_\_\_\_ is identified as 3RD FLEET.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 34)

Another report on the battleship YAMATO was  
received at this time, and warning was issued that  
the battleship FUSO might be accompanying the Seventh  
Cruiser Squadron as it approached the Solomon Islands.  
The battleship KONGO, together with the KIRISHIMA,  
HARUNA, and the aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU, was associa-  
ted with the Solomons, although no positive indication

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

had been received which proved their presence therein:

No. 1056

Unidentified Maru \_\_\_\_\_ ad-  
dressed serial number 20, at 0900,  
21st, to \_\_\_\_\_ YAMOTO  
\_\_\_\_\_ for Paymaster  
information 3RD FLEET Paymaster  
and unidentified \_\_\_\_\_ Tokio de-  
livered this despatch on his broadcast,  
thereby suggesting YAMATO is actually  
the battleship rather than the name of  
a paymaster.  
(BEL-230738-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 32)

No. 1057

Indications that Japanese Battle-  
ship FUSO may be in company with 7TH  
CRUISER SQUADRON approaching New Bri-  
tain Area.  
(CinC E.F.-0802Z/23)

It was observed:

C.O.I.S. EASTERN FORCES on 18  
August stated Japanese BB FUSO be-  
lieved on passage to Solomon Islands.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 22)

No. 1058

Destroyer \_\_\_\_\_ addressed  
KONGO \_\_\_\_\_, CINC 1ST AIR FLEET  
\_\_\_\_\_, COMDESRON 3 \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1058 (cont.)

COMDESDIV \_\_\_\_\_ info MARU  
at 0800, 21st.  
(GT#738-OPNAV-2300-TI)

It was stated:

COMDESRON 3 appeared in the Palao Area on Aug. 21st, with some units of DESRON 3, escorting CRUDIV 7 in vicinity of New Britain. On Aug. 20th, DESDIV \_\_\_\_\_ of DESRON 3 appeared possibly escorting a convoy which is en-route Palao to Rabaul. \_\_\_\_\_ appears to be a destroyer of DESDIV \_\_\_\_\_, and was indicated by traffic routing to be in Truk Area on Aug. 19th. The battleship KONGO, along with KIRISHIMI, HARUNA, and the Carrier ZUIKAKU, has been associated with Truk Area, but there are no positive indications that these units are actually in the Truk Area. \_\_\_\_\_ is a new call and is not positively identified. (COM 14 believes \_\_\_\_\_ is CRUDIV 7). (Summary, 230600, August, No. 21)

A report, which located the cruiser CHIKUMA in the Soerabaya-Koepang area, was received, although traffic analysis appeared to confirm the presence of this warship in the vicinity of Truk. Cruiser Division Eighteen was still active in the Solomons, as was the KAKO and the FURATAKA:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1059

Japanese Cruiser CHIKUMA in  
Soerabaya-Koepang Area.  
(CinC E.F.-0802Z/23)

It was commented:

On 22 August traffic for CHIKUMA  
was again routed to Truk by Tokyo,  
confirming this Cruiser in Truk Area.  
On 24 August TI stated CHIKUMA of  
CRUDIV 8 and Kure Navy Yard Dry Dock  
Section included as addressees in a  
despatch from Naval Secretary, which  
may suggest arrangements for docking  
the CHIKUMA at Kure or may refer to  
docking previously carried out.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 36)

No. 1060

Comdr. 5TH SPECIAL LANDING FORCE  
sent a 2 part priority at 23/1445,  
action Staff Communication Officer  
CRUDIV 18, whose guard is Fleet Unit

(COM-14-232018-TI)

It was indicated:

has been suggested as a  
Destroyer of DESDIV 8 of DESRON 4.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 14)

No. 1061

Traffic routing indicates KAKO  
and FURUTAKA to be  
still in New Britain Area.

(BEL-230738-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 44)

756

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

It was estimated that between fifteen and twenty destroyers, and approximately twenty submarines were operating in the Rabaul-Solomon area at this time. Some of the destroyers noticed in this area were: a unit of Destroyer Division Thirty-Four; several units of Destroyer Squadron Six; a ship of Destroyer Division Fifteen; Destroyer Squadron Three, and units in Destroyer Divisions Nine, Twenty-nine, and Thirty:

No. 1062

From units addressed and traffic routing believe total of 15 to 20 destroyers and approximately 20 submarines in Rabaul-Solomons Area.  
(COM-14-232026-TI)  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 12)

No. 1063

FROM: (unidentified) #428 Aug. 12  
The KAMO I and  
(Destroyer of DESDIV 34) departed PYR for Rabaul.  
(BEL-230305-TI)

It was noticed:

PYR is unidentified; it is in the

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1063 (cont.)

Jaluit Atoll and Lib Island or Ribong Is., are suggested as possibilities. CINCPAC reported that KAMOI appeared in vicinity of Rabaul on Aug. 20th. Previous translation of this message by OPNAV indicated place of departure was RYP instead PYR. RYP also is unidentified but may be in vicinity Gilbert Islands since other RY designation occur there.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 16)

No. 1064

Originator in a highest priority at 23/16 minutes, garbled, addressed CINC 8TH FLEET, COMDESRONS 2 and 3, 8TH BASE FORCE info Destroyer Units

(COM-14-232018-TI)

It was noted:

is DESDIV 30 of DESRON 6.  
is a destroyer in DESDIV 29 of DESRON 6. is a destroyer of DESDIV 15 of DESRON 3.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 17)

No. 1065

COMDESRON 2, about 0640, 23rd, commenced sending series of short 4-Kana R.I. or D/F despatches addressed to SOUTHERN FORCE CINC 2ND FLEET and CINC 1ST

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1065 (cont.)

AIR FLEET  
(COM-14-230818-TI)

It was declared:

COMDESRON 2 is currently associated with CRUDIV 6, apparently in the Solomon Area.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 41)

No. 1066

DESDIV and DD of  
in DESRON 6, and DD of  
in DESRON 1 closely associated  
and and believed in company.  
(COM-14-230818-TI)

It was declared:

is identified as DESDIV 30 and translation of his serial 365, of 14 August, showed he expected to arrive Rabaul 21 August from Truk.  
is identified as DESDIV 29.  
is identified as DESDIV 9. Both Destroyers and were prominent in operational traffic with Guadalcanal Station on 22 August. These ships are also associated with COMDESRON 2 and COMCRUDIV 6.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 42)

Close attention was being paid to the location of Japanese aircraft carriers, since the enemy's

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

striking power would be considerably strengthened by their presence. The ZUIHO appeared in radio traffic on the evening of August 22, and it was thought that it was somewhere in the Empire. The HOSHO was placed at Kure, and the KASUGA MARU, ferrying planes, was believed to be headed south from the Empire. No radio transmission had been received from the RYUJO since July 24, but it had appeared as an addressee at various times up to August 14. Its absence from radio traffic since that time led to the suggestion that it might be undergoing an overhaul in a Navy Yard.

No. 1067

ZUIHO was heard working  
Carrier Plane Group  
during evening of 22nd and bearings  
place that ship on a line between  
Kagoshima and Harmon.  
(BEL-230715-TI)

It was remarked:

ZUIHO, by T.I., appears to be in  
Sasebo Area.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 13)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1068

ZUIHO believed in Empire. HOSHO at Kure 1800, 21st, by specific traffic routing instructions. KASUGA MARU believed Southbound from Empire.  
(COM-14-230822-TI)

It was observed:

T.I. indicated KASUGA MARU in Saipan Area 21 August.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 14)

No. 1069

No traffic from RYUJO since 24 July.  
(COM-14-230822-TI)

It was stated:

RYUJO has, however, appeared as an addressee up to 14 August, and also at various times up to then was exempted from Collective CARDIV 2 addresses. It was suggested that RYUJO might be in Navy Yard.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 16)

However, enemy dispatches in the late afternoon of August 22 indicated that the Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet was aboard the SHOKAKU accompanying the ZUIKAKU. The fact that Truk reported to Tokyo concerning its inability to relay traffic to the RYUJO

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

probably indicated that all these carriers, plus some plane transports, were en route to the Truk area:

No. 1070

Traffic for SHOKAKU and RYUJO was routed to Truk for delivery by Tokio during afternoon of 22nd. Truk later informed Tokio he was unable deliver traffic to RYUJO. Indications such as this tend to confirm belief these vessels are enroute this area and Tokyo is routing traffic in normal manner.

(BEL-230715-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 27)

No. 1071

CINC 1ST AIR FLEET aboard SHOKAKU and believed in company with ZUIKAKU, are in Truk Area according to traffic routing.  
(COM-14-230822-TI)

It was commented:

The ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU have been silent since 15 August. These carriers are associated with other ships in what appears by T.I. to be a TASK FORCE under CINC 1ST AIR FLEET. Possibility of movement of these ships to the South seems likely because of

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1071 (cont.)

associations of CINC 1ST AIR FLEET with 2ND, 4TH and 8TH FLEET CINCS, and since a small amount of traffic for CINC 1ST AIR FLEET, or members of his staff, was routed to Truk on 22 August, however, traffic was also broadcast for CINC 1ST AIR FLEET from Tokyo on the same date.

(Summary, 231400, August, No. 26)

No. 1072

1ST AIR FLEET Haru is evidently enroute from Kure to Truk and associations suggest units of carrier-based Plane Groups and may be aboard this ship.

(BEL-230739-TI)

(Summary, 231400, August, No. 28)

It was thought that the Japanese Air Squadron Twenty-six was stationed at Kavieng:

No. 1073

Traffic for Staff Communication Officer AIRON 26 is emanating from Rabaul with indications of that command being at Kavieng.

(BEL-230738-TI)

(Summary, 231400, August, No. 38)

Heavy operational traffic in the Yokosuka Defense Force area attracted the attention of American

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

traffic analysts. The KAMIKAWA MARU, which had been located at Yokosuka, now announced its departure for Rabaul. Two air tenders were en route from the Empire to Truk, and another air tender was already in Rabaul. Two other Marus were noticed in this area, together with the AKEBONO MARU, a tanker, slated to refuel warships in that area:

No. 1074

KAMIKAWA MARU at 1500,  
22nd, originated despatch for action  
CINC 11TH AIR FLEET, uniden-  
tified, and information Command-  
ers 8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul  
AIRON 11 and Operations Sec-  
tion Naval General Staff. Further  
confirming indication this vessel will  
shortly depart for Rabaul Area.  
(BEL-230715-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 21)

No. 1075

Large amount operational traffic  
involving YOKOSUKA DEFENSE FORCE Units  
suggests considerable movements in that  
area. Tentative CHITOSE in  
communication these units. KAMIKAWA  
MARU also believed moving from Yokosuka.  
(COM-14-230815-TI)

It was indicated:

KAMIKAWA MARU made apparent movement

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1075 (cont.)

report 22 August, indicating destination Rabaul Area. On 19 August, T.I. indicated possible movement of CHITOSE from Yokosuka Area to Truk. (Summary, 241400, August, No. 22)

No. 1076

KAMIKAWA MARU, at 1600, 22nd, sent typical zone report indicating departure Yokosuka for Rabaul via Chichijima, Saipan and Truk. (COM-14-230824-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 20)

No. 1077

Routing and association indicate:  
DESDIV in Rabaul Area. Auxiliary in Rabaul Area. Airtender in Rabaul. 2ND PATROL FORCE, in Rabaul Area and associated with AKEBONO MARU and DESDIV MARU enroute Truk to Rabaul. (BEL-230800-TI)

It was observed:

is DESDIV 30. Airtender appeared to be transporting part of plane group to the Rabaul Area. On Aug. 21st, Comdr. 2ND PATROL FORCE was indicated by traffic routing and associations as enroute Empire to Saipan. AKEBONO MARU is a tanker which has been indicated as possible

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA  
R.I.P. 300

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1077 (cont.)

fuel ship for DESDIV 30, CRUDIV 6  
and other ships in the Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 18)

No. 1078

Routing and association indicate:  
DESDIV in Palao Area. MARU  
Airtender and enroute  
Empire to Truk via Chichijima and Sai-  
pan. MARU in Truk Area. Comdr.  
SHICHIKU AIR at Truk.  
(BEL-230800-TI)

It was stated:

On Aug. 16th, according to routing and association, the MARU Airtender YUKA 3 was indicated as enroute from Rabaul to Truk. Comdr. SHINCHIKU AIR GROUP was associated with SHOKAKU, SETTSU, Carrier Plane Groups and , and Comdr. BIHORO AIR GROUP, on Aug. 19th, which suggested that some air operations or exercises were involved; the fact that the routing indicated that SHOKAKU and SETTSU were not in company suggests that the operations or exercises have already been completed. Prior to Aug. 19th, Comdr. SHINCHIKU AIR GROUP appeared in the Northern Area.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 7)

A Maru which had been shuttling back and forth between Rabaul and Truk announced its departure for Truk on August 22. Japanese Navy merchant ships were

A

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

accustomed to announced their arrival and departure from various communication zones, and with this information American observers were able to plot their course:

No. 1079

FROM: (A MARU)  
TO : (4TH FLEET)  
(Truk)

"Departed Rabaul for Truk on the 22nd."  
(COM-14-230204-DI)

It was commented:

This MARU left Truk about 14 August and arrived Rabaul at Noon 19 August.  
(Summary, 230600, August, No. 87)

No. 1080

Maru Movements:

<u>Call</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Time</u>
	Jaluit	Truk Zone	1200, 26th
	Rabaul	Truk Zone	0800, 25th
	Jaluit	Truk Zone	2400, 23rd

(COM-14-230815-TI)  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 29)

The presence of the Commander of the First Landing Force was indicated at Palao. The Yokosuka

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

Third Special Landing Force was being sent to Rabaul:

No. 1081

FROM: NUMITI #297 Aug. 10  
Unreadable, but concerns advance of Yokosuka #3 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE to Rabaul.  
(BEL-230305-DI)

It was indicated:

NUMITI appears to be Tokyo Intelligence. DUTCH EAST INDIES FORCE (SUWA 5) serial #406, Aug. 9th, says that the \_\_\_\_\_ MARU carrying the YOKOSUKA #3 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE will depart Ambon for Rabaul about \_\_\_\_\_ (date) (later than Aug. 12th). The 10th BASE FORCE (Ambon) is ordered to provide escort.  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 15)

No. 1082

\*COMDR. 1ST LANDING FORCE at PALAO\* originated despatch to Comdr. MAJOR FORCE in WESTERN SECTOR (ARMY). Despatch intercepted at 1410, 22nd.  
(BEL-230800-TI)  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 9)

Japanese submarines were active in various parts of the Empire. Submarine Division Thirty-three, of Submarine Squadron Seven, was operating



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

in the Solomons area; five units of Submarine Squadrons Five and Eight were based at Saigon, from which a Division of Submarine Squadron Eight had recently departed for the Empire. It seemed certain that all units of Submarine Squadron One were in the Southeast Pacific:

No. 1083

COMSUBDIV indicated remaining in 8TH FLEET Area.  
(COM-14-230824-TI)

It was noticed:

is SUBDIV 33 of SUBRON 7 and while not heard from since 11 August, appeared to operating in the Solomons Area at that time.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 46)

No. 1084

SUBDIV of SUBRON 5, including subs and and SUBDIV of SUBRON 8, including subs and now comprise total of five submarines operating out of Saigon.  
(COM-14-230824-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 47)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1085

All Units of SUBDIV appear to be underway for Empire. ap-  
(COM-14-230824-TI)

It was noted:

SUBDIV is in SUBRON 8 and has been in the Saigon Area according to T.I.  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 48)

No. 1086

COMSUBDIV of SUBRON 1 originated 2 despatches on 23rd, to all major commands interested in 8TH FLEET Area, including COM-SUBDIV, also of SUBRON 1, showing this division probably in that area, and placing all SUBRON 1 units in the SOUTHEASTERN FORCE.  
(COM-14-232026-TI)  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 19)

The Japanese used their submarines in the Southwest Pacific primarily for scouting purposes, and two operational reports from submarines on this day indicated that they were operating according to their usual custom:

No. 1087

8TH BASE FORCE Communication

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1087 (cont.)

Officer at 0945, addressed urgent operational type despatch to all ships within Rabaul Communication Channel. Despatch probably contains information of enemy submarine sighting in Rabaul Area.  
(BEL-230800-TI)  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 11)

No. 1088

Another origin on Submarine frequency 13220 sent an operational code at 23/1030, 2 addressed Chiefs of Staff COMBINED, 2ND, 1ST AIR FLEETS, 8TH FLEET, 11TH AIR FLEET, Comdr. 5TH AIR ATTACK CORPS., SUBRON 1, 6TH AIR ATTACK CORPS.; info Southeastern SUBFORCE Collective HON 4. Latter placed by DF, 2 station cut, at 0615/23rd, was 06° South, 164° East. This may have been a sighting or intelligence report.  
(COM-14-232022-TI)  
(Summary, 240600, August, No. 20)

An important dispatch from the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force was addressed to almost all the units which were either at or destined to be in the Rabaul area:

No. 1089

At 23/1200, COMSUBFORCE under call

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1089 (cont)

originated 2 fairly long despatches, action COMDESRON 7 (believe should be COMSUBRON 7 who is operating in Rabaul area according available R.I.) and SOUTHEASTERN SUBMARINES info CINCSOBBINED, 2nd, 1ST AIR, 11TH AIR, and 8TH FLEETS, Commanders 4TH, 5TH, 6TH, and 8TH AIR ATTACK CORPS., and COMDESRON 2. A bearing fix on this transmission placed it near or at Saipan. List of addressees comprises nearly all units in or shortly destined Rabaul Area including Destroyers and DESDIV less , COMSUBDIV and Destroyer (COM-14-232022-232024-TI)

It was declared:

DESRONS 2 and 7 appear in the Solomon-New Britain Area. There have been no previous indications of an 8TH AIR ATTACK FORCE. The 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE normally operates in the Mandate Island Area, but some of the units of this attack force are currently reinforcing the 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE in the Rabaul Area. Likewise, the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE normally operates in the Empire-Northern Areas, but some of the units of this attack force are also in the Rabaul Area. Commander of the 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE appears at Tenian. (Summary, 240600, August, No. 21)

Evidence that Japanese espionage agents were

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

still at work in the United States was contained in  
the following dispatches:

No. 1090

FROM: Madrid (Suma) #907 20 August 1942  
TO : Tokyo

Strictly secret — To Intelligence —  
Dispatched from New York on August 14.

1. According to secret information from Los Angeles, on August 11, a convoy of 9 ships took on a cargo of all equipment needed for making a landing in the face of the enemy, and sailed for Australia. A convoy of 11 ships also arrived from Australia, and in addition to a cargo of foodstuffs, brought sick and wounded soldiers from New Zealand. Many of the sufferers had died during the homeward voyage due to the (roughness ?) of the crossing.

2. Another convoy of 24 ships carrying cargoes totalling 55,000 tons arrived at Los Angeles. It is thought that both of the above convoys had joined to form one large convoy during the voyage from Australia.

This has been transmitted to Berlin and to Rome.

(GZ#6057-JAP DIP-OPNAV 231820-TI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 5)

No. 1091

FROM: Madrid #908 20 August 1942  
TO : Tokyo

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1091 (cont.)

Strictly secret -- To Intelligence -- Dispatched from New York on August 14th.

1. Rumors are being circulated to the effect that if the American troops which landed in the Solomon Islands can hold on there for another month, they will then be supported by powerful reinforcements.

2. I had dinner today with a certain official, who shall be nameless; and he told me that a combined fleet was now being assembled for the purpose of recapturing Timor and then proceeding on to attack the Solomons. He said it would be necessary for the American air forces constantly to challenge the Japanese air force at both Timor and the Solomons, but that the high American military authorities considered the Japanese air force very much inferior to the American, and were confident of complete victory if only the American air forces could maintain contact with the enemy.

3. The same person told me that very powerful forces were now being gathered to go to India, also for the purpose of conquering Burma, Thailand, and the Malacca (Malay?) Peninsula; and that at the latest, these forces would be on their way by October. He also said that first of all a huge air offensive (would be carried out and that this?)<sup>a</sup> would be followed by an attack by armored troops.

a - One line missing at this point, but context indicates above meaning.

(GZ#6060-JAP DIP-OPNAV-231420-DI)  
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 7)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1092

No. 1093

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence  
Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on  
23 August 1942 stated:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1942

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1094

GENERAL

Further indications that CarDiv 1 is approaching TRUK are noted. There are also indications that the RYUJO may be included in this force. It is believed that this force will enter TRUK and anchor. CarDiv 2 although active has entered EMPIRE ports and there are no indications of a move to the South for this force.

It is believed that another and heavier landing will be attempted by Orange in the GUADALCANAL area within the next twelve hours. This force apparently consists of 2 CA, 5 DD, 4 AP and 2 AK.

The bombing of OCEAN ISLAND by nine planes and shelling by two unidentified surface vessels may be a move by Orange to attempt to divert some of our strength in the S.E. area away from the SOLOMONS. This conclusion is drawn because of the relative strategic unimportance of this island at this time.

Heavy reinforcements of planes transported by AV's and XAV's to the TRUK-RABAUL area continues.

PALAO has been more active during the last two weeks than it has been for several months. This probably is caused by the movement, which is still continuing, of troops from DAVAO to the RABAUL area.

Subron 1 has arrived in the 8th Fleet area. The KAKO of CruDiv 6 was sunk August 10th.

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on 23 August 1942 read as follows:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1095

FROM: CINCPAC 230345 August 1942  
TO : COMINCH  
COMSOPACFOR  
COMSWPACFOR  
ALL TASKFORCOMSPAC  
COMPASEAFRON  
COMHAWSEAFRON  
COMWESTSEAFRON  
COMNOWESTSEAFRON  
OPNAV  
COMNAVEU

Bulletin No. 160 NCR 1103 J

Disposition of Carriers.

SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU enroute Japan to Truk. Possible HITAKA, HAYATAKA, ZUIHO may depart Empire for Truk shortly. Estimate RYUJO in home yard. HOSHO in Honshu waters. KASUGA MARU enroute Truk. Detachment Kisaratsu Air Group at Kavieng. CHIKUMA in Truk area.

Possibly 2 battleships BATDIV 3 also in vicinity Truk. COMSUBFOR nearing Truk. Air tender KAGU MARU may depart Truk for New Britain near future. FUJIKAWA MARU heading south from Japan.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons continued on this day, but the usual communication intelligence available on this day will be discussed first.

Enemy radio traffic was very heavy. It was noted that a new type of call was being used by Japanese ships operating in the New Britain area:

No. 1096

Traffic volume in general heavy with more wide-spread use of 3-Kana calls. No material changes noted in unit locations. (COM 14-240742-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 3)

No. 1097

The new type 3-Kana calls continue to be used extensively by Units involved in current operations New Britain Area. Research indicates each unit has several alternates and possibly that a strip cipher arrangement, based on time of origin, is being employed to make up calls. (BEL 240744-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 4)

No. 1098

3-kana calls were used in headings of resulting high precedence traffic. (COM 14-242008-TI) (Summary, 250600, August, No. 20)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

A new enemy transmitter near New Britain was located by direction finding:

No. 1099

6346 kilocycles has been used by Palao to Bases in East Indies. However, at 0740, 24 August, a D/F plot of unknown transmitter on 6350 kcs. centered near New Britain. (GT #751-OPNAV 242120-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 10)

There were several indications that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was at sea:

No. 1100

Short operating signal noted from tentative COMBINED FLEET to 1ST AIR FLEET Maru Tender instructing that vessel to set watch on "O" (unknown frequency but an indicator previously used by COMBINED FLEET). This, plus instances of traffic for Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET being routed to Truk by Tokio, taken as some indication CINC COMBINED at sea. Many instances noted of traffic for CINC COMBINED being sent on Truk broadcast, but this not considered particularly indicative since traffic frequently delivered to Tokio on this circuit, normal procedure being to call Tokio and SOUTHERN FORCES and deliver to both simultaneously. Tokio was not called today, however, possibly through operators error. (BEL 240702-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1100 (Cont.)

It was observed:

is identified by OPNAV as COMBINED  
FLEET. (Summary, 241400, August, No. 7)

No. 1101

One instance noted where Saipan re-  
layed message to Truk for delivery to CINC  
COMBINED FLEET. (Com 14-240744-TI)

It was remarked:

There have been slight indications  
that CINC COMBINED FLEET might be out of  
Empire waters but this has not been con-  
firmed. (Summary, 241400, August, No. 6)

No. 1102

CINC COMBINED FLEET addressed Op Code  
to CINC 11TH AIR FLEET, information CINCs  
2ND, 1ST AIR, SUB, and 8TH FLEETS, Com-  
manders 4TH, 5TH, and 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCES.  
This message was delivered to Truk  
and COMBINED FLEET Collective by  
concealed transmitter who signed  
COMBINED FLEET call at end of  
transmission. Frequency measured as 6346.  
(GT #748-OPNAV 241412-TI) (Summary,  
241400, August, No. 8)

No. 1103

Traffic originated in Tokyo is being

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1103 (Cont.)

delivered to Truk by unknown transmitter on 6346 kcs., addressed to CINC COMBINED and CINC 1ST AIR FLEET, at 1900, 24 August. (GT #749-OPNAV 242120-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 9)

No. 1104

Tokio continues to route traffic for CINC 2ND FLEET and Commander 1ST AIR FLEET to Truk for delivery. (BEL 240702-TI)

It was noted:

OPNAV identified \_\_\_\_\_ as COMBINED FLEET. (Summary, 241400, August, No. 24)

No. 1105

FROM: Unidentified transmitter on 6346 kcs., at 1746, 24 August

TO : \_\_\_\_\_  
(CRUDIV 5)  
(CRUDIV 6)  
(CRUDIV 7)  
(CRUDIV 8)  
(DESRON 4)  
(DESRON 10)  
(DESDIV 30)  
(Rabaul Radio)  
(1ST AIR FLEET)  
(8TH FLEET)  
(COMBINED FLEET)  
(11TH AIR FLEET)  
(Unidentified Fleet Unit)  
(Unidentified Fleet Unit)

781

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1105 (Cont.)

On this call-up, a message from unidentified was transmitted addressed to all commands called, the Fleet CinCs being addressed for information, and naval General Staff added as an information addressee. Message is a 2-part Operational Code. Believe this is action report. (GT #750-OPNAV 242120-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 31)

An unidentified man-of-war appeared to be sailing from Ominato to Maizuru. It was believed that some of the units of Battleship Division Three were not in company with the First Air Fleet staff, but, the battleship KONGO was thought to be proceeding to Rabaul, although no definite information as to its whereabouts, or that of the battleship KIRISHIMA had been received:

No. 1106

Traffic headings and routing indicates:  
Man-of-War probably enroute  
Ominato to Maizuru. (BEL 240744-TI)  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 8)

No. 1107

Tokyo Personnel addressed Secretary  
1ST AIR FLEET, unidentified and

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1107 (Cont.)

and was relayed to BATDIV 3  
indicating BATDIV 3 not in  
company with 1ST AIR FLEET Staff.  
(COM 14-240742-TI)

It was stated:

is a Major Command Shore Sta-  
tion call, but is not yet identified for  
the current period. is believed  
to mean Flag Secretary. is not  
identified definitely, however, BELCONNEN  
suggests that it may mean "1st Section."  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 12)

No. 1108

Indications that air forces in Rabaul  
Area are being reinforced. The Japs BB  
KONGO believed proceeding to Rabaul Area.  
(CINC EF 1201z/24 Serial #16)

It was explained:

No definite information has been re-  
ceived that the KONGO is approaching Rabaul,  
however it has been associated in traffic  
with the ZUIKAKU, KASUGA MARU, MYOKO, MAYA  
and TAKAO, all of which are believed in the  
Truk-Rabaul Area.  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 16)

No. 1109

Another personnel despatch from Sasebo  
sent to KIRISHIMA , SENDAI ,

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1109 (Cont.)

ABUKUMA and HITAKA with  
delivery effected to all by Tokyo broad-  
cast. (COM 14-240744-TI)

It was declared:

TI has indicated the SENDAI was in the  
Malay area, the ABUKUMA was in the Ominato-  
Kurile Area August 11 while the HITAKA (in  
CARDIV 2) is in Southern Jap waters. No  
indication of the KIRISHIMA being away from  
Japan has been received although it has  
been closely connected with some ships in  
the Truk-Rabaul Area. (Summary, 241400,  
August, No. 11)

Much urgent operational traffic was being  
transmitted by the Commander of the Sasebo #5 Special  
Landing Force at Buna and by enemy forces at Lunga  
on Guadalcanal Island. Strangely enough, it appeared  
that there were two radio stations on Guadalcanal  
which, though not in communication with each other,  
could operate through Rabaul:

No. 1110

Commander SASEBO #5 SPECIAL LANDING  
FORCE at Buna. and Lunga (Guadal-  
canal) using call were active orig-  
inators of High Precedence operational



ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1110 (Cont.)

traffic throughout the 23rd.  
(BEL 240716-TI) (Summary, 241400, August,  
No. 36)

No. 1111

Guadalcanal(?) addressed  
short Op Code to IKKI Detachment in care  
Guadalcanal ), at 1400, 23 August.  
Only explanation of this is that there are  
two radios on Guadalcanal which are not in  
communication with each other but can work  
through Rabaul. (GT #748-OPNAV 241412-TI).  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 35)

The Supply Officer of the Kure #5 Special  
Landing Force was aboard a Maru in the Truk-Rabaul  
area, the Commander of the Kawaguti Detachment was at  
Rabaul, the Commander of the First Landing Force was  
at Palao, and a new enemy base force was established  
at Makin:

No. 1112

Supply Officer of KURE #5 SPECIAL LAND-  
ING FORCE was shown aboard Maru  
at 0735, 23rd. No indication of  
exact location but in Truk-Rabaul Area.  
(BEL 240716-TI) (Summary, 241400, August,  
No. 37)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1113

Comdr. of KAWAGUTI DETACHMENT appeared as enciphered addressee on Army traffic. This Detachment at Rabaul and associated with Comdr. #1 LANDING FORCE at Palao. (BEL 240728-TI) (Summary, 250600, August, No. 32)

No. 1114

(Unidentified) followed by "Makin" may be new base activity set up at that place associated in traffic with 6TH BASE FORCE, 6TH DEFENSE FORCE, Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET, 14TH and 19TH AIR, CHITOSE AIR and (YOKA 3) of MINESWEEP DIVISION #16. (COM 14-240744-TI)

It was noted:

The 6TH BASE FORCE, CHITOSE AIR, 14TH and 19TH AIR GROUPS are in the Marshalls. (Summary, 241400, August, No. 28)

A dispatch addressed to all the Commanders in Chief of the Kago Operations Force proved that several enemy fleets were combined under this one title:

No. 1115

All CINCs "KAGO OPERATIONS FORCE" noted, indicating this force includes several Fleets.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1115 (Cont.)

(GT #748-OPNAV 241412-TI) (Summary,  
241400, August, No. 23)

It was rather definitely determined that Cruiser Division Eight had been assigned to operate with the First Air Fleet in the Rabaul area. The MAYA, a unit of Cruiser Division Four, was noted in the vicinity of Truk on August 22:

No. 1116

Association of CRUDIV 8 and  
Commander 1ST AIR FLEET in despatch  
from Naval Secretary may be taken  
as confirmation that CRUDIV 8 now assigned  
to operate with 1ST AIR FLEET. CHIKUMA  
of CRUDIV 8 and Kure Navy Yard Dry-  
docks Section included as addressees  
which suggests arrangements for docking the  
CHIKUMA at Kure or may refer to docking  
previously carried out. (BEL-240702-TI)

It was indicated:

CHIKUMA appeared by traffic routing to  
be in Truk Area on 21-22 August.  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 25)

No. 1117

(CA in CRUDIV 4) worked Truk

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1117 (Cont.)

Radio ( ) on 6085 Kcs.  
(COM 14-240744-TI)

It was commented:

is believed to be the MAYA and  
was noted in Truk area 22 August.  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 26)

Many urgent dispatches were concerned with the operations of Destroyer Division Thirty in the Eighth Fleet area on August 24. Destroyer Squadron Three was also quite active in this region, and the SUMOSA was located at 166° E. 07° S.

No. 1118

Many URGENT despatches, mostly concerned with DESDIV noted in 8TH FLEET Area, also High Precedence utilized in dissemination despatches from Guadalcanal Radio addressed to Major Commanders previously listed. (COM 14-240742-TI)

It was pointed out:

is DESDIV 30. Forces to which messages from Guadalcanal have been re-transmitted include Commanders (sometimes Chiefs of Staff) 2ND, 4TH, 8TH and COMBINED FLEET, 1ST AIR FLEET, SUBFORCE, 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE and the Naval General Staff.  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 32)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1119

DESDIV 30 appears to be escorting convoy into 8TH FLEET Area. (COM 14-242008-TI)

It was observed:

See inclusion in message from above. This Unit was concerned in many urgent despatches in 8TH FLEET Area on 24 August. (Summary, 250600, August, No. 7)

No. 1120

DESRON 3 becoming more prominent in 8TH FLEET operations. (COM 14-240744-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 33)

No. 1121

SUMOSA at 166 East, 07 South. (COM 14-242014-TI) (Summary, 250600, August, No. 24)

There was considerable carrier radio traffic, some of which indicated that the ZUIHO was not in company with the HAYATAKA and the HITAKA:

No. 1122

Considerable activity on 7122 kcs concurrently with activity on 6685. Only tactical traffic going from KOUTO and WISOTI to apparently more carrier activity. (COM 14-242014-TI) (Summary, 250600, August, No. 3)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1123

Two despatches today indicated the ZUIHO is not in company with HAYATAKA and HITAKA. Message from Plane Group RIA 3, to Communication Officer CARDIV 2, information ZUIHO, HITAKA and HAYATAKA with prior delivery shown to latter two carriers. (COM 14-240742-TI) (Summary, 241400, August, No. 19)

It was believed that the Sixth Air Attack Corps was either operating in the Solomons, or would be there very shortly. The Commander of the Shinchiku Air Group was believed to be at Truk:

No. 1124

Comdr 6TH AIR ATTACK \_\_\_\_\_ and Detachment appear at \_\_\_\_\_ in Truk Area. Detachment KISARATSU AIR at Kavieng. (COM 14-242012-TI)

It was remarked:

TI on 21 August suggested that Units of KISARATSU and MISAWA AIR may be ferried to Kavieng via Truk. (Summary, 250600, August, No. 30)

No. 1125

5TH and 6TH AIR ATTACK GROUPS, DESRON 2 Command, 1ST AIR and 11TH AIR FLEETS associated DESDIV 30 operations. (COM 14-242012-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1125 (Cont.)

It was stated:

is believed to mean  
Commanding Officer NUBA, but unable to  
locate "NUBA" which may be an abbreviated  
name for a place. Traffic routing on 23  
August indicated DESDIV 30 (ORI 3) in  
Rabaul Area. (Summary, 250600, August,  
No. 31)

No. 1126

24 August/1030  
FROM: (Comdr 6TH AIR ATTACK CORPS)  
TO : (Guadalcanal)

In operations code. Believed indica-  
tion this Air outfit will operate in  
Solomons or already there.  
(COM 14-242136-TI)

It was explained:

On August 18 was indicated at  
Tenian, by TI.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 29)

No. 1127

Traffic headings and routing indicates:  
Commander SHINCHIKU AIR GROUP  
at Truk. Maru enroute Jaluit to  
Yokosuka via Chichijima. (BEL 240744-TI)  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 17)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis indicated the possibility that the RYUJO was in the Solomons area, and there were definite indications that an enemy carrier, SEKETE, had come into contact with American carriers and was homing lost planes. Its location was estimated to be at 160° East, 10° South on a bearing 237° from Oahu:

No. 1128

RYUJO info addressed from unknown origin to Comdr 8TH BASE FORCE and possible Destroyer or Salvage Ship RYUJO may be in Solomons Area.  
(COM 14-242012-TI)

It was declared:

was by D/F on 16 August in 01°N, 147°E. On 9 August this call reported to Chief of Staff 8TH FLEET and 8TH BASE FORCE at Rabaul scheduled to arrive 1730. (Summary, 250600, August, No. 27)

No. 1129

RYUJO and Rabaul Radio being worked by unidentified on 5591 kcs measured at 0400, 25th. COMBINED FLEET and FIRST AIR FLEET collectives also called on this frequency. RYUJO being addressed in care of 8TH FLEET  
(BEL 242300-TI) (MEMO #24-2)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1129 (Cont.)

It was noted:

COM 14 on 24 August stated, "RYUJO information addressed from unknown origin to Comdr 8TH BASE FORCE and possible Destroyer or Salvage Ship RYUJO may be in Solomons Area".  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 26)

No. 1130

Enemy carrier active on 6685 kcs. with planes since 1520. Contact with our carriers, and homing lost planes. Several planes involved. bearing 237 from Oahu appears to use other calls; and possibly additional carrier. URGENT traffic indicated only by absence of word count; consists of 4-Kana despatches except for one or two contact abbreviations.  
(COM 14-241432-TI) (MEMO #24-1)  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 30)

No. 1131

Contact traffic intercepted from 1500, 24th on old CARDIV 2 channel 6686 kcs. Several planes and suspected carrier using 3-kana in lower Solomons by D/F.  
(COM 14-242008-TI)

It was indicated:

A more detailed despatch relative to this appeared in RI Summary 241400/C August, page 11, item 30.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1131 (Cont.)

(See Also #23 below.)  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 25)

No. 1132

at 160 East, 10 South.  
(COM 14-242014-TI)

It was commented:

COM 14 calls an enemy carrier which on 24 August was active on 6685 kcs with planes since 1520, contact with our Carriers and homing lost planes. This call bore 237 from Oahu. Appears to use other calls: and possibly additional carrier.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 23)

That Japanese planes had been in contact with Allied forces was evident in enemy aircraft radio traffic. Some planes were requesting American positions and later their requests for bearings from their own carrier were intercepted:

No. 1133

At 1557 Plane requested position of enemy. At 1826 Plane and at 1927 Plane asked Carrier for searchlight.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1133 (Cont.)

Between 1906 and 2011 received  
bearings from Carrier. (COM 14-242008-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 13 August (14TH AIR GROUP)  
sent to AIRONS 24 and 25 (4TH and 5TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCES), "In accordance with 4TH AIR  
ATTACK FORCE Radio Order #\_\_\_3 flying boats  
of this Force are scheduled to leave Imieji  
for Rabaul \_\_\_ hours 15th using call signs  
and \_\_\_ respectively."  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 28)

Some doubt as to the exact location of the  
AKASHI, a repair ship, was expressed at this time,  
since certain associations indicated that it could  
be either near Truk or en route to Singapore. The  
KANIGAWA MARU was sailing from the Empire to Rabaul  
from which a fleet tanker had recently departed for  
Kure. The tanker SHIRETOKO was moving from Ominato  
to Truk via Yokosuka, and it was believed that its  
final destination would be in the Marshall Islands.  
Three other Marus were associated with this area.  
The tanker HAYATOMO and the KASUGA MARU, used to ferry  
planes, were southbound from the Empire to Truk.

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

Several other Marus were noticed in the region of  
Rabaul:

No. 1134

Traffic routing suggests AKASHI  
still in Truk Area, although that vessel  
from other indications recently arrive  
Kure. This probably error in routing.  
(BEL 240728-TI)

It was observed:

On Aug. 21st, there were indications  
that AKASHI may have departed Empire for  
Saigon-Singapore Area.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 18)

No. 1135

Movement of KAMIGAWA MARU  
from Yokosuka to Rabaul via Chichijima,  
Saipan and Truk, indicated by heading of  
Communication Zone report at 1600, 22nd.  
(BEL 240728-TI) (Summary, 250600, August,  
No. 21)

No. 1136

Traffic headings and routing indi-  
cates:

Marus            and            probably Kure  
Area. Maru        in Yokosuka Area.  
(BEL 240744-TI)

It was remarked:

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1136 (Cont.)

is identified as a fleet tanker and T.I. indicated it to be in Rabaul Area 18 August and enroute to Truk 19 August. (Summary, 250600, August, No. 12)

No. 1137

SHIRETOKO sent movement report at 0615, 23rd, which appears to be report of arrival at Yokosuka. Despatch addressed TO : \_\_\_\_\_ (CINC 4TH FLEET)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Movement Report Office)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Yokosuka Commandant)  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_ (Comdr. 6TH BASE FORCE at Jaluit)

This vessel sent Communication Zone report on 20th, which indicated movement from Ominato to Truk via Yokosuka. Heading above suggests final destination may be Marshall Area. (REL 240728-TI)

It was stated:

SHIRETOKO is a Tanker.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 19)

No. 1138

Makin and associated Marshall Air Units. (COM 14-242008-TI)

It was explained:

TI on 24 August indicated followed by Makin might be new base

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1138 (Cont.)

activity at that place, was associated in traffic with 6TH BASE FORCE, 6TH DEFENSE FORCE, Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET. 14TH and 19TH AIR, CHITOSE AIR, and of MINE-SWEEP DIV 16.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 16)

No. 1139

HAYATOMO appears scheduled depart Empire for Truk at 1358, 22nd, addressed Truk Harbor Master TRUK BASE FORCE, Commander 2ND ESCORT FORCE and Kure Home Defense Guard, information Chief of Staff COMBINED FLEET, 4TH FLEET Chief of Staff Kure Defense Patrol Bungo Channel and SAIPAN BASE FORCE Point of departure apparently Kure, passing through Saipan Area enroute. (BEL 240716-TI)  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 27)

No. 1140

KASUGA MARU about to depart Empire for Truk Area. (COM 14-242014-TI)

It was declared:

Traffic routing on August 21 indicated this vessel in Empire and on same date was believed southbound from Empire.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 15)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1141

Traffic headings and routing indicates:

Communication Officer 11TH AIR FLEET  
at Rabaul Air Station

Maru Airtender in Rabaul Area.

Staff Communication Officer AIRON 26  
at Rabaul.

Maru shown at Makassar ).

KAGU MARU in communication

with AIRON 25 at Rabaul.

Maru scheduled shift from Rabaul  
to Truk Communication Zone at 0800, 25th.  
(BEL 240744-TI)

It was noted:

Air Tender was shown by D.I.  
on 13 August as being scheduled to depart  
from the Rabaul Area on the 13th and pro-  
ceed to the Empire.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 33)

An enemy submarine was located at 166° East,  
09° South by Allied direction finders:

No. 1142

Jap Sub indicated posit 166 East, 09  
South at 1916Z, 24th. This a two station  
fix on 13220 kcs. (COM 14-242152-TI)  
(MEMO #24-2) (Summary, 250600, August,  
No. 35)

Japanese espionage agents in the United States,  
working through Spanish lines of communication, kept

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

Tokyo well informed of the movements of United States convoys and warships. A steady stream of intelligence was passed along from New York to Tokyo via Madrid:

No. 1143

FROM: Madrid (SUMA), Message to Tokyo #909;  
TO : Berlin August 20  
Strictly Secret

"To" Intelligence (New York, August 16, 1942).

1. According to reports emanating from the Navy Department, 163,000 tons of cargo consisting mainly of coast guns and landing barges have arrived in Australia. The convoy made up of several aircraft carriers and submarines negotiated the passage safely without detection by the enemy.

2. On the 10th, four ships (respectively 9,700, 6,890, 4,595 and 4,000 tons) sailed from New Orleans for Panama. These were loaded with long range Navy seaplanes.

Relayed to Berlin.  
(GZ?Jap. Dip. #6071 - DI)  
(Summary, 241400, August, No. 13)

A comment in the Traffic Intelligence Summary of the Combat Intelligence Unit of the Fourteenth Naval District issued on the evening of August 24, 1942 is worthy of repetition:



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1144

"Success of a large task force including carriers in reaching the Solomons without detection by R.I. indicates that radio security practices of the Japs are effective insofar as concealing actual movements is concerned.

"R.I. was able to detect formation of forces concerned in the Coral sea engagement and make a general estimate of their movements from the Empire southward. Also the formation of the Midway Striking and Occupation Forces whose associations with the Marshalls gave a hint as to direction of operations.

"In the same manner, association of the RYUJO and HAYATAKA, NACHI and others with the Fifth Fleet and Northern area suggested their campaign against the Aleutians, and associations of combatant units with the Second Fleet and First Air Fleet indicated formation of task forces for the present operations on 11 August.

"Appearance of First Air and Second Fleets in the Jaluit/Rabaul R.I. traffic on the 21st would now seem to have indicated that they were actually entering the operating area, rather than preliminary to movement."

The Summary issued by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet on August 24, 1942 stated:

No. 1145

"GENERAL

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1145 (Cont.)

\*The RYUJO has been sighted and this was subsequently verified by combat intelligence when that carrier was definitely identified probably as a result of the attack carried out against her by our forces. The other two CVs in the area are the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU. From all appearances an aerial attack will be carried out against our holdings in TULAGI-GUADALCANAL at daybreak followed by an attempted landing.

\*Following the engagement of last evening, the enemy experienced considerable difficulty in recovering her aircraft. D/F bearings were obtained from this area, but the lines were too nearly parallel to be of use.

\*Cinc COMBINED FLEET appears to be at sea. He is not definitely located but there are slight indications he may be proceeding to TRUK.

\*Radio communications are believed to have been reestablished at WAKIN.

\*CARRIERS

SHOKAKU	- SOLOMONS
ZUIKAKU	- SOLOMONS
RYUJO	- Possibly SOLOMONS
HITAKA	- KURE, ready for sea.
HAYATAKA	- KURE, ready for sea.
ZUIHO	- SASEBO, ready for sea.
HOSHO	- KURE.
KASUGA MARU	- nearing TRUK, enroute South.

\*SUBMARINES

\*Considerable submarine activity in SOLOMONS area but no crosses.

\*Part of SUBRON THREE is believed to have returned home from the EIGHTH FLEET area.\*

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 24, 1942 (Continued)

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on August 24, 1942 read as follows:

No. 1146

FROM: Cincpac (NERK) 240224, August 1942  
TO : Comsowespac  
Cominch  
Comnaveu  
Opnav

NCR 1596 J

Bulletin No. 161

Takao in Truk area. 1 division each from Subrons 5 and 8 in Saigon area. By DF submarines East and South 158 and 2. 161 and 4. 164 and 6. 156 and 3. 173 East 10 North. SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU Truk area. KASUGA enroute south with plane reinforcements. All other carriers believed home waters. KAMIKAWA MARU 2 days out of Japan for Rabaul via Truk. One unit Crudiv 6 possibly KAKO sunk by American sub.

---

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942

Enemy operational traffic in the Solomon Islands area was very heavy on this day. Some units of the Kagou Operation Force were in the Palao area. It was thought that the call sign of the Commander of the Makin Relief Force had been discovered, and it appeared that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was originating some of the operational dispatches which were addressed to major air and fleet commanders in the southern area.

No. 1147

Operational traffic out of Solomons Area heavy, but no urgent or abbreviated texts intercepted.  
(COM-14-250600-TI)  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 12)

No. 1148

A despatch transmitted from Palao to Truk to KAGOU SAKUSEN BUTAI indicates some units of this TASK FORCE in Palao Area.  
(COM-14-250636-TI)

It was noted:

KAGOU SAKUSEN BUTAI means KAGOU OPERATIONS FORCE and is believed to include several Fleets.  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 10)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1149

Comdr unidentified is shown at Makin. Appearance in current traffic of enciphered Comdr Makin Relief Force suggests the call may be assigned to that Relief Force.  
(BEL-250732-TI)

It was indicated:

TI on 24 August stated (unidentified) followed by "Makin" may be new base activity set up at that place associated in traffic with 6TH BASE FORCE, 6TH DEFENSE FORCE, Chief of Staff 4TH FLEET, 14TH and 19TH AIF, CHITOSE AIR and of MINESWEEP DIVISION #16.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 16)

No. 1150

CinC COMBINED FLEET originated several operational type despatches addressed to Major Air and Fleet Commanders currently associated with activities in Southern Area. Tokyo continues route traffic for CinC COMBINED FLEET to Truk for delivery tending confirm Southward movement.  
(BEL-250715-TI)

It was commented:

One operational type was noted yesterday falling into same addressee classification. The message was delivered to Truk by concealed originator who signed COMBINED FLEET Call at end of transmission.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 22)

805

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1151

Concealed originator using cover call - originated Comm Zone Report at 1635, 24th routing of which indicates originator to be COMBINED FLEET ship or unit and enroute from Truk to Rabaul.  
(BEL-250715-TI)  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 44)

One operational dispatch was addressed to most of the enemy units concerned with defending the South Pacific from the American invaders.

No. 1152

A 2-part operational code despatch originated by unidentified (which may be call for a section of BATDIV 3) at 24/1640 went to collective CRUDIVS 5, 6, 7, and 8, DESPONS 4 and 10, Commanders-in-Chief 1ST AIR FLEET, and 8TH FLEET, plus unidentified combatant calls and collective ; info CINC COMBINED and 11TH AIR FLEETS, Navy General Staff, and (COMDESDIV 30).  
(COM-14-250608-TI)

It was remarked:

CRUDIV 6 has been in the Solomons area since before the U. S. Operations began. These same units, as above, have appeared in messages at 1746, Aug. 24th, and at 0227, Aug. 25th, originated by

(Summary, 251400, August, No. 15)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

Announcement was made by the British that a tremendous Japanese striking force had left its home waters for the Mandates and New Guinea area. However, there were still many signs indicating the presence of Japanese battleships in their home waters.

No. 1153

A despatch at 1015/24, serial 024 addressed (KIFISHIMA), KYUSHU PATROL, and (KANOYA AIR) which fits the (HIEI) series well and appears to place these battleships still in the Empire.  
(COM-14-250632-TI)  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 7)

No. 1154

Two or possibly 3 BBs, 2 Carriers, 1 converted Carrier, 5 heavy cruisers including HAGURO and MYOKO, 1 light cruiser, 3 seaplane carriers and unknown number of destroyers have left home waters for Mandated and New Guinea Area.  
(CINC EF-0954Z/25)

It was observed:

Since both the HAGURO and MYOKO were believed in Truk Area 21 August, it is believed this has reference to the carriers SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO plus CRUDIVS 4 and 5.  
(Summary, 261400, August, No. 25)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1155

Five or possibly 6 heavy cruisers,  
2 seaplane carriers and an unknown num-  
ber of DDs have moved from Malaya and  
East Indies Area to Mandated and New  
Guinea Area.  
(CINC EF-0954Z/25)

It was pointed out:

CRUDIV 7, divisions of DESRONS 2 and  
3 as well as 4 are the only units believed  
to have gone to Rabaul Area from Malay.  
(Summary, 261400, August, No. 30)

The organization of two sections of Cruiser  
Division Sixteen was now furnished to United States  
Naval operational authorities, as was some information  
concerning Cruiser Division Six and Destroyer Squadron  
Two.

No. 1156

Research indicated below discloses  
existence of CRUDIV 16 with calls  
and \_\_\_\_\_ and consisting of:

<u>1st Section</u>	<u>2nd Section</u>
NATOFI _____	KINU
ISUZU	

Although \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ are our  
longtime DESRON 5, believe that  
serial 056 of 10 April and \_\_\_\_\_ serial  
302 of 27 May are conclusive proof of  
correctness of above. The first serial  
gives ships in organization, but title is



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1156 (Cont.)

in single code group and  
unrecoverable. The other serial, how-  
ever, reveals it to be 16 S, i.e. 16  
or 16th Division. Names of  
ships are taken from generally accep-  
ted version of 1941 organization and  
are subject to its inaccuracies. Thus,  
the names may not be exact, but they  
are the same ships shown in the 1941  
organization as the flagships of DES-  
RON 5, SUBRON 3 and SUBRON 6. COMCRU-  
DIV 16 and is also  
Commander East Indies SCREENING FORCE  
which ac-  
counts for his many associations with  
known destroyers and DESDIVS.

This was sent out on 25 August  
and COM 14 and BELCONWEN Units were  
asked to check the above and comment.  
Since no indications of disagreement  
have been noted and since COM 14 has  
referred to the "KINU in CRUDIV 16",  
it may be assumed that the above or-  
ganization is correct.

(GZ Organization Bull #6 -OPNAV-251742-  
TUNA - TI)

(Summary, 011400, September, No. 5)

No. 1157

KAGU MARU operating with  
CRUDIV 6 and MARU SOU 6. DESRON 2  
associated KAGU MARU, CRUDIV 8 and  
Comdr 1ST AIR FLEET. Possibly furnish-  
ing destroyers to carrier as well as  
KAGU MARU

(COM-14-251932-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1157 (Cont.)

It was declared:

KAGU MAFU was in communication with 5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE at Rabaul on 24 August.

MAFU on 16 August was believed to be enroute Sasebo to Rabaul via Truk.

TI on 22 August stated COMDESRON 2 and CRUDIV 6 both frequently addressed by 8TH FLEET but seem to come under 11TH AIR FLEET for operations. (Summary, 260600, August, No. 45)

The administrative organization of Carrier Divisions One and Two was also outlined at this time. The RYUJO was in the vicinity of Rabaul, and though it belonged to Carrier Division Two for administrative purposes, it was operating with Carrier Division One.

No. 1158

Reference RI Summary 230600/Q August, Item 28  
PI Summary 240600/Q August, Item 4

It appears to GZ that as late as 15 August, the Administrative Organization of CARDIVS 1 and 2 was as follows:

CARDIV 1	:	CARDIV 2
SHOKAKU	:	RYUJO

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1158 (Cont.)

ZUIKAKU : HITAKA  
ZUIHO \* : HAYATAKA

RYUJO, however was operating with SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU, while ZUIHO was operating with HITAKA and HAYATAKA.

\* ZUIHO may not be in CAPDIV 1 (although staff officer of occasionally shows on her), but is certainly not in CARDIV 2.

(GA MEMO-DI)

(Summary, 250600, August, No. 1)

No. 1159

One from (Yokosuka Air) at 24/1605, addressed (a carrier Plane Group); info (ZUIHO), and (Staff Comm. Officer CARDIV 2) was delivered by Tokyo Broadcast and give no clue to location.

(COM-14-250632-TI)

(Summary, 251400, August, No. 6)

No. 1160

RYUJO now apparently in Southern Area and one instance was addressed care of 8TH FLEET. RYUJO also associated with RABAUl BASE FORCE and was called along with Rabaul Radio by unidentified on 5590 kcs at 0400, 25th. (BEL-250715-TI)

It was stated:

This previously noted in RI Summary 250600/Q August, page 9, items 26 and 27. Item 27 associated the RYUJO with possible Destroyer or Salvage Ship

(Summary, 260600, August, No. 33)

811

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1161

COMCARDIV 2 and ZUIHO placed by D/F in Kyushu Area. Two despatches from ZUIHO indicate she will soon depart Kure Area. ZUIHO repeatedly indicated as not in company HITAKA and HAYATAKA. RYUJO still unit of CARDIV 2 for administration although operating with CARDIV 1. (COM-14-251932-TI)

It was mentioned:

COMCARDIV 2 on 22 August was placed by TI at Kure.  
ZUIHO by D/F on 24 August was at 29 N, 132-30E.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 7)

An estimate of the position of Japanese carriers on this day was contained in the following dispatches:

No. 1162

Association of HOSHO with Kure Navy Yard Drydocks Section and other Kure addressees suggests that vessel at present in Kure Area possibly undergoing overhaul.  
(BEL-250715-TI)

It was noticed:

On 22 August COMCARDIV 2 and HOSHO appeared in heading of a despatch apparently from a unit of CARDIV 2, which indicated HOSHO at Kure.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 8)

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1163

No change in positions of carriers noted. SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, and RYUJO believed in Solomons. HITAKA and HAYATAKA believed Kyushu Area. ZUIHO and HOSEO believed at Kure. No information on KASUGA MARU since 20th.  
(COM-14-251934-TI)

It was noted:

COM14 on 24 August stated KASUGA MARU about to depart Empire for Truk Area.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 9)

It was suggested that aircraft for the Kisaratsu Air Detachment at Kavieng were being transported from the Empire by the NITCHO Maru. Warning was issued that enemy planes were operating on Rekata Bay on the northeast coast of Santa Isabel Island in the Solomons. Seaplanes were also operating at Salamaua.

No. 1164

Comdr Remaining Forces at Kisaratsu Air Station addressed despatch at 2030, 23rd to Commanding Officer Kavieng Base, info NITCHO MARU suggesting aircraft stores for Kisaratsu Air Detachment at Kavieng may be transported from Empire by NITCHO MARU.  
(BEL-250732-TI)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1164 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

TI on 15 August indicated possibility NITCHO MARU in Saipan Area in company with KAMIKAWA MARU and Air Tenders and (Summary, 260600, August, No. 12)

No. 1165

Comdr REKATA Seaplane Base appeared as addressee along with Staff Comm Officer 8TH FLEET in despatch from Staff Comm Officer DESRON 10 at 2215, 24th. Apparently refers to Rekata Bay on Northeast Coast of Ysabel in the Solomons.  
(BEL-250715-TI)  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 28)

No. 1166

Seaplanes operating from Rekata Bay, Sta Isabel Island. This from address in message from Communication Officer DESRON 10, which went to Communication Officers 11TH AIR FLEET, 8TH FLEET, and above address; info to Communication Officers 1ST AIR FLEET, and at 2230, 24th. Latter believed collective for HIEI and KIRISHIMA.  
(COM-14-250814-TI) (MEMO #25-1)

It was commented:

Santa Isabel Island is in the Solomons Islands.  
(Summary, 250600, August, No. 34)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1167

On Aug. 20th,  
"COMMANDER, SOLOMON ISLANDS SEAPLANE  
GROUP", was noted.  
(GW memo 8/25-DI)  
(Summary, 290600, August, No. 35)

No. 1168

EIYEJAWA MARU addressed  
his seaplane units at Salamoia at 1435,  
25th.  
(COM-14-251932-TI)

It was remarked:

has been identified pre-  
viously as KIYOKAWA MARU which on 22  
August was associated with SASEBO #5  
LANDING FORCE shown at Buna.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 38)

An enemy air base was believed to be in opera-  
tion on Gizo Island, and part of the Sixth Air Attack  
Force was believed to be stationed there. The Com-  
mander of the Misawa Air Group was located at Gasmata,  
and an air unit which had been active in the Aleutians  
was now observed at the Yokohama Air Station. It  
was believed that preparations were being made here  
for a movement to the Indies or Malay area.

ORIGINAL

1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1169

Air Unit active in Aleutians until recently now shown at Yokohama Air Station at 1438/23 August addressed message to Commander TOKO AIR Info: Operations Section Naval General Staff Staff Communication Officer 3RD FLEET, 11TH AIR FLEET and AIRRON 21 COMAIRRON 21 is at Sabang and has recently been associated with 3RD FLEET. Current association suggest movement either to Indies or Malay Area after refit in Empire.  
(BEL-250722-TI)

It was observed:

AIR Unit left Kiska on the KAMITSU MARU about August 19.  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 9)

No. 1170

Commander Gizo Base was action addressee in dispatch from Staff Communication Officer AIRRON 26 which was intercepted at 0537/25 August. Association with Air Stations and Units suggests this is an Air Base and part of AIRRON 26 may be based there.  
(BEL-250722-TI)

It was pointed out:

The commander AIRRON 26 is the same as Comdr. 6TH AIR ATTACK FORCE currently believed to be located at Tenian.  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 11)



ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1171

Comdr MISAWA AIR at Gasmata.  
(COM-14-251934-TI)

It was declared:

TI on 15 August indicated Comdr  
MISAWA AIR at Gasmata (?).  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 36)

Japanese ships were watched constantly since their movements provided valuable clues concerning enemy plans. One Maru was en route from Truk to Rabaul with a Commander of a salvage unit aboard, and several other Marus were in the same area, as were some warships acting as escorts.

No. 1172

MARU shifted from Truk  
to Rabaul Communication Zone at  
1900/24 August.  
(BEL-250722-TI)

It was stated:

On 13 August Commander SOUTHERN  
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ordered MAPU  
to proceed to Rabaul. It was believed  
to be at Palao at that time.  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 19)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1173

Commander Salvage Unit  
\_\_\_\_\_ was shown aboard MARU  
\_\_\_\_\_ and associated with Rabaul  
Harbormaster, Staff Communication  
Officer CRUDIV 18 \_\_\_\_\_, WIKZAI  
MARU \_\_\_\_\_ and Truk DEFENSE FORCE  
\_\_\_\_\_ in Operation Type traffic  
originated at 2250/24 August and  
0100/25 August.  
(BEL-250722-TI)  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 20)

No. 1174

SOUYOU MARU \_\_\_\_\_ in Marshalls  
Area. WATSUTA \_\_\_\_\_ at Truk.  
NITCHO MARU \_\_\_\_\_ probably enroute  
Saipan from Yokosuka. SUBDIV  
of SUBRON 1 traffic routed to Saipan.  
Man-of-War \_\_\_\_\_ enroute Yokosuka to  
Jaluit.  
(BEL-250732-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI on August 20 indicated SOUYOU  
MARU \_\_\_\_\_ possibly departing Mar-  
shalls for Kure. TI on 13 August indi-  
cated SUBDIV \_\_\_\_\_ would accompany  
COMSUBRON 1 from Yokosuka to 8TH FLEET  
Area or possibly would follow later.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 15)

No. 1175

Traffic routing and associations  
show TENRYU \_\_\_\_\_ at Rabaul. MARU \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1175 (Cont.)

and Man-of-War \_\_\_\_\_ in  
Rabaul Area. MAUR \_\_\_\_\_ enroute  
Truk to Rabaul.  
(BEL-250732-TI)

It was noticed:

on August 16 was indi-  
cated in Saipan Area by T.I. MARU

on August 14 was indicated  
by TI enroute Rabaul from Yokosuka.

MARU \_\_\_\_\_ was by traffic  
routing and association on 23 August  
in Truk Area.

On August 13 TI indicated uni-  
identified Fleet Ship \_\_\_\_\_ origi-  
nated movement report apparently  
departure from home waters for  
Rabaul.

(Summary, 260600, August, No. 43)

Enemy submarines were very active in the  
Solomon area and the wide dissemination given to their  
dispatches probably indicated that they were engaged  
in scouting operations.

No. 1176

Submarine activity continued  
today with frequent reports.

(COM-14-250606-TI)

(Summary, 251400, August, No. 25)

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1177

Submarines in Solomons Area continue high activity and despatches received wide publicity. Probably engaged in scouting operations.

(COM-14-251932-TI)  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 47)

No. 1178

COMSUBRON 1 located by DF in Area, 10 South, 167 East, was most active with in SUBRON 1, located in Area, 13 South, 157 East, next in volume.

(COM-14-250606-TI)  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 24)

The Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force was believed to be en route to the South Pacific, which would bring the total number of major commanders operating in that vicinity to five.

No. 1179

COMSUBFORCE, by traffic headings, is indicated enroute Solomons Area and place by DF in Area, 04 North, 159 East.

(COM-14-250606-TI)

It was noted:

CINCPAC placed COMSUBFOR as nearing Truk on Aug. 23rd.  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 22)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1180

Indicated arrival of COMSUBFORCE in Rabaul Area will bring list of Major Commands in that Area to: 2ND FLEET, 1ST and 11TH AIR FLEETS, 8TH FLEET, COMSUBFORCE.  
(COM-14-250636-TI)  
(Summary, 251400, August, No. 23)

No. 1181

Traffic for Chief of Staff SUBFORCE was routed to Truk by Tokyo in one instance which is taken as some indication this command also proceeding South from Yokosuka.  
(BEL-250715-TI)

It was indicated:

Previously on 25 August, COMSUBFOR by traffic heading was indicated enroute Solomons Area and placed by D/F in 04N, 159 E.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 25)

No. 1182

COMSUBFORCE using Truk Radio call as cover up.  
(COM-14-251934-TI)

It was commented:

COMSUBFOR on 25 August, by traffic headings, was indicated enroute Solomons Area and placed by D/F in 04 N, 159 E.  
(Summary, 260600, August, No. 26)

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

The summary by the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the United States Pacific Fleet issued on 25 August 1942 stated:

No. 1183

The Battle of the SOLOMONS continues. All contacts received yesterday showed the enemy to be returning to the Northward.

Enemy is using PEKATA BAY on SANTA ISABEL as a seaplane operating area.

CARRIERS

Estimated positions:

SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, RYUJO - Solomon area.

HITAKA, HAYATAKA, ZUIHO - JAPAN? Possibility of having departed 23 August.

HOSHO - - - - - Unknown. JAPAN?

KASUGA MARU - - - - - TRUK area?

SUBMARINES

Submarines are very active in the SOLOMON area, engaged in scouting operations.

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on 25 August 1942 stated as follows:

No. 1184

COMINCH  
COMSFPACFOR

250303 August, 1942

ORIGINAL  
1 December 1944

AUGUST 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1184 (Cont.)

COMSOPACFOR  
COMHAWSEAFRON  
COMNOVESEAFRON  
COMPASEAFRON  
COMWESTSEAFRON  
ALL TASKFORCOMS PAC  
OPNAV  
COMNAVEU

NCR 2518 J

Bulletin No. 162


DESDIV 30 IN RABAU AREA PROBABLY ESCORTING CONVOY. UNITS OF CRUDIVS 5, 6, 7, AND 8 DESRON 10 DESRON 4 MAY BE IN NEW BRITAIN AREA OR PROCEEDING TO THAT AREA. CARRIERS BELIEVED ZUIKAKU RYUJO SHOKAKU CONTACTED SOLOMONS 24TH ZED. ENEMY APPARENTLY ATTEMPTING ATTACK GUADALCANAL AREA. ZUIHO, HIYATAKA AND HITAKA HAVE ALL EAR-MARKS OF DEPARTING JAPAN. POSSIBLY LEFT WITHIN LAST 48 HOURS. DESTINATION UNKNOWN BUT PROBABLY SOUTH. CINC COMBINED AT SEA BETWEEN EMPIRE AND TRUK. 1 DIVISION OF SUBRON 3 ARRIVED KURE FROM SOUTHERN THEATER. KASUGA MARU VICINITY TRUK ENROUTE RABAU.

# SOLOMONS BATTLES



SMALL SCALE  
OPERATIONS  
JAN-FEB, 43

EASTERN SOLOMONS  
AUG. 23, 42



NAVAL AIR ACTIONS  
JAN. 29 - FEB. 7, 43

T.M.B.



**JAP PLANES DESTROYED**  
24 AUG 1942

BY ENTERPRISE FIGHTERS (NIN) 27  
 BY ENTERPRISE VS-8-VTB 2  
 BY ENTERPRISE A A 13  
 BY TASK FORCE N 1A 9  
 BY SARATOGA FIGHTERS (NIN) 18  
**GRAND TOTAL 71**

NOTE THIS TOTAL INCLUDES ALL TYPES -  
 ZERO AND SOME OF THE OTHER PLANE  
 AND SOME OTHER TYPES ON PLANE TO  
 COUNTERACT THE OVERLAPPING CLASH  
 OF SEARCHES AND HITS

TAKU IS

MURUMANU IS

SARATOGA ATTACK  
 FAILED TO INTERCEPT  
 THIS FORCE PM 23  
 RETURNED CAUTIOUS

ONTONG JAWA

RONCADER  
 REEF

RYUGO FORCE HIT  
 BY SARATOGA  
 ATTACK GROUP  
 AT 0002 24 AUG

OCCUPATION FORCE  
 CAPTURED ON AP AND  
 HIT BY SEARCHES  
 AND VS-8 LATER  
 BY 0117 24 AUG 42

CHOISZUL I

KOLOMBANGARA I

SANTA ISABEL I.

AR-JAN

MALAITA I.

GUADALCANAL

SAN CRISTOBAL I.

RENNELL I.

**U.S.S. ENTERPRISE**

TRACK CHART WITH CONTACT AND  
 ATTACK SEQUENCE OFF SOLOMON  
 ISLANDS AUGUST 23-25, 1942

**• LEGEND •**

- JAP TWIN FLOAT MONOPLANE VS0
- JSS- CONTACT WITH JAP SUBMARINE
- TRACK OF USS ENTERPRISE
- LIMITS OF SEARCHES BY VS-8
- RADAR PLOT OF JAP ATTACK GROUPS

ALL TIME IS MINUS 11HR 30 MIN

JAP STRIKING FORCE

STRIKING

STREET

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD

THE AIRFIELD


THE AIRFIELD

JAP STRIKING FORCE

STRIKING FORCE RETIREMENT

CONTACT AND ACTION SEQUENCE

- AT 0800, 81426, 2 CV 4CA 6CA 300, CUB 120, 13A" DIVISION FROM LINE OF BEARING 048 (N, CV), RIGHT PLANK 240000, CV
  - AT 0810, 81426, 4CA 3-500, CUB 100 SP 20K" AND VERY LARGE "CA" THIS CONTACT LEFT PLANK OF 240000, CA
  - AT 1840 "4V42" 1 CV, 3 CA, 200"
  - AT 1840 8175 HIT CV WITH 5-300" BOMBS
  - AT 2120 "18V57" REPORTED UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS IN BAY
  - AT 2130 "18V44" 5 VESSELS CUB 140 SP 20 HOURS VESSEL TO " "
  - AT 0910-25TH UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS (FOR INFO AND)
  - AT 0910-25TH "20V57" 4CA 2CA CUB 020 SP 18, 2CA CUB 200
  - AT 1008-25TH "1CA CUB 000 SP 15A"
  - AT 1135-25TH "18V57" 18A, 2CA, 100, CUB 138 SP 25K"
  - AT 2135-24TH "1 CV PLUS ONE OTHER VESSEL, CUB 100 SP 25K"
  - AT 0155 AND 0205-25TH "CV GROUP 160-15K" (SOME VESSELS)
  - AT 1054-26TH "CARRIERS ----" (NO IDENTIFICATION REPORT)
  - AT 1005-24TH, 8175 "1 CV 2CA CUB 100, SP ----"
  - AT 1440 "71, 76" CV, 2CA, 200, CUB 170 SP 20K" (SOME CV)
  - AT 1510 "21, 27" CV 2CA 200 CUB 100 SP 10K" (SOME CV)
  - AT 1400 SARATOGA ATTACK GROUP BY 8175
  - AT 1645 8-175 REPORT "RYUJO DEAD IN WATER (FROM SARA)"
  - AT 2215-24TH "13V5" ALL 200 SP CUB 100 SP 10K"
  - AT 0905-25TH CONTACT BY 8175, 2CA'S ON FIRE, AND SARA IN 5 MIN
  - AT 1145 "79P, 2CA, 1AP CUB 000 SP 15K"
  - AT 1023-25TH "2CA, 300, 1AP, CUB 100 SP 17K"
  - AT 1230 "CHANGED COURSE TO "N", LOST IN GENERAL
- NOTE: ENT. ATTACK GROUP, 11 VES, 6VTE, CEAR DEPARTED AT 1710, FOR SP 16 INTERCEPT RYUJO FORCE VSB PROCEEDED TO CALTUS, VTB RETURNED TO ENT AND SARA.



Eastern Solomons  
Battle Chart  
(August 23-25  
1942)